FROM ROWING BETWEEN TWO REEFS TO SAILING IN TWO OCEANS: THE END OF “A THOUSAND FRIENDS, ZERO ENEMIES”? 

by 

Jackson Y.M. Pang 

December 2015 

Thesis Advisor: Michael S. Malley
Second Reader: Naazneen H. Barma

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Under the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), Indonesia made positive strides in improving its international image, and the country’s global stature is on the ascent. These outcomes were largely attributed to SBY’s internationalist foreign policy, which adopted a principle of “a thousand friends, zero enemies” and preferred a multilateral approach to problem solving. Despite the successes gained from SBY’s “all directions” foreign policy, Indonesia’s foreign policy has turned nationalistic under Jokowi. In comparison with SBY’s preference for cooperation and conflict avoidance, Jokowi’s foreign policy decisions have shown a willingness to take unilateral actions and to be less conciliatory toward other countries. What set of factors informed Indonesia’s foreign policy during SBY’s drive for multilateralism and cooperation among countries and how much of the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi can be explained by changes in these factors? This thesis examines three domestic factors that have shaped Indonesia’s foreign policy under both presidents: the state of Indonesia’s economy, public opinion during each president’s administration, and the strength of the president’s political coalition. This thesis argues that changes in these three domestic factors took place during the period of transition between the two presidents, and Jokowi’s interpretation of and response to the changes, subjected to the constraints imposed on a democratic system, caused the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy.
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ABSTRACT

Under the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), Indonesia made positive strides in improving its international image, and the country’s global stature is on the ascent. These outcomes were largely attributed to SBY’s internationalist foreign policy, which adopted a principle of “a thousand friends, zero enemies” and preferred a multilateral approach to problem solving. Despite the successes gained from SBY’s “all directions” foreign policy, Indonesia’s foreign policy has turned nationalistic under Jokowi. In comparison with SBY’s preference for cooperation and conflict avoidance, Jokowi’s foreign policy decisions have shown a willingness to take unilateral actions and to be less conciliatory toward other countries. What set of factors informed Indonesia’s foreign policy during SBY’s drive for multilateralism and cooperation among countries and how much of the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi can be explained by changes in these factors? This thesis examines three domestic factors that have shaped Indonesia’s foreign policy under both presidents: the state of Indonesia’s economy, public opinion during each president’s administration, and the strength of the president’s political coalition. This thesis argues that changes in these three domestic factors took place during the period of transition between the two presidents, and Jokowi’s interpretation of and response to the changes, subjected to the constraints imposed on a democratic system, caused the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy.
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<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>ASEAN Economic Community</td>
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<td>AFC</td>
<td>Asian Financial Crisis</td>
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<td>AGO</td>
<td>Attorney General’s Office</td>
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<td>AICHR</td>
<td>ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<td>AMMTC</td>
<td>ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>BAKAMLA</td>
<td>Badan Keamanan Laut (Maritime Security Board)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDF</td>
<td>Bali Democracy Forum</td>
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<td>BRIC</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, and China</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>Defence Cooperation Agreement</td>
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<td>DPR</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives)</td>
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<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of 20</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GFC</td>
<td>Global Financial Crisis</td>
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<td>GMA</td>
<td>Global Maritime Axis</td>
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<td>IUU</td>
<td>Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated</td>
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<td>KIARA</td>
<td>Koalisi Rakyat untuk Keadilan Perikanan (The People’s Coalition for Fisheries Justice)</td>
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<td>KIH</td>
<td>Koalisi Indonesia Hebat (Great Indonesia Coalition)</td>
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<td>KIP</td>
<td>Kartu Indonesia Pintar (Smart Indonesian Card)</td>
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<td>KIS</td>
<td>Kartu Indonesia Sehat (Indonesian Health Card)</td>
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<td>KKP</td>
<td>Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan (Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries)</td>
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<td>KKS</td>
<td>Kartu Keluarga Sejahtera (Family Welfare Card)</td>
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<td>KMP</td>
<td>Koalisi Merah Putih (Red and White Coalition)</td>
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<td>KPK</td>
<td>Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication Committee)</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2014, Indonesia held its third direct presidential election. The incumbent, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), was serving out his second and final presidential term. The election was closely contested between two candidates: Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, former governor of Jakarta and furniture businessman, and Prabowo Subianto, a former Indonesian army general and an established member of Indonesia’s political elite. Jokowi’s politically moderate campaign prevailed against Prabowo’s highly populist campaign. Jokowi’s 6.3 percent margin of victory was hailed as a triumph for Indonesia’s fragile democracy.

Since his inauguration on 20 October 2014, Jokowi has made a number of highly publicized foreign policy decisions. These decisions, made early in his presidential term, have characterized his approach to foreign policy. An example is his “sink the vessels” policy to eradicate illegal fishing in Indonesian waters. In a bid to send a strong deterrent signal and exhibit Indonesia’s resolve to combat illegal fishing, Jokowi permitted Indonesia’s Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) to destroy fishing vessels seized for fishing illegally in Indonesian waters.1 Jokowi’s decision to take aggressive and unilateral actions against errant fishing vessels, regardless of country of origin, has riled the countries whose ships were sunk. Jokowi’s demonstrative “sink the vessels” policy, however, was well received at home by Indonesians who had grown tired of the irresolute SBY.2 In another example, Indonesia’s diplomatic relations with countries such as Brazil, Netherlands, and close neighbor, Australia, were strained after Jokowi refused

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to grant clemency and proceeded to execute convicted drug smugglers, including nationals from these countries, in the period between January and April 2015. Similar to the robust Indonesian support for his “sink the vessels” policy, Jokowi’s strong stance against drugs and firm decision to execute the drug smugglers was popular with a majority of the Indonesians.

During Jokowi’s presidential campaign, he expressed his vision for Indonesia to transform into a maritime power through his *poros maritime dunia* (Global Maritime Axis) doctrine. The doctrine, which also serves as a guide for Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is a multipronged strategy that seeks to harness Indonesia’s maritime history, archipelagic geography, and economic potential in order to turn Indonesia into a global maritime power. To that end, Retno Marsudi, Jokowi’s foreign minister, has expressed that the foreign ministry “will carry out the president’s vision” and “push the realization of the maritime axis through the enforcement of [Indonesia’s] sovereignty, security, and prosperity.”

A new metaphor, *berlayar di dua samudera* (sailing in two oceans), has been coined for Indonesia’s foreign policy by one of Jokowi’s key foreign policy advisors, Rizal Sukma. The metaphor, according to Sukma, reflects Indonesia’s growing confidence in its ability to safely navigate in the sea of international relations to reach the intended national objectives. The oceanic theme of the metaphor firmly gives recognition

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4 According to a poll conducted by Indo Barometer, almost 85% of survey respondents said they support Mr. Widodo’s firm stance on the death penalty, while more than 84% of respondents said they agreed with the death penalty for drug traffickers and dealers. Anita Rachman, “Widodo Earns Indonesian Approval for Death Penalty Stance,” *Wall Street Journal* (blog), April 7, 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/indonesiarealt ime/2015/04/07/widodo-earns-indonesian-approval-for-death-penality-stance/.


to the vital importance of Indonesia’s archipelagic geography in relation to national security.

Much of Jokowi’s early foreign policy activism strongly indicates a departure from Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda under SBY. SBY’s internationalist outlook emphasized cooperation and multilateralism in Indonesia’s foreign policy. By contrast, Jokowi has adopted a unilateralist approach, preferring to focus on domestic issues. Although Jokowi does not rule out working with other countries, he questions the utility of SBY’s principle of “a thousand friends, zero enemies” in the conduct of its foreign relations and disparagingly asks: “What’s the point of having many friends but we only get the disadvantages? Many friends should bring many benefits.”

In her articulation of Jokowi’s objectives for the conduct of diplomatic relations and Indonesia’s foreign policy, Retno provides the clearest signal that Indonesia’s foreign policy is turning away from the direction set by the SBY administration. She acknowledges that under Jokowi, Indonesia’s foreign policy will place greater emphasis on domestic priorities through its practice of “pro-people” diplomacy. Specifically to the corps of Indonesian diplomats, Retno instructed them to discard “their old mindset” and work towards realizing President Jokowi’s “so-called Trisakti vision,” which refers to the attainment of political sovereignty, economic self-sufficiency, and cultural independence in Indonesia.

With a strong focus on advancing domestic issues, demonstrated willingness to engage in confrontation with other countries, and inclination to take uncompromising unilateral actions, one could argue that compared to the general direction Indonesia’s foreign policy direction took under former president SBY, Indonesia’s foreign policy

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10 Saragih, “FM to Realize,” *Jakarta Post*. 
under Jokowi has become more nationalistic. SBY’s internationalist foreign policy has resulted in foreign media and scholars lauding Indonesia as a model of success in democratization and economic recovery.\textsuperscript{11} Why, then, has Indonesia’s foreign policy taken a nationalist turn under Jokowi?

**A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION**

Under SBY’s presidency, Indonesia made positive strides in improving its international image and the country’s global stature is on the ascent.\textsuperscript{12} These outcomes were largely attributed to SBY’s outward looking internationalist foreign policy whereby concerted efforts were made “to improve Indonesia’s international image and to enhance its role in Southeast Asia and in the world.”\textsuperscript{13} Despite the successes gained from SBY’s “all directions” foreign policy, which included foreign policy goals of promoting regional and global “stability, peace, and prosperity” and advocating “the creation of a balanced, strong, and sustainable global economic growth” through its membership in the G20, Indonesia’s foreign policy has turned inward-looking and nationalistic under Jokowi.\textsuperscript{14} What set of factors informs Indonesia’s foreign policy during SBY’s drive for multilateralism and cooperation amongst countries and how much of the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi can be explained by changes in these factors? By identifying these casual factors and examining how they shaped the foreign policy


decisions of the two presidents, this thesis seeks to explain the causes of the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Soon after its independence in 1945, Indonesia defined the underlying challenges of its foreign policy as the need to *mendayung antara dua karang* (row between two reefs). In the context of Indonesia’s history of anti-colonial struggle for independence and the Cold War, the metaphor stood for the need to maintain autonomy in the face of antagonistic global power blocs. This dictum of non-alignment has persisted and Indonesia’s foreign policy, subjected to contextualized interpretations of its *bebas-aktif* (independent and active) principle, has continually evolved to fit its national interests and to advance the country’s global standing.15

Although scholars and analysts may use different metrics to assess Indonesia’s power, most will conclude that Indonesia is increasingly recognized as a country on the ascent.16 Based on the archipelagic nation’s size and demographics alone, Indonesia certainly possesses the potential to become a global power. However, much of the government’s efforts to actualize Indonesia’s aspirations of assuming a bigger role in the global arena have been constrained by domestic factors; Indonesia lacks the economic, political, and military capacities to provide a comprehensive and sustainable boost towards becoming a global player.17


In 2007, SBY introduced “navigating a turbulent sea” as a fresh metaphorical description of Indonesia’s foreign policy challenges.18 Having to strike a balance between Indonesia’s aspirations and realities, SBY assessed that Indonesia’s national interests were best served by cultivating friendly diplomatic relations to foster goodwill, engaging in multilateral forums to resolve complex foreign policy problems, and nurturing Indonesia’s positive image as a responsible emerging country. SBY proclaimed Indonesia as “an outward-looking country, eager to shape regional and international order.”19 Through his interpretation of the bebas-aktif principle, SBY’s foreign policy sought to promote Indonesia as “a peace-maker, confidence-builder, problem-solver, bridge-builder.”20 SBY embraced an internationalist outlook and promoted multilateralism in international relations. Over the course of his presidency, he was able to repair Indonesia’s international image through his “a thousand friends, zero enemies” foreign policy.

SBY’s aspirations for Indonesia to become a global power and to wield global influence were significantly hampered by the country’s relatively inferior military strength. SBY’s internationalist foreign policy involved Indonesia as a regional and global actor in a wide range of issues, some more complex and contentious than others. Although SBY was not successful in all his foreign policy activism, his endeavors improved Indonesia’s reputation. Indonesia may not have transformed into a world power under SBY but the country’s sustained efforts to grow its influence through the ASEAN platform produced results and increased Indonesia’s regional leadership.21

Jokowi’s nationalist foreign policy, however, appears to run counter to Indonesia’s aspirations. Jokowi’s assertive and confrontational foreign policy is likely to


strain foreign relations and provoke retaliatory measures from other countries. Compared to SBY’s decade-long presidency, Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi is likely to be marked by less cooperation and more confrontation with other countries. Going forward, identifying the causes of Indonesia’s foreign policy nationalist turn will help to diffuse unintended tensions between Indonesia and its neighbors. Other countries can also formulate appropriate responses in their conduct of foreign relations with Indonesia.

As the only Southeast Asian country in the G20 and the primus inter pares of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia’s foreign policy attracts regional and global attention. Scholars have argued that domestic politics have had extensive impact on Indonesia’s foreign policymaking. Scholars such as Evan A. Laksmana and Jörn Dosch have attributed the divergence between SBY’s intentions and actual actions to Indonesia’s democratization. Both scholars conclude that democracy has complicated Indonesia’s foreign policymaking process through the introduction of new actors and the growing prominence of public opinion in foreign policy. The constraints of domestic politics explain SBY’s occasional inability to make the foreign policy decisions that he wanted.

Investigating the changes in democratic Indonesia’s foreign policymaking, Greta Nabbs-Keller and Dewi Fortuna Anwar argue that the four amendments made between 1999 and 2002 to Indonesia’s 1945 constitution have given the Indonesian House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR) significant power to hold the executive branch accountable for Indonesia’s foreign policy and to disapprove

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international agreements proposed by the government. Notable examples of divergence between the executive and legislative branches of the government include the parliament’s refusal to ratify the Indonesia—Singapore Defence Cooperation Agreement that was signed between the two heads of state and Indonesia’s voting abstention on UN Security Council Resolution 1803 to reaffirm the imposition of sanctions on Iran for nuclear proliferation activities.

Besides the impact of democracy and growing importance of public opinion on Indonesia’s foreign policymaking, scholars such as Anwar and Sukma have examined various domestic factors and their effects on Indonesia’s foreign policy including the state of economy, role of Islam, and nationalism. There is, as Nabbs-Keller attests, unanimous agreement among scholars that domestic politics continue to inform Indonesia’s foreign policy. If so, what were the domestic sources of influence on Indonesia’s foreign policymaking under SBY and Jokowi? By explaining the causes of the nationalistic turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi, this thesis seeks to contribute to scholarship on Indonesia’s foreign policy and the role of domestic politics in foreign policy.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review comprises two sections. The first section reviews how scholars and analysts have characterized Jokowi’s foreign policy and the evidence they use to support their claims of increased nationalism in Jokowi’s approach to foreign policy. The second section reviews how scholars have characterized Indonesian foreign policy during SBY’s presidency and the evidence that show Indonesia’s foreign policy under SBY was less nationalistic.


27 Nabbs-Keller, “Reforming Indonesia’s,” 57.
1. **Characteristics of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Jokowi**

Jokowi’s foreign policy can be characterized in three ways. First, Jokowi’s Global Maritime Axis (GMA) doctrine has a strong focus on domestic development. The doctrine emphasizes the development of Indonesia’s maritime domain for the benefit of Indonesia’s economy. For example, Jokowi wants to reap economic benefits from Indonesia’s vast maritime resources by increasing maritime connectivity among Indonesian islands. Second, Jokowi considers foreign policy primarily as a tool to serve Indonesia’s interests in pragmatic ways. Consequently, Indonesia’s foreign ministry’s has adopted *dipomasi membumi* (down-to-earth diplomacy), which principally aims to serve the needs of Indonesians first. Third, nationalist sentiments in Indonesia’s domestic politics have increased in the aftermath of SBY’s presidency. Jokowi had fought against a highly populist opponent who remains in parliament as leader of the opposition. In formulating Indonesia’s foreign policy, Jokowi will need to take into account the higher level of nationalist sentiments among Indonesians following his election win.

**a. The Nationalist Tone of Jokowi’s GMA Doctrine**

Cognizant of the growing importance of East Asia, Jokowi sees Indonesia favorably positioned to facilitate the global power transition from West to East. Jokowi views Indonesia as a maritime nation strategically positioned in the geographical and ideological center of an ongoing quest for influence amongst global, middle, and emerging powers in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Jokowi intends to capitalize on Indonesia’s geographical position and maritime resources to transform Indonesia into a maritime power astride the sea lanes between two oceans. This vision for Indonesia is encapsulated in his GMA doctrine, which was first mentioned during his presidential campaign and subsequently articulated in greater detail at the East Asia Summit in November 2014.²⁸

Consisting of five components, the GMA doctrine can be summarized as Jokowi’s strategy to develop the economy and grow the country’s influence through exploitation of

Indonesia’s maritime domain and history. To this end, Jokowi’s GMA doctrine entails improving Indonesia’s maritime networks and infrastructure in order for maritime trade to flourish. Indonesia’s maritime defense capabilities will also be bolstered in order to safeguard its maritime resources and ensure maritime security in the region. Jokowi believes that his GMA doctrine will enable Indonesia to realize its potential and transform into a maritime power.

Scholars have pointed out the parallels between Jokowi’s GMA doctrine and the Trisakti principles.\(^{29}\) Indeed, Retno has established that Jokowi’s goals of developing Indonesia’s maritime domain for economic growth, protecting Indonesia’s maritime resources, and tapping into Indonesia’s rich maritime culture and history are embodiments of the Trisakti principles.\(^{30}\) Originally conceptualized in 1963 by Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, the Trisakti principles reflect a time of surging nationalism in Indonesia. Therefore, it is not surprising that with Trisakti as the major influence on Jokowi’s GMA doctrine, Indonesia’s foreign policy has decidedly adopted a more nationalist attitude in its approach.

Based on a detailed examination of Jokowi’s GMA doctrine, Aaron L. Connelly contends that the objectives of Jokowi’s doctrine are mainly focused on domestic developments.\(^{31}\) Connelly notes that the first three pillars of Jokowi’s maritime doctrine, which focuses on Indonesian culture, fisheries, and infrastructure, mainly serve Indonesia’s interests.\(^{32}\) Only the latter two pillars, dealing with diplomacy and defense,

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30 Marsudi, “Annual Press Statement.”


can be considered foreign policy issues. An example of how the GMA doctrine is translated into foreign policy is Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy on illegal fishing. Jokowi claims that the problem of illegal fishing adversely impacts Indonesia’s economy and Indonesia stands to lose Rp 300 trillion annually. Additionally, illegal fishing depletes Indonesian maritime resources and poses a threat to the country’s sovereignty. He has instructed Susi Pudjiastuti, Indonesia’s Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, to put errant fishing vessels through Indonesia’s judicial process and sink vessels that are found guilty of illegal fishing. Through his “sink the vessels” policy, Jokowi has demonstrated his willingness to seek unilateral solutions that are less conciliatory in order to benefit Indonesians. By contrast, SBY handled vessels arrested for illegal fishing differently and seized vessels were not immediately sunk. SBY’s preference for more cooperative options to deal with illegal fishing was reciprocated by Indonesia’s neighbors.

b. Pro-People and Down-to-Earth Foreign Policy

To realize his vision of Indonesia as a maritime global power, Jokowi has renewed Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities to focus on domestic issues. Despite Retno promising “that Indonesia would not abandon its international roles,” Jokowi’s foreign policy reflects a greater emphasis on domestic issues than the foreign policy adopted by SBY. Jokowi’s statements on foreign policy tend to have a strong nationalist tone. For example, at the 25th ASEAN Summit in November 2014, Jokowi remarked that although

33 Ibid., 8.
37 Mietzner, “Repolarization,” 134.
Indonesia supports the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), its establishment must not compromise Indonesia’s national interests.\(^{39}\) On another occasion, when asked if he will continue SBY’s strategy of friendship diplomacy, Jokowi replied that Indonesia will “make friends with all countries; but only when doing so would be beneficial to our people. Do not just make friends if we are disadvantaged.”\(^{40}\) His reply suggested that Indonesia’s main motivation for foreign relations building was how much Indonesia stood to gain from it.\(^{41}\)

Connelly argues that unlike SBY’s lofty aspirations to become an international statesman, Jokowi is mainly interested in using foreign policy to help achieve his domestic reforms.\(^{42}\) Hence, Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities and decisions under Jokowi are markedly different from his predecessor. Jokowi’s standpoint on foreign policy is that it should deliver pragmatic outcomes that benefit Indonesians. In his words, Jokowi wants to “bring diplomacy back to earth … and serve the people in practical ways.”\(^{43}\) To this end, he has asked the foreign ministry to improve the provision of consular service and protection of Indonesian citizens overseas, which Indonesians perceived to have been neglected during SBY’s presidency.

The nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy is clearly articulated by Retno. In Jakarta Globe’s report of her first press conference, Retno was quoted as confirming Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi will be geared towards supporting national interest rather than a continuation of SBY’s international engagements.\(^{44}\) Connelly also cites Retno’s annual foreign minister statement as further evidence of Indonesia’s foreign policy focus on domestic reforms.\(^{45}\) In her speech to deliver the Ministry of Foreign


\(^{41}\) Yahya, “Sidelines,” *Jakarta Post*.


\(^{43}\) Ibid.

\(^{44}\) “‘Thousand Friends’,” *Jakarta Globe*.

Affair’s annual statement, Retno established that Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities over the next five years would be to safeguard Indonesia’s sovereignty, protect Indonesian citizens and legal entities, and strengthen economic diplomacy. Indonesia’s diplomacy, Retno states, will “serve the needs of the people” and “be down-to-earth.” In marked contrast to Retno’s foreign minister statement for 2015, the previous year’s statement given by Marty Natalegawa, the former foreign minister, focused global issues and on the maintenance of regional peace and security. Combined, Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities and approach under Jokowi will, according to Connelly, lead to more contentious relations with its ASEAN neighbors.

Based on Indonesia’s recent high profile foreign policy decisions, such as the “sink the vessels” policy against illegal fishing, the execution of foreigners convicted on drug charges, and the foreign ministry’s articulation of the top priorities in its pro-rakyat (pro-people) foreign policy, Jokowi appears to have fewer qualms about acting unilaterally for Indonesia’s interests even if that provokes other countries. Indonesia’s foreign policy has become more nationalist under Jokowi. In his evaluation of the impact of Jokowi’s presidency on Indonesia’s foreign policy, Connelly concludes that compared to the SBY’s presidency, Indonesia will be reluctant to assume leadership on regional and global issues. Going forward, he argues that Indonesia’s foreign policy will be less coherent in its direction and will adopt a more confrontational and unilateral approach to resolve foreign policy challenges. SBY’s brand of internationalism, espoused in his foreign policy of “a thousand friends, zero enemies,” had stopped.

46 Marsudi, “Annual Press Statement.”
47 Ibid.
50 Ibid., 21.
c. **Rising Nationalism in Domestic Politics**

Nationalism has been rising in Indonesia’s domestic politics and was a dominant theme the candidates employed at the 2014 presidential elections. Nationalism, Sukma explains, is at the root of Indonesia’s principle of *bebas-aktif*, which has guided the country’s foreign policy since independence.\(^5\) Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that nationalism has continued to be a key feature of Indonesia’s domestic politics and foreign policy. Between then and now, Sukma points out that the crucial difference lies in the impact of democracy on the manifestation of nationalism.\(^6\) No longer under the sole purview of the government, the influence of nationalism in Indonesia’s domestic politics and foreign policy has grown more complex. Just as democratization has complicated the process of Indonesia’s foreign policymaking, the democratic expression of nationalism in Indonesia has produced a similar effect.

The global commodities boom during SBY’s presidency enabled resource-rich Indonesia to achieve sustained economic growth.\(^7\) Although Indonesia’s economy grew, it remained reliant on the commodities sector and did not initiate reforms to wean itself off resource-led growth. Indonesia’s economy posted healthy GDP growth but many Indonesians felt that SBY was not able to eradicate the problems of corruption and high incidence of poverty in Indonesia.\(^8\) As the commodities boom started to taper off, Indonesia’s economic outlook weakened. To soften the impact of declining commodity prices on its economy and also to appease growing resentment among Indonesians who felt that foreigners were exploiting Indonesia’s resources, the Indonesian parliament passed a raft of protectionist measures between 2009 and 2014.\(^9\) Despite SBY’s efforts to enact protectionist measures to promote economic growth, the perception that he was ineffective in resolving Indonesia’s domestic problems grew among Indonesians.\(^10\)

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\(^6\) Ibid., 88.
\(^7\) Mietzner, “Repolarization,” 128-9.
\(^8\) Mietzner, “Yudhoyono’s Legacy,” 120-8.
\(^9\) Mietzner, “Repolarization,” 129.
\(^10\) Ibid., 121.
Marcus Mietzner contends, the challenges in Indonesia’s economy required deep structural reforms but the SBY administration adopted “exceedingly nationalist and protectionist policies” that profited “mostly oligarchs with interests in natural resource extraction, agriculture, and horticulture.”\(^{57}\) In other words, SBY’s solutions were not beneficial to Indonesia’s economy in the long run and did not serve the needs of poor Indonesians.

SBY’s reluctance to make hard but necessary political decisions and his misdirected efforts to overcome Indonesia’s economic challenges had unwittingly created a political opportunity for demagogues, such as Prabowo, to exploit.\(^{58}\) Unsurprisingly, nationalism, especially economic nationalism, became the prevailing theme during the 2014 presidential elections.\(^{59}\) Mietzner argues that coupled with the perception of foreign exploitation of Indonesian resources, mounting economic and social problems led to rising nationalism in Indonesia, thereby creating “an environment in which a populist, belligerent challenge to the political stasis was almost inevitable.”\(^ {60}\)

Mietzner explains that Prabowo exploited the growing support for economic nationalism among Indonesians by campaigning on a populist platform that criticized Indonesia’s democracy and favored more protectionist policies.\(^{61}\) With the economy declining and mounting dissatisfaction among Indonesians, Prabowo devised an electoral strategy that sought to convince Indonesians that the root of the country’s problem was the existing democratic regime.\(^ {62}\) Prabowo’s campaign targeted the section of Indonesians who longed for a return to pre-reformasi days and presented the destruction of the current democratic institutional structures as a populist solution to the economic malaise Indonesia was in. By contrast, Jokowi offered a more restrained form of populism in which he disparaged SBY’s failure to bring greater tangible improvements to

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57 Mietzner, “Repolarization,” 129-30
58 Ibid., 121-2.
60 Mietzner, “Repolarization,” 121.
61 Ibid., 130.
62 Ibid., 121-2
the lives of more Indonesians but sought to improve the existing democratic regime by introducing reforms.

2. Characteristics of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under SBY

During SBY’s presidency, Indonesia made great strides in improving its international image and the country enjoyed a period of political and economic stability. In that period, Indonesia’s status as a Muslim-majority country that has successfully consolidated its democracy became its source of soft power. Therefore, Indonesia’s successful democratization enabled SBY to expand the country’s influence. But at the same time, democracy has introduced a range of actors into foreign policy and complicated the process of foreign policymaking in Indonesia. Nevertheless, SBY was able to pursue an internationalist foreign policy that focused on cooperation and multilateralism. Through his foreign policy, SBY sought to be recognized as an international statesman who raised Indonesia’s global influence and actively promoted issues on democracy and human rights.

a. SBY’s Internationalist Outlook

SBY sought to develop Indonesia’s stature as a key global player through his internationalist foreign policy and looked for opportunities to cast Indonesia as an actor of growing importance in international issues. In his speeches to Indonesians, SBY often pointed to Indonesia’s membership in multilateral organizations as “foreign policy successes.” For example, in a speech near the end of his presidency, SBY said the past decade (2004–2014) had been Indonesia’s “golden era” and that Indonesians should be proud of the country’s membership in the G20 and involvement in “global economic decision-making.”


During SBY’s visit to the United Kingdom in 2012, he gave a speech on how Indonesia’s success in democratization and sustained economic growth had “strengthened Indonesia’s capacity to project a new activism in its foreign policy, to play greater and diverse roles, to help shape regional and global order.”

SBY classified the country’s roles in five areas—namely, norm setter, consensus builder, peacekeeper, bridge builder, and voice of the developing world. Supported by a foreign policy that advocated multilateralism, Indonesia performed these roles through its membership in various regional and international organizations such as ASEAN, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the G20, and the United Nations (UN) and achieved varying levels of success in them.

In practicing his concept of “a thousand friends and zero enemies” and an “all directions foreign policy,” SBY picked policies that contributed to the creation of a positive image for Indonesia. In addition, SBY’s penchant for summit diplomacy in foreign affairs was apparent. Beyond intra-ASEAN interactions, Jonathan Chen notes that Indonesia had “enhanced its engagements” in other groupings including the East Asia Summit, G20, and the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), which was initiated by Indonesia in 2008. During SBY’s presidency, Indonesia has also actively engaged on many global issues, such as climate change, and was an ardent supporter of global institutions, including the UN and the UN Security Council.

Despite SBY’s foreign policy activism, Indonesia did not always make significant gains in diplomacy or influence. In a critical assessment of SBY’s foreign policy achievements, Natalie Sambhi asserts that while Indonesia has become “a more


prominent foreign actor” through its involvement in regional and global initiatives, progress towards the goals he set remained elusive. For example, Sambhi cites the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Indo-Pacific and the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG), were initiatives that SBY championed but which produced insignificant results. Without clearly defined roadmaps to realize the treaty, discussions on the TAC for Indo-Pacific have been stalled since December 2013. Considering SBY’s involvement as one of three chairpersons of the MDG panel, Indonesia’s failure to meet the targets set in the MDG is ironic, but it also points to deeper problems that continue to plague the country.

b. Democratization of Foreign Policymaking

Soeharto resigned as president of Indonesia in May 1998 after the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) struck and the Indonesian economy collapsed. His resignation marked the end of the New Order and the start of reformasi (reformation) in Indonesia. The reformasi period saw Indonesia democratizing and foreign policymaking changing. The process of foreign policymaking has become more pluralistic in terms of representation and the policymakers have become more accountable for their policy decisions. Freed from authoritarian rule, Dosch observes that democratic Indonesia has allowed the entry of a larger number of new actors into the field of foreign policy.”

Dosch also makes the point that democratization has shielded foreign policymaking from the military’s influence. The dilution of military influence in Indonesia’s foreign policy is a similar point made by Anwar and Nabbs-Keller. Another common point the scholars share is the observation that Indonesia’s foreign ministry has become more inclusive and consultative in its foreign policymaking. Indeed, Dosch argues that “public opinion has proved to be a decisive factor pushing the respective

70 Sambhi “Australia—Indonesia Relations,” 27-8.
71 Ibid.
72 Dosch, “Impact of Democratization,” 5.
executive towards the prominent consideration of business, human rights, and religious issues” in Indonesia’s young democracy.74

In agreement with Dosch, Nabbs-Keller describes Indonesia’s foreign policymaking as becoming “more deliberative and consultative, and is now subject to the contestation of new and recently unbridled actors including the legislature (DPR), media, public opinion, civil society organizations, and business groups.”75 The new process of foreign policymaking in Indonesia is completely different form the authoritarian approach before reformasi. Anwar observes that Indonesia’s democracy, with the introduction of new foreign policy actors, has witnessed the creation of “multiple centres of power,” and a democratization of Indonesian foreign policymaking.76

A powerful change in Indonesia’s foreign policymaking is the willingness of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) to exercise its constitutional powers and exert domestic political pressure on foreign policy. This change further complicates the process because differences in policy stance between the executive and legislative branches can result in the latter not ratifying treaties signed by the former. For example, Anwar recounts the example of Indonesia reneging on its Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Singapore after Indonesian provinces lobbied the DPR to repudiate the DCA on grounds that “Singaporean military exercises would have an adverse impact on the people’s livelihood.”77 In another example, Anwar describes the confrontation between the DPR and SBY that occurred after Indonesia, being a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council at the time, voted to impose sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program.

Several scholars contend that democratization has affected Indonesia’s ability to keep a consistent set of foreign policies. Laksmana argues that although democratization has expanded Indonesia’s policy scope, it has reduced Indonesia’s ability to maintain “a

75 Nabbs-Keller, “Reforming Indonesia’s,” 57.
77 Ibid., 129-30.
stable and coherent foreign policy.” Anwar explains that because democratization forces Indonesia to consider a wider range of perspectives, Indonesia’s foreign policymaking will “become more sensitive to popular sentiments.” Nabbs-Keller notes that pluralism in Indonesia’s foreign policymaking did not produce better practices or decisions. Instead, under SBY’s presidency, the DPR had politicized Indonesia’s foreign policy issues and wielded them as political tools to challenge the executive branch. According to Nabbs-Keller, democracy “has in many ways made the management of foreign policy issues more inflammatory and difficult for the ministry to contain.”

But by and large, SBY appeared to have successfully quelled domestic political pressures on his foreign policy. The inconsistencies in Indonesia’s foreign policy under SBY have to be measured against the successes of SBY’s diplomatic outreach during his decade-long presidency. Except for a few notable instances when Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions were challenged, SBY had adopted a fairly coherent set of foreign policy for the country. In sum, SBY was able to adopt an internationalist foreign policy while remaining accountable to Indonesians for the country’s foreign policy decisions.

c. Democracy as Soft Power

Besides introducing Indonesia to a more pluralistic and accountable form of foreign policymaking, democracy has also become an important policy tool in the foreign ministry’s agenda. Recognizing the leverage Indonesia’s democratization could provide to SBY’s internationalist foreign policy, the foreign ministry successfully capitalized on the Indonesia’s newly acquired image to promote issues related to democracy and human rights within ASEAN and around the world. This inclusion of “democracy promotion” in Indonesia’s foreign policy has been labelled as the foreign ministry’s “democracy

79 Anwar, “Regional Changes,” 130.
81 Ibid., 71.
82 Anwar, “Regional Changes,” 139.
agenda,” which relies on Indonesia’s relatively rare status as a Muslim-majority democracy developing on a path of moderation and modernization.\textsuperscript{83}

Making a similar observation, Laksmana contends that the foreign ministry view democracy as “a very important source of ‘soft power’” to achieve Indonesia’s foreign policy objectives.\textsuperscript{84} Some of these objectives include improving the country’s international profile, and fostering a peaceful and stable regional environment that is conducive for economic development. Citing the changes taking place in Indonesia’s domestic politics, Nabbs-Keller argues that the country’s democratization, “when combined with Islam and pluralism,” boosted Indonesia’s image and relevance in the international arena.”\textsuperscript{85}

Growing Indonesia’s soft power was not the only reason for Indonesia to promote issues related to democracy and human rights in the region. Equally important was to address an internal demand among Indonesians’ for the promotion of democracy and protection of human rights to be tenets of Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda with its ASEAN neighbors.\textsuperscript{86} Policymakers thought that to introduce democratic principles to ASEAN countries could allow democratic Indonesia “to align Indonesia’s external stance with its core values at home, which now include respect for democracy and human rights.”\textsuperscript{87} But as noted by Jürgen Rüland and Dosch, both of whom have examined the impact of democracy on foreign policymaking in democratic Indonesia, the government was not always successful in reconciling the promotion of democratic principles in the region and the constraints imposed by ASEAN’s emphasis on consensus and non-interference.\textsuperscript{88}

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83 Poole, “Foreign Policy Nexus,” 157.
85 Nabbs-Keller, “Reforming Indonesia’s,” 73.
86 Anwar, “Regional Changes,” 133.
87 Ibid., 132.
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Indonesia’s drive to promote democratic principles and protect human rights in ASEAN took a number of forms and returned varying results. Collectively, the member countries of ASEAN established the ASEAN Charter in 2007, which “calls for the establishment of an ASEAN human rights body as a new organ of ASEAN” for the “promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of peoples in ASEAN.”89 But the charter attracted criticism within Indonesia for lacking the necessary power to impose sanctions on countries that violate human rights. While the absence of constituted powers to protect citizens against human rights abuses in the ratified ASEAN Charter was in line with the “ASEAN Way” of non-interference, it was negatively viewed by Indonesians who felt spurned by the other ASEAN countries. Such a situation similarly developed in the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in October 2009. Indonesia’s foreign ministry felt that in both instances, the country faced overwhelming opposition from the rest of the ASEAN members and felt compelled to compromise on regional mechanisms that provide oversight on human rights issues.90 Consequently, the disparity between what Indonesians expected of the ASEAN Charter and what the member countries finally agreed on led public and political actors to question the value of keeping ASEAN centrality as part of Indonesia’s foreign policy.91

Beyond ASEAN, Indonesia also kept issues on democracy and human rights high on its agenda for diplomatic interactions. Under SBY, Indonesia has been “eager to share its experiences on democratic transition with other leaders of aspiring democracies.”92 For example it initiated the annual Bali Democracy Forum in 2008, which is seen as a platform for states in the Asia-Pacific region to “exchange lessons learnt and experiences


90 Anwar, “Regional Changes,” 134.


on democracy.”93 SBY proudly branded the BDF as a “premier inter-governmental forum for exchanging ideas and sharing experiences on democracy in the region.”94 Reviews of the BDF are mixed: the BDF’s effectiveness in promoting democracy is unproven and its inclusion of authoritarian regimes such as China and Myanmar has been criticized as much as it has been lauded. Indonesia also made forays into the Middle East by advocating for the rights of the Palestinian people and encouraging democratic transition in the Middle East. Indonesia’s “advice on finding the right mix of religion and politics,” Anwar claims, was “sought by a number of Muslim countries, notably Egypt and Tunisia” following the Arab Spring. Without the necessary economic, political, or military clout, the combination of Islam, democracy, and modernization becomes an important source of soft power for Indonesia. Such a combination, considerably rare in a world where news of the turmoil of Middle Eastern Islamic countries dominates the headlines, is viewed by Indonesian foreign policymakers as leverage for widening and deepening diplomatic ties and raising Indonesia’s international image.

3. Domestic Politics and the Nationalist Turn in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy

Comparing the literature on the two presidents’ foreign policies highlights the differences between the two presidents’ foreign policies and helps to define the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi. The literature also show that changes in Indonesia’s domestic politics have correspondingly led to changes in Indonesia’s identity, the country’s view of its role in the world, and the process of foreign policymaking. Changes in the regional and international environment have also affected Indonesia’s foreign policy directions. Indonesia’s democratization, however, has been the dominant influence on the country’s foreign policy during SBY’s presidency. Indonesia’s democratization has raised the country’s international profile. Democracy also meant that political elites can no longer afford to dismiss domestic politics and public opinion in process of foreign policymaking.

93 Poole, “Foreign Policy Nexus,” 157.

a. Defining the Nationalist Turn in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy

In comparison with SBY’s preference for cooperation and conflict avoidance, Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions have indicated Jokowi’s willingness to take unilateral actions and lesser regard to be conciliatory. Therefore, compared to SBY’s internationalist foreign policy, Jokowi’s foreign policy is more nationalist. However, there is no evidence of hypernationalism in Indonesia: Jokowi’s foreign policy indicates a change in priorities, switching from global to domestic issues, but does not appear to exhibit chauvinism or xenophobia in its diplomatic interactions. Indonesia’s economic nationalism has certainly increased in response to declining commodity prices. Although the state of the economy certainly appears to be a significant determinant, however, that alone cannot account for the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Jokowi’s adherence to the Trisakti principles in the approach taken by the Indonesian foreign ministry appears to be a contributing factor but the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy should really be described as multidimensional.

Examining the differences between the foreign policies of SBY and Jokowi reveals three aspects of Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi that can define the nationalist turn. First, Indonesia’s foreign policy has undergone a domestication process and has focused on domestic issues. The foreign ministry has reduced its emphasis on regional and global issues such as climate change and issues related to democracy and human rights in its foreign policy agenda. Indonesia is also less interested in promoting its role as the bridge for the Islam—West divide, moderator for complex international disputes, and representative of less developed countries in economic groupings. For example, the foreign minister has consistently mentioned the change in foreign policy direction to focus on domestic issues and pledged in the ministry’s annual statement to provide better consular services for its overseas migrant workers. While Indonesia has been paying attention to the plight of Indonesians working overseas under poor conditions, this marks the first time it has featured as a foreign policy priority.

The second aspect is Jokowi’s willingness to take unilateral actions to resolve problems that may affect diplomatic relations. Unlike SBY’s preference for multilateralism and cooperation, Jokowi seems more concerned with being seen to be
taking decisive actions than with seeking effective solutions. For instance, although Indonesia is unlikely to singlehandedly resolve the problem of illegal fishing in its waters that has not stopped Jokowi from conducting his “sink the vessels” policy, which is decidedly a unilateral action. This is a marked deviation from SBY’s collaborative approach in which the problem of illegal fishing was treated as a multifaceted regional problem, not just a domestic one. As such, sustainable solutions would require cooperation and coordination with neighboring countries. Although SBY made negligible progress, he consistently pressed for cooperation and a regional solution for illegal fishing. On the other hand, Jokowi, sensing the lack of improvement to the illegal fishing problem has caused exasperation in Indonesians, took the more expedient approach by unilaterally enforcing domestic laws over foreign vessels seized for illegal fishing in Indonesian waters.

The final aspect of Jokowi’s nationalism is that Indonesia has less regard for the impact of its foreign policy decisions on diplomatic ties and will act in a confrontational manner if it is in its interest to do so. For instance, Indonesia certainly has the sovereign right to exercise its own laws but its insistence to do so on sensitive policy issues such as the dramatic sinking of seized foreign fishing vessels and execution of convicted foreign drug smugglers has caused bilateral relations to deteriorate. Jokowi’s decision to assert Indonesia’s sovereign right may advance domestic objectives and feed into populist sentiments at home and may even help to relieve domestic pressures generated by Indonesians who want quick resolutions to what they view as national problems. Such aggressive foreign policy decisions, however, jeopardizes Indonesia’s diplomacy with other countries. Moreover, in the long run, Indonesia’s confrontational approach may not produce the desired results and could prompt tit-for-tat actions instead. Countries on the receiving end of Indonesia’s assertiveness may reciprocate by becoming more antagonistic towards Indonesia.

b. The Domestic Roots of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy

A consistent overarching theme in the scholarship on the roots of Indonesia’s foreign policy is the assertion that domestic politics have significantly shaped Indonesia’s
foreign policy. Such an assertion is neither new nor unique in the study of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Indeed, Sukma argues that Indonesia’s foreign policy has always reflected the country’s domestic politics.95 Scholars and analysts have focused their research on the changes in Indonesia’s domestic politics to trace the determinants of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Although their research do not preclude contextualizing changes in Indonesia’s foreign policy directions to the regional and international environment, the literature highlights the impact of changes in domestic politics on foreign policy. These changes, in turn, enable the concomitant expansion of foreign policy space in certain areas and reduction of foreign policy activism in others.

The scholarship on Indonesia’s post-reformasi foreign policy has tended to focus on the impact of democracy. Much of the scholarship, Nabbs-Keller asserts, is focused on assessing two effects of Indonesia’s democratization.96 The first effect is DPR’s role in raising transparency and introducing plurality in Indonesia’s foreign policymaking. The second effect is the incompatibility between democratic principles and existing political norms within Indonesia and the region. Indeed, Indonesia’s democratization and the impact it has on foreign policy and policymaking have been intensely studied. In response to the narrow focus in previous literature, Nabbs-Keller’s research widens the scholarship by examining the role of the reformed foreign ministry and the foreign ministers of the time in driving change in the country’s foreign policy.97

Scholars have pointed out different ways in which domestic politics shaped Indonesia’s foreign policy. For example, Sukma asserts that Indonesia’s foreign policy “remains subject to both the facilitating and constraining effects of domestic political factors” such as “the state of Indonesia’s democracy, the role of Islam, the assertion of nationalism, and the presence of persistent domestic weakness.”98 Avery Poole argues that unequal distribution of economic gains from Indonesia’s democracy agenda has

96 Nabbs-Keller, “Reforming Indonesia’s,” 57.
97 Ibid.
98 Sukma, “Constraints and Possibilities,” 82.
resulted Indonesians “seeking to challenge the domestic democratic project” and demanding the government to serve their needs.\textsuperscript{99} In addition, Anwar contends that the introduction of pluralism and transparency to the Indonesian foreign policymaking process has presented “both constraints and opportunities to the traditional foreign policy establishment.”\textsuperscript{100} Here, Anwar and Laksmana make a similar point when they both describe how democracy has complicated Indonesia’s foreign policymaking but also provided Indonesia with a source of soft power. And it is with this soft power that SBY was able to expand Indonesia’s foreign policy space and fulfil the aspiration of Indonesia becoming a global player in international relations.

The prime drivers of Indonesia’s foreign policy, as Paige Johnson Tan assesses, are contextualized to the country’s domestic politics and needs.\textsuperscript{101} Although Indonesian political leaders aspire to achieve great things for Indonesia through an activist foreign policy, the country’s political and economic conditions, and sometimes even natural disasters, provide a practical limit on Indonesia’s aspirations.\textsuperscript{102} Tan gives the example of SBY taking office at a time when Indonesia’s international image was tarnished in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis and the economy needed a boost in terms of foreign investments and aid.\textsuperscript{103} Thus, in order to meet domestic needs, SBY had to steer Indonesia’s foreign policy towards rebuilding Indonesia’s image and promoting multilateralism. It was within such a domestic context that SBY’s internationalist foreign policy was developed and sustained.

Just as domestic politics have shaped SBY’s foreign policy approach and decisions, Jokowi will have to accordingly adjust to accommodate domestic political pressures. Jokowi’s presidency and foreign policy must be situated within Indonesia’s domestic context in order to determine the causes of Indonesia’s nationalist turn. While much of the literature has focused on the relationship between Indonesia’s domestic

\textsuperscript{99} Poole, “Foreign Policy Nexus,” 169.
\textsuperscript{100} Anwar, “Regional Changes,” 139.
\textsuperscript{102} Tan, “Navigating,” 149.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 179.
political factors and the country’s foreign policy, due to Jokowi’s relatively short period of presidency for assessment, it has been limited to evaluations of SBY’s presidency. A year has passed since Jokowi took office and there is sufficient scope for research that concentrates on examining the dominant domestic political pressures that have shaped Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi and evaluating the changes in domestic politics during the transition between the two presidents.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

During SBY’s presidency, there was strong domestic support for Indonesia to promote democracy and human rights issues. That support enabled SBY to advance his internationalist foreign policy. On the contrary, rising nationalism in Indonesia’s domestic politics during Jokowi’s presidency meant that the president had to reflect such a domestic trend by trumpeting nationalism in his foreign policy. However, the nationalism in Indonesia’s foreign policy can also be accounted for by Jokowi’s perception of what foreign policy should bring to Indonesia, his desire to improve the welfare of Indonesians, and the strong domestic priorities in his GMA doctrine to develop Indonesia’s maritime domain to benefit Indonesians. The need to provide for the economic needs of Indonesians is especially relevant as commodity prices have declined and adversely affected Indonesia’s natural resource-dependent economy.

In addition, Jokowi is the first Indonesian president who is not considered a member of the elite.104 Unlike SBY who was a former military general and wielded significant influence with Indonesian elite circle, Mietzner notes that Jokowi “had to make numerous compromises with established elites” in order to mount a credible campaign against his opponent.105 These differences affect the strength of each president’s political coalition and their ability to push ahead with national reforms and a foreign policy that supports those reforms.


105 Mietzner, “Repolarization,” 126.
Scholars exploring the determinants of Indonesia’s foreign policy do consider the regional and international context in which Indonesia’s foreign relations are conducted, but the majority premises their research, in varying proportions, on the impact of domestic factors on Indonesia’s foreign policy. The impact of democracy on Indonesia’s foreign policy was the prime candidate for scholarly research because democratization caused significant changes across a broad spectrum of Indonesia’s domestic politics. During SBY’s presidency the rising influence of democratic principles in foreign policymaking was the single most impactful change in Indonesia’s domestic politics. Consequently, in the last decade, Indonesia’s democratization and its effect on Indonesia’s foreign policy became the most studied aspect of Indonesian domestic factors.

The literature review on the dominant factors that shape Indonesia’s foreign policy has led to the hypothesis that will be investigated. This thesis will examine three domestic factors that have shaped Indonesia’s assertive foreign policy under Jokowi: the state of Indonesia’s economy, public opinion on Jokowi’s administration, and the strength of the president’s political coalition. This thesis argues that these three domestic factors have evolved considerably over the course of the two presidencies. In turn, Jokowi’s interpretation of and response to these changes, subjected to the constraints imposed on a democratic system, caused the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

E. METHOD AND SOURCES

The thesis will discuss how each of the three selected domestic factors had appeared in the respective presidencies and had given rise to the two different foreign policies. Next, the hypothesis will be tested against evidence from Indonesia’s illegal fishing problem -- an issue both presidents faced. This will determine if changes in the three domestic factors that occur during the presidential transition have indeed caused the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Evidence for the case study will be obtained from a mix of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources will include ministerial statements and records on Indonesia’s
stance on the eradication of illegal fishing in Indonesian waters. Newspaper articles, Indonesian and non-Indonesian, will also be used to track official statements made by the various Indonesian ministries. Secondary sources will largely be from scholarly articles and newspaper reports.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

The thesis consists of four chapters. The first half of the thesis surveys the literature on Indonesia’s foreign policy, defines the nationalism in the current foreign policy, and describes the domestic factors that have shaped the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi. The second half of the thesis describes the case study and test the hypothesis.

This introductory chapter has outlined the research question and stated its significance. The chapter highlights the characteristics of the two presidents’ foreign policies and by comparing both presidents’ foreign policies, the nationalist turn that has taken place in Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi was defined. A survey of the scholarship on the sources of influence in Indonesia’s foreign policy indicates how domestic politics matter in Indonesian foreign policymaking.

The second chapter describes changes in the three domestic factors that took place under the two presidents. The chapter discusses how changes in the three domestic factors generated diametrically opposite foreign policies.

Chapter III examines Indonesia’s “sink the vessels” policy as a case study. It discusses in detail the context of Jokowi’s decision to take a hardline approach on illegal fishing and examines why, in comparison to SBY’s approach, his approach is considered nationalistic.

The final chapter analyzes and tests the hypothesis against the evidence from the case study. The analysis of the “sink the vessels” policy shows that Indonesia’s nationalist foreign policy has to be understood in relation to internal and external tensions the president faces. Finally, the thesis concludes with the scholastic and policy implications of the hypothesis.
II. THE DOMESTIC ROOTS OF INDONESIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

A. THE INCREASING INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS IN INDONESIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

Democracy has significantly increased the influence of domestic politics on Indonesian foreign policymaking because democratic governments are expected to be accountable for their foreign policy goals and decisions to the electorate. Researching on the impact of democratization on the making of foreign policy in former authoritarian regimes, Dosch argues that accountability has limited influence on foreign policymaking in authoritarian regimes. By contrast, accountability in a democracy can legitimately impose in a democracy restrictions on the government’s foreign policy.106 Hence, Indonesia under authoritarian regime was able to negate much of the domestic political pressure on the conduct of foreign policy but foreign policy in democratic Indonesia is constrained by support from both the president’s political coalition and the electorate. As a democracy, Indonesia faces the same requirements of being accountable and this has led to domestic politics having a greater influence after the post-New Order reforms.

1. Two-level Game

Researching Indonesia and other democracies in Southeast Asia, Dosch refers to Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory, which contends that foreign policymaking can be thought of as a game the government plays in two contexts: one at the national level and the other at the international level.107 At the national level, domestic interest groups, who form part of the electorate, pressure the government to adopt preferred foreign policy. In return, the government seeks support from these domestic interest groups to remain in office. At the international level, the government makes foreign policy decisions that generate maximal support from domestic interest groups, yet keep the risk

of jeopardizing diplomatic relationships to the minimal.\textsuperscript{108} Therefore, the democratized Indonesian government is often constraint by having to meet conflicting domestic and international demands as politicians try to take an approach to foreign policy that domestic interest groups find acceptable yet maximizes benefit to the country.

Building on the application of the two-level game theory in Indonesia’s foreign policymaking process, Dosch draws on Joe Hagan’s nuanced analysis of the theory’s application at the national level. Hagan expands the national level political game and argues that politicians actually have to contemporaneously engage in two, not one, national level games.\textsuperscript{109} In the first national level game, because other domestic political entities may share control over foreign policy decisions, the government is pressured to form political coalitions to smoothen the decision-making process. In the second national level game, because the government wants to retain its political dominance across electoral cycles, it is pressured to take the approach that will garner the greatest domestic support.\textsuperscript{110} Hagan’s analysis of the dynamics created from the games played at the national level are reflective of the political environment in which SBY and Jokowi operate in.

2. \textbf{Winning Moves in the Two-level Game}

Dosch’s research shows how foreign policy and domestic politics is intricately intertwined in Indonesia. In his conclusion, Dosch highlights public opinion becoming a pivotal domestic political factor in Indonesia that guides the government “towards the prominent consideration of business, human rights and religious issues.”\textsuperscript{111} As a democracy, it is also obvious that Indonesian foreign policymakers cannot ignore the importance of strong political coalitions as they play the two-level game rationalizing national and international pressures. So long as Indonesia remains economically and politically interdependent with other countries, its decision-makers will need to play the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{108} Putnam, “Two-Level Games,” 434.
\textsuperscript{109} Dosch, “Impact of Democratization,” 45-6.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 66.
\end{flushright}
two-level game. In the current reality of globalized international trade and politics, Indonesia cannot choose otherwise. In addition, the two-level game played by Indonesian foreign policymakers adds another constraint to those already imposed by the country’s lack of clout in the economics, political, and military realms to fulfil Indonesia’s aspirations for global leadership.

Conventional wisdom suggests that a president should face less resistance in advancing his preferred foreign policy if the country he is running has a positive economic outlook. Likewise, a president should have a positive public opinion, as reflected in approval rating polls, if his foreign policy approach finds favor with domestic interest groups. The process of foreign policymaking among the political leadership will also be smoother and more aligned with the preferred direction of the president if supported by a strong political coalition.

Returning to Putnam’s two-level game analogy of the political complexities, he describes the possibility of opportunities for astute leaders to devise a coherent set of policy moves that provide winning outcomes across all levels of the game. In his words, Putnam says that occasionally, “clever players will spot a move on one board that will trigger realignments on other boards.”\(^{112}\) This thesis will show that SBY did indeed spot such an opportunity during his presidency. Through his internationalist foreign policy, SBY was able to “trigger realignments” across Indonesia’s domestic and international politics. However, the domestic and international conditions that created such an opportunity for SBY’s internationalist foreign policy to flourish changed in his second term. Jokowi is attempting to find an opportune time to “trigger alignments” through his GMA doctrine.

In the meantime, however, domestic politics do not allow Jokowi to have more liberty in foreign policymaking. But Jokowi has to remain in the game and will therefore need to implement a foreign policy that best fits the situation. Similar to Putnam’s description of a player in the two-level game, Jokowi will seek to “satisfy domestic

\(^{112}\) Putnam, “Two-Level Games,” 434.
pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.” The remaining sections of this chapter will describe the pressures three domestic factors, namely the state of Indonesia’s economy, public opinion of the president, and strength of the president’s political coalition, exerted during the respective presidencies and how changes in these domestic factors influenced their foreign policy approaches.

B. SBY’S PRESIDENCY: INDONESIA’S GOLDEN DECADE?

When Professor Klaus Schwab, founder and chairman of the World Economic Forum (WEF) presented SBY with the “Global Statesman Award” in the Philippines in May 2014, he described the period of SBY’s presidency as Indonesia’s “Golden Years.” Indonesia’s past decade under SBY has indeed seen a period of high economic growth. Indonesians rewarded SBY’s leadership by returning him as president for a second term with a landslide victory in 2009. Popular support of SBY peaked when he was running as a candidate in the 2009 Indonesian presidential elections and went into decline halfway through his second term until he left office in 2014.

1. State of Economy

When SBY was sworn into office on 20 October 2004, the Indonesian economy was starting to show signs of recovery from the devastation of the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis but had not shaken off its reputation “as an economic and political ‘basket case.’” Indonesia’s economy, in comparison with the immediate aftermath of the AFC, experienced a period of sustained economic growth during SBY’s presidency and it was especially apparent as he started his second term as president.

The economy had contracted by 13.1 percent in 1998 but was able to rebound to 5 percent growth by 2004. During SBY’s first term as president, Indonesia’s foreign direct investments were low due to widespread perceptions of internal instability. Indonesia’s

113 Putnam, “Two-Level Games,” 434.


average foreign direct investment (FDI) growth as a percentage of GDP in the period between the AFC and SBY’s presidency was -1.1 percent. As SBY entered his second term, the economy had fully recovered and Indonesia had paid off its IMF debt. Indonesia was gaining a reputation of an emerging economic powerhouse in the region, if not the world. Recognition of Indonesia’s economic potential was cemented in 2008 when the country was inaugurated into the G20 major economies.

The growth rate for Indonesia’s FDI was increased during his second term. FDI increased from an average of 1.5 percent during his first term and steadied at 2.4 percent average during his second. During SBY’s decade-long presidency, Indonesia’s GDP growth peaked at 6.3 percent in 2007. In fact, SBY pointed out in a newspaper interview that “Indonesia’s economic growth averaged 5.9 percent from 2009 to 2013, much higher than the US, Europe, Japan, or other regional peers.”

Based on GDP and FDI growth rates, the SBY administration improved Indonesia’s economy. Compared to its collapse during the AFC, the Indonesian economy did not suffer from a precipitous drop during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–08. Indonesia’s GDP growth rates declined from 6 percent in 2008 to 4.6 percent in 2009 and rebounded rapidly to reach a pre-crisis growth level of 6.2 percent in 2010. Instead of widespread turmoil that characterized the country during the AFC, Indonesia was praised for showing resilience during the GFC.

By 2012, on the back of declining commodity prices, Indonesia’s GDP growth rate started to decline and dropped to 5 percent in 2014. By most measures, 5 percent GDP growth was laudable especially when global commodity prices were declining. A greater concern that threatened SBY’s legacy of economic stability, however, was the problem of inequality. Generally, declining poverty rates and income inequality indicated that the economic growth had been inclusive and the country as a whole had benefited


from its economic endeavors. In SBY’s first term, Indonesia’s poverty rates reduced from 16.7 percent to 14.2 percent.\textsuperscript{119} In his campaign for re-election in 2009, SBY promised to reduce poverty rates to below 10 percent within five years.\textsuperscript{120} Although Indonesia’s poverty rates were reduced by 2.9 percent to 11.3 percent in 2014, the spotlight was focused on SBY’s failure to deliver on his promise.\textsuperscript{121}

The World Bank published a critical report on Indonesia’s problem of inequality in October 2014. The reported stated that despite halving its poverty rates from 24 percent to 12 percent between 1999 and 2012, Indonesia’s Gini coefficient had risen from 0.32 to 0.41 in the same period.\textsuperscript{122} Between 1996 and 2005, the Gini coefficient inched up from 0.31 to 0.34. But between 2008 and 2012, the Gini coefficient shot up from 0.34 to 0.41 and showed that the widening of income gap had accelerated during SBY’s presidency.

In sum, SBY’s presidency saw a period of GDP growth and economic stability for Indonesia. Judging by the economy’s ability to weather the GFC, SBY’s economic policy had been effective in bringing sustained growth during his tenure. But as the end of his second term neared, the structural weaknesses in Indonesia’s economy were exposed. A global downturn in commodities trade showed that Indonesian economy was heavily reliant on commodities trade and vulnerable to the sector’s price changes. In addition, Indonesia’s economic growth was not equally shared among Indonesian; Indonesia’s income distribution worsened and the drop in poverty rates failed to impress the Indonesians.

\textsuperscript{119} “World DataBank—World Development Indicators—Indonesia.”
\textsuperscript{121} “World DataBank—World Development Indicators—Indonesia.”
2. Public Opinion

The number of opinion polls on political matters has increased in the post-
reformasi period and has become a vital political indicator that politicians ignore at their
own peril. Opinion polls have caused a number of effects that are novel in Indonesian
politics. One of the effects is that political actors and institutions are more attuned to
the demands of the voters and have to make decisions that the electorate finds acceptable.
Unlike the era of authoritarian rule, Mietzner observes that contemporary Indonesian
politicians must take voters’ preferences into consideration, which is consistent with the
analysis of the two-level game. Politicians who do not provide adequate and timely
responses to the electorate demands have borne the consequences by failing to stay in
public office.

As a democratically elected president, SBY was not immune to political trends in
Indonesia and, according to Edward Aspinall, was “notoriously sensitive to public
opinion.” SBY’s consideration of public opinion reflected the way he viewed his role
as the leader of a democracy and his realistic assessment that the president’s legitimacy
was dependent on the electorate. SBY’s attention to the vagaries of Indonesian public
opinion paid off in the months leading up to the presidential elections in July 2009.
Although SBY’s proposal to cut fuel prices earlier in the year drew protests from other
presidential candidates, the Gallup Poll of Indonesia showed that 92 percent of
Indonesians approved of SBY’s performance between April and May 2009, just in time
for elections. Opinion polls proved to be an accurate assessment of SBY’s popularity
because he won more than 60 percent of the votes in the first round of voting and
returned as Indonesia’s president without the need for a run-off vote.

123 Marcus Mietzner, “Political Opinion Polling in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: Catalyst or Obstacle
to Democratic Consolidation?” Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia 165, no. 1
124 Mietzner, “Political Opinion,” 96.
125 Ibid., 95.
126 Edward Aspinall, “The Yudhoyono Legacy,” The Strategist, August 7, 2015,
127 Julie Ray, “Most Indonesians Approve of Incumbent Ahead of Election,” Gallup, July 3, 2009,
There were several factors that helped SBY maintain relatively high levels of approval ratings throughout much of his presidency. For example, SBY’s management of the 2004 tsunami crisis in Aceh and the subsequent peaceful resolution of the region’s separatist conflict had impressed Indonesians. SBY’s commendable performance as leader of a country in crisis was all the more impressive given that the natural disaster had struck in the early part of his presidency. The approval ratings for SBY appear to correlate directly with Indonesia’s economic performance. Indonesia’s post-AFC economic recovery and news of the country paying off its IMF debt in 2006 boosted the president’s approval ratings. According to LSI’s polls, SBY’s approval ratings rose from 67 percent in December 2006 to peak at 85 percent in July 2009.

During SBY’s second term, his approval ratings steadily declined from its peak to 70 percent in January 2010 and to 63 percent in December 2010. Tracking the opinion polls conducted by the Indonesian Survey Circle (LSI-C), public opinion of SBY continued to grow negative and his approval ratings fell below 50 percent in June 2011 to 47.2 percent and bottomed out at 30 percent in May 2013. Besides economic causal factors, the public’s increasing awareness of pervasive corruption that continued to plague Indonesian politics also kept SBY’s approval ratings low. A series of high profile cases cast doubts on the government’s ability to eradicate corruption and the president’s integrity. For the rest of his presidency, SBY was unable to recover from the decline and led to widespread dissatisfaction with the president’s indecisiveness in the handling of national problems.

132 Ibid., 121.
Despite the decline in his second term, SBY’s “approval ratings … would have been the envy of most democratically elected leaders.”133 Taken together, public opinion of SBY throughout his presidency was generally positive. SBY had proven his leadership and won the support of Indonesians. This support translated into an impressive first round victory at the 2009 presidential elections where SBY fended off challenges from two other presidential candidates.

3. **Strength of the President’s Political Coalition**

Winning an Indonesian presidential election by a large margin is certainly the result of strong support from the electorate but that does not necessarily equate to having a strong political mandate. The political disconnect between the Indonesian polity and its people is caused by the victorious presidential candidate forming a broad political coalition in order to achieve a majority in parliament. In the context of Indonesian politics, Aspinall, Mietzner, and Dirk Tomsa argue that coalitions constitute political parties that seek alliance in order to gain access to a share of state power for private gains, “rather than to identify opportunities to steer policy.”134 There are few, if at all, shared political philosophical similarities within the coalition. The transactional rather than ideational nature of coalition forming has become a feature of Indonesian politics.

During his first term, SBY formed a cabinet that consisted of politicians from seven parties and held 73 percent of the DPR. After his re-election, SBY formed his cabinet with politicians from a reduced six-party coalition but retained a high 75 percent majority of the seats in the DPR.135 Theoretically, forming a majority coalition should ease the process of policymaking because bills motioned in parliament are more likely to be passed. In practice, because of problems such as conflicts of interest and misaligned policy directions, SBY often had to play the role of the “moderating president.”136

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135 Ibid.
136 Ibid., 2-3.
Instead of making hard political decisions and assuming responsibility for them, SBY’s approach was to delay, and even to avoid, controversial decisions. Such an approach, when used indiscriminately and repeatedly, diluted SBY’s leadership and caused critics to view him as an indecisive leader.

As the political moderator of his coalition, SBY sought consensus among the members but will avoid issues that have intractable differences between parties or individuals in the coalition. SBY’s propensity to avoid confrontation and preference for stability led him to focus on resolving problems that are less controversial. Problems that the Indonesian president is required to tackle, however, are usually complex and contentious problems. The domestic issue of fuel subsidies illustrated SBY’s indecisiveness. Despite knowing that fuel subsidies were taking up more than a fifth of the country’s budget and should be reduced to fund urgent infrastructure investments, SBY was unable to decisively increase subsidized fuel prices. He has repeatedly backed down after proposing to increase subsidized fuel prices and opposition to proposed fuel subsidies cut come from both the public and within the coalition.137

SBY saw the need to form a broad political coalition as a necessity of Indonesian politics and took a utilitarian view on his role as a president. He acknowledged that a broad coalition can provide him with the political support to facilitate policymaking and remain in power but the different political parties that comprise the coalition can also bring incompatible political stances that divide the polity. As president and leader of the coalition, SBY assessed that he should “moderate these divisions by mediating between the conflicting forces and interests to which they gave rise” and thereby reduced himself to function as “a moderator rather than a decision-maker.”138

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C. JOKOWI’S RISE: INHERITING ASIA’S NEXT POWERHOUSE?

Jokowi’s rise in Indonesian politics has been meteoric. Less than a decade after starting in his political career as mayor of Surakarta (Solo), Jokowi was nominated as a presidential candidate in the 2014 presidential elections. As mayor of Surakarta between 2005 and 2012 and governor of Jakarta between 2012 and 2014, Jokowi was known for his hands-on approach, emphasis on transparency, and penchant for reforms. Leading up to his victory in the presidential elections, Jokowi had gained a reputation of being reform-minded and effective as a public administrator. Jokowi developed his popular hands-on approach in which he conducts unannounced visits *(blusukan)* to poor areas under his administration to understand the challenges faced by the poor. During the presidential elections, he started out as a strong favorite but rapidly lost ground to Prabowo who ran a more polished campaign that sought to undermine the prevailing democratic regime and focused on economic nationalism. In the end, Jokowi was able to maintain the lead and won the elections by highlighting the importance of good governance and accountability.

1. State of Economy

In many ways, there is much to celebrate about the Indonesian economy Jokowi inherited from SBY in 2014. Indonesia’s economic performance under SBY had several notable positive points. Except for the one year immediately following the GFC, Indonesia’s GDP grew by at least 5 percent every year. Poverty rates did not fall below SBY’s target of 8 to 10 percent but have seen a modest 5.4 percent decline from 16.7 percent to 11.3 percent. Unemployment has seen some improvement with rates dropping from 9.9 percent to 5.9 percent. Alongside Mexico, Nigeria, and Turkey, Indonesia is part of the MINT countries. Similar to the term BRIC, which is formed by Brazil, Russia, India, and China, MINT represents a new bloc of countries identified to possess the economic potential to take-off in the coming years ahead. Plaudits have poured in with some claiming Indonesia to be Asia’s next China.139 While Indonesia’s macroeconomic

indicators appear healthy, the economy has structural problems that Jokowi’s administration will have to resolve.

SBY’s exit from office in October 2014 coincided with Indonesia showing signs of a weakening economy. Indonesia’s capital market, as with many other developing economies, is vulnerable to capital outflows in response to news of the United States Federal Reserve announcing the impending end of quantitative easing. The value of the Indonesian rupiah dropped below Rp 15,000 against the dollar, which represents rates that were last seen during the AFC.140 With the global outlook on economic growth softening and China’s economy slowing down, decreasing demand for commodities have sent prices tumbling and economies that are reliant on commodities trade, such as Indonesia and Australia, have suffered.141 Falling commodity prices have put pressures on Indonesia’s economy and exposed the country’s economic vulnerability in that it is heavily dependent on the performance of the commodity sector.

Sustained improvements in Indonesia macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth rates, poverty rates, and unemployment rates belie the structural problems that exist in the Indonesian economy. Economic data and accolades, Mietzner says, “may have lulled the Indonesian Government and public in the wrong belief that the country’s economic development is inevitable and thus does not require the sort of major infrastructure effort other nations have undertaken.”142 Comparing the investments on infrastructure in Indonesia, China, and India, Mietzner observes that the 3.9 percent of its GDP Indonesia spent on infrastructure in 2009 was much lesser, much less than the 10.4 percent and 7.5 percent China and India respectively spent on infrastructure in the same year.143 Indonesia’s expenditure on infrastructure was certainly lagging. In May 2011, SBY announced the Master Plan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia’s


143 Ibid., 127.
Economic Development (MP3EI), which included plans for $468.5 billion worth of investments, including in infrastructure projects, to be made over the next 14 years.\textsuperscript{144} Although Indonesia’s economy seems poised for growth in the short run, the assessment is that the country’s infrastructure is in urgent need of investment.

Jokowi did not waste time addressing the economy’s needs. Besides targeting to increase infrastructure spending, his economic policy had a strong focus on improving the quality of the Indonesian workforce. To that end, the government launched the Productive Family welfare program, which comprises the Prosperous Family Card (KKS), the Indonesia Health Card (KIS), and the Indonesia Smart Card (KIP) in November 2014.\textsuperscript{145} Collectively, the program aims to improve accessibility to education and health services by providing free health insurance to impoverished Indonesia’s and reducing the cost of education. In order to fund his welfare program, Jokowi announced that fuel subsidies will be cut and in doing so, he has also unlocked 15 percent of the state’s budget that will be diverted into Indonesia’s infrastructure investment plans.\textsuperscript{146}

Unlike fuel subsidy cuts in the past, Indonesians did not carry out street protests. This positive development was fortuitously helped by falling global oil prices. Instead of the expected Rp 3,000 increase per liter, when fuel subsidies were actually cut, fuel prices dropped from the subsidized price of Rp 8,500 per liter in December 2014 to Rp 7,600 per liter in January 2015. Nevertheless, Jokowi initiated cash transfer programs to help needy Indonesians facing financial problems caused by the removal of fuel subsidies.

Believing the more he delayed cutting fuel subsidies, the greater his political risk, Jokowi acted immediately and delivered a strong signal to the investors that Indonesia’s new administration is embarking on pro-market reforms. In February 2015, following the removal of fuel subsidies, Jokowi was reported to have told his diplomatic corps to step


\textsuperscript{146} “Welfare,” \textit{Jakarta Post}. 43
up efforts to promote economic diplomacy and “to turn [Indonesia’s] negative trade balance into a surplus one.”147 In his speech at the World Economic Forum meeting in April 2015, Jokowi marketed Indonesia’s economic potential to his audience, encouraged investors to invest in Indonesia, and candidly welcomed investors to call him if they face any problem.148

By getting the controversial fuel subsidies out of the way early in his presidency, Jokowi has shown political savviness and, more importantly, firmness to a country that has grown weary of the previous administration’s useless vacillation. Jokowi’s socio-economic policy is likely to improve productivity levels of Indonesian workers. Similarly, investments in infrastructure will expand Indonesia’s capacity and connectivity. These efforts augur well for Indonesia’s economic performance but results will not be immediately observable.

2. Public Opinion

As a political outsider who has ascended the highest public office in Indonesia, Jokowi values the popular support he receives and knows the importance of public opinion in Indonesian politics. However, unlike his predecessor’s obsession with public opinion, Jokowi seems less enamored with the need to maintain high approval ratings. Instead of moderating the peace by dithering on decisions, Jokowi appears to be more interested in winning support through action rather than inaction. Jokowi decided to cut fuel subsidies, for example, knowing it will be an unpopular move, but he did so believing it was a decision that will benefit Indonesians. Undeniably, cutting fuel subsidies to spend on infrastructure can also signal to foreign investors that Indonesia under Jokowi is serious about economic reforms.

Judging from Jokowi’s decision to sink foreign vessels engaged in illegal fishing and execute convicted foreign drug smugglers, one could argue that he is applying to his


foreign policy the same principle of benefitting Indonesians. Although Jokowi’s nationalist foreign policy can appear to other countries as aggressive and confrontational, majority of Indonesians support Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy and tough stance on illegal drug use. If, as some have suggested, one of Jokowi’s reasons for enacting aggressive policies on foreigners was to stoke nationalist sentiments and boost his domestic popularity, there is no evidence that Jokowi succeeded.149

According to an opinion poll conducted by Indo Barometer, a Jakarta-based survey agency, more than 84 percent of respondents supported Jokowi’s decision to execute the convicts on death row.150 Based on the poll results, many Indonesians view drug use as a threat to society and death sentences will deter drug-related offenses. In a survey conducted by the Social and Political Study Center (Puspol) Indonesia, 756 respondents in three cities, including Jakarta, were asked questions on the performance of Jokowi’s administration in six areas. On Jokowi’s maritime policy, 74.07 percent of respondents supported the policy to sink foreign vessels engaged in illegal fishing in the country’s territorial waters.151 Yet the same survey also recorded 74.60 percent of respondents being dissatisfied with Jokowi’s first three months as president.152 In other words, Indonesians supported Jokowi’s foreign policy decisions but there was no corresponding rise in his approval ratings.

Based on polls conducted by the LSI-C, approval ratings for Jokowi was highest in August 2014 at 71.73 percent, immediately after winning the elections.153 Ratings plummeted in November 2014 to 44.94 percent and dropped further in January 2015 to


42.29 percent, after Jokowi announced and commenced his “sink the vessels” policy.\footnote{154 Hasyim Widhiarto, “Calls for Jokowi to Explain Controversial Decisions,” 
\textit{Jakarta Post}, November 24, 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/24/calls-jokowi-explain-controversial-decisions.html.} Similarly, there is insufficient evidence from opinion polls to conclude that the execution of foreign drug smugglers in April 2015 improved Jokowi’s approval ratings. Survey institution Indo Barometer polled Jokowi’s approval ratings in March 2015, before the execution took place, as 57.5 percent, which was higher than the 41.7 percent recorded in a June 2015 poll conducted by another survey consultancy, Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC).\footnote{155 Ayomi Amindoni, “Public Doubtful over Jokowi’s Leadership,” \textit{Jakarta Post}, October 20, 2015, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/10/20/public-doubtful-over-jokowis-leadership.html.} If Indonesians are indeed supporting Jokowi’s foreign policy, the support is not translated into approval ratings, or at least the support is not enough to reverse the decline in Jokowi’s approval ratings.

Although Jokowi’s nationalist foreign policy did not produce a boost to his domestic popularity, it does not mean that was not the intention. However, there are other more compelling reasons for Jokowi to adopt an assertive foreign policy on illegal fishing and foreign drug smugglers. There is the issue of safeguarding Indonesia’s sovereignty, which is also the foremost priority for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sovereignty takes on different dimensions here because it refers simultaneously to Indonesia’s right to claim its territorial waters, safeguard the natural resources contained therein, and exercise its laws. For example, on the execution of convicted drug smugglers, Jokowi asked for mutual respect on the sovereignty of law between countries.\footnote{156 Satria Sambijantoro, “Diplomatic Row Will Hurt Australia More Than RI, Says Kalla,” \textit{Jakarta Post}, April 29, 2015, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/04/29/diplomatic-row-will-hurt-australia-more-ri-says-kalla.html.} In addition to sovereignty issues, Jokowi’s decisions are aligned to his pro-people policy. The “sink the vessels” policy protects Indonesians’ fishing rights and the tough stance on illegal drug use protects Indonesians from the dangers of drugs.

Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi reflects both the people’s will and the president’s beliefs. Under Jokowi, public opinion continues to matter in foreign policymaking in democratic Indonesia. But unlike SBY who avoid making hard decisions
and appear indecisive, Jokowi is willing to weigh the cost of political risks and take a hard stance on matters that will benefit Indonesian, even if they are unpopular. From cutting fuel subsidies to sinking errant foreign vessels, Jokowi applies the principle of balancing cost and benefit to his decisions and is less averse to risky choices thus far in his presidency.

There is, however, a price for Jokowi’s risk-balancing approach to foreign policymaking. The price has been the public’s confidence in his ability to fulfill his promises. According to SMRC’s polls, the percentage of Indonesians who are confident of Jokowi honoring his promises have plunged from 74.5 percent in October 2014 to 54.9 percent in July 2015.\textsuperscript{157} But Jokowi can take consolation in that the figure has clawed up by just over 7 percent to 62 percent in October 2015.\textsuperscript{158} Despite a general decline in his approval ratings, polls show that among possible contenders, including Prabowo, Jokowi remains as Indonesians’ most popular choice of president.

3. **Strength of the President’s Political Coalition**

As the first president to enter office controlling a minority parliament, Jokowi’s political coalition was weaker than the one SBY formed as president. Weak political support in parliament poses a challenge in policymaking for any president in a democracy and for Jokowi there was no exception. On his inauguration, Jokowi’s Awesome Indonesia Coalition (Koalisi Indonesia Hebat or KIH), led by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) formed 37 percent of the parliament. Rival coalition, the Red and White Coalition (Koalisi Merah Putih or KMP), led by Prabowo’s Great Indonesia Movement (Gerindra) Party dominated the DPR with a 63 percent majority. A divided parliament meant that Jokowi was more likely to face challenges when seeking policy approval.

The expectation in Indonesian politics was that political parties will offer their political support and form coalition in exchange for a share of political power such as a


\textsuperscript{158} Amindoni, “Public Doubtful,” *Jakarta Post.*
cabinet appointment or other public office. This form of political cartel discourages parties to compete and provide credible opposition. Instead, Indonesia’s political cartels form to consolidate power among oligarchic elite that undermines democratic ideology and state authority. Inside the coalition, prominent oligarchs, defined by Aspinall “as a dominant class arising from an informal fusion of state and economic power,” are nominated by their respective parties for office and exploit state resources for private gains.159

In the face of such overwhelming political opposition, Jokowi was adamant on his commitment to separate political support from political office. Even as he reached out for support from his political rivals, he insisted that “there will be no transactions.”160 In other words, Jokowi will not trade a cabinet position in exchange for political support. As a result, political parties in the opposition coalition chose to remain and Jokowi’s became the first Indonesian president with a minority parliament. Jokowi’s biggest political challenge, however, comes from his own coalition. For example, Jokowi’s nomination of Budi Gunawan in January 2015 as police chief was particularly damaging to his personal image of being transparent. Budi, who is a close associate of former president and chairperson of the PDI-P, Megawati Sukarnoputri, was subsequently charged by the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi or KPK) for suspected corruption but Jokowi did not immediately withdraw the nomination. It was only after much public dissatisfaction that Jokowi retracted Budi’s nomination and replaced him with Badrodin Haiti. In a series of twists, Budi was eventually appointed deputy police chief in April 2015 following an internal police process.

This episode was widely regarded as an example of Jokowi’s inability to manage intra-coalition pressures, especially those from Megawati. Nominating Budi, who had been under investigation since 2010, compromised Jokowi’s political integrity. Yet, this episode also show the power and influence of the oligarchic system that operates within Indonesian politics and the challenges a reform-minded president such as Jokowi face.


The strength of Jokowi’s political coalition is, therefore, not only represented by the number of seats his coalition has in parliament. For someone who belongs outside of the oligarchic elite, the strength of Jokowi’s political coalition is also a measure of his ability to manage those who seek to undermine the state’s power and authority from within the political system.

D. A TIME FOR FRIENDS AND A TIME FOR ENEMIES

SBY had presided over a period of political and economic stability in Indonesia. Resource-rich Indonesia was enjoying economic growth because of the commodities sector boom led by China’s economy. As Indonesia’s economy grew, complacency sets in and SBY did not want to upset the oligarchs in control of Indonesia’s natural resources, therefore a golden opportunity for the country to develop alternative engines of growth was missed. Although income distribution strongly favored the oligarchs, many Indonesians benefited from the growth and rose out of poverty. Despite growing concerns over the Indonesian economy’s structural weakness due to underinvested infrastructure and lack of industrial reforms, strong economic growth contributed to a positive public opinion of SBY. As the country began to turn around after a period of turmoil caused by regime change and financial crisis, glowing accolades showered upon Indonesia inflated Indonesians’ confidence. The growing sense of self-confidence, coupled with Indonesians feeling more hopeful and optimistic about their future led to higher approval ratings for SBY. The president’s political coalition was numerically strong and the opposition provided little impact. SBY was keeping the coalition together by allowing oligarchs to operate and by managing conflict among different political factions.161

Indonesia’s domestic conditions between the start of his first term and midway through his second enabled SBY to pursue a foreign policy that focused on multilateralism and economic cooperation. Such an approach was also aligned to SBY’s nature to avoid conflict. As domestic politics and economy stabilized, SBY saw an opportunity to grow soft power. He did so by tapping into Indonesia’s image of “a country where democracy, Islam, and modernity go hand-in-hand,” pursuing an

161 Mietzner, “Repolarization,” 120.
internationalist foreign policy that promoted democratic and human rights issues.\textsuperscript{162} During this period, SBY was able to “trigger realignments” across the two-level game and rebuild Indonesia’s reputation. Under SBY, the image of Indonesia as a model of success in political and economic development came to dominate global perceptions. This reversal in Indonesia’s image was certainly a remarkable recovery but without sustained efforts to institutionalize reforms in Indonesia’s politics and economy, the country was unable to adapt to changes in the global economy.\textsuperscript{163} The initial responses by SBY’s administration to counter the effects of a declining commodities market were mainly to enact “nationalist and protectionist policies” but they were insufficient to resolve the structural problems.\textsuperscript{164} By the 2014 presidential elections, populist measures to address the ills of Indonesian economy sprung forth and nationalist sentiments grew among Indonesians.\textsuperscript{165}

Rising to power from humble beginnings and bearing no connections to the oligarchic elites that looted Indonesia of its riches, Jokowi’s election win held promise of much needed reforms that would renew the hopes of Indonesians. Trumpeting his vision of transforming Indonesia into a global maritime power through his GMA doctrine, Jokowi invoked a resurgence of nationalism that had undergirded Indonesia’s aspirations to be a global leader. Reality, however, prevented him from embarking on the transformative journey he envisaged. Facing a structurally weak economy, underdeveloped infrastructure, underfunded military, and powerful Indonesian oligarchs, reform-minded Jokowi realized quickly that these problems require careful political maneuvering and long-term planning. In order for Indonesia to have a chance of becoming a global maritime power, Jokowi will need to create the capacity for change in Indonesia while biding for an opportune time to push through reforms.

\textsuperscript{163} Mietzner, “Legacy,” 128.
\textsuperscript{164} Mietzner, “Repolarization,” 129.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 121-2.
In the meantime, the president has to pick issues that provide the best leverage in terms of maximizing nationalist sentiments while containing the harmful effects of frayed bilateral ties. An example is Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy. Thus, far, Jokowi’s administration has been careful to emphasize that Indonesia has the sovereign right to protect its natural resources from foreign exploitation. It has been repeatedly stressed that the policy is lawful and other countries should respect Indonesia’s sovereignty and its implementation of domestic laws.\textsuperscript{166} Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy ticks a lot of boxes: it is aligned to aspects in the GMA doctrine that seeks to safeguard Indonesia’s maritime resources for economic gains; it protects Indonesian fishermen livelihood; and it highlights the potential of Indonesia’s maritime and fishery industry. For good measure, the dramatic destruction of the seized vessels enjoys widespread coverage on media. Admitting that exploding seized vessels was mostly for the spectacle in an interview, the KKP detonated 41 foreign vessels, including the first Chinese vessel, on National Awakening Day in May 2015 and 34 foreign vessels on Independence Day in August 2015.\textsuperscript{167}

Jokowi continues to lead the country and endeavors to retain his seat at the two-level game. Global demand for commodities remains weak and the lackluster economic outlook looks set to continue in the foreseeable future. Indonesia’s economy is likely to continue growing at about 5 percent but Jokowi’s economic plan has to consider government intervention to bring about poverty alleviation and equitable income distribution. His approval ratings continue to decline and political support from his coalition remains low. Some of his early political decisions, such as cutting of fuel subsidies, choice for police chief and cabinet positions, have damaged his credibility.\textsuperscript{168}


\textsuperscript{167} In an interview program, Susi admitted that detonating the ships before sinking them was for publicity. Additionally, Susi said the original intent was to sink 70 foreign ships to mark Indonesia’s 70\textsuperscript{th} Independence Day but there were only 34 that were available. This proved, according to Susi, the effectiveness of the policy. Susi Pudjiastuti, “Conversations with S11,” Channel News Asia Interview, 22:34, posted by \textit{Channel News Asia}, accessed on October 30, 2015, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/tv/tvshows/conversation-with-s11/susi-pudjiastuti/2171096.html.

Jokowi has to continue to strike delicate balance in politics by reciprocating support with some form of incentives and avoid succumbing to cartelization or oligarchic pressure. Domestic and international conditions dictate that Jokowi is more likely to gain public and political support by advancing a nationalist foreign policy. However, while he adopts a more aggressive and confrontational stance on foreign policy issues, Jokowi has to be mindful not to jeopardize diplomatic ties.
III. “SINK THE VESSELS” POLICY: JOKOWI’S FOREIGN POLICY ADVENTURISM

This chapter is a case study of Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy and tracks the evolution of Indonesia’s approach to its illegal fishing problem. The chapter starts with an overview before showing how Indonesia’s current nationalist approach to its illegal fishing problem has concurrently produced results in some aspects and exposed its limitations in others. For example, the government’s efforts have led to more foreign vessels being seized for illegal fishing, which is a positive development for the fishing industry, but the push to enforce Indonesia’s fishery laws have also exposed the country’s limited resources for fishery monitoring and policy incoherence across the various government agencies. Even as Jokowi wants to continue to sink the foreign fishing vessels, the problem of illegal fishing is too massive and complex for Indonesia to handle unilaterally. This puts both Jokowi’s efforts to reform Indonesia’s economy and his approval ratings at risk. In the near-term, Indonesia’s economy will not be able to meet the demand for resources required to eradicate illegal fishing and develop its fishing industry. Going forward, the immensity and intricacies of Indonesia’s illegal fishing problem will prove to be an overmatch for Jokowi’s unilateral solution. The next section describes how Indonesia intends to widen its unilateral approach by incorporating cooperative solutions in order to overcome its resource constraints in eradicating illegal fishing. The chapter concludes with a comparison of the different approaches adopted by the two presidents and an explanation of Indonesia’s “sink the vessels” policy and the eradication of illegal fishing as a linchpin of Indonesia developmental goals and a showcase for Jokowi’s administration to exhibit its technocratic competence.

A. WAGING A WAR ON ILLEGAL FISHING

In November 2014, President Jokowi “declared war” on illegal fishing activities in Indonesian waters.169 Expressing grave concern over the extent and range of problems that illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing was causing Indonesia, Jokowi

concluded that errant vessels, including foreign ones, must be seized and destroyed in accordance with Indonesia’s law. According to a 2012 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) report on Indonesia’s fishery and aquaculture profile, 54 percent of an Indonesian’s animal protein intake comes from fishery production and fish represents the cheapest source of animal protein for majority of the population. The fishing industry is also a key source of employment for Indonesians, especially the low-wage earners in the coastal regions and outlying islands. Fishing provides livelihood for 6.4 million Indonesians and constitutes 3 percent of Indonesia’s GDP. Jokowi’s concerns are warranted because a threat to fishery production has a big impact on Indonesia’s food and economic security.

The first tranche of vessels impounded for illegal fishing were destroyed in early December 2014 amidst much media publicity. Since then, a series of public sinking of foreign vessels has taken place as part of Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy. While Jokowi’s administration has offered numerous reasons for enacting such a drastic measure on illegal fishing vessels, an underlying message that was consistently emphasized was Indonesia’s sovereign right to enforce its laws. During the past year of the “sink the vessels” policy, the scope of the illegal fishing problem in Indonesian waters has focused on the domestic aspects such as the impact on the economy and preserving the livelihood of local fishermen. However, judging by Indonesia’s recent articulation of the illegal fishing “as a form of transnational organized crime,” there appear to be efforts to draw in regional implications of illicit fishery activities, giving hints of possible adjustments to the heretofore unilateral approach that has prevailed under Jokowi. Incorporating a multilateral approach to the illegal fishing problem can resolve some of the challenges imposed by the lack of resources. As yet, without

evidence of tangible actions taken to swing towards a cooperative solution to eradicate illegal fishing, it remains to be seen if Indonesia will indeed change tack. In the meantime, Indonesia is continuing its “sink the vessels” policy against illegal fishing.

B. SCOPE OF THE ILLEGAL FISHING PROBLEM

The effects of illegal fishing are multifarious and recent investigations by the KKP show that the enormity of the problem is matched by its pervasiveness. As a result, Indonesia’s illegal fishing problem carries more than just economic costs; overfishing by poachers also threatens the sustainability of fishery resources and livelihood of small-scale fishermen. The adverse effects of illegal fishing are sufficient for the FAO to recognize it as “a major problem” in Indonesia.175

Certainly, the problem is not new and the fishery laws that Indonesia is enforcing now were ratified before Jokowi’s presidency. Notwithstanding, Indonesia has never been as aggressive in enforcing its laws on illegal fishing and the sinking of foreign vessels has never involved as much theatrics. For most of Jokowi’s presidency, Indonesia has looked upon illegal fishing as a domestic problem that can be solved unilaterally. Jokowi’s unilateral approach puts diplomatic ties at risk by pursuing a unilateral approach. While the “sink the vessels” policy has undoubtedly created awareness of the problem but it has also exposed Indonesia’s resource limitations to completely eradicate the problem.

1. Too Many Vessels, Too Few Resources

Illegal fishing operations conducted by foreign vessels take place daily among thousands of fishing boats in Indonesia’s expansive waters. Some of the foreign fishing vessels have legitimate rights to fish in Indonesian waters while others do not. With Indonesia’s existing fisheries monitoring system, it is difficult to differentiate between licensed and unlicensed foreign fishing vessels with certainty. One of the earliest steps the KKP took to eradicate illegal fishing was to impose a moratorium on issuing of foreign fishing permits in order to work on new regulations and review the existing

175 “Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles.”
fishing permits. Under Marine and Fisheries Minister Regulation 56/2014, effective from November 3, 2014, Indonesia has stopped granting and renewing of fishing permits.\textsuperscript{176} Instead of the original planned six months of moratorium, the KKP extended the ban by another six months in order to complete an audit of the fishing permits.\textsuperscript{177} In all, the ministry took 11 months to audit a total of 1,132 fishing permits for large-sized foreign vessels and discovered that every audited vessel had violated some form of Indonesian fishing laws and regulations.\textsuperscript{178} The findings from the audit resulted in the ministry invalidating 291 foreign fishing permits and meting out disciplinary actions, such as suspension and issuance of warnings, to 156 permit holders. The problem’s prevalence lends credence to estimates by Indonesian authorities who claim more than 5,400 fishing vessels are operating illegally in Indonesian waters.\textsuperscript{179}

The monitoring of illegal fishing activity poses an overwhelming challenge to Indonesian authorities. The sheer vastness of Indonesian waters and the innumerable vessels fishing at any one time test Indonesia’s ability to monitor illegal fishing activities and enforce the law. For instance, then Rear Admiral Widodo, commander of the Indonesian navy’s Western Fleet Command pledged support to Jokowi but anguished over the lack of resources.\textsuperscript{180} Widodo, who has been promoted to Vice Admiral and is currently the Deputy Chief of Navy, said that the naval ships were straining to meet all of its requirements because just over a quarter of the navy’s fuel requirements in 2014 were met.\textsuperscript{181}

Indonesia’s inability to comprehensively monitor illegal fishing activities and enforce its fishery laws exposes the dire state of its navy and maritime security forces, including the newly established Maritime Security Board (BAKAMLA). Based on

\textsuperscript{177} Salim, “Fishing Ban,” \textit{Jakarta Post}.
\textsuperscript{178} Salim, “RI Urges,” \textit{Jakarta Post}.
\textsuperscript{181} Saragih, “Fishing Begins,” \textit{Jakarta Post}.
available indicators such as GDP growth rates and economic trends over the next few years, Indonesia will continue to face a shortage of resources to conduct patrols and law enforcement. During his presidential campaign, Jokowi had promised to increase the defense budget allocation to 1.5 percent of GDP.\textsuperscript{182} The caveat to his promise, however, was that Indonesia’s economy must grow at least 7 percent.\textsuperscript{183} With the economy projected to grow 5.3 percent in 2015 and growth in 2016 and beyond marked by cautious optimism, Indonesia’s defense budget looks set to remain tight for the next few years.\textsuperscript{184} In fact, Indonesia’s 2016 defense budget of Rp 99.5 trillion is less than the Rp 102.3 trillion received by the military in 2015.\textsuperscript{185} So long as Indonesia’s military and maritime security forces remain underfunded and ill-equipped, the country’s ability to maintain comprehensive awareness of its fishery zones and conduct law enforcement in its waters will continue to struggle.

2. Between Legal Sovereignty and Diplomatic Sensitivities

According to Article 69, Paragraph 4 of Law No. 45/2009 on Fisheries, Indonesian authorities are “entitled to take special actions in the form of burning and/or sinking a fishing ship flying a foreign flag based on sufficient initial proof.”\textsuperscript{186} It is stipulated that Indonesian authorities functioning to control and enforce law in Indonesia’s fishery management zone, consisting of Indonesia’s internal waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), are entitled to destroy foreign fishing


\textsuperscript{183} Dewi, “Jokowi Promises,” \textit{Jakarta Post}.


vessels. Therefore, the actions taken by Indonesian authorities in blowing up or sinking foreign fishing vessels are in accordance with Indonesian domestic law.

Indonesia’s policy of sinking foreign vessels is not new; Indonesian authorities were permitted to destroy foreign illegal fishing vessels since 2009 but Indonesia’s enforcement of its fishery laws has intensified under Jokowi. According to Asep Burhanudin, the director general of marine resources supervision from Indonesia’s Marine Affairs and Fisheries Ministry, Indonesian authorities sank 33 of 38 foreign vessels caught illegally fishing in Indonesian territorial waters between 2007 and 2012.\(^{187}\) Illegal fishing boats from Vietnam accounted for 32 of the 33 boats that were sunk during that period. By contrast, Susi Pudjiastuti, in her first year as Minister for Marine Affairs and Fisheries, has sanctioned the destruction of 106 foreign boats that were fishing illegally in Indonesian waters.\(^ {188}\) Based on ministerial data reported in the *Jakarta Post*, the nationalities of the illegal fishing boats that were wrecked under Susi’s leadership were more varied, with boats coming from the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, and China.\(^ {189}\)

Brushing aside concerns over the harm caused by Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy on diplomatic ties, Asep maintains that the “important thing” is that Indonesia’s marine resources are protected.\(^ {190}\) Indeed, several high level Indonesian public officials, including ministers, have stated that Jokowi’s harsh measure will achieve the intended effect of eradicating illegal fishing without compromising diplomatic relations. Susi seems convinced that she has “established persuasive coordination” with ambassadors of Australia, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, regarding Indonesia’s position on illegal fishing.\(^ {191}\) According to Susi, regional countries understand that illegal fishing to Indonesia means more than “stealing fish but also


\(^{189}\) Amindoni, Sinks 106,” *Jakarta Post.*

\(^{190}\) Ibid.

sovereignty as well as environmental sustainability.”\textsuperscript{192} The minister has pitched the “sink the vessels” policy to the other countries as judicial punishment for stealing from Indonesia.\textsuperscript{193} Susi believes that other countries will see Indonesia’s actions simply as law enforcement and not confrontational.\textsuperscript{194} Foreign Minister Retno, and then Coordinating Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Minister, Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno also made similar statements in concert that downplayed the diplomatic blowback and emphasized on the policy’s legality.\textsuperscript{195}

Implausible as it may seem, Jokowi’s administration expects countries whose nationals have had their fishing vessels dramatically and publicly detonated in a foreign country to acquiesce in Indonesia’s antagonistic foreign policy. Occasionally, the sinking of foreign fishing vessels was deliberately conducted to stoke nationalism among Indonesians. In particular, two widely-publicized large-scale “sink the vessels” events were held on dates that had nationalistic significance. One was on Indonesia’s National Awakening Day in May 2015 in which the first Chinese fishing vessel was among 41 foreign vessels sunk. Another 34 foreign vessels were sunk on Indonesia’s Independence Day in August 2015.

Both of these mass public sinking drew responses from China and Vietnam. Amidst requests for Indonesia to clarify on its policy and to constructively seek cooperation in the fishery sector, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson also highlighted that “China expresses strong concern” about the sinking of a Chinese fishing boat.\textsuperscript{196} In similar vein, Vietnamese foreign ministry spokesperson said that Vietnam was “seriously concerned” about the sinking of Vietnamese fishing boats that were captured

\textsuperscript{192} Saragih, “Turns Diplomatic,” \textit{Jakarta Post}.
\textsuperscript{193} Saragih, “Fishing Begins,” \textit{Jakarta Post}.
\textsuperscript{195} Salim and Parlina, “Sink 3,” \textit{Jakarta Post}.
for fishing illegally in Indonesian waters and had send a diplomatic note asking Indonesia to treat the retained Vietnamese fishermen humanely.197

A strongly worded editorial in the Bangkok Post tersely further exposes Indonesia’s unrealistic expectations.198 The editorial, published in January 2015, accuses Indonesia of exaggerating its monetary loss and slighting Indonesia’s ability to enforce laws within its boundaries. Describing the sinking of foreign vessels as “aggressively destructive,” “undiplomatic,” and “unfriendly,” the editorial recommends Indonesia to stop the sinking or risk retaliatory actions by its ASEAN partners and neighbors.199 Despite Indonesia’s insistence that it is merely enforcing its laws, the reactions from other countries clearly show that acrimony has been built up between Indonesia and some of the countries affected by the “sink the vessels” policy. But as the rest of this chapter will show, when the scope of the illegal fishing problem in Indonesia expands to include transnational issues of human rights abuse, regional countries will have to relook at their responses to Indonesia’s anti-illegal fishing campaign.

3. The Case of MV Hai Fa: Exposing Indonesia’s Policy Incoherence

Indonesia’s handling of MV Hai Fa, a Panama-flagged Chinese fishing vessel that was detained and fined Rp 200 million for its illegal fishing activities in Indonesian waters, has exposed the country’s lack of policy coherence on illegal fishing. Normally applied to national development agendas, the concept of policy coherence is defined as “the systematic application of mutually reinforcing policies and integration of development concerns across government departments to achieve development goals along with national policy objectives.”200 Policy coherence is about different national agencies working in concert to generate “synergies and complementarities” and actively


199 “Indonesia,” Bangkok Post.

seeking to fill policy gaps so as “to meet common and shared objectives.”

Therefore, policy coherence requires all relevant agencies to align their individual policies and commit to a single cause. But the various Indonesian public institutions involved in the MV Hai Fa case appear to display nonaligned behavior.

The KKP, with help from the Indonesia navy, seized MV Hai Fa for illegal fishing activities on December 27, 2014. The fishing vessel was found with 900 tons of ocean catch, including 66 tons of hammerhead sharks and oceanic whitetip sharks that belong to Indonesia’s list of prohibited catch. According to the KKP, the value of the catch found in MV Hai Fa was estimated at Rp 70 billion. Much to the disappointment of Susi, the Ambon Fisheries Court fined the vessel’s captain a mere Rp 200 million, which amounted to a slap on the wrist. Essentially, the court fined the captain of the vessel but did not press criminal charges. In defense of the Ambon Fisheries court, the Attorney General Office (AGO) said that prosecutors had brought all substantiated charges on the vessel. However, in an embarrassing blunder, the vessel managed to sneak past local port authorities and fishery monitoring agencies and exit Indonesia’s porous maritime borders undetected and without the necessary documents.

The disappointing outcome of the MV Hai Fa court proceedings and Susi’s awkward admission of security slipups drew questions from different actors. There were doubts that the various national agencies under Jokowi’s administration shared the same level of commitment to eliminate illegal fishing. Speaking on behalf of the People’s Coalition for Fisheries Justice Indonesia (KIARA), a non-governmental organization that

204 Halim, “Light Sentence,” Jakarta Post.
looks after the Indonesian small-scale fishermen, Abdul Hakim, KIARA’s secretary-
general accused the AGO of failing to support Indonesia’s drive to eradicate illegal
fishing. Hakim lamented that the AGO, in approving the request from the Maluku
Prosecutor’s Office to fine the captain of MV Hai Fa, has missed out on several other
charges that carry heavier sentences including larger fines and jail terms. To support his
accusation, Hakim provided a list of laws that MV Hai Fa could have broken but were
not considered by the AGO. Ultimately, both Hakim and Susi agreed that the paltry fine
was unable to deter other fishing vessels from operating illegally in Indonesian waters.

Undaunted by the court’s feeble decision, Susi pressed investigators from her
ministry to uncover more incriminating evidence against MV Hai Fa. Susi filed for
appeal because she wanted to bring more charges against the fishing vessel and prevent
setting a low benchmark in the courts for high profile cases of illegal fishing. The
protracted case had the owner of MV Hai Fa threatening to sue Susi for defamation and
filing a report with the Indonesian police, only to be rejected by the Indonesian police for
lacking legal basis. Besides the MV Hai Fa, Susi was similarly disappointed by the
verdict on five other Chinese fishing vessels that were charged with illegal fishing and
wanted the prosecutors to file appeals on the cases. Susi had also directed her anger
towards the Indonesian navy for not acting quickly enough to capture vessels suspected
of illegal fishing. The accusatory tone extended to the Jakarta Post reporting that the
navy’s failure to meet its intended target of catching 22 Chinese vessels, including the

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209 Ibid.
210 Salim, Susi Continues,” Jakarta Post.
211 Ibid.
212 Fedina S Sundaryani and Nani Afrida, “Hai Fa Lacks Legal Basis to Sue Susi: Police,” Jakarta
police.html.
213 Tama Salim, “Susi Goes After Chinese Boats,” Jakarta Post, May 23, 2015,
MV Hai Fa, had “raised questions about the navy’s commitment to safeguarding the country’s territory.”

These series of incidents indicate that the fishery laws have expanded and strengthened but Indonesia’s judiciary remains impotent. It appears that not all of the public agencies were as enthusiastic and driven regarding Indonesia’s campaign against illegal fishing. A similar point is made by Aria Bima, member of PDI-P, who said that Jokowi “had made a good start, but with minimal results as a result of a lack of ministerial cooperation.” Bima’s observations and the obstacles faced by Susi’s KKP show that policy coherence within the government is necessary to achieve the intended outcomes.

4. The Hidden Cost of Illegal Fishing

Among the different costs associated with illegal fishing, monetary cost and environmental cost are most commonly cited. Monetary cost refers to the value of fishery products that foreign fishermen take out from Indonesian waters and represents a loss in revenue to Indonesian economy. Environmental cost usually refers to the problem of overfishing, which is when the amount of catch exceeds the maximum sustainable yield and the fish stock starts depleting. It could also mean the damage done to the marine environment because of fishermen employing harmful fishing methods that upset the delicate natural balance of the ocean. The balance could be disrupted by the use of trawl nets because trawling leads to overfishing, indiscriminate fishing, and coral reef destruction.

The monetary cost of Indonesia’s illegal fishing problem is significant. Indonesian officials claim that 30 percent of global losses from illegal fishing occur in Indonesia. The monetary loss from illegal fishing costs the Indonesian economy an

estimated Rp 300 trillion annually. The lost revenue is transferred out of the Indonesian economy and into the private coffers of companies operating the fleets of illegal fishing vessels.

Despite the monetary loss incurred, the fishing industry makes significant contributions to Indonesia’s GDP. As it stands, the fishing industry constitutes 21 percent of Indonesia’s agricultural sector and 3 percent of its GDP. The fishing industry’s yearly growth rates published in the 2014 KKP annual report show that it consistently exceeds Indonesia’s GDP growth rate and is the best performer in the entire agricultural sector consisting of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries production. According to a business appraisal of Indonesia’s maritime and fisheries sectors published in the *Jakarta Post* in August 2015, the fishing industry’s sterling performance is likely to continue. In order to harness the economic potential of Indonesia’s maritime and fisheries sectors, the Indonesian government must succeed in curbing illegal fishing.

More than just a loss of revenue, large scale illegal fishing also hides a host of other problems that negatively impact Indonesia economically, socially, and environmentally. An example of a hidden cost of illegal fishing is the smuggling of Indonesia’s subsidized fuel: foreign fishing vessels operating in Indonesian waters replenish their fuels stores at sea by buying subsidized fuel that has been smuggled out of Indonesia. In an interview with the *Jakarta Post*, Susi bemoaned the irony that foreign fishing vessels engaged in illegal fishing activities in Indonesian waters are using fuel

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219 “Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles.”


subsidized by the Indonesian government while some Indonesian fishermen are deprived of subsidized fuel for their legal fishing activities.\textsuperscript{222}

Another hidden cost of illegal fishing is the worsening of economic conditions of small-scale Indonesian fishermen. According to Anambas Islands Deputy Regent, Abdul Haris, foreign vessels engaged in illegal fishing drive out local fishermen.\textsuperscript{223} Haris notes that Indonesian fishermen with their small fishing boats are unable to compete with foreign fishermen. Unlike foreign fishing vessels that operate commercial fishing equipment, local fishermen usually conduct small-scale fishing by using traditional fishing methods. Haris claims that in areas where fish are plentiful, foreign fishermen drive local fishermen out by deliberately colliding with the small boats.\textsuperscript{224} As a result of foreign illegal fishing, many Indonesian fishermen, who are already impoverished, are prevented from eking out their livelihood in small-scale fishing. Without effective incentives or punitive measures to ensure the sustainability of Indonesia’s marine ecosystem, foreign fishermen often fish using destructive methods, such as trawling, and leave behind a marine ecosystem that is permanently destroyed. From the description of the unfair competition posed by foreign illegal fishermen to local fishermen, the social and environmental dimensions of the problem of illegal fishing in Indonesia become apparent.

C. EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE ILLEGAL FISHING PROBLEM

There are indications that Indonesia has begun expanding the scope of the illegal fishing problem a year into Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy. Instead of restricting the illegal fishing problem to a domestic issue that Indonesia has to face alone, the scope of the problem is being expanded to define illegal fishing as an international problem that demands multilateral cooperative actions. According to Mas Achmad Santosa, the head of the KKP’s illegal fishing prevention task force, expanding the scope of the illegal fishing problem is part of the ministry’s “post-moratorium national plan of action


\textsuperscript{223} Saragih, “Fishing Begins,” \textit{Jakarta Post}.

\textsuperscript{224} Ibid.
(NPOA).”225 Even as Jokowi’s administration continue to build on the narrative of Indonesia as a victim of illegal foreign exploitation, the narrative has taken a new trajectory to describe illegal fishing as a transnational organized crime and a vehicle for other syndicated illicit activities. As discussed in the preceding section, the eradication of Indonesia’s illegal fishing problem and enforcement of its fishery laws entail a big demand for resources. The Indonesian navy has already cited the lack of fuel budget as a limiting factor in its ability to support the country’s eradication efforts. Budgetary resources are limited and will continue to be limited. This is because of competing demands from Indonesia’s plan to develop its infrastructure and the newly implemented social welfare programs. Poor economic growth rates worsen the situation because the government’s budgets in the coming years are unlikely to increase. The NPOA should not be viewed as Indonesia shifting away from its existing unilateral approach; rather, Indonesia’s approach has been widened to incorporate multilateral solutions to overcome the country’s resource challenge.

1. Post-Moratorium National Plan of Action

The KKP’s NPOA encompasses several different components that are related to illegal fishing. As reported in the *Jakarta Post*, the NPOA “will focus on policies promoting sovereignty, sustainability and prosperity, as well as optimizing the ability to detect, respond and punish perpetrators of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.”226 For example, the linking of Indonesia’s aggressive “sink the vessels” policy to wider issues of good governance and investor confidence in Indonesia by Susi can be interpreted as part of the NPOA.227 Specifically, the Indonesian government has been calling for illegal fishing to be approached as a transnational organized crime that acts as cover for a slew of other illicit activities.228 These illicit activities include human smuggling, slavery, drug trafficking, and the smuggling of endangered species. Along


226 Salim and Sundaryani, “ASEAN Efforts,” *Jakarta Post*.

227 Amindoni, Sinks 106,” *Jakarta Post*.

228 Salim, “RI Urges,” *Jakarta Post*. 

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with the expansion of illegal fishing’s scope of problem is the renewed focus to seek cooperative solutions at the ASEAN level. Pursuing cooperative solutions does not preclude the continuation of Indonesia’s unilateral “sink the vessels” policy. In fact, following the announcement of the NPOA in early October 2015, Minister Susi was reported in late October 2015 to have reiterated her ministry’s efforts to eradicate illegal fishing and that the sinking of illegal fishing boats was proof of the government’s commitment to finding a solution. In the same report, the KKP’s director general said that the ministry has plans to sink more boats. The Indonesian navy also announced its plans to sink more vessels after the NPOA was revealed.

In a keynote speech made at the Second International Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Conference in November, Susi has called on the regional and international community to recognize illegal fishing as a transnational organized crime and to come together to work on finding a solution. Susi’s description of Indonesia’s illegal fishing as a transnational organized crime echoes the sentiments made by Indonesia’s police chief, Badrodin Haiti, during the 10th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) in September 2015. Badrodin reported that the transnational nature of illegal fishing poses a challenge to law enforcement because beyond Indonesia’s sovereign boundaries, enforcement protocols on illegal fishing between different countries are absent.

2. Not Just About Stealing Fish

The sinking of foreign fishing vessels represents a drastic measure adopted by Jokowi’s administration to eradicate illegal fishing. But in Susi’s opinion, it is a necessity because she thinks that the unbridled illegal fishing in Indonesian waters “distorts good

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229 Salim and Sundaryani, “ASEAN Efforts,” *Jakarta Post*.
233 Salim and Sundaryani, “ASEAN Efforts,” *Jakarta Post*. 
governance and jeopardizes economic growth."\textsuperscript{234} The strident nature of Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy symbolizes the will of the Indonesian government in resolving a longstanding problem that has beleaguered Indonesia.\textsuperscript{235} Susi believes that the Indonesian government has to take strong actions to eradicate illegal fishing and enforce law and order within its waters in order to boost investor confidence.\textsuperscript{236} With greater confidence in Indonesia’s commitment to the rule of law, investors are more likely to invest in Indonesia and develop Indonesia’s fishing industry. The funds can then be channeled to build new fishery ports, upgrade the existing port infrastructure, and improve Indonesia’s overall maritime connectivity. At the national level, the development of Indonesia’s fishing industry and upgrading of the country’s infrastructure are aligned with Jokowi’s GMA doctrine and will contribute towards transforming Indonesia into a maritime power.

Indonesia’s realization of the extent of human rights abuse in the fishing industry has provided the government with additional motivation to eradicate illegal fishing. Human rights abuses in the form of enslavement and torture of foreign fishermen are not isolated cases and Susi says that it is “embarrassing for Indonesia” to be at the international forefront of human rights abuse in fishing industry.\textsuperscript{237} Susi’s remarks were made in reference to the prominent slavery case in the remote Indonesian island of Benjina, near Maluku. Investigations into the irregularities of Thai and Indonesian fishing industries by the Associated Press in March 2015 discovered that men from all over the Southeast Asia, majority of who were Burmese, were stranded on Benjina in what

\textsuperscript{234} Salim, “RI Urges,” \textit{Jakarta Post}.

\textsuperscript{235} Amindoni, Sinks 106,” \textit{Jakarta Post}.

\textsuperscript{236} Ibid.

appeared to be an organized form of modern slavery. The situation was sufficiently dire for Jokowi to quickly establish a special task force to rescue the fishermen.

In the initial wave of rescue, more than 320 foreign fishermen were evacuated from Benjina. Many of those who remained on the island chose to do so because they harbored beliefs that they will be paid their withheld wages. Up to 550 foreign fishermen were eventually released from working under inhumane conditions. Based on estimates by the International Organization for Migration, there may be up to 4,000 foreign fishermen who are stranded in the group of islands surrounding Benjina, many of whom are victims of human trafficking. Indonesian fishermen working overseas are just as affected by the human rights abuse in the fishing industry. According to Susi, up to 61,000 Indonesian fishermen working on foreign fishing boats operating in New Zealand are treated as slaves and subjected to torture. In line with Jokowi’s pro-people diplomacy, the government will need to address the maltreatment of Indonesian fishermen working overseas and the KKP has sought help from the New Zealand ambassador to address the issue.


245 “Seeks Protection,” Jakarta Post.
Unraveling the many layers of interrelated transnational crimes associated with illegal fishing and exposing the hidden costs of Indonesia’s hijacked fishing industry have provided Indonesian authorities with the opportunity to press for cooperation with countries while maintaining its unilateral approach in eradicating illegal fishing. The initiative to have illegal fishing listed as a transnational organized crime has gained support from Ono Surono, a member of the House of Representatives’ Commission IV overseeing agriculture and fisheries and the environment.\textsuperscript{246} Ono thinks that collective action by members of ASEAN and regional countries will enable individual countries to overcome their challenges in enforcing anti-illegal fishing laws and has called for the establishment of a regional illegal fishing institution to provide oversight.\textsuperscript{247}

Adding the dimension of human rights abuse in the fishing industry seems to have acted as a catalyst in speeding up discussions between countries to cooperate on anti-illegal fishing solutions. Several countries that share maritime borders with Indonesia have agreed to a work together on eradicating illegal fishing. In the aftermath of the Benjina case, Indonesia and Thailand agreed in April 2015 to set up a joint taskforce on illegal fishing and disrupt the syndicates that conduct illicit activities in the fishing industry. In May 2015, the Philippines and Indonesia agreed to tackle the illegal fishing problem together, kindling hopes of reviving bilateral fishing agreement discussions that have stalled since 2006.\textsuperscript{248} In similar fashion, Indonesia has established new levels of agreement with Australia “to strengthen its cooperation with Indonesia on combating illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing practices, and to engage at the operational level and promote sustainable fisheries governance.”\textsuperscript{249} The most recent participant is Papua New Guinea and the two countries have signed a Joint Communique

\textsuperscript{246} Salim and Sundaryani, “ASEAN Efforts,” \textit{Jakarta Post}.  
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid.  
to combat IUU fishing in their waters. At the signing, Susi reiterated that besides “loss of revenue, illegal fishing opens doors to other crimes and human rights violations,” and repeated the call for “illegal fishing to be classed as a transnational crime.”

D. TWO PRESIDENTS, TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES

In her first annual press statement as minister for foreign affairs, Retno lamented that illegal fishing has been occurring unchecked in Indonesian waters “for far too long” and said the government “is determined and committed” to eliminate illegal fishing. Indonesia’s illegal fishing problem started before Jokowi’s presidency and attracted varying levels of attention from past presidents. Evidence from the post-reformasi era indicates that efforts to resolve the problem of illegal fishing were intermittent and plans to develop Indonesia’s fishing industry were neglected. Following reformasi, the most significant change related to Indonesia’s fishing industry was former President Abdurrahman Wahid’s decision to establish the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries in 2000. In October 2006, repeated statements by the KKP on the issue of illegal fishing and public calls for the government to “save the country’s fishing industry from poachers” were not heeded. Then, the KKP had estimated that foreign fishing vessels were causing the Indonesian economy to lose Rp 20 trillion annually. In March 2008, an article assessing Indonesia’s approach to eradicate illegal fishing contended that regional and bilateral agreements “have not shown any significant results” and “illegal fishing continues to be a problem in Indonesia.” The ineffectiveness of diplomatic solutions prompted SBY to amend Law No. 31/2004 on Fisheries to the present Law No. 45/2009 in October 2009. Although Indonesian authorities were accorded more punitive power,

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251 “Sign Communique,” PNG Mirror.

252 Marsudi, “Annual Press Statement.”


fishery laws were poorly enforced – only 38 foreign vessels were caught for illegal fishing between 2007 and 2012.

The prolonged neglect of Indonesia’s fishing industry and the passivity in resolving the problem of illegal fishing indicate that they were not priorities of the SBY government. SBY’s internationalist approach to foreign policy extended to the measures he took to resolve the problem of illegal fishing. The Indonesian government under SBY did not enforce fishery laws and passively relied on regional and bilateral agreements to curb illegal fishing. The reasons for not enforcing fishery laws or taking a tougher stance on illegal fishing are related to the characteristics of SBY’s presidency. Indonesia lacked maritime assets to safeguard its fishing industry and did not wish to blow up foreign fishing vessels and risk entering into conflict with other countries. What is clear is that the SBY did little to resolve Indonesia’s illegal fishing problem during his decade-long presidency. Between 2006 and 2014, there was a 15-fold increase in the KKP’s estimates for loss revenue from illegal fishing with the latest estimates at Rp 300 trillion. Now, illegal fishing in Indonesia is being described as a problem that is entrenched within a network of transnational organized crime. It is also clear that SBY handed over to Jokowi a problem that has grown bigger and more complex.

Jokowi takes a different approach to resolve Indonesia’s illegal fishing problem. The eradication of illegal fishing is featured in one of five pillars of Jokowi’s GMA doctrine and is listed as one of Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities. Indonesia’s fishery resources, just like its energy and mineral resources, are seen to be exploited by foreigners and join the list of natural resources that need to be protected to benefit Indonesians. Jokowi has promised “to make a commitment to using the sea to help improve the welfare of the Indonesian people and a strong commitment to enforce [Indonesia’s] sovereignty in [its] waters.”256 The Indonesian fishing industry is a vital component of Jokowi’s GMA doctrine and has the potential to develop into a key engine of growth for the economy. In order for the fishing industry to make sustainable contributions to the economy, the Indonesian government will need to ensure that its

maritime resources are protected and fish stocks are not depleted through illegal fishing. The successful eradication of rampant illegal fishing in Indonesian waters will provide a crucial boost to Jokowi’s vision of transforming Indonesia into a maritime power. After taking office, Jokowi has unsurprisingly paid close attention to Indonesia’s illegal fishing problem but has unexpectedly opted to take an aggressive approach to eradicate illegal fishing.

Domestically, the effects and cost of illegal fishing straddles the political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental realms. Regionally, with the KKP’s NPOA, illegal fishing is couched as a transnational organized crime that masks a slew of other illicit activities including human trafficking and slavery. Finding a solution for illegal fishing by foreign fishing vessels will invariably involve diplomatic actions by Indonesia. Consequently, Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy draws elements from many government ministries and agencies, such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, KKP, and BAKAMLA. The “sink the vessels” policy therefore becomes a representation of his administration’s ability to deliver on promises. If rampant illegal fishing, especially by foreign fishing vessels, were to continue, Jokowi’s credibility as Indonesia’s president would be undermined. In addition, his GMA doctrine and vision for Indonesia to transform into a global maritime power will be in jeopardy.

Suffice it to say, Indonesia’s decision to put focus on the problem of illegal fishing is not all that surprising. Illegal fishing has ramifications on several domestic issues and is featured as an area of priority for Jokowi’s administration. However, it is Jokowi’s unilateralist approach and the lack of disdain for confrontation that have caused consternation among scholars and analysts. Indonesia’s decision to resolve its problem of illegal fishing through the aggressive enforcement of the “sink the vessels” policy deviates from the modalities of conflict avoidance and multilateralism preferred by SBY. For these reasons, the epitome of Indonesia’s nationalist turn in foreign policy under Jokowi is exemplified by the “sink the vessels” policy.
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IV. CONCLUSION

A. THE BURDEN OF DOMESTIC EXPECTATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS ON FOREIGN POLICY

Indonesians voted Jokowi into office with hopes that he would bring much needed political and economic reforms to the country. The optimism harbored by Indonesians was not unwarranted; they had pinned their hopes on a president who, as mayor of Surakarta, was awarded second runner-up of the 2012 World Mayor Prize.257 According to reports, Jokowi was praised for turning the “crime-ridden city into a regional center of arts and culture” and his anti-corruption campaign. As a reform-oriented politician, becoming Jakarta’s governor in September 2012 accorded Jokowi a bigger platform to showcase his technocratic credentials. Jokowi’s successes in Jakarta further cemented his credentials as a leader who could deliver effective governance and propelled him quickly up the political ladder. By October 2014, Jokowi was presented with Indonesia’s highest office to drive reforms that will bring the country to its rightful place in the global arena.

As a non-elite, political outsider with no military links, Jokowi was “ushered in on a wave of hope” by the Indonesian electorate.258 Foreign media coverage of Jokowi’s election win reflected the exuberance felt throughout Indonesia.259 Interestingly, four months before the election results were announced, Sukma made the observation that should Jokowi win the election, “domestically, there would be the difficult challenge of managing the high expectations.”260 Based on the evidence provided in Chapter II, after becoming president, the trends in Jokowi’s approval ratings suggest that public


expectations were not met but the public opinion polls indicate that majority of Indonesians remain hopeful of the president delivering on his promises.261

The existence of cartelization among Indonesian political parties and a powerful oligarchy in Indonesia has ensured that political and economic reforms will be rigorously scrutinized by the political and business elites — not for their effectiveness but the impact to the elites’ accessibility to power and profit. The lack of political reforms during SBY’s presidency has allowed inter-party collusion in Indonesian politics to dull the competition for credible alternative policies from the opposition and constructive feedback in parliament. Power-sharing politicians who are more interested in strengthening their bargaining position within Indonesia’s oligarchy than pushing through economic reforms that can benefit the Indonesian economy form oversized coalitions in parliament. Worse, these elites block reforms that are disadvantageous to them at the expense of the state. Indonesia’s oligarchic system has locked the country into a pattern of yawning income gap between the elites and ordinary Indonesians. Without much needed economic reforms and investments in infrastructure development, the Indonesian economy finds itself unable to diversify its exports away from natural resources.

In analyzing the domestic factors that shape Indonesia’s foreign policy, the thesis found that both SBY and Jokowi face the same challenge of running an economy, responding to the vagaries of public opinion, and managing their political coalition. Yet, SBY has chosen to keep a short-term view on the economy instead of making painful and unpopular, but necessary decisions to generate economic vitality and build resilience. While SBY sought international recognition and public adulation through conflict avoidance, Jokowi carefully allow public opinion to shape his policy choices without the need “to abandon [his] responsibility for independent leadership” and sacrifice sensible governance.262 SBY considered the need to form broad political coalitions an inconvenient necessity despite knowing the propensity for corruption in the system. By


262 Mietzner borrows the concept of “independent leadership” from Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro who “assert that ‘polls encourage elected officials to abandon their responsibility for independent leadership,’ suggesting that politicians feel forced to make decisions based on polls rather than on their own expertise and judgement.” Mietzner, “Political Opinion,” 121.
contrast, Jokowi understands the expediency of political horse trading but refuse to capitulate in the face of seemingly insurmountable political pressure.

Context matters in evaluating why the two Indonesian presidents have taken different approaches to the same problem. This thesis has focused on the domestic factors; therefore, the concluding chapter will explain the key points of Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy and his approach to Indonesia’s illegal fishing problem mentioned in Chapter III to the three domestic factors discussed in Chapter II. Finally, the thesis argues that Jokowi’s interpretation of and response to the changes in the characteristics of the three domestic factors, vis-à-vis Putnam’s two-level game theory, caused the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

B. EXPLAINING JOKOWI’S “SINK THE VESSELS” POLICY

1. The Multiplier Effects of Indonesia’s Fishing Industry

Although Indonesia’s fishing industry is not a panacea for all of the country’s economic problems, it certainly is a key component of Jokowi’s GMA doctrine. Despite SBY’s promises of economic reforms and infrastructure spending, Jokowi inherited an Indonesian economy that is overly dependent on the commodities sector and has poorly developed infrastructure. Jokowi’s efforts to develop Indonesia’s overlooked and neglected fishing industry have the potential to uplift Indonesia’s economy, ignite alternative engines of growth, and improve port infrastructure in one fell swoop. Therefore, Jokowi’s efforts to eradicate illegal fishing and develop Indonesia’s fishing industry have effects that will be multiplied across adjacent industrial sectors. Enhancing maritime connectivity among the Indonesian islands will also be a boon to the logistics sector and unleash economic potential of less connected coastal settlements in the expansive archipelago.

Indonesian authorities have firmly asserted that the sinking of foreign fishing vessels was in accordance with Indonesian fishery laws. That assertion, however, cannot explain Indonesia’s decision to make a spectacle out of the sinking. Jokowi could have destroyed the boats without the fanfare. The connection made by Susi between sending a strong signal to show the government’s commitment to law enforcement and attracting
investors is relevant here. It is too early to measure the success of Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy and it remains to be seen if investors will be convinced by Indonesia’s efforts to improve the governance of its fishing industry.

In the meantime, the government has also taken steps to ensure Indonesia’s marine fisheries resources are protected from foreign exploitation. The KKP has issued Ministerial Regulation No. 56/2014 to ban the transshipment of ocean catch at sea. The principle of banning transshipment at sea is similar to Law No. 4/2009 on Mineral and Coal Mining, which bans the export of unprocessed minerals. Both laws are designed to ensure that the high value processing phases of the supply chain remain in Indonesia and motivate investors to establish more processing facilities. Efforts to retain high value-add production processes in Indonesia reinforce Jokowi’s intent to develop the fishing industry.

2. Indonesia’s Sophisticated Electorate

On the influence of public opinion on Jokowi’s “sink the vessels” policy, the research found evidence showing that part of the reason for Jokowi to publicly sink ships was to boost popularity. The aggressive policy was popular with Indonesians but did not translate to higher popularity for Jokowi. If Jokowi had intended to use the dramatic public sinking of foreign ships to bolster his approval ratings, the policy did not produce the necessary effect of reversing his declining popularity. The evidence discussed in Chapter II clearly showed that Jokowi’s approval ratings continue to fall even as more boats were detonated. It would be presumptuous to conclude that Jokowi’s policy helped to reduce the rate of decline in public opinion of his presidency.

The impact of “sink the vessels” policy on approval ratings for Susi, the KKP’s minister and lead in Indonesia’s efforts to eradicate illegal fishing, however, can be evaluated with more conviction. Susi was the outright winner in popularity polls conducted on Jokowi’s cabinet. Results from a public opinion poll conducted by LSI in

263 Amindoni, Sinks 106,” Jakarta Post.

January 2015 show approval ratings for Susi at 61 percent.\textsuperscript{265} In the runner-up positions were taken by the religious affairs minister at 48.4 percent and social affairs minister at 48.3 percent.\textsuperscript{266} Susi’s popularity was not short-lived. Her ministry was placed at the top with a 25.2 percent approval rating by SMRC’s poll conducted in July 2015. The approval rating for the fisheries ministry was more than three times higher than the runner-up – religious affairs ministry – with 8 percent.\textsuperscript{267}

The Indonesian electorate is increasingly sophisticated and it is simplistic to think that Susi’s popularity was founded upon nationalist Indonesians enjoying the spectacle of seeing foreign ships getting blown up. At this juncture, it is useful to review Mietzner’s findings on the Indonesian electorate in his study of the growing number of opinion polls in Indonesia and its impact on Indonesian politics. Mietzner’s analysis suggests that contrary to conventional wisdom, Indonesian voters were not easily hectored by authorities or swayed by gifts; the electorate was “much more sophisticated (and diversified)” than what they are given credit for.\textsuperscript{268} “Most voters,” as Mietzner observes, “have very concrete wishes when it comes to the profile of their ideal candidate for public office and the policies he or she should pursue,” and appraisals are primarily based on performance.\textsuperscript{269}

Going back to Susi’s popularity, it shows that voters are indeed discerning and have specific expectations of politicians. On the country’s efforts to eradicate illegal fishing and develop Indonesia’s fishing industry, Indonesians have attributed credit to Susi but not Jokowi. The Indonesian electorate has shown that it does not measure the performances of cabinet ministers and the president with the same yardstick. Susi’s high approval ratings do not mean that Jokowi was ineffective. Instead, Jokowi can claim that his cabinet, which he dubbed as the “Working Cabinet” (Kabinet Kerja), was indeed

\textsuperscript{265} “Best Performing,” \textit{Jakarta Post}.
\textsuperscript{266} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{267} Jong, “Chopping Block,” \textit{Jakarta Post}.
\textsuperscript{268} Mietzner, “Political Opinion,” 95-6.
\textsuperscript{269} Ibid.
Susi’s high approval ratings and the popularity of the government’s efforts to eradicate illegal fishing and develop the fishing industry help to shore up overall approval ratings for the Jokowi’s administration. The success of the “sink the vessels” policy contributed to maintaining the 62 percent of Indonesians who continue to believe that Jokowi can deliver on his promise.271

3. First, Reform the Economy

Generally, Jokowi did not face resistance in parliament on his “sink the vessels” policy. Similarly, there is no direct opposition to his plan to develop Indonesia’s fishing industry. Despite holding a minority parliament, Jokowi was given free rein to execute his anti-illegal fishing policy. The state of Indonesian politics is consistent with the political nature of cartel parties. However, it cannot be taken for granted that the lack of contestation in parliament over Jokowi’s drive to eradicate illegal fishing indicates that the oligarchs are equally acquiescent. As Jokowi pushes for more economic reforms in sectors outside of the fishing industry and open the Indonesian economy to global markets and competition, the political elites, finding their positions of strength compromised, may stop being cooperative in the political sphere.

Two recent developments in Indonesia augur well for the future of Indonesian politics and Jokowi’s political coalition. Without trading for favors, Jokowi’s coalition has expanded with the National Mandate Party (PAN) joining the KIH in September 2015.272 Altruistically, Zulkifli Hasan said that the decision to switch out of KMP and into KIH was “for the benefit of the republic” and “not for personal, party or group interests.”273 With PAN defecting from the KMP, Jokowi’s KIH now holds the majority in parliament. Prior to PAN’s defection from the KMP, Jokowi had reshuffled his cabinet and introduced new ministers with substantial credentials in economics and trade. The


reshuffle in August 2015 was lauded by the media and analysts as a positive move towards reviving Indonesia’s ailing economy.²⁷⁴ While it has been argued that the Indonesian oligarchy is immovable, there appears to be opportunities for a reform-minded president to exploit. By focusing on economic reforms first, Jokowi has exerted influence over the behaviors of the political elites and oligarchs.

Going forward, Jokowi could stand to benefit from a broader coalition as he introduces more contentious economic reforms. Jokowi has explicitly stated that Indonesia has to move towards “labor-intensive investment” and reject “investment that depletes natural resources.”²⁷⁵ Externally, Jokowi will need to eradicate illegal fishing in Indonesian waters and develop Indonesia’s fishing industry. Internally, as Jokowi seeks to achieve policy coherence across the government, he will have to surmount the critical challenge of diffusing the oligarchic pressure against reforms in other economic sectors. If successful, Jokowi, whose focus on economic growth had seen him pressing for sensible policies and emphasizing on effective governance, may have found the winning move to “trigger realignments” across the two-level games.

C. THE END OF “A THOUSAND FRIENDS, ZERO ENEMIES”?

The thesis has shown the interplay between the state of the economy, public opinion, and the president’s political coalition. These three domestic factors combine with varying degrees of influence to shape Indonesia’s foreign policy. President SBY and Jokowi faced the same three domestic factors but each of the factors had undergone significant changes during the presidential transition.

This thesis argues that SBY, who naturally preferred a multilateral approach, enjoyed a period whereby the three domestic factors were conducive for him to enact an


internationalist foreign policy. SBY’s foreign policy enabled the country’s image to be rebuilt and Indonesia to rise in global prominence. During this period, SBY did not push for change in Indonesia’s economic and political fundamentals, and the rise was not sustained. When the global commodities sector declined, Indonesia was caught without an effective response and the vulnerabilities of the economy were exposed. The economic situation caused nationalism to rise in Indonesia as the causes of domestic problems were externalized.

Winning an election where nationalism was a dominant theme forced Jokowi to be sufficiently nationalistic in order to keep his political opponents at bay. While Jokowi may not have intended to adopt a nationalist foreign policy, his unwavering motivation to develop Indonesia’s economy has inadvertently caused him to adopt unilateral approaches to problems, as can be seen from his “sink the vessels” policy. Moreover, the nature of his GMA doctrine and “down-to-earth” diplomacy was inherently focused on domestic issues and could easily be perceived as nationalist. The challenge is for Jokowi to show that his nationalism is neither hostile nor anti-foreign. Instead, Jokowi’s nationalism is driven by his vision of creating an Indonesia that is economically strong, politically sovereign, and culturally independent – the principles of Trisakti.

Specific to Indonesia’s “sink the vessels” policy, Jokowi sensed that Indonesians were tired of SBY’s indecisiveness. Jokowi wanted to take immediate actions to prove he was a decisive leader, unlike SBY. Moreover, his call to sink errant fishing vessels and develop the fishing industry fits with his GMA doctrine and pro-people policy. On the economic front, there was a serious concern that the Indonesian economy, besieged with structural problems, was likely to remain in the doldrums. The urgency to generate economic growth drove Jokowi to risk antagonizing neighbors in exchange for faster results.

As the KKP continues to lead in the fight to eradicate Indonesia’s illegal fishing problem, it has to contend with the surge in demand for resources to enforce Indonesia’s fishery laws. Indonesia’s current languid economic performance is expected to persist in the near future and resources will grow scarcer. The KKP’s announcement of its post-moratorium NPOA seems suited to address Indonesia’s resource constraints in
eradicating illegal fishing. Instead of a domestic issue that Indonesia must face alone, the KKP’s NPOA advocates pushing for illegal fishing to be recognized as a transnational organized crime with regional implications. Such a definition of illegal fishing will require a multilateral approach to resolve the problem. In the meantime, Indonesia is unlikely to stop the public sinking of foreign fishing vessels as both the KKP and the Indonesian navy have separately announced plans to sink more fishing vessels after reports on the post-moratorium NPOA were released. Although Indonesia has proposed a multilateral approach to its illegal fishing problem, it is retaining its “sink the vessels” policy. The change in approach can be argued from an economic perspective: Indonesia does not have the resources to tackle the problem on its own; a cooperative solution enables Indonesia to access more resources and overcome its domestic constraints.

In conclusion, the nationalist turn in Indonesia’s foreign policy can be traced to the changes in domestic factors. Responding to those changes and taking cognizance of the national objectives he had set, Jokowi’s foreign policy approach has been characterized by a willingness to take unilateral actions to resolve problems with little regard for the consequences those actions have on diplomatic ties. Jokowi’s nationalist approach is a pragmatic response to the global conditions and domestic constraints he face. As global conditions and domestic constraints are not static, Jokowi’s nationalist foreign policy will correspondingly change. In the analogy of the two-level game, what remains constant is the need for Jokowi to continuously strike a balance between adopting policies that domestic interest groups prefer without compromising the benefits of maintaining good diplomatic ties.


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