Operational Risk Defined Through a Complex Operating Environment

A Monograph

by

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Military operations occur in complex operating environments. Commanders evaluate options based on capabilities and limitations of available resources. Planners identify elements of risk that the commander must assume in order to produce positive results and set conditions which enable a future desired state. Doctrine, however, does not currently provide a definition for risk at the operational level of war. Operational risk must identify factors that threaten or compromise linking tactical actions towards strategic goals. The definitions and guidance provided by joint doctrine to commanders and staff fail to meet the effort dedicated in planning to properly addressing risk. A proper assessment and definition of operational risk should address the twelve principles of joint operations: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Maneuver, Economy of Force, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, Simplicity, Restraint, Perseverance, and Legitimacy. This argument defines operational risk as any environmental, institutional, or social impediment to the principles of joint operations that disrupt tactical actions from achieving military objectives.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
Abstract
Operational Risk Defined through a Complex Operating Environment, by Maj Jeffrey B. Pattay, 49 pages.

Military operations occur in complex operating environments. Commanders evaluate options based on capabilities and limitations of available resources. Planners identify elements of risk that the commander must assume in order to produce positive results and set conditions which enable a future desired state. Doctrine, however, does not currently provide a definition for risk at the operational level of war. Operational risk must identify factors that threaten or compromise linking tactical actions towards strategic goals. The definitions and guidance provided by joint doctrine to commanders and staff fail to meet the effort dedicated in planning to properly addressing risk. A proper assessment and definition of operational risk should address the twelve principles of joint operations: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Maneuver, Economy of Force, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, Simplicity, Restraint, Perseverance, and Legitimacy. This argument defines operational risk as any environmental, institutional, or social impediment to the principles of joint operations that disrupt tactical actions from achieving military objectives.
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Introduction

Clausewitz stated that “Chance makes everything more uncertain and interferes with the whole course of events.”\(^1\) Clausewitz wrote this statement based on Napoleonic, linear wars, but implied the requirement to account for complexity. The modern battlefield evolved into multi-dimensional arena containing a variety of actors and actions. Commanders address this non-contiguous and chaotic environment by applying operational art, the linking of tactical actions to strategic goals. Commanders specifically must address chance and uncertainty which is commonly referred to as risk.

Operations orders and plans developed through doctrinal processes identify risk and arrange risk management procedures. Doctrine, however, poorly addresses risk and risk management. This monograph explores risk at the operational level of war. The monograph understands risk management as the exercise of caution to mitigate risk in order to gain or maintain the initiative. Caution does not equal risk aversion; but, deliberate care taken to avoid danger or mistakes. Operational planners and commanders can use the concepts and factors described to define and categorize obstacles that can prevent the consolidation of tactical gains from achieving strategic successes.

This monograph focuses on risk and it examines the case of U. S. intervention in Somalia. Specifically, this monograph examines the research question of How does the United States employ third party forces, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), to reduce operational risk? The research focuses on specific aspects of the AMISOM mission and the operational environment of Somalia to establish a framework for defining operational risk. The United States is in a situation in the Horn of Africa where risk must be acceptable to allow local forces to exercise mission command over a significant portion of the planning and execution

against Al-Shabaab in order to allow the government of Somalia to progress. The question now becomes: How does Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) influence a complex system and assess and accept risk?

“Historically, Somalis have shown a fierce independence, as unwillingness to submit to authority, a strong clan consciousness, and conflict among clans and sub-clans despite their sharing a common language, religion, and pastoral customs.”

Colonial rule controlled Somalia from 1890 through 1960. Colonial and external authorities divided Somalia into five regions administered by Britain, France, Italy, Ethiopia, and Kenya. Somalia established its first national government in 1960 in accordance with the Westphalian system. Somalia held its first national elections in March, 1969. The Somali Youth League dominated sixty one other parties and swept the elections. One party rule turned autocratic and led to a presidential assassination in October, 1969. A military coup occurred immediately after the assassination and created a socialist state under military rule.

The new regime led by Major General Mahammad Siad Barre aligned with the Soviet Union. Soviet advisors provided political and military assistance to strengthen the regime. The regime, however dissolved its relationship with the Soviet Union in 1977. Somalia then aligned with the US following a loss in the Ogaden War (1977-1978) between Somalia and Ethiopia. Siad’s regime consistently operated under domestic threat. The United States provided economic assistance in the form of aid packages and negotiations with the World Bank. Somalia hosted a joint military exercise with the US in 1986. In 1987, however, significant human rights violations forced the United States to make drastic cuts to aid packages. Siad struggled to maintain control

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3 Ibid., 3.

through the government and resorted to violence and coercion. The United States withdrew support in 1991.\textsuperscript{5}

Siad fled Somalia under threats of assassination shortly after the United States ended the relationship. The Somali government immediately collapsed and the international community recognized Somalia as a failed state. A famine in 1992 affected the entire country and resulted in more than one-half million Somalis starving to death.\textsuperscript{6} The United Nations Security Council recognized the horrific conditions and signed Resolution 751 that April. The United States, in turn, deployed forces for humanitarian aid and disaster response in August of 1992. Operations Provide Relief and Restore Hope served as vehicles for humanitarian aid and restoring order in southern Somalia, while setting conditions for a follow-on United Nations peacekeeping force. US forces did improve the security environment which significantly increased the passage of aid throughout Somalia. The transition to the United Nations force reduced the number of US personnel by seventy five percent. The security situation immediately reversed and violence erupted. Events culminated on October 3, 1994 during the infamous “Blackhawk down” event.\textsuperscript{7}

The Transitional Federal Government formed in 2004 to provide executive governmental functions. The Transitional Federal Government received support from the government of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian Army. The Transitional Federal Government did not garner the popular support needed to deter internal opposition. The Islamic Courts Union assumed control in Mogadishu and over southern Somalia in 2006. The Islamic Courts Union quickly consolidated power and effectively controlled all activities of the local populations. The Islamic Courts Union created regional legitimacy by signing a peace treaty with the Transitional Federal Government.

\textsuperscript{5} Metz, 17-22 and 44-52.


\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 15-20.
and the Ethiopian Army. The military wing of the Islamic Courts Union did not recognize the

treaty. The Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin, commonly known as al-Shabaab, forcibly took control

er over southern Somalia. Somali and Ethiopian forces defeated al-Shabaab in 2007. Al-Shabaab,

however, organized a clan-based insurgency that employed terrorism as a tactic to regain power.9

The United States recognized Somalia’s instability and returned to the region in 2002 by

establishing the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa under Central Command.10 The

United States continued to recognize the importance of the region and Africa at large which

served as the impetus to establish Africa Command in 2007. The United States identified Africa

as having large ungoverned areas and a propensity for failed states that can serve as safe havens

for criminal and terrorist organizations. A 2008 report to the U. S. Congress explained the

criticality of ensuring a safe, secure, and stable Africa. Specifically, “Africa’s role in Global War

on Terror and potential threats posed by uncontrolled spaces: the growing importance of Africa’s

natural resources, particularly energy resources; and ongoing concern for Africa’s many

humanitarian crises and armed conflicts.”11

The report also identified a working problem statement for CJTF-HOA and Africa

Command. A permanent United States presence concerns domestic audiences due to past

exposure and may embolden domestic terror groups. Some African governments in the region

8 Nikola Kovac, “Rebuilding Somalia: Security Challenges for the Post-Conflict Nation,”


consider themselves regional hegemons. A United States military presence may become a political or military rival with the potential to reduce African prestige. CJTF-HOA, with a physical presence, must empower regional partners and build strong alliances through the application of United States soft power in order to promote national security objectives.\textsuperscript{12} The report used the National Security Strategy of 2002 to identify those security objectives to “strengthen [U.S.] energy security and the shared prosperity of the global economy by working with our allies, trading partners, and energy producers to expand sources and types of global energy supplied.”\textsuperscript{13}


\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 14.
Literature Review

Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) participates in a complex system. Robert Jervis describes systems as being complex when interactions among actors do not demonstrate apparent cause and effect patterns. The system hosts interconnectedness that allows for nonlinear relationships and reactions to occur. Analysis of the complex systems through reduction does not explain holistic changes. Direct interactions between actors produce unintended consequences. Complex systems, essentially, do not equal the sum of the parts.\(^{14}\)

Complexity theory examines how order and chaos achieves balance to allow for organization and processes to function. Complex systems continually and unpredictably adapt to information and actions injected into the environment. No single actor maintains control over the system, but a single actor can manipulate the entire system’s status. Observers, in an effort to understand methods of manipulation, divide systems into three dynamic regions: stable, chaotic, and complex. Stable regions maintain order and predictability. Stability processes information in a determined manner, but resists change. Chaotic regions behave without recognizable rules or direction. Chaos does not resist change, but lacks the capacity to incorporate change. Complex regions border stability and chaos. Systems possessing properties of stability and chaos have the ability to retain information (stability) and inherent flexibility (chaos) to adapt.\(^{15}\)

Any actor, as stated, can simply disrupt the status quo of a system. An actor, however, that desires to influence a system to produce a desired change must confront the inherent complexity. Desired changes become more complicated when the actor enters from outside the basic system. The environment may seem overwhelming, but systems are not impregnable due to


complexity. Social systems, in fact, that manufacture properties derived from cultural ideas and societal norms possess subtle guides for interacting with the system. Those actors attempting to change a system must be aware of system effects that prevent straight forward cause and effects. Social systems have ideas, cultures, and norms that guide interactions. The unpredictable nature of complex and dynamic systems requires factors of risk to be included in any purposeful formula attempting to pressure the status quo.

Peter Bernstein’s best seller Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk identified significant developments in social thinking concerning numbers and the future. Bernstein specifically argued that human appreciation of risk enabled logical decision making and limited the thought that all future events were predetermined by gods and fates. The maturation process of developing risk awareness and the utility of risk enabled the growth of academics, economics, businesses, and government institutions. The historical study of risk developed contemporary procedures for measuring risk and concepts to succeed despite risk.

Risk has traditionally been rooted in mathematics. Leonardo Pisano, known as Fibonacci, wrote Liber Abaci in 1202. Liber Abaci explained the Hindu-Arabic numbering system, which for the first time included zero, to audiences throughout the Holy Roman Empire. The new numbering system replaced Hebrew, Greek, and Roman systems that used letters to represent numbers. Fibonacci described the theory of numbers, but more importantly, he demonstrated application through calculations, bookkeeping, conversions, and fractions. The Hindu-Arabic numbering system facilitated individuals and societies to think and design life with more precision.

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16 Jervis, 251-255.


18 Ibid., 14-15.
Although advancements in mathematics improved calculations and advanced business and governments, social norms did not provide for thought of the future. Fates and gods determined outcomes, humans could not make predictions. In the 1500s Girolamo Cardano, an Italian physician instigated a paradigm change through his curiosity in mathematics by way of gambling. Cardano’s gambling interests focused his attentions to the development of statistical probabilities expressed in fractions, particularly what a gambler could expect from throwing a pair of six sided dice. Cardano sought to distinguish safe bets from unsafe bets.

Gambling continued to motivate academic circles. In 1654, Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat resolved a riddle from the late 1400s which pondered how to appropriately divide a money pot from an unfinished game of bala, an old game of chance played with animal bones as dice. Pascal wrote his solution as probability theory and just distribution. Pascal’s and Fermat’s work foreshadowed risk management and expanded calculating probabilities by incorporating more than two variables.

Pascal and Fermat produced letters and treatises during a time when academic circles began to widen and include people other than scientists and mathematicians. In 1662 John Graunt, an English businessman studied demographics throughout London. His objective was “[T]o know how many people there be of each Sex, State, Age, Religious, Trade, Rank, or Degree, &c. by the knowing whereof Trade and Government may be of more certain, and Regular; for, if men know the People as aforesaid, they might know the consumption they would make, so as Trade might not be hoped for where it is impossible.” Graunt unknowingly produced sampling theory and market research.

19 Bernstein, 49-50.
20 Ibid., 67-68.
21 Bernstein, 67.
This same time also developed insurance as a viable market and a method to protect investments against negative consequences. Edward Lloyd operated a coffee-house at the port of London. Lloyd published charts that tracked ships and the goods transported. The charts grew in sophistication beyond departure and arrival times. Charts expanded to include sea states, weather information, and other anomalies that could affect delivery. Underwriters provided contracts based on premiums to guarantee investments on the shipping.22 Contracts became a basic method for protecting business arrangements. Financial institutions formalized contract processes through interest rates and insurance premiums as ways of managing and mitigating risk.23

Daniel Bernoulli, around 1733, challenged industry by arguing that the base of risk management was inadequate. Bernoulli identified that the current system only appreciated the mathematical expected value of probability to weight decisions. Bernoulli instead developed utility theory against stated probabilities which argued that logical people consider usefulness, desirability, and satisfaction to develop true worth.24 True worth, according to Bernoulli, required qualitative analysis.

Bernoulli influenced modern practices of assessing risk and evaluating the true value of investments. Ron Dembo and Andrew Freeman, in Seeing Tomorrow: Rewriting the Rules of Risk, described strategies for decision-making with regards to investments. One concept introduced was risk-adjusted measures, comparing principle payment and insurance premium to potential gains. Dembo and Freeman showed that this value, positive or negative, further defines

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22 Bernstein, 90.


24 Bernstein, 104.
true worth. Dembo and Freeman viewed positive risk-adjusted values as good investments versus negative risk-adjusted values as bad investments.\textsuperscript{25}

Many common statistical tools currently employed to evaluate data began as pivotal concepts. In 1816, Carl Friedrich Gauss conducted geodesic measurements throughout Bavaria in order to determine the size of the earth. He recorded measurements on a graph that formed a Gaussian curve, now commonly referred to as a bell curve. The bell curve produced a simulacrum of normal distribution. Normal distribution enhanced probability theory by providing a method for estimating a range of normally occurring data points. Normal distribution provided a standard framework for risk-management systems, particularly in insurance markets.\textsuperscript{26}

The bell curve identified normal occurrences and at the same time highlighted abnormal events. William W. Allison addressed certain anomalies in \textit{Profitable Risk Control: The Winning Edge}. Allison presented a theory of Profitable Risk Control (PRC) that improves performance by “eliminating or reducing the causes of human error and preventing their consequences.”\textsuperscript{27} PRC relied on Pareto’s Law of the Significant and the Trivial Many. Pareto’s Law, or the 80/20 rule, stated that 80% of an output is determined by 20% of an input. Allison advocated for business managers and executives to increase profits by identifying and addressing the most costly incidents of human error. Companies applied to 80% of allocated resources to 20% of the negative incidents.\textsuperscript{28}

Allison’s theory showed several methods for determining risk events that need attention. But more significantly, PRC placed responsibility of risk control on managers and chief executive


\textsuperscript{26} Bernstein, 140-144.


\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 3.
officers (CEO). The CEO cannot delegate the responsibility to ensure profit, the company’s goal.\(^{29}\) Allison recognized that habitual success requires leadership to personally account for risk. Specifically, “The need for sound judgment and experience in the real world cannot be overemphasized in making proper, rather than apparent assumptions” when analyzing risk and probabilities.\(^{30}\)

Allison additionally differentiated risk control from risk management. Financial and insurance industries described risk management as reactions for when events go bad. Risk control described as setting conditions to limit negative outcomes. Proactive risk control allowed managers to review historical industry events and look for larger patterns to represent probable future outcomes.\(^{31}\) PRC anchored risk control to evaluating experiences that showed similarities in causes of common risk and severe risk. Historical review outlined preventative actions to limit costly consequences.\(^{32}\)

Davidson J. Frame also explored roles and responsibilities in *Managing Risk in Organizations: A Guide for Managers*. He argued that organizations can proactively prepare against risk and prevent being caught by surprise through sound operating procedures. Frame contributed to the field of study a five step risk management framework: plan for risk, identify risk, examine risk impacts (qualitative and quantitative), develop risk-handling strategies, and monitor and control risks. Frame stated that “risk management is the combination of risk assessment and action.”\(^{33}\)

\(^{29}\) Allison, 88.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 39.

\(^{31}\) John Lewis Gaddis, *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Gaddis described how historians represent the past to provide a wider view through shared experience when considering future actions.

\(^{32}\) Allison, 50-57.

\(^{33}\) Frame, 14-15.
Frame theorized that while efficiency improves quality, efficiency also reduces risk. He defended the position by reviewing Total Quality Management (TQM), a business trend in the 1980s that provided education throughout organizations to improve business practices and focuses on the end product. TQM correlates to Six Sigma and zero defects concepts to eliminate unnecessary processes and improve processes through early intervention. Organizations, according to Frame, used two control methods. First, implicit organizational controls relied on training, management, and organizational structure to naturally reduce risk; establishing a positive work environment focused on the end product. Second, explicit organizational controls established unique roles and responsibilities to control a risk management process.34

Frame proposed several notable techniques towards explicit controls and the risk management process. Proper risk management teams included expert representatives from all departments of an organization. The teams employed brainstorming while they identified risk and examined impacts, particularly for a qualitative approach. The framework used for brainstorming was SWOT – strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. “The qualitative approach recognizes that experience coupled with hunches and good judgment enables people to develop insights that they cannot develop if they are constrained by the requirement that they work only with measurable phenomena.”35

In completing the risk management framework, Frame placed significance on the monitor and control risks. He described the development of required feedback to be planned and integrated within risk-handling. Scenarios should be developed, with a vision of the future in mind, to evaluate and identify events that can risk or impact a desired end state.36 Frame warned

34 Frame, 40.

35 Frame, 55 and 69. SWOT is discussed on page 55 and the qualitative approach quotation is found on page 69.

36 Frame, 253.
that an organization that neglects to completely and honestly plan for risk creates a system that is vulnerable to catastrophic consequences, a serious problem that arises without enough resources available to offset the result.  

Dembo and Freeman described risk and risk management similarly to Frame. *Seeing Tomorrow* identified the elements of risk as time-horizon, scenario, risk measure, and benchmarks. When addressing risk management Dembo and Freeman importantly noted the distinction between risk and uncertainty. Risk can be quantified with certainty, while uncertainty cannot be measured or assumed. With certainty, probabilities can be understood which allows for cause and effect relationships to be discovered.  

Dembo and Freeman argued that risk management should not be viewed as a science. Similar to Bernoulli’s utility theory, math and computer models do not account for human intervention. Successful risk managers considered many possibilities of causes and effects to develop proactive and reactive measures to suppress realized risk. Dembo and Freeman ultimately hypothesized that “the essence of risk management lies in maximizing the area where we have absolutely no control over the outcome and the linkage between effect and cause is hidden from us.”  

The concept of risk and human influence on risk developed as the result of gamblers attempting to win a game of chance, or more importantly, not lose. Mathematicians developed and expanded utility in numbers and methods to use probabilities to make predictions. Social scientists, financial experts, and business leaders further enhanced math models and theories to formulate decision-making processes. The preceding authors and theorist identified that logical

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37 Ibid., 145.

38 Dembo and Freeman, 200.

39 Ibid., 18-22.

40 Dembo and Freeman, 197.
investors, whether through insurance or system controls, guard their investment, blood or
treasure, against risk.

Risk challenges military commanders at all levels of war. Joint Publication 3-0 establishes three levels to frame military actions:

1. Strategic Level – establishes policy, national objectives and concepts to employ instruments of national power,
2. Operational Level – coordinates the efforts and purpose of tactical actions to satisfy strategic objectives,
3. Tactical Level – Plans and executes battles.

This paper focuses on the operational level and explores factors of risk managed through operational art. How does a military commander apply resources (Means) in time, space, and purpose (Ways) to accomplish favorable results (Ends) and identify obstacles (Risk)? Commanders and staffs apply knowledge, experience and creativity to develop potential solution sets to advance an environment’s current condition to the desired future condition.41

“The fundamental purpose of military power is to deter or wage war in support of national policy.”42 US policy prefers to create atmospheres of deterrence directed at potential enemies. The attention required by the United States, due to globalization of economies and societies, exceeds the capacity of the US military. The United States uses security cooperation to compensate for the delta: “Establishing, maintaining, and enhancing security cooperation among our alliances and partners is important to strengthen the global security framework of the United States and its partners.”43 The counter terrorism mission specifically addresses security cooperation and deterrence.

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42 Ibid., I-1.

43 Joint Publication 3-0, I-4.
Counter-terrorism, particularly in the Horn of Africa, requires regional cooperation to identify and defeat adversarial groups. Geographic Combatant Commands, through military engagement and security cooperation, seek to build indigenous capability, strengthen trust and confidence, and establish conditions for deterrence. Commanders share intelligence, exchange information, conduct joint intelligence operations, and bolster logistics to host nation and partner nations. Commanders can increase support beyond security cooperation with security assistance.

Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales. Security assistance equips, trains, and develops capabilities and capacities in foreign [Counter-Terrorism] CT forces. A [Geographic Combatant Command] GCC theater campaign plan may include activities to provide security assistance to a nation’s military and, when authorized, civilian CT forces, and may be combined with similar security assistance to neighboring countries to develop a regional CT capability to address cross-border terrorist threats and act in a coordinated effort.44

Geographic Combatant Commanders utilize a variety of Department of Defense programs to advance local and regional security capabilities to demonstrate a legitimate, lasting threat to organizations that employ terrorism. Discouraging terrorism, though, is difficult. Incomplete or misguided deterrence and counter terrorism activities aimed to dislocate a network risks relocating the network in a less secure environment.45 Risk is an organic element residing in all military operations and requires attention at all levels of command.

*Joint Publication 3-0* and *Joint Publication 5-0* use the word ‘risk’ 66 and 126 times, respectively. The references, however, only offer a generic definition of “the likely chance of failure or unacceptable result in a sequence of actions.”46

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46 *Joint Publication 3-0*, II-4 and *Joint Publication 5-0*, III-2 and III-17.
describes in detail the importance of identifying risk at all level and deliberately planning to manage risk in the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP). Joint Publication 3-0 depicts a five step, continuous action Risk Management Process: Identify Hazards, Assess Hazards, Develop Controls, Implement Controls, and Supervise and Evaluate Controls. The commander’s responsibility includes developing feedback mechanisms within the process to improve the decision-making process.

Geographic Combatant Commands and subordinate Joint Task Forces conduct JOPP to plan military actions against national and strategic objectives through common language and shared processes between joint headquarters. The process relies on a continuous discussion between levels which often concerns the Risk Management Process. The Joint Task Force, as the operational commander, develops the landscape for operational risk. Joint Publication 5-0 recognizes that “determining risk is more art than science.” The definition provided reads, “Operational risk. Defines aspects of the campaign or operation in which the commander will accept risk in lower or partial achievement or temporary conditions. It also describes areas in which it is not acceptable to accept such lower or intermediate conditions.”

The definitions and guidance available to commanders and planners fails to meet the effort dedicated to properly addressing risk in joint doctrine. A proper assessment and definition of operational risk should address the twelve principles of joint operations: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Maneuver, Economy of Force, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, Simplicity, Restraint, Perseverance, and Legitimacy. This argument defines

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47 Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning is the Department of Defense’s doctrine for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational planning activities.

48 Joint Publication 5-0, III-17.

49 Joint Publication 3-0, I-2.
operational risk as any environmental, institutional, or social impediment to the principles of joint operations that disrupt tactical actions from achieving military objectives.
Methodology

The methodology applied to this monograph examined the relationship between CJTF-HOA and AMISOM during the counter terrorism fight based in central and southern Somalia and the relationship’s effect on CJTF-HOA’s operational risk. The analysis first examined risk from historical and non-military points of view to develop a definition of operational risk. Second, the analysis reviewed joint doctrine’s understanding of risk and complexity. Third, a detailed process tracing case study of how AMISOM affected CJTF-HOA and how CJTF-HOA assisted AMISOM was conducted in order to examine how risk affected operational planning.

The monograph established a suitable definition of operational risk above. This definition was used to evaluate the effectiveness of third party forces, African Union (AU) forces, reducing the operational risk for the US military and supported the CJTF-HOA mission statement. Sources of information included reports from the United Nations, African Union, CJTF-HOA, and US Government. Interviews of government and military officials obtained from online and press resources provided official assessments and guidance for the AMISOM and CJTF-HOA missions. United States joint military doctrine served as the authority on military terms, definitions, and concepts. The analysis identified areas of operational risk and discovered controls or mitigations managed through CJTF-HOA.

The conclusion identified positive and negative effects of third party forces employed in a complex system from the viewpoint of US forces. The recommendations provided future considerations in regards to operational risk and the use of third party forces to conduct counter-terrorism. The monograph additionally identified future research questions that developed throughout the examination.
Analysis

The Horn of Africa includes the countries Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia. CJTF-HOA, located in Djibouti, extends its area of responsibility to include Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, and the Seychelles. The region, as a system, presents a unique level of complexity through varying degrees of governance, security, and economic stabilities. Somalia, in particular, struggles to establish sovereignty because of the continual threat of terrorism, poverty, warlordism, and poor regional cooperation. CJTF-HOA assists the region through security cooperation to improve internal defense capabilities. CJTF-HOA manages environmental, institutional, and social factors to counter terrorism.

The environmental factors of Somalia include challenging terrain that hosts poorly connected population centers and natural obstacles, arid to semiarid conditions, and a long coastline. The risk to military operations challenges legitimacy, security, maneuver, and offensive.

The institutional factors exist locally, the governance struggles of Somalia; regionally, AU responsibilities and capabilities; and globally, US strategy and United Nations mandates. Institutional dynamics pose risks against legitimacy, perseverance, unity of command, restraint, objective, and security.

The social factors within this complex system derive from varying ideologies, ethnicities, and cultures. The social tensions risk legitimacy, perseverance, simplicity, offensive, and restraint.

Environmental Factors

Somalia’s total geographic area, 637,657 square kilometers, compares to the state of Texas. Where Texas boasts eight US Interstates and over thirty-five state highways, Somalia ranks 105 out of 222 countries in roadway comparisons with only two major paved roads. The country consists mostly of flat desert, with the exception of the highlands in the north. Minimal rainfall and limited fresh waterways enables only 2,000 square kilometers of irrigated lands. The
coastline of 3,025 kilometers abuts the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, providing access to the Suez Canal. Somalia’s natural resources include uranium, iron ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, copper, salt, natural gas, and unexplored oil reserves.50

Al-Shabaab controlled the majority of Somalia by securing urban areas in central and southern Somalia. “Most major southern Somali towns, including Dhusamareeb, Beletweyne, Buulo Burto, Jomhar, Xuddur, Waajid, Bardheere, and the strategic port towns of Kismayo and Merka” remained under control of opposition forces until 2010.51 Al-Shabaab enjoyed freedom of movement and action throughout central and southern Somalia during this time. The group’s physical power allowed them, at times, to also control airports, including the airport in Mogadishu. Isolating urban populations and the associated road networks proved to be a critical enabling requirement for Al-Shabaab operations.

Al-Shabaab established and managed a sophisticated logistics network that enabled organizational legitimacy amongst local populations. The organization “filled a governance vacuum, providing the population with essential services and welfare” by restricting access and movement within controlled territories.52 A drought, in 2011 led to a serious famine throughout

50 The CIA World Fact Book provided the geographic assessment, accessed on December 9, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html. The information on Texas highway infrastructure was accessed on December 9, 2014, http://geology.com/cities-map/texas.shtml. The information on Somalia highway infrastructure was accessed on December 9, 2014, https://www.google.com/maps/place/Somalia/@1.0878058,44.282757,7.48z/data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x181d2ea7ecd15b83:0x9e393ace5ce9e5be.


most of Somalia. International support organizations such as the World Food Program arrived in Somalia to distribute critical food supplies. Al-Shabaab, however, implemented policies that forbade outside assistance from any organization with Western relationships. Al-Shabaab created an atmosphere of dependency for local populations towards al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab’s refusal of foreign aid contributed to an estimated three million famine related deaths.\(^{53}\)

Al-Shabaab’s coercive enforcement of policies included conventional and unconventional military violence. A robust arms trafficking and supply network enabled Al-Shabaab to consistently equip fighters. The majority of supplies entered Somalia through the port at Kismayo and smaller port cities along the Lower Juba coastline. “A wide variety of ammunition, ranging from cartridges for different types of assault rifles, handguns and machineguns (PKMs, DShKa) to anti-tank weapons (RPG 2 and 7, Carl Gustavs and B-10s), mortar rounds of different calibers (60mm, 81mm and 120mm) and light anti-tank guns.”\(^{54}\) Small, well-armed military forces employed guerilla tactics to emplace improvised explosive devices and roadside bombs to secure roads. Al-Shabaab, in addition, travelled with impunity while carrying out assassinations and kidnappings for ransom and establishing taxation checkpoints.\(^{55}\)

The Military Operations Coordination Committee of the African Union identified Mogadishu as the center of gravity for Al-Shabaab.\(^{56}\) Mogadishu provided Al-Shabaab its largest recruiting district and direct access to Somalia’s largest economic transactions. The major road networks, additionally, connect in Mogadishu which provided a command and control hub for Al-

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\(^{53}\)Wiklund, 37.


\(^{55}\)Ibid., 14.

Shabaab. AMISOM, to defeat Al-Shabaab, created six tactical areas of operations within Southern Somalia: Sector 1 – Mogadishu, Sector 2 – Jubbada Hoose, Sector 3 – Baidoa, Sector 4 – Belet Weyne, Sector 5 – Shabeellaha, and Sector 6 – Port of Kismaayo.\(^57\) AMISOM, mandated to conduct peace support operations, needed to win the support of local populations and receive recognition for improving the welfare of Somalis.\(^58\)

Central and southern Somalia contained large ungoverned areas. AMISOM forces entered Somalia on the offense via Mogadishu and employed conventional military tactics to provide security to the Transitional Federal Government. Local clans, in 2007, initially rejected AMISOM’s presence and challenged their legitimacy as an impartial organization.\(^59\) Local leaders complained that AMISOM indiscriminately used artillery and other area fire weapons which resulted in high civilian casualties.\(^60\) AMISOM improved command and control and focused on reducing civilian casualties while consolidating gains in territory from 2007 to 2012. Operation FREE SHABELLE in 2012 secured a critical corridor from Mogadishu to Afgoooye that enabled humanitarian aid to travel without interference. AMISOM commanders recognized the need to protect civilians and open roads to allow governance to extend control and influence.\(^61\)

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CJTF-HOA hosted military engagement with Troop Contributing Countries in the form of security force assistance. Marines and sailors from Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Africa deployed to Kampala, Uganda and provided pre-deployment training. The training events lasted ten weeks. AMISOM forces received training and evaluation on individual and collective task to include marksmanship, vehicle and communication equipment maintenance, convoy operations, and logistic operations. AMISOM forces also received training to improve first responder actions, triage skills, and casualty evacuation procedures.

CJTF-HOA’s partnership with Troop Contributing Countries reduced operational risk by increasing the capability of individual soldiers to maintain individual and equipment readiness. AMISOM forces extended their lines of communication from 2007 to 2012 and expanded security for local populations. Communities received much needed humanitarian aid and access to the economy. AMISOM’s consolidation of gains and respect shown towards Somalis established legitimacy in AMISOM forces and Somali government officials. AMISOM overcame environmental factors to enable security through efficient maneuver and effective offenses.

**Institutional Factors**

John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, through the lens of institutional theory, argued that institutions enable formal organizations. Formal organizations created by an institution typically enjoy legitimacy and resiliency merely from sponsorship. Constructed rules, norms, and accepted behaviors have been the by-product of formality expected by social environments.\(^{64}\)


factors (rules, norms, accepted behaviors) embedded throughout the Horn of Africa established constraints and restraints for military action inside of Somalia. CJTF-HOA confronted institutional factors implemented by Al-Shabaab, the United Nations, the African Union, several Somali Transitional Governments, and the United States. Each organization uniquely demanded legitimacy, perseverance, unity of command, restraint, objective, and security.

Al-Shabaab, as previously stated, operated as a political body with a military component to provide governance to the local populations of Somalia. Its goal, particularly as a member of the Islamic Courts Union, sought a Somali Caliphate that promoted nationalism and enforced sharia law. Katherine Zimmerman argued “Al-Shabaab and the Challenges of Providing Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia” to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights. Zimmerman noted that “al-Shabaab’s shura council consolidated power and enforced bans on humanitarian aid agencies.”

Al-Shabaab’s shura council structured local administration of policy to delineate responsibility and delegate authority. The shura, similar to most other recognized government bodies, established ministries and offices to include: Defense, Intelligence and Internal Security, Religious Affairs and Orientation, Interior, Information, Religious Police, and Finance. The framework developed taxes, dispute resolution systems, military recruitment, rule of law, and engagement. Al-Shabaab enjoyed local legitimacy and international recognition. In 2009, it created the Office for the Supervision of the Affairs of Foreign Affairs that dictated rules and regulations for any outside agency to conduct Humanitarian Assistance within Al-Shabaab

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controlled territory. Organizations caught operating in violation received harsh punishment, often violent.\(^{68}\)

The bureaucratic structure of al-Shabaab has to be taken more seriously than the TFG State apparatus. It reflects a will to duplicate the organisation of other Jihadi movements (including al-Qa’idah), the strong influence of foreigners who want to mitigate problems that always hindered the development of a Somali Jihadi group (clanism, warlordism and physical elimination by outsiders) and the de facto governing role of al-Shabaab. While resources are put first and foremost in the military and security sectors, the need to (re)educate the population and to govern it without become prisoners of its internal tensions (or becoming again a full social actor and interacting with it) has convinced al-Shabaab leaders to build new institutions and procedures. Whatever evaluations made on the ideological debates within al-Shabaab, the key question still is whether at one point ruling a population would create a political dynamic that would circumvent a mere militaristic Jihadi agenda.\(^{69}\)

The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of the Republic of Somalia fought to survive against Al-Shabaab. The TFG struggled to gain local support because the TFG could not out produce Al-Shabaab’s political ventures. The TFG, lacking an army, partnered with the African Union to create operational space. In March 2007, The TFG signed a Status of Mission Agreement with the African Union on the African Union Mission in Somalia. The agreement permitted AMISOM “to deploy a peace support mission in Somalia to provide security support to the Transitional Federal Government in order to ensure its relocation to Somalia, guarantee the sustenance of the outcome of the IGAD peace process, and assist with the re-establishment of peace and security, including training of the police and the army.”\(^{70}\)

The agreement, in summary, set parameters for the force to operate within Somalia. African Union member states would contribute nine infantry battalions, with civilian and police

\(^{68}\) Zimmerman, 1.

\(^{69}\) Marchal, 23.

components, to total 8000-9000 personnel. Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 1977, the UNESCO convention of 1954 and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 framed operational plans and actions. The TFG requested that AMISOM display distinctive markers on all vehicles and aircraft, wear uniforms while on duty, and submit official requests in writing to the TFG for additional support. AMISOM, in return, received permission to install, operate, and maintain command and control networks and conduct information operations to engage the Somali public.\footnote{Status of Mission Agreement Between the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic and The African Union Mission in Somalia, 4-7.} Cooperation amongst both parties provided legitimacy to the AMISOM force as an advocate for peace and not as an aggressive, occupying force.


The initial resolution covered a six month period of operations in order to support Somalia’s political process and create conditions for inclusive Somali government institutions. The mandate authorized AMISOM protect Transitional Federal Institutions and key infrastructure by all means available and create conditions for a United Nations peacekeeping mission. The United Nations Security Council, form 2007 to 2013, issued fifteen resolutions with AMISOM as the subject. Each resolution after UNSCR 1744 contained similar language that extended the
mandate timeline, stressed humanitarian rights, and focused on providing security and protection – defensive in nature. Four resolutions deviated from the standard:

- UNSCR 1766(2007) allowed AMISOM to enforce an arms embargo,
- UNSCR 1910(2010) named Al-Shabaab as an obstacle to the peace process,
- UNSCR 1964(2010) increased the maximum troop presence to 12,000,
- most significantly, UNSCR(2012) expanded the territorial scope of the mission, increased the troop size to 17,731, and permitted offensive action against Al-Shabaab.

All resolutions identified the United Nations as a source for equipment and service support for AMISOM. The United Nations also provided technical and expert advice to African Union planners. The resolutions, lastly, demanded that all support and donation towards the mission be coordinated through the Security Council. The Security Council directed AMISOM and the AU to show transparency for usage and accounting of all support provided through the United Nations.

CJTF-HOA conducted operations to support AMISOM within parameters established through United Nations Security council resolutions. UNSCR 1744 requested international support in terms of logistics and training towards military and humanitarian operations. A 2010 report noted that “CJTF-HOA personnel train the region’s security forces in counter-terrorism and other areas of military professionalization, collect intelligence, conduct civil affairs projects, oversee and support humanitarian assistance efforts, and serve as advisors to multilateral peace operations.”

CJTF-HOA applied indirect approaches to bolster AMISOM efforts. The United States, in 2007, provided a $78.7 million support package to AMSIOM that included pre-
deployment training for Uganda and Burundi forces, military equipment, and logistics support. CJTF-HOA also served as a conduit for Non-Governmental Organizations that sought to deliver guaranteed aid to Somalia.⁷⁴

CJTF-HOA strengthened AMSIOM efforts despite institutional restraints. The Government Accountability Office reviewed CJTF-HOA’s mission to assist Africa Command’s decision on the future of CJTF-HOA. Specific criticisms discovered in the report fall outside the scope of this analysis. But the report noted that “CJTF-HOA’s presence in Africa offers benefits such as its ability to respond to contingencies, provide forces for AFRICOM activities, and build U.S.-African relationships.”⁷⁵

The UNSCR resolutions delayed offensive actions and threatened security. AMSIOM, while defending from 2007 to 2011, possessed the potential to lose sight of the mission’s objective and erode confidence in the coalition’s unity of command. CJTF-HOA applied soft power via leadership and mentorship to reduce institutional factors which influenced operational risk. The perseverance and cooperation between CJTF-HOA and AMISOM created conditions for the force to improve, practice restraint, and consolidate tactical gains.

**Social Factors**

A stable Somalia positively affects the region. The peace process, however, eluded Somali since the state collapse in 1991. Social factors, or more importantly a lack of understanding of the Somali culture, prevented enduring resolutions. Demographic facts remained consistent from pre-colonial times to current times: Somali nationals are 85% of the population, enjoy the common language of Somali, and the country is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, with a

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literacy rate of only 38%. As noted in environmental factors, the landscape of Somalia does not offer plentiful farming and fertile grazing lands. Somalis, therefore, constantly competed amongst themselves for land and water. Protection and support against outsiders existed within clan-based social structures. Individual Somalis naturally developed a sense of caution and guard against outsiders. “Clans are the most important form of organization in Somali society.” Somalia’s hierarchy derived from five major clans: Darod, Dir, Digil and Mirfifle, Hawiye, and Isaaq. I.M. Lewis noted that the Somali clan served as the basic political group in the absence of formal government, to include during the colonial period. The clan, additionally provided individuals with their primary identity.

The clan-based culture that still dominates Somalia continues to practice the traditional law of Xeer for dispute resolution. Xeer promotes clan security through collective punishment and mediation between clans through elders. Adjudication under Xeer relies on the diyya system. “This traditional system is based on collective compensation and reconciliation rather than an individual punishment, but is backed by the threat of the use of direct retaliatory force by the


victim’s clan in the absence of settlement. Somalis prefer a peaceful atmosphere, however, Somalis resort to violence quickly if negotiations falter. The sanctity of Xeer represents survival and prosperity of the clan and individuals.

Al-Shabaab originated from within Somalia. Leaders and members participated in clan activities and the clan-based social structure prior to becoming separatists. The Islamic Courts Union provided political legitimacy to the militia known as al-Shabaab by authorizing al-Shabaab as a law enforcement agency. Al-Shabaab and the Islamic Courts union veered from Xeer and believed that Shari’a law should dominate Somalia. Al-Shabaab’s self-described narrative centered on nationalism combined with strict adherence to Islam. The organization seized popular support through nationalism in 2007 by resisting Ethiopia’s “invasion” and protecting Somalia’s sovereignty. Al-Shabaab appealed to the emotions of the clans by claiming to guard against foreign Christian occupation. Al-Shabaab quickly consolidated power throughout the major population centers and sought to diminish clan prominence through the enforcement of Shari’a law. Local populations initially respected al-Shabaab due to the establishment of civil order. But, “Al-Shabaab’s enforcement of extreme measures and punishments under the mantle of Shari’a [became] increasingly unpopular with many Somalis.” The majority of Somalia’s population, expressed through clans, rejected Al-Shabaab’s attempt to rapidly disassembled tradition and transform the Somalia’s social structure.

AMISOM predominately comprised of troops from Uganda and Burundi. Commanders and soldiers from both countries arrived in Somalia to support the peace process with their on social narratives. The social structures of both countries possessed similarities and differences.

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80 Grubeck, 26.
81 Roque, 2.
82 Marchal, 17.
83 Roque, 2.
with the structure in Somalia. Uganda speaks English and the majority of the population affiliate with Christian faith. Uganda, additionally maintains a literacy rate of 73%.\textsuperscript{84} Burundi, similarly practices Christian religions and holds a literacy rate of 67.2%. The Burundi’s, though, speak French and Kirundi.\textsuperscript{85} Education and religious preference differed between the AMISOM forces and the Somali population. All three social structures share an appreciation of clan or tribal relationships and traditions, particularly in regards to dispute resolution. The Ugandan tradition of Acholi utilizes a council to investigate circumstances of disputes and assigns responsibility to the offender. The council gathers both parties for a cleansing and reconciliation ceremony where each side drinks mato oput, a bitter herb, and the offender repents. The ceremony provides collective healing for both clans.\textsuperscript{86} The Burundi tradition of Ubushingantahe also uses elders to settle disputes. The practice focuses on the community and imposes punishment against individuals or groups. The guilty party bears a guilty stigmatism and is sentenced to isolation for period of time.\textsuperscript{87} All three social structures believe in accountability and mutual resolution.

The Somalia population routinely complained about interactions with and the actions of AMISOM, specifically with regards to the use of force. Civilian causalities increased with AMISOM’s presence and attributed to AMISOM’s use of indirect fires. Often Al-Shabaab fired mortars in close proximity to civilians who Al-Shabaab viewed as shields. AMISOM employed artillery fire indiscriminately within populated areas as counter mortar fire.\textsuperscript{88} Neither the


\textsuperscript{86} Grubeck, 43.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 44.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 19.
Ugandans nor the Burundi applied their native social values to respect the Somali community. AMISOM, additionally, demonstrated no signs of accountability for their actions. AMISOM operated from 2006 to 2011 without a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell to investigate and respond to civilian victims. The AU imposed an Indirect Fire policy in 2011 to limit use in populated areas.\textsuperscript{89}

CJTF-HOA injected a critical service, mentorship, into the operational environment in an attempt to reduce misunderstandings between AMISOM and Somali attitudes while reducing the effects of complexity. “Since 2002, CJTF-HOA personnel have used military-to-military mentorship as the cornerstone to building regional security.”\textsuperscript{90} CJTF-HOA encouraged and improved AMISOM leadership through command sponsored training, participation with Department of State initiatives, and partnership with non-government organizations. CJTF-HOA’s efforts to address social factors allowed AMISOM commanders and leaders to translate military victories into political and social successes. AMISOM leaders, in this realm, learned to interact with civilians respectfully.

CJTF-HOA described its military-to-military engagement as an approach to “build trust and confidence among host populations.”\textsuperscript{91} CJTF-HOA focused goals to address root causes of instability throughout the region. The selected method utilized International Military Education and Training by hosting conferences and train-the-trainer events. The 409th Civil Affairs Battalion and Functional Specialty Rule of Law Office of CJTF-HOA trained warrant officers and non-commissioned officers from the Uganda People’s Defense Force. The lead trainer from CJTF-HOA stated that “The purpose [of this event] was to advocate a respect for human rights

\textsuperscript{89} Grubeck, 4.


and the rule of law by promoting good conduct, so as to build support for our partner nation, Uganda, among its people, and to build capacity among the troops.\textsuperscript{92}

The United States Department of State resourced the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA) to improve African partnerships in peace building. AMISOM received significant support through ACOTA. CJTF-HOA supported ACOTA programs by providing military subject matter experts to a variety of training venues. The Peace Operations Staff Course and the AMISOM Force Headquarters Course both function as part of the pre-deployment training program from troop contributing countries. The Headquarters course, specifically, lasted four weeks and trained officers on staff processes in a combat environment. Officers practiced the military decision-making process and integrated the following principles and instruction in the military decision-making process: civil-military operations, rules of engagement and intelligent operations, AMISOM command relationships, protection of civilians, urban operations, counter improvised explosive device awareness, and staff operating processes.\textsuperscript{93}

The CJTF-HOA J9 produced a one page document to highlight critical activities that have been planned build and enhance trust and confidence among host populations. A host population, in this context, refers to the individual countries that request support or invite activities from CJTF-HOA. Operating under International Military Education and Training and ACOTA, CJTF-HOA planned train-the-trainer programs that address root causes of instability with a goal to “foster partner militaries use of expanded capacities to support or participate in


regional security initiatives.” Train-the-trainer programs offered an efficient venue to transmit and amplify messages of expected military behavior and actions. CJTF-HOA, in 2009, supported the Ethiopian National Defense Force establishment of a Non-Commissioned Officers Academy. Senior Enlisted members from within CJTF-HOA partnered with Ethiopian course developers and instructors to impart leadership qualities expected of Non-Commissioned Officers and the relationship with the officers they support.

CJTF-HOA made significant contributions toward AMISOM commanders’ ability to employ and leverage enabling operations, particularly managing and employing information. The tensions between AMISOM and Somalia leadership stemmed from a lack of shared information. CJTF-HOA, in partnership with the United States Mission to the African Union, hosted the Peace and Security Operational Center Functional Training seminar. The audience consisted of representatives from all troop contributing countries of AMISOM and other regional partners. The program of instruction intended to initiate streamlined information requirements during the conduct of operations. Field grade leaders from CJTF-HOA highlighted the importance of Commander’s Critical Information Requirement and how to organize, analyze, and distribute information. AMISOM, effectively using the train-the-trainer concept, conducted similar events focused on information. Public Information Units were formed in 2011 and instituted annual training conferences. AMISOM training focused on raising awareness of the mission throughout

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Somalia, and the employment of media at multiple levels.\textsuperscript{97} CJTF-HOA influenced significant operational progress when AMISOM, in 2012, included the Transitional Federal Government into information development conferences. Together, using United States military language, AMISOM and the Transitional Federal Government created the Joint Fusion and Liaison Unit to improve information sharing and develop shared situational awareness.\textsuperscript{98} Public Information Units coordinated AMISOM and government messaging to the population. Popular awareness improved popular support to provide legitimacy to the government.

Social tensions existed among all actors within Somalia. The social tensions risked legitimacy, perseverance, simplicity, offensive, and restraint. CJTF-HOA’s intervention reduced the complexity through awareness and mediation. Each group owned unique cultures and attitudes, but shared similar goals. Improvements in leadership unified efforts and recognized the plight of individual Somalis while simultaneously increasing Somali awareness of the AMISOM mission and purpose. These deliberate actions significantly reduced cultural and social cognitive tensions effectively.


Conclusion

A 2008 Congressional report on the role for the United States military in Africa noted the need to employ soft power and set conditions for a stable security environment.99 The author referenced a public meeting report from the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid and comments made by the Honorable Christopher Ryan Henry, Principle Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Henry stated AFRICOM’s goal as “to prevent a situation where the only solution is outside intervention.”100 Henry additionally expressed that “We can judge AFRICOM’s degree of success by whether or not it keeps American troops out of Africa for the next 50 years.”101 CJTF-HOA provided AFRICOM a physical presence in the region to enable military engagement and regional alliance building. CJTF-HOA did not utilize conventional U.S. military forces to conduct peace operations in Somalia.

CJTF-HOA applied operational art by managing relationships and improving regional military capabilities to enable stability in the Horn of Africa. The African Union, with support from the United States needed to empower Somalia’s progression as a state. The United States recognized the Government of Somalia on January 17, 2013.102 The tactical actions performed by AMISOM defeated al-Shabaab and improved the local population’s confidence and attitude towards the force.


101 Ibid., 25.

CJTF-HOA selected leadership as the tool for action. The lack of direct command and control over the tactical force did not prevent the execution of the United States military mission. It certainly did not discount the assumption of operational risk. CJTF-HOA, instead, applied creativity to influence a complex system in order to reduce friction and develop a more desirable stable state. Environmental, institutional, and social factors set constraints and restraints that had the potential to prevent the actualization of joint operational principles. AMISOM bridged a gap between Somalia and the United States strategic interests.

The African Union, United Nations, nor the United States properly prepared or set conditions for the initial deployment to Somalia. The force, and the international community failed to recognize the problem. AMISOM commanders misaligned resources against al-Shabaab and other criminal organizations. The Somali people needed support, which included protection from terror. The desired end state required the defeat of al-Shabaab and criminal organizations as a key task of the solutions. Including Somali government and clan leadership to garner popular support towards peace and away from coercion and fear was the true problem. The movement towards information and protection of civilians occurred as a ripple effect from the United States military’s lessons learned and institutionalization of conducting a counter-insurgency operation.

Joseph Nye, in *The Future of Power*, explained the value of soft power, particularly when that power is indirectly applied. "Sometimes, a third party helps with cultural intermediation. In China, many Americans and Japanese cultural ideas are proving more attractive when they arrive via South Korea."\(^{103}\) This intermediation proved true in the Horn of Africa. The African Union, through AMISOM, enhanced African prestige by investing African blood and treasure into the fight for security and stability. CJTF-HOA adeptly mentored and sponsored the African Union’s efforts by indoctrinating United States military tactics, techniques, and procedures within AMISOM’s commanders and troops.

\(^{103}\) Nye, 85.
Training and equipment by United States forces assisted and enabled AMISOM to effectively overcome environmental factors. Better equipped AMISOM forces learned how to properly maintain and employ equipment. Al-Shabaab and the Somali population viewed AMISOM as a legitimate force because AMISOM grew a capacity to go on an offensive through maneuver. The cumulative effect of the offense and effective maneuver had two positive effects. First it improved local security and the second effect expanded protection to the transitional government and population. AMISOM, although experienced some tactical setbacks, advanced as a military force in capabilities and confidence. The consolidation of gains over time combined with the disenfranchisement of al-Shabaab directly influenced institutional factors. The international community recognized progress and potential occurring in Somalia. The United Nations continually extended AMISOM’s mandate. The extensions provided additional legitimacy to the mission while proving to the enemy and the people of Somalia that the mission would persevere until the force achieved mission objectives. CJTF-HOA’s greatest achievement occurred in flattening social factors. The mentorship provided by the United States military reached all levels of the AMISOM force. AMISOM commanders and troops learned to appreciate the operational environment and the amount of actors distributed throughout the battlefield. AMISOM, through military-to-military engagements, improved interactions with civilians. CJTF-HOA provided tools for AMSIOM to communicate with clan leaders and to establish and gain mutual respect. CJTF-HOA’s regular involvement at all echelons enabled nine of the twelve joint operational principles through mitigation and control mechanisms.

This monograph recommends doctrine writers address risk at each level of war. Each level of war contains unique characteristics that require commanders to safeguard in order to complete tasks, set conditions for transitions, and accomplishes missions. Properly stated definitions of risk enables planners to thoroughly frame the problem and present complete, appropriately resourced options to a commander. The definition for operational risk presented
allows planners to more effectively leverage current tools available through doctrine which define
the operational environment to identify parts of the plan that require risk management.

This research identified several topics that require additional investigation. The formation
of the Somali National Army occurred outside of CJTF-HOA’s immediate involvement. The
Somali National Army received significant training and operations support from AMISOM and
Bancroft Global Development, a private contractor based out of Washington, DC. Can a military
command interface with a private security contractor to achieve a military end state? Social
contract theory, additionally, could evaluate and identify regional partners that could serve as a
troop contributing country in a similar situation. What influences regional, non-neighboring
countries, to sacrifice their limited military resources? Further investigation offers some unique
opportunity and insight towards better understanding of effective peace keeping and stabilization
operations in conflict prone and saturated areas across the globe.


