JUST WAR AND POSTMODERN WARFARE: A GERMAN CASE STUDY

by


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When the smoke clears from the next big war, will the United States and its allies have chosen the right path? Recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have unveiled a new kind of warfare, demanding a deeper understanding of context and cultural sensitivity. Adversaries, more empowered and less apparent, are searching for creative ways to exploit blind spots. While the United States reels from recent conflicts and searches for ways to integrate lessons-learned into its conventional warfare construct, Germany is shaping a military concept based on recent conflicts and unfettered by biases of conventional strategies, organizations, and doctrine. The United States military is the lead in combat force and kinetic effects; whereas, the value of Germany’s untested military approach in contemporary warfare, remains to be seen. Germany garnered significant negative press when the country decided not to provide direct support to Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya. After much deliberation, Germany decided to refrain from direct intervention in a scenario where the extent of military action in Libya was unknown and the consequences unclear. Though many have criticized Germany’s lack of solidarity with the multilateral mission, there is something to be said for Germany’s measured approach to foreign affairs. According to Jonas Wolff, there are two schools of thought regarding the promotion of democracy: (1) a democratic mission, which takes a coercive approach that demands adherence to explicit democratic values through tough sanctions and exclusionary tactics or by applying democratic assistance only to core political processes and institutions in turbulent moments which might catalyze acceptance of democratic ideals.1 (2) a normative, evolutionary approach that utilizes soft powers that encourage open dialogue, economic and diplomatic incentives, inclusion and long-term evolutionary strategies of democratization—with coercive measures as the exception.2 Wolff notes, “the more democracy promotion is seen as part of a liberal mission, the more coercive instruments will be applied; the more democracy is seen as something that has
to grow from within society, the more low-key tools (if any) are preferred.”

Though Wolff’s argument does not discuss Just War Theory and postmodern warfare, his research supports a critical pillar for postmodern warfare theory and its application for a postmodern military. Germany’s evolutionary approach to international relations exhibits elements of contemporary Just War theory and postmodern warfare thought, and though imperfect, provides a vital contrast to modern military thinking, which furthers the ongoing postmodern warfare discourse. The first section of this essay describes Walzer’s Contemporary (Just War theory) and various aspects of postmodern warfare in order to provide the theoretical background underwriting the argument. The second section uses this theoretical model to investigate Germany’s foreign policy and military constructs with some comparison to the United States. The third section uses the theoretical model to evaluate German actions in Afghanistan with some comparisons to US actions in Iraq. The fourth section discusses key takeaways and future implications for a postmodern military.

**Walzer’s Contemporary Just War Theory**

Walzer has reshaped and reinvigorated just war theory. His studies and theories cover just and unjust actions through intervention, guerrilla warfare, terrorism and other aspects of war. To analyze Michael Walzer’s theory of just and unjust intervention it must be broken down into the elements of: **self-determination-nonintervention, exceptions to nonintervention and prudence vs morality.**

According to Walzer, the political leader who tries to overtly shape the domestic agreements or alter the political construct in a particular country owns the burden of proving justification for intervention. Furthermore, he states if military action is necessary, it is the right of the people within sovereign states to suffer coercion and devastation at the hands of one
another vice an intervening force. At the core of this idea is John Stuart Mill’s (a 19th century British philosopher) theory of self-determination. Self-determination means a single political community holds the collective right to regulate its own affairs. A state can be self-determining even if its people try and fail to install a democratic institution; however if an intrusive state successfully installs a democratic institution then self-determination is lost. Additionally, John Stuart Mill argues that institutions established without self-determination fail by design. Self-determination is the right of a people “to become free by their own efforts, and it is through these efforts the value and virtues required to sustain freedom are built. It is impossible for an intervening state or military to imbue the people of the target state with democratic values and virtues. Walzer argues, “Self-determination is the school in which virtue is learned (or not) and liberty is won (or not)”. In essence, the process of arriving at democracy is more important than democracy itself. It is an evolutionary process and a responsibility of the people. Ultimately, people get the government they deserve. However, self-determination does not mean the international community will stand by as a society is led to slaughter by a stronger society; there are exceptions.

Intervention is only allowed when it preserves self-determination. According to Walzer, there are three scenarios that permit intervention: (1) to equalize a political conflict, (2) to conduct counter-intervention and (3) to prevent genocide. Equalizing a political conflict would mean supporting the weaker political entity so the self-determination process can continue. Under this exception, the key concern is being sure the political entity has legitimate support from a significant portion of the population. In this case, “significant” means enough of the population) supports the political entity to a degree where it can stand and fight without assistance from an outside force. “Conducting counter-intervention” means intervening to
impede the intrusions of other outside states. Finally, preventing genocide means stepping in when human rights atrocities are so bad it makes the discussion of self-determination inappropriate.9 Intervening to protect a country’s right to self-determination is morally required; however, it is not always prudent.

The final element to Walzer’s theory of intervention involves prudence. Prudence must be taken when the risks and dangers of intervening outweigh its benefits. In considering whether to intervene, every country weighs its economic risks and dangers to its own people. However, it would be immoral to not also weigh the risk and danger imposed on the people for which the intervention is meant to benefit. Ultimately, if an intervention puts a third party in eminent danger then it is immoral.9 For example, Russia annexed Crimea through a Russian Separatist movement within Ukraine. This conflict has already produced significant violence; however a United States intervention would only increase the violence, while leaving behind an end-state that could be easily reversed by another separatist movement. To eliminate the Russian threat of a future reassertion of territorial claims in the Crimea, the United States would have to embroil the entire region (most of Europe and Eastern Europe) in a major conflict with Russia, risking nuclear escalation. In this case, the value of using US military means to return Crimea to Ukrainian control does not outweigh the cost of human life in Ukraine and the surrounding region. In essence, states apply prudence best by ensuring the costs in resources and human life to safeguard self-determination within a certain country do not outweigh the value of self-determination itself.

Walzer believes self-determination is the key component of successful, stable governments. However, self-determination does not mean countries should stand by in the presence of gross injustice. Intervention may be necessary, but only in the case it preserves self-
determination or in cases of genocide where the argument of self-determination is arbitrary. Nevertheless, prudence must be applied in all cases to ensure the costs of intervention do not outweigh its values. That being said, a key element of Walzer’s theory is that the path to achieving democracy is more important than democracy itself, an idea that emphasizes the importance of context, a critical aspect of postmodern theory.

**Postmodern Warfare**

Spanish writer and poet Frederico de Onis first used the term postmodern in 1934 to identify a tendency of literary regression from conservatism; however, the term grew to hold a much broader application. Postmodernism, as a term, worked its way through literary circles and into architecture, the visual and performing arts, and music in the 1970s and 1980s. Through its evolution, the term, as it relates to art, came to represent “the collapse of the hierarchical distinction between high and mass/popular culture; a stylistic promiscuity favoring eclecticism and the mixing of codes; parody, pastiches, irony, and a rejection of the assumption that art can only be repetition.” In other words, the art and literature world, over time, defined postmodernism as the rejection of assumption and social coherence; however, its definition continues to expand as new applications surface. Postmodern ideas have permeated disciplines spanning philosophy, cultural studies, geography, and art history; however, postmodernism’s application to society and warfare remained unclear until recently.

As it applies to society and warfare, postmodern theorists posit that advances in computer technology, Internet and telecommunications, media (i.e., 24 hr news cycle), social media, information dissemination, and changes in the socioeconomic system are shaping a new kind of social formation, transcending conventional state/cultural borders. And until the events of 9/11, these social formations remained hidden or at least inconsequential. Since 9/11, postmodern
theorists characterize a world where events unfold in a non-linear (i.e., not black and white) fashion, juxtaposing the universalizing and totalizing claims espoused by modernism. With respect to society and warfare, postmodernism sees history, the present and the future through a lens of multiplicity, plurality, fragmentation, and indeterminacy. Therefore, perception becomes reality. As such, actions in the world hold no meaning or significance until translated by individuals and societies, leading to an incalculable number of interpretations and reactions and requiring postmodern leaders to deeply consider cultural contexts. For example, “A book has no meaning or significance until it interacts with a reader. Individuals interpreting the book—not the words or events themselves—determine the meaning.” Thus, postmodern society and warfare is far more complex than modern society and warfare where one side’s win meant the other side’s loss and winning every battle meant winning the war.

According to Reed, 9/11 ushered in a fifth generation of warfare to a postmodern environment where strategists must counter adversaries using asymmetric methods without knowing who the enemies are or what methods they will use. First generation warfare encompassed smoothbore muskets and line and column military formations massing on decisive or weak points in the enemy’s line. Second generation warfare stressed technology and the massing of firepower instead of manpower towards the main effort on the battlefield. Third generation warfare relied on non-linear maneuver and mass effects of combined arms (air, land and sea forces) working in concert, defeating an enemy from within instead of having to start with an enemy’s outer defenses before closing in. Fourth generation warfare uses asymmetric strategy and tactics, applied over long periods of time, against the enemy’s political will to fight instead of focusing on the enemy’s superior conventional military forces, which it cannot defeat.
Fifth generation or postmodern warfare encompasses all prior generations and forces military strategists and senior leaders to redefine the basic elements of war—battlefield domains, soldiers/adversaries, purpose/objectives, and weapons/force—through a postmodern lens. Because of impacts of the Information Age and of globalization, war has expanded beyond the purely military realm. Adversaries may strike the physical domain, information domain, cognitive domain or social domain. State actors, non-state actors, and “super” empowered individuals, groups and networks (or any combination of the five) are now capable of waging war—previously only waged by nation-states and insurgencies. The combination of domains and actors in postmodern warfare redefines success in accomplishing objectives. Whereas in modern warfare, policy, strategic, operational and tactical objectives were separated by space and time (i.e., one had to accumulate tactical victories before garnering an operational success), postmodern warfare erases that separation, meaning a tactical action can have an immediate strategic or policy impact, an idea echoed by Emile Simpson in his book, “War from the Ground Up”. In his work, Simpson brings the idea that the Strategic Narrative, i.e., explanation for action, in the information age can have a devastating effect on operations. If the enemy can propagate a narrative that delegitimizes United States’ actions then his political will grows while the United States’ political will shrinks, having an instant strategic effect. Finally, because of the multitude of permutation in domains, adversaries, methods/objectives and weapons/force, enemies’ centers-of-gravity become increasingly unclear to a point of obscurity. Therefore, success is contextually based and any combination of military/non-military, lethal/non-lethal or kinetic/non-kinetic force, successfully applied, may defeat an adversary. In short, postmodern warfare is limitless, encompassing all five generations in that it can be conducted everywhere, by anyone, using any weapon, garnering any level of effect (i.e., policy, strategic, operational,
tactical). To counter a postmodern adversary, nation-states must utilize every instrument of
power, monitor every domain, build networks and relationships in every region and govern the
strategic narrative. In that regard, Germany is leading in areas that may be useful for postmodern
warfare.

**German Foreign Policy and Military Construct**

From analyzing German foreign policy and Germany’s military construct and approach,
Germany’s Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) policies align closely with
Walzer’s intervention approach and Reed’s principles of postmodern warfare. The following
section analyzes Jonas Wolff’s study of Germany’s operations policy, which highlights its
military force structure and recent activity.

In his study, Wolff outlines key precepts of German foreign policy that promote
democracy in a non-intrusive, evolutionary manner. For instance, German diplomatic, economic
and informational foreign policies rarely speak of “Promoting Democracy”, a concept other
governments perceive as abrasive. In fact, Germany’s only overt reference to “democratic
promotion” happens within the confines of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). German
NGOs promote democracy by supporting states’ public sector needs through governance and
administrative process standardization as well as political system and rule of law
professionalization, planting the seeds for a slow evolution toward democratic ideas. Furthermore, when Germany discusses democratization, they always refer to it as a normalizing,
long-term approach, a testament to Germany’s constructivist ideas that people and societies must
evolve instead of being coerced. Thus, Germany utilizes positive capacity-building activities
such as open dialogues, incentives and long-term trust building measures and strategies, quite
different from the United States’ hard power (military action, rigid economic sanctions and
exclusion from international institutions) approach. US hard power measures are quite effective for modern warfare; however, hard power is only a piece of the postmodern warfare equation.

By maintaining dialogue, trade, inclusive institutions and public sector support, Germany directly follows Walzer’s non-intervention approach, allowing states to remain sovereign while subconsciously evolving toward liberal democratic ideas. In respecting each country’s political sensitivities, Germany’s indirect approach prompts democratic progress, allowing the citizens of a given society to pave their own path towards democracy from the bottom up. This approach demonstrates the constructive concept that people construct societies and societies influence people. Thus, echoing Walzer’s points that people get the government they deserve and strong democracies stand on the values of the people who found it. Furthermore, Germany’s evolutionary strategy promotes the Waltzer idea that democratic values do not occur naturally nor can outside intruders magically push these values into individual’s hearts and minds. In short, Germany’s “Democracy Promotion” policies exhibit elements of contemporary “Just War” theories that say societies must evolve, and the only way to do so is through interaction (i.e., dialogue, trade, institutional membership and public sector support) with other democratic states in an international society.

The postmodern benefits of open diplomatic, information and economic ties with a potential adversary is adaptability. Since adversaries are not restricted to a specific domain, they can take any form and wield any weapon; therefore, countries must be prepared for everything. Germany improves its odds of countering an attack by staying plugged into all areas from which a strike might occur. As suggested by Boyd, open systems are a cornerstone to warfighting and essential to combating postmodern adversaries. A system can be a life form, process, organization or network. If it is closed it cannot use elements of the external environment to
adapt, which ultimately results in it being consumed by the environment and ceasing to exist.

Open systems use elements of the external environment to constantly adapt and morph into something that can survive the environment. Accordingly the more connections an open system has the more survivable it becomes. By maintaining dialogue, connections and social networks with adversarial countries, Germany is sharing experiences with these countries, constructing shared values and identities and garnering adaptability and survivability. These connections are also important because they accentuate the importance of context, a key principle noted in Reed’s postmodern theory. By emphasizing soft power and not excluding potential adversaries from the world order, a country can understand how a particular event will affect a potential adversary and therefore be prepared for any negative responses, perhaps even preventing the negative response all together. However, postmodern warfare does not always support a soft power approach. Some world actors view the world through a modern (linear) lens and may view soft power politics as inconsistent and dubious. In those cases a hard power response sends a clearer message and successfully deters aggression. For actors like this, the United States’ hard power and strong military serve as a powerful negotiating tool. That being said, a potential adversary can always shift between modern and postmodern approaches based on the context of the situation, which is why Germany’s soft power approach is emphasized in this analysis. The following section analyzes how well Germany’s actions follow contemporary just war and postmodern warfare theories.

Wolff’s description of Germany’s diplomatic activity in Russia, Bolivia and Turkey presents real world examples of Germany’s adherence to contemporary Just War theories and postmodern warfare aspects. Bolivia elected its first indigenous president, who dismantled democratic institutions that have been in place since the 1980s. Additionally, Bolivia’s new
president pushed a nationalistic policy less postured towards liberal democracy and market economies, damaging German business interests in the area. Despite Bolivia’s divergence from Germany’s liberal democratic preferences, Germany maintained an open dialogue with the new administration to temper Bolivia’s further deviation from international democratic norms. Furthermore, they refrained from overt interference with sensitive domestic politics, a quite uncommon approach considering the United State’s exclusionary policies towards Cuba, Iran and other “non-democratic” countries. Turkey’s government transitioned to political Islam, a non-secular brand of democracy that clashes with the liberal democratic order, threatening Turkey’s relationship with the West. In spite of sharp public resistance, Germany continued to assist Turkey’s public sector democratic institutions, improving governance and administration as well as professionalizing the political system and rule of law. In response the Russian authoritarian posturing by Vladimir Putin, Germany followed a similar approach of maintaining open dialogue, improving Russia’s public sector governance and administration as well as professionalizing the political system and rule of law. Germany could have instituted exclusionary policies with each country, hoping the pain of sanctions and embargos might coerce them toward liberal democratic norms. This is a tactic the United States attempted with Cuba fifty-five years ago, and Cuba is still a communist nation today. After fifty-five years of no progress in Cuban-American relations, the United States has changed its strategy and reopened their dialogue with Cuba, hoping inclusion might stimulate Cuban conformance to liberal democratic norms. By maintaining a dialogue and trade agreements with Turkey, Bolivia and Russia, Germany is doing the same thing. It has ensured each country remains plugged into liberal democratic institutions, allowing them to gradually conform to liberal democratic norms at their own pace—perfectly aligning with contemporary Just War intervention methods.
The postmodern benefits of Germany’s actions are the Bolivian, Turkish and Russian connections, resulting in relationships and networks Germany can leverage, shape and pressure should threats from super empowered individuals, groups and networks emerge in those countries. In short, Germany’s soft power diplomacy, information, and economic instruments of power meld well with Walzer’s just and unjust war theory and serve a piece of postmodern equation; however, Wolff’s analysis of German foreign policy reveals few hard power tools necessary for postmodern warfare. To survive postmodern warfare, a state must be postured to utilize both the hard and soft power aspects of the diplomatic, information, and economic instruments of power without completely alienating the adversary, creating a potential blind spot. The next section examines how Germany’s military construct applies to contemporary Just War theory and postmodern warfare.

Hypothetically, a country that embraces Waltzer’s self-determination/self-help principles possesses minimal need for an active, aggressive military instrument. While a country that embraces postmodern warfare theory possesses a military that can provide military/non-military, kinetic/non-kinetic, lethal/non-lethal in equal measure. In many ways, Germany’s Bundeswehr (military) construct and participation in various conflicts mirror contemporary just war theory and postmodern warfare, while its military concept lacks the necessary postmodern balance. The Bundeswehr stands in stark contrast to the United States. The Bundeswehr is only employed for the purposes of defending German citizens where the United States military can be employed to protect the interests of the United States. A vague term, interest defines anything the United States finds advantageous or beneficial. For this reason, the President (as commander in chief) holds the ability to employ the United States military actions without congressional approval and before exhausting all diplomatic, economic and information instruments. Whereas the term
“interests” may bias the United States to overuse military means, the term in conjunction with a streamlined approval process through the President gives the United States flexibility, an important aspect in postmodern warfare. On the other hand, Germany can, by law, only use military means where civilian means are unsuitable, unavailable or unsuccessful and the federal government and parliament have weighed up the pros and cons, concluding military employment is imperative and indispensable. Accordingly, Germany limits military employment for clearly defined purposes and whenever possible, to multinational environments, a strategy with some pluses and minuses from a postmodern warfare perspective. On the positive side, Germany is more likely to use diplomatic, economic and information instruments of power to their fullest extent, maintaining a live dialogue with the potential adversaries, making non-lethal solutions more likely. On the negative side, Germany’s military response is less flexible due to rigid approval processes, and the threat its military possesses is less credible, which limits the effectiveness of its other instruments of power.

Though the basis for Germany’s military construct stems from its history and cultural biases, the Bundeswehr’s core competencies and mission descriptions align closely with contemporary just war and aspects of postmodern warfare theories, emphasizing a whole-of-government approach. According to the Bundewehr’s operations policy, once employed, the Bundeswehr mission focuses on protecting German citizens against attacks, external threats and political blackmail by conducting crisis and conflict prevention, combined crisis management and post-crisis rehabilitation. To execute these missions, the Bundeswehr follows three tenets: (1) preemptively counter threats to German security, including the threats to human rights (2) emphasize a comprehensive, networked approach combining the military instrument with the political, diplomatic and economic instruments; (3) take crisis prevention measures to an
increasing extent as a multinational effort, using a multi-agency approach. These tenets reflect how the Bundeswehr uses a comprehensive whole-of-government approach to either contain or forcibly terminate threats to German citizens at the points from which they originate—often weak and failed states. Germany’s whole of government approach, utilizes non-governmental organizations and host nation civil organizations to eliminate violence, stabilize crisis areas and install reliable government institutions and rule of law. Furthermore, the Bundeswehr sees post-crisis rehabilitation, host-nation defense capacity building, security sector reform, peace building and peacekeeping operations as core competencies.

In accordance with just war and postmodern warfare theories, the Bundeswehr’s military tenets and core competencies emphasize a broad multi-discipline approach and deep cultural understanding, allowing Germany to shape the battlespace from the bottom up and reduce the reach and intensity of violence. Their core competencies (i.e., post-crisis rehabilitation, peace building, etc) build crucial relationships that promote cultural awareness and construction of powerful networks, important for both self-determination and postmodern warfare situational awareness. By enabling weak and failed states to take part in reconstructing their own socioeconomic identities, Germany plays an important role in reconstructing and influencing a new social fabric for the host nation. Because of its role in that process, Germany is able to shape the battlespace and absorb vital cultural understanding, crucial to understanding the postmodern context of that country. Furthermore, because of German involvement, the newly established democratic institutions, public sector governance and professional politics of that country will bear some resemblance to western values and ideas, making navigation of the human terrain in that country easier. Additionally, the Bundeswehr’s networked approach improves its adaptability by opening intelligence lanes from non-military entities, increasing the array of
options available to military commanders and improving unity of effort along military lines of operations.

In contrast, the United States military’s core functions like those of the Air Force (e.g., air and space superiority, global attack, rapid global mobility, precision engagement, information superiority and agile combat support) showcase a coercive combat power that threatens violence in the cases where diplomacy fails. As a result, major world powers/responsible states are less inclined to escalate conflicts or resort to violent military means when their political goals are not met, fostering a relatively high level of peace worldwide. Consequently, the United State’s military construct works great for deterring major world actors but its blind spot resides with non-state actors. On the other hand, German military construct adheres to contemporary just war theory, which postures it to deal more effectively with non-state actors and many postmodern threats; however, its inability to use a strong military to deter major state actors degrades its postmodern effectiveness. The following section examines how Germany’s actions in Afghanistan relate to contemporary just war and postmodern warfare theories.

**Germany’s Missions in Afghanistan**

Germany’s mission in Afghanistan presents both successes and challenges of helping countries towards self-determination and postmodern warfare operations. As noted in the Bundeswehr operations policy, recognizing there can be “no security without reconstruction and no reconstruction without security”, Germany assists the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a NATO led security mission in Afghanistan, in instilling Afghan forces with the prerequisites to lead future reconstruction projects. Germany’s primary focus in Afghanistan is: (1) its commitment as a key partner nation in the northern region, (2) close coordination of all military measures and the civilian reconstruction process; and (3) the provision of training and
support to the Afghan security forces. Additionally, Germany works hard to ensure the local Afghan population see ISAF troops as helpful. As such, the Bundeswehr conducts all ISAF operations within Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), a comprehensive philosophy consisting of a civilian and military component. PRTs in the Northeast region of Afghanistan adapt to specific regional features such as social and societal structures, and changes in the security situation. To do this, the Bundeswehr coordinates with the Federal Ministry of Defense, the Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, ensuring its adaptability and helping it achieve long lasting, comprehensive progress towards stability and democratization within Afghanistan.

Successes

Examples of Bundeswehr and ISAF achievements in Afghanistan are as follows: Democratically elected President, construction of 3,500 new schools, construction of over 34,000 kilometers of roadways, removal of 7.7 million explosive devices and accessibility of basic health care for 85 percent of the population.

Each of these projects intends to improve conditions by promoting development and modernization within the Afghan population and helping individual Afghan citizens take stock in the existence of its own country. Education, healthcare, a stable infrastructure and a democratic government help Afghanistan become a self-governing, self-determining society. By focusing on civil projects that improve the lives of the population and working with its civilian counterparts to reduce its intrusiveness, the Bundeswehr has been instrumental in leading the Afghan people towards self-determination, ensuring a longer lasting progress for the country. Consequently, Northern Afghanistan is significantly more stable than southern Afghanistan where United States and British forces reside, an argument posited by many in academia.
However, it is too early to tell whether Germany’s networked approach, light in military force, will successfully transition Afghanistan into a stable environment, capable of reducing postmodern threats, such as super-empowered individuals, networks and groups. Nonetheless, a contrast to US actions in Iraq provides some support by highlighting the potential shortfalls of not using a networked approach.

The United States military policies in Iraq were different from the Bundeswehr Afghanistan policies and achieved poor results, providing a convincing argument for Germany’s evolutionary approach. Following the Iraq invasion in 2003, the United States dismantled all Iraqi government organizations and the prevailing rule-of-law in a process called de’ba’athification. As a result, thousands became unemployed, leading to a violent insurgency that lasted until 2011. Additionally, the United States’ attempt to install a democratic government led by a Shia prompted a violent civil war and numerous sectarian conflicts, creating a fertile atmosphere for Islamic State of Iraq in Syria (ISIS), a terrorist group that still has Iraq embroiled in violence and bloodshed.34 In contrast, Germany’s self-determining approach seems to have reduced violence in Afghanistan, where as the United States’s coercive approach in Iraq led to further violence which still rages today. That being said, in a postmodern sense, Iraq also demonstrated critical successes for the United States. Because of the strength of its military force, the United States took Baghdad in less than a month, thanks in part to its space, cyberspace and precision weapon technology, but more so because of its combined arms capability and the unprecedented joint relationships shared among all four services. As a result, the United States military quickly advanced from the dominate phase to the stabilize phase of Joint Combat Campaign Phase Model (i.e., Shape, Deter, Seize the initiative, Dominate,
Stabilize, Enable Civil Authority), resulting in a relatively low death toll for combat operations and a low collateral damage to the civilian population.\textsuperscript{35}

In short, Germany’s networked approach has potential for success because it avoids some of the overt mistakes the United States experienced in Iraq. However, the United States’ successes in Iraq highlight an important Achilles Heal to Germany’s success in Afghanistan.

\textbf{Challenges}

Germany’s Afghanistan operations unveiled critical barriers to successful implementation of a networked approach in a postmodern environment. In theory, Germany’s networked approach, predominately a civil tool interwoven with host nation participation, reconstructs a society from the ground up, reducing violence and eliminating threats through stabilization of the core elements of society, rule-of-law, professional politics and a responsive civil infrastructure. The postmodern value of this self-determination approach should be a social construct the western world understands and has valuable ties with. However, in practice, Germany’s soft military approach undermines the very security and stabilization its networked approach tries to promote.\textsuperscript{36} Strengthening its military tools has been challenged by Germany’s inability to garner public support, define the strategic end-state and tailor its networked approach.

According to Schröer, Germany’s failures creating the Afghan National Police (ANP), responsible for domestic security, criminal investigation, border protection and counter-narcotics, typify Germany’s inability to mobilize \textit{public support} for heavier military/security efforts in the region. Originally designed to educate and equip 62,000 officers, the ANP program has lacked necessary resources manning and political support from its inception, resulting in a failure to produce educated and equipped officers anywhere close to 62,000. Lack of public support for the mission detracts from Germany’s ability to provide police officers for the training
mission in Afghanistan. First, Germany provides its own police officers to international
missions on a volunteer-only basis, and because of the security situation in Afghanistan they
cannot lineup volunteers despite their offer of generous financial incentives. Second, because
Germany sources police trainers from within the interior ministry, it must request permission to
send police forces abroad, a time consuming process. 37

Public support is not forthcoming because the setup of a Western-style police force in
Afghanistan requires a force loyal to the central government, dedicated to protecting human
rights and enforcing western style law. 38 The culture has yet to understand and value western-
style central government, human rights beliefs and rule-of-law. It takes significant dedication
and time to do this because most of this does not exist. Afghanistan cannot be stable without
security and security requires a semblance of a stable government. Under this paradox
stabilization may take more patience and understanding than the German public is, perhaps,
willing to give. A fragile security situation and the publics’ lack of postmodern understanding
lead to the next concern, inability to define an acceptable strategic end-state.

According to Schröer, a strategic end-state in postmodern warfare is often too broad and
underlying objectives and measures of success are elusive. Berlin’s stated end-goal in
Afghanistan, i.e., “transferring responsibility and empowering the Afghan government to provide
security and stability on its own,” is extremely vague when compared to the US goal, “keeping al
Qaeda and the Taliban militarily down.” Germany’s end-goal arguably aims effort towards the
root cause of al-Qaeda and Taliban empowerment, while US goals seem to treat the symptoms. 39
However, Germany cannot segment “responsibility and empowerment of the Afghan
government” into discrete, measurable tasks that properly gauge success. As a result, the
inability to measure short-term successes wanes on public support and Berlin’s ability to
understand lessons learned that might feed the next line of operation. As noted by Schröer, all of this amounts to Berlin’s inability to embed the Afghanistan mission into the broader foreign policy strategy. Additionally, because Berlin cannot measure immediate success and failures, it is forced to fall back on its core beliefs that a civil focused approach with a soft military element applies to every scenario. This breaks the first rule of postmodern warfare, which is “context matters”.

Afghanistan proved that Germany’s networked approach must be tailorable as postmodern warfare requires quick adaptability. According to Schröer’s research, by 2008, insurgencies broke out in Northern Afghanistan. Enemy engagement steadily rose; however, the Bundeswehr was not given authority to use lethal force until April 2009, nearly a year later. Once the rules of engagement were approved, the Bundeswehr, in concert with Afghan security forces and NATO allies launched a series of operations to secure strategic commercial routes and improve force protection in rural areas. Fierce fighting ensued in Kunduz’s Chardara district and the provinces of Baghlan and Faryab and it was clear the Bundeswehr needed to conduct counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense operations. However, policy makers refused to acknowledge that Germany was fighting a war and that a more military robust networked approach was required. Germany’s cognitive dissonance about the importance of military force and counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan is an uphill battle they are still fighting today.

In essence, Germany’s challenges in Afghanistan highlight inherent challenges conducting military operations that adhere to both contemporary just war and postmodern warfare ideals. Germany must learn that self-determination does not negate military force and that postmodern warfare sometimes requires overt military action. If the German state and
public accept that a postmodern warfare environment exists, it can realize the value of its networked approach, but only if tailored to properly fit the context of the situation.

Key Takeaways and Future Implications

As noted in Waltzer’s and Reed’s theories above, postmodern warfare is limitless, encompassing all five generations, in that it can be conducted everywhere, by anyone, using any weapon, garnering any level of effect (i.e., policy, strategic, operational, tactical). To counter a postmodern adversary, nation-states must utilize every instrument of power, monitor every domain, build networks and relationships in every region and govern the strategic narrative. Germany’s foreign policy and the Bundeswehr’s networked approach exhibit elements of contemporary just war and postmodern warfare theories that make it a potential model for other countries to follow; however, it is imperfect. Every approach and strategy must be tailored to fit the context of the environment, and a postmodern force must be able to provide military/non-military, kinetic/non-kinetic, lethal/non-lethal effects in equal measure. A perfect postmodern force would combine US hard powers and military strengths with Germany’s soft power and culturally sensitive networked approach. However, this may be difficult to achieve.

As evident in Afghanistan, Germany was less adaptable because it lacked the political and public support to tailor its networked approach to bring heavier military effects. Therefore, senior leaders must take every opportunity to educate the public on the inherent dangers of the postmodern landscape. Before any transformation can occur, the public needs to accept that postmodern military forces will be permanently engaged in countries all over the world as a means of shaping and deterring threats from potential adversaries. Additionally, a force that can provide military/non-military, kinetic/non-kinetic, lethal/non-lethal effects in equal measure is
difficult to build because it will be a jack of all trades yet a master of none. Unfortunately, we need a master of all trades. One solution to this problem would be seamless security cooperation between forces and agencies all over the world.

To implement, senior leaders should analyze small-scale examples of organizations that already do this, such as the Green Beret and the National Guards’ State partnership program. The Green Berets are regionally aligned, cultural experts whose job is to seamlessly integrate with indigenous societies to build a defense capacity and eliminate potential problems before they arise. The National Guards’ State Partnership program aligns militaries of a foreign country with the Guard Units of one US state (e.g., Jordan is partnered with Colorado). In practice, Jordan and Colorado Guard units conduct joint and multi-national exercises, forming crucial relationships and cultural understandings that can be called on in times of crisis. As a result of successes in this realm, “Big” Army is considering regionally aligned forces that mirror the National Guard’s state partnership program. The Air Force should consider a similar approach—perhaps partnering an Air Force wing with a specific foreign country. The benefits of the interoperability, relationships, cultural understanding and value-exchange far outweigh the costs.

For example, as a result of the United States’ close military partnership with Jordan, the values of Jordanian military culture progress quicker than standard Jordanian society, as evident by their push to provide equal opportunity and training for females in the military, an effort I helped support while deployed to Jordan. This progression may be, in part, due to the fact that most of Jordan’s senior leaders are formally educated at US military institutions (e.g., ACSC). Additionally, those military senior leaders interact with civil senior leaders, slowly shaping the greater Jordanian culture, which is the ultimate goal. In short, building a force that can do it all is probably not possible, which bounds the solution space to the security cooperation realm.
Senior leaders will have to think about how security cooperation relationships will be formed and what level of interoperability must be achieved.

There is no definitive body of work on postmodern warfare. Therefore, as it is written senior leaders must contend with a myriad of questions. Such as: What are the implications of a postmodern force that seamlessly integrates diplomatic, information, military and economic instruments of power? If postmodern force has to operate in every domain and use civil and military forces interchangeably, will it militarize the aspects of society that should remain civil and if so, what are the effects? This is the realm future research and discourse must explore.

Conclusion

Germany’s evolutionary approach to international relations exhibits elements of contemporary Just War theory and postmodern warfare thought, and though imperfect, provides a vital contrast to modern military thinking, which furthers the ongoing postmodern warfare discourse. The shift to postmodern societies and warfare drives a need for multicultural interactions at the lowest level. Because of globalization and the information age, a new social construct that crosses conventional state and cultural borders has formed. The interconnectedness of the information age allows an ongoing dialogue and interaction among people and communities from various countries, forming a virtual society that remains hidden from physical societies. The inherent danger of this postmodern societal formation is that adversaries are now faceless, with endless means and methods of threatening a nation’s security at their disposal. Nation-states cannot see the enemy or know what method of destruction he will use. Therefore, nation-states must construct a virtual security net, as close to the potential adversary as possible—-isolationism is not an option. This security net must interweave diplomatic, economic, information and military instruments of power in order to be effective. As such,
militaries must seamlessly integrate with non-governmental organization, intergovernmental organizations, inter-agencies, other militaries, multinational organizations and host nation militaries and institutions along lines of operation, achieving unity of effort and action.

Germany’s foreign policy and networked approach provide a potential model as it exhibits characteristics of Just War and postmodern warfare theories. Self-determination, a key aspect of Just War theory is the idea that change has to occur among the people before extending to the greater society, for it will be the values imbued in the people, which uphold and sustain this change for the long-term. Germany exhibits this principle by adopting inclusive policies that maintain strategic dialogue with weak and failed states or countries tipping towards authoritarianism. Additionally, the German Bundeswehr focuses on peacekeeping and operating with a whole-of-government team. As such, both approaches develop deep cultural ties and relationships that help Germany shape the fabric of a culture unobtrusively, a vital capability for postmodern warfare. However, Afghanistan proved Germany’s approach misses the hard power aspects postmodern warfare sometimes requires. A force that “does it all” may be impossible to construct, which requires tighter cooperation between foreign military forces. Therefore, senior leaders must grapple with organizational considerations as well as postmodern challenges and implications.

1 Democracy Promotion and Civilian Power, Wolff, 487
2 Ibid, 480
3 Germany’s “Value-Oriented” Foreign Policy, Wolff, 487.
4 Just and Unjust War, Walzer, 86-88
5 Ibid
6 Ibid
7 Ibid
8 Ibid
9 Ibid
11 In Pursuit of the Postmodern: An Introduction, Featherstone, 203
12 Ibid, 203
13 Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations, Best & Kellner, 3-5.
14 Messy Wars - Postmodern Way to see a War, Huhtinen, 90.
15 Post Modern Warfare: Beyond the Horizon, Geraghty, 6
16 Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict, Reed, 687-690
17 Ibid, 690-695
18 War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics, Simpson, 181
19 Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict, Reed, 697-699
20 Democracy Promotion and Civilian Power, Wolff, 482-483
21 Ibid, 481
22 Just and Unjust War, Walzer, 86-88
23 The Enemy as a Complex Adaptive System: John Boyd and Air Power in the Postmodern Era, Osinga, 20-26
24 Democracy Promotion and Civilian Power, Wolff, 484-487
25 Ibid
26 The Bundeswehr on Operations, Federal Ministry of Defense, 48
27 The Bundeswehr on Operations, Federal Ministry of Defense, 48
28 Ibid, 40-45
30 The Bundeswehr on Operations, Federal Ministry of Defense, 80-83
31 Ibid
32 Ibid
33 The Bundeswehr Abroad, Chauvistré, 1
34 US Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army, Pfiffner, 76-78
35 Joint Operations Planning, Joint Publication 5-0, xxiii.
36 Lessons Learned? German Security Policy and the War in Afghanistan Schröer, 96
37 Ibid, 92-95
38 Ibid
39 Ibid, 89-90
40 Ibid, 96
41 Ibid, 88
42 Ibid, 95-97
43 Just and Unjust War, Walzer, 86-88
44 Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict, Reed, 687-699
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