## THESIS

The ASEAN Political-Security Community: Enhancing Defense Cooperation

by

Aminuddin Albek

December 2015

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<th>Thesis Advisor:</th>
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<td>Second Reader:</td>
<td>Daniel Moran</td>
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For more than three decades after its inception in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was reluctant to institutionalize multilateral defense cooperation because it wanted to avoid becoming a military alliance or a defense pact. Instead, its members limited themselves to bilateral forms of defense cooperation with each other. However, at its 2003 Summit, ASEAN established the ASEAN Security Community (later changed to the ASEAN Political-Security Community), with a goal to enhance its defense cooperation to a multilateral scope. Why did the member states agree to this change? This thesis finds three reasons that ASEAN agreed to pursue multilateral defense cooperation. First, the main security challenges faced by ASEAN members had changed from traditional to non-traditional forms. These non-traditional threats are transnational in nature and difficult for a single state to solve. Second, in comparison to these threats, ASEAN members’ defense capabilities were large enough to make a difference. And third, mutual suspicions among these countries had declined over time, so they were more willing to cooperate with each other. Therefore, ASEAN established the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) for intramural interaction and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) for external engagement. Through these arrangements, the members work together to achieve the ASEAN Political-Security Community. However, their cooperation remains limited to exercises against non-traditional security threats, and it seems unlikely that this new commitment to multilateral defense cooperation can be used in response to potential traditional security threats in the South China Sea or elsewhere in the region.
THE ASEAN POLITICAL-SECURITY COMMUNITY: ENHANCING DEFENSE COOPERATION

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<td>AACC</td>
<td>ASEAN Air Forces Conference</td>
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<td>AADMER</td>
<td>ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response</td>
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<td>ACAMM</td>
<td>ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting</td>
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<td>ACDFIM</td>
<td>ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces Informal Meeting</td>
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<td>ACNM</td>
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<td>ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution</td>
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<td>CTX</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Exercise</td>
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<td>EiS</td>
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<td>EWG</td>
<td>Experts’ Working Groups</td>
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<td>FRETI LIN</td>
<td>Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor)</td>
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<td>GAM</td>
<td>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka</td>
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<td>HA/DR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<td>IEG</td>
<td>Intelligence Exchange Group</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
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<td>JI</td>
<td>Jemaah Islamiyah</td>
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<td>KMM</td>
<td>Kumpulan Militan Malaysian</td>
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<td>MAPHILINDO</td>
<td>Malaysia–Philippines–Indonesia</td>
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<td>MALSINDO</td>
<td>Malaysia–Singapore–Indonesia</td>
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<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
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<td>MMI</td>
<td>Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>MSP</td>
<td>Malacca Straits Patrol</td>
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<td>Malacca Straits Sea Patrol</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NTS</td>
<td>Non-Traditional Security</td>
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<td>OPM</td>
<td>Organisasi Papua Merdeka</td>
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<td>ReCAAP</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery</td>
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<td>SASOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations</td>
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<td>ZOPFAN</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Since its inception on August 8, 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has developed as a prominent, successful regional organization that aims to promote regional peace and stability in the Southeast Asia region.\(^1\) Although not literally stated in the Bangkok Declaration as a security organization, ASEAN has put regional security as its central objective. What was missing from the text of the Declaration—which is mainly focused on economic, social, and cultural cooperation—was a commitment to security cooperation. Based on the circumstances and the official statements preceding the Declaration, security was needed as a required condition for development. ASEAN formation was a means to consolidate and solidify the relationships among members after several disputes or conflicts, such as Indonesia’s *Konfrontasi* (confrontation) towards Malaysia, and the dispute over Sabah between Malaysia and the Philippines.

In ASEAN’s early years, however, the members’ desire to enhance regional security was not enough to drive them to formally approve multilateral security or defense cooperation. They preferred to limit security-related cooperation to a bilateral level. The primary reason was to prevent ASEAN from becoming a defense pact or military alliance. Another reason was that ASEAN members had weak military forces and could not help each other.

ASEAN opposition to formal multilateral security cooperation first changed after the end of the Cold War. ASEAN created the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 as a forum for dialogue about security. At this time, ASEAN still rejected multilateral and defense cooperation.

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The driving factor that enabled multilateral security cooperation within ASEAN was the change in the nature of the security challenges that it had faced since its inauguration. Until the end of the Cold War, the members’ main security threats were domestic, especially from communist and other insurgencies. Most of them did not face major external challenges.

After the Cold War ended, which changed the security environment in Southeast Asia, ASEAN policy toward security cooperation also changed. The nature of security challenges has changed from traditional into non-traditional threats: from state to non-state actors. Furthermore, the non-traditional security challenges are transnational in nature. They require broader-scale efforts rather than bilateral or unilateral ones. At the same time, some Southeast Asian countries had successfully overcome communist insurgencies and relatively achieved stable national development—primarily economic. Those conditions provided the members of ASEAN an opportunity to redefine their policy and approach to the security challenges and their view on the ASEAN strategic role in maintaining peace and stability of the region.

In 2003, ASEAN leaders finally decided to expand security cooperation to include military and defense cooperation, not just dialogue about security. At a summit meeting that year, they agreed to a broader goal of creating an ASEAN Community, which would have three pillars. One of these would be the ASEAN Political-Security Cooperation (APSC). Examining the development of ASEAN policy towards security and defense cooperation brings up the question that is answered by this thesis: why did ASEAN leaders decide in 2003 to enhance defense cooperation, but not in 1967 when ASEAN was created? As discussed already in the preceding paragraphs, this thesis is based on the premise that the emergence of new security challenges drives ASEAN to change its approach to security and defense cooperation. This thesis examines the nature of security challenges before and after the Cold War. It also examines security and defense cooperation within ASEAN prior to and since 2003, when the members agreed to create the APSC, which will officially be launched at the end of 2015.
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Scholars have debated ASEAN’s role and contribution to regional peace and stability as it is described in the Bangkok Declaration in 1967. Some optimistically argue that ASEAN has made many efforts to prevent conflicts and manage existing disputes among its members. Others pessimistically assert that ASEAN only conducts talks and negotiations without taking any real measures. Though the ASEAN Community has not yet been established, it is interesting to explore the reasons for the APSC becoming one of ASEAN Community’s pillars. Under APSC, endorsing and enhancing defense cooperation through military engagement is evidence to support the argument that ASEAN has changed its approach to security. Through the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-plus (which includes eight non-ASEAN countries), ASEAN members have hosted various military exercises to address potential security challenges, which is very different from what ASEAN did in the past. These changes suggest that concrete, effective, and large-scale defense cooperation is more possible today than before, and may become even more possible in the future.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

This section reviews the literature on the three pertinent areas that are essential to the thesis: the definition of a security community and defense cooperation, the nature of security challenges, and the development of ASEAN defense cooperation. Defining security community and defense cooperation facilitates the development of the conceptual framework for understanding the factors involved in forming the community. As described in the previous section, the changing nature of security threats contributes to the need to widen the area of cooperation within ASEAN. In relation to the security challenges, defense capability is one of the factors that drives member states’ decisions to participate or not in the cooperation framework. In line with the security challenges, defense cooperation among members has also increased from bilateral to multilateral scope.
1. Defining Security Community and Defense Cooperation

Many scholars, such as Karl Deutsch, have defined a security community based on a Western European standpoint derived from the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Amitav Acharya, among others, has adopted and applied that definition to explain a security cooperation framework in the ASEAN context. He asserts that “a security community is distinguished by a ‘real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.’”2 There are two types of security communities: the amalgamated and the pluralistic. Rather than amalgamated, which requires binding political obligation, as seen in NATO, Acharya uses the pluralistic characteristic of a security community to characterize ASEAN; this type of community allows members to retain their independence and sovereignty, which is a primary concern for the developing countries that are a part of ASEAN.3 This is reflected in the principle of non-interference. A pluralistic security community is “a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change.”4 This definition, according to Acharya, contains two prominent features: “the absence of war” and war planning against other members. It does not mean that there are no conflicts of interest or differences among them, but it means that they can manage and prevent their dissimilarities peacefully. This is the characteristic that makes a security community distinct from other forms of security cooperation.5

Adopting the same principle, Donald K. Emerson came to a new definition of a pluralistic security community that he sees as suitable for the ASEAN context as well: “A pluralistic security community … is simply a group of sovereign states that share both an

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3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
expectation of intramural security and a sense of intramural community.”  

Separately, he defines *security* as “the presence of a durable peace among these [member] states, reflecting a lasting prior absence of war among them” and *community* as “the presence of a cooperative identity among these [member] states, including a commitment to abstain from using force against each other.” Emerson then stresses that “the more pluralistic the security community, the more sovereign its members.”

As stated in its blueprint, the APSC is a means for ASEAN members “to achieve ASEAN’s goals in the political and security fields.” The APSC is based on the concept of comprehensive security, which takes into account the close relationship of political, economic, social-cultural, and environmental dimensions of development. It reiterates the rejection of aggression and the use of force for dispute resolution. This principle fits with Acharya and Emmerson’s features of a security community as described previously: the absence of war and the ability to solve conflict with peaceful means. Furthermore, to preserve and enhance peace and stability in the region, “the APSC seeks to strengthen the mutually beneficial relations between ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners and friends.”

Defense cooperation is one of the common concerns that needs to be improved to achieve the goals of the ASEAN Political-Security Community. Defense cooperation is the process of working together in defense-related areas. The actor is primarily armed forces, and the aim is to build and maintain security. The term is literally stated in the Bali Concord II:

> ASEAN shall nurture common values, such as habit of consultation to discuss political issues and the willingness to share information on matters

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7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.
of common concern, such as environmental degradation, maritime security cooperation, the enhancement of defense cooperation among ASEAN countries, develop a set of socio-political values and principles, and resolve to settle long-standing disputes through peaceful means.\textsuperscript{13}

In this regard, according to Rodolfo C. Severino, a former secretary general of ASEAN, the Association must establish a forum for defense officials or related ministers with two functions: to identify areas of defense cooperation and to serve a “consultative and confidence-building purpose.”\textsuperscript{14} He then argues that defense cooperation in ASEAN is far from being a defense pact or military alliance per se since there are some differences in views, capabilities, and circumstances among members. This step, however, demonstrates significant change in the ASEAN perspective over the multilateral defense cooperation that it has long avoided.\textsuperscript{15}

2. The Nature of Security Challenges

In its inception, all the first five members of ASEAN faced and shared common challenges of internal threats, according to Michael Leifer, which were also influenced by the external circumstance.\textsuperscript{16} The communist ideology, among others, had been the prominent threat for countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. Leifer also asserted that the basic consensus among governments was that their common threat was derived only from internal subversion or insurgency, which mainly occurred because of economic deprivation. Promoting economic development was considered a means to counter and solve the internal threats.\textsuperscript{17} Therefore, focusing on economic cooperation within ASEAN was a more logical approach than focusing on security or defense cooperation.

ASEAN countries had to face potential external challenges as a result of the Cold War and conflict among non-member countries—Vietnam and Cambodia. The Cambodia


\textsuperscript{14} Rodolfo C. Severino, \textit{Towards an ASEAN Security Community} (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), 15.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 2.
invasion by Vietnam had triggered ASEAN to redefine its security policy to assume a regional security role.\textsuperscript{18} The conflict, for example, had posed a threat to Thailand when Vietnamese troops were sent to its border. To directly address those challenges, the Thai government required adequate military forces that might have been obtained from other ASEAN members; however, mainly due to their lack of defense capability, they did not provide physical military support to Thailand. The association was only able to provide diplomatic and political support for peaceful conflict resolution. Furthermore, according to Acharya, “the military weakness of the individual ASEAN states, which made them dependent on Western security guarantees, also undermined the deterrent value of any intra-ASEAN security commitments.”\textsuperscript{19}

The end of the Cold War stopped the communist threat, but it destabilized regional security in Southeast Asia following the U.S. forces’ withdrawal from the region. As Noel M. Morada identified, ASEAN faced several security concerns in the early post–Cold War period, including “the issue of U.S. involvement in the region along with the unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea, instability on the Korean Peninsula, nuclear proliferation, and the gradual expansion of ASEAN membership.”\textsuperscript{20} This was the reason for ASEAN to start recalculating its security approach. Although there had been some proposals, ASEAN began deeply thinking in 1992 about the creation of an ASEAN-led security forum that would include not just ASEAN members but also its dialogue partners and some non-dialogue states. Finally, in 1994, ASEAN launched the ARF, which was the first and only multilateral security forum in the region.\textsuperscript{21} As a means to manage uncertainty, another important objective of the ARF was to manage the potential rivalry among existing and emerging major powers. In other words, ASEAN intended to enmesh the major powers—China, Japan, and United States—through the

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 15.
The ARF, however, was only a mechanism for security discussion among foreign ministry officials. Defense and military officials had no official role in the ARF until 2002 when the Forum established the ARF Defense Dialogue and the ARF Security Policy Conference to include those officials.

By the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, Southeast Asian countries had to deal with the rise of non-traditional security (NTS) challenges, defined as “challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states which arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, smuggling of persons, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crimes.” Those challenges are complex in nature, as Mely Caballero-Anthony describes; they are “transnational in scope, unprompted, rapidly transmitted, hardly prevented by national solution but manageable through regional and multilateral cooperation, and human security becomes central.” ASEAN had struggled to mitigate and solve the risk of NTS challenges, such as infectious diseases (SARS, Avian Flu, and HIV/AIDS); environmental degradations (the pollutant haze since 1997 that was caused by forests fires); natural disasters (Aceh’s Tsunami in 2004 and several typhoons that periodically hit the Philippines, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia); and maritime security issues, such as combatting piracy in the Malacca Straits.

As stated in the APSC Blueprint, “A key purpose of ASEAN is to respond effectively and in a timely manner, in accordance with the principle of comprehensive security, to all forms of threats, transnational crimes and trans-boundary challenges.” Departing from the statement, the ASEAN concept has altered from state-actor references

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22 Ibid., 18.
26 Ibid.
27 ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, 12.
to human security, which includes individuals and societies. The important notion is that the NTS challenges, although difficult, are manageable through cooperation, so they require less defense capability to counter than traditional security threats do. Departing from this consideration, the change from traditional to non-traditional security concerns is seen as a driving factor to institutionalize a multilateral security community within ASEAN.

3. The Development of ASEAN Defense Cooperation

Shifting to a multilateral approach in security and defense cooperation has long been avoided in ASEAN. Although many attempts were made to promote the new idea of defense cooperation as a response to Cold War-era security challenges, none of the proposals earned support from the majority of ASEAN leaders. According to Acharya, “the goal of creating security not only assumed priority over a military pact, but the latter was considered subversive of the former.” In the first decade of ASEAN, the sources of interstate conflict in the region—which were intimately connected to domestic political stability—made a military pact irrelevant since its purpose was mainly to counter external military attacks.

In this regard, ASEAN members initially formed and developed their defense cooperation bilaterally. Addressing the cross-border insurgency issue with border security arrangements was the first model of defense cooperation, and, after the communist collapse, it expanded to other areas such as “intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, which have greater utility against conventional military threat.” Another form of defense cooperation that was perceived as a minimalist approach to ASEAN defense cooperation was arms manufacturing and equipment standardization with the prospect of a regional self-sufficient defense industry. Nevertheless, the possibility to operate under

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30 Ibid., 162.
31 Ibid., 164.
32 Ibid., 169.
this arrangement was small because of the wide gap in the defense industry capacity among members.

The development of security cooperation is interconnected with the idea of regionalism. The primary factors that motivated ASEAN member states to avoid a military alliance, according to Acharya, were the desire to not provoke the states involved in the Vietnam conflict and the availability of an external security guarantor. The first factor related to the Vietnamese view towards ASEAN as an extension of the Western security framework. Thus, creating such a defense or military pact would likely trigger other Great Powers—the Soviet Union and China—to react, thereby amplifying the security tension in the region. It was impossible, of course, to seek security support from neighboring countries to deter a spillover communist threat since they had limited defense capabilities as well. Therefore, most of the Southeast Asian countries relied upon Western states. When the security provider faded, ASEAN needed another approach to address internal and external challenges.

Since 1996, ASEAN defense officials have participated in the ASEAN security dialogues. In addition, several types of multilateral defense cooperation have been established outside the ASEAN framework, namely, ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces Meeting (or Chiefs of Staff) in 2002, ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting in 2000, ASEAN Navy Interaction in 2001, ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference in 2004, ASEAN Military Intelligence Meeting in 2003, and ASEAN Armies Rifles Meet in 1991. In 2006, ASEAN members agreed to form the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM)—the highest defense consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN—to provide an official forum to “promote mutual trust and confidence through greater understanding of defense and security challenges as well as enhancement of transparency and openness.” The scope of defense cooperation has developed in many areas, as also stated in the APSC Blueprint, including maritime security, Humanitarian Assistance and

33 Ibid., 163.
34 Ibid., 162.
Disaster Relief (HA/DR), terrorism, contagious diseases, and so on. Examining this pattern in which the characteristics of security challenges have changed, it is reasonable for ASEAN to enhance its defense cooperation from merely bilateral to more regional and multilateral scope. The formation of ADMM-Plus in 2010 reflected another new significant step in ASEAN multilateral defense cooperation.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The reasons that ASEAN agreed to enhance its defense cooperation under the APSC are the change of security challenges, the increase of defense capability relative to the threats, and the success of ASEAN in avoiding intramural military conflicts. The change in the nature of security challenges from traditional to non-traditional seems to be the primary factor in the formation of the ASEAN security community. Non-traditional threats, with their transnational nature and human security-related concerns, require less capability to address challenges than state actor threats. Although the source of non-traditional threats may be from one of the ASEAN members, this source is more unlikely to trigger a conflict with neighboring countries. Furthermore, ASEAN has had sufficient experience in managing conflicts between its members. It gives more room for ASEAN members to cooperate in the defense field. Piracy and armed robbery, terrorism, environmental issues, and natural disasters, among other things, are non-traditional security challenges that require the cooperation of states to address the threats. Despite existing disputes in the region, the attainment of relative peaceful and stable region since its inception through a comprehensive security approach has also motivated ASEAN to continuously enhance its defense cooperation.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

In conducting my research, I study three variables that influenced ASEAN members’ decision to form the APSC—the nature of security challenges, the defense capability, and the ability to prevent conflict among members; the goal is to find the patterns of those variables. I examine and compare security challenges that ASEAN faced since its inception in two significant periods of time: the Cold War era, when ASEAN faced mostly traditional security challenges, and the time after the end of the Cold War,
when ASEAN encountered mostly non-traditional threats. The comparison of security challenges sheds light on the different levels of threat to the peace and stability of the region, as well as of every member state, and the level of defense capability required to address the challenges.

The research analyzes how ASEAN addressed those security challenges through defense cooperation. The purpose of this analysis is to find out what approaches they used—bilateral or multilateral, whether they were successful or failed, and which factors might affect the approach to address the security challenges. For this research, I use several case studies of conflict resolution efforts by ASEAN and its members.
II. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND ASEAN

A. INTRODUCTION

As stated in the Bangkok Declaration, promoting regional peace and stability is one of ASEAN’s aims and purposes. To achieve this aim, the association has to ensure that all security challenges are addressed appropriately. The declaration also implicitly articulates the need to conduct collective efforts to maintain order in the region “through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.” The security problems in Southeast Asia come from three sources: domestic, regional, and external. Moreover, Alice D. Ba points out that, in ASEAN, the “sources of insecurity are wide-ranging and typically include regime survival, economic and political stability, internal insurgences, and also more conventional concern about foreign intervention and interference.”

Domestic, or internal, security threats are established in the form of rebellion groups or freedom movements and typically challenge the legitimacy of governing regimes in a state. Regional, or intramural, problems are related to the dispute between two countries in the region. External sources of security issues emanate from outside actors’ influence and may potentially create instability within the region.

These sources of predicaments are inter-connected and influence each other. The impact of a domestic security issue in one country may spill over into others and create

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37 Ibid.

38 Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 10, 16.


40 Ibid., 205–6.
tensions between them. Conversely, a regional conflict may affect domestic conditions in a country within the region. External influences come into play and shape the region and countries within domestically. This type of relationship can occur as the result of interactions among states, and globalization accelerates the dynamics of their behaviors towards each other.

Among the domestic, regional, and external sources of security issues in the region, the external factor is the most influential in the security environment of Southeast Asia; this factor shaped the perception of threat and the policies of ASEAN members to address the security challenges that endanger peace and stability of the region. Most scholars of Southeast Asia agree that the prominent external factor was the Cold War. According to Acharya, there were two Cold Wars in Southeast Asia: “the East-West [the U.S. alliance versus the Soviet Unions’ coalitions] and the East-East (Sino-Soviet) rivalries.” These wars reflected the involvement of the great powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, and China—in the region that made domestic conflicts expand into global issues such as the Vietnam War and agitated regional disputes in the case of Cambodia. This power competition strongly influenced most of the governments in the region as they formulated their foreign policies, which directly contributed to their security policy stances within ASEAN as well as their political positions toward regional conflict among countries in Southeast Asia.

As ASEAN was born in the Cold War era, Tommy Koh characterizes its foundation as “born in the challenging time,” because it had to directly face several serious issues at the same time. Moreover, Acharya asserts that the Cold War order

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43 Ibid., 126.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

encouraged the creation of ASEAN as a sub-regional community. The association illustrated the common idea of founding states taking a position against superpower rivalry. Therefore, the demise of the Cold War brought a new dimension of regional order.

After the Cold War and along with economic development in the region, some internal threats in ASEAN countries were significantly reduced because some rebellions and separatist movements halted their activities. The countries still had to face the security impact of the China’s territorial claim in the South China Sea, however. In addition, in this era of globalization, ASEAN members recognized the emergence of non-traditional security challenges ranging from transnational crimes—such as terrorism, piracy, illicit drugs trafficking, and illegal immigrants—environmental degradation, contagious diseases, natural disasters, to cyber security, and so on that are transnational in nature.

This chapter seeks to identify the development of the security environment and the challenges ASEAN has encountered from its inception to the present day. The Cold War is employed as the variable framework to demarcate and compare the characteristics of security challenges. The following sections describe the security environment and challenges during the Cold War and in the post–Cold War period.

B. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA DURING THE COLD WAR ERA

When it was created, as Koh has pointed out, ASEAN and its members, had to immediately deal with a complex, challenging situation brought by the Cold War, which also complicated the existing security challenges they faced. While struggling to overcome domestic challenges, Southeast Asian countries had to begin dealing with regional problems such as territorial disputes and conflicts among Indochinese countries. In the early years after the association was formed, the first five members of ASEAN—Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—were striving to develop

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47 Acharya, Regionalism and Multilateralism, 132.
their nations. At the same time, conflicts among them over territorial claims tested their cohesion and the survival of the association.

1. Domestic Security Challenges

According to Alan Collins, countries in the region, having been under colonial rule (except Thailand) and having encountered communist insurgencies, were “at the early stage of state making and nation building.”\(^{48}\) The first led to the effort to obtain regime legitimacy from the people, and the latter related to the national identity.\(^{49}\) To achieve these two efforts, governments in Southeast Asia confronted resistance from separatist groups and ethnic conflicts. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Myanmar, for example, had experienced such challenges. To suppress those oppositions, the governing regimes mainly used violent measures through military operations. According to Collins, coercive action was the only capable, adequate means available to the elites.\(^{50}\) Military action as a solution, however, did not always successfully overcome the problem. Therefore, understanding the root cause of rebellions can help to build a proper strategy to comprehensively solve these internal challenges.

The background of internal conflict in Southeast Asia, according to Acharya, is ethnic and political.\(^{51}\) Based on Southeast Asian indigenous characteristics, which have broad ethnic, cultural, and language differences, Acharya argues that one of the sources of internal conflict in ASEAN was the attempt to accommodate the diverse groups of people in a single, solid state.\(^{52}\) To achieve this goal, a government requires a strong legitimacy. It has to establish a political system to exercise its authority. Most of the countries in the region implemented an authoritarian type of governance. Acharya points out that changing or removing authoritarian regimes from power was another reason that separatist groups undertook their movements.\(^{53}\) The ethnic tension in Myanmar

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\(^{49}\) Ibid., 12.

\(^{50}\) Ibid., 13.

\(^{51}\) Acharya, *ASEAN 2030*, 11.

\(^{52}\) Collins, *Security and Southeast Asia*, 11.

\(^{53}\) Acharya, *ASEAN 2030*, 11.
exemplified this argument. The tension started when Burman ethnics, the largest population, dominated the central government and proposed the incorporation of other ethnic minorities—the Karen, Shan, Araknese, Kachin, Chin, and Mon—into the Burman population. These ethnic minorities rejected the proposal because it would remove their identity and initiated an armed struggle against the central government, which met the opposition with a military approach. The fighting continued until early 2000 when elites began an initiative of national reconciliation, which culminated in the release of the leader of the National League for Democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi, in 2002.

Together with the ethnic and political reasons, economic disparity, religion, and ideology were also motivating factors for rebellions to demand autonomy or freedom from existing nations. Indonesia experienced this when it had to deal with three separatist groups: the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), or the Free Papua Movement; the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), or the Aceh Freedom Movement; and the FRETILIN in East Timor (which became Timor Leste after obtaining independence). All of these movements demanded independence. Although Indonesia defined itself as a multi-ethnic country, officials in the central government in Jakarta were dominated by Javanese. This condition created a negative perception of Javanese and introduced the term Javanization. In addition, the transmigration program exaggerated this negative impression. Although the program had positive goals of reducing the population in Java Island and distributing economic development, local communities had a different interpretation. They saw the arrival of Javanese in their homes as an invasion. Collins calls this “internal colonialism.”

54 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia, 27.
55 Ibid., 34.; an attribution to characterize the domination of Javanese officials in the central government and a connotation of a transmigration program.
56 Ibid.
57 This was a program during Suharto’s tenure to evenly distribute dense populations in a region and to prevent Java island from becoming overpopulated—by moving Javanese to low-density islands: Kalimantan, Sumatera, Papua, and Sulawesi.
58 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia, 36.
Besides the negative perception on the transmigration, Aceh’s resentment toward Jakarta occurred because of economic growth distribution and military activities. Aceh obtained only a small benefit from the economic development program implementation compared to what it had contributed to the Indonesian government. As it has had abundant natural gas and oil, Aceh has been among the largest revenue contributors for Indonesia’s economy. A similar case happened to the West Papua, where its natural resources—copper and gold—had been exploited with little compensation and benefit for the local government and people.\(^{59}\) Human rights violations by military personnel during the separatist suppressing missions upset the local people and triggered them to continue their struggle against Jakarta.\(^{60}\) The violent treatment of rebel groups in Myanmar had a similar outcome.\(^{61}\) Hence, considering the factors that led to the domestic challenges, the economic development approach would have been more appropriate than a military one.

2. **Regional and External Security Challenges**

In the regional scope, the old conflicts among Southeast Asian nations—and among the founding members, in particular—still challenged ASEAN’s cohesiveness and created tensions during the Cold War era. Some of those regional tensions were related to territorial disputes and border security issues. Although several border disputes had been settled via bilateral agreement, the North Borneo/Sabah claim between Malaysia and Philippines, the execution of Indonesian marines by Singapore, racial tensions following Singapore’s separation from Malaysia, and bilateral tension between Myanmar and Thailand over “ethnic insurgencies and security policies, illegal fishing, and drug production and trafficking” were among other issues that the association members had to deal with.\(^{62}\) These problems had the potential to escalate the existing frictions among them.

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59 Ibid., 43, 47.
60 Collins, *Security and Southeast Asia*, 39; ibid., 43, 47.
The Vietnam invasion into Cambodia in 1978 was the most influential conflict in Southeast Asia that challenged ASEAN’s effort to promote and maintain the peace and stability of the region and to uphold the principles of Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The invasion followed the communist victory over the Western powers in Indochina after the South won the Vietnam War and the Hanoi treaty between Vietnam and the Soviet Union in 1978. The Cambodian conflict, according to Mely Caballero-Anthony, brought up two security problems for ASEAN: the security of Thailand and the continuing communist influence.⁶³ The first concern was related to the border between Thailand and Cambodia and the historical rivalry between Vietnam and Thailand; the latter heightened ASEAN’s anxiety toward Moscow’s effort to strengthen its presence in the region, which could potentially invite more heated tensions of a superpower rivalry.⁶⁴ To address this challenge, ASEAN had three options: military support; political, diplomatic, and economic isolation against Vietnam; and a political settlement proposal.⁶⁵ Among the three, ASEAN successfully brought the conflict to a peaceful resolution through a comprehensive political settlement.⁶⁶ Overall, the border-related issues and the involvement of great powers in the region shaped regional security challenges in the Cold War era.

C. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER THE COLD WAR

Vietnam’s military withdrawal from Cambodia, followed by the fall of the Soviet Union, marked the end of the Cold War and its influence in Southeast Asia. Moscow’s military retreat from the region diminished the tension between superpowers. This development also fulfilled ASEAN’s desire to make the region free from the great power intervention, as stated in the ZOPFAN. The situation, however, also created new dimensions of security challenges. The absence of a power balance after the Soviets left the region offered opportunities to other major powers, such as China, Japan, and the

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⁶⁴ Ibid.
⁶⁵ Ibid., 87.
⁶⁶ Ibid., 106.
United States, to set their influences and their new roles in the region. Alice D. Ba observes that the growing influence of China, and increasing pressures on human rights issues in the region, urged regional states to respond appropriately in pursuing the idea of “One Southeast Asia.”

Moreover, as a followed-up response to the end of the Cold War and U.S. policy changes, the United States closed its military bases in the Philippines. For ASEAN, this step altered the balance of power in the region and created an opportunity for middle powers in the region to move in. To address these challenges, according to David B. H. Denoon and Evelyn Colbert, “ASEAN undertook to enlarge its membership, to expand its Asia-Pacific role through the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) [in 1994], and to seek economic integration—the ASEAN Regional Free Trade Area (AFTA) [in 1992].” In addition, as Ba points out, the global, external development in economic and security affairs changed ASEAN perspective of its former role orientation, from domestic and intramural into global scope.

Simon S. C. Tay and Jesus P. Estanislao identified three trends after the economic crisis in 1997 that arguably brought new challenges to ASEAN: “democracy, economic openness, and development and security.” While democracy promises better conditions for development, countries’ responses to democratization in Southeast Asia were diverse. Transforming into democratic systems has not been an easy process in the region since most of the countries have exercised soft authoritarian models. Indonesia’s dramatic change was an example of the difficulty of this transition: Suharto’s authoritarian regime gave up its power after a tragic, massive, bloody demonstration in May 1998. While economic crisis brought the region into deeper economic cooperation, competition among

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68 Ba, “Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” 209.
70 Ba, “Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” 209.
the countries was inevitable. In addition, security challenges also increased due to the increase of economic activities such as trading, commodities distribution, transportation, and so on, which increase the potential for illegal and criminal activities. Furthermore, threats to human security increased as well since development has created better welfare but social and environmental degradation.

The membership expansion of ASEAN was also another factor that changed the strategic political environment of Southeast Asia. The retreat of Vietnam troops from Cambodia following the end of the Cold War as the result of the Soviet Unions’ fall brought new direction for ASEAN members’ policy toward Indochinese countries—Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodian—and vice versa. When ASEAN was founded, those countries, particularly Vietnam, perceived the association as “part of an American policy containment,” as Ralf Emmers observes.72 Led by Hanoi, they persistently refused the invitation from ASEAN to attend its meeting as an observer and complained about the concept of Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and ZOPFAN.73 Reciprocally, Vietnam’s invasion to Cambodia amplified the existing ASEAN members’ caution toward communist expansion efforts, and the association saw the annexation as a violation of the TAC. The resolution of the Cambodian conflict and domestic economic considerations urged ASEAN and Indochinese states to reconcile their relationship, and the result was that Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam were accepted as new members. According to Emmers, the acceptance of the Indochinese countries brought at least three security and diplomatic benefits to the countries: regional and international recognition, intramural conflict avoidance and management, and assistance for diplomatic efforts.74

The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN, however, also created more security issues for the association to manage. Vietnam brought its existing territorial dispute with China over Spratly and Paracels islands into several ASEAN’s meetings to obtain support


73 Ibid.

74 Ibid., 75–76.
from other members. This effort exaggerated the complexity for the association to manage the South China Sea disputes. In addition, the Thailand–Laos border conflict in September 2000 and the anti-Thai riots in Phnom Penh in January 2003 increased the vulnerability of bilateral ties and regional tension.\textsuperscript{75}

Along with this development, China has emerged as a new major power in the region and started to propagate its influence and assertiveness. It again triggered existing tension with regard to the South China Sea dispute when it submitted its infamous “9-dash line” map to the United Nations in 2009 to indicate its claim over the area.\textsuperscript{76} The dispute in the South China Sea began attracting the association’s attention in 1992 when Vietnam and China quarreled over oil exploration.\textsuperscript{77} China’s first aggressive move was its military occupation over the Mischief Reef, which was claimed by the Philippines.\textsuperscript{78} Recently, China has maintained and increased its continuous efforts to obtain legitimacy over its claim by starting reclamation and physical construction in several islands and rocks and placing some military assets.\textsuperscript{79} China’s incessant assertiveness in the South China Sea could potentially lead to a military clash among the claimants. This development has driven ASEAN to establish policy and efforts to manage the conflict through several diplomatic meetings.\textsuperscript{80}

Furthermore, while dealing with the traditional state-to-state conflicts, the countries in Southeast Asia have also had to deal recently with the emergence of non-traditional security challenges such as piracy and armed robbery, terrorism, environmental issues, contagious diseases, human rights violence, natural disasters, and so on. Some of these are described in more detail in the following section. These types of

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 84–85.
\textsuperscript{77} Carlyle A. Thayer, “ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea,” The SAIS Review of International Affairs 33, no. 2 (2013): 76.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80} Thayer, “ASEAN, China,” 77.
security challenge are more complex because they are transnational in nature and have non-state-actor characteristics. Therefore, addressing those predicaments requires a cooperative strategy and transnational efforts from the surrounding countries.

1. Domestic Security Issues

While facing pressure from global security challenges, Southeast Asian countries also had to deal with existing domestic turbulence from non-communist separatist movements. Although communist insurgencies declined due to the decrease of external communist power supports, governments in the region still encountered freedom movements that consumed their energy and resources. The Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), and the FRETILIN kept Indonesian political and military elites occupied in seeking a holistic solution to halt the progress of these movements. In the Philippines, the Moro National Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front remain active. The Pattani United Liberation Organization in Southern Thailand continues its fight for freedom and recognition.81 Tables 1 and 2 illustrate selected communist rebellion and separatist movements in Southeast Asia.

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Table 1. Selected Communist Movements and Parties in Southeast Asia, 1946–1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Burma Communist Party (1948–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Khmer Rouge (1970–75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Madiun Communist Rebellion (1948)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partai Komunis Indonesia (1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Pathet Lao (1951–75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) (1948–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Kalimantan Communist Party (1950s–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>New People’s Army (1969–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Huk Rebellion (1946–54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>none (The CPM operated in Singapore before its separation from Malaysia in 1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Communist Party of Thailand (1965–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>National Liberation Front (1958–75)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2. Selected Separatist Movements in Southeast Asia, 1946–1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Armed Rebellion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Ethnically related armed rebellions (1948–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Organisasi Papua Merdeka (1963–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Le Ligue de Resistance Meo (1946–75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Moro National Liberation Front (1972–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front (1984–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Pattani United Liberation Organization (1967–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barisan Nasional Pembekasan Pattani (1971–)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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82 Dissolved after peace agreement was signed in August 2005.
In the early 2000s, some of the separatist movements and internal armed conflicts had reduced their activities and signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the government due to various reasons, such as political and economic factors. The FRETILIN automatically dissolved and its armed members were transformed into the Timor Leste armed forces after gaining independence in 1999. After the 2004 tsunami severely hit several regions in the vicinity of the Indian Ocean including Aceh, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) leaders decided to sign a peace agreement with the Indonesian government on August 15, 2015, in Helsinki, Finland, which was mediated by the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. Several separatist groups still continue pursuing their political goals including the MILF in the Southern Philippines and Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani in Thailand. The reduction in separatist activities and the capability of governments to mitigate the existing separatist movement have minimized internal challenges in Southeast Asia.

2. Regional Security Problems

After the Cold War ended, Southeast Asian countries faced several regional security challenges such as intramural territorial disputes and the South China Sea disputes. Through bilateral agreements and the International Court of Justice settlement, some territorial disputes have been solved for example the Pedra Branca and the Sipadan-Ligitan. In contrast, the South China Sea disputes still exist and challenge peace and stability of the region.

a. Territorial Dispute

Bilateral disputes that were dominated by territorial claims on land and at sea might still lead to escalated military conflicts in Southeast Asia. The Pedra Branca dispute between Malaysia and Singapore; the Sipadan and Ligitan islands case; and the case of Ambalat and conflicting claims by Malaysia and Indonesia, in which both parties sent their naval assets to deter and anticipate the use of force, were some of the prevalent cases of maritime territorial quarrels among countries in the region. At the same time,

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unsettled bilateral disputes on land—for example, between Thailand and Cambodia over the Temple of Preah Vihear, which triggered armed conflict in 2000— have also left a residue of security problems.\textsuperscript{84}

In both maritime territorial disputes described here, the opposed countries had resolved their arguments through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) after several incidents of tension between their respective naval ships during the process of negotiation. In 2002, Malaysia won the claim over the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands. In the Pedra Branca case, the ICJ had decided to recognize Singapore’s sovereignty over the Pedra Branca, but decided that Malaysia owned Middle Rocks.\textsuperscript{85} Acharya points out that although it failed to address the Preah Vihear dispute, the ICJ’s involvement in resolving the territorial dispute among countries in the region shows another significant step in ASEAN members’ conflict management and resolution by peaceful means.\textsuperscript{86}

b.\textit{ The South China Sea Dispute }

Since it shows no sign of ending soon, the territorial dispute in the South China Sea remains in the highest rank of security threats in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{87} Although all claimants have agreed to adhere to the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea to prevent escalation, China’s increasing assertiveness in the area makes others wary of its intentions. In 2007, three incidents amplified the tension in the South China Sea involving the PRC and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{88} First, in April, the China’s complaint toward Hanoi’s agreement with British Petroleum (BP) to conduct exploration in the Con Son Basin. Second, in July, the fire incident by a Chinese naval ship killed one fisherman. Moreover, the Chinese Navy also conducted naval exercise, and Beijing started promoting the Paracels tourism. Lastly, in December, China created Sansha city to manage the Paracels

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\textsuperscript{86} Acharya, \textit{ASEAN 2030}, 6.
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\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 7.
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\textsuperscript{88} Storey, “Maritime Security in Southeast Asia,” 49.
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and Spratlys. Nonetheless, the PRC and China could alleviate the tension through diplomatic approach.89

Additionally, its growing military capabilities in the past ten years have signaled an alarm that China will continue pursuing its 9-dashed-line territorial claim by potentially using military action. Based on a RAND Corporation assessment in 2001, Acharya points out that the PRC’s (People’s Republic of China’s) aggressive behaviors in pursuing its territorial claim over the South China Sea, which is supported by adequate naval capabilities, exhibits two conventional military threats to Southeast Asia: endangering freedom of navigation and possible military maneuvers.90 The probability of China using military power to annex a territory is seen as high. Another trauma like the 1995 Mischief Reef incident seems highly probable. In addition, it has changed the balance of power in the region. Facing this trend with insufficient military capabilities, countries in the region may logically seek assistance from major powers countries.91 Thus, the possibility of a power rivalry is more likely to happen, and the great power competition will again be established in the region.

Furthermore, although it involves countries outside Southeast Asia, the South China Sea dispute is considered a regional conflict since most of the area is within the region and the impact of the dispute will directly or indirectly hamper the Southeast Asian states. Therefore, it is logical that the regional countries under the ASEAN umbrella would make a collective effort to urge China to negotiate a solution. In response, however, Beijing has consistently rejected the proposal and has preferred to engage the problem through a bilateral mechanism.92 This indicates that the South China Sea Dispute will remain a longstanding, unsolved problem.

89 Ibid., 50.
90 Ibid., 7–8.
91 Acharya, “ASEAN 2030, 8.
92 Ibid., 9.
3. Global and Transnational Security Challenges

The emergence of the non-traditional security threats such as sea piracy and armed robbery, terrorism, environmental issues, and natural disasters has presented another complex predicament to the countries in Southeast Asia to solve. These security challenges are transnational, which means the source of threats comes from one state, and the impacts may be transmitted to other neighboring states. In addition, in contrast with the traditional threats, which are mainly committed by states, the actors of the non-traditional security challenges actors are non-states.

a. Sea Piracy and Armed Robbery

Besides the possible security impact of the South China Sea issue, Southeast Asia is also still occupied with other maritime security threats—piracy and armed robbery and their implications. In the mid-2000s, the increasing number of piracy and armed robbery activities in the Malacca Straits attracted world attention and attributed to the area being named the most dangerous waters in the world.\(^9^3\) Figure 1 shows the pattern of incidents in Southeast Asian waters, including the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea. The graph shows the increasing number of incidents in the early 2000s. The downslope in the chart occurred in the period from 2004 to 2010. Since 2012 and until quite recently, the curve shows an incline. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP) against Ships in Asia reported that the maritime piracy and armed robbery in Asia has grown 8 percent in the first semester of 2015, most of which occurred in the Malacca Straits and the Singapore Straits.\(^9^4\) This data evidently illustrates that piracy and armed robbery continues to pose security challenges in the region.

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Figure 1. Piracy and Armed Robbery Incidents per Year (Worldwide), 1984–2012


b. Terrorism

The aftermath of the Bali Bombing in 2002 following the 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001 on American soil made Southeast Asia an important region for the War on Terrorism campaign. The Bali incident indicated the linkage between al-Qaeda and a terrorist network in Southeast Asia—the Jemaah Islamiyah group—which is active to this day.95 Washington had described the region as the “second front” in the war on terrorism.96 Based on the Global Terrorism Database, the infographic in Figure 2 shows the ten most active terrorist groups in Southeast Asia since 197097 and illustrates their active period and activities, while Figure 3 shows incidents of terrorism in Southeast Asia in 2013. Most of the attacks took place in Thailand and the Philippines. These statistics

95 Collins, *Security and Southeast Asia*, 201.
and mapping obviously suggest that terrorism clearly remains a prominent security threat to Southeast Asia.

Furthermore, the region has become a safe haven for al-Qaeda terrorist cells and networks to expand their efforts. As Acharya has observed, a number of factors—including a large Moslem population, various entry-exit access points without sufficient control by local authorities, low levels of education, economic hardships, and remote areas—have made this region favorable for terrorist operations of recruitment, training, execution, and logistic support.98 As al-Qaeda’s regional link, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has played an important role in supporting and exercising al-Qaeda operations by creating a more sophisticated, complex network in Southeast Asia and by working with other Islamic-based groups in the region, including the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, Kumpulan Militan Malaysian (KMM) in Malaysia, and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI).99 This situation has produced multifaceted challenges for governments in Southeast Asia in undertaking anti-terrorist measures. They require cooperative efforts within their respective governmental structures and with their neighbors.


99 Ibid.
Figure 2. Ten Most Active Terrorist Groups in Southeast Asia (1970–2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>1970s</th>
<th>1980s</th>
<th>1990s</th>
<th>2000s</th>
<th>2010s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New People’s Army (NPA)</td>
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<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khmer Rouge</td>
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<td>Free Aceh Movement (GAM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keren National Union</td>
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<td>Jemaah Islamiya (JI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ruma Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)</td>
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c. **Environmental Challenges: The Haze**

Another problem that is complicated to address without a cooperative approach is environmental challenges. According to Lorraine Elliott, most of these problems have transferable impacts beyond a state’s territorial border. An explicit example is the air pollution caused by a massive forest fire widely known as “the Haze.” Although it originates in Indonesia, the Haze moves across borders. The primary cause of this problem has been traditional land clearing that is done by burning the vegetation, mainly for agricultural purposes. Although it is a low-cost method, land burning can create a huge problem when it goes uncontrolled.

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101 Ibid.


103 In addition, most of the lands were rain forests that produced peatlands, which have unique characteristics: continuously flammable and smoky.
The haze issue has been a longstanding problem in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia has been the largest contributor. In 1982–1983, more than 3.5 million hectares of forest in East Kalimantan were burned, and the fire increased to 4 million hectares in 1997–1998. Recently, in October 2015, Indonesia again experienced the same problem in the Sumatera and Kalimantan regions. Satellite images indicated hundreds of fire spots in the area and, even worse, the fire had expanded to other islands.\(^{104}\) The fire could increase and worsen if it happened during El Nino, which causes longer dry season.\(^{105}\) The haze has paid a large toll on the health of people in the region, and has also severed economic activities such as air transportation.

To address this problem, in addition to conducting physical responses by sending troops and fire brigades, Indonesia and other ASEAN members have undertaken a series of soft measures through various conferences, meetings, and workshops to produce comprehensive strategies. Indonesia had inadequate capabilities to act individually. Therefore, it requested international assistance. The first step was an international conference on Long-Term Integrated Forest Fire Management in Bandung in 1992, which was followed by a series of meetings. In this conference, ASEAN initially declared that the haze was “a regional problem requiring regional cooperation.”\(^{106}\) In 1995, the association validated the ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution (ACPTP) that provided a number of concrete actions to prevent and mitigate the risks.\(^{107}\) Another further effort was the Regional Haze Action Plan (RHAP) in 1997.\(^{108}\) Although many mechanisms and efforts have been established, the haze remains problematic.


\(^{106}\) Nguitragool, “Negotiating the Haze Treaty,” 362.

\(^{107}\) Ibid., 362–3.

\(^{108}\) Ibid., 364.
d. Natural Disasters

Southeast Asia is considered a vulnerable region for natural disasters. A range of natural disasters have frequently occurred and destroyed the locations that have been hit. The most tragic one was the Indian Ocean’s 9.0-magnitude earthquake and tsunami in 2004, which affected Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and the East coast of Africa. In Indonesia, Aceh experienced the most devastation.\(^{109}\)

Cyclones and typhoons are other environmental challenges that frequently affect Southeast Asia with devastating impacts. In May 2008, Cyclone Nargis blew out the Irrawaddy Delta in Myanmar where “84,500 people were killed and 53,800 went missing. A total of 37 townships were significantly affected by the cyclone. The UN estimates that as many as 2.4 million people were affected.”\(^{110}\) Although it has experienced various storms, the Category 5 Typhoon Haiyan (also known as Yolanda) that slammed the Philippines on November 8, 2013 caused President Benigno S. Aquino III to announce the highest level of national emergency due to its massive impacts.\(^{111}\) The typhoon affected over 14 million people, including more than 4 million who had to leave their homes, more than 6,000 who died, and around 1,700 who were missing; over one million houses were devastated, according to data from the Philippine government.\(^{112}\)

Frequent volcanic eruptions continue the list of natural disasters in Southeast Asia. Living in the “Ring of Fire” of the Pacific Ocean makes the region vulnerable to seismic activities such as eruption and earthquake.\(^{113}\) Indonesia is one of the countries in

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the region that has many volcanic mountains. In 2010, Mount Merapi, one of the world’s most active volcanos, erupted and affected more than 75,000 residents, killing over 100. These facts show that natural disasters are one of the prominent challenges for Southeast Asian countries.

D. SUMMARY

This chapter examined the development of security challenges in Southeast Asia from domestic, regional, global, and transnational scopes to illustrate their dynamics and nature during and after the Cold War. It shows a major shifting from the traditional to non-traditional security challenges. Since its inception in 1967 until the late 1990s, when focused on state making and nation building, ASEAN members faced domestic challenges such as separatist groups and freedom movement that were prevailing due to economic hardship and military activities. In the Cold War era, the countries in this region focused their efforts mostly on state-making and nation-building. Therefore, domestic challenges such as separatist groups and freedom movements were dominant due to economic hardships and military activities. At the same time, the Cold War rivalry heightened the intramural conflict among the countries in the region caused by territorial and border disputes. Furthermore, the fear of communist threats remained high in this era since communist countries—the Soviet Union and China—continued their efforts in maintaining influence in the region. Moscow supported Vietnam’s invasion into Cambodia, and China assisted communist insurgencies.

In the post–Cold War period, security challenges mainly stem from external and transnational sources. Since 1990s, the ASEAN governments had achieved significant economic developments, and internal security challenges also had decreased. Additionally, the regional challenges also decreased after the Cambodian conflict in 1991, and the regional states revisited their relationships with Indochinese states and admitted them into ASEAN. Nevertheless, the 2007 incidents in the South China Sea showed growing Chinese threats to the region. Moreover, the regional challenges also

decreased after the Cambodian conflict, and the regional states revisited their relationships with Indochinese states. Although disputes over territory and sovereignty continue, including in the South China Sea, traditional armed conflict has not occurred since the Thailand and Cambodian fire exchange in the Temple Preah Vihear. For the conflicting parties, a peaceful solution is more preferable than the use of force.

Even though traditional threats have decreased, the security challenges in Southeast Asia have become more complex and difficult to overcome through a single-state response because non-traditional threats have emerged, such as natural disasters, maritime piracy, the haze, terrorism and so on. The transnational nature of these challenges, the correspondence with non-state actors, and the multifaceted, uncontrolled qualities require regional states to address the challenges through cooperative strategies.

To summarize, the strategic environment in Southeast Asia after the Cold War has created more complex, dynamic security challenges to regional countries. Table 3 illustrates the development of security challenges in Southeast Asia. Although traditional security challenges still require attention, the region currently has to deal more with transnational security challenges that limit states’ control and require cooperative approaches in broader scope including defense cooperation.

Table 3. Comparison of Security Challenges in Southeast Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Security Challenges</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Cold War</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-Cold War</strong></td>
<td>Medium to Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN ASEAN

A. INTRODUCTION

To overcome security challenges, a state can employ its defense force. In developed countries, governments use military forces to encounter threats from outside and use civilian law enforcement to address domestic security challenges. Meanwhile, developing countries employ their armed forces to suppress all security threats domestically and externally. These efforts commonly occurred during the state-making and nation-building in Southeast Asian countries. Their defense forces, however, could not simultaneously deal with internal and external security challenges.

Facing this deficiency and having the types of security challenges described in Chapter II, Southeast Asian countries needed cooperation in the military sector to enhance their defense capabilities and thus properly address the challenges. In the earlier decades of ASEAN, some leaders delivered proposals to create a form of regional military cooperation to address security challenges in the region through formal and informal meetings. Jakarta proposed a “joint defence council” in 1976. Similarly, in 1982, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew saw the need to conduct trilateral ASEAN military exercises, and the former Malaysian prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, suggested an ASEAN “joint command.” In 1989, the former minister of Malaysia, Abu Hassan Omar, recommended a concept of a “Defence Community.”

Nevertheless, the five original members of ASEAN rejected these ideas. They believed that the proposals to create defense cooperation would limit ASEAN’s flexibility in managing existing intramural conflicts and economic cooperation. In addition, establishing defense cooperation could increase Chinese or Soviet suspicion and possibly trigger an attack against a member. In the first ASEAN Summit in Bali in

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115 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia, 94.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid., 159.
119 Ibid., 168–9.
1976, the minister of Malaysia, Hussein Onn, stated that changing the direction of ASEAN to a security alliance would create suspicion and weaken its efforts to achieve its goals.\textsuperscript{120} Looking at these disadvantages, leaders of the association persistently rejected the idea of military alliance.

Furthermore, members’ lack of defense capabilities was another reason for rejecting the idea of multilateral military cooperation.\textsuperscript{121} Most of the association’s members still had very small militaries. They had insufficient capabilities to project military force into a conflict zone. This impeded their ability to commit to provide direct military assistance to a member that was threatened, such as in 1970 when Indonesia declared its intention to assist Thailand which anticipated attack from Vietnam, which was also supported by Singapore and Malaysia in 1978.\textsuperscript{122} In addition, most countries still encountered internal challenges from separatist movements. To address these challenges, their governments put greater emphasis on economic development.

Looking at the impact of great power rivalry, ASEAN decided to impose political barriers for external involvement in the region. It declared a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). This step stemmed from the military weakness of ASEAN members and the prospect of Britain and the United States withdrawing from the region, which persuaded them to exercise a self-reliance policy. For the members, the ZOPFAN could enhance their security more than a military alliance.\textsuperscript{123}

While rejecting the idea of broader defense cooperation, the regional countries successfully managed some bilateral military arrangements. The background of these arrangements was initially to address traditional threats from communist and regional border insurgencies. The areas of cooperation were intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training. Since then, they have expanded these bilateral arrangements into broader fields, even after communism has faded from the region.\textsuperscript{124} As Acharya pointed out,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 163.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 162.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 160.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 163.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 164.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
ASEAN members saw that bilateral defense cooperation was more beneficial and relatively easier to deal with than multilateral defense cooperation. Moreover, ASEAN members obtained significant benefits from bilateral defense cooperation, such as increasing security awareness and enhancing capabilities in traditional military skills. This growing bilateral defense cooperation created an ASEAN “defence spider web,” a term that was firstly coined by the chief of Indonesian Armed Forces, General Try Sutrisno, in 1989. This web was seen as the initial foundation for a broader scope of defense cooperation.

Since 2003, ASEAN members have changed their policy on defense cooperation. During the 9th ASEAN Summit that year, by signing the Bali Concord II, the members agreed to enhance their cooperation in the security arena, including defense under the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) umbrella. The proposal to establish a security community was made by Indonesia, which saw the need to revisit ASEAN’s role in answering the emergence of nontraditional threats. Prior to this consensus, its members had continuously undertaken their existing bilateral cooperation and engaged in several multilateral defense activities in the form of meetings and operations.

Richard Sokolsky, Angel Rabasa, and C. R. Neu claimed that the policy to exercise defense cooperation at a multilateral level to address security problems in ASEAN was driven by three factors: “the proliferation of transnational problems that cannot be solved at the national level, uncertainty about the future of the U.S. security role in the region, and the expectation that locking China into multilateral security arrangements might constrain its behavior and induce it to take greater account of ASEAN interests and sensitivities.” The formalization of defense cooperation in the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus exemplified this argument. Carlyle A. Thayer identified

that the meetings emphasized their focus on “addressing non-traditional security threats and enhancing cooperation with ASEAN’s dialogue partner counterparts.”

During the 3rd ADMM in Bangkok in 2009, ASEAN endorsed four official documents:

- **Joint Declaration on Strengthening ASEAN Defence Establishments to Meet the Challenges of Non-Traditional Security Threats**
- **The Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster relief**
- **ASEAN Defence Establishments and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) Cooperation on Non-traditional Security**
- **ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus): Principles for Membership.**

The trend in ASEAN’s official public documents also indicated ASEAN focus on non-traditional security challenges. In the period from 1967 to 2009, a study conducted by the University of Indonesia found that more than 50 percent of these documents addressed non-traditional security issues.

While it shows the same path, the formation of ADMM-Plus also reflected ASEAN’s strategy to enmesh major powers, particularly the United States and China. Establishing the meeting allowed the association to ensure the continuity of U.S. engagement in the region and possibly alleviate China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea. Since the ADMM-Plus also concentrated on tackling non-traditional security issues, China agreed to accept ASEAN invitation to participate in the meeting. As its defense minister, Liang Guanglie, stated during the first ADMM in Hanoi in 2010, “Non-traditional security threats are transnational and unpredictable, and require joint response. We support ADMM-Plus in focusing on non-traditional cooperation.” This chapter examines the development of defense cooperation in Southeast Asia and ASEAN to identify the factors that influence regional states’ responses to ASEAN defense

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130 Ibid.


cooperation framework. As a comparison, the chapter uses the Bali Concord II or year 2003 as a turning point.

B. DEFENSE COOPERATIONPRIOR TO THE BALI CONCORD II

Before the Bali Concord II, defense cooperation among Southeast Asian countries was more prevalent at the bilateral level as the result of ASEAN leaders’ opposition to a multilateral framework. There were three primary areas of military cooperation under a bilateral framework: border security, intelligence exchange, exercises and trainings; the defense industry (arms transfer and equipment standardization); and security dialogue (the ASEAN Regional Forum and defense officials meetings).\(^{133}\) The first three occurred on a bilateral basis. The other two, and later intelligence sharing, worked in a multilateral setting.

1. Border Security Arrangement

According to Acharya, all bilateral military cooperation since ASEAN’s inception started from border control agreements. The purpose of border region cooperation was formerly to prevent and contain the spreading of communism and its insurgencies and illegal activities. The agreements dealt with land and maritime border management. In the land regime, Indonesia and Malaysia and Malaysia and Thailand respectively approved their border control agreements in 1967 and 1977. On the maritime side, agreements happened between Indonesia and Malaysia and between Malaysia and the Philippines.\(^{134}\)

Both agreements on land border region cooperation had two purposes: to prevent communist insurgencies spillover and suppress illegal activities. The Malaysia–Thailand border cooperation was established to maintain monitoring activities of the Communist Party Malaysia (CPM) after it was defeated by the British Campaign. Following the same purpose, the Indonesia–Malaysia border arrangement expanded the scope to maritime border in 1984.\(^{135}\)


\(^{134}\) Ibid., 8–9.

\(^{135}\) Ibid., 9.
In the maritime domain, the border settlement has primarily focus on illegal activities. Indonesia and the Philippines established their cooperation on a Border Crossing Agreement in 1961 and followed by a Joint Patrol Border in 1975 named the CORPATPHILINDO (Coordinated Patrol Philippines-Indonesia). This settlement had two purposes. The first was to provide a legal umbrella for the ancient, existing family ties between people living in the Southern Philippines and in the Northern islands of North Sulawesi to easily travel crossing the border back and forth. The latter was to monitor and encounter any illegal activities at the sea border. Similarly, the Indonesia–Malaysia maritime border agreement dealt with cross-border activities, criminal offenses, and defense cooperation. The scope of the border security arrangement also enlarged to operational aspects such as joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and joint patrols. These activities produced positive outcomes not only to reach the goal of the settlement but also to enhance military skills and interoperability.

2. Intelligence Exchange

Intelligence sharing has played a vital role in achieving the goals of a bilateral border security arrangement. This initiative emerged during the Indochinese crisis and communist rebellion. Agreements to use intelligence exchanges to combat internal insurgencies were made between Manila and Bangkok in 1976, between Singapore and the Philippines in the same year, and between Bangkok and Jakarta in 1978. Nonetheless, ASEAN countries covertly executed their intelligence exchange to avoid greater tensions. After the crisis, intelligence sharing significantly increased and became an important field for multilateral military cooperation.

3. Military Exercises

Military exercises between countries in Southeast Asia initially developed from border security initiatives and operations. Since the 1970s, the number and type of these military exercises have grown from largely involving a single service to including

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136 Ibid.
137 Ibid., 10.
138 Ibid., 15–16.
multiple services. As shown in Table 4, the interaction between the air forces and navies of Southeast Asian countries was more dominant than between the armies. These exercises had several goals: to enhance skills in conducting military operations, to reduce technical barriers in doctrines and procedures, to obtain a deterrence effect, to amplify confidence-building measures, and to save defense expenses. Looking at these positive outcomes, military exercises were a reasonable option to maintain and magnify military cooperation among ASEAN members.

Table 4. Bilateral Military Exercises in ASEAN (1972–1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Exercise</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Participating States</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Thamal</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Malaysia-Thailand</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anoa-Singa</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Phillipines-Singapore</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darsasa Malindo</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Indonesia-Malaysia</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eagle</td>
<td>Air/naval</td>
<td>Indonesia-Singapore</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elang Indopura</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Indonesia-Singapore</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elang Thainesia</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Indonesia-Thailand</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elang Malindo</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Indonesia-Malaysia</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Biennial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Englek</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>Indonesia-Singapore</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Biennial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hornbill (&amp; others)</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>Brunei-Malaysia</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kekar Malindo</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Indonesia-Malaysia</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kripura Malindo</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Indonesia-Malaysia</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kocha Singa</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Singapore-Thailand</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maju Bersama</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Brunei-Singapore</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malapura</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>Malaysia-Singapore</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malindo Jaya</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>Indonesia-Malaysia</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelican</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>Brunei-Singapore</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philindo/Corpatphilindo</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>Indonesia-Philippines</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safkar Indopura</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Indonesia-Singapore</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Garuda</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>Indonesia-Thailand</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semangat Bersatu</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Malaysia-Singapore</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sing-Siam</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Singapore-Thailand</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar Malindo</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Indonesia-Malaysia</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termite/Flaming Arrow/</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Brunei-Singapore</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juggernaut</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thai-Sing</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>Singapore-Thailand</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thalay</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>Malaysia-Thailand</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


139 Ibid., 18.
4. Defense Industry

The defense industry was another promising area for regional military cooperation in ASEAN. Many military leaders repeatedly voiced the idea to endorse a regional defense industry including arms manufacture, weapon standardization, joint purchases, and the transfer of technology. The goals of this program were primarily economic: to achieve self-sufficiency and competitive value over external products.¹⁴⁰ In addition, establishing a collaborative defense industry could produce other benefits: reducing cost-production, establishing sustainable logistics chain, increasing interoperability, and preventing arms races. Looking at these advantages, it made sense that members of the association would support this initiative.

Nevertheless, further implementation of this defense industry proposal had been stagnant. There were some steps by Indonesia and Singapore, which had firstly developed arms manufacturing in the 1980s and the 1990s to undertake this program. Indonesia, using its aircraft industry, produced and exported various types of aircraft to ASEAN members. Likewise, Singapore, having advanced in shipbuilding capability, actively sold its naval patrol boats and Fast Attack Aircraft (FAC).¹⁴¹ Factors such as an unbalanced level of technology acquisition, different interest and economic policies, and defense budget allocation constrained subsequent efforts for expansion to include other countries.

5. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

The ARF was born to promote regional peace and stability through dialogue and cooperation in the Asia Pacific. The end of the Cold War created a vacuum of power in the region and left ASEAN members anxious about stability in the region. They faced the emergence of new major powers without external power guarantors. Looking at this situation, in 1994, ASEAN leaders agreed to establish a regional organization with broader memberships to include major powers such as China, Japan, and the United States, which had currently competed for influence in region. This momentum indicated a fundamental change in the ASEAN view of multilateral security cooperation.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 20–21.
¹⁴¹ Ibid., 21.
Although it had conducted several steps to achieve its goals, the forum failed to turn its dialogues for preventive diplomacy into concrete implementation. With 27 members, the ARF has brought a wide range of security issues to be discussed within a multilateral setting, including transnational threats. Information exchange on defense policy and white papers has also occurred among participants. Additionally, its members have developed a network for national security and defense and military officials. These achievements, however, have been sluggish without a significant realization of goals. According to Ralf Emmers and See Seng Tan, the “divergent strategic outlooks” of its members was one of the factors impeding the ARF in attempts to enhance security cooperation. In addition, the involvement of ASEAN defense officials has been limited. In this context, assuming the ARF as a multilateral defense cooperation is far from relevant. Nevertheless, the forum reflected ASEAN’s initial, important attempt to create a multilateral defense cooperation. This initiative also demonstrated ASEAN leaders’ shared vision that the association required a broader scope of security cooperation involving members’ defense officials.

6. Defense Officials Meetings

Besides their dialogue engagement in the ARF, defense officials in ASEAN have also frequently met on other formal and informal occasions multilaterally on an annual basis. Started in 2002, the annual ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM) provides a place for ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces to build networks and trust. It continuously develops and enlarges the area of cooperation, with not only talks but also real activities. Until 2014, the ACDFIM has conducted 11 meetings. Similarly, chiefs from the three services—army, navy, and air force—have created such forums. In 2000, ASEAN Army Chiefs started their engagement in the ASEAN Chiefs of

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Army Multilateral Meeting (ACAMM) to discuss security issues in the region. Through personal interactions, they strengthen their relationships to promote trust and enhance capacity and professionalism.\textsuperscript{145} The ASEAN Navy Interaction (now officially named the ASEAN Naval Chiefs’ Meeting, or ANCM) established in 2001 provides an annual forum to develop and expand naval cooperation and interoperability.\textsuperscript{146} Initiated in 2004, Air Force Chiefs of ASEAN annually meet in the ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference (AACC) to discuss issues and air forces’ interests and to formulate action-plan recommendations to strengthen their relationships.\textsuperscript{147} Furthermore, the military interaction in ASEAN also manifests in the form of a military sports competition: the ASEAN Armies Rifles Meet (AARM).\textsuperscript{148}

C. DEFENSE COOPERATION AFTER THE BALI CONCORD II

Since the endorsement of the APSC under the Bali Concord II in 2003, defense cooperation within ASEAN has significantly developed. While maintaining existing bilateral military cooperation, the members have expanded and realized various regional and multilateral arrangements. Collaborative maritime operations and intelligence sharing are some of these crucial efforts, among others. The institutionalization of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) in 2006 and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) in 2010 marked this expansion and demonstrated members’ real commitment to multilateral defense cooperation.


1. Multilateral Coordinated Patrol

Multilateral maritime cooperation is one of the important arenas in Southeast Asia security and the defense framework. This cooperation initially established outside the ASEAN framework, however. Later, the ASEAN adopted this field into its area of cooperation under the ARF and the ADMM-Plus. Following the increasing number of piracy attacks and armed robberies in the Malacca Straits, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore launched the first Malaysia–Singapore–Indonesia Coordinated Patrol (MALSINDO CORPAT) in July 2004.149 This trilateral naval operation is under the Malacca Straits Sea Patrol Joint Working Groups (MSSP JWG) supervision. The background of this initiative was that the problems in the Straits of Malacca required comprehensive, cooperative efforts among coastal countries; external involvement is unnecessary.

The MALSINDO then evolved to enlarge its area of cooperation by establishing the Eyes in the Sky (EiS) in 2005 and the Intelligence Exchange Group in 2006 and endorsing the Thailand Navy’s participation. Both arrangements were designed to support patrolling ships with adequate intelligence information. As a continuation of these initiatives, the countries decided to build the Malacca Straits Patrol Information System (MSP-IS). In 2008, the Thailand Navy started its contribution to the Malacca Straits Sea Patrol (MSSP).150 This commitment enhanced the capacity of the previous force composition in terms of patrolling assets, area coverage, and intelligence gathering.

2. Expanding Intelligence Sharing: The ASEAN Information-Sharing Portal

The need to provide real-time and sufficient maritime pictures drove ASEAN navies’ leaders to enhance their existing information sharing. Led by the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) and the Indonesian Navy (TNI AL), ASEAN navies developed and officially launched the ASEAN Information-Sharing Portal (AIP) in July 2012. The


purpose of the portal is to “provide a common platform for ASEAN navies to share maritime security-related information in the region and enhance information-sharing procedures.” Every country has attached its Liaison Officer to the center. The system allows members to easily access the information through permanent and mobile stations. At the official launching, the countries also initiated the first ASEAN Maritime Information-Sharing Exercise.

3. The ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)

Endorsed in Kuala Lumpur on 9 May 2006, the ADMM is “the highest defense consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN.” It also denoted the association’s embarking on a multilateral defense and security framework, which had been consistently rejected by its members. As stated in the Concept Paper, the ADMM has four purposes: promoting regional peace and stability, supervising dialogues and cooperation, encouraging mutual trust and confidence, and supporting the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) establishment. Besides the important role of cooperative security, this commitment bolsters the United Nations’ concept of “security regions.”

Furthermore, the institutionalization of existing defense and military engagements among members into the ADMM purview represents a major shift in the association’s policy toward multilateral defense cooperation. This transformation opens a wide window for a broader scope of military and defense arrangements to address security challenges within the region and, to some extent, to deal with global security. According to Tomotaka Shoji, the ADMM approached this idea by deliberately providing “an


154 ASEAN Secretariat, “Concept Paper.”

155 Ibid.
atmosphere of security cooperation and dialogue within ASEAN.” The establishment of the ADMM indicated that the association implemented the concept of defense diplomacy, which is “to forge positive and productive relationships among militaries in the region, leading to the creation and maintenance of a peaceful and stable security environment.” The ADMM has identified that the region recently had to deal with new security challenges in the form of non-traditional security threats and initiated several steps to address these issues, such as establishing cooperation between ASEAN Defense Establishments with the Civil Society Organization (CSO), strengthening ASEAN Defense Establishments, and strengthening defense cooperation of ASEAN. Hence, ASEAN defense establishments would have more significant roles to play in maintaining security of the region.

To meet its goals, the ADMM formulates its roadmaps in the Three-Year Program as guidance and an outline. This document contains priorities for the activities that the meeting should achieve. Setting priorities every three years helps the ADMM members to bolster their engagements in practical defense and security cooperation. Moreover, the decision of the ADMM to emphasize its cooperation on the non-traditional security threats is more acceptable. Based on ASEAN’s experiences, it is more difficult to achieve a consensus on solving traditional security issues such as the South China Sea disputes because each member has polarized views and different interests, according to Shoji.

The ADMM has set four areas of non-traditional security as its current agenda: humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), peacekeeping operations, and the defense industry. On HA/DR, the ADMM has conducted three workshops and produced

156 Shoji, “ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM Plus,” 7.
157 Ibid.
159 Shoji, “ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM Plus,” 8.
documents such as the Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP) in 2009 following the signature of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) on July 26, 2005, in Vientiane, Lao PDR, and the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the Utilisation of Military Assets for HADR under the Framework of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) on March 18, 2015.  

To realize its commitment to peacekeeping operations, the meeting developed the Peacekeeping Center Network in 2012 and conducted the Regional Workshop on Operational Challenges Facing United Nations Peacekeeping Operations at Indonesian Peacekeeping Training Center in Sentul in November 2012. This initiative allows members to conduct joint training and share experiences. On the defense industry, the ADMM has held three workshops on ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration (ADIC) since 2012. These serial defense engagements demonstrate the ASEAN’s strong commitment to accommodate multilateral defense cooperation among its members through the ADMM.

4. The ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus)

After the establishment of the ADMM, ASEAN continued its endeavor to enhance security and defense cooperation by endorsing the ADMM-Plus during the 4th ADMM in Vietnam in 2010. This step was the manifestation of the ADMM commitment to maintain its “open, flexible, and outward-looking” behavior. As it enjoyed benefits from its external engagements such as the ARF, ASEAN expected more advantages through practical defense cooperation with its dialogue partners—Australia, China, India,

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Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Russian Federation, and the United States—to address complex security challenges under the ADMM-Plus framework.

Although it adopted the same principles as the ADMM, the ADMM-Plus expanded its area of cooperation into five fields: maritime security, counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster management, peacekeeping operations, and military medicine. To supervise and facilitate cooperation in these areas, the ADMM endorsed five Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs) on temporary base, which means an EWG could be dissolved after the goal is obtained. On May 7, 2013, the ADMM-Plus established a new EWG on humanitarian mine action.

As stipulated in the ADMM Modalities and Procedures, the ADMM-Plus should work on practical cooperation to address key issues especially non-traditional and transnational security challenges. This commitment requires a concrete action, not only written on paper. To fulfill its commitment, the ADMM EWGs have conducted a series of exercises. In 2012, the ADMM-Plus EWG on Military Medicine and Maritime Security held a table-top exercise in July and September 2012. The ADMM-Plus recorded a historical endeavor in 2013 when the military forces from ASEAN and the eight counterpart countries executed practical exercises in four of the five areas of the ADMM-Plus: the HADR Military Medicine in Brunei, Counter-Terrorism Exercise (CTX) in Indonesia, and Maritime Security Field Training Exercise in Australia. In February 2014, the members conducted a table-top exercise on peacekeeping operations in Manila.

Given the development of the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus, “ASEAN has started to move forward in the right direction,” as a political observer from the Indonesian

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165 “Past Meetings and Events.”
Institute of Sciences, Riefqi Muna, stated. Similarly, the executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Rizal Sukma, asserted that “there was an urgent need for ‘ASEAN’s militaries to quickly build trust and comfort levels to cooperate among themselves while solving internal disputes amicably and to back away from using force if they want to realize a security community by 2015.’”

Enhancing defense cooperation among members has been crucial for ASEAN to achieve its goals to promote peace and regional stability by addressing new dimensions of security challenges. During the 5th ADMM in 2011, the Indonesian Defense Minister, Purnomo Yusgiantoro, reiterated the importance of this initiative:

While ASEAN was not a defense pact like NATO, the grouping had ample opportunity to cooperate on defense issues – and on regional and transnational problems. The ten ASEAN member states have no obligation to give full political commitment and support to defense cooperation because of their own domestic conditions. However, we are all committed to forging multilateral defense cooperation to handle common problems.

At the same tone, the Malaysian Defense Minister, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, said that “increasing cooperation would encourage ASEAN’s member nations to enhance multilateral cooperation at the regional level.” Specifically, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak emphasized the role of the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus in countering non-traditional threats such as terrorism conducted by non-state actors like the Islamic State (IS):

This issue [terrorism] has been discussed at sub-ASEAN forums, namely the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and the ADMM-Plus meeting in Langkawi recently. This means that ASEAN is aware and has acted through defence ministers, home ministers, armed forces and others in order to enhance cooperation. This is to enable ASEAN through

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167 Ibid.

168 Ibid.

169 Ibid.
collective and bilateral efforts work more closely to address the IS threat which we cannot and are unable to handle individually. We must act collectively.\textsuperscript{170}

In the 2010 Shangri-Dialogue, the Vietnamese Minister of National Defence, General Phung Quang Thanh, clearly stated in his speech that the development of security challenges was one of the driving factors that motivated regional countries to create multilateral security cooperation such as the ARF, East Asian Summit, ASEAN Plus, the ADMM, and the ADMM-Plus.\textsuperscript{171} Regarding the ADMM-Plus, General Thanh highlighted the crucial role of the meeting as “a place for consultation, building confidence and finding out areas of practical cooperation in defense” to provide “an effective solution to the common security challenges and emerging non-traditional security challenges.”\textsuperscript{172} Furthermore, the Vietnamese minister also reiterated the important function of the ADMM-Plus as a medium for engaging states that have interest and influence in the Asia-Pacific region; it has been “a leap forward,” he said, to “Renewing the Regional Security Architecture.”\textsuperscript{173}

D. SUMMARY

The evolution of defense cooperation in ASEAN demonstrates the change in the direction and the area of cooperation. In its earlier period, ASEAN members consistently resisted the idea of a military alliance or defense pact. Yet, they continued building collaborative efforts in military affairs in a bilateral arrangement. The political reason for their rejection was to prevent their countries from the superpowers’ military offensive actions during the Cold War and the Cambodian conflict. In addition, they did not have sufficient defense capability to provide direct military assistance by sending troops into the member state that was threatened.


\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.
Nonetheless, bilateral defense cooperation among regional countries has grown from time to time. Starting from a border security arrangement, they continued expanding their scope into other areas such as intelligence sharing, exercises and training, and the defense industry. Regional states recognized and enjoyed some important benefits from this bilateral cooperation such as capacity building, in terms of military proficiency and technology modernization, and intelligence awareness to support military operations. These benefits encouraged ASEAN leaders to enhance defense ties to a multilateral level after the Cold War, such as with the ARF. In addition, having achieved significant economic growth, the defense capability of regional countries has also increased.

The direction of ASEAN’s defense role experienced a significant shift when its members had to deal with new types of security challenges in the post–Cold War era: non-traditional security threats. These threats require collaborative strategies since they are transnational in nature. To address such challenges, some ASEAN members initiated regional and multilateral defense cooperation such as the Malacca Straits Sea Patrol and frequent meetings among defense officials. These initiatives, however, worked outside the ASEAN mechanism.

Looking at this development, ASEAN leaders decided to institutionalize defense cooperation into a formal mechanism within the association. They were aware that multilateral defense cooperation had become more important to address transnational security challenges. The establishment of the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus exemplified this policy change. Both meetings provide opportunities for members and external actors to participate in achieving ASEAN goals. This also demonstrates ASEAN’s commitment to promoting peace and stability in Southeast Asia through concrete actions.

In sum, this chapter explains how defense cooperation in ASEAN has moved from a bilateral to multilateral scope. Table 5 summarizes the development of ASEAN defense cooperation. The primary factor in this development is the emergence of non-traditional security challenges.
Table 5. The Development of Defense Cooperation and Defense Capability in ASEAN

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IV. CONCLUSION

A. FINDINGS

This thesis has examined three factors—the type of security challenges, the defense capability, and the ability to avoid intramural conflicts—that have shaped ASEAN’s approach to defense cooperation since its foundation in 1967 in order to explain why the members decided in 2003 to enhance defense cooperation under the APSC arrangement. The question stemmed from an observation that, during its first three decades, ASEAN members rejected any idea to establish multilateral military cooperation among themselves, but in 2003, their leaders reversed this policy and agreed to pursue multilateral defense cooperation. This thesis concludes that each of the three factors influenced the members of ASEAN in deciding either to adopt or reject multilateral defense cooperation within ASEAN. These factors had different effects depending on the circumstances the members faced.

Since it was founded in the Cold War era, ASEAN encountered traditional threats that came from internal turbulence caused by communist rebellions and separatist movements and intramural conflicts, such as the Cambodian conflict, and some territorial disputes involving the military forces (e.g., between Indonesia and Malaysia and between Thailand and Cambodia). To deal with the internal security challenges, ASEAN leaders shared the same perception that these challenges should be dealt with domestically since they fell under the sovereign jurisdiction of each country. Therefore, security or defense cooperation among members to overcome domestic security challenges was out of the question.

In addition, Southeast Asian countries experienced the impact of the Cold War circumstances, which brought them into the rivalries of superpowers and created external security challenges. The Cold War exaggerated the fear of the growing communist influence related to communist rebellion activities, which were supported by China. Additionally, most ASEAN members worried about Thailand’s security after Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, which was backed by the Soviet Union. To address the intramural
and also the external security challenges, ASEAN leaders decided to manage the conflict through a diplomatic settlement. To prevent further military conflicts, ASEAN actively engaged the conflicting countries to meet at a negotiation table.

Although military support was one of the options available to address traditional security challenges, ASEAN recognized that this approach was irrelevant since the members had very small military forces during the Cold War. In addition to the lack of force projection capability, most countries in the region still had to deal with internal threats and economic hardship. Hence, providing military assistance, either individually or collectively, to another member that was under military threat was not a viable solution.

The demise of the Cold War led Southeast Asia into another uncertain external security environment since the emergence of regional great powers like Japan and China wanted to increase their influence in the region after the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet military forces. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the U.S. departure from the region left room for the regional great powers to expand and strengthen their influence. The intention of Japan and China could have started a new power competition. ASEAN leaders saw that this development would again challenge the association’s cohesiveness and goals to promote peace and stability in the region. Therefore, ASEAN required a strategy to work toward this goal, and thus the ARF was established. This forum was created only to conduct security dialogues and enmesh the major powers to prevent them from further hostile actions that could jeopardize regional security. However, starting at this point, ASEAN defense multilateralism significantly intensified.

Furthermore, with the increase of economic development and interconnectedness among regional and global countries, non-traditional security threats such as piracy and armed robbery, terrorism, environmental issues, contagious diseases, human rights violence, natural disasters, and so on, have become a major concern for the countries in Southeast Asia. To address these challenges, numerous multilateral defense cooperation frameworks have been established such as the MSSP, intelligence sharing, and a number of defense officials’ meetings; these are, however, outside the ASEAN framework.
Looking at the development of non-traditional security challenges and the increase of security and defense cooperation, ASEAN leaders decided to institutionalize multilateral defense cooperation into the association. They were aware that multilateral defense cooperation became more important to address transnational security challenges. The establishment of the ADMM in 2006 and the ADMM-Plus in 2010 exemplified this policy change. Both meetings provide opportunities for members and external actors to participate in achieving ASEAN goals in support of the establishment of the APSC. This initiative started in 2003 when leaders of ASEAN agreed to create an ASEAN Community in 2020, which was mandated by the Bali Concord II, and the APSC was one of its three pillars. Under the political-security community, enhancing the defense cooperation is one of the areas to be realized to achieve the goals of the ASEAN Community.

The ADMM and the ADMM-Plus also demonstrate ASEAN’s commitment to promote peace and stability in Southeast Asia through concrete actions. The ADMM incorporates some of the existing multilateral defense cooperation outside the ASEAN framework, particularly high officials’ meetings. Moreover, both meetings have taken the non-traditional security challenges as their primary focus to implement practical defense engagements. The ADMM’s current areas of cooperation are HA/DR, peacekeeping operations, and the defense industry; and the ADMM-Plus focuses on maritime security, counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster management, peacekeeping operations, military medicine, and humanitarian mine action. This development shows that the increase of non-traditional security threats has become the primary driving factor for the establishment and expansion of multilateral defense cooperation in ASEAN. Also, enhancing defense cooperation in ASEAN indicates that the association has reached another important step in its endeavor to accomplish one of its goals: to promote and maintain stability in Southeast Asia.

Furthermore, focusing ASEAN multilateral defense cooperation on the non-traditional security challenges allows more room for members to contribute. In contrast to addressing traditional threats, members’ existing military capabilities are arguably sufficient to encounter the non-traditional security issues. Having obtained significant
economic growth, most ASEAN members have been able to develop their defense capabilities and handle the internal security threats posed by separatist movements. Yet, the countries need to work together because the challenges are difficult to overcome by an individual state.

In addition, having engaged in intense and increased bilateral defense cooperation such as border security cooperation, intelligence exchange, and exercises and trainings, ASEAN leaders have seen that these kinds of cooperation have produced some benefits. High-ranking defense officials have regularly met in conferences, meetings, and dialogues such as the AACC (ASEAN Air Forces Conference), the ACDFIM (ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces’ Meeting), the ACNM (ASEAN Chiefs of Navies’ Meeting), and the ACAMM (ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting) to discuss specific security and defense issues in the region and produce constructive ideas to address the problems. In a practical context, the troops and military assets have been involved and engaged in periodic training and exercises. These have provided opportunities for lower level military commanders and personnel to build better understandings and enhance inter-operability in conducting future real missions. By engaging in exercises and trainings, they can produce and evaluate standard operating procedures for a future joint operation, for example the SASOP for HA/DR operations. Through these various, intense military engagements, the region’s countries have built confidence and trust among them.

Endorsing multilateral defense cooperation in ASEAN also provides another opportunity to enhance the association’s ability to prevent intramural conflicts. This benefit also comes from the confidence-building measures that have been achieved through intense defense interactions. Additionally, ASEAN members use the non-traditional security challenges as another common interest to find peaceful forms of conflict prevention. Although the source of non-traditional threats may come from specific members, for instance, the haze from Indonesia and terrorism from the Philippines and Indonesia, evidence shows that these problems did not provoke conflicts with neighboring countries. Moreover, the countries in the region have been able to find solutions to prevent and mitigate through multilateral arrangements such as the ACPTP (ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution).
To conclude, the nature of the security challenges, defense capability, and ability to find peaceful conflict resolution have shaped ASEAN members’ policies toward multilateral defense cooperation. In the past, the members faced non-traditional threats and had relatively weak defense capabilities to address those security challenges. In addition, the level of trust among members was still low. These circumstances led the members of association to establish bilateral rather than multilateral defense cooperation.

Over time, as the three factors have changed, ASEAN leaders have agreed to endorse multilateral defense cooperation under the association mechanism. The non-traditional security threats have emerged and become prevalent. Defense capabilities have increased and have become adequate to deal with the threats. After having engaged in intense interactions, the members have built a considerable level of trust with one another, through which they can prevent conflicts that come from existing disputes or from transnational issues. The members of ASEAN have seen that these circumstances have given them opportunities to institutionalize defense cooperation into a multilateral scope. They have realized that multilateral defense cooperation will accelerate the achievement of ASEAN goals.

B. WAY AHEAD

Although ASEAN has survived and obtained significant achievements toward reaching its goals, the dynamic of the security environment in Southeast Asia always brings new challenges to the organization, such as the non-traditional threats. These motivate ASEAN to continue its efforts to seek comprehensive strategies to address the challenges. In doing so, defense cooperation is one of the means available to ASEAN. After rejecting the development of multilateral defense cooperation in the early decades of ASEAN, ASEAN leaders agreed to enhance defense cooperation under the APSC. Mandated by the Bali Concord II, this initiative reflected ASEAN’s first commitment to pursue multilateral defense cooperation within the association. Subsequently, the members have developed the idea into more practical implementation, namely the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus.
As multilateral defense cooperation has successfully been established, ASEAN members arguably have removed the most difficult barrier to complete the regional organization’s aims to bolster and materialize the three pillars of the ASEAN Community. Although the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus still have a long way to go to achieve its goals, ASEAN has created more opportunities and wide room for other areas of cooperation. The increased number of expert working groups in both meetings indicates that the ASEAN members’ commitment to enhance multilateral defense cooperation is growing. Although critics still question its role in solving regional problems, ASEAN’s decision to enhance defense cooperation through the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus proves that the organization has achieved important momentum toward reaching its goals. The association has effectively used non-traditional security issues as a common interest to enhance ASEAN defense cooperation.

While members’ growing concern about non-traditional security threats has driven the institutionalization of multilateral defense cooperation in ASEAN, the association still has to find a solution to the existing turbulence around the South China Sea disputes. This issue could have several possible impacts on regional stability. Although ASEAN has actively attempted to negotiate the implementation of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, China still maintains its resistance to the proposal and continues its assertiveness, combined with its military presences in the dispute areas. This unilateral move has prompted strong reactions from other claimants that also have deployed and conducted naval patrols in their claimed territories. This situation might trigger armed skirmishes and endanger maritime activities in the region. Moreover, to balance China’s power, some claimants such as the Philippines and Vietnam still expect U.S. involvement in the negotiation. This individual initiative might regenerate power rivalry in the region, which has been avoided by ASEAN.

By establishing the ADMM-Plus, ASEAN has tried again to enmesh some major powers in the Asia-Pacific region, including China, to prevent the negative impacts of the South China Sea territorial conflicts. The member countries expect that engaging China through the meeting might give them wider room to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the issue. Continuous interactions with China’s defense officials might become a bridge to, at
least, reduce China’s move and prevent armed conflicts. To achieve this goal, ASEAN should continue developing its defense cooperation through the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus to address non-traditional threats. In addition, the meetings should strengthen their respective areas of cooperation and possibly enhance the number of existing working groups to deal with other non-traditional security issues.

Nevertheless, the commitment to enhance ASEAN multilateral defense cooperation by focusing on the non-traditional security threats will be questioned if the South China Sea issue escalates and becomes a military conflict triggered by China’s growing assertiveness. The worst scenario is that China declares its sovereignty claims in the region by deploying military forces in all disputed territories. The existing ASEAN multilateral defense cooperation has not been designed to mitigate the impacts of armed conflicts by providing military support to members that are involved in conflicts. The primary objective of the ASEAN defense cooperation framework is to promote peace and stability in Southeast Asia by preventing conflicts through dialogue and defense cooperation or by conducting defense diplomacy. Therefore, if war occurs between China and other claimants in the South China Sea, the established defense cooperation will not be ready to address this traditional threat. Similarly, although members’ defense capabilities have significantly developed, the possibility of providing military support to members involved in the conflict is still unlikely. In addition, this also indicates that ASEAN’s conflict prevention mechanism arguably has failed.

Furthermore, as a comprehensive security organization, sovereignty is the primary consideration of ASEAN members, ahead of committing to any multilateral cooperation. The presence of traditional security challenges, such as armed conflict in the South China Sea, may change members’ policies toward the established multilateral defense cooperation. Most likely, some countries would again try to seek security assistance from major powers to balance China. If that happens, the legacy of the power rivalry will most likely be reborn in Southeast Asia. In short, traditional security challenges remain the primary driving force that can change the security environment in Southeast Asia and affect the existing ASEAN’s multilateral defense cooperation.


“Renewing the Regional Security Architecture: General Phung Quang Thanh.”
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), June 6, 2010.


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