Ready, Reliable, and Relevant: The Army Reserve Component as an Operational Reserve

A Monograph

by

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### ABSTRACT
The Army Reserve Component (RC) has a major role in America’s Global War on Terror (GWOT). Over the past decade and a half, the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) have mobilized hundreds of thousands of Soldiers in support of contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as to numerous other missions worldwide and throughout the Continental United States (CONUS). They have proven their capabilities and exceeded operational expectations, successfully transitioning from the strategic reserve force of the Cold War era to a well-trained and experienced operational reserve force of the GWOT era. The problem facing the Department of Defense (DOD), is determining the future utilization of RC forces, specifically their operational role, their implementation, and the development of a suitable mobilization authority that will support a broad spectrum of future operational requirements. This monograph presents two primary arguments. First, the Army RC should continue its role as an operational reserve in support of future operational requirements. Second, continuing the use of the Army RC as an operational reserve requires the implementation of a new mobilization authority, one that will be more lasting, functional, and suitable for the current operating environment. This monograph presents two key proposals including the sustainment of the RC as an operational reserve, and a comprehensive plan for the implementation of a new mobilization authority. The action plan for these proposals includes a recommended framework and guidelines for a new mobilization authority that will achieve the goals of maintaining the use of RC forces as an operational reserve while modernizing the mobilization process to meet the demands of the current operating environment. A new and improved mobilization authority will allow Army RC forces to remain ready, reliable and relevant, capable of supporting future operational requirements of the 21st century.

### SUBJECT TERMS
Army Reserve Component, Army National Guard, United States Army Reserve, Operational Reserve, Total Force Policy, Mobilization Authority, Reserve Component Ready Force

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
Abstract

Ready, Reliable, and Relevant: The Army Reserve Component as an Operational Reserve, by Lieutenant Colonel Kurt A. Rorvik, 65 pages

The Army Reserve Component (RC) has a major role in America’s Global War on Terror (GWOT). Over the past decade and a half, the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) have mobilized hundreds of thousands of Soldiers in support of contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as to numerous other missions worldwide and throughout the Continental United States (CONUS). They have proven their capabilities and exceeded operational expectations, successfully transitioning from the strategic reserve force of the Cold War era to a well-trained and experienced operational reserve force of the GWOT era. The problem facing the Department of Defense (DOD), is determining the future utilization of RC forces, specifically their operational role, their implementation, and the development of a suitable mobilization authority that will support a broad spectrum of future operational requirements. This monograph presents two primary arguments. First, the Army RC should continue its role as an operational reserve in support of future operational requirements. Second, continuing the use of the Army RC as an operational reserve requires the implementation of a new mobilization authority, one that will be more lasting, functional, and suitable for the current operating environment. This monograph presents two key proposals including the sustainment of the RC as an operational reserve, and a comprehensive plan for the implementation of a new mobilization authority. The action plan for these proposals includes a recommended framework and guidelines for a new mobilization authority that will achieve the goals of maintaining the use of RC forces as an operational reserve while modernizing the mobilization process to meet the demands of the current operating environment. A new and improved mobilization authority will allow Army RC forces to remain ready, reliable and relevant, capable of supporting future operational requirements of the 21st century.
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<th>Description</th>
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<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC/RC</td>
<td>Active Component/Reserve Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin-ADOS</td>
<td>Administrative-Active Duty Operational Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADOS</td>
<td>Active Duty Operational Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>Active Guard Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANGCRRA</td>
<td>Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>Area of Concentration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARFORGEN</td>
<td>Army Force Generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Annual Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCA</td>
<td>Budget Control Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOG</td>
<td>Boots on the Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Chief of the Army Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCMRNF</td>
<td>CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEF</td>
<td>Contingency Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMH</td>
<td>Center of Military History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNGB</td>
<td>Chief of National Guard Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO-ADOS</td>
<td>Contingency Operation-Active Duty Operational Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTS</td>
<td>Contingency Tracking System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DA  Department of the Army
DC  District of Columbia
DEF  Deployment Expeditionary Force
DMDC  Defense Manpower Data Center
DOD  Department of Defense
DODD  Department of Defense Directive
DOT  Department of Transportation
DRB  Division Ready Brigade
DRF  Division Ready Force
ESB  Enhanced Separate Brigade
FY  Fiscal Year
FORSCOM  Forces Command
FTNGD  Full Time National Guard Duty
GRF  Global Response Force
GTMO  Guantanamo Bay
GWOT  Global War on Terrorism
HQDA  Headquarters, Department of the Army
HOA  Horn of Africa
ID  Infantry Division
JFHQ  Joint Force Headquarters
KFOR  Kosovo Force
LAD  Latest Arrival Date
METL  Mission Essential Task List
MFO  Multinational Force and Observers
MOS  Military Occupational Specialty
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization

vi
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGB</td>
<td>National Guard Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOS</td>
<td>Notification of Sourcing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCO</td>
<td>Overseas Contingency Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFS</td>
<td>Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>OND</td>
<td>Operation New Dawn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE</td>
<td>Operation Noble Eagle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP-ADOS</td>
<td>Operational-Active Duty Operational Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUA</td>
<td>Operation United Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB</td>
<td>President’s Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFI</td>
<td>Personnel Force Innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>Professional Military Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPG</td>
<td>Personnel Policy Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Regular Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCRF</td>
<td>Reserve Component Ready Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFPB</td>
<td>Reserve Forces Policy Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIP</td>
<td>Relief-In-Place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROA</td>
<td>Reserve Officers Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECARMY</td>
<td>Secretary of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>Soldier Readiness Processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOD</td>
<td>Tour of Duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSB</td>
<td>Training Support Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOA</td>
<td>Transfer of Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>United States Army Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARC</td>
<td>United States Army Reserve Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YTB</td>
<td>Yearly Training Brief</td>
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Introduction

“So these are all questions that we're looking at, but I think we need to do some hard thinking because we could not have done what we did in Iraq and do what we're doing here in Afghanistan without the operational engagement of the Guard. So I think whatever happens going forward, the Guard is going to continue to have an operational role. How much of the Guard that involves and how we situate the Guard and Reserve going forward, I think, is still a question that everybody is looking at.”

—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Forward Operating Base Sharana, Paktika Province, Afghanistan, June 6, 2011

The Problem

Former Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert Gates’s comments remain relevant in determining the future role of United States Army Reserve Component (RC) forces. Units of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the US Army Reserve (USAR) have completed over a decade of large scale mobilizations to Afghanistan and Iraq in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation New Dawn (OND), as well as in the Continental United States (CONUS) in support of Operation Noble Eagle (ONE). They have proven their capabilities and exceeded operational expectations, successfully transitioning from the strategic reserve force of the Cold War era to a well-trained and experienced operational reserve force of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) era. Today, RC forces are capable of rapidly mobilizing and deploying Soldiers anywhere in the world to perform a wide range of missions. The problem facing the Department of Defense (DOD), as former SECDEF Gates conveyed, involves determining the future utilization of RC forces, specifically their operational role, their implementation, and the development of a suitable mobilization authority that will support a broad spectrum of future operational requirements.

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This monograph presents two primary arguments. First, the Army RC should continue its role as an operational reserve in support of future operational requirements. Second, continuing the use of the Army RC as an operational reserve requires the implementation of a new mobilization authority, one that will be more lasting, functional, and suitable for the current operating environment. There are five principal factors supporting the continued use of the Army RC as an operational reserve. First, over three quarters of a million Army RC Soldiers representing a large scale of ARNG and USAR units have mobilized since September 11, 2001 (9/11) in support of OEF, OIF, OND, and ONE, demonstrating the proven capabilities and very significant operational role of the Army RC in America’s GWOT. Second, as the Regular Army (RA) decreases its end strength, projected to fall to as low as 440,000 to 450,000 Soldiers by 2019, the RC can expect ongoing mobilizations and a substantial operational role. Third, current force structure allocations include a large volume of the Army’s critical support units in the RC, including sustainment units and those historically categorized as combat support (i.e., chemical, engineer, military police, and signal units), as well as civil affairs and medical units. Maintaining such a large volume of the Army’s support force structure in the RC increases the likelihood of their operational use for future operational requirements. Fourth, continuing the use of the RC as an operational reserve is highly supported by senior leaders of each military branch of the RC as well as by senior military leaders in the Active Component (AC). Fifth, the Army’s “Total Force

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Policy” supports the use of the Army RC as an operational reserve as part of the integration of the AC and RC to fulfill global military requirements.4

This monograph presents two key proposals including the sustainment of the Army RC as an operational reserve, and a comprehensive plan for the implementation of a new mobilization authority. The action plan for these proposals includes a recommended framework and guidelines for a new mobilization authority that will achieve the goals of maintaining the use of Army RC forces as an operational reserve while modernizing the mobilization process to meet the demands of the current operating environment. The monograph consists of three primary sections. The first section examines the Army RC’s transition from a strategic reserve of the Cold War era to an operational reserve of the post-9/11 GWOT era, highlighting the expanded capabilities of the Army RC in the first decade and a half of the 21st century. The second section makes a case for the Army RC as an operational reserve, analyzing the current operating environment and illustrating the need for a continuing operational role of the Army RC. The third section provides an analytical review of current mobilization authorities and offers a proposal for a new mobilization authority, one that will streamline the mobilization process and achieve enduring operational reserve goals for Army RC forces going forward. A new and improved mobilization authority will allow Army RC forces to remain ready, reliable and relevant, capable of supporting future operational requirements of the 21st century.

**Background**

Army RC forces have a significant role in America’s fight against terrorism. The presidential declaration of national emergency following the terrorist attacks on America on 9/11 initiated RC mobilizations under the authority of 10 United States Code (USC) 12302.5 Although

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this mobilization authority successfully mobilized hundreds of thousands of RC Soldiers in support of OEF, OIF, OND and ONE, the legal authority of 10 USC 12302 is limited strictly to contingency operations. The initiation of this legal authority was in swift response to a catastrophic national emergency. Its intent was not to serve as a permanent solution or for the mobilization of RC forces for non-contingency operations. Despite continuous global threats of terrorism, it is difficult to justify that a national state of emergency has lasted over 13 years. Eventually, the declaration of national emergency will end and the implementation of a new mobilization authority will be required.

With the conclusions of OIF and OND in Iraq, and the conclusion of OEF and the transition to Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) in Afghanistan, although a large volume of RC forces may no longer be required, given their capabilities, there still remains an operational need to mobilize the RC for specialized missions worldwide. Over the past decade, in addition to Iraq and Afghanistan, RC forces have mobilized and deployed to Kosovo, Egypt, the Horn of Africa (HOA), the Philippines, Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Central America, and numerous mission


locations throughout CONUS. The scheduled reduction in the RA end strength, combined with ongoing global operational needs, places ever increasing demands on RC forces, not only to support combat operations, but also to support peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance missions, and disaster relief efforts. The commencement of Operation United Assistance (OUA) in West Africa in September 2014, illustrates the ongoing role of the Army RC as an operational reserve and the need to mobilize RC forces rapidly and efficiently for various types of operations. In November 2014, the DOD ordered the mobilization of approximately 2,100 ARNG and USAR Soldiers, representing over half of the OUA planned force of 4,000 US service members. Although changes in mission requirements later resulted in a smaller military force


deploying to West Africa, RC units played a significant role in the planning and execution of OUA, validating their role as an operational reserve.12

The role of the RC as part of the overall mission of the US military has greatly evolved over the past few decades. In 1970, force reductions and the end of the draft prompted then SECDEF Melvin Laird to introduce the “Total Force” concept, directing the RC to be more directly involved in national defense and reinforcing the AC during times of war.13 Laird’s successor, SECDEF James Schlesinger, further developed this concept with the implementation of the “Total Force Policy,” directing each service to integrate their Active and Reserve Components with the intent of building cohesion.14 Finally, the “Abrams Doctrine,” introduced by former Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Creighton Abrams, promoted an increased involvement of National Guard and Reserve forces.15 In the aftermath of the publicly unpopular Vietnam War, General Abrams believed that the use of citizen-Soldiers would garner public support and build legitimacy for future military operations.16 These policies developed a lasting foundation for an increased relevancy for RC forces.

More recently, the role of the RC has become increasingly significant. On October 29, 2008, former SECDEF Robert Gates issued Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force.

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14 Ibid., 278.


16 Ibid.
as an operational force as part of the strategic US military mission. Subsequently, on September 4, 2012, Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) John McHugh issued Army Directive 2012-08, 

*Army Total Force Policy*. This 21st century revamped edition of the Total Force Policy accents the expanded role of the Army RC as part of the Total Army mission. These two policies call for the RC to continue its utilization as an operational reserve in support of future mission requirements. The Army’s strategy for its Total Force Policy is to make the Active and Reserve Components an integrated operational force that plans and fulfills national military requirements.

The effective implementation of the Total Force Policy requires unified strategic planning efforts from both the Active and Reserve Components. Determining exactly how and where RC forces mobilize to meet operational requirements necessitates a mobilization authority that will allow RC planners the ability to conduct long range planning with the flexibility for potential mission changes. The current mobilization authority under 10 USC 12302 occurred as an emergency response to the terrorist attacks on America on 9/11, thus it lacks the depth and expanded capability for planners to utilize RC forces for broader missions as part of the Total Force Policy.

Although there have been efforts to develop a more applicable mobilization authority that meets the needs for RC forces, thus far they have fallen short. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year (FY) 2012 included the implementation of mobilization under the authority of 10 USC 12304b, allowing the activation of RC forces for

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19 Ibid., 1.

20 Ibid.
operations during times other than war or national emergency.\textsuperscript{21} Although 10 USC 12304b provides a means of mobilizing RC forces without a presidential declaration of national emergency, it contains operational limitations that prevent it from serving as a viable long range mobilization authority and solution to the current problem.

**Proposed Solution**

Army RC forces require a new mobilization authority enacted into law for efficient and long range utilization as an operational reserve for future mission requirements in support of the Army’s Total Force Policy. This new mobilization authority must streamline the mobilization alert and orders process, providing flexibility and long range planning capabilities to RC units and Soldiers. An updated and improved mobilization authority will allow Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Forces Command (FORSCOM), the National Guard Bureau (NGB), the Unites States Army Reserve Command (USARC), and First Army, the ability to efficiently and practically mobilize, train, and deploy RC forces worldwide in support of future operations. This will achieve the goal of Army RC forces remaining ready, reliable and relevant, capable of supporting future operational requirements of the 21st century.

**The Transition: A Strategic Reserve to an Operational Reserve**

**Introduction**

Army RC forces have experienced a significant transformation in the 21st century. They have transitioned from a strategic reserve force of the Cold War era to an operational reserve force of the GWOT era. At the height of America’s involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2007, former CSA, General George Casey, Jr., outlined the changing role of the RC: “We must continue to adapt our reserve components from a paradigm of a strategic reserve only

mobilized in national emergencies, to an operational reserve, employed on a cyclical basis to add
depth to the active force. This has been happening for the last six years and will be required in a
future of persistent conflict.”

The contributions of the Army RC as part of America’s GWOT are significant. 
Approximately 775,000 ARNG and USAR Soldiers have mobilized since 9/11. Over half of
Army RC Soldiers are combat veterans. The RC has proven that it is a relevant operational
force that can effectively supplement the AC during major operations, meeting the goals of the
Army’s Total Force Policy.

**The Cold War Era**

Throughout the Cold War era, the role of the RC was primarily that of a strategic reserve,
planned for use only in the event of a total war with the former Soviet Union. The RC served
not as an immediate operational capability, but rather as a long range asset to be committed only
during times of war or national emergency. During the Cold War period, with the exception of
the Korean War, there was only one major mobilization, Desert Shield and Desert Storm from

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22 George Casey, Jr., “The Strength of the Nation,” *Army Magazine* 57, no. 10 (October

23 National Guard: Always Ready, Always There, “Army National Guard History:

24 John Nagl and Travis Sharp, “Operational for What’ The Future of the Guard and
Reserves,” The Official Homepage of the United States Army, News Archives, Article,

25 Kathryn Coker, *The Indispensable Force: The Post-Cold War Operational Army
Reserve, 1990-2010* (Fort Bragg, NC: Office of Army Reserve History, United States Army
Reserve Command, 2013), 32.

26 Ibid.
1990-1991, occurring at the very end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{27} 238,729 RC personnel representing all branches of service mobilized worldwide in support of Desert Shield and Desert Storm.\textsuperscript{28} Of this total, 148,632 came from the ARNG and the USAR.\textsuperscript{29} Even with this large scale, it represented less than 20 percent of the total Army RC force at that time. In 1990, the ARNG and USAR end strengths were 444,224 and 335,000 respectively, for a total of 779,224.\textsuperscript{30}

Therefore, over nearly half a century, from the end of the Korean War in 1953 to just prior to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, there was only one major mobilization of Army RC forces.\textsuperscript{31} The vast majority of RC Soldiers spent their entire careers in the ARNG or USAR without ever serving an activation. The result was an inexperienced RC force with limited capabilities and untested mobilization readiness. Table 1 represents the number of Army RC personnel mobilized for major military operations from 1950 to 2000 and illustrates the use of the Army RC as a strategic reserve.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Mobilized Force & Notes \\
\hline
1950 & 12,000 & \\
1960 & 25,000 & \\
1970 & 50,000 & \\
1980 & 100,000 & \\
1990-1991 & 238,729 & Described in Table 1.
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Army RC Mobilization Forces 1950-2000.}
\end{table}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} Michael Doubler, “Will They Be Ready? Guard and Reserve Mobilization Issues in the War on Terror,” in The U.S. Citizen-Soldier at War: A Retrospective Look and the Road Ahead (Chicago: McCormick Tribune Foundation, 2008), 58.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Doubler, “Will They Be Ready?” 58; Coker, The Indispensable Force, 19.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Jacob Klerman, Rethinking the Reserves (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 10.
\end{itemize}
Table 1. Number of Army RC Personnel Mobilized for Major Military Operations, 1950-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation / Conflict</th>
<th>Mobilization Period(s)</th>
<th>ARNG</th>
<th>USAR</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Korean War</td>
<td>July 31, 1950 – December 1, 1953</td>
<td>138,600</td>
<td>240,500</td>
<td>379,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Berlin Crisis</td>
<td>September 25, 1961 – August 31, 1962</td>
<td>44,091</td>
<td>69,263</td>
<td>113,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Cuban Missile Crisis</td>
<td>October 28, 1962 – November 31, 1962</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just Cause / Panama</td>
<td>December 20, 1989 – January 31, 1990</td>
<td>Data Unavailable</td>
<td>Data Unavailable</td>
<td>Data Unavailable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified Task Force (UNITAF) / Restore Hope / Somalia</td>
<td>December 8, 1992 – March 25, 1994</td>
<td>Data Unavailable</td>
<td>Data Unavailable</td>
<td>Data Unavailable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uphold Democracy / Haiti</td>
<td>September 20, 1994 – May 1, 1996</td>
<td>8,454</td>
<td>1,897</td>
<td>10,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Endeavor, Joint Guard, and Joint Forge / Bosnia</td>
<td>December 11, 1995 – December 2, 2004</td>
<td>5,567</td>
<td>12,652</td>
<td>18,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations in Southwest Asia to include Desert Falcon and Desert Fox</td>
<td>March 1, 1998 – March 19, 2003</td>
<td>1,287</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>1,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo Force (KFOR) / Kosovo</td>
<td>May 1, 1999 – Present</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>270,895</strong></td>
<td><strong>421,007</strong></td>
<td><strong>691,902</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32 Table 1 presents RC mobilization data from 1950-2000, during the Cold War era and just prior to the GWOT era. The ending point for the mobilization data is February 3, 2000, even though the mobilization periods for three of these operations continued into the 21st century. The ARNG and the USAR did not mobilize forces for the Cuban Missile Crisis, however it is included in this table because President John F. Kennedy ordered the mobilization of 14,200 Air Force Reserve personnel, making it a significant mobilization of RC forces during this period. Operation Just Cause did not include the involuntary mobilization of Army RC units, however approximately 300 USAR Soldiers volunteered and provided civil affairs support. In addition, a platoon from the 1138th Military Police Company of the Missouri ARNG was in Panama conducting unit annual training and ordered to active service. The data containing the total number of ARNG Soldiers activated in Panama is unavailable. UNITAF / Restore Hope also did not include the involuntary mobilization of Army RC units, however approximately 48 USAR Soldiers volunteered and formed the 711th Adjutant General Postal Company (Provisional), providing postal services for US Soldiers deployed in Somalia. Additionally, USAR Soldier volunteers from the 352nd Civil Affairs Command provided civil affairs support. The data containing the total number of USAR Soldiers activated in Somalia is unavailable. Although US Military operations as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia officially ended on December 2, 2004, the RC mobilization data presented in this table is limited to the time period of December 11, 1995 to February 3, 2000. The operations in Southwest Asia to include Desert Falcon and Desert Fox supported the enforcement of the United Nations (UN) ceasefire agreement following the first Persian Gulf War in 1991. The operations officially ended on March 18, 2003 as the US Military commenced OIF on March 19, 2003. The RC mobilization data presented in this table is limited to the time period of March 1, 1998 to February 3, 2000. Although US Military operations as part of the NATO-led KFOR in Kosovo are still ongoing, the RC mobilization data presented in this table is limited to the time period of May 1, 1999 to February 3, 2000.
Table 1 demonstrates the evolution of RC mobilizations in the second half of the 20th century, which would set the stage for even more evolutionary changes in the 21st century. Of particular importance are changes that occurred at the end of the Cold War. For approximately four decades at the height of the Cold War from the 1950s to the 1980s, RC forces mobilized in support of four operations. In contrast, in the 1990s, during just one decade, RC forces mobilized in support of seven operations. This signaled an increasing operational role for RC forces.

One major contributing factor for this change was the implementation of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act (ANGCRRA) of 1992 as part of the NDAA for FY 1992 and FY 1993. The intent of this legislation was to increase the operational readiness of ARNG and USAR units, as well as to build constructive relationships between AC and RC units. It became widely known throughout the Army as the Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) program. RC units throughout the Army received AC officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) assigned as training advisors. The AC/RC program also included the fielding

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of 18 Training Support Brigades (TSBs) and two AC/RC integrated divisions, each containing ARNG Enhanced Separate Brigades (ESBs) and an AC division headquarters. TSBs assisted RC units with the development of mission essential task lists (METL), Yearly Training Briefs (YTB), and training plans for weekend drills and annual training (AT). When RC units mobilized, TSBs focused on post-mobilization training, which increased mobilization efficiency, particularly after 9/11. First Army Division West and Division East later assumed the role of the integrated divisions, providing command and control over TSBs and managing RC unit training and mobilization readiness.

The AC/RC program has proven to be far more favorable and successful than its predecessor programs, CAPSTONE and WARTRACE. Under CAPSTONE and WARTRACE, RC units maintained both a peacetime and a wartime chain of command. AC units were responsible for collectively training and mentoring RC units, and in the event of war, the units would likely deploy together. The primary deficiency with CAPSTONE and WARTRACE was that AC units did not receive additional time or resources to perform these additional tasks.

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36 Ibid., 6.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., 15.

39 CAPSTONE and WARTRACE are not acronyms. These terms are referenced in Chapman, “Planning for Employment of the Reserve Components,” 1-4; 6-9; 11-12.


41 Ibid., 4.
units had their own training missions and METL tasks to focus on first, making these the priority over working with their RC counterparts. This allowed little time for AC units to truly develop a functional working relationship with their designated RC units. Additionally, RC units train primarily during weekends, which is typically off duty time for AC units, making scheduling training both difficult and unpopular among Soldiers. The lack of time and resources devoted to CAPSTONE and WARTRACE made it very difficult to achieve positive results.

The deficiencies of CAPSTONE and WARTRACE were perhaps most evident during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, when the 24th Infantry Division (ID) from Fort Stewart, Georgia, selected the 197th Infantry Brigade from Fort Benning, Georgia, to deploy with them, rather than the 24th ID’s designated roundout brigade, the 48th Infantry Brigade from the Georgia ARNG. In total, three ARNG combat brigades activated during Desert Shield and Desert Storm but never deployed to the Persian Gulf: the 155th Armor Brigade from the Mississippi ARNG, the 256th Infantry Brigade from the Louisiana ARNG, and the 48th Infantry Brigade from the Georgia ARNG. These actions suggested a lack of confidence by the AC in the deployment readiness of RC units, and prompted necessary changes to improve the training and readiness of RC units.

The AC/RC program has been instrumental in increasing the operational readiness and relevance of RC units. The AC/RC program simply devotes more time and resources to training RC units than CAPSTONE and WARTRACE, leading to more positive results. The difficulties that existed for AC Soldiers under CAPSTONE and WARTRACE, including performing their AC unit mission while also trying to allot time to train RC Soldiers, no longer exist. The AC/RC program directly assigns AC Soldiers to RC units with a clearly focused and sole mission of


43 Ibid., 9.

44 Ibid., 10.
advising and assisting RC unit training and operational readiness. These efforts paid dividends throughout the 1990s and even more so after 9/11 when mobilizations and the operational tempo of RC units increased significantly. Army RC units would prove to have a much more substantial role in the 21st century GWOT era.

The Post-9/11 GWOT Era

Table 1 revealed that over a 50 year period during the Cold War era, a total of 691,902 Army RC Soldiers mobilized. Contrast this with the GWOT era, in which approximately 775,000 Army RC Soldiers mobilized over a 14 year period from 2001 to 2014. These numbers clearly indicate a transition of Army RC forces from a strategic reserve of the Cold War era to an operational reserve of the GWOT era. Table 2 illustrates the volume and operational use of the Army RC from 2001 to 2014.

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Table 2. Number of Army RC Personnel Mobilized by Year, 2001 to 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ARNG</th>
<th>USAR</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>18,515</td>
<td></td>
<td>18,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>29,927</td>
<td></td>
<td>29,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>155,748</td>
<td></td>
<td>155,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>159,972</td>
<td></td>
<td>159,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>116,946</td>
<td></td>
<td>116,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>73,159</td>
<td></td>
<td>73,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>71,711</td>
<td></td>
<td>71,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>69,151</td>
<td>27,828</td>
<td>96,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>73,727</td>
<td>31,516</td>
<td>105,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>47,098</td>
<td>25,924</td>
<td>73,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>46,621</td>
<td>20,314</td>
<td>66,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>26,104</td>
<td>14,628</td>
<td>40,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>19,079</td>
<td>12,929</td>
<td>32,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>8,492</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>18,392</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by the author using data from two sources. The data collected for 2001 to 2007 is from Department of Defense News Releases of the total number of National Guard and Reserve personnel mobilized in December of each year. The data collected for 2008 to 2014 is from the Contingency Tracking System (CTS) Daily Processing Files produced by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), reporting the number of RC members activated in December of each year.

Comparing 691,902 personnel mobilized over a 50 year period to approximately 775,000 personnel mobilized over a 14 year period signifies a heavier reliance on the Army RC for operational use in the 21st century compared to the latter half of the 20th century. A review of statistical data from the preliminary years of OEF and OIF demonstrates that the Army RC was responsible for a significant share of the Army’s overall operational requirements. From September 2001 to November 2007, a total of 1,650,241 US service members representing all branches of service, had deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.\(^48\) Of this total, 254,894 were from the Army and Air National Guard and 202,113 were from the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Reserves.\(^49\) This total of 457,007 RC personnel represented nearly 28 percent of the total US

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\(^49\) Ibid.
force deployed to OEF and OIF. The ARNG and USAR made up the vast majority of these RC forces. These statistics indicate a validation of the Total Force Policy, with RC forces successfully augmenting AC forces.

Further indicators supporting the Total Force Policy include the considerable operational role of the ARNG during OIF. During the third rotation of OIF in 2005, out of the 13 BCTs deployed in Iraq, five were from the ARNG, accounting for approximately 38 percent of the total combat force. Throughout FY 2005, in total, the ARNG had one division and nine BCTs mobilized worldwide, and more than 141,700 ARNG Soldiers served on active duty in support of CONUS and OCONUS operations. Also in 2005, the 42nd ID, an ARNG division headquartered in New York, commanded both AC and ARNG brigades. This represented the first time since the Korean War that an ARNG division deployed for a combat operation and was the first time in history that an ARNG division commanded AC brigades in a combat zone.

Although the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were the largest contributing factor in the increase of RC mobilizations, Army RC forces have mobilized in numerous other locations, demonstrating their range and adaptability, and further validating their use as an operational reserve. Table 3 represents the location and number of ARNG Soldiers mobilized since 9/11.

50 Waterhouse and O’Bryant, “National Guard Personnel and Deployments: Fact Sheet,” 5.


52 Ibid., 35

53 National Guard: Always Ready, Always There, “About the Army National Guard.”

54 Ibid.
Table 3. Location and Number of ARNG Soldiers Mobilized Since 9/11\textsuperscript{55}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of ARNG Soldiers Mobilized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>217,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest Asia</td>
<td>102,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>101,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>56,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>18,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>8,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>8,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>3,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Georgia</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the World</td>
<td>16,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>534,548</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The wide range of mission locations shown in Table 3 demonstrates the versatility and adaptability of the Army RC to augment AC forces and function as an operational reserve. For the ARNG, the increased operational tempo has also included numerous mobilizations for domestic operations. In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita resulted in the largest National Guard mobilization for disaster relief in American history.\textsuperscript{56} Over 50,000 Army and Air National Guard members representing all 50 states, the District of Columbia (DC), the territories of Guam and the US Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, mobilized to the Gulf Coast states of

\textsuperscript{55} The Army National Guard: Always Ready, Always There, “Army National Guard By the Numbers,” web page posts periodic data updates. Table 3 reflects data collected through December 1, 2014.

\textsuperscript{56} National Guard: Always Ready, Always There, “About the Army National Guard.”
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Texas.\textsuperscript{57} Thousands of additional Guardsmen provided coordination and logistical support from other areas.\textsuperscript{58} ARNG aviation units deployed 146 rotary wing aircraft to the region, flying more than 7,300 missions and transporting nearly 6,200 civilians to safety.\textsuperscript{59} This mobilization occurred while approximately 80,000 National Guard members were serving on active duty in other locations throughout the world, illustrating the full range and mobilization capabilities of the National Guard.\textsuperscript{60} Table 4 illustrates the number of duty days the ARNG performed for domestic missions from FY 2005 to FY 2014.


\textsuperscript{58} Neumann, \textit{Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 2005}, 36.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{60} National Guard: Always Ready, Always There, “About the Army National Guard.”
Table 4. ARNG Domestic Mission Response, FY 2005 to FY 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Duty Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1,988,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2,185,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>394,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>630,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>296,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>512,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>907,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>447,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>387,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>699,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,450,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Further increasing the operational capabilities of the Army RC, the NDAA for FY 2012 added mobilizations under the authority of 10 USC 12304a, authorizing the SECDEF to mobilize members of the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air Force Reserve to provide domestic relief in response to major disasters or emergencies. Under this new mobilization authority, any time a state governor requests federal assistance during major disasters and emergencies, the SECDEF may involuntarily mobilize reservists for up to 120 days.

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61 The number of duty days represents one Soldier performing one duty day. The Army National Guard: Always Ready, Always There, “Army National Guard By the Numbers,” web page posts periodic data updates. Table 4 reflects data collected through December 1, 2014.

to provide assistance. Historically, the Army and Air National Guard primarily performed domestic operations of this type. 10 USC 12304a now allows the USAR and other reserve branches of service to assist with domestic relief operations. When a disaster or emergency strikes, it is quite possible that the USAR may have mission critical vehicles, equipment, or other assets available at armories near the disaster area, which can now be mobilized and quickly employed to provide relief. This is particularly important if, for example, the Army and Air National Guard do not have those same assets immediately available near the disaster area.

The demonstrated competency of the Army RC to mobilize sizeable numbers of Soldiers in support of domestic operations, while simultaneously executing large scale mobilizations overseas for more than a decade, proves the Army RC’s capabilities as an operational reserve. The Army RC’s substantial operational use and demonstrated achievements throughout the first decade and a half of the 21st century, illustrates the likelihood for continued success. Based on proven capabilities in its recent history, current operational conditions, and future operational requirements, the sustainment of the Army RC as an operational reserve is a smart and logical course of action.

**Sustaining the RC as an Operational Reserve**

**Introduction**

Sustaining the use of the RC as an operational reserve is a critical component of the Army’s Total Force Policy strategy. As Admiral Mike Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) remarked in 2010, “We could not have accomplished what we have these past eight years were it not for our Reserve and National Guard forces.” Executing the overall missions in Afghanistan and Iraq simply required the augmentation of AC forces by RC forces.

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64 Talley, “Twice the Citizen,” 104.

65 Nagl and Sharp, “Operational for What’ The Future of the Guard and Reserves.”
The mass mobilization of RC forces resulted in enhanced training and invaluable combat experience for the overwhelming majority of RC Soldiers. It professionalized the RC force, developing more experienced and competent Soldiers, capable of performing a variety of missions worldwide.

The role of the RC has evolved greatly since the end of the Cold War and the start of the GWOT, demonstrating the full range of its mobilization capabilities. The post 9/11 RC has a great deal of deployed experience around the world, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also to Kosovo, Egypt, Djibouti, the Philippines, GTMO, Central America, and a multitude of CONUS locations.\textsuperscript{66} The Department of Defense (DOD) 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review validates the contributions of the RC and emphasizes its transition to an operational reserve: “More than a decade of sustained and large-scale use of Reserve Component Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines, conducting overseas contingency operations and supporting domestic emergencies has transformed our Reserve Components to a force that is routinely and effectively engaged in a wide range of missions.”\textsuperscript{67}

\textbf{The Current Operating Environment}

The current operating environment, including the impending drawdown of the AC, suggests only an increased operational role in the future for RC forces. Under the DOD manpower requirements included in the President’s Budget (PB) for FY 2015, the Army will reduce its total end strength to 980,000 by FY 2017: 450,000 in the RA, 335,000 in the ARNG,

\textsuperscript{66} Soucy, “National Guard is ‘All In’ for Deployments;” Army National Guard: Always Ready, Always There, “Army National Guard By the Numbers.”

and 195,000 in the USAR.\footnote{Defense Manpower Requirements Report: Fiscal Year 2015,” Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness & Force Management, Total Force Planning & Requirements Directorate, June 2014: 106, accessed December 24, 2014, http://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/RFM/TFPRQ/docs/F15%20DMRR.pdf.} Under these proposals, the Army’s force mix ratio will change considerably from a 51 percent AC and 49 percent RC mix in FY 2012 to a 54 percent RC and 46 percent AC mix by FY 2017.\footnote{Ibid.} These numbers signify an increased reliance upon RC forces to meet future operational requirements.

Even more concerning are the sequestration impacts of the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011, which plans for a reduction in the Army’s total end strength to 920,000 by FY 19: 420,000 in the RA, 315,000 in the ARNG, and 185,000 in the USAR.\footnote{“Estimated Impacts of Sequestration-Level Funding: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request,” Department of Defense, News, Publications, April 2014: 1-2; 3-1, accessed January 3, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Estimated_Impacts_of_Sequestration-Level_Funding_April.pdf.} The PB for FY 2015 would essentially prevent this action and instead maintain the Army’s end strength at a total force of 970,000-980,000 from FY 2016 to FY 2019 (440,000-450,000 RA, 335,000 ARNG, and 195,000 USAR).\footnote{Ibid., 3-1.} However, Congress must approve the PB for FY 2015 in order to maintain the Army’s end strength at these levels and ultimately prevent the BCA end strength levels.\footnote{Ibid., 1-2; 3-1.} These conditions demonstrate a smaller AC force and a continued use of the RC in support of future operational requirements. Table 5 illustrates changes in the Army’s end strength from 2001 to 2015, and the trend in recent years of an increasing RC force as part of the AC to RC force mix ratio.
Table 5. RA, ARNG, and USAR End Strength by Year, FY 2001 to FY 2015\textsuperscript{73}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>RA</th>
<th>ARNG</th>
<th>USAR</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Force Mix Ratio (AC to RC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>480,000</td>
<td>350,526</td>
<td>205,300</td>
<td>1,035,826</td>
<td>46.3% / 53.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>480,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>1,035,000</td>
<td>46.4% / 53.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>482,400</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>1,037,400</td>
<td>46.5% / 53.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>502,400</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>1,057,400</td>
<td>47.5% / 52.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>512,400</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>1,067,400</td>
<td>48.0% / 52.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>502,400</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>1,057,400</td>
<td>47.5% / 52.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>525,400</td>
<td>351,300</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>1,081,700</td>
<td>48.6% / 51.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>532,400</td>
<td>352,600</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>1,090,000</td>
<td>48.8% / 51.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>562,400</td>
<td>358,200</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>1,125,600</td>
<td>50.0% / 50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>569,400</td>
<td>358,200</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>1,132,600</td>
<td>50.3% / 49.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>562,000</td>
<td>358,200</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>1,125,200</td>
<td>50.0% / 50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>552,100</td>
<td>358,200</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>1,115,300</td>
<td>49.5% / 50.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>520,000</td>
<td>354,200</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>1,079,200</td>
<td>48.2% / 51.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>490,000</td>
<td>350,200</td>
<td>202,000</td>
<td>1,042,200</td>
<td>47.0% / 53.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6 reveals the impacts of the BCA on the Army’s end strength, showing end strength reductions that would occur across the RA, ARNG, and USAR between FY 2016 and FY 2019, unless the PB for FY 2015 is approved by Congress. Regardless of these reductions, the RC force would continue to increase as part of the AC to RC force mix ratio.

Table 6. RA, ARNG, and USAR End Strength Projections for FY 2016 to FY 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>RA</th>
<th>ARNG</th>
<th>USAR</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Force Mix Ratio (AC to RC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>470,000</td>
<td>336,000</td>
<td>195,000</td>
<td>1,001,000</td>
<td>47.0% / 53.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>329,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>969,000</td>
<td>46.4% / 53.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>430,000</td>
<td>322,000</td>
<td>186,000</td>
<td>938,000</td>
<td>45.8% / 54.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>420,000</td>
<td>315,000</td>
<td>185,000</td>
<td>920,000</td>
<td>45.7% / 54.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The drawdown of the AC and increase of the RC in the AC to RC force mix ratio is just one indicator of an expanded use of the RC as an operational reserve. Another important contributing factor supporting the RC as an operational reserve includes force structure allocations placing critical support units in the RC. The USAR retains the majority of sustainment units and those historically categorized as combat support (i.e., chemical, engineer, military police, and signal units), as well as civil affairs and medical units. In a 2012 address, Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, the former Chief of the Army Reserve (CAR) explained the significance: "To the point where today, if you're in the transportation community in the Guard and Reserve, you

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74 “Estimated Impacts of Sequestration-Level Funding,” 3-1. This is a DOD report on the DOD FY 2015 Budget Request and the reductions of military end strengths that would result from the imposed sequestration cuts from the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011. The President’s Budget (PB) for FY 2015 proposes to maintain the Army’s end strength at a total force of 970,000-980,000 from FY 2016 to FY 2019 (440,000-450,000 RA, 335,000 ARNG, and 195,000 USAR). If Congress approves the PB for FY 2015, the DOD would maintain the Army’s end strength at these levels.
represent about 80-85 percent of the Army's capability." General Stultz went on to add that the RC maintains about 75 percent of the Army’s engineer units, 70 percent of medical units, 85 percent of civil affairs units, 66 percent of the Army's logistics capacity, and 70 percent of military police units. With such a large volume of the Army’s support forces in the RC, it significantly increases the likelihood of their continued operational use in support of future operational requirements.

The Continuing Operational Role of the Army RC

At a Reserve Officers Association (ROA) conference in Arlington, Virginia in August 2013, the senior leaders of each military branch of the RC, including the ARNG, the USAR, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, and the Coast Guard Reserve openly supported the concept of continuing the use of RC forces an operational reserve. The Chief of National Guard Bureau (NGB), General Frank Grass emphasized readiness and illustrated the importance of maintaining the RC as an operational reserve: “We need to continue to engage in the operational missions of our services…We have to look like the Army and the Air Force, and we have to have missions that get us into the fight so we can continue to grow leaders that can be ready at a moment's notice anywhere in the world.” Lieutenant General Richard Mills, Commander of Marine Forces Reserve, spoke in practical


76 Ibid.


78 Ibid.
terms, pointing out that with a smaller AC force, “You've got to have a Reserve that's ready, enabled and trained to go out the door fairly quickly.”\textsuperscript{79} He went on to explain that an operational reserve will also ensure that AC units receive adequate dwell time at home to reset.\textsuperscript{80}

Taking into account budget cutbacks and limited resources, Lieutenant General James Jackson, Chief of the Air Force Reserve discussed the advantages of the RC: “Why pay for something every day, 24/7, when you can put it in the Reserve component and have it only when you need it?”\textsuperscript{81} Further supporting the sustainment of an operational reserve, Vice Admiral Robin Braun, the Chief of the Navy Reserve, added, “This is a perfect time to look to see what mission areas we can move into the Reserve components and then, as we draw down on the active component side, take advantage of those great Sailors who are leaving the Active component and move them into the Reserve component.”\textsuperscript{82} Finally, Marine Corps Major General (Retired) Arnold Punero, Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB), summarized the important partnership between the AC and the RC going forward: “This is not and should not be an 'us versus them...This should be a hand-in-glove situation. We're all in this together. ... The Guard and Reserves bring tremendous capacity to the active components. ... This capacity is not at their expense.”\textsuperscript{83}

Sustaining the RC as an operational reserve supports the principles of the Army’s Total Force Policy. Since 9/11, the RC has proven its capability to mobilize worldwide and perform a variety of missions. Continuing the use of the RC as an operational reserve is widely supported by senior leaders from each military branch of the RC as well as by senior military leaders in the

\textsuperscript{79} Greenhill, “Chiefs: National Guard, Reserves Should Remain Strong, Operational.”

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
AC. From a practical standpoint, given the impending drawdown of AC forces, limited resources, and the large capacity of sustainment and support assets residing in the RC, sustaining the RC as an operational reserve is a logical and cost effective strategy. Converting this strategy into a viable solution requires the implementation of a new mobilization authority, one that goes beyond using the RC strictly in response to national emergencies, to one that is more enduring and structured for the RC as an operational reserve in support of future operational requirements.

Proposal for a New Mobilization Authority

Introduction

Army RC forces are playing a significant role in America’s GWOT in support of the Army’s Total Force Policy. Since 9/11, the ARNG has mobilized more than 500,000 Soldiers worldwide in support of federal military operations including OEF, OIF, OND, and ONE.84 The USAR has mobilized over 275,000 Soldiers.85 This significant volume of mobilizations and the continued use of the RC as an operational reserve demonstrate the need for changes and modernization to current mobilization policies. A functional and effective mobilization authority that will streamline the mobilization process for RC units and Soldiers is required.

Five years after 9/11, during an extremely demanding operational environment for all components of the Army, former CSA, General Peter Schoomaker, recognized that mobilization policies for the RC were outdated and in desperate need for change.86 In a December 2006

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84 National Guard: Always Ready, Always There, “Army National Guard History: Always Ready, Always There.”


address to the Congressional Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, General Schoomaker remarked, “Today's reserve components hardly resemble the reserve components of the Cold War, which were - by design - principally elements of the Nation's strategic reserve.”

He went on to add, “…we need to reexamine our mobilization policies, authorities and practices which evolved from laws written more than 50 years ago for a conscripted force and a strategic reserve.” Indeed, the transition of the Army RC from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve requires new and revamped mobilization policies.

The RC has proven that it is a relevant operational force that can effectively supplement the AC during major operations, meeting the goals of the Army’s Total Force Policy. In over 13 years since the attacks of 9/11, the mobilization authority under 10 USC 12302 has served its purpose but is no longer a practical means of mobilizing RC forces for future operations. Subsequently, the mobilization authority under 10 USC 12304b simply has too many limitations to serve as an effective replacement process to mobilize RC forces for future operational requirements.

The implementation of a new mobilization authority is required; one that will be more inclusive, lasting, functional, and suitable for the current operating environment. The remainder of this monograph will identify the deficiencies and limitations of current mobilization authorities, and offer a proposed framework and guidelines for a new mobilization authority. It will compare and contrast current mobilization authorities with the newly proposed mobilization authority, demonstrating clear advantages of establishing a new mobilization authority. The newly proposed mobilization authority will posture the RC to successfully function and operate as an operational reserve in support of future operational requirements.

87 Schoomaker, “Statement by General Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff United States Army.”

88 Ibid.
Analytical Review of Current Mobilization Authorities

Section 10 of the USC provides several methods for mobilizing RC service members, covering a wide range of legal authorities and purposes. 10 USC 12301(a) is for a full mobilization requiring congressional declaration of war or national emergency (i.e., in the event of a total war). 89 10 USC 12302 is for a partial mobilization requiring a presidential declaration of national emergency (i.e., for limited wars such as OEF and OIF). 90 10 USC 12304b authorizes combatant commander preplanned missions to augment AC forces. 91 10 USC 12301(d) is for Active Duty Operational Support (ADOS) for voluntary active duty for contingency operations and other operational support. 92 32 USC 502(f) is for National Guard only and authorizes Full Time National Guard Duty (FTNGD) and operational support for a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives (CBRNE) Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF), to perform counter-drug operations, and for support of the southwest border mission (i.e., Operation Jump Start and Operation Phalanx). 93


forces, 10 USC 12406 authorizes the President to mobilize National Guard forces from any state in the numbers required to repel the invasion, suppress the rebellion, or to execute US laws.\textsuperscript{100}

In addition to mobilization authorities for operations, there are numerous mobilization authorities for training, support, and administrative purposes, both involuntary and voluntary. These include annual training; other training duty; the performance of funeral honors; muster duty; to receive medical care, evaluation, and/or treatment; for disciplinary purposes; for failing to attend required drills (also known as an unsatisfactory participant); for RC service members determined by the SECDEF and Service Secretary to be in a captive status due to hostile action; for failing to complete a statutory service obligation; and for active duty service of Army and Air National Guard officers at NGB.\textsuperscript{101} Table 7 illustrates RC mobilization legal authorities for operations. Table 8 presents RC mobilization legal authorities for training, support, and administrative purposes.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Authority</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Coordination</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12301(a)</td>
<td>Full Mobilization [WWI, WWII]</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>Requires Congressional declaration of war or national emergency: Includes all Reserve categories</td>
<td>No number limitation; Duration of war/emergency + 6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12302</td>
<td>Partial Mobilization [ONE, OEF, OIF]</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>Requires Presidential declaration of national emergency</td>
<td>Not more than 1M Ready Reserves; Up to 24 consecutive months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12304</td>
<td>Presidential Reserve Call-Up (PRC) [OJG/OJE, KFOR]</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>Emergency response: Notification of Congress; No Congressional action required Operational mission: Soldiers participate only one time in any &quot;named&quot; campaign</td>
<td>Not more than 200K Selected Reserves with up to 30K IRR; No longer than 365 days; Emergency response limited to WMD or terrorist attack; Not natural or manmade disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12304a</td>
<td>Military Reserve Emergency Activation</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Activation</td>
<td>Determined by SECDEF; Governor request; Response to major US disasters or emergencies</td>
<td>No number limitation stated; Only Reserves; Does not apply to National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12304b</td>
<td>Combatant Commander Preplanned Missions</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>Determined by Military Secretary: Augment the active forces for preplanned missions ISO COCOMs</td>
<td>Not more than 60K Selected Reserves; No longer than 365 days; Costs must be identified in FY Defense Budget Materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12301(d)</td>
<td>Operational Support/Additional duty [ADOS-AC (CO-ADOS, OP-ADOS, Admin-ADOS); ADOS-RC; AGR (10 USC 12301)]</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Reserves &amp; National Guard; Service Secretary Authority; Requires RC SM's consent; Requires Governor's consent for NG SM</td>
<td>No number limitation stated; No duration stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 USC 502(f)</td>
<td>Operational Support/Additional duty [FTNGD-OS; CCMRF; Counter-drug (32 USC 112); SWB]</td>
<td>Voluntary/Involuntary</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>National Guard only; May include operations or training missions directed by President or SECDEF</td>
<td>Full-Time National Guard Duty (FTNGD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 331</td>
<td>Insurrection [Federal Aid for State Governments]</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Presidential order; National Guard only</td>
<td>Federal Service (FS); Insurrection Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 332</td>
<td>Insurrection [Enforce Federal Laws]</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Presidential order; National Guard only</td>
<td>Federal Service (FS); Insurrection Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 333</td>
<td>Insurrection [Major Public Emergencies]</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>National Guard only; President determines; Congressional notification: 1) Public violence beyond capabilities of state authorities 2) Condition obstructs execution of state or federal law</td>
<td>Federal Service (FS) to restore public order in the event of natural disaster, epidemic or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident; Insurrection Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12406</td>
<td>Invasion</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Presidential order; National Guard only</td>
<td>Federal Service (FS); Insurrection and Rebellion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G-3/5/7, DAMO-OD, Washington, DC, Reserve Component Utilization Authorities, July 11, 2012.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Authority</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Coordination</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 10147</td>
<td>Annual Training (AT) / Drill Requirement</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Reserves Only</td>
<td>Active Duty (AD); Inactive Duty Training (IDT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12301(b)</td>
<td>Annual Training (AT)</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Reserves &amp; National Guard; Service Secretary Authority; Requires Governor's consent for NG SM</td>
<td>Active Duty (AD); Ready Reserves up to 15 days/per year; May perform operational missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12301(d)</td>
<td>Additional /Other Training Duty</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Reserves &amp; National Guard; Requires RC SM's consent; Requires Governor's consent for NG SM</td>
<td>Active Duty (AD); No number limitation stated; No duration stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 USC 502(a)</td>
<td>Annual Training (AT) / Drill Requirement</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>National Guard only</td>
<td>Full-Time National Guard Duty (FTNGD); Inactive Duty Training (IDT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 USC 502(f)</td>
<td>Additional /Other Training Duty</td>
<td>Voluntary/ Involuntary</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>National Guard only</td>
<td>Full-Time National Guard Duty (FTNGD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12503</td>
<td>Funeral Honors</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Reserves &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>Inactive Duty (ID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 USC 115</td>
<td>Funeral Honors</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>National Guard only</td>
<td>Inactive Duty (ID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12319</td>
<td>Muster Duty</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Reserves &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>Inactive Duty (ID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12301(h)</td>
<td>Medical Care</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Reserves &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>Active Duty (AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12322</td>
<td>Medical Evaluation &amp; Treatment</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Reserves &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>Active Duty (AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 802(d)</td>
<td>Disciplinary</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Reserves &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>Active Duty (AD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 10148</td>
<td>UNSAT Participation</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Reserves &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>Active Duty (AD); Up to 45 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12301(g)</td>
<td>Captive Status</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Reserves &amp; National Guard</td>
<td>Active Duty (AD); Not more than 30 days following termination of captive status without consent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12303</td>
<td>UNSAT Participation</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Presidential order; Reserves &amp; National Guard who have not fulfilled statutory obligation</td>
<td>Active Duty (AD); Up to 24 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 USC 12402</td>
<td>Duty at National Guard Bureau</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>National Guard only</td>
<td>Active Duty (AD)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G-3/5/7, DAMO-OD, Washington, DC, Reserve Component Utilization Authorities, July 11, 2012.
Since 9/11, the three most commonly used mobilization authorities are 10 USC 12302, 10 USC 12301(d), and 10 USC 12304b. Mobilizations under the authority of 10 USC 12302 began on September 14, 2001, when President George W. Bush issued Proclamation number 7463, declaring a national emergency based on the terrorist attacks of 9/11 at the World Trade Center in New York City and at the Pentagon, and based on the threat of further attacks against the United States.¹⁰² Executive Order 13223 immediately followed, authorizing the DOD and Department of Transportation (DOT) to order RC forces to active duty from the Ready Reserve of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard.¹⁰³ The intent of 10 USC 12302 was to provide an initial and rapid response to a national emergency, mobilizing RC forces as needed to augment AC forces in America’s GWOT.

The initial effort after 9/11 included the mobilization of over 7,000 National Guardsmen to provide security at 434 airports throughout the United States, as well as 800 Guardsmen working with the US Border Patrol in nine states to secure the northern and southern US border.¹⁰⁴ 10 USC 12302 ultimately resulted in the mass mobilization of hundreds of thousands of RC forces globally in support of ONE, OEF, OIF and OND. Each of these operations has concluded with the exception of ONE, which continues with a limited homeland security mission of providing force protection to key US facilities, protecting critical infrastructure, and defending


¹⁰³ Bush, “Ordering the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces To Active Duty,” 48201.

the United States from airborne attacks.\textsuperscript{105} OIF and OND concluded in December 2011.\textsuperscript{106} OEF concluded in December 2014, with US forces transitioning to OFS, a limited mission to train and advise Afghan security forces, and to continue counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{107} The conclusion of these operations indicates a significant reduction in mobilizations under 10 USC 12302.

Mobilizations under the authority of 10 USC 12301(d) are voluntary and have provided an effective method for thousands of RC Soldiers to volunteer for mobilizations both overseas and in CONUS. RC Soldiers volunteering for active duty under 12301(d) serve on ADOS in a variety of capacities. Active Duty Operational Support-Active Component (ADOS-AC) is active duty in support of Title 10 AC operations and is broken down into three categories.\textsuperscript{108} Contingency Operation-Active Duty Operational Support (CO-ADOS) is active duty in support of contingency operations (i.e., OEF, OIF, and OND); Operational-Active Duty Operational Support (OP-ADOS) is active duty in support of non-contingency operations; and, Administrative-Active Duty Operational Support (Admin-ADOS) is active duty in support of


\textsuperscript{107} Hagel, “Statement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel.”

administrative functions.\textsuperscript{109} Active Duty Operational Support-Reserve Component (ADOS-RC) is active duty in support of RC requirements and missions.\textsuperscript{110}

The Army created the “Tour of Duty (TOD)” website to manage voluntary active duty tours for RC Soldiers.\textsuperscript{111} AC and RC commands needing to fill vacant critical positions can advertise position announcements on the TOD website.\textsuperscript{112} Congruently, RC Soldiers in search of active duty tour opportunities may search the TOD website for vacant positions by location, paygrade, and Area of Concentration (AOC) or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).\textsuperscript{113} Similar to TOD, the DOD created the “Personnel Force Innovation (PFI)” website to manage voluntary active duty tours for RC members of all services.\textsuperscript{114} The TOD and PFI websites have served as an effective means of mobilizing RC service members to serve in critical positions worldwide, particularly when AC commands are short personnel or do not have an AC service member available to fill the requirement. Mobilizations under the authority of 10 USC 12301(d) will continue as necessary, as a method of filling critically vacant AC positions.

Mobilizations under the authority of 10 USC 12304b, recently implemented by the NDAA for FY 2012, has effectively mobilized RC forces for operations other than war or national emergency, including peacekeeping operations in support of Kosovo Force (KFOR) and

\textsuperscript{109} Tour of Duty, “A Soldier’s Guide to Voluntary Active Duty.”


\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.

the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission in Sinai, Egypt.\textsuperscript{115} Although 10 USC 12304b was a major step in the right direction towards the development of a more functional mobilization authority for future operations, it also includes a number of limitations. First, it requires the pre-planning and pre-budgeting of each mobilization in the defense budget prior to the FY of execution, allowing very little flexibility for operational adjustments (i.e., mission changes in the number of personnel required) that may need to be made later.\textsuperscript{116} Second, 10 USC 12304b reduces the mobilization period from 400 days to 365 days, reducing the amount of time a unit can spend in a mission location.\textsuperscript{117} Given the time required for post-mobilization training, mission related travel, demobilization, and accrued leave, a unit would have less than 270 days in their mission location.\textsuperscript{118} Third, 10 USC 12304b includes a limit of 60,000 RC personnel mobilized at one time.\textsuperscript{119} Limiting the operational number of RC forces hinders the goals of the Army’s Total Force Policy. Additionally, with the drawdown of the AC and an increased reliance on RC forces, the 60,000 force cap may present challenges to achieving operational goals.

Under national emergency conditions, the mobilization authorities under 10 USC 12302, 10 USC 12301(d), and most recently 10 USC 12304b, have effectively mobilized large volumes of RC forces in support of GWOT requirements since 9/11. However, with OEF, OIF, and OND now complete, and as the operating environment evolves, these mobilization authorities contain legal and functional limitations that diminish their effectiveness. Current mobilization authorities are simply not practical, if the RC continues its utilization as an operational reserve. RC

\textsuperscript{115} Soucy, “National Guard is ‘All In’ for Deployments.”


\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{118} Department of the Army, Headquarters, Department of the Army G-1, Military Mobilization Branch, \textit{Department of the Army Personnel Policy Guidance for Overseas Contingency Operations} (Washington, DC: July 1, 2009, Last Updated August 9, 2013): 22.

\textsuperscript{119} National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 1396.
mobilization authorities must adapt and change to meet existing and future operational needs. Mobilization authorities that were effective under emergency conditions for mobilizing RC forces in support of OEF, OIF, OND, and ONE, may not be effective for mobilizing RC forces under more lasting conditions as an operational reserve in support of future operational requirements. A new mobilization authority is required that will allow the RC to transition from an emergency response force to an operational reserve.

Proposal for a New Mobilization Authority

A newly proposed mobilization authority is required for the RC to serve effectively as an operational reserve in support of future operational requirements. Since 9/11, the majority of RC unit mobilizations have been under the authority of 10 USC 12302. The primary drawback with 10 USC 12302 is that it requires a declaration of national emergency by the President each fiscal year to authorize the mobilization of RC Soldiers. On September 4, 2014, President Obama issued a “Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Certain Terrorist Attacks,” under the authority of section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 USC 1622(d), continuing a state of national emergency for another year.120

Since President Bush issued Proclamation number 7463 on September 14, 2001, declaring a national emergency based on the terrorist attacks of 9/11, this state of emergency has continued for over 13 years. Maintaining a state of national emergency for an infinite period is simply unsustainable and impractical for a long range and planned use of the RC as an operational reserve. Further, the National Emergencies Act of 1976 aimed to prevent open ended states of national emergency, limiting Presidential declarations of national emergency to genuine

crises rather than for recurring use.\textsuperscript{121} Utilizing the RC as an operational reserve requires a more practical, functional, and permanent mobilization authority, one that does not require a declared state of national emergency.

The new mobilization authority must streamline, improve, and clearly define the following key areas: the duration of mobilization orders; the maximum duration of the mobilization (i.e., if mobilization orders are extended); the purpose of the mobilization; the delegation of authority; the maximum number of RC personnel from all services that may be mobilized at one time; the funding source; the involuntary and voluntary status; stop loss conditions; required conditions for the termination of duty (i.e., upon completion of the mission); the dwell ratio (the number of years between the last involuntary mobilization and subsequent involuntary mobilizations); the minimum length of time required for the publication of mobilization orders prior to the mobilization date; and the establishment of a new unit alert system.

Under the proposed mobilization authority, the duration of mobilization orders would be 400 days. This maintains the duration of mobilization orders used in 10 USC 12302, and does not adopt the 365 day mobilization order model used by 10 USC 12304b. The purpose of the 400 day mobilization order is to allow a unit to complete approximately 270 days, or nine months, in their mission location. This meets the intent of the SECARMY’s “Army Deployment Period Policy” also referred to as “Boots on the Ground,” issued on August 4, 2011, which directs both AC and RC units to deploy for a period of nine months when supporting named operations overseas.\textsuperscript{122} Although 400 days may sound like sufficient time for an RC unit to achieve 270 days in their mission location, given the time required for unit home station activities, post-mobilization


\textsuperscript{122} Department of the Army, Secretary of the Army, \textit{Army Deployment Period Policy} (Washington, DC: August 4, 2011): 1.
training, Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP), travel to and from the mission location, demobilization activities, and accrued leave for each Soldier, a 400 day mobilization order is required. Table 9 provides a standard RC unit mobilization event timeline, with the approximate number of days required for each event.

Table 9. Standard RC Unit Mobilization Event Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Approximate Number of Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home Station Activities and Travel Time to Mobilization Station</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Mobilization Training and Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP)</td>
<td>30-75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel from Mobilization Station to Mission Location</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execution of Mission</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel from Mission Location to Demobilization Station</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization Activities</td>
<td>5-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel Time from Demobilization Station to Home Station</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accrued Leave for Each Mobilized Soldier</td>
<td>30-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>341-400</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by the author using data from the Department of the Army Personnel Policy Guidance (PPG) for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), July 1, 2009, last updated August 9, 2013. The number of days for each event are estimates and will vary by the size and type of each unit mobilized.

Although the specific mobilization timeline for each unit will vary based on the unit’s size, type, and mission, Table 9 illustrates the need to sustain 400 day mobilization orders. Table 9 shows a standard unit requiring 341 to 400 days to successfully complete all mobilization events. 10 USC 12304b reduced the mobilization order period from 400 days to 365 days. This reduction in the mobilization period provides insufficient time for a unit to complete all mobilization events. As a result, units must condense post-mobilization training, or worse, perform less than 270 days in their mission location. This is inconsistent with the nine month Army Deployment Period Policy and is also problematic for relief-in-place (RIP) and transfer of

123 Department of the Army Personnel Policy Guidance for Overseas Contingency Operations, 22.
authority (TOA) timelines for transitioning units in theater. Finally, with a 400 day mobilization order, there is flexibility to curtail the order if the unit does not require the full 400 days. In contrast, if a unit initially mobilizes for 365 days and mission requirements later necessitate an involuntary extension, the process is very arduous and inflexible, requiring approval by the SECDEF.\textsuperscript{124}

Under the proposed mobilization authority, the maximum duration of the mobilization would also be 400 days. The 400 day mobilization order timeline is consistent with former SECDEF Robert Gates’s “Utilization of the Total Force” DOD policy issued on January 19, 2007, which directed that RC service members only be mobilized involuntarily for a maximum one year at a time, excluding periods of post-mobilization training and accrued leave.\textsuperscript{125} The maximum duration of a 400 day involuntary mobilization differs from 10 USC 12302 which authorizes up to 24 months, and 10 USC 12304b which authorizes a maximum of 365 days. The 400 day mobilization order has been a successful model for RC units since 2007. It achieves the intent of the nine month Army Deployment Period Policy, and perhaps more importantly, it manages expectations for RC Soldiers. They can plan and prepare for an exact length of absence from their families and civilian employers, with the reassurance that there will be no extension to their tour of duty.

Each mobilization authority has an intended purpose which should justify the use of RC forces and articulate their role. 10 USC 12302 is for contingency operations for emergency response during a presidential declaration of national emergency. 12301(d) is for individual Soldier mobilizations for Active Duty Operational Support (ADOS). 10 USC 12304b augments


the AC for preplanned missions in support of Combatant Commanders (COCOMs). The proposed mobilization authority is for RC missions as an operational reserve in support of planned operational requirements. The primary difference between existing mobilization authorities and the proposed mobilization authority is that existing mobilization authorities are more reactive, while the proposed mobilization authority aims at being more proactive. The RC cannot be an effective operational reserve without taking a proactive approach to mobilizations. This requires close coordination between senior leaders of the AC and RC, developing a sensible balance of the operational workload between AC and RC units, and clearly defining operational requirements tasked for the RC. It also requires long range strategic planning, ensuring that the RC understands its role and can plan and prepare for mobilizations as an operational reserve in support of future operational requirements.

The mobilization of RC forces usually requires the authority of the President. Some mobilization authorities include provisions for delegation to a subordinate, however most do not. Mobilizing RC forces under the authority of 10 USC 12302 requires a formally issued declaration of national emergency by the President. On the other hand, delegations of authority to each Service Secretary may occur for mobilizations under 10 USC 12301(d) and 10 USC 12304b. The proposed mobilization authority would also allow delegations to each Service Secretary. These delegations of authority are simply required to achieve more functional, streamlined, and permanent mobilization procedures. Requiring a presidential declaration of national emergency each year to mobilize RC forces is inefficient and centralizes control. Allowing each Service Secretary to manage their own RC units reduces bureaucratic formalities, increases organizational capacity, and builds efficiency.

Each mobilization authority outlines the maximum number of RC personnel (representing all services) mobilized at one time. Due to the significance of a presidentially declared state of national emergency, 10 USC 12302 authorizes up to 1,000,000 RC service members mobilized at one time. Since 10 USC 12301(d) is a voluntary mobilization authority, there is no limitation on
the number of RC service members mobilized. 10 USC 12304b provides a limitation of 60,000 RC service members mobilized at one time. The proposed mobilization authority would provide a limitation of 200,000 RC service members mobilized at one time. The rationale for 200,000 is to allow the RC sufficient capacity to achieve all operational requirements.

The funding source for each mobilization varies based on the mobilization authority, operation, and mission location. Mobilizations under the authority of 10 USC 12302 must be in support of contingency operations and correspondingly use overseas contingency operations (OCO) funds. Title 10 USC provides a definition of contingency operation:

A military operation that—

(A) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force; or

(B) results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members of the uniformed services under section 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12305, or 12406 of this title, chapter 15 of this title, or any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress.126

These legal conditions are required for the use of the 10 USC 12302 mobilization authority and OCO funds.

The 12301(d) mobilization authority uses OCO funds for CO-ADOS missions and base funds for Operational-Active Duty Operational Support (OP-ADOS) missions. 12304b uses OCO for missions in support of legally defined contingency operations, and base funds for all others.

The proposed mobilization authority would use a model similar to that of 12304b. Base funds would be the source for planning and funding the majority of operations, however OCO funds would remain available as needed under emergency conditions in support of contingency operations. More funding clarity is required in order to continue transitioning the RC from an emergency based force to an operational reserve force.

One goal of the proposed mobilization authority is to improve fiscal accountability when it comes to military spending, eliminating the perceived “blank check” label of OCO funds. The DOD relied heavily on contingency funding during OEF and OIF. When OCO funds are used, the DOD can avoid congressional budgetary constraints established at the start of the FY.127 Between FY 2002 and FY 2009, Congress approved emergency funding legislation 17 times to support OEF and OIF.128 The cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is second only to World War II, both in total dollars and actual dollars, when factoring in inflation.129 This magnitude of emergency funding is fiscally inefficient and unsustainable. The proposed mobilization authority would fund the RC for future planned operations as an operational reserve, while still retaining the flexibility for contingency funding when required.

Another important consideration is the involuntary and voluntary conditions of each mobilization authority. 10 USC 12302 and 10 USC 12304b are involuntary, intended for unit mobilizations. 10 USC 12301(d) is voluntary, intended for individual Soldier mobilizations. The proposed mobilization authority would fall in line with 10 USC 12302 and 10 USC 12304b and would also be involuntary. To effectively conduct global military operations, it is simply required

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128 Ibid.

129 Ibid., 5-6.
for the DOD to be able to involuntarily mobilize RC Soldiers in support of future operational requirements. Units and detachments may also collectively volunteer for mobilizations. If every member of an entire unit or detachment volunteers, the mobilization approval authority remains at the Service Secretary level, rather than being elevated to the SECDEF.\textsuperscript{130}

Involuntary mobilizations and subsequent RC deployments are unavoidable and simply a reality of conducting military operations worldwide, particularly with the impending drawdown of the AC and with substantial mission essential force structure residing in the RC. With this in mind, the newly proposed mobilization authority aims at managing long range expectations for RC Soldiers collectively and individually, providing as much advance notice of future mobilizations as possible. DODD 1235.10, \textit{Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve}, provides the following guidelines reinforcing these expectations: “Support the predictable use of all RC forces by notifying RC members up to 24 months in advance that they are being considered for activation and by issuing mobilization orders as soon as it is operationally feasible to do so.”\textsuperscript{131} It goes on to illustrate the important role of the RC as part of collective US military objectives: “Enhance the predictable use of RC forces by establishing rotational-ready forces and by employing RC forces where practical in support of our national defense strategy.”\textsuperscript{132} These directives emphasize that although RC unit mobilizations will continue to occur, comprehensive long range planning can ensure that RC units and Soldiers receive sufficient advance warning.

\textsuperscript{130} Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, \textit{Accessing the Reserve Components (RC)}, Department of Defense Instruction (DODD) 1235.12 (Washington, DC: February 4, 2010), Incorporating Change 1, April 4, 2012: 18-19.


\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
At the ROA conference in Arlington, Virginia in August 2013, General Grass, the Chief of NGB, addressed the issue of mobilization probability: “We have the best military and the best Reserve components we have ever had in our history…These young men and women expect to deploy. They joined since 9/11. They know what they're getting into. They want predictability, as much as possible, but they do want an opportunity to deploy.” Providing this predictability means careful and coordinated long range planning of RC unit mobilizations, allowing RC Soldiers as much time as possible to prepare their families and civilian employers for their absence. The current operating environment plays a significant role in how much advance notice RC units receive prior to a mobilization. The newly proposed mobilization authority aims at notifying units at least 12 months in advance of a mobilization, providing units with notifications of sourcing (NOS) for a mobilization, an alert order, and mobilization orders, allowing sufficient time for the unit to plan for the mobilization.

Stop loss conditions also impact RC mobilizations. Stop loss is a force management tool that involuntarily extends service members past their contractual separation date to support critical operational requirements or to utilize unique military skills that are in high demand. The legal authority for stop loss of RC personnel is contained in 10 USC 12305:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during any period members of a reserve component are serving on active duty pursuant to an order to active duty under authority of section 12301, 12302, or 12304 of this title, the President may suspend any provision of law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation applicable to any member of the

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133 Greenhill, “Chiefs: National Guard, Reserves Should Remain Strong, Operational.”

armed forces who the President determines is essential to the national security of the United States.135

Stop loss procedures were in effect army wide in support of OEF and OIF until former SECDEF Robert Gates’s “Utilization of the Total Force” DOD policy issued on January 19, 2007, which directed that stop loss would be minimized for both the AC and the RC.136 This resulted in the suspension of stop loss conditions on August 1, 2009 for the USAR, on September 1, 2009 for the ARNG, and on January 1, 2010 for the RA.137 In an effort to compensate Soldiers under stop loss, the FY 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act authorized payments of $500 per month during FY 2009 for service members in a stop loss status. Although each service retains the legal authority to renew stop loss conditions, it would only occur under emergency situations.138 Under former SECDEF Robert Gates, the DOD made significant progress in eliminating the need for stop loss procedures, and the newly proposed mobilization authority will not utilize stop loss.

Identifying the appropriate authority level for the termination of duty is another important planning consideration when comparing and contrasting the functionality of mobilization authorities. Termination of duty results in the curtailment of an RC unit’s current mobilization orders and cancelling of future RC unit mobilization orders. A practical recent example was the completion of OIF in December 2011.139 Mobilized RC units deployed at that time had their 400 day mobilization orders curtailed, while units programmed for future mobilizations had their


136 Utilization of the Total Force, 2.


138 Ibid.

139 Miles, “Panetta, Dempsey Mark End of Iraq Mission.”
mobilizations cancelled or re-missioned in support of OEF. The President is the authority level for terminating RC unit mobilizations under 10 USC 12302. Mobilizations under 10 USC 12302 require a declaration of national emergency by the President, therefore it is logical that it also requires the President to declare the national emergency no longer exists, in order to terminate RC unit mobilizations. Since mobilizations under 10 USC 12301(d) are voluntary, termination of duty is a marginal issue. The authority to terminate duty under 10 USC 12304b rests with each Service Secretary. This is much more functional and practical than 10 USC 12302, which requires action from the President. For this reason, the proposed mobilization authority also grants the authority to terminate duty with each Service Secretary.

The dwell ratio, the number of years between the last involuntary mobilization and subsequent involuntary mobilizations, is another important issue affecting RC mobilizations. DODD 1235.10 outlines an objective of a 1:5 dwell ratio (one year mobilized followed by five years of dwell time) for involuntary mobilizations of RC units. However, the increased operational demands of OEF, OIF, OND, and ONE have resulted in a 1:4 dwell ratio standard for involuntary mobilizations of RC units. The Service Secretaries may approve the involuntary mobilization of units and individuals with a dwell ratio greater than 1:4, as well as the voluntary mobilization of Soldiers with dwell ratios less than 1:4. Involuntary mobilizations of units and individuals with dwell ratios less than 1:4 require approval by the SECDEF. These dwell ratio standards apply to all mobilization authorities and the proposed mobilization authority also maintains these standards.

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140 DODD 1235.10, 6.
141 *Utilization of the Total Force*, 1.
142 DODD 1235.12, 18-19.
143 Ibid., 20.
The minimum length of time required for the publication of mobilization orders prior to the mobilization date is perhaps the most important mobilization issue affecting RC units. Providing as much advance notice as possible to mobilizing units is extremely important, allowing sufficient time for units to plan and prepare for the mobilization. The majority of mobilizations under 10 USC 12302 and 10 USC 12304b provide mobilization orders to units at least 180 days or more prior to the mobilization date.\footnote{DODD 1235.12, 18.} The Service Secretaries are the approval authority for these mobilizations.\footnote{Ibid.} Units receiving mobilization orders less than 180 days to their mobilization date require approval by the SECDEF, and there must be appropriate justification (i.e., the RC unit is filling an emergent operational requirement or the AC cannot fill the requirement).\footnote{Ibid., 3.} The publication of mobilization orders cannot occur less than 30 days prior to the mobilization date, unless for crisis response approved by the SECDEF, or if the mobilizing Soldiers waive this minimum notification period in writing.\footnote{Ibid., 20.} Since 10 USC 12301(d) is for voluntary mobilizations, there is no minimum requirement for the publication of mobilization orders. RC Soldiers volunteering for mobilization under 12301(d) waive the minimum notification requirements in writing.

The proposed mobilization authority recommends innovative changes to the minimum length of time required for the publication of mobilization orders prior to the mobilization date. The proposed mobilization authority would establish a sequential system of readiness for RC units. Units at the highest state of readiness could receive mobilization orders in as little as 120 days to their mobilization date (fewer than 120 days if ordered by the SECDEF) while other units would receive mobilization orders at the standard time period of at least 180 days prior to their

\footnote{DODD 1235.12, 18.} \footnote{Ibid.} \footnote{Ibid., 3.} \footnote{Ibid., 20.}
mobilization date. This sequential system of readiness would incorporate a new and revolutionary unit alert system for Army RC units, described in depth at the conclusion of this section.

The newly proposed mobilization authority aims to build upon the strengths of current mobilization authorities, while making necessary improvements to eliminate weaknesses. The goal is to implement an improved and streamlined mobilization authority, increasing flexibility and planning capabilities to RC units and Soldiers. Table 10 compares and contrasts features of the newly proposed mobilization authority with mobilizations under the authority of 10 USC 12302, 10 USC 12301(d), and 10 USC 12304b, illustrating limited change in certain areas and bold changes in others.
### Table 10. Comparison of Mobilization Authorities: 10 USC 12302, 10 USC 12301(d), 10 USC 12304b, and Proposed Mobilization Authority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>10 USC 12302</th>
<th>10 USC 12301(d)</th>
<th>10 USC 12304b</th>
<th>Proposed Mobilization Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration of Mobilization Orders</td>
<td>400 days</td>
<td>365 days</td>
<td>365 days</td>
<td>400 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Duration of Mobilization (i.e., if orders are extended)</td>
<td>24 months</td>
<td>No limitation</td>
<td>365 days</td>
<td>400 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Contingency operations for emergency response during a Presidential Declaration of National Emergency</td>
<td>Individual Soldier Mobilizations for Active Duty Operational Support (ADOS)</td>
<td>Augment the AC for preplanned missions in support of Combatant Commanders (COCOMs)</td>
<td>RC missions as an operational reserve in support of planned operational requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation of Authority</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Service Secretaries</td>
<td>Service Secretaries</td>
<td>Service Secretaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Number of RC Personnel (All Services)</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>No limitation</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding Source</td>
<td>Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds</td>
<td>OCO funds for CO-ADOS; base funds for OP-ADOS</td>
<td>OCO or base funds, depending on mission location</td>
<td>OCO or base funds, depending on mission location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involuntary / Voluntary</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Involuntary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stop Loss</td>
<td>Used in support of OEF, OIF, and ONE; suspended on August 1, 2009 (USAR) and September 1, 2009 (ARNG) with legal authority to renew if necessary</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termination of Duty (i.e. mission complete)</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Service Secretaries</td>
<td>Service Secretaries</td>
<td>Service Secretaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwell Ratio (Number of years between last involuntary mobilization and subsequent involuntary mobilization)</td>
<td>Greater or equal to 1:4 (1 year mobilized followed by 4 years dwell), unless ordered by the SECDEF or waived by mobilizing Soldier(s)</td>
<td>No requirement since these mobilizations are voluntary; dwell ratio is waived by mobilizing Soldier</td>
<td>Greater or equal to 1:4 (1 year mobilized followed by 4 years dwell), unless ordered by the SECDEF or waived by mobilizing Soldier(s)</td>
<td>Greater or equal to 1:4 (1 year mobilized followed by 4 years dwell), unless ordered by the SECDEF or waived by mobilizing Soldier(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization Orders Issued Prior to Mobilization Date</td>
<td>At least 180 days prior to mobilization unless ordered by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF); minimum of 30 days unless waived by mobilizing Soldier(s)</td>
<td>No requirement since these mobilizations are voluntary; minimum notification period is waived by mobilizing Soldier</td>
<td>At least 180 days prior to mobilization unless ordered by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF); minimum of 30 days unless waived by mobilizing Soldier(s)</td>
<td>At least 120 days prior to mobilization unless ordered by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF); minimum of 30 days unless waived by mobilizing Soldier(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Alert System</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>RC Ready Force 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RC Ready Force 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RC Ready Force 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, the new unit alert system for Army RC units is the most revolutionary concept introduced by the proposed mobilization authority, structured with many similarities to the AC model. Historically, AC divisions have had a designated unit that serves as the Division Ready Force (DRF) or Division Ready Brigade (DRB). Collectively, the Army has a Global Response Force (GRF), usually from the 82nd Airborne Division, which acts as America’s first response force covering a broad mission scope. These units maintain the highest state of readiness in the division, with weapons, vehicles, and equipment, ready and capable for rapid deployment anywhere in the world, often times in as little as 18 hours. Soldiers within the unit are in a rapid recall alert status, limiting leave and travel away from the installation, and usually conducting periodic phone alert status checks and recall formations.

Divisions typically rotate DRF status quarterly for its units, and often times have more than one DRF designated within the division, establishing a priority for movement in the event of a deployment (i.e., DRF-1, DRF-2, and DRF-3). The GRF and DRF deployment readiness systems have been very effective for AC units for many years, evident by their success of rapidly deploying units for Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983, Operation Just Cause in Panama

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in 1989, Operation Desert Storm in Iraq and Kuwait in 1990-1991, and Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994. More recently, since 9/11, the GRF has deployed 18 times in support of OEF and OIF, in support of joint special operations task forces, and for disaster relief operations for Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the Haiti earthquake in 2010. The GRF and DRF systems increase efficiency by establishing a hierarchy of military readiness and increasing predictability for Soldiers and families of when their unit may deploy. The proposed mobilization authority would introduce a similar system to the RC.

The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, approved by the SECARMY and CSA in 2006, is the current system of readiness used by both AC and RC units. The ARFORGEN system consists of three phases: RESET, Train/Ready, and Available. For RC units, the ARFORGEN model is a six year cycle (five years during surge levels). The RESET phase lasts 12 months following a mobilization, and allows a unit to conduct important tasks such as Soldier and family reintegration, changes of command, medical and dental appointments, professional military education (PME), and receive new equipment and personnel. The

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154 Ibid., 2.

155 Ibid., 3.
Train/Ready phase lasts 48 months (36 months during a surge level) for RC units and includes individual and collective training, as well as continuing to field unit equipment, filling personnel shortages, and increasing the medical and dental readiness of unit Soldiers.\textsuperscript{156} Upon completion of the Train/Ready phase, RC units transition to the Available phase, placing them at the highest state of readiness and postured for mobilization.\textsuperscript{157} The Available phase lasts 12 months, in which RC units may fulfill requirements as a Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) or a Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF).\textsuperscript{158} DEF units are those designated for ongoing rotational missions as was used for OEF and OIF, while CEF units remain in an available pool ready to fill emergent requirements or conduct contingency operations worldwide.\textsuperscript{159} Figure 1 outlines the AC and RC ARFORGEN timelines for DEF and CEF units, and when they would deploy as regular mission forces or as surge forces.

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotesize
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{156} AR 525-29, 3-4.
\item \textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 4.
\item \textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 4-6.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Although ARFORGEN has been an effective means of establishing a structured readiness system for RC units, it unfortunately does not provide the same level of precision and predictability as the GRF and DRF systems used by AC units. RC units in the Available pool simply know that they are available for a mobilization and deployment, but they lack a rotation order for activation. They have limited visibility on if and when a mobilization may occur and no way of differentiating a potential selection for mobilization over fellow Available units. Granted, for DEF rotational requirements such as OEF and OIF, RC units received a mobilization date and latest arrival date (LAD) into theater, usually well in advance as part of the synchronization planning process by FORSCOM, HQDA, NGB, USARC, and First Army. However, Available RC units designated for CEF requirements do not have an organized system providing them visibility on their potential rotation order in relation to other RC units.
Providing RC units with a system similar to the GRF and DRF systems of AC units, would increase planning capabilities, improve accuracy, and most importantly, provide better predictability for when RC units would mobilize and deploy. The proposed mobilization authority would establish a Reserve Component Ready Force (RCRF) system for RC units. The RCRF system would categorize RC units in the Available and Train/Ready phases of ARFORGEN into three levels of mobilization readiness: RCRF-1, RCRF-2, and RCRF-3.

Units in the RCRF-1 category would represent the highest level of unit readiness and be the first RC units to mobilize. Correspondingly, the new mobilization authority would reduce the time required for the publication of mobilization orders prior to the mobilization date from a minimum of 180 days to a minimum of 120 days (fewer than 120 days if ordered by the SECDEF) for RCRF-1 units. Units in the RCRF-2 category would represent the second level of unit readiness, postured to mobilize after RCRF-1 units. These units would receive a minimum of 180 days for the publication of mobilization orders prior to their mobilization date (fewer than 180 days if ordered by the SECDEF). Finally, units in the RCRF-3 category would represent the third level of unit readiness, and would mobilize after RCRF-1 and RCRF-2 units, if needed. These units would receive a minimum of 270 days for the publication of mobilization orders prior to their mobilization date (fewer than 270 days if ordered by the SECDEF). RC units would serve for 12 months in their designated RCRF category before rotating. Table 11 illustrates each mobilization readiness category and the corresponding time period for the publication of mobilization orders prior to the unit mobilization date.
Table 11. Mobilization Readiness Category and the Minimum Number of Days for the Publication of Mobilization Orders Prior to the Unit Mobilization Date

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilization Readiness Category</th>
<th>Minimum Number of Days for the Publication of Mobilization Orders Prior to the Unit Mobilization Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RCRF-1</td>
<td>120 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCRF-2</td>
<td>180 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCRF-3</td>
<td>270 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by the author.*

The RCRF system would place ARNG and USAR units of various capabilities representing the Army’s six warfighting functions into the three levels of readiness. Each mobilization readiness category would contain units capable of performing each warfighting function, ensuring that in the event of a mobilization, a wide range of operational capabilities are available for individual or collective mobilization. (JFHQ) and Division Headquarters elements would represent the mission command warfighting function. BCTs, including infantry, armor, and cavalry units would cover movement and maneuver operations. Military intelligence units would fulfill intelligence requirements. Artillery and air defense units would represent the fires warfighting function. Logistical, personnel services, and medical units would be responsible

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160 Under the newly proposed mobilization authority, the SECDEF still retains the authority to mobilize RC units in fewer days than these established minimum time periods, in the event of emergent operational requirements or if AC units are unable to fill the requirement.


162 Ibid., 3-2 - 3-3.

163 Ibid., 3-3.

164 Ibid., 3-4.

165 Ibid.
for sustainment. Engineered, military police, chemical, and ordnance units would be among those representing the protection warfighting function.

RC units would serve for 12 months in their designated RCRF category before rotating. NGB, USARC, FORSCOM, and First Army would collectively manage the 12 month unit rotations for RCRF-1, RCRF-2, and RCRF-3 units based on current and future operational requirements. NGB and USARC would synchronize their efforts with FORSCOM to ensure an even distribution across the RCRF categories for ARNG and USAR units representing the same warfighting function, while also ensuring there is sufficient depth available to perform a variety of missions. Dissemination of RCRF rotation schedules would occur down to the unit level, ensuring maximum awareness for units and Soldiers of their current RCRF category and the corresponding level of readiness.

For ARNG units, each State Headquarters would manage the RCRF status of the units assigned to their state. This would include ensuring an adequate operational balance exists between RCRF units designated for federal active duty mobilizations and units designated for state active duty mobilizations for domestic response in the event of natural disasters, civil disturbances, etc. NGB would assist each State Headquarters, ensuring that every state would have sufficient unit assets available to perform both their federal and state missions. Regularly scheduled RCRF planning conferences between NGB, USARC, and FORSCOM, would occur as a means to ensure that ARNG and USAR units successfully complement the collective RCRF requirements, while ensuring that ARNG units are also successfully postured to perform their state missions. With a diverse mix of units available in the ARNG and USAR, capable of performing a wide array of missions, the RCRF planning conferences would ensure that the

166 ADRP 3-0, 3-4 - 3-5.

167 Ibid., 3-5 - 3-6.
collective RC units representing the RCRF-1, RCRF-2, and RCRF-3 categories, have sufficient capabilities to mobilize individually, or with a cohort of other RC units.

The RCRF system would significantly increase the precision and predictability of mobilizations for RC units. It would provide unit planners with a more efficient framework in which to plan future operations. Units in the RCRF-1 category, knowing that they would be the first called upon for mobilization, would ensure a maximum state of readiness for the 12 month RCRF-1 period. Meanwhile, units in the RCRF-2 category could focus more on individual and collective training, knowing that they are in the second level of readiness. Finally, units in the RCRF-3 category could focus heavily on training, as well as PME for Soldiers, equipment fielding, and other unit needs, understanding that they are in the third level of readiness.

The most important benefit of the RCRF system is that it increases mobilization predictability for RC Soldiers, who possess the challenging task of managing civilian careers and family obligations, in addition to maintaining their RC unit responsibilities. Mobilization predictability is a great benefit of the RCRF system as it manages the expectations of RC Soldiers and provides them with more timely and accurate information pertaining to future operations of their unit. The RCRF system not only provides more advance notice to RC Soldiers pertaining to a potential mobilization, it also provides greater certainty as to the probability of that mobilization. As a result, individual mobilization readiness would improve as RC Soldiers would be better informed and have greater situational awareness of the operational conditions affecting their unit.

The newly proposed mobilization authority and RCRF unit alert system would streamline and improve the mobilization alert and orders process for RC units, maximizing capabilities of the RC to function as an operational reserve in support of future operational requirements. The new mobilization authority would increase flexibility for unit planners and leaders at all levels, while providing better predictability of future mobilizations to RC Soldiers. The new mobilization authority builds upon the strengths of current mobilization authorities, while making
necessary improvements to eliminate weaknesses. Implementing the new mobilization authority would require congressional approval as an amendment to Title 10 USC passed as part of a future NDAA. A logical place for this legislation would be as a new section under Chapter 1209, “Active Duty” in Subtitle E, “Reserve Components,” in the same location as sections 12301 through 12304.\(^\text{168}\) Enacting this legislation would provide the necessary means to allow the RC to fully and effectively fulfill its role as an operational reserve, complementing AC forces, supporting future operational requirements, and meeting the goals of the Army’s Total Force Policy.

**Conclusion**

“Today's army also has an unprecedented level of integration between its active and its reserve components. The Army National Guard and the Army Reserve have stood shoulder to shoulder with active-duty troops around the globe, and the level of trust, respect, and mutual understanding between them is unparalleled in the army's history. Our reserve component soldiers are better than they have ever been, and we will dedicate resources to ensure that some of them will be either deployed or ready to deploy around the globe.”


General Odierno’s remarks highlight the contributions and significant role of the Army RC to the Army’s operational successes in the 21st century. Over the past decade and a half, the Army RC has successfully transitioned from a strategic reserve force of the Cold War era to an operational reserve force of the GWOT era, capable of rapidly mobilizing and deploying units and Soldiers anywhere in the world to perform a wide range of missions. The Army RC proved

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these capabilities, mobilizing three quarters of a million Soldiers in support of OEF, OIF, OND, and ONE, and is postured to continue its role as an operational reserve in support of future operational requirements.\textsuperscript{170}

The problem presented in this monograph included determining the future utilization of RC forces, specifically their operational role, their implementation, and the development of a suitable mobilization authority that will accommodate a broad spectrum of future operational requirements. The monograph presented two key arguments. First, the Army RC should continue its role as an operational reserve in support of future operational requirements. Second, continuing the use of the Army RC as an operational reserve requires the implementation of a new mobilization authority, one that will be more lasting, functional, and suitable for the current operating environment. The monograph provided five factors supporting the continued use of the Army RC as an operational reserve: (1) the demonstrated capabilities of the RC during its support of OEF, OIF, OND, and ONE; (2) the impact of the drawdown of the RA, likely increasing the operational role of the RC; (3) current force structure allocations maintaining a large volume of sustainment and combat support units in the RC; (4) the continued use of the RC as an operational reserve is widely supported by senior military leaders in both the RC and the AC; and, (5) the Army’s Total Force Policy supports the use of the Army RC as an operational reserve as part of the integration of the AC and RC to fulfill global military requirements.\textsuperscript{171}

In providing an answer to the problem and support to the two key arguments, the monograph provided significant evidence supporting the five factors and the continued use of the Army RC as an operational reserve. The monograph presented two key proposals including the sustainment of the RC as an operational reserve, and a comprehensive plan for the implementation of a new mobilization authority. The action plan for these proposals included a


\textsuperscript{171} Army Directive 2012-08 (Total Force Policy), 1.
recommended framework and guidelines for a new mobilization authority that will achieve the goals of maintaining the use of RC forces as an operational reserve while modernizing the mobilization process to meet the demands of the current operating environment. The action plan also introduced a new RC unit alert system with the goal of improving mobilization planning and predictability for RC units and Soldiers. The new mobilization authority and RC unit alert system would increase the mobilization efficiency of the Army RC, providing enduring effectiveness as an operational reserve.

The Army faces many challenging operational demands, now and in the future, requiring a synchronized total force effort. The Army RC has proven that it is a relevant operational force that can effectively supplement the AC during major operations, meeting the goals of the Army’s Total Force Policy. The achievements of the Army RC in the first decade and a half of the 21st century demonstrate the likelihood for continued success. The sustainment of the Army RC as an operational reserve is a smart and logical course of action based on recent history, current operational conditions, and future operational requirements. The implementation of a new and improved mobilization authority will streamline the mobilization process, allowing Army RC forces to fulfill their operational role, remaining ready, reliable, and relevant, capable of supporting future operational requirements of the 21st century.
Bibliography


