A EUROPEAN IDENTITY: TOO MUCH TO HOPE FOR?

by

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Right-wing political parties are nothing new to Europe. However, there has been a rise and revitalization among far-right populist parties across Europe over the past two decades. This development does not appear to be a flash in the political pan but a manifestation of deeper trends. Contributing factors include perceived and actual economic hardships, anti-immigrant sentiments, and perceived loss of autonomy under the European Union’s umbrella. This thesis analyzes Europe’s flirtations with populist parties and the current state of extreme right-wing parties in politics today. Specifically, it analyzes the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party to determine what the implications are for the success of a European identity becoming the normal status quo—and the consequences if it fails.

The thesis concludes that should the extreme right parties continue in their successes, the EU would change radically or even disintegrate, with security implications for the United States. Specifically, if UKIP and AfD are influential in having Britain or Germany exit the EU, the European project of forging a common European identity among EU citizens would be a catastrophic failure and a notable problem for U.S. security, which relies on a stable, prosperous, and unified Europe.
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ABSTRACT

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Contributing factors include perceived and actual economic hardships, anti-immigrant sentiments, and perceived loss of autonomy under the European Union’s umbrella. This thesis analyzes Europe’s flirtations with populist parties and the current state of extreme right-wing parties in politics today. Specifically, it analyzes the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party to determine what the implications are for the success of a European identity becoming the normal status quo—and the consequences if it fails.

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<tr>
<td>AfD</td>
<td>Alternative fur Deutschland (Alternative for Germany)</td>
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<td>BUF</td>
<td>British Union of Fascists</td>
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<td>BNP</td>
<td>British National Party</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

Not quite a decade after the European Union (EU) member states signed the Treaty of Lisbon— the agreement that stands in for a European constitution after referenda throughout Europe derailed the planned Constitutional Treaty (TCE)—the May 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections saw victory after victory delivered to populist and far-right parties whose platforms are largely, even exclusively, anti-Europe. These parties include the Front National in France, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in Britain, the Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, and the Danish People’s Party in Denmark. At the same time, the established parties of the center lost dozens of seats, and some all but disappeared from the EP altogether. While the Eurocrats in Strasbourg and Brussels have mostly attempted to shrug off the results as protests within the otherwise happy context of European integration, the trend seems to predict dimmer future for the EU’s ambitions of a Europe “united in diversity.” Has Europe reached its political—and emotional—limits, granted the grand problems of the year 2015 with economic stagnation and security problems in the east and the south?

A. IMPORTANCE

This thesis examines the implications for the concept of a European identity for the citizens of the EU nations with the new success of populist, right-wing political groups in the new century. Specifically, the focus falls on the UKIP in Britain and the AfD in Germany, both of which made significant and startling inroads into the European political mainstream in the last several years. In the 2014 European Union elections, UKIP received 27.49 percent of the vote in the United Kingdom (UK), the first time in

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more than a century that a party from outside the broad center, left or right, has won an
election in Britain. UKIP’s campaign concentrated on spreading the message that Britain
ought to leave the EU and establish tougher immigration policies to control the flow of
refugees and others into the United Kingdom. In Germany, the AfD received 7 percent of
the vote in the 2014 European Union elections, that is, it exceeded the 5 percent rule, and
succeeded in “winning seats in the European Parliament for the first time” on its
platform of an anti-euro monetary policy and tougher immigration control into Germany.

To be sure, the UKIP and AfD are two prominent entries in contemporary right-
wing populist politics in Europe, but they are neither unique nor unusual, especially since
the euro crisis of 2008–2014, when populist parties once again became prominent on the
European electoral scene and in popular discourse. Today, especially amid the crush of
migrants fleeing violence in Syria and poverty in Africa and South Asia, there is a
growing discontent with the European Union among many countries in Europe that
manifests itself in more and more organized and polished forms of populism. More
disturbing is that these extreme populist parties are gaining support in many of the
seemingly established pro-EU Western powers. While some of these parties have been
on the political scene, at least on the fringes, for decades, their newfound power and
prevalence, as a group of like-minded parties, is unprecedented in Europe since the
earliest days of the EU and recalls the unhappy record of the interwar period.

The United States has vested interests in maintaining a stable European political
landscape for various reasons, not the least of which is the resurgent threat of Russian
intervention along the former Soviet Union’s borders. Along the same lines, the United
States relies on political stability in Europe, especially in light of the threats like radical

5 “European Elections: UK Results,” Guardian, May 25, 2014,

6 “Germany’s Centre-Right Wins Election, Eurosceptics near 7%,” EurActiv, May 25, 2014, accessed
eurosceptics-near-7-302378.

7 Catherine Shoichet and Jim Boulden. “That ‘Earthquake’ in Europe? It’s Far-right Gains in
Islamic groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Khorasan group. Instability in or among European NATO allies would be a clear signal to Russian leadership, and indeed all foreign adversaries, that the West is indeed weak and unable to respond to further Russian scheming, potentially allowing for miscalculations to be made. Thus, it is in the interest in the United States to maintain the status quo, more or less, in the event of a future coalition that is required to execute extended campaigns abroad.

More disturbingly, sustained success by the radical right wing in Europe also may be a sign that the shared values and ideas that have united the transatlantic community may be faltering, or worse. The ascendance of radical right-wing groups among American allies in Europe ought to be a reminder to pay attention to the elections of America’s friends, for “a divorce between America and Europe is likely to be disastrous for order in world politics.”

B. RISE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT WING IN EUROPE

The problem seems clear enough: the appeal of the extreme right wing and populist politics, particularly since the end of the Cold War and its impact on a security order that, more or less, has for a decade been devoid of an integral nationalist or fascist right-wing. In the interwar period (and perhaps even today), Fascism’s appeal was a call to action to the tens of millions who turned against democracy and pluralism: “Its [fascism’s] appeal was based more on action than dogma and had a strong performative [sic], aesthetic and affective aspect.”

As Jim Wolfreys writes:


In the post-war period parties gradually lost their mobilizing capacity and become more entwined with the state until, from the 1970s, this relationship began to change, so much so that some have argued that “the political party as a primary link between the society and the state disappeared and a vacuum was created.”

But just what is populism in Europe? Jerome Jamin offers a definition:

It can be said that populism refers to a political discourse placing the glory of the people in opposition to the corrupted elite, and that the former must take back control of the democracy that was confiscated by the latter. In the same way, it can be said that the extreme right is an ideological movement based on an extreme nationalism that is anxious to defend a given people in a given territory. A nationalism that justifies xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and the development of a strong police state to protect the future of that people from a racial, territorial and cultural point of view.

Hans-Georg Betz elaborates:

Radical right-wing populist parties tend to distinguish themselves by their radical rejection of the established socio-cultural and sociopolitical system, their pronounced advocacy of individual achievement, a free marketplace, and drastic restrictions of the role of the state; their rejection of individual and social equality, their opposition to the social integration of marginalized groups and the extension of democratic rights to them, and their promotion of xenophobia, if not overt racism; their populist instrumentalization of diffuse public sentiments of anxiety, envy, resentment, and disenchantment, and their appeal to the allegedly superior common sense of the common people against the dominant cultural and political consensus.

Jamin speaks for Betz, as well, when he writes that the rejection of the “European programme has become central” and goes hand-in-hand with a perceived loss of sovereignty from the state to the EU. This viewpoint underlies the trend of anti-Europe parties running in European elections, as the case of UKIP and AfD demonstrate.

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12 Ibid., 120.
15 Jasmin, “Two Different Realities,” 49.
16 Ibid.
1. United Kingdom Independence Party

United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) first competed in the 1997 elections as “a largely unknown and disorganized fringe group of Eurosceptics.”¹⁷ Until recently, and perhaps even to this day, the party has been largely scorned at by mainstream political parties in Britain: “Prime Minister David Cameron once called them ‘fruitcakes, loonies and closet racists,’ and a cabinet minister, Kenneth Clarke, dismissed them last year as ‘clowns.’”¹⁸ UKIP did not help its own image with the ferocious and public infighting that took place among the party leadership in 2004.¹⁹ By 2013, however, the party was being written about in a more positive light, and perhaps of greater importance, more frequently. The party’s leader, Nigel Farange, who styles himself as a thoroughly British eccentric, was being lauded with congratulations for “having transformed ‘a rag tag and bobtail party into an effective political campaigning force.’”²⁰ The perception that this is a protest party or a flash in the pan is changing.

The strong results in the recent 2014 European Parliament elections have forced some critics to reassess just how to respond to the party’s growing popularity, as some have argued that the party is already making its mark on the political scene in the UK.

The strength of the following it has built is forcing Mr. Cameron and his party to move further rightward, and compelling other mainstream parties to take account of the appeal its anti-elitist message has for economically stressed voters who might otherwise lean left.”²¹

Support for UKIP seems to be growing out of voters who feel that there is a need being met by UKIP that the other mainstream parties are ignoring.²² Martin and Smith assert that Farange’s portrayal of himself as an “outsider unfairly excluded by a


¹⁹ Ford, and Goodwin, Revolt on the Right, 49–52.

²⁰ Ibid., 9.

²¹ Castle, “Populist Party Gaining Muscle.”

²² Ford, and Goodwin, Revolt on the Right, 144.
members-only establishment club”23 reaches voters in a way that makes them feel like he is actually one of them, also left behind by the politicians in power—even though Ford and Goodwin point out that this sense of disenfranchisement is not especially new: “Wider trends in British society … showed how social and economic changes created a market for radical right politics among struggling ‘left behind’ voters.”24 Martin and Smith warn that the established parties ought to avoid mocking UKIP and its supporters lest this contempt “strengthen the feeling that those in power look down on those who are incompetent enough to think that the exclusion of their communities should actually matter.”25

Immigration concerns are one of the key issues that UKIP supporters feel that the establishment has overlooked. Ford and Goodwin identify the support base for UKIP as “the older, whiter and poorly educated working class, who share strong feelings about national identity, Europe and immigration, and a lack of faith in established politics.”26 This polity feels precarious and underrepresented, especially in connection with “Europe” and its integrative ideals, which all seem very far away and alien—and getting ever more distant as the literal and figurative complexion of Europe changes with migration. The UKIP manifesto for the 2014 European parliamentary elections reveals a common trend: a sense of complete loss of control and sovereignty to the EU.27 On its eight-page manifesto, the various headlines include “Lost Control of Our Borders,” “Public Services under Threat,” “Risk of Blackouts,” “Cutting and Controlling Immigration,” “Cheaper Petrol and Diesel,” and “Repairing the UK.”28 UKIP accuses current mainstream

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24 Ford, and Goodwin, Revolt, 145.


26 Ford, and Goodwin, Revolt on the Right, 147.


28 Ibid., 4–7.
politicians of obeying orders from Brussels, to the point where there is no perceivable
difference between any of the other parties.  

Indeed, UKIP’s website describes today’s world as unsafe: “These are anxious
and troubled times. As crisis follows crisis, our politicians do nothing in the face of
dangers rearing up all around us.” The UKIP’s local manifesto for 2014 warns of
“unlimited numbers of people” immigrating to the UK from Bulgaria and Romania. In
the next bullet, the handout describes Romanians as being “second on the list of foreign
nationals arrested by police for serious crimes.” UKIP’s six priorities for local elections
are given (in order) as: Binding local referendums with five percent of the population
demanding them; controlling housing developments, education and health services;
prioritize public services for local residents; moving the government closer to the people;
spending money on local issues instead of EU costs; and fighting crime and anti-social
behavior. The implication is that the EU has afflicted Britain and the British with alien
ideas and people who cannot be assimilated—while diverting attention and money from
the hapless British everyman, who is increasingly disinclined to apologize for looking
and sounding like John Bull.

While the UKIP did not experience the success that it thought it might in 2015, a
resurgence in future elections is not out of the question. As Ford and Goodwin write,
there is a support base in the UK that does not feel any of the main parties are fighting for
them.

We [Ford and Goodwin] employed the term “left behind” to signal this
broader sense of insecurity, pessimism and marginalization [sic] which
characterizes [sic] the UKIP support base and sets it apart from backers of
the other political parties. The majority of these voters no longer feel
equipped to get by or get ahead in modern Britain and do not feel that the

29 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 8.
mainstream parties can represent or respond effectively to this feeling of insecurity, which is why they are attracted to a radical alternative.\textsuperscript{34}

2. \textbf{Alternative für Deutschland}

Alternative für Deutschland, the AfD party was founded in 2013 by Bernd Lucke, a Ph.D.-holding macroeconomist and professor at the University of Hamburg, and disillusioned former Christian Democrat.\textsuperscript{35} In a sense, the party arose from the relative political transformation of grand coalition governments, in which the normal Bonn Republic political landscape has fused with the Merkel chancellorship—the CDU/CSU and SPD in single cabinet. The party arose a as one-issue party concerned about the loans that Germany was distributing to Greece and other struggling EU members, it has gained popularity and expanded in the interim to tap into the radical right and neo Nazi political milieu, especially in the state of Saxony.\textsuperscript{36} The opinions of analysts about where AfD as a party truly stands and what it is about range from “a flash in the pan,”\textsuperscript{37} to the “German Tea Party,”\textsuperscript{38} to “Anti-European”\textsuperscript{39} and divided.\textsuperscript{40} Thus, AfD, too, can be classified as Euroskeptic, though the AfD has focused more criticism on the euro and a strong centralized EU instead of against the idea of integration within Europe itself.

Following its successful European parliament campaign in 2014, some say that “the AfD is being seen by a growing number of voters as a legitimate, democratic party


\textsuperscript{40} Koschmieder. “An ‘Alternative für Deutschland?’”
to the right of the [Christian Democratic Union, the party of Chancellor Angela Merkel], and less like a flash in the pan.” Adding to this sense of legitimacy is the recent inclusion of the AfD in British Prime Minister David Cameron’s faction within the EU parliament. Lucke has called the AfD members the “‘True Europeans’ and ‘the party of common sense.’” Following a power struggle in 2015, Lucke was ousted as the leader of AfD by his rival, also an academic and business woman, Frauke Petry, as she “won 60 percent of the votes against her competitor” in the 2015 AfD party convention. Petry has been eager to embrace the Saxon PEGIDA movement, as well, a process that has moved the AfD much farther into the radical right wing camp, if not openly associating itself with neo Nazis. Comparing the two leaders, “Petry seeks to steer the party further to the right, while Lucke wants to adopt a more liberal, pro-business stance and is worried that his supporters are not being able to sufficiently distance themselves from the far-right.” Ultimately, Lucke and some of his stalwart supporters left the AfD and formed a new party, the Alliance for Progress and Renewal (ALFA).

In light of the Syrian migration crisis in Germany and the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015, Petry’s agenda seems likely to draw more attention—and more followers.

In contrast to UKIP’s portrayal of itself as made up of average voters left behind by the privileged and established parties, the AfD leadership has been described as an over educated and over aged elite due to its membership demographics: “Its media-fueled profile is generally white, male, middle class, middle-aged, and educated—two-thirds of the initial membership held doctorates, with 86 percent of these male.” One writer

42 Ibid.
43 Lachmann. “AfD siehtsich auf dem Wegzur Volkspartei.”
45 Ibid.
47 Benzow. “Germany AfD Tries to Shake off ‘Tea Party’ Tag.”
deemed AfD a “party of professors,”48 in no small part because of the high proportion of educators on its membership rolls. Such a thing echoes the process in the educated middle class of another epoch, especially in the interwar period, in which such persons of education and property associated themselves with anti-Weimar political parties.

This constituency of professionals and establishment types makes, at first sight, an unlikely protest party. Arguably, they have only benefited from the policies and prosperity of the Europe that they now doubt. By the same token, the existence of extreme-right undercurrents within the AfD demographic may put rather a finer point on this analysis, and is cause for a great deal of concern. Carsten Koschmieder notes that many of the party activists had once been members of small right-wing extremist or anti-immigration parties. Right-wing extremist newspapers or online communities urge their readers to support the AfD. On the party’s Facebook page, for example, anti-Semitic or racist prejudices are often articulated by its supporters. Several influential party members have a record of making derogatory comments about foreigners, women or poor people.49

The AfD, however, would prefer to characterize its supporters as “church-going traditionalists who believe in conservative family values, are deeply worried about the loose policies of the European Central Bank (ECB) and want Germany to cure its own ills rather than help its euro partners.”50

The 2014 manifesto of the AfD’s European campaign was approved on 22 March 2014. The preamble to the document begins with the statement:

The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) aims for a European Union (EU) of sovereign states. It rejects a European federal state on the model of the United States of America, because there is no European nation as such and no single European constitutive populace.51


49 Koschmieder, “An ‘Alternative für Deutschland?’”

50 Barkin, and Brown. “German Eurosceptics Go Mainstream in Threat to Merkel.”

Furthermore, the manifesto claims that the AfD desire an EU “which enduringly preserves the fundamental values of the Christian West.”52

There are similarities to the UKIP manifestos, as the AfD also voices concerns over the centrality of the EU, the possible loss of sovereignty to Germany, and being dragged down in general by the poorer EU members:

The success of European unity is also ever more threatened by the euro. The common currency sows the seeds of discord in the euro zone, because southern Europe is becoming impoverished and laying claim to the money of other countries in the north.53

The AfD’s manifesto ends with a section called “Courage to Stand Up for Germany!” In this section, the party concludes its declaration against the current state of the EU with the following: “The AfD will change Europe for the better, because it will transform the established parties.”54 As events have continued to shake out following the 2014 EP elections, forcing the mainstream parties to react and respond to the far right is ultimately changing the nature of their policies and as a result, moving the political discourse ever more to the right.55

Similar to the UKIP, AfD’s political ambitions did not go according to plan, and the party failed to capture the larger share of votes in 2015. The party is far from done, however, as the political upheaval of the years 2014–2015 is fully in train and shows no signs of deceleration. The AfD still has seats in the European Parliament56 and has “representation in five German state assemblies after widening its appeal with populist positions on law and order, immigration and traditional social values.” All of these

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 24.
55 Castle, “Populist Party Gaining Muscle.”
platform points will likely resonate with more of the Germany voting public since the Paris attacks.\textsuperscript{57}

C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

At least since 1992, the thrust of the European Union has been to become more than just the sum of its member states. The EU project continues to aspire to create the formation of a European identity; a “pan-European identity,”\textsuperscript{58} as one author has written. Perhaps this identity is even required for the EU to succeed in the long term. Certain developments suggest that this identity is well advanced in its creation, but the progress is uneven.

The subtext of most of the concern about EU enlargement into the newly democratizing states of Central and Eastern Europe was whether or not the inhabitants of the former second world were European enough to embrace this necessary identity; the ongoing debate about Turkey’s candidacy for membership rests on the same question. In other words, a significant share of EU observers—whether they are Europhiles or Eurosceptic—seem to assume that there is some Eastern limit to the extent of Europe, both geographically and conceptually. Similarly, they assume that the question of a European identity has been settled in Western Europe. The advent of parties like UKIP and AfD—smaller parties, to be sure, but by no means any no longer considered fringe extremists—suggests that there may be distinct limits to the breadth or depth of a pan-European identity, even in the established Western European democracies.

D. RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design for this thesis is a comparative case study between the UKIP and the AfD that focuses on the successes of these parties mean for the European Union’s project today. Given the new and evolving nature of these two parties, this research will likely need to refer frequently to news articles, current events, and available peer


reviewed sources, utilizing scholarly articles as they continue to be developed and published.

The UKIP was selected because of the special relationship that has developed since World War I and II between the UK and the America. The AfD was chosen as a comparison because it is the first anti-euro group to gain momentum in Germany in decades. There appears to be an underlying need or want that the EU has not fulfilled, and these groups may embody the discontent that is being felt by populations in Europe. Dismissing these groups as merely radical or crazy would be a mistake on the part of the Western governments, as the appeal for these types of political parties is growing.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND SCOPE

This thesis is organized as follows: The first substantive chapter discusses how the EU has tried to develop a European identity among its member states and to what extent that has succeeded and failed. The second chapter provides an overview of the history of populism in Europe. The third and fourth chapters discuss the platforms, supporters, and other details of the UKIP and the AfD, respectively. Contrasting these two political parties with the attempts by the EU to create a pan-European identity, either through politics or economics, will help show the reader where some policies have succeeded and where they have failed. The conclusion makes sense of what the gains made by the UKIP and AfD mean for a pan-European identity and the EU project.
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II. CONSTRUCTION OF A “EUROPE”

To avoid the horrors of another war in Europe, the western European and Atlantic powers that emerged from the rubble of World War fashioned a concept of anti-nationalism and continental unity, which had been a rallying cry in earlier epochs. The ancient blood feuds and dynastic rivalries as well as total wars had only escalated over 150 years prior, and the unity that had defeated the Axis had to be preserved and fortified. Core to this idea was a reconciliation across the Rhine between France and Germany. Thus, how remarkable that these two historic enemies are now the cornerstones of the European Union. Attempts to neutralize this enmity occurred following World War II, largely to set about to interlock the industrial might of France and West Germany, along with neighboring countries. The Coal and Steel Union in 1951 soon led to the Common Market in 1957, and each country was involved. Gerhard Bebr writes, “By creating a common productive unit and market for coal and steel, the participating States have pooled resources representing fifteen percent of their industrial production and constituting two-thirds of the world’s steel exports.”

The European Union of 2015 began as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC was founded in 1951 with the original goal of preventing another war between France and Germany: “Determined to prevent another such terrible war, European governments concluded that pooling coal and steel production would—in the words of the Declaration—make war between historic rivals France and Germany ‘not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.’” In first the former and then the latter form, it has remained a primarily “Franco-German consortium, a series of arrangements designed to ensure that France and Germany will not again go to war by inducing them to merge their institutions and economies to a point where this ceases to be possible.”


Increased standards of living over the past 60 years in the majority of EU member states have made the chances of war between members of the EU much less likely. Indeed, “it’s hard to imagine war in today’s Europe, which has coalesced around democratic values.” Speaking of the EU elections in 2014, Paul Krugman continues: “The Parliament has very limited powers, but its mere existence is a triumph for the European idea.”

Yet the material benefits provided by the ECSC and its later incarnations—the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Community (EC), and the EU—represent only part of the final goal for the proponents of European political union. According to the Council of the European Union, the commonality among European states that
draw[s] inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law, [and] recall[s] the historic importance of the ending of the division of the European continent and the need to create firm bases for the construction of the future Europe.

In other words, the ultimate goal of the EU is forging a common European political identity to supplant and perhaps supersede existing national identities.

A. WHAT MAKES A EUROPEAN?

Which mechanisms are being used to pursue this goal? And what commonalities comprise a “European?” As Risse might say, certain clear “European values” emerge. First, there is an obvious adherence to democracy and human rights. Walter Laqueur explains:

The postwar generation of European elites aimed to create more-democratic societies. They wanted to reduce the extremes of wealth and

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63 Ibid.
64 Thomas Risse, A Community of Europeans (London: Cornell University Press, 2010), 1.
65 Ibid., 84.
poverty and provide essential social services in a way that prewar government had not. They wanted to do all this not just because they believed that it was morally right but because they saw social equity as a way to temper the anger and frustrations that had led to war.66

Continuing along the theme of European reluctance to commit further crimes against humanity as much as possible, Jos De Beus states, “government and peoples [of the EU] ought to pursue the enforcement of the humane morale minimum.”67 De Beus explains that “this minimum implies that member states respect human rights in their own country and under their own power as much as possible.”68 Preventing human rights abuses is certainly is a large part of what the EU has sought to accomplish within its own borders, though the same cannot be said for the atrocities along the EU’s borders in the Balkans in the 1990s. In this way, Jos De Beus illuminates where some of the perceived borders of where “Europe” actually may lie:

Furthermore, these states renounce aggressive war, on European territory to start with. They help fellow Europeans in any struggle against barbarism. And they commit themselves in international treaties and organizations to the pursuit of decent and just peace and security, and to additional humanitarian obligations outside Europe and its sphere of influence”69

Not perceiving the Balkans as really being a part of ‘Europe’ may also be one of the reasons why the atrocities there were allowed to happen for so long. Regardless, these are elements that the EU strives to pursue within its own borders as the very least.

Second, a strong sense of the rule of law and equality is present. Laqueur states that

among the European values and fundamental rights most often mentioned were the respect for human dignity, the rule of law, peace, respect for the

68 Ibid
69 Ibid
environment, perhaps above all, tolerance—the great diversity of European culture and the willingness to accept it.\(^{70}\)

This characteristic, along with the commitment to democracy, represents a self-conscious reference to—and rejection of—the atrocities committed during the Second World War and perhaps even of the totalitarian regimes that ruled to the East of the Iron Curtain. Somehow, the embrace of tolerance as a complete about-face against the horrors committed in Europe over the past 100 years has allowed an cultural and social environment to thrive where a once conservative Christian culture has since embraced an artist like Conchita Wurst (real name Thomas Neuwirth),\(^{71}\) a homosexual man who dresses in drag and was voted Europevision’s most popular pop music artist in 2014.\(^{72}\)

Indeed, the legacy of World War II (and, perhaps even more so after Ukrainian developments the past two years, the Cold War) is central within a European identity, even if may have faded somewhat over time and generations in Western Europe’s nations.

Third, the average European Union citizen has come to expect a certain prosperous and socially assured standard of living. Marta Kuc writes, “Nowadays the standard of living has an increasing role in the European Union integration process.”\(^{73}\) It is no wonder that thousands upon thousands of immigrants and refugees attempt to flood into the EU every year; there are widely developed roads and infrastructure, readily available medical services, and a vast library of leisure activities to select from.\(^{74}\) Kuc notes, “It is worth mentioning that the access to higher-order goods, including the culture, is an indicator of increased standard of living.”\(^{75}\)

Migrants aside, these real and imagined

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\(^{70}\) Laqueur, After the Fall, 4.


\(^{72}\) Ibid

\(^{73}\) Marta Kuc, “The Use of Taxonomy Methods For Clustering European Union Countries Due to the Standard of Living,” Oeconomia Copernicana 3, no. 2 (2012): 5–23.

\(^{74}\) Ibid., 7

\(^{75}\) Ibid.
benefits have been a huge allure to many former Soviet-bloc states that have sought and successfully joined the EU over the past 25 years.

There are still other traits that make up the compositions of the generic European Everyman or Everywoman. He or she is likely not very religious save for the socially mandatory holiday service, but will probably identify as a Christian.\textsuperscript{76} This number will only decrease by 2050 as more Europeans are expected to continue the trend of coming “religiously unaffiliated,”\textsuperscript{77} projected to be 23 percent by 2050.\textsuperscript{78} Education is abundant and correlates well with those Europeans who tend to associate with the EU concept in general.\textsuperscript{79} With wide-ranging access to the work force and other opportunities for “self-fulfillment,” EU women have a fertility rate of 1.6 per woman.\textsuperscript{80} Much of the population’s growth in Europe has to do with immigration with up to two million coming to Europe every year.\textsuperscript{81} The EU at large is committed to green energy, and it does so “from a wide variety of sources including wind, solar, hydro, tidal, geothermal, and biomass.”\textsuperscript{82} Spending on infrastructure and social projects are preferred to spending significantly on defense, which is generally left to NATO and the Americans. National rivalries seem to peak mostly during soccer matches and when interstate debts become problematic to repay.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{77} Ibid.
\bibitem{78} Ibid.
\bibitem{79} Risse, Community of Europeans, 46.
\bibitem{81} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
1. The Better West and Anti-Americanism

To a certain degree among some proponents of Europe as a third path and as an Anti-Anglo Saxon, neo liberal block, anti-Americanism is now considered a composite of the general European attitude. As Andrei Markovits writes:

Ambivalence, antipathy, and resentment toward and about the United States have comprised an important component of European culture... Animosity toward the United states migrated from the periphery and disrespected fringes of European politics and became a respectable part of the European mainstream... These negative sentiments and views have been driven not only—or even primarily—by what American does, but rather by an animus against what Europeans have believed that America is. Anti-Americanism has been a core element, indeed at times a dominant one, among European elites for centuries.83

Certainly, the events of the 2003 U.S. unilateral invasion of Iraq, use of drone strikes and enhanced interrogation tactics, and continued operations in Afghanistan to 2015 have further strained American and European politicians to some degree, which appears in the common discourse of the day among those social and political groups who have been habitually anti American since former times.

Philippe Roger adds that anti-Americanism is not simply about the political aspect; it is a discourse. According to Roger:

After all, a discourse is … a way of ‘running here and there.’ Anti-Americanism is an unbridled discourse, not only because it is rife with irrationality and bubbling with humors, but also because it takes an essayistic form, rather than that of a dissertation or demonstration.84

Tracing the long history of French anti-Americanism and pessimism, Roger asserts that this sentiment is not even truly based in facts or evidence, but instead it is now a “cultural pillar”85 that certain French on the left and the right can see as a cultural “other.” Reasoning for this comes from the French “resigned dependency on American for goods

85 Ibid., left inside flap.
and commerce and finally to the fear of America’s global domination in light of France’s thwarted imperial ambitions.”  

Despite the intriguing anti-Americanism in European political discourse, Victoria de Grazia points out that there is a powerful American infiltration of European culture through commercialization, in all manner of retail of consumer good and in the definition of class on an American basis and not that of the tradition estates or even classes as seen by Marx. McDonald’s, as a case in point, serves to illustrate that although Europeans may tend to view American politics as distasteful, there is an undeniable appeal for American products:

The food at McDonald’s was a matter of indifference. It was the cultural associations that made for its appeal: the bright lights and noise; the milling of tourists and other outsiders; colorful employee uniforms; the absence of adult mediators like waiters; the self-service and open seating; the tie-ins with familiar Disney cartoons and Coca-Cola; the familiarity of the company mascot, the red-haired clown Ronald McDonald, said to be the world’s most widely known figure after Jesus; and the small toys handed out for free to the children. 

Thus, even in the face of the inherent skepticism of America the political entity, there was a strong attraction to the cultural undertones of American society and product in Europe, shown by the rapid expansion of McDonald’s throughout Europe in the 1980s.

As an example of traditional left wing and intellectual anti Americanism, Jürgen Habermas expresses his opinion about what he believes some of the core European values are. Contrary to American politicians proclaiming a deep faith (typically of the Christian variety), “In Europe, a president who begins his official functions every day with a public prayer and connects his momentous political decisions with a divine mission is difficult to imagine.”

Religion is typically treated “apolitically” in

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86 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
European politics, however with the immigration problems of 2015, conversations about Islam are certainly becoming more common. European citizens generally expect that their governments will help “compensate [citizens] for market failures”\(^\text{90}\) in times of fluctuations with the free market. Continuing with this reasoning, Habermas explains:

In Europe, the long-enduring impacts of class differences were experienced by those affected as a fate that only collective action could prevent. Thus, against the background of the labor movement and the traditions of Christian social thought, a solidary ethos of struggle for greater social justice aimed at universal welfare prevailed over an individualistic ethos of performance-based justice that accepts the inevitability of gross social inequalities.\(^\text{91}\)

Never forgetting the horrors of the holocaust, Europeans have developed “a heightened sensitivity for violations of personal and bodily integrity … reflected … in the fact that the Council of Europe and the EU have made the rejection of the death penalty a criterion of membership.”\(^\text{92}\) As Europeans have looked on their past with a self-critical eye on the topic of colonialism and militarism, the “conviction that the domestication of the state’s use of violence also calls for a reciprocal restriction of the scope of sovereignty at the global level.”\(^\text{93}\) This position can help explain the EU’s apparent mandate that the UN Security Council give an approval before military action is taken abroad, and the indignation at the U.S. for not waiting for one prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Risse argues there are other characteristics the average EU supporter possesses, but specifically cosmopolitanism. He writes that “those who identify with Europe are more likely than others to hold cosmopolitan values, have positive attitudes towards immigrants, and place themselves politically more to the left than to the right on the respective scale.”\(^\text{94}\) He adds that

there is a high probability that these attitudes come in a bundle, that is, that Europeans with cosmopolitan values also identify with Europe as part of

\(^{90}\) Ibid., 47.
\(^{91}\) Ibid.
\(^{92}\) Ibid., 48.
\(^{93}\) Ibid.
\(^{94}\) Risse, Community of Europeans, 47.
these attitudes. Statistical data on a newly emerging cultural cleavage in Europe lends strong support to this argument. Accordingly, pro-European attitudes load heavily on the cosmopolitan end of this cleavage, while Euroskepticism is part and parcel of the nationalist end.95

Finally, Floria Pichler provides some research results regarding cosmopolitanism in Europe:

Research has shown that individual characteristics and contextual conditions shape cosmopolitanism and other orientations to a considerable degree. Younger people, the better educated, and people in professional/managerial occupations are more likely to see themselves as European or world citizens. Contextual variables are important criteria to distinguish between people. Where experience with differences is most likely, such as in big cities, people are more likely to see themselves as cosmopolitans. Most importantly, personal experience, as in living abroad, was decisive in influencing identities and wider orientations including attitudes and perceptions of the EU. This is a clear sign that diversity does not appeal to everybody in the same way but that ‘personal involvement’ (voluntary cosmopolitanism) plays a crucial role.96

In sum, these characteristics are the base values of what has come to be accepted as traits of a common European identity.

2. Institutions for “Europeanization”

Two words characterize the EU’s attempt to forge a pan-European identity: Europeanization and interdependence. Europeanization is defined by Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso as:

the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of government, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European Rules.97

95 Ibid.
Spanning the policy areas of gender equality (in terms of pay and other realms), telecommunications, the judiciary systems across the EU member states, business practices, and even citizenship, Europeanization has been perhaps at the heart of EU motivations all along.

According to Richard Hermann, “Interdependence is an unavoidable reality in the modern world.” Moreover, it is a reality for anyone who spends any time in traffic in central Europe today as in contrast to the same roads approximately 30 years ago. Understanding that the EU is built on interdependence, institutions have been constructed in order to promote a larger European identity in various ways. Herrmann, Brewer, Risse write that over time, institutions can gain trust of the members participating in it, and therefore can be successful whether or not the individual members necessarily have large amounts of trust in one another. The authors describe an alternative purpose of these institutions besides just regulating affairs, be they economic or otherwise: “to promote the construction of an overarching common identity among the participating subgroups. The institutional form in this case [talking about the EU] is a supranational unit, with participating nations as constituent parts.”

For the British and Germans, given their respective political cultures and their experiences of constitutions and government in the past, each country has a unique view of “Europe” and the EU. Using the case of adopting the Euro as a currency or not, both the British and Germans obviously reached different conclusions on whether or not to do so. Going back for centuries, the British have long maintained an arm length relationship with Europe, intervening when necessary to prevent any one continental power from amassing too much influence, but otherwise withdrawing back to the isles when the conflict was over. The case of the euro was little different. Especially in the view of the Little England partisan, the British have rarely if ever considered themselves European, even if there is a certain understanding that they share an interdependence with the

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99 Ibid., 11.
100 Ibid.
continent. For the British, joining the euro would bring catastrophic costs—and not just economic ones:

The British debate on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the continuing reluctance to join the single currency must be understood with reference to a stable national identity collectively shared by the political elites. The dominant discourse strengthened the opponents of the single currency who regularly used identity arguments to make their point. They feared that Britain would lose the ability to govern itself and argued against any further losses of national sovereignty. The political discourse centered around whether to join later or not, in sharp contract with the debated in Germany, which concentrated on joined now or later.101

For Germany, joining the EMU served as a means to achieve separation from its ugly Nazi past in the first half of the 20th century. Risse writes, “German elite support for the single currency was based on the Germany post-World War II European identity, whose purpose was to overcome the Germany nationalist and militarist past once and for all.”102 Contrary to British elites, political parties in West Germany, and later a united Germany, never had any doubts about their support for the Euro.103 Risse shows that then-German Chancellor Kohl, echoing Konrad Adenauer, presented the argument in a way that left little to no room for opponents to argue against integration and adoption of the single currency, saying it was a “question of war and peace:”104

Support for the euro = support for European integration = good Europeans = good Germanness = rejection of the German militarist and national past.105

In looking at the case of the euro, it is clear that national identities play a major role in the decision to adopt a more independent and nationalist attitude, or a more Europeanized one:

With regard to both the British and German cases, collective identities—Englishness as non-Europeanness[sic], in one case, and Germany

102 Ibid., 187.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid., 188.
105 Ibid.
Europeanness[sic], in the other—largely influenced how political elites came to see their economic interests with regard to European integration in general and EMU in particular. In these two cases, collective identities—whether national or Europeanized—do a large part of the causal work in explaining the particular ways in which the elites in both countries came to view British and German interests.106

B. RESISTANCE AND PROBLEMS

Attempts to forge any kind of common identity among the varied cultures in Europe would lead to winners and losers emerging, and thus resistance. This process proceeded from the 1950s until the 1990s on the solid progress of Western Europe and of the FRG at the lead. National unity and the end of the cold war led to the further phase of consolidation, which, as of 2008, has now entered into a period of crisis. In the news for much of 2014 and 2015, the Greek debt problem has been a crippling issue for the EU. How far the EU should be able to go in executing measures for member countries to reform their financial infrastructure has been certainly playing out in front of the world’s eyes. Immigration has been a constant source of strife, yet only recently have the central and northern EU members had to start sharing the burden. Violence by Muslim radicals has only fueled tensions within those groups skeptical of the EU project’s success at all. Even a democracy like the United States has not fully solved these kinds of issues, and most people would agree the United States is only one country; the EU has many, and the issues are not simple in nature.

As discussed earlier, there is, on one hand, a certain sense of what “Europe”107 is:

EU Europe represents a modern, political entity encompassing liberal values such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy. Modern Europe’s ‘others’ are the continents own past of militarism and nationalism, but also xenophobia and racism.”108

This notion has been forwarded and promoted by the elites and politicians at large within member countries of the EU.

106 Ibid., 190.
107 Ibid., 10.
108 Ibid.
Yet there is also competing and contrary narrative of what “Europe” ought to be: in the view of a Europe that is much older and was also prevalent in Hitler’s time,

‘Nationalist Europe’ emphasizes a (Western) civilization and culture with references to a common historical heritage, strong national traditions, Christians as its core religion, and clear geographical boundaries. National Europe’s ‘others’ are non-Christian countries such as Turkey, but also non-European immigrants and large parts of the Muslim populations in European cities.¹¹⁰

This sentiment has found its contemporary expression in UKIP and the AfD, whose appeal to contemporary sentiment cloaks a highly retrograde political idea.

But who subscribes to the idea of “Europe” to begin with? As Risse explains that in general,

If you are Italian, Spanish, French, or German, you are more likely to belong to the group of inclusive nationalists who also identify with Europe than if you are Swedish, Finnish, or British. In general, the populations of continental Western and Southern Europe (except for Greece) feel comparatively more attached to Europe than Northern Europeans or Central Eastern Europeans.¹¹¹

Risse also mentions a study by Neil Fligstein and David Green that “show[s] age, education, income, and socioeconomic status in general are strong predictors for European identity.”¹¹² It should therefore come as little surprise that having superior education and frequent interactions with other countries (and knowing a second language) only helps to reinforce the pro-Europe stance for those Europeans who do so. But that is not exactly an option open to every person in the EU. Traveling and advanced education may have some prohibitive costs, thereby closing the door to those on the lower end of the socioeconomic scale of the public. Unfortunately, have these kinds of international interactions and experiences can be very expensive, and thus limits the number of people who can send their children abroad for studying or other excursions. As

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.
¹¹⁰ Ibid.
¹¹¹ Ibid., 46.
¹¹² Ibid.
Risse says above, it is a primarily elite driven idea, the idea of Europe. This scenario is where the roots of resistance to the whole EU concept begin to grow.

1. Europe’s Integral Nationalist Past

Resistance to immigration and the “other” constitutes a norm in the record of Europe. Nationalism since the eighteenth century, if not before, has always had an opponent, an “other,” to consolidate the nation, especially since the turn in nationalism in the 1880s that led to the world wars. Since the end of World War II, there have been a number of these populist groups in western Europe who have come into existence and ebbed and flowed in terms of popularity, such as the Front National in France, the British National Party in Britain, Alleanza Nazionale in Italy, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in Austria, and the NPD in the FRG. “Their agenda is opposed to immigration, political and economic integration, international capitalism, globalization, and current socioeconomic and political systems, and is pro-national identity.”

Ian Bremmer adds, “[Marine] Le Pen has shown Europe’s radical right that a little rebranding can mask a long history of xenophobic ugliness,” opening the door for more mainstream support than ever before.

Jos De Beus describes what populism means and contrasts it with pragmatism. He writes:

Political scientists draw a distinction between populism by outsiders with a claim to representation of oppressed and excluded members of the polity (grassroots populism) and populism by insiders with a claim to use of the state apparatus in accordance with the will of ordinary citizens (government house populism). Some argue that stable liberal democracies are marked by alternation of populism and pragmatism (Hirschman 1982; Unger 1987; Notermans 2000). Pragmatism is non-populism in the sense of continuation of rational public policy, liberal pluralism (respect for minorities and dissidents), elitist administration of the nation state, politics as professional business insulated from the cycle and buzz of elections,


and control of the public by means of mitigating rhetoric and moderation. Populism will be articulated by new politicians seeking office via offensive campaigning and radical change, and by old politicians whose office holding is losing the support of major constituencies and who stick to power by defensive campaigning and preservation of the status quo. Pragmatism will be articulated by cooperative and flexible leaders of opposition parties as well as by incumbent politicians whose office is both vested and popular.115

De Beus goes further into defining what populism means on its own:

Populism is a technical term for mobilization of resistance against a ruling class alias establishment, pursuit of absolute majority rule (with contempt of deliberation and compromise), display of popular and militant nationalism, electoral opportunism (following polls and the given policy preferences of relevant voters), and manipulation of the public—either stirring up dangerous emotions of the crowd or pleasing an irrational crowd.116

De Beus describes a common criticism by the far right of the EU’s political process, namely the lack of trust by common citizens in the EU and the growing lack of national governments to assert their wills:

According to the thesis of the democracy deficit, European politics suffers from failing and missing modes of democratic mobilization, delegation, contest, deliberation, choice and accountability. The authority of the European Parliament is weak, due to its limited grip on regulatory and budgetary actions of the European Council and the European Commission, the embryonic nature of political cleavages and parties in a pan-European space, and endemic internal corruption. The authority of national parliaments is hollowed out, due to sovereignty pooling, informational time-lags, and the tension between effective diplomacy in European networks and parliamentary binding of national ministers… The deficit engenders popular alienation. The gap between the growing capacity and impact of the European regulatory regime and the limited commitment of ordinary citizens in the European Union leads to disbelief, indifference and hostility with respect to European policies.117

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116 Ibid., 1.
2. Support for Populist Parties

Roger Eatwell explores several different theses that shed light onto the support base of right wing extremism in Europe. First, the single-issue thesis “implies that extreme right parties will do especially well at times when there are major concerns about new immigration.”118 This observation is especially relevant considering the immense immigration problem the EU countries have been attempting to deal with during the summer and fall of 2015. Second, the protest thesis postulates “anti-politics as the key factor explaining the rise of the extreme right.”119 Voters may vote for one of the parties on the extreme right as a way to “express discontent with the mainstream parties” in their respective government, and not necessarily as full-fledged support of the party’s entire platform.120 Third, the social breakdown thesis states that the breakdown of “traditional social structures, especially those values based on class and religion, are breaking down” may be a factor in citizens supporting extremist parties purporting to defend these perceived traditional values, which may be as simple keeping women in the house or anti-homosexuality.121

Ultimately, Eatwell proposes his own theory for extreme right-wing support that is based on three areas of perception converging: a growing perception of legitimacy in extremist groups, rising personal efficacy, and a decline in trust in the political systems that be.122 Extremist groups can increase their ability to be seen as legitimate and acceptable most commonly “by creating the impression that it is a legitimate part of the national tradition. Careful packaging of policies can help.”123 Repackaging policies can involve “watering down” issues, for example “reducing immigration rather than totally banning it.”124 This view may make extremist parties rather more attractive to the

119 Ibid., 51.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid., 53.
122 Ibid., 68–69.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
mainstream of society, as it may not be expounding blatantly racist or xenophobic ideas. Copsey reinforces this point: “Moreover, rather than ‘single issue’ anti-immigrant electors and no one else, the electorates of right-extremist parties contain ‘both extreme right/xenophobic supports and diffuse anti-party protestors.”125 Eatwell argues that an increase self-efficacy can be fueled through group membership and power leaders within the party.126 Last, trust “refers to the feelings about the ability of the economic and political system to deliver desired goods.”127 Failure of the political system to deliver on promises, appear inept, get caught up in scandals, and petty infighting with no realize achievements being perceived by the public all further erode public trust in the system,128 making extremist parties look both decisive and attractive in comparison.

Wilcox, Weinberg, and Eubank propose:

These findings suggest that the far-right vote has shown the greatest increase … in socially and economically conservative nations whose highly individualized citizens express low levels of trust in others, and dissatisfaction with the direction their lives have taken. They are also prepared to express ‘moral indignation’ at the failings of others but no themselves and do not wish to have as neighbors people of different backgrounds. In addition, the countries where these qualities are most prevalent—Austria, Belgium, France, and Italy—appear to be high contentious societies. There is widespread disagreement over important social values as well as in the economic and political realms. Strikes and other labor stoppages are common phenomena, while governments come and go at a substantially faster than normal pace. Moreover, the narrowly self-interested members of the various governments seem to have considerable difficulty in getting along with one another… all these traits leave us with the impression of a not so silent counter-revolution against growing social pluralism and institutional weakness.129

127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
The common theme with the far right’s support base is concern over the future and how their own country and individual situation will fare in an increasingly more globalized world. Goodwin and Ford write:

Since the collapse of communism and the Maastricht treaty, which accelerated political integration, the radical right has turned against the European project, attacking the EU as a threat to national sovereignty and identity. Popular opposition to the EU has now become an important driver of radical right support, leading some to conclude that radical right parties are now a decisive force in swaying popular opinion against Europe by mobilizing the growing uncertainties about the future of European integration among the mass public.\(^\text{130}\)

Bremmer expands on this concept by writing:

Despite all their bluster, the migration crisis is a godsend for Europe’s far right: it gives both new and older parties an opening to capitalize on the rising fear of voters that might never otherwise consider supporting them. As ultra-nationalists who want to protect the strong welfare systems their citizens currently enjoy, they frequently couch their criticism of migrants in terms of economic pragmatism, explaining there is simply not enough money and jobs to go around. Though these parties often have extensive histories of racist comments and policy proposals, their economic message now resonates across a continent exhausted by multiple crises in recent years.\(^\text{131}\)

The economist’s article *Trouble in Labourland* perhaps captures the phenomena most succinctly:

Excessive this may be, but playing out on the streets of Oldham is a story repeated across Europe; a suspicion of political elites borne of stagnant living standards, doubts about globalisation\(^\text{sic}\) borne of deindustrialization\(^\text{sic}\) and in particular hostility to immigration borne of shifting demographics and pressures (however unrelated) on housing, wages and services. Support for nativist parties, ranging from Britain’s blokeish UKIP to France’s hard-right National Front and Hungary’s overtly racist Jobbik, is squeezing traditional social democratic parties

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\(^{130}\) Ford, and Goodwin, *Revolt on the Right*, 188.

\(^{131}\) Bremmer, “These 5 Facts.”
more comfortable discussing redistributive social policies than flags, nationhood and identity.\textsuperscript{132}

What is the common theme for explaining the far-right surge in recent years? As long as there is reasonable fear and uncertainty about how positively or negatively the EU’s influence will be on individual countries, there will always be a support base for radical right wing parties to rally.

C. CONCLUSION

The far right continues to gain in popularity across Europe in the face of political and economic crises since 2008. Economic problems within the EU and global economy coupled with the ever present and constantly growing immigration influx (which is, as of 2015, a full blown crisis with no clear solution) from North Africa and Middle East will present opportunities for extremist parties to make inroads into the electoral landscape. If confidence in the political system of the Europe Union continues to be questioned by the extremist parties, these forces will play a more prominent role in politics, as is already the case in the German political scene.

No one is able to see the future, but this trend has implications for the strength of European political unity and, thereby, for U.S. security and defense policy in the midst of multiple crises. The potential for a radical change of the EU’s policies, member countries exiting the EU, and perhaps even integrity of the EU could be realized in the coming decades given the right conditions described above. Failure of the EU’s government to maintain confidence would potentially spell doom for the prospect of a European identity. If elected leaders continue to fail to properly address the concerns of these disaffected voters, UKIP and its likeminded ilk may someday soon see themselves as major players in government decision making, far from the fringes where they started.

III. THE UNITED KINGDOM INDEPENDENCE PARTY

Britain had a long-standing history of radical or extreme right wing political parties prior to 1939 and in its post-World War II period. What is important about the United Kingdom Independence Party is that it is the first and only far right political group to have won a British EU election, garnering 27.49 percent of the British vote in the 2014 EU election.\(^\text{133}\) While the party did not do as stunningly well in the 2015 national elections, it still gained one seat in the parliament and 12.6 percent of the vote overall, up from the last elections 9.5 percent.\(^\text{134}\) While this result is not exactly the explosion of support the party and its leaders may have been hoping for, it is a clear signal to the establishment that the party is not going to fade away with time as some rivals wished. As the current UKIP leader, Nigel Farage, has said, “UKIP is not a pressure group. It is not a spin-off of the Conservative Party. It is a new political force, and it is here to stay.”\(^\text{135}\) This chapter explores where this party originated, what it stands for, who supports it, and why it matters.

A. THE BRITISH INTRIGUE WITH RIGHT WING EXTREMISM

The British Isles have never been entirely “European” in the sense that has been either France or Germany. Metaphorically and geographically, the English Channel and the North Atlantic form a barrier that represents the traditional hesitation of the British involve themselves too much in Continental affairs. This ambivalence has carried over to Britain’s relationship with the EU. Indeed, in 1960, the British brought together several European states as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which was conceived as an alternative to the EEC.\(^\text{136}\) At the same time, British interests in joining the EEC were rebuffed by Charles de Gaulle, who remained suspicious of the Anglophone allies’

\(^{133}\) “European Elections: UK Results.” \textit{Guardian}.


\(^{135}\) Ford, and Goodwin, \textit{Revolt on the Right}, 15.

dedication to Europe. Only de Gaulle’s death in 1970 cleared the way for Britain’s membership in the EEC (in 1973). Already in 1975, the British electorate was asked to affirm the country’s willingness to remain affiliated with Europe, as the EEC styled itself. While the referendum showed a significant majority in favor of EEC membership for the UK, the fact that the new government felt compelled to ask is symptomatic of Britain’s abiding skepticism of European institutions.

Since the end of World War II, there have been various right wing extremist groups, all varying in duration and impact (if any). In fact, from the 1930s until the present day, there have been more than 75 far right-wing extremist groups or political parties in the UK. And just like in America prior to the outbreak of World War II, Britain had more than a small minority of Fascist Germany supporters in its ranks: “The British ‘Establishment’, including key figures in the aristocracy, the press [sic] were keen supporters of Hitler up until the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Few were supporters of Nazism, but they admired Hitler and felt he offered the best means of preventing the spread of communism. They tended to turn a blind eye to anti-Semitism and the attacks Hitler made on communists, socialists, and other internal opponents.” The author continues:

British high society had a ’30s love affair with Nazism and Hitler which was in many cases just as profound as that which the German people experienced at the same time. When they looked at Hitler, many who had an affection for Germany liked what they saw. Intermarriage between British and German high society goes all the way to the top; the Royal Family themselves were called the Saxe-Coburg-Gothas until they changed their name to Windsor at the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Germany seemed to be thriving under the man who had abolished democracy and declared himself dictator in 1933.

140 Ibid.
Notorious British socialite Unity Mitford fell under the Nazi spell in the early 1930s, moving to Germany in 1934.

Writing to Julius Streicher’s infamous Jew-baiting newspaper *Der Stürmer* in June 1935, she enthused: “England for the English! Out with the Jews! With German greeting, Heil Hitler. P.S. Please publish my whole name. I want everyone to know that ‘I am a Jew-hater.’”¹⁴¹

As Sykes writes, Mitford is perhaps “entirely symbolic of the shame many of the British upper classes [later] felt at their support for Hitler and the Nazis when the war finally began. They suddenly realized they had been engaged in something pretty close to treason.”¹⁴²

Right wing extremism is resolutely anti-communist. Given the Western fears of a wide spread communist subversion in the 1930s following the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, is it not hard to imagine British high society encouraging someone staunchly anti-communist and much closer to the Soviets than they were. Still, it was not merely the royals or the rich whom were initially captivated by the Nazi way of life. Scientists within the British eugenics movement were also encouraged by what they saw as positive, decisive action:

Some were politically right wing and even openly discussed creating closer ties to Nazi Germany’s health establishment while associating the domestic eugenics movement with anti-Communist and, occasionally, anti-Semitic groups. As will be seen, several Eugenics Society figures travelled to Germany during the interwar years and reported favourably to Society General Secretary C.P. Blacker on the “eugenic experiment” taking place there. One former Society officer, later ensconced in the IFEO, lectured at German universities on the necessity of worldwide eugenic reform and the merits of fascism.¹⁴³

As early as 1919, a political party named the Anglo-German Fellowship was established to “foster friendship and understanding between Great Britain and


¹⁴² Sykes, “British High Society.”

Seemingly irrelevant until 1935, “it was resurrected by those whose fear of Bolshevism inclined them to overlook Nazi misdemeanors and to support the Hitler regime as a defence [sic] against communism. Others were more directly pro-Nazi.”

Many members sought to create business deals and trade agreements between the two countries, yet as more of the truth of the Nazi regime’s rule came to light, like the Berlin pogrom against Jews on 10 November 1938, many began to leave the fellowship.

After the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia, the group dissolved following the now fully-apparent aggressive actions of the Germany leadership.

Only one of the pro-Nazi parties in the UK survived beyond the war: “the British People’s Party was founded to oppose war with Nazi Germany and to promote radical right policies.” Party leadership was interred by the British government during the war, and the party became largely irrelevant after the war ended. It is important to note that the British People’s Party “was the only inter-war fascist organization to survive the 1939–45 conflict.”

Perhaps most infamously of the pre-war extreme right parties, the British Union of Fascists [BUF] party was founded in 1932 by Sir Oswald Mosley, a recurring figure in pre- and post–war Britain. Inspired by a visit to fascist ruled Italy in 1932, Mosley published a manifesto for the future of Britain undertook to steal large numbers of members from other right wing parties in the UK. “In terms of his [Mosley’s] political ideas and policy in the 1930s, there can be no doubt that he advocated a coherent programme [sic] for restricting the political and economic life of Britain. His programme

145 Ibid., 174–175.
146 Ibid., 174.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid., 178.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
[sic] envisaged the implantation of Empire autarky, and the creation of a totalitarian democracy in the shape of the corporate state.”¹⁵³ Unsurprisingly, the BUF was founded on the rhetoric of national pride and a deep suspicion of communism:

The BUF based its policies on the corporate state, an end to the established fixed structure of British politics and on the necessity for an authoritarian regime to solve the economic crisis. It was also anti-communist, nationalist, and increasingly anti-Semitic.¹⁵⁴

The group was responsible for large and violent clashes with between left wing groups and itself between 1933 and 1934. As the party’s popularity waned, it focused much more intensely on anti-Semitism and sought to increase violence towards Jewish neighborhoods.¹⁵⁵ It came to a head in 1937 when a large group of anti-Fascist groups came together to opposed the BUF’s demonstrations.

In what came to be known as the ‘Battle of Cable street,’ this clash led to the Public Order act of 1937 which increased police powers to ban marches, forbade the wearing of political uniforms and made the use of insulting words in public speeches illegal. BUF official anti-Semitism reflected the growing influence of Nazism. It [the BUF] changed its symbol from the fasces to a lightning flash within a circle and, in 1936, changed its name to the British Union of Fascists and National Socialists, commonly known as the British Union.¹⁵⁶

Stephen Cullen adds,

The BUF is seen as Britain’s experience of the European-wide disease of fascism and Nazism in the interwar period. As such … the movement is still held to possess all the features that are present in the demonology of fascism. Foremost amongst these is fascism’s use of political violence. Fascism is seen to be a uniquely violent form of politics.¹⁵⁷

The party was largely incapacitated following the internment and incarceration of its leaders in 1940 by the British government following the declaration of war, and never

¹⁵⁴ Barberis, McHugh, and Tyldesley, Encyclopedia of British, 179.
¹⁵⁵ Ibid.
¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 180.
¹⁵⁷ Cullen, “Political Violence,” 246.
fully rose to relevance afterwards, especially following the execution of one of its leaders for treason in 1946.158

Still, as early as the 1940s, but even more so during the 1950s, there were grumblings and deep regrets at the decline and retreat of the British Empire. A few notable groups and parties were formed during the 1950s and through the 1970s, among them were British Empire Party, which received 1,643 votes in the 1951 UK General Election.159 The Union Movement was pioneered by the previously aforementioned Sir Oswald Mosely in the 1940s and 1950s, founded on a primarily fascist agenda that depended largely on anti-Semitic and anti-Communist views.160 His group was also unique in that while it was anti-immigrant and extremely patriotic, Mosley also sought a fascist union of sorts with other fascist parties across Europe. The Union Movement’s speakers were reminded “to stress the movement’s ‘revolutionary’ credentials, reminding their audiences that the UM was ‘anti-Communist,’ but also ‘equally anti-Capitalist.’”161

While his UM party would ultimately fade away by the 1950s, it was important for two reasons. First, the UM attempted to capitalize on the fact that

British Fascism’s limited recovery was provided for by an unforeseen external factor: “coloured [sic] immigration.” The consequent radicalization of British politics that this development engendered enabled British fascism to synthesise [sic] its own culturally pessimistic, racists clarion call with the prejudices of the wider polity, thus shortening the distance between the fringe and fabric of British society.162

Second, perhaps more importantly for the purposes of this chapter,

The UM acted as an ideological conveyor belt transmitting its own particularly malignant set of political and cultural idioms across the chasm of defeat and despair to a new generation of activists who, confronted with more propitious external circumstances, were able to make their own conceptions about race, identity, and mass immigration resonant within

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158 Ibid.
160 Graham, Very Deeply Dyed in Black, 54.
161 Ibid., 62.
162 Ibid., 141.
mainstream debates on the issue, and to reap some electoral benefits, the likes of which Moseley could have only dreamed of.163

Many other groups came and went during the decades after the war: in the 1960s, Neo-Nazi parties like the British Movement and The Greater Britain Movement emerged, often running on anti-immigrant or anti-Semitic slogans.164 In the 1970s, parties like the British Democratic Party and the National Front would emerge with similar mantras,165 and they would live long enough to have most of its members defect and form the British National Party, which endures to this day.

While nothing incredibly significant was to come of the many fleeting right wing groups and parties throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, one major party would emerge that would shake up the political landscape of the United Kingdom, for a period of time. The 1982 iteration (there had been a previous British National party in the 1940s and 1960s166) of the British National Party (BNP) would be the first right-wing extremist party to earn meaningful electoral gains in Britain since the end of World War II. According to Hill and Bell:

Over the course of the past two decades, as far-right parties rose to prominence on the continent we could congratulate ourselves on having no domestic equivalent to the French national Front, Belgium’s Flemish Block, Austria’s Freedom party, or Italy’s National Alliance… Since the turn of the millennium, however … British society has started to present some worrying symptoms of this ‘continental’ illness.167

They would continue to gain little bits of momentum here and there rose to relative prominence in the 2003 local elections, winning 13 council seats.168 Copsey notes, “It [the BNP] had outperformed all its predecessors by far.”169

163 Ibid., 142.
164 Barberis, McHugh, and Tyldesley, Encyclopedia of British, 178.
166 Copsey, Contemporary British Fascism, 2.
167 Ibid., 203.
168 Ibid., 124.
169 Ibid.
The BNP achieved notoriety through a number of ways, including some of its controversial slogans, for example, “Rights for Whites,” amid the racial tensions and riots of 2001 in Northeast Manchester, in Chadderton district. According to Copsey, “Intent on creating a political opening, party activists were increasingly drawn to Oldham especially when, throughout March and April 2001, inter-racial tensions were brought to the boiling point.” The situation culminated in skirmishes between militant members of the BNP, Pakistani youth, and police and involved bombs and the destruction of a soccer field and multiple cars being vandalized and destroyed. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the BNP gained more notoriety and continued to ride high on its policies of stopping non-white immigration. For 77 percent of BNP voters, immigration was the most important issue facing Britain. Going into the 2004 local and European elections, expectations were high enough that BNP leadership “was confident of obtaining up to several MEPs along with some 50–50 council seats.” According to Copsey, “The party [BNP] received over 800,000 votes in the 2004 European elections and close to 300,000 in the 2007 local elections.”

Wolfreys finishes by outlining the demise and decline of the BNP into a outlier party, no longer statistical significant and fraught with economic problems:

These [electoral] advances, however, were interrupted in 2010 when the party failed to win a parliamentary seat (its overall vote rising only 1.8 percent to 514,819 despite a year of unprecedented media exposure) and lost all its representatives in the champ of its flagship council.

Indeed, it is hard to foresee the BNP gaining a huge electoral victory soon, especially if it “remains ‘the most demonized party in modern British political history.’”

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170 Ibid., 126.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid., 126–127.
173 Ibid., 154.
174 Ibid., 156.
175 Wolfreys, “The European Extreme Right in Comparative Perspective,” 29.
176 Ibid., 30.
177 Copsey, *Contemporary British Fascism*, 207.
B. UKIP’S OBJECTIVES

What does UKIP ultimately hope to accomplish? The UKIP markets itself primarily as a conservative and highly Eurosceptic party, and by far the primary immediate goal is to have the United Kingdom exit the EU. As the UKIP leader Nigel Farage has stated:

The forthcoming debate and referendum about Britain’s membership of the European Union is likely to be the defining political decision of this generation…In recent weeks and months it has become normal for many correspondents to use ‘Europe’ as shorthand for ‘the European Union.’ To do so is inaccurate, and suggestive of a general dislike of our continental allies, when what Eurosceptics oppose is membership of a supranational political organisation.\textsuperscript{178}

UKIP activist Suzanne Evans echoes Farange’s reasoning, writing:

UKIP isn’t embarrassed by patriotism or by being British. We believe our nation can be a force for good and that our country has developed social and civic values over the last thousand years which should be celebrated, preserved and build upon. This is the philosophy at the heart of all UKIP policies … and principles… We do believe the British way of life is fundamentally good and worth saving. This is why our foremost policy is withdrawal from the European Union.\textsuperscript{179}

Leaving the EU is a central pillar of the UKIP’s identity. “Given that UKIP are even more intensely Eurosceptic than most of their European cousins, and operate in one of the most Eurosceptic countries in the EU,”\textsuperscript{180} it is not a far stretch of the imagination to figure a large measure of support for UKIP can be attributed to Eurosceptic British citizens. In fact, Ford and Goodwin go so far as to say that being Eurosceptic is “so universal, and so central to the party’s identity, that it is better seen as a necessary condition for considering a UKIP vote: 95 per cent of UKIP voters disapprove of Britain’s EU membership.”\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{178} Nigel Farange, “This Referendum is Not about Leaving ‘Europe’ It is about our EU Membership,” United Kingdom Independence Party, last modified October 20, 2015, http://www.ukip.org/this_referendum_is_not_about_leaving_europe_it_is_about_our_eu_membership.


\textsuperscript{180} Ford, and Goodwin, \textit{Revolt on the Right}, 188.

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid., 195.
In line with the extreme right’s standard view on individual countries’ well-being being prioritized, a key criticism by UKIP of the EU is that over time, being a member of the EU has only resulted in Britain’s sovereignty and independence being eroded.\textsuperscript{182} There are a number of causes that the party attributes to the alleged degradation of sovereignty. The inability to negotiate trade deals between Britain and commonwealth countries, which are of course not in the EU, is thus a large source of anguish for the Euroskeptics.\textsuperscript{183}

Linked with the EU’s trade policies, UKIP targets the immigration policies of the EU. UKIP of course advocates the withdrawal and exit from the EU. By doing this, the party vows to

\begin{quote}
take back control of our [British] borders, put a five year moratorium on immigration on unskilled workers, … introduce an Australian-style points based system to manage the number and skills of people coming into the country, … [and] tackle the problem of sham marriages.\textsuperscript{184}
\end{quote}

UKIP would also end multiculturalism in Britain if it came to power. A quote from the 2015 UKIP manifesto explains:

\begin{quote}
We reject multiculturalism, the doctrine whereby different ethnic and religious groups are encouraged to maintain all aspects of their cultures, instead of integrating into our majority culture, even if some of their values and customs conflict with British ones. We believe multiculturalism has led to an alarming fragmentation of British society.\textsuperscript{185}
\end{quote}

Ultimately, UKIP’s two prime objectives are: ceasing certain kinds of immigration while radically changing the way immigration is handled in the UK (read another way: undoing and removing the EU’s policy of free movement among EU citizens within EU countries) and banishing the EU’s oversight and outside influence into Britain’s affairs by exiting the EU altogether.

\textsuperscript{182} Evans, \textit{Why Vote UKIP}, xvii.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., xvii–xviii.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., 61.
C. DEMOGRAPHICS

The UKIP support base does not differ largely from the stereotypical extreme right demographics: Mostly white, conservative, and middle to lower class citizens who have major issues with immigration and the EU at large. As Elise Rietveld writes, “UKIP draws its core support from working class men from a Conservative background who are financially insecure and read tabloid newspapers, but also appeals more widely particularly in European elections.”

Ford and Goodwin speak to the demographics of the UKIP support base:

Looking to the examples of more successful insurgents [extreme right-wing political parties across Europe], the party finally embraced the fundamentals of party-building: the need to establish local bastions of support; to invest in parliamentary by-elections; to establish a clear target electoral market; to fuse their Eurosceptic message with an anti-immigration appeal; and to exploit the weakness of the main parties and other, rival insurgents.

Richard Seymour writes of the UKIP support base:

The share of the vote for both Labour and the Conservatives barely altered between 2010 (29 per cent and 36.1 per cent, respectively) and 2015 (30.4 per cent and 36.9 per cent). UKIP, however, increased its vote from 3.1 per cent to 12.6 per cent. Deploying a political strategy which I will call “counter-transformism,” UKIP consolidated the right wing, energized it, hardened its positions, polarized the debate to the right, and kept a weak Labour leadership on the defensive. With the petty bourgeoisie as its bedrock, UKIP assembled an impressive, cross-class coalition, with moderate advances into the Liberal and Labour vote.

UKIP has been able to successfully merge domestic concerns with association and dissatisfaction with Brussels’ political establishment and management of the EU. Ford and Goodwin write that “Across Europe, academics have traced support for radical right parties that are similar to UKIP to four particularly important movies: Euroscepticism;
hostility towards immigration; populist dissatisfaction with established parties; and a pessimistic and dissatisfied outlook on life.”189

Positioning UKIP as an outsider party that will fight for the common citizens is a strong selling point for the party. As Martin and Smith write,

Despite Farage’s privileged lifestyle and support of the same neoliberal economic politics that the other major political parties are signed-up for, his constant presentation of himself as an outsider unfairly excluded by a members-only establishment club taps into this sense of unfair exclusion from the political discussion.190

This portrayal of Farage has aided in supporters of UKIP perceiving that it is for the common Englishman.

Ford, Goodwin and Cutts write:

Examining vote-switching between first- and second-order elections evidence is found of a distinction between two types of supporter: more affluent and middle-class ‘strategic ‘defectors’ from the main-stream Conservative Party who support UKIP to register their Euroscepticism, and more economically marginal and politically disaffected ‘core loyalists’ who are attracted to UKIP by its anti-immigration rhetoric and populist anti-establishment strategy. UKIP also succeeds in attracting core support from groups such as women who have traditionally rejected extreme right parties such as the BNP.191

Between reinventing the message of the extreme right and changing the electoral strategies for gaining votes, UKIP’s leadership will seek to continue making inroads into the political mainstream.


IV. THE ALTERNATIVE FÜR DEUTSCHLAND

Cited by some as “Germany’s UKIP,” AfD was only recently established—in 2013—yet has quickly become a new wrinkle in the resurgent right-wing extremist movement across Europe’s political landscape. It was the first anti-Euro party to gain a seat in the German parliament, winning several others since its founding in 2013. A leadership change in the summer of 2015 now has the party’s rhetoric focused on closing Germany’s borders to further immigration from Syria and the Middle East, while also maintaining the call to leave the Eurozone. This chapter surveys the post-war political landscape in Germany regarding the extreme right’s popularity, what the AfD’s goals are, and who supports it.

A. THE FAR RIGHT IN THE FRG

Following the defeat of the Nazi regime in 1945, the völkisch brand of radical and violent nationalism in Germany was physically destroyed and politically bankrupt. The occupying powers banned the NSDAP and purged public life of Nazis, though this purge was incomplete and laden with contradictions. In the FRG, in particular, laws were put into place following 1945 in order to ban the use of the Nazi symbol, speech, and other “unconstitutional” methods that would support hatred. This effort formed part of the program of both the German government and the victorious allies root out Nazi thought and organization: “German politics denied the existence of a xenophobic far-right movement for many years in order to be accepted by the international community and to silence any discussion of the continuation of Nazi elites in post-war Germany.”


Yet, the far right in the FRG resurfaced as various nationalist parties that had a very mixed experience. The first party to be banned under the West German law was the Socialist Reich Party (SRP), in 1952. This party had attracted many former Nazi members and experienced mild successes in elections prior to being banned as the allied powers exercised significant influence in the young FRG. For the rest of the 1950s, the far right did not achieve much success in Germany, since many Nazis were recycled and thus de-weaponsized, in contrast to the Weimar record in the 1920s. For one thing, Article 131 was added to Federal German constitution, the Basic Law, in 1951:

This opened the floodgates for those officials of the Third Reich to return to similar posts within the Federal Republic and functioned as a neutralizing force by integrating what could have constituted a potential reservoir of far right support into the structure of the Federal Republic.

It was clear by 1960s that the extreme right was not dead though; instead, it had been merely passive. The National Democratic Party (NPD) was formed out of the shell of fractured far-right groups and by former Nazis. As the leader of NPD stated, the party would “serve as a haven for all the shipwrecked right-wing splinter groups and attract the dissatisfied of all classes in Western Germany to whom a strongly nationalist and authoritarian policy would appeal.” Though it began very small with only 2 percent of the general vote in 1965, with the onset of recession in the mid-1960s and a grand coalition government, the NPD achieved almost 10 percent by 1968 in a few German states. Some called this development an “indicator of symptoms of crisis in the democracy,” in which skeptics were convinced that the Bonn government would go the way of the first German democracy. This surge in popularity can likely be attributed in part to the economic problems that befell the Germans in 1966–67, which is

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197 Ibid
200 McGowan, The Radical Right In Germany, 155.
201 Ibid., 156.
202 Ibid.
typical of many far right-wing groups. Once a new social liberal coalition formed, the NPD performed disastrously in the 1969 elections, amid internal fighting that crippled the party’s influence until the end of the century.

Various other small populist and extreme right parties formed in the later 1970s and mid-1980s, but none were as serious contenders in the political arena as Die Republikaner and the Deutsche Volksunion. From 1989 to 1995, the group succeeded in gaining entry into multiple German state legislatures.\textsuperscript{203} According to Jaschke,

| their platform included anti-immigrant policies, a tough stance on crime, and a rejection of what was seen as failed government policies in general. | Franz Schoenhuber, their leader … can be compared to other European right-wing populist leaders such as Jean-Marie Le Pen.\textsuperscript{204} |

Absorbing voters who were dissatisfied with the mainstream conservative parties, Die Republikaner fell apart in 1995 due to infighting and in large part because mainstream parties had adopted some of Die Republikaner’s rhetoric.\textsuperscript{205}

Approaching and following reunification with East and West Germany, populist groups targeted the East Germans, where a very different electorate existed, and whose attitudes about nation and Europe differed greatly from that of the FRG in the 1980s. The labor market in East Germany tried to cope with the large-scale overhaul of the economy in the unification process, as “old industrial structures were transformed into modern, service-oriented companies that required skilled workers. Unemployment rates kept growing and left parts of the former working class behind.”\textsuperscript{206} This dislocation created a disgruntled and dissatisfied swath of young unskilled men, persons who were perfect candidates for the far right’s overtures. Jaschke argues that

| although anti-fascism had been an official doctrine of the East German regime, it had no deep roots in the everyday life of society and people’s minds. At the same time, xenophobic attitudes, anti-Semitism, and |

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\textsuperscript{203} Jaschke, “Right-wing Extremism,” 27.  
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., 26.  
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{206} Ibid., 24.
authoritarian beliefs had always been part of the so-called socialist society.207

The extreme right served as a domain for the “social losers of reunification by giving political and ideological support for militant action.”208 The GDR had boasted a neo Nazi underground, tolerated by the regime, because of the impossibility of stamping it out. The GDR, too, had recycled Nazis in the 1950s and, in many cases, had recycled Nazi organizations with a hammer and sickle badge, which could do little to cover up the integral nationalist core ideas.

At this point, the extreme right split into three distinct branches, radicalizing in the process. First, there were the violence-oriented militants.209 These groups were compromised of neo-Nazis and skinheads, of which the latter culture was transplanted from the United Kingdom. These typically young white men were used by the NPD to cause harm to anyone who did not fit in with their worldview.210 This localized violence had become routine enough to the point that between 1990 and 2010, “some east German locations were generally considered to be no-go areas for visitors from abroad and domestic, especially dark-skinned minorities.”211 The second category is the intellectual branch, which Jaschke calls the New Right.212 This, in reality, was an evolution of the old right, but in a new package. Schellenberg notes,

They share a rejection of the ideas of the French Revolution: freedom, equality, and solidarity. They blame those ideas for what they view as the decline of politics, society, values, and the traditional German ways of life. The New Right attacks democracy and liberalism, fighting for a strong state, rejection immigration and multicultural societies.213

207 Ibid., 25.
208 Ibid.
211 Ibid., 29.
212 Ibid., 27.
213 Ibid.
Third, the national-conservative branch laid the foundation for later populist groups like the Republicans and German People’s Union to emerge.\textsuperscript{214} Schellenberg writes that these two groups were formed out of dissatisfaction with the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union as it became more centrist and inclusive of socialist ideas and practices.\textsuperscript{215}

In the shadow of the Nazi past, the far right in Germany can never escape domestic and international suspicion, for it is seemingly forever linked to fascism and Hitler. The extreme right has not polled especially well in recent elections, but given the wave of far right growth and the surge in popularity across Europe in general, this situation may well change. Laws may ban overtly fascist parties, but militant activists maintain high crime rates targeted at foreigners or minorities.\textsuperscript{216} This persistence must remain a cause for deep concern going forward for the German political elite.

B. AFD’S OBJECTIVES

More in the sense of the Lucke wing,

The AfD strives for an EU of sovereign states supporting human rights, democracy, the values of the Christian West, selective integration, subsidiarity, competition, and the rule of law. It is against excessive EU centralism, bureaucracy, dirigisme and a common currency that leads to rescuing incompetent banks, to frustrated jobless young people and to minimal pensions.\textsuperscript{217}

So begins the 2014 AfD preamble in its European elections manifesto. The primary goal of the AfD is to ensure all states in the EU are eligible to be removed from the Euro currency, either by their own choice or by ouster from the other EU member states. As the party states in its European election manifesto: “The EU is threatened by the single currency euro: Presently, committees lacking adequate democratic legitimacy issue regulations with the status of law and establish institutions that lack any kind of

\textsuperscript{215} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{216} Jaschke, “Right-wing Extremism,” 29.
parliamentary control.”218 An article from Deutsche Welle states a similar analysis of the party’s primary purpose: “The AfD’s central argument is that the euro is a failed currency that threatens the European Union’s future by supporting impoverished countries and uncompetitive economies, which in turn burdens future generations.”219

The apparent fragility of the euro has been put into sharp focus over the past two years with the crippling Greek debt threatening to sink the currency. This development is made worse in German politics by the noisy nostalgia of a certain group of Germans for the Deutsche Mark in its glory years as the emblem of a prosperous and stable West Germany, which has now vanished into the mists of time. The German government has given several bailout loans to the Greeks and there is a profound concern within the AfD leadership that this crisis could do irreparable damage to the German economy. The AfD has gone so far as to create an entire manifesto dedicated to the Greek debt crisis alone, citing in it many concerns regarding “internal devaluation”220 of the Euro. From the AfD’s Greek recovery manifesto:

[ AfD] Condemns the present situation in which European taxpayers are forced to prop up a failed currency union, prolonging the suffering of Greek society. Such a policy does not have any economic or moral justification. [AfD] Underscores that Germany cannot be expected to lower its competitiveness to solve the Eurozone crisis, and that ‘internal devaluation’ cannot improve the competitiveness of Greece.221

The document stresses that the AfD does not endorse nor desire a total “Grexit” from the EU, however, as there are other successful countries in the EU but not members of the Eurozone currency.222 This position contrasts with the UKIP’s primary reason for existence—Britain’s exit from the EU entirely.

218 Ibid.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid.
Similarly to UKIP, AfD is for expanded restrictions on the movement of people between EU countries. The 2015 immigration crisis has only served to highlight and reinforce the party’s stance in this regard, and the polls support this measure: “Support for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) … has risen to its highest level in nearly four months as an influx of refugees from the Middle East gathers pace.”223 The party has continued to feed off the increased anxiety of immigrants, specifically those from Syria.224

The party absolutely maintains its commitment to leave the Eurozone, but recent discussions have shifted the party much more into the realm of xenophobia. As a result, Lucke has severed ties with AfD. His departure will likely allow the AfD’s new leadership to pursue further emphasis on border control than it would have with Lucke present in the party, especially with growing concerns over possibly one million migrants on pace to enter the EU in 2015.225 The party is also apt to continue its vaguely pro-Russian and less vaguely anti-American development.226

C. DEMOGRAPHICS

At the party’s foundation in 2013, the AfD was labeled by critics in the grand coalition as a fringe group; originally “[AfD] was derided as the ‘professors’ party’ and dismissed by Chancellor Angela Merkel.”227 The group consisted of dissatisfied and nationalist economists and other professionals who would have seemed to be prime candidates to prosper in the EU’s Eurozone setup, but instead came together to form a group with the purpose of making Germany leave the euro behind. The group was soon

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224 Ibid.


227 Hill, “What Next for Germany’s Eurosceptic AfD Party?”
credited by some observers as the first legitimate conservative alternative to Merkel’s Christian Democrat (CDU) party, taking away votes from the CDU/CSU in 2014.\textsuperscript{228}

The initial demographic make-up of the party in 2013 and 2014 is worth noting because it stands in contrast to the typical extreme-right support described in Chapter 2. Too focused on skin heads and old Hitler Youth leaders in their dotage, the respectable veneer of the educated middle class led to the confusion of political observers. Of course, middle class and educated support for Nazis had been prominent in a past that was now essentially forgotten. As Jaschke writes, “Non-acceptance of immigration and prejudice toward immigrants are common values of right-wing voters in Europe. This electorate mainly consists of younger males on a low skill and education level. Most of them are laborers or unemployed.”\textsuperscript{229} The AfD started out as something rather different, though the party’s demographics have begun to morph slightly in the past year. With the change in leadership, some have written that AfD “has shed its academic gown, becoming more grass-roots and overtly nationalist, and is focusing all its efforts on opposing Angela Merkel’s asylum policy.”\textsuperscript{230} This development has significant implications for its support base going forward, as it would seem much easier to get those already leery of immigrants riled up to a cause that directly confronts that issue than getting supporters to march over the finer details of Eurozone policies.

Tied with the shift toward a more radical right-wing philosophy is the struggle for Petry to attempt to maintain the projection that the AfD is not overtly far-right and instead moderate. With the rise of the mass movement PEGIDA in Saxony in 2014, this argument is proving extremely difficult as ever more of the far-right’s supports flock to the AfD from other fringe or banned parties, some of whose speakers “are increasingly radical right-wing, because they use hate and semantics that is certainly close to neo-Nazi


\textsuperscript{229} Jaschke, “Right-wing Extremism,” 32.

One of the AfD’s most significant spokesmen, the new broom Thuringian schoolteacher Björn Höcke, has been quoted as saying he wanted “1,000 years of Germany!” This statement was offered in the same tones as Joseph Goebbels on German national television and in several of his public speeches, leaving many commentators and analysts weary of the AfD’s motivations in light of his “Nazi era” choice of words. In a very real way, he represents some of the newer blood to have entered into the AfD with the appointment of Petry as party boss. Ben Knight continues his analysis of AfD’s membership:

Since the unceremonious ouster in July [2015] of the previous leader and founder Bernd Lucke, who represented the euroskeptic liberal economist element of the party, the AfD has been reduced to two wings - the middle-class nationalist conservative wing, represented by Frauke Petry, and the far-right radicals, represented by Höcke, which is rapidly leeching voters from the NPD and among PEGIDA demonstrators.

According to Knight, this is the AfD’s strategy—maintain two kinds of rhetoric to attract both middle-right and extreme-right supporters to gain votes. This policy also mobilizes the underground skin head bullies, whose assassination attempt against a candidate for mayor in Cologne, in addition to the upswing in acts of violence against asylum seekers, has been more than noteworthy. Given the uncertainty of the immigration situation across Europe at large and in particular France and Germany, this will likely continue to be the AfD strategy until the next national election in 2017.

D. CONCLUSION

Germany’s Nazi past reduced extreme right-wing parties in West Germany to the fringe, where for long they hid behind a conservative “national pride” agenda. In East Germany, ring-wing movements only materialized in the 1980s in the form of skinheads.

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231 Ibid.
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
234 Ibid.
but no formal parties formed due to the communist rule there up until 1989. As time marched on, far-right parties never entered the political mainstream in Germany, though that may be changing, as societal sentiments regarding disillusionment and frustration with Eurozone policies increases—not only in Germany but across Europe. As the civil war rages and generally austere conditions persist in the Levant and North Africa, refugees continue to pour into EU countries, causing ever more limelight to be placed on policies and public relief to be given to them; this in turn provides the perfect fodder to grow the ranks of the extreme right, and AfD, like so many other far-right parties in Europe, are benefitting because of their border control proposals. Should the AfD see major gains in the future and enter into the political mainstream in Germany, it would be expected to see a major effort to leave the Eurozone, which would likely doom the euro as a currency. In the long run, it may result in closer ties between Russia and Germany, turning away from the West.
V. CONCLUSION

What are the implications for European politics and U.S. security policy in Europe with the further expansion of populist and radical right wing politics in two key U.S. allies? Bremmer expresses what could be the worst case scenario for the United States should the far right claim victory in a major EU member:

Economic sanctions against Russia, imposed by the U.S. and E.U. after Moscow’s Crimea grab, have made matters worse, because they cost Europe much more than American sanctions cost the U.S.—Russia is America’s 23rd largest trade partner, but Europe’s third. The effects are felt most sharply in key economic sectors: France’s defense industry, the German and Italian energy sectors and British finance. But Die Welt reports that sanctions on Russia could eventually cost Europe $114 billion and up to 2 million jobs. According to E.U. law, the imposition of sanctions must be unanimous across all 28 member states; that’s a big problem. Vladimir Putin has two missions in Syria. The first is to prop up his ally Bashar Assad and protect Russia’s foothold in the Middle East. The second is to persuade Europeans that Russia can help stabilize Syria, halting the flow of refugees into Europe. There are already plenty of European governments and countries that want to see the sanctions lapse. And all Putin needs is one far-right party to assume power and decide that their country’s economic well-being is more important than punishing Russia. That would further undermine European unity and create a new source of tension in U.S.-European relations at a time when a new trans-Atlantic trade deal might revive Europe’s longer-term economic potential.236

Thus, a widespread far right victory poses a threat to the U.S. organized Atlantic security order since 1945, which has relied on a moderate political culture and party landscape unlike that of interwar Europe, especially after 1930, in which the middle class in much of Europe embraced fascism and revisionism. What with the enduring economic problems, as well as the role of terrorism after the Paris fall 2015 assault and the Russian threat to the status quo, the extreme-right is now a feature of the political world. The threat is real, given the multitude of problems facing the EU as “the extreme right parties have rearranged and reaffirmed themselves in the last 20 years,” through various

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236 Bremmer, “These 5 Facts.”
problems ranging from economic pain with Greece, to Russian trade embargos harming EU members, to the very real immigration flood and the EU’s apparent inability to appropriately handle the problem: “For far-right parties across the continent, mismanagement of the Greek crisis is proof positive that the E.U. is a net negative for any country not named Germany.”

Ever more a voice in the wilderness, Habermas voices his despair of a pluralist and postmodern pan-European identity taking hold at this stage of the EU, writing: “Elites … cling to the established mode of intergovernmental decision-making so that they do not need to concern themselves with a normative integration of citizens that would first make possible the pursuit of common goals across national boundaries.”

He points out that as the EU membership encroaches on Europe’s East, member countries will have to share resources further and “active political interventions will be necessary to bridge the gaps in socio-economic development between the old and new members.” The pie can only get so big, and everyone wants a slice—between the poorer Southern countries, flooded with immigration and unemployment, and the newly minted Eastern members, the EU has spread itself thin. The struggle ultimately lies, as Habermas argues, between those who argue for the nation-state as a primary participant in international affairs and those who push for a solution past the state level. It appears unlikely that the EU countries work towards a common identity while each state tries to push for an increasingly better deal on its own.

Roger Eatwell speculates further about what a lack of confidence in the system may do to the European Union’s political processes of consensus and small steps:

As long as the communist “evil empire” existed, Western democracy could in an important sense define itself by the “Other.” Following the collapse of the … Soviet empire, the spotlight has turn inward, towards democracy’s basic principles and linked socioeconomic structures. What

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238 Bremmer, “These 5 Facts.”
239 Habermas, Divided West, 68.
240 Ibid. 69.
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid.
exactly does international “multi-level governance” mean in terms of democracy? Such new institutions may seek to protect (liberal) democracy in terms of rights, but they officer little or no possibility for (direct) democratic participation. These arguments clearly point to the growing possibility of constructing a legitimate discourse which is critical of the system rather than just of mainstream parties. This in turn may affect voter attitudes. The proportion of authoritarians within the extremist constituency may well grow if democratic legitimacy declines… serious national or sectoral crises … could dramatically reduce trust in the system.243

A lack of “trust in the system”244 would only de-legitimize a common European political identity, as countries would bow to a noisy nationalist electorate and turn its back on the federative policy, seeking self-interest first. One hardly needs to recall that this process marked the evolution from 1919 until 1930 with disastrous results

If other government benefits and subsidies to the public were to be cut in the midst of such a catastrophe, the door would be open for parties like UKIP or AfD to come to power and enact a nationalist and anti-pluralist agenda. These parties and parties like them across Europe will not go away anytime soon. Regardless of seemingly outrageous statements that are decried as politically incorrect, racist, or too simple, these parties must not simply be cast aside or chalked up as simply racist extremists. Anyone concerned with U.S. security and defense in the midst of the present crisis is enjoined to study and analyze these trends if they are to be understood and countered. Especially meaningful are “the ways in which alienation, ineffective representation, and a decisive disconnection of citizens from government are perceived and expressed on local levels remains an important area for continual attention,”245 because it will shed light into how these groups market themselves and gain votes. For the United States, it is imperative we understand where, how, and when these parties gain victories in our allies’ countries.

The core assumptions of U.S. power relies to a large extent on its alliance system, of which the UK and the FRG are the heart of NATO, as well as a part of an economic

244 Ibid.
order of open markets in Europe and Asia that are the basis of American prosperity. Nationalist and xenophobic parties in western Europe represent a retrograde process to a dangerous and troubled future, the impact of al Qaeda and ISIS notwithstanding. Putin’s Russia has well recognized the opportunities for ideological adventure in western and central Europe proffered by the 2008 crisis as well as the stalemate of U.S. military power in the Middle East and the ensuing retrenchment and pivot to Asia. A political earthquake in London and Berlin might well cause these nations to move away from the United States and closer to Russia. If the extreme right begins to win consistent and significant victories, it would likely signal the failure of a common postmodern European political identity to emerge beyond that of a fuzzy concept, unable to materialize anything more concrete than what it is today. A UKIP-led Britain seems remote in 2015, but then again, they were considered merely “fruitcakes” 246 a decade ago. AfD was founded only in 2013 yet the political gains have been consistent in the face of crises that few foresaw and the mastery of which has proven as challenging as the crises of the early and mid-20th century. The populist challenge to Merkel on the immigrant crisis has continued to propel the party’s popularity in the public’s discourse over the topic. Given time and more members, there is a distinct threat that AfD makes a legitimate inroad in German politics. Failure to take the far right’s surge seriously, and more importantly, the issues with which those parties are using to make electoral gains, will only result in a further erosion of the status quo and a potential destabilization of the political system in Europe.

The role of domestic politics in the formulation of external policy might be doubted by certain theorists of political science, but for anyone concerned with the real forces that make for security policy in a democracy; these domestic forces are real and significant. Makers of policy today can ill afford any nostalgia about special relationships and a mythical sharing of the burden when the actual situation suggests a disintegration of essentials of policy as concerns the UK and the FRG. An epoch of growing radicalization in one theater of U.S. security policy has a knock on effect in another, which, wrongly, too many have regarded as a given, as a thing to be taken for granted. This examination of the role of nationalism and right wing mass politics in the new

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246 Castle, “Populist Party Gaining Muscle.”
century offers an important piece of the mosaic of policy and commends itself to the student of European security in the twenty-first century.
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