The Evolution of the Combined Allied Headquarters in the North African Theater of Operations from 1942 to 1943

A Monograph

by

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Over the course of the North African campaign, General Eisenhower reorganized Allied Force Headquarters to establish unity of effort within his command. He used the principles of unity of command and multinational staff integration to bring all forces under his operational control, create land and air component commanders that exercised operational control over American, British, and French forces, and to get the right people in the right jobs regardless of nationality. Eisenhower saw unity of effort, and the principles employed to achieve it, as enablers to Allied Forces Headquarters’ success in North Africa. When Eisenhower became Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, he employed the same principles to instill unity of effort within this new command. It is this author’s assessment that today’s multinational headquarters must employ these same principles.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
Abstract


Over the course of the North African campaign, General Eisenhower reorganized Allied Force Headquarters to establish unity of effort within his command. He used the principles of unity of command and multinational staff integration to bring all forces under his operational control, create land and air component commanders that exercised operational control over American, British, and French forces, and to get the right people in the right jobs regardless of nationality. Eisenhower saw unity of effort, and the principles employed to achieve it, as enablers to Allied Forces Headquarters’ success in North Africa. When Eisenhower became Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, he employed the same principles to instill unity of effort within this new command. It is this author’s assessment that today’s multinational headquarters must employ these same principles.
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## Acronyms

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Army Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABC-1</td>
<td>the first American, British, and Canadian conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFHQ</td>
<td>Allied Force Headquarters</td>
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<td>BCOS</td>
<td>British Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-in-C</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCO</td>
<td>Combined Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CofS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>COSSAC</td>
<td>Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCoS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>English Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETO</td>
<td>European Theater of Operations</td>
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<td>ETOUSA</td>
<td>European Theater of Operations, United States Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTP</td>
<td>Fleet Training Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFLCC</td>
<td>Joint Force Land Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>JPS</td>
<td>Joint Planning Staff</td>
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<td>LCC</td>
<td>Land Component Commander</td>
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<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mediterranean Air Command</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NATOUSA</td>
<td>North African Theater of Operations, United States Army</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>Noncommissioned Officer</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
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<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>WD</td>
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Introduction

Amongst the important and far reaching decisions taken by me during this campaign were those which concerned the administrative side of the organization of my headquarters. There was not historical precedent upon which to base them.

--Dwight D. Eisenhower, Report of the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Operations in Northwest Africa.

“[M]y division has been taken away from me. . . . I have no command. I can’t tell you what to do.” Major General Orlando Ward’s February 12, 1943 response to a subordinate questioning the 1st Armored Division’s defense of the Kasserine Pass, signaled a crisis of command that could not have come at a less opportune time for Allied Force Headquarters, General Eisenhower’s North African command. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s Panzerarmee Afrika, withdrawn from Egypt and Libya into Tunisia after the British Eighth Army victory at El Alamein, joined the battle two days later on February 14 and smashed the 1st Armored Division’s Combat Command A, rendering it combat ineffective with 1,400 troops captured or killed. Captain Ernest Hatfield, an aide to General Ward, writing in his diary, captured the chaos of the 14 February engagement. “Germans are attacking . . . in force with tanks and artillery. Stukas bombing their CP. Tanks . . . overran B Battery of 91st Field Artillery. Thirty tanks striking . . . toward Sidi Bou Zid . . . Fighting is very hard and bombing is ongoing. Our air support isn’t too good.” Five hours after the German attack started, and after remnants of the shattered command were already moving to the corps rear area, the British First Army commander, Major General K. A. N. Anderson instructed the II Corps commander, Major General Lloyd Fredendall, to “restore the situation.”


Fredendall instead withdrew the remnants of 1st Armored Division, saying that the Germans “have broken through and you can’t stop them.”

In a series of actions occurring over the next week that reflect the creeping hysteria and desperation of the situation, General Anderson ordered Fredendall to not “withdrawal under any excuse . . . . Fight to the last.”

Then in a more pragmatic move, he dispatched Brigadier General Charles Dunphie, commander of the British 26th Armored Brigade, on February 19, to coordinate the II Corp’s defense. From his headquarters in Algiers, over two hundred miles removed from Kasserine, Eisenhower also attempted to bring order to the situation by sending Major General Ernest N. Harmon on February 20, to assume command of the II Corps. The Allies were finally able to maintain their defensive positions, and after meting out a punishment of over six thousand American casualties, Rommel elected to withdraw on February 23 rather than risk overextending his lines of communication. A British Guardsman in Anderson’s First Army headquarters captured the tenor of the situation in a letter home as “the most perfect example of order, counter-order, and disorder that has happened in my experience.”

Subsequent to Kasserine, Eisenhower publicly assumed “full responsibility” for the defeat, placing much of the blame on his decisions not to subordinate French troops to the Allied chain of command, and to allow the dispersal of American forces. However, the defeat’s real causes were more than just poor battlefield decisions, and they certainly were more nuanced than the reasons proffered by Eisenhower. The events at Kasserine were the culmination of months of demonstrated a lack of unity of effort within Allied Force Headquarters and between Eisenhower, Anderson, and Fredendall.

The idea that the elements of a military force unified in effort under a commander’s guidance can synergize those elements to become more than the sum of their individual parts has been evident to

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4 Atkinson, 375.
5 Ibid., 373.
6 Ibid., 375.
7 Ibid., 390.
military practitioners and theorists throughout history. A theorist no less than Sun Tzu recognized unity of effort and its corollary; “if an enemy force is united, it is necessary to split it into fractions to defeat.”

Less than thirty years prior to the Kasserine debacle, events during World War I resulted in Marshal Foch being named as the Allied Supreme Commander on the Western Front to foster “coordination of action” between the Allies, something that no doubt inspired Eisenhower and his boss, General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff from 1939 to 1945. While the term ‘unity of effort’ was not widely used prior to World War II, the idea gained currency within the Army by the opening days of the war. Eventually included in the 1941 version of FM 100-5, Operations, the term was coupled with the familiar unity of command and “cooperation between elements of the command” to become the three “guiding principles” of command.

That the pre-Kasserine Allied Force Headquarters was unable to achieve unity of effort was due largely to an organizational structure shaped by the exigencies of Operation TORCH, decisions made by Eisenhower during the formation of the command, US and British doctrine, and the nature of operations subsequent to TORCH. These factors served to disrupt unity of command and cooperation between the elements of command (something that henceforth referred to as ‘mutual cooperation’). The Allied vision for the November 8, 1942 Operation TORCH amphibious landings that brought the command to Africa and subsequent operations was the British First Army rapidly attacking from their beachhead in the vicinity of Algiers to seize Tunisian port facilities and airfield complexes before Axis forces could react and reinforce. American forces landed further west in Algeria and Morocco would then occupy North

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Africa and secure those same facilities. This would allow the Allies to bomb Italy, protect naval traffic in the Mediterranean, and, in concert with the British Eighth Army attacking from Egypt, destroy Axis forces in Libya.\textsuperscript{12} The lack of suitable Tunisian beaches and the threatening presence of an ostensibly neutral but fascist Spain precluded landing in Tunisia and forced Allied Force Headquarters to adopt three, essentially national task forces: two American, the West and Center Task Forces, and the British Eastern Task Force (that later became First Army).\textsuperscript{13} After successfully executing TORCH, the Tunisian winter rain and mud and an unexpectedly rapid and robust Axis response all conspired to slow the Allied attack, allowing the Axis time to reinforce and move Rommel’s army north into Tunisia. Eisenhower was forced to rush American forces to the fore, creating unexpectedly multinational subordinate commands – parts of five US Army divisions organized under British command, and the largely untested US II Corps coordinated by the First Army. This unplanned integration did little to foster multinational cooperation and mitigate friction between the participating nations’ forces, or the commanders of those forces for that matter.\textsuperscript{14}

The clearest cause of the lack of unity of effort between Eisenhower, Anderson, and Fredendall was that Eisenhower chose not to name land and air component commanders who were able to command

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{12} Dwight D. Eisenhower, \textit{Crusade in Europe} (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1948), 64. “Northwest Africa would be denied to the Axis for a submarine and aircraft base . . . all North Africa cleared of the Axis; and that the Mediterranean . . . could be used by the convoys of the Allied nations . . . .” George F. Howe, \textit{U.S. Army in World War II, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Northwest Africa, Seizing Initiative in the West}, Center of Military History Publication (Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1957), 16. “The first stage would be to establish firm, mutually supported lodgments in the Oran-Algers-Tunis area on the north coast, and in the Casablanca area on the northwest coast, in order to have readily available good bases for continued and intensified air, ground, and sea operations . . . A second stage was to extend control over the entire area of French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, and . . . complete annihilation of Axis forces now opposing the British forces in the Western Desert . . . .”


\textsuperscript{14} Atkinson, 391. Brigadier Paul Robinette later claimed, “one would have to search all history to find a more jumbled command structure than that of the Allies in this operation.”

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both American and British forces, that is, unified land and air component commanders. Eisenhower gave Anderson the responsibility and authority only to coordinate all land forces, meaning he was only the de facto land component commander. This condition required Eisenhower to ensure unity of effort between subordinate commanders if personality or battlefield induced stress, of which there was plenty during the North African campaign, prevented them from working well together. Eisenhower also proved a distracted air marshal, a role forced upon him as he had two air forces organized underneath him, the US 12th Air Force and the British Eastern Air Command. With no air component commander to coordinate action there was little effort pre-Kasserine to conduct an air campaign that established air superiority or interdicted Axis reinforcement and resupply efforts. Furthermore, the Spanish threat that occupied the Western Task Force, also occupied the Deputy Commander, Allied Force Headquarters, General Mark Clark, depriving the command of a leader with the requisite stature to coordinate operations in Eisenhower’s absence. Something that happened all too frequently as the requirements to equip and integrate the French Army, and the political travails of administering territory in which the formerly Vichy civil servants still applied Vichy policy, increasingly occupied Eisenhower’s schedule. Eisenhower later complained, "[T]he number and complexity of problems at ALGIERS and in the forward area, simply did not permit divided attention."^15 Thus, the relationship between Eisenhower’s attention and the coordination between American and British army commanders and between ground and air efforts were directly proportional, i.e. with his removal from Tunisia to work things political, unity of effort suffered and few Allied aircraft conducted air interdiction or strategic bombing. The lack of unity of effort ultimately forced Eisenhower to postpone offensive operations in January 1943 after it became apparent that the Allied Force Headquarters would not be able to reach its objectives before Rommel could attack. General Harold Alexander, who, after surveying the battle at Kasserine (prior to assuming command of

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soon to be created 18th Army Group), correctly surmised, “[T]here has been no policy and no plan. The battle area is all mixed up with British, French, and American units.”\(^{16}\)

To understand Allied military success in during World War II subsequent to North Africa, one must understand how unity of effort developed in Allied Force Headquarters and how it enabled the command to defeat the hitherto seemingly invincible ranks of Hitler’s Wehrmacht. In researching this paper, the author looked to the official and personal correspondence, diaries, and memoirs from the personalities associated with Allied Force Headquarters, particularly Generals Eisenhower and Smith, Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff both in Africa and Europe. Military doctrine from the interwar period provided insight into how unity of effort developed and shaped Allied Force Headquarters. The publication most helpful in providing insight into the Allied Force Headquarters task organization was the *History of the Allied Force Headquarters.*\(^{17}\) The author relied upon the *United States Army in World War II* series of publications and a number of secondary sources about the North Africa campaign to build the timeline of events and to give an overview of how the events unfolded.\(^{18}\) Two of those secondary sources that inform much of the writing about the campaign are Martin Blumenson’s *Kasserine Pass*, which provides a detailed look at the events associated with the Battle of Kasserine Pass, and Rick Atkinson’s *An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943*, an account of the events and personalities who participated in the entire campaign.\(^{19}\)

\(^{16}\) Atkinson, 377.


\(^{19}\) Atkinson; Blumenson, *Kasserine Pass*, 243.
Seven months after Kasserine, with victory in North Africa nearly complete, Brigadier General Walter Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters was trumpeting the command’s success. Smith wrote a letter to Lieutenant General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, Winston Churchill’s military assistant, on September 12, 1943, inviting General Ismay to “arrange for a joint visit to Allied Force Headquarters where you can see real Allied cooperation and coordination.”

Further noting that “[I]ncidentally, we still have it and always will as long as Ike is in the saddle.” General Smith, only seven months after Kasserine, was not only lauding a surfeit of the very thing that the command’s lack of had contributed to the Kasserine defeat, but presumably also inviting Winston Churchill to see unity of effort in action. What changed in Allied Force Headquarters organization and processes to allow the very same Allies who struggled so mightily prior to and at Kasserine, defeat Axis forces in North Africa and ultimately experience such spectacular success in Europe?

The North African campaign was important not only in that it was the first major American and British combined offensive action, but it was also formative in the sense that it was where American soldiers “became killing mad,” where the hard truth about combat was revealed to many, and where the theories about unity of effort were turned into fact.

Contemporary World War II War Department studies attributed American failures during the formative phase of the campaign to officers and men being “psychologically unprepared for war,” but saw no “defects in . . . tactics.” Historians have cited the garnered experience and improved weaponry between the TORCH landings and the seizure of Tunis to account for the change in Allied fortunes and victory in North Africa. Kasserine did in fact separate the

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20 Memorandum from Walter Bedell Smith to Hastings Ismay, September 12, 1943, SHAEF, Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-1945, Box 17, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.

21 Ibid.

22 Atkinson, 4.

wheat from the chaff, so to speak, separating the officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers fit for garrison duty from those ready for combat. The Allies also became better equipped with, for example, the M3 Stuart tanks and their 37mm gun giving way later to the M4 Sherman’s 75mm gun. The author acknowledges that these theories have merit, but posits that unity of effort between American and British forces, enabled by the guiding principles of unity of command, and staff integration, developed and refined by General Eisenhower and his staff during the North Africa campaign was what laid the foundation for Allied success during World War II. This paper will analyze how these principles developed and how Allied Force Headquarters employed them to refine the command’s organization over the course of the North African campaign.

### Unity of Effort

After TORCH, Eisenhower realized that Allied Force Headquarters was operating with little unity of effort, specifically between him and his subordinate commanders. Over the course of the North African campaign, Eisenhower would establish a forward command post, reorganize the command multiple times, and refine Allied Force Headquarters’ multinational staff integration in an effort to foster unity of effort within Allied Force Headquarters. Early in the campaign, Eisenhower, frustrated with the pace of operations in Tunisia, but occupied with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and negotiations with the French, assessed that his physical presence was required to motivate his subordinate commanders. The most ambitious timeline for seizing Tunis had Anderson’s First Army landing in vicinity of Algiers on November 8 and in Tunis within ten days. First Army, however, plodded through the Tunisian mud

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rather than raced, leading Eisenhower to claim that his orders “were not clearly understood nor vigorously executed.”

In a letter sent home to one of his brothers he complained, “I suffer from the usual difficulty that besets the higher commander, things can be ordered and started, but actual execution at the front has to be turned over to someone else. . . I get so impatient to get ahead that I want to be at a place where there is some chance to push a soldier a little faster or hurry up the unloading of a boat.”

On November 23, in an effort to exert tighter control, Eisenhower moved his command post from Gibraltar to Algiers, Algeria, a difference of nearly one thousand miles, to assume “personal command of the battle area” and “maintain close touch with all commanders and insure co-ordination of all ground and air forces.”

Despite moving forward, he remained tethered to Algiers due to the sensitivities and “political conundrums involved with political control of French North Africa,” unable to exert the required influence to subordinate his commanders to his will.

It was during this time that Eisenhower was deprived of his deputy commander, Major General Mark Clark, when Clark was given command of the newly established US Fifth Army. General Marshall, concerned about a threat from a technically neutral Spain, but sympathetic to Hitler, insisted the new army remain on guard against Spanish treachery, effectively removing Clark from the North Africa campaign. This left Allied Force Headquarters with no leaders other than Eisenhower with the requisite stature to effectively coordinate and influence the subordinate British, French, and American contingents and get them to Tunis prior to the Germans.

Eisenhower’s naval chief, Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham, wrote to a friend, “Tunis is anyone’s who

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28 Atkinson, 170.

29 Salmon and Birdsell, *Part 2 - Period of the Tunisian, Sicilian, and South Italian Campaigns (December 1942 to December 1943) Section 1*, History, History of Allied Force Headquarters (Caserta, Italy: Allied Force Headquarters, September 22, 1945), 106.

cares to walk in. But the Huns are beating us in the race.”31 The Allied lack of speed meant that Rommel was able to arrive in Tunisia before the Allies could seize Tunis, causing Eisenhower to postpone offensive operations. Lack of unity of effort within Allied Force Headquarters ultimately drove Eisenhower to conduct two major reorganizations while in North Africa, each time trying to establish unified component commanders and better multinational staff integration.

Genesis of the Principle

Unity of effort is obtained by employing mutual cooperation between combatants or unifying forces under a single commander.32 General Eisenhower recognized the truth in this, noting, “[T]here is no separate land, air, or naval war,” without all three united against a common objective “their maximum potential power cannot be realized.”33 General Grant’s army force cooperating with Admiral Porter’s ironclads during the Vicksburg campaign, provides a historical example of mutual cooperation achieving unity of effort. No formal command relationship was established, nor was there significant staff integration, but Porter clearly acted in support of Grant’s operations to achieve a goal that both recognized as beneficial to the Union cause.34

Unlike Grant, Eisenhower benefited from an evolving American doctrine that had gradually recognized the linkage between unity of effort, mutual cooperation, and unity of command. Although unity of command was something recognized as “essential to success” as far back as the US Army’s 1914 Field Service Regulations, there was no mention of unity of effort until the War Department’s post-World

31 Atkinson, 183.


33 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 230.

War I publications. The 1930 *A Manual for Commanders of Large Units*, while still addressing unity of command, began to introduce terms that sounded very much like unity of effort and mutual cooperation, like “secure unity of action throughout his command” to ensure all means are directed to a common purpose. The 1941 version of FM 100-5, *Operations*, realized the relationship between unity of effort, mutual cooperation, and unity of command in the statement that unity of command was “essential” to unity of effort and “the decisive application of full combat power of the available forces.”

Development of the Principle

The pre-Kasserine Allied Force Headquarters was a command characterized by field commanders unwilling or unable to subordinate their differences in outlook and desires for the good of the organization and in doing so negatively impacted unity of effort within the command. This condition was not unique to Allied Force Headquarters however. Martin Blumenson in his definitive account of the battle, *Kasserine Pass*, spoke to the tendency towards disunity in times of stress.

>[T]he exercise of command is not only a matter of organizational structure, doctrine, and authority; it is also a matter of personality—each commander commands in a personal manner. In times of tactical success, frictions among men tend to be overlooked or minimized; in times of operational adversity, annoyances develop into irritations and contribute their own influences on a deteriorating situation.

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37 FM 110-5, 22.

38 Carr, Jr., 53-57.

Eisenhower’s description of command in a multinational environment as being “circumscribed by a special kind of courtesy that inhibits unified, cohesive, and quick action” echoes Blumenson’s assessment and implies difficulty and frustration under the best of conditions.⁴⁰

Allied Force Headquarters’ failure to reach its objectives in Tunisia prior to the Germans prompted Eisenhower’s first reorganization in January 1943 from the TORCH task force configuration depicted in Figure 1, to that depicted in Figure 2. Notice that an Allied Air Command was created that ostensibly subordinated all air forces to a single commander and that the First Army was given coordination authority over the II Corps. While these arrangements conferred neither true command nor operational control upon the land and air commanders, one can see that Eisenhower was attempting to create unified component commands. The chapter on unity of command will cover the failings of this interim organization in detail.

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Figures and Sources:

Figure 1. Allied Force Headquarters Organization, November 1942


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⁴⁰ Carr, 15.
Problems with unity of effort between Eisenhower, Anderson, and Fredendall may have come to a head in February 1943, but they had been building for nearly a month prior to Kasserine. At a January 18, 1943 commanders’ conference with Anderson and Fredendall, Eisenhower directed that they defend key terrain and gave guidance to “hold as much of the II Corps as possible in mobile reserve, especially the U. S. 1st Armored Division.”\footnote{Eisenhower, \textit{Crusade in Europe,} 140.} This guidance went unheeded and on January 19, Anderson ordered Fredendall to send the 1st Armored’s Combat Command B to support French forces north of the II Corps area of responsibility. First Army retained control of Combat Command B, as its reserve, until February 14 when the unit was returned to II Corps to “restore the situation” at Kasserine.\footnote{Atkinson, 326; Eisenhower, \textit{The Eisenhower Diaries,} 90.} On February 1, Eisenhower gave Anderson the more explicit instruction that the “1st Armored Division must be kept and...
used concentrated.” Anderson expanded the II Corps area of responsibility to compensate for the decreasing French XIX Corps combat effectiveness, prompting Fredendall to create two additional Combat Commands from 1st Armored Division assets. Combat Command C was given terrain to defend and Combat Command D, while designated the II Corps reserve, executed a number of raids along the Axis lines of communication prior to Kasserine. This left the division with only Combat Command A to execute all assigned tasks. Anderson and Fredendall’s actions contributed to Orlando Ward’s predicament at Kasserine and of course, ran counter to Eisenhower’s guidance.

Eisenhower received approval from the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the reorganization executed in March 1943 while he attended the Casablanca Conference. The reorganized Allied Force Headquarters used personnel formerly assigned to Britain’s Middle Eastern Command headquarters to create the component commands for both land and air as depicted in Figure 3.

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44 Ibid., 399.

45 Atkinson, 324.
The Combined Chiefs agreed that General Harold Alexander would serve as “Deputy Commander-in-Chief” and Air Chief Marshal Tedder the Air Commander.⁴⁶ These two officers knew how to balance the conflicting demands of their respective services while maintaining their own integrity. They both had a deep-seated belief in the necessity of unity of command for ground and air forces that was able to ensure unity of effort within the command. After the war Tedder recounted,

> Each of us—Land, Sea, and Air Commanders—had our own special war to fight, each of us had his own separate problems; but those separate problems were closely interlocked, and each of us had responsibilities one to the other. Given mutual understanding of that, you get mutual faith; and only with mutual faith will you get the three arms working together as one great war machine.⁴⁷

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Unity of Command

Allied Force Headquarters executed multiple reorganizations to create a task organization that fostered unity of effort between Eisenhower and his subordinate commanders. The method Eisenhower leveraged to create unity of effort was to establish unified component commanders who had the authority to command any subordinate formation, American, British, or French. Immediately after the TORCH landings in North Africa and the first tentative Allied steps inland, Eisenhower realized that problems associated with unity of effort would require the reorganizations described in the previous chapter. This chapter will explore the details associated with these problems. After the first Allied Force Headquarters reorganization away from the TORCH task forces, Anderson received authority to coordinate French and American forces. Unfortunately, Anderson had neither the formal authority nor the force of personality that allowed him to command subordinates like Fredendall and the French XIX Corps commander, General Louis-Marie Koeltz. General Eisenhower found that Anderson “permitted himself to express, at times, disappointments or disapprovals in a way that seems to offend subordinates or others around him.” Complicating matters further was that both General Alphonse Juin, French Army commander, and Koeltz, both Anglophobes of the highest order, refused to submit to General Anderson's authority. It was this friction, along with the ongoing Anderson and Fredendall difficulties, that served as the impetus to move the Allied Force Headquarters forward in to Tunisia. It rapidly became apparent after a German attack on January 19 nearly destroyed the French XIX Corps that despite the agreement signed by both Admiral Francois Darlan and General Mark Clark that promised “closest cooperation . . . in driving Axis

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48 David Fraser, *And We Shall Shock Them*, Kindle (Boomsbury Publishing, 2011), Kindle Locations 4165-4166. Eisenhower noted this tendency of Anderson’s in a letter to General Brooke.

49 Salmon and Birdsall, *History of Allied Force Headquarters, Part 2, Section 1*, 107. “The result is that AFHQ, with a command post at CONSTANTINE, will command Generals Fredendall, Juin, and Anderson direct. General Eisenhower does not regard it as an ideal solution but as the best solution in the circumstances.”
forces from French African territory,” the arrangement was insufficient if the French were to receive adequate support from Allied Force Headquarters. Eisenhower encouraged Juin to subordinate his forces to Anderson who despite doing so, still occasionally needed Eisenhower, acting in his role as the final arbiter for the “indispensable” military equipment that the United States provided for French rearmament, to reinforce Allied and French unity. Naturally, this provided Eisenhower the leverage he used to gain French concurrence on strategy and command decisions.

Genesis of the Principle

As stated earlier in this paper, American doctrine had long incorporated the idea of unity of command. For the British, however, unity of command was practically anathema, as the British armed forces operated under a "committee system," where each service shared command responsibility in joint operations. Allied adoption of unity of command as a guiding principle was consummated at General

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50 Salmon and Birdsall, History of Allied Force Headquarters, Part 2, Section 1, 17. The November 22 agreement between Clark and Darlan is excerpted here to highlight the emphasis on coordination:

There shall be the closest cooperation between the Commanding General of the French and, sea, and air forces and the Commanding General United States Army … in cooperation with the forces of the UNITED STATES and its allies, in driving Axis forces from French African territory and in protecting it from further violation by them.

At the time of the Torch landings, Darlan was Vice President of the Council of the Vichy government, in effect, prime minister, as well as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of the Interior, and Minister of National Defense. Darlan, after American troops detained him in Tunisia, ordered French forces in North Africa to support Allied Force Headquarters efforts. Morgan, 216.

51 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “The President’s Personal Representative (Murphy) to the Secretary of State,” February 1, 1943, Box 2, France Index, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, accessed March 18, 2015, http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/PSF/BOX2/.

Marshall’s insistence at the December 1941 – January 1942 ARCADIA Conference, attended by both General Marshall and Eisenhower. On the first day of the ARCADIA conference, Eisenhower, who attended the conference as Assistant Chief of Staff in the Operations Division of the General Staff, drafted a memo for Marshal that outlined the challenges associated with command and control in the Southwest Pacific Theater. Eisenhower noted, "[t]he strength of the allied defenses in the entire theater would be greatly increased through single, intelligent command." Eisenhower’s suggestion seems to have crystallized Marshall’s vision and he was subsequently very specific in what he deemed necessary –

I am convinced, that there must be one man in command of the entire theater - air, ground, and ships. We cannot manage by cooperation. Human frailties are such that there would be emphatic unwillingness to place portions of troops under another service. If we can make a plan for unified command now, it will solve nine-tenths of our troubles.

That Marshall and Eisenhower advocated unity of command to the degree that they did during ARCADIA is interesting. There was only a single reference to unity of command in FM 100-5, Operations – “[u]nity of command obtains that unity of effort which is essential to the decisive application of full combat power of the available forces” – the publication authored, or at least approved, by Marshall in the same year as ARCADIA. It is possible that Marshall and Eisenhower’s World War I experiences influenced their insistence on employing unity of command to ensure unity of effort between the Allies during World War II. As the American Expeditionary Force Assistant Chief of Staff during

three service heads were equal in rank and authority, and each had his own staff.” Each service component was operationally independent with no direct unified commander subordinate to the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Watson, 390. There were four nations’ armies, navies, and air forces operating in the Southwest Pacific Theater - American Air Force, American Asiatic Fleet, the Australian Forces, the British Army, navy, and Air Force, and the Dutch land, sea, and air forces.

Ambrose, 27.

Sproles, 8.

FM 100-5, 22. FM 100-15 places even less emphasis on unity of command, with an almost offhand mention of the necessity of a commander to “organize his forces and area so as to permit the necessary unity of command for both combat and administration.” FM 100-15, 4-5.
World War I, Marshall was intimately involved with the American Expeditionary Force’s integration into the Entente war machine. That the US War Department General Staff, organized along French lines by General Pershing after he became Army Chief of Staff in 1921, remained that way through Marshall’s tenure gives some indication of the impact the French World War I staff organization had on Marshall, and by extension, Eisenhower, who later worked on Marshall’s War Department General Staff. The General Staff actually served as the model for any new “wartime General Headquarters” to include Eisenhower’s Allied Force Headquarters. Another World War I construct that influenced both Marshall and Eisenhower was General Ferdinand Foch’s turn as Allied Supreme Commander. After the Italian defeat at Caporetto in November 1917, Allied leaders created the “Supreme War Council” with representatives from each of the Entente still in the war – Britain, France, and Italy, along with an American representative to coordinate strategy on the Western Front. In the face of the March 1918 German Michael Offensive, however, the Allies recognized the need to better coordinate multinational forces on the battlefield; to this end, Foch was chosen to “coordinate all Allied land forces.” While Foch never had command authority, and thus, was not a true unified commander, he was “reasonably successful” in persuading Allied commanders and was able to coordinate actions amongst the various national armies. Marshall and Eisenhower likely realized that persuasion would not be enough for war


58 Dwight Salmon and Paul Birdsall, Part 2 - Period of the Tunisian, Sicilian, and South Italian Campaigns (December 1942 to December 1943) Section 2, History, History of Allied Force Headquarters (Caserta, Italy: Allied Force Headquarters, September 22, 1945), 10. “The WD General Staff organization and procedure is the "basis for the organization and procedure used in AFHQ."

59 Stewart, 29.

60 Ibid.
against what looked at the time, to be an overwhelming and implacable foe, hence the insistence while at ARCADIA on a unified commander.

Eisenhower knew that American success in the coming war would be dependent on the commander’s ability to employ forces as he saw fit. Prior to Eisenhower’s appointment as Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, he worked with Marshall to determine the scope of authority for a theater commander-in-chief. Eisenhower, after seeing a proposed organization chart for American forces in Europe under the heading “US Set-up for Administrative Purposes,” insisted that the commander in England should be “a Theater Commander in every sense of the word . . . a unified commander with full responsibility.”61 The War Department changed the chart to organize US ground, air, and naval forces under the BOLERO Task Force commander.62 On June 8, 1942, Eisenhower sent a letter to Marshall calling for a European Theater of Operations. He argued,

[i]n view of the distance between the European Theater and the United States, absolute unity of command should be exercised by the Theater Commander. The officer himself should be able to organize, train, and command the combined forces of all arms and services set up in the BOLERO plan, and should also be qualified to assume the duties of chief of staff to the eventual ROUNDUP commander.63

Marshall agreed in principle, designating Eisenhower Commander-in-Chief, European Theater of Operations, but had not yet determined the scope of the commander’s authority in anything but the broadest of brush strokes though, nor had he actually identified how to integrate the nations’ forces; both problems would be Eisenhower’s to solve.

61 Pogue, 43.

62 Ray S. Cline, United States Army in World War II – The War Department – Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1990), 100. BOLERO was the code name given to the Americans troop buildup on England for the invasion of the European continent (called at that time ROUNDUP).

63 Ibid., 47.
Development of the Principle

It was fortuitous that the Combined Chiefs selected Eisenhower to command the “African operation” as he was a proponent of unity of effort and command, but their rational hints that they did not anticipate fully the multinational nature of what Allied Force Headquarters was to become:

1. The initial invasion had to have the appearance of being an American enterprise because of French bitterness (however unjustifiable) toward the British after DUNKIRK and MERS-el-KEBIR.
2. In the planning stage there was even the anticipation that the British would leave NORTH AFRICA largely to the Americans once the campaign had gotten well under way.
3. More men and materials would be furnished, either directly or indirectly, by the UNITED STATES.
4. Once the landings were made, the rest of the campaign would be largely an army function with strong air support.64

The fact that the order mentions that the British would leave reinforces just how bold Eisenhower’s vision for Allied Force Headquarters really was and how much work he had yet to do if he was to acquire true command authority. In a move that presaged the increasingly integrated American/British effort, he was officially notified by the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the British War Cabinet, on behalf of the Combined Chiefs. “The President and the Prime Minister have agreed that combined military operations be directed against AFRICA. . . . You are appointed Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force, to undertake the above-mentioned operation”; it was not until the following month that General Marshall cabled the approval of the US Chiefs of Staff.65

64 Roland G. Ruppenthal, European Theater of Operations, Logistical Support of the Armies: May 1941-September 1944, vol. Volume I, United States Army In World War II (Washington, DC, 1953), 88. It was decided at the second Claridge Conference, to “launch a combined operation against the North and Northwest Coast of AFRICA at the earliest possible date before December 1942” and that “a task force commander for the entire African operation should be appointed forthwith.” The Combined Chiefs of Staff quickly decided the commander would be American and selected Eisenhower to be that commander. Salmon and Birdsall, Part I - Period of the North African Invasion (August to December 1942), History, History of Allied Force Headquarters (Caserta, Italy: Allied Force Headquarters, September 22, 1945), 12.

65 Salmon and Birdsall, Part 2 - Period of the Tunisian, Sicilian, and South Italian Campaigns (December 1942 to December 1943) Section 2, 3. The Combined Chiefs determined that the commander-in-chief should be an American because of French bitterness toward the British after the attack on the French naval squadron at Mers-el-Kebir.
Eisenhower’s first battle was to refine his authorities and scope of responsibility. Despite using the language of unity of command, the order appointing Eisenhower Commander-in-Chief did not specifically state that he would have any authority over air and naval forces. However, the US Joint Staff Planners rectified this with an October 13 order stating that "[t]he Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force, will command all forces assigned to Operation TORCH, under the principle of unity of command." The British were less forthcoming in granting Eisenhower true command authority, employing instead language reminiscent the 1918 Foch directive where British, French, and American Armies continued to “exercise to the fullest extent the tactical direction of their armies,” and each had “the right to appeal to his Government, if in his opinion his Army was placed in danger.”

If any order given by him [Eisenhower] appears to you [Gen Anderson] to imperil any British troops in the Allied force, even if though they may not be under your direct command, it is agreed between the British and United States governments that you will be at liberty to appeal to the War Office before the order is executed.

This draft was submitted to Eisenhower, who objected on the grounds that he believed such a directive weakened rather than supported the “spirit that should be developed” by the participating nations. He further stated,

I believe that this directive should be written in the form of a short statement of principles, emphasizing unity of the whole, and stressing the great desirability of keeping the integrity of national forces. I should give to General Anderson the right, in what he may consider to be grave and exceptional circumstances, to appeal to his home government, but he should be instructed first to notify the Allied Commander-in-Chief that he intends so to appeal, giving his reasons therefor.

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66 Salmon and Birdsall, *Part 2 - Period of the Tunisian, Sicilian, and South Italian Campaigns (December 1942 to December 1943)* Section 2, 8. This open-mindedness on the Americans’ part was likely a reflection not only of Marshall’s attitude, but the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King, as well, who promised to give Eisenhower full support, to see to it that he was “commander of the U.S. Navy in the British Isles in fact as well as name.” King realized that in England the United States was, for the first time in her history, attempting to create a unified command in the field for an indefinite period.

67 Horne, 83.

68 Salmon and Birdsall, *Part 2 - Period of the Tunisian, Sicilian, and South Italian Campaigns (December 1942 to December 1943)* Section 2, 9.

69 Ibid.
The British Chief of Staff considered Eisenhower’s views and came to agree, “[s]implicity of purpose and unified direction are essential to the speedy success of these operations.” They then proceeded to revise their directive to reflect Eisenhower’s views on this point.

First Army has been placed under the Supreme command of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, United States Army. In the exercise of his command, the national forces at his disposal will be used towards, the benefit of the United Nations and in pursuit of the common object. You will carry out any orders issued by him. In the unlikely event of your receiving an order which, in your view, will give rise to a grave and exceptional situation, you have the right to appeal to the War Office, provided that by so doing an opportunity is not lost, nor any part of the Allied Force endangered. You will, however, first inform the Allied Commander-in-Chief that you intend so to appeal, and you will give him your reasons.

This directive met General Eisenhower’s expectation to such a degree that he forwarded a copy to the United States War Department to serve as a model for future multinational commands.

Eisenhower’s recognition that Allied Force Headquarters’ unity of effort and command were not what they should be prompted his January 1943 reorganization that attempted to consolidate American and British land and air forces each under single ground and air component commanders. When Allied Force Headquarters actually invaded North Africa in November 1942, it was organized into three task forces: Western, commanded by General George S. Patton; Center, composed of General Fredendall’s II Corps; and Eastern, General Anderson’s British First Army. Each task force had a tactical air force organized underneath it in accordance with US Army Air Force doctrine. Eisenhower’s subordinate air

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70 Salmon and Birdsall, Part 2 - Period of the Tunisian, Sicilian, and South Italian Campaigns (December 1942 to December 1943) Section 2, 10.

71 Ibid.

72 Reference Figure 2. Allied Force Headquarters, January 1943.

73 Reference Figure 1. Allied Force Headquarters Organization, November 1942.

74 War Department, Field Manual (FM) 31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1942), 2. The air support commander functioned under the army commander with “the most important target at a particular time will usually be
force commanders controlled the American and British elements more or less as national elements. Brigadier General James H. Doolittle commanded the American Air Forces; while Air Marshal Sir William L. Welsh (Br) commanded the corresponding RAF units. In its November 1942 incarnation, Allied Force Headquarters had a component commander for naval forces only; the other task forces were essentially national commands reporting directly to Eisenhower. This arrangement was in the spirit of an agreement reached at the 1941 ABC-1 Conference that national forces “should operate in their own areas of responsibility, under their own commanders.” As Allied Force Headquarters pushed into Algeria, command and control became significantly more complicated as the Allies acquired French forces as partners. The Combined Chiefs anticipated the requirement for a land component commander and initially planned to send Harold Alexander to serve not only as commander of British land forces, but to look after the operational employment of all Allied Force Headquarters land forces. This decision to create a land component commander was borne more of British concern over the inexperience of American forces and commanders than a desire to establish a unified land component commander. Alexander’s diversion to Egypt in 1942 to serve as Commander-in-Chief, British Middle East Command, however, necessitated replacement by the more junior K. A. N. Anderson. Anderson had the requisite experience, but without, as it turned out, the personality to tie Allied Force Headquarters together and command the respect of American officers like Fredendall, obviating the benefit of a land component commander. In preparation for the Tunisia campaign Eisenhower directed Anderson to “coordinate” British, American, and French forces across the battlefield and organized, under Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz, the Royal Air Force

that target which constitutes the most serious threat to the operations of the supported ground force. The final decision as to priority of targets rests with the commander of the supported unit.”

75 Watson, 373. In 1941, General Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, met with their British counterparts at the ABC-1 Conference to establish “understanding of purpose”, i.e., a high-level unity of effort, for collaboration between America and Britain.
Eastern Air Command, US Twelfth Air Force, and Allied Air Support Command.\textsuperscript{76} With this reorganization, Eisenhower, rather than solving the command and control problems, established the preconditions for the confusion and disorganization of the Kasserine defeat.

The decision to centralize control of air forces was a significant change in that the idea was unexplored during Allied Force Headquarters’ creation, due no doubt to the antipathy that many ground commanders had for an independent air force. The decision to unify command of the previously independent American and British air forces reflected not only Eisenhower’s recognition that he was unable to coordinate them effectively himself, but also incorporated British lessons learned from the Middle East.\textsuperscript{77} Eisenhower informed Marshall that he was making the change after careful study and discussions with Spaatz, Tedder, and Air Vice-Marshal Coningham (the latter two who were still with the British Middle Eastern Command at the time). “I have come to the conclusion that a single air commander is necessary.”\textsuperscript{78} Unfortunately, the move did not break the American method of subordinating the tactical air forces to ground commanders, limiting the impact of the reorganization.

The post-Kasserine, March 1943 reorganization, however, fully realized Eisenhower’s desire for unified land, air, and naval component commanders. The Combined Chiefs approved the changes Eisenhower wanted to make to resolve the unity of effort issues and difficulties integrating airpower within Allied Force Command that became so apparent at Kasserine. The British Eighth Army’s pursuit of Rommel into Tunisia and its pending organization under Allied Force Headquarters reduced the

\textsuperscript{76} Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, \textit{The Army Air Forces In World War II, Europe: Torch to Pointblank, August 1942 to December 1943}, vol. II (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1983), 140.

\textsuperscript{77} Memorandum from Eisenhower to Spaatz, Nov 30, 1942, 331.2 General Records of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force 1942-46, Eisenhower Library. Eisenhower realized that little coordination existed between Major General James H. Doolittle, commander of Twelfth Air Force, and Air Marshal Sir William Welsh, commander of Eastern Air Command, and that neither officer had an overall picture of the current situation.

\textsuperscript{78} Davis, 166.
importance of the British Middle East Command, Eighth Army’s higher headquarters while in Egypt and Libya, to such a degree that the Combined Chiefs felt comfortable assigning its commander, Alexander, and the bulk of its staff to Eisenhower. Organized under the resultant 18th Army Group was the British Eighth Army, along with Anderson’s First Army, and the II Corps. Eisenhower had seen fit to replace Fredendall with George Patton after Alexander’s none too subtle comment, “I’m sure you must have better men than that.”

The Chiefs also agreed at the Casablanca Conference to create the Mediterranean Air Command, commanded by Tedder, under which was organized Spaatz’ Northwest African Air Forces (the rechristened Allied Air Force), along with the other British air forces that operated in the Middle East and Mediterranean. Three subcommands would be under Spaatz: Major General James H. Doolittle would control heavy and medium bombers with their fighter escorts; Air Vice Marshal Hugh Pughe Lloyd would control general reconnaissance and fighters defending shipping and ports; and Coningham would specialize in air support for ground forces. The French were also convinced to give Alexander operational control of the XIX Corps. Eisenhower had now unified under him all forces operating in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa.

Allied Force Headquarters completed its air reorganization with the introduction of the British method of air/ground coordination brought from Egypt by General Bernard Law Montgomery. Montgomery, the commander of the British Eighth Army, met with American and British officers in February to discuss lessons learned from the Libyan campaign; he prepared and circulated a pamphlet


80 Reference Figure 3. Allied Force Headquarters, March 1943.


82 Salmon and Birdsall, Part 2 - Period of the Tunisian, Sicilian, and South Italian Campaigns (December 1942 to December 1943) Section 1, History, History of Allied Force Headquarters (Caserta, Italy: Allied Force Headquarters, September 22, 1945), 20.
entitled "Some Notes on High Command in War". In what Tedder styled "a gospel according to Montgomery," he bluntly stated that "[a]ny officer who aspired to high command in war must understand clearly certain basic principles regarding the use of air power," specifically, that aircraft should be centralized under the command of an air force officer who worked in conjunction with the commander of the ground forces. Eisenhower, after reading the pamphlet and discussing it with Spaatz and Tedder, adopted this method of air/ground coordination proven effective by Montgomery and Alexander during the second battle of El Alamein. Eisenhower and his Chief of Staff, General Smith, championed the new organization despite finding it, in Tedder’s opinion, “difficult to understand that every General has not a divine right to command his own private air forces, and incidentally a divine inspiration by which he knows better than anyone else how those air forces should be employed.” Smith told Tedder that he would do all he could to make the system work, but it did not affect his opposition to the US Air Force as an independent branch of service, which was something that would come only “over his dead body.”

The post-Kasserine reorganization reflected Eisenhower’s decision with all air forces now directly commanded by air force officers, and Coningham’s Tactical Air Force coordinating with, rather than organized under Alexander’s 18th Army Group. This marked the end of the American-style air/ground integration inspired by FM 31-35. With the publication US Army FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, later that year, Montgomery’s air/ground concept became the foundation for modern air force doctrine. FM 100-20 was explicit that the first and second priority in the employment

83 Bernard Law Montgomery, “Some Notes on High Command in War” (Eighth Army, February 1943).


85 Tedder, 405. Orange, Mets, and Spires, 18.

86 FM 31-35.

87 War Department, Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power (United States Government Printing Office, 1943).
of a tactical air force was to “gain air superiority and to prevent the movement of hostile troops and supplies into the theater of operations or within the theater;” gaining objectives on the immediate front of the ground forces was relegated to the third priority.  

The creation of the North Africa Theater of Operations United States Army happened at the Casablanca Conference. Also decided upon at Casablanca was the split of the European Theater of Operations United States Army. Eisenhower and Marshall had discussed creating an African theater prior even to TORCH, but as the scope and size of Allied Force Headquarters was to increase with the infusion of British leadership and forces, Eisenhower cabled Marshall, "[t]he assumption of detailed theater functions has now become necessary". The effect of this new headquarters on operations was very small as it functioned, in an administrative capacity much the same as the European headquarters. However, its creation served to lighten the load, so to speak, on those officers who were ‘dual hatted’, specifically, Eisenhower and Smith.

**Multinational Integration**

Eisenhower wrote in his after action report to the Combined Chiefs on operations in Northwest Africa that he was “determined from the first” to make Allied Force Headquarters a “truly Allied Force, with real unity of command and centralization of administrative responsibility.” As outlined in the previous chapter of this paper, it took time to achieve unity of effort in part because of the struggle to gain unity of command over the various nations’ armies and air forces. From the aspect of multinational integration, however, Eisenhower was more successful. Viewing multinational staff integration as one of

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the pillars to achieve the mutual cooperation necessary for unity of effort within Allied Force
Headquarters, his problem was how to integrate officers and enlisted personnel from not only the two
nations, but also their distinct services, army, navy, and air forces. Fortunately, the fact that the
headquarters was composed of only two nationalities, American and British, shared a common language,
and for the most part, a common heritage and values, made the task easier.

Genesis of the Principle

The idea of multinational integration was nothing new, although by World War II it had assumed
a somewhat different character than historic instances like Napoleon’s armies and the multinational
coalitions formed to fight Napoleon. Despite the fact that both were composed of multiple national
armies, and there were even instances of officers of one nation serving on another’s staff, Napoleon’s
Grande Armée, for example, was a multinational formation in which the various subjugated nations
would contribute soldiers typically as part of a national formation.91 The Swiss officer, Antoine Henri de
Jomini, who famously served under both Napoleon and under his rival Tsar Alexander I, was different
than Air Chief Marshal Tedder serving on Allied Force Headquarters staff, for example. When Jomini
served in a particular nation’s army, he typically did so for personal gain and would wear that nation’s
uniform, act as a subject of that nation’s sovereign, and accept that sovereign’s pay; Tedder, on the other
hand, remained an Englishman wearing a Royal Air Force uniform regardless of the unit in which he
served.

The multinational integration employed by Eisenhower differed from that seen in the Napoleonic
era in that it was driven by common national interest. Much of this common interest was determined at
the ABC-1 and ARCADIA conferences where a common American and British approach and the idea of
unity of command were accepted. The fact that the Allies created language to describe their collaboration,

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91 J. P. Riley, Napoleon and the World War of 1813: Lessons in Coalition Warfighting (New
specifically, the term “combined” to refer to British-American operations, gives an indication as to how
different and thorough this collaboration was to be.92

Development of the Principle

Eisenhower employed a number of solutions to promote integration. The first was the method by
which Allied Force Headquarters initially populated Americans and Britons on its staff using something
Brigadier General John Whiteley, the British Deputy Chief of Staff called “the principle of balanced
personnel,” essentially, equal numbers of each.93 There was no formal agreement that American and
British personnel would be represented in equal numbers on the Allied Force Headquarters staff, but that
the idea of balanced personnel was tacitly recognized can be seen from a letter from General Bedell Smith
to General Marshall on October 22, 1942 –

I have a British Deputy and two British Assistants, heads of Staff Divisions, and the rest
of the staff is about equally divided British and American. They have been completely
cooperative and I cannot say too much for the way they have helped solve the difficult
organization problem of modifying the staff system of the two armies to fit a combined
working team.94

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92 Cline, 98-100. A paper presented at the January 10, 1942 session of the ARCADIA Conference
defined the terms “Joint” and “Combined.” It recommended the “usage . . . of Joint as a term applying to
interservice affairs in either country and Combined as a term for British-American collaboration.”

93 Cline, 13. Brigadier General Sir John Whiteley, the AFHQ British Deputy Chief of Staff, stated
in a letter to Major General John N. Kennedy, the Director of Military Operations at the British War
Office -- "Here again the balance of American and British: officers has been watched." On the American
side, we find the recognition of the same principle: "The CG has determined a policy of providing equal
U. S. personnel to that being furnished by the British in all strictly Allied Force activities." The numbers
of authorized and assigned American and British officers and enlisted personnel were roughly equal
according to the Table of AFHQ Personnel, November 1942, Box 28, SHAEF, Office of Secretary,
General Staff: Records, 1943-1945, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library

94 Memorandum, Walter Bedell Smith to George C. Marshall, October 22, 1942, Box 17, SHAEF,
Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-1945, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.
The Allied Force Headquarters Air Staff where the Chief of Staff (Air), Air Commodore A.P.M. Sanders, was British, and his deputy, Brigadier General Louis A. Craig, was American, demonstrated this idea of balance.\textsuperscript{95}

Balanced personnel did not apply, however, to logistics sections because of the differences in organization, procedure, and channels of communication.\textsuperscript{96} In these sections, explained General Eisenhower, “it was my principal concern to insure that no international façade should be built, which would prejudice the administration and maintenance of the armies upon which the success of my operations would depend.”\textsuperscript{97} To ensure unity of effort between these separate, parallel American and British staff sections, Eisenhower created the Chief Administrative Officer.\textsuperscript{98} Major General H. M. Gale (British) held the position through 1942 and ‘43 and was responsible for the coordination of all American and British logistics in the Theater. Cables from both the War Department and British War Office that identify the Chief Administrative Officer a Deputy Chief of Staff indicate the importance Eisenhower put on the position:

The CofS is assisted by two deputies. One DCoS is charged with the general coordination of tactical matters (i.e., with G-2 and G-3 functions). The other DCoS, CAO, is charged with the coordination of supply matters. As the supply DCoS is also the British CAO, he is charged with the administration of British personnel and in this capacity deals directly with the WO.\textsuperscript{99}

\textsuperscript{95} Smith.

\textsuperscript{96} See Figure 4. Task Organization of Staff Under the Chief Administrative Officer, March 1943.

\textsuperscript{97} General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Report of the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Operations in Northwest Africa, 1.

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., 20. “[A]dministration and supply would be under a British officer, General Gale, with Colonel E. N S. Hughes as his deputy.

\textsuperscript{99} Salmon and Birdsall, Part 2 - Period of the Tunisian, Sicilian, and South Italian Campaigns (December 1942 to December 1943) Section 3, History, History of Allied Force Headquarters (Caserta, Italy: Allied Force Headquarters, September 22, 1945), 360.
The effect of the 1943 reorganizations was to increase the scale and scope of the headquarters. Because of this increase, the principle of balanced personnel, that was so important in the infancy of Allied Force Headquarters, became less important as the headquarters matured. In fact, by 1944, American and British personnel were almost interchangeable, to the point that “as far as practicable, the best man was assigned to each job, irrespective of nationality.”\textsuperscript{100} As an example, a document denoting the vacant Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) billet in 1944 stated that it could be “an interchangeable US/RAF appointment.”\textsuperscript{101} This was not a repudiation of balance, but indicated just how thoroughly integrated the staff was. In a May 1943 cable from Allied Force Headquarters to the War Department it was explained that:

In those subsections where specialized knowledge of organization, technique, and procedure is necessary, the selection of personnel, British and American, is made from

\textsuperscript{100} Eisenhower, \textit{Report of the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Operations in Northwest Africa}, 4.

\textsuperscript{101} Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, “Composition of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Appendix D to SHAEF/17218/Ops(A),” August 17, 1944, SHAEF, Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-45 box 25, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.
the best qualified source, without regard to nationality or rank and without regard to maintaining an equal division of nationalities.\textsuperscript{102}

Other constructs employed by Allied Force Headquarters to foster integration and unity of effort were the Joint Planning Staff and Chief of Staff Conferences. The Joint Planning Staff included representatives of Allied Force Headquarters, Cunningham's naval headquarters, and MAC. It was originally created to develop the “future strategy in the TORCH theater,” a responsibility it retained throughout Allied Force Headquarters existence.\textsuperscript{103} The Chief of Staff instituted a tri-weekly conference with representatives from each of the staff sections on December 24, 1942. In these meetings representatives from each of the staff sections exchanged information on “detailed intentions, plans, and developments in operations, especially of those operations of each service which affected the others. This practice served to remove points of friction or faulty coordination.”\textsuperscript{104}

A cable dispatched from Allied Force Headquarters in August 1943 in response to a request from the Combined Chiefs to summarize the command and staff organization gives such a concise and yet comprehensive description of the headquarters in this period:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a.] COMMAND: Eisenhower occupies dual capacity as C-in-C Allied Forces and American Theater Commander. He exercises his command functions as follows:
    \begin{enumerate}
      \item With Navy (EN [English Navy] and USN [US Navy]) through C-in-C (Commander-in-Chief) Mediterranean.
      \item With Air (RAF [Royal Air Force] and AAF [Army Air Force]) through C-in-C MAC.
      \item With Ground Forces and task forces through General Staff AFHQ.
    \end{enumerate}
  \item[b.] CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR effected as follows:
    \begin{enumerate}
      \item Heads of major staff divisions of AFHQ, exercise general co-ordination and supervision over corresponding staff divisions of Naval and Air staffs.
      \item Joint Planning Staff, composed of representatives from planning staffs of AFHQ, and Naval—Air staffs, functions as a supporting agency of G-3 AFHQ. The organization, membership, and duties of this JPS (Joint Planning Staff) parallel closely those of the JPS in the CCS (Combined Chiefs of Staff) organization, except that its recommendations are
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{102} Salmon and Birdsall, \textit{Part 1 - Period of the North African Invasion (August to December 1942)}, History, History of Allied Force Headquarters (Caserta, Italy: Allied Force Headquarters, September 22, 1945), 221.

\textsuperscript{103} Salmon and Birdsall, \textit{Part 2 - Period of the Tunisian, Sicilian, and South Italian Campaigns (December 1942 to December 1943) Section 2}, History, History of Allied Force Headquarters (Caserta, Italy: Allied Force Headquarters, September 22, 1945), 328.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 224.
processed through G-3 AFHQ, to C-in-C.
(3) CofS AFHQ, presides at a Chief of Staff Conference with the Air and Naval Chiefs of Staff, G-2, and G-3, which sits every morning. This is strictly a tactical conference for the co-ordination of air, naval, and ground power.\textsuperscript{105}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Over the course of the North African campaign, Eisenhower reorganized Allied Force Headquarters to ensure unity of effort. To establish this unity of effort, he primarily used the principle of unity of command to bring all forces under his operational control and created land and air component commanders that exercised operational control over American, British, and French forces. He also employed the principle of multinational staff integration to get the right people in the right jobs regardless of nationality and foster mutual cooperation. Eisenhower saw unity of effort, and the principles employed to achieve it, as enablers to Allied Forces Headquarters’ success in North Africa; so much so, that when possible, he employed the organization and principles for the remainder of the time Allied Force Headquarters was an operational command. When Eisenhower returned to command European Theater of Operations United States Army and officially became Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force in January 1944, he employed many of the lessons learned from Allied Forces Headquarters to instill the same unity of effort within this new command. Evidence of Eisenhower’s success was that the forces of the United States, Great Britain and her Commonwealth Dominions, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, along with the free forces of many Nazi-occupied countries were able to execute successfully Operation OVERLORD, the amphibious invasion of continental Europe that preceded the Allied drive to Berlin. OVERLORD was an epic undertaking, comprised of the largest amphibious operation ever, the largest armada of ships ever assembled, and nearly a million men ashore by the end of June 1944.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{105} Salmon and Birdsall, \textit{Part 2 - Period of the Tunisian, Sicilian, and South Italian Campaigns (December 1942 to December 1943) Section 2}, 219.

\textsuperscript{106} Gerhard L. Weinberg, \textit{A World At Arms, A Global History of World War II} (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 684.
Despite the operation’s scale and the risk associated with the operation, the relative smoothness of its execution likely would have amazed not only the War Department planners in 1941 struggling to ready the Army for combat, but General Eisenhower himself in 1942 after the Kasserine defeat. If one is to draw any conclusion about the value of unity of command and multinational integration in facilitating unity of effort, and whether the lessons of North Africa can be applied to current operations, it bears exploring if and how Eisenhower employed the principles with the Allied Expeditionary Force, the command that executed OVERLORD.

Unity of Command

Despite the successful employment of component commanders in North Africa, the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe had neither land nor air component commanders. This was due to the exigencies of the American and British politics and the decisions of the service chiefs. While Allied Force Headquarters conducted operations in the Mediterranean, COSSAC, the organization charged with much of the formative planning for the Allied Expeditionary Force, forwarded a draft task organization to the Combined Chiefs that included a land component commander. It was widely assumed at the time that General Marshall would become the Supreme Commander in Europe and thusly the Combined Chiefs largely deferred to him on matters relating to Allied Expeditionary Force task organization. Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan, the lead planner later recounted,

[t]here was to be an appointment to command the ground forces. Such an appointment would leave the Supreme Commander free to give his main attention to politico-military questions while his three subordinates fought the sea, land, and air battles. It appeared to us that this concept originated on the British side, inspired, no doubt, by the course of evolution in the Mediterranean. It seemed to have no support whatever on the United States side. The question naturally impinged upon that of the appointment of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. In this, one had to be guided by General Marshall in his role of heir presumptive. He was naturally unable to be didactic on the point, but he left no doubt as to his ideas on the subject and the ideas of his countrymen in general. So the concept of the Ground Forces Command died at birth.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{107} See Figure 5. Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Organization, April 1944.

\textsuperscript{108} Morgan, 222.
One can only speculate why Marshall vetoed the land component command, as US doctrine suggested assigning “a suitable officer of adequate rank” to command a group of armies while “engaged in a joint operation” rather than a Commander-in-Chief be in direct charge himself.\textsuperscript{109} Later, when Eisenhower actually assumed command, it was much too late to appoint a commander and create an additional subordinate headquarters prior to the invasion. Instead, what Eisenhower actually did was to employ General Montgomery, who commanded the 21st Army Group, as the de facto ground force commander during the invasion, “until such time as the Supreme Allied Commander allocates an area of responsibility to the Commanding General, First Army Group.”\textsuperscript{110} While Montgomery’s tenure in this temporary position was not made clear, the arrangement was such that the Supreme Commander could and did change it when he assumed operational control of both the 21st and General Bradley’s US 12th Army Group in September 1944.\textsuperscript{111}

Unlike in Allied Force Headquarters, Eisenhower did not exercise full command or even operational control over all air forces operating in the European theater. The relationship between Eisenhower, and the commanders of the American and British strategic air forces, Spaatz, and Air Chief Marshal Arthur Harris, respectively, was coordination only. At the August 1943 Quebec Conference, the Combined Chiefs decided to ensure that the strategic air forces supporting the Combined Bombing Offensive remained free from ground commanders’ desires to use those assets to prosecute tactical targets. In their “European Strategic Concept,” they emphasized that Operation POINTBLANK “continued to have the highest strategic priority,” and outlined the operations objectives.

\textsuperscript{109} War Department. \textit{A Manual For Commanders of Large Units}, 13.

\textsuperscript{110} Pogue, 45.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength.\textsuperscript{112}

They aimed to maintain the strategic air forces’ independence by having the Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force, Charles Portal, and the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Hap Arnold, exercise control of all strategic air forces in Europe.\textsuperscript{113} In the intervening months, as the Allied Force Headquarters’ air/ground arrangement proved effective during the Italian Campaign, and Eisenhower returned to Europe agitating for command of the strategic air forces, Portal agreed to modify his increasingly embattled position. The revised agreement described by Eisenhower as “exactly what we want,” incorporated elements of both positions.\textsuperscript{114} Eisenhower later informed Marshall, “[a]ll air forces here will be under Tedder’s supervision as my agent and this prospect is particularly pleasing to Spaatz.”\textsuperscript{115} Spaatz, espousing a similar opinion, wrote to Arnold, “I feel that this is a logical, workable plan and, under the conditions which exist, cannot be improved upon.”\textsuperscript{116} The British then passed the draft agreement to the Combined Chiefs, with a cover sheet containing three notes. First, the overall mission of the strategic air forces remained “the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic systems,” but also included “the direct support of Land and Naval forces.”\textsuperscript{117} Second, “responsibility for supervision of air operations out of England” was jointly Eisenhower and Portal’s responsibility.\textsuperscript{118} Finally, the Supreme Commander’s calls for aid in battle were to be “filled

\textsuperscript{112} Office of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, ed., “QUADRANT Conference, Papers and Minutes of Meetings” (presented at the QUADRANT Conference, Office of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1943).

\textsuperscript{113} Pogue, 273.

\textsuperscript{114} Davis, 344.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{117} Pogue, 273.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 125.
promptly.”

Despite the British concessions, the US Joint Chiefs, exhibiting a marked change of opinion from Quebec, balked at the fact that the proposal did not give Eisenhower unquestioned control of the strategic air forces. Even Eisenhower had second thoughts and insisted on control of the strategic air forces for the invasion period. He actually threatened to “request relief from this command” if a “satisfactory answer” was not reached. The Combined Chiefs settled the issue with a statement on April 7, 1944 that “the USA Strategic Air Force and British Bomber Command will operate under the direction of the Supreme Commander, in conformity with agreements between him and the Chief of the Air Staff as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.” In this instance, ‘direction’ was essentially a coordination relationship between Eisenhower, Spaatz, and Air Chief Marshal Arthur Harris that gave the Supreme Commander, in his estimation, “all the authority necessary to secure full support from all the air forces in England.” After the war, Spaatz complained that without unity of command the organization was dependent on force of personality.

Eisenhower, Tedder and myself kept in such close touch with ourselves that nothing could possibly go wrong, except in our own persons. . . . It worked well enough to win the war, yes, but if one of the three had been struck by heart failure it might have worked so poorly as to lose the war. . . . In other words, it was a lousy organization. I don’t know what the stumbling block was—it may have been [Air Chief Marshal Arthur] Harris. . . . Perhaps Harris had been built up too strong to be placed under the command of Tedder. . . . We felt that all Air Forces must be tied in with the operation of the ground forces, all being considered as one problem. That was based on our experience down in the Mediterranean.

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119 Pogue, 273.
120 Ibid., 125; Eisenhower, The Eisenhower Diaries, 115.
121 Ibid.
122 Eisenhower, The Eisenhower Diaries, 117.
123 Orange, Mets, and Spires, 61.
Multinational Integration

Employing a qualified officer in an available position who would be able to work in a multinational context was more important to Eisenhower than ensuring strict quantitative parity between American and British personnel. Furthermore, Eisenhower restricted the multinational aspect of his headquarters to those nations that were able to contribute without reservation, specifically, American and British at the exclusion of the French and multitude of other nations who contributed forces. As at Allied Forces Headquarters, Eisenhower populated staff positions with the best man for the job. Eisenhower brought with him to the Allied Expeditionary Force key leaders – Arthur Tedder, now the Deputy Supreme Commander; Chief of Staff, General Smith; Chief Administrative Officer, General Gale – and others who had proven critical to integrating the headquarters while in North Africa, and tasked them with doing the same to the European headquarters. Officers and NCOs were screened to ensure they could fit into the multinational staff; highly capable men who could not work closely with officers of a

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different nationality were transferred out. Eisenhower characterized “teamwork” in Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force as being “easier to establish” than when Allied Force Headquarters was formed. As Tedder later stated, the task involved “getting the right people and being ruthless . . . and you must be ruthless. . . . If a man does not fit he will never learn the language and you will never make a team; that is the guts of the whole thing, the team.”

So completely integrated were British and American forces in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, despite the fact that there were more Americans than British, that General Smith, an American officer, would deny General Kenneth Strong’s, a British officer and G-2 (intelligence), July 18, 1944 request for additional personnel. In reply to Strong, Smith directed that he “explore some way by which some of your functions, and particularly counter-intelligence, can be decentralized to armies and army groups, and thus relieve me of the very great embarrassment of having to justify the enormous staff to higher authority.” The higher authority he was referring to was the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, who took him “most severely to task” over the size of the “G-2 establishment which he characterized as phantastic [sic].”

The Allied Expeditionary Force, despite a functional land component commander and no unity of command over its air forces, still exhibited a high degree of unity of effort during OVERLORD. This was due largely to the mutual cooperation fostered through multinational staff integration and the fact that the key players worked with and knew each other well after years of war. One must consider the ruthlessness referred to by Tedder as one most important considerations when screening staff in a multinational environment where the incompetency or bad attitude of an individual, could reflect poorly upon a particular nation, or worse, create an international incident.


126 Pogue, 57.

127 Walter Bedell Smith, July 18, 1944, SHAEF, Office of Secretary, General Staff: Records, 1943-1945, Box 28, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.

128 Ibid.
Future Applicability

World War II marked the United States’ transition from a reluctant contributor to multinational military operations to a leading contributor. In nearly every subsequent operation in which the US military participated, the basic organizational framework has been multinational in nature; this framework, whether as an alliance or coalition, looks likely to continue in to the future. Even in the heady days post-Soviet collapse when the United States was the sole superpower, President Clinton stated, “[a]ny large-scale participation of US forces in a major . . . operation that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under US command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.” 129 This multinational paradigm can be seen in the United States’ NATO membership, the number of regional combined organizations, like Combined Forces Command-Korea since the 1950s, to which it belongs, and is reinforced by formal United States policy like the 2010 National Security Strategy that leveraged the US military to “sustain . . . alliances, and to build coalitions of support toward common objectives.” 130

As demonstrated by Allied Force Headquarters, there is a degree of tension inherent in all multinational coalitions. As Winston Churchill put it, “the history of all coalitions is a tale of the reciprocal complaints of allies.” 131 The primary source of tension between participants tends to be associated with command relationships, who is in charge of whom and what authorities a commander will have. 132 This contentiousness surrounding command and control authorities should be evident to those


132 Anthony J. Rice, “Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare,” Parameters, Spring (1997), 152-167. There is much research confirming this, suggesting that “the most contentious
military members who served in an organization such as the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, a nominally NATO-led mission with just enough of a multinational flavor to create headaches. With the US military’s significant amount of multinational experience, it seems anomalous that there would continue to be such friction in those multinational organizations to which US forces belong, particularly since many of those conditions related to experience, equipment and doctrine that caused problems for Eisenhower are no longer deficient. The February 2014 version of Joint Publication 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*, lists four primary options available to a joint force commander for employing land forces from two or more components:

1. Subordinate unified command for land operations (available only to a CCDR).
2. Subordinate JTFs.
3. Service components.
4. Functional land component with JFLCC (Joint Force Land Component Commander).\(^{133}\)

The joint publication is explicit that the advantages of option one are “enduring unity of command and effort,” and the presence of a “joint staff.” Interestingly enough it mentions in the introduction that

\[H\]aving a land component commander (LCC) is not new to the Armed Forces of the United States. . . . \[A\]fter the Allied repulses at the battle of the Kasserine Pass in 1943 due to poor command relationships, General Dwight D. Eisenhower restructured his Allied Forces in North Africa. Not only were all air elements brought under centralized control, but all land forces were also consolidated under General Sir Harold Alexander’s 18th Army Group. This structure was the first modern combined organization with coequal land, sea, and air component commanders under separate commanders and contributed significantly to the defeat of the Axis in North Africa by May 1943.\(^{134}\)

The difficulties associated with establishing unity of effort within an organization composed of multiple nations, each with differing national caveats over the ability of that nation’s military to command, resupply, fund, task, or release information to another, are great. Certainly, agreement between the participating nations’ political masters is a requirement, but even among NATO member countries, the aspect of coalition operations is command and control” and that “[t]his sensitivity reflects the participants’ concern over who will command their forces and what authority that commander will have.”


\(^{134}\) Ibid., I-1.
there are still differences between what each military can and cannot do; these caveats can significantly hamper operational flexibility. General John Craddock, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (December 2006 to June 2009), said in a July 2009 interview that these caveats imposed on NATO member militaries participating in the International Security Force in Afghanistan, “increase the risk to every service member deployed in Afghanistan and bring increased risk to mission success. . . . They are also a detriment to effective command and control, unity of effort and . . . command.”135 This suggests a requirement to heed the lessons learned from Allied Force Headquarters’ failure at the Battle of Kasserine Pass and the organization’s subsequent recovery and adherence to those principles by which General Eisenhower promoted unity of effort, unity of command and multinational staff integration.

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