2014 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Military Leader Findings

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CASAL is the Army’s annual survey to assess the quality of leadership and leader development. 2014 findings are based on responses from 23,264 Army leaders, consisting of 16,795 sergeants through colonels in the Regular Army, US Army Reserve, and Army National Guard and 6,469 Army civilians. This tenth year of the survey has additional coverage on methods of influence and self-development. Among uniformed leaders, assessments of leader attributes and leadership competencies surpass a benchmark of 67% favorable by an additional 6-21% of the assessed leaders, except for developing others on which 62% of the uniformed leaders are rated effective or very effective. Operational experience has the largest percentage of active duty leaders rating it as an effective domain of leader development at 79%, followed by self-development at 73%, and institutional education at 62%. Favorable attitudes toward self-development increased by 10% since 2013 for active duty NCOs and 7% for reserve NCOs. While professional military education quality is rated favorably by 77% of recent graduates, only about half believe their course was relevant to their job duties or improved their leadership. Even in the face of not receiving developmental support from their superiors, many leaders are not proactive in seeking feedback or engaging in self-development. Aligning with the Army’s preferred mission command philosophy, the use of commitment-building influence techniques are more frequent than compliance techniques. The climate in which leadership occurs has mixed indicators with high commitment to one’s unit, but a decline in the proportion of leaders who report career satisfaction, an upturn in unit discipline problems, and an increase in workload stress. Recommended steps are offered to address the results.
2014 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Military Leader Findings

Executive Summary

Purpose

The Center for Army Leadership’s (CAL) Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) is a longitudinal study to capture assessments from the field about leadership and leader development. CASAL has been a dependable source to inform senior leaders about the level of leader quality and associated upward or downward trends since 2005. CASAL affords decision makers and stake-holders the option to make informed course corrections or to leverage prevailing strengths. Agencies and individuals may submit data queries to CAL for further analysis of CASAL survey results. CASAL results inform groups such as the CSA’s Training and Leader Development Conference, Army Profession and Leader Development Forum, Human Capital Enterprise Board, Army Learning Coordination Council, as well as special studies and initiatives.

Method

CAL uses standard scientific approaches for survey development, sampling, data collection and analysis. The survey covers leadership and leader development as covered by Army regulations and doctrine. Survey items are chosen based on past usage, input from stake-holders and emerging issues. Sampling practices produce results with a margin of error of +/-2.5% or less for the nearly 600,000 Army leaders represented. Data were collected from November 20 through December 15, 2014. Survey respondents consisted of 16,795 globally dispersed, active duty and reserve component Soldiers in the ranks of sergeant through colonel and 6,469 Army civilians. Data analysis includes assessment of percentages by cohort and ranks, analysis of trends, comparisons across experiences and demographics, coding of short-answer responses, correlations and regressions. Selected findings from other surveys and data sources are consulted to check the reliability of CASAL responses. This report concentrates on uniformed leaders, and a second report presents findings from Army civilian leaders.

For most items, percentages are used to summarize the level of responses and show trends across time. As an aid in interpretation, favorability levels have been set based on past CASAL and other surveys. Results are generally considered favorable if the positive response choices (e.g., effective plus very effective) sum to 67% or greater. Unfavorable levels are represented by negative response choices that sum to 20% or greater. Across nine previous years of CASAL, several common patterns emerged that provide a backdrop to aid in understanding specific findings.

- Group percentages indicating favorability of leadership and leader development increase with the rank and length of service of the respondent.
• Ratings on items that have greater personal impact (e.g., agreement that your immediate superior is an effective leader) tend to be more favorable than ratings for items that are less specific (e.g., rating the effectiveness of your superiors as leaders).
• Results from active and reserve component leaders tend to be similar, within 1% to 3% on many items. Meaningful differences are noted where applicable.

Summary of Findings

Leadership Competencies

The Army’s expectations for leaders are established in Army leadership doctrine (ADRP 6-22) and reinforced in its multi-source assessment and feedback program and performance evaluation systems. Leadership competencies consist of the activities that leaders are to do; they can be observed and can be improved through development. All CASAL results show that the leadership requirements in doctrine are significantly associated with effective leader and unit outcomes. Also results from the 2014 CASAL show that leadership expectations are generally met across the force. The most favorably rated competencies are Getting Results, Preparing Oneself and Stewardship of the Profession. The leadership competency Developing Others continues as in past years to be of concern across all leader cohorts. Some subgroups, like junior noncommissioned officers and civilian leaders, fall below the two-thirds favorable benchmark in other competencies or supporting behaviors, such as leading subordinates and managing people and time. Team building notably increased 8% in ratings of effectiveness since 2007 to 72% in 2014. More than three-fourths of respondents indicate their immediate superior has had a positive or very positive effect on their work quality, motivation and commitment to the Army.

Leader Attributes

The doctrinal set of leader attributes that support and enable leadership activities are met by two-thirds or more of leaders. While assessments of the 15 leader attributes are well above the two-thirds level, there is up to a ten percent difference between the most and least favorable, ranging from the most leaders being rated effective at demonstrating the Army Values and fewer effectively demonstrating Innovation and Interpersonal tact.

Leader Development Domains

Leader development practices are established by the Army Leader Development Strategy (Department of the Army, 2013c) and AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development (Department of the Army, 2014) with three domains providing the primary categories. The operational experience domain receives the highest percentage of active and reserve component leaders rating it effective for preparing them to assume new levels of leadership or responsibility. While Army leaders have consistently rated operational experience favorably, currently at 79%, there is a considerable drop in the percentage of Army civilian leaders rating their job experiences effective for developing them for higher levels of leadership. Informal
practices (opportunities to lead others, on-the-job training, learning from peers, and development from mentoring) are viewed as having the largest positive impact on the respondents’ development as leaders. While personnel management practices are a conduit to the highly rated operational experiences, however, only half rate personnel management activities effective or very effective at supporting development. The low ratings of personnel management have remained consistent since 2011. In 2014, CASAL results show that two-thirds of active duty leaders believe that their mix of assignments and amount of time in key developmental assignments have been appropriate for their leader development.

Army leaders rate their most recent professional military education course effective for their development at levels (62% of AC and 70% of RC leaders) similar to the previous two years. Similar percentages of leaders rate that course cadre set appropriate leadership examples and provide constructive feedback on leadership. However, the learning challenge presented by the course, the relevance of course content to graduates’ next duties, and the effectiveness of the course for improving leadership are below the two-thirds level. Courses are rated effective for improving leadership capabilities by only 52% of recent AC course graduates. Separating the ratings by specific PME courses, only the Warrior Leader Course reaches the two-thirds level for improving leadership.

Self-development effectiveness ratings have improved to 74% after a notable decline in past years (from 85% in 2010 to 69% in 2013 rating self-development effective). The drop had been greatest among NCOs whose levels in 2014 improved by 10% for AC and 7% for RC. Respondents expressed a strong preference for self-determined self-development as opposed to structured requirements.

Satisfaction and Commitment

Army leaders are positive about the environments in which they operate. Over four-fifths believe their assigned duties are important to the unit or organization and know what is expected of them in their positions. Ninety-four percent are committed to their team or immediate work group. About three-fourths hold favorable attitudes about the ability of their unit to perform its mission, commitment among team members to perform at a high level, and being proud to identify with their unit. Eighty-two percent agree senior leaders in their chain of command would take action to address an ethical violation, if reported.

Seventy-two percent of leaders agree that standards are upheld (e.g., professional bearing, adherence to regulations), however, 24% indicate there is a discipline problem in their unit (up from 18% in 2013). Among AC Jr NCOs, 35% indicate a discipline problem in their unit.

Stress from a high workload is a persistent problem that has gradually increased. In 2014, 23% of AC leaders report workload stress is a serious problem (compared to 18% to 21% over the past six years). Nearly 50% of AC leaders and 40% of RC leaders indicate that workload stress is at a problem level. Seeking help for stress-related problems is better accepted and encouraged
than it was in 2011. Two out of three leaders assess their immediate superior as effective in taking action to help subordinates manage excessive workload demands.

Seventy-four percent of leaders report they are satisfied with their Army career thus far. While above the two thirds level, the ratings of career satisfaction are continuing to decline from 82% in 2009. More than 20% of AC company grade officers and Jr NCOs report dissatisfaction with their Army careers. Morale is the strongest factor associated with career satisfaction, and morale levels have remained modest and steady since 2010. Fifty-four percent of AC leaders and 62% of RC leaders rate their current level of morale as high or very high, and 26% rate it neither high nor low. Other factors associated with the decline in career satisfaction are attitudes toward assignment history, current job satisfaction, effectiveness of operational experiences and PME courses, and the level of interest the respondent’s immediate superior shows in the leader.

Leader intentions to remain in the Army continue to be positive. Of leaders not currently eligible for retirement, 68% in the AC and 85% in the RC intend to stay in the Army until eligible for retirement or beyond 20 years. Fifty-five percent of AC captains intend to remain in the Army until they are retirement eligible or beyond, which is among the highest percentages observed by CASAL over the past nine years (the lowest was 39% in 2007, a level similar to that recorded by the Army Training and Leader Panel (ATLDP) study in 2000).

Subordinate Development

The competency Develops Others has been one exception for which less than two-thirds of respondents assess their immediate superior as effective. Other indicators support this finding. Leaders report using a range of methods to develop subordinates’ leadership skills, though many perceive development to be an activity that a subordinate is sent to or directed to do, such as resident training or course attendance, online training and self-development. Many leaders also view counseling to be a primary method for development.

The quality and frequency with which performance counseling occurs continues to show room for improvement. Twenty-two percent of leaders report formal and informal counseling never or almost never occurs. Twenty-one percent report it occurs at rating time, and 56% indicate it occurs semi-annually or more often. Half of leaders indicate they receive performance counseling with about the right frequency and 46% it occurs too infrequently. When counseling is conducted, only half agree it is useful for setting performance goals. Forty-one percent of leaders report their immediate superior frequently talks with them about how they are doing in their work, though more than half indicate discussions only occur rarely or occasionally about how to improve duty performance and prepare for future assignments.

People other than one’s rater can also contribute to development. About half of leaders currently have a mentor and indicate their mentoring needs are being met with regard to the frequency of desired interaction and its impact on development. Nearly half of leaders frequently seek developmental feedback from peers. However, those leaders who characterize
their receipt of performance counseling with their rater as too infrequent do not tend to compensate by being proactive in seeking or asking for developmental feedback from others.

**Mission Command**

Immediate superiors are rated effective at demonstrating the principles of the mission command philosophy by 72% to 80% of their subordinates, depending on which specific mission command behavior is assessed. There are strong relationships between exercising mission command, levels of trust, and perceptions of leader effectiveness as shown by correlational and regression analyses. Positive implementation of mission command in units is also indicated by ratings that subordinates are enabled to determine how best to accomplish their duties and that they are allowed to learn from honest mistakes (87%-92%). The least favorable aspect of mission command from assessed topics is that comparatively fewer commanders rate their staff as effective at distilling information related to warfighting functions (69% of AC brigade and battalion commanders).

**Trust**

Trust is a basis for effective relationships between leaders and followers. From 81% to 98% of respondents across rank groups report person-to-person trust with subordinates, peers and superiors as moderate, high or very high. Trust is similarly rated favorably among unit members with 84% indicating moderate, high or very high trust. Ratings of trust in one’s immediate superiors are strongly associated with positive ratings of their superiors’ effectiveness in *Creating a Positive Environment*, exercising *Sound Judgment*, displaying *Empathy*, Leading by *Example*, *Developing Subordinates*, *Army Values*, *Communicating*, and *Innovating*. Three-fourths of leaders are rated effective at trust-building behaviors, which in turn have positive effects on subordinate motivation, work quality, commitment and morale. Trust-building skill is less pronounced among Jr NCOs, with 20% rated ineffective or very ineffective. Trust tends to be greater in units where standards are upheld, where unit members are empowered to make decisions pertaining to their duties and are allowed to learn from honest mistakes.

**Counter-productive Leadership**

The presence of counter-productive or negative leadership behaviors in the Army remains limited as found in past years. Less than four percent of leaders scored 2 or less on a composite scale indicating that they displayed more counter-productive than productive behaviors. This low rate is the same observed in 2013. CASAL results continue to show that counter-productive leadership behaviors are strongly associated with lower levels of cohesion, discipline and trust. Leaders who demonstrate counter-productive leadership behaviors also tend to be assessed as ineffective at building trust and exercising mission command.
Leader Development Practices

The Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback (MSAF) program is designed to enhance leader adaptability and self-awareness and to identify strengths and developmental needs (AR 350-1). About 80% of officers have participated as an assessed leader within the prescribed period of the previous 36 months, as well as 36% of AC NCOs and 25% of RC NCOs. About 53% of assessed leaders indicate the experience was effective at increasing their awareness of their strengths and developmental needs, and 30% rate it as effective for extending improvement to their organization.

Conclusions

This and previous years’ analyses support the validity of the competencies and attributes described in the Army’s doctrinal leadership requirements model (ALRM) (ADP 6-22). Assessment of the effectiveness of competencies and attributes explain high levels of variance in leadership outcomes such as levels of trust, absence of counter-productive leadership behaviors, and overall effectiveness. The relationships between the set of competencies and attributes and the leadership outcomes are strong, with multiple correlation coefficients ($r$’s) ranging from .81 to .90.

Army leaders continue to hold favorable attitudes toward their working environments and commitment to others. Levels of perceived workload stress, morale, trust and career satisfaction, especially among junior-level leaders, could be more positive. All assessed areas of mission command and leadership are rated favorably with one persistent exception – developing others. One in five leaders do not receive performance counseling; about half receive formal or informal performance counseling too infrequently and do not agree it is effective; more than half receive informal performance feedback occasionally or less often; and nearly half do not have a mentor. These indicators point to a shortcoming in development practices.

Leaders consistently prefer informal leader development practices and methods over formal activities and requirements. For example, leaders view their personal self-development as more impactful than guided and structured methods. Professional military education courses are rated favorably for their quality of education, but most junior grade courses continue to be rated less favorably on their degree of challenge and relevance to assigned duties. All PME courses are rated less favorably on improving the leadership capabilities of their graduates.

Many leaders appear not to have a mindset for developing others, as significant numbers of superiors are reported as not conducting counseling or not providing effective developmental guidance. Many Jr NCOs as well as civilian leaders also are not effective at developing others, and they are not effective at leading subordinates and managing tasks.
While operational experience is a consistently strong domain for leader development, the informal and multidimensional aspects of experience create uneven opportunities and results. About half of uniformed leaders do not see personnel management practices as effective contributors to leader development. While PME and self-development contribute to leader development, they do not fill all of the gaps left by operational experience or how leaders choose to engage in the opportunities they have.

Assessments of the conditions surrounding leadership and leader development provide mixed indicators on Army climate. Commitment to teams, confidence in mission ability, and intent to remain in the Army are positive indicators of a capable and productive climate. However, there are signs of increasing stress from workload, a return to unit discipline problems, and a decrease in career satisfaction.

The 2014 CASAL provides numerous contrasts between favorable and unfavorable findings, some within the same topic, competency or leader development practice. There are effective, respected leaders and leaders who reportedly are not so effective. There are schools and courses that have great instructors and are professionally conducted, yet do not provide as much challenge as students desire, or they underachieve on relevance or do not improve leadership skills as much as desired. While it may be appealing to have findings that can be characterized as “good” or “bad,” the diverse results are an indication that CASAL is a true reflection of the environment. CASAL reflects all sides as viewed from actual leaders in the field, collected in as objective as a manner as possible.

The very step of seeking feedback posing 180 survey questions to over 20,000 leaders, demonstrates that the Army is serious about collecting detailed, actionable feedback. To show its intent to improve, the Army also can demonstrate its seriousness – not necessarily by the number of new initiatives – but by providing a laser focus on what to address. Having priorities is a first step to change. Developing others is far from a new gap but persists as the lowest rated among leader attributes and competencies. Recognizing this gap that was confirmed by an Army level inspection (IG, 2015), the Army directed development of doctrine to guide the development of Soldiers and Army civilians throughout their careers. The newly released Field Manual 6-22, Leader Development, provides a viewpoint on achieving individual change, sample plans for embedding development into routine unit actions, and descriptions of measurable skills that provide additional guidelines for development. Many leaders have viewed leader development as an event or process that is provided by the institution. Sending a Soldier or Army civilian to a resident course achieves nothing if the individual is not prepared and willing to engage in development and if instruction does not challenge that leader to change. If leaders are not assessed against organizational expectations, then feedback will be spotty and learning will be uncertain.

Leadership and developing others are skills that can be learned through study, observation and practice, but some leaders fail to value the process of assessing leadership and providing feedback on the very skills that should set Army leaders apart from others. Developing others is stated in doctrine as an action; it is not merely an event, a training exercise or a school that
releases leaders from their responsibility for developing others. Many leaders understand and are appropriately involved in subordinate development. Preparing oneself is also an action relating to what leaders should do. It is the individual leader who has the most to gain or lose through development, and the greatest say in what and how much development they engage in. Leaders who are proactive in seeking feedback and development will improve at a faster rate than those who wait to be developed. Individual leaders have the discretion to change the landscape of their team, one Soldier or civilian at a time, in what they do to support the development of others and how proactive they are in their own improvement and growth. Leaders write the future history of the Army by their day-to-day choices in how they spend their time.
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Organization of Findings

The CASAL was administered online to a representative sample of Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers who were globally dispersed. In addition to uniformed leaders, Army civilian leaders have participated in CASAL since 2009 (findings for Army civilians are presented in a separate technical report). In November 2014, the survey invitation was sent via e-mail to a random sample of 178,160 Army leaders within the uniformed and civilian cohorts, of whom 23,264 participated, for a response rate of 13%. The online survey was accessible to participants for three and one-half weeks and closed the third week of December 2014.

The level of sampling precision met the desired standard for four of five rank groups (field grade officers, company grade officers, senior NCOs, and junior NCOs) for the active component (AC) and reserve components (RC) (i.e., within sampling error of +/-1.6% to +/-2.5%). The level of sampling precision for warrant officers was acceptable (i.e., a sampling error of +/-2.7% to +/-2.8%). The sampling error for the entire survey across components and cohorts is +/- 0.6%, meaning that 95 times out of 100 the observed percentage will be within 1% of the true value.

In addition to meeting stringent sampling error goals, CASAL data demonstrated further support of representativeness across the Army. The respondent sample closely approximated the population of the Army in distribution of component and gender as reported by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). In particular, the distribution of males and females in CASAL match the proportion of males and females in the Army (within 2%). The sample is also representative of deployed Army leaders; 43% active and 25% reserve had recent deployment experience (in the past 36 months). Further, 6% of active and 6% of reserve component respondents were serving on a deployment at the time of the survey. The population, sample, response rate, and sampling error for each uniformed rank group are presented in Table 1. Sampling procedures invited equal numbers of respondents from the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard.

This report is presented in two parts:

- The first part, Quality of Leadership, discusses the current leader quality in the Army, leader effectiveness in meeting leadership requirements, and climate and situational factors affecting leadership.
The second part, *Quality of Leader Development*, discusses the current quality of Army leader development practices, programs and activities, including leader effectiveness in developing subordinate leaders, and the contribution of operational experience, self-development, and institutional education to leader development.

**Table 1. Population, Sample, Response Rates and Sampling Error by Rank Group and Component for Uniformed Personnel.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Strata</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Random Sample (Invitations)</th>
<th>Returned N</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
<th>Sampling Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active Component (Regular Army)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Grade Officer (major - colonel)</td>
<td>31,933</td>
<td>7,700</td>
<td>1,556</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Grade Officer (second lieutenant - captain)</td>
<td>51,075</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>2,042</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer (warrant officer 1 - chief warrant 5)</td>
<td>15,471</td>
<td>8,282</td>
<td>1,139</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior NCO (sergeant first class - sergeant major)</td>
<td>54,833</td>
<td>11,398</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior NCO (sergeant and staff sergeant)</td>
<td>136,915</td>
<td>29,999</td>
<td>2,244</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Active</td>
<td>290,227</td>
<td>74,379</td>
<td>8,794</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reserve Components (US Army Reserve and Army National Guard)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Grade Officer</td>
<td>25,935</td>
<td>8,428</td>
<td>1,512</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Grade Officer</td>
<td>42,608</td>
<td>21,394</td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>11,744</td>
<td>7,210</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior NCO</td>
<td>54,776</td>
<td>11,581</td>
<td>1,921</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior NCO</td>
<td>153,310</td>
<td>39,840</td>
<td>1,889</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Reserve</td>
<td>288,373</td>
<td>88,453</td>
<td>8,001</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Uniformed Personnel</strong></td>
<td>578,600</td>
<td>152,905</td>
<td>16,795</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Survey Development and Administration**

Each year, survey development begins with the identification of issues of importance in leadership and leader development. As one purpose of CASAL is to adequately track trends and identify patterns over time, many survey items from past years are used without change during each administration of the survey. Other items are dropped, added, or modified in order to balance coverage on leadership topics with survey size, time to respond and respondent fatigue. In part, this is done to ensure that the survey assesses contemporary issues in the Army that change from year to year. Data are collected through both quantitative (e.g., select a response) and qualitative (e.g., type a brief answer) means. Item skip patterns and branching
are employed to tailor sections of the survey to specific ranks or to leaders with relevant experiences, a method that also helps to minimize survey length and respondent fatigue. Items cover topics on the quality of leadership and leader development to address the survey’s Essential Elements of Analysis (EEAs). A sampling of EEAs includes:

Quality of Leadership
- What is the overall quality of Army leaders?
- How effectively do Army leaders demonstrate core leader competencies and attributes?
- How effective are Army leaders at demonstrating principles of mission command?
- How do climate and situational factors affect leadership?
- How are leaders affecting trust in units and organizations?
- What is the impact of negative leadership behavior in the Army?

Leader Development
- How effective are Army leader development practices?
- How effective are Army leaders at supporting the development of subordinate leaders?
- How effective are personnel management practices for leader development?
- How effective are self-development activities for preparing leaders?
- How effective are Army institutional courses/schools for preparing leaders?

The 2014 CASAL was administered online in November and December 2014 and was accessible for three and one-half weeks. A total of 16,795 uniformed leaders in the active and reserve components, along with 6,469 Army civilians, responded to the survey. This strong participation in the CASAL provides an overall sampling error of approximately +/- 0.6%. This sampling error, together with the stratified random sampling method used, means that the CASAL respondents are representative of the Army population. Accumulated trends reported over the past ten years increase the clarity of interpretation. Thus, a high degree of confidence can be placed in the findings.

Within each sub-section, key findings are highlighted in text and summarized in call-out boxes. Trends are identified as reported for items asked in previous years of survey administration. Where applicable, CASAL findings are supplemented with results from other Army or DoD surveys that have assessed similar topic areas. For accuracy and simplicity, percentages are emphasized for active duty Army leaders. In many cases, findings are comparable between the active and reserve components, though exceptions are noted.
CASAL includes items that capture both quantitative (select choice) and qualitative (short answer) responses. Most multiple choice items ask participants to respond on a scale of 1-5, where 5 is the most favorable (e.g., very effective, strongly agree) and 1 is the least favorable (e.g., very ineffective, strongly disagree), with a neutral middle point (3). To ease the interpretation of results, the five point response categories are collapsed into three point scales. For example, responses of ‘5’ (strongly agree) and ‘4’ (agree) are collapsed and reported as the percentage of participants who “agree or strongly agree.” Thus, most charts in this report display the percentage of favorable, neutral and unfavorable responses for an item or rank group.

A useful rule of thumb in analyzing CASAL data is the two-thirds favorability threshold, whereby item results that receive two-thirds or more favorable response (e.g., 67% agreement or effectiveness) are considered positive. Items where favorable response falls below this threshold and/or receive 20% or more unfavorable response are considered areas for improvement. Similarly, a 6% difference in results between years is a useful guideline for identifying meaningful change over time. While these rules of thumb may be applied as general guidelines to data interpretation, each item warrants its own consideration. Several factors impact the interpretation of item favorability and change, including the sampling error for each sub-group, cohort and component being examined, and in some cases, variation in the way items are worded between years. Additional statistical analyses are performed to aid in the interpretation of the survey domains and to draw out higher level meaning across items.

Longitudinal Analysis

The 2014 CASAL is the third consecutive year to include longitudinal sampling as part of the data collection process. Since 2012, a subset of CASAL respondents has participated each year of the survey.¹ The purpose of examining longitudinal responses was twofold. First, longitudinal ratings provide an indication of stability of attitudes and opinions across three points in time, when controlling for respondent situational stability (e.g., remaining in the same unit or organization; reporting to the same immediate superior). Second, longitudinal data allow for examination of the levels of variance in item ratings between a longitudinal sample (within respondent variability) and a regular random sample (between respondent variability) of respondents. The longitudinal analyses aimed to determine the stability of CASAL results by comparing within respondent and between respondent trends. If the variability from the two

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⁠¹ A series of steps are taken each year to protect the confidentiality and anonymity of all CASAL respondents. The identities of CASAL respondents (i.e., name, e-mail address) are disassociated with individual survey responses prior to any data analyses are conducted.
types of respondent sampling is similar, greater confidence can be placed in the accuracy of trends derived from different respondents sampled each year.

A total of 2,447 longitudinal respondents completed the 2014 CASAL. These cases of data represent 36% of all longitudinal respondents that completed both the 2012\(^2\) and 2013 CASAL (n = 6,762). Ratings collected from these respondents were examined through multiple methods of analysis to answer two key questions: 1) Are respondent attitudes stable across three points in time? 2) How does response variability (i.e., range in respondents’ ratings) for longitudinal respondents compare to the response variability observed in the regular sample? A series of repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted to examine the stability of longitudinal responses across three points in time. In other words, these analyses examined whether longitudinal ratings, on average, were the same or different for the past three CASAL administrations. To examine the second question, a series of analyses were performed\(^3\) to compare the spread of ratings (frequency of unfavorable to favorable) provided by the longitudinal sample compared to the spread of ratings from the regular approach to random sampling across CASAL items.

Results of the repeated measures ANOVAs demonstrated that respondent attitudes remain stable across three points in time, when controlling for respondents’ situational stability. Specifically, longitudinal respondent attitudes toward characteristics of their unit/organization and their working environment show minimal fluctuation between 2012 and 2014. Similarly, respondents’ assessment of their immediate superior in demonstrating numerous indices of effective leadership also show consistency across the three years, when controlling for situational stability of the respondent (i.e., reporting to the same immediate superior for all three years). Analyses examining the similarity of the range of ratings between the longitudinal sample and the regular sample demonstrated minimal differences. These results indicate the spread of ratings on CASAL items is similar for both the longitudinal and regular samples.

The longitudinal analyses of CASAL data help confirm the accuracy of findings observed with the main (regular) sample. Findings indicate that CASAL respondent attitudes are generally stable. In addition, the variance observed in CASAL item ratings is similar for both regular and longitudinal samples. The longitudinal results corroborate the trends observed across recent CASAL administrations.

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\(^2\) Longitudinal sampling used an entirely random selection process in the first year (2012).

\(^3\) Levene’s test was utilized to examine homogeneity of variance between the longitudinal sample and the main (regular) sample.
1. Quality of Leadership

This section discusses several perspectives of leadership performance and quality. The 2014 CASAL examined multiple indicators of leadership quality, including respondents’ assessments of others as leaders (i.e., their superiors, peers and subordinates); overall satisfaction with the quality of military and civilian leadership; specific, observable leadership attributes and behaviors described in Army doctrinal frameworks (ADRP 6-22); and assessment of leader effectiveness in building trust (ADRP 1 and 6-22) and in demonstrating principles of the mission command philosophy (ADP 6-0).

The current status and trends in morale and career satisfaction are examined, as well as leader intentions to remain in the Army. Trust is a characteristic of the working environment that affects leadership and impacts both organizational and subordinate outcomes. The prevalence and impact of counter-productive leadership behaviors are discussed. Finally, the frequency with which Army leaders use various methods to influence others is examined.

1.1 Perceptions of Leader Quality

Leader attitudes toward the quality of leadership in the Army continue to be positive. In 2014, a majority of AC leaders view their superiors (70%) and peers (76%) as effective leaders. Additionally, a larger percentage of leaders (79%) with supervisory responsibilities rate their subordinates as effective leaders. Also positive are the smaller percentages of leaders that rate their superiors (15%), peers (7%) and subordinates (6%) as ineffective leaders (see Figure 1).

The relative percentages of effective ratings and the trend of more critical upward assessments reflect patterns characteristic of these results across the years of survey administration. Since first assessed in 2005, no more than 9% of the combined ranks of leaders have rated their peers as ineffective leaders, and no more than 8% have rated their subordinates as ineffective leaders. Seventeen percent of company grade officers and 21% of Jr NCOs believe their superiors are ineffective or very ineffective as leaders, while 21% of all AC leaders are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the quality of military leadership in their current unit.

These results are useful as holistic and generalized assessments of the current quality of leadership in the Army. Assessments are relative to the respondent, and while one’s direct-report subordinates are usually a well-defined cohort, the leaders who constitute one’s peers and superiors are less well defined. Despite these limitations, the results are useful in gauging current attitudes about leadership quality. The consistent relative pattern of these results, with
only slight fluctuation over the past ten years, provides evidence that attitudes toward the quality of leadership across the Army are strongly positive.

**Figure 1. Effectiveness Ratings of Superiors, Peers, and Subordinates as Leaders, by Respondent Rank.**

At a more specific level, a majority of Army leaders hold favorable perceptions of the effectiveness of their immediate superior or supervisor as a leader. Additional discussions on Army leader performance across the doctrinal competencies and attributes and the effect these behaviors have on followers and mission accomplishment are presented in the following sections.

**Satisfaction with Army Leadership**

Since 2013, CASAL has included broad assessments of satisfaction with the quality of leadership in the Army. In 2014, 62% of AC leaders are satisfied or very satisfied with the quality of military leadership in their current unit or organization, while 21% are dissatisfied. Army civilian
managers and first line supervisors report similar levels of satisfaction (61%) and dissatisfaction (19%) with military leadership. Smaller percentages of both AC uniformed (55%) and civilian (59%) respondents are satisfied with the quality of the civilian leadership in their current organization. Dissatisfaction toward civilian leadership quality is found among one-fifth of uniformed (21%) and one-fourth of civilian (24%) respondents (see Table 2).

**Table 2. Satisfaction with the Quality of Military and Civilian Leadership in the Army.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASAL Respondents</th>
<th>Satisfaction with the Quality of Military Leadership in Current Unit/Organization</th>
<th>Satisfaction with the Quality of Civilian Leadership in Current Unit/Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Duty Uniformed</td>
<td>62% Satisfied (65%)</td>
<td>55% Satisfied (57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21% Dissatisfied (18%)</td>
<td>21% Dissatisfied (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Civilians (Managers and First Line Supervisors)</td>
<td>61% Satisfied (65%)</td>
<td>59% Satisfied (61%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19% Dissatisfied (17%)</td>
<td>24% Dissatisfied (20%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Results of the 2013 CASAL (percentages) are displayed in parentheses for comparison.

When active duty respondents are matched to Army civilian grades, comparisons provide a more accurate examination of leadership satisfaction. For example, active duty majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels correspond to Army civilian GS grades 13-15. Seventy-six percent of those field grade officers are satisfied with the quality of military leadership and 65% are satisfied with the quality of civilian leadership. Civilian leaders in grades GS 13-15 report the same levels of satisfaction as shown in Table 2.

These results reflect broad but useful indicators of Army leader attitudes toward the current quality of leadership. Compared to results of the 2013 CASAL, the reported levels of satisfaction with either type of leadership are lower for both uniformed (-2% to -3%) and civilian leader (-2% to -4%) respondents. A useful method for interpreting the decline in satisfaction toward the quality of leadership is by identifying relevant factors with the strongest associations. A series of analyses were performed to further understand the factors that significantly contribute to satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the quality of military and civilian leadership in Army units and organizations. Of particular interest was whether the same factors affect within-cohort ratings of satisfaction (e.g., AC leader satisfaction with military leadership)

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4 Levels of satisfaction with the quality of military and civilian leadership were asked of all CASAL respondents regardless of assignment type. Respondents were instructed to select the response option "No basis to assess" as appropriate in instances where their unit/organization did not consist of military or civilian leaders.
compared to cross-cohort ratings (e.g., AC leader satisfaction with civilian leadership). Multiple regression analyses\(^5\) were conducted to examine respondent attitudes toward several characteristics of their working environment, their current states (e.g., morale), and ratings for the effectiveness of superiors and peers as leaders.

Results indicate that about half of the factors examined explain a significant amount of variance in the ratings of satisfaction for both military and civilian leadership. The key factors that explain a significant amount of variance in leaders’ ratings of satisfaction were largely consistent across cohorts, and are presented in Table 3. As was found in the 2013 CASAL, the proportion of variance accounted for by the key factors was notably higher for within-cohort (i.e., AC respondents’ satisfaction with military leadership and civilian respondents’ satisfaction with civilian leadership) compared to cross-cohort satisfaction (i.e., AC respondents’ satisfaction with civilian leadership and civilian respondents’ satisfaction with military leadership). Respondents’ perception of the effectiveness of their superiors as leaders was the greatest contributor to their level of satisfaction with the quality of both military leadership and civilian leadership in their unit or organization. Other factors associated with satisfaction with civilian and military leadership include: respondents’ perception of the overall level of trust among unit members; the perceived quality of respondents’ peers as leaders; agreement that standards are upheld in the unit or organization; and respondents’ current level of morale.

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\(^5\) Multiple regression analyses were conducted using the stepwise method and examined the following variables to determine their impact on satisfaction with the quality of military and civilian leadership: agreement that respondent is proud to tell others they are a member of their unit; agreement that respondent is confident in the ability of unit/organization to perform its mission; agreement that members of unit/organization are committed to performing at a high level; agreement that members of unit/organization are allowed and encouraged to learn from honest mistakes; agreement that members of unit/organization work collaboratively to achieve results; agreement that standards are upheld; disagreement that discipline is a problem in the unit/organization; overall level of trust among unit members; specific levels of trust in subordinates, in peers, in immediate superior, and in superior two levels up; severity of stress from high workload; effectiveness of peers as leaders; effectiveness of superiors as leaders; respondent’s current level of morale; and respondent’s agreement that he/she is committed to team or immediate work group.
Table 3. Factors that Explain Significant Variance in Active Duty and Army Civilian Leader Satisfaction with the Quality of Military and Civilian Leadership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AC Uniformed Respondents</th>
<th>Army Civilian Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factors Impacting Satisfaction with Military Leadership</strong></td>
<td><strong>Factors Impacting Satisfaction with Civilian Leadership</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of superiors as leaders</td>
<td>Effectiveness of superiors as leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall level of trust among unit members</td>
<td>Agreement standards are upheld in unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit members empowered to make decisions</td>
<td>Effectiveness of peers as leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent’s level of morale</td>
<td>Respondent’s level of morale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of peers as leaders</td>
<td>Overall level of trust among unit members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement standards are upheld in unit</td>
<td>Trust in immediate superior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in superior two levels up</td>
<td>Trust in subordinates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of discipline problem in unit</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2 = .71, p &lt; .001$</td>
<td>$R^2 = .31, p &lt; .001$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.2 Indicators of Leadership Performance

The 2014 CASAL assessed indicators of Army leadership performance through the following areas:

- The Leadership Requirements Model
- Characteristics of Leader Effectiveness
- The Impact of Leadership on Organizational and Soldier Outcomes

The focus areas of this section address how effectively Army leaders are performing, including demonstration of doctrinal core leader competencies, leadership attributes and other behaviors.

1.2.1 The Leadership Requirements Model

CASAL serves as the benchmark in the Army for assessing leader effectiveness in demonstrating the doctrinal core leader competencies and attributes described in the Army Leadership Requirements Model (ADRP 6-22). Since 2009, CASAL has employed a consistent method of capturing upward ratings of survey respondents’ immediate superior or supervisor, a practice
that enables trend comparisons across years\textsuperscript{6}. The findings have consistently demonstrated that Army leaders reflect a relatively stable profile of strengths and developmental areas across the core leader competencies and leader attributes. Army leaders are consistently rated more favorably in demonstrating the range of leader attributes compared to the competencies.

**Core Leader Competencies**

Competencies provide a clear and consistent way of conveying expectations for Army leaders; apply across all levels of leader positions; and can be developed. As leaders progress throughout their careers, they continuously refine and increase their proficiency to perform the core leader competencies and learn to apply them to increasingly complex situations (ADRP 6-22).

Since 2009, results have demonstrated a three tier competency trend, an established pattern in the relative position of highest, lowest and ‘middle ground’ competencies. The highest rated competencies are *Gets Results*, *Prepares Self*, and *Stewards the Profession*, as more than three-fourths of Army leaders rate their immediate superior effective or very effective, while about 7% to 10% rate their superior ineffective (see Figure 2).

Six competencies constitute the ‘middle ground’ across the assessment profile. These include *Creates a Positive Environment*, *Leads by Example*, *Extends Influence beyond the Chain of Command*, *Communicates*, *Leads Others*, and *Builds Trust*. Favorable ratings for these competencies include 72% to 75% of leaders, while 11% to 14% are rated ineffective.

Assessments continue to show that leader effectiveness in developing their subordinates, captured in the core leader competency *Develops Others*, is the area where the most improvement is warranted. In 2014, 62% of AC leaders are rated effective in developing their subordinates. Since 2009, favorable ratings have fluctuated from a low of 59% effective to a high of 63% effective. Results have been consistent, in that about one in five leaders is rated ineffective in developing subordinates.

\textsuperscript{6} CASAL items ask respondents to assess their immediate superior, supervisor or first line leader on a range of behaviors, attributes and outcomes. The approach of capturing upward ratings is effective, as most Army leaders have an appropriate opportunity to observe and become familiar with the effectiveness of their immediate superior’s leadership behavior, attributes and outcomes. The assessments, confined to direct relationship between subordinate and superior, are more precise than a respondent’s global assessment of all superiors, peers or others, and avoids the bias inherent in self-ratings.
Overall, assessments of leader effectiveness in demonstrating the core leader competencies are fairly stable with a subtle trend of improvement since 2009 (see Figure 3). Extends Influence beyond the Chain of Command is the competency that shows the largest increase over the past six years (+6%).
Figure 3. Comparison of Leader Effectiveness in Demonstrating the Core Leader Competencies from 2009 to 2014.

Leader Attributes

The attributes represent the values and identity of Army leaders (character), how leaders are perceived by followers and others (presence), and the mental and social faculties that leaders apply when leading (intellect). CASAL results have consistently captured favorable assessments of Army leaders across the range of attributes, and overall, findings do not indicate there are widespread deficiencies. The CASAL's assessment of the leader attributes has evolved over the past several years, both to reflect changes to descriptions within the Leadership Requirements Model (ADRP 6-22) and to better reflect the underlying attribute being assessed. The attributes assessed in 2014 have been included in CASAL since 2012.

The most favorably rated leader attributes include demonstrating the Army Values, Confidence & Composure, Military & Professional Bearing, and Self-Discipline (see Figure 4). The two attributes that consistently rank at the bottom of the list are Interpersonal Tact and Innovation. Importantly, Army leaders are generally rated effective in demonstrating all of the leader attributes (76% to 87%). Between 5% and 12% of leaders rate their immediate superior
ineffective in demonstrating any of the leader attributes. Prior to 2013 the level of assessments of leader attributes were trending up, and since 2013 the levels have remained high and very stable (+/- 2%) (see Figure 5).

**Figure 4. Ratings of Immediate Superior Effectiveness in Demonstrating the Leader Attributes by Active Duty Leaders.**
The 2014 CASAL survey included additional coverage on two competencies and two attributes that warrant further attention due to their relative ranking (in their respective taxonomies). Leader effectiveness in behaviors related to Gets Results, Innovation and Interpersonal Tact are discussed below. Additionally, a closer examination of behaviors related to Develops Others is discussed in section 2.2 of this report.

**Gets Results**

Leaders are charged with influencing others to achieve the organization’s objectives. The core leader competency Gets Results encompasses the leadership behaviors and actions required to get the job done on time and to standard. Specific behaviors that are relevant to getting results include, but are not limited to: providing direction, guidance and clear priorities; guiding teams in what needs to be done and how; monitoring performance and providing feedback; removing work barriers; managing time and resources; and adapting to changing circumstances to achieve the mission.
As noted previously, assessments for leader effectiveness in *Getting Results* consistently place it among the two most favorable competencies rated by CASAL. In 2014, 82% of AC leaders rate their immediate superior effective or very effective at getting results to accomplish the mission successfully (7% rate them ineffective). When drilling down to specific actions of *Gets Results*, smaller percentages of leaders rate their immediate superior effective in providing sufficient guidance on how to accomplish tasks (73%), and in managing people and time to complete work efficiently (72%). Thirteen percent of leaders rate their superior ineffective in either behavior. Both behaviors are significantly related to *Gets Results* ($r = .71$ and $p < .001$).

The general pattern of decreased favorability for *Gets Results* at the behavioral level suggests that when rating at the competency level, respondents attend to the end result (e.g., the accomplishment of goals and objectives) rather than the behaviors necessary to effectively reach a favorable end result (e.g., providing guidance, managing people). However, these differences do not detract from the validity of the individual results, meaning that large percentages of leaders view their immediate superior effective in achieving goals or results while greater variance exists in the perceptions about superiors’ effectiveness in demonstrating specific behaviors contributing to the achievement of those goals or results.

**Innovation**

*Innovation* is marked by the ability to introduce something new when it is needed or when opportunities present themselves. Army leadership doctrine (ADRP 6-22) describes innovative leaders as inquisitive and adept problem solvers, who seize opportunities to think creatively and find new ways of doing things, often adapting to changing circumstances. *Innovation* should not be considered as an individual phenomenon, but rather stemming from the exchange of input between leaders and others. *Innovation* allows the Army to achieve its missions more efficiently through continuous improvement of processes and procedures.

In 2014, 76% of leaders rate their immediate superior effective at demonstrating *Innovation* (new ideas, creative thinking, and forward thinking) while 10% rate them ineffective. At a more specific behavior level, 72% of leaders rate their immediate superior effective at encouraging others to challenge conventional methods for accomplishing tasks (12% rate them ineffective). While positively related ($r = .77$, $p > .001$), the 4% difference in ratings of effectiveness reflects an important distinction between these two considerations. While more than three-fourths of leaders are viewed as effective at demonstrating *Innovation*, a slightly smaller percentage are viewed as effective at infusing or fostering the innovative process through communications with subordinates and others (i.e., encouraging others to challenge usual methods). The latter is an important behavior, as leadership doctrine describes the need to prevent complacency by
finding new ways to challenge subordinates with forward-looking approaches and ideas, and to reinforce team building by making everybody responsible for, and stakeholders in, the innovation process.

Interpersonal Tact

Interpersonal tact concerns leaders’ ability to productively interact with others. Leaders exemplify this attribute through understanding others’ points of view, accepting the diversity that exists in their sphere of influence, exercising self-control and demonstrating balance, stability and emotional intelligence. Overall, 77% of leaders perceive their immediate superior to be effective at demonstrating Interpersonal Tact (12% ineffective). The 2014 CASAL also assessed three behaviors associated with Interpersonal Tact:

- A large percentage of leaders (84%) rate their immediate superior effective at getting along with new people he/she just met (6% rate them ineffective).
- Three-fourths of leaders (76%) rate their immediate superior effective at demonstrating emotions (composure, urgency, concern) that are appropriate to the situation (10% rate them ineffective).
- 72% of leaders rate their immediate superior effective at recognizing the emotional states of others (13% rate them ineffective).

Leader ratings for each of these behaviors is positively related to ratings for Interpersonal Tact ($r = .72$ to $.73$, $p < .001$).

Taken together, these results indicate a majority of leaders are perceived as effectively displaying tact when getting along with new people, though smaller percentages are viewed as effective in demonstrating and recognizing emotional factors during interpersonal interactions. Despite relatively lower levels of effectiveness ratings, each of these behaviors exceeds the two-thirds threshold of favorability. Thus, these may be interpreted as potential areas for improvement in the Army, but results do not indicate they are systemic weak areas for leadership.

1.2.2 Characteristics of Leader Effectiveness

The 2014 CASAL assessed additional characteristics of leader performance beyond the doctrinal competencies and attributes. A majority of Army leaders are rated effective in demonstrating a range of leadership actions or skills (see Figure 6) that are bulleted items in ADRP 6-22 tables. Examples include fostering ethical climates, empowering subordinates, team building, recognizing how actions impact others, and organizational improvement.
A strong positive finding is that 82% of AC leaders rate their immediate superior effective at setting the standard for integrity and character, while only 8% rate them ineffective. As expected, leaders who are viewed as the standard bearers for integrity and character are also viewed as effectively Leading by Example ($r = .80$, $p < .001$).

**Figure 6. Army Leader Effectiveness in Demonstrating Various Behaviors.**

![Figure 6](image)

More than three-fourths of AC leaders rate their immediate superior effective at developing a quick understanding of complex situations (79%) and dealing with unfamiliar situations (77%). These behaviors are positively related to Mental Agility ($r = .79$ and $r = .77$, $p < .001$). Leaders demonstrate Mental Agility through flexibility of mind and when anticipating or adapting to uncertain or changing situations (Department of the Army, 2012b). CASAL assessments for each of these considerations have trended favorably (+2% to +3%) over the past three years.

Seventy-two percent of leaders rate their immediate superior effective at building effective teams, while 13% rate them ineffective. Team building is a leadership behavior that has shown a notable, positive and steady trend in recent years (from 64% effective in 2007-08, to 65-67%
in 2009-11, to 70% in 2012-13 and 72% in 2014). Building effective teams is positively related to Leading Others \(r = .82, p < .001\), Building Trust \(r = .82, p < .001\) and Creating a Positive Environment \(r = .80, p < .001\).

More than three-fourths of leaders (79%) rate their immediate superior effective at emphasizing organizational improvement, while 74% rate their superior effective at balancing subordinate needs with mission requirements. Finally, just over two-thirds of leaders (69%) are rated effective at taking action to help subordinates manage excessive workload demands, while 16% are rated ineffective. This leader behavior holds increasing importance to the Army, as the percentage of AC leaders reporting stress from a high workload as ‘a serious problem’ shows an increase (from a range of 18% to 21% between 2009 and 2013, to 23% in 2014).

**Relationship between the Leadership Requirements Model and Leader Effectiveness**

CASAL includes two single-item, global assessments of leader effectiveness. First, three-fourths of AC leaders (75%) agree or strongly agree with the statement ‘my immediate superior is an effective leader.’ Thirteen percent of leaders neither agree nor disagree, while 12% disagree or strongly disagree. Figure 7 displays the results of these ratings by the unit position\(^7\) of the immediate superior that was assessed. Favorable ratings tend to increase with the level of leadership at which the immediate superior (officer or NCO) serves.

Additionally, respondents provided a single judgment on the relative ranking of their immediate superior’s leadership abilities compared to other leaders at the same rank or in a similar position. The results of the characterizations of one’s immediate superior are generally favorable:

- ‘Best or among the best’ – 29%
- ‘A high performer’ – 37%
- “Middle of the road’ – 21%
- ‘A marginal performer’ – 8%
- ‘Worst or among the worst’ – 5%

The above pattern is similar to items assessing the effectiveness of superiors and satisfaction with the quality of military leadership. Implicit leadership theory (Eden & Leviatan, 1975; Yukl,

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\(^7\) The level of agreement for each unit position represents ratings by subordinates who assessed their current immediate superior in that position. Assessments were made by the CASAL sample of SGT through COL. This is notable, as the results for the squad/section leader position include assessments by subordinate Jr NCOs (SGT and SSG) but do not include assessments by junior enlisted Soldiers (E-1 to E-4) who represent the primary cohort of subordinates for this position.
2002) indicates followers’ perceptions of leaders can be impacted by follower’s own idea of what effective leadership is and how closely their leader’s behaviors and characteristics align to this image. Thus, these findings are positive for the Army, as large percentages of leaders indicate their immediate superior or supervisor is performing at a high level, while small percentages report their superior demonstrates ineffective leadership. In comparison to results from the past four years, the levels of favorable ratings for both of these indicators are very stable.

**Figure 7. Ratings for Effective Leadership by Position.**

The 10 competencies and 15 attributes assessed by CASAL were examined through the use of a stepwise multiple regression\(^8\) to identify which of the competencies and attributes best explain ratings of effective leadership. Five competencies and two attributes significantly explain 81% of the variance \((R^2 = .81, p < .001)\) in effectiveness ratings for one’s immediate superior:

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\(^8\) A stepwise multiple regression is an exploratory statistical approach to identify which variables provide the largest, singular contribution to the explanation of a dependent variable (i.e., ratings of effective leadership).
Leading Others, Building Trust, demonstrating Sound Judgment, Developing Others, Leading by Example, demonstrating Confidence and Composure, and Creating a Positive Environment are strongly associated with agreement that the superior is an effective leader. This means that these seven factors best differentiate levels of effective leadership. Ratings for leader effectiveness in demonstrating the other competencies and attributes, while favorable, explain less unique variance in ratings and are therefore less useful in differentiating levels of leadership effectiveness. These findings are consistent with those observed in 2012 and 2013.

Leadership research by Horey et al. (2007) observed that in comparison to leader behaviors, leader traits have less impact on leadership outcomes. This assertion has been supported by recent CASAL findings. Since 2012, multiple regression analyses utilizing composite scale scores for leader effectiveness have examined the impact of the competencies and attributes on indices of effective leadership. Results continue to indicate that the core leader competencies have a stronger impact on ratings of effective leadership (more than 2-to-1) compared to the impact of the leader attributes (see Table 4).

Table 4. Results of Multiple Regression Examining the Impact of Leader Competencies and Attributes on Indices of Effective Leadership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agreement Immediate Superior is an Effective Leader</th>
<th>How do you rate the leadership abilities of your Immediate Superior relative to other leaders at the same rank/position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core Leader Competency Composite Score</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Attribute Composite Score</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Summary</td>
<td>(R^2 = .80)</td>
<td>(R^2 = .70)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Standardized beta weight and \(R^2\) significant \(p < .001\) unless noted.

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9 The ten items that reflect behaviors associated with immediate superior effectiveness in demonstrating the core leader competencies were combined into a single scale composite variable. Values across the ten items were summed and then divided by ten to produce a single scale score with a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 5. Scale scores of ‘5’ indicate a respondent’s average rating across all ten items = 5 (highest rating that immediate superior demonstrates the competencies). A composite score was only generated for respondents who rated their immediate superior on all ten competency items. This same process was used to develop a single scale composite variable for the 15 items that assess the leader attributes.

10 A statistic called a standardized beta weight represents the specific impact each factor within the model has on the outcome measure. Standardized beta weights are similar to correlation coefficients in that they range from -1.0 to +1.0, with the size of the weight indicating the extent of impact and the direction (+ or -) of the relationship. The larger the standardized beta weight, the larger the impact scores for that variable have on the dependent variable.
1.2.3 The Impact of Leadership on Organizational and Soldier Outcomes

A majority of Army leaders are viewed as having a positive or very positive impact on their organizations and their subordinates (see Figure 8). More than two-thirds of AC leaders are rated as having a positive impact on cohesion and discipline in their units or teams. At the individual level, about three-fourths or more of leaders are viewed as positively affecting subordinate work quality, subordinate motivation, and subordinate commitment to the Army. Also positive is that no more than one in six leaders (16%) is rated as having a negative or very negative impact on any of these outcomes. The levels of favorable response for these indicators of leadership effectiveness have remained consistent for the past four years.

**Figure 8. Effects of Leadership on Organizational and Soldier Outcomes.**

As reported in previous CASAL studies, effective demonstration of the core leader competencies and leader attributes is significantly and positively related to organizational and Soldier outcomes that impact mission accomplishment. The strength of the relationship between the competencies and attributes and these outcomes continues to be uniformly high (see Tables 5 and 6). Leaders who effectively demonstrate the competencies and attributes are viewed as positively impacting the cohesion and discipline in their units. Similarly, there are positive effects on subordinate motivation, work quality, and commitment to the Army. Finally, there are positive relationships between a leaders’ effective demonstration of the
competencies and attributes and the level of trust subordinates’ have in that immediate superior, and their morale.

Table 5. Correlations between Effective Demonstration of the Leadership Competencies and Attributes on Organizational Outcomes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect of Leader Demonstration of Leadership Competencies &amp; Attributes on Organizational Outcomes (AC, n=4,906)</th>
<th>Core Leader Competencies</th>
<th>Leader Attributes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Unit or Team Cohesion</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Unit or Team Discipline</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All correlations significant $p < .001$ (2-tailed).

Table 6. Correlations between Effective Demonstration of the Leadership Competencies and Attributes on Soldier Outcomes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect of Leader Demonstration of Leadership Competencies &amp; Attributes on Subordinate/Soldier Outcomes (AC, n=7,738)</th>
<th>Core Leader Competencies</th>
<th>Leader Attributes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Subordinate’s Motivation</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Subordinate’s Work Quality</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Subordinate’s Commitment to the Army</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinate’s Level of Trust in Immediate Superior</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinate’s Current Level of Morale</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All correlations significant $p < .001$ (2-tailed).

1.3 The Effects of Climate and Situational Factors on Leadership

The quality of leadership in the Army is influenced by numerous climate and situational factors. CASAL assesses and tracks trends on factors such as morale, career satisfaction, and intentions to remain in the Army, and examines the relationships among these factors. Additionally, leader attitudes and perceptions about characteristics of the current working environment provide context for factors that affect leadership, duty performance and mission outcomes.

The 2014 CASAL examined three areas of focus related to unit climate, including trust within Army units and organizations; leader actions and operational environments supportive of the mission command philosophy; and continued examination of the prevalence and impact of negative leadership behaviors. Additionally, CASAL examined the frequency with which leaders use various methods to influence superiors, peers and subordinates.
1.3.1 Morale, Career Satisfaction and Career Intentions

Morale

Results of the 2014 CASAL show that 54% of AC leaders and 62% in the RC report high or very high morale (19% and 13% low or very low morale, respectively). Levels of morale reported by CASAL have remained generally stable since 2010. A consistent trend in CASAL results is that larger percentages of RC leaders report high or very high morale compared to AC leaders. Variation in the percentages of high or very high morale by rank group has also been consistent across the past several years. Levels of high morale tend to increase with rank and length of service; AC company grade officers and Jr NCOs report the largest percentages of low or very low morale (23% and 30%, respectively) (see Figures 9 and 10).

Figure 9. Current Levels of Morale Reported by Active Duty Leaders.

The following results reflect levels of morale by various demographic variables:

- At CONUS locations, 55% of AC leaders and 62% of RC leaders report high or very high morale, while 19% and 13% (respectively) report low or very low morale. This is consistent with the levels of high or very high morale reported by CASAL since 2010 (55% to 57% for AC leaders; 61% to 63% for RC leaders).
- Current levels of morale at OCONUS locations vary. The location with the largest percentage of respondents reporting high or very high morale continues to be Europe.
(56%), while the smallest percentages of high morale are reported in Korea (48%). Low morale is reported by 19% and 21% of respondents at these locations, respectively.

- Larger percentages of respondents in joint assignments (62%), TDA assignments (58%), and those currently assigned to a school or course as a student (62%) report high morale, compared to respondents in TOE assignments (52%).

**Figure 10. Current Levels of Morale Reported by Reserve Component Leaders.**

![Figure 10. Current Levels of Morale Reported by Reserve Component Leaders.](image)

**Career Satisfaction**

There is a positive relationship between leaders’ current level of morale and their career satisfaction in the Army ($r = .63, p < .001$). Morale represents leaders’ current affective reaction to the environment or job in which they operate. In contrast, career satisfaction represents a compilation of affective and other attitudes regarding characteristics spanning a leader’s career (Locke, 1976; Pinder, 1998). Levels of career satisfaction among Army leaders continue to be favorable. As expected, leaders with longer length of service (i.e., field grade officers, warrant officers, senior NCOs) tend to indicate higher levels of career satisfaction than do junior-level leaders (see Figure 11). Sixty-two percent of AC company grade officers and 58% of Jr NCOs are satisfied with their Army careers thus far, while more than one-fifth of leaders in these rank groups (21% and 23%, respectively) are dissatisfied. In comparison, more than two-thirds of RC leaders in all rank groups report satisfaction with their Army careers, including 73% of company grade officers and 67% of Jr NCOs (see Figure 12).
The percentage of leaders indicating satisfaction with their Army careers has gradually trended downward in recent years. In 2009, 82% of AC leaders and 84% of RC leaders were satisfied or very satisfied with their Army careers up to that point (2014 results reflect -8% and -4%, respectively). CASAL did not ask respondents to specifically identify reasons for their career
satisfaction or dissatisfaction. However, other indicators in CASAL provide insight into the leadership and leader development factors with the strongest associations. A stepwise multiple regression was conducted to examine the relative impact various factors have on leaders’ level of career satisfaction. This analytical approach examines an assortment of factors to identify those that significantly contribute to an outcome (i.e., career satisfaction). The model included a range of factors expected to impact career satisfaction as demonstrated in past CASAL results.

Results indicate that 8 out of 18 factors that were examined accounted for nearly half ($R^2 = .48$, $p < .001$) of the variance in AC leader ratings of career satisfaction. Of the factors examined, leaders’ current level of morale was the strongest overall contributor to understanding their current satisfaction with their career up to this point. Other factors found to help explain variance in career satisfaction include: attitudes regarding one’s assignment history and the assignment process; satisfaction with characteristics of one’s current job; effectiveness of one’s operational experiences in preparing them for increased leadership responsibility; the frequency in which respondents’ immediate superior takes time to talk about how to prepare for future assignments; whether the leader currently serves as a mentor; characteristics of leaders’ current unit; and the effectiveness of Army institutional courses or schools in preparing them for increased leadership responsibility. The remaining factors examined were not found to significantly explain the variation in leaders’ career satisfaction. These findings closely mirror results of the 2013 CASAL, as the same factors were found to have a significant contribution to ratings of career satisfaction.

Career Intentions

Since 2005, CASAL has reported on the career intentions of Army leaders. Overall, leader intentions to remain in the Army are fairly stable. One indicator of commitment to service is that 35% of AC leaders and 42% in the RC are currently eligible for retirement but choose to remain in service to the Army. In the AC, this includes 61% of field grade officers, 61% of senior

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11 Stepwise regression results only report factors that significantly contribute to the model, not all variables examined. For these analyses, the following factors were examined: job characteristics; unit characteristics; the overall level of trust among unit members; severity of stress from high workload within the unit; attitudes regarding assignment histories and the assignment process; effectiveness of operational experiences in preparing for leadership; effectiveness of self-development in preparing for leadership; effectiveness of institutional education in preparing for leadership; frequency of discussions with immediate superior about how work is going, improving job performance, and planning for future assignments; immediate superior effectiveness in demonstrating mission command principles; disagreement that immediate superior engages in negative leadership behaviors; agreement immediate superior is an effective leader; respondents’ current level of morale; whether the respondent currently has a mentor; whether the respondent currently serves as a mentor; and respondents’ supervisory status.
NCOs (Sr NCOs), and 48% of warrant officers. In the RC, this includes 63% of field grade officers, 60% of Sr NCOs and 57% of warrant officers. Of leaders in these cohorts who are not currently eligible to retire, 90% or more indicate they plan to stay until retirement eligible or beyond 20 years.

Intentions to remain in the Army are also strong among leaders with shorter length of service:

- Forty-three percent of AC company grade officers plan to stay in the Army until retirement or beyond, while nearly an equal percentage are undecided (40%).
- In comparison, almost three-fourths of RC company grade officers (73%) plan to stay until retirement, while one in five is undecided (21%).
- Two-thirds of AC Jr NCOs (68%) plan to stay while 20% are undecided. Most RC Jr NCOs (85%) intend to remain in the Army until retirement eligible or beyond 20 years.

These findings are consistent with levels reported in past CASAL studies. Current leader career intentions by component and rank group are presented in Figures 13 and 14.

The results of the 2013 Status of Forces Surveys (SOFS) also reflect favorable intentions of leaders to remain in the Army (Human Resources Strategic Assessment Program, 2013; 2014). Results of these surveys found:

- 77% of active duty officers and 66% of enlisted members indicated they are likely to stay on active duty (15% and 23%, respectively, unlikely to stay).
- 83% of officers and 71% of enlisted members in the reserve components indicated they are likely to stay in the National Guard or Army Reserve (10% and 17%, respectively, unlikely to stay).
Figure 13. Career Intentions of Active Duty Leaders Not Currently Eligible for Retirement.

![Chart showing career intentions of Active Duty Leaders Not Currently Eligible for Retirement (2014)]

- Probably/definitely plan to leave upon completion of obligation
- Undecided about staying in the Army beyond obligation or until retirement eligible
- Plan to stay to retirement or beyond 20 years

Figure 14. Career Intentions of Reserve Component Leaders Not Currently Eligible for Retirement.

![Chart showing career intentions of Reserve Component Leaders Not Currently Eligible for Retirement (2014)]

- Probably/definitely plan to leave upon completion of obligation
- Undecided about staying in the Army beyond obligation or until retirement eligible
- Plan to stay to retirement or beyond 20 years
The career intentions of active duty captains are of particular interest, as this cohort has historically shown the highest degree of uncertainty or indecision about their intentions to remain in the Army. The average length of service for AC captains assessed by the 2014 CASAL is 9 years. Results indicate that 55% of AC captains who are not currently eligible to retire intend to remain in the Army until retirement eligible or beyond 20 years. This is an increase of 5% compared to the 2012 CASAL, an increase of 10% since 2011, and is among the highest percentages observed in CASAL studies for this rank (see Figure 15). In 2000, the officer phase of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) found that 39% of AC captains planned to stay in the Army until retirement eligible, while 42% were undecided and 19% planned to leave (Fallesen et al., 2005). For the purpose of comparison, 2014 CASAL results indicate 86% of majors and 32% of first lieutenants currently intend to remain in the Army until retirement or beyond 20 years.

Figure 15. Career Intentions of Active Duty Captains from 2005-2014.

1.3.2 Characteristics of the Working Environment

Leader perceptions of the current operational environment (i.e., attitudes about job duties and the organization in which leaders perform their duties) provide context for understanding the quality of leadership in the Army and its impact on subordinate and organizational outcomes.
Findings from the 2014 CASAL provide several indications that leaders hold favorable perceptions about their assigned duties and the characteristics of the working environment (i.e., the people they work with and the degree in which standards are enforced). Stress from a high workload continues to be an issue for some leaders.

**Attitudes toward Assigned Duties**

Assessment of leader attitudes toward their assigned duties is important for several reasons. Research has demonstrated that attitudes about one’s job positively relate to motivation, job performance, job satisfaction and turnover (Campion & Berger, 1990; Hackman & Oldham, 1976; Muchinsky, 2003). Army leaders in both components continue to hold favorable attitudes toward the performance of their current duties (see Figure 16):

- 87% of AC leaders (91% RC) agree their assigned duties are important to the organization (7% and 5% disagree, respectively).
- 84% of AC leaders (86% RC) agree they know what is expected of them in their current position (8% and 7% disagree, respectively).
- 74% of AC leaders (80% RC) are satisfied or very satisfied with the freedom or latitude they have in the conduct of their duties (15% and 10% are dissatisfied, respectively).

**Figure 16. Active Duty Leader Attitudes toward Assigned Duties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader Attitudes toward Assigned Duties (AC, 2014)</th>
<th>Agreement or Satisfaction</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagreement or Dissatisfaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My assigned duties are important to my unit or organization</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I know what is expected of me in my current position</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with amount of freedom or latitude in conduct of duties</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel encouraged to come up with new and better ways of doing things</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel informed about decisions that affect my work responsibilities</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Additionally, about three-fourths of leaders (73% AC; 76% RC) agree they feel encouraged to come up with new and better ways of doing things. These attitudes reflect positive working conditions that foster innovative thought and action. Over two-thirds of leaders (69% AC; 72% RC) agree they feel informed of decisions that affect their work responsibilities, which is consistent with levels of agreement observed in 2013 but more favorable than prior years (66% in 2012; 51% in 2011; 54% in 2010). As with results from past years, favorable attitudes toward characteristics of assigned duties and working environments increase with rank and length of service.

**Characteristics of Units and Organizations**

Leaders also report favorable attitudes regarding several characteristics of the units and organizations in which they work. A majority of leaders in both components rate their unit/organization favorably on several indicators that reflect environments conducive to mission accomplishment (see Figure 17). Results of three of the most favorable unit indicators assessed by CASAL include:

- 94% of AC leaders (95% RC) agree they are committed to their team or immediate work group (3% and 2% disagree, respectively).
- 82% of AC leaders (79% RC) agree that if they were to report an ethical violation, senior leaders in their chain of command would take action to address it (8% and 10% disagree, respectively).
- 81% of AC leaders (83% RC) agree that members of their unit/organization collaborate effectively to achieve results (8% and 7% disagree, respectively).

A majority of leaders in both components also indicate agreement that members of their unit or organization are committed to performing at a high level (78% AC; 82% RC); that they are confident in the ability of their unit or organization to perform its mission (74% AC; 80% RC); and that they are proud to tell others that they are a member of their unit or organization (76% AC; 86% RC).

Additionally, CASAL assessed two unit characteristics that reflect climates conducive to learning and the mission command philosophy:

- 79% of AC leaders (85% RC) agree that members of their unit/organization are allowed and encouraged to learn from honest mistakes (9% and 7% disagree, respectively).
- 72% of AC leaders (78% RC) agree that members of their unit/organization are empowered to make decisions pertaining to the performance of their duties (14% and 10% disagree, respectively).
The levels of agreement for each of these characteristics of learning climates trended more favorably in 2014 compared to results from 2013 (+8% and +2%, respectively).

**Figure 17. Characteristics of the Current Working Environment in the Army.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Climate Indicators for Army Units and Organizations (AC, 2014)</th>
<th>0%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>40%</th>
<th>60%</th>
<th>80%</th>
<th>100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am committed to my team or immediate work group</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I were to report an ethical violation, senior leaders in my chain of command would take action to address it</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of my team/immediate work group collaborate effectively to achieve results</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of my unit/organization are allowed and encouraged to learn from honest mistakes</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of my unit/organization are committed to performing at a high level</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am proud to tell others that I am a member of my unit/organization</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am confident in the ability of my unit/organization to perform its mission</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In this unit/organization, standards are upheld</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of my unit/organization are empowered to make decisions pertaining to the performance of their duties</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagreement that unit/organization has a discipline problem</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Stress from High Workload**

Since 2009, the percentage of AC leaders reporting stress from a high workload as a serious problem has increased. In 2014, this includes 23% of AC leaders, while 60% rate stress as a moderate problem and 16% rate it as not a problem. In comparison, the percentage of AC leaders reporting workload stress as a serious problem has ranged from 18% to 21% over the past six years. This shift is also evident in the declining percentage of leaders rating stress from...
a high workload as ‘not a problem’ (from 29% in 2009, to 16% in 2014). Slightly smaller percentages of RC leaders report stress from a high workload as a serious problem (18%), though this percentage has also increased since 2009. A similar decline in the percentage indicating stress is ‘not a problem’ is observed for RC leaders, though it is less pronounced (from 32% in 2009, to 21% in 2014).

Results of the 2013 Status of Forces Surveys (SOFS) (Human Resources Strategic Assessment Program, 2013; 2014) serve as additional indicators for the current stress levels experienced by active duty and reserve component personnel. Results indicate 39% of active duty officers and 46% of enlisted members reported they were experiencing more stress than usual in their work life (17% reported less stress than usual). Similarly, 34% of officers and 29% of enlisted members in the reserve components reported they were experiencing more stress than usual in their work life (16% and 26%, respectively, reported less stress than usual).

Previous CASAL results have demonstrated that, of leaders who perceive stress from a high workload as a moderate to serious problem, about half also indicate the stress has had a moderate to great negative impact on their well-being, while slightly smaller percentages report the stress has affected their work quality (Riley, Hatfield, Freeman, Fallesen, & Gunther, 2014).

Unit leaders can respond to stress associated with high workloads by fostering a climate in which seeking help for stress-related issues is accepted and encouraged. In 2014, less than two-thirds of uniformed leaders (62% AC; 63% RC) agree that seeking help for stress-related problems is accepted and encouraged in their unit or organization (13% and 11% disagree, respectively). The level of agreement by leaders has remained stable in recent years, but is more favorable than levels observed between 2009 and 2011 (range of 55% to 59% agreement). Unit leaders can also respond to high workloads by taking action to mitigate or alleviate demands associated with subordinate stress. However, only two-thirds of leaders rate their immediate superior effective at taking action to help subordinates manage excessive workload demands (16% rate them ineffective).

As is evident in Table 7, AC junior-level leaders report the least favorable attitudes regarding their experience with workload stress:

- One-fourth or more of company grade officers (25%) and Jr NCOs (27%) report workload stress as a serious problem (14% and 15% report it is not a problem, respectively).
- Slightly more than half of company grade officers (55%) and Jr NCOs (56%) agree seeking help for stress-related issues is accepted and encouraged in their unit (19% and 15% disagree, respectively).
• Less than two-thirds of company grade officers (64%) and Jr NCOs (62%) rate their immediate superior effective at taking action to help subordinates manage excessive workload demands (21% rate them ineffective).

In comparison, field grade officers, warrant officers and Sr NCOs report slightly lower incidence of stress as a serious problem, and provide more favorable assessments of actions by their immediate superiors and level of acceptance within their units.

**Table 7. Indicators of Stress from High Workload in Units and Organizations.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of Workload Stress in Units and Organizations</th>
<th>Active Duty Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rating stress from a high workload as ‘a serious problem’ (6 or 7 on a 7-point scale)</td>
<td>SGT-SSG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement seeking help for stress-related problems (not limited to seeking help at work) is accepted and encouraged in unit/organization</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of immediate superior at taking action to help subordinates manage excessive workload demands</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Standards and Discipline**

Nearly three-fourths of leaders (72% AC; 75% RC) agree that standards are upheld in their unit or organization (e.g., professional bearing, adherence to regulations). Overall, this is a positive finding, as these results are consistent with those observed in 2013, and are more favorable than results from 2012 (+3%) and 2011 (+8%). Consistent with past findings, smaller percentages of Jr NCOs (60% AC; 66% RC) agree standards are upheld in their unit or organization, though the level of agreement for this rank group has also trended more favorably since 2011 (+11%).

There is a positive relationship between standards being upheld and a lack of discipline problems in units and organizations. In 2014, leaders who agree standards are upheld in their unit also more frequently disagree that there are discipline problems in their unit ($r = -.40$, $p < .001$). This statistical relationship is important, as it shows enforcement of standards is positively associated with favorable perceptions about the absence of discipline problems in units and organizations.

Fifty-nine percent of AC leaders disagree that a discipline problem exists in their unit or organization, while 24% agree a problem exists. Results for RC leaders are slightly more favorable, as 63% disagree their unit or organization has a discipline problem while 20% agree.
Overall, the percentage of leaders that indicate unit discipline problems exist are comparable to levels reported in 2011 and 2012 (+/- 1%, AC and RC); however, the observed level of agreement declined in 2013 (18% agree) but has trended back upward in 2014. Jr NCOs in both components (35% AC; 27% RC) report the highest levels of agreement that discipline problems exist, likely given their proximity and responsibility over junior enlisted personnel.

Important for interpreting the prevalence of unit discipline problems is consideration of the types of factors that are associated with the perceived problems. The 2013 CASAL captured comments from the subset of respondents that agreed discipline problems existed in their unit or organization. The most frequently cited issues regarding poor discipline related to poor application and enforcement of existing standards (e.g., relaxed environments, lack of accountability, inconsistent enforcement); ineffective leadership (e.g., leaders setting a poor example, self-focused, poor communication); unfavorable unit climate characteristics (e.g., low morale, lack of cohesion, lack of respect for others); and perceived hindrances to leader action (e.g., unable to appropriately correct conditions, lack of support from organization). Regarding the nature of the discipline issues, specific problem areas included a lack of adherence to customs, courtesies and professional bearing; infractions (e.g., drugs and alcohol, fighting, crime); laziness or a poor work ethic; Soldiers failing to meet physical fitness standards; and policy violations.

1.3.3 Mission Command

Mission command has emerged as a central tenet underpinning how the Army currently operates. It represents a philosophical shift that emphasizes the centrality of the commander and the decentralization of capability and authority in increasingly complex operational environments. Mission command promotes disciplined initiative and empowers leaders to adjust operations within their commander’s intent (Perkins, 2012). Army doctrine on mission command (ADP 6-0) describes the mission command philosophy as exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent, to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (Department of the Army, 2012a).

The 2013 CASAL was the first year to include assessment of Army leader effectiveness in demonstrating principles of the mission command philosophy and the extent current operational climates support mission command in practice. A goal has been to capture insights to support the Army’s understanding and movement toward Strategic End 1: All Army leaders understand and practice the mission command philosophy (Department of the Army, 2013d).
The six principles of the mission command philosophy, as outlined in ADP 6-0, are presented in Table 8.

Table 8. Principles of the Mission Command Philosophy and Associated CASAL items.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Command Principles</th>
<th>ADP 6-0</th>
<th>CASAL Item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust</td>
<td>Building effective teams</td>
<td>“How effective is your immediate superior at...”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create Shared Understanding</td>
<td>Creating a shared understanding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent</td>
<td>Determining a clear, concise purpose and desired end state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise Disciplined Initiative</td>
<td>Enables subordinates to determine how best to accomplish their work or tasks (Agreement item)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use Mission Orders</td>
<td>Communicating results to be attained rather than how results are to be achieved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept Prudent Risk</td>
<td>Accepting prudent risk to capitalize on opportunities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mission Command Doctrine**

One indication of Army leader awareness and understanding of the mission command philosophy is the level of familiarity leaders have with Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command*. Of specific interest are changes in the reported levels of awareness of this doctrine among Army leaders between the 2013 and 2014 CASAL.

Overall, about one in four AC leaders (25%) report they are very familiar with ADP 6-0, while just under half (46%) are somewhat familiar with it. An additional 15% have heard of the doctrine but are not familiar with it, while 13% are not familiar with it. Overall, 71% of AC leaders now report they are somewhat or very familiar with ADP 6-0, compared to 59% in 2013 (+12%). Four out of five field grade officers and Sr NCOs report being somewhat or very familiar with the doctrine. However, a positive finding is that since 2013, the cohorts that reflect the largest increases in reported familiarity with ADP 6-0 are warrant officers (+19%), company grade officers (+13%) and Jr NCOs (+12%). Variation by rank group is noted in the results presented in Table 9. For the purpose of comparison, 2013 CASAL results are presented in parentheses.

The reported awareness of mission command doctrine in the reserve components continues to lag slightly behind the active component; 16% of RC leaders report they are very familiar with
it, 42% are somewhat familiar with it, 19% have heard of it but are not very familiar with it, and about one-fifth (21%) are not familiar with it. The proportion of RC leaders that are somewhat or very familiar with ADP 6-0 has increased from 51% to 59% since 2013 (+8%).

Table 9. Active Duty Leader Familiarity with Mission Command Doctrine, ADP 6-0.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active Duty Leaders</th>
<th>Not familiar with ADP 6-0, Mission Command</th>
<th>Heard of ADP 6-0, but not very familiar with it</th>
<th>Somewhat familiar with ADP 6-0, Mission Command</th>
<th>Very familiar with ADP 6-0, Mission Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAJ-COL</td>
<td>9% (12%)</td>
<td>9% (11%)</td>
<td>41% (40%)</td>
<td>40% (37%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2LT-CPT</td>
<td>16% (21%)</td>
<td>15% (23%)</td>
<td>47% (39%)</td>
<td>23% (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO1-CW5</td>
<td>12% (23%)</td>
<td>15% (24%)</td>
<td>55% (40%)</td>
<td>17% (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC-CSM</td>
<td>7% (11%)</td>
<td>11% (17%)</td>
<td>48% (46%)</td>
<td>34% (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGT-SSG</td>
<td>19% (29%)</td>
<td>24% (28%)</td>
<td>44% (35%)</td>
<td>12% (8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Results of the 2013 CASAL are presented in parentheses.

Mission Command within Army Units and Organizations

Other indications of the current practice of mission command in the Army are demonstrated through leader attitudes about unit and organizational climate factors that are supportive of the mission command philosophy. Results show that a majority of AC leaders rate the following characteristics of climate favorably (results for RC leaders in parentheses):

- 83% indicate the level of trust among members of their unit or organization is moderate, high or very high (97% RC).12
- 74% are satisfied or very satisfied with the amount of freedom or latitude they have in the conduct of their duties (80% RC).
- 79% agree that members of their unit or organization are allowed and encouraged to learn from honest mistakes (85% RC).
- 72% agree members of their unit or organization are empowered to make decisions pertaining to the performance of their duties (78% RC).
- 73% feel encouraged to come up with new and better ways of doing things (76% RC).

Favorable attitudes tend to increase with rank and length of service (see Table 10). The findings for most of these indicators are consistent with results from the 2013 CASAL, with one notable exception. In 2014, the percentage of leaders agreeing that members of their unit or

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12 CASAL uses a trust scale with a midpoint of ‘moderate trust’ which is included in the percentage of favorable ratings (i.e., moderate, high, or very high trust). Results of a 2012 CASAL follow-up survey indicated that ratings of moderate trust levels can be interpreted positively. The survey found that leaders who indicated agreement or strong agreement that unit members trust one another also frequently reported the level of trust among unit members to be moderate, high or very high.
organization are allowed and encouraged to learn from honest mistakes has increased (+8%, AC and RC). This is a favorable finding, as units that foster environments for learning promote subordinate development and initiative, which might otherwise be hindered in zero-defect climates.

Table 10. Indicators of Mission Command in Units and Organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of Mission Command in Units and Organizations (% Favorable)</th>
<th>Active Duty Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SGT-SSG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate, High or Very High Trust Among Members of Unit/Organization</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with Amount of Freedom/Latitude in the Conduct of Duties</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement that Members of Unit/Organization are allowed to Learn from Honest Mistakes</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement that Members of Unit/Organization are Empowered to Make Decisions Pertaining to their Duties</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement respondent feels encouraged to come up with new and better ways of doing things</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several of these unit condition indicators continue to be low for junior-level leaders. Specifically, ratings are below a two-thirds favorability threshold for Jr NCO satisfaction with the freedom/latitude to conduct their duties (60% satisfied), empowerment to make decisions pertaining to their duties (60% agreement), and feeling encouraged to come up with new and better ways of doing things (64% agreement). These measures of empowerment and the fostering of innovation in units are rated unfavorably by about one in five Jr NCOs (22%, 21%, and 17%, respectively).

Company grade officer ratings for several of these indicators are at or slightly above a two-thirds favorability threshold. Results are consistent with findings reported by the Chief of Staff of the Army Leader Development Task Force (Department of the Army, 2013a), which found that junior officers did not believe that their higher headquarters allowed them to exercise disciplined initiative or take prudent risks to the same extent expressed by senior officers. The study noted that these differences are potentially due to junior officers having limited knowledge and experience operating in a mission command environment, or operating in environments not guided by these two principles of mission command.

As first reported in the 2013 CASAL, the attitudes of company grade officers and Jr NCOs about unit outcomes related to disciplined initiative show notable differences depending on type of
assignment in which they currently serve (see Figure 18). Namely, attitudes by junior leaders currently serving in TDA assignments are more favorable than those serving in TOE assignments. Ratings by Jr NCOs serving in TOE assignments are the lowest, and fall below the two-thirds threshold on most indicators.

**Figure 18. Junior Officer and NCO Ratings for Indicators of Disciplined Initiative by Assignment Type.**

Leader Demonstration of the Mission Command Philosophy

CASAL assessment of leader effectiveness includes behaviors reflecting the six principles of the mission command philosophy. A majority of AC leaders (72% to 79%) rate their immediate superior favorably (see Figure 19). At an overall level, these results are positive as ratings for each behavior exceed a two-thirds favorability threshold, and relatively small percentages of
leaders (9% to 13%) are rated ineffective on any individual behavior. These levels of effectiveness show no notable changes in comparison to results from 2013.

**Figure 19. Leader Behaviors Related to the Mission Command Philosophy**

A majority of leaders at all ranks are rated favorably in demonstrating six behaviors that comprise a composite scale score\(^{13}\) of mission command effectiveness (see Figures 20). Results of this analysis were first reported for the 2013 CASAL. The 2014 results are presented here and demonstrate the consistency in ratings spanning the two points in time. Perceptions of leader

\[^{13}\text{Six items that reflect behaviors associated with immediate superior effectiveness in demonstrating the mission command philosophy were combined into a single scale composite variable. The composite variable included the items presented in Figure 19. Values across these six items were summed and then divided by six to produce a single score with a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 5. Scale scores of ‘5’ indicate a respondent’s average rating across all six items = 5 (highest rating that immediate superior demonstrates mission command behaviors). A composite score was only generated for respondents who rated their immediate superior on all six items. A reliability analysis showed that this set of items demonstrates very strong internal consistency (α = .95). Reliability indices above .80 are generally considered acceptable for a measurement scale while values greater than .90 are considered very strong (Guion, 1998).}\]
effectiveness in demonstrating the mission command philosophy (as rated by subordinates) increase with rank and length of service, which is a consistent pattern observed across CASAL leader effectiveness ratings.

**Figure 20. Perceptions of Leader Effectiveness in Demonstrating the Mission Command Philosophy by Rank.**

The results of leader effectiveness in demonstrating mission command behaviors by key leadership positions also show consistency with the previously mentioned findings by rank (see Figure 21). Commanders at brigade and battalion levels are generally viewed strong in demonstrating all principles of the mission command philosophy. Mean score ratings for these commanders exceed the overall equivalent scores for colonels and lieutenant colonels. Ratings for leadership positions at the company level and below show less favorability than commanders and command sergeants major at battalion and brigade levels.
Figure 21. Perceptions of Leader Effectiveness in Demonstrating the Mission Command Philosophy by Position.

Positive demonstration of the mission command philosophy is significantly related to effective leadership. Leaders who rate their immediate superior favorably across the six behaviors reflecting the mission command philosophy also rate their immediate superior effective in demonstrating the core leader competencies ($r = .92, p < .001$) and leader attributes ($r = .90, p < .001$), and agree their immediate superior is an effective leader ($r = .88, p < .001$).

As expected, there is also a positive relationship between trust and leader effectiveness in demonstrating the principles of mission command. Leaders who rate their immediate superior favorably on the composite scale score for mission command also rate their superior favorably across a combination of trust building behaviors ($r = .87, p < .001$). Importantly, there is a similar positive relationship between mission command effectiveness and subordinate ratings for their immediate superior on the favorable end of a composite score for counter-productive leadership behavior (indicating low/no prevalence of negative behavior) ($r = .84, p < .001$).
Ratings for each individual core leader competency and attribute were examined to determine the strongest contributors\(^{14}\) to effective demonstration of mission command. Results indicated four competencies and four attributes explained 88% of the variance in ratings for effective mission command \((R^2 = .88, p < .001)\). Specifically, leader effectiveness in Building Trust, demonstrating Sound Judgment, Developing Others, demonstrating Mental Agility, Communicating, demonstrating Innovation, Creating a Positive Environment, and demonstrating Expertise in Primary Duties significantly contribute to perceptions that one’s immediate superior effectively demonstrates the principles of mission command.

Finally, results show that leader demonstration of the mission command philosophy is positively associated with favorable organizational and subordinate outcomes that impact mission accomplishment (see Tables 11 and 12). There are strong positive relationships between leader assessments of their immediate superior exhibiting the mission command philosophy and their superior’s impact on unit cohesion, unit discipline, getting results, and the level of trust among unit members. There are also positive relationships between leader behaviors and intended mission command outcomes including agreement that unit members are empowered to make decisions pertaining to the performance of their duties and allowed to learn from honest mistakes; trust in one’s immediate superior; satisfaction with the amount of freedom or latitude to perform duties; and subordinates feeling informed about decisions affecting their work responsibilities. Notably, there are stronger correlations between a superior’s demonstration of the mission command philosophy and effects on subordinates’ states and processes (e.g., cohesion and discipline, motivation, and trust in that leader) than on subordinate attitudes about broader characteristics of the unit (e.g., the level of trust among all unit members).

\(^{14}\) A stepwise multiple regression was conducted to determine which combination of individual competencies and attributes best explain scores on the mission command composite score. Stepwise regression is an exploratory technique to identify the variables or factors that have the strongest impact on a dependent variable (i.e., mission command composite score). Results from stepwise regression indicate only significant variables; nonsignificant variables are not included in the final model.
Table 11. Correlations of Leader Demonstration of Mission Command and Organizational Outcomes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship between Immediate Superior Demonstrating Principles of the Mission Command Philosophy and Unit or Organizational Outcomes</th>
<th>AC (n=5,563)</th>
<th>RC (n=5,593)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Unit or Team Cohesion</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Unit or Team Discipline</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate Superior effectiveness in getting results to accomplish the mission successfully</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived level of trust among members of unit/organization</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of unit are empowered to make decisions pertaining to the performance of their duties</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of unit are allowed and encouraged to learn from honest mistakes</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All correlations significant $p < .01$ (2-tailed).

Table 12. Correlations of Leader Demonstration of Mission Command and Subordinate outcomes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship between Immediate Superior Demonstrating Principles of the Mission Command Philosophy and Subordinate Outcomes</th>
<th>AC (n=5,563)</th>
<th>RC (n=5,593)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Subordinate Motivation</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Subordinate Work Quality</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Subordinate Commitment to the Army</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinate level of trust in Immediate superior</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinate level of morale</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinate feels informed of decisions affecting work responsibilities</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinate feels encouraged to come up with new/better ways of doing things</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinate satisfaction with freedom or latitude in conduct of duties</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All correlations significant $p < .01$ (2-tailed).

Brigade and Battalion Commander Perceptions of Subordinates

Brigade and battalion commanders continue to hold very favorable views toward the effectiveness of their subordinates to exercise disciplined initiative. Small percentages of AC brigade and battalion commanders rate their subordinates ineffective at taking action in the absence of orders, either when existing orders no longer fit a situation or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise (see Figure 22). Ratings for subordinate effectiveness by reserve component commanders at these levels are equally favorable, and results for both components are consistent with those reported in 2013.
More than two-thirds of AC commanders at brigade (74%) and battalion (65%) levels rate their staffs effective at distilling information related to warfighting functions that allow the commander to visualize, direct and command. Twelve percent of AC brigade commanders and 13% of battalion commanders rate their staff ineffective in this regard. Larger percentages of RC commanders at brigade (85%) and battalion (72%) levels view their staffs as effective at distilling information. Ratings for staff effectiveness by commanders in both components are less favorable than results reported in 2013 (AC, -10%; RC, -6%).

Figure 22. Commander Perceptions of Subordinate Effectiveness in Supporting Mission Command.

Summary of Findings on Mission Command

Leader demonstration of the mission command philosophy is strongly associated with effective leadership, specifically the core leader competencies and attributes, and trust building behavior. A majority of Army leaders effectively demonstrate a combination of behaviors supportive of the mission command philosophy and ratings of effectiveness increase with rank and length of service. Exercising mission command is positively related to favorable outcomes that affect followers and the organization.
Brigade and battalion commanders are rated very favorably in demonstrating the principles of mission command; in turn, these commanders view their staff and subordinates as effective in exercising disciplined initiative. Larger percentages of senior leaders view their unit climates and conditions as supportive of mission command outcomes than do leaders at lower levels, particularly with regard to job latitude and empowerment, and learning from honest mistakes. Jr NCOs continue to hold the least favorable perceptions about these factors as they relate to their working environments. While the percentage of leaders reporting familiarity with mission command doctrine has increased, attitudes regarding unit climates and the practice of mission command have remained fairly steady since 2013. Continued focus is needed in improving leader and follower understanding and practice of the mission command philosophy.

1.3.4 Trust

Results of the 2014 CASAL support the Army’s understanding of trust within units and organizations, perceptions of leader effectiveness in building trust, and related outcomes.

The following points summarize the key findings related to trust in the Army:

- At a broad level, 83% of AC leaders indicate a favorable level of trust currently exists among members of their unit or organization (50% report high or very high trust, 33% report moderate trust); 17% indicate trust among unit members is low or very low. Results are slightly more favorable than levels observed in 2013.

- At an individual level, two-thirds of AC leaders report having high or very high trust in their immediate superior, peers, and subordinates (overall no more than 12% of leaders report having low or very low trust in these cohorts). Smaller percentages of leaders (58%) report having high or very high trust in their superior two levels up (19% report low or very low trust).

- Seventy-two percent of leaders rate their immediate superior effective or very effective at building trust while 14% rate them ineffective. A majority of leaders (71% to 83%) are also viewed favorably in demonstrating trust-related behaviors including showing trust in others’ abilities, following through on commitments, looking out for others’ welfare, and correcting conditions in units that hinder trust.

- Leaders who effectively build trust are viewed as positively impacting subordinate work quality, motivation and commitment, as well as unit or team cohesion and discipline.

- Subordinates hold high levels of trust in superiors that effectively Create a Positive Environment, demonstrate Sound Judgment, demonstrate Empathy, Lead by Example, Develop Others, live the Army Values, Communicate, and demonstrate Innovation.
addition to the competency Builds Trust, these competencies and attributes explain a significant amount of variance in ratings for a superior’s trustworthiness.

Leader Effectiveness in Building Trust

Leadership doctrine (ADRP 6-22) states that Army leaders build trust to facilitate relationships and encourage commitment among followers. This starts with respect among people and grows from both common experiences and shared understanding. Trust establishes conditions for effective influence and for creating a positive environment (Department of the Army, 2012b). In 2014, 72% of AC leaders (74% RC) rate their immediate superior effective or very effective at the competency Builds Trust, which is consistent with findings observed over the past four years (70%-73% effective). Also consistent is that larger percentages of senior-level leaders (i.e., field grade officers and Sr NCOs) rate their immediate superiors effective at building trust than do junior-level leaders (i.e., company grade officers and Jr NCOs) (see Figure 23).

Figure 23. Ratings for Immediate Superior’s Effectiveness in Building Trust by Rank Group.

The results of specific behaviors that comprise leader effectiveness in building and sustaining trust among others are presented in Figure 24. These indices include levels of agreement that one’s immediate superior demonstrates reciprocal trust; honors commitments to others; positively corrects unit conditions that hinder trust; looks out for subordinate welfare; and
refrains from displaying favoritism. At a broad level, the results for each of these behaviors are consistent with results observed in 2013 (within 1%).

Two behaviors with relatively lower favorable ratings warrant further consideration. First, 71% of AC leaders agree their immediate superior corrects conditions in the unit that hinder trust (14% disagree). Leaders build and sustain climates of trust by assessing factors or conditions that promote or hinder trust, and correct team members who undermine trust with their attitudes or actions (Department of the Army, 2012b). Results of the 2012 CASAL identified poor communication (or a lack of communication), discipline problems, and favoritism (e.g., inconsistent standards) as conditions that commonly exist in units where trust is low. Results also indicated that leaders who demonstrate effective leadership (i.e., character, leading by example, empathy and care for others) and uphold standards, enforce discipline, and hold others accountable to promote trust in environments where negative conditions may threaten it.

Figure 24. Indicators of Trust in Immediate Superiors by Active Duty Leaders.
Secondly, favoritism is a behavior that continues to rest below a two-thirds threshold of positive results as assessed by CASAL. One in five leaders (20%) agrees that their immediate superior demonstrates favoritism (63% disagree). Favoritism, preferential treatment, and inconsistent enforcement of standards are types of behaviors that hinder trust by creating climates of perceived inequality. As expected, the display of favoritism is negatively related to effective demonstration of the competency Creates a Positive Environment \( (r = -.42, p < .001) \). Company grade officers (22%) and Jr NCOs (26%) report the highest levels of agreement that their immediate superior displays favoritism. Results of the 2012 CASAL found that leaders often reference favoritism as reflecting ‘good ol boy’ systems or cliques within units and organizations. Examples of unit issues included promoting friends or ‘favorites’ in lieu of the most qualified personnel, unequal enforcement of standards and discipline, and use of discretion in workplace justice (Riley, Hatfield, Paddock, & Fallesen, 2013). Displaying favoritism can degrade a leader’s perceived trustworthiness.

**Trust and Effective Leadership**

A composite scale score\(^{15}\) was used to examine the relationships between trust-building behavior, effective leadership and important outcomes. A positive finding is that a majority of Army leaders continue to be rated favorably in demonstrating a combination of behaviors associated with building trust. Respondents who rate their immediate superior favorably across the six behaviors (the trust composite scale) also rate their superior effective in demonstrating the core leader competencies \( (r = .88, p < .001) \), the leader attributes \( (r = .85, p < .001) \), and indicate agreement that their immediate superior is an effective leader \( (r = .85, p < .001) \).

As demonstrated in past CASAL results, leaders who effectively build trust are also viewed as positively impacting their subordinates and their organizations. There are strong positive relationships between leader demonstration of trust-building behavior (i.e., the trust composite scale), positive effects on unit cohesion and unit discipline, getting results to accomplish the mission successfully, and overall assessments of the level of trust within units and organizations (see Table 13). Similarly, favorable assessments of one’s immediate superior in building trust are positively related with that superior’s impact on subordinate work quality, motivation, motivation,

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\(^{15}\) Six items that reflect behaviors associated with immediate superior effectiveness in demonstrating trust were combined into a single scale composite score. The composite variable included the items presented in Figure 24. Values across these six items were summed and then divided by six to produce a single score with a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 5. Scale scores of ‘5’ indicate a respondent’s average rating across all six items = 5 (highest rating that immediate superior demonstrates trust-building behaviors). A composite score was only generated for respondents who rated their immediate superior on all six items. A reliability analysis showed that this set of items demonstrates very strong internal consistency \( (\alpha = .91) \). Reliability indices above .80 are generally considered acceptable for a measurement scale while values greater than .90 are considered very strong (Guion, 1998).
commitment and morale (see Table 14). These findings continue to reflect the importance of vertical trust relationships in the Army, as leaders who are effective in building trust have a positive effect on their followers and on mission accomplishment.

**Table 13. Correlations of Leader Trust with Organizational Outcomes.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship between Immediate Superior Demonstrating Trust and the Effect on Unit or Organizational Outcomes</th>
<th>AC (n=5,698)</th>
<th>RC (n=5,646)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Unit or Team Cohesion</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Unit or Team Discipline</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate Superior effectiveness in getting results to accomplish the mission successfully</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current level of trust among members of unit/organization</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All correlations significant \( p < .01 \) (2-tailed).

**Table 14. Correlations of Leader Trust with Subordinate Outcomes.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship between Immediate Superior Demonstrating Trust and the Effect on Subordinate Outcomes</th>
<th>AC (n=5,698)</th>
<th>RC (n=5,646)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Subordinate Work Quality</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Subordinate Motivation</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Subordinate Commitment to the Army</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current level of morale</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All correlations significant \( p < .01 \) (2-tailed).

**Trust in Leaders**

Overall, 68% AC leaders (71% RC) report having high or very high trust in their immediate superior while 12% rate the trust as low or very low (11% RC). Subordinate ratings of trust in their immediate superior (by the superiors’ rank) are presented in Figure 25. A pattern observed in these results (similar to ratings of leadership effectiveness) is that favorable percentages increase with rank and length of service. The highest percentages of low or very low trust are for immediate superiors in the ranks of SFC (20%) and SSG (26%).

CASAL data are useful in helping to understand what leaders do (behaviors) that positively relate to followers having high levels of trust in their immediate superior. In comparison, 58% report high trust in their superior two levels up.

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16 The levels of vertical trust for each superior rank represent ratings by subordinates who assessed their current immediate superior. Assessments were made by the CASAL sample of SGT through COL. This is notable, as results for the ranks of SSG and SFC include assessments by subordinate Jr NCOs (SGT and SSG) but do not include assessments by junior enlisted Soldiers (E-1 to E-4) who represent the primary cohort of subordinates for these ranks.
of trust in those leaders. Trust in one’s immediate superior is significantly related to the extent the superior exhibits four leadership competencies and four attributes. Specifically, a leader’s effectiveness in Creating a Positive Environment, demonstrating Sound Judgment, demonstrating Empathy, Leading by Example, Developing Others, living the Army Values, Communicating, and demonstrating Innovation explain a significant amount of variance in the level of trust subordinates have in that leader ($R^2 = .80, p < .001$). These are characteristics that exemplify a leader’s trustworthiness (from subordinates’ standpoint), in addition to the leader’s effectiveness in Building Trust.

Figure 25. AC Leader Trust in Immediate Superiors by Rank.

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17 A stepwise multiple regression was conducted to identify the core leader competencies (excluding Builds Trust) and leader attributes that account for the largest percentage of variance in respondent ratings of trust in their immediate superior. The competency Builds Trust is significantly related to the Trust composite scale ($r = .88, p < .001$) and is included as an item that comprises the scale.
Results continue to indicate that vertical trust is less often ‘high or very high’ between leaders and their superior two levels up. Overall, 58% of AC leaders report having high trust in their superior two levels up; 23% report moderate trust and 19% report low trust. For officers and NCOs in traditional work settings, this relationship is assumed to be one of a leader and his/her senior rater. The 2013 CASAL reported the most common reasons leaders hold low or very low trust in their superior two levels higher relate to perceptions of several factors, including: self-interest or self-serving behaviors; character or integrity issues; lack of concern for subordinate welfare and development; communication issues; disconnected, absentee or apathetic leadership; and favoritism and partiality. Overall, these results further support the premise that leaders hold low levels of trust in superiors they perceive to demonstrate ineffective leadership (Riley et al., 2014).

**Trust in Army Units and Organizations**

In units and organizations, higher levels of trust relate to the upholding of standards, effective communication, confidence in unit capabilities, and higher cohesion. Perceptions of trust at the unit or organization level continue to be moderately favorable, as demonstrated by several positive indicators. As a broad measure of trust-related attitudes, 50% of AC leaders rate the trust among members of their unit or organization (inclusive of everyone) as high or very high, 33% rate it moderate and 17% rate it low. In the RC, 54% of leaders report high trust, 33% moderate trust, and 13% low trust. Overall, these results are slightly more favorable than results from 2013 (+4%); each rank group shows an increase in the percentage rating high or very high trust among unit members.

At a more proximal level, two-thirds of AC leaders report having high or very high trust in their peers (67%) and their subordinates (66%). Between 2% and 13% of AC rank groups report having low or very low trust in their peers and subordinates. These results are comparable to results of the 2013 CASAL (within 1%). Figure 26 displays results for the reported levels of trust AC leaders have in others.

The 2013 CASAL examined various conditions that promote trust within units and organizations (Riley et al., 2014). Specifically, factors positively associated with trust included unit members helping to protect others from physical and psychological harm, treating one another with respect, doing their share of the work, and delivering on what they say they will do. A favorable range of AC leaders (70% to 88%) agreed or strongly agreed that these conditions existed in their current unit/organization. The highest levels of disagreement were for unit members

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18 The 2014 CASAL did not collect information identifying respondents’ superior two levels up (e.g., rank, position).
doing their share of the work (12%) and delivering on what they say they will do (12%), which are levels that still reflect positive findings for the Army.

**Figure 26. Active Duty Leader Ratings of Trust in Subordinates, Peers, Immediate Superior, and Superiors Two Levels Higher.**

Trust among unit members is positively related to command climate and other characteristics of the working environment, including accountability (i.e., upholding standards and enforcing discipline), open and honest communication, social cohesion, cooperative performance and job latitude (see Table 15). Two characteristics that have strong positive relationships with high levels of trust in units relate to leader empowerment and a climate for learning. Specifically, trust is high in units where members are empowered to make decisions pertaining to the performance of their duties. This measure of job latitude reflects the intent of mission orders, whereby subordinates are provided with maximum freedom of action to determine how best to accomplish missions. Similarly, trust is high in units where honest mistakes and failure are underwritten as part of the learning process. In this way, units capitalize on the leader development and learning that occurs in the operational domain. Finally, a high level of trust among unit members is positively related to high morale, esprit de corps (i.e., pride in
identifying with one’s unit), and confidence in the unit’s ability to perform its mission. Units with low trust lack these characteristics.

**Table 15. Correlations of Perceived Organizational Trust with Various Outcomes.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship between Characteristics of Army Working Environments and the Perceived Level of Trust among Members of Units and Organizations</th>
<th>AC Leaders (n=8,209)</th>
<th>RC Leaders (n=7,596)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Characteristics of Army Working Environments</strong></td>
<td><strong>Perceived Level of Trust</strong></td>
<td><strong>Perceived Level of Trust</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of my unit/organization are empowered to make decisions pertaining to the performance of their duties. [Empowerment]</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent current level of morale</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In my unit or organization, standards are upheld (e.g., professional bearing, adherence to regulations) [Accountability]</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of my unit/organization are allowed and encouraged to learn from honest mistakes. [Learning Climate]</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am proud to tell others I am a member of my unit or organization. [Esprit de Corps]</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am confident in the ability of my unit/organization to perform its mission [Unit Efficacy]</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of my unit/organization are committed to performing at a high level. [Social Cohesion]</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel informed about decisions that affect my work responsibilities [Communication]</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent satisfaction with amount of freedom or latitude in the conduct of duties [Job Latitude]</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel encouraged to come up with new and better ways of doing things [Job Latitude]</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of my team or immediate work group collaborate effectively to achieve results. [Cooperative Performance]</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a discipline problem in my unit or organization [Accountability]</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td>-.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All correlations significant $p < .01$ (2-tailed).

**Summary of Findings on Trust in the Army**

CASAL findings confirm numerous linkages between high levels of trust, effective leadership and positive organizational and subordinate outcomes. A majority of leaders rate their immediate superior effective in trust-related behaviors such as showing trust in other’s abilities, following through on commitments, looking out for others’ welfare, and correcting conditions in units that hinder trust.
CASAL’s assessment of the perceived levels of trust among members of Army units and organizations shows a slight increase in comparison to 2013 results. Subordinates trust superiors who are effective at *Creating a Positive Environment*, demonstrating *Sound Judgment*, demonstrating *Empathy, Leading by Example, Developing Others*, living the *Army Values*, *Communicating*, and demonstrating *Innovation*. Leaders who build trust are perceived as positively impacting subordinate work quality, motivation, commitment and morale.

### 1.3.5 Counter-productive Leadership

The presence of counter-productive or negative leadership in the Army and its effects on Soldier and mission outcomes continues to be an important area of study and improvement. At the most detrimental level, counter-productive behaviors are manifested as toxic leadership, which is a combination of self-centered attitudes, motivations, and behaviors that have adverse effects on subordinates, the organization and mission performance. Toxic leaders hold an inflated sense of self-worth and a lack of concern for others and the climate of the organization. Toxic leaders tend to operate at the bottom of the continuum of commitment, using compliance-driven techniques that sometimes involve demeaning or threatening messages, where followers respond to the positional power of the leader to avoid negative consequences. A toxic leader can gain results in the short-term, but other important competencies that Army leaders must demonstrate are ignored. Effective leadership is characterized by encouragement and inspiration, while coercive techniques run counter to the Army’s leadership principles (Department of the Army, 2012b). The term counter-productive leadership replaces the term negative leadership in this year’s CASAL report to reflect emphasis on the outcome instead of the intent. The term counter-productive conveys that a given behavior or absence of a behavior will be counter to productive results and processes.

**Prevalence of Counter-productive Leadership Behaviors in the Army**

Since 2010, CASAL has assessed and tracked trends in the prevalence of counter-productive leadership behavior. Assessments are based on subordinate ratings of their immediate superior in demonstrating counter-productive behaviors that are associated with toxic leadership. While the term ‘toxic leadership’ has been popularized in the media in recent years, past CASAL studies have found that this term is not consistently interpreted in the Army. Therefore, the term ‘toxic leadership’ did not appear anywhere in the survey. Rather, assessments focused on observable behaviors that are known to be associated with counter-productive leadership. This method prevents respondents from making holistic assessments about their immediate superior that associate bad intentions with the observable behaviors.
The presence of counter-productive leadership behaviors in the Army remains limited. The reported occurrence of several negative behaviors shows no change from 2010 to 2014. Perceptions of counter-productive behaviors continue to be more prevalent among junior-level leaders and are less pronounced at senior levels. The proportion of leaders who indicate their immediate superior demonstrates any specific counter-productive behavior is one-fifth or less (see Table 16), and assessments have remained within this threshold for the past five years. Importantly, these behaviors alone do not constitute toxic leadership, but in combination represent counter-productive behaviors. The most commonly displayed counter-productive leadership behaviors are setting misplaced priorities that interfere with accomplishing goals and doing little to help teams be more cohesive.

**Table 16. Ratings of Immediate Superior Demonstration of Counter-productive Leadership Behaviors.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AC Leader Perceptions of their Immediate Superior’s Exhibition of Counter-productive Leadership Behaviors</th>
<th>% Agree/Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My immediate superior…</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sets misplaced priorities that interfere with accomplishing goals</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does little to help his/her team be more cohesive</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blames other people to save himself/herself embarrassment</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berates subordinates for small mistakes</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The prevalence of positive leadership behavior in the Army is a strong indication that the occurrence of counter-productive leadership remains limited. Results show that a majority of leaders engage in positive leadership behaviors related to ethical conduct, selfless service and communication that fosters teamwork:

- 86% of AC leaders agree their immediate superior upholds ethical standards (5% disagree)
- 81% of AC leaders agree their immediate superior puts the needs of the unit/organization and mission ahead of self (8% disagree)
- 74% of AC leaders agree their immediate superior promotes good communication among team members (11% disagree)
- As a broad assessment, 75% of AC leaders agree their immediate superior is an effective leader (12% disagree)
CASAL examines counter-productive leadership using a scaled composite score\(^{19}\) that includes assessments on a combination of leadership behaviors. Figure 27 displays the distribution of scores on the composite scale where most leaders fall across the continuum of values. Results show that small percentages of AC leaders rate their immediate superior as demonstrating most of the counter-productive leadership behaviors in the composite. The high frequency of scores at 5.00 is very encouraging, as it indicates strong disagreement that superiors are demonstrating counter-productive leadership behaviors. The average score of 3.00 serves as the neutral mid-point, indicating subordinates neither agree nor disagree that their superior demonstrates the behaviors, or are balanced between demonstrating some negative and some positive behaviors. A score of 2.00 or less for any leader on the composite score indicates that the counter-productive behaviors are more frequent than the productive ones. The median score was 4.00 with an interquartile range of 1.50. Less than four percent of the assessed leaders had a score of 2.00 or less. This rate holds for groups of company, battalion and brigade commanders, as well as first sergeants, battalion CSMs and brigade CSMs.

Ratings for each individual core leader competency and attribute were examined to identify the strongest contributors\(^{20}\) to leaders’ demonstration of positive leadership behaviors regarded as not toxic. Results indicated three competencies and six attributes accounted for 65% of the variance in ratings of the absence of counter-productive leadership behaviors (\(R^2 = .65, p < .001\)). Specifically, immediate superior’s effectiveness in Building Trust, demonstrating Self-discipline, demonstrating Sound Judgment, Creating a Positive Environment, Leading by Example, living the Army Values, demonstrating Stewardship of the Profession, demonstrating Empathy, and demonstrating Mental Agility significantly contributed to perceptions that one’s immediate superior does not demonstrate counter-productive leadership behaviors.

\(^{19}\) The eight items that reflect behaviors associated with counter-productive leadership were combined into a single scale composite variable. The four negative behavior items (i.e., presented in Table 16) were reverse coded so all eight items were scored in the same direction. Positive behaviors are represented by higher response values. After recoding responses, values across all eight items were summed and then divided by eight. This created a single scale composite score with a minimum value of 1 representing counter-productive leadership behaviors and a maximum value of 5 representing positive, productive leadership behaviors. A reliability analysis was conducted on the eight items and had strong internal consistency (\(\alpha = .91\)).

\(^{20}\) A stepwise multiple regression was conducted to identify the core leader competencies and leader attributes that account for the largest percentage of variance in respondent ratings of non-toxic (negative) leadership behaviors in their immediate superior.
Counter-productive Leadership by Rank and Position

A general pattern reflecting the prevalence of counter-productive leadership behaviors by rank remains consistent with past results. Average scores for senior-level officers (LTC, COL, GO) and sergeants major (SGM, CSM) indicate subordinates less often view these leaders as exhibiting a combination of behaviors associated with counter-productive leadership (see Figure 28). The lowest and least favorable average composite scores continue to be found among ratings for NCOs, particularly sergeants first class and staff sergeants.\textsuperscript{21} Again, this pattern of less favorable ratings for immediate superiors at lower ranks is a consistent pattern observed across CASAL results.

\textsuperscript{21} Composite score means for each unit position represent ratings by subordinates who assessed their current immediate superior in that position. Assessments were made by the CASAL sample of SGT through COL. This is notable, as the results for the superior rank of SSG and the position of squad/section leader include assessments by subordinate Jr NCOs (SGT and SSG) but do not include assessments by junior enlisted Soldiers (E-1 to E-4) who represent the primary cohort of subordinates for this rank and position.
Examination of counter-productive leadership behavior at key leadership positions shows consistency with the previously mentioned findings on rank (see Figure 29). Brigade and battalion commanders are generally viewed as demonstrating few negative leadership behaviors. Average scores for the command sergeants major at these levels are only slightly less favorable. Leaders at company level and below are rated slightly less favorably in terms of demonstrating a combination of counter-productive leadership behaviors. The lowest scores are reflected in ratings for NCOs in the positions of platoon sergeant and squad/section leader.
Impact of Counter-productive Leadership

CASAL results have consistently demonstrated that counter-productive leadership is associated with unfavorable subordinate and organizational outcomes. Specifically, there are strong positive relationships between a leader’s assessment of their immediate superior exhibiting positive leadership behavior (i.e., the favorable end of the composite score) and their assessment of their immediate superior’s effect on organizational outcomes such as those presented in Table 17. The presence of a combination of counter-productive leadership behaviors is associated with adverse effects on unit cohesion and discipline, and trust among members of units and organizations. Subordinates of counter-productive leaders show less agreement that they would be proud to tell others they are a member of the organization.
Leaders who demonstrate a combination of counter-productive behaviors have similar detrimental effects on subordinate outcomes (see Table 18), including adverse effects on work quality, motivation and commitment to the Army; subordinates also report lower levels of morale. Findings also indicate that subordinates hold low levels of trust in leaders who demonstrate counter-productive leadership behaviors. Further, the absence of counter-productive leadership behavior is positively associated with multiple indices of trust-building behavior \((r = .68\text{ to } .75)\), meaning leaders who demonstrate productive leadership are viewed favorably on behaviors such as looking out for subordinate welfare, correcting unit conditions that hinder trust, keeping his/her word and following through on commitments to others, and demonstrating trust in their subordinates.

**Table 17. Correlations of Counter-productive Leadership Behaviors with Organizational Outcomes.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship between the Extent of Immediate Superior Not Demonstrating Counter-productive Leadership Behaviors and the Effect on Unit or Organizational Outcomes</th>
<th>AC (n=5,786)</th>
<th>RC (n=5,795)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Unit or Team Cohesion</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Unit or Team Discipline</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current level of trust among members of unit/organization</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinate proud to tell others of membership of current unit</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All correlations significant \(p < .01\) (2-tailed).

**Table 18. Correlations of Counter-productive Leadership Behaviors with Subordinate Outcomes.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship between the Extent of Immediate Superior Not Demonstrating Counter-productive Leadership Behaviors and the Effect on Subordinate Outcomes</th>
<th>AC (n=5,786)</th>
<th>RC (n=5,795)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Subordinate Motivation</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Subordinate Work Quality</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect on Subordinate Commitment to the Army</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent level of trust in immediate superior</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent level of morale</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All correlations significant \(p < .01\) (2-tailed).

Finally, the absence of counter-productive leadership is positively associated with multiple indices of interpersonal developmental behaviors assessed by CASAL \((r = .64\text{ to } .68)\), including a leader’s effectiveness at developing subordinate leaders, assessing the developmental needs of subordinates, coaching subordinates to improve what they are capable of doing, providing appropriate developmental feedback, and creating or calling attention to leader development.
opportunities for subordinates. The implication for these findings is that toxic leaders either do not engage in developing their subordinates, or do not do it well.

**Summary of Findings on Counter-productive Leadership**

In summary, the prevalence of counter-productive leadership behaviors in the Army remains relatively unchanged since first assessed by CASAL in 2010. Smaller percentages of leaders (one-fifth or less) are viewed as demonstrating specific behaviors associated with counter-productive leadership, and the percentage of leaders demonstrating a combination of behaviors to the extent they would be considered ‘toxic’ continues to be below four percent. Results reinforce that leaders who engage in a combination of counter-productive behaviors have adverse effects on the motivation, commitment, and work quality of their subordinates as well as on unit cohesion and discipline. Subordinates report low levels of trust in leaders who they perceive to demonstrate counter-productive leadership.

**1.3.6 Influence**

The 2014 CASAL asked respondents to assess the frequency with which they use various methods to influence others (i.e., their superiors, peers, and those subordinate to them). Nine methods of influence are described in Army leadership doctrine, ADRP 6-22, and are presented in Table 19 (Department of the Army, 2012b).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pressure</td>
<td>Makes explicit demands to achieve compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimating</td>
<td>Emphasizes authority as the basis for a request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange</td>
<td>Makes an offer in trade for compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Appeals</td>
<td>Uses the basis of friendship or loyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>Commits personal assistance or resources to fulfill a request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational Persuasion</td>
<td>Applies evidence, logical arguments or explanations of relevance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprising</td>
<td>Explains why an action will provide a benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspirational Appeals</td>
<td>Creates enthusiasm by arousing strong commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Gets buy-in by having you take part</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ADRP 6-22 states “leaders can draw on a variety of methods to influence others and can use one or more methods to fit the specifics of any situation. These outcomes range from obtaining compliance to building commitment to achieve” results (Department of the Army, 2012b). Effective use of influence methods ultimately depends on a leader’s recognition of the outcome or side-effect of the influence (e.g., compliance or commitment) and the level of the
individual(s) being influenced (downward, upward or lateral). Compliance is appropriate for rare, immediate requirements and situations where there is not a great need for a subordinate to understand why a request occurs. Compliance-seeking influence focuses on meeting and accounting for task demands. Commitment reaches deeper to change attitudes, beliefs and behavior, and generally produces longer lasting and broader effects. Gaining commitment is useful when the aim is to create initiative and high esteem within others. Commitment grows from an individual’s desire to gain a sense of control and develop self-worth by contributing to the organization. Commitment-encouraging influence emphasizes empowerment and long-lasting trust.

The 2013 CASAL found that a majority of Army leaders are viewed effective in demonstrating the range of influence methods. Three-fourths of leaders rated their immediate superior effective in demonstrating rational persuasion, collaboration, apprising, legitimating and participating. Smaller percentages of leaders rated their superior effective in using exchange (65%) and inspirational appeals (69%). Overall, larger percentages of leaders use the preferred methods of influence to gain commitment as compared to compliance-gaining methods, which is a positive finding.

Use of Influence

Experts in leadership research (e.g., Yukl 2002; Yukl & Tracey, 1992) note that choosing the appropriate influence strategy or strategies should be based on two key factors: the direction of influence (i.e., is the influencer trying to influence their subordinates, peers or supervisors) and the objective of the influence attempt (i.e., is the outcome of the influence easy to obtain with little cost to either the agent or the recipient of influence, or is the outcome costly and challenging to the recipient). Yukl, Falbe, & Young (1993) further found that the sequence and ordering of influence attempts can have an effect on the likelihood of success. Leaders who utilize the appropriate strategies or sequence of strategies based on the two conditions (i.e., the target of the influence strategy and the desired outcome) will have greater likelihood of influencing others to meet their end goal.

The 2014 CASAL examined differences in the frequency with which leaders use methods of influence depending on the direction of the influence. Specifically, leaders were asked to rate the frequency with which they use various methods to influence their superiors, their peers, and those subordinate to them.22

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22 To minimize survey length, CASAL respondents were randomly assigned to one of three survey paths to respond to items regarding methods used to influence their superiors or their peers/colleagues or those subordinate to them.
Table 20 presents the percentages of leaders that report frequently or very frequently using each influence method by the direction of the influence, ordered from the most frequent to least frequently-used method. Overall, the largest percentages of leaders report frequently or very frequently using methods to gain commitment from others (64% to 76%), including collaboration, rational persuasion, apprising, inspirational appeals, and participation. Past research has found these five methods are most strongly linked to perceptions of effective leadership in the Army (Riley et al., 2014). In comparison, smaller percentages of leaders report frequently or very frequently using compliance-gaining methods (13% to 27%) including pressure, legitimating, exchange, and personal appeals. This observed pattern holds true regardless of the direction of the influence (i.e., with superiors, peers, or subordinates).

**Table 20. Active Duty Leader Frequency in Using Methods of Influence (% Frequently or Very Frequently).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence Method Used</th>
<th>Direction of Influence</th>
<th>Overall Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Superiors</td>
<td>Peers/Colleagues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational Persuasion</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprising</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspirational Appeals</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment Methods Average</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Appeals</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimating</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance Methods Average</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The frequency of usage of compliance-gaining methods shows little difference depending on the direction of influence. The five commitment methods, on the other hand, are used most frequently with subordinates (74%) and peers (73%), and least frequently with superiors (69%).

Table 21 displays the percentages of leaders by rank cohort that report using influence methods either frequently or very frequently regardless of the direction of influence. There are slight differences in the overall reported frequency of use for the methods of influence across the five rank cohorts. Examining usage of compliance versus commitment-gaining methods, the following observations are made:

- Larger percentages of Jr NCOs (24%) report using compliance-gaining methods than the average of all leaders (20%), while field grade officers (14%) report using compliance-
gaining methods less frequently than the average. The differences are especially pronounced in Jr NCO usage of *legitimating* (23% frequently or very frequently, compared to an average of 15%).

- The reverse is true for commitment methods, as field grade officers (79%) report using commitment-gaining methods more frequently than the average (72%), and Jr NCOs (64%) report using commitment-gaining methods less frequently than the average. The largest reported gap in frequency of usage is between field grade officer (83%) and Jr NCO (46%) use of *participation*.
- Company grade officers, warrant officers, and Sr NCOs tend to report using compliance and commitment methods with similar frequency to each other.
- Sr NCOs report the most frequent usage of *inspirational appeals* (79% frequently or very frequently, compared to the average of 71%).

**Table 21. Leader Use of Influence Methods by Rank Cohort.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence Method Used</th>
<th>Jr NCO</th>
<th>Sr NCO</th>
<th>Warrant Officer</th>
<th>Company Grade Officer</th>
<th>Field Grade Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rational Persuasion</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprising</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspirational Appeals</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment Methods Average</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Appeals</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimating</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance Methods Average</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Relationships between Influence, Trust and Effective Leadership**

Interestingly, the levels of trust leaders have in others (i.e., their superiors, peers, and subordinates) have minimal impact on the frequency with which leaders report using methods to influence those others. Table 22 displays the results of a canonical correlation analysis

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23 Three canonical correlations, based on the direction of influence, were conducted to examine the contribution leaders’ ratings of trust in each target cohort has on the frequency with which leaders’ use each influence method with the respective cohort. Canonical correlation analysis (CCA) is a statistical test to examine the relationship between multiple predictors (i.e., overall trust in unit and trust in specific cohort) on multiple outcome variables in a single analysis (i.e., reported frequency in using each influence method). Results from a CCA identify the overall
examining the impact leaders’ ratings of trust in others has on the frequency with which they report using each of the nine methods when influencing the respective cohort.

Results reflect a general pattern that leaders who hold higher levels of trust in others more often report frequently using commitment-gaining methods to influence those others. Specifically:

- Leaders reporting higher levels of trust in others more often report using participation, inspirational appeals, and rational persuasion to influence superiors, peers and subordinates.
- In instances where the level of trust in peers is low, leaders more often report frequently using the compliance-gaining methods of legitimating and exchange to influence their peers.
- In instances where trust is high in subordinates, leaders more often report frequently making personal appeals when influencing their subordinates.

**Table 22. Relationships between Level of Trust and Frequency of Using Influence Methods.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence Method Used</th>
<th>Direction of Influence and Level of Trust</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Superiors</td>
<td>Peers/Colleagues</td>
<td>Subordinates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>.05*</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational Persuasion</td>
<td>.08*</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td>.07*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprising</td>
<td>.07*</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspirational Appeals</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td>.07**</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimating</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.08**</td>
<td>-.06*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.06*</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Appeals</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Impact</td>
<td>$R^2 = .04, p &lt; .001$</td>
<td>$R^2 = .04, p &lt; .001$</td>
<td>$R^2 = .09, p &lt; .001$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant at the .01 level.
*Significant at the .05 level.

Leader perceptions regarding the effectiveness of their superiors, peers and subordinates as leaders also demonstrated a small impact on the frequency with which they report using various methods of influence. Leaders rating their superiors, peers and subordinates as contribution the set of predictors have on the set of outcome variables. In other words, the results indicate the amount of variance in the usage of all influence methods that is accounted for by leaders’ reported level of trust. In addition, CCA indicates the relative relationship each predictor (i.e., trust in peers) has on each of the outcome variables (i.e., frequency of using each specific influence method) – expressed as standardized beta weight.
effective leaders more often reported using commitment-gaining influence methods rather than compliance-gaining methods, although the strength of the relationships tends to be small (i.e., \( r_s = .05 \) to \( .18 \), \( p_s < .05 \)).

2. Quality of Leader Development

CASAL assesses and tracks trends in the quality of leader development in the Army. Essential findings on leader development are organized by the following topic areas:

- Army Leader Development
- Subordinate Development
- Leader Development Practices and Programs
- Personnel Management System
- Self-development
- Institutional Education

Key findings for each topic area provide an assessment of the current quality, effectiveness, role and level of support for leader development in the Army.

2.1 Army Leader Development

Leader development is a continuous and progressive process, and spans a leader’s entire career. The Army’s leader development model comprises training, education and experience gained through three mutually supporting domains: operational, self-development, and institutional. By design, a majority of leader development occurs in operational assignments and through self-development, as limited time is allotted for schoolhouse learning (Department of the Army, 2012c).

CASAL has assessed leader attitudes on the effectiveness and relative positive impact of the three leader development domains since 2008. The operational and self-development domains have consistently been rated more favorably than the institutional education domain. In recent years, CASAL results have shown a downward trend in favorable ratings for the effectiveness of self-development, first observed in 2011 for AC leaders and in 2012 for RC leaders (see Figure 30 and 31). Results of the 2014 CASAL indicate ratings are now trending more favorably. Closer examination shows that these changes at the component level are driven heavily by NCO ratings for self-development effectiveness.
Figure 30. AC Leader Ratings for the Army Leader Development Domains (2008-2014).

Figure 31. RC Leader Ratings for the Army Leader Development Domains (2008-2014).
Operational Experience

Operational experiences continue to be the favored and highest impact method for developing Army leaders, and these ratings show the least fluctuation across years. The developmental value of ‘learning by doing’ is reflected in the large percentage of leaders (at all levels and in both active and reserve components) who report operational work experiences as being effective or very effective in preparing them to assume new levels of leadership or responsibility. Favorable ratings by rank group generally run parallel over time (see Figure 32).

Figure 32. Ratings of Effectiveness for Operational Experience from 2008-2014.

Army leaders develop through operational experiences on an ongoing basis. The 2011 CASAL reported that large percentages of leaders report frequently or very frequently engaging in opportunities to lead others and to train on-the-job (Riley, Conrad, Hatfield, Keller-Glaze, & Fallesen, 2012). These practices are also consistently rated among the most favorable in terms of their ‘large’ or ‘great’ positive impact on leader development (81% and 83%, respectively, in 2014).
Self-Development

Self-development encompasses the planned, goal-oriented learning that reinforces and expands the depth and breadth of an individual’s knowledge base, self-awareness, and situational awareness to enhance professional competence and meet personal objectives (Department of the Army, 2012c). Self-development represents a continuous, life-long process that is used to supplement and enhance knowledge and skills Army leaders gain through their operational experiences and institutional education and training (Day, Harrison, & Halpin, 2009).

In recent years, CASAL has reported a shift in attitudes toward the effectiveness of self-development. A decline in the level of favorable attitudes was first observed in 2011. In years prior to 2012, more than three-fourths of leaders rated self-development effective. In 2012 and 2013, that proportion fell to only about two out of three leaders (see Figures 30 and 31). Results show that current attitudes toward self-development are trending upward, as closer to three-fourths of leaders in both components (74% AC and 72% RC) rate self-development effective. Despite the noted decline, no more than 10% of leaders (at the component level) have rated their self-development ineffective during this range of years.

**Figure 33. Ratings of Effectiveness for Self-Development from 2008-2014.**
Closer examination of these trends shows that (less favorable) ratings by NCOs have heavily influenced the overall trend (see Figure 33). From 2008 to 2010, more than three-fourths of Jr NCOs (79% - 83%) rated their self-development effective for preparing them for leadership. This decreased to a low of 54% in 2013 before improving to 64% in 2014. Favorable ratings by Sr NCOs also followed this pattern, from more than three-fourths favorable prior to 2012 to a low of 65% in 2013 and returning to 75% favorable in 2014. The observed decline in favorable ratings for officers and warrant officers has been more subtle, and ratings for these rank groups have remained at or near three-fourths favorability.

Despite the fluctuation in views on its effectiveness as a leader development domain, self-development has consistently been viewed by a majority of leaders as having a moderate to strong positive impact on their development. More than half of leaders (61%) indicate self-development has had a large or great positive impact on their development as a leader, while one-fourth (26%) rate the impact as moderate.

Institutional Education

As noted previously, CASAL has consistently reported that favorable attitudes toward the institutional education domain have lagged behind operational experiences and self-development. In 2014, 62% of active duty leaders rate institutional education effective or very effective in preparing them to assume new levels of leadership or responsibility, while 17% rate it ineffective. In comparison, 70% of RC leaders rate institutional education effective and 11% rate it ineffective. The trend line has fluctuated since 2008, but in recent years the proportion of favorable ratings has shown a slight increase, which is positive.

CASAL results have consistently shown that leader attitudes toward the effectiveness of institutional education increase with rank and length of service, and ratings by rank groups generally run parallel over time (see Figure 34). Notably, these results represent global assessments by respondents about the effectiveness of the institutional domain as a whole and do not reflect attitudes about specific schools or courses that leaders attend.

Other results show that nearly half of AC leaders (47%) rate resident course attendance as having a large or great positive impact on their development, while about 31% indicate the impact has been moderate. More than half of RC leaders (58%) rate the impact of resident course attendance as large or great and 27% rate it as moderate. Consistent with results reported in previous years, leaders favor the learning that occurs at resident courses over the non-resident learning that occurs through DL. About one-fourth of AC leaders (24%) rate Army-provided distributed learning (nonresident courses) as having a large or great impact, while
27% rate the impact as moderate. For RC leaders, 29% rate the impact of nonresident and DL courses as large or great, and 31% rate it as moderate.

**Figure 34. Ratings of Effectiveness for Institutional Education from 2008-2014.**

![Figure 34. Ratings of Effectiveness for Institutional Education from 2008-2014.](image)

### 2.2 Subordinate Development

The practice of subordinate development (i.e., leaders’ abilities to develop others) has been consistently found to be an area for improvement in past CASAL surveys, and should continue to receive the Army’s attention and focus. Subordinate leader development requires a concerted effort in both enabling superiors to do it well and holding them accountable for this leadership responsibility. Further, given the frequent percentage of superiors who are rated ineffective or neutral, the role of every Army leader in their own development is elevated in importance.

**Unit Leader Development**

For perspective, two broad indicators of unit leader development demonstrate a need for effective subordinate development in the Army. First, 29% of AC leaders indicate that leaders in their unit or organization develop the leadership skills of their subordinates to a great or very
great extent, while 61% report it only occurs to a moderate extent. For the reserve component, 28% of leaders indicate subordinate development occurs to a great or very great extent, while 65% report it is moderate. Results for both components are consistent with past years.

Second, less than one-third of AC leaders (29%) rate formal leader development programs within their units (e.g., OPD/NCOPD, Sergeant’s Time) as having a large or great impact on their development, while a comparable percentage (31%) indicates the impact is moderate. Again, results for RC leaders are consistent with the AC, and findings for both components show no change in comparison to past years. While formal unit programs are important, these results suggest this practice is not occurring to a great extent and do not have a substantial impact on development. Thus, the Army requires committed and engaged leaders willing to focus on developing their subordinates.

Leader Effectiveness in Developing Others

The Army requires all of its leaders to develop subordinates into leaders for the next level. In developmental relationships, it is the leader’s responsibility to help subordinates learn. Leaders develop subordinates through assessing developmental needs; providing coaching, counseling and mentoring; creating challenging assignments in their jobs; and providing developmental feedback (ADRP 6-22).

The core leader competency Develops Others has consistently received the least favorable assessments across rank levels and positions. Less than two-thirds of leaders across the Army (62%) rate their immediate superior effective at developing their subordinates. Since 2009, the percentage of AC leaders rated effective or very effective in developing subordinates has ranged from 59% to 63% (about three in five) while the percentage of leaders rated ineffective has ranged from 18% to 21% (about one in five).

The 2014 CASAL included assessments of several doctrinal behaviors (ADRP 6-22) that comprise the competency Develops Others. About two-thirds of AC leaders are rated effective across these behaviors, while 18% or less are rated ineffective (see Figure 35). There are strong relationships between each of these behaviors and the competency Develops Others:

- Coaching subordinates to improve what they are capable of doing \( (r = .82, p < .001) \)
- Assessing the developmental needs of subordinates \( (r = .82, p < .001) \)
- Providing appropriate developmental feedback \( (r = .81, p < .001) \)
- Creating or calling attention to leader development opportunities \( (r = .78, p < .001) \)
The range of effectiveness ratings for the behaviors (65% to 68%) in comparison to the competency (62%) is interesting, in that leaders are rated less favorably at the competency level than at the behavior level. As noted with the similar analysis of Gets Results (see section 1.2.1), leaders may attend to an end result (e.g., a developed subordinate) when making assessments at the competency level, and perceive their immediate superior to be more (or less) effective in demonstrating individual developmental actions (e.g., assessing subordinate developmental needs; providing feedback) at the behavior level. These differences do not detract from the broader finding that leader effectiveness in Developing Others (and the related behaviors) ranks lower than the other core leader competencies and attributes and warrants further attention by the Army.

Figure 35. Ratings for Active Duty Leader Effectiveness in Developing Subordinates.
Subordinate Development Actions

The 2014 CASAL sought to understand the types of activities Army leaders engage in when developing their subordinates. An additional goal was to understand the types of activities that leaders perceive they are provided by their immediate superior, so that comparisons between these two conditions may be made.

CASAL respondents were first asked to describe the actions they have taken in the past year to develop the leadership skills of their subordinates. Similarly, at a later point in the survey, respondents were asked to describe the actions their immediate superior has taken in the past year to develop their (i.e., the respondent’s) leadership skills. Comments were analyzed using the same categories of themes to facilitate comparisons between these two viewpoints. Five broad categories of themes emerged from the comments and included: promoting continuous learning; providing learning/developmental opportunities; assessing performance and development; focusing on individual development; and exemplifying leader behaviors.

Promote continuous learning. This category of themes most frequently indicated leaders recommended, authorized, or allowed for their subordinate to attend training or education. This included allowing time for subordinates to attend residence courses and to complete distributed learning during work hours. Recommendations and referrals were also frequently mentioned and included recommendations for education and training through college courses or certifications, but also books and other developmental materials. Less frequently mentioned were instances of leaders directly providing training or teaching to enhance learning, including on-the-job training individually or instruction provided to a group or team. Other examples of training included participation in unit development programs such as OPD/NCOPD and Sergeants’ Time.

Provide learning/developmental opportunities. The comments within this category included themes related to leaders providing subordinates with learning conditions such as job latitude and opportunities to lead. Respondents mentioned providing subordinates the autonomy to make their own decisions and choose courses of action to solve their own issues. A second prevalent theme in this category included delegating tasks to subordinates and expanding their responsibilities outside of their normal duties. Less frequently mentioned were activities such as providing challenging or developmental assignments (including broadening), have subordinates participate in the decision making process and/or soliciting their input.

Assess performance and development. Within this category of themes, respondents frequently cited broad approaches to assessing and developing their subordinates such as developmental counseling, performance counseling, mentions of counseling that were nondescript about the
intended purpose, and formal evaluations (e.g., OER/NCOER). Counseling was often described as verbal and informal. Providing honest feedback and identifying strengths and weaknesses were also cited as methods used to develop subordinates.

**Focus on individual development.** Themes within this category reflect interpersonal methods of supporting or fostering subordinate development such as mentoring and encouraging subordinate goal-setting (e.g., IDP development), sharing advice and lessons learned, taking a personal interest in subordinates and making time to interact one-on-one.

**Exemplify leader behaviors and values.** These comments most prevalently emphasized developing subordinates through *Leading by Example*, but also through fostering teamwork and cohesion, communicating effectively, and providing encouragement, motivation and praise to subordinates.

Comments regarding actions that respondents had taken to develop subordinates resulted in the following categorizations:

- *Promoting continuous learning* was overwhelmingly the most often mentioned category of themes (mentioned by 3 out of 4 respondents).
- *Providing learning/developmental opportunities, assessing performance and development, and focusing on individual development* were categories of themes that received mention at nearly the same frequency (mentioned by roughly 1 out of 3 respondents).
- *Exemplifying leader behaviors* was the least prevalent category (mentioned by 1 out of 5 respondents).

In comparison, comments regarding actions that respondents’ immediate superior had taken resulted in the following categorizations:

- *Assessing performance and development, promoting continuous learning, providing learning/developmental opportunities, and focusing on individual development* were categories of themes that received mention at nearly the same frequency (mentioned by 1 out of 5 respondents)
- *Exemplify leader behaviors* was the least prevalent category in the comments (mentioned by 1 out of 10 respondents)
- *Lack of development occurring* – respondents comments indicated that their immediate superior provided them with ‘no’ development in the past year (mentioned by 3 out of 10 respondents). Additionally, a sparse number of comments indicated their immediate superior was ineffective, disengaged from developing others, unavailable, or had taken actions that affected the respondent in a negative way.
These findings support to two key conclusions. First, many leaders perceive development to be an activity that a subordinate is sent to or directed to do. Examples include leader recommendations, authorizations or referrals to resident and nonresident military education and training; online training (military or otherwise); education outside of the Army (e.g., college courses); and other materials a subordinate can work on independently (e.g., books, self-development). In relatively fewer instances, leaders report engaging in proactive methods to develop subordinates such as assigning challenging work or structuring subordinate duties. There are indications that many leaders still view ‘counseling’ as a primary method to develop subordinates.

Second, a larger proportion of leaders report they have engaged in proactive subordinate development than they give their immediate superior credit for doing. Respondents were much more likely to indicate they had not benefited from any development from their immediate superior in the past year. The disparity is not unexpected, and supports two assumptions: 1) leaders are biased in what they view as developmental activities and the frequency of occurrence (i.e., giving more credit to themselves than their immediate superior), and 2) leaders do not always recognize instances when they are being developed by their immediate superior.

**Formal and Informal Counseling**

Performance counseling continues to be rated relatively low in terms of its positive impact on development. In 2014, only one in three leaders from both components (33% AC; 36% RC) rate the developmental counseling received from their immediate superior as having a large or great impact on their development. Twenty-eight percent rate the impact as moderate while 39% indicate it has a small, very little or no positive impact (for RC leaders, 29% and 35%, respectively). These results align with trends observed in past years. Larger percentages of leaders rate informal learning from peers (75%) or superiors (64%), and on-the-job training (83%) as having a large or great impact on their development.

Nearly half of leaders (47% AC; 48% RC) agree the feedback they received during their last performance counseling was useful in helping them set performance goals for improvement. Larger percentages of AC company grade officers and Sr NCOs favor the counseling they receive compared to leaders in other rank groups. However, favorable attitudes regarding the
usefulness of counseling for setting goals for improvement have fluctuated since 2008 and show a decline in 2014 for all rank groups (see Figure 36).  

**Figure 36. Ratings of Usefulness for Performance Counseling Received (2008-2009, 2012-2014).**

Table 23 displays the frequency with which Army leaders report receiving formal or informal performance counseling in 2014. A persistent concern, reinforced by the stable trends of these results, is the percentage of AC leaders who indicate they ‘Never or almost never’ receive formal or informal counseling. The range includes one-sixth of AC company grade officers to one-fourth of AC warrant officers and Sr NCOs.

Also of concern is that only half of leaders (51% AC; 49% RC) characterize the frequency with which they currently receive formal or informal performance counseling as ‘about right’ while nearly half (46% AC; 47% RC) believe they receive counseling too infrequently or much too infrequently. The proportion of AC leaders indicating they receive counseling too infrequently includes 49% of company grade officers, warrant officers and Jr NCOs; 45% of field grade officers; and 39% of Sr NCOs. For RC leaders, counseling occurs too infrequently for 53% of field grade officers; 50% of company grade officers; 48% of warrant officers; 42% of Sr NCOs; and

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24 Item was not assessed in the 2010 or 2011 CASAL.
43% of Jr NCOs. Taken together, these results confirm there is currently an unmet need with regard to performance counseling in the Army, both for the frequency of the interaction and the usefulness of the feedback received by leaders in setting goals for improvement.

Table 23. Frequency at which Active Duty Leaders Report Receiving Formal or Informal Performance Counseling (2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How often do you receive formal or informal performance counseling? (2014 CASAL)</th>
<th>Active Duty Leaders</th>
<th>Monthly or More Often</th>
<th>Quarterly</th>
<th>Semi-Annually</th>
<th>At Rating Time</th>
<th>Never or Almost Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAJ-COL</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2LT-CPT</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO1-CW5</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC-CSM</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGT-SSG</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As identified in previous CASAL studies, less formal developmental interactions are more common than traditional counseling (Riley et al., 2014). These types of interactions include supervisor-subordinate discussions on job performance, performance improvement and preparing for future roles. Specifically, 2013 results showed that modest percentages of leaders agree or strongly agree their immediate superior takes the time to talk with them about how they are doing in their work (62%); how they could improve duty performance (53%); and what they should do to prepare for future assignments (47%).

To extend these findings, the 2014 CASAL examined the relative frequency with which these types of interactions occur between superiors and subordinates. Overall, AC leaders report that their immediate superior frequently or very frequently talks with them about the following:

- How they are doing in their work – 41% (50% rarely or occasionally; 10% never)
- How they could improve their duty performance – 25% (59% rarely or occasionally; 16% never)
- What to do to prepare for future assignments – 25% (52% rarely or occasionally; 23% never)

Results for RC leaders indicate comparable frequencies of interaction for each of these discussion areas. Figure 37 displays the frequency for these types of informal interactions and are presented by immediate superior rank group (e.g., 41% of AC leaders indicate their immediate superior, a field grade officer, frequently or very frequently talks with them about how they are doing in their work). Results at each rank level generally follow a consistent
pattern; work performance is most frequently discussed, followed by how to improve duty performance and what to do to prepare for future assignments.

**Figure 37. Frequency of Developmental Interactions between Superiors and Subordinates.**

Seeking Developmental Feedback

The 2013 CASAL also examined leader attitudes regarding the reasons why counseling does not occur when/as it should. The most prevalent opinions in the findings were that leaders are not held accountable when counseling does not occur; leaders do not have time; leaders do not demonstrate the knowledge or skills for proper counseling; leaders avoid situations that might lead to conflict; and counseling is not emphasized or valued by the chain of command (Riley et al., 2014).
As stated in ADP 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, individuals are responsible for their own professional growth (Department of the Army, 2012c). Thus, one method to address the lack of counseling occurring in superior-subordinate relationships is to emphasize that every Army leader (i.e., as a subordinate) should seek out or request developmental feedback from his/her superior and others to benefit their growth as a leader. The 2014 CASAL sought to gain new insight regarding the frequency with which leaders currently request developmental feedback from others. Overall results indicate nearly half of leaders frequently or very frequently seek developmental feedback from their peers (48% AC; 47% RC), while smaller percentages ask their immediate superior (40% AC; 40% RC), and those subordinate to them (35% AC; 36% RC). Small percentages of leaders indicate they frequently ask for developmental feedback from their superior two levels higher (12% AC; 13% RC). Results for rank group differences in the frequency in which leaders ask for developmental feedback are presented in Figure 38. Again, results generally follow a consistent pattern across rank groups.

*Figure 38. Frequency in which Active Duty Leaders Report Seeking Developmental Feedback From Others.*
Additionally, one-third of leaders (34% AC; 33% RC) report that they frequently or very frequently seek or ask for developmental feedback from others outside of their chain of command; 51% and 53%, respectively, do so rarely or occasionally. These leaders indicated they most often sought this feedback from their friends or acquaintances; former commanders, supervisors, colleagues and co-workers; mentors; and peers outside of the chain of command or Army.

**Mentoring**

The Army’s definition of mentoring describes a voluntary and developmental relationship that exists between a person of greater experience and a person of lesser experience, characterized by mutual trust and respect (Department of the Army, 2007). *Army Leadership* (ADRP 6-22) expounds on this definition by identifying general characteristics of a mentoring relationship. Namely, mentorship affects both personal and professional development; both individuals must be active participants; and contrary to common belief, mentoring is not limited to superior-subordinate relationships.

More than half of Army leaders (58% AC; 53% RC) indicate they currently receive mentoring from one or more mentors. For AC leaders, Sr NCOs (64%) most frequently report having a mentor, followed by warrant officers (58%), Jr NCOs (57%), company grade officers (57%) and field grade officers (56%). In the reserve component, company grade officers (60%) most frequently report receiving mentoring, while about half of Sr NCOs (52%), Jr NCOs (52%), field grade officers (51%) and warrant officers (50%) report having a mentor.

The following points summarize from whom leaders currently receive mentoring:

- About half of AC leaders (50%) indicate their primary mentor is a Soldier or Army civilian outside of their current unit or chain of command, while another 8% indicate their mentor is a person outside of the Army.
- Nearly an equal percentage of AC leaders report their mentor is their immediate superior or supervisor (21%), or another Soldier or Army civilian within their unit or chain of command (18%). One-fourth of AC company grade officers (24%) and 35% of Jr NCOs identify their immediate superior or supervisor as their primary mentor.
- In comparison, just over one-third of RC leaders (36%) identify their mentor as a Soldier or Army civilian outside of their unit or chain of command, while nearly one-third (32%) identify their immediate superior or supervisor as their primary mentor.
- One-fourth of RC leaders (25%) indicate their mentor is another member of their unit or organization, while 7% indicate it is a person outside of the Army.
Most AC leaders report frequent interaction with their current mentor, but there are notable differences by rank group and level. Overall, leaders at junior levels interact more frequently with their mentor(s) than do leaders at more senior levels.

- Nearly half of AC Jr NCOs (49%) interact with their mentor weekly or more often.
- About one-third of company grade officers (35%), warrant officers (33%) and Sr NCOs (29%) interact with their mentor weekly or more often.
- Mentoring interactions occur less frequently for AC field grade officers, as 54% report interacting with their mentor ‘monthly’ or ‘quarterly’, while 26% indicate it is less often than quarterly.
- In the reserve component, a majority of leaders (75%) report interacting with their mentor monthly or more often.

A majority of leaders (85% AC; 87% RC) characterize the frequency with which they receive mentoring from their current mentor as ‘about right.’ One in seven leaders in both components (14% AC; 12% RC) believe they interact with their mentor too infrequently. These results are consistent across rank groups. Further, Army leaders who receive mentoring generally view the relationship as beneficial and impactful on their development. Three-fourths of leaders (75% AC; 76% RC) indicate mentoring has had a large or great impact on their development as a leader, a finding consistent across rank groups (see Figure 39). No more than 7% of any rank group indicates mentoring has had a small, very little or no positive impact on their development. These findings provide strong indications that, for most leaders who receive mentoring, the need is currently being met with regard to the frequency of desired interaction and the impact on development.

The percentage of Army leaders who report having one or more mentors in the 2014 CASAL is higher than reported during the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) study conducted from 2000-2004 (Fallesen et al., 2005). During ATLDP, less than one-half of uniformed leaders (40%) reported having a mentor. Of those leaders, nearly two-thirds rated the mentoring they received as effective (61% to 69%). The study also found that over 80% of leaders agreed mentoring had a positive effect on their development, as more than three-fourths of officers agreed that mentoring is important for their personal and professional development. Most NCOs agreed mentoring was important for their development, and that NCO-to-NCO mentoring relationships were reported as being more beneficial compared to NCO-to-officer relationships.

Finally, the 2014 CASAL also found that just under two-thirds of uniformed leaders (62% AC; 63% RC) indicate they provide mentoring to one or more individuals. AC Sr NCOs (80%) are the rank group with the largest percentage providing mentoring, followed by field grade officers
(71%), warrant officers (66%) and Jr NCOs (63%). Notably, a smaller percentage of AC company grade officers (37%) indicate they mentor others. In the reserve component, a majority of Sr NCOs (76%), field grade officers (70%) and warrant officers (66%) provide mentoring, compared to smaller percentages of Jr NCOs (55%) and company grade officers (47%).

**Figure 39. The Level of Positive Impact that Mentoring has had on Active Duty Leaders (who Report having a Mentor).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subordinate Development across Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A series of analyses examined the interrelationships of various subordinate development methods. As a reference, 46% of AC leaders characterize the frequency with which they currently receive formal or informal performance feedback (counseling) as too infrequent or much too infrequent. Responses were examined to determine the extent with which these respondents (who report not receiving the desired amount of counseling from their immediate superior) compensate by actively seeking out other developmental relationships and performance feedback.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results indicate that respondents who report they are not receiving counseling at a desired frequency (‘too infrequent’) also report less frequently seeking out or asking for feedback from their immediate superior (compared to leaders who characterize the frequency of counseling received as ‘about right’). In short, in these instances where counseling is not being received, it is also not being requested. Notably, the frequency with which leaders receive formal or
informal performance feedback does not impact the frequency with which they seek out feedback from their peers or their superior two levels up (see Table 24).

Table 24. Comparisons between the Frequency of Counseling Received and Respondent Propensity to Seek Developmental Feedback from Others.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent seeks developmental feedback from:</th>
<th>Frequency with which respondents currently receive informal or formal performance counseling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Too infrequent’ or ‘Much too infrequent’ (n=3,169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate superior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely or Occasionally</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently or Very frequently</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely or Occasionally</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently or Very frequently</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior two levels up</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely or Occasionally</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently or Very frequently</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other results indicate that leaders who report they are not receiving formal or informal counseling at their desired frequency (i.e., ‘too infrequent’) do not tend to compensate by seeking out mentoring from one or more individuals. Over half of AC leaders (53%) who fall within the ‘too infrequent’ counseling group report they do not interact with one or more mentors (see Table 25). In comparison, 70% of AC leaders who characterize the frequency of their counseling as ‘about right’ report having one or more mentors. Also interesting is that of the respondents who report ‘too infrequent’ counseling and currently receive mentoring, more than half (60%) indicate their mentor is a person from outside of their unit or organization.

Results also indicate that the impact of not receiving the desired amount of counseling does not detrimentally impact a respondent’s perception of the effectiveness of other leader development methods. There is a weak relationship between respondents’ characterization of the frequency with which they receive counseling (i.e., ‘too infrequent’ = 0, and ‘about right’ = 1) and ratings of effectiveness for operational experiences \( (r = .23, p < .001) \), self-development \( (r = .11, p < .001) \), and Army institutional courses \( (r = .15, p < .001) \) in preparing them to assume new levels of leadership or responsibility.
Table 25. Comparisons between the Frequency of Counseling Received and Leader Participation in Mentoring Relationships.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent currently has a mentor</th>
<th>Frequency with which respondents currently receive informal or formal performance counseling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Too infrequent' or 'Much too infrequent' (n=3,213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>My current mentor is...</strong></td>
<td><strong>(n=1,504)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My immediate superior</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An individual inside of the unit (but not my immediate superior)</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An individual outside of my unit</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person outside of the Army</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3 Leader Development Practices and Programs

Since 2005, CASAL has reported on the relative contribution that various practices have had on leader development. In 2014, respondents rated a list of 15 developmental practices in terms of the positive impact each has had on their development as a leader. As findings on the positive impact of these practices are integrated into results discussions throughout this report, a brief overview and summary is provided here. Leader development practices are activities such as on-the-job training, opportunities to lead others, self-development, resident and nonresident course attendance, formal leader development from within one’s unit, and broadening experiences with outside organizations.

As reported in the findings for the 2011 CASAL, the frequency in which leaders engage in leader development practices varies. About half to two-thirds of AC leaders in 2011 reported frequently or very frequently engaging in opportunities to lead others (66%), learning from peers (66%), on-the-job training (58%), and self-development (49%). Smaller percentages of leaders reported frequently or very frequently learning from superiors (44%) or engaging in formal leader development programs within their unit (35%). Receiving developmental counseling from one’s immediate superior was reported to occur least often (26% frequently/very frequently, 55% rarely/occasionally) (Riley et al., 2012).

CASAL findings show a relatively stable rank ordering of leader development practices in terms of the positive impact each practice has on development. Findings are also generally consistent between the active and reserve components. 2014 results indicate the perceived positive
impact of leader development practices fall within three tiers, determined statistically through pair-wise comparison of means:

- **Highest impact** – practices include on-the-job training, opportunities to lead others, mentoring, and learning from peers. Notably, three of these practices are practices that the largest percentage of leaders reported engaging in frequently or very frequently.

- **Moderate impact** – practices include learning from superiors, self-development, broadening experiences, unit training activities/events, and resident (military) institutional education.

- **Lowest impact** – practices include developmental counseling from immediate superior, formal leader development programs within units, distributed learning (DL), and multisource 360 assessment feedback.

Results of AC leader ratings for the 2014 CASAL are presented in Figure 40. As noted, the trend in the relative ordering of these practices (lowest to highest impact) has remained generally consistent across years.

**Figure 40. The Impact of Various Practices on the Development of Active Duty Leaders.**
The Army 360/MSAF Program

The Army 360/MSAF, a program of record operated by the Center for Army Leadership (CAL), provides uniformed and civilian leaders a validated 360-degree approach to garnering feedback. Assessments from superiors, peers, and subordinates, can be compared to the leader’s self-assessment based on the Army Leadership Requirements Model (ADP 6-22). Major goals of the program are to increase leaders’ self-awareness of their abilities and to help them improve their leadership. The program features: individual and unit-level feedback reports; confidential and anonymous feedback from others; developmental resources available online (i.e., the Virtual Improvement Center); no cost to the unit or leader (other than time); and dedicated support staff. The program is complemented by a professional coaching component whereby MSAF participants interact with a coach (in person, via telephone, or via e-mail) to receive assistance in interpreting their feedback report; to create an individual leadership development plan (ILDP); and to receive suggestions on resources and activities for developing their leadership skills.

Overall, the percentage of AC leaders that report having been assessed through the MSAF program increased steadily from 45% in 2012 to 61% in 2014. Participation by RC leaders also increased, from 32% in 2012 to 52% in 2014. About 80% of officers have participated as an assessed leader within the previous 36 months, as well as 36% of AC NCOs and 25% of RC NCOs. Fifty-three percent of AC respondents (55% RC) rate the program effective for making them more aware of their strengths and developmental needs, which is a slight decline compared to results from 2013 (59% AC and 62% RC). NCOs who use MSAF continue to view it more favorably than officers, as 71% of Sr NCOs and 63% of Jr NCOs rate the program effective or very effective for increasing their self-awareness (compared to just under half of AC field grade officers, company grade officers, and warrant officers).

More than half of AC Sr NCOs and Jr NCOs (62% and 56%, respectively) rate the program effective for improving their leadership capabilities. In comparison, smaller percentages of AC field grade officers (32%), company grade officers (33%) and warrant officers (38%) rate the program effective for improving their leadership capabilities. Less than one-third of AC respondents (30%) rate the program effective for improving their unit or organization, while nearly one-third (32%) rate it neither effective nor ineffective. The level of favorable attitudes about the developmental value of MSAF shows a slight decline compared to results from the 2012 CASAL.

There are several potential factors that explain attitudes about the MSAF program. First, the imbalance in favorable ratings for the MSAF program between rank groups (i.e., NCOs and
officers) has been addressed in program evaluation research (Hinds & Freeman, 2014). Specifically, the study found that larger percentages of NCOs (42%) initiated an MSAF assessment for their own self-development (i.e., to increase their personal insight) while two-thirds or more of officers and warrant officers (66% and 74%, respectively) participated in MSAF to fulfill an OER requirement (i.e., box check for initiating an assessment). Previous program evaluation research by Freeman, Foster & Brittain (2012) noted that the OER requirement for MSAF was implemented to increase participation, though the mandate may have inadvertently spurred a culture of resistance to its value as a developmental tool. In response to participant feedback, program improvements have been made to include a shortened survey instrument (requiring less time to complete) and enhancements to the online portal.

Second, the decline in ratings for the perceived effectiveness of MSAF in improving the leadership capabilities of leaders and units is likely influenced by the degree to which respondents participate in the program. The online assessment and feedback component is designed primarily to collect feedback to increase self-awareness and to serve as a guide for development. The optimal impact of the process (i.e., improving leadership capabilities) is realized through the assessed leader’s actions that follow feedback receipt, such as requesting additional feedback from others, interacting with a coach, developing an ILDP, and self-initiated learning. The program evaluation by Hinds & Freeman (2014) reported that following feedback receipt, 70% of assessed leaders did not create an ILDP, and two out of three respondents reported devoting minimal effort to their development planning (40% spent less than five hours per month, and 24% reported spending no time on development planning). Moreover, the MSAF program’s Virtual Improvement Center (VIC) and coaching components continue to be underutilized resources, accessed or engaged by only 10% of MSAF participants. These later components of the MSAF program are valuable tools but require time, effort and commitment by leaders to ‘own’ the process of their personal development.

2.4 Personnel Management System

The 2014 CASAL addressed the effectiveness of Army personnel management systems through examination of leader attitudes regarding personnel evaluations and promotions, the developmental impact of assignments and the assignment process.

As a broad assessment, 46% of AC leaders (47% RC) rate the Army effective at supporting the development of individuals through personnel management practices (e.g., evaluations, promotions, assignments). Leaders with shorter length of service such as company grade officers and Jr NCOs tend to hold mixed views. One-third of AC company grade officers and Jr NCOs (34% and 35%, respectively) rate the Army ineffective in supporting the development of
individuals through personnel management practices. These results are consistent with CASAL results reported in prior years (Riley et al., 2013; Riley et al., 2014).

Evaluations and Promotions

Leader attitudes regarding the accuracy and fairness of personnel management actions continue to be mixed, and remain largely unchanged since 2012. In 2014:

- About half of leaders agree performance evaluations are accurate (52% AC; 55% RC), while more than one-fourth disagree (28% AC, 25% RC).
- Attitudes about promotion decisions show less favorability. Just over one-third of AC and RC leaders (38% and 37%, respectively) agree that the most capable personnel are promoted while almost an equal percentage (36% and 37%, respectively) disagrees. Disagreement is found among nearly half of Jr NCOs in both components (48% and 46%, respectively).

Results for AC leader attitudes about personnel management are presented in Figure 41.

Figure 41. Active Duty Leader Attitudes about the Personnel Management System.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Performance evaluations are accurate</td>
<td>28% U, 20% N, 52% F</td>
<td>29% U, 25% N, 46% F</td>
<td>36% U, 26% N, 38% F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assignment Practices

The assignment process is an important mechanism by which the Army can utilize leadership talent and deliberately develop leadership skills. Assignment decisions can be made to ensure
that leaders receive experiences through an appropriate mix of assignments and through serving in assignments for an adequate duration to prepare for future responsibilities. The officer assignment process is based on several factors and considerations, including the needs of the Army, force stabilization and availability, but also an officer’s professional development needs. As each branch and functional area has a life-cycle development model, an officer’s career needs are examined to ensure the next assignment is progressive, sequential and achieves professional development goals for that grade (Department of the Army, 2010).

CASAL assesses leader attitudes regarding assignment practices through four considerations: the mix of assignments to support development; the dwell time for key developmental assignments; and the degree of predictability and input into the selection of assignments. Figure 42 provides an overview of 2014 CASAL ratings for assignment practices. In general, AC leaders tend to agree they have served in an appropriate mix of assignments and for a sufficient amount of time in key developmental assignments. Assignment predictability and leader input into the selection of assignments are aspects of the process rated least favorably. At a broad level, these results are very consistent (+/-2%) with results reported in the 2013 CASAL (Riley et al., 2014).

Figure 42. Active Duty Leader Ratings for Assignment Histories.
As might be expected, favorable attitudes regarding the developmental nature of assignments tend to increase with rank and length of service. Leaders at more junior levels have served in fewer assignments and thus have fewer experiences on which to base favorable attitudes (i.e., sequencing, dwell time) than do leaders with more extensive assignment histories. As leaders progress in rank and experience in the Army, they are afforded more opportunities to reflect on their mix of assignments, time spent in assignments, and the developmental value of these experiences. As noted in previous CASAL reports, attitudes about the developmental nature of assignments are generally favorable:

- Among AC leaders with longer length of service, most agree they have had an appropriate mix of assignments to support their development. Agreement is generally high among field grade officers (81%), warrant officers (71%) and Sr NCOs (76%).
- Leaders with shorter length of service report lower levels of agreement about their mix of assignments in supporting their development. Agreement is found among 63% of company grade officers and 52% of Jr NCOs.
- Two-thirds or more of AC field grade officers (82%), warrant officers (72%), company grade officers (66%) and Sr NCOs (70%) agree the time spent in their most recent key developmental assignment was sufficient to prepare them for future assignments. In comparison, half of Jr NCOs (48%) agree they spent enough time in their most recent developmental assignment, while one in four (27%) disagrees.

Attitudes regarding assignment processes tend to be less favorable, and there are notable differences between rank groups:

- A majority of AC field grade officers agree they have had sufficient predictability and input into the selection of their assignments (74% and 76%, respectively), though for majors, one in five (21%) indicates insufficient predictability and one in four (24%) insufficient input.
- About half of company grade officers agree they have had sufficient predictability and input into their assignments (53% and 49%, respectively). Twenty-seven percent and 30%, respectively, indicate disagreement.
- Less than half of Sr NCOs (48%) and Jr NCOs (40%) agree they have had sufficient input into the selection of their assignments, while upwards of one-third (34% and 38%, respectively) disagree they have had enough input. Regarding assignment predictability, 54% of Sr NCOs and 40% of Jr NCOs agree their series of assignments were sufficiently predictable, while 28% and 30% (respectively) disagree.

Consider that for newer leaders, allowing input into assignment selection can especially enhance the leaders’ sense of control over their careers. Likewise, assignment predictability can
allow leaders to better plan and prepare for their next assignment(s), and may mitigate leaders’ stress associated with balancing commitments to family and work.

A multiple regression\textsuperscript{26} was conducted to examine the contribution of leaders’ attitudes regarding their assignment histories on their ratings of satisfaction with their careers up to this point. As expected, attitudes regarding assignment histories have a larger effect on career satisfaction for leaders with shorter lengths of service. Specifically, attitudes regarding assignment practices have a larger impact on career satisfaction at the 1LT and CPT level compared to the MAJ and LTC levels. Notably, all four assignment history considerations were found to be significant contributors to ratings of career satisfaction by captains. Across all rank levels, respondent agreement that the amount of time in his/her most recent key developmental assignment was sufficient to prepare for future assignments (i.e., assignment dwell time) was the largest contributing factor to ratings of career satisfaction.

Finally, further examination of leader attitudes regarding assignment practices found only minimal effects on leaders’ intention to remain in the Army. AC leader attitudes regarding assignment histories have a larger effect on ratings of career satisfaction ($R^2 = .26, p < .001$) than on intentions to remain in the Army ($R^2 = .08, p < .001$).

2.5 Self-Development

To reiterate an operational definition (AR 350-1), self-development encompasses the planned, goal-oriented learning that reinforces and expands the depth and breadth of an individual’s knowledge base, self-awareness, and situational awareness to enhance professional competence and meet personal objectives. Past CASAL results have indicated that Army leaders hold broad interpretations of what constitutes self-development (Riley et al., 2009; Keller-Glaze et al., 2010). CASAL results previously discussed in this report noted that a majority of leaders rate self-development effective for preparing them to assume new levels of leadership and responsibility. These attitudes toward the effectiveness of self-development are trending more favorably in 2014 after a sizeable decline observed in 2012 and 2013. One potential reason why ratings declined was the new and expanded requirements for self-development rolled-out during these years. This explanation is particularly relevant for the NCO Corps which introduced a program of Structured Self-Development (SSD) with levels aligned with professional military education and career progression objectives.

\textsuperscript{26} The enter method was used for a multiple regression that examined the overall contribution that attitudes regarding assignment practices have on ratings of career satisfaction. In addition, each of the four assignment-focused questions were examined to identify the unique contribution each item has on ratings of career satisfaction.
A hypothesis applied to other CASAL results is that the Army’s formalization of developmental tools (e.g., MSAF Program) into requirements may inadvertently spur resistance. In the case of self-development, the Army’s formalized Structured Self-Development may have influenced leader attitudes and concepts about self-development, with the shift in perceptions becoming evident in CASAL ratings. Prior to Structured Self-Development, leaders engaged in activities largely at their own discretion or with minimal guidance from the Army.

Types of Self-Development

The 2014 CASAL sought to identify new insights regarding the perceived relative impact of three types of self-development described in Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development* (Department of the Army, 2014). Table 26 displays descriptions of these three self-development types.

*Table 26. Types of Self-Development described in AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development (2014).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Self-Development</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structured Self-Development</td>
<td>Modules with specific learning objectives and requirements that are linked to and synchronized with classroom and on-the-job learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guided Self-Development</td>
<td>Recommended but optional learning that keeps individuals prepared for changing technical, functional and leadership responsibilities through their career</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Self-Development</td>
<td>Self-initiated learning to meet personal training, education and experiential goals (i.e., the individual defines the objective, pace and process)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In CASAL, leader assessments of structured self-development include, but do not uniquely pertain to NCO Structured Self-Development (i.e., SSD levels 1-4). The description of structured self-development provided in AR 350-1 does not distinguish this type of self-development as exclusively an NCO activity. Thus, CASAL ratings by officers and warrant officers are interpreted as comparable self-development activities that are aligned with classroom and on-the-job learning for their respective branch, functional area or assigned duties.

At a broad level, 61% of AC leaders (59% RC) indicate self-development activities have had a ‘large or great impact’ on their development, while 13% (both AC and RC) believe self-development has had a ‘small, very little, or no impact’ on their development. The results for
each type of self-development indicate that AC leaders tend to favor their own personal self-development (i.e., unstructured and un-prescribed) over the other two types. Differences in the perceived value of each type are reflected in the percentages of AC leaders rating each as having a ‘large or great’ impact:

- Personal self-development – 65% (26% moderate impact)
- Guided self-development – 33% (39% moderate impact)
- Structured self-development – 28% (33% moderate impact)

Overall, 39% of AC leaders rate structured self-development as having a ‘small, very little or no impact’ on their development (including 41% of Sr NCOs and 42% of Jr NCOs). The percentages of AC leaders selecting the low end of the impact scale also include 28% for guided self-development and 9% for personal self-development. Ratings by RC leaders for each self-development type closely approximate the AC results. As presented in Figure 43, the disparities in favorable ratings across the three types of self-development are evident by AC rank group.

Figure 43. The Impact of Different Types of Self-Development for AC Leaders.
Purposes for Self-Development

Army leaders engage in self-development for a variety of purposes. A 2008 study by the RAND Corporation found that over half of Army leaders had self-development plans to sustain critical skills they had already mastered, train for individual proficiency in areas requiring improvement, prepare for future duties or assignments, attend schools and courses, and gain exposure to new tactical or technical procedures (Schirmer et al., 2008).

2014 CASAL respondents were asked to indicate the purpose for which they had engaged in self-development during the past year. Results show that more than half of leaders engaged in self-development to develop new skills, to gain knowledge in new areas unrelated to their current duties, to maintain proficiencies in their job or specialty area, and to complete mandatory training (see Table 27). Smaller percentages of AC and RC leaders engaged in self-development to overcome shortcomings in their abilities, to meet promotion criteria, to move to another job, or to satisfy some other objective (e.g., obtain a college degree, self-improvement in general, prepare for life after the Army).

Table 27. Reported Purposes for Engaging in Self-Development by Component.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Active Component</th>
<th>Reserve Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To develop new skills</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To gain knowledge in a new area(s) unrelated to my current duties</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To maintain proficiency in my Branch/MOS/Job</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. To complete mandatory training</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. To overcome shortcomings in my abilities</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. To meet promotion criteria</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. To move to another job</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Other reason</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. I have not engaged in self-development in the past year</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In comparison to results of the 2009 CASAL (Keller-Glaze et al., 2010), slightly smaller percentages of AC respondents now report engaging in self-development to maintain proficiency in their jobs (-6%), to overcome shortcomings in their abilities (-7%) and to move to another job (-10%). A larger percentage of leaders now report they engage in self-development to complete mandatory training (+5%).27 The change in results for RC leaders between 2009 and 2014 mirror this same pattern (within 1% of AC differences).

27 From the list of purposes, items that show a 5% difference or more between 2009 and 2014 are described here.
Self-Development Activities

2014 CASAL respondents were also asked to indicate the types of self-development activities they had completed in the past year. Table 28 presents results for both components on the list of self-development activities leaders have engaged in.

Table 28. Reported Self-Development Activities Completed in the Past Year by Component.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-Development Activities CASAL Respondents have Completed in the Past Year (Rank Ordered by Frequency of AC Respondents)</th>
<th>Active Component</th>
<th>Reserve Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Professional reading</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Worked to develop or improve a skill (e.g., physical fitness, improved communication skills)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Networked or interacted with others (e.g., in person or through online forums, professional society membership)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Attended conferences, seminars, workshops, or professional meetings</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Took college courses or sought a college degree</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Completed continuing education courses</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Studied in a new area</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Sought or volunteered for operational experiences (e.g., duty assignments, leadership positions, deployments)</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Attended a resident professional military education course</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Completed Army-sponsored distance or distributed learning (e.g., nonresident courses, correspondence courses)</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Completed Structured Self-Development (SSD)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Learned a foreign language</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Other method</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. No self-development activities in the past year</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The most frequently selected activities (as selected by half or more of AC respondents) include professional reading; working to develop or improve a skill (e.g., physical fitness, improved communication skills); and networking or interacting with others (e.g., in person or through other means).

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28 CASAL assessed leader engagement in self-development through a list of 14 categories of activities. This refined list is based on the most prominent themes from open-ended comments provided by respondents in past years. The themes provide a useful method for organizing and capturing the information from respondents. However, the diversity of the activities in these options further demonstrates that leader conceptualizations of self-development do not universally align with the Army’s definition for this training domain (e.g., some respondents consider PME attendance to be their self-development).
• Other activities commonly selected (by 30% or more) include attending conferences, seminars, workshops or professional meetings; taking college courses or seeking a college degree; completing continuing education courses; studying in a new area; and seeking out operational experiences (e.g., duty assignments, leadership positions, deployments).

• Smaller percentages of respondents indicate they attended an Army-sponsored resident course, completed DL, completed Structured Self-Development (SSD), learned a foreign language, or engaged in other activities (e.g., online classes/training, certifications, other training).

The rank ordering of self-development activities by the frequency selected in 2014 mirrors the results from the 2009 CASAL (Keller-Glaze et al., 2010) with one exception: smaller percentages of leaders now indicate they have sought or volunteered for operational experiences (e.g., deployments) (-15%). Other trends (that do not affect the relative rank ordering of activities) show that smaller percentages of AC leaders now report they attended conferences, seminars, workshops or professional meetings (-10%); networked or interacted with others (-6%); and worked to develop or improve a skill (-5%). A larger percentage of leaders now report they completed continuing education courses (+7%) in the past year.29

Time and Other Factors Affecting Self-Development Engagement

About half of AC and RC leaders (51% and 53%, respectively) agree they have sufficient time for self-development in their current assignment, while nearly one-third disagrees (31% and 29%, respectively). Comparable levels of agreement and disagreement were found by the 2008 Leadership Assessment Survey (Riley et al., 2009).

A positive finding is that a majority of AC and RC leaders report they have engaged in some sort of self-development activity in the past year (only 4% report they have not). However, effective self-development requires a personal commitment to lifelong learning, and should be an active process for all Army leaders. While time available is one factor that affects engagement, other factors include leader self-awareness of strengths and developmental needs; knowing what to do or engage in; and a personal commitment to learning. Reliance on passive learning methods, lack of a (focused) personal self-development strategy, and an expectation that development is something provided by others (e.g., superiors, or the Army) are pitfalls to leaders’ capitalizing on effective self-development.

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29 For the list of activities for self-development, items that show a 5% difference or more between 2009 and 2014 are described here. Structured Self-Development (SSD) was not assessed as an activity in the 2009 CASAL.
2.6 Institutional Education

This section summarizes the quality of Army education, perceptions about the instructive process, and the effectiveness of education systems in preparing Army leaders.

Quality of Army Education

- 62% of active duty leaders and 70% in the reserve component rate institutional education as effective or very effective for preparing them to assume new levels of leadership or responsibility.
- The quality of Army courses and schools is generally viewed favorably. Overall, 75% of recent active component graduates rate the quality of the education received at their respective course as good or very good (79% effective for the reserve component). More than half of recent graduates found what they learned in the course to be ‘of considerable use’ or ‘extremely useful’ (see Tables 29 and 30).
- Course cadre continue to receive positive ratings, as 74% of recent graduates agree that course instructors, faculty and staff set an appropriate example by modeling doctrinal leadership competencies and attributes, and 69% agree instructors and faculty provided constructive feedback on student leadership capabilities.
- About half of recent graduates rate their respective course effective for improving their leadership capabilities; one in five rates their course ineffective in this regard.
- 61% of recent graduates agree the content of their course was relevant to their current job, while 21% disagree.

Table 29. Metrics and Trends for the Quality of Army Courses/Schools for Active Duty Leaders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of education received</td>
<td>75% Good or Very good</td>
<td>74% (+1%)</td>
<td>69% (+6%)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usefulness of what is learned</td>
<td>54% ‘Of considerable use’ or ‘Extremely useful’</td>
<td>52% (+2%)</td>
<td>47% (+7%)</td>
<td>52% (+2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course content relevant to next job</td>
<td>61% Agree or Strongly agree</td>
<td>59% (+2%)</td>
<td>54% (+7%)</td>
<td>52% (+9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course improved leadership capabilities</td>
<td>52% Effective or Very effective</td>
<td>49% (+3%)</td>
<td>47% (+5%)</td>
<td>48% (+4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 30. Metrics and Trends for the Quality of Army Courses/Schools for Reserve Component Leaders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of education received</td>
<td>79% Good or Very good</td>
<td>80% (-1%)</td>
<td>77% (+2%)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usefulness of what is learned</td>
<td>58% ‘Of considerable use’ or ‘Extremely useful’</td>
<td>59% (-1%)</td>
<td>56% (+2%)</td>
<td>61% (-3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course content relevant to next job</td>
<td>66% Agree or Strongly agree</td>
<td>64% (+2%)</td>
<td>63% (+3%)</td>
<td>61% (+5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course improved leadership capabilities</td>
<td>59% Effective or Very effective</td>
<td>58% (+1%)</td>
<td>59% (+0%)</td>
<td>60% (-1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Education Systems**

- Consistent with results of past CASAL, ratings for the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) B and Captains Career Course (CCC) show room for improvement in effectively improving learners’ leadership capabilities. Findings also suggest graduates continue to see opportunity to increase the degree of rigor or challenge presented in these courses, both to challenge learners to perform at a higher level and to separate high performers from low performing students.

- A majority of warrant officer course graduates rate the quality of the education they received as good or very good, and course cadre receive favorable ratings for modeling leadership competencies and attributes. However, warrant officer courses are not generally viewed by learners as effective for improving leadership capabilities.

- A consistent finding across CASAL administrations is that the Warrior Leader Course (WLC), Advanced Leader Course (ALC) common core, and Senior Leader Course (SLC) continue to show room for improvement with regard to the perceived level of rigor or challenge offered by the courses. Many NCOs do not perceive that these courses challenged them to perform at a higher level, or that course activities and activity assessments were sufficiently challenging to separate high performers from low performing students.

- Rank group comparisons for various PME quality metrics are presented for the active and reserve components in Tables 31 and 32.
Table 31. Metrics for Education System Quality by Active Component Rank Cohort.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality of Army Education System</th>
<th>2014 CASAL Metric – Recent Course Graduates (2013-2014)</th>
<th>NCO</th>
<th>Warrant Officer</th>
<th>Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of education received</td>
<td>Good or Very Good</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenging students to perform at a higher level</td>
<td>Effective or Very effective</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving leadership capabilities</td>
<td>Effective or Very effective</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usefulness of what was learned</td>
<td>'Of considerable use’ or ‘Extremely useful’</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 32. Metrics for Education System Quality by Reserve Component Rank Cohort.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality of Army Education System</th>
<th>2014 CASAL Metric – Recent Course Graduates (2013-2014)</th>
<th>NCO</th>
<th>Warrant Officer</th>
<th>Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of education received</td>
<td>Good or Very Good</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenging students to perform at a higher level</td>
<td>Effective or Very effective</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving leadership capabilities</td>
<td>Effective or Very effective</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usefulness of what was learned</td>
<td>'Of considerable use’ or ‘Extremely useful’</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.6.1 Quality of Army Education

The quality of the education received at Army courses and schools continues to be favorable. Attitudes about education quality increase with rank and length of service. A majority of field grade officers (85%), warrant officers (77%), and Sr NCOs (77%) rate the quality of the education they received in their most recent course as ‘good’ or ‘very good’ (about one-tenth rate the quality as ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’). In comparison, more than two-thirds of company grade officers and Jr NCOs rate the quality of the education they received as ‘good’ or ‘very good’, while 11% and 14% (respectively) rate it as poor (see Figure 44). Favorable ratings are consistent with results from 2013 and are more favorable than those observed in 2012. From 2009 to 2011, CASAL assessed attitudes about the quality of the leader development received at Army courses and schools; results showed a similar pattern in ratings by rank group, though the percentage of favorable ratings was lower during these years (59% to 61% ‘good’ or ‘very good’).

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30 To facilitate year-to-year trend analysis for indicators of the quality of Army education, the percentage values representing recent graduates includes respondents who completed their most recent course within the two most recent years of the survey. For the 2014 CASAL, this includes Army course graduates from 2013 and 2014.
Figure 44. Perceptions of Recent Graduates about the Quality of Education Received at Courses/Schools.

Course Instruction

Three-fourths of recent graduates (74%) agree that course instructors, faculty and staff set an appropriate example by modeling doctrinal leadership competencies and attributes. Only 12% of recent graduates disagree the cadre appropriately demonstrated leadership during their most recent course attendance. Further, more than two-thirds of recent graduates (69%) agree course instructors and faculty provided them with constructive feedback on their leadership capabilities (15% disagree). These results are similar to those observed in 2013.

Course Challenge

The perceived level of rigor or challenge in Army courses and schools continues to show room for improvement. Sixty-one percent of recent graduates rate their course effective at challenging them to perform at a higher level, while one in five (19%) rates it ineffective. Similarly, 57% agree that course activities and activity assessment were sufficiently challenging to separate high performers from low performing students (25% disagree). Percentages of favorable responses for both of these indicators show gradual increases since 2012. While the positive trend indicates larger percentages of course graduates now perceive these elements of
challenges in courses, there continues to be room for improvement. A summary of ratings by recent graduates of the characteristics of Army courses/schools is presented in Figure 45.

**Figure 45. Ratings for Characteristics of Course Instruction and Quality by Recent Graduates (2013-2014).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>% Favorable Ratings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of the education received at the course</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructors set an appropriate example by modeling leadership competencies and attributes</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructors provided students constructive feedback on leadership</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course challenged students to perform at a higher level</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course activities were sufficiently challenging to separate high performers from low</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Improving Leadership Capabilities**

About half of recent graduates (52%) rate their most recent course effective or very effective at improving their leadership capabilities, while one-fifth (20%) rate the course ineffective (see Figure 46). These results reflect a fairly consistent pattern of moderate ratings which has shown only slight fluctuation since first assessed in 2007 (from a high of 55% in 2007 to a low of 46% in 2009). Another consistent trend is that a larger percentage of reserve component graduates rate their courses effective for improving their leadership capabilities (when compared to AC graduates). In 2014, 59% of RC graduates rate their course effective for improving their leadership capabilities; effective ratings by RC graduates have ranged from 58% to 65% since 2007.
Utility of Course Learning for Army Duties

An objective of Army education is to arm learners with knowledge and skills that will help them to successfully perform their duties (Department of the Army, 2011). CASAL results have consistently shown mixed attitudes about the usefulness and relevance of what Army courses offer learners, and the learners’ effectiveness in applying new knowledge and skills to their assigned duties. Results of CASAL indicators for course learning outcomes in operational work settings are presented in Table 33.

Overall, 54% of recent graduates rate what they learned in their course as being ‘of considerable use’ or ‘extremely useful’, while 32% indicate ‘of some use.’ Sixty-one percent of graduates agree their course was relevant to their current duties, while about one-fifth (21%) indicate disagreement. Only about half of recent graduates (48%) rate their unit or organization effective at utilizing or supporting leadership skills learned in the course; 19% rate their unit/organization ineffective in this regard.
Table 33. Perceptions by Recent Graduates about the Relevance and Utility of Courses by Rank Cohort.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratings for the Relevance and Utility of Army Courses/Schools (Recent Graduates from 2013-2014)</th>
<th>SGT-SSG</th>
<th>SFC-CSM</th>
<th>WO1–CW5</th>
<th>2LT-CPT</th>
<th>MAJ-COL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agreement course content was relevant to current job</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usefulness of what was learned ('Of considerable use’ or ‘Extremely useful’)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of unit/organization in utilizing or supporting leadership skills learned in the course</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Timing of course attendance in career ('Too late’ or ‘Much too late’)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, both the timing of course attendance in leaders’ careers and the effects of an enrollment backlog on leaders’ education and development were concerns during the past decade. Active and reserve component units and organizations experienced high OPTEMPOs and frequent deployment cycles that posed barriers for some leaders to attend courses and schools in accordance with their professional career development path.

In 2010 and 2011, less than two-thirds of AC leaders (65% and 63%, respectively) believed they attended their most recent course at ‘about the right time’ in their career to prepare them for responsibilities they had held. In comparison, one in three (33% and 36%) believed they attended too late in their career. For RC leaders, results were only slightly more favorable for those attending ‘at about the right time’ (68% in 2010 and 67% in 2011) and those attending too late in their career (30% in 2010 and 31% in 2011).

In 2014, leaders’ attitudes about the timing of the course in their career show more favorability. More than two-thirds of recent graduates in both components (71% AC and 72% RC) believe they attended their most recent course at ‘about the right time’ in their career to prepare them for responsibilities they now hold. Overall, the proportion of leaders that believe they attended too late or much too late has fallen to one in four (26% AC and 24% RC). The highest percentages of leaders indicating they attended their course too late include warrant officers (33%), Sr NCOs (31%) and Jr NCOs (36%). Also notable is that across all of these years, very small percentages of recent graduates (1% to 3%) indicated they attended their most recent course too early in their career.
2.6.2 Course-Specific Findings

This section summarizes CASAL findings for officer, warrant officer and NCO professional military education (PME). Interpretation of these results requires a note of caution. The intent of CASAL has been to identify and track trends in the quality of Army education as it pertains to educating and preparing leaders for increased responsibilities (i.e., developing leadership skills and abilities). CASAL’s assessment of course characteristics and learning outcomes is not tailored to the instruction or objectives specific to any given course or school. Rather, these results offer a broad look at the quality of the education, the relevance and utility of what is learned, and the contribution of Army education to developing leadership skills and capabilities.

Results are discussed for select courses and schools where a sufficient number of recent graduates (i.e., > 100) provided ratings on the 2014 CASAL. The results presented are constrained to the respondents who completed the specified course within the past two years. For clarity in interpretation, percentages reflect ratings by active component respondents.

Officer Courses

This section reviews CASAL results for the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) B, Captains Career Course (CCC), Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) / Intermediate Level Education (ILE) resident, and the Army War College (AWC) or other Senior Service College Program (SSC). A consistent pattern observed in the ratings of recent officer course graduates is that courses for junior officers are rated less favorably compared to higher level courses. For example, smaller percentages of company grade officers rate BOLC B and CCC favorably compared to the percentage of field grade officers that rate CGSOC/ILE and AWC favorably.

- The quality of education received at BOLC B and CCC is very positive (72% and 73%, respectively) while even higher proportions of ILE and AWC graduates rate the education quality positively (89% and 95%, respectively).
- The course cadre at all four officer courses examined (BOLC B, CCC, CGSOC/ILE and AWC) are viewed as effectively setting an appropriate example by modeling doctrinal

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31 Results in this section reflect perceptions of 2014 CASAL respondents who completed the course in calendar years 2013 and 2014. The level of sampling in CASAL does not allow for examination of results for a single course year (e.g., 2014 course graduates). Where applicable, patterns in item favorability across CASAL years are discussed.

32 Active component officer course-level analyses included the following samples of respondents by course: Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) B – 543; Captains Career Course (CCC) – 190; Command & General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) / Intermediate Level Education (ILE) resident – 104; Army War College (AWC) or other Senior Service College Program – 113.
leadership competencies and attributes. The levels of agreement that course instructors and faculty provide constructive feedback on student leadership capabilities are at or above a two-thirds threshold of favorability.

- Just over half of recent graduates of BOLC B (58%) and CCC (59%) rate the course effective at challenging them to perform at a higher level. Similar percentages of graduates (59% and 52%, respectively) agree the course was sufficiently challenging to separate high performers from low performing students, indicating a potential area for improvement.

- The quality of education received at ILE is rated very favorably by a majority of recent graduates (89%). However, smaller percentages of recent graduates (64%) believe the course increased their leadership capabilities.

- AWC graduates continue to report positive assessments for their course experience and the relevance of what is learned.

Across officer courses, an area for continued consideration is the level of rigor or challenge posed to learners as part of the education. A notable finding reported in the 2012 CASAL (Riley et al., 2013) was that one-fifth of recent graduates of ILE and about one-third from BOLC B (35%) and CCC (31%) indicated their respective course fell short or fell well short of their expectations. Across the board the most frequently cited reason by this sub-group of leaders related to a lack of rigor or challenge in the course. 2014 CASAL results continue to indicate this should be a point of consideration for officer education system improvement.

Finally, more than three-fourths of recent officer graduates believe they attended their course at ‘about the right time’ in their career to prepare them for responsibilities they now hold. This is a positive finding as it indicates most officer graduates believe they are receiving education at the appropriate time in their careers to prepare them. No more than one in five graduates of CCC (21%), CGSOC/ILE (19%) and the AWC (19%) believes they attended their course too late or much too late in their career. No more than 6% of these course graduates believe they attended too early in their career.

Percentages of favorable ratings for officer course characteristics are presented in Table 34. Ratings for attitudes about course outcomes are presented in Figure 47.

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33 Percentages that are bolded and underlined in Table 34 represent areas within officer courses that received favorable ratings below a threshold of 66% (e.g., agreement, effectiveness, or good/very good quality).
Table 34. Ratings for Officer Courses and Schools by Recent Graduates (2013-2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Quality of Education Received (% Good or Very Good)</th>
<th>Effectiveness of course at challenging learner to perform at higher level</th>
<th>Agreement course was sufficiently challenging to separate high and low performers</th>
<th>Agreement course cadre appropriately model leadership competencies and attributes</th>
<th>Agreement course instructors provided constructive feedback on leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) B</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains Career Course (CCC)</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command &amp; General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) / Intermediate Level Education (ILE) resident</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army War College (AWC) or other SSC</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 47. Ratings for Officer Course Relevance, Applicability and Effectiveness in Preparing Leaders (2013-2014).
Warrant Officer Courses

This section reviews CASAL results for the Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) / BOLC B, the Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC), the Warrant Officer Staff Course (WOSC) / Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education (WOILE), and the Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course (WOSSC) / Warrant Officer Senior Service Education (WOSSE) 34. A consistent pattern observed across CASAL administrations is that ratings by recent graduates of warrant officer courses show less favorability compared to officer and NCO courses.

- Ratings for the quality of the education received at the four warrant officer courses examined are generally positive. Assessments by recent graduates of these courses meet or exceed a two-thirds threshold of favorability (i.e., ‘good’ or ‘very good’ quality of education).
- Across courses, warrant officers report strong agreement that course instructors, faculty and staff set an appropriate example by modeling doctrinal leadership competencies and attributes, which is positive (ranging from 72% to 89% agreement).
- More than three-fourths of WOBC/BOLC B graduates (77%) agree the course content was relevant to their current job. Smaller percentages of graduates of other warrant officer courses agree the course content was relevant to their current jobs (ranging from 54% to 60%).
- Two-thirds or more of WOSSC/WOSSE (72%) and WOBC/BOLC B (66%) graduates rate their course effective at challenging them to perform at a higher level. Smaller percentages of WOAC (48%) and WOSC/WOILE (57%) graduates rate their course effective in this regard. The results of the 2012 CASAL noted that a ‘lack of rigor or challenge’ was a primary reason given as to why warrant officer courses fell short of the expectations of over 40% of recent graduates (Riley et al., 2013).
- Another pattern observed in past CASAL results is that warrant officer graduates consistently rate leadership aspects of courses they attend as low. Across courses, one-third to about one-half of graduates (ranging from 35% to 56%) rate their course experience as effective for improving their leadership capabilities. Less than two-thirds of WOAC (61%) and WOSC/WOILE (61%) graduates agree course instructors and faculty provided them with constructive feedback on their leadership.

34 Active component warrant officer course-level analyses included the following samples of respondents by course: Warrant Officer Basic Course or BOLC B – 121; Warrant Officer Advanced Course – 105; Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education or WOSC – 143; Warrant Officer Senior Service Education or WOSSC – 67. The respondent sample completed or graduated from their course within calendar years 2013 and 2014.
Low ratings on the perceived contribution of warrant officer courses for improving leadership capabilities are not unexpected, especially given the predominantly technical orientation of the warrant officer cohort. However, Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, states that a goal of warrant officer training and education is to produce highly specialized expert officers, leaders and trainers who are fully competent in technical, tactical and leadership skills (Department of the Army, 2010). A recent Army-wide study of the warrant officer cohort concluded that the role of warrant officers serving as technical experts is expanding to include greater leadership and strategic-level functions (Lamphear et al., 2012). Warrant officers are being utilized in a broader range of roles to include formal and informal leadership responsibilities at platoon, company, battalion and higher echelons, and as members of staffs. Thus, it is important that warrant officers receive the appropriate preparation for these roles at the courses they attend.

The 2014 CASAL also found that recent warrant officer graduates report mixed perceptions about the timing of their education in their career. A positive finding is that 87% of recent WOBC/BOLC B graduates believe they attended ‘about the right time’ to prepare them for responsibilities they now hold. However, graduates of subsequent courses more frequently indicate they attended ‘too late’ or ‘much too late’ in their careers, including 36% for WOAC, 48% for WOSC/WOILE, and 41% for WOSSC/WOSSE. These findings are similar to results observed in the 2012 survey of recent warrant officer students (Lamphear et al., 2012). In that study, 39% of WOAC, 49% of WOSC, and 59% of WOSSC graduates believe they attended too late in their careers to adequately prepare them for responsibilities associated with their next job.

Percentages of favorable ratings for warrant officer course characteristics are presented in Table 35. Ratings for attitudes about course outcomes are presented in Figure 48.

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35 Percentages that are bolded and underlined in Table 35 represent areas within warrant officer courses that received favorable ratings below a threshold of 66% (e.g., agreement, effectiveness, or good/very good quality).
Table 35. Ratings for Warrant Officer Courses by Recent Graduates (2013-2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Quality of Education Received (% Good or Very Good)</th>
<th>Effectiveness of course at challenging learner to perform at higher level</th>
<th>Agreement course was sufficiently challenging to separate high and low performers</th>
<th>Agreement course cadre appropriately model leadership competencies and attributes</th>
<th>Agreement course instructors provided constructive feedback on leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) or BOLC B</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC)</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer Staff Course (WOSC) / Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education (WOILE)</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course (WOSSC) / Warrant Officer Senior Service Education (WOSSE)</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 48. Ratings for Warrant Officer Course Relevance, Applicability and Effectiveness in Preparing Leaders (2013-2014).

Noncommissioned Officer Courses

This section reviews CASAL results for the Warrior Leader Course (WLC), Advanced Leader Course (ALC) common core, Senior Leader Course (SLC), and Sergeants Major Course (SMC)\(^{36}\). The SMC continues to be the most favorably rated and well received course within noncommissioned officer education system (NCOES), while courses for Jr NCOs continue to show room for improvement in various respects.

- Four out of five recent WLC graduates rate the quality of education received as good or very good (79%); agree course cadre modeled leadership competencies and attributes (78%); and provided constructive feedback on student leadership capabilities (82%).

\(^{36}\) Active component NCO course-level analyses included the following samples of respondents by course: Warrior Leader Course – 148; Advanced Leader Course – 431; Senior Leader Course – 310; Sergeants Major Course – 108. The respondent sample completed or graduated from their course within calendar years 2013 and 2014.
• Ratings for ALC common core indicate the quality of education received meets a two-thirds favorability threshold (68%) though a smaller percentage of recent graduates (48%) rate the course effective for improving their leadership capabilities. The common core DL portion of ALC is preparation for the MOS-specific resident phase of the course. ALC is well attended but not generally viewed as challenging by many NCOs.

• The SLC also meets a two-thirds favorability threshold with regard to course quality (71%). Just over half of recent SLC graduates (53%) rate the course effective for improving their leadership capabilities.

• Three-fourths of recent SMC graduates (76%) rate the course effective at challenging them to perform at a higher level. About two-thirds rate the course effective for improving their leadership capabilities (64%) and agree the course content was relevant to their current job (68%).

As reported in previous CASAL results, a common theme in ratings across several NCOES courses is that the level of rigor or challenge shows room for improvement. Just over half of recent graduates of ALC (53%) and SLC (58%) rate their course effective at challenging them to perform at a higher level and agree activities and activity assessments were sufficiently challenging to separate high performing students from low (53% and 58%, respectively). Ratings for WLC are only slightly more favorable. The 2012 CASAL found that one-third of recent graduates from these three courses (WLC, ALC and SLC) indicated the course fell short or well short of their expectations. The most frequently cited reason was a ‘lack of rigor or challenge (e.g., the course felt like a check-the-block activity)’ – a response given by about two-thirds of this sub-group (Riley et al., 2013). Another frequently cited reason indicated that for some NCOs the information presented in these courses was not new to the learner (e.g., covered in previous course, learned through self-development, or through experiences). This factor would also contribute to a lack of perceived challenge in these courses. 2014 CASAL results indicate the level of rigor or challenge continues to be an area for improvement for NCOES courses prior to SMC.

Finally, less than two-thirds of recent NCOES graduates (62%) believe they attended their course at ‘about the right time’ in their career to prepare them for responsibilities they now hold. In contrast, more than one-third believes they attended ‘too late’ or ‘much too late’ in their careers, suggesting a potential gap in the timing of NCO education. The courses with the highest frequencies of graduates indicating they attended too late include WLC (37%), ALC (39%) and SLC (32%). However, these percentages are smaller than results observed in the 2010 and 2011 CASAL, where 45% and 47% of Jr NCOs (respectively) indicated they attended their most recent NCOES course too late in their careers. Across these years, no more than 3% of NCO graduates believe they attended their course too early in their career.
Percentages of favorable ratings for NCO course characteristics are presented in Table 36. Ratings for attitudes about course outcomes are presented in Figure 49.

**Table 36. Ratings for Noncommissioned Officer Courses by Recent Graduates (2013-2014).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Quality of Education Received (% Good or Very Good)</th>
<th>Effectiveness of course at challenging learner to perform at higher level</th>
<th>Agreement course was sufficiently challenging to separate high and low performers</th>
<th>Agreement course cadre appropriately model leadership competencies and attributes</th>
<th>Agreement course instructors provided constructive feedback on leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warrior Leader Course (WLC)</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td><strong>60%</strong></td>
<td><strong>61%</strong></td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Leader Course (ALC)</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td><strong>53%</strong></td>
<td><strong>53%</strong></td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Leader Course (SLC)</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td><strong>58%</strong></td>
<td><strong>58%</strong></td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeants Major Course (SMC)</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td><strong>67%</strong></td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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37 Percentages that are bolded and underlined in Table 36 represent areas within NCO courses that received favorable ratings below a threshold of 66% (e.g., agreement, effectiveness, or good/very good quality).
Summary of Findings on Institutional Education

The quality of the education received in Army courses and schools is rated favorably by 75% of recent course graduates; results show a positive increase since first assessed in 2012. Recent graduates also provide favorable assessments of course instructors and cadre, specifically in setting an appropriate example by modeling doctrinal leadership competencies and attributes. About two-thirds of graduates also agree course instructors and faculty provided them with constructive feedback on their leadership capabilities.

The effectiveness of courses in preparing learners for leadership tends to be rated less favorably than other aspects of the course. A stable trend sustained in 2014 results is that only about half of recent graduates rate their course effective at improving their leadership capabilities. In fact, the only courses that exceed a two-thirds favorability threshold are the Army War College and Warrior Leader Course, while ratings for the Sergeants Major Course and
Command and General Staff Officer Course/Intermediate Level Education resident fall just short of the threshold.

CASAL results continue to point to the level of rigor or challenge (associated with several courses) as a persistent area for improvement. Specifically, course effectiveness at challenging learners to perform at a higher level falls below a two-thirds favorability threshold for each course examined with the exception of CGSOC/ILE resident, WOBC/BOLC B, WOSSC/WOSSE, and SMC. Additionally, the content of many of these courses is not seen as sufficiently challenging to separate high performers from low performing students.

In comparison to four years ago, smaller percentages of recent graduates now believe they attended their most recent course too late in their career progression. In 2014, 71% of leaders believe they attended their course at ‘about the right time’ while 26% believe they attended too late. A general pattern in these attitudes is that appropriate course timing is occurring for most officers but is less often optimal for warrant officers and NCOs. The courses where more than one-third of recent graduates believe they attended ‘too late’ in their careers include WLC (37%), ALC (39%), WOAC (36%), WOSC/WOILE (48%), WOSSC/WOSSE (41%).
Conclusions and Recommendations

Findings from the 2014 CASAL provide the Army with several new insights on the quality of leadership and leader development within the Army. The following points highlight new insights, important trends observed across multiple years, and areas that warrant further consideration.

New Findings and Insights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Develops Others</th>
<th>The competency Develops Others requires continued focus and attention. Less than two-thirds of leaders are rated effective at developing subordinates, while about two-thirds are rated effective at coaching subordinates to improve what they are capable of doing, assessing the developmental needs of subordinates, creating or calling attention to leader development opportunities in assignments, and providing developmental feedback to subordinates.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Subordinate Development</td>
<td>Many leaders perceive development to be an activity that a subordinate is sent to or directed to do, such as resident training or course attendance, online training, or independent development activities. Many also view ‘counseling’ to be a primary method to develop subordinates. A larger proportion of leaders report they have engaged in proactive development of their subordinates than they give their immediate superior credit for doing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-Development</td>
<td>Favorable attitudes toward the effectiveness of self-development have improved slightly after an observed decline the past three years. Larger percentages of leaders value the impact of their personal (self-initiated) self-development compared to guided (recommended) or structured (required) self-development methods.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mentoring</td>
<td>More than half of leaders report they engage in mentoring, either as a mentor or mentee or both. For most leaders who receive mentoring, the need is currently being met with regard to the frequency of desired interaction and its impact on development.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Performance Counseling</td>
<td>There is currently an unmet need with regard to the frequency and quality of performance counseling. Nearly half of leaders characterize the frequency with which they receive counseling as ‘too infrequent’ and only about half agree the feedback they have received was useful in helping them to set performance goals for improvement.</td>
</tr>
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### Seeking Feedback
Nearly half of leaders frequently seek developmental feedback from their peers, while smaller percentages request feedback from their immediate superior, subordinates, or others outside the chain of command. Army leaders who characterize the counseling they receive as ‘too infrequent’ are not generally compensating by seeking or asking for feedback from others.

### Influence
Larger percentages of leaders report using methods of influence aimed at gaining commitment from others as opposed to compliance-gaining methods. Use of commitment-gaining methods has been found to be strongly associated with effective leadership.

### Key Findings across Years (Trends)

#### Morale
An overwhelming majority of Army leaders continue to show strong commitment to their teams or immediate work groups. The level of morale in the Army is moderate and remains largely unchanged in recent years.

#### Career Intentions
Intentions to remain in the Army continue to be high for leaders not currently eligible for retirement. More than half of active duty captains (55%) report they intend to stay in the Army until retirement eligible or beyond 20 years, which is among the highest percentages observed since 2000.

#### Trust
Overall, perceptions of trust among unit members have increased slightly since 2013. Half of leaders report there is high or very high trust in their units, while one-third report moderate trust. Trust exists in units where standards are upheld, where unit members are empowered to make decisions pertaining to their duties, and are allowed to learn from honest mistakes.

#### Leader Attributes
Army leaders continue to be rated favorably in demonstrating all leader attributes. The competencies Gets Results, Prepares Self, and Stewards the Profession remain leader strengths.

#### Mission Command
A majority of leaders continue to be rated effective in demonstrating the principles of the mission command philosophy. There are strong relationships between effectively exercising mission command, high levels of trust, and perceptions of leader effectiveness. Since 2013, the percentage of leaders reporting familiarity with mission command doctrine (ADP 6-0) has increased for all rank groups.
Counter-productive Behaviors

Small percentages of leaders are perceived as demonstrating any specific negative or counter-productive behavior associated with toxic leadership, and this has remained unchanged since 2010. The incidence of negative behaviors at brigade, battalion and company command levels remains low. Negative leadership has a measurable and significant detrimental effect on subordinate motivation, work quality, commitment and morale. Leaders who demonstrate counter-productive leadership behaviors tend to be viewed as ineffective at building trust and exercising mission command.

Career Satisfaction

The percentage of leaders reporting satisfaction with their Army career thus far has slowly trended downward since 2009. Leaders’ career satisfaction is strongly associated with morale, attitudes toward assignment histories, and characteristics of one’s current duties.

Stress

Stress from a high workload persists as a problem in the Army, and is trending unfavorably. Nearly half of active duty leaders report workload stress at a problem level and one in four rate it as a serious problem. In recent years, smaller percentages of leaders have indicated workload stress is not a problem at all, and more report it as a moderate problem.

Education

Attitudes toward Army education have trended more favorably over the past 5 years, as evidenced in larger percentages of recent graduates rating the quality of the education they receive as favorable.

Rigor & Challenge of Education

With the exception of senior officer and NCO schools, perceptions on the level of rigor or challenge offered in Army courses continue to show room for improvement. About half of recent graduates agree course activities and activity assessments were sufficiently challenging to separate high performers from lower performing students.

Considerations for Improvement

The 2014 CASAL identified numerous areas where the Army is strong, and, where improvements could be made. The following considerations identify areas where the Army can take actionable steps to improve the quality of leadership and leader development.

Developing others continues to be done less than recommended by regulations and as a required part of a leader’s responsibility. When it occurs, the developmental activities have lower impact than desired. The percentage of leaders who seek informal feedback from others, have a mentor and participate in 360° assessments is not so high that these approaches compensate for shortcomings of counseling and other superior-subordinate developmental interactions. Counseling, regardless of formal, documented processes or informal discussions between leader and follower, is not being done as frequently as regulations require and does not have the intended impact.
To change these trends, performance and developmental counseling need to occur and to be done as an effects-based activity. Mission command principles consistently applied to counseling across organizations could provide the push needed to set the right conditions and to allow sufficient freedom by subordinate commands in execution. Accountability for counseling needs to increase, but there should not be such an administrative emphasis that leaders have an aversion to do it. First-time doctrine on leader development, FM 6-22 (Department of the Army, 2015), supports an increased emphasis on developmental actions supported through unit plans and guidance to leaders on how to support learning, assessment, feedback and developmental action planning.

Basic leadership skills are below expected levels among Jr NCOs and have room for improvement at all ranks. Increased attention can be placed on specific leadership issues and actions through periodic delivery of advice and tips about how to employ best practices and how to address typical leadership problems. Many leaders are not getting desired levels of leadership instruction in PME courses. A more direct dissemination of information through such forums as the FORSCOM leader development tool box is an alternative way to increase attention on leadership activities. Broad dissemination of a better base of knowledge in direct-level leadership skills will have the advantage of increasing the capabilities of leaders when they assume organizational and then strategic level responsibilities, and should produce more detailed guidance to use in counseling as well.

When considering how to address problems, so-called solutions can often be designed for what someone else should do or how change starts with the organization. Many of the problems from the field that are identified by 2014 CASAL can be addressed by individual Army leaders who elect to take action on their own. Working with other leaders cooperatively, investing interest and time in subordinates, setting performance goals for subordinates and helping subordinates grow their expertise are all actions an individual leader can do that will have an impact on the state of leadership and leader development. Leaders will want to study relevant sections in FM 6-22 to learn how to create developmental opportunities for subordinate leaders and teams. Stakeholders in leader development and leadership development should identify or track practices that improve the level of leader engagement in organizational events. Since leader development is an Army priority for everyone, then there are relevant actions leaders can take that will make a difference in how well development occurs and how well leaders are assessed in the future.

While involvement by many leaders is required to change the current climate for leader development, the goals for increased activity need to be endorsed by senior leaders to ensure
shared understanding of priorities and desired outcomes. The amount of emphasis on developing leadership in PME is likely not to change unless decision-makers set it as a priority and resource it accordingly. The specific groups of Jr NCOs and Army civilians have lower levels of leaders who are rated effective in leading and managing, so special emphasis could start there. Senior leaders need to become better aware of the effects that high workload have on the force. While it would be natural to assume that reduced rates of Soldiers being deployed would translate to lower workload levels, there may be greater interest now in innovation and preparing for new, uncertain futures while trying to maintain current training levels. Finally, leaders need to be vigilant about an increase in the rate of reports of discipline problems in units, and they must be ready to counteract discipline problems through fair and consistent enforcement of standards.
References


