Let’s Get Counterinsurgency Right:
Collective Action Theory in Joint Publication 3-24

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF OPERATIONAL ARTS AND SCIENCES

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Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2015
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Abstract

Major military counterinsurgency doctrines of the last century, which are almost exclusively based on practice, avoid references to theories that address the tension between opposing sides for popular participation in insurgency. Failures in current doctrine, to cognate and adhere to one uniform concept of the issue at hand and to present all lessons learned with sufficient evidence establishing them as valid precepts, are caused by a similar failure. *JP 3-24* does not incorporate a theory of rational choice to counter what it presents as the root cause of insurgency: “people support an insurgency because they perceive it is in their best interest.” This paper presents a literature review of relevant current and historical doctrine, conflict theories, and recent research into these theories. Further, this paper suggests a useful addition to current doctrine to improve efforts to capture lessons learned from recent conflicts and prepare commanders for counterinsurgency in future conflicts.
Lessons Learned in Doctrine

Counterinsurgency doctrine has been authored by practitioners of, as Callwell called it in 1906, “small war…said to include all campaigns other than those where opposing sides consist of regular troops.” The struggle for support of the population is increasingly recognized as central to insurgency/counterinsurgency, but major military counterinsurgency doctrines of the last century, which are almost exclusively based on practice, avoid references to theories that address the tension between opposing sides for popular participation in insurgency. Failures in current doctrine, to cognate and adhere to one uniform concept of the issue at hand and to present all lessons learned with sufficient evidence establishing them as valid precepts, are traceable to a single point of failure. *JP 3-24* does not incorporate a theory of rational choice to counter what it presents as the root cause of insurgency: “people support an insurgency because they perceive it is in their best interest.”

Neither currently in vogue nor a proponent of what is currently called “population-centric counterinsurgency,” Colonel C.E. Callwell published his third edition of *Small Wars* in 1906. His experience spanned British efforts from the Afghan and First Boer Wars of 1880-1881, South African War of 1899, and command of a mobile column against the Boers in 1901. Callwell’s *Small Wars* doctrine formulates not an approach that regards the struggle for a population as equally legitimate on both sides of the conflict. Rather, he divides small wars into three campaign classes and categorizes conflicts by the actions of the state-based military: “conquest…suppression of insurrection…and revenge or overthrow of a dangerous enemy.” He further veils the effort of the insurgent force by declaring that “in no two campaigns does the enemy fight in the same fashion.” This statement seems to preclude the possibility of theory development. Callwell does, though, delineate potential end states that regard the contingent...
population once he dispenses his preference for Clausewitzian “decisive victory.”

For example, suppression of a rebellion requires “overawing and not the exasperation of the enemy [as] the end to keep in view.” Callwell fails to understand the implication of his statement: all enemies are sufficiently organized to allow “overawing,” and the mechanisms of organization may be understood.

The United States Marine Corps 1940s *Small Wars Manual* similarly categorizes small wars in terms of the major power’s effort. “The Marine Corps engaged in a particular type of warfare in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua; during the process they developed a common set of responses to the insurgents.” Punitive expeditions, suppression of insurrection, and campaigns of conquest are the categories, though conquest is noted as “contrary to the policy of the Government of the United States.” The phases of a small war, too, were contingent on friendly actions. The manual presents “actual or potential hostiles,” acknowledging the concept of competition for popular support, vulnerable to “judicious application of psychological principles [which] may be just as effective as battle casualties.” Where the manual confronts “recruiting” for revolutionary masses, it presents “the method of approaching the problem” as two-fold, but doesn’t offer a rigorous scientific framework for any understanding of collective action. Though the manual had not been based solely on the Marine Corps experience, the other notable influences in the bibliographies of the authors were doctrine of other services and Callwell.

Roger Trinquier’s *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* is founded in his experiences in three tours in Indochina, post-WWII, where he initiated his study of, as he calls it “modern warfare.” But, his overwhelming influence is that of a commander of the 3rd Colonial Airborne Regiment during the “Challe Plan,” a messy conflict for primacy in Algeria.
between nationalists and colonial France. He holds that the “sine qua non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of the population.” Trinquier fails, however to ascribe humane methods to either side of the conflict. Later in his manuscript, he devolves slightly from his earlier noble goal of “unconditional support,” identifying “control of the populace” as at stake in “modern warfare.” Methods towards victory for the regime include strict population control methods like census cards, used to “keep tabs on each individual” and creation of an oppressive citizens’ brigade to detect, surveil, and arrest “dangerous individuals.” He suggests a counter-intelligence unit, a “bureau of inhabitants’ organization and control,” be created to watch that organization. The insurgents are even more unruly, however, relying primarily on terrorism to “cause the population to vacillate.” While Trinquier seems to agree with previous military doctrines and thought about the aims of “small wars,” he fails to recognize the population as a group of rational actors capable of decisions to support either the regime or the insurgents. His reliance on experience alone blinded him to that possibility.

In 2013, the United States Department of Defense (DOD) revised its Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency to refine its definition of counterinsurgency, introduce “tenets and precepts of counterinsurgency,” “emphasize that understanding grievances is key to addressing root causes of insurgency,” and make several other structural updates. JP 3-24’s refined definitions make two opposing cases for the role of the population. On one hand, “[Counterinsurgency] COIN is a[n]…effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes” and identifies one root cause, “people support an insurgency because they perceive it is in their best interest.” Contrarily, military planners “should not assume the population is a center of gravity.” Translated, this means that the population may not be a “source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of...
action, or will to act”\textsuperscript{24} for an insurgency. Unfortunately, these two presentations seem to at least be in tension, if not in disagreement.

If \textit{JP 3-24}’s new definitions of counterinsurgency seem contradictory, its introduction of “tenets and precepts” further complicates the doctrine’s usefulness. Similar to Callwell, the USMC \textit{Small Wars Manual}, and Trinquier, the new “Precepts for Counterinsurgency” appendix relies on “recent experience” to formulate guidelines for commanders.\textsuperscript{25} These precepts are not compiled leveraging any specific theory to assure logical completeness, removal of context-specific bias, or validity. Strategist Colin Gray describes general theory’s purpose: “to help inoculate politicians and soldiers against capture by inappropriate doctrine derived from another, possibly yesterday’s, ‘present.’”\textsuperscript{26}

A quantitative analysis by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, economists “investigating the causes of civil war,” first presented in 2004 and updated in 2009, is cited in \textit{JP 3-24}.\textsuperscript{27,28} This appears to be an initial attempt by the DOD to incorporate theory into its doctrine. Their study foists the concept of “grievance” into the counterinsurgent’s lexicon, misunderstood even within the well-read social and political science circles from which it springs. Updating definitions and incorporating lessons learned with Collier and Hoeffler’s quantitative analysis into doctrine attempts sound practice in line with Gray. Unfortunately, \textit{JP 3-24}’s authors slipped into the same traps other recent authors have, failing to understand the complexity of the theory’s terminology, acknowledge the inherent weaknesses quantitative studies of conflict theories present, recognize the utility of the concepts as presented, and check its lessons learned against its chosen theory.

\textbf{Grievance with “Grievance”}

Seth Jones wrote, in \textit{The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency}, that “conventional explanations about why insurgencies begin, which center around grievance or greed, do not
 convincingly explain this [Afghanistan, 2001-2007] insurgency.”

His application of the theories of grievance and greed are not consistent with the concepts as presented in *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, by Collier and Hoeffler, authors Jones and *JP 3-24* both cite.

The duo presented “greed and grievance” in 2004 as the potential causes of “civil war” or “rebellion,” with definitions of these phenomena sufficiently similar to *JP 3-24*’s definition of “insurgency.”

“Greed and grievance” as motivations to rebel, however, are more complicated than the attractive alliteration suggests. First, Collier and Hoeffler don’t even like the terms “greed and grievance,” instead preferring “preferences [objective grievances], opportunities [greed], or perceptions [misperceived grievance].” They note, “Greed and misperceived grievance… are observationally equivalent since we cannot observe motives [quantitatively].” So, whatever their findings for greed, misperceived grievance must be viewed as inextricably tied as a source for rebellion.

Second, quantitative analysis requires Collier and Hoeffler to proxy “greed and grievance” with “quantitative indicators of opportunity.” Their study finds six proxies for opportunity [greed] with “substantial” impact on the risk of war. Increases in primary commodity export, diasporas, and dispersed population all increase the risk of conflict.

Male secondary education enrollment, per capita income and the growth rate of the economy are all inversely proportional to risk of conflict. Additionally, the study includes “subventions from hostile governments,” but fails to quantify the concept for successful analysis, which renders the factor still worthy of attributional consideration for civil war onset.

Greed, therefore, contains at least seven independent factors contributing to the risk of war.

Third, Collier and Hoeffler present grievance’s weak predictive capability as problematic at best in 2004. Their 2009 study substantiates that with newly repackaged terminology — “the
primacy of feasibility [opportunity, greed] over motivation [preference, grievance].” They nail the coffin shut to grievance as predictive of rebellion, because “motivation is indeterminate, being supplied by whatever agenda happens to be adopted by the first social entrepreneur to occupy the viable niche.”

Evidence used by Jones to support his case that greed was not a cause of Afghan insurgency, would directly support a contrary claim based soundly in Collier and Hoeffler’s analysis. First, Jones claims only that the “profit-seeking” element of greed failed to contribute to the outbreak of insurgency in Afghanistan in 2001. He successfully discounts the state’s natural resources as a source of opportunity, one of Collier and Hoeffler’s proxies, since Afghanistan is relatively resource constrained. He demonstrates this point further by identifying poppy by-name as not contributing to insurgent opportunity. In fact, this result agrees with Fearon and Laitin’s Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, a work he cites but does not reference in this respect, that primary commodity exports have “no impact” on opportunity for war.

Jones fails to consider the six other proxies of opportunity presented by Collier and Hoeffler, including “donations from diasporas and subventions from hostile governments.” Jones notes the increase in “external support from like-minded jihadists,” which reduced costs of “rebellion-specific capital” like “increasingly sophisticated IEDs.” He also cites information and tactics exchanges and “aid from wealthy Arab donors.” All these are examples of contributions by diaspora to the cause. Additionally, Jones presented subventions from Pakistan as “critical to the onset of insurgency” for its use as sanctuary, as a source of intelligence to the Taliban, as a source of materiel and manpower support, and as lowering the cost of rebellion-specific capital like heavy machine guns and rocket propelled grenades.
Jones did not have the benefit of Collier and Hoeffler’s *Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War* from 2009 that the authors of *JP 3-24* did. The doctrine says on page I-1 that “long-standing external and internal tensions tend … create core grievances…which can result in… insurgency.” Collier and Hoeffler’s analysis favors a “feasibility hypothesis” to “motivation” theories into which grievance is categorized as a predictive model. 54 Nonetheless, *JP 3-24* instructs:

**Grievance-based approaches focus on the motivations that drove the insurgent to take up arms in the first place. Because these approaches target the source of insurgent actions, they have the greatest potential for producing lasting peace.**

– *JP 3-24*, VIII-16

Collier and Hoeffler note “more traditional grievance-based explanation” of rebellion relies on rational motivations and requires either benefits to acquire to a social leader (which Jones effectively refuted) or faces “acute collective action problems.”

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, greed, opportunity, motivation, feasibility, grievance, perceptions, and preferences, all concepts delicately constructed by Collier and Hoeffler, are only quantitatively tested against civil war’s onset. In effect, a “1” is ascribed to any five year internal conflict in which at least 1,000 combat-related deaths per year and a “0” to spans in which it does not. 56 Years of continuing war are “missing.” 57 These concepts were not devised by their creators to endow any better understanding of how insurgencies continue to survive in the face of regime opposition. Certainly, the reasons groups take up arms in the first place is important to understanding the nature of any conflict, but a rigorous theory used to counter an insurgency is going to require the flexibility to address enemy efforts aimed at continuing resistance and war.

**Let’s Get Counterinsurgency Right**
Collier and Hoeffler require grievance-based explanations of rebellion to solve the collective action (CA) problem. The collective action problem addresses the question of “why do people cooperate?” The solutions to this question apply not only to the outset of war, but also to its continuance. Lichbach’s treats solutions to CA as both political and pathological, both of which consider the “What’s next?” question after rebellion begins. He presents four challenges which comprise the problem of “collective action faced by rebellions. First, a rebel’s likelihood of achieving any benefits is low. Second, success and benefits are both largely independent of any individual’s contribution. Third, rebels are interested in many social causes and have many personal demands. Finally, rebellion can be very costly or potentially fatal. Lichbach refers to this collective of CA challenges as The Rebel's Dilemma.

Let’s overlook JP 3-24’s waffling about “centers of gravity” and address that “people support an insurgency because they perceive it is in their best interest.” Immediately, JP 3-24 ties that interest to “the insurgent narrative,” since the doctrine does not incorporate theories of collective action to help commanders better understand the gambit of mechanisms available to the insurgency and the regime (the whole group could be comprised of the Host Nation government, its military, non-governmental agencies, any participating nations’ governments and/or their militaries, etc.). Making that leap is where JP 3-24 derails. It offers no theoretical underpinning for its concept of an “insurgent narrative” and how that actually translates into collective action. Incorporating collective action theories into current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine would be useful. Commanders and staffs would better understand historical examples and “lessons learned” in their appropriate contexts when making doctrinal improvements. Also, military professionals would better anticipate tensions during future conflicts and understand insurgent activities in a current conflict with a baseline framework.
The Rebel’s Dilemma

CA research supposes that people will generally tend to rely on the behavior of others to realize a public good, based on an interpretation of the prisoner’s dilemma that people tend to behave in only their own interest. First, Lichbach notes that many potential dissident groups never form. Where they do form, however, society divides into five groups of increasing involvement in the cause: constituents (comprised of the whole of interested society), sympathizers, members, activists, and militants. He notes that of sympathizers, only five percent will be members, a percentage that holds for member/activist and activist/militant ratios. This phenomenon describes participation for insurgencies and regimes. A necessary corollary to CA’s challenge of individual participation is that it must be extended to organizational cooperation too. Smaller groups should tend to rely on larger groups to secure public goods. The solutions of CA are to organize people or groups in ways that are combinations of “deliberate” (planned or unplanned) and “ontological” (spontaneous or contingent). Market (unplanned, spontaneous), Community (unplanned, contingent), Contract (planned, spontaneous), and Hierarchy (planned, contingent) are the four categories. Graphically, the four categories of solutions are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliberate</th>
<th>Unplanned Order</th>
<th>Planned Order</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td></td>
<td>Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
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Market
According to Lichbach, “Market solutions vary the parameters of the canonical [public good-prisoner’s dilemma] model.” Each one represents a condition an individual will consider when making his/her decision about whether to contribute. The three other solutions, community, contract, and hierarchy categorize the organizations which contextualize market solutions. In effect, the other three describe ways insurgencies can organize. He identifies twelve market solutions for insurgencies to encourage population support, motivate supporters to greater participation, challenge regime authority to represent the people, perpetuate its effort, and ultimately achieve victory. These twelve solutions represent rebel tactics in contention for popular support during an insurgency. The twelve solutions are:

1) Increase Benefits  
2) Lower Costs  
3) Increase Resources  
4) Improve the Productivity of Tactics  
5) Reduce the Supply of a Public Good  
6) Increase the Probability of Making a Difference;  
7) Increase the Probability of Winning  
8) Use Incomplete Information  
9) Increase Risk Taking  
10) Increase Team Competition among Enemies  
11) Restrict Exit  
12) Change the Type of Public Good.

Since popular support is the ultimate prize during an insurgency, these tactics are in tension against regime tactics for the duration of the conflict. For example, as an insurgent organization seeks to reduce the costs associated with insurgency and increase the costs for the regime, the regime will act to the contrary on both points. Tension, therefore, exists against the insurgency’s production function as it does against the regime’s. All twelve aspects of market solutions were contested by the Taliban from 2001 – 2008 as they sought to regain former prominence and control during their insurgency against the Afghan National Government and coalition forces. Collective Action theory is useful in that a commander or staff may quickly attribute new intelligence or information to insurgent actions, remove the context, and understand an insurgency’s motives and prospective results.
“Start-up costs, fixed costs, or sunk costs are the initial investment in Collective Action.” Costs for insurgencies can be reduced in at least two ways to encourage participation. First, as organizational costs are reduced, potential insurgents are more likely to join, since the relative contribution required to join the insurgency will be lower. Those who join early may expect to benefit from seniority or greater draw from future gains, but they also expect to contribute more resources to initiate the effort. The Taliban has organizational roots in the mujahedeen that fought Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s. These forces were seeded with $4-5 billion in funds and supplies funneled through Pakistan’s ISI from the United States Central Intelligence Agency. Even through the summer of 2001, the Taliban were U.S. conscripts in its “war on drugs.”

Another way insurgencies reduce costs and encourage participation of the population is to lower individual costs of participation. One way insurgencies can do this is by shielding supporters from regime reprisals. As part of most counterinsurgencies, regimes criminalize insurgent activities to raise the potential costs of participation in the effort. During the Taliban’s insurgency in 2007, the coalition decided to attack a source of revenue for the Taliban, namely Afghanistan’s poppy crops. Eradication was the regime’s policy from at least 2005, if not intermittently since 2002. An Afghan farmer however praised, “The Taliban tell us ‘as long as we are here, no one can destroy your poppy’…The government cannot come here now.” Farmers who were previously only constituents or sympathizers are shown in the “contract” section to become activists.

Similarly, the Taliban also sought to reduce the costs of insurgency to the lowest echelons of already active members. Leaders set operating guidelines that required field commanders to equally distribute captured weapons amongst the insurgents, while the tendency
otherwise might have been to sell the weapons and pocket profits. Taliban members who experience fair sharing of expensive weapons are more likely to increase participation from “activist” to “militant,” since the member will suffer fewer burdens in making the transition.

Insurgent leaders actively manage market forces to their advantage as they seek popular support, because the population decides whether or not to participate based on market conditions. Regimes must do the same, because an insurgency would quickly overrun a regime not actively countering rebel market-shaping efforts. Regimes must either create tension against insurgent efforts to control an aspect of the market or overwhelm one insurgent effort through advances in other market solutions to the regime’s favor. Weak and/or failing regimes struggle to counter insurgencies, where they fail to create tension against rebel market solutions. As weak regimes fail to influence market dynamics to encourage its population’s support, small insurgent market-shaping efforts experience greater success. In the zero-sum game of collective action, in which individuals’ decisions of whether to support a weak/failing state or an insurgency is be have a lower threshold bar to clear on perceptions of each’s capacity for shaping market solutions, insurgencies thrive.

Community

A community is a network across which market solutions to realizing popular support may be shared. Common knowledge and common values are the two mechanisms that enable a community’s market solutions to the CA problem. Community beliefs, or common knowledge, manifest as shared behaviors that may be exploited by insurgents to encourage participation and support. For example, perceptions of an insurgency’s higher probability of winning are shared more widely amongst society as successes are enjoyed by network affiliates and communicated
through a community versus successes enjoyed by disconnected groups. The community, therefore, will enjoy greater numbers of more deeply involved constituents.

In Afghanistan from 2003-2008, tribes were largely seen to dominate culture in mountainous areas, whereas religious networks (Deobandi) dominated the plains. Common knowledge affects both of these social orders and the insurgencies they prosecute. Generally, insurgent efforts in the tribe-dominated mountainous terrain are “less virulent” than those in the plains. This could be construed as a result of the relative difficulty of movement, presentation of fewer regime targets, or that resource demands on inhabitants to sustain life in the mountains leaves room for little else. However, Jalaluddin Haqqani created a community of madrasas in the mountains that bucks this trend. The Haqqani network of madrasas “was able to maintain a relatively high degree of violence” more comparable to that seen in the religiously-networked plains through the fighting season of 2006 in Afghanistan’s Paktia Province’s mountainous terrain. Tribal leaders were not.

What the Haqqani network’s success demonstrates is something of a ripple effect, or spatial diffusion, of violence through a community. The clergy represent “often the only supra-communitarian network” in Afghanistan across difficult terrain, great distances between rural communities without transportation infrastructure, and limited communications networks. Haqqani violence overcame terrain difficulties to spread greater violence than tribal efforts through tighter community communication. Lichbach’s concept of spatial diffusion of insurgency applies to the Haqqani network of madrasas in Paktia Province and explains the virulent effort in the mountains, since his religious community was able to share common knowledge.
The implications of this understanding are two-fold. First, the regime could target the
Taliban’s market solution in this case to reduce the violence, if that market solution can be
determined. Again, hypothesizing that one insurgent market solution was to restrict exit of young
men by limiting educational opportunities to mountain populations to Haqqani madrasas,
construction of regime-affiliated or tribe-affiliated schools would undermine the insurgent
solution. Second, the regime could target the network or its processes to confront the Taliban’s
community solution to CA. This would serve to reduce the violence across the network, but not
necessarily at any given node as fractured communities persist.

Community solutions to participation in the Taliban’s insurgency were also based on
common values. Two mechanisms are theorized for the common values solution to CA, “other-
System”\textsuperscript{80} in Afghanistan from 2006 – 2008. He describes seven elements to the system, three of
which are in Afghanistan: “full-timers, local guerrillas, and village cells.”\textsuperscript{81} The local guerrillas
sourced from Waziristan came two per family at the direction of the tribal leaders.

This is an example of other-regardingness from Lichbach’s description of CA solved by
common values. The guerrillas from this Waziristan tribe fight not for pecuniary self-interest, as
part of any exchange of service for service, or simply because they were told to do so. The local
guerrilla’s motivation to join the Taliban effort was for “tribal and local identity…tribal
solidarity.”\textsuperscript{82} Other factors, from market or contract solutions, may also accumulate to individual
fighters such as “a desire for revenge…from the loss of relatives…and destruction of property
through ‘collateral damage’” or “fear of retaliation if they fail to support the Taliban.”\textsuperscript{83}
However, the Mahsuds in Waziristan, described by Killcullen as “legendarily well-organized, dangerous, and cohesive” self-organized and fought from a sense of tribal loyalty.\textsuperscript{84}

The Pashtun tribal youth just outside of North Waziristan in Banu, in the North West Frontier Provinces along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, participated in radical movements for “process orientation” reasons. Process orientation means that an individual participates because he or she values the process of insurgency in itself, not necessarily for a material benefit. The value may be ascribed to an entertainment value, that participation mirrors others’ behaviors in the community, or that the costs of joining are perceived as benefits. Many more processes are valid, as well. Banu youth did not receive a sense of “peace, income, or a sense of purpose” from their tribal affiliation, because the power of tribal elders had been brought into question in the wake of perpetual military, regime strongman, and police actions.\textsuperscript{85} Taliban militants intervened in Baku to administer justice and restore order. Families who sought to diversify their sources of influence beyond their tribal affiliation sent their sons to Pakistani madrasas. Upon return to Baku, joining the Pakistani Taliban was a self-actualizing process for those youth who wanted to “harness their potential,” according to Imran Gul of the Sustainable Participation Development Program, a non-governmental organization operating in the region.\textsuperscript{86, 87}

**Contract**

Describing the ways in which an insurgency will attempt to foster public support and encourage participation in the insurgency, \textit{JP 3-24} makes no mention that an insurgency may use contracts. Lichbach discusses three forms of contracts that insurgents use to further their cause: self-government, tit-for-tat, and mutual exchange agreements.\textsuperscript{88} He also describes the conditions in which contracts are more likely to derive the desired participation from the population.
Several conditions encourage successful contracts with the population in support of insurgent causes. All of these conditions relate directly to the transaction costs of contracts. Longevity of a cause reduces the discount rate of activities in the present over the future. Causes with deadlines act in greater haste. Similarly, homogenous groups, groups with autonomy, stability, and groups in close proximity to another all enjoy lower transaction costs. Finally, groups enjoying pre-existing organization reduce transaction costs, like the Taliban did in 2002, after the U.S.’s initial invasion into Afghanistan decimated their structure.

Little is known about the initial calls to arms in 2002 of the greatly reduced Taliban’s leaders that had been pushed into hiding, into Pakistan or both. Giustozzi notes, however, that little progress had been made by late summer 2002, since many former Taliban waited in their villages claiming pro-government, sometimes even pro-American allegiances. The former fighters were too disparate to mount a credible, forceful counterattack absent more favorable market conditions. Deobandism had homogenized the young Afghanistan Muslim clergy. With difficult terrain, great distances between rural communities without transportation infrastructure, and limited communications networks, the clergy represent “often the only supra-communitarian network” in Afghanistan. Not only would the clergy be able to broker political alliances and foster communication between widely separated insurgents, each madrasa was an autonomous group capable of mobilizing its own supporters on demand. By 2006, clergy in Zabul, Helmand, Ghazni, Paktika, and Kandahar Provinces all supported the Taliban. From 2002 to 2006, Giustozzi estimates that the Taliban quadrupled in size, from 4,000 to 17,000 active participants.

The three types of contracts are easily understood. Self-governance of sub-organizations within an insurgency allows smaller units to infiltrate communities and leverage market solutions
more readily to influence participation thanks to flexibility of rule. Tit-for-tat arrangements between insurgents and potential supporters are agreements assuring that their participation will be met with same kind participation by others. Finally, mutual exchange agreements were used by the Taliban in 2006 to resource the insurgency from an unlikely source.

In April 2001, Osama Bin Laden praised Mullah Omar, the Taliban Supreme Commander, for his “great Islamic decisions…the prohibition of growing opium.” In 2001, the Taliban had eviscerated what had been the world’s largest poppy crop in less than a year. The crop was viewed by the Taliban as contrary to “Islamic prohibitions against drugs.” State Department, James P. Callahan, director of Asian affairs at the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, said that the Taliban, framing their opposition to the crop in religious terms, threatened farmers not in compliance of the ban with prison. This is a market solution (raising the cost of rebellion) to the problem of drug cultivation when the Taliban was, in effect, the regime in Afghanistan. Fast-forward five years to 2006 and the Taliban “appear to have offered protection to the farmers targeted by eradication.”

This apparently stunning reversal of a deep religious conviction can only be fully understood by conflating two solutions to “the Rebel’s Dilemma.” The farmers had resources that the Taliban desperately needed to continue the insurgency in 2006. The farmers could offer the Taliban trucks, motorcycles, and safe lodgment in exchange for security against U.S. eradication efforts. Mutual “exchange of favors” would benefit both sides and require little enforcement from either side. Farmers without crops have little ability to continue support of an insurgency and insurgents without modes of transportation cannot offer effective security. The second explanation for the Taliban’s remarkable reversal has its roots in the U.S.’s initial invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the final category of solutions to the Rebel’s Dilemma.
Hierarchy

In 2001, following the Taliban’s great defeat by U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Mullah Omar issued a call to determine the extent of damage to his ranks and concentrate power. Further, he reorganized the Taliban, directed recruiting of young people from religious schools, identified new leaders, those still alive from his decimated organization, and completely remade the Taliban into an organization which western reporters dubbed “The Neo-Taliban.” While Ted Gurr, a well-known political scientist and author of the award-winning Why Men Rebel notes “There is no precise correspondence between the existence of leadership and the development of massive political violence,” pre-existing organizations external to the insurgency can reduce the effort’s costs. Extending this argument to the organization itself, where an organization pre-exists the insurgency, several factors can make the insurgency more effective. Re-organization around a consolidated groups of older leaders and a much younger and more aggressive group of subordinate leaders allowed the Taliban to alter the public goods sought (eradication of poppy) and create contracts with the farmers for mutual cooperation (security for trucks). Along with reorganization, “imposing monitoring and enforcing agreements” makes hierarchy a necessity for some contract solutions. “Locating principles or patrons” is important to create relationships with powerful disparate supporters and secure material support. The Taliban leveraged the final two strengths of hierarchy solutions, “locate agents or entrepreneurs” and “increase team competition among allies,” to strengthen its ranks.

Entrepreneurs are leaders for the insurgency that might fill many roles. Lichbach lists several: theorists, agitators, idealists, propagandists, organizers, and administrators. The Taliban, in late 2001-early 2002, badly needed to regroup and reorganize. The core of the “old” Taliban counted heads and Mullah Omar dispatched Mulas Dadullah and Sadiq Hameed to
recruit from Baluchistan and Karachi and a third trusted agent, Hafiz Majeed, to secure support among tribal leaders, or principals. Had this trio not re-invigorated the still hiding middle managers of the Taliban in their home villages, had Dadullah and Sadiq Hameed failed, the “old” Taliban might have fizzled completely out in the mountains of Pakistan. Mullah Omar knowing the strengths of his agents, however, succeeded in bringing about the rise of the Neo-Taliban, and by 2006 had reconstituted the Taliban’s capacity to launch large-scale attacks. Several later events present scenarios of debatable entrepreneurship for the Taliban. The group Jami’at-i Khudam-ul Koran seceded from the Taliban in 2002 and attempted in 2004 to negotiate a political settlement on its own behalf. The group had fractured further however, and rather severely, such that any negotiation was seen as meaningless. This may have been an attempt by Mullah Omar to secure a political solution, but intentions are not easily teased from evidence.

In market solutions, popular participation is encouraged as the insurgency is challenged by external forces. Mullah Omar waged a similar ploy against his own organization, pitting members and sub-organizations in controlled competition to strengthen his insurgency. Lichbach identifies this ploy as “Increasing Team Competition among Allies.” Mullah Omar keeps his middle manager commanders from achieving prominence within tribes or larger areas via frequent moves and forced reconstitution (paid vacation). This has at least three desired effects. First, no single commander can accumulate sufficient following to unexpectedly rise in power or stature amongst his forces. Second, commanders must continually innovate to maintain control over the forces with which they are charged, since on-the-job training for middle managers in the Taliban is not heavily resourced. Third, intra-group rivalries, sub-tribal rifts and power struggles are exacerbated by these small groups always vying for primacy. These group rivalries stoke passions and skirmishes that draw the neutral population into active support. For example, in
Khas Uruzgan, the Alizai and Matakzai sub-tribes compete for dominance. These relationships and rivalries are “directed and monitored from Pakistan by what is known as the Quetta *shura*.” The Taliban, therefore, increases sub-group allegiances (community), encourages moderates to greater participation, increases innovation (improves tactics), and strengthens bonds of contracts by realizing their mutual benefits.

**So, How Do I Get Out of This Context?**

Joint Doctrine offers military professionals many different theoretical frameworks to inform comprehensive efforts. For example, *JP 5-0: Joint Operation Planning* says “the team can use a PMESII analytical framework to better understand the operational environment, a concept central to military plans.” This model helps military planners quickly receive information, categorize it, understand its nature, and place it within a context of the current conflict to better inform commanders of shifting circumstances. Without this mechanism, commanders and staffs would not have the tools necessary to manage the intelligence and information tidal wave our current collection systems now enable. Lichbach’s four solutions to collective action is a theoretical framework in the same vein. Information about insurgent’s actions may be ascribed meaning as part of an insurgent organization’s efforts rather than in the conflict’s context as it is understood within Lichbach’s framework.

Military commanders and staffs are currently falsely limited by *JP 3-24*. The doctrine says, “the strength and success of an insurgency depends…on the credibility of the insurgent narrative.” The narrative links “conditions-based grievances” to the regime and tries to “create self-reinforcing narratives about which side is most likely to win.” Linking conditions-based grievances to the regime is an element of the “change the type of public good” that emphasizes “public bads” imposed by the regime in CA theory. Similarly, CA’s “Increase the Probability
of Winning” predicts that as the population’s expectations of victory increase, so too does its participation, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of success. So, while both of these elements are part of the CA model, they represent just one-sixth of the possible solutions to CA. JP 3-24’s current effort to address the challenge of collective action, the “insurgent narrative,” incorporates neither the full range of market solutions nor the institutions insurgencies use to employ them from theories of collective action. Improving JP 3-24 by adding collective action theory would solve this problem.

**Improving Theory with Lessons Learned and Vice Versa**

Einstein improved on Newton’s theory of gravity when he devised his theory of relativity. Theories improved through theoretical work. Observational scientists pursued ever more precise methods to observe his predictions and succeeded. Theories led practice. However, in extrapolating his general relativity theories to the field of cosmology, he included a constant to account for his presumption that the universe is static. Hubble, among other observational scientists (practitioners), was able to demonstrate Einstein’s false reliance on a preconceived bias based on direct observations. Practice improved theory.

*JP 3-24* presents 25 “Precepts for Counterinsurgency…taken from recent experience” in an appendix. Lessons like these are invaluable to military practitioners as they seek to avoid the mistakes of previous conflicts. However, just as theory led practice in the case of the introduction of the theories of relativity, these precepts should be validated by CA theory to avoid creating traps in doctrine for future commanders, as Gray forewarns. Further, military practitioners may leverage CA theory to determine which lessons have not yet been extracted from recent experience to better inform authors of doctrine. CA theory, too, should stand up to the observations of practitioners. In Appendix B, the 25 Precepts for Counterinsurgency are
charted against the market solution or enabling order, as applicable. Three discoveries are noteworthy. First, every “Lesson learned” readily maps to Lichbach’s presentation of solutions to collective action.

Second, two of the precepts can be considered for update to remove context specific to Afghanistan culture. In the precept “Support justice and honor,”117 the Community-driven, “process orientation” solution to CA, in theory, requires only that “if one had a process, rather than pecuniary, orientation to…rebellion, he or she could be a willing participant.”118 Here, *JP 3-24* suggests that the commander consider only the justice and honor process motivations other than pecuniary, an unnecessary constraint. This may be a thread common to most societies; however, other processes may be more prominent within a culture. It may, therefore, be more advantageous to direct commanders to determine the process which will most strongly compel the population to mobilize in support of the regime. In the precept, “Make the people choose,” the market solution “Restrict Exit” informs that dissidents may abandon their efforts given the opportunity to withdraw. Similarly, Sun Tzu’s theory says, “When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.”119 Both texts drive to the same destination, avoid fighting where it is not necessary. Also, constituents will remain constituents indefinitely, not increase participation, until market conditions change to favor one side. A suggested, updated theme: “Make the people want to support the regime.”

Third, Lichbach’s institutions (community, contract, and hierarchy) are underrepresented throughout *JP 3-24*, notably in the “Precepts” section. The concepts of hierarchy, community, and contract are certainly embedded in the text of the document. Unfortunately, the institutions are not attributed the ability to impose, enforce, and monitor market solutions nor are they collectively recognized. In particular, descriptions of contract solutions to collective action in
Afghanistan seem to get rough reviews for of two context-specific reasons: the characters with whom the US attempted contracts and that the US, not the host nation government, employed them. Better precepts for institutional employment of market solutions, namely community, contract, and hierarchy, might better prepare our doctrine for the next insurgency.

Finally, more precepts might be sought from recent experience. Tension exists in each market solution, of which there are twelve. Applying the twelve concepts, described in Appendix A, to recent experience would yield at least 24 precepts alone. Many more exist since each market solution is woven by Lichbach as a fibrous rope of many efforts, not just one. Further, precepts may also be derived considering all of the organizational constructs available to insurgencies. Several have been captured, some may have been missed. Again, JP 3-24 presents 25 with no impetus to compel further reflection.

**The Way Forward**

*Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency* requires revision. Chapter II must incorporate Lichbach’s solutions to collective action to remain consistent with the sources the doctrine cites. Tactical precepts from war must be validated against at least one theory specifically chosen for its relative risk or they should not be considered. Comparison must be accomplished to remove unnecessary context from the precepts. Removing context will make them more valuable in future conflict. Also, comparison would validate precepts against a standard that may be reviewed, updated, and approved. Otherwise, valuable precepts are destined to be replaced by bad habits defined as principles in the future. Finally, at least a summary of collective action’s market solutions, similar to Appendix A presented here, should be added as a reference for commanders and staffs. Better yet, also including a similar summary of organizational mechanisms an insurgency will employ to contextualize its solutions would afford planners better insights into how to interrupt an insurgency’s operational processes. The condensed list
should direct further study while outlining theoretical concepts valuable to planners as tools for understanding insurgent lines of effort. Incorporating collective action theories into JP 3-24 will make the document more cohesive. It will provide commanders and staffs relevant, usable cognitive tools for understanding insurgent activities and removing them from context to predict potential outcomes in current and future conflicts.
Appendix A

Twelve Market Tensions from Collective Action Theory:

Insurgencies and regimes shape market conditions for popular support in twelve ways, some potentially unwittingly, to encourage active and/or passive public support. No one element is overpowering; market shifts are cumulative.

*Market solutions* represent spontaneous and unplanned orders. People come together to serve individual interests and based on perceptions of circumstances, not with intent. Economics theory’s invisible hand is at work.

1. Increase Benefits: The greater the intensity of a person’s demands, the greater his participation:
   a. Insurgents attempt to create zealots by promoting an ethos, a vision of the future, or moral code… focusing on the pleasures, rather than the travails of the struggle.
   b. Regimes must interrupt the causes of zealotry by disseminating an alternative ideology and improving individual personal experiences (or at least by minimizing the negative).

2. Lower Costs: Insurgents must reduce both opportunity cost and fixed costs when organizing:
   a. Insurgents grow their organization (larger insurgent efforts benefit from lower individual costs of participation), reduce costs of government repression of participants (shielding recruits from government costs of participation in outlawed activity), subsidize participation, and limit organizational costs of recruiting (by
leverage no-cost activities like public gatherings and religious meetings and by holding meetings at places of work or neighborhood/community centers.)

b. Regimes raise the costs of insurgencies by interrupting night operations (forcing insurgencies to operate by day increases opportunity costs of lost wages), operating persistently (increasing time demands on insurgent organizations), leveraging holidays or leisure periods (“an opportunity cost that people are loathe to pay”\(^\text{124}\)), balancing government reprisals (limiting the opportunity for insurgents to reduce recruits’ costs, while still repressing insurgents by outlawing their activities), separating insurgents from the population (increasing insurgent organization costs of recruitment\(^\text{125}\)), and increasing participation in regime-sponsored no/low cost activities (e.g. voting).

3. Increase Resources: Insurgencies with greater supplies are able to sustain greater rebellion.\(^\text{126}\)

   a. Insurgent resources are individual and group-based. Individual resources are training, time, and energy for effort. Group-based resources are financing, arms, equipment, training facilities, and training information (like manuals, experience, and know-how).\(^\text{127}\) Conflict-specific resources, like ammunition, weapons, and training information, are the most valuable to an insurgency due to their scarcity.

   b. Regimes must protect their own conflict specific resources. Reducing insurgent resources at the source end of the supply chain is more effective than at the delivery/use end, when insurgencies operate via de-centralized organizations.

4. Increase Productivity of Tactics: Insurgents seek the most favorable benefit/cost ratio in tactics\(^\text{128}\)

26
a. An insurgency’s production function represents how well tactics translate resources into effects. A target’s value (publicity, resource, legitimacy, and inherent or cultural values are all cumulative), relative security, and its arena (political, private, public) reflect the intended audience(s) (the state, general public, potential dissidents, and/or victims). New tactics (adaptation) increase benefits or decrease costs.

b. Regimes limiting violence used in retaliation limit the violence necessary for insurgent’s self-defense and reduce the production value of insurgent activity by eliminating a potential new issue. Increased defense of the general public, potential recruits and victims impose higher production costs on insurgencies. Limiting any technology used for any tactic of the insurgency limits the modes of attack available to the effort, restricting innovation altogether.

5. Reduce the Supply of a Public Good: Public goods reduced by insurgents require regime accommodation or refusal; failure to frame the regime’s response will belie legitimacy.129

   a. Insurgencies will restrict the availability of goods that the public demands, for example security or water supply, increasing the likelihood that the public will join the revolt to demand its supply by the regime.

   b. Regimes must carefully weigh the Public Good at issue and whether supply of it in opposition to the insurgency is beneficial to the regime in context. Not all accommodations will tilt the balance of favor to the regime or be seen as anything but a response that encourages more demands. Similarly, goods reduced by the insurgency may be publicized as such.
6. Increase the Probability of Winning: Unique from the bandwagon effect, causes perceived as likely to win are causes worth supporting as participants can increasingly expect benefits from support.¹³⁰ Both insurgents and regime should message biased, self-serving appraisals, since legitimacy follows, it does not lead, success.
   a. Insurgents must communicate early, dramatic victories and emphasize their swelling ranks to spur membership. Dissent among regime supporters and regime inefficiencies and ineffectiveness are emphasized. Here, just the probability of foreign support, not its realization, is valuable.
   b. Perpetuating messages of insurgent futility and frustration, regime commitment, flexibility, and strength, and recent and large successes supports the regime.

7. Increase the Probability of Making a Difference: Insurgents frame individual contributions to victory.¹³¹
   a. Insurgencies perpetuate five messages: 1) Each member is needed; 2) Each with a unique attribute provides essential contribution; 3) Each contribution is unique; 4) Each member adds something; 5) Each contribution effects all other contributions.¹³²
   b. Regime messages should contradict these themes as they appear.

8. Use Incomplete Information: Opponents struggle to control information received by public. Language and terms have cultural importance. Greater volumes of information render “true” and “false” cognitions in the public.¹³³
   a. Insurgents leverage illusions relating to all previous factors, emphasizing desired perceptions and altering public consciousness and cognition. Ideology, essential
to an insurgency’s success, criticizes the regime’s order, creates scapegoats, and provides vision.

b. Regimes must use propaganda to counter ideas of an insurgent’s vision, validate its own order, educate the populace of societal norms, insure compliance, and reinforce the desired messages from all previous elements as well.

9. Increase Risk Taking: Focus on pooling certain individuals towards diverse activities

a. Insurgents guide risk prone individuals towards riskier activities, which it ranks according to risk/reward understanding.

b. Regimes can coopt and reintegrate risk prone individuals, the wealthy, independent, and unsuccessful, into society.

10. Increase Team Competition among Enemies: Divisive conflict mobilizes people.¹³⁴

a. Insurgents build group consciousness and spur innovation through competition with other groups. Conflict within a society encourages conflict from more within that society as more general politicization causes social forces to defend their positions.

b. Regimes must understand the nature of the resource in contest for inter-group conflicts. Conflict for zero-sum gain may result in increased costs for both groups, however, conflict rarely takes place in a context where no additional resources may mobilize that otherwise would have remained neutral.

11. Restrict Exit: Constraining the population’s choice to us or them decisions encourages participation.
a. Insurgencies restrict options for the population to increase the likelihood of participation. A person that may withdraw from conflict has less incentive to participate in it, especially if it may be costly.

b. Regimes may decrease participation in insurgencies if viable options are presented to the constituents. Emigration, refuge, and withdrawal to another part of the country are each viable actions that might replace insurgency.

12. Change the Type of Public Good: Seeking public bad prevention (i.e. grievances) or non-trivial goods are goals for which more people are willing to join causes.

a. Insurgents may shift the final aims of their efforts in order to attract new support from the population. Seeking reparation of a public bad instead of a public good is typically more mobilizing. So too, groups seeking non-trivial public goods, or those that do not diminish as they are shared, do not suffer from competition among peers for the good.

b. Regimes may benefit from an insurgency’s new aims in that some members may become alienated from the original group. Regimes that are able to successfully reintegrate disaffected former members of an insurgency, or at least compel them to neutrality, can counteract this insurgent attempt to grow. This might also have the added benefit of increasing costs to the insurgency.

Note: (This section will be expanded to include institutions of Collective Action immediately upon request for further consideration)
### Appendix B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precepts for Counterinsurgency, condensed (JP 3-24, D1-D3)</th>
<th>CA Theory – (Lichbach)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Help US or Hurt Enemy: CA Solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Secure and serve the population.</td>
<td>Enemy: Reduce the Supply of a Common Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Live with the people.</td>
<td>US: Common Knowledge, Simultaneous Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Pursue the enemy relentlessly.</td>
<td>Enemy: Increase the Probability of Winning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Fight hard and fight with discipline.</td>
<td>Enemy: Lower the Costs of Rebellion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Identify, confront corrupt officials</td>
<td>Enemy: Locate Agents or Entrepreneurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Hold what is secured.</td>
<td>US: Common Knowledge, Sequential Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Money is an important tool…</td>
<td>US: Increase Resources for Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Build relationships.</td>
<td>US: Locate Principals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Walk. Stop by, don’t drive by.</td>
<td>US: Increase the Probability of Winning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Act as one team.</td>
<td>Enemy: Increase Team Competition between Enemies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Live, eat, train…operate together.</td>
<td>Enemy: Increase Team Competition between Enemies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Promote local reintegration.</td>
<td>Enemy: Common Knowledge, Simultaneous Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Be first with the truth.</td>
<td>Enemy: Use Incomplete Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Fight the information war...</td>
<td>US: Change the Type of Public Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Live our values.</td>
<td>Enemy: Use Incomplete Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Win the battle of wits.</td>
<td>US: Improve the Productivity of Tactics</td>
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<td>---------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>22. Exercise initiative.</td>
<td>Enemy: Improve the Productivity of Tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Integrate civilian-military teams.</td>
<td>Enemy: Increase Team Competition between Enemies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Fight for intelligence</td>
<td>US: Improve the Productivity of Tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Make the people choose.</td>
<td>US: Restrict Exit *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - Indicates a “Lesson Learned” that requires amendment

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)

2. Callwell, 21.
5. Callwell, vi.
7. Callwell, 37.
8. Callwell, 42.
10. SWM, 1-2.
11. The five phases, abbreviated, are: Initial Landing, Re-enforcements, Assumption of control of government, Policing, and Withdrawal. Source: SWM, 1-5.
12. SWM, 19.
13. “The method of approaching the problem should be to make revolutionary acts nonpaying or non-beneficial and at the same time endeavor to remove or remedy the causes or conditions responsible for the revolution. One obstacle in dealing with a revolution lies in the difficulty of determining the real cause of the trouble. When found, it is often disclosed as a minor fault of the simplest nature. Then the remedies are also simple.” Source: SWM, 22.
15. Trinquier, xii-xv
16. Trinquier, 8.
17. Trinquier, 29.
18. Trinquier, 32.
20. Trinquier, 17.
23. JP 3-24, I-3
25. JP 3-24, D-1
26. Gray, 42.
28. 3-24, E-3.
37. The end of the Cold War is used as a proxy for rebel finance from hostile government, because “During the Cold War each great power supported rebellions in countries allied to the opposing power.” Their quantitative representation relies on an assumption that governments of the United States, Soviet Union, or Russia have been the only governments to finance conflict in other nations, albeit at times through other nations. Source: Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, 568-569.
38. This assumption is contested by Jeremy Weinstein’s *Inside Rebellion*, cited in 3-24 also: “Many are right to point out variation in the characteristics of civil war and its perpetrators, but to explain this variation in terms of Cold War and post-Cold War dynamics is simplistic, theoretically insatisfying, and empirically wrong.” Source: Weinstein, 19.
39. “Most proxies for grievance were insignificant, [but]… the risk of conflict is proportional to a country's population... [and] both opportunities and grievances increase with population” They conclude that “the grievances that motivate rebels may be substantially disconnected from the large social concerns of inequality, political rights, and ethnic or religious identity,” phenomena most easily represented quantitatively. Source: Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, 588-589.
40. Collier and Hoeffler, 2009, 20
42. Fearon and Laitin, 76.
44. Jones, 35.
46. Jones, 35.
47. Jones, 35.
51. Jones, 32.
52. Jones, 32.
53. Jones, 32.
58. Politics: “Revolution is a two-step process.” (pg. 255) First, achieve cooperation with individuals to create the insurgent group. Then, form coalitions of groups to challenge the organization of the regime. Pathology: “Under what conditions are the intended consequences of dissident organization achieved?” (pg. 261) This question brings the concept of continuing struggle implicitly. Source: Lichbach, 247-275.
59. Lichbach, 7.
60. JP 3-24, I-2 to I-3.
61. Lichbach, 15.
62. Lichbach, 17.
63. Lichbach, 21.
64. Lichbach, 35.
65. Lichbach, 35-110.
66. Lichbach, 45.
67. Lichbach, 45
68. Rashid, 48.
69. Jones also notes that the Saudis also matched these contributions. Source: Jones, 37.
70. Crews, 6.
71. Giustozzi, 86.
72. Crews, 1.
73. Giustozzi, 84.
74. Lichbach, 111.
75. Trives, 89-100.
76. Giustozzi, 53.
77. Lichbach, 118.
78. Giustozzi, 44.
79. Lichbach, 121.
81. Kilcullen, 83.
82. Kilcullen, 85.
83. Kilcullen, 85.
84. Kilcullen, 85.
85. Giustozzi, 39.
86. Giustozzi, 40.
87. Giustozzi, 39.
88. Lichbach, 129.
89. Lichbach, 135.
90. Lichbach, 138-165.
91. Giustozzi, 39-44.
92. Giustozzi, 44.
93. Giustozzi, 44.
94. Giustozzi, 35.
95. Crew, 50.
96. Crossette, 1.
97. Crossette, 1.
98. Giustozzi, 87.
100. Ansari, 1.
101. Gurr, 291.
102. Lichbach, 167.
103. Lichbach, 168.
104. Giustozzi, 37.
105. Riedel, 1.
106. Giustozzi, 82.
107. Lichbach, 201.
108. Van Bijlert, Unruly, 156.
109. van Bijlert, Battle, 1.
110. “In analyzing the current and future operational environment, the team can use a political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) analytical framework to analyze the operational environment and determine relevant and critical relationships between the various actors and aspects of the operational environment.” Source: JP 5-0, III-9 to III-10.
111. JP 3-24, II-10.
114. Lichbach, 62.
115. JP 3-24, D-1
116. Gray, 42.
117. JP 3-24, D-1.
118. Lichbach, 121.
119. Giles, 82.
120. Lichbach, 36.
121. Lichbach, 37.
122. Lichbach, 37.
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125. Lichbach, 22.
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128. Lichbach, 50.
129. Lichbach, 62.
130. Lichbach, 62.
131. Lichbach, 82.
132. Lichbach, 85.
133. Lichbach, 96.
134. Lichbach, 99.
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