Reshaping the All-Volunteer Force of the United States to Increase its Utility: A Reassessment of Over Forty Years of Experience

A Monograph

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
Abstract

Reshaping the All-Volunteer Force of the United States to Increase its Utility: A Reassessment of Over Forty Years of Experience, by LtCol Walter H. Schulte, German Army, 95 pages.

This monograph reassesses over forty years of development of the All-Volunteer army and analyzes how it could be reshaped to improve its utility in the twenty-first century. It shows, that the army as an All-Volunteer Force was optimized solely for kinetic and decisive operations due to a focus on narrow ‘military professionalism’ that gravitates around managing and applying violence. Consequently, the army was able to prove its utility in scenarios of limited complexity where it was able to achieve prompt and decisive results. Its employment in more complex environments brought mixed results at best. As a consequence, the army needs to adopt a more comprehensive concept of military professionalism defined as the managing of security. The army also has to acknowledge, that, as a professional organization, it incorporates the elements of calling, profession and occupation holistically without contradictions. This concept far better reflects the army’s broad set of capabilities and individual diversity. It will positively affect its ability to successfully operate in complex environments and, with convincing messaging, appeal to a bigger number of potential high-quality volunteers. The army will also continue to redesign its ‘Total Force’ concept to achieve the right mix between the active and the reserve components as well as the delineation of their tasks within the concept of an ‘expansible army.’ In addition, a true ‘Total Force’ concept will have to include the element of private contracting and clarify its future role. To ensure access to civilian expertise that was severely lacking in recent operations, the army will have to define its requirements in this regard so that the US government can develop an approach to ‘draft’ those experts from state or federal public service into the army should it be necessary for operational success. For the ultimate case of a true national emergency, the instrument of a general draft requires to be sharpened to avoid a mental or organizational ‘shock’ that paralyzes rather than enhances the responsiveness of the United States.
# Contents

Acronyms ......................................................................................................................................... v  
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1  
The Creation of the All-Volunteer Army ......................................................................................... 4  
**Historical Background** ................................................................................................................ 4  
**Social, Political, and Military Considerations** ........................................................................... 12  
**Design and Organization** ........................................................................................................... 17  
The Development of the All-Volunteer Army from 1973 to 2001 ......................................................... 21  
**Social, Political and Military Considerations** ........................................................................... 21  
**Design and Organization** ........................................................................................................... 26  
**Utility and Employment** .............................................................................................................. 33  
The Development of the All-Volunteer Army from 2001 to 2015 ........................................................ 40  
**Social, Political, and Military Considerations** ........................................................................... 40  
**Design and Organization** ........................................................................................................... 48  
**Utility and Employment** .............................................................................................................. 54  
The Future of the All-Volunteer Army .............................................................................................. 64  
**Social, Political, and Military Considerations** ........................................................................... 64  
**Effects on Design and Organization** .......................................................................................... 73  
**Effects on Utility and Employment** ........................................................................................... 79  
Conclusion...................................................................................................................................... 82  
Bibliography................................................................................................................................... 86
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
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<td>Army Force Generation</td>
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<td>Area of Operation</td>
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<td>Army Techniques Publication</td>
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<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
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<td>Military Operations other than War</td>
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<td>Operational Tempo</td>
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OR Operational Reserve
PROVIDE Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
RAND Research and Development Corporation
RC Reserve Component
SAMS School of Advanced Military Studies
SAMVA Special Assistant for the Modern Voluntary Army
SSTR Stabilization, Security and Reconstruction
STEP Special Training Enlistment Program (1964)
STSA Selective Training and Service Act
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command
US United States
USAAC US Army Accessions Command
USAR United States Army Reserve
USC United States Code
VCA Vice Chief of the Army
VOLAR Volunteer Army
WWI World War I
WWII World War II
This is not a profession in crisis, though it could become that way if left unaddressed .... This is the first time we've taken the all-volunteer force to war for a protracted period.

—General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Introduction

In what shape is the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) of the United States today after over forty years of development, which for the first time included a decade of protracted wars? And, based on this experience, how will the All-Volunteer Force need to be shaped to have true utility in the future? This monograph reassesses over forty years of development of the All-Volunteer army and analyzes how it could be reshaped to improve its utility in the Twenty-first Century. It shows that the army as an All-Volunteer Force was neither intended for nor designed to be employed in protracted or complex scenarios. Instead, in quantity and quality it was optimized solely for kinetic and decisive operations due to a focus on narrow ‘military professionalism’ that gravitates around managing and applying violence. Consequently, the army was able to prove its utility in scenarios of limited complexity where it was able to achieve prompt and decisive results. Its employment in more complex environments brought mixed results at best.


2 The current discussion about the mixed results is being reflected in different accounts of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq with telling titles, such as Thomas E. Ricks’s Fiasco or Daniel Bolger’s Why We Lost. See Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (London: Penguin Books, 2007) and Daniel Bolger, Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2014).
The analysis proves that the US army will continue as an All-Volunteer Force for clear societal, political and military preferences, but will need to be redesigned on the basis of an enhanced ‘Total-Force’ concept that truly acknowledges the complex world on which the currently evolving doctrine focuses. This ‘Total-Force’ must include clear roles of the active and reserve components of the army as well as clear mechanisms for their relationships and cooperation. It needs to include a clear role for private contractors and mechanisms for cooperation. Additionally, it needs to include a mechanism for accessing and integrating operationally relevant expertise from civilians in the public services. To be provocative, if no other procedure is feasible, this should lead to a draft of civilian government employees, federal or state, into the military. This approach will bridge and reduce the current remoteness of society, politics and the military towards a draft, which mentally and organizationally endangers the ability of the United States to mobilize fully in case of a true national crisis.

Overall, US society, politics and especially the army will have to reassess their approach towards military professionalism. The reduction of the ‘military professional’ as a manager of violence is simply insufficient to ‘win in a complex world’, as the army has defined its level of ambition in its recent operating concept. Instead, the military professional will need to be redefined as a ‘manager of security’ in a much broader sense. This also reflects in a better way, that the US army will have to attract and incorporate high-quality volunteers who do not necessarily have to qualify for a narrow definition of a professional.

This monograph focuses on the army as the biggest service and mostly affected by manpower issues, that result out of the all-volunteer status. In addition, because of the complex nature of land operations, the army is well suited for an analysis of the military profession.3 The

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3 For the unique position of the army regarding manpower issues see Lawrence Kapp, Recruiting and Retention: An Overview of FY2011 and FY2012 Results for Active and Reserve Component Enlisted Personnel (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 10, 2013), 1.
analysis will reassess the history of the All-Volunteer Force as a basis for drawing conclusions regarding its future. This historical analysis differentiates between the creation of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973 and its development afterwards until now. Regarding this development the analysis distinguishes two phases. Between 1973 and 2001 the All-Volunteer Force has been employed in a variety of operations, first tentatively and then regularly in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. Although this followed a historic tradition it also raised questions about the true purpose of the US army. The period after 2001 marks a significant change as it includes the large-scale employment of the US army in what can be defined as protracted wars of increased complexity.4

The analysis will approach each the creation, the development and the future of the All-Volunteer Force in a distinct pattern. To understand who influenced the development of the US army as an All-Volunteer Force, it is important to analyze assumptions, considerations and intentions of the relevant players. In this regard, the analysis will focus on the classic Clausewitzian trinity of society, politics and the military itself. It will then cover the implications for the design and organization of the army as an All-Volunteer Force focusing on manpower and the human dimension in a broad sense. This will include the army’s identity as a professional organization, how it presented itself in this regard, and how it envisioned to be employed. Finally, each section will address the actual utilization and employment of the force.

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4 Traditionally the American Army has conducted operations across the full spectrum throughout its history. Besides decisive kinetic battles it prominently also had “other unpleasant tasks: the occupation of the defeated Southern states [after the Civil War] and the long campaign to ‘settle’ the Indian problem on the frontier.” Richard W. Stewart, ed., American Military History Volume 1: The United States Army and the Forging of a Nation, 1775-1917 (Washington, DC: Center for Military History United States Army, Second Edition 2009), 304. And, again after the Civil Wars, the “United States Army performed a variety of highly useful civil functions in the interwar years, despite the new professionalism that decried such activities as contrary to the natural purpose of any army.” Ibid., 320.
The Creation of the All-Volunteer Army

Historical Background

The United States has discussed the way it organizes its military since its Declaration of Independence in 1776. One key element throughout US history, though, has been a distrust of standing federal military. As the major source for this stance Samuel Huntington had identified liberalism which “dominated American thinking from the Revolution through the first half of the twentieth century … [and] does not understand and is hostile to military institutions and the military function.”\(^5\) Huntington concluded that out of this ideological stance a standing army with its hierarchies resembled an aristocratic institution. As the opposite, the militia was perceived as “the only military force suitable for the new republic … as it embodied the democratic principle that defense of the nation was the responsibility of every citizen.”\(^6\) According to Huntington, this liberal approach was complemented by the conservative approach of the Federalists who, for functional reasons, perceived a standing army necessary given the very concrete threats from European nations that the United States faced during its infancy. This led to the establishment of the United States military that included standing forces and a militia in the Constitution. Regarding this dual approach, the United States Army Center of Military History concluded, that “[until] World War II, American military policy was centered on the maintenance of very small regular forces and reliance on citizen-soldiers in case of national emergency.”\(^7\) The principle of a ‘gradable’ military consisting of different elements presented a sociopolitical but also an organizational challenge. Between 1817 and 1825 Secretary of War John C. Calhoun advanced the army’s administrative capabilities and in 1820 introduced the concept of an officer cadre within a force

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\(^6\) Ibid., 167.

\(^7\) Stewart, ed., *American Military History Volume I*, 17.
structure that allowed for quick expansion. “This marked the start of the ‘expansible army’ concept… [reflecting] that the Regular Army and its officer corps was the first line of our nation’s defense rather than relying totally upon the militia or hastily raised, equipped, and trained volunteer units.”

Despite those functional developments the question of how to organize the army’s expansion remained. Regarding the instrument of the draft the prevailing liberal perspective, according to Huntington, viewed the concept of forcing free people against their will into the military as nothing but a mechanism of making them the lowest class in an aristocratically constructed institution. Consequently, former Director of Selected Service, head of RAND’s Defense Manpower Research Center and Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Bernhard Rostker argues that “America has no tradition of a draft absent an ongoing war, hot or cold.” According to this perception, only then and for strict functional reasons has the disputed concept of a draft been temporarily acceptable as the only viable way of providing for the ‘common defense’ by the people.

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8 Ibid., 164. The United States struggled throughout the Nineteenth Century with concepts of how to achieve the appropriate growth from a small peacetime military to one capable for major war with sophisticated armies. One concept, that “became a military cult”, was the 1820 ‘Expansible Plan’ of Secretary of the Army John C. Calhoun. Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 1955), 61. This plan “contemplated an efficient staff and a peacetime Regular Army so organized that it would provide the skeleton framework for a wartime expanded army.” Ibid., 61. Kreidberg and Henry also provided criticism of the concept when they claimed that the plan “did not have any provision for the improvement or utilization of the militia …[and failed] to foresee that a small Regular Army would not be able to provide sufficient cadres for a huge mass Army and that the organization would crack under the weight of too many recruits.” Ibid., 61.

9 Bernhard Rostker, I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force (Santa Monica, Arlington, Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation 2006), 3. Rostker is an outspoken proponent of the All-Volunteer Force in its current form. He especially defended the AVF against sociologists who “were dismayed by the very thought that the nation would give up conscription, which for them epitomized the social contract between the citizen and the state.” Ibid., iii.

According to Rostker, a federal military draft has only been instituted in the Civil War, World War I (WWI), World War II (WWII) and during the Cold War. However during the Civil War the draft, implemented by Congress through the Enrollment Act of 1863, created public aversion that was caused by a sense of lacking equal sacrifice. However, the US Army Center of Military History emphasized, that “[c]omparatively few men were ever drafted into the Federal Service, but by stimulating men to volunteer the Enrollment Act had its desired effect. … This measure established firmly the principle that every citizen is obliged to defend the nation and the Federal government can impose that obligation without the mediation of the states.”  

After the Civil War “the volunteers wanted to go home and Congress wanted to decrease the Army”, which led to demobilization. The combined effect of the resulting isolation and concentration of the army enabled the “rise of military professionalism.” Concerns about domestic disturbances as well as a “certain martial enthusiasm in the 1870s and 1880s” led to the establishment of the National Guard as “the new volunteer militia of the states.”

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12 Ibid., 312.
13 Huntington, 161. The origins and implications of ‘military professionalism’ have been contested. Huntington claimed that a broad isolation of the officer corps from civil society after a severe break following the Civil War served as a major driver for developing a professional stance. This is being contested by Edward M. Coffmann, “The Long Shadow of the Soldier and the State,” *Journal of Military History* 55, no.1 (January 1991), 69-82. Coffmann questioned Huntington’s theory of a severe break between the officer corps and civil society and referred to intense links between military and civilian personnel and shared middle class values. Without denying the seminal experiences of the Civil War, Coffmann viewed the end of the Indian Wars as the crucial starting point for major change within the army. Especially the following reorganization and “the simple demographic concentration of the army following the Indian Wars was more crucial in bringing about this result [of increased professional development].” Ibid., 81. The common factor for the professional development is concentration. This can be based on Huntington’s concept of psychological concentration on oneself and one’s activity as a result of an intellectual or social gap to civil society. It can be based on actual physical concentration in bigger garrisons that enable new forms of collective thinking and training. It seems futile to view those concepts as completely exclusive.
In this framework, only the urgent requirement for mass armies in WWI and WWII was appropriate to instill legitimacy into a general draft that provided the massive manpower for an expandable army. In both wars, the factors of equality and morality within a comprehensive governmental approach, as formulated in WWII’s ‘Victory Plan’ by Albert Wedemayer, became dominant for legitimizing the required service of each citizen. After WWII society, politics and the military struggled about the way to organize its armed forces until the political environment was recalibrated by the ‘shock’ of the invasion of South Korea by the North with the result that Congress fully extended military conscription.

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15 The mass armies of WWI and WWII consisted mainly of draftees creating the notion of equality of sacrifice that served ideal goals. See Huntington, 150-152. According to Huntington, “American idealism has tended to make every war a crusade, fought, not for specific objectives of national security, but on behalf of universal principles such as democracy, freedom of the seas, and self-determination.” Ibid., 152. According to journalist Tom Brokaw the benefits of serving for a higher purpose has created the ‘Greatest Generation.’ In his influential narrative Brokaw described their members as “mature beyond their years, tempered by what they had been through, disciplined by their military training and sacrifices…. They stayed true to their values of personnel responsibility, duty, honor, and faith.” Tom Brokaw, The Greatest Generation (New York: Random House, 1998), xx. For the framework concept regarding the WWII effort as formulated by then Major Albert Wedemayer in the ‘Victory Plan’ see Charles E. Kirkpatrick, An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan in 1941 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 1992). This comprehensive approach conceptualized who had to serve and who did not depending on whether the individual’s skills might be of better service for the nation elsewhere, e.g. as government officials, or in occupations relevant to the public health, interest and safety. Still, Rostker viewed the issue of equal sacrifice as rather superficial as the ‘Selective Service Act of 1917’ and the ‘Selective Training and Service Act of 1940’ (STSA) required all men of a specific group to register but only a much smaller portion actually had to serve in the military with the higher risk involved. See Rostker, I Want You!, 24-26.

16 According to military sociologist Beth Bailey, public opinion regarding the draft declined immediately after the defeat of Germany and so too did the willingness to volunteer for military service. The Truman administration and Congress debated between extending and ending the Selective Service Act, while the military favored a professional standing force due to its ability to mobilize rapidly in the face of the perceived Soviet threat. However, a volunteer force proved to be unfeasible. For the different positions and struggles between the public, politics and the military see Beth Bailey, America’s Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force (Cambridge, London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 10-11. See also Rostker, I Want You, 27.
WWII and the peculiar new situation of the Cold War with its permanent security threat led military sociologists, most prominently Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, to develop distinct concepts with regard to the nature of military service and civil-military relationship. Huntington found, that because of the acknowledged state of a Cold War including a now ‘permanent’ security threat “[m]ilitary men and institutions acquired authority and influence far surpassing that ever previously possessed by military professionals on the American scene.”17 As Huntington focused on the value of a distinct ‘military professionalism’, he urged American society to adopt conservative realism, which he recognized in the military establishment and that more appropriately acknowledges the threats to security.18

Janowitz, on the other hand, supposed that the continuous threat had changed the military and led to a “constabulary force concept [that] eliminates the distinction between the peace-time and wartime military establishment … [and] draws on the police concept.”19 This approach led Janowitz to focus on the ideal of the citizen soldier and to argue that the “professional soldier

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17 Huntington: 345.

18 According to Huntington, the “distinguishing characteristics of a profession as a special type of vocation are its expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.” Ibid., 8. Huntington assigned only military officers to meet the criteria of professionalism because of their distinct skill of the management of violence. In contrast, according to Huntington, the vocation of enlisted personnel is a trade not a profession as they “have neither the intellectual skill nor the professional responsibility of the officer. They are specialists in the application of violence not the management of violence.” Ibid., 17-18. Huntington defines the military ethic of conservative realism as “pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist, and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession. It is, in brief, realistic and conservative.” Ibid., 79. For Huntington, this ethic “holds that war is the instrument of politics, that the military are the servants of the statesmen, and that civilian control is essential to military professionalism.” Ibid., 79.

must develop more and more skills and orientations common to civilian administrators.”\textsuperscript{20} This approach included the importance of service for the relationship between the nation and its citizens, as well as for providing a sense of purpose for the individual. Consequentially, from this perspective military service had the added value of providing the ‘social good’.\textsuperscript{21}

Both concepts began to influence the development of the armed forces. The military focused on Huntington’s concept of ‘military professionalism’ as distinct expertise that serves the civilian leadership following the principle of ‘objective control.’ Politicians, on the other hand, adopted significant elements of Janowitz’s theory including a preference for intruding the distinct sphere of military professionalism with what Huntington described as ‘subjective control.’ They also utilized the military for socioeconomic development and experimentation as the 1964 Special Training Enlistment Program (STEP) and the 1966 ‘Project 100,000.’\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 424. However, Janowitz also conceded that “the effectiveness of the military establishment depends on maintaining a proper balance between military technologists, heroic leaders, and military managers.” Ibid., 424.

\textsuperscript{21} This development of the formerly unchartered field of military sociology after WWII did not happen by accident. The seemingly ‘militaristic’ societies of America’s enemies in WWII, Germany and Japan, the impact of nuclear weapons on war in general and the concrete issue of the dismissal of General MacArthur in the Korean War contributed to this trend. For an overview of the arguments for a citizen-soldier concept see also Rostker, \textit{I Want You!}, 32-33.

\textsuperscript{22} Huntington viewed ‘objective civilian control’ as the form that maximizes military professionalism but also produces the lowest level of military political power. In contrast, Huntington described ‘subjective civilian control’ as civilianizing the military. Comparing the two forms, Huntington argues in favor of objective civilian control as it “maximizes the likelihood of achieving military security.” Huntington, 85. To this day the American military is dominantly influenced by Huntington’s concept. In a speech about the All-Volunteer Force in November 2014 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey focused on the professionalism of the armed forces and repeatedly referred to Huntington. See Department of Defense, \textit{Gen. Dempsey’s Remarks at the Center for a New American Security} (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 21, 2014), accessed January 12, 2015, http://www.jcs.mil/Media/Speeches/tabid/3890/Article/12072/gen-dempseys-remarks-at-the-center-for-a-new-american-security.aspx. On the other hand, politicians such as John F. Kennedy and Robert McNamara identified the chance to utilize the military for ‘socializing’ those who had difficulties to function in society. This led to socioeconomic experiments as the 1964 Special Training Enlistment Program (STEP) and the 1966 ‘Project 100,000.’ For details see Bailey, 94-95.
Discussions about military service and especially the draft intensified during the army’s engagement in Vietnam, which led government to examine the issue in 1966. Different entities, such as the Pentagon’s ‘Study Group’, the President’s ‘Marshall Commission’ and Congress’ ‘Clark Panel’, resulted in different findings and to the lowest common political denominator of continuing the then-current system of selected service. This system, however, remained controversial because the two key factors of equality and morality were contested in the case of providing manpower for the war in Vietnam. According to Rostker, the inability to reform the selective service system constituted a major case for the move to an all-volunteer force in the long run.23

The development that led to an All-Volunteer Force was supported by the combination of two trends that seem to have little in common except their shared antipathy regarding conscription. On the one hand, increasingly influential economic liberals, such as Milton Friedman, strongly argued in favor of ending the draft. This approach found political resonance in conservative politicians, such as the young Congressman Donald Rumsfeld, who wanted to reduce the overall influence of the state and government in particular.24 On the other hand, the draft had been rejected by a societal and political movement against a government that was perceived unjust in its policy in general. The highly debated Vietnam War provided the perfect focus point

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23 The Pentagon’s ‘Study Group’ concluded the feasibility of an all-volunteer force. The President’s ‘Marshall Commission’ recommended a continuation of the draft but a significant reform of the Selective Service System in order to increase equity. Congress’ ‘Clark Panel’ also rejected an all-volunteer force but also any change regarding a reduction of inequity. See Rostker, I Want You!, 30-32. Rostker also argued, that the Pentagon’s ‘Study Group’ provided a testing ground for later scientific work on the creation of the All-Volunteer Force.

24 In his foreword to a conference to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the All-Volunteer Force Donald Rumsfeld recalled, that “[i]n the mid-1960s, I attended a conference at the University of Chicago on the all-volunteer force. My friend Milton Friedman was there. He was such an enthusiast for the all-volunteer force that it was contagious. Everyone there seized the issue, myself included.” Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Forword,” in The All-Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of Service, ed. Barbara A. Bicksler, Curtis L. Gilroy, John T. Warner (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2004), VII.
that became tangible through increased draft calls and the perceived unfairness of involuntary service.²⁵

Considering the political spectrum or respective factions, the draft and its proponents were cornered by economic liberals as well as political conservatives. This informal but broad coalition left the government of President Lyndon B. Johnson no political room in which to maneuver. In addition, President Johnson had effectively limited his maneuver space by excluding the reserves from being employed in Vietnam out of fear it would cause additional unrest because of the effects on society.²⁶ Ultimately, the conservative challenger for the presidency in 1968, Richard Nixon, included the issue of abandoning the draft and moving to an All-Volunteer Force as part of his campaign platform. As a Republican, he based his arguments specifically on the rather leftish position of the arbitrary character and inequity of the Select Service System.²⁷


²⁶ Even former President Eisenhower had advised Johnson in 1965 against sending increased numbers of conscripts into the war instead of activating reserves. However, Johnson obviously estimated the political costs of sending young conscripts as lower than sending middle-aged reservists that would leave holes in America’s everyday life structures and cause additional unrest. See Bailey, 15.

²⁷ According to Bailey’s analysis, Nixon was “as usual, more the pragmatist than the ideologue. He wanted to gain whatever political advantage possible, to defuse the issue of the draft.” Ibid., 23.
Societal, Political, and Military Considerations

That presidential candidate Nixon decided to run on the promise of abandoning the draft and then won the election seemed like a mirror that the draft had lost its legitimacy due to a highly unfair Selective Service System and its obvious purpose of providing manpower for a highly unpopular war. However, in contrast to this notion former Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Stephen E. Herbits recalled, that “the public, the Congress and the military opposed the concept of a volunteer force when it was introduced.”

Therefore, it remains questionable, if indeed a significant majority of the US population was in favor of abandoning the draft. However, no popular movement in favor of ‘a’ draft, even if reformed, was visible.

In the political realm, newly-elected President Nixon perceived the need for major change management and in March 1969 established a commission to “develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving toward an all-volunteer armed force.” To stress the importance of a responsible approach and counter critics, President Nixon enhanced this clear task with also calling the Commission to “determine what standby machinery for the draft will be required in the event of a national emergency.”

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28 Stephen E. Herbits, “Reflections from the Gates-Commission,” in The All-Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of Service, ed. Barbara A. Bicksler, Curtis L. Gilroy and John T. Warner. (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2004), 13. For this reason he stressed the importance of leading and managing change. The perception of the Gates-Commission as an honest effort to responsibly deal with options for an All-Volunteer Force seems an important factor in the overall approach. This needs to be taken into account when analysts, as does Bailey, criticized that “[d]uring the twelve months in which the Gates Commission met (...) 6,106 servicemen died in combat in Vietnam.” Bailey: 33. Additionally, it seems unclear whether any other approach regarding the change to an AVF could have prevented casualties in Vietnam.


30 Ibid.
management that addressed concerns with eliminating conscription was the fact, that according to
the designated chairman of the commission, former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, Jr., each
member of the commission was guaranteed the option of dissent with a move to an All-Volunteer
Force. It is important, however, to consider the set-up of the commission as a whole. Military so-
ciologist Beth Bailey argued, that “[w]hile the commissioners represented an even division of
opinion, the commission staff most certainly did not. Four of the five senior staff members were
anticonscription free-market economists …” 31 This construct reflected a shift to what Rostker de-
scribed as a ‘new Paradigm for the Study of Military Manpower’. The key element of this change
of paradigm was a scientific approach to apply economics to all sorts of human and societal top-
ics with a specific focus on labor economics. 32

Under those circumstances it is not unexpected but still remarkable that the new para-
digm and its proponents had led to a unanimous proposal of the Commission in favor of a swift
move to an All-Volunteer Force after one year of work in February 1970. This had been achieved
by linking two factors as major assumptions: “individual liberty is the most essential American
value, and the free market is the best means to preserve it.” 33 Despite this theoretical duality, the
commission practically focused heavily on pure labor-market mechanisms, mainly pay increases,
to make an All-Volunteer Force feasible and rejected additional benefits. 34 The Commission only

31 Bailey, 29.
32 See Rostker, I Want You!, 46-47. This development actually started in 1963 with
President Johnson launching the study of options for reforming the Selective Service System and
possibilities for an all-volunteer force. Rostker argued that until then psychologists,
psychometricians, and sociologists had analyzed and influenced military personnel issues. During
and after the Second World War military issues were increasingly examined using quantitative
analysis as being exemplified by the creation of RAND and the preferences of Secretary of
Defense McNamara. For an overview see ibid., 43-58.
33 Bailey, 33.
34 For the respective discussion within the commission and its staff see ibid., 30-31.
restricted their labor-economic approach by accepting the requirement of a ‘standby draft’ in the specific case of a “possible urgent need for the nation to act quickly.”

Concerning future military employments, the Commission assumed that after ending the US engagement in Vietnam, the United States would not soon commit itself to a comparable endeavor. Therefore, it focused its analysis on a reduced size of the military of 2.5 million troops. The Commission estimated that in a reduced military only a rather small amount of personnel needed to be additionally recruited as the main body of service members would still be true volunteers. The respective key assumption of the Commission was, that the All-Volunteer Force would still largely consist of professionals who would serve based on a calling. Labor-market incentives, meaning money, only had to attract sufficient volunteers to fill the gap. The commission articulated no concerns that this group or even society as a whole might adopt an occupational perspective towards military service. When the Commission presented its report, President Nixon “did not commit himself to any specific recommendation … [but] did express his enthusiasm for an all-volunteer force …. He wants thoughtful people to ‘read the report and become convinced.’”

Due to its prominence and clearly-stated rationale, the Gates Commission played a significant role in articulating a justification for replacing peacetime conscription. This made it an important part of the change management of President Nixon. The required legislation was provided by Congress which, despite concerns about rising costs of military manpower as reflected in the establishment of a ‘Defense Manpower Commission’ in 1973, ultimately did not develop

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35 Thomas Gates, ed., 120.
36 See ibid., 125-127.
37 Martin Anderson, Memorandum for the President’s File (Washington, DC: The White House February 21, 1973) cited after Rostker, I Want You, 88. However, the commission acknowledged possible criticisms regarding the acceptability of an AVF as was reflected in the fact that significant parts of the Commission’s report deals with countering respective arguments. See Thomas Gates, ed., 11-21 and 129-157.
an alternative approach regarding military manpower. In fact, Congress supported the creation of the AVF by lowering the size of the army to 785,000 due to budget reductions, therefore reducing the pressure on recruiting volunteers.\textsuperscript{38}

The army approached the issue of an All-Volunteer Force in ambiguous ways. The step towards an AVF arguably meant the biggest challenge for the army as it relied most heavily on the draft and was the least popular service. Overall, the army as an institution had accepted the requirement to reform itself after the Vietnam War, which resulted in the widespread narrative of an “Army, which emerged from the conflict in shambles” as Steven L. Rearden put it.\textsuperscript{39} Don Snider, Professor at the US Army War College, goes as far as claiming, that “in the early 1970s, after Vietnam, the Army was not a profession.”\textsuperscript{40} However, while there are significant examples that supported this thesis, in essence it goes too far and rather served the continuing narrative of an ‘Army rising from the Ashes’. In fact, this thesis neglected significant strands of positive continuity over the long term and especially a continuous capability for adaption as well as reform.

As it increased its engagement in Vietnam in the mid-1960s, the United States had no doubts concerning a high quality of its army.\textsuperscript{41} And despite the obvious shortcomings and ultimate failure in

\textsuperscript{38} The ‘Defense Manpower Commission’ was tasked to ‘focus on the substantial increase in the costs of military manpower.’ See Rostker, I Want You!, 294. Congress rather focused on the organizational approach the army took towards an AVF, arguing about modern or conservative ways to design the ‘new Army’ and how to advertise it. See Bailey, 83-87. See also Rostker, I Want You!, 294-296. For a comprehensive overview of the army’s drawdown after the Vietnam War see Andrew Feickert, Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 28, 2014), 27-28.


\textsuperscript{40} Don Snider, “Renewing the Motivational Power of the Army’s Professional Ethic,” US Army War College Quarterly Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn 2014): 8. Snider based his thesis on the claim, that the Army “had expended its corps of non-commissioned officers who were later so instrumental in professionalizing the junior ranks of the new all-volunteer force.” Ibid, 8.

\textsuperscript{41} In October 1966 General William C. Westmoreland confirmed to President Johnson during a troop visit in Vietnam that “no Commander in Chief in our history has ever had finer troops than these.” William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1976), 192.
the conflict, the Vietnam War had forced the US army to improve its concepts of employing forces under challenging circumstances. According to historian Robert M. Citino, “there had never been an army in the history of the world that could move faster or generate more firepower than the US force in Vietnam.”

Nevertheless, because of the ultimate failure in Vietnam and negative public opinion, it was obvious that the army had no alternative to re-establish itself as a professional and trustworthy organization. Acknowledging significant tensions during the change management military historian Robert K. Griffith, Jr. concluded, “while viewing the end of the draft with misgivings, those charged with developing and implementing the Army’s program to achieve all-volunteer status approached the task with a determination to succeed.” This is a more positive verdict than Bailey’s analysis, that the “all-volunteer army was born of chaos and division.” Griffith identified three phases of the army’s change management. A study phase between 1968 and early 1970, an experimentation phase between 1970 and 1972, and, finally, an implementation phase between 1972 and 1974. The key finding of the army’s initiatives regarding its reorganization was, “that the problem with the army was its own fault, the combination of a flawed ‘system’

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43 Griffith, vii. For the internal struggles of the army during the implementation of early change in 1970 see Bailey: 43. A key issue was whether the army should attempt a ‘zero-draft’ concept which included the major elements of a volunteer force but would keep the draft as a fallback position.

44 Bailey, 32.

45 Griffith, vii - viii. These phases are marked by different initiatives, such as the 1968 Career Force Study (“Butler Study”) and the following 1969 PROVIDE (“Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation”) study, which had a significant impact on the Department of Defense’s study (“Project Volunteer”). Chief of Staff of the Army General Westmoreland enforced the experimentation phase and established a Special Assistant for the Modern Voluntary Army (SAMVA) leading to the Modern Volunteer Army Program (MVAP) as a trial-and-error effort which included the VOLAR (Volunteer Army) – Experimentation. For an overview of the Army’s studies and programs see Griffith’s comprehensive study.
Design and Organization

Overall, the army had accepted the new requirement to attract quality personnel but attempted to develop a concept that went beyond the pure rationalism applied by labor-market economists. In addition, the army also sought to focus on the emotional and irrational elements that it perceived important for the decision to join the military. This concept had a fundamental and a current dimension. Fundamentally, leadership of the army focused on the distinct professional character of the institution according to Huntington’s theories and disregarded a design of the Army that made military service seemingly a job like any other. In addition to this fundamental conviction, the then-current research of Lieutenant-General George Forsythe, as the Army Chief’s Special Assistant for the Modern Voluntary Army (SAMVA), concluded that the youth of the time presented the solution to the problems the Army faced if their concerns and high ideals were only taken seriously and addressed correctly.47

This served as the starting point for the army’s redesign, which is being reflected in the controversial slogan “Today’s Army Wants to Join You!” in 1972, even before abandoning the draft. This slogan implied a break with the army of the past; and the fact, that the army leadership accepted it despite reservations, was, according to Bailey, a “key moment in the shift to the logic of the market.”48 In addition, the army also adapted some of its inner workings in an attempt to

46 Bailey, 44.
47 See Bailey, 44.
48 Ibid., 74.
reflect societal change and appeal to young people it would have to recruit in an AVF. This approach caused friction as critics in Congress and the army itself argued about a lowering of ‘professional’ quality-standards in a desperate attempt to meet recruitment goals at all costs. When those concerns led to the re-adjustment of standards in an attempt to ensure quality recruiting, it became inevitable that proponents of the AVF perceived this approach as another tactic to make the All-Volunteer Force a failure. This reflected what the US Army Chief of Military History Brigadier General John W. Mountcastle described as “those turbulent years of transition.”

Structurally, the army had to organize the most significant changes of all services during the transition to the AVF. According to General David Petraeus, “[i]t was cut in size from about 1.6 million to 800,000, had to deactivate four divisions and a vast array of non-divisional units and was forced to reconfigure most of what remained for a European battlefield.” General Petraeus described these steps as being forced upon the army, but this imposed reconfiguration also set the scene for reconstruction. The reduction as imposed by Congress allowed the Army to meet its recruitment goals at least partially in a way that would not be perceived an immediate and complete failure. The refocus on the European battlefield meant a chance to reassure the institution in the ‘safe field’ of conventional warfighting.

Regarding its structure, the army implemented additional changes after the experiences of Vietnam, which, according to James Jay Carafano of the Heritage Foundation, were rooted in the ‘Total-Force’ Concept initiated by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. To achieve an expandable organization, this concept closely linked the active and reserve components “as a means to provide sufficient troops for the nation’s security needs without the costly burden of maintaining

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49 Griffith, v.

a large standing army.”51 From the perspective of Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Creighton Abrams this ‘Total-Force’ concept offered the opportunity to increase the strength of the army from thirteen to sixteen divisions, which was only affordable by heavy reliance on the reserve component. Additionally, the linkage of active and reserve components addressed a concern the army had developed during the Vietnam War, when President Johnson had decided not to call up these reserves for political reasons. From the army’s perception, this contributed to the erosion of public support throughout the war.52 To ensure that in future employments the reserves would be indispensable, the composition of active and reserve units was significantly altered to make them more interdependent. According to political analyst Andrew Feickert, “General Abrams believed increased reliance on the reserves would be beneficial in obtaining American public support in the event of a major conflict.”53 Carafano remarked, that proponents of this ‘Abrams Doctrine’ claim “that dependence on [Reserve Components] RC serves as an extra-Constitutional tripwire on the presidential use of power.”54 While Carafano saw “scant evidence” of actual constraints on presidential decision-making, analysts Peter D. Feaver, David P. Filer and Paul Gronke, considered the concept of forcing the executive to include the activation of the reserve components into its calculus “an innovative compromise to address an age-old civil-military tension.”55 In any way, the approach to limit options for civilian interference into perceived dis-


52 See Petraeus, 124.

53 Feickert, 28.

54 Carafano, 2.

tinct military matters followed the pattern of promoting ‘objective control’, which has been continually preferred by the military. The concept of enhancing the sphere of distinct military professionalism had also included a “full-fledged intellectual renaissance” of the army, which early on became evident in the creation of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in July 1973 that developed new approaches to doctrine, education and training.\textsuperscript{56}


\textsuperscript{56} See Citino, 260.
The Development of the All-Volunteer Army from 1973 to 2001

Social, Political and Military Considerations

At no time during the 1970s, 1980s or 1990s was there any serious public effort that called for a reintroduction of any form of draft. This reflected an American society that was comfortable with its military as an All-Volunteer Force and trusted its utility for providing security. However, events in Lebanon 1983 and Somalia 1993 with their hasty withdrawal of troops also showed, that the public would not accept an employment of US forces when both its utility was in question and significant losses occurred.

Some concerns about the state of the All-Volunteer Force and a discussion about a return to the draft became apparent by the end of the 1970s. Then, “as the US armed forces were learning how to manage the volunteer force, they also learned that it was within their capacity to destroy it through mismanagement.”57 This perception coincided with the inability of the United States to influence events in Iran and to contain the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. At this point in 1980, even former President Nixon had ‘reluctantly’ changed his opinion from viewing the AVF as a major accomplishment to perceiving it a failure which had to be replaced by the draft again. In early 1980 the Carter administration asked Congress for reinstating the registration for a draft, which President Ford had abandoned in 1975. However, this is not to assume that the administration intended to abandon the AFV, but rather as installing a mechanism for its inevitable enhancement. According to Bailey, “[v]irtually no, one, even among the strongest supporters of a volunteer force, imagined that the nation would go to war without reactivating conscription. No one expected to fight a war with a volunteer force.”58 Although Congress approved legislation after a


58 Bailey, 128.
lengthy debate, no public or political momentum or concept for reinstating a draft had been developed. Whether there was any true agenda beyond an immediate signal towards the USSR remains doubtful. In fact, in his remarks at the signing of the Registration Act, even President Carter had to declare: “I would like to emphasize that the Registration Act is not a draft; I am not in favor of a peacetime draft.” This reflected a society which, even in what seemed a crumbling world situation with the US army undermanned, had no inclination for involuntary military service. Gallup-analyst Frank Newport found, that, instead of the issue of a draft, the public was rather concerned with the amount of money being spent for the military as between 1978 and 1982 a majority of the population considered defense spending as too low.

Despite the allegations, the public had never completely lost its confidence in the military services in the 1970s. According to *Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 2010* in its annual Confidence in Institutions list, the military “has ranked No. 1 or No. 2 almost every year since its initial measure 1975.” But within the period between 1973 and 2001, the public showed a significantly low inclination for voluntary service first in the late 1970s and then, again, in the late 1990s. Both periods were marked by comparable socioeconomic circumstances such as rather good civilian job opportunities and payrolls in comparison to lower government wages. In both periods, the

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60 Frank Newport, “Americans remain divided on Military Spending. Views are not as extreme in either direction as in other years, *Gallup* (February 27, 2014), accessed January 22, 2015, http://www.gallup.com/poll/167648/americans-remain-divided-military-spending.aspx. Obviously, the public perceived the amount of money spent on defense as crucial, not the status of the military as an All-Volunteer Force.

role of the military in US foreign policy had to be reshaped, the military had to redesign itself and struggled with its messaging.\textsuperscript{62}

The academic discussion regarding the civil-military relationship that had already influenced the creation of the All-Volunteer Force continued. Military sociologist Charles C. Moskos Jr. especially expressed critical remarks about the development of the US Armed Forces as an All-Volunteer Force. Continuing the critique of Janowitz, Moskos claimed in 1977 that the mechanisms of the All-Volunteer Force led the military to resemble more the model of an occupation than that of the more traditional calling or profession. According to Moskos an “occupation is legitimated in terms of the marketplace, ie. prevailing monetary rewards for equivalent competencies. … Traditionally, the military has sought to avoid the organizational outcomes of the occupational model.”\textsuperscript{63} Throughout the 1980s and 1990s this argument became a key issue for both critics and advocates of the AVF, leading to critical questions regarding the concept of soldiering and the army branding itself.

Politics in the form of the various administrations as well as Congress has supported the peacetime All-Volunteer Force since 1973. Both would focus on the military beyond its immediate purpose as a test bed for workforce experimentation, which reflects an approach to shape the military according to ‘subjective control.’ This applies specifically to the approach towards

\textsuperscript{62} For the recruiting environment of the late 1970s see Caspar W. Weinberger, ed., Military Manpower Task Force. A Report to the President on the Status and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Force (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, November 1982), I-3. For the late 1990s see Bailey, 234. Both periods in the late 1970s and late 1990s also have in common, that public opinion began to consider defense spending as too low. For specifics see Newport.

different ethnicities, women and gays as being reflected in initiatives by Secretary of the Army Clifford Alexander, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and the Administration of President William J. Clinton. These cases reflect a political agenda shared by Republican as well as Democratic administrations for increasing opportunities for minorities and women in the overall workforce. In November 1983, at a conference to commemorate ten years of experience with the All-Volunteer Force, Secretary Weinberger stated with regard to minorities that the armed forces offered “better opportunities, it appears, than many of these young men and women have found in the rest of our society.” However, in the case of the 1970s discussion, a huge practical element is to be considered as well. Given the challenging environment for recruiting as mentioned above, it became clear that the recruitment goals of the AVF, although already lowered, could only be met when the significant pool, especially of potential black and female volunteers, could be fully exploited.

The army had fully accepted its status as an All-Volunteer Force as late as the early 1980s. After the change to the Reagan-administration in 1981, according to Rostker, the army assumed an increase in military manpower and, as a consequence, an inevitable return to the draft. It was the November 1983 Report of the Military Manpower Task Force that sent a clear signal

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65 For a comprehensive description of the army’s focus on women and especially the respective political factors see Bailey, 156-158.

66 See Rostker, I Want You!, 504. The change from the Carter to the Reagan administration also caused the army leadership to assume an end of the ‘social experimentation’ regarding women in the military. According to Bailey, the “army instituted a ‘womanpause’ and stopped recruiting women.” Bailey, 171.
that the “draft is not needed in the foreseeable future” and that a re-installment of any kind of involuntary service was not considered to be an option.67 The report, however, advised for maintaining the selective service registration as reinstalled in 1980, a move that candidate Reagan had initially opposed in the election campaign.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, a mixture of events and measures helped to establish a positive and stable relationship between society, politics and the military. By the early 1980s, the traumatic experiences of the Vietnam War inevitably became a thing of the past, which reduced the strong reservations against the army of the early 1970s. This trend was backed by an increased conservative mood which had some origins in the foreign policy experiences in the Middle East, leading to questions concerning the ability to project U.S power and a call for sharpening the respective tools, especially the military. In addition, the continued analysis of the Vietnam War led to reassessments concerning the army and especially the individual soldier. During the heated debates of the late 1960s and early 1970s the Army was portrayed as a failing institution and individual soldiers verbally assaulted as ‘baby killers’; the reassessment during the later 1970s and 1980s rather analyzed the army as a misused instrument and the individual soldier as the scapegoat a divided society sacrificed for a failed national policy. Many activities that are benevolent to the military beginning in the 1980s and lasting to today, such as military appreciation events, can be traced to this narrative. It is to be acknowledged as an attempt to make up for mis-treating the soldiers who fought in Vietnam, that Americans continue to demonstrate support for

67 Weinberger, ed., *Military Manpower Task Force*, A-1. The report marked a clear signal against the negativism with regard to the AVF in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when “[m]any in the army were not convinced that the all-volunteer force was working, some larger sub-group was not convinced that it would ever work (...) It was in the spring of 1980 that Edward C. ‘Shy’ Meyer, the chief of staff of the army, said publicly that the United States had a ‘hollow army.’” Bailey, 172-173. “Looking to Reagan’s defense oriented administration, the Department of the Army proposed (...) to return to the draft.” Bailey, 216. The Military Manpower Task Force had analyzed six options for a peacetime(!) draft ranging from a “Minimal Active Force Draft” to “Universal Military Training” and beyond this even options for National Service. It came to the conclusion that none of these options was preferable to the All-Volunteer Force. This was an obvious approach to counter any attempt of creating an ongoing draft discussion.
the soldiers of today although support for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has waned. This narrative of a military and of the individual soldier deserving trust and support from society and politics has significantly been supported by a highly effective communications strategy of the Army beginning in the 1980s.  

Design and Organization

The concept of redesigning and reorganizing the Army started early in 1973 with new intellectual and doctrinal approaches, as exemplified by the establishment of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). This inward development, however, was not matched with an outward approach that proved that the Army had fully acknowledged its status as an All-Volunteer Force. The latter was only achieved in the early 1980s when it became clear that a return to a draft was no longer an option and the Army had made major steps in redesigning itself.

Regarding the redesign to an audience outside the army, a decisive step was the acknowledgement that the All-Volunteer Force was in fact an ‘All-Recruited Force’. After the rather clumsy approaches to recruitment in the 1970s, exemplified in the unpopular slogan ‘Today’s Army Wants to Join You,’ Major General Maxwell Thurman as Commander of the US Army Recruiting Command professionalized the recruitment effort and created a new army brand. “In turning Army recruiting around, most believe he has saved the All-Volunteer Force.” The corresponding slogan ‘Be All You Can Be’ introduced in 1980 and used until 2001 became “one of the

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68 It is no coincidence that by the end of the 1970s the attitude to the individual soldier had changed positively and recruiting numbers for the AVF went up. Individual biographies supported understanding and positively acknowledging the role of the Vietnam veterans. This has also been reflected in popular culture such as cinema. For a highly recognized example see Al Santoli, Everything We Had: An Oral History of the Vietnam War by Thirty-Three American Soldiers Who Fought It (New York: Ballantine Books, Fourteenth Printing 1984).

The army rebranded itself as a professional institution providing opportunity for personal development shifting “the meaning of military service from obligation to opportunity (…) [and] creating the mental association between army and college.”

As proof of its success, it is remarkable that the slogan “Be All You Can Be” lasted for two decades and was abandoned only some months before the events of 9/11. Despite its obvious merits, the focus on opportunity for individual development instead on the traditional values of duty and sacrifice led to critical questions from within and outside the army about selling military service as an occupation rather than a true profession. The implied danger was that the respective advertising would ultimately shape perceptions and identities. In 1985, the New York Times remarked that “today's military recruiting ads play down the notions of service and patriotism. The Army's commercials, for example, seem designed to produce a corps of Yuppies in uniform.”

Despite the criticism of this marketing approach of ‘the ends justify the means’, it was only consequential and professional from a recruiting perspective. It followed the research-based approach emphasized by General Maxwell R. Thurman and used attractive messages to address especially...
those who would not receive their ‘calling’ to serve from elsewhere, therefore successfully lowering the threshold to enter the military.73

The approach to appeal to the ‘Zeitgeist’ of providing opportunity for success in the 1980s was continued and refined in the 1990s. Then, according to Bailey, the Army “sold itself as a provider of social good” by providing more opportunity for minorities and women than other sectors of society.74 In this regard, the Clinton administration’s approach to lift the ban on gays in the military became a major controversy and would prove the limits of the army’s inclusiveness and willingness to accept this form of ‘subjective control.’ The army’s attempt to preserve its sphere of distinct professionalism led to the compromise of the ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’-policy in 1993.75

Overall, “the 1990s had been a tough decade for the army.”76 It was obvious, that the size of the army required change as the end of the Cold War and an economic crisis in the United States called for a substantial peace dividend. However, even the issue of a thirty-percent downsizing did not seem a comparable intellectual challenge to that of the 1970s. The seemingly positive side of the reduction in size was less pressure on the recruitment of volunteers as the respective goals had shrunk from 211,600 in fiscal year 1974 to less than 79,000 in fiscal year 1991.77 As one consequence of ever decreasing manpower levels the connection between the army and

73 “Research demonstrated that young people were not motivated by appeals to patriotism, service, or sacrifice, but congressional committees nonetheless believed in the power of such calls. Army advertising regularly included at least one ad to satisfy their congressional overseers.” Bailey, 142.10.

74 Ibid., 224. This role is to be analyzed as rather complex. Resembling the notion of the ‘School of the Nation’ Secretary of Defense McNamara developed ‘Project 100,000’ as a “plan to utilize the military as part of the Johnson-administration’s antipoverty drive.” Ibid., 94.

75 This policy “ended questions about sexual orientation at the time of enlistment, but required discharge of anyone who made his or her [homo]sexual preference known.” Ibid., 224. For an overview of Clinton’s approach and the following discussion see Bailey: 220-224.

76 Ibid., 231.

77 See ibid., 205.
society became less tight, so that in 1999 “fewer than 6 percent of Americans under the age of 65 had any military experience at all.” The perceived lack of a challenging recruiting environment also led to significant reductions in the recruiting effort. This, however, in combination with unclear capabilities given the ambiguous character of the dominant peacekeeping operations of the 1990s, a deteriorating quality of army life and attractive civilian jobs as well as educational opportunities led to the fact, that in 1999 “the army missed its recruiting goal. Badly. It needed only 74,500 new soldiers, and it fell 7,000 short.”

Having found, that “the army was suffering a post-Cold War ‘identity crisis’” Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera and Army Chief Eric Shinseki began an attempt of ‘transforming’ the Army not only technologically but also mentally with a renewed focus on a distinct military professionalism, again relying on Huntington. This led to the development of new ‘Army Values’ in 1997 and controversial symbolic measures, such as changing the headgear for all army soldiers into berets and a new advertising campaign “An Army of One” in 2000 and 2001. The latter was but one element of a new and more intense communications strategy developed by the newly-created Pentagon based ‘Army Brand Group’ that marked “a shift from advertising to marketing,

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78 Ibid., 234.

79 Ibid., 233. For a description of challenges regarding the quality of army life see Rostker. I Want You!, 667-683. Rostker focuses on compensation, food stamps, housing among other issues. Regarding its recruitment strategy, according to Rostker, the army was still able to keep a balanced personnel structure by synchronizing recruiting with encouraging older career personnel to voluntarily leave the service in contrast to the air force, which sharply cut accessions. See Bernhard Rostker, Right-Sizing the Force: Lessons for the Current Drawdown of American Military Personnel Working Paper (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2013): 12-15. Rostker refers to a balanced ratio between an appropriately high number of accessions and ever decreasing numbers of mid- and senior-career personnel. Rostker uses the Air Force as an example, how insufficient numbers of accessions, meaning new recruits, and increased retention of mid- and senior-career personnel created a personnel structure out of balance.

80 Bailey, 233. Bailey pointed to the fact that at this time, both Secretary of The Army Louis Caldera, son of Mexican immigrants, and Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric Shinseki, of Asian-American descent, served as role models for proving that the Army provided opportunity regardless of origin.
from slogan to brand, from old media to new.” A significant part of the new approach laid the groundwork for what would become the development of the ‘Warrior Ethos’ in 2003.

Already in the final phase of the Vietnam War but especially afterwards, the army leadership attempted to re-establish the army as a professional institution with distinct expertise. Besides the highly important element of attracting quality personnel, a key task in this regard was the conceptualizing of Army capabilities and their employment. The creation of TRADOC was a major step in redefining the purpose of the army and how it would conduct its business. A major element in order to professionalize the Army after the traumatic Vietnam experience and during a phase of major transition to the All-Volunteer Force was reassurance in the form of a ‘back to conventional’ approach. This ultimately led to a self-imposed mission of ‘fighting and winning the nation’s wars’ through the means of doctrine in 2001. This statement is obviously less ambiguous as the army’s Title 10 mission of ‘preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States’ as issued by Congress and reflects the army’s attempt to define its mission according to its professional preferences.

This concept was aided by ongoing analysis of the Vietnam War in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which explained the Army’s failure in Vietnam with having overemphasized coun-

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81 Ibid., 241.

terinsurgency and neglected the conventional North Vietnamese forces. One of the most prominent arguments in this direction was made by Colonel Harry G. Summers in *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* in 1982, in which he argued for putting “counterinsurgency in proper perspective as a valuable adjunct to our military operations against North Vietnam.” This analysis suited the US Army’s preference of conventional warfare and therefore has gained much traction. In his analysis “The Army and Vietnam” Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. analyzed the implications of this narrative for the civil-military relationship and concluded, that “[Summers] contends that the proper strategy for the war was denied the Army by the civilian leadership.” This reflected the army’s reluctance to accept ‘subjective control’ by the civilian leadership but calling for ‘objective control,’ which does not penetrate the distinct realm of military professionalism.

During a “time of soul searching” in the 1970s, the army came to two conclusions: First, it turned to the well-known potential battlefield of Europe where it assumed to fight a highly demanding but nevertheless conventional war. And second, the Army in cooperation with the other services created a realm in which the military would find freedom to maneuver relatively unhindered by the civilian influence of subjective control which contemporary analysis had blamed for the developments in Vietnam. Both elements led to a doctrinal concept nested on an operational level below the perceived civilian-dominated level of strategy but still sufficiently

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85 Citino, 255. Citino concludes that “[o]ut of this period of introspection would come intellectual rebirth, doctrinal reform and the creation of a high-quality combined arms force that would be the best in the world: the heir to the French and German armies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.” Ibid., 255.
above the ‘grass-root’ level of tactics. The attempt to link doctrine and organization resulted in the development of ‘AirLand Battle’ doctrine and of the ‘Division 86’-concept, both of which were heavily influenced by TRADOC commander General Donn A. Starry. This approach was the result of an internal discussion within the Army about its operational focus. Against advocates of building on the ‘Infantry-Airmobility’ experiences of Vietnam reinforced by the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, CSA General Creighton Abrams decided to refocus the Army on mechanized warfare.

The army’s ‘intellectual renaissance’ and desire for ‘objective control’ led to a renewed interest in the principles of Carl von Clausewitz and his focus on an ends-ways-means relationship and the trinity of political leadership, the military and society regarding the use of military force. This resulted in rather strict criteria regarding the decision to use force as prominently formulated by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger in November 1984, which became known first as the ‘Weinberger Doctrine’ and was refined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell in 1990. This approach would dominate discussion about the way the United States would employ its military in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.

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86 For an analysis of the dynamics that led to the development of the operational level of war see Hew Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 47, 3 (2005), 33-54.


88 The Powell-Doctrine, as “[e]laborated by Colin Powell back in 1990, during his tenure as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, … consisted of a series of questions identifying the conditions that should be met before committing US military forces to battle. The questions were: 1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?; 2. Do we have a clear attainable objective?; 3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?; 4. Have all other nonviolent policy means been fully exhausted?; 5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?; 6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?; 7. Is the action supported by the American people?; 8. Do we have genuine broad international support?” Stephen M. Walt, “An Imaginative Way to Deal with the Syrian Crisis,” Foreign Policy (August 29, 2013), accessed February 10, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/29/an-imaginative-creative-way-to-deal-with-the-syrian-crisis/.
Utility and Employment

In the 1960s, according to military historian Russel F. Weigley, “McNamara’s Defense Department held that in view of America’s global responsibilities the United States should be prepared to fight two and a half wars simultaneously – that is, a major war in Europe, a major war in Asia, and a lesser struggle elsewhere.” 89 In the early 1970s, President Nixon announced that the level of ambition regarding the employment of military forces would be downgraded to a ‘one-and-a-half-conflict’. 90 However, the increased conventional capabilities of the USSR in Europe and commitments of the United States, especially in Korea, effectively forced the US military to keep the capabilities required to fight two wars simultaneously. After the end of the Cold War, this approach continued even after the ‘Base Force Study’ ordered by President George H.W. Bush and the ‘Bottom-Up Review’ under President Clinton in 1993. Even just prior to 9/11, the Quadrennial Defense Review under Secretary of Defense Donald F. Rumsfeld stated the requirement of the US military to win two ‘near-simultaneous’ major regional conflicts. 91

This level of ambition was never truly tested in the years between 1973 and 2001. However, it can be argued and it has become somewhat of a myth that the US Army has significantly increased its utility, especially throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The ‘intellectual renaissance’ of the 1970s led to doctrine, structures, equipment and successfully recruited personnel,


90 “A reassessment of how the Army fought began with President Richard M. Nixon’s ‘Guam Doctrine’ of 1969, in which he stated that the United States would maintain a smaller defense establishment able to fight a "1 1/2 war" contingency. This was generally interpreted to mean that the Army would prepare to engage in a general war, probably in the European theater, and in a minor conflict, presumably a Third World counterinsurgency.” Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM (Washington, DC: United States Army Center for Military History, 1994): 26.

bound together by new training concepts that in the 1980s created a convincing capability of the US army to win conventional wars. Nevertheless, this ‘new’ capability had only partially to do with the AVF as major developments regarding doctrine, equipment and training were conducted or initiated by professional officers anyway. Still, according to former commanding general of the US Army Accessions Command (USAAC) Lieutenant General Dennis Cavin, a major argument for positive developments within the army due to the AVF became the fact that volunteers would lead to a better return on investment regarding training due to the longer service terms.92

In the 1970s and 1980s, the US Army was employed rather cautiously and reluctantly. In the 1970s after Vietnam, the United States conducted only minor military engagements such as the ‘Mayaguez-Incident’ of 1975 or the ‘Korean Demilitarized Zone Incident’ of 1976 but no major employment of the army.93 The key driver in this regard was the military itself, because, according to General David Petraeus, the “widespread acceptance of the lessons of Vietnam has produced a military leadership that … conforms more closely to Samuel Huntington’s concept of military conservatism than in any other period since World War II.”94 In the 1980s, this included the Secretary of Defense as exemplified in the ‘Weinberger Doctrine’. The simultaneity of a lack of actual employment and intellectual renewal evoked the theory that Huntington applied to the state of the army after the Civil War, when he stated that “[p]aradoxically, the United States could


93 In the ‘Mayaguez-Incident’ in 1975, just weeks after the fall of Saigon, Cambodian gunboats seized the US merchant ship Mayaguez. President Ford ordered a controversial military operation of the US marine corps to free the crew, in which several service members were killed. In the Korean Demilitarized Zone Incident in 1976 several US service members were killed and wounded during the trimming of a large tree in the Joint Security Area of the Korean Demilitarized Zone. The US reaction consisted in an unchallenged operation to cut down the tree and remove illegal North-Korean road blocks that was followed by official regrets of North Korea. For an analysis of the operations see Petraeus, 147-160. For a description of the decision-making processes regarding military operations between 1973 and 1986 see ibid., 138-231. Petraeus emphasized the reluctance and conservatism of senior military leaders regarding the use of force in contrast to a more aggressive stance from the civilian side.

94 Ibid., 263.
only create a professional military force when it was lacking any immediate use for such a force."

Whether the United States lacked the use for its armed forces in the 1970s is debatable; however, it remains doubtful if events, especially in Iran and Afghanistan, could have been influenced by a security policy that had employed military means at different stages. Nevertheless, it is significant that during the 1970s the US armed forces have enhanced their utility by broadening the global Combatant Command Structure that has become a prevalent factor especially for operations in the Middle East ever since. In the early 1980s, a tentative development regarding the use of force began. The resulting military activities became part of the learning process after the Vietnam War. Major endeavors in this regard were the disastrous attempt to free the hostages in Tehran in operation ‘Eagle Claw’ 1980, the Lebanon-Presence of 1982/1983 and the invasion of Grenada in operation ‘Urgent Fury’ 1983, in which the Army, for the first time since Vietnam played a major role. Although of those the Grenada invasion has been publicly presented as a success, all these operations were significant for their shortcomings or outright mistakes, especially regarding specialized capabilities and joint cooperation. The lessons from ‘Eagle Claw’ led to improvements regarding Special Operations capabilities and operation ‘Urgent Fury’ paved the way to increased jointness, which Congress enforced ultimately through the ‘Goldwater-Nichols’ legislation.

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95 Huntington, 229.
96 This is being reflected in William E. Odoms assessment, that “[t]he origins of US Central Command (CENTCOM) and most of the programs for the developing theater of Southwest Asia and the Middle East are to be found in the years of the Carter administration, from January 1977 to January 1981.” William E. Odom, “The Cold War Origins of the US Central Command,” Journal of Cold War Studies 8, no. 2 (Spring 2006), 52.
97 According to the CJCS Guide to the Chairman’s Readiness System, “[t]he Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was the most sweeping change to the US Department of Defense since its establishment under the National Security Act of 1947 and instrumental in changing the way the services interact. Under the act, military advice is centralized with the CJCS, as opposed to the service chiefs, and the Chairman is designated as the principal military adviser to the President, National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Effectively, the services no longer had operational control of their forces -- service component
Overall, however, in the 1970s and 1980s, the US Army generally operated in peacetime conditions that allowed for reestablishing itself as the All-Volunteer Force with a focus on conventional war. This development culminated between 1989 and 1991 in the successful operations ‘Just Cause’ in Panama and ‘Desert Shield/Desert Storm’ in Kuwait/Iraq. However, it needs to be emphasized that both operations focused on kinetic and decisive activity that was rather short and caused only limited US casualties. Operation ‘Desert Shield/Desert Storm’ has especially been analyzed as the successful result of the intellectual, doctrinal, organizational and manpower rebirth of the US army after Vietnam.  

What the army, and the US military in general as a professional All-Volunteer force, had achieved intellectually was a sphere of independence that limited civilian influence on operational matters as advocated by Huntington. It seemed that ‘Desert Storm’ had also validated that the military needed freedom of maneuver regarding the way it employed its forces. In this environment, a powerful Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff such as General Colin Powell could publicly interfere in the decision-making process regarding the US participation in military operations in the Balkans. It was also the environment in which the influential book ‘Dereliction of Duty’ by now-Lieutenant General H.R. McMasters could be developed, in which the military forces would now support functional or geographical COCOMs [Combatant Commanders]. The result has been unity of command, with each individual service changing from relatively autonomous warfighting entities into organizational and training units, responsible for acquisition, modernization, force-development and readiness as a component of the integrated force. This in effect allows a COCOM with assigned specific naval, ground, and air forces to accomplish objectives, eliminating the inefficient method of each individual service planning, supporting, and fighting the same war.” Mike M. Mullen, CJCStide to Chairman’s Readiness System: CJCStide Guide 3401D (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 15, 2010), 5-6.  

According to historian Mark Atwood Lawrence, “[t]he victory restored the image of the American military and made plain that Washington was capable of using force to crushing effect. ‘By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome, once and for all!’, declared a jubilant President George H.W. Bush, after the fighting had ended.” Mark Atwood Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 181.
elite of the pre-Vietnam and the Vietnam era was accused of being too deferential to the political leadership.\textsuperscript{99} 

The 1990s, nevertheless, gave the US army reason to question itself again. Instead of being able to validate itself in comparable regional conflicts such as ‘Just Cause’ or ‘Desert Storm’, the pattern of operations changed significantly. Beginning with Operation ‘Restore Hope’ in Somalia and continuing in Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, the Army had to switch its operational focus from rather conventional warfighting to ‘Military Operations Other than War’ (MOOTW), such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{100} This change gained momentum during the Clinton-Administration after General Colin Powell had left office. According to military historian David Jablonsky, this ‘Clinton-Doctrine’ meant “a primary constabulary mission for American military power to ensure the system didn't break down, causing globalization to fail.”\textsuperscript{101} This approach, that would reflect the predictions of Janowitz and erase the clear distinction between a peacetime and wartime military, went against the considerations that had shaped the organization of the army in the early 1990s after the influential events of ‘Desert Storm’. Then it was rather conveniently assumed that the army had its doctrine, organization, equipment


\textsuperscript{100} The question, of what the army is for, led Journalist Michael Eskenazi to ask: “Without an Enemy, What makes a soldier’s heart sing?” He described the consequences of a lack of an imposing enemy and internal concerns regarding too much ‘subjective control’, specifically about the military leadership that “had weakened the nation's military by bowing to popular politically correct demands on issues such as promoting women and admitting gays.” Michael Eskenazi, “Without an Enemy, What makes a soldier’s heart sing? The cold war’s over but it is not forgotten,” Time Magazine (April 17, 2000), accessed January 22, 2015, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,43225,00.html.

and personnel exactly right to meet the predicted challenges of regular ‘Major Regional Conflicts’ possibly in Korea or other hot spots.\footnote{In the early 1990s contingency plans for conventional combat operations in case of instabilities on the Korean peninsula had been developed. See Jong-Yun Bae, “South Korean Strategic Thinking toward North Korea. The Evolution of the Engagement Policy and Its Impact upon US-ROK Relations,” \textit{Asian Survey} 50, no. 2 (March/April 2010): 337-345. In the complex scenario in Haiti 1994 the US military had developed a battle plan to restore democracy by force and positioned the respective forces. The last-minute diplomatic effort of the delegation headed by former President Jimmy Carter in combination with the credible threat of a full-fledged military invasion led to the change of mission into an immediate stabilization effort. See Stewart, ed., \textit{American Military History Volume II}, 433-436.}

The effect of the intellectual and recruitment complacency became be visible by the end of the 1990s, when events in Kosovo in 1999 led to questions regarding the army’s utility by Congress and army leadership itself.\footnote{The controversy regarding the seemingly slow pace and limited utility of the deployment of the army’s Task Force Hawk as part of operation Allied Force in Kosovo 1999 led to inquiries from the House Armed Services Committee and was included in the Congressional Report about the operation. See Paul E. Gallis, \textit{Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force} (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 19, 1999): 16-17. This event had significant impact on the fact, that, according to military historian David Jablonsky, “[n]ot since General Hans von Seeckt’s efforts with the German Reichswehr in the early 1920s has a military organization so self-consciously set about transforming itself as the US Army today [in 2001].” Jablonsky.} Those doubts regarding the army’s utility had three dimensions. First, they questioned the actual capability of the Army to project power swiftly and effectively. The build-up of forces in Kosovo had shown that the army lacked forces that could be projected immediately and create significant effects in theatre. The second dimension concerned the issue of sufficient manpower as the army failed to achieve its recruitment goals even given its reduced size. Thirdly, the new type of operations that differed from traditional military employments led to questions concerning the fighting spirit of the army and, therefore again, its ability to fulfill the self-imposed mission to ‘fight and win the nation’s wars’. This question aimed directly at the core of the ‘military profession’ and how it would be defined in the Twenty-first Century and by whom. By the end of the 1990s, Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera and Chief of the Army General Eric Shinseki attempted to address all three issues by modernizing equipment,
reenergizing recruitment and refocusing the army on values and towards what would become the ‘Warrior Ethos’. This implied a neglect of the new role, in which the army had found itself during the Clinton-Administration. In 2000 though, the army found a supporter of this neglect in the form of presidential candidate George W. Bush.\\footnote{In his speech accepting the nomination as Republican vice presidential nominee Richard Cheney declared in 2000, that “[f]or eight years, Clinton and Gore have extended our military commitments while depleting our military power. … George W. Bush and I are going to change that, too. I have seen our military at its finest, with the best equipment, the best training, and the best leadership. … And I can promise them now, help is on the way. Soon, our men and women in uniform will once again have a commander in chief they can respect, one who understands their mission and restores their morale.” CBS News.com Staff, “Text of Dick Cheney’s Speech,” \textit{CBS News} (August 02, 2000), accessed March 01, 2015, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/text-of-dick-cheneys-speech/.
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In addition to those factors, an issue that seemed to be on the sidelines of the All-Volunteer Force but was in fact closely connected to it and its utility received increased attention in the 1990s and would produce headlines in the operations of the 2000s. The use of civilian contractors became an important element of the All-Volunteer Force concept early on, as one key argument against the draft was the low cost of the individual soldier and his consequent misuse for inappropriate activities that had nothing to do with soldiering. This led to the outsourcing of increased support activities, starting with the individual soldier who was no longer supposed to be responsible for cleaning his barracks. In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, this trend focused mainly on service support tasks. As a consequence, combat forces in Somalia and Kosovo were greeted by civilian contractors who had been employed even before them. In the 2000s, this trend would spill in the area of activities directly related to combat.\\footnote{In his analysis of the army’s transition to the All-Volunteer Force Robert K. Griffith uses the ‘civilianization’ of the so-called Kitchen Police, meaning soldiers assisting cooks in the kitchen, as “one of the more successful innovations of the Modern Volunteer Army Program.” Griffith, 167. This concept aimed at allowing soldiers more time for developing their professional skills and not being misused for obvious inappropriate activities. This marked the starting point for increased outsourcing so that fewer soldiers can concentrate on a narrow sphere of military professionalism, meaning managing and applying violence. The following events of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s led Deborah D. Avant in 2001 to analyze the consequences of privatizing security in the first edition of ‘The Market for Force.’ For the 6th edition see Deborah D. Avant, \textit{The...}}
Social, Political, and Military Considerations

The events of 9/11 brought a significant shift in the United States’ attitude towards the employment of military power as the military became the instrument of choice to react to this event with a prominent public and actual role. But, not unlike the situation in the late 1970s when the public had perceived a deteriorating security situation for the United States, the attitude of society towards the organization of the military did not change. Again, no public demand of a return to any form of compulsory service became visible. Instead, already before the events of 9/11, the public would rather focus on the issue of defense spending that it considered as being too low between 2000 and 2003.106

Despite a wave of patriotism, “the head of army recruiting pointed to the fundamental reality: there was a ‘surge of people buying American flags after 9/11. But there was no surge of people rushing in saying they wanted to join the Army.’”107 Still, according to political analyst Lawrence Kapp “all of the services achieved their quantity goals while increasing their quality levels” between 2002 and 2004.108 The American public continued its conviction that its military in the form of the All-Volunteer Force would be suited well enough to counter any potential threat and defeat it through power projection. This notion was supported by political statements that attempted to calm the public and reduce any sense of continued emergency situation. One major rationale behind this attempt was to prevent an economic crisis after 9/11, as President

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106 See Newport. Obviously, the public perceived the amount of money spent on defense as crucial, not the status of the military as an All-Volunteer Force.

107 Bailey, 244.

108 Kapp, 3.
Bush pointed out in his speech to Congress on September 21, 2001.\textsuperscript{109} But, according to political analyst Andrew J. Bacevich, Bush’s approach had a tremendous impact on the bond between society, politics and the military, “when he chose not to mobilize the country or summon his fellow citizens to any wartime economic sacrifice.”\textsuperscript{110} Bacevich critically argued that citizens who were being kept disengaged and even encouraged not to show behavioral change after an event like 9/11, and during the resulting wars, would inevitably abandon their role as the ultimate guarantor of checks and balances.\textsuperscript{111}

Only through the longer-term impact of the increasing public debt the population would be forced to contribute to the military effort. This reflects the free-market economists’ concept of true cost transparency as already being argued by the Gates commission in favor of the All-Volunteer Force. But this still precluded any immediacy or even physical danger. In this seemingly comfortable position, the general public had adopted a clear supportive role for the military, and especially its individual service members, becoming somewhat of a habit to ‘thank those who serve’; a notion which had been picked up by business companies and their advertising.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{109} After 9/11 President Bush addressed specific individuals and especially the military regarding America’s response to 9/11 but required no sacrifice from the ‘ordinary citizen’, when he stated, that “tonight, a few miles from the damaged Pentagon, I have a message for our military: Be ready. I’ve called the Armed Forces to alert, and there is a reason. The hour is coming when America will act, and you will make us proud.” George W. Bush cited after Chris Abbott, \textit{21 Speeches That Shaped Our World: The People and Ideas that Changed the Way we Think} (London: Random House, 2010), 127.


\textsuperscript{111} According to Bacevich, “Bush seems to have calculated -- cynically but correctly -- that prolonging the credit-fueled consumer binge could help keep complaints about his performance as commander in chief from becoming more than a nuisance.” Ibid.

\textsuperscript{112} The ‘Salute to the Troops’ of the Annheuser-Busch Brewery and the ‘Salute to Service’ of the National Football League are only two prominent examples of business corporations attempting to establish a positive image by showing gratitude to service members. For a critical depiction of a ‘Salute to the Troops’ advertising by Annheuser-Busch see Dan Lamoth, “Exclu-
Despite the general support of the population for the army recruitment numbers were mixed throughout the 2000s. The contested nature of the Iraq War and a strong economic climate especially hampered the army’s recruitment efforts in the mid-2000s. According to political analyst Lawrence Kapp from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) this was visible “particularly in the FY2005-FY2007 timeframe, when the Army had difficulty meeting its recruit quantity goals and began accepting lower quality recruits.”\(^{113}\) And, according to the \textit{New York Times}, in 2009 “[f]or the first time in its history, the Army is introducing an advertising campaign to recruit officers” but struggled with the limited attractiveness of the slogan ‘Army Strong’, as introduced in 2006, among “ambitious young Americans.”\(^{114}\) In this ongoing discussion about the quality of personnel that the army is able to attract, sharply divided opinions collided. Former Lieutenant General and Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry criticized, that “so many officers have sons and daughters serving that they speak, with pride and anxiety, about war as ‘family business.’ Here are the makings of a self-perpetuating military caste, sharply segregated from the larger society and with its enlisted ranks disproportionately recruited from the disadvantaged.”\(^{115}\) Those, who had developed a critical perception on the All-Volunteer Force on

\(^{113}\) Kapp, 1. Bailey found, that the Iraq War in particular affected the recruitment of African-Americans, who were largely in opposition to the war. Their ‘enlistment rates dropped from 23 percent of new enlistments in 2000 to 12 percent in 2005.’ Bailey, 258.


these grounds, made proposals of a reintroduction of compulsory service, but gained no traction from broader society, politics or the military. The lack of concern in this regard was reflected the analysis of Bailey, that "America’s army -even its enlisted ranks- is fairly solidly middle class."\footnote{Bailey, 258. Other critical arguments focus on the requirement during the Iraq War to lower quality standards. For a harsh criticism of the quality of Army recruitment and service members see Matt Kennard, \textit{Irregular Army: How the US Military recruited Neo-Nazis, Gang Members, and Criminals to Fight the War on Terror} (London, New York: Verso, 2012). The argument that the All-Volunteer Force would exploit minorities or ‘the poor’ has been contested. Bailey claimed that “people of color have not borne the brunt of the war [in Iraq].” Bailey, 258.}

Politically, the armed forces had become the prominent instrument of choice in what President Bush had labeled the ‘Global War on Terror’. This prominent role ultimately led to criticism which, remarkably, was formulated in 2008 by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, who warned “against the risk of a ‘creeping militarization’ of US foreign policy, urging that the State Department should lead the US engagement with other countries, with the military playing a supporting role.”\footnote{Ann Scott Tyson, “Gates Warns of Militarized Policy,” \textit{Washington Post} (July 16, 2008), accessed February 2, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/15/AR2008071502777.html. Additionally, “‘we cannot kill or capture our way to victory’ in the long-term campaign against terrorism, Gates said, arguing that military action should be subordinate to political and economic efforts to undermine extremism.” Ibid.} However, in 2001 the executive assumed that it would be possible to use the All-Volunteer Force for swift and economically-conducted strikes within the broad concept of a ‘Long War’ against terrorism. Secretary of Defense Donald F. Rumsfeld especially focused on a new way of war that only required the smallest amount of forces, a concept which dominated the planning and execution of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but which did not foresee the prolonged stability- or nation-building operations that had previously marked the 1990s and for which the Bush Administration had criticized the Clinton Administration. The executive disregarded military advice, especially from the army, concerning the requirement of increased numbers of troops for the war in Iraq. This exemplified the administration’s perception of the army as an institution that lacked the intellectual and organizational capacity to ‘transform’ itself
into the agile instrument that Secretary Rumsfeld envisioned.118

This rift between the administration and the army would lead the executive to influence the ‘Total Force’-concept of the Army and increase the amount of civilian contractors as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq turned into counterinsurgencies, stabilization and nation-building efforts that required increased manpower. However, the President and Secretary of Defense still presented themselves as exercising ‘objective control’ and valuing military advice from the responsible combatant commander, General Tommy Franks. Careful not to resemble an administration that would give the military impossible tasks, President Bush claimed to have asked Franks repeatedly whether he had everything he needed to accomplish his mission in Iraq. According to Bush and Franks himself, he received the amount of forces he deemed necessary. However, already in Afghanistan Secretary Rumsfeld had set his agenda of employing only the lowest number of forces necessary and substituting mass with other means, such as technology or speed. He specifically neglected statements by Army Chief General Eric Shinseki, who called for several hundred thousand troops to stabilize Iraq, and therefore denied the army a distinct sphere of professional expertise that serves as a defining element of ‘objective control’ over the

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118 Military correspondent Michael R. Gordon and Lieutenant-General (ret.) Bernhard E. Trainor referred to the military’s contingency plan for Iraq in late 2001 to illustrate Secretary Rumsfeld’s perception of the military at the time: “For Rumsfeld, the plan required too many troops and supplies and took far too long to execute. It was, Rumsfeld declared, the product of old thinking and the embodiment of everything that was wrong with the military.” Michael R. Gordon and Bernhard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 4. This instance also reflected the approach to civilian influence over the military. When Secretary Rumsfeld set the number of forces required for a war in Iraq at 125,000 or even lower this posed a clear reversal of Huntington’s concept of ‘objective control’ for which the army had continually lobbied. Gordon and Trainor quoted Lieutenant-General Greg Newbold who summed-up his concerns as “‘[m]y regret is at the time I did not say, ‘Mr. Secretary, if you try to put a number on a mission like this you may cause enormous mistakes …. Give the military the task, give the military what you would like to see them do, and then let them come up with it.’’” Ibid, 4. For an account of the stressful relationship between the civilian and military leadership in the Pentagon under Rumsfeld until 2005 see also Dale R. Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 377-408.
Throughout the 2000s, Congress in general supported the administration’s approaches to the use of force. In a significant move after 9/11, Congress equipped the President with far reaching authorities in this regard of forces that led to a renewed debate about an ‘Imperial Presidency’. In addition, Congress voted against any attempt to reintroduce compulsory service after Democratic Representative Charles Rangel and Democratic Senator Fritz Hollings proposed a Universal National Service Act in 2003. At this time, Secretary Rumsfeld approached congressional leaders and strongly argued, that “[w]e're not going to reimplement a draft. There is no need for it at all. The disadvantages of using compulsion to bring into the armed forces the military.”119

119 The discussion about different assumptions and approaches regarding the use of force has been summed up by New York Times Journalist Michael Kakutani in his review of Thomas E. Ricks book ‘Fiasco’. Kakutani concluded “that Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld’s determination to conduct the war with a light, fast force had crippling consequences for the American military’s ability to restore law and order in post-invasion Iraq …This was partly a byproduct of the Pollyannaish optimism of hawks like Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, who slapped down the estimate by the Army’s chief of staff, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, that several hundred thousand soldiers would be required to secure Iraq.” Michael Kakutani, “From Planning to Warfare to Occupation, how Iraq went wrong,” New York Times (July 26, 2006), accessed January 25, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/25/books/25kaku.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0. Also according to the Army Historical Series, in General Franks’ “mind mass was firepower more so than troops.” Stewart, ed., American Military History Volume II, 478.

men and women needed are notable.” But despite supporting the All-Volunteer Force in general, Congress would take specific interest in manpower issues throughout the campaigns in Afghanistan as well as Iraq and in their aftermath, as numerous reports to Congress suggest. The same applied to the ongoing issue of gender equality and opportunities for minorities within the army as part of ‘subjective control’ of the military. The general issue of equality but specifically the experiences of the deployment of female soldiers in the nonlinear battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq led the Congressional Military Leadership Diversity Commission in 2011 to propose that “DOD and the Services should eliminate the ‘combat exclusion policies’ … for women.” As a consequence the Department of Defense declared that “[n]o later than Jan. 1, 2016, women will be able to apply to all military occupational specialties, and to all Army units, across the total force.” Already in 2010, Congress had repealed the ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’

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121 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Department of Defense News Briefing (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 7, 2003), accessed January 25, 2015, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2003/01/20030107160911simmons@pd.state.gov.0.3441126.html#ixzz3Ps6FXa00. Rumsfeld made his criticism of compulsory service and his perception of the value of conscripts more than clear: “If you think back to when we had the draft, people were brought in; they were paid some fraction of what they could make in the civilian manpower market because they were without choices. Big categories were exempted … And what was left was sucked into the intake, trained for a period of months, and then went out, adding no value, no advantage, really, to the United States armed services over any sustained period of time.” Ibid. This led to criticism from veterans which caused Rumsfeld to apologize. See Rostker. I Want You!, 691. Representative Charles Rangel has continued his attempts for compulsory service legislation to this day. See Charles Rangel, “Rangel: It’s Time for a War Tax and a Reinstated Draft,” Time (September 19, 2014), accessed January 25, 2015, http://time.com/3403976/rangel-draft-tax/.


(DADT)-policy regarding gay soldiers after a Department of Defense Study had “concluded that repeal of DADT would pose a low risk to military readiness.”

By 2013, the army had accepted this approach of subjective control. CSA General Odierno declared that “[w]e have been able to implement the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” frankly, with only very small issues—and almost no issues at all” and, that the army “has more women than any other Service in terms of numbers, and it’s important they get all the opportunities they can meet.” The army had also proven its ability to acknowledge and manage change over time regarding its status as an All-Volunteer Force. From an organizational perspective it is remarkable, how an institution that struggled throughout the 1970s into the early 1980s with its role as an All-Volunteer Force had completely reversed its position and currently considers its All-Volunteer Status one of its major assets, as evidenced in repeated priority statements of the Chief of the Staff of the Army.

As described earlier, the events of 9/11, also caught the army in a period of ‘reconstruction’. Then, General Shinseki had assumed that a period of peace would allow the Army to transform itself undisturbed by major military employments. Instead, after 9/11 the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would serve as the major drivers for the Army’s further development continuing the path of focusing on professionalism that would lead to the ‘Warrior Ethos’. The details of what this meant for the conduct of operations in the Global War on Terror were quite contested within


127 Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond T. Odierno put the status of the army as an All-Volunteer Force to the top of priority list, when he stated, that “My intent is to sustain a high-quality All-Volunteer Army that remains the most decisive land force in the world.” Raymond T. Odierno, Marching Orders 38th Chief of Staff, US Army: America’s Force of Decisive Action (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, January 2012), 2, accessed February 1, 2015 at http://www.chapnet.army.mil/pdf/38th%20CSA%20Marching%20Orders%20%28Janu-
ary%202012%29.pdf. The focus on ‘decisive action’ is, again, telling with regard to the army’s preferred definition of military professionalism.
the army. This has already been reflected in the different opinions of Army Chief General
Shinseki and CENTCOM Commander General Franks about troop numbers and would continue
in discussions about the nature of operations as limited counterterrorist or more ambitious coun-
terinsurgency. These differences influenced the way the army perceived as well as presented it-
self, its organization and equipment. Overall key to this was the perception of ‘an army at war’.128

Design and Organization

Prior to 9/11, the Army was in the middle of redesigning itself after questions regarding
its capabilities had been raised by Congress but within the military itself. At the core of this
redesign was the development of the ‘Warrior Ethos’ within the ‘Soldier’s Creed’.129 At first, this
aimed at refocusing the Army as an institution and each individual soldier on core military
competencies which had been pushed to the background in the humanitarian and peacekeeping
missions of the 1990s. But the ‘Warrior Ethos’ contained a message to the outside as well. Its
purpose was to signal that the Army was still about soldiering after all, meaning the managing or
application of violence to win the nation’s wars. The ‘Soldier’s Creed’ emphasized service,
values and professionalism in an obvious attempt to counter allegations that the army had lost its
edge, had turned into a constabulary force rather resembling a police-model and had adopted the
occupational approach that Moskos had connected with the All-Volunteer Force. This resulted in
a permanent and institutionalized discussion about military professionalism in the army that has

128 The Army Historical Series stated the situation after 2001 clearly: “The Army was at
war. The Army was also transforming itself while at war, attempting to make ready for the next
adversary even while coping with the current ones.” Stewart, (ed.), American Military History
Volume II, 497.

129 “The Army has four statements of Warrior Ethos in the Soldier’s Creed: ‘I will always
place the mission first, I will never leave a fallen comrade, I will never quit, I will never accept
defeat’ [bold in original].” US Army Training and Doctrine Command, The Profession of Arms:
An Army White Paper (Fort Eustis: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, December 2,
been reflected in a remarkable organizational approach, which step by step increased the prominence of the issue. When in 2011 *Military Review* designated a Special Edition to ‘The Military Profession’ retired General Frederick Franks described the rapid development of the Army Center for the Professional Military Ethic in 2007 and its rebranding as Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) in 2010 with an “Army-wide proponency for the Army profession, our ethic, and character development.”

This organizational approach led to increased conceptual thinking and respective official papers, such as Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1 ‘The Army Profession’ in 2013. In his foreword, TRADOC commander Lieutenant General David Perkins asserted, that the publication provided the answers regarding the army as a military profession and its members as army professionals after a decade of war. But already in 2014 CSA General Raymond T. Odierno was less assertive, when he stated in the Army Ethic White Paper, that “we must intensify our understanding of what it means for the Army to be a Profession. The recent publication of ADRP 1, The Army Profession, brought us a long way in achieving that understanding, but we must do more.” Consequently, the definition of what it means to be a military professional seems under continuous construction, which implies that the previous focus on a narrow concept as the ‘Warrior Ethos’ is not sufficient.

Closely related, the army struggled with coherent and convincing messaging. In 2001, even before 9/11, a new slogan, ‘An Army of One’, had replaced the long-lived, but dated ‘Be All

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133 This struggle is being reflected in the numbers of ‘creeds’ and ‘norms of conduct’ that are supposed to define the professional soldier’s behavior. See US Army Training and Doctrine Command, *The Profession of Arms*, 15. For the list of oaths, creeds and norms of conduct see ADRP 1, B1-B8.
You Can Be’ message, which seemed to have focused too much on opportunity and too little on commitment and service. The new slogan was supposed to bridge the appeal to individuality with the requirement to be part of a bigger whole. However, despite some ingenuity, the new branding failed to initiate a similar momentum as ‘Be All You Can Be’ achieved in the early 1980s. This was reflected in its rather quick removal and replacement with the branding ‘Army Strong’ in 2006. This slogan aimed at reflecting an army at war that focused on toughness. The word ‘strong’ still seemed to have sufficient ambiguity to not only imply solely physical strength but capability beyond to appeal to a broader audience.  

With its rebranding through new slogans and the ‘Warrior Ethos’, the Army attempted to focus on military service as a calling and a true profession and not merely an occupation. But as a consequence, from 2005 to 2007 the Army faced serious recruitment problems in quantity and quality, as described in the previous section. Being challenged to attract sufficient numbers of volunteers, the Army faced a reversal of the situation of the 1990s. Instead of being at peace in general but with deployments in rather non-traditional peacekeeping scenarios, now the Army was at war in complex high-intensity operations that would either be characterized as counterterrorism or counterinsurgencies. And instead of being reduced, the changing nature of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq led Secretary Rumsfeld in 2004 to authorize an increased end strength of the Army by 30,000 personnel on a temporary, emergency basis. In the FY 2005 Defense Authorization Bill Congress authorized an increase of the army by 20,000.135

134 The slogan ‘An Army of One” drew much criticism due to its ambiguous message. Cynics wondered about the capabilities of an ‘army of one’ and its impact on the central army tenet of teamwork. The content of this branding was not as obvious as the clear-cut ‘Be All You Can Be’ that catapulted the Army in a new era of professional advertising. The new slogan attempted some sophistication as it was explained that ‘ONE’ not only focuses on the individual service member but also reflected the composition of the Army with Officers – Non-commissioned officers – Enlisted Personnel. For a summary of the criticism regarding the slogan ‘An Army of One’ see Bailey, 236-237. As a contrast to the previous campaigns Bailey analyzed the ‘Army Strong’ advertising as “intended for an army at war … that meant to scare potential enemies.” Ibid., 252.

135 See Bruner, 3-4.
At the same time, Congress was not only concerned about quantity but also about the quality of the Total Force with all its components. As a consequence, Congress established the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) “to report on the roles and missions of the reserve components.” After three years, the commission concluded a need for significant change regarding the cooperation and organization of the active and reserve components; this need had deep roots in the way the military had developed as an All-Volunteer Force. According to Ellis and McKnight Mackenzie, the commission had “determined that the Army would be unable to sustain future operations without extensive involvement by the RC and recommended that the DoD formally create a sustainable and adequately resourced OR [Operational Reserve].” Regarding the active force the commission with distinct criticism focused on its reduced size, isolated basing, lack of civilian skills and dramatically increased personnel costs. In contrast, the commission praised the reserve component as domestically forward deployed, intensively linked to society, equipped with a broad military as well as civilian skillset and “from a cost perspective … a significant bargain for the taxpayer in comparison to the active component.” The commission compared the scope of required reform with the approach of the

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137 John D. Ellis and Laura McKnight Mackenzie, *Operational Reservations: Considerations for a Total Army Force* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, 2014), 7-8. The commission defines the change to an operational force as follows: “At the core of these changes is the explicit recognition of the evolution of the reserve components from a purely strategic force, with lengthy mobilization times designed to meet Cold War threats from large nation-states, to an operational force. This operational reserve must be readily available for emergencies at home and abroad, and more fully integrated with the active component. Simultaneously, this force must retain required strategic elements and capabilities.” Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Transmittal Letters.

138 Ibid., 9. Key findings of the commission are “that the National Guard and Reserves offer the nation great capability and return on its investment. … The per capita annual cost of active duty manpower has risen from $96,000 to more than $126,000 since 2000, owing largely to increases in such deferred benefits as health care, as well as to the expenses of recruiting, retention, and other initiatives to maintain an all-volunteer force strained by prolonged conflict…. In contrast to the nationwide presence of reserve component forces, the nation’s active duty military
Goldwater-Nichols Legislation of 1986 and even defined the development of the reserve components into an operational reserve as a necessary condition for the survival of the All-Volunteer Force.\footnote{139}

As a result of the commission’s report, in 2008 DoD issued the directive ‘Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force;’ only in 2012 the army formulated the ‘Army Total Force Policy’.\footnote{140} But, in fact, the army had already altered its approach to the reserve components for force generation in 2005 and 2006 when it developed and implemented the ‘Army Force Generation’ approach ARFORGEN due to the increased operational requirements. For deployment planning this included a move from a traditional division-centric to a brigade-combat-team centric focus. In addition to this, active and reserve units were interconnected as the active component of the army had become too small for sustaining the prolonged operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This concept already included a change of the Army Reserve and also the National Guard from strategic to operational reserves that became part of the standard force generation process. In fact, due to this concept they had lost key characteristics of a true ‘reserve’, such as being freely available and not already fixed with a tremendous impact on the utility of the institutions and burden on the individual members.\footnote{141} The Army Total Force Policy, and

\footnotetext{139}{“Achieving total force integration of the active and reserve components will require changes to the defense establishment of a magnitude comparable to those required by Goldwater-Nichols for reserve components the active component.” Ibid., 4. “In fact, without the National Guard and Reserves, the nation would have needed to reinstitute the draft to fight in Iraq and . . . the reserves are Afghanistan. Thus, the reserves are the key to ensuring the success of the all-volunteer force and avoiding the draft.” Ibid., 10.}


\footnotetext{141}{The effect on the individual soldier, regardless of his status as active, reserve or guard, were repeated deployments of increased length and unclear conditions regarding the terms of service due to the Stop Loss regulations. For an analysis of the Stop Loss program see Charles A.}
specifically ARFORGEN, has been under constant development. Political analyst Andrew Feickert sums up the Army’s current approach to integrate active and reserve components to achieve an expandable army as follows:

Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond T. Odierno reportedly stated the Pentagon’s decision to cut the active force by 80,000 soldiers would place greater reliance on the National Guard and Reserves …. General Odierno suggested if the Army had to fight two large, simultaneous, longterm wars; the United States would rely more heavily on allies and request a large-scale mobilization of the reserves. The reserves would also be used to “buy time to increase the size of the active component,” and because of the requirement for higher readiness, a new readiness model would need to be developed to keep the National Guard and Reserves at a higher state of readiness.¹⁴²

Ultimately, Feickert suggested that Congress establish a National Commission on the Structure of the Army, as it “has already indicated an interest in examining Army force mix in greater detail.”¹⁴³

In the timeframe of 2001 and 2015, a significant organizational change happened outside of the Army but had significant effect on it. As it became clear that the army would not be able to provide sufficient manpower for all requirements in the complex and protracted scenarios of Afghanistan and Iraq, the amount of civilian contractors rose tremendously. Specialist in Defense Acquisition Moshe Schwartz stated before Congress that, “[c]ontractors have played a pivotal role in these operations, making up more than half of the Department of Defense’s workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan.”¹⁴⁴ Instead of being solely put in supporting roles, they assumed responsibilities in the military advising of indigenous forces and took over force protection functions that traditionally belonged to combat arms. This development challenged the


¹⁴² Feickert, 7.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 20.

monopoly of the armed forces as the sole purview of the military profession. It also continued the theoretical train of thought that led to the All-Volunteer Force in the first place and connected military service to mechanisms of the free market. In continuing steps, this process questions increased portions of the military which do not seem to serve an immediate purpose. Secretary Rumsfeld’s frustration with the Army as a seemingly immobile and antagonistic behemoth largely consisting of a ‘legacy force’, which he thought unable to adapt swiftly to new challenges, fits into this approach. The increased reliance on contractors providing not only individual manpower but whole capabilities shifts responsibilities, such as oversight, from the executive and legislative to private corporations and limits transparency to the public. This overall redesign, not only of the Army but also of military instruments of the United States in general, had tremendous impact on the utility of the US military.¹⁴⁵

Utility and Employment

In 2003, the thirtieth anniversary of the All-Volunteer Force, the United States military was lauded for swift victories in Afghanistan and Iraq. Elections in Afghanistan and a regime-change in Baghdad seemed to prove that applying a limited amount of military force in a creative and decisive manner produced the effects desired by the politicians. On September 16 and 17, 2003 a conference was held at the National Defense University to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the All-Volunteer Force following a tradition that began in 1983 and had already been continued in 1993. The utility of the volunteer army to enforce the immediate regime changes in Kabul and Baghdad was obvious to the participants of the conference, most of which played significant roles in creating or developing the All-Volunteer Force. Under Secretary of

Defense for Personnel and Readiness David S. C. Chu concluded, that “there is now little argument about the wisdom of those who championed the volunteer concept in the early years.”146 However, he also acknowledged significant challenges that became visible during the first two years of the ‘Global War on Terror’ and predicted “[i]f we can pronounce the all-volunteer force, on its 40th anniversary, as successful as it is on its 30th, then we will have met these challenges successfully.”147

Remarkably distinct from 1983, 1993 and 2003, in 2013 no conference celebrating the achievements and the status of the All-Volunteer Force had been held. Instead the developing events after 2003 showed increased doubts regarding the AVF’s utility, especially of the army, in complex environments that included prolonged employments.148 Those doubts were reflected in the discussions within both the Bush and the Obama administrations and within the military itself about the increasingly complex situations in Afghanistan and Iraq and how to apply the military instrument. Between 2006 and 2010 this discussion gained a remarkable dynamic reflecting different but also shifting positions between the civilian leadership, the service chiefs and commanders in the field. Given the frustrating developments in Iraq during the second Bush


147 Ibid., 352. Chu concedes “that we have taken the all-volunteer force beyond what the Gates Commission imagined in its report” and views recruiting/retention, force generation in sustained operations, the role of the reserves, and the best use of volunteers in the future as future challenges. Ibid., 351.

148 Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates has come to call the Iraq War a ‘debacle’. Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 568. However, Gates also made a cautious note, that “only time will tell whether the invasion of Iraq was worth its monumental cost.” Ibid., 568. In any case, Gates made a clear statement rejecting the employment of large ground formations when he declared in West Point in February 2011, that “in my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it.” Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Speech, United States Military Academy West Point (NY) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011), accessed February 02, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1539.
administration, the discussion about the nature of the conflict would soon be dominated by
counterinsurgency (COIN)-theorists, the so called ‘COINdinistas’, around General David
Petraeus.149

The key doctrinal factor to a successful counterinsurgency became manpower, which
was supposed to be the essential instrument for approaching, protecting, and winning the
indigenous population thereby defeating the insurgency. The focus on manpower resembled the
neglected predictions by CSA General Shinseki in 2002. After the experiences of four years in
Iraq, this perspective gained traction with the civilian leadership and especially President Bush.
However, according to Gates, during the decision-making process that ultimately led to the
’surge’ in Iraq in 2007, the service chiefs questioned a manpower intense approach, doubting the
ability to deploy and especially sustain the additional forces. Being rather concerned about the
long-term utility of the army they “worried about ‘breaking the force’ through repeated
deployments and about the impact on military families. … [President] Bush heard them out

149 For an overview of the so-called ‘COINdinistas’ see Thomas E. Ricks, “The COINdi-
nistas. Who knows everything there is to know and more about counterinsurgency and its current
role in US military strategy? These Guys,” Foreign Policy (November 30, 2009), accessed Febru-
for his ability during operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ to make forces originally designed for major com-
bat operations suitable for stability operations. In a surprisingly swift move that seemed only pos-
sible in the complex and frustrating situation of 2006 General Petraeus as commander of the
Combined Arms Center in Fort Leavenworth led the development of a new counterinsurgency
manual published in December 2006, jointly by the army and the marine corps. Field Manual 3-
24 made clear statements regarding the requirements for manpower in counterinsurgencies. “[N]o
predetermined, fixed ratio of friendly troops to enemy combatants ensures success in COIN
[counterinsurgency] . . . . A better force requirement gauge is troop density, the ratio of security
forces (including the host nation’s military and police forces as well as foreign counterinsurgents)
to inhabitants. Most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents
for every 1,000 residents in an AO [area of operations]. Twenty counterinsurgents per 1,000 resi-
dents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN [counterinsur-
gency] operations; however, as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent on
the situation.” Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Government Print-
respectfully but at the end simply said, ‘The surest way to break the force is to lose in Iraq.’”

After the change to the administration of President Barack Obama in 2009 a similar discussion took place with regard to Afghanistan. This time the military leadership was united in the approach to employ more forces to enable a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign. The White House, on the other hand, doubted the concept, including the utility of the army and attempted to significantly reduce the level of ambition in Afghanistan to counterterrorism and Afghan capacity-building. This resulted in a compromise, in which President Obama decided a two year limited ‘surge’ of only 33,000 troops.

It is contested, whether the operational concepts in Iraq and Afghanistan truly worked and whether the US army was able to prove its utility. West Point historian Colonel Gian P. Gentile has provided a counterview to “the misleading current narrative … that the … lowering of violence in Iraq is primarily due to the American ‘surge’ and the application of so-called ‘new’ counterinsurgency methods.” Instead, he analyzed non-military influences on Sunni as well as

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150 Gates, *Duty*, 39-40. Gates attempted to portray himself as torn between the political requirements of not losing the wars but also leveraging the stress on the soldiers and their families. In this regard, he stressed his difficulties with the extension of combat tours to fifteen months instead of twelve in 2007 and repeated deployments with less than twelve months of dwell time. See Gates, *Duty*, 57-60. For a comprehensive summary of the human dimension of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, see Feickert, 16.

151 For the inside perspective of Secretary of Defense Gates regarding the decision-making process see Gates, *Duty*, 336-386. The discussion about the nature of operations in Afghanistan turned into a power struggle between the White House and the Pentagon. CJCS Admiral Mike Mullen, Commander CENTCOM General Petraeus and COMISAF General McChrystal urged for 40,000 additional troops arguing for a counterinsurgency campaign. The White House questioned the concept itself as well as the utility of the forces and attempted to significantly reduce the level of ambition. Especially Vice President Biden argued for a ‘Counterterrorism Plus’ strategy that would not make US forces part of what was from his perspective an Afghan civil war. With regard to President’s Obama ‘Afghanistan/Pakistan’ (Af/Pak) Strategy, Gates, again, expressed “deep doubt that the required number of civilian advisers from State, the Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, and other agencies could be found and deployed. My doubts would prove justified.” Gates, *Duty*, 343.

152 Gian P. Gentile, “Misreading the Surge Threatens the Army’s Conventional Capabilities,” *World Politics Review* (March 4, 2008), accessed February 02, 2015, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/1715/misreading-the-surge-threatens-u-s-armys-conventional-capabilities. Gentile argues that the US forces in Iraq had already adapted to counterinsurgency tactics before the official doctrine was released in 2006 and the surge conducted. But even more important, the
Shia insurgents and their change of behavior as necessary conditions for the reduction of violence in Iraq in 2007 and 2008.\textsuperscript{153} Retired Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger has also questioned the general utility of the US army for non-conventional operations and argued against employments of this sort resembling post-Vietnam considerations.\textsuperscript{154}

Any ongoing debate notwithstanding, concerns of the military leadership regarding the operational stress on the force have already proven that the reduced size of the US army has limited its utility. This stress was the result of parallel operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as the US army did not have enough forces to deploy sufficient troops to both theaters. Secretary Gates stated, that “I realized I couldn’t deliver in both places at once.”\textsuperscript{155} Acknowledging limitations regarding the army’s utility, in 2011 at the United States Military Academy at West Point Secretary Gates delivered his verdict, that the protracted operations including the surges in Iraq and Afghanistan had led to an army, which “while it is resilient, it is also stressed and tired.”\textsuperscript{156}

To prevail under these stressful conditions the army had to change its force generation process which meant the inclusion of the reserve components. As described in the previous section, this transformed the army reserve and National Guard from a strategic into an operational reserve and limited their overall utility. In 2005, this led to the remarkable situation when forty

\textsuperscript{153} See Gentile, “Misreading the Surge.”
\textsuperscript{154} See Bolger, xvi.
\textsuperscript{155} Gates, Duty, 200. Gates also conceded critically that the effort in Afghanistan had been “neglected … [and while] we were preoccupied with Iraq, between 2002 and 2005 the Taliban reconstituted … and again became a serious fighting force.” Ibid., 198.
\textsuperscript{156} Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Speech.
percent of Louisiana’s National Guard forces were in Iraq and not available for disaster relief operations in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. Whether this shortfall had actual negative impacts or could be compensated by other forces has been debated ever since. The Report for Congress “Hurricane Katrina: DoD Disaster Response” in September 2005 found “anecdotal evidence” that the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq had at least a limiting effect of what the total-force army could make available for disaster relief.\(^{157}\) On the other hand and despite obvious shortcomings, the army still proved its utility as the respective Report to Congress suggested with regard to the National Guard, that its “ability to respond through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact may be proven to have been exemplary, given the extent of regional destruction.”\(^{158}\) The report also suggested, that it conceptual and cultural issues hampered the disaster relieve effort of the military. The report specifically focused on the role of the military as the supporting agency, a role the military embraces due to its emphasis on ‘military professionalism.’\(^{159}\)

This principle and culture did not change in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.


\(^{157}\) “Though DOD has sought to focus this question on the number of personnel that remained available for relief operations, there is anecdotal evidence that, particularly for the National Guard, the issue centered more upon the availability of equipment rather than personnel. … Another example noted is that of the 101st Air Assault Division …, which has the largest number of transport helicopters of any Army unit, was not deployed to Katrina operations because it is in the process of deploying to Iraq.” Steve Bowman, Lawrence Kapp and Amy Belasco, Hurricane Katrina: DoD Disaster Response (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 19, 2005), 15.

\(^{158}\) Ibid., Summary (no page number).

\(^{159}\) “This principle [of being a supportive agency] exists because, for DOD, disaster relief is secondary to its primary mission of national defense, and there has been a traditional concern that any greater emphasis on essentially civilian or non-military operations would detract from its preparedness for its primary mission.” Ibid., 13-14.
not on the military. To improve the responsiveness and utility of the National Guard, in addition, the “John Warner National Defense Authorization Act provides new authority for the calling up and assignment of duties to national guard troops.”\textsuperscript{160} But within the army, the roles of the different components during the disaster relief were contested. In their study “Operational Reservations: Considerations for a Total Army Force”, Colonels John D. Ellis and Laura McKnight Mackenzie offer a critical analysis of the US Army Military History Institute’s account \textit{The Army Response to Hurricane Katrina}: “The NG [National Guard] received only three sentences in the entire article, the USAR [US Army Reserve] received none. … The RC [Reserve Component], it seemed from the Army’s report, was still considered to be just a backup to the AC [Active Component].”\textsuperscript{161} This did not acknowledge the fact that the National Guard elements under control of the local governor in domestic disaster relief operations can have a significantly higher utility than other troops due to the exemption from the ‘Posse Comitatus Act’, which prohibits the active military to act in a law enforcement capacity. According to Ellis and McKnight Mackenzie this had been proven during the operations after Hurricane Katrina, when “National Guardsmen, with broader law enforcement authority [than the active duty troops], provided backup to the beleaguered New Orleans Police Department, evacuated the Superdome, and patrolled the more dangerous areas of the city.”\textsuperscript{162}

Ultimately, two aspects from outside the US army had significant impact on its utility


\textsuperscript{161} Ellis and McKnight Mackenzie, 6.

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., 6. For the different activation statuses of the national guard, as State Active Duty, “Title 32” Status and Federal Status, with the respective advantages and disadvantages see Bowmann, Kapp and Belasco, 6-10. They summed up the Posse Comitatus Act as follows: “The Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC. 1385), along with other related laws and administrative provisions, prohibits the use of the military to execute civilian laws unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. Congress has made a number of exceptions to the act which permit military involvement in law enforcement.” Ibid., 7.
over the last fourteen years. First, the employment of increased numbers of contractors and, second, the availability of civilian expertise required in the complex operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Political Analysts Moshe Schwartz and Jennifer Church have argued, that “[o]ver the last two decades, contractors have played a critical role in US military operations, making up more than half of Department of Defense’s (DOD) total workforce in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans.” As the All-Volunteer Force from its inception had concentrated itself on military professionalism and increased the outsourcing of ‘non-military’ capabilities, the military has become “unable to effectively execute many operations … without extensive operational contract support.” But while contractors have become a necessary requirement for the army’s utility, Schwartz and Church conceded, that “contractors can also compromise the credibility and effectiveness of the US military and undermine operations, as many analysts believe happened in Iraq and Afghanistan.” This verdict has been supported by Secretary Gates, when he stated, that “[a]s the contractor presence developed in Iraq, after the original invasion, there was no plan, no structure, no oversight, and no coordination. … The behavior of some of these men was just awful …. Obviously, their behavior undermined our efforts.”

The utility of the army has also been undermined by an absence of civilian expertise. According to Secretary Gates, this presented operational problems and he recalls that “[m]y sense

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164 Ibid., 2.

165 Ibid., 4.

166 Gates, *Duty*, 224. Gates offered a distinction between the different departments, which hired contractors. He specifically pointed to the State Department, which he accused of being responsible for those contractors “who caused most of our headaches.” Ibid., 224. He then described how increased coordination between the departments and oversight in theatre had improved the situation. Schwartz and Church avoided a focus on any specific department but rather referred to the United States government as a whole as the contracting entity. With regard to DOD contracting they stated, that “according to an Army investigative report, a lack of good contractor surveillance at Abu Ghraib prison contributed to fostering a permissive environment in which prisoner abuses took place.” Schwartz and Church, 4.
from our military leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan was that the civilian experts made a real
difference, there were just too few of them.”\textsuperscript{167} Despite all efforts over the last decades such as
National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), the establishment of a ‘comprehensive
approach’ including all governmental departments especially in ‘Stabilization, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations’ is still lacking. According to the army-
sponsored RAND-Study ‘Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations’, “there has
clearly been progress. But one of the most vexing problems centers on the whole issue of civilian
agency participation in the planning for and implementation of SSTR operations.”\textsuperscript{168} The military
has attempted to increase its own capability to conduct ‘Civil-Military Operations’ and in May
2014 the army issued Army Techniques Publication (ATP 3-57.70) ‘Civil-Military Operations
Center’ (CMOC), which is supposed to be “the doctrinal solution that facilitates unity of effort
during unified land operations between the civil environment and military forces.”\textsuperscript{169} This
concept implies the integration of civilian expertise into the army, either by training soldiers or
incorporating civilians.

\textsuperscript{167} Gates, \textit{Duty}, 100. In their study of operation Iraqi Freedom Donald P. Wright and
Timothy R. Reese focused on the consequences of the US army’s cultural preoccupation with
winning wars when planning the operation: “While planning and preparation for what in 2003
was called Phase III, Decisive Operations, of a joint campaign will always tend to have primacy
for Joint and Army planners, it is time to increase the importance of what is now known as Phase
IV, Stabilize. Sustained and decisive ground combat is the sine qua non of the US Army. … At
the same time it must be remembered that the purpose of military operations is to achieve a spe-
cific strategic or political objective. As OIF has shown, this phase of operations is ultimately
more important than Phase III in securing the end for which military operations were initiated.”
Wright and Reese, 572-573. The verdict of an absent coherent plan beyond seizing a military ob-
jective also implies a lack of civilian expertise.

\textsuperscript{168} Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, James E. Barnett II, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Ter-
rence K. Kelly and Zachary Haldeman, \textit{Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations}
(Santa Monica: RAND Aroyo Center, 2009), xiii.

\textsuperscript{169} ‘Civil-Military Operations’ have been defined as the “activities of a commander performed
by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or
exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI).”
Office, 2013), ix. For the CMOC see Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.70, \textit{Civil-Military
The experiences and initiatives of the years between 2001 and 2015 raise several questions regarding the current and future utility of the All-Volunteer Force. How many and what kind of wars is the US army capable of fighting simultaneously? What other operations can be conducted in parallel? What is the ability of the US army to adapt its size and quality of its personnel within the boundaries of the All-Volunteer Force and the ‘Total Force’ concept? What impact does the increased number of civilian contractors have on the nature of the military profession and on the Army as an organization? And how is it possible to enhance the civilian expertise that is required for operations in complex environments?
Societal, Political, and Military Considerations

Despite some discussions about the increasing divide in civil-military relations, about a too heavy reliance on the military instrument since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force, especially since 2001, among other concerns, no serious societal movement exists that urges for a change of the status of the US armed forces or even calls for a return of a draft. Quite to the contrary, the United States society seems more than comfortable with a ‘professional’ military that is being hailed for serving the country and that allows the majority of citizens not to do so. This satisfaction is being reflected in Beth Bailey’s verdict that the army as, “[a]n institution that once seemed mired in crisis has achieved remarkable successes, both as purveyor of military force and provider of social good.”

170 Bailey, 260.

American society has implemented specific mechanisms as some form of compensation for not having to serve personally, which focus heavily on ‘appreciation of service’ on different levels and in different forms. However, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey has expressed his doubts that this behavior will continue when the military changes from its highly visible combat role in Afghanistan and Iraq.


Critics of the All-Volunteer Force in their current form, such as retired Lieutenant General and former Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, already have expressed their concern about a widening civil-military divide, which is being reflected in the fact, that specific parts of society, such
as civilian elites, do not consider military service a career option for themselves.\textsuperscript{172} This resembles the phenomenon after the Civil War, which Samuel P. Huntington defined as business pacifism, which “rejected things military as outmoded in an industrial world designed to produce and sell goods; and it made an impression upon both intellectuals and the popular mind.”\textsuperscript{173}

Whether this is a truly worrisome future trend is contested between those who have expressed their concerns and those who, such as Beth Bailey, have positively concluded, that “America’s army -even its enlisted ranks- is fairly solidly middle class.”\textsuperscript{174} In any case, CJSC General Dempsey urged the military not to take a positive opinion by society for granted but to “better figure out … that the American people want you to be in touch with them all the time.”\textsuperscript{175} This implies a broad appeal by the army towards society, which will have to influence the design and organization of the future All-Volunteer Army.

Similarly, American politicians have no interest in changing the status of the military as an All-Volunteer Force. It is evident, however, that government will force the military to reform. This is being reflected in continued political influence, already described as ‘subjective control’, such as regulations regarding opportunities for women and minorities, but also in the shrinking size of the budget that the armed forces will be granted, especially in the case of sequestration cuts. In the case of the army, this will result in a significantly reduced amount of forces. Following the rationale of CJCS Admiral Mullen, that the “the single, biggest threat to our national security is our debt”, the administration’s Strategic Guidance of 2012 has clearly empha-

\textsuperscript{172} “Even fewer of the privileged and powerful shoulder arms. In 1975, 70 percent of members of Congress had some military service; today, just 20 percent do, and only a handful of their children are in uniform.” Eikenberry and Kennedy.

\textsuperscript{173} Stewart, ed., \textit{American Military History: Volume I}, 313.

\textsuperscript{174} Bailey, 258.

\textsuperscript{175} Department of Defense, \textit{Gen. Dempsey’s Remarks at the Center for a New American Security}. 65
sized, that for budgetary reasons “US forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, pro-
longed stability operations [Italic in original].”176 The approach to limit the public debt for na-
tional security reasons and, therefore, possibly control it by the automatic spending cuts of se-
questration will significantly reduce the funding available to the US military.177

This reflects the assumption that the army will not be required to conduct protracted
stabilization or counterinsurgency operations again, at least in the near future or on short notice.
Political analyst Dominic Tierney has labeled this approach “in a looser way” as the Obama Doc-
trine and concluded, that “[f]or Obama, the most powerful lesson of history seems to be ‘no more
Iraqs.’”178 As a result, the current Strategic Guidance has limited the level of ambition with re-
gard to military intervention for the foreseeable future. It places the military among the tools of
American power, focuses on international burden-sharing and enabling partner capacity to pro-
mote security, prosperity and human dignity instead of tasking the US military to enforce them.
However, the same guidance still requires the military to conduct two large scale operations sim-
ultaneously. For analysts Michael O’Hanlon and Daniel Goure this level of ambition is without
alternative given the superpower-status of the United States, but has not yet been operationalized
sufficiently considering the shrinking size of the armed forces.179

176 Department of Defense, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012), 6. For Admiral Mullens com-

177 For a comprehensive analysis see Todd Harrison, Chaos and Uncertainty: The FY2014 Defense Budget and Beyond (Washington, DC: Center for Strategy and Budgetary Assess-
ment, October 2013).


One part of the strategy includes a ‘rebalancing to Asia’, but after Michael Spengler, member of the US State Department’s Senior Foreign Office, has already noticed a ‘rebalancing the rebalance’, meaning a delay in concrete measures, it remains to be seen whether this will result in an actual qualitative or quantitative shift in US military, and specifically army activity.\(^{180}\) Regarding the overall political security strategy and its potential overemphasis of negative lessons from the Iraq War by politicians and the military, Dominic Tierney as well as other analysts, such as Michael O’Hanlon, have already issued a warning. According to Tierney, “[t]he truth is that the United States is almost certain to carry out stabilization missions in the future. For all roads, it seems, lead to nation-building …. The answer is to make sure that the US military is highly trained at nation-building—and then employ this tool with great discretion.”\(^{181}\) The development of criteria to enable a discretionary use of forces consequentially implies a renewed strategic concept resembling the ‘Weinberger-Powell-Doctrine’.

To clarify potential disputes originating from the army’s proclaimed responsibility of ‘winning the Nation’s wars’ and the requirement to respond to disasters in the United States, the Congressional Commission on the National Guard and Reserves in 2008 issued the clear recommendation that “Congress should codify the Department of Defense’s responsibility to provide support for civil authorities … [and] that responding to natural and man-made disasters in the

\(^{180}\) Spengler assessed a significant slow-down of concrete measures in the strategy that started as a ‘pivot’ to Asia and then was renamed as ‘rebalancing’ to manage expectations. For details see Michael Spengler, “Rebalancing the Rebalance,” Parameters. *US Army War College Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (Summer 2014), 11-21. For considerations regarding the application of US Landpower in the Asia-Pacific area see Kimberly Field and Stephan Pikner, “The Role of US Land Forces in the Asia Pacific,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 74 (3rd Quarter 2014), 30-37.

\(^{181}\) Tierney. It is remarkable, of course, that the administration of George W. Bush had made comparable remarks in early 2001 to distinguish itself from the Clinton-administration’s ‘non-traditional’ military operations of the 1990s but nevertheless ended up conducting them on a large scale. For these seeming ironies of history Michael O’Hanlon has developed the phrase “even if we have no further interest in counterinsurgency, it may have an interest in us.” Michael O’Hanlon, “Sizing US Ground Forces: From ‘2 Wars’ to ‘1 War + 2 Missions’,” *The Washington Quarterly* 37, 1 (Spring 2014), 153.
homeland is a core competency of DoD, of equal importance to its combat responsibilities."182 This led the Department of Defense to acknowledge in its directive ‘Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force’, that “Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) are total force missions.”183

With regard to a true Total-Force-concept, including all available forces, it will be of specific importance, how government and the army will approach the issue of including private contractors. Congress has shown increased interest in this topic and established the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2008. Focusing on functional and organizational issues, such as the importance of increased oversight, the commission concluded in its final report in August 2011, that “[t]he United States will not be able to conduct large or sustained contingency operations without major contractor support. … The nation’s security demands nothing less than sweeping reform.”184 This verdict points to the necessity of actively approaching the inevitable integration of contractor support into military operations but also into the military organization. Overall, Congressional activity and language indicate that the army will not be limited to ‘fight wars’ in a narrow sense but will have to prepare for a broad spectrum of missions including sustained contingencies and disaster relief.

The army struggles with the current situation in several ways. The first issue to solve is a true evaluation of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is unlike the situation in 1973 when the failure of Vietnam was generally accepted and could lead to the ‘intellectual renaissance’ that marked the doctrinal and organizational development of the Army in the 1970s. This time, it seems much more difficult to clearly identify positive and negative outcomes, both of

182 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 92.
183 Department of Defense, Managing the Reserve Components, 1.
which can support further development of an organization.\textsuperscript{185} However, the army has already begun to define the transformation from protracted operations to garrison duty and preparation for contingencies as a challenge and an opportunity. This applies to the individual and organization level. For both levels, operations in Afghanistan Iraq posed a sense of immediate purpose on the one hand, but also a significant level of stress on the other. Political analyst Andrew Feickert analyzed, that “[t]hese conflicts have often been very stressful for service members, spouses, and families as indicated by higher than normal divorce and suicide rates.”\textsuperscript{186} The army has begun to acknowledge specific problems regarding individual health and also discipline that are directly related to its status of an All-Volunteer Force engaged in protracted operations. This led to an organizational effort to achieve transparency of those problems, which resulted in several reports, such as ‘Army 2020. Generating Health and Discipline in the Force ahead of the Strategic Reset’ in 2012. It stated, that “we cannot simply deal with health or discipline in isolation; these issues are interrelated and will require interdisciplinary solutions.”\textsuperscript{187} Looking for reasons and solutions

\textsuperscript{185} The Army gained significant experiences throughout the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq on all levels. During operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the tactical proficiency of the individual soldier as well as units and the organizational ability to sustain protracted operations abroad had been improved. However, those assets seemed already the positives in Vietnam, when according to Colonel Harry Summers an American colonel said in Hanoi 1975 “You know you never defeated us on the battlefield.” Summers, 21. In the same way CSA General Odierno claims, that “[w]e’re starting from an incredible position of strength because of the experience that the Army has.” Eliaison and Seich, 8. Others were rather critical with regard to the efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, such as retired Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger who states, that the military leadership “added to our trouble by misusing the US Armed Forces which are designed, manned and equipped for short, decisive, conventional conflict.” Bolger, xvi. It is remarkable that Bolger’s criticism of too much counterinsurgency and stabilization already mirrors the post-Vietnam discussion arguing for a return to a narrow definition of military professionalism focusing on decisive violence. For a critical review of Bolger’s focus on conventional warfighting see Carter Malkasian “Book Review: ‘Why We Lost’ A general’s account of two wars by Daniel Bolger,” \textit{Washington Post} (January 2, 2015), accessed February 08, 2015 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/book-review-why-we-lost-a-generals-account-of-two-wars-by-daniel-bolger/2015/01/02/0d8675d2-8081-11e4-81fd-8e4814d9a7d_story.html.

\textsuperscript{186} Feickert, 16.

\textsuperscript{187} Department of the Army, \textit{Army 2020: Generating Health and Discipline in the Force ahead of the Strategic Reset. Report 2012} (Washington, DC: Department of the Army 2012), Foreword/VCA sends (no page number). “The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are unique in many ways. They represent not only the longest wars fought by our Army, but also the longest fought
to this challenge journalists had already pointed to the lowering of recruitment standards in the
period of 2005 to 2007, as described in an earlier section. Already in 2007 the New York Times
reported, that “former military officials and defense specialists said they fear that enlisting more
soldiers with criminal backgrounds will increase the risk of disciplinary problems and criminal
activity among soldiers in uniform.” This implies consequences for developing the army’s de-
sign in order to recruit high-quality personnel.

The complex evaluation of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq significantly affects doc-
trinal issues. The army, on the one hand, has been tasked to master the full spectrum of conflict as
being reflected in the twelve enduring armed forces missions formulated in the 2014 Quadrennial
Defense Review. Those include ambiguous tasks as a ‘global, stabilizing presence’, ‘security op-
erations’, and ‘stability and counterinsurgency operations.’ On the other hand, it is already obvi-
ous that the army will be limited in its capabilities, as it will not be sized for protracted stability
operations, which the current President has stated are not what he envisions anyway.

by an all-volunteer force. Today’s wars have placed tremendous and unique burdens on our Sol-
diers and Families as compared to previous conflicts. Past wars were generally noted for several
days of intense combat followed by lengthy periods of military inactivity. According to some es-
timates, the average infantryman in the South Pacific during World War II saw about 40 days of
combat in four years. In contrast, the OPTEMPO in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade
has remained persistently high, providing very few opportunities for individuals to rest, either
physically or mentally.” Ibid., 3-4.

188 Bryan Bender, “Almost 12% of US Army recruits required waivers for criminal rec-
times.com/2007/07/13/world/americas/13iht-13recruits.6652316.html?_r=0. For a popular ac-
count and criticism of the low quality of Army recruitment and service members see also Ken-
nard, Irregular Army.

189 See Department of Defense, Sustaining US Global Leadership, 6. Still, in the QDR
2014 CJCS General Dempsey formulated the “following prioritization of missions (or ‘ways’) …:
1. Maintain a secure and effective nuclear deterrent; 2. Provide for military defense of the
homeland; 3. Defeat an adversary; 4. Provide a global, stabilizing presence; 5. Combat terrorism;
6. Counter weapons of mass destruction; 7. Deny an adversary’s objectives; 8. Respond to crisis
and conduct limited contingency operations; 9. Conduct military engagement and security oper-
a tions; 10. Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations; 11. Provide support to civil author-
ities; and 12. Conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster response.” Department of Defense,
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2014 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014), 62-
[t]he active Army will reduce from its war-time high force of 57,000 to 440,000-450,000 Soldiers. The Army National Guard will continue its downsizing from a war-time high of 358,000 to 335,000 Soldiers, and the US Army Reserve will reduce from 205,000 to 195,000 Soldiers. If sequestration-level cuts are imposed in FY2016 and beyond, all components of the Army would be further reduced, with active duty strength decreasing to 420,000, the Army National Guard drawing down to 315,000 and the Army Reserves reducing to 185,000.190

The army has translated this dilemma in its US Army Operating Concept ‘Win in a Complex World’ of October 2014. In a remarkable attempt, the army leadership combined its acknowledgement of complexity with its continued desire for decisiveness and ‘winning.’191 To be able to ‘win’, the army assumed that it will be able develop an appropriately comprehensive, as well as flexible force structure and a continuing technological advantage. This concept of a scalable force increasingly relying on its reserve component resembles the ‘expansive army’ concept. To achieve the ability to expand rapidly implies the development of experienced cadres to form the backbone of expansion, a ‘generating force’ to organize expansion and already intense links between the active and reserve components. Critics have already issued doubts about the feasibility of an expansive army. Bernhard Rostker argued that a too heavy reliance on reserves and an unbalanced reduction in end strength, meaning less accession in favor of the preservation of older, experienced personnel to form cadres, are serious errors for reasons of feasibility and long-term structural consequences.192

64. Also DoD Directive 3000.05 defined Stability Operations a “core US military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.” Department of Defense, DoD Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 16, 2009).

190 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2014, IX.

191 TRADOC commander General Perkins defined in the preface, that “‘Win’ occurs at the strategic level and involves more than just firepower…. Complex is defined as an environment that is not only unknown, but unknowable and constantly changing.” US Army Training and Doctrine Command, The US Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World (Fort Eustis: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2014): iii.

192 See Rostker, Right Sizing the Force. For approaches to increase the links between the active and reserve components in the form of a ‘continuum of service’ and to increase flexibility in career development see Sidney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army Juggles Drawdown; Plans for Future
The Army Operating Concept also acknowledged the “need to balance the technological focus of Army modernization with a recognition of the limits of technology and an emphasis on the human, cultural, and political continuities of armed conflict.” However, it also emphasizes, that the “US Army’s advantage over enemies depends in large measure on advanced technology [and that] increased technological complexity demands that Army forces maintain a high degree of preparedness in peacetime.” Elements of those considerations resemble the approach towards a ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ through which Army Chief General Shinseki attempted to transform the army in the late 1990s and early 2000s to increase its utility with mixed results. The overall approach to reorganize and replace manpower, which will be too expensive in an All-Volunteer Force, will have significant influence on the design of the army.

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194 Ibid., 34.
195 For different reasons, many of the major projects of this technological revolution, most prominently the Future Combat System (FCS), never materialized. Instead, in manpower-intensive operations the army had to be equipped with improvised material in the form of MRAPs (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles), which it never intended to procure and for which the army will have to develop a coherent concept to operate as a fleet. The issue has become a topic for discussion as the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were abandoned or significantly reduced. For a critical overview see Eric Beidel, “Military Provides little Clarity for Future Truck Fleet,” *National Defense Magazine* (June 2012), accessed February 08, 2015, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/June/Pages/MilitaryProvidesLittleClarityForFutureofTruckFleets.aspx. See also Majorie Censer, “Pentagon contends with a surplus of armored trucks,” *Washington Post* (March 7, 2012), accessed February 8, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/pentagon-contains-with-surplus-of-armored-trucks/2012/03/01/glQAByHaxR_story.html. See also Walter Pincus, “What happens to all that military gear?,” *Washington Post* (June 4, 2012), accessed February 08, 2015 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/what-happens-to-all-that-military-gear/2012/06/04/gJQAPVeNEV_story.html.
Effects on Design and Organization

The complex environment that the army acknowledged as a foundation for its future design and organization prevents any clear cut focus on specific operations as was possible after the Vietnam War when the Army based its doctrinal and organizational renewal mainly on a conventional war in Europe. Instead, the army will play "a substantial role" in the missions the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has prioritized within the full spectrum of conflict.196 This broad spectrum must be reflected in the way the army designs itself. The notion of designing the army mainly as a ‘corps of warriors’ and focusing on the narrowest concept of military professionalism is not only insufficient but misleading. This approach does not reflect the necessary diversity of the army as an organization and, in fact, will decrease the army’s ability to deal with complex issues successfully. The military’s tendency to focus overly on Huntington’s concept of military professionalism needs to be enhanced by elements of Janowitz’s concept. As he foresaw, the distinction between the peacetime and wartime military establishment has at least been greatly reduced, if not eliminated. The nature of today’s and future employments always in complex environments truly require professional soldiers to develop “more and more skills and orientations common to civilian administrators.”197

That does by no means imply any loss of identity; instead, it will solve major contradictions in this regard. Managing and applying violence remains the ultimate instrument, and the ‘ability to win’ is the ‘conditio sine qua non’ to influence or, if necessary, defeat adversaries. But it is it necessary to remove the army’s focus from the instrument of violence to the aim of achieving security and stability. This will lead to a redefinition of the military profession away from the ‘managing of violence’ towards the ‘managing of security.’ This focus will ensure that violence is

196 US Army TRADOC, Win in a Complex World, 7. The only mission, in which the army will not be involved, is ‘nuclear deterrence’. For the prioritized missions see Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 61-62.

197 Janowitz, 424.
not managed and applied as an absolute and with only short-term goals, as happened in Iraq in 2003. It will support an understanding that complex environments regularly do not call for decisive but rather deliberate action, which is still purposeful. It will also influence the way the army defines and presents itself. This will help to overcome some of the contradictions of the past when society, politicians or the military argued about the nature of military service and the way it was presented rather exclusively as a calling, profession or, seemingly, just an occupation. Already sociologist Charles Moskos presented the absolutes of calling, profession, and occupation as caricatures and acknowledged that “the reality is complicated in that the armed forces have elements of all three models.” Huntington and Janowitz in some unison concluded, that the interior structure of the armed forces would lead to only a limited amount of truly ‘professional’ personnel in the military by a rather narrow definition. Huntington saw only the officer corps as truly professional and referred to the activity especially of enlisted personnel as craftsmanship or trade, while Janowitz foresaw that “the effectiveness of the military establishment depends on maintaining a proper balance between military technologists, heroic leaders, and military managers.”

This distinction resembles the models of occupation, calling, and profession as being normatively and practically required within one organization all at once. So in fact, the three models are not exclusive but elements of one holistic model that is applicable to the army.

Despite an intuitive concern that this diversity might blur a coherent identity, the army needs to acknowledge, embrace and utilize it. Its diversity offers broad opportunities to attract

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199 Janowitz, 424. For Huntington’s position on military professionalism see Huntington, 7-18.

high-quality personnel with different backgrounds and interests, to instill a clear as well as credible sense of purpose and create a coherent ‘esprit de corps.’ In contrast to 1973, the army has the intent to present its contribution to the ‘War on Terror’ as a success story. Therefore, it will not break with its past in a way the slogan ‘Today’s Army Wants to Join You!’ attempted. The army will have to develop a credible message that includes its ongoing role in counterterrorist operations with its ‘Warrior Ethos’ and also an appeal to those who are less attracted to play an active role in combat but are instead interested in serving in other areas as well as in personal development.

To neglect the importance of redefining itself as a brand would resemble the situation in the 1990s. Then, as has been described, the army reduced its recruiting effort and played it safe with the continuation of the, as it seemed, evergreen ‘Be All You Can Be!’ Because the Army’s reduction in strength reduced the pressure for clear, coherent and credible messaging and recruiting this approach could last to the end of the decade. But then the Army faced the consequences of its neglect in the form of missed recruitment goals and questions regarding its spirit as well as utility. A new approach to recruiting that still includes but redefines ‘Army Strong!’ has the potential to appeal to a broad spectrum of volunteers and reduce the danger of attracting and relying on those who pose longer-term risks for the health and discipline of the force.201

201 Whether a potential recruit volunteers because of a calling, because he wants to join a profession or rather views his activity in the army as an occupation is important but not essential. However, it is essential that the personnel is of the highest quality and positively contributes to the army effort. It is also essential to acknowledge the potential for individual development after having joined the military. Given the influential approach of the military organization on the individual member it is possible if not probable that a significant number will reconsider or further develop its reasoning for service. This approach resembles an individual move from an occupational to a professional stance that might include the notion of a ‘calling’. For the pragmatic approach of Secretary of the Army Caldera with regard for the different reasons for joining the military and the respective advertisement in the late 1990s and early 2000s see Bailey, 241. See also Janowitz, 426.
The army has already begun to reform its ‘Total-Force’ concept to enable an ‘expansible army’. How this concept will look, especially with regard to the mix between the active component (AC) and the reserve component (RC), is under development and contested. In their December 2014 Report to Congress “Army Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Force Mix: Considerations and Options for Congress”, political analysts Andrew Feickert and Lawrence Kapp summarized, that “those who favor a stronger RC emphasis believe that RC units, if properly trained and equipped, are as capable as their AC counterparts while costing less…. Given the nation’s current fiscal situation, the contemporary debate has shifted somewhat in favor of a higher ration of RC forces.”202 According to Feickert and Kapp, this shift is being reflected in the administration’s FY2015 budget request, which proposes an increase of RC forces ratio in the army to 54.1% by FY2017 compared to 49.1% in 2010. However, the debate regarding the army’s Total Force is far from over. Feickert and Kapp proposed, that “Congress could gain valuable insights through either a national commission on the Army or some other academic endeavor that examines unresolved cost, readiness, effectiveness, and risk issues in greater detail.”203

Despite the ambition to approach the army’s Total Force comprehensively, a key component for its utility is still missing, which is the role private contractors will play in future army operations. After the Congressional Commission on Wartime Contracting has already made sev-

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202 Andrew Feickert and Lawrence Kapp, Army Active Component (AC)/Reserve Component (RC) Force Mix: Considerations and Options for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 5, 2014), Summary. Feickert and Kapp added, that “[th]ose who favor a stronger AC emphasis believe that certain RC forces … are not as capable as AC forces without substantial additional preparation; … cannot respond to a crisis as rapidly as AC forces; and cannot be used with the same frequency and duration as AC forces due to policy limitations.” Ibid. The costs of the active component of the All-Volunteer Force have increased significantly. According to the QDR 2014, over the past decade “Military Health System costs have more than doubled from $19 billion in FY 2001 to $49 billion in the President’s Budget request.” Department of Defense, QDR 2014, 50.

203 Feickert and Kapp, 38.
eral recommendations to improve overall cooperation and effectiveness, according to political analysts Moshe Schwartz and Jennifer Church, the Department of Defense has “taken a number of steps to improve how it uses contractors during operations.”

Those steps focus on the integration of contractors into military operations from planning to execution. But to ensure a coherent approach that guarantees certain standards and accountability the army needs to define and continually readjust the capabilities it will not provide itself but require from outside sources. Those capabilities and their providers need to be held to clear standards. Due to the immediate links in theatre and possibly very limited time for preparation during contingencies clear procedures need to be established and tested through training already at home down to the tactical level. Beyond these practical issues a deeper discussion about the nature of contractor support is necessary. In this regard it is remarkable, that Schwartz and Church argue, that

[c]ontractors are often responsible for such critical tasks as providing armed security to convoys and installations, providing life support to forward deployed warfighters, conducting intelligence analysis, and training local security forces. Because contractors can be hired when a particular need arises and released when their services are no longer needed, contractors can be less expensive in the long run than maintaining a permanent in-house capability. And when a decision is made to limit the number of troops on the ground, contractors can fulfill critical manpower needs.

This comprehensive summary describes nothing else than a stunning ‘contractor’s creep’ into the military profession. Society, politics and the military will need to address this issue and answer the question of how far this is supposed to go. From the normative perspective of defining military service as a highly distinctive profession, and this does not imply a sole focus

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204 Schwartz and Church, 9. Those include organizational changes such as the establishment of the Joint Theatre Support Contracting Command and training as well as exercises. See ibid., 9-12. For further recommendations see Commission on Wartime Contracting, 172.

205 Schwartz and Church, 3.
on violence as the defining factor, this development is to be rejected and clear limitations, standards and supervision be imposed. Ultimately, to achieve true integration and control of private contractors, they need to be included in the army’s overall ‘Total-Force’ concept.206

However, due to the complex challenges the army faces, even such a ‘Total Force’ concept is not reaching far enough. The hybrid character of future operations with significant civil-military elements, as envisioned in the Army Operating Concept, will require the rapid availability of civilian expertise. The smaller army with all its components will inevitably only be able to generate a limited amount of civilian experts. Therefore, it needs access to additional manpower that exists in the public service but has not been made available in the past. This implies, that the US government must have the authority to employ or compel federal or state public servants in military operations if it judges their expertise more important there than at home. Because of the politically-charged environment, it is debatable whether this should be termed a ‘draft for public servants.’ But it does reflect a whole-of-government approach that ensures that public resources are spent responsibly and economically. In the longer-term, this approach includes that all public servants, federal and state, volunteer at the beginning of their career to serve wherever the US government will employ them in the time of a crisis and according to a comprehensive concept that can be inspired by the ‘Victory Plan’ for WWII.207

Ultimately, as CJCS General Dempsey pointed out in the QDR 2014, the United States collectively and the army in specific need to address the issue of mobilization in the event of a true crisis that goes beyond the traumatic events of 9/11, which were still limited to a single day,

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206 Alternatively, private contractors need to be included in DOD’s Total Force, possibly resembling an additional service component.

207 A clear definition where an individual is needed to serve the country in the time of crisis resembles the ‘Victory Plan’ for WWII. See Charles E. Kirkpatrick, An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan in 1941 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 1992).
and their consequences. This includes the implementation of a draft, for which some organizational mechanisms are in place, but the mindset is not.

Effects on Utility and Employment

According to CSA General Odierno the Army is already engaged in those missions that will mark its future employments and is proving its global responsiveness. He stated, that

“[g]lobally responsive” means responding quickly and understanding the region in order to be responsible for it. In fact, there are two recent examples where we’ve done this. The first is the deployment of four companies to Eastern Europe to assure our allies after Russia’s recent actions in the Ukraine. The second is the quick deployment of an assessment force to Iraq—a majority of that being the Special Operation Army Conventional Capability. They are two small examples of how I see the future.208

At the same time, General Odierno issued his concerns about the future utility of the army in accordance with the goals of the US National Security Strategy. Regarding the utility of the army over the next five years, he focused on the balance of end strength, readiness, and modernization and predicted that probable sequestration cuts will lead to decreased readiness and modernization as the army’s costly strength can only be reduced over time. According to Odierno, after 2021 the army will again increase its readiness and modernization, but “we will be too small to meet the current national security strategy.”209 In contrast, CJCS General Dempsey viewed the goals of the National Security Strategy as ‘given’, when he stated in the QDR 2014, that “[w]ith our ‘ends fixed and our ‘means’ declining, it is therefore imperative that we innovate within the ‘ways’ we defend the Nation.”210 As a possible approach for innovation, Brigadier General Stephan Field, Deputy Director of Army Strategic Plans and Policy, and Major Kimberly

208 Eliason and Seich: 9.
209 Ibid. 
210 Department of Defense, QDR 2014, 59.
Pikner, Strategist on the Army Staff, offer an operational pattern located in the middle ground between limited resources and ambition in their study ‘The Role of US Land Forces in the Asia Pacific’. They conclude that the full spectrum of possible employments of landpower “by no means implies that the United States has to become a global policeman, draining its resources in ways that do not promote its national interest. Rather, smaller and shorter operations as well as an increasingly indirect and longer-term approach in conjunction with partners may be able to achieve desired ends without long-term individual military commitments of scale.”

The army has already attempted a balanced approach of innovative ways in the Army Operating Concept ‘Win in a Complex World’ as “the diversity of threats to US security and vital interests will increase the need for Army forces to prevent conflict and shape security environments.” This leads to the army concept of continuing or establishing a kind of permanent presence in different regions of the world with ‘Regionally Aligned Forces.’ This concept does not focus on protracted stability operations but the development of the traditional approach of forward positioning or rotation of forces overseas, which is supposed to support the building of partner capability, the assuring of allies and the deterrence of adversaries or alternatively contingency operations within the conceptual framework of a ‘Global Landpower Network.’ This adds a geographic dimension to the concept of an ‘expansible army.’ Conceptually, regional cadres form the backbone for additional forces that can be escalated according to the security challenge.

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211 Field and Pikner: 33-34.

212 US Army TRADOC, Win in a Complex World, 14. It remains questionable, whether the army necessarily had to insist on still ‘winning’ after it had at least acknowledged that it is operating in a complex world.

However, this idea is far from being fully developed. Currently, it seems like an attempt to prevent possible isolationist tendencies of pulling the US army back to the homeland, to ensure the relevance of the army in scenarios that seem Air-Sea dominated for example in the Asia-Pacific, and allow an economy of force approach in the austere budget environment that will lead to a reduced army as mentioned above. The further development of the concept will require a clearer understanding of scenarios that would lead to the employment of army forces on different scales. In this regard, it is only consequential if the Department of the Army supported the development of specific criteria for a scalable use of force which build on the ‘Weinberger-Powell Doctrine.’

What is clear, however, is that the army will have to increase its flexibility in the broadest sense to preserve or, even better, increase its utility. Because of the broad spectrum of activities it cannot solely focus on warfighting but will engage in different roles to shape the environment and prevent conflict. It will require the organizational and individual capability to rely on technology, be physically and mentally highly mobile and conduct autonomous decision-making as well as execution on all levels. This requires high-quality personnel with expertise and so-

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214 This seems specifically important in the Asia-Pacific where some analysts seem to be convinced that conflict can potentially be limited to the Air-Sea or possibly Cyber domain. For example, Robert Kaplan rather focuses on the naval dimension when he concludes with regard to the South China Sea, “because … the theater of operations will be on the water rather than on dry land, the chances of conflict are somewhat diminished.” Robert Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (New York: Random House, 2014), 175. In fact, the effects that events at sea, in the air or in the cyber domain will have in the states of the Asia-Pacific or in other regions of concern will require additional analysis. It is not convincing to assume that reassurance of allies or the deterrence of adversaries can solely be achieved by naval or air force assets. Their mobility is an asset but can also lead to doubts regarding sustained commitment. Instead, it is important to develop concepts and contingency plans for supporting or even stabilizing states in the Asia-Pacific region with ground forces of different scales as the result of destabilizing effects that spill over from the sea to land creating political unrest and possibly violence. For an analysis of the role of landpower in the 21st century, again, as a means to an end see William T. Johnson, Re-examining the Roles of Landpower in the 21st Century and their Implications (Carlisle: United States Army War College Press, 2014).
phistication that the label ‘Warrior’ does not sufficiently describe and which needs to be led according to the principles of mission command. All the while, it is inevitable, that the All-Volunteer cannot sustain its current active component but will increasingly rely on its reserve components within the concept of being expansible. This ‘Total Force’ concept needs further development and, in some form, the inclusion of contracted support. Ultimately, to make the concept of ‘Regionally Aligned Forces’ in complex environments at civil-military interfaces work, the army needs to organize its access to civilian expertise that is available in the public service in the United States.

Conclusion

The historical analysis has shown that the US army and its relationship to society and politics have been heavily influenced by the change to an All-Volunteer Force. In general, this was predictable, of course. But significant developments have not matched the original assumptions or expectations that influenced the inception and the further development of the AVF. At first, it became clear that the notion of purely applying market-based incentives to attract volunteers, mainly in the form of higher pay as the Gates Commission argued in 1970, was insufficient. In fact, the army had to create a multidimensional approach that treated the potential recruit as a ‘tough customer’ and included multiple incentives in the form of money, education and, highly important, a permanent convincing messaging. At the core of this approach stood the revelation that the All-Volunteer Force was an ‘All-Recruited Force’ that required permanent effort. Whenever this effort was taken lightly, the army faced serious consequences such as missed recruitment goals. This happened in the 1970s due to a lack of experience and commitment regarding the AVF, in the 1990s as a seemingly successful organization neglected the need to reconfigure
itself holistically in a changed environment, and in the 2000s when the Army felt forced to focus on an aggressive response during the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The challenges of the army to recruit sufficient volunteers reflect a society that has developed a dual relationship towards the Armed Forces. That the army regularly struggles to meet even shrinking recruitment goals proves a diminishing willingness of individual citizens to serve actively. On the other hand, society perceives the army as the provider of an important social good and values the risky service of each individual member, an appreciation, which is being exaggerated as a result of the regular citizen not being required to share this risk and hardship.

After tentative beginnings in the 1970s and 1980s, politicians have increasingly employed the army into the current status in which a clear distinction between peacetime and wartime establishment has been eliminated. Due to the complexity of operations, with which the army has being tasked, it had to adopt major elements of a constabulary force. In addition, the US government still imposes the ability of winning two parallel wars on the army but has also imposed significant restrictions on its budget. US government and the army continually clashed over the issue of ‘objective’ versus ‘subjective control’. Despite the army’s preference for ‘objective control’ it had to accept continued civilian influence, for example in the form of increased opportunities of women and minorities, and its employment in missions other than the preferred conventional warfighting.

As an All-Volunteer Force, the army has attempted to define itself according to a narrow concept of military professionalism focusing on managing violence in the preferred form of fighting major conventional wars. This approach supported the intellectual renaissance of the army after the Vietnam War and enabled operational success in conventional and decisive operations, such as ‘Just Cause’, ‘Desert Storm’ and the early phases of ‘Enduring Freedom’ and ‘Iraqi Freedom’. However, this narrow concept regularly proved to be insufficient to attract sufficient volunteers and had to be enhanced with messaging that focused on opportunity and self-development less resembling a profession but rather an occupation. It also created frictions within the
army as it had to take on complex operations such as in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia as well as Kosovo, and it failed to prepare the army for the stabilization phases in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a consequence, the army needs to adopt a more comprehensive concept of military professionalism defined as the managing of security. This will still include the decisive means of violence but move the focus away from one instrument towards the aim of sustained security, which is ultimately more important and requires appropriate attention in all stages of military planning and execution. The army also has to acknowledge that as a professional organization it incorporates the elements of calling, profession and occupation holistically without contradictions. This concept far better reflects the army’s broad set of capabilities and individual diversity. It will positively affect its ability to successfully operate in complex environments and, with convincing messaging, appeal to a bigger number of potential high-quality volunteers.

The army as an All-Volunteer Force will also continue to redesign its ‘Total Force’ concept. Its active component will have to be reduced further due to the significant increase of costs of the individual soldier as a result of the move to an All-Volunteer Force. To still meet operational requirements, the importance of the reserve components will increase within the concept of an ‘expansible army.’ The right mix between the active and the reserve components, as well the delineation of their tasks, will require further discussion and might include a Congressional Commission on the Army. However, the analysis has also shown, that the focus on the active and reserve components of the army is insufficient when truly referring to a ‘Total Force.’ The increased role of private contractors over the last decade has moved them into the military profession with significant conceptual and practical implications. A true ‘Total Force’ concept that deserves this title has to include the element of private contracting and clarify its future role. Recent operational requirements, as well as those predicted for the future, have also shown a need for civilian expertise that was severely lacking. So far the army has no access to this expertise, although it is generally available in the federal or state public service. The army will have to define its requirements in this regard, so that the US government can develop an approach to ‘draft’
those experts from state or federal public service into the army should it be necessary for operational success.

These conceptual and practical steps will increase the capabilities of the army and its flexibility tremendously. They will preserve those capabilities that ensure that the army wins when decisive operations are adequate. And they will significantly enhance the chance of success in complex environments where the army has struggled so far. This possible increase in utility will apply to one larger operation and different low-level engagements in parallel. But due to its reduced size and need for demanding expansion, the army will struggle with parallel operations of larger size. It will have to develop highly functional mechanisms for employing, expanding and shifting forces to achieve success should simultaneous crises occur.

Ultimately, society and politicians but also the military, which now views its status as an All-Volunteer Force as a major asset, must acknowledge that the utility of the AVF inevitably has its limits in the case of a true national crisis. Should operational requirements, due to their protracted nature or simultaneity, prove the All-Volunteer Force as insufficient, the draft is the obvious instrument of choice. This instrument, though, needs to be sharpened mentally and organizationally to avoid a situation in which the implementation of the draft is perceived as a mental or organizational ‘shock’ that paralyzes rather than enhances the ability of the United States to provide for its security in the case of a national emergency.

There is no strategic pause to be expected for reflecting on the broader issues of how to further shape the All-Volunteer Force to increase its utility and reform it accordingly. But with over forty years of experience, an austere budget environment, and the challenges of a complex operational environment, it is even more important that this reflection and reform are conducted.
Bibliography


