


CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION
ON MILITARY TRAINING AND
GENDER-RELATED ISSUES



FINAL REPORT
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

VOLUME I

JULY 1999

CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES



FINAL REPORT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS



CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING
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The United States Senate and House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Commissioners

Nancy Cantor

George R. Christmas

Robert A. Dare, Jr.

William M. Keys

Thomas Moore

Charles Moskos

Barbara Spyridon Pope

Mady Wechsler Segal

Dear Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members:

The Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues is pleased to present its final report in four volumes to the United States Congress pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 as modified by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-85.

We appreciate your patience and support in the production of these documents and acknowledge the assistance of your staff.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Anita K. Blair".

Anita K. Blair
Chairman

Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues

*Submitted
to the
United States Congress
this
July 1999*

Approved by:



Anita Blair
Commission Chairman




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Commission Vice Chairman



Dr. Nancy Cantor
Commissioner



Mr. Thomas Moore
Commissioner




LtGen George R. Christmas, USMC (Retired)
Commissioner




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
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Special Thanks To:

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Debra Crnkovic
COL Hank Hodge, USA (Retired)

Acknowledgments

The Commission's almost 16 months has been both informative and hectic. The mandate set forth by the Congress in Public Law 105-85 provided the commissioners and staff a roadmap, but the knowledge was gained in the journey. The report and the journey would not have been possible, but for the cooperation and support of many individuals. We can mention only a few and, in doing so, apologize to the many who remain anonymous even to us.

First, we acknowledge the great service to the Nation provided by the men and women of our Armed Forces. In particular, we thank the thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who escorted, met, and spoke with us on the numerous trips and who took time to respond to the research inquiries.

The Commission thanks the many individuals from other governmental agencies who assisted in fulfilling our mandate. Specifically, the Commission thanks Mr. Mark E. Gebicke, Director, and William E. Beusse, Ph.D., Assistant Director, of the General Accounting Office for their advice and testimony. We also recognize the contributions of Special Agent Thomas Lyons, Chief, Physical Training Unit, FBI Academy, for assembling needed expertise and testimony from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

We wish to thank all the witnesses who testified at our hearings. This venue provided an interactive format for commissioners to inquire into several statutory sections. Much of the testimony came from current Defense officials and active duty military personnel; additionally, several private sector and retired individuals gave the Commission essential information. All are commended for their time and expertise. All witnesses are listed in Appendix C of Volume I.

The Commission's trip to visit TASK FORCE EAGLE in Tuzla, Bosnia, was an informative and extraordinary event. We commend our expert and gracious escorts, LTC Lunn and 1Lt. Peter J. Masich, USA. We also visited the USS ENTERPRISE in the Mediterranean Sea and salute her extraordinary and gallant crew for providing a unique adventure.

Washington Headquarters Services offices had the additional task of supporting this Commission. Mr. Richard Townsend was instrumental in quickly organizing support for the temporary and permanent office space. Also of note were the services provided by: Mr. Leroy Miles (Property Management), Mr. Neal Jacobson (Space Management), Ms. Judy Mitchell (Telecommunications Branch), Mr. Robert Yorke (Budget Branch), and Mr. H. F. "Butch" Christensen (Accounting Branch). We must single out the excellent support given by the Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, especially from Ms. Mary George, Mr. Russ Daul, and Mr. Robert (Bud) Parlette. They designed the management information system (MIS) and provided almost daily assistance and counseled the staff about the need for on-site MIS support.

Acknowledgments (Continued)

Mr. Al Gardner and his colleagues from ACS Defense, Incorporated, formerly known as ASEC (Analytical Systems Engineering Corporation), Alexandria, Virginia, kept the Commission staff free from disrupting technical problems with timely solutions for the information systems. They also gave us excellent administrative support.

Mr. Christopher Toven, Contract Specialist, Department of Health & Human Services who facilitated the contract with HumRRO and Mr. Tim Elig of the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) who assisted with the Westat, Inc. contract. Sincere appreciation is extended to Mr. John Helmick, overall Project Director/Senior Study Director, and Cynthia Gimbel, Ph.D., Senior Study Director, from Westat's Organizational and Management Research Group. Mr. Michael Dove, Jerome Lehnus, Ph.D (DMDC); W. S. Sellman, Ph.D., Jane Arabian, Ph.D. OASD (FMP); Mickey Dansby, Ph.D., Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute and Mr. Eric Wetzel (HumRRO) provided invaluable assistance to the research effort.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense provided excellent support. The Honorable Rudy de Leon, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and Mr. Frank Rush, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), assisted us on numerous occasions. Captain Martha E. McWatters, USN, and her staff in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy), Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management, contributed greatly. LTC Bruce Batten, USA, on several occasions provided exceptional support.

The Commission faced a challenge in capturing accurate information during the hearings. The Commission received court reporting services from Anita B. Glover & Associates, Ltd., Fairfax, Virginia. We gratefully acknowledge the services of Mr. Donald E. Scott who recorded and transcribed all 12 days of hearings with accuracy and speed. Dowless and Associates, Incorporated, Herndon, Virginia, provided the editorial and layout services for this report and the desktop publishing services of Mr. Costa Bugg and Mr. David Farquharson. Ms. Dawn Hottle of Betac Corporation, Alexandria, Virginia also contributed critical desktop publishing expertise. We recognize the editorial contributions of Ms. Rhonda Mohrmann to a section of the report. The Commission especially thanks the recording expertise of Headquarters, Air Force Television Service Center, and the U.S. Army Visual Information Center for providing a video record of the hearings and meetings.

We also thank the Defense Automated Printing Service, and especially Mr. David G. Jeffries, who expedited the printing of both the interim and final reports to Congress; and Mr. Dwayne A. Wilson and Mr. DaWan Simms, who were responsible for creating and designing both the CD and Web page for all to access the report.

Acknowledgments (Continued)

Personnel detailees from other organizations within the Department of Defense provided great support and assistance. The Commission wanted to do creditable and interesting research, but had constraints due to time and other limited resources. This dilemma was solved by borrowing our Research Director, Kathleen Wright, Ph.D., from the United States Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC) and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR). Thus, we were able to undertake an ambitious research program responsive to the Congressional mandate. Instrumental in providing this support were MG John S. Parker, Commander, USAMRMC; COL Martin H. Crumrine, Director, WRAIR; and COL Gregory L. Belenky, Director, Division of Neuropsychiatry, WRAIR.

The Commission thanks each of the Military Services for providing highly qualified, knowledgeable Service liaison officers. Additionally, the Director of the Department of Defense Education Activity provided the excellent services of its Deputy Comptroller, Mrs. Carolyn Duke, who also served as the Deputy Executive Director.

Finally, we acknowledge the assistance of the Congressional staffers. The Commission especially thanks Mr. John Chapla and Ms. Mieke Eoyang, professional staff to the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, and Mr. Charlie Abell and Mr. Gary Leeling, professional staff to the Subcommittee on Personnel of the Senate Armed Services Committee.



Stephen C. Fogleman
Executive Director

Explanation of Volume Formats and Footnotes

The Final Report of the Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues is presented in four volumes as follows:

Volume I. “Findings and Recommendations” consists of the commentaries, assessments, findings and recommendations that are responsive to the mandate set forth in Public Law 105-85. Volume I also contains several appendices (A through K) referenced in the commentary or responsive to a specific section of Public Law 105-85. Example of a footnote to this volume is: Volume I. “Final Report” page 65.

Volume II. “Transcripts and Legal Consultants’ Reports” contains the transcripts of the 12 days of Commission hearings as well as the Legal Consultants’ Reports presented on the last hearing day, 30 January 1999. The Commission wanted to record accurately the testimony of the witnesses and the question and answer dialog between the commissioners and witnesses. We used the excellent court reporting services of Mr. Donald E. Scott of Anita B. Glover & Associates, Ltd., Fairfax, Virginia.

In Volume II pages 1 through 540 are the transcript pages in a condensed format. Each volume page consists of six condensed transcript pages that are numbered at the top of each square. For example, Volume II, page 420 consists of transcript pages 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 for the hearing on January 29, 1999. A reference or footnote for that hearing in Volume I is: Volume II. “Transcripts” page 420 (29Jan99, pp. 2-7). A citation to a specific witness would be: Starling II, H. D. CAPT, USN, CO, USS EISENHOWER, Volume II “Transcripts” page 420 (29Jan99, pp 2-7). An abbreviated reference is Vol II, page 420 (29Jan99, pp 2-7).

Volumes III and IV. “Research Projects, Reports, and Studies” contains research studies referenced throughout Volume I. A complete listing of studies in Volumes III and IV is found at the Tables of Contents for Volumes I, III, and IV. A research report is footnoted as: Johnson, C. (1999), *The Study of Military Recruit Attitudes Conducive to Unit Cohesion and Survey of Military Leader Opinions on Recruit Training and Gender-Related Issues*, Volume III “Research Studies” page 155.

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The Statute

CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES

PL 105-85, 1997 HR 1119

(Cite as: 111 Stat 1629, *1750)

<< 10 USCA § 113 NOTE >>

SEC. 561. ESTABLISHMENT AND COMPOSITION OF COMMISSION.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established a Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues to review requirements and restrictions regarding cross-gender relationships of members of the Armed Forces, to review the basic training programs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and to make recommendations on improvements to those programs, requirements, and restrictions.

(b) COMPOSITION.--(1) The commission shall be composed of 10 members, appointed as follows:

(A) Five members shall be appointed jointly by the chairman and ranking minority party member of the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives.

(B) Five members shall be appointed jointly by the chairman and ranking minority party member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(2) The members of the commission shall choose one of the members to serve as chairman.

(3) All members of the commission shall be appointed not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) QUALIFICATIONS.--Members of the commission shall be appointed from among private United States citizens with knowledge and expertise in one or more of the following:

(1) Training of military personnel.

(2) Social and cultural matters affecting entrance into the Armed Forces and affecting military service, military training, and military readiness, such knowledge and expertise to have been gained through recognized research, policy making and practical experience, as demonstrated by retired military personnel, members of the reserve components of the Armed Forces, representatives from educational organizations, and leaders from civilian industry and other Government agencies.

(3) Factors that define appropriate military job qualifications, including physical, mental, and educational factors.

(4) Combat or other theater of war operations.

(5) Organizational matters.

(6) Legal matters.

(7) Management.

(8) Gender integration matters.

(d) APPOINTMENTS.--(1) Members of the commission shall be appointed for the life of the commission.

(2) A vacancy in the membership shall not affect the commission's powers, but shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.

<< 10 USCA § 113 NOTE >>

SEC. 562. DUTIES.

(a) FUNCTIONS RELATING TO REQUIREMENTS AND RESTRICTIONS REGARDING CROSS-GENDER RELATIONSHIPS.--The commission shall consider issues relating to personal relationships of members of the Armed Forces as follows:

(1) Review the laws, regulations, policies, directives, and practices that govern personal relationships between men and women in the Armed Forces and personal relationships between members of the Armed Forces and non-military personnel of the opposite sex.

(2) Assess the extent to which the laws, regulations, policies, and directives have been applied consistently throughout the Armed Forces without regard to the armed force, grade, rank, or gender of the individuals involved.

(3) Assess the reports of the independent panel, the Department of Defense task force, and the review of existing guidance on fraternization and adultery that have been required by the Secretary of Defense.

(b) FUNCTIONS RELATING TO GENDER-INTEGRATED AND GENDER-SEGREGATED BASIC TRAINING.--(1) The commission shall review the parts of the initial entry training programs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps that constitute the basic training of new recruits (in this subtitle referred to as "basic training"). The review shall include a review of the basic training policies and practices of each of those services with regard to gender-integrated and gender-segregated basic training and, for each of the services, the effectiveness of gender-integrated and gender-segregated basic training.

(2) As part of the review under paragraph (1), the commission shall (with respect to each of the services) take the following measures:

(A) Determine how each service defines gender-integration and gender-segregation in the context of basic training.

(B) Determine the historical rationales for the establishment and disestablishment of gender-integrated or gender-segregated basic training.

(C) Examine, with respect to each service, the current rationale for the use of gender-integrated or gender-segregated basic training and the rationale that was current as of the time the service made a decision to integrate, or to segregate, basic training by gender (or as of the time of the most recent decision to continue to use a gender-integrated format or a gender-segregated format for basic training), and, as part of the examination, evaluate whether at the time of that decision, the Secretary of the military department with jurisdiction over that service had substantive reason to believe, or has since developed data to support, that gender-integrated basic training, or gender-segregated basic training, improves the readiness or performance of operational units.

(D) Assess whether the concept of "training as you will fight" is a valid rationale for gender-integrated basic training or whether the training requirements and objectives for basic training are sufficiently different from those of operational units so that such concept, when balanced against other factors relating to basic training, might not be a sufficient rationale for gender-integrated basic training.

(E) Identify the requirements unique to each service that could affect a decision by the Secretary concerned to adopt a gender-integrated or gender-segregated format for basic training and assess whether the format in use by each service has been successful in meeting those requirements.

(F) Assess, with respect to each service, the degree to which different standards have been established, or if not established are in fact being implemented, for males and females in basic training for matters such as physical fitness, physical performance (such as confidence and obstacle courses), military skills (such as marksmanship and hand-grenade qualifications), and nonphysical tasks required of individuals and, to the degree that differing standards exist or are in fact being implemented, assess the effect of the use of those differing standards.

(G) Identify the goals that each service has set forth in regard to readiness, in light of the gender-integrated or gender-segregated format that such service has adopted for basic training, and whether that format contributes to the readiness of operational units.

(H) Assess the degree to which performance standards in basic training are based on military readiness.

(I) Evaluate the policies of each of the services regarding the assignment of adequate numbers of female drill instructors in gender-integrated training units who can serve as role models and mentors for female trainees.

(J) Review Department of Defense and military department efforts to objectively measure or evaluate the effectiveness of gender-integrated basic training, as compared to gender-segregated basic training, particularly with regard to the adequacy and scope of the efforts and with regard to the relevancy of findings to operational unit requirements, and determine whether the Department of Defense and the military departments are capable of measuring or evaluating the effectiveness of that training format objectively.

(K) Compare the pattern of attrition in gender-integrated basic training units with the pattern of attrition in gender-segregated basic training units and assess the relevancy of the findings of such comparison.

(L) Compare the level of readiness and morale of gender-integrated basic training units with the level of readiness and morale of gender-segregated units, and assess the relevancy of the findings of such comparison and the implications, for readiness, of any differences found.

(M) Compare the experiences, policies, and practices of the armed forces of other industrialized nations regarding gender-integrated training with those of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

(N) Review, and take into consideration, the current practices, relevant studies, and private sector training concepts pertaining to gender-integrated training.

(O) Assess the feasibility and implications of conducting basic training (or equivalent training) at the company level and below through separate units for male and female recruits, including the costs and other resource commitments required to implement and conduct basic training in such a manner and the implications for readiness and unit cohesion.

(P) Assess the feasibility and implications of requiring drill instructors for basic training units to be of the same sex as the recruits in those units if the basic training were to be conducted as described in subparagraph (O).

(c) FUNCTIONS RELATING TO BASIC TRAINING PROGRAMS GENERALLY.--The commission shall review the course objectives, structure, and length of the basic training programs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The commission shall also review the relationship between those basic training objectives and the advanced training provided in the initial entry training programs of each of those services. As part of that review, the commission shall (with respect to each of those services) take the following measures:

(1) Determine the current end-state objectives established for graduates of basic training, particularly in regard to--

(A) physical conditioning;

(B) technical and physical skills proficiency;

(C) knowledge;

(D) military socialization, including the inculcation of service values and attitudes; and

(E) basic combat operational requirements.

(2) Assess whether those current end-state objectives, and basic training itself, should be modified (in structure, length, focus, program of instruction, training methods or otherwise) based, in part, on the following:

(A) An assessment of the perspectives of operational units on the quality and qualifications of the initial entry training graduates being assigned to those units, considering in particular whether the basic training system produces graduates who arrive in operational units with an appropriate level of skills, physical conditioning, and degree of military socialization to meet unit requirements and needs.

(B) An assessment of the demographics, backgrounds, attitudes, experience, and physical fitness of new recruits entering basic training, considering in particular the question of whether, given the entry level demographics, education, and background of new recruits, the basic training systems and objectives are most efficiently and effectively structured and conducted to produce graduates who meet service needs.

(C) An assessment of the perspectives of personnel who conduct basic training with regard to measures required to improve basic training.

(3) Assess the extent to which the initial entry training programs of each of the services continue, after the basic training phases of the programs, effectively to reinforce and advance the military socialization (including the inculcation of service values and attitudes), the physical conditioning, and the attainment and improvement of knowledge and proficiency in fundamental military skills that are begun in basic training.

(d) RECOMMENDATIONS.--The commission shall prepare--

(1) with respect to each of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, an evaluation of gender-integrated and gender-segregated basic training programs, based upon the review under subsection (b);

(2) recommendations for such changes to the current system of basic training as the commission considers warranted; and

(3) recommendations for such changes to laws, regulations, policies, directives, and practices referred to in subsection (a)(1) as the commission considers warranted.

(e) REPORTS.--(1) Not later than April 15, 1998, the commission shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives a report setting forth a strategic plan for the work of the commission and the activities and initial findings of the commission.

(2) Not later than September 16, 1998, the commission shall submit a final report to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives. The final report shall set forth the activities, findings, and recommendations of the commission, including any recommendations for congressional action and administrative action that the commission considers appropriate. The report shall specifically set forth the views of the Secretaries of the military departments regarding the matters described in subparagraphs (O) and (P) of subsection (b)(2).

<< 10 USCA § 113 NOTE >>

SEC. 563. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.

(a) MEETINGS.--(1) The commission shall hold its first meeting not later than 30 days after the date on which all members have been appointed.

(2) The commission shall meet upon the call of the chairman.

(3) A majority of the members of the commission shall constitute a quorum, but a lesser number may hold meetings.

(b) AUTHORITY OF INDIVIDUALS TO ACT FOR COMMISSION.--Any member or agent of the commission may, if authorized by the commission, take any action which the commission is authorized to take under this title.

(c) POWERS.--(1) The commission may hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, and receive such evidence as the commission considers advisable to carry out its duties.

(2) The commission may secure directly from the Department of Defense and any other department or agency of the Federal Government such information as the commission considers necessary to carry out its duties. Upon the request of the chairman of the commission, the head of a department or agency shall furnish the requested information expeditiously to the commission.

(3) The commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as other departments and agencies of the Federal Government.

(d) PAY AND EXPENSES OF COMMISSION MEMBERS.--(1) Each member of the commission who is not an employee of the Government shall be paid at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during which such member is engaged in performing the duties of the commission.

(2) Members and personnel of the commission may travel on aircraft, vehicles, or other conveyances of the Armed Forces when travel is necessary in the performance of a duty of the commission except when the cost of commercial transportation is less expensive.

(3) The members of the commission may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the commission.

(4)(A) A member of the commission who is an annuitant otherwise covered by section 8344 or 8468 of title 5, United States Code, by reason of membership on the commission shall not be subject to the provisions of such section with respect to such membership.

(B) A member of the commission who is a member or former member of a uniformed service shall not be subject to the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of section 5532 of such title with respect to membership on the commission.

(e) STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT.--(1) The chairman of the commission may, without regard to civil service laws and regulations, appoint and terminate an executive director and up to three additional staff members as necessary to enable the commission to perform its duties. The chairman of the commission may fix the compensation of the executive director and other personnel without regard to the provisions of chapter 51, and subchapter III of chapter 53, of title 5, United States Code, relating to classification of positions and General Schedule pay rates, except that the rate of pay may not exceed the maximum rate of pay for grade GS-15 under the General Schedule.

(2) Upon the request of the chairman of the commission, the head of any department or agency of the Federal Government may detail, without reimbursement, any personnel of the department or agency to the commission to assist in carrying out its duties. A detail of an employee shall be without interruption or loss of civil service status or privilege.

(3) The chairman of the commission may procure temporary and intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, at rates for individuals that do not exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of such title.

(4) The Secretary of Defense shall furnish to the commission such administrative and support services as may be requested by the chairman of the commission.

<< 10 USCA § 113 NOTE >>

SEC. 564. TERMINATION OF COMMISSION.

The commission shall terminate 60 days after the date on which it submits the final report under section 562(e)(2).

<< 10 USCA § 113 NOTE >>

SEC. 565. FUNDING.

(a) FROM DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS.--Upon the request of the chairman of the commission, the Secretary of Defense shall make available to the commission, out of funds appropriated for the Department of Defense, such amounts as the commission may require to carry out its duties.

(b) PERIOD OF AVAILABILITY.--Funds made available to the commission shall remain available, without fiscal year limitation, until the date on which the commission terminates.

<< 10 USCA § 113 NOTE >>

SEC. 566. SUBSEQUENT CONSIDERATION BY CONGRESS.

After receipt of each report of the commission under section 562(e), Congress shall consider the report and, based upon the results of the review (and such other matters as Congress considers appropriate), consider whether to require by law that the Secretaries of the military departments conduct basic training on a gender-segregated or gender-integrated basis.

Amendment to Public Law

105 PL 85

Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues

October 17, 1998

EXTENSION OF REPORTING DATES FOR COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING
AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES.

FIRST REPORT – Subsection (e)(1) of section 562 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85; 111 Stat. 1754) is amended by striking out “April 15, 1998” and inserting in lieu thereof “October 15, 1998”.

FINAL REPORT – Subsection (e)(2) of such section is amended by striking out “September 16, 1998” and inserting in lieu thereof “March 15, 1999”.

Executive Summary

A. Commission Activities

Congress established the Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues under Title V, Subtitle F, of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998. Its mandate, set forth in Public Law 105-85, was enacted on Nov. 18, 1997. The Commission was to review the basic training policies of all four Services (including gender integration and gender segregation), as well as the policies governing the cross-gender relationships of military personnel, and to recommend any changes it believed were needed. The Commission was to be made up of 10 private citizens, with 5 appointed by the chairman and ranking minority member of the House Committee on National Security (now the House Armed Services Committee) and 5 by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

At its first meeting, on April 13-14, 1998, the Commission elected Anita K. Blair as its chairman and Frederick F. Y. Pang as vice chairman. It also organized itself into three working groups to address its principal areas of concern: adultery and fraternization rules, basic training in general, and gender integration in basic training. The Commission initiated a general information data call regarding initial entry training (IET) from all Services.

At its next meeting, in May, the Commission chose a chronological model as its conceptual approach to assess IET. The model, referred to as the “Continuum,” was to trace the steps from the military's first contact with a prospective recruit through the eventual placement of the soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine in an operational unit. The focus would be on operational readiness as it related to the recruits and IET. Meanwhile the Commission decided to divide its own activities into three parts: on-site examinations of both training sites and operational units, a research program, and formal hearings. These activities were to be supplemented with written interrogatories to the Secretary of Defense and the Services. The

aim was to have each activity complement the others, while providing a wide spectrum of information on which the Commission could base its recommendations.

In early June, the Services briefed the Commission and provided data concerning all phases of IET. The on-site visits began the same month, and in August the Commission approved staff appointments, including those of its research team. The interrogatory phase began in September 1998, and was completed in February 1999. Meanwhile from October 1998 through January 1999, the Commission held a total of 12 days of formal hearings. A wide variety of witnesses testified, among them both supporters and critics of current military practices. Witnesses included the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Other serving officers, as well as retired officers, senior enlisted personnel, civilian and military authorities on physical fitness, representatives from the General Accounting Office, experts on the legal aspects of Service policies on adultery, fraternization and sexual harassment, and military historians also testified.

The research program-10 projects in all-was developed in collaboration among the commissioners, staff members and consultants, and consisted of two types of activity. Existing documents and literature relevant to the Commission's work were gathered and analyzed, and new data were collected. Consistent with the chronological approach, the research program was designed to track the continuum of recruit experience, beginning with enlistment and continuing through graduation from the initial entry training program to assignment at the receiving units. The aim was to measure recruit socialization and the development of military values and attitudes, and to assess the quality of the training programs and the readiness of the graduating recruits to serve in the operating forces.

Surveys and interviews were conducted with a wide range of servicemembers. Recruits were asked to assess themselves and their training. Recruit trainers were asked to assess the recruits, and officers and non-commissioned officers in operational units were asked to assess the quality of the training programs and the quality of the graduating recruits.

A survey of approximately 9,000 recruits and 2,300 recruit trainers from all four Services, for example, was used to assess the attitudes of beginning and graduating recruits and how they related to unit cohesion and commitment. Another project, assessing the open-ended comments of recruit trainers, provided information on the trainers' perceptions of basic training, gender-integrated training, and adultery and fraternization policies. A complementary project surveyed some 10,000 enlisted personnel across the Services with 1 to 8 years of military experience. Researchers also conducted 42 focus groups with approximately 420 participants, stratified by gender, Service and career level, and the extent of gender integration in their current units.

Concurrent with the research projects, members of the Commission, either in a group or as individuals, continued their visits to the training facilities and operational units. Commissioners who made individual visits shared their observations with their colleagues. In all, 17 sites-14 in the United States, one in Germany, one in Bosnia, and one aboard the USS ENTERPRISE-were visited, several of them more than once. The Commission's first on-site

examination took place at the Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois, in June 1998 and concluded with a visit to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, in April 1999.

In their visits to training sites, the commissioners attempted to get as detailed a picture as possible of how recruits lived and trained. Thus they visited dining halls, living quarters, fitness centers and training areas. They also talked informally with recruits, although principally they observed them in a variety of training situations: obstacle and confidence courses, physical fitness sessions, rifle ranges, gas chambers. The commissioners then tested their observations in formal discussions with recruits, recruit trainers, and commanders.

Typically the Commission organized panels at both the training and operational units in which military personnel, randomly selected, were encouraged to be candid. The Commission told the respondents that comments were not for attribution so they would not have to fear reprisals for critical remarks.

Visits to the operational units, among them several joint commands, followed a different format from the one used at the training sites. Although the commissioners observed some on-going operational activities, they focused on asking questions. During these visits, they received a brief overview of the unit or units. Then, by asking questions at different levels of the chain of command, both in informal conversations and in panel discussions, the commissioners tried to develop a sense of the unit's readiness and its relationship to the training process. Were the new soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines assigned to the operational units sufficiently trained? Did the new personnel have the necessary skills? How did they compare with IET graduates the units had received in the past? Many of the questions were determined in consultation with the Commission's research and military staff.

B. Cross-Gender Relationships

In accordance with Section 562(a) of the enabling statute, the Commission was tasked to review and assess requirements and restrictions regarding “cross-gender relationships,” in the Armed Forces. To accomplish this, the Commission received briefings, research data and documents from the Department of Defense and the Services. It also compiled research on servicemembers' opinions on adultery, fraternization and sexual harassment, and heard from both serving and retired members of each Service’s Judge Advocate General’s office in hearings. Meanwhile, aware that the scope of the review encompassed in the enabling statute could easily involve tens of thousands of pages of regulations and case records, the Commission tried to set appropriate limits to its inquiry in time and resources.

Before determining findings, assessments, conclusions, and recommendations, however, the Commission studied the structure of the military justice system, and how it differs from its civilian counterpart. An explanation of the differences and the specific components applicable to cross-gender relationships is found in chapter 2.

The Commission was asked to look at perceptions, practices and the regulatory scheme of military justice as it pertained to “cross-gender relationships.” It found that while

many servicemembers perceive that laws, policies and directives concerning male-female relationships are applied consistently, a perception exists among a significant number of military personnel that they are not applied consistently.

The Commission's legal consultants concluded that the more junior the servicemember involved, the more comparable the level of punishment between co-actors. As the rank increases, however, a potentially significant disparity may exist, most prominently in the area of trainer-to-trainee consensual sexual misconduct. There may be reasons for this disparity, ranging from the historic rationale and culture of the military, which holds more senior members to a higher standard, and the fact that many of these offenses are handled as nonjudicial proceedings.

The Commission found that all parties to sexual misconduct should be held accountable, but accountability does not require that all punishments be identical. In an improper senior-subordinate relationship, holding the senior more accountable is not unreasonable. Equally, the basic training environment is unique, and to impose special restrictions on trainer-trainee relationships, and hold trainers more accountable when violations of the imposed restrictions occur, is not unreasonable. Thus, the Commission found that the rule of reasonableness could warrant a more severe penalty for the senior co-actor as long as all offending parties are held accountable to an appropriate, not necessarily equal, degree.

The Commission also found that data collection in the military justice system was inconsistent and incomplete. The Air Force has developed the most advanced tracking system, while the Army, and to a lesser extent the Navy and the Marine Corps, track some data, but have not yet developed systems to the level and thoroughness of the Air Force, especially concerning non-judicial punishments.

Additionally, the Commission found that low and mid-level officers now have little or no exposure to the military justice system in which they one day will have major administrative responsibilities. Exposure to the system through additional training for all officers, especially junior officers, would produce more rounded, experienced courts-martial convening commanders.

The Commission found that the proposed changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) concerning the offense of adultery are unnecessary. According to the Services, a charge of adultery is an infrequent occurrence. The elements of this offense are: (1) that the accused wrongfully had sexual intercourse with a certain person; (2) that, at the time, the accused or the other person was married to someone else; and (3) that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the Armed Forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the Armed Forces. These elements are discussed fully in chapter 2. Command consensus holds that the current guidance is "clear" and that no changes or further guidance is necessary. The Commission is concerned that such an amendment may have a negative effect on morale, an area that is always of concern to commanders. A change could very likely demoralize members of the Armed Forces and give undue weight to this admittedly rare infraction. Any change, whether

in “guidance” or legal form, will send an unintended message to the field that a check mark must be placed by each new item before action. A checklist mentality is exactly what good military leadership must avoid. The proposed changes are not desirable in a military or legal context.

Technically, fraternization is a limited offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) involving inappropriate officer/enlisted relationships. Other inappropriate relationships are also prohibited because they are “prejudicial to good order and discipline” or are “of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.” Because of an OSD review, the Secretary of Defense first mandated and now has implemented an order requiring the Services to make “uniform” their policies regarding prohibited relationships that are considered unprofessional or improper. Army commanders, who face the most significant change under such a policy, told the Commission that “enforcement will be difficult and will be impossible to manage.” Military personnel also underscored the Commission's concern that this latest top-down policy change was another example of taking away the discretion of commanders to make judgements on a case-by-case basis. One supposed rationale for the change is that Service policies need to be consistent because of fraternization among members of different Services in joint commands. The Commission found, however, that there have not been any specific problems as a result of different policies.

Following are the Commission’s recommendations regarding cross-gender relationships:

Adultery

The proposed changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) concerning the offense of adultery are unnecessary. The Secretary of Defense should not submit the proposed changes for inclusion in the MCM.

Unanimous Approval

Fraternization

The Commission is not persuaded that the new changes to military fraternization rules developed by the Department of Defense Good Order and Discipline Task Force are necessary or advisable. Service-specific policies have been functional and suitable to meet the requirements of each Service. Therefore, the Services should be permitted to retain their prerogatives in this area.

Unanimous Approval

Perceptions of Inconsistent Application of Laws and Rules

The Commission recommends that the Secretary of Defense take steps to cause the Services to educate their members and to inform the public about the special considerations that affect the prosecution and punishment of offenses relating to sexual misconduct in the military.

Unanimous Approval

The Commission recommends that the Services improve military justice data collection systems so that the Services may better monitor the consistency of application of rules governing sexual conduct in the military and prevent or correct misperceptions.

Unanimous Approval

There is a need to increase leader training at all levels in knowledge and application of military law and to increase their participation in the military justice system.

Unanimous Approval

C. Initial Entry Training with Emphasis on Basic Training

Basic training may be the single most important phase of an individual's life in the military. Although structured and defined differently by each Service, it is the common passage in which a young civilian learns the fundamentals of being a soldier, sailor, airman or Marine. The newly minted servicemember then proceeds to advanced or military occupational specialty (MOS) training. As indicated in the initial entry training (IET) Continuum foldout in chapter 3, IET encompasses the entire process: from the swearing in to the eventual departure to an operational assignment

The Commission's charter required it to focus on IET and in terms of visits and research most of its resources centered on the IET process, with an emphasis on recruit training. From the outset, however, the Commission understood that the Services all had distinct cultures, and that each Service's training reflected both its cultural heritage and current military objectives. Although there were common elements in all the training, there

were also marked differences in formats and emphasis. At the same time, each Service points out--and the Commission agrees--that improving IET must be an ongoing process. Descriptions of IET as it is now practiced in each of the Services and examples of recent and projected changes are found in chapter 3.

Following are the Commission's recommendations for initial entry training:

1. Where there is good leadership and a positive command climate, the training environment is healthy and appropriate, and accomplishes what is expected. Commanders need to be allowed to do their jobs. Overly restrictive requirements take away the Commanders' authority to make sound judgments (something we trust them to do with the lives of their men and women), and to act on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Let the Commanders command.

Unanimous Approval

The Commission found that commanders responsible for initial entry training sensed that leaders or senior leaders distrusted their ability to execute their duties. A consensus of commanders, as determined throughout extensive field visits, discussion groups, focus groups, and surveys felt they were subject to overly restrictive requirements and often, "micromanagement," which kept them from being totally effective. The Commission's assessment of the leaders we encountered is that they are professional, dedicated, and committed to transforming young men and women into the world's finest soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines. Leaders are also committed to training to the highest standards possible. They want to get on with their duties and minimize time spent reacting to changes in their training curricula and standard operating procedures. Too often, it seems, these changes emerge as reactions to isolated incidents in initial entry training, rather than being motivated by systematic analyses. These reactive changes can, over time, create negative unintended consequences. By contrast, proactive decisions based on periodic review, operational unit feedback, shared Service experiences, and trainer input lead to an ever improving, positive training environment.

2. Current Armed Forces personnel shortages and increased OPTEMPO appear to be adversely impacting readiness, deployment, and sustainability. Throughout our visits to both basic training organizations and the operating forces of all Services, we heard about the adverse effects of personnel shortages caused by downsizing and increased OPTEMPO. Personnel shortages in the noncommissioned officer ranks, E-5 to E-7, were noted by all. Attrition of these mid-level leaders results in more-senior leaders assuming their duties, with the result that they have no time to guide, mentor, or groom newly arrived trainees from IET into the operating forces organizations.

Unanimous Approval

The adage “do more with less” aptly reflects the reality of the Armed Forces today. In discussions with operational leaders, most negative comments directed at the “quality of recruits” were quickly replaced with ones concerning the more acute challenge of balancing operational requirements with the traditional and necessary development of subordinates. Senior leadership quite often finds itself filling the void created by the absence of these first-line supervisors, with little time left to spend with newly arrived graduates.

3. Provide career-enhancing incentives so that the best personnel seek a tour of duty in recruit training. Screen, select, train, and assign only outstanding enlisted personnel and commissioned officers for this duty.

Unanimous Approval

The Commission found that the Services have made many improvements in incentive pay, promotion opportunities, follow-on assignments, uniform allowances, priority of post housing, and child care for enlisted trainers. Additionally, the Services have reviewed and appropriately adjusted screening and selection processes. However, this is an area of concern that must not simply be considered now because of the current attention being paid to IET and forgotten at a later date. Attention to this area must be continuous. Recruit trainers are the individuals most responsible for transformation of recruits. They must be the best, wanting to serve and being appropriately compensated and recognized for their efforts.

4. Leader expectations are an issue across the Services. The Commission recommends that each Service have formal systems through which the operational force can send feedback to schools and training programs on the quality of the trainees they produce. Each Service needs a “leadership expectations” program that clearly tells all leaders what Initial Entry Training is supposed to accomplish, and what standards recruits and new trainees must meet.

Unanimous Approval

This recommendation is addressed to both recruit trainers and receiving leaders at the operational units. First, the Commission noted that recruit trainers are selected based on their professional performance, which almost always exceeds that of their peers. As a result, there is an expected conflict between Service-specific minimum standards and the personal standards of the trainer. Often, this personal standard is unrealistic for the average recruit to achieve given his/her training status. This phenomenon can be addressed positively through mentoring and coaching from experienced leaders at the training base.

Second, recruits in all Services are expected to meet the requirements and standards set by their Service and described in this report. These requirements and standards are expected to be sustained and improved upon in the operating forces as the final phase of transformation. The Commission found that in some instances where operating unit leaders complained about the capabilities of new personnel arriving from IET, when questioned, they were unaware of the Service standards the recruit or trainee had been trained to and their own role as sustainers of the transformation process. It is important that such leaders understand what standards recruits and new trainees must meet, and their own role in sustaining the transformation process. In some cases, this may reduce first term attrition.

5. Recruit trainer continuity is considered essential. We recommend that the Services give priority to full staffing of recruit trainer billets, and to keeping the same trainers with the same unit from the beginning to the end of the training cycle. Additional duties and/or details that remove trainers from their units during the cycle should be minimized.

Unanimous Approval

The Commission found that not all Services were fully staffing recruit trainer billets, and some, the Air Force in particular, did not keep the same trainers with the same unit from the beginning to the end of the training cycle. Additionally, many trainers found themselves being pulled away from their training duties to perform details for the base or post. Such

removal from the training unit is disruptive and inefficient. Air Force recruits vehemently objected to the practice, stating that they became confused with what standard was expected of them when the enforcers of the standards kept changing. Navy recruits had similar confusion with the Navy's practice of instructor assignment. Equally, it was evident that the recruit trainer is the most responsible for the transformation from recruit to soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine. Their example is critical to a successful transformation. When the recruit trainer continually changes, or there are fewer trainers than required, the process is adversely impacted and less successful.

6. The Services should continue to study and improve their physical fitness standards and programs. The Services have come far in studying and incorporating improved fitness standards and better understanding of job performance requirements. These studies should be continued, and fitness/performance programs should be continually reviewed and improved. There need to be clearly stated objectives about physical fitness tests and physical performance standards.

The Services should take steps to educate servicemembers about the meaning of "physical fitness," and how it differs from job performance standards. There is widespread misunderstanding about the purpose of the Services' physical fitness tests. The tests are designed to measure physical health and well-being. Measures of physical fitness must take age and gender into account, as the Services' tests currently do. Physical fitness tests are not measures of job-specific skills. The Services should maintain this distinction and communicate it to all levels of personnel, including basic trainees.

Unanimous Approval

The Commission acknowledges that the Services are currently engaged in extensive research concerning physical fitness and physical conditioning. This must continue and lead to a coherent, understood physical fitness and conditioning program for each of the Services. Superior physical fitness by individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines is a combat multiplier on the battlefield.

7. Initial Entry Training should emphasize military socialization and the inculcation of core values. Values training is very important to the trainees, and must be sustained throughout the training continuum and in the operating forces. Today, as in the past, some recruits enter the military having had life experiences that may increase the challenge of transforming them into servicemembers. Effective transformation can still take place if Initial Entry Training strongly emphasizes military socialization and inculcation of core values.

Unanimous Approval

The Commission applauds the efforts of each Service to formalize values training in the basic training portion of initial entry training. Recruits and trainers were quick to tell us how great an impact that this training has had in their growth and development. The continuation and sustainment of these core values must exist throughout each Service to include the operational forces.

8. Reasonable security measures for barracks are appropriate, but the Services should avoid creating the impression of a prison lockup.

Unanimous Approval

The Commission continues to be concerned that security measures for barracks being enacted as a result of the Kassenbaum Baker committee finding are, in some cases, being carried to an extreme. At some locations, especially Lackland Air Force Base and Fort Leonard Wood, these security measures leave the perception that the recruits live in a “lock up” similar to a detention center. The objectives of IET include developing self-discipline, self-confidence, and a sense of “team” and mutual trust and support. A “lock up” environment does not support attaining these objectives.

Additionally, the Army should re-evaluate the use of latrines and/or changing rooms in recruit barracks, where trainees undergoing integrated basic training must change their clothes rather than in their barracks room. The expressed reason for this is access by mixed-gender drill sergeants to the barracks. To the degree practical and based on the number of male and female drill sergeants assigned and the regular times that recruits are required to change their clothes, it may be more logical to manage male or female drill sergeant presence in the barracks at the times when hygiene and clothes-changing occur.

9. The Commission encourages supplying the proper resources to the training establishments, to enhance the basic training improvements the Services are currently implementing.

Unanimous Approval

The Commission observed great initiative and innovation on the part of dedicated cadres to improve through self-help, training facilities and events. In addition, in the case of Navy individual weapon familiarization/qualification with real ammunition is omitted and replaced by simulators due to the lack of range facilities. To ensure that recruit training is as robust and effective as it should be the Commission believes that training facilities and events must be fully resourced, and not left to self-help.

10. Each Service should establish an oversight program to ensure that recent improvements to recruit training will be sustained over time.

Unanimous Approval

Each of the Services has made substantial changes to initial entry training in the past 18-24 months. Most of these changes are a result of self-evaluation, Department of Defense direction as a result of the Kassebaum Baker committee findings, and congressional concerns. Generally, the changes represent clear improvements to the training process; however, like all changes, their effects should be periodically reviewed and analyzed to ensure they are serving the purpose for which they were made. Positive changes should be enhanced, while ineffective ones should be dropped or modified, as appropriate. New initiatives should also be considered if such training will result in a better soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine being provided to the operating forces.

To be effective, such an oversight program must have the personal involvement of the Service Chiefs. Each Service Chief should annually review the initial entry training Program with his staff, evaluate program results and methodologies being practiced, other services IET initiatives, and provide guidance, as appropriate. Service Chiefs should continually strive to improve their Services initial entry training process; it is their Title 10, U.S. Code, responsibility.

11. There is a need for a Department of Defense forum where all Services periodically exchange ideas, concepts, etc., for sustaining and improving Initial Entry Training.

Unanimous Approval

While the Department of Defense has numerous gatherings where initial entry training Programs (IET) can be discussed, the Commission believes that the Department should conduct an annual forum where the Services' Personnel Chiefs, Recruiting Commanders, and those responsible for IET will gather with the corresponding staffs of the Defense and Service Departments. The forum's agenda should include an exchange of ideas and concepts with the purpose of sustaining the current improvements that have been made to IET, and seeking additional ones. The Commission's findings clearly show that most improvements made by the Services were borrowed from another. The best example of this is that each Service now has a defining event that culminates the basic training part of IET. All stated that they adopted the event because of the success of the Marine Corps' Crucible. Open discussion and shared ideas can be a powerful tool in providing to the nation the very best trained soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines.

12. The Commission recommends that the Services develop longitudinal studies as part of their ongoing research programs. Longitudinal data, recognized in social science research as the best way to measure change and its causes, would provide the Services with valuable information.

Unanimous Approval

As was noted in the Executive Summary of *The Study of Military Recruit Attitudes Conducive to Unit Cohesion*, time constraints made it necessary to measure separate samples of beginning and ending recruits. Therefore, the study was not longitudinal; that is, it did not measure the same recruits at the beginning of training and then again at the end of their training. Because the Commission believes that longitudinal studies will provide more accurate data from which to draw conclusions, it recommends that they be part of the Services' ongoing research programs. Such studies would be most informative if they also follow the graduates through their first enlistment term.

13. It is important to continue “military training” (e.g., physical, military customs and courtesies, and values training) throughout each Service’s training continuum, from accession until assignment to the operating forces.

Unanimous Approval

The Commission found instances of a decline in the emphasis on basic military training as a recruit progressed in the training continuum. The cumulative result in these instances was a less than prepared servicemember arriving to his/her first operational assignment. Military training in the form of physical fitness, core values, drill, and military customs and courtesies must continue throughout all phases of IET. These basic requirements cannot be taught or performed in basic training only, and then forgotten during advanced individual training. If they are not reinforced or sustained, they will atrophy.

14. As much as is feasible, each Service should maintain an active pretraining program that encourages the beginning of the military socialization process for recruits in the Delayed Entry Programs (DEPs).

Unanimous Approval

Pretraining programs conducted by recruiters in their DEP improve the chance of success of new recruits entering IET. Programs which begin to lay a foundation for the military socialization process that the new recruits will experience should include physical fitness, rudimentary drill, and an introduction to values training. The Commission understands that creating and maintaining such a program in the highly charged, difficult world of recruiting is not easy and, if not managed correctly, can detract from the recruiter’s primary mission. The Commission also recognizes that each of the Services has established such a program; however, the Commission’s interviews reveal that their programs are not universally conducted by all recruiting stations. The Commission urges the Services to review their DEP Training Programs annually as part of the Service Chiefs’ annual review of IET which we have also recommended be accomplished to continually improve IET. Such training should also be discussed at the Department of Defense Forum that we have recommended for action. (See Recommendation 11).

15. Recruiter assistance duty should not be assigned before a trainee has completed Initial Entry Training, and should not extend beyond 14 days. Trainee participation in recruiter assistance programs should be monitored and regulated.

Unanimous Approval

The Commission recognizes that this is an unpopular finding, especially at a time when recruiting is so difficult. Some Services, especially the Marine Corps, make extensive use of recruiter assistants and interrupt IET, using those awaiting further advanced training. Unfortunately, the Commission found that, in many cases, trainees participating in the program returned to advanced training or reported to the operating forces in poor physical condition and having lost the values imparted at basic training. The Commission recommends that the Services that maintain such a program thoroughly evaluate it for its overall effectiveness, and then ensure that it is closely monitored and regulated.

D. Functions Relating to Gender-Integrated and Gender-Segregated Basic Training

Under Section 562(b) of the statute, the Commission was required to review the policies and practices of each of the Services “with regard to gender-integrated and gender-segregated basic training and, for each of the Services, the effectiveness of gender-integrated and gender-segregated basic training.” The issues set forth in the statute were complex to say the least, and in attempting to resolve them the Commission had not only to consider a confluence of information sources, but also remain cognizant of the limitations of static data in measuring a dynamic environment. Service policies, needs and attitudes change.

Randomized experiments in gender format training are impractical, and in the present context generally unavailable. However, the Commission researchers reviewed those that had been conducted in the past. Meanwhile, differences across Services (and even within Services across job specialties) in personnel characteristics (aptitude and education levels), job characteristics, leadership characteristics, location and other factors vary with gender format making cross-Service comparisons invalid. Further, organizations take time to adapt to change and the military is no exception. Attitudes toward gender issues do not change overnight.

Fortunately, the Commission was able to gather a great deal of evidence to use in making its assessments. This included results of Commission research (surveys, focus groups, attrition statistics, etc.), testimony, site visit observations, discussion groups, and previous reports on gender integration. A thorough examination of that evidence led the Commission to conclude that each Service should continue to conduct basic training in accordance with its current policies. This includes the manner in which trainees are housed and organized into units. The current gender formats in basic training are consistent with the current combat exclusion policies, which the Commission accepted as a given. Men training

for direct ground combat positions (Army and Marine Corps) train in all-male units. In the Army, Navy, and Air Force men and women training to serve in positions that are open to women do so in gender-integrated units. The Marine Corps uses the rheostat approach which is an entry-level process that moves from gender segregation at boot camp, to partial gender integration at Marine Combat Training, and finally to full gender integration at MOS school. In all cases across the Services, basic training creates an environment that is as close as possible to the operational environment in which first-term personnel will serve. Commanders, senior enlisted personnel and the immediate supervisors of first-term personnel told the Commission on its visits to operational units that they were generally satisfied with the vast majority of the new servicemembers they received after initial entry training. This incorporated their sense that the current gender formats in basic training were working well. The Commission found no evidence that operational readiness was adversely affected by gender-integrated training. When commanders were asked if they would take their new servicemembers into battle, the vast majority of leaders unhesitatingly said, "Yes!"

When asked about their major problems and concerns, the commanders did not mention gender until they were asked specifically about gender issues. Rather, their major concerns centered on sustainability. Both at training organizations and operational forces, the Commission heard about the adverse effects of personnel shortages caused by downsizing and increased operational tempo, or OPTEMPO. When asked what the Commission should tell Congress, a mid-grade Marine Corps officer said, "Personnel or OPTEMPO, fix one or the other."

The Commission did hear concerns about specific gender issues at the training bases they visited; however, the Commission was impressed by the generally positive attitudes expressed both by trainers and trainees and by the effective training it observed. With few exceptions, recruits said the training was challenging and difficult. The Commission also found that trainees who had worked with the opposite gender had more positive attitudes about gender-integrated training than the trainees who had not.

Trainers generally supported the basic training format followed by their Service. Trainers who expressed dissatisfaction with gender-integrated training tended to be those who also were trainers when significant changes were made: Their "routine" had been disrupted. Trainers who expressed more positive views tended to be those who became trainers after the changes were made.

A Commission survey measured the effect of training formats on the degree to which graduating recruits expressed attitudes of commitment, respect for authority and group identity. For the three Services where comparisons were possible (because there were males in both formats at the same location) the training format had no effect on the levels of these attitudes expressed; that is, graduates of gender-integrated and gender-segregated training expressed similar attitudes of commitment, respect for authority and group identity.

Moreover, when 9,270 enlisted personnel in operational units were asked what gender mix was best suited for basic training, most expressed a preference for the training format they had experienced themselves. Support for segregated training ranged from a low of 19 percent

in the Air Force to a high of 66 percent in the Marine Corps; this reflected their own Service's practices. Further, when these enlisted members were asked to evaluate the effect of gender integration on the quality of basic training, the majority said gender integration improved or had no effect on training quality (ranging from 41 percent of the Marine Corps respondents to 79 percent of the Air Force respondents).

Commission research on first-term soldiers, sailors and airmen shows that those who worked with the other gender more frequently during basic training reported being better prepared by basic for advanced training and their first assignments and better prepared for service in a gender-integrated unit.

The Commission believes the Department of Defense and, in particular, the military departments are best suited to assess the effectiveness of the training formats. Each Service has specific operational requirements to which it must train and perform. Success is measured by mission accomplishment, and the Commission has found no evidence of mission failures. Therefore it can find no compelling reason why the training formats should be changed. The current formats, which reflect the substantial improvements made in them over the last 24 months, are delivering well-trained soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines to the operational forces.

The Commission found no significant differences in attrition rates among servicemembers that were associated with either gender-segregated or gender-integrated training. Although attrition rates are higher for women than for men during first-term enlistments, the rates did not rise for either men or women coincident with gender-integrated training. Stress fractures are notably more common among female recruits, but they are not related to gender segregation or gender integration. Medical disqualifications overall are not consistently higher for women. Rather, male and female rates are comparable during first-term enlistments. The Commission even analyzed the potential effects gender-integrated or gender-segregated training would have on recruiting and found virtually no effect.

Of the three recommendations made by the Commission on gender-integrated and gender-segregated training, one was not adopted by unanimous approval. The alternative views of the commissioners who dissented or abstained are presented in chapter 5.

Following are the recommendations:

1. The Commission concludes that the Services are providing the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines required by the operating forces to carry out their assigned missions; therefore, each Service should be allowed to continue to conduct basic training in accordance with its current policies. This includes the manner in which basic trainees are housed and organized into units. This conclusion does not imply the absence of challenges and issues associated with the dynamics found in a gender integrated basic training environment. Therefore, improvements to Initial Entry Training that have been made by the Services or are currently being considered must be sustained and continually reviewed.

***VOTE: Yeas: Cantor, Christmas, Dare, Pang, Pope, Segal
 Nays: Blair, Keys, Moore
 Abstentions: Moskos***

Note: Commissioner Keys indicated that he wished to change his vote from “abstention” to “nay” and provided his reasons in the hearing before the Subcommittee on Personnel of the House Armed Services Committee on March 17, 1999. His vote was changed accordingly. Chairman Blair indicated that she wished to change her vote from “abstention” to “nay” and provided her reasons in an e-mail to commissioners on July 6, 1999. Her vote was changed accordingly.

2. The Services should review their regulations and policies concerning gender relations, to ensure that they are clearly stated, and with the aim of achieving consistency in practice across their training bases and throughout the training continuum.

Unanimous Approval

3. Initial entry training issues, to include gender, must continue to be discussed openly at all levels of the Services’ chains of command and legitimate feedback (both positive and negative) from trainers must be encouraged and acted upon.

Unanimous Approval

E. Alternative Views on Gender-Integrated and Gender-Segregated Training

Part 1. Alternative Views of Commissioner Moskos

Commissioner Moskos concurs with the overall finding that the Services are, by and large, providing the trained personnel to carry out their assigned missions; however, he concludes that he cannot state unequivocally that there are no serious flaws with gender-integrated training as expressed by trainers detailed in the graph in chapter 5, part 1.

Part 2. Alternative Views of Commissioners Blair, Keys, Moore

The issue of gender-integrated versus gender-separate training is politically difficult; it does not readily admit compromise positions. Training cannot be “a little bit integrated” or a “little bit separate.” It must be either one or the other; it cannot be both. The search for resolution, therefore, must take place in a different context. Meanwhile where one stands on the issue seems to depend on how one defines the purpose of basic training, or indeed, the purpose of the military in a democratic society. The studies sponsored by the Commission, as well as those done by others, undoubtedly contain judgments that reflect the glass through which the researchers themselves view the subjects.

Commissioners Blair, Keys, and Moore voted against the recommendation endorsing gender-integrated basic training. They found that not only is there evidence of serious problems in gender-integrated basic training, but there is also substantial evidence that gender-separate training produces superior results. Unfortunately, and despite having concurred with a 1996 General Accounting Office (GAO) recommendation that they do so, the Services have not collected comparative performance data for men and women in gender-integrated and gender-separate training units. Instead, these commissioners found that the Services have taken the position that their decisions regarding training formats are final.

Despite these and other limitations Commissioners Blair, Keys, and Moore were able to draw information from a variety of sources – surveys, focus groups, personal observations, training statistics – showing that gender-integrated training is flawed. The problems revolve around the difficulties of providing appropriate privacy for both sexes, accommodating fundamental physiological differences, and controlling sexual conduct. These issues simply do not arise in gender-separate training, which appears to generate better results at lower costs.

The opinions of recruit trainers, who are most familiar with today’s recruits and the basic training programs now being implemented, were particularly revealing. Asked which format “best facilitates the purpose of basic training,” large numbers of recruit trainers surveyed chose gender-separate training (33 percent in the Air Force, 37 percent in the Army, 44 percent in the Navy and 88 percent in the Marine Corps) over gender-integrated training (chosen by 40 percent in the Air Force, 36 percent in the Navy, 27 percent in the Army, and 2 percent in the Marine Corps). Even larger numbers agreed that “mixing males and females

causes unnecessary distractions in recruit training” (54 percent in the Army, 62 percent in the Air Force, 67 percent in the Navy, and 84 percent in the Marine Corps).

All the Services purport to apply the same standards to recruits, except for physical fitness standards, which are always gender-normed. Although the standards are defined and applied in a gender-neutral manner, some are defined in a way that permit individuals to fail at certain tasks, even critical ones, yet still pass overall tests. The standard for the Army’s hand-grenade qualification course, for example, requires a recruit to complete five of seven events and throw two live hand grenades. A recruit who completes five events, however, and does not demonstrate adequate throwing ability may be excused from the requirement to throw the live grenades. Similarly, “completion” of obstacle and confidence courses does not mean that recruits actually negotiate a confidence course; they are only required to make an attempt. A commissioner observed Air Force recruits, mostly female, walk around confidence-course barriers rather than try to scale them.

There is a related problem here. Some studies report that gender-integrated basic training produces the same, or better, results than gender-separate training. Other studies, including those sponsored by the Commission, seem to show that the gender formats have no particular effect on the outcome of training. But studies of gender-integrated training focus primarily on issues of sociological and psychological, not necessarily military, interest. Many observers worry that the “warrior spirit” is disappearing in the military. Rarely if ever does the existing literature ask about outcomes relating to the characteristics of a warrior: disciplined, hard working, appropriately aggressive, cool-headed, quick, self-motivated, enterprising and tenacious.

A Commission study measured the inculcation of attitudes in graduating recruits in all four Services that were considered conducive to cohesion. The attitudes were commitment, respect for authority, and group/Service identity, all essential to a warrior spirit. Marine Corps graduating recruits scored highest on those attitudes, and in fact, female Marine recruits scored at the highest levels of all the graduating recruits who were measured.

The other Services might lose nothing, and perhaps gain much, by emulating the Marine Corps practice of separating men and women during the first several weeks of basic training. Having completed the reviews and assessments required by Congress, Commissioners Blair, Keys, and Moore concluded that the Army, Navy and Air Force should (a) collect data to permit an objective evaluation of existing gender-integrated training; and (b) test alternate models to generate comparative data on the military effectiveness of gender-integrated versus gender-separate training. These studies should be performed under the auspices of qualified, impartial outside organizations.

The modern battlefield exposes many non-combat personnel to the risks of battle. For the sake of the lives of all personnel, basic training should emphasize skills and attitudes that will enable them to survive and to help, not endanger, others. The principle of military effectiveness should dictate how the Services train and it should not be subordinated to any other goal.

Congress established the Commission on Military Training and Gender-Integrated Issues under Title V, Subtitle F, of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998. Its mandate, set forth in Public Law 105-85, was enacted on November 18, 1997. The Commission was to review the basic training policies of all four Services including gender integration and segregation and the policies governing the cross-gender relationships of military personnel, and recommend any changes or improvements it concludes are needed. The Commission was made up of 10 private citizens; 5 were to be appointed by the chairman and ranking minority member of the House Committee on National Security (now the House Armed Services Committee) and 5 by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services.¹

The statute required the Commission to review and assess laws, regulations, policies, and practices regarding cross-gender relationships in the Services. With regard to initial entry training (IET), the Commission also was directed to look at all aspects of gender-integrated training and gender-segregated/separate training, including the effectiveness of each. The Commissioners were required to review a specific list of items set forth in Section 562(b)(2)² and to make factual determinations, qualitative assessments, and recommendations on gender-integrated and gender-segregated training. The Commissioners investigated and assessed the component parts of basic training in general to determine whether the individuals coming out of training meet the needs of the receiving operational unit. The focus of their efforts was operational readiness as it relates to recruits and IET, with emphasis on basic training.

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<sup>1</sup> Appendix A “Commissioner Members.”

<sup>2</sup> Public Law 105-85.

## *A. Chronological Overview*<sup>3</sup>

At its first meeting, on April 13-14, 1998, the Commission elected Anita K. Blair its chairman and Frederick F. Y. Pang vice chairman. At the same time, it adopted military effectiveness and readiness as its standard for review, and it organized itself into three working groups to address its principal areas of concern: (1) adultery and fraternization rules, (2) basic training in general, and (3) gender integration in basic training. The Commission also familiarized itself with previous reviews of gender integration and gender segregation in basic training, in particular, the findings by the Kassebaum Baker panel.<sup>4</sup> Mindful of the General Accounting Office's (GAO) critique of that committee's report, the Commission decided to ask for a GAO briefing.

At its next meeting, in May 1998, the Commission chose a chronological model as its conceptual approach to assessing IET. The model, referred to as the "Continuum,"<sup>5</sup> would trace the steps from the military's first contact with a recruit through the eventual placement of the recruit in an operational unit. The Commission also initiated and received a general information data call regarding IET from all Services. In early June, the Commission was briefed by all four Services on their policies governing basic training. At the same time, the Commission decided to divide its activities into three parts: (1) on-site examinations of both training sites and operational units, (2) a research program, and (3) formal hearings. These activities were to be supplemented with written interrogatories to the Secretary of Defense and the Services. The aim was to have each activity complement all the others while providing a wide spectrum of information on which the Commission could base its recommendations.

On June 1 and 2, 1998, the Services briefed the Commission on all phases of IET from accession of the recruit to the initial assignment to an operational unit. Commissioners became acquainted with the differing cultures and missions of the four Services. These briefings included emphasis and detail on basic or recruit training, or "boot camp," as it is termed in the Marine Corps. Throughout the summer, they visited IET installations in all four Services.

In late August, the Commission planned the next phases of its evaluation. The commissioners decided to visit operational forces, use written interrogatories to the Secretary of Defense and the Services, and hold information-gathering hearings to complete the multidimensional assessment. The research program began with the hiring of the Research Director and the principal researchers.

The interrogatory phase, started in September 1998 and completed in February 1999, included written and oral requests for information and data. All requests went to the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Services. The Commission obtained volumes of relevant material. The commissioners and staff commend those who labored to meet the deadlines.

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<sup>3</sup> Timeline of Commission Activity at page 8.

<sup>4</sup> Chapter 2, page 9, footnote 9.

<sup>5</sup> IET Continuum foldout, chapter 3, page 93.

From October 1998 to the end of January 1999, the Commission held over 20 sessions, spanning 12 days of hearings, to gather and assess information. At the commissioners' direction, the staff identified witnesses who could address areas relevant to the inquiry. Witnesses from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Services presented official practice and policy. Retired military officers, outside experts from both the military and the civilian sectors, and individuals knowledgeable of the experiences and practices of foreign allies also testified. The Commission heard from both supporters and critics of current policies. Briefing books were assembled for the commissioners before each hearing. These books usually included biographies of the witnesses and relevant data collected by the military liaison officers. Individual commissioners also requested data bearing on their particular interests. Some of the data formed the basis for the questions at hearings; additional requests for data would be motivated by the testimony at the hearings.

The hearings, held over one- or two-day periods, touched on subjects as diverse as physiology and physical fitness, gender integration in the Dutch and Israeli militaries, and the Services' response to the Kassebaum Baker recommendations. A wide variety of witnesses testified, among them the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Other serving officers, as well as retired officers, senior enlisted personnel, civilian and military authorities on physical fitness and physical conditioning, representatives from the GAO and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), experts on the legal aspects of Service policies on adultery, fraternization and sexual harassment, and military historians also testified.

The Commission retained consultants to provide expertise and former Judge Advocate General officers to assist in legal issues. Additional research consultants and an editor also joined the staff.

The research program, 10 projects in all, was developed with the collaboration of the commissioners, staff members, and consultants, and consisted of two types of activity. Existing documents and literature relevant to the Commission's work were gathered and analyzed, and new data were collected. Consistent with the chronological approach, the research program was designed to track the continuum of recruit experience, beginning with enlistment and continuing through graduation from the IET program to assignment to receiving units. The aim was to measure recruit socialization and the development of military values and attitudes and to assess the effect of the training experience as recruits were assigned to their new units and began their military careers.

To achieve this goal, surveys and interviews were conducted with a wide range of servicemembers. Recruits were asked to assess themselves and their training. Recruit trainers were asked to assess the recruits. Officers and noncommissioned officers in operational units were asked to assess the quality of the training programs and the quality of the graduating recruits.

Concurrently with the research projects, members of the Commission, either in groups or as individuals, continued their visits to the training facilities and operational units. Commissioners who made individual visits shared their observations in oral and written

reports to their colleagues. To accommodate conflicts in the commissioners' schedules, the four military liaison officers on the staff of the Commission arranged multiple visits. In all, 17 sites were visited, 14 in the United States, one in Bosnia, one in Germany and aboard the USS ENTERPRISE underway. The Commission's first on-site examination, for example, took place at the Great Lakes Naval Training Center in June. Additional visits to Great Lakes were made in July and February. Commissioners, along with members of the research staff, conducted their final visit, to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, in early April 1999.

During their visits to the training sites, the commissioners tried to get as detailed a picture as possible of how recruits live and train. They visited dining halls, living quarters, fitness centers, and training facilities. Commissioners talked informally with recruits and observed them in a variety of training situations, such as obstacle and confidence courses, physical fitness tests, rifle ranges, and gas and chemical warfare chambers. Commissioners also conducted formal discussions with recruits, trainers, and commanders.

Typically, the Commission organized panels at both the training and the operational units. Military personnel were encouraged to be candid in responding to questions by being told that the Commission would keep their comments confidential; also, that they would not have to fear reprisal for critical remarks. Recruits were chosen from units at random, often by social security number.

Visits to the operational units, among them several joint commands, followed a different format from the one used at the training sites. Although the commissioners observed some activities, they focused on asking questions. During these visits, the commissioners received a brief overview of the unit or units. Then, by asking questions at different levels of the chain of command, both in informal conversations and in panel discussions, they tried to develop a sense of the unit's readiness and its relationship to the training process. Are the new soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines assigned to the operational units sufficiently trained? Do the new personnel have the skills they need to do their jobs? How do they compare with the graduates of IET the units received in the past? Many of the questions were determined in consultation with the Commission's research staff. In these discussions, commissioners asked a fairly consistent set of questions, with follow-up questions arising out of the answers.

The Commission met regularly from the first of February to May 1999 to assess the information it gathered. At the request of the House Subcommittee on Military Personnel, the Commission presented a Statement and Status Report on March 17, 1999. There was not total agreement on all issues; differences are identified. For most of the work, the commissioners acted as a committee of the whole in reviewing and analyzing the information. Thus, each commissioner acted on both common and shared information. The basic assessments in this report are supported by the Commission as indicated.

## ***B. Initial Entry Training Overview***

The four military liaison officers joined the staff and planned, coordinated, and executed the visits to the basic training installations and advanced individual training/military occupational specialty schools. Regardless of the Service site being visited, the format was

similar. The commissioners observed training activities and talked with recruits and trainers. The first impressions and introductions to military life for recruits helped the commissioners start the process of fulfilling the mandate of the Congress. The Commission conducted multiple visits<sup>6</sup> to accommodate conflicting schedules. Commissioners talked with hundreds of servicemembers in planned discussion groups. They also conversed informally with trainers, commanders, and other personnel while observing training activities.

### ***C. Services' Operational Overview***

The Commission used the operational force visits as one component of its evaluation of the results of IET. The format for these trips differed from the training site visits. The commissioners no longer concentrated on observed activities; instead, they spent most of the time asking all levels of command to assess the IET product: the trained and recently assigned servicemembers. Commissioners focused on units from the commanding officer down to the firstline supervisor, and met with both commissioned and noncommissioned officers. They also asked the individuals who were beginning the working phase of their military careers to assess their own training. The discussion group participants represented a variety of combat and support units. The final event of this phase was a trip to the European Theatre to visit soldiers in Bosnia, sailors and Marines aboard the USS ENTERPRISE underway in the Mediterranean Sea, and airmen at Ramstein Air Base in Germany. This final trip allowed the commissioners to interact with servicemembers deployed in the performance and support of operational commitments abroad.

### ***D. Joint Operational Overview***

The Commission went to Bosnia, visited TASK FORCE Eagle in Tuzla, toured the headquarters, and talked with active and reserve component soldiers. The Army also took the commissioners to Camp Comanche and Camp Bedrock, where they talked to soldiers about their tour of duty in Bosnia. The commissioners then proceeded to the USS ENTERPRISE underway, where they observed night flight operations; remained overnight; toured the ship, including berthing compartments; and talked with sailors and Marines. The Commission's final site visit was to Ramstein Air Base in Germany, where commissioners toured the installation and talked with airmen, noncommissioned officers, and officers.

In addition, individual commissioners made authorized visits to several joint commands and the United States Coast Guard basic training facility. The joint visits included the Pacific Command, the Atlantic Command, the Southern Command, and the Southern European Task Force.

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<sup>6</sup> See Appendix D "Trip Maps and Trip Matrices."

## ***E. Research Program***

### **1. Overview**

The research program consisted of two types of assessment: gathering and analyzing existing documents and literature, and new data collection. These new studies addressed sections of the statute that required an examination of basic training in general and the effects of gender format in particular. In all, 10 projects were initiated. The research program was developed in collaboration with commissioners, contractors, and consultants. The GAO provided valuable review and input on research methodologies. The design and review phases of the program were conducted in September and October 1998. The fielding of the program occurred in November, and the majority of data were collected from November 1998 through January 1999. Final reports for the 10 projects were submitted from February through May 1999.

### **2. Objectives**

The program encompassed the continuum of recruit experience, beginning with military enlistment and arrival at a basic training site, and continuing through graduation from the IET program and assignment to receiving units. The objectives were to track recruit socialization and the corresponding development of values, attitudes, and performance and to assess the effect of these experiences as recruit graduates were assigned to their new units and began their military careers.

To this end, surveys and interviews were conducted with an extensive range of servicemembers. The surveys included recruit self-assessment. In addition, recruit trainers, enlisted leaders, and officers serving in operational units provided their assessments of the quality of the training programs and the qualifications of trainees who graduated. Further, enlisted members with one through eight years of military service retrospectively assessed their experiences and proficiency levels in a number of dimensions. Assessments focused on socialization into the military, development of core values and attitudes, and opinions on military training and gender-related issues. Systematic focused interviews were conducted with enlisted members at different career levels to provide qualitative, in-depth information about superior/subordinate relationships, unit social interactions, and viewpoints on gender integration in the military. Several projects reviewed existing data, conducting secondary analyses on issues relevant to the Commission's charter.

### **3. Projects**

Volumes III and IV "Research Projects, Reports, and Studies" contain each of the studies summarized below. The report of one project, *The Study of Military Recruit Attitudes Conducive to Unit Cohesion and Survey of Military Leader Opinions on Recruit Training and Gender-Related Issues* (Johnson, 1999), includes samples of approximately 9,000 recruits and 2,300 recruit trainers across the Services. There also was a leader sample of approximately 10,000 officers and senior enlisted members. The sample included a stratified random sample

of O-3<sup>7</sup> and E-6/7<sup>8</sup> military leaders, as well as a mail survey of all operational unit battalion, squadron, and ship commanders and their senior enlisted advisors. The report of a second project *Content Analysis of Written Comments Provided on the Recruit Trainer Survey* (Miller and Januscheitis, 1999), assesses open-ended comments given by some of the sample of recruit trainers across Services. This analysis provided in-depth information on their perceptions of basic training, gender-integrated training format, and adultery and fraternization policies. The *Thematic Assessment of Graduate Recruit Written Comments* (Shrader, 1999) summarizes open-ended comments from surveys of approximately 3,000 graduating recruits, supplementing the data on their basic training experiences. Finally open-ended survey comments from all recruit and military leader samples were transcribed for the record.

The report on a complementary project, *Retrospective Survey of Socialization, Values, and Performance in Relation to Recruit Training* (Ramsberger, Laurence, and Sipes, 1999), is based on surveys of approximately 10,000 enlisted personnel across the Services with one through eight years of military experience. The strata also included gender and career fields. The survey section on basic training overlapped the data collected for the project on recruits' and leaders' values, attitudes, and training experiences summarized above. Other survey questions addressed current assignment, career-progression experiences, proficiency levels, and gender-interaction policies.

The report on a systematic focused interview project, *Focus Group Research* (Laurence, Wright, Keys, and Giambo, 1999), presents an in-depth qualitative description of the following topics: performance, equitable standards and treatment, superior-subordinate relationships, social interactions and their effect on performance, clarity and effectiveness of military regulations on gender interactions, and viewpoints on gender in the military. Content analyses of summaries of full transcripts were completed for 42 focus groups (approximately 420 total participants), organized by gender, Service, career level (Basic Training, Advanced/Technical Training, or Operational Unit), and level of gender integration in current unit.

Three projects in the research program evaluated existing survey and performance data to broaden the perspective on recruit training experiences and outcomes and on gender-integration issues. These secondary analyses provided a longitudinal perspective without the requirement of following servicemembers over time. *Performance Data Modeling* (Sipes and Laurence, 1999), compares attrition rates for fiscal years 1992 through 1997 cohorts of enlisted servicemembers by gender and job category across Services. Another project, *Youth Attitude Tracking Study. (YATS): A Review of Selected Results* (Laurence and Wetzel, 1999), reviews data from an existing annual national survey of 10,000 male and female respondents, 18 to 24 years of age, on military-enlistment propensity and includes questions added at the Commission's request on attitudes toward gender-integrated recruit training. *The Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (MEOCS): Overview of Results Related to the CMTGRI* (Dansby, 1999) presents data evaluating equal opportunity and organizational effectiveness trends for 800,000 servicemembers from 6,000 units across Services.

<sup>7</sup> Captains in the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps; Lieutenants in the Navy.

<sup>8</sup> Staff Sergeants/Sergeants First Class in the Army; Technical Sergeants/Master Sergeants in the Air Force; 1<sup>st</sup> Class Petty Officers/Chief Petty Officers in the Navy; Staff Sergeants/Gunnery Sergeants in the Marine Corps.

**VOLUME I - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The final projects included a report, *Executive, Legislative, and Policy Chronology Regarding Women in the Military* (Handy and Saunders, 1999), documenting the chronology of changes from 1947 to the present and *Literature Reviews and Annotated Bibliographies* (Handy, 1999). Collected literature addressed the following subjects: gender-integrated training, women in the military, military training, women's integration in nontraditional work sectors, and women in militaries outside of the United States.

| <b>TIME LINE OF COMMISSION ACTIVITY</b> |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
|-----------------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--|
|                                         | APR '98 | MAY '98 | JUN '98 | JUL '98 | AUG '98 | SEP '98 | OCT '98 | NOV '98 |  |
| Organization/Administration             |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| Data Calls                              |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| Initial Entry Level Training Visits     |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| Research                                |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| Interim Report                          |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| Hearings                                |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| Operational Visits                      |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| Commission Review                       |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| Status Report                           |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| Final Report                            |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
|                                         | DEC '98 | JAN '99 | FEB '99 | MAR '99 | APR '99 | MAY '99 | JUN '99 | JUL '99 |  |
| Organization/Administration             |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| Data Calls                              |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| Initial Entry Level Training Visits     |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| Research                                |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| Interim Report                          |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| Hearings                                |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| Operational Visits                      |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| Commission Review                       |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| Status Report                           |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |
| Final Report                            |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |         |  |

Along with assessing the consistency with which laws, regulations, and policy directives are applied, and among the duties listed below, the Commission was tasked with assessing the reports of the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues (Kassebaum Baker Committee) and two other review panels—one dealing with the sufficiency of guidance to commanders regarding the offense of adultery, and a separate task force reviewing Service regulations pertaining to fraternization and other prohibited interpersonal relations among military personnel.<sup>9</sup>

At its inception, the Kassebaum Baker Committee was referred to by the Department of Defense as the “independent panel” to signify its independence from the Pentagon and to distinguish it from the other review initiatives concurrently announced by the Secretary of Defense in the summer of 1997.<sup>10</sup> The other two initiatives came to be called the “adultery review” and the “good order and discipline task force.”<sup>11</sup>

The Commission has placed the requirement to assess the Kassebaum Baker report primarily under the gender-integrated training section of this report, except to the extent that regulatory or practical aspects of military justice and cross-gender relations are concerned.

<sup>9</sup> The Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues is commonly referred to as the Kassebaum Baker committee. The panel was named after its Chair, former Senator Nancy Kassebaum, who subsequently married former Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker. Unlike the other two panels, members of the Kassebaum Baker committee were independent from the Pentagon by virtue that none of its members were employed by the Department of Defense at the time of their appointment.

<sup>10</sup> Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Press Release, *Secretary of Defense Announces Initiatives to Ensure Equity In Policies for Good Order and Discipline*, 7 June 1997 ([http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1997/b066071997\\_bt296-97.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1997/b066071997_bt296-97.html)).

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, “[A]dultery review” is shortened from the Office of the Secretary of Defense description of “review the clarity of existing guidance on adultery under the Uniform Code of Military Justice;” the Pentagon coined the phrase “good order and discipline task force” in internal documentation.

## ***A. The Statute***

“SEC. 562. DUTIES.

FUNCTIONS RELATING TO REQUIREMENTS AND RESTRICTIONS REGARDING CROSS-GENDER RELATIONSHIPS.—  
The commission shall consider issues relating to interpersonal relationships of members of the Armed Forces as follows:

“(1) Review the laws, regulations, policies, directives, and practices that govern personal relationships between men and women in the Armed Forces and personal relationships between members of the Armed Forces and non-military personnel of the opposite sex.

“(2) Assess the extent to which the laws, regulations, policies, and directives have been applied consistently throughout the Armed Forces without regard to the armed force, grade, rank, or gender of the individuals involved.

“(3) Assess the reports of the independent panel, the Department of Defense task force, and the review of existing guidance on fraternization and adultery that have been required by the Secretary of Defense.”<sup>12</sup>

## ***B. The Process***

At the outset, the Commission used the structure of its enabling statute to organize the comprehensive review.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, the remainder of this chapter is organized according to the Section 562(a) format in the statute.

In reviewing Section 562(a) pertaining to “cross-gender” relationships, the Commission received briefings, research data, testimony, and documents from the Department of Defense and the Services on male-female relationships relative to the military justice system, and it compiled research on the opinions of servicemembers regarding adultery, fraternization, and sexual harassment.

Beginning in September, the Commission included a set of questions in a large data request to the Department of Defense to delineate the scope and limits of this very broad area of inquiry. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) identified all relevant laws and

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<sup>12</sup> Public Law 105-85, Section 562 (a).

<sup>13</sup> In August of 1998, the commissioners agreed to separate the research projects and formed subcommittees according to the three primary sections of the statute, Section 562 (a) (cross-gender relationships); Section 562 (b) (basic training generally); and Section 562 (c) (gender-integrated training).

regulations and provided a self-assessment that the laws are consistently applied regardless of Service, rank, and sex, but with several caveats that some laws apply only to certain ranks and Services.<sup>14</sup>

In October, the Commission held two hearings relevant to Section 562(a). Senior representatives from each Service's Judge Advocate General (JAG) office testified before the Commission on matters pertaining to adultery, fraternization, unprofessional or improper relationships, and the military justice system as a whole.<sup>15</sup>

In November, the Commission heard from a former senior military JAG officer and a former inspector general (IG).<sup>16</sup> This panel testified about typical cases involving prohibited relations between men and women, the role of JAGs and IGs, the consistency of application of military justice in these types of cases, and the training and direct involvement of junior officers in military justice affairs.<sup>17</sup>

In late November, the Commission hired five legal consultants. Each was an expert in his own area of the law, having a total of more than a century of military justice experience, and substantial experience in both military and civilian courts. In an attempt to fashion a realistic yet viable research plan, given the time and resources of not only the Commission but also the Pentagon, they divided their inquiry into an assessment of policy and practices for offenses pertaining to prohibited male and female relations.

Charles W. Gittins, a former U.S. Marine Corps trial counsel, and Henry Hamilton, a retired lieutenant colonel in the criminal trial division of Army JAG, headed the review of consistency of application in practice. Brigadier General Thomas R. Cuthbert, USA (Ret), a former Chief Military Judge and trial counsel; Captain Gerald Kirkpatrick, USN (Ret); and Colonel Thomas Abbey, USAF (Ret) headed up the review of the laws, regulations, policies and directives. All consultants had input and responsibilities for all areas of inquiry, although each concentrated on both the practice and the policy aspects of his specific Service. Cuthbert, Abbey, and Kirkpatrick each held the position of Director of Legal Policy in OSD at one time.

<sup>14</sup> An example of a law applying only to certain ranks is UCMJ Article 133 "Conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman," which, as its name indicates, applies only to officers, not enlisted personnel. See Volume II "Transcripts" pages 111-112, (17Nov98, pp. 181 and 186).

<sup>15</sup> The general assessment from the JAG testimony was that the frequency of adultery and fraternization was not the cause of overriding alarm or concern in the Services, but that prevention of sexual harassment was at the top of the list of priorities for the Services. See Volume II "Transcripts" pages 112-115, (17Nov98, pp. 185, 190, 193, 194, 197, 203).

<sup>16</sup> Miller, BGen Gerald, USMC (Ret), former senior ranking Marine Corps JAG officer, and Trefry, LTG Richard, USA (Ret), former Inspector General of the United States Army, Volume II "Transcripts" pages 96-111 (17Nov98, pp. 91-176). Except for the Marine Corps, a "TJAG" is the highest-ranking legal officer in each Service. TJAG is the literal acronym for "The Judge Advocate General." Other lower-ranking legal officers also are referred to as Judge Advocate Generals, but not "The" JAG. The highest-ranking JAG officer in the Marine Corps is the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant because the USMC is within the U.S. Department of the Navy, which already has its TJAG.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* Volume II "Transcripts" pages 99-106 (17Nov98, pp. 104-107, 114, 124, 147-150). They testified to their opinion that the military justice system had become the predominant domain of lawyers to the detriment of the nonlawyer officer corps. Although they recognized the need for the reforms of the late-1960's, which primarily addressed the problem of command influence in military justice, the generals believe that the system needed to allow nonlawyer junior officers more direct exposure to UCMJ proceedings at earlier stages in their careers. This would, they believe, allow for more experienced and practiced general courts-martial convening authority in the future.

The legal consultants helped fashion the second round of questions and document requests sent to OSD and, separately, to the Services. OSD was asked several follow-up questions on testimony before the Commission and was asked to provide documents relevant to its adultery review and good order and discipline task force. In addition, each Service was asked to provide a limited set of documents involving eight specific offenses<sup>18</sup> relevant to prohibited male-female relationships for a small sampling of installations.<sup>19</sup>

On beginning its review of this section of the statute, the Commission became aware of the broad scope of this area of inquiry. Although not omitting any important matters, the Commission found it necessary to incorporate in the research process a reasonable effort to narrow the scope to a manageable yet meaningful level. Although the Commission substantially complied with the tasking set forth in the statute, it was not able in the allotted time to cover everything that conceivably could have been included in this inquiry.<sup>20</sup>

In the Fiscal Year 1998 Defense Authorization Act creating the Commission, Congress The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) conducted the study. This NAPA study, which focused on investigatory policies and practices regarding sex-related crimes

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<sup>18</sup> Excerpt from the 11 December 1998 Commission document request to each Service: “1) Sexual harassment or maltreatment by sexual harassment in violation of Article 93, UCMJ; 2) Sodomy in violation of Article 125, UCMJ; 3) Violation of a lawful general order or regulation where the order or regulation relates to fraternization, improper association, illegal association, unprofessional relationship, sexual harassment, or any misconduct involving a service member of the opposite sex of the alleged transgressor in violation of Article 90 or 92, UCMJ; 4) Adultery or fraternization in violation of Article 134, UCMJ; 5) Indecent Language in violation of Article 134, UCMJ; 6) Indecent acts where the acts were allegedly committed by a military member upon another military member; 7) Assault with intent to commit a sexual offense against another service member in violation of Article 134, UCMJ; 8) Rape in violation of Article 120, UCMJ; 9) Attempts of the above listed offenses in violation of Article 80, UCMJ.”

<sup>19</sup> After negotiations, the Services provided documents in mid-January 1999. To provide a minimally adequate sampling, the Commission’s request required the Services to perform a hard-copy search for records which each Service said involved a manpower intensive undertaking. The Services expressed concern about the request for legal reviews and specific records of individual courts-martial and nonjudicial punishment offenses because of privacy concerns, the sensitive and confidential nature of opinions from military legal staff to their commanders, and the potential for public scandal if the information found its way into the public arena. After several discussions to clarify the requests, further documentation was provided from mid- to late January 1999. Although OSD has yet to produce some documents and data on several matters that arose during testimony, the response to the request for documentation concerning the adultery and good order and discipline reviews was thorough and complete. See also Volume II “Transcripts” page 515 (30Jan99, page 45).

<sup>20</sup> Broad reading of the statute would require a substantially longer period of study, because of the large amount of paperwork it would generate.

within the military, should provide Congress a complementary review on related matters.<sup>21</sup> The NAPA report was issued on 24 June 1999.

In terms of potential volume, the scope of review encompassed in the Commission's enabling statute could easily involve tens of thousands of pages of regulations and case records (court-martial documents, adverse administrative actions, nonjudicial punishment files, reprimands, *etc.*). Again, the Commission sought to limit the inquiry appropriately in terms of feasibility, both in time and resources.

Upon receiving documentation from the Services, the consultants reviewed all material relative to this section and produced a report for the Commission, which they presented prior to testifying on 30 January 1999. In response to commissioner requests, the consultants produced follow-up material clarifying and elaborating their initial report, findings and recommendations.<sup>22</sup>

### ***C. Findings and Assessments***

#### **1. Section 562 (a)(1)**

“(1) Review the laws, regulations, policies, directives, and practices that govern personal relationships between men and women in the Armed Forces and personal relationships between members of the Armed Forces and non-military personnel of the opposite sex.”<sup>23</sup>

##### **a. Review and Overview of the Military Justice and Regulatory System**

First, it is useful to explain the overall structure of the military justice system and how that system is integrated into the military before discussing aspects of the governance of male-female relationships in the Armed Forces.

The primary responsibility of commanders is to accomplish the “mission.”<sup>24</sup> That mission, because it ultimately involves the organized and, ideally, optimized use of deadly force, at times may come to loggerheads with civilian notions of adjudging “justice” for transgressions among the troops. Although this potential conflict most often finds a

<sup>21</sup> NAPA was tasked with studying the investigatory policies, procedures, and practices for crimes involving sexual misconduct in the military. After staff-to-staff contact, it was determined that the two studies would not be substantially overlapping. While this Commission primarily focused on issues concerning consensual offenses involving interpersonal relationships, the NAPA review focused on sexual crimes commonly understood in civilian justice as felony-level crimes (rape, sexual assault, child molestation and the like). The Commission's review almost exclusively focused on such consensual offenses as adultery, fraternization, and improper and unprofessional relationships. To the extent that the Commission focused on nonconsensual offenses, its inquiry was primarily limited to sexual harassment.

<sup>22</sup> See full report and addendum submissions of legal consultants in Vol II, “Transcripts” pages 508-604.

<sup>23</sup> Public Law 105-85, Section 562 (a)(1).

<sup>24</sup> “The Department of Defense is responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of the United States.” (Department of Defense Directive 5100.1) (Department of Defense website “[defenselink.mil/pubs/ofg/0s\\_dod.html](http://defenselink.mil/pubs/ofg/0s_dod.html)”).

reasonable and natural balance, particularly during peacetime, the vital military mission always must take priority over the slower mechanisms of the civilian criminal justice system. Compromising a mission and risking lives solely to administer identical notions of civilian justice in a military context would be unjust. Minimizing unnecessary death and injury, when measured directly against a desire to adhere strictly to civilian legal processes, must take precedence.

Because the essence of military missions involves the potential loss of life, it is neither morally justifiable nor advisable for a system or culture of civilian jurisprudence to interfere improperly with the duly exercised discretion and judgment of commanders vested with a just mission on the field of battle. To restrict a commander's exercise of prudential judgment would very likely imperil the morale, good order and discipline of units, this would strike at the foundation of military effectiveness. If commanders operate on anything less than the optimal level required by military effectiveness, a tragic and potentially greater injustice that results in unnecessary death and injury may follow.<sup>25</sup>

The proper function of military law is set forth in the preamble to the *Manual for Courts-Martial* (MCM): “[t]he purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline . . . to promote [the military’s] efficiency and effectiveness. . . and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States.”<sup>26</sup>

The MCM also states that military law “. . . consists of the statutes governing the military establishment and regulations issued thereunder . . . the constitutional powers of the President and regulations thereunder, and *the inherent authority of military commanders.*”<sup>27</sup>

In broad terms, military justice consists of the following, in descending order of legal authority:

The U.S. Constitution.

Federal statutory law primarily found in Title 10 of the U.S. Code, within which is found the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and International Treaties ratified by the U.S. Senate.

Enumerated powers granted to the President as Commander-in-Chief.

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<sup>25</sup>“The purpose of military law is to promote . . . [military] efficiency and effectiveness.” (*Manual for Courts-Martial, United States* [“MCM”] (1998 ed.), Part I, Preamble, Section 3. Nature and purpose of military law (p. I – 1). Military effectiveness also may be referred to as “combat effectiveness” or, at times, interchanged with “military readiness.”

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, The MCM has been referred to as “the commander’s bible.” As explained later, the text of the UCMJ, the elements of crimes, and procedural and evidentiary matters are found within its pages.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, (*emphasis added*).

The President's authority to manage the executive branch, which includes authority to issue and revise the Manual for Courts-Martial. International law to the extent that it is consistent with U.S. Constitutional law.<sup>28</sup>

Applicable federal agency authority to issue regulations.

Policy and management authority of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

Policy and management authority of the Services.

Command authority of orders from superiors to subordinates.

Of course, each descending level of authority cannot contravene the authority of a higher level. It becomes clear when reviewing this hierarchy that the exercise of a commander's discretion forms the backbone of military effectiveness and, as discussed below, military justice.

Commanders have a substantial amount of independent authority and many options in administering military justice. For the more severe crimes, commanders have a formal system of trial known as "courts-martial." There are three levels of courts-martial, each offering a different level of potential punishment. The forum involving the most severe punishment, General Court-Martial, also affords the most generous use of procedural options benefiting the defendant.<sup>29</sup>

Commanders also have at their disposal a layer of punitive procedures just below courts-martial, known as "Article 15 proceedings."<sup>30</sup> Article 15 proceedings are likewise layered, depending on the severity of the offense. An Article 15 conducted by a field-grade commanding officer (O-4 to O-6) can impose a more severe punishment than an Article 15 conducted by a company grade commanding officer (O-1 to O-3). The severity of the alleged offense, the rank of the accused, and the rank of the convening authority are factors considered in determining the level of Article 15 punishment.

Other corrective measures are available to commanders besides courts-martial and Article 15's nonjudicial punishment (NJP). Administrative remedies may be pursued by a commander in lieu of or concurrently with punitive actions.

<sup>28</sup> In this context, international law means 'customary international law' which is derived by common custom among countries observed over a sufficient period of time and which courts may recognize as law. As these "laws" are not ratified by the federal government, U.S. courts only recognize this customary law if it does not contravene a federal statute, federal court precedent, or executive order. Regarding whether customary international laws not ratified by the federal government may preempt the laws of the various states and municipalities, recent case law and academic views may be trending against the states and municipalities; however, respected experts have raised legitimate and fundamental sovereignty issues which cast this position in doubt.

<sup>29</sup> The three levels of courts-martial, General, Summary, and Special are discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

<sup>30</sup> Article 15 is the section of the MCM that authorizes these "nonjudicial punishment" proceedings.

Administrative remedies range from informal counseling, substandard performance ratings, oral and written reprimands, demotions, and denials of reenlistment to administrative separation from the Service. Significantly, although these measures may be taken concurrently with criminal prosecution under the UCMJ, they are not considered “punishment” options issued as sentences for violations of UCMJ provisions. Rather, they are administrative tools to be used at a commander’s discretion to deal with military personnel in a manner consistent with the best interests of the Service, yet technically separate from punitive actions. That is a subtle but important distinction. A commander may decide that prosecution under the UCMJ either through courts-martial or nonjudicial punishments is not the best approach, even if the acts committed technically violated an UCMJ provision.

A commander’s discretion, however, is not absolute. Procedural checks and balances exist to address a situation in which command discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.

In the final analysis, military members have a level of rights that, although not the same as those found in civilian courts, can provide adequate and sufficient protection against abuse of authority. In fact, during peacetime, some of these measures may even exceed civilian standards.<sup>31</sup>

Among these rights is the opportunity for review and appeal. Courts-martial may be appealed to each Service’s court of appeals.<sup>32</sup> Although only sentences of death, punitive discharge, or a minimum of one year of confinement are offered an automatic review at the particular Service’s Court of Criminal Appeals, others may be offered an appellate review at the discretion of the convening authority. Cases may be reviewed further at an even higher level by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, which considers cases from the lower Service-level appellate courts.<sup>33</sup> Occasionally, cases are appealed to the United States Supreme Court.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> For instance, military efforts to address sexual harassment have seen a concerted emphasis in recent years, which has given rise to a dramatic increase in the volume of policies, regulations, and educational programs that often exceed those found in civilian workplaces. See also Volume II “Transcripts” pages 89-90 (17Nov98, pp. 47-51).

<sup>32</sup> There are three criminal courts of appeal: The United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, The United States Navy Court of Criminal Appeals, and The United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals. As part of the Department of the Navy, Marine Corps courts-martial cases are appealed to the United States Navy Court of Criminal Appeals. For further discussion, see MCM (1998 ed.) Chapter XII. APPEALS AND REVIEW (Pages II-166 to II-175).

<sup>33</sup> Capital punishment cases receive an automatic review by each level of the military appellate process culminating in a final review at the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.

<sup>34</sup> There is a separate administrative review process for servicemembers seeking to expunge or change derogatory or erroneous records of current and former Service members. This process is undertaken by each Service’s Board for Correction of Military Records. A further appeal from these Boards is available to the Court of Federal Claims or to a U.S. District Court, depending on the specific matter at issue. These cases only involve disputed records, not appeals of criminal convictions.

In the case of Article 15s, appeals are limited. Each servicemember, however, may refuse Article 15 proceedings in favor of a more formal, although potentially more punitive, courts-martial process.<sup>35</sup> Thus, servicemembers have options and rights at their disposal providing checks and balances that, although different from and more limited in scope than civilian courts, offer concrete protection against abuse.

The military justice system also offers protection in the form of command oversight, subject to the limits that the higher chain of command may not exercise unlawful command influence. Commanders are answerable and accountable to their superiors for mishandling a case or failure to act on an incident. Deference appears to be the norm from senior to subordinate courts-martial commands, much as federal appeals courts defer to trial courts on the reliability of evidence at trial, according to the assumption that seeing and experiencing the evidence is a more reliable basis on which to make determinations than is a later recounting. Although decisions may rarely be overturned, all commanders are continually evaluated by higher authority. Any documented mistakes by these commanders in the area of leadership performance, to include any actions taken as courts-martial convening authorities, may be considered during deliberations for promotion and commendation.

Because of the nature of the military culture and its primary national security mission, to impose civilian standards on a military organization is ill advised and potentially dangerous. Any scrutiny of the military justice system must give due deference to military necessity and military effectiveness.

#### b. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)

The UCMJ is the ultimate legal authority in military law. It is a federal statute that was passed into law by Congress and signed by the President nearly 50 years ago.<sup>36</sup> The UCMJ contains the broad descriptions of rules, crimes, procedures, and other matters of military court administration. Because the UCMJ is a federal statute, there is only one higher body of civil law, the U.S. Constitution. The UCMJ is equivalent in stature and authority to the Federal Criminal Code, the Internal Revenue Code, and other federal laws. Thus, a conviction or plea of guilty in a military judicial proceeding is equivalent to a federal criminal conviction.

A very wide range of potential punishments are available for violating the UCMJ, punitive regulations, or lawful orders. Certain criminal acts in the military, such as murder and rape, may be punishable with the death penalty; less serious infractions of regulations or orders may merely warrant oral reprimands. The more formal forms of punishment above the level of administrative actions must be prosecuted and proven to meet the elements of the punitive sections of the UCMJ.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>35</sup> There may be exceptions to this option in exigent circumstances, such as shipboard duty or imminent combat. Shipboard duty is the most common circumstance where commanders may impose mandatory Article 15 with no option for a more formal and public court-martial. There is a long-held tradition in the Navy that such severe isolation and need to avoid any potential disorder requires broader discretion for the commander.

<sup>36</sup> 10 U.S.C. §§ 801 *et seq.* (1999).

<sup>37</sup> Offenses most directly relevant to “cross-gender” relations are Articles 90, 91, 92, 120, 133, and 134.

The UCMJ consists of approximately 30 pages of code consisting of more than 100 articles. Each article is of varying length, averaging several short paragraphs. Only Articles 77 to 134 refer to expressly prohibited crimes. These 57 articles constitute the body of laws known as the “Punitive Articles.” The remaining parts deal with rules for court administration, evidentiary matters, and historical material.

The Punitive Articles contain a series of punishable criminal offenses. They include traditional crimes, such as murder, rape, and burglary, but also include such unique offenses as “fraudulent enlistment,” “desertion,” “releasing prisoners without proper authority,” “dueling,” and “misbehaviour before the enemy.”<sup>38</sup> The two final Punitive Articles contain broad categories of offenses: Article 133, “Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman,” and Article 134, the “General Article.”

Article 133, “Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman,” is briefly described in the UCMJ:

“Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”<sup>39</sup>

This broadly worded Article provides little other than the limitation of jurisdiction to officers, cadets, and midshipmen.

Article 134, the “General Article,” states:

“Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter,<sup>40</sup> all disorders and neglects to *the prejudice of good order and discipline* in the armed forces, [and] all conduct of a nature to bring *discredit upon the armed forces* . . . shall be punished at the discretion of that court [emphasis added].”<sup>41</sup>

As with “Conduct unbecoming,” no specific crimes are mentioned. The definitions of “conduct unbecoming,” “conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline,” and “conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces” are broad and vague, allowing military commanders to use their discretion when wielding these legal tools in maintaining order and integrity in the ranks.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> All citations are from the MCM (1998 ed.), “Fraudulent enlistment, appointment, or separation.” (Section 883, Article 83); “Desertion.” (Section 885, Article 85); “Releasing prisoner without proper authority.” (Section 896, Article 96); “Dueling.” (Section 914, Article 114); “Misbehaviour before the enemy.” (Section 899, Article 99); “Murder.” (Section 918, Article 118); “Rape.” (Section 920, Article 120); “Burglary.” (Section 929, Article 129).

<sup>39</sup> Article 133, UCMJ “Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman.”

<sup>40</sup> “This chapter” refers to the Punitive Articles chapter of the UCMJ. For further discussion see Volume II “Transcripts” pages 532-533 (30Jan99, pp. 151-157).

<sup>41</sup> Article 134, UCMJ.

<sup>42</sup> Article 134, the “General Article,” differs from Article 133 in that it applies to both officers and enlisted. Article 133 applies only to officers.

These articles are described further in the *MCM*.<sup>43</sup>

c. Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM)

The MCM parallels the UCMJ in form, but provides greater detail. Like the UCMJ, the bulk of the MCM pertains to intricate procedural, evidentiary, and historical matters of military court administration. In legal terms, the MCM is the rough equivalent of federal regulations written by any executive branch agency implementing federal statutes.

The criminal section of the MCM also is referred to as the “Punitive Articles.” Each Punitive Article in the MCM, however, contains several detailed sections not found in the UCMJ. Each Punitive Article in the MCM includes the following sections:

- Section (a): “Text” of complete UCMJ language
- Section (b): “Elements” of the offense
- Section (c): “Explanations,” including definitions and context
- Section (d): “Lesser included offenses”
- Section (e): “Maximum punishment”
- Section (f): “Sample specifications” (forms)

Modifications to the MCM are made under the authority of the President of the United States in the form of an Executive Order.

Although the MCM outlines a formal process for charging servicemembers with offenses, a range of administrative remedies also may be used by a commander to protect a Service from the effects of misconduct and a breakdown of good order and discipline. These remedies include counseling, documentation of substandard performance, oral and written reprimands, withdrawal of reenlistment recommendation, demotion, and administrative separation from the Service.

While the UCMJ and MCM form the broad legal structure through which all misconduct must be prosecuted, a massive volume of policies and regulations exist, ranging from OSD-level policies and regulation to Service-level and company-level regulations, down to the lawful orders in the field. The following is an example of a recruit training battalion policy against sexual misconduct:

- “a. Sexual misconduct within this Battalion is defined as any action that involves a nonprofessional, social relationship of a personal nature between IET soldiers during BCT. This includes but is not limited to: (1) Dating. (2) Any type of sexual activity or involvement, to include kissing. (3) Any touching of a sexual nature. (4) Hugging of a sexual nature. (5) Intimate hand-

<sup>43</sup> A third element included under the General Article but less relevant to the Commission’s scope is “crimes and offenses not capital.” This doctrine allows commanders to prosecute Service members under certain circumstances for violations of civilian laws that are not explicitly outlawed under the UCMJ. An example could be traffic violations not committed on military property. See *MCM* (1998 ed.) page IV-95 for more information.

holding or physical caressing. (6) Meeting privately and/or intimately with another trainee. (7) Entering into the sleeping area of trainees of the opposite sex unless authorized by unit SOP. (8) Entering into latrines designated for members of the opposite sex.”<sup>44</sup>

Like the Army, the Navy has issued a plethora of specific regulations at lower levels of the chain of command. Marine Corps regulations at lower commands are less voluminous than the Navy’s and the Army’s, but more voluminous than the Air Force’s. The Air Force, and to a lesser extent the Marine Corps, rely more on the broad regulations at the higher commands and allow commanders to enforce those broadly worded regulations on a more case-by-case basis.

The Air Force uses a streamlined approach that centralizes regulations regarding these types of matters. Although lower-level commands may supplement these regulations, supplemental written regulations are the exception rather than the rule. Like the other Services, however, Air Force training bases provide supplements to the existing regulations of the higher commands in order to be very specific about trainer-trainee intimate relations.

#### d. Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD)

OSD may augment UCMJ laws or MCM regulations in the form of policy changes. Such policy guidance, however, may not contravene the higher authority of the UCMJ or the MCM. Defense Secretary William Cohen’s recent proposal regarding fraternization falls under this category. The proposal to amend the adultery section, however, requires action by Executive Order of the President because it would amend the text of the MCM.

The Secretary of Defense does not have authority to amend the MCM. Currently, the Secretary has approved in concept his General Counsel’s plan to recommend that the President amend the adultery provision of the MCM. Although specific language has not yet been forwarded to the President, the OSD plans in the near future to forward a draft Executive Order for changing the adultery provision of the MCM.<sup>45</sup>

#### e. Military Services

Each Service may further implement policies and orders if they do not contravene higher authority. An example is the Services’ restrictions on relations between trainers and trainees. In each Service, for example, specific prohibitions and policies restricting trainer-trainee sexual relations were issued following implementation of gender-integrated basic training.

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<sup>44</sup> U.S. Army training battalion regulation for basic combat training trainees (Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri).

<sup>45</sup> The adultery amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial are in process to be submitted to the President with the package of other recommended changes to the MCM in its annual review process for the calendar year 1999. This information was communicated to the Commission via electronic mail from the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel to the Commission’s legal office on 22 February 1999. According to testimony, the Secretary of Defense will recommend that the President change the adultery provision. Volume II “Transcripts” page 15 (12Oct98, p. 84) (“the Secretary of Defense will approve it.”) As of 22 February 1999, the recommendation regarding the maximum punishment for adultery is to leave it unchanged from its current maximum of a dishonorable discharge.

#### f. Severity of Forum

As in civilian courts, courts-martial provide for a tiered approach to the administration of justice. Unlike in civilian courts, however, there is no equivalent to a civil division. Only criminal violations are formally adjudicated within military courts.

The more severe the nature of the offense, the greater the likelihood of a more formal proceeding. The military justice system recognizes the importance of a commander's discretion and authority because the ultimate test of military justice is whether it can withstand and be practical in a wartime environment. Thus, the UCMJ provides for a multilevel system of forums geared to ensure swift and complete justice that allows for a significant amount of command discretion.

The tiered system begins with the strict military command structure itself. Sanctions, reprimands, and performance reports are tools used on a daily basis to promote good order and discipline. At times, this may seem arbitrary to the lower ranks; however, inculcating discipline and military bearing is essential to carrying out a military mission. Failure to comply with proper military comportment needs to be remedied immediately, lest good order and discipline be corrupted and military effectiveness be lessened. When charged with a life-and-death mission, any lessening of military effectiveness translates into a very real threat of loss of life. A key goal in this culture is inculcating respect for authority.

Intrinsic to this regime is the supremacy of the commander and other superiors in the chain of command. For instance, if recruits fail to adequately obey a drill sergeant's command, they face the first level of military justice, the verbal reprimand. In essence, this system of rank and command authority is the informal foundation of the military justice system. This informal regime is an essential part of military effectiveness and must be considered as important as, if not more important than, the formal processes of military justice.

#### g. Nonjudicial Punishment (Article 15)

The first tier of the military's formalized punitive processes involves nonjudicial punishment (NJPs). They often are referred to as Article 15s after the UCMJ article that authorizes such proceedings. NJPs make up the bulk of official punitive actions taken by commanders and allow for the greatest degree of discretion and judgment on their part. Punishments meted out by commanders in Article 15 proceedings are substantially restricted. NJPs include reduction in grade (for enlisted only), forfeiture of pay, correctional custody (not imprisonment),<sup>46</sup> restriction of movement, extra duty, and reprimands.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Correctional custody is not per se imprisonment; however, it restricts free movement and imposes a very austere regime of extra duty and character-forming practices traditionally utilized in basic training.

<sup>47</sup> "Extra duty" involves assignment to duties that take away from free time and are in addition to the normal duties that a servicemember is expected to perform. Although it is not characterized as "punishment" by the Services, it may very likely be viewed as such by the subject given such "privileges." This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of potential actions.

In administering formal military justice, commanders begin by authorizing an investigation. Upon learning the results, a commander may do nothing or may decide to pursue prosecution. Throughout the entire process, a commander may drop the matter even if the commander believes the subject is guilty. The determination may be that a subject is guilty but that in the context of the military mission, the offense does not sufficiently affect that mission, or that a prosecution would do more harm to the unit than good. It illustrates the level of discretion built into the military's justice system. This is a level of discretion that the Commission believes is essential in maintaining an effective military force. Accordingly, a distinct emphasis on the character development and high standards applied to officers, commanders, and leaders is paramount.

As noted, commanders may choose to handle incidents of misconduct in a variety of ways. They may pursue punitive action pursuant to an Article 15 proceeding or seek administrative remedies at their disposal, or both.

In a case where an Article 15 is begun, the servicemember generally has the right to refuse the Article 15 proceeding and to demand that a court-martial be convened.<sup>48</sup> A commander faced with a demand for a court-martial in lieu of an Article 15 may decide to prefer charges for a court-martial, drop the matter, or seek administrative action (*e.g.*, letter of reprimand). Of course, a court-martial offers the possibility of more severe penalties; however, a court-martial provides a great deal of procedural and legal defenses, including trial before other Service members, that are not available in NJP proceedings.

#### **h. Courts-Martial**

Like Article 15s, courts-martial are tiered according to the seriousness of the offense. They range from the lesser Summary Court-Martial to the intermediate Special Court-Martial to the most severe, General Courts-Martial. The General Court-Martial, which is authorized to mete out more severe punishment, gives the most generous procedural and legal protections to the accused—for example, a more formal pretrial inquiry under Article 32 of the UCMJ.

In sum, “good order and discipline” is the fundamental rationale for the Services to regulate interpersonal relationships among military personnel. Good order and discipline includes prohibitions against adultery, fraternization, unprofessional and improper relationships, and sexual harassment. At the same time, a rationale exists to prohibit these types of relationships for historical, societal, and military reasons. The reasons include family preservation, unit cohesion and morale, trust, a sense of fairness, and, ultimately, the effect that the conduct may have on military effectiveness and efficiency.

## **2. Section 562 (a)(2)**

“(2) Assess the extent to which the laws, regulations, policies, and directives have been applied consistently throughout the Armed Forces without regard to the armed force, grade, rank, or gender of the individuals involved.”

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<sup>48</sup> As described in footnote 27, exigent circumstances may prevent the exercise of this option.

This section presents the Commission’s assessment of the proposed and implemented findings and recommendations of the adultery review, the good order and discipline task force, and the themes that address the requirements of this section of the statute.

The Commission included questions about perceptions of adultery, fraternization, and sexual harassment in its two most extensive surveys of currently-serving military personnel: *The Study of Military Recruit Attitudes Conducive to Unit Cohesion & Survey of Military Leader Opinions on Recruit Training and Gender-Related Issues*<sup>49</sup> and *Retrospective Survey of Socialization, Values, and Performance In Relation to Recruit Training*.<sup>50</sup> Both studies are presented in their entirety in the research volumes of this report.<sup>51</sup>

The Commission was asked to look at perceptions, practices and the regulatory scheme of military justice as it pertained to “cross-gender relationships.” It found that while many servicemembers perceive that laws, policies and directives concerning male-female relationships are applied consistently, a perception exists among a significant number of military personnel that they are not applied consistently.

The *Survey of Military Leader Opinions* included military personnel across a wide range of ranks and military occupational specialties.<sup>52</sup> Questions captured the opinions of approximately 12,300 currently serving military personnel on issues related to adultery, fraternization and sexual harassment. Almost 8,000 of the respondents were E-6/E-7 enlisted leaders and O-3 junior officers. These two samples were surveyed using a stratified random sample design and therefore are considered to be more representative of their respective populations than samples selected using non-random sampling techniques. Results from the enlisted leaders and junior officers are summarized below.

Approximately 43 percent of respondents in both samples felt that different standards are applied to men and women for regulations governing *fraternization*. Of the 43 percent of enlisted leaders who indicated that different standards are applied, more than three-quarters believe that women are favored. For the 44 percent of junior officers who indicated that different standards are applied, approximately two-thirds believe that women are favored.

Fifty-four percent of enlisted leader respondents indicated that different standards are applied to officers and enlisted for regulations governing *fraternization*. Of these respondents, 85 percent believe that officers are favored; 15 percent believe that enlisted are favored. For the 44 percent of junior officer respondents who indicated that different standards are applied based on rank, approximately half indicated that standards favored officers and half indicated that standards favored enlisted.

<sup>49</sup> Johnson (1999), *The Study of Military Recruit Attitudes Conducive to Unit Cohesion & Survey of Military Leader Opinions on Recruit Training and Gender-Related Issues*, Volume III “Research” pages 126-129.

<sup>50</sup> Ramsberger, P., Laurence, J., and Sipes, D. (1999), *Retrospective Survey of Socialization, Values, and Performance in Relation to Recruit Training*, Volume IV “Research” pages 5-250.

<sup>51</sup> For more detailed survey results including a breakdown of officer, enlisted, male, and female responses, see each study in its entirety in Volume III and Volume IV “Research.”

<sup>52</sup> Johnson, (1999) Volume III, “Research” pages 126-129.

The percentages for respondents indicating that different standards are applied to men and women for *adultery* were somewhat lower, with approximately one third of enlisted leaders and junior officers indicating that different standards are applied based on gender. For both samples, of the one third of those who responded in this manner, about half believed that the standards favored men, and half believed that the standards favored women.

Approximately 40-50 percent of enlisted leader and junior officer respondents indicated that different standards are applied for adultery based on rank. In this case, for the 47 percent of E-6/E-7 enlisted leaders who believed there were different standards, 88 percent of these indicated that regulations favored officers. However, for the 39 percent of junior officer respondents who indicated that there were differences in regulations based on rank, 57 percent believed that officers were favored, and 43 percent believed that enlisted were favored. Sixty percent of enlisted leaders and 56 percent of junior officers who responded to the survey indicated that different standards are applied for adultery across commands within their Services. In addition, approximately two-thirds of enlisted leader and junior officer respondents indicated this same perception of inconsistency across commands for regulations governing fraternization.

When asked about consistency of application of rules for *sexual harassment*, 44 percent of enlisted leader and 39 percent of junior officer respondents indicated that false accusations against men and *actual sexual harassment* against women happen equally. Forty-two percent of junior officers and 31 percent of enlisted leaders responding to the survey indicated that women are *sexually harassed* more often than men are falsely accused, and 15 percent of junior officers and 22 percent of enlisted leaders indicated that men are falsely accused more often than women are *sexually harassed*.

Approximately two-thirds of both enlisted leader and junior officer respondents indicated that adultery, fraternization, (or both) pose a significant threat to operational readiness. One half of the enlisted leaders responding to the survey indicated that military standards for both *fraternization* and *adultery* should be stricter than those found elsewhere in society. For junior officer respondents, 72 percent indicated that military standards should be stricter for *fraternization*, and 66 percent indicated that military standards should be stricter for *adultery*.

The *Retrospective Survey of Socialization, Values, and Performance in Relation to Recruit Training* included approximately 9,300 enlisted personnel, with more than two-thirds of the sample in pay grades E-3 to E-4.<sup>53</sup> Those surveyed were asked for their views on adultery, fraternization, and sexual harassment, as occurred in the *Survey of Military Leader Opinions* summarized above. Key data showed the following.

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<sup>53</sup> Ramsberger, Laurence, and Sipes (1999), Volume IV "Research" pages 23-25.

Perception of consistency of application of rules for *fraternization*:

Of the 49 percent of respondents who indicated that *fraternization* standards are applied differently by *gender*:

- 68 percent of these indicated that females are favored.
- 22 percent of these indicated that males are favored.
- 9 percent of these do not know.

Of the 39 percent who indicated that *fraternization* standards are applied differently by *rank*:

- 74 percent of these indicated that officers are favored.
- 18 percent of these indicated that enlisted are favored.
- 8 percent of these do not know.

Perception of consistency of application of rules for *adultery*:

Of the 34 percent who indicated that *adultery* standards are applied differently by *gender*:

- 57 percent of these indicated that females are favored.
- 34 percent of these indicated that males are favored.
- 9 percent of these do not know.

Of the 28 percent who indicated that *adultery* standards are applied differently by *rank*:

- 76 percent of these indicated that officers are favored.
- 16 percent of these indicated that enlisted are favored.
- 7 percent of these do not know.

Perception of consistency of application of rules for *sexual harassment*:

Of the 48 percent who indicated that *sexual harassment* standards are applied differently by *gender*:

- 83 percent of these indicated that females are favored.
- 12 percent of these indicated that males are favored.
- 5 percent of these do not know.

Of the 24 percent who indicated that *sexual harassment* standards are applied differently by *rank*:

- 75 percent of these indicated that officers are favored.
- 16 percent of these indicated that enlisted are favored.
- 9 percent of these do not know.

The report states that “[a]pproximately one-half of the respondents agreed that standards regarding fraternization and harassment are applied differently by gender, with the majority who expressed this sentiment suggesting that women are favored. The percentage indicating that adultery standards are applied differently by gender, or that any of the standards are applied differently to officers and enlisted personnel are somewhat smaller. In the latter case, nearly three-quarters of those who felt rank played a role in the application thought that officers are favored.”<sup>54</sup>

The Commission’s legal consultants conducted a further review of documentation of Service disciplinary records. Each consultant scrutinized the submissions from his Service with a particular eye toward comparing different categories of cases: peer-to-peer consensual offenses, senior-subordinate consensual offenses, and officer-enlisted consensual offenses. From the beginning, a determination was made that concentrating on a review of consensual offenses would provide the best indication of any potential discrepancies because, by the very nature of the offense, it is certain that both parties committed a punishable criminal offense. It was understood that the level of culpability could reasonably be different according to the rank of co-actors. Nonetheless, both parties committed an offense per se by consensually engaging in prohibited social or sexual acts. With this in mind, the consultants paid particular attention to the consistency of application with regard to the consequences and accountability of the acts for both the accused and their consensual co-actors.

After reviewing the documentation provided by the Services, the Commission’s legal consultants concluded that the more junior the servicemembers involved, the more comparable the consistency of punishment.<sup>55</sup> “This was particularly true for consensual sex-related offenses involving junior enlisted personnel in training environments and for violations by junior enlisted personnel of shipboard regulations governing conduct between the sexes.”<sup>56</sup> As rank increases, however, a potentially significant disparity may exist, most prominently exhibited in consensual trainer-trainee social and sexual misconduct. In consensual cases involving officer and enlisted personnel, the legal consultants observed “. . . there appears to be little uniformity of disciplinary action between co-actors.”<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Ramsberger, Laurence, and Sipes (1999), Volume IV “Research” page 42.

<sup>55</sup> See Volume II “Legal Consultants’ Reports” pages 541-604 and “Transcripts” pages 507-540. (30Jan99, pp. 98-109, 146-163, 170-181).

<sup>56</sup> Volume II, “Legal Consultants’ Reports” page 562.

<sup>57</sup> Volume II, “Legal Consultants’ Reports” page 562, 572-573 and “Transcripts” pages 3, 513-517, 524-526, 532-534, 536-538 (30Jan99, pp. 32-61, 98-110, 147-162, 173-187).

Although the data indicate a potential trend, there could be reasons for this disparity, ranging from the historical rationale and culture of the military, which holds more senior members to a higher standard, and the fact that many of these offenses are handled at the Article 15 level, a far less public forum than a court-martial. In all Article 15 proceedings, other members of a unit may not ever know the final outcome of an infraction. Court-martial proceedings, on the other hand, are public, similar to civilian court proceedings.

Again, a commander's discretion as it pertains to maintaining good order and discipline is the overriding focus of military justice. The commander's determination may be that infractions such as consensual sexual misconduct should be handled at the most private level to prevent an open scandal.

The Commission believes that trainees as well as trainers are required to comply with all applicable rules.<sup>58</sup> All parties to sexual misconduct should be held accountable, but accountability does not require that all punishments be identical. In an improper senior-subordinate relationship, holding the senior more accountable is not unreasonable. Equally, the basic training environment is unique, and imposing special restrictions on trainer-trainee relationships and holding trainers more accountable when violations of the imposed restrictions occur is not unreasonable.

#### Importance of Systematic Data Collection

That data collection in the Service's military justice system is inconsistent and incomplete became obvious to the Commission. The Commission took pains to minimize the burden on the Services in producing necessary documentation of NJPs, reprimands, and courts-martial. Even so, the burden on the Services, as gleaned from their reaction to this data collection effort, was obvious.

The Air Force has developed the most advanced military justice tracking system among the Services. It can tally all NJP and court-martial cases, and provide name, demographic background, charge specifications, punishments, and other key data for review by commanders. The Army and, to a lesser extent, the Navy and the Marine Corps track some data but have not developed systems to the level of detail and thoroughness of the Air Force, especially concerning NJP offenses.<sup>59</sup>

The Department of Defense and Congress would benefit from collecting such data in ways beyond military justice statistics. The Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey

<sup>58</sup> Data received by the Commission indicate that, at the sampling of installations covered in the document requests for NJP and courts-martial records, fewer than 5 cases out of more than 100 showed a trainee receiving any official punishment in cases involving consensual sexual or social relationships with trainers or permanent-party personnel. In nearly every case, the trainee was female and the senior was male. In each case, the trainers faced significant punishment, often at the courts-martial level. Although rare, several of these cases resulted in imprisonment for the trainer. See also discussion on "official double standard" Volume II "Transcripts" pages 23-24 (12Oct98, pp. 131-137) (OSD Legal Counsel's Office: junior ranking parties in consensual male-female UCMJ violations are looked upon as "victim" not "perpetrator.")

<sup>59</sup> See discussion Volume II "Transcripts" page 21 (12Oct98, page 120). The Department of Defense has begun implementation of the Defense Incident Based Reporting System (DIBRS) to track violent crimes and another system to collect sex-related crimes. However, data from these systems were not yet available according to the Department of Defense.

(MEOCS) and other command-level tools could be augmented with an accessible and condensed data source by which to gauge morale, perceptions, and other matters of concern to commanders.

Need for Military Personnel, Especially Junior Officers, to Have More Training and Direct Exposure to Military Justice

In the late 1960s, sweeping reforms were enacted in the military justice system. Those changes were focused primarily on preventing unlawful command influence. An unfortunate by-product of those reforms, however, was a lessening of direct exposure to the military justice culture for junior and mid-grade officers.<sup>60</sup>

In the old system, junior officers were required to represent individuals in military court proceedings.<sup>61</sup> Few junior officers at that time, however, were attorneys. The reforms of the late 1960's had the collateral effect of no longer requiring low-level and midlevel officers to participate directly in trials and other court proceedings. As a result, junior officers who later become senior commanders with court-martial convening authority likely have less direct exposure to the military justice system in which they will have major administrative responsibilities.

Providing more training, but especially more direct exposure for all officers, especially the junior officers, to the military justice system would produce more rounded, experienced, and seasoned court-martial convening commanders.

Similarly, all Service personnel, both officer and enlisted, would benefit greatly from better education in and understanding of the UCMJ. Better awareness and understanding will help prevent the instances where ignorance of a law or a regulation precipitates an offense.

**3. Section 562(a)(3)**

“(3) Assess the reports of the independent panel, the Department of Defense taskforce, and the review of existing guidance on fraternization and adultery that have been required by the Secretary of Defense.”

a. Adultery

The Commission was asked to review the findings and recommendations of the Department of Defense panel regarding the sufficiency of guidance to commanders for the offense of adultery.

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<sup>60</sup> Miller, BGen Gerald, USMC (Ret) and Trefry, LTG Richard, USA (Ret), Volume II “Transcripts” pages 99-100, 102, 106, (17Nov98, pp.104-107, 114, 124-126, 147-150).

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

The Commission found that the proposed changes to the MCM concerning the offense of adultery are unnecessary.

The elements of the offense of adultery found in the MCM are as follows:

Article 134, Paragraph 62. (Adultery)

“b. Elements.

- (1) That the accused wrongfully had sexual intercourse with a certain person;
- (2) That, at the time, the accused or the other person was married to someone else; and
- (3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.”<sup>62</sup>

It is important to emphasize that adultery *per se* is not prosecutable in the military. Conduct involving adultery must be proven to have been prejudicial to good order and discipline, or a discredit to the armed forces in order to be prosecuted.<sup>63</sup>

The crime of adultery, as defined under Article 134, should remain an offense in the military justice system. The rationale for this centers on issues of integrity and order in military units. The military possesses authority to use organized, deadly force at the behest of the nation’s civilian leadership in the pursuit of the national interest. Adultery may create a very real threat to the good order and discipline of the Armed Forces. Comments from surveys collected by the Commission indicate a clear desire by members of the Armed Forces to keep the high standards of the UCMJ already in place and to maintain adultery as an offense under Article 134.<sup>64</sup> Adultery has the very real potential to be a “cancer” within a unit.<sup>65</sup> Commanders must be allowed to utilize this specification to prevent the distrust and discord that adulterous actions may cause.

Although the proposed amendments to the MCM do not change the elements of the offense of adultery, in the Commission’s view, these changes would not achieve their intended goal and would likely send the wrong message to the field and be counterproductive.

First, it is important to describe the context of the offense of adultery and where it fits into the overall context of military justice and then to describe the process and results of the Department of Defense’s adultery review.

<sup>62</sup> MCM (1998 ed.), Part IV, Article 134, paragraph 62. (Adultery)(page IV-95).

<sup>63</sup> Without one of these final elements, prejudicial to good order and discipline or discredit to the armed forces, adultery is not an offense under the UCMJ.

<sup>64</sup> Johnson (1999), Volume III “Research” pages 312-314.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, Sample comment received from current active-duty personnel on Dr. Johnson’s cohesion study (Forms: 233, 851, 4190, 9350, 9411, 12432, and 41996).

The offense of adultery is dealt with in the General Article (MCM, 1998 Ed., Article 134) along with approximately 85 other offenses that affect good order and discipline or are "of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces." Article 134 is sometimes referred to as the "commander's article" because of its broad, unspecified application and its grant of broad discretionary powers to enforce discipline. Many specific offenses have been defined under this article, only one of which is adultery, but Article 134 offenses are not limited to these 85 subspecifications. Article 134 charges could be brought against any person under a commander's authority for any conduct deemed to be "prejudicial to good order and discipline" or "of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces."<sup>66</sup>

Understanding that Articles 77-134 encompass all the UCMJ's punitive articles and that most common criminal offenses are divided into separate articles under the UCMJ is important. In fact, all of the Punitive Articles are separated into specific articles in the UCMJ and the MCM except the General Article (Article 134). Examples include rape (Article 120), murder (Article 118), failure to obey an order or regulation (Article 92), and perjury (Article 131). Article 134 is the only punitive article with multiple criminal subspecifications. Common to all Article 134 subspecifications but not to the other punitive articles, however, is that the acts in question must at least be determined to be conduct "prejudicial to good order and discipline" or "of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces."<sup>67</sup>

In assessing the recommendations of the OSD adultery review panel, the Commission discovered that the purpose of the review was to ascertain whether current guidance to commanders on adultery was sufficient in the wake of several high-profile cases.<sup>68</sup> The Secretary asked the Department of Defense General Counsel to lead an internal Department of Defense panel in undertaking the review. The General Counsel chose 13 members from within the Department of Defense.<sup>69</sup> Ultimately, the panel recommended the addition of approximately two pages of guidance to be placed within the adultery subsection of Article 134, a substantial portion of which were relevant also to all Article 134 subspecifications.

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<sup>66</sup> MCM (1998 ed.), Part I, Preamble, Section 3. Nature and purpose of military law (p. I – 1).

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> Defense Secretary William Cohen memorandum to Department of Defense General Counsel, subject: Review of the Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. (June 1997) "Recent events suggest the need to review the clarity of existing guidance related to adultery."; See also Miller, BGen Gerald, USMC (Ret) and Trefry, LTG Richard, USA (Ret), and JAG representatives, Volume II "Transcripts" pages 104, 110-127 (17Nov98, pp.137-139, 273-274) and page 14 (12Oct98, pp. 74-75). The Lt Kelly Flinn case garnered much media attention over the adultery charge; however, Flinn was charged with numerous other even more serious criminal offenses which were not discussed in media accounts (two counts of failure to obey order or regulation (Article 92, UCMJ), one count of making a false official statement (Article 107, UCMJ), one count of conduct unbecoming an officer (Article 133, UCMJ), one count of failure to obey a written order from a superior officer regarding her fraternization (Article 90, UCMJ), and violation of AFI 36-2909, a general prohibition on fraternization)

<sup>69</sup> Members of this panel were: (Chair) Leigh A. Brandley, the Principal Deputy General Counsel (Navy), T.W. Taylor, Senior Deputy General Counsel (Army Operations & Personnel), Mathew D. Slater, Principal Deputy General Counsel (Air Force), Ms. Florence W. Madden, Deputy General Counsel (Air Force Military Affairs), Robert T. Cali, Deputy Counsel to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, BG (P) John D. Altenberg, Jr., Assistant Judge Advocate General (Army Military Law & Operations), RADM Carlson M. LeGrand, Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Maj Gen Andrew M. Egeland, Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, Col Joseph Composto, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, COL Judith M. Guarino, Staff Judge Advocate, Army Combined Arms Support Command, CAPT Michael F. Lohr, JAGC, USN, Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Robert S. Horowitz, Deputy Chief Counsel (Coast Guard), CAPT Lane I. McClelland, Chief, Office of Claims and Litigation (Coast Guard).

Thus, an amendment to the MCM, a significant portion of which would apply to all 85 subspecifications to Article 134, would be awkwardly and exclusively placed within the adultery subspecification.

According to the Department of Defense, a charge of adultery alone at a court-martial is an infrequent occurrence.<sup>70</sup> It is often a lesser-included charge among a series of other alleged offenses. The infrequency of the occurrence may render the amendment needless for a practical purpose.

Although the proposed changes were instigated to give commanders in the field more guidance, after a review of the comments provided to the OSD review panel by field commanders, OSD reported to the Commission on 11 December 1998 that a consensus prevails that the current guidance is clear and that no changes or further guidance are necessary.

Of great concern to the Commission is the potential effect such an amendment may have on morale, an area that is always a concern to commanders. A change such as this very likely could demoralize members of the Armed Forces and give undue weight to this reportedly rare infraction.

The rewording or amendment to the MCM's punitive articles is a dramatic and high-profile act, especially to commanders and judge advocates in the field. They view the MCM as their "marching orders." The very real prospect of creating a checklist mentality exists. Any change, whether as "guidance" or in legal form, will send an unintended message to the field that the new language offering a litany of mitigating circumstances is, in fact, a checklist to be strictly followed rather than guidance.

A checklist mentality is exactly what good military leadership should avoid because it robs commanders of their discretion. The Commission believes that a great need exists at this time to support a commander's authority and develop the reasonable exercise of command discretion, which is the heart of leadership and the soul of military effectiveness. The fashion and form of the proposed adultery amendment could very reasonably be viewed as a checklist. Thus, the rule of reasonableness should prevail in these matters, rather than a mandated consistency in the form of "guidance" that admittedly does not change anything.<sup>71</sup> The proposed changes to the MCM concerning the offense of adultery are not desirable in a military or legal context.

<sup>70</sup> JAG representatives Volume II, "Transcripts" page 114 (17Nov98, pp. 197-199). See also Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Press Release, *Secretary of Defense Directs More Uniformity and Clarity In Service Policies Pertaining to Good Order and Discipline*, 29 July 1998 ("Breaches of good order and discipline in the all-volunteer force are not widespread." ([www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1997/b06071997\\_bt296-97.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1997/b06071997_bt296-97.html))). See also Background Briefing of Senior Officer involved in the adultery review 29 July 1998 ("...it is less than one – less than half of one percent of all courts-martial deal with adultery only.") ([www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul1998/x07301998\\_x729goad.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul1998/x07301998_x729goad.html)). Compare with testimony of JAG representative, Volume II "Transcripts" page 114 (17Nov98, p. 197) ("about one-third of our total workload relates to sexual misconduct of one sort or another.")

<sup>71</sup> See Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Press Release, *Secretary of Defense Announces Initiatives to Ensure Equity in Policies for Good Order and Discipline*, 7 June 1997 ([http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1997/b066071997\\_bt296-97.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1997/b066071997_bt296-97.html)).

Nevertheless, the Secretary and the Services should take steps to educate servicemembers and the public on the special considerations that affect the prosecution and punishment of “adultery” under the UCMJ. Particularly, an effort should be made in the future to educate the public and all military personnel that to be an offense under the UCMJ, the act must not only constitute adultery but also negatively affect good order and discipline or discredit the affected Armed Service. The commanders already appear to understand this fact, but the public, reporters, and the general population of the Services may not.<sup>72</sup> Thus, changing guidance to commanders when it seems clear that others, not the commanders, are in need of the guidance is not advisable or necessary.

#### b. Accountability vs. Punishment

To provide commanders with necessary leadership discretion, protecting and fostering a commander’s ability to lead is important. Data may indicate a potential gap between punishment for individuals involved in consensual sexual offenses under the UCMJ that is based on rank or sex. Distinguishing, however, between punishment and accountability and between proportional and equal punishment is important.

Holding a more senior individual to a higher standard and thus punishing that individual more severely for the same offense may be justified. The standard is not necessarily equal punishment but accountability. To require the same punishment for the junior individual would again remove the commander’s discretion and begin to erode the trust and confidence placed in those commanders.

The Commission’s view is that “consistency of application” does not directly translate into “equal punishment.” It may be perfectly suitable for a more senior co-actor in a consensual sexual offense to receive a more severe penalty than the junior co-actor. All members of the Armed Forces to the extent that they are aware of the rules should be expected to comport themselves accordingly. Thus, the Commission finds that the rule of reasonableness could warrant a more severe penalty for the senior co-actor as long as all offending parties are held accountable to an appropriate, not necessarily equal, degree.

#### c. Fraternalization (Good Order and Discipline)

This section on fraternization should not be confused with the section on adultery. It is important to distinguish between the two. First, the Commission’s enabling statute calls for a review of the recommendations of two separate review panels within the OSD. One dealt with guidance to commanders on the offense of adultery. The other review pertained to a broader range of issues commonly referred to as “fraternization.”

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<sup>72</sup>Under Secretary of Defense Rudy de Leon, Volume II “Transcripts” pages 17-18 (12Oct98, pp. 97-98) (“The confusion is with the public.”) For further discussion see Volume II “Transcripts” pages 17-19, (12Oct98, pp. 97-109).

Technically, fraternization is a limited offense under the UCMJ involving inappropriate officer-enlisted relationships.<sup>73</sup> This particular Department of Defense good order and discipline task force, however, reviewed all issues relating to interpersonal relations between Service members that are prohibited because they are “unprofessional” or “improper,” as well as “fraternization.”

Practically speaking, the great majority of these issues involve reviewing intimate relations between men and women. These relationships, however, are prohibited primarily because they are “prejudicial to good order and discipline” or are “of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.”<sup>74</sup> These standards are the same ones that are applied to adultery cases because fraternization is one of the 80-plus other subspecifications found under the General Article (Article 134) along with the adultery subspecification.<sup>75</sup>

Although both fraternization and adultery are subspecifications of Article 134 because of their adverse effect on good order and discipline, a whole body of regulations, orders, and policies exist from the top level of each Service to the unit level pertaining to unprofessional and improper relations. Violations of these regulations and orders also are federal criminal offenses under UCMJ Article 92, “Failure to obey order or regulation.”

The Commission received four binders containing thousands of pages of written regulations, policies, directives, and orders regarding cross-gender related regulations from a very small sampling of installations, bases, and commands.<sup>76</sup> Violating many of these regulations could result in prosecution under the General Article (Article 134) or under other punitive articles of the UCMJ, such as Article 92 (failure to obey order), depending on the discretion of the commander.

Upon completion of the OSD “fraternization” review of these laws and regulations, the Secretary of Defense first mandated and now has implemented an order requiring the Services to harmonize (make “uniform”) their specific policies and regulations regarding prohibited relationships that are considered fraternizing, unprofessional, or improper. The increasingly

<sup>73</sup> This is not well understood by many servicemembers. For example, recruit trainers often refer to improper relationships between recruits as “fraternization.” Similarly, servicemembers at all levels misuse the term when referring to other unprofessional or improper relationships that are not technically “fraternization” under the UCMJ, but rather, encompasses senior-subordinate relationships not peer-to-peer relationships.

<sup>74</sup> (1998 ed.), Part I, Preamble, Section 3. Nature and purpose of military law (p. I – 1).

<sup>75</sup> Other articles may form the basis for prosecution, such as UCMJ Article 92, failing to obey an order or a regulation (among others).

<sup>76</sup> Requests were made for copies of laws, regulations, policies, directives, and punitive orders relating to male-female relations from four Army installations, three Air Force bases, a large Navy base, and a large Marine Corps base.

joint Service environment where some or all of the four Services work together under a unified commander from one Service was the driving force behind this move to make the Service regulations on “unprofessional” or “improper” relationships more uniform.<sup>77</sup>

When queried by the commissioners on the new “fraternization” policy, commanders indicated that enforcement will be difficult and will be impossible to manage. Ironically, some commanders said that the new policy, although intended to improve good order and discipline, may create an unavoidable integrity problem in that “selective disobedience” or cover-ups may ensue because of the seemingly impossible enforcement environment. Although many soldiers indicated during the Commission’s visits that they are not even aware of any changes, many enlisted personnel said there would not be any “buy-in” on their part, meaning they did not believe it necessary or helpful. In addition, military personnel confirmed the Commission’s concern that this latest top-down policy change is another example of taking the discretion away from commanders to “make judgments on a case-by-case basis.” The consensus seems to be that the prohibition on dating and sexual relations needs to be maintained only within the same chain of command.

The change in the OSD “fraternization” policy seems to lack a foundation or a rationale. The previous rules appeared fundamentally sound, and the Commission has not learned of any facts that lead it to conclude that the previous fraternization rules were inadequate. In the absence of a clear rationale, it appears that the change in policy may have been founded on the assumption that relations between officers and enlisted are harmful to good order and discipline and therefore to readiness. If this is true, one must conclude that the past practice of the Army was harmful.

During the Commission’s travels, it appeared that the previous policies on fraternization and unprofessional and improper relationships were functional and suitable to meet the requirements of each Service. Even in the joint-service environment, the Commissioners heard that fraternization is not a notable problem in such commands, although the desirability of a uniform policy also was communicated.

One rationale presented to the Commission was the need for the policies of all Services to be consistent due to cases of fraternization between members of different services in joint Services command environments. The commissioners explored this issue, including a direct query to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and were told that there have not been any specific problems as a result of different policies. Thus, imposing a supposed uniformity seems to correct a problem that does not exist and may create far more serious problems.

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<sup>77</sup> Navy regulations prohibit “improper” relationships; while Army regulations prohibit “unprofessional relationships.” Both Services use the Article 134 standard of prejudicial to good order and discipline and discrediting to the Armed Forces as the rationale. Each Service, however, explicitly has prohibited certain relationships as “improper” or “unprofessional.” Examples include trainer-to-trainee relationships or certain relationships within the chain of command. For instance, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps explicitly prohibit all officer-to-enlisted dating. The Army, prior to the implementation of Secretary Cohen’s policy, did not implement a blanket prohibition on all officer-enlisted dating but undertook a case-by-case review.

The Commission is not persuaded that new changes are either necessary or advisable. Nevertheless, the Commission acknowledges that it may be too disruptive to revoke the February 3, 1999, directive.

#### ***D. Conclusions and Recommendations***

As a result of the Commission's investigations, the Commission developed the following recommendations and conclusions.

##### ***Adultery***

***The proposed changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) concerning the offense of adultery are unnecessary. The Secretary of Defense should not submit the proposed changes for inclusion in the MCM.***

- ***Unanimous Approval***

##### ***Fraternization***

***The Commission is not persuaded that the new changes to military fraternization rules developed by the Department of Defense Good Order and Discipline Task Force are necessary or advisable. Service-specific policies have been functional and suitable to meet the requirements of each Service. Therefore, the Services should be permitted to retain their prerogatives in this area.***

- ***Unanimous Approval***

##### ***Perceptions of Inconsistent Application of Laws and Rules***

***The Commission recommends that the Secretary of Defense take steps to cause the Services to educate their members and to inform the public about the special considerations that affect the prosecution and punishment of offenses relating to sexual misconduct in the military.***

- ***Unanimous Approval***

*The Commission recommends that the Services improve military justice data collection systems so that the Services may better monitor the consistency of application of rules governing sexual conduct in the military and prevent or correct misperceptions.*

- *Unanimous Approval*

*There is a need to increase leader training at all levels in knowledge and application of military law and to increase their participation in the military justice system.*

- *Unanimous Approval*

# *Initial Entry Training with Emphasis on Basic Training*

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Many believe that basic training or boot camp is the single most defining and important part of an individual’s military life. This phase, structured and defined differently by each Service, is the common passage by which a person drawn from civilian life learns the fundamentals of being a soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine. Afterward, the individual proceeds to advanced or military occupational specialty (MOS) training. The process from swearing in to departing for one’s first operational assignment is initial entry training (IET).

The Commission’s charter required a focus on IET. Most of the resources in terms of visits and research centered on the IET process, with an emphasis on recruit training. The visits to operational units provided a final check and review of the IET process and its effects on operational readiness.

Congress also directed the Commission to assess gender-integrated and gender-segregated training. No meaningful assessment is possible without first understanding each Service’s IET. That is why the Commission presents its findings for this part of the statute before assessing gender-integrated and gender-segregated basic training. The Services have different objectives and unique positions within the nation’s security framework.

From the outset, commissioners understood that the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps have distinct cultures. The training of each reflects its cultural heritage and current Service objectives. There are some common elements in all training; however, the Services’ distinct cultures and missions necessarily cause differences in their training formats and emphasis.



## A. *The Statute*

The statute required the Commission to review and assess basic training, as follows:<sup>78</sup>

(c) FUNCTIONS RELATING TO BASIC TRAINING PROGRAMS, GENERALLY—The Commission shall review the course objectives, structure, and length of the basic training programs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The Commission shall also review the relationship between those basic training objectives and the advanced training provided in the initial entry training programs of each of those Services. As part of that review, the Commission shall (with respect to each of those Services) take the following measures:

(1) Determine the current end-state objectives established for graduates of basic training, particularly in regard to

- (A) physical conditioning;
- (B) technical and physical skills proficiency;
- (C) knowledge;
- (D) military socialization, including the inculcation of values and attitudes; and
- (E) basic combat operational requirements.

(2) Assess whether those current end-state objectives, and basic training itself, should be modified (in structure, length, focus, program of instruction, training methods, or otherwise), based, in part, on the following:

(A) An assessment of the perspectives of operational units on the quality and qualifications of the initial entry training graduates being assigned to those units, considering in particular whether the basic training system produces graduates who arrive in operational units with an appropriate level of skills, physical conditioning, and degree of military socialization to meet unit requirements and needs.

(B) An assessment of the demographics, backgrounds, attitudes, experience, and physical fitness of new recruits entering basic training, considering in particular the question of whether, given the entry-level demographics, education, and background of new recruits, the basic training systems and objectives are most efficiently and effectively structured and conducted to produce graduates who meet service needs.

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<sup>78</sup> Public Law 105-85, Sec. (c).

(C) An assessment of the perspectives of personnel who conduct basic training with regard to measures required to improve basic training.

(3) Assess the extent to which the initial entry training programs of each of the services continue, after the basic training phases of the programs, effectively to reinforce and advance the military socialization (including the inculcation of service values and attitudes), the physical conditioning, and the attainment and improvement of knowledge and proficiency in fundamental military skills that are begun in basic training.

### ***B. Recruitment and Military Entrance Processing Review***

Recruiters in all Services use similar methods to identify potential recruits, to begin their transition from civilian to soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine. These methods include telephone prospecting; high school, college, and area business canvassing; telephone calls to potential recruits referred by students, parents, relatives, teachers, and other positive centers of influence in their lives; and follow-up calls or meetings with those who have requested information about enlistment. Once at the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS), applicants complete any required Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) testing, take a medical exam, and meet with a Service counselor. Service-specific contract documents are completed, and the new servicemember enters the Delayed Entry Program (DEP), from 14 days up to 365 days, depending on educational status or the training start date for which he or she has been scheduled. Before the new servicemembers are taken to their IET location, the MEPS again verifies their medical status and contract documents.

The chart on page 93 depicts the IET continuum for each Service. This chart provides a visual representation of the servicemember's maturation process from civilian to military status in his or her first operational assignment. Major activities, graduation requirements, and defining events are highlighted throughout the continuum. The chart is not meant to compare the Services, but rather to show the unique processes used by each Service and described below.

### ***C. Initial Entry Training Overview***

The Commission's four military liaison officers planned, coordinated, and executed the visits to basic training installations and advanced individual training (AIT)/MOS schools. Regardless of the Service site, the format of the visit was similar. The commissioners observed training activities and talked with recruits and trainers. In witnessing recruits' initial phase of socialization to military life, the commissioners began the process of fulfilling Congress' mandate. The Commission conducted multiple visits<sup>79</sup> to accommodate conflicting schedules, and commissioners talked with hundreds of servicemembers in planned discussion groups. They also conversed informally with numerous servicemembers while observing training activities across each Service's training continuum.

<sup>79</sup> See Appendix D "Trip Maps and Trip Matrices."

## **Army**

The Commission completed an extensive review of the Army's initial entry training program, covering the different types of training: basic training and advanced individual training, or one station unit training (OSUT).

By the end of the second visit to Fort Jackson, South Carolina, commissioners had observed both basic training and AIT, as well as the Drill Sergeant School (DSS). They talked to over 140 basic training and 26 AIT soldiers, 42 drill sergeants, 8 drill sergeant leaders,<sup>80</sup> 15 officers and senior noncommissioned officers, 13 chaplains, and the Commanding General.

The two Fort McClellan, Alabama, visits provided information about the conduct of OSUT for Military Police (MP) and chemical MOSSs. Commissioners also gained insights into the conduct of training for joint Service students attending AIT. They observed MP and chemical OSUT and talked to more than 150 OSUT soldiers, 34 drill sergeants, 23 officers and senior noncommissioned officers, 6 chaplains, and the Commanding General.

At Fort Benning, Georgia, commissioners received a briefing from the Army Physical Fitness Institute, and also observed infantry OSUT. They talked to 32 OSUT soldiers, 7 drill sergeant leaders, 15 drill sergeants, 12 drill sergeant candidates, 14 officers and senior noncommissioned officers, 7 chaplains, and the Commanding General.

The commissioners conducted the final Army visit on April 5, 1999, at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. This visit was structured the same as the operational visits. The commissioners spoke with representatives of one AIT, two basic training, and two OSUT battalions. They conversed with 5 battalion commanders, 5 command sergeants major, 5 company commanders, 5 first sergeants, 5 mixed-gender drill sergeant teams, and 10 drill sergeants. The Commission also spoke with 20 drill sergeant candidates and the Commanding General.

## **Navy**

The Commission visited the Navy's Recruit Training Command (RTC) and Service School Command (SSC), Great Lakes, Illinois, three times, and talked with more than 70 recruits, 55 recruit division commanders (RDCs), 60 officer and senior enlisted recruit training leaders, and more than 70 advanced skills instructors. They also spoke with commanding officers of both schools, as well as with the Commander of Naval Training Center, Great Lakes.

## **Air Force**

The Commission visited Lackland Air Force Base (AFB), Texas, four times, and had the opportunity to view basic military training (BMT), as well as advanced technical training (TT). Commissioners spoke with more than 190 basic recruits, 80 military training instructors

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<sup>80</sup> Instructors at the Drill Sergeant School.

(MTIs), 18 basic and TT squadron commanders, more than 40 advanced TT students, and 19 military training leaders (MTLs).<sup>81</sup> In addition, they visited the MTI/MTL School and talked with students and instructors.

### **Marine Corps**

The Commission visited the Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD), Parris Island, South Carolina; Marine Combat Training (MCT) at Schools of Infantry (East and West); Infantry Training Battalion at School of Infantry (East); Marine Corps Service Support School, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; and Marine Detachment for Military Police MOS at Fort McClellan, Alabama. At these sites, commissioners spoke with more than 135 recruits, 75 Marines in MCT, 45 Marines in MOS schools, 50 drill instructors, 20 Drill Instructor School students, 20 Drill Instructor School instructors, 20 MCT instructors, 40 MOS instructors, and 45 officer and senior enlisted recruit training leaders. They also talked with the commanding officers of all schools, and the commanding generals of MCRD Parris Island and the Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune.

### ***D. Services' Operational Overview***

The Commission used the operational force visits to evaluate IET results. The format for these trips differed from the training site visits. Rather than concentrate on observed activities, the Commission spent most of the time asking all levels of command to assess the IET product: the trained and recently assigned servicemembers. Commissioners focused on units from the commanding officer down to the first-line supervisor, and met with both commissioned and noncommissioned officers. They also asked those who were beginning the working phase of their military careers to assess their own training. These discussion group participants represented a variety of combat, combat support, and combat service support units. The last step in this phase was a trip to the European Theater to visit soldiers in Bosnia; sailors and Marines aboard the USS ENTERPRISE underway in the Mediterranean Sea; and airmen at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. This final trip allowed the commissioners to interact with servicemembers deployed in the performance and support of operational commitments abroad.

### **Army**

The Commission visited Fort Hood, Texas, in January 1999. The orientation and familiarization consisted of meeting with soldiers assigned to operational units, and viewing Fort Hood's extensive infrastructure and seven miles of motor pools by Blackhawk helicopter. Commissioners also observed pilots training in helicopter flight simulators, and soldiers conducting operator checks and maintenance. They received a command briefing from the III Corps chief of staff and conducted separate discussion groups with 60 soldiers, consisting of battalion commanders, command sergeants major, company commanders, first sergeants, first-line supervising NCOs, and soldiers recently graduated from IET.

<sup>81</sup> MTIs are assigned to basic training units; MTLs are assigned to technical training units.

## **Navy**

The Commission visited the Norfolk Naval Station, Virginia, in December 1998. This visit included an orientation and walk-through of an amphibious assault ship, a destroyer, a nuclear attack submarine, and a helicopter support squadron. In addition, commissioners had a discussion with the Commander, Amphibious Group TWO, and spoke in systematic discussion groups with more than 60 representatives of the entire organization: junior seamen, first-line supervising NCOs, junior and mid-grade officers, and commanding officers.

## **Air Force**

In January 1999, commissioners visited the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley AFB, Virginia, which is also the home of the Air Combat Command headquarters. This visit included orientation and familiarization with the entire base, a tour of the F-15 engine repair hangar, and an opportunity to explore an F-15 static display aircraft. Commissioners conducted separate group discussions with more than 60 permanent personnel, consisting of first-term airmen, first-line supervising NCOs, squadron senior enlisted superintendents, squadron first sergeants, squadron section commanders, and squadron commanders.

## **Marine Corps**

The Commission visited the II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and subordinate units at Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and Marine Corps Air Station, New River, North Carolina, in December 1998 and February 1999. These visits included orientation and familiarization with an artillery battalion, motor transport maintenance company, heavy-lift-capable helicopter squadron, and Marine Aviation Logistics squadron. In addition, commissioners spoke in discussion groups, and individually with more than 120 people representing the entire organization: new Marines, first-line supervising NCOs, staff noncommissioned officers, junior and mid-grade officers, the commanding officers of deployable units, and the Commanding General, II MEF.

## **Joint Operational Overview**

Commissioners went to Bosnia, visited TASK FORCE Eagle in Tuzla, toured the headquarters, and talked with active and reserve component soldiers. They also went to Camps Commanche and Bedrock, where they talked with soldiers about their tour of duty in Bosnia. They then proceeded to the USS ENTERPRISE underway, where they observed night flight operations and stayed overnight. They toured the ship, including berthing compartments, and talked with sailors and Marines. The final site visit was at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, where they toured the installation and talked with airmen, NCOs, and officers.

In addition, individual commissioners made authorized visits to several joint commands and the U.S. Coast Guard basic training facility. The joint visits included the Pacific Command, the Atlantic Command, the Southern Command, and the Southern European Task Force.

### ***E. Initial Entry Training Continuum Requirements***

The Commission understands and accepts the unique roles and requirements of each specific Service to produce the best-trained soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines possible. The following are the specific curricula, standards, and procedures that encompass each Service's IET portion of the training continuum.

#### **Army**

After arriving at one of four basic combat training (BCT) or four OSUT locations, new soldiers spend 3 to 10 days in a reception battalion for further processing, uniforms and identification tags, and a fitness evaluation test. New soldiers are evaluated using specific fitness standards and, if required, are placed in a fitness training unit (FTU) for up to 3 weeks before starting IET.

IET is divided into five phases. The first three phases, weeks 1 through 9, are common to BCT and the BCT portion of OSUT. Phases IV and V are associated with only AIT or the MOS portion of OSUT.

Day 1 begins with arrival at a BCT or OSUT company. BCT lasts 9 weeks, and at graduation, new soldiers go on to AIT for MOS training lasting 4 to 52 weeks. OSUT, which combines BCT and AIT training in a single company, lasts 12 to 18 weeks.

The Army's basic training format achieves the end-state objectives of instilling values (*e.g.*, the value of teamwork, through training in phases) and basic combat skills (*e.g.*, weapon and tactical proficiency). This phased process is applied to both gender-integrated and male-only training. All soldiers are taught and tested through phases. Soldiers must meet each phase's requirements to move to the next level of responsibilities and privileges. Privileges granted in IET support the phase training program, which establishes intermediate goals to help recruits in their transformation from civilians to soldiers. Specific privileges are granted in each phase as incentives, and soldiers are eligible for those privileges as they progress in training. However, the decision to award privileges is based on individual performance. Soldiers are given additional freedom as they demonstrate more self-discipline and the ability to accept responsibility. These are privileges, not rights, and thus can be withheld, modified, or withdrawn according to performance, mission, and program requirements. The following privileges are the upper limits and, therefore, can be more restrictive.

Phase I is the "Patriot" phase. Weeks 1 through 3 of IET establish an environment of total control, where active, involved leadership begins transforming civilians into soldiers. Training during this phase focuses on inculcating Army values, traditions, and ethics, as well as beginning the development of individual basic combat skills and physical fitness training. This phase corresponds to the IET objective of instilling values and making soldiers tactically proficient.

Phase II is the "Gunfighter" phase. Weeks 4 through 6 of IET develop basic combat skills, with special emphasis on weapon proficiency. Skill development, self-discipline, and

team building characterize Phase II, along with a lessening of control, commensurate with demonstrated performance and responsibility. This phase prepares soldiers for the technical transition to their unit by teaching the weapons qualification (U.S. weapons training, basic rifle marksmanship training, and bayonet assault training, along with foot-march training), self-discipline, and team building required for the readiness of combat units. Instruction on Army values, ethics, history, and traditions is continued.

Phase III is the “Warrior” phase. Weeks 7 through 9 of IET develop and foster the IET soldier’s understanding of the importance of teamwork. This phase culminates with the application of all skills learned in BCT, during a 72-hour field training exercise (FTX). This exercise stresses soldiers physically and mentally, and requires each soldier to demonstrate basic combat skills proficiency in a tactical field environment, while operating as part of a team. This phase enhances the soldier’s ability to adjust to the mental and physical stress imposed in a tactical field environment. Soldiers learn the importance of operating as a team, while meeting physical and mental challenges. The training enables them to transition to their units smoothly, confident in their skills to do their jobs in a combat environment.

To graduate from BCT, all soldiers must successfully do the following:

- Pass the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT), with 50 points in each of three events: push-ups, sit-ups, and the 2-mile run.
- Qualify with the M16A2 rifle, for a minimum of 23 of 40 target hits.
- Qualify on the hand grenade course, and throw two live hand grenades.
- Pass all end-of-phase tests and all end-of-cycle tests.
- Complete all obstacle and confidence courses.
- Complete bayonet and pugil fight training.
- Complete hand-to-hand combat training.
- Complete the Protective Mask Confidence Course.
- Demonstrate knowledge and understanding of the Army core values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless, honor, integrity, and personal courage.
- Complete all tactical field training, including 7 foot marches (3, 5, 8, 10, and 10 km) and field training exercises (which includes a 10 and 15 km road march).

After BCT, the soldierization process continues in phases IV and V, in which more than 210 Army MOSs in 32 different career management fields (CMFs) are taught at 23 AIT and 4 OSUT locations. In these phases, there is an increased emphasis on technical MOS training, and reduced control over the training environment. Soldiers also receive reinforcement training on values, and an introduction to the history, heritage, and traditions of their specialty branches. The lessening of control, expansion of privileges, and focus on MOS skills are all part of the evolutionary process marking the transformation from a civilian to someone who thinks, looks, and acts like a soldier.

## Navy

Arriving at Chicago's O'Hare Airport from all over the country, Navy recruits are met by senior petty officers (noncommissioned officers) and transported to the RTC at Great Lakes, Illinois. On their arrival, the recruits are assigned to divisions of approximately 88 members. Each division is assigned to a training barracks, referred to as a "ship." The typical layout of a ship is four living areas, referred to as "compartments," on each deck of the ship. Three recruit division commanders are assigned to each division, and each ship has a leading chief petty officer and a ship's officer.

Navy recruit training lasts 9.2 weeks. In-processing includes medical and dental exams, physical fitness and academic assessments, and basic courses on military policy. Training divisions are formally commissioned during the recruits' second week, and the structured curriculum begins. This includes instruction in Navy core values, personal rights and responsibilities, shipboard communications, rights and responsibilities, watch-standing procedures, and basic seamanship. In addition, recruits participate in marching, drill, and physical training; swimming qualifications; fire-fighting and damage-control scenarios; gas-mask donning; and weapons familiarization. The defining event of a recruit's training is a physically and mentally demanding 14-hour event composed of 12 fleet-oriented scenarios referred to as "Battle Stations."

As formally defined by the Navy, to graduate from recruit training, a recruit must do the following:

- Be able to succeed in a gender-integrated, multiracial, multicultural fleet environment.
- Demonstrate an understanding of the team concept.
- Have a basic military knowledge, including customs, courtesies, and rank recognition.
- Have knowledge of the Navy's heritage.
- Display military bearing, and demonstrate proper wearing of the uniform.
- Display an understanding of the chain of command.
- Be familiar with the procedures for small-arms fire.
- Demonstrate an understanding of proper watch-standing procedures.
- Be introduced to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
- Emulate core values (honor, commitment, and courage).
- Show an acceptance of the Sailor's Creed.
- Be introduced to shipboard life and fire-fighting/damage-control/seamanship procedures.
- Exceed the fleet's minimum physical fitness standards.
- Pass third-class swimming qualifications.

Recruits may face setbacks in training for academic or nonacademic reasons. Remedial programs help dedicated and able recruits to meet training graduation standards. Recruits who do not meet physical fitness or body-fat standards are placed in special units

until they meet the standards, or until they are separated. Injured recruits likely to return to training are placed in a medical holding unit until determined fit for training duty.

No recruit reports directly to his or her duty station without attending an apprentice school for some type of specialized training, ranging in duration from 2 to 63 weeks. For those ratings (job specialties) unrestricted by gender, the instructional course is fully gender-integrated. In fiscal year 1998, some 52,000 new sailors did the following: 25 percent attended apprenticeship training (seaman, airman, and fireman); 7 percent attended nuclear training; 3 percent attended Seabee-related training; and 8 percent attended administrative-related training. In addition, 25 percent attended training related to surface warfare; 19 percent attended training related to air warfare; and 14 percent attended training related to submarine warfare.

### **Air Force**

On arrival at the San Antonio International Airport, recruits are transported to Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. They arrive Wednesdays through Fridays, and as they leave the buses, they are divided into groups of 50 to 58, and assigned to a flight. They also meet their military training instructors (MTIs), who will stay with them around the clock for the first 72 hours. Female recruits live in clustered dormitory bays on the top floors of the recruit housing and training facilities, to enhance their security and privacy. During their first weekend, the recruits, now called “rainbows,” continue to wear civilian clothes, although they are issued some gear, and they begin to learn basic drill. Their first day of basic military training (BMT), however, will not begin until 0500 the Monday after arrival.

BMT is conducted over 6.4 weeks, or 47 calendar days. As the primary BMT trainers, the MTIs instruct recruits in discipline, academics, military customs and courtesies, physical conditioning, and the field training exercise (FTX). The principal goal is to produce disciplined, physically fit, and academically qualified airmen who can then go on to technical training (TT) schools and Air Force duty.

On an hourly basis, BMT breaks down as follows:

- Administration (83.75 hours): clothing issue, job classification, medical examination, and record keeping.
- Military studies (44.25 hours): customs and courtesies, financial management, Air Force history and organization, and human relations.
- Military training (183.25 hours): dorm, drill (parade and retreat), core values, FTX, marksmanship, and physical conditioning 6 days a week.
- Miscellaneous (143.25 hours): meals, tests and surveys, and transit time.

To graduate from BMT, all recruits must do the following:

- Be within the maximum weight or body-fat standards.
- Pass the wear-of-the-uniform evaluation.
- Pass the reporting procedures evaluation.
- Pass the individual drill evaluation.
- Pass dorm performance.
- Demonstrate an understanding of the Air Force core values of “Integrity First,” “Service Before Self,” and “Excellence in All We Do.”
- Pass the end-of-course test (must score at least 70 percent).
- Pass the sixth-week-of-training physical-conditioning evaluation, consisting of a 2-mile run, push-ups, and sit-ups.

Recruits are required to run a confidence course during their fourth and fifth weeks. Rifle qualification and the FTX also take place during the fifth week. The FTX prepares recruits for Air Force expeditionary deployments by familiarizing them with field conditions and basic encampment operations.

Graduation parades are held on the last Friday of the sixth week of BMT. On Saturday, recruits are given a town pass to visit San Antonio or to spend time with their families. On the Monday after their graduation, the recruits, now airmen, leave Lackland AFB to undergo their second phase of training, which is TT. BMT does not include TT, although it attempts to lay its foundation by introducing recruits to proper study discipline, familiarizing them with Air Force manuals and directives, and acclimating them to Air Force testing programs and methods.

There are 178 Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs) within the enlisted career fields that are taught in TT. School lengths vary per AFSC, from 4 weeks to 83 weeks. The majority of the initial skills TT takes place at five major sites: Lackland AFB; Texas, Sheppard AFB, Texas; Goodfellow AFB, Texas; Vandenberg AFB, California; and Keesler AFB, Mississippi. When airmen from BMT arrive at one of the Air Force’s TT schools, they begin the second step in the training continuum. Each day, they spend 8 hours in class receiving instruction from TT instructors who are experts in their career fields. During the weekends, morning hours, and evening hours, MTLs supervise the students. The MTLs are in charge of ensuring that students eat in the dining facility, receive physical and military training, and adhere to TT rules.

A five-phase TT program bridges the gap between the closely controlled BMT environment and the operational unit. In Phase I, privileges are limited, and airmen must demonstrate the ability to accept responsibility and be held accountable for their actions. They must understand that readiness depends on their ability to act responsibly. As they demonstrate this trait, they earn privileges. In Phase II, some freedoms are allowed for those who have demonstrated the required military bearing expected at this point in training. In Phase III, airmen are granted additional freedoms, such as the use of a privately owned vehicle, and the ability to request permission to reside off base if one’s spouse is in the local

area. In Phase IV, there is no curfew on the weekends. Phase V is the least restrictive, the one that most closely mirrors the environment of the airman's first operational duty station.

## **Marine Corps**

The Marine Corps entry-level training pipeline is designed to make Marines. The process is called "transformation," and consists of four phases: recruiting, recruit training (boot camp), cohesion, and sustainment. The phases are interrelated, each building on the previous one, and are essential to the process of making Marines.

All female recruits, as well as male recruits east of the Mississippi River, go to MCRD Parris Island, South Carolina. Male recruits west of the Mississippi go to MCRD San Diego, California. Except for the differences imposed by geography and environment, the training is the same at both MCRDs. The recruits undergo 12 weeks of boot camp, starting the transformation from young, and usually immature, civilians to basically trained Marines. During this socialization process, the recruits learn institutional values and are inculcated with the Marine Corps' core values of honor, courage, and commitment.

The organizational structure of three recruit training battalions is the same at both recruit depots, except for the existence of an additional all-female training battalion at MCRD Parris Island, South Carolina. The battalions are separated into four training companies, each commanded by a captain (O-3). Each company has two series, usually commanded by a lieutenant, and each series has three platoons. The platoons, supervised by three or four drill instructors, are the primary training units. Drill instructors are always the same gender as the recruits under their command.

After the recruits arrive at either of the two depots, they spend 4 or 5 days undergoing physical examinations, taking classification tests, receiving uniforms and equipment, and beginning their assimilation into the military environment. Their 12-week training cycle, standard for all recruits since 1996, may be broken down into 489 training hours over 64 training days. However, the training hours do not include the forming period of 1 to 3 days, Team Week (week 9), Sundays, and holidays. Week 6 entails field training. Weeks 7 and 8 are marksmanship training, followed by the Crucible in Transformation Week (week 11), and Transition Week (week 12). In addition, there are 157 nonacademic hours: 70 hours of commanders' time, and 87 hours of administrative time.

To graduate from boot camp, all recruits must meet the following requirements:

- Pass the Marine Corps Physical Fitness Test.
- Qualify with the service rifle.
- Complete the Combat Water Survival Test.
- Pass the Recruit Training Battalion Commander's Inspection.
- Achieve mastery of designated general military subjects and individual combat basic tasks, as set forth in the Program of Instruction.
- Complete the Crucible.
- Be at or below maximum weight (or body fat) requirements.

Recycling is authorized for recruits who fail to meet physical training standards; cannot meet the desired level of general performance; lose 3 or more days of training within any 30-day period, no matter what the reason; or fail to meet weight standards, or to show satisfactory progress while following a weight-control program. In general, when all attempts to bring recruits to satisfactory levels of conditioning, behavior, discipline, or skills have failed, they are separated from the Service .

Marines completing boot camp (other than those designated for the infantry, who go directly to MOS training) go to either Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, or Camp Pendleton, California, for MCT. This training is a 17-day exercise simulating an overseas deployment, seeking to provide the new Marines with skills needed to fight and survive in a combat environment. After completing combat training, all Marines, except the infantry, report to MOS schools. Sixty-two percent of the schools are combined with those of the other Services, or shared with the other Services, and their courses vary in length from weeks to months.

The Marine Corps also considers unit cohesion as an important part of the transformation from civilians to Marines. Cohesion begins with the formation of teams in their respective MOS schools, keeping the teams together through training, and assigning them to a unit. The intent is to have the teams train, garrison, deploy, and fight together. The operational units carry out sustainment training.

### ***F. Recent Initial Entry Training Changes***

The Services provided information on IET changes during Commission briefings, visits, and hearings. In January 1999, the Commission asked the Services to update the Commission, in a hearing, on the status of IET changes since the initial briefings, with particular attention to any projected changes in the next 12 months. The Commission found, as a result of previous outside reviews and periodic self-evaluation of programs, a dynamic and evolving training environment. The following paragraphs summarize the Commission's observations. Each Service differs in size and needs; however, all pointed out, and the commissioners agree, that improving IET is a continuous process.

#### **Army**

Initial entry training has undergone numerous changes in the Army over the past year. The Army has implemented these changes with the intent to produce a values-based, motivated, disciplined, and physically ready soldier. These changes have been phased into the Army IET programs throughout TRADOC, and have occurred in the areas of IET policy and training improvements, personnel selection and assignment, and drill sergeant selection and training.

The Army extensively updated TRADOC Regulation 350-6, initial entry training Policies and Administration, the foundation for its conduct of IET, and published it November 30, 1998. The new regulation focuses on training rigor and standardization. It establishes ten nonwaiverable graduation requirements, encourages new starts, and tightens control at AIT sites. In addition, it strengthens APFT requirements and mandates the use of FTUs for APFT

failures. IET commanders are also required to conduct mid- and end-of-course sensing sessions. The Army has mandated standards for separate and secure housing, and for Charge of Quarters (CQ) and supervisory policies. This revision also standardizes individual training records (ITRs), so that field commands have better information on how their new soldiers are trained.

The Army increased BCT and OSUT phases I through III from 8 to 9 weeks, beginning October 1, 1998. The additional 54 hours of training are spread over these three initial phases, and focus on human relations (HR), core values, and Army traditions. The Army has included 12 HR training support packages (TSPs), 9 values TSPs, 9 values videotapes, and 2 Army heritage videotapes in the BCT revision. The Army has also produced a cadre guide for drill sergeants, a train-the-trainer guide, and a reception-station TSP, covering introduction to the Army's values and heritage. Overall, the Army has added 21 new TSPs to the BCT program of instruction, and has revised 72 TSPs to incorporate values training.

The Army has also increased physical and mental rigor during BCT/OSUT. It has updated graduation standards, requiring each BCT/OSUT soldier to pass the APFT and demonstrate proficiency in nine other requirements. A 72-hour, end-of-course/Phase III Warrior FTX tests each soldier's physical, mental, and tactical skills. The FTX centers on discipline, teamwork, and reinforcement of Army values. Each Warrior FTX ends with a rite-of-passage ceremony, which marks the successful completion of the FTX, as well as all BCT requirements. The rite-of-passage ceremony confirms the right to continue in the soldierization process.

Human relations and values reinforcement training in AIT began January 1, 1999. These TSPs include Army core values, individual branch history, equal opportunity (EO), prevention of sexual harassment (POSH), Uniform Code of Military Justice, spiritual/emotional/mental fitness, personal finances, and rape prevention. The World Institute of Leadership and Learning is completing development of virtual-experience software to supplement EO/POSH training in AIT.

The Army has measures in place to provide IET soldiers with gender privacy and dignity in secure living conditions. The Army implemented these measures in BCT/OSUT on May 1, 1998, and in AIT on July 1, 1998.

The Army is filling all company executive officer billets and unit ministry teams. The Army conducts a quality review of IET commanders and has added EO/sexual harassment training to the Pre-Command Course (PCC), Cadre Training Course (CTC), and Orientation Course.

The new Drill Sergeant School (DSS) program of instruction, introduced October 1, 1998, provides more ethics, values, and HR training. The Army has added a total of 38 hours of HR and values/ethics training to ensure drill sergeants are better trained to meet the diverse challenges in today's IET environment. In addition, in an effort to improve drill sergeants' ability to conduct physical fitness training, the Army has added a master fitness trainer (MFT)

qualification as part of the curriculum. The Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute certifies all DSS instructors as EO representatives. The Army assigns qualified EO advisors to each training installation.

The Army directed that all BCT companies be limited to 240 soldiers, and to support this decision, expanded BCT to Fort Benning, effective January 1999. The analysis of the future barracks design is ongoing, along with the strategic study of barracks requirements.

## Navy

During the past 12 months, the Navy has implemented substantive changes to recruit and apprentice training, as a result of focused leadership to improve the IET processes at the Naval Training Center, Great Lakes. The Commanding Officer, Recruit Training Command, his directorate heads, and other key command personnel began weekly roundtable discussions in the fall of 1998 to address training issues and propose/enact actions.

Battle Stations, a series of fleet-oriented tests initiated in July 1997 to measure a recruit's transformation from civilian to sailor in the seventh week of training, was extended from 12 to 14 hours in June 1998.

In response to the poor fitness levels noted among some beginning recruits, and in an attempt to prevent exercise-related injuries, the Navy has instituted several physical fitness-related initiatives. In May 1998, the Navy increased the physical rigor of recruit training to ensure that all graduating recruits pass the Physical Readiness Test with a score of "good" in every category, exceeding the Navy-wide standard of "satisfactory."

In December 1998, recruits began to take a physical fitness screening test on their third day of training. The Navy assigns those found in need of additional physical conditioning to a remedial fitness training unit for a 2-week program designed by the Naval Health Research Center. In addition, the Navy extended a restructured, progressive physical training program to six times per week, to improve physical stamina and better prepare recruits to meet the physical demand of Battle Stations.

In October 1998, the Navy lengthened the curriculum at the Recruit Division Commander (RDC) School from 7 to 13 weeks, to allow RDC students to spend more time under senior commanders' supervision. Additionally, the Navy revamped the program of instruction for this critical school, to provide the RDCs with the tools to succeed.

Since July 1998, the Navy has added 171 reservists to instructor and training support billets, to increase supervisory presence during peak training periods. The Navy also temporarily assigned 10 ensigns, awaiting flight instruction, to offset officer-manning gaps and provide an additional barracks presence during peak training periods. The Navy reports that the number of ensigns participating in this program will increase in 1999. By December 1, 1998, the Navy Personnel Command had filled RTCs 651 authorized billets, thereby meeting the 13-week training requirement prior to transfer of qualified RDCs.

The Navy has implemented controls at RTC to ensure that same-gender members conduct after-hour security watches in recruit barracks. In addition, the Navy has installed alarms on doorways leading to fire escape ladders. Personnel at remote stations (ship quarterdecks) monitor the alarms to detect unauthorized access to recruit barracks. At Service School Command (SSC), the Navy began in February 1999 and completed in June 1999 hallway barrier installation to separate the genders in different wings of the barracks. Men and women have separate entrances to their floors, and the Navy assigns adequate personnel and monitors rooms for proper security and access control.

In September 1998, the Navy restructured the curriculum for the Navy military training (NMT) program in response to fleet feedback. Incorporated into all IET, and continuing in the fleet for all sailors in their first year of enlistment, NMT advances the Navy sailorization process by building on the military socialization skills gained in recruit training. The revamped program focuses on inculcating skills to help the sailor manage personal and professional priorities. In addition to specific physical training and military bearing/values requirements, the latest revision to NMT instituted a three-phase ladder of privileges to guide sailors' personal time.

### **Air Force**

Since January 1998, the Air Force has required MTIs who conduct counseling sessions with trainees of the opposite gender to have an additional permanent party member in attendance as a witness. Previously, another trainee could be a witness. In July 1998, the Air Force increased basic military training physical conditioning sessions to 6 days a week, and lengthened them from 45 to 75 minutes each. The Air Force also required recruits to run the confidence course twice, rather than once. Currently, the Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine is conducting a study that reevaluates physical fitness and gender-based standards.

Another new initiative has involved upgrading security measures in the recruit housing and training facilities. The Air Force has installed alarms on all fire-exit doors, closed-circuit cameras in stairwell foyers, and monitor screens in the squadron CQ offices.

The Air Force is currently restructuring the BMT FTX. The new "Warrior Week" will expand the current FTX to a full week and include mobility processing, M-16 qualification, Law of Armed Conflict, self-aid/buddy care, and gas-mask training. The defining event will bestow "airman" status on the graduating recruit. The goal of "Warrior Week" is to provide airmen ready for the challenges of the Expeditionary Air Force at their first operational unit.

### **Marine Corps**

In July 1996, the Marine Corps implemented changes to the Initial Strength Test (IST) in the Delayed Entry Program (DEP). These changes required the women to run 1 mile instead of three-quarters of a mile, and to do 35 sit-ups in 2 minutes instead of 19 in 1 minute. The flexed-arm-hang requirement of 12 seconds remained unchanged. The changes paved the way for the Marine Corps to implement the same changes to the Initial Strength Test at the recruit depots, in October 1996.

In August 1996, the Marine Corps made the most extensive changes to its recruit training (boot camp) program of instruction in almost 15 years. These changes included a renewed emphasis on instilling the core values of honor, courage, and commitment; a new training schedule that provided more drill instructor time for mentoring recruits, culminating in the Crucible, a defining “rite of passage”; and an additional week of training. The Marine Corps was no longer just training recruits. Focusing on the leadership provided by drill instructors, it was “transforming” them.

In October 1996, in addition to the changes to the IST mentioned above, the Marine Corps required women in recruit training to run 3 miles instead of 1.5 miles, and to do sit-ups for 2 minutes rather than the previous 1 minute, thus meeting the male standard. The Marine Corps implemented the same physical fitness test requirements fleetwide in January 1997.

December 1996 brought the first official running of the Crucible by a company of female recruits and a company of male recruits. The Marine Corps continued to refine the Crucible, and other new aspects of the program of instruction, over the next year. In January 1998, the Marine Corps standardized the training at the MCRDs at Parris Island and San Diego. However, a 10 percent difference in the program of instructions exists and is attributed to environmental and geographical differences at the training sites.

In July 1998, the Marine Corps required recruits to do abdominal crunches instead of the traditional sit-ups, still within the 2-minute time limit.

In October 1998, the Marine Corps revised the women’s physical fitness standards, requiring the women to complete the same 1.5-mile run (increased from 1 mile) as the men, as part of the IST. The Marine Corps also required them to complete the 3-mile run and do abdominal crunches (sit-ups) similar to the men’s.

### ***G. Specific Statutory Requirements***

As noted at the beginning of the chapter, Congress directed the Commission to determine the end-state objectives in several areas of basic training. In response, the Commission determined the following.

#### **1. Physical Conditioning**

##### **Army**

The Army’s basic training format achieves the end-state objectives through phase training. The Army applies this phased process to both gender-integrated and gender-segregated training, under the “train as you fight” method. The Army teaches and tests all soldiers through phases. Phase I (weeks 1 through 3 of IET) provides an environment of total control, where an active, involved leadership begins transforming civilians into soldiers. Training during this phase focuses on inculcating Army values, traditions, and ethics, as well as beginning the development of individual basic combat skills and physical fitness training, which continues throughout the five IET phases.

At the end of BCT or OSUT Phase III, a soldier must pass the APFT with a minimum of 50 points in each event, 150 points total. At the end of AIT or OSUT Phase V, a soldier must pass the APFT with a minimum of 60 points in each event, 180 points total. The Army requires soldiers to maintain this 60-point minimum per event throughout their military career.

| ARMY PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST (APFT) |       |       |       |       |            |       |       |       |       |
|-----------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Male                              |       |       |       |       | Female     |       |       |       |       |
| Push-ups                          |       |       |       |       | Push-ups   |       |       |       |       |
| AGE                               | 17-21 | 22-26 | 27-31 | 32-36 | AGE        | 17-21 | 22-26 | 27-31 | 32-36 |
| 60 PTS                            | 42    | 40    | 39    | 36    | 60 PTS     | 19    | 17    | 17    | 15    |
| 50 PTS                            | 35    | 31    | 30    | 26    | 50 PTS     | 13    | 11    | 10    | 9     |
| Sit-ups                           |       |       |       |       | Sit-ups    |       |       |       |       |
| 60 PTS                            | 53    | 50    | 45    | 42    | 60 PTS     | 53    | 50    | 45    | 42    |
| 50 PTS                            | 47    | 43    | 36    | 34    | 50 PTS     | 47    | 43    | 36    | 34    |
| 2-mile run                        |       |       |       |       | 2-mile run |       |       |       |       |
| 60 PTS                            | 15:54 | 16:36 | 17:00 | 17:42 | 60 PTS     | 18:54 | 19:36 | 20:30 | 21:42 |
| 50 PTS                            | 16:36 | 17:30 | 17:54 | 18:48 | 50 PTS     | 19:42 | 20:36 | 21:42 | 23:06 |

Source: APFT Update Study Briefing, November 1998. Ages 17 and 36 correspond with minimum and maximum ages allowed for initial enlistment.

Recruits must also complete all tactical field training required in the appropriate program of instruction, to include five foot marches and FTXs, culminating with the rigorous, comprehensive, 72-hour Warrior FTX. The Army designed this exercise to stress soldiers physically and mentally, requiring that they demonstrate proficiency in common military subjects, complete a confidence course, and finish a 10-km road march.

Basic training provides the Army with mentally and physically fit soldiers who can perform their duties in an extended-stress atmosphere. It teaches soldiers to value mental, physical, and spiritual health, and to recognize its impact on quality of life and unit readiness. This includes adherence to the Army’s Health Promotion Program objectives of having a good diet, exercising, abstaining from drugs and tobacco products, eliminating alcohol abuse, managing stress, receiving regular health checkups, and ensuring spiritual and moral growth.

The Army also reinforces physical conditioning after BCT. All soldiers continue with a rigorous physical fitness program after graduation from BCT. As shown above, soldiers must pass the APFT to graduate from AIT and OSUT.

## Navy

The Navy inculcates physical fitness and wellness as a way of life during recruit training. Components of this effort are the achievement and maintenance of physical fitness standards, endurance and stamina, and proper weight distribution. Recruits participate in physical fitness training 6 times per week, for over 60 minutes per session. In the sixth week

of training, recruits also participate in the Captain’s Cup Olympics, a physical events competition the results of which are included in scoring for divisional honors.

| NAVY PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST |                          |                           |                           |                           |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| MEN                        |                          |                           |                           |                           |
| Event                      | Maximum Score Each Event | 17-to-19-Age Min Required | 20-to-29-Age Min Required | 30-to-34-Age Min Required |
| Push-Ups                   | 67 = 100 pts             | 51 = 84 pts               | 42 = 75 pts               | 36 = 69 pts               |
| Curl-Ups                   | 100 = 100 pts            | 60 = 60 pts               | 50 = 50 pts               | 40 = 40 pts               |
| 1.5-Mile Run               | 8:10 = 100 pts           | 11:00 = 83 pts            | 12:00 = 77 pts            | 13:45 = 66 pts            |
| Recruit Passing Score      |                          | 227 pts                   | 202 pts                   | 175 pts                   |

| WOMEN                 |                          |                           |                           |                           |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| Event                 | Maximum Score Each Event | 17-to-19-Age Min Required | 20-to-29-Age Min Required | 30-to-34-Age Min Required |
| Push-Ups              | 67 = 100 pts             | 24 = 57 pts               | 17 = 50 pts               | 11 = 44 pts               |
| Curl-Ups              | 100 = 100 pts            | 52 = 52 pts               | 45 = 45 pts               | 39 = 39 pts               |
| 1.5-Mile Run          | 8:10 = 100 pts           | 13:30 = 68 pts            | 14:15 = 63 pts            | 15:30 = 56 pts            |
| Recruit Passing Score |                          | 177 pts                   | 158 pts                   | 139 pts                   |

### Air Force

According to the Air Force, they cultivate a mindset that physical fitness and wellness are a way of life. With the combination of rigorous physical conditioning, conducted six days per week, the physical and mental challenges of the confidence course, and the culminating FTX, the Air Force prepares recruits to function in even an austere environment.

| AIR FORCE PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST |                  |                       |                    |                         |
|---------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|
|                                 | Males (< 29 yrs) | Males (> or = 30 yrs) | Females (< 29 yrs) | Females (> or = 30 yrs) |
| 2-Mile Run                      | 18 min           | 21 min                | 21 min             | 23 min                  |
| Push-Ups Within 2 Minutes       | 30               | 30                    | 14                 | 14                      |
| Sit-Ups Within 2 Minutes        | 45               | 45                    | 38                 | 38                      |

Currently, the Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine is conducting a study, revisiting physical conditioning and gender-based standards.

**Marine Corps**

The Marine Corps emphasizes recruits’ physical fitness and wellness as a way of life, requiring that they do the following:

- Achieve and maintain physical fitness, endurance, and proper weight distribution.
- Pass the physical fitness test with a minimum score of 135 out of 300.

| <b>MARINE CORPS PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST</b>     |                 |           |                      |                 |                            |               |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------|----------------------|-----------------|----------------------------|---------------|
| <b>Required Minimum for Males</b>             |                 |           |                      |                 |                            |               |
| AGE                                           | PULL-UPS        | CRUNCHES  | 3-MILE RUN (MINUTES) | SUBTOTAL POINTS | REQUIRED ADDITIONAL POINTS | PASSING SCORE |
| 17-26                                         | 3               | 50        | 28                   | 105             | 30                         | 135           |
| 27-39                                         | 3               | 45        | 29                   | 94              | 16                         | 110           |
| 40-45                                         | 3               | 45        | 30                   | 88              | 0                          | 88            |
| 46+                                           | 3               | 40        | 33                   | 65              | 0                          | 65            |
| <b>Required Minimum for Females</b>           |                 |           |                      |                 |                            |               |
| AGE                                           | FLEXED-ARM HANG | CRUNCHES  | 3-MILE RUN (MINUTES) | SUBTOTAL POINTS | REQUIRED ADDITIONAL POINTS | PASSING SCORE |
| 17-26                                         | 15 seconds      | 50        | 31                   | 105             | 30                         | 135           |
| 27-39                                         | 15 seconds      | 45        | 32                   | 94              | 16                         | 110           |
| 40-45                                         | 15 seconds      | 45        | 33                   | 88              | 0                          | 88            |
| 46+                                           | 15 seconds      | 40        | 36                   | 65              | 0                          | 65            |
| <b>Required Minimum Classification Scores</b> |                 |           |                      |                 |                            |               |
| AGE                                           | UNSAT           | 3RD CLASS | 2ND CLASS            | 1ST CLASS       |                            |               |
| 17-26                                         | 0-134           | 135       | 175                  | 225             |                            |               |
| 27-39                                         | 0-109           | 110       | 150                  | 200             |                            |               |
| 40-45                                         | 0-87            | 88        | 125                  | 175             |                            |               |
| 46+                                           | 0-64            | 65        | 100                  | 150             |                            |               |

Physical fitness training covers more than 60 hours that are dedicated to structured training, conditioning marches, combat water survival, close combat, and the Crucible event. The Marine Corps equally emphasizes marksmanship training, because two defining characteristics of being a Marine are, first, that one is a rifleman, and second, that one is physically fit. These characteristics are the essence of success in combat.

Finally, recruits must satisfactorily complete the combat water survival test, as described in the table below.

| <b>COMPLETION OF THE COMBAT WATER SURVIVAL (CWS) TEST</b> |                                                                                                                              |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| CWS-CLASS 4<br>(MINIMUM)                                  | IN THE UTILITY UNIFORM (WITHOUT BOOTS):<br>– ENTER SHALLOW (1-METER-DEEP) WATER AND SWIM 25 METERS                           |
|                                                           | USING THE “ABANDON SHIP” TECHNIQUE:<br>– STEP INTO DEEP WATER FROM A MINIMUM HEIGHT OF 8 FEET                                |
|                                                           | TREAD WATER AND DEMONSTRATE “DROWN PROOFING” FOR 2 MINUTES                                                                   |
|                                                           | WITHOUT EXITING THE WATER:<br>– INFLATE THE UNIFORM BLOUSE AND FLOAT FOR 1 MINUTE<br>– DEFLATE THE BLOUSE AND SWIM 25 METERS |

## 2. Technical and Physical Proficiency

### Army

The Army’s basic training format of phase training achieves the end-state objectives of instilling values (such as the value of teamwork), and providing soldiers with basic combat skills, including weapon and tactical proficiency. The Army teaches and tests all soldiers through phases. Soldiers must meet each phase’s requirements to move to the next level of responsibilities and privileges.

The goal of IET is to produce motivated, disciplined, team-oriented soldiers who are inculcated with and understand Army values, and who are technically, physically, and mentally prepared to meet the Army’s challenges. The skills of being a team member and rapidly developing into a cohesive unit carry forward when soldiers complete IET and go to their operational unit. By graduating from OSUT or AIT, soldiers have demonstrated the technical and tactical skills, physical conditioning, and military socialization necessary to join the ranks in the field. They immediately contribute to the unit's mission accomplishment.

Each soldier must meet 10 graduation requirements by the end of Phase III:

- Qualify with an M16A2 rifle.

| <b>Basic Rifle Marksmanship</b> |                           |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------|
| EXPERT                          | 36-40 target hits         |
| SHARPSHOOTER                    | 30-35 target hits         |
| MARKSMAN                        | 23-29 target hits         |
| UNQUALIFIED                     | Fewer than 23 target hits |

- Pass the APFT standard: 50 points in each of three events, for a minimum of 150 total points. The Army awards soldiers the APFT Excellence Badge for scoring 190 or above.
- Qualify on the Hand Grenade Qualification Course, and throw two live hand grenades.

| TASK      | CONDITION                                                                                                                                                | STANDARD                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Station 1 | Engage an area-type target from a standing position, from within a two-man fighting position.                                                            | Distance to target is 35 meters. Hand grenade must detonate within 5 meters of the center of the target to qualify as a target hit. Must complete task within 15 seconds.                                     |
| Station 2 | Use available cover and concealment to approach a bunker from a “blind” side.                                                                            | Distance to target is 20 meters. Hand grenade must be thrown, land, and detonate within the bunker to qualify as a target hit. Must complete task within 15 seconds.                                          |
| Station 3 | Engage an 82mm mortar position while using available cover and concealment and the kneeling position.                                                    | Distance to target is 20 meters. Hand grenade must go inside the mortar position and detonate to qualify as a target hit. Must complete task within 5 seconds.                                                |
| Station 4 | Engage concealed troops behind cover while using available cover and concealment and the alternate prone position.                                       | Distance to target is 20 meters. Hand grenade must detonate within 5 meters of the center of the targets to qualify as a target hit. Must complete task within 15 seconds.                                    |
| Station 5 | Engage targets in a trench while using available cover and concealment and the kneeling position.                                                        | Distance to target is 25 meters. Hand grenade must detonate in the trench to qualify as a target hit. Must keep exposure time under 3 seconds.                                                                |
| Station 6 | Engage dismounting troops and/or an open-type 2.5-ton wheeled vehicle while using available cover and concealment and the kneeling or standing position. | Distance to target is 25 meters. Hand grenade must land and detonate within 1 meter of the vehicle or within 5 meters of dismounting troops to qualify as a target hit. Must complete task within 15 seconds. |
| Station 7 | Identify the types of hand grenades and what each is used for.                                                                                           | Correctly identify all five types of hand grenades and their uses.                                                                                                                                            |

Note: The soldier is given 10 M69-fused practice grenades. The soldier must throw one fused practice grenade at each target from stations 1 through 6. The soldier may use the four remaining fused practice grenades in a second throw at any of the targets missed (1 through 6); however, the soldier may use no more than two grenades at any one station.

| Hand Grenade Qualification |                               |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| EXPERT                     | Pass seven of seven stations  |
| FIRST CLASS                | Pass six of seven stations    |
| SECOND CLASS               | Pass five of seven stations   |
| UNQUALIFIED                | Pass fewer than five stations |

- Complete all tactical field training, including foot marches (3, 5, 8, 10 and 10km) and FTXs.

| <b>WARRIOR FTX</b>     |                        |                                        |                        |
|------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------------|------------------------|
| <b>DAY 1 0430-2400</b> | <b>DAY 2 0430-2400</b> | <b>DAY 3 0430-2400</b>                 | <b>Day 4 0001-0630</b> |
| 10km road march        | Stand-to               | Stand-to                               | 15 km road march       |
| Occupation             | STX/TRC                | TRC/STX                                | Battalion Ceremony     |
| Prepare defense        | Continue defense       | Continue defense                       |                        |
| Conduct defense        | Night STX lanes        | MOPPEX                                 |                        |
| Tactical feed          | Security               | Close defense                          |                        |
| Night defense          |                        | Night Infiltration Course and Exercise |                        |
| Night STX lanes        |                        |                                        |                        |

STX–Situational Training Exercise  
 TRC–Teamwork Reinforcement Course  
 MOPPEX–Mission-Oriented Protective Posture Exercise

- Complete all obstacle and confidence courses.

| <b>TASK</b>                  | <b>CONDITION</b>                                                                                                                                                                              | <b>STANDARD</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Conditioning Obstacle Course | Given an obstacle course no fewer than 300 yards or more than 450 yards long, consisting of no fewer than 15 or more than 25 obstacles. During daylight hours, and in all weather conditions. | Successfully complete obstacles for the following:<br><br>JUMPING: Ditch, trench, platform, hurdles.<br>DODGING: Lane change, mazes.<br>VERTICAL CLIMBING and SURMOUNTING: Climbing rope, cargo net, wall, pole.<br>HORIZONTAL TRAVERSING: Pipe or beam, horizontal ladder, one- and three-rope horizontal bridge.<br>VAULTING: Fence, low wall.<br>BALANCING: Logs, planks.<br>CRAWLING: Tunnel, wire, low rail.                                           |
| Confidence Obstacle Course   | Given a confidence course containing 24 confidence-building obstacles. During daylight, under all weather conditions.                                                                         | Successfully complete the following obstacles:<br><br>RED GROUP: Belly buster, reverse climb, weaver, hip-hip, balancing logs, island hopper.<br>WHITE GROUP: Tough nut, inverted rope descent, low belly over, belly crawl, easy balancer, Tarzan.<br>BLUE GROUP: High step-over; swinger; low wire; swing, stop, and jump; six vaults; wall hanger.<br>BLACK GROUP: Inclining wall, skyscraper, jump and land, confidence climb, belly robber, tough one. |

- Complete rifle bayonet and pugil-fighting training.

| TASK                                | CONDITION                                                                                                                        | STANDARD                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Bayonet<br>Basic<br>Movements       | Daylight, in a suitable training area, given an M16A2 rifle with bayonet and scabbard.                                           | Correctly fix and unfix bayonet, assume the basic attack and rest positions, and perform the whirl and crossover movements in accordance with published procedures.                                                                                                                                                            |
| Bayonet<br>Attack<br>Movements      | Daylight, in a suitable training area, given an M16A2 rifle with bayonet.                                                        | Correctly perform the following attack movements in accordance with published procedures:<br><br>Thrust.<br>Butt stroke to the head.<br>Butt stroke to the groin.<br>Slash.<br>Smash.                                                                                                                                          |
| Bayonet<br>Defensive Move-<br>ments | Daylight, in a suitable training area, given an M16A2 rifle with bayonet and scabbard.                                           | Correctly execute the following defensive rifle/bayonet movements in accordance with published procedures:<br><br>Parry right and parry left.<br>Parry right/left and thrust.<br>Parry right/left, slash, and butt-stroke.<br>Parry right/left, slash, and smash.<br>Low block.<br>Side block (left and right).<br>High block. |
| Individual<br>Pugil<br>Bouts        | In a suitable training area, given a pugil stick, padded helmet, chest protector, pugil gloves, and groin protector.             | Participate in a one-on-one pugil bout while following prescribed safety precautions, and in accordance with published procedures.                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Bayonet Qualifica-<br>tion Course   | Daylight, on a bayonet assault course, given a model M16A2 rifle with unsheathed bayonet, while wearing load-carrying equipment. | Complete the course while correctly executing each movement.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |

- Complete hand-to-hand combat training.

| TASK                     | CONDITION                                                                                                                                                                 | STANDARD                                                                                     |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Stance and Strikes       | As a member of a buddy team in a sawdust-filled combat pit, given a demonstration of each movement, and instruction on the principles of balance, momentum, and leverage. | Correctly execute the basic stance and hand strikes in accordance with published procedures. |
| Kicks, Falls, and Throws |                                                                                                                                                                           | Correctly execute the kicks, falls, and throws in accordance with published procedures.      |

- Demonstrate knowledge and understanding of Army core values.

| TASK                                                | CONDITION                                                                                                                                                    | STANDARD                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Describe application of the seven Army core values. | During training, while under observation in the normal performance of assigned duties, and when faced with daily decisions on what personal actions to take. | Fully define, state an example of, and always demonstrate correct application of the seven Army core values. Provide one example of each core value during participation in discussions. |

- Pass all end-of-phase tests and the end-of-course test

| TASK                                 | CONDITION                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | STANDARD                                                                                    |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Phase I Test                         | Establish a training foundation on which to focus solid and effective training goals. Provide detailed soldier orientation, and meet new soldiers' expectations regarding the Army. Instill self-discipline through a rigidly controlled environment. | Of the 29 tasks taught, soldier must successfully complete 4 of 5 randomly selected ones.   |
| Phase II Test                        | Continue the soldierization process based on the initial entry foundation established in Phase I. Concentrate on weapons training and physical conditioning.                                                                                          | Of the 15 tasks taught, soldier must successfully complete 9 of 11 randomly selected ones.  |
| End-of- Course Test (Phase III Test) | Sustain the process begun on the initial day of training. Enhance soldiers' leadership development. Continue skill development. Bring all previous training into focus through concentration on weapons skills and individual tactical training.      | Of the 27 tasks taught, soldier must successfully complete 20 of 22 randomly selected ones. |

- Complete the Protective Mask Confidence Exercise.

| TASK                     | CONDITION                                                                                        | STANDARD                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Mask Confidence Exercise | During daylight, in the field or CS chamber, with CS present, while wearing the protective mask. | Perform the following, in sequence:<br><br>Stay in a chemical environment 2 minutes without making any adjustments to the mask.<br>Break the seal and clear the mask within 9 seconds.<br>Remain in the chemical environment an additional 1 minute.<br>Remove mask and immediately exit the chemical environment. |

## Navy

The Navy reported, and the Commission observed during visits to the Recruit Training Command, Great Lakes, the essential technical and physical proficiency standards that recruits must successfully meet to graduate from recruit training. The requirements include the following:

- **Seamanship Skills in the Marlinespike Field Application Trainer:** Recruits must demonstrate basic seamanship and watch-standing skills, including safety at sea, man-overboard procedures, entering- and leaving-port procedures, line handling, underway replenishment stations, and quarterdeck honors.
- **Fire Fighting and Field Application Lab:** Recruits must successfully serve as the nozzleman during a “charged hose” evolution.
- **Weapons Familiarization on the M16 (Simulator Weapon Range):** Recruits must “fire” a total of 50 rounds into a 100-yard target on the electronic simulator range, with no safety violations.
- **Personal Protective-Equipment Lab:** Recruits must successfully don personal protective gear, including a gas mask, and participate in a familiarization event inside a tear-gas chamber.
- **Third-Class Swimmer Qualifications:** Recruits must qualify as Swimmer, Third Class, which requires entering the water feet first, from a 10-foot tower; treading water for 3.5 to 5 minutes; and swimming 50 yards, using any stroke.
- **Physical Readiness:** Recruits must complete two physical readiness tests, passing the second with a minimum score of “good” in each category, thereby exceeding the acceptable Navy standard of “satisfactory.” The chart on page 55 details the requirements for each event, differentiated by gender and age.
- **Battle Stations:** Recruits must successfully complete 12 consecutive events that demonstrate basic technical skills, core values, teamwork, physical stamina, and mental endurance. Each event mirrors actual events from U.S. Naval history. The 12 events are as follows:
  - General Quarters: Recruits are awakened at night and quickly dress for battle, assemble personal emergency gear, and double-time march to the first battle station.
  - Battle Transit: Recruits double-time march and, at times, run between events. The total distance traversed during Battle Stations is over 4.5 miles.
  - Emergency Sortie: Recruits complete procedures for getting a ship underway on the Marlinespike Trainer, including handling mooring lines.
  - Abandon-Ship Drill: After double-timing to the pool, recruits jump into the water from a 10-foot platform and board a life raft.

- Magazine Flooding: Locked in two separate confined compartments (rooms), recruits pass weighted containers for 3-inch gun rounds through an ammunition scuttle (access), as cold water rains down on them from a simulated fire-main leak. As the water on the deck rises, facilitators watch to ensure recruits safely handle each container as if it contained live ordnance.
- Escape Scuttle Egress: Recruits must pass through a hot metal scuttle 4 feet off the deck. This event requires the cooperation and assistance of other recruits.
- Shaft Alley Rescue: After running one-half mile and then donning gas masks, recruits enter a building and carry, drag, and lift two 150-pound mannequins in stretchers through an obstacle course.
- Stores on Load: Recruits move a large number of weighted containers through a hatch, which requires some ingenuity and teamwork.
- Mass Casualty: Double-time marching to another building, two recruits become “casualties,” and their shipmates must locate them and evacuate them on stretchers. They conduct the evacuation in a confusing maze, in darkness, with flashing lights and sound simulating gunfire.
- Repel Boarders: Proceeding to the M16 Weapons Simulator Lab, recruits don their gas masks and fire on the range, under the stress of a scenario of boarders advancing to their station.
- Investigate and Rescue: At the fire-fighting laboratory, recruits, wearing Oxygen Breathing Apparatuses (OBAs), enter a simulated berthing compartment filled with smoke to search for a shipmate.
- Shipboard Fire Fighting: Continuing at the fire-fighting lab, recruits with OBAs man a fire hose and enter a compartment to extinguish a fire.

## Air Force

The Air Force requires recruits to do the following to pass recruit training:

- Pass the physical conditioning test in the sixth week of training.
- Be within the maximum weight and body-fat standards
- Pass the wearing-of-the-uniform evaluation.
- Pass the reporting-procedures evaluation.
- Pass the individual drill evaluation.
- Pass dorm performance. Demonstrate an understanding of the Air Force core values of “Integrity First,” “Service Before Self,” and “Excellence in All We Do.”
- Pass the end-of-course test (with a minimum score of 70 percent).

## Marine Corps

Recruits must complete 368 hours of field training, including physical fitness, close order drill, marksmanship and field firing, close combat training, combat water survival training, and the 54-hour Crucible event described below.

Qualification with the service rifle, an M16A2, is done on a known-distance (KD) range, at known distances of 200, 300, and 500 yards. Compensating for weather, the recruits fire at a stationary target from the four basic firing positions: standing, sitting, kneeling, and prone. The maximum score possible is 250, while the minimum score for qualification is 190. The three levels of qualification are expert (220 to 250 points), sharpshooter (210 to 219 points), and marksman (190 to 209 points). A score of 189 or less results in an unqualified classification.

Recruits must also satisfactorily complete a combat water survival test, four events designed to ensure their safety in a maritime environment. In utility uniform, they must swim 25 meters, “abandon ship” into deep water from a minimum height of 8 feet, and demonstrate “drown proofing” for 2 minutes. In addition, without exiting the water, recruits must inflate a uniform blouse, float for 1 minute, deflate the blouse, and swim 25 meters. These are the minimum requirements for a Combat Water Survival-Class 4.

Lastly, recruits must complete the Crucible, the final training scenario before becoming a Marine. It is designed to test recruits physically, mentally, and morally, and is the defining moment in recruit training. Broken down into six events, with two additional night events (the Night Infiltration Course and a 5-mile hike), the Crucible is designed to test the values the recruits have learned over the last 10 weeks.

Steeped in Marine Corps history, events 1, 3, and 4 each entail 7 to 8 individual stations named after Marine Corps Medal of Honor winners. The one exception is Laville’s Duty, the only event named after a woman Marine. Corporal Laville risked her life to save the lives of sick and injured Marines in a structure fire. At the end of each event, the drill instructor, who has played no role except to provide the initial instructions, explains the actions of the Medal of Honor winner for whom the station is named. The drill instructor then facilitates a discussion among the recruits of what they learned during the execution portion of the station, and how it ties into the theme of the citation of the award.

Events 2 and 5, in addition to either team pugil stick bouts or team-negotiated obstacles, seen previously on the confidence course, involve reaction course problems. The recruits are presented with a scenario and the required equipment, and must attempt to complete a mission, such as moving ammunition crates over a swift-moving river without losing any equipment. Throughout the Crucible, each recruit is given the opportunity to be a team leader for one or more events. At the completion of the Crucible, the recruits’ drill instructors present each of them with the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor—the Marine Corps emblem.

### ***3. Knowledge***

#### **Army**

For soldiers to progress through IET, they must demonstrate their ability to meet the requirements the Army has set for each training phase. Before moving to the next training phase, all soldiers must pass the end-of-phase test. To pass BCT or OSUT Phase III, soldiers

must successfully complete the End-of-Course Comprehensive Test (EOCCT) and satisfactorily demonstrate knowledge and understanding of the Army core values.

### **Navy**

Recruits must get at least a 3.2 on a 5.0 scale on four academic tests that cover a variety of curriculum topics, including seamanship, Navy heritage, watch-standing, fire fighting, and damage control. If a recruit gets less than a 3.2 on two tests, he or she is set back and remediated.

### **Air Force**

The major component of BMT is military discipline-teaching recruits to function in a military environment. The presentation format includes education, practice, reinforcement, and evaluation/testing. The methods used include individual and team study, in-class lectures and case studies, and realistic dramatization and field practice. This format is validated using end-of-course examinations (a minimum score of 70 percent is required), dormitory inspections, instructor assessments, and a weekly assessment/evaluation of recruits' application/demonstration and understanding of Air Force core values. After completing BMT, recruits acquire Air Force technical proficiency in the follow-on technical training schools.

### **Marine Corps**

Recruits must demonstrate basic military knowledge and individual skills in a variety of academic military subjects and practical applications, embodied in more than 650 hours of classroom instruction, field training, and administrative subjects. Recruits must attain an academic proficiency minimum of 80 percent in general military subjects, pass the battalion commander's final inspection, and demonstrate knowledge of the basic principles, history, and traditions of military life.

## **4. Military Socialization, Including the Inculcation of Values and Attitudes**

### **Army**

IET is the new soldier's introduction to the Army. The goal of IET is to transform civilians into technically and tactically competent soldiers. This transformation from civilian to soldier is accomplished during an intense five-phase "soldierization" process that begins with a soldier's arrival at the reception battalion, and ends with the awarding of an MOS upon completion of IET. The soldierization process produces motivated, disciplined, physically fit soldiers who are trained in both basic and MOS-related skills, are inculcated with the Army's values, and are prepared to take their place in the Army ranks in the field.

Soldierization is, by definition, a tough, comprehensive process that immerses a soldier in a positive environment established by active, involved leadership. IET leaders set high standards, provide positive role models, and use every training opportunity to reinforce

basic soldier skills. This demands that all soldiers in IET, regardless of rank, strictly adhere to the standards of excellence and commitment that set the U.S. Army apart from others and make it the world's best professional army.

IET promotes and instills in the soldier the desire to attain the following:

- The highest degree of individual responsibility, self-discipline, and self-respect. This includes respecting others' dignity, as well as accepting the Uniform Code of Military Justice and other statutes and applicable rules as the standard of appropriate conduct on and off duty.
- The professional pride, dignity, and bearing associated with being a soldier in the U.S. Army. This includes inculcation of the tenets of the enlistment obligation, the Oath of Enlistment, and the Soldier's Creed.
- The knowledge, understanding, and appreciation of Army customs, heritage, and traditions. This includes developing an understanding of the Army's role in defending the United States throughout its history, and the principles on which today's Army was founded.

Throughout IET, soldiers must demonstrate their knowledge, understanding, and respect for the Army core values, defined as follows:

- **Loyalty:** Bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other soldiers.
- **Duty:** Fulfill your obligations.
- **Respect:** Treat people as they should be treated.
- **Selfless Service:** Put the welfare of the nation, the Army, and your subordinates before your own.
- **Honor:** Live up to all the Army values.
- **Integrity:** Do what's right, legally and morally.
- **Personal Courage:** Face fear, danger, or adversity (physical or moral).

All IET graduates, by definition, have demonstrated the technical and tactical skills necessary to join the ranks in the field and contribute to the unit's mission accomplishment. Graduation from IET does not signify the end or completion of the soldierization process. Soldiers continue to develop professionally throughout their military careers, both in and out of the institutional training base.

## Navy

The Navy established the current standards of sailor attributes in February 1996, during the Navy Training Readiness Review of the recruit training curriculum. The training transformation process provides each recruit the tools that enable him or her to emulate Navy core values, as follows:

**Honor:** The accountability for one's professional and personal behavior. The understanding of the privilege one has to serve the nation. Sailors will:

- Abide by an uncompromising code of integrity, taking full responsibility for their actions, and keeping their word.
- Conduct themselves in the highest ethical manner in relationships with seniors, peers, and subordinates.
- Be honest and truthful in their dealings within and outside the Department of the Navy.
- Make honest recommendations to their seniors and peers, and seek honest recommendations from junior personnel.
- Encourage new ideas, and deliver bad news forthrightly.
- Fulfill their legal and ethical responsibilities in their public and personal life.

**Courage:** The value that gives one the moral and mental strength to do what is right, with confidence and resolution, even in the face of temptation or adversity. Sailors will:

- Have the courage to meet the demands of their profession and the mission entrusted to them.
- Make decisions and act in the best interest of the Department of the Navy and the nation, without regard to personal consequences.
- Overcome all challenges, while adhering to the highest standards of personal conduct and decency.
- Be loyal to their nation by ensuring the resources entrusted to them are used in an honest, careful, and efficient way.

**Commitment:** The daily duty of every man and woman in the Department of the Navy to join together as a team to improve the quality of the work and people in the department. Sailors will:

- Foster respect up and down the chain of command.
- Care for the professional, personal, and spiritual well-being of their people.
- Show respect toward all people, without regard to race, religion, or gender.
- Always strive for positive change and personal improvement.
- Exhibit the highest degree of moral character, professional excellence, quality, and competence in all activities performed.
- Have basic military and Navy knowledge/discipline (*e.g.*, regarding Navy heritage).
- Have enthusiasm and understanding about a future in the Navy and shipboard life.
- Succeed in the fleet's gender-integrated environment.
- Have strong, positive self-esteem and team commitment.

- Understand the Navy rights and responsibilities, military courtesies, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and watch-standing.
- Be a recruiter by presenting a positive image and exemplary military bearing.
- Understand the “what” and “why” of zero tolerance as it applies to drug/alcohol abuse, sexual harassment, etc.
- Succeed in the fleet’s multiracial/cultural environment
- Wear with pride and properly care for the Navy uniform.

Recruit training begins the transition from civilian to Navy life, focusing on fundamental skills and knowledge, and on the military socialization process. The Navy aims to develop sailors who are motivated, willing to learn, proud to serve, and confident to perform basic seamanship skills, and whose behavior is consistent with the Service standards and values.

### **Air Force**

The Air Force achieves socialization objectives through the flight/squadron organization, which mirrors an Air Force operational wing. In addition, the mix of genders in the MTI corps provides the proper role models in teamwork and leadership. BMT replicates, as closely as practical from day one, the organizational environment and culture recruits will experience in operational units. In addition, housing and training recruits in co-located dormitory bays enhance opportunities for team building, while preserving individual dignity and ensuring security. The gender-integrated training (classroom, flight formations, and field environments) allows recruits to learn and practice proper professional conduct and relationships within the military culture. It is also imperative throughout BMT to instill acceptance and practice of core values (“Integrity First,” “Service Before Self,” and “Excellence in All We Do”), as demonstrated in recruit daily behavior and understanding of zero tolerance for sexual harassment.

### **Marine Corps**

The Marine Corps spells out the objectives of recruit training in Marine Corps Order 1510.32.B, *Recruit Training*. They are:

#### **Self-Discipline and Confidence**

- Recruits will achieve a state of discipline that ensures respect for authority.
- Recruits will instantly and willingly obey orders.

#### **High Moral Standards**

- Recruits will achieve/maintain high moral standards in keeping with core values, as follows:

**Honor:** Honor guides Marines to exemplify the ultimate in ethical and moral behavior; to never lie, cheat, or steal; to abide by an uncompromising code of integrity; to respect human dignity; and to respect others. The qualities of maturity, dedication, trust, and dependability commit Marines to act responsibly, to be accountable for their actions, to fulfill their obligations, and to hold others accountable for their actions.

**Courage:** Courage is the mental, moral, and physical strength ingrained in Marines. It carries them through the challenges of combat and helps them overcome fear. It is the inner strength that enables a Marine to do what is right, to adhere to a higher standard of personal conduct, and to make tough decisions under stress and pressure.

**Commitment:** Commitment is the spirit of determination and dedication found in Marines. It leads to the highest order of discipline for individuals and units. It is the ingredient that enables 24-hour-a-day dedication to the Corps and the country. It inspires the unrelenting determination to achieve a standard of excellence in every endeavor.

- Recruits will not lie, cheat, or steal, and must treat all others without prejudice.

#### **Pride, Respect, and Love of Country and Corps**

- Recruits will acquire the common spirit of the Corps, which inspires enthusiasm, devotion, pride, initiative, teamwork, aggressiveness, determination, moral integrity, and camaraderie.
- Recruits will have a burning desire to work with and for others toward excellence in common goals.

#### **The Warrior Spirit**

- Recruits will defend the cause of the nation and remain always faithful to the Corps.
- Recruits will complete the Crucible event.

### ***H. Basic Combat Operation Requirements***

#### **Army**

A soldier in IET learns the same tasks and is trained to the same standards that Army units require. The IET objectives are some of the same objectives used in judging units' combat readiness. For instance, a soldier who graduates from IET must be physically fit, technically and tactically proficient, and function as a member of a team. The Army takes each of these factors into account in judging a unit's combat effectiveness. Soldiers who have these skills can and do very quickly make a significant contribution to their assigned unit's readiness.

Phase III culminates with the application of all skills learned in BCT during a 72-hour FTX. This exercise stresses IET soldiers physically and mentally and requires each soldier to demonstrate basic combat skills proficiency in a tactical field environment, while operating as part of a team. This phase enhances the soldier's ability to adjust to the mental and physical stress resulting from a tactical field environment. Soldiers learn the importance of operating as part of a team, enabling them to smoothly transition into their units, with the skills and confidence to perform their jobs in a combat environment.

## **Navy**

The Navy teaches several specific operational skills in recruit training. First, in fire-fighting classes and in a field application laboratory, each recruit serves as a nozzleman during a "charged hose" evolution. Second, in weapons familiarization classes for the M16A2 rifle (simulator), each recruit "fires" a total of 50 rounds into a simulated 100-yard target, without safety violations. Third, in seamanship classes and an associated field application laboratory, each recruit demonstrates basic deck seamanship and watch-standing skills, including safety at sea, man-overboard procedures, entering and leaving port procedures, line handling, underway replenishment stations, and Quarterdeck honors.

Recruit training provides several other fleet readiness skills as well. First, recruits must pass a final medical evaluation with a mandatory finding of "Fit for Full Duty" before graduating. Along with this medical determination, all recruits receive medical immunizations to support worldwide deployment. Second, the Navy issues all recruits a complete inventory of tailored uniforms, and recruits must demonstrate the proper wearing of those uniforms. In addition, all recruits receive conduct-ashore and precautions-ashore training that includes anti-terrorism training.

## **Air Force**

To orient recruits for combat operations or peacetime Expeditionary Air Force deployments, the Air Force familiarizes them with field conditions and basic encampment modes of operation. The FTX serves as the cornerstone for expanding the recruits' expeditionary training experience to a full week.

Warrior week training consists of mobility line processing, force protection, law of armed conflict, code of conduct, forward "frontline" deployment, field communications, self-aid/buddy care, terrorism and chemical warfare, full weapons qualification, and a culminating event to signify transformation from "trainee" to "airman."

## **Marine Corps**

The physical regime of recruit training provides opportunities throughout to challenge recruits, instilling in them the confidence and self-discipline to overcome adversity through dedication and determination. Recruit training is an institutional method of providing operational commanders with a Marine trained to a common standard.

The Marine Corps sends all Marines not designated to enter the infantry field to MCT. “Operation Leatherneck” is a 17-day, scenario-based training exercise designed around a unit’s notional deployment in an overseas contingency operation. Through field exercises, MCT provides Marines with the weapons and field skills essential to operate and survive in a combat environment, and ensures that every Marine, no matter what his or her eventual MOS, is a basic rifleman.

## ***I. Commission Research***

The statute required the Commission to assess whether the current end-state objectives, and basic training itself, should be modified (in structure, length, focus, program of instruction, training methods, or otherwise) based, in part, on the following: an assessment of the perspectives of operational units; an assessment of the demographics, backgrounds, attitudes, experience, and physical fitness of new recruits entering basic training; and an assessment of the perspectives of personnel who conduct basic training.

As part of the assessment, the Commission conducted several new studies. These studies included surveys of attitudes and opinions of recruits, recruit trainers, and operational unit leaders. In addition, the Commission conducted focus groups and surveys with servicemembers at different stages in their military careers, to measure attitudes, opinions, and self-assessments in the time frame following basic training. Secondary analyses of existing data, bibliographies, and literature reviews provided additional background information on military training.

This section summarizes findings from the Commission’s basic training research. The studies provided the commissioners with one source of information contributing to their assessments of the statute’s questions. Chapter 4 covers the research relating to the Commission’s assessment of basic training gender format. Appendix E contains the research summaries for all the research projects. Volumes III and IV contain the complete research reports for each project.

### **1. Selected Data From the Youth Attitude Tracking Study**

The Commission assessed whether basic training systems and objectives are most efficiently and effectively structured and conducted to produce graduates who meet Service needs, given the demographics, backgrounds, attitudes, experience, and physical fitness of new recruits. Among the methods used by the Commission’s research staff was examination of existing data, including the Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS).<sup>82</sup> The YATS provides policy makers and the Services’ recruiting commands with information on young people’s propensity, attitudes, and motivations regarding military service. Other topics relevant to the Commission’s governing statute include attitudes and preferences toward, and effects of,

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<sup>82</sup> Laurence, J. and Wetzel, E. (1999), *Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS)*, Volume IV “Research” pages 633-688. The YATS is a computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI) of a nationally representative sample of 10,000 young men and women (16 to 24 years old). The YATS has been conducted annually since 1975.

gender-integrated training; equal opportunity and sexual harassment; perceptions of “boot camp”; and reasons for joining (or not joining) the military.

The primary purpose of the YATS is to gauge American youth’s propensity toward service in the Armed Forces. The results examined here reflect previously noted findings that men, people who score in the bottom half of the Armed Forces Qualification Test score distribution, younger people, minorities, and people with less education are all more likely to exhibit the propensity to serve.

In another relevant section of YATS, respondents were asked about their perceptions of the “toughness” of boot camp and desire for physical challenge. The researchers reported that, in general, women (40 percent) were more likely than men to agree with the statement “Military boot camp is too tough”; one out of every four male respondents also agreed with this statement. Men tended to be more likely than women to indicate that a physical challenge is important to them (56 percent of men, vs. 44 percent of women). Similar proportions of men (53 percent) and women (57 percent) felt that they were likely to be physically challenged in the military. By Service, respondents indicated that a physical challenge was most likely in the Marine Corps.

Results from the analysis indicated that men and women tended to give very similar responses when asked for reasons why they would or would not join the military. The rank ordering of the top five reasons for joining the military were the same for men and women. The reasons, in order, were money for education, job training, duty to country, pay, and travel. In terms of reasons for not joining, men and women rated the same reasons as the top five, although in a slightly different order. These reasons were military lifestyle, family obligations, too long of a commitment, other interests, and threat to life.

## **2. Study of Military Recruit Attitudes Conducive to Unit Cohesion, and Survey of Military Leader Opinions on Recruit Training and Gender-Related Issues**

One of the studies undertaken by the Commission included a survey of beginning and graduating military recruit attitudes believed conducive to unit cohesion.<sup>83</sup> Survey items were selected from studies of military cohesion, organizational commitment, and professional identity. The study also surveyed military leaders on their opinions about basic training and the quality of entry-level graduates. Leader opinions are discussed below, in the section on assessment of recruit training from the perspective of operational units.

In addition to the limitations inherent in self-reported attitude assessments, time constraints precluded a longitudinal research design, that is, the study did not measure the same recruits at the beginning and end of their training. Since the study assessed different samples, comparisons between the beginning and graduating recruit samples were not made.

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<sup>83</sup> Johnson, C. (1999) *The Study of Military Recruit Attitudes Conducive to Unit Cohesion and Survey of Military Leader Opinions on Recruit Training and Gender-Related Issues*, Volume III “Research” pages 13-33.

*Comparing Graduating Recruits' Attitudes With Their Service Expectations*

The researchers identified three attitude constructs in this study, and labeled them: commitment, respect for authority, and group identity. A stratified random sample of enlisted leaders (E-6/E-7) from each of the Services provided the weighted standard for the attitude survey items by answering “as they hoped graduating recruits would respond.”<sup>84</sup> The E-6/E-7 construct scores for each Service were proposed to represent Service expectations. The research compared the mean scores for graduating recruits with their E-6/E-7 Service expectations, and found that graduating recruits of both genders<sup>85</sup> scored equal to, and sometimes higher than, their Service expectations for commitment; scored lower than their Service expectations for respect for authority; and did not always meet their Service expectations for group identity.<sup>86</sup>

*Comparing Graduating Recruits by Gender Format*

Controlling for age, education, and race, research results indicated that male Army, Navy, and Air force recruits in mixed-gender formats scored similarly to male Army, Navy, and Air Force recruits in single-gender formats on the three attitude constructs.

*Comparing Beginning Recruits by Service*

The study also assessed beginning recruits’<sup>87</sup> scores on the attitude constructs. Results indicated that there were some Service differences in construct scores, controlling for age, education, race/ethnicity, and gender.<sup>88</sup> The results from beginning recruits implied some degree of self-selection by Service.<sup>89</sup>

*Recruit Experiences*

The study also assessed graduating recruits’ basic training experiences. In addition, recruits could provide written comments on the last page of the survey. The analysis of responses to the basic training questions indicated that graduating Army and Marine recruits

<sup>84</sup> The factor weights were then applied to all recruit and leader samples, permitting comparisons within Services.

<sup>85</sup> Graduating recruits who completed the survey numbered 4,988. Of these, 3,759 (75 percent) were men, and 1,229 (25 percent) were women.

<sup>86</sup> It is important to note that there were only four items on the “respect for authority” scale. The scale was not as statistically reliable as the other constructs, and the label may not be appropriate. Items (along with the responses that scored high) were as follows: “The military should take into account the needs of its members when it makes decisions on how to operate” (disagree), “People in authority tend to abuse their power” (disagree), “I should not contradict leaders who have authority over me” (agree), and “What I do in my personal life should be of no concern to my superiors” (disagree). Thus, “respect for authority” may not quite capture the tapped constructs.

<sup>87</sup> An independent sample of beginning recruits (n = 3,971) surveyed in their first week of training.

<sup>88</sup> For example, Navy and Marine beginning recruits scored significantly higher on “commitment” than Army and Air Force recruits, Marine beginning recruits scored significantly lower on “respect for authority” than Navy recruits, and all Services were similar on “group identity.” There were no gender differences found for beginning recruits on any of the constructs, controlling for age, education, race/ethnicity, and Service.

<sup>89</sup> The Service differences in construct scores of beginning recruits should serve as a caution against making cross-Service-comparisons for graduating recruits. A longitudinal study designed to survey the same recruits at the beginning and end of their training could help control for the possibility of selection bias.

thought basic training was easier than they expected, while Navy and Air Force recruits provided more mixed responses. The research indicated that, overall, the majority of recruits preferred basic training to be conducted “about [the way] it was.” Male Marine recruits, however, responded more frequently that they would have preferred it to be “tougher.”<sup>90</sup> Forty-seven percent of graduating recruits believed men and women in basic training should have the same physical fitness requirements.<sup>91</sup>

### **3. Recruit Theme Assessment of Written Comments**

Of the graduating recruits who completed the survey, almost 60 percent (2,980) provided written comments on their basic training experience. The theme assessment study summarized a subset of comments concerning two areas of interest to the Commission: basic military training and gender-related issues.<sup>92</sup> The researchers selected three themes in the area of basic military training: discipline, difficulty of basic training overall, and difficulty of physical training. For gender-related issues, the recruits’ comments were categorized as either positive or negative toward gender-integrated training, or as other general comments about gender-related issues.<sup>93</sup>

#### *Graduating Recruit Comments on Basic Training*

The following sections provide a summary of research findings, organized by themes from the analysis of graduating recruit comments.

**Discipline:** Of those recruits who commented, about 7 percent of Air Force men and women, and approximately 10 percent of Marine men, made positive statements about discipline, indicating satisfaction that basic training had provided them with discipline and self-control. However, approximately 8 percent of Marine men also had negative comments, indicating dissatisfaction with the quality of discipline. Army men and women also expressed some dissatisfaction, with negative comment rates of about 8 percent and 6 percent, respectively.

**Basic Training Overall:** Almost 25 percent of Marine men providing comments said that the overall training experience was easy, easier than expected, or too easy, followed by Army and Navy men, at about 10 percent. Of the women recruits who commented, Army and Marine women had the highest rates, at about 12 percent. However, almost 10 percent of Marine women who provided comments said that basic training was hard, harder than expected, or too hard.

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<sup>90</sup> Rating breakdown of recruits preferring “tougher” training, by Service and gender: Army, males = 47 percent, females = 30 percent; Navy, males = 38 percent, females = 25 percent; Air Force, males = 24 percent, females = 12 percent; Marine Corps, males = 66 percent, females = 35 percent.

<sup>91</sup> Johnson (1999) Volume III “Research” page 130.

<sup>92</sup> Shrader, L. (1999) *Thematic Assessment of Graduate Recruit Written Comments*, Volume III “Research” page 677. The research report contains the complete transcript of all graduating recruit comments, by Service and gender.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, page 671 provides a graphical presentation of the theme assessment results. The percentages on the graphs represent the number of recruits, organized by gender and Service, who made comments about a particular theme, out of all those recruits of the same gender and Service who made any comments.

**Physical Training:** Of Marine men and women who provided comments, 15-18 percent said that physical training was easy, easier than expected, or too easy, more so than recruits from the other Services. Very few recruits, across Services and gender, said that physical training was hard, harder than expected, or too hard.

**Gender Integration:** In general, there were few comments about gender integration by male or female recruits from any Service, except for about 11 percent of Navy women, who commented positively. Female recruits tended to make more general comments about gender-related issues other than gender integration than did male recruits.

#### **4. Retrospective Survey of Socialization, Values, and Performance in Relation to Recruit Training**

Other research performed for the Commission examined attitudes toward and perceived impact of basic training in the timeframe following recruit training.<sup>94</sup> The goal of this study was to shed light on the longer view and to identify whether factors such as individual differences, particular characteristics of recruit training, and subsequent military experiences are related to variations in socialization, values, and attitudes toward the military and military careers. This would permit servicemembers to assess their recruit training experiences from the perspective of the operational unit in which they currently work.

The researchers conducted a survey of enlisted personnel from each of the Services. They restricted the sample to those with eight years or less of service, a period encompassing two typical terms of service. The researchers proposed that this would be the time frame when training effects on military socialization would be likely to surface. They considered four respondent characteristics to be relevant for this study's purposes: Service, gender, tenure, and military occupation group (combat, combat support, combat service support). The goal was to obtain sample sizes of approximately 3,600 equally distributed across strata.<sup>95</sup>

The researchers surveyed respondents about their basic training experience. Results indicated that the vast majority thought that basic training left them well-prepared for advanced training, except in the Navy, where about one-third said they were well-prepared, one-third said they were moderately well-prepared, and one-third said they were not well-prepared. The researchers found similar results when they asked respondents how well basic training prepared them for their first assignment, although the percentages saying they were well-prepared were not as high. This was to be expected, given that advanced training is necessary for on-the-job performance in most military occupations. A majority of personnel in each Service said that basic training prepared them well for serving in gender-integrated units.

<sup>94</sup> Ramsberger, P., Laurence, J. and Sipes, S. (1999), *Retrospective Survey of Socialization, Values and Performance in Relation to Recruit Training*, Volume IV "Research" pages 5-250.

<sup>95</sup> The survey response rate was as follows: Army, 74 percent; Navy, 60 percent; Marine Corps, 70 percent; Air Force, 33 percent. In-person administration of the survey was necessary, given the short time frames available. A mail survey was conducted for the Air Force because the dispersion of personnel did not allow for sufficiently large groups to be assembled.

Examination of the data in a multivariate framework revealed several significant relationships between background/experience variables (*e.g.*, tenure, gender-integrated/non-integrated basic training) and outcome measures such as opinions regarding training and personal/unit readiness/morale. The researchers found a variety of such relationships, involving characteristics such as unit type, race/ethnicity, and education. The most significant of these relationships, as indicated by their consistency, included the following. Length of service accounted for more variation in response than any other factor. Tenure was associated with a wide range of outcomes, including career intent (+), readiness (+), morale (-), degree of improvement resulting from basic training (-), degree of improvement since basic training (+), group orientation (-), and endorsement of core values (+). The researchers found that the extent to which individuals worked with members of the other gender during training was positively related to a number of basic training outcomes and attitudes.

The researchers found that, although respondents generally endorsed the concept of teamwork and said that the members of their unit work hard and work well together, fewer than half agreed that their unit members trust, like, respect, or inspire one another. Across Services, over half of the respondents said that personal and unit readiness were high. However, fewer than half said the same about personal and unit morale. The timing of the data collection is an important contextual factor to consider. The surveys were fielded in the midst of the winter holiday season, when already highly taxed military personnel (particularly sailors) were reacting to the strains of deployments and fast-paced OPTEMPO.

The researchers concluded that the most notable finding from this study, in terms of the questions facing the Commission, might be the lack of relationships between training-related variables and the outcomes of interest. For instance, there were no clear connections uncovered between training gender format and attitudes toward or evaluations of that training. No pattern of results emerged that suggested that factors such as instructor mix in training were related to subsequent outcomes. The study suggests that outcomes (performances and attitudes) are robust across a variety of training formats and instructor mixes.

## **5. Focus Group Study**

In another Commission study, researchers conducted focused interviews as one means to assess issues relevant to the mandated areas of inquiry.<sup>96</sup> Focus groups included enlisted personnel from the four Services, at three phases in their careers: basic training, technical/job training, and operational units.<sup>97</sup> These focus groups were intended to provide a more in-depth understanding of issues related to training effectiveness overall.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Laurence, L., Wright, M., Keys, C., and Giambo, P. (1999), *Focus Group Research*, Volume IV "Research" pages 251-575.

<sup>97</sup> Members of the research team traveled to 10 military bases over a 6-week period, from December 1998 through January 1999, to conduct 42 focus groups, which had a total of 420 participants.

<sup>98</sup> A structured, standardized protocol was developed, covering multiple topics such as performance, equitable standards and treatment, superior/subordinate relationships, social interactions and their effect on performance, clarity and effectiveness of military regulations regarding gender interactions, and viewpoints on gender in the military.

The researchers reported that teamwork, quality of instructors, field exercises, and personnel shortages, together with high OPTEMPO, were key factors perceived to influence individual and unit readiness. Effective teamwork is a motivator. Further, it builds cohesion and trust. Positive social interaction generally increases team cohesion and trust. A major barrier to performance is the presence of those who dodge their duties or otherwise avoid sufficiently contributing to the team effort. Such people detract from valuable training time and place greater demands on those in operational units. In addition to such active work-avoidance behaviors, personnel consider physical injuries (sustained mostly in training) and pregnancy as more benign or passive detractors from performance. These factors take people off the duty roster, but not the job .

Analyses indicated that trainees hold most instructors in high esteem. They particularly admire basic training instructors. Superiors have a profound impact on servicemembers' attitudes, motivation, and behaviors. They serve as mentors and role models, aiding individual and unit performance and adjustment. A concern reported in the research, voiced by those in training and on the job, was that there is a shortage of training instructors and supervisory personnel. Laments about limited resources and personnel shortages reverberated along the training continuum. Enlisted members in training and new to the job expressed dismay at not having enough practical application time.

The research also noted that, although personnel regard trainers and supervisors positively, and see them as having legitimate authority, they do not regard peers in leadership roles the same way. Judging from the comments made by focus group participants, learning how to follow (and, perhaps, how to lead) does not come easily.

## **6. Recruit Trainer Comments on the Quality of Basic Training and of Recruits**

The statute also required an assessment of the perspectives of those who conduct basic training. The *Survey of Military Leader Opinions on Recruit Training and Gender-Related Issues* included several sections where open-ended comments were invited. For example, respondents were asked to elaborate on their answers to survey items that asked whether the quality of recruits had changed in the last five years. At the end of the survey, respondents were encouraged to write further comments about their opinions on any of the issues raised in the survey. In a supplemental study, a content analysis focused on recruit trainers' comments.<sup>99</sup>

### *Recruit Trainer Sample*

The recruit trainer sample was a sample of convenience, that is, the research team administered the survey to available trainers at the training sites. At the time of survey administration, in November 1998, the number of recruit trainers assigned to recruit training

<sup>99</sup> Miller, L. and Januscheitis, G. (1999), *Content Analysis of Written Comments Provided on the Recruit Trainer Surveys*, Volume III "Research" pages 371-376.

bases totaled 3,713. Of these, 2,290 (62 percent) completed the survey.<sup>100</sup> Of those completing the survey, 1,430 (62 percent) wrote comments, representing 39 percent of all trainers assigned to recruit training.<sup>101</sup> The following sections summarize some of the findings from the analysis of trainer comments.

### *Positive Comments About Recruits and Basic Training*

The researchers reported that, overall, only a minority of those recruit trainers who wrote comments made positive assessments of recruit quality (15 percent) or of basic training in general (6 percent). The researchers noted that the most common positive response was that recruits are smarter or more educated, although very often, those statements were qualified with a “but” or “however.” In addition, trainers often asserted that negative qualities outweigh or counteract the benefits of increased intelligence. For example, some trainers said that “smarter” often translated into recruits’ too often questioning orders, rules, and decisions, or using their “smarts” to “outsmart” the system. Trainers frequently distinguished between “book smart,” in which they saw recruits improving in quality, and “common sense”, which they perceived to be increasingly lacking in recent years. The researchers found that male Marine trainers were the most likely to make positive comments about recruits. Marine trainers in particular, but also a few Army trainers, found the recent emphasis on values training a positive improvement in recruit training. Other, though less frequently mentioned, improvements included better equipment and training facilities.

### *Negative Comments About Recruits*

The number of recruit trainers who offered comments on the survey represented a minority of the Services’ trainers. However, trainers who made negative comments about the quality of basic training and of recruits provide a rich source of information concerning the training environment and areas that may deserve attention.<sup>102</sup> The researchers found that, in general, female recruit trainers who commented were less likely than men to make negative statements about the training itself, and were more likely to place the negative emphasis on the quality of recruits. While roughly half of Air Force and Army trainers who wrote comments gave a negative evaluation of basic training, only about a third of Marine and Navy instructors had a similar evaluation of their training programs.

The analysis indicated that negative comments about recruits were wide-ranging. Below is an example:

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<sup>100</sup> Percentages of trainers who completed the survey varied by Service. Marine Corps trainers surveyed represented 83 percent of all trainers assigned to that Service ; Air Force trainers represented 47 percent; and Navy trainers represented 43 percent. Army trainers represented 58 percent of only those assigned to the six Army recruit training installations. Unlike the other Services, the Army also assigns drill sergeants to AIT sites.

<sup>101</sup> The highest response rates for comments came from Marine Corps and Air Force recruit trainers, with 73 percent and 69 percent, respectively, of those completing the survey also including comments. Navy recruit trainers who provided comments represented 62 percent of those surveyed, and Army trainers represented 53 percent.

<sup>102</sup> Of all the comments written about quality, 46 percent included negative statements about the quality of recruits (compared with 15 percent that included positive statements about recruits), and 43 percent included negative statements about the quality of basic training in general (compared with 6 percent that included positive statements about basic training).

“Trainers complained that people accepted in the Service were unfit to begin with, entering with physical problems. New recruits were frequently characterized as lazy, selfish, out of shape, undisciplined, lacking in morals, challenging every order or decision or rule, having no respect for authority, lacking in pride or self-esteem, lacking any attention span or ability to focus on the long term, unwilling to endure hardships or put forth much effort, and unwilling to shift from an individual mentality to a team orientation.”<sup>103</sup>

This study provides a snapshot in time, and there are no comparative data to determine whether the recruit trainers’ comments are better or worse than comments that may have been made in the past. The researchers concluded the following:

“Because there are no data to compare these responses to previous generations, it is unknown whether these negative attitudes toward the youth are a recent trend or consistent pattern. Throughout American history, one can find complaints by older generations that the younger generations are somehow lacking. Rather than speculate on whether these attitudes are new or not, it may be more productive to explore whether these trainers’ negative attitudes toward recruits interfere with their job or help to motivate them in it. On one hand, trainers are charged with transforming ordinary civilians into military personnel who can perform well under the stress and hardships of the combat environment. Thus, they should view entering recruits as needing to undergo a significant transformation. On the other hand, it is possible that negative evaluations of incoming civilians could be excessive and detrimental. Recruit trainers with overly negative impressions of recruits may have trouble forming productive trainer/trainee relationships, or may discourage youth who pick up on their trainers’ perceptions that they do not belong in the military.”<sup>104</sup>

### *Negative Comments About Basic Training*

The researchers found that negative comments about basic training tended to focus on the perceived lack of tools for properly shaping civilians for military service. Common complaints from instructors included their lack of options for transforming what they see as terribly unfit recruits into ideal military personnel. The study suggests that recruit trainers are looking for new models for training and motivating recruits. Such concerns are illustrated by the following:

“Although several trainers commented that the harsh discipline of the past might have gone too far, many argued that the pendulum had swung too far in the opposite direction. Trainers expressed anger that they could not fail or expel recruits who did not meet standards; that they could not raise their voices or curse to motivate recruits verbally; and that they had no recourse when

<sup>103</sup> Miller and Januscheitis (1999), Vol.ume III “Research” page 389.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, page 389.

recruits ‘talked back’ or refused to do what they were supposed to do. Respondents also argued that boot camp has shifted from a focus on preparing youth for military service, to avoidance of scandals and/or hurting the feelings of recruits or impinging upon their rights. Further obstacles to effective training cited include underfunding and understaffing, requirements to teach irrelevant or too much material at once, expectations that they achieve too many changes in too short a period of time, and pressure to push as many people through the training as possible, without any regard for quality of the outcome.”<sup>105</sup>

The researchers also concluded that problems with basic training encompass much more than gender, noting that the Marine trainers, who separate the genders for basic training, were as likely as respondents from the other Services (who integrate men and women in basic training) to register lengthy complaints about the quality of recruits and of boot camp in general. Overall, it appears that managing gender is but one of a whole host of problems facing recruit trainers today.

In summary, it is important to remember that a minority of trainers provided comments on the survey, and their responses may not be representative of recruit trainers in general. However, their observations can be useful in highlighting potential areas for evaluation. For example, many recruit trainers who wrote comments on their surveys tended to view recruits as requiring more effort to train in recent years. This conclusion appears to result from two perceptions: first, that the quality of recruits entering the Services has declined, and second, that methods of discipline and training that were effective in the past are no longer available. The researchers concluded that recruit trainers are calling for a reinstatement of some of the prior tools for discipline, and, possibly, education in new forms of motivation and discipline, as well.

## **7. Study of Military Recruit Attitudes Conducive to Unit Cohesion, and Survey of Military Leader Opinions on Recruit Training and Gender-Related Issues**

The statute required the Commission to assess the quality and qualifications of initial entry training graduates from the perspective of operational units. Basic training is expected to produce graduates with an appropriate level of skills, physical conditioning, and military socialization to meet unit requirements and needs. Accordingly, one of the studies undertaken by the Commission surveyed military leader opinions about basic training, quality of entry-level graduates, and other gender-related issues.<sup>106</sup> Leaders surveyed included recruit trainers

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<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, page 389.

<sup>106</sup> Johnson (1999), Volume III “Research” pages 13-33.

across all Services and all recruit training sites.<sup>107</sup> Other leader samples consisted of officers and senior enlisted personnel across Services, including a stratified random sample of E-6/E-7 and O-3 leaders, and battalion/squadron/ship operational commanders and their senior enlisted advisors.<sup>108</sup>

The recruit and military leader surveys included sections inviting open-ended comments. Comments from all respondents have been transcribed for the record, and organized by sample, Service, and gender. Given the time constraints, however, the researchers analyzed only the recruit trainers' and graduating recruits' comments. These studies were summarized above, in the sections discussing findings from the recruit and recruit trainer research. Thus, the analysis of leader opinions on the quality of current basic training graduates is based only on their responses to closed-ended survey questions, without the benefit of further elaboration from their comments.

#### *Importance of Basic Training to Readiness*

The research indicated that, when asked about the importance of basic training in general, more than 80 percent of all leaders at all levels of the four Services said "that the quality of basic training has a direct effect on operational readiness." More than 70 percent of all leaders said that there is a relationship between what recruits learn in basic training and their success in operational units. Most leaders said that the primary purpose of basic training is to transform recruits into group members of cohesive military units.<sup>109</sup>

#### *Leader Opinions on Quality of Current Graduates of Entry-Level Training*

The research showed that, when asked about the current quality of entry-level graduates, leaders generally responded that, compared with five years ago, graduate recruits had declined in overall quality, particularly in discipline, adjustment to the military, and acceptance of authority. Most leaders thought that recruits' intelligence had improved or stayed the same. However, leaders had mixed opinions about changes over the past five years in recruit acceptance of Service core values. Approximately one-half to two-thirds of the Army, Navy, and Air Force leaders responded that there had been a decline, while Marine leaders responded about equally to each of the three options (*i.e.*, improved, stayed the same, declined). Leaders also had mixed opinions about changes in the military skill proficiency of graduating recruits.<sup>110</sup>

<sup>107</sup> 2,290 recruit trainers were surveyed, representing 62 percent of recruit trainers assigned to the recruit training bases. Percentages of trainers who completed the survey varied by Service. Marine Corps trainers surveyed represented 83 percent of all trainers assigned to that Service; Air Force trainers represented 47 percent; and Navy trainers represented 43 percent. Army trainers represented 58 percent of only those assigned to the six Army recruit training installations. Unlike the other Services, the Army also assigns drill sergeants to AIT sites.

<sup>108</sup> Approximately 10,000 officers and enlisted leaders completed the mail survey assessing military leader opinions on recruit training and gender-related issues. Samples comprised 4,400 E-6s/E-7s; 3,288 O-3s; 1,126 battalion/squadron/ship commanders; and 1,185 senior enlisted advisors. Response rates for these samples ranged from 48 to 63 percent.

<sup>109</sup> Johnson (1999), Volume III "Research" pages 285-287.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, pages 283-285.

As noted previously in the discussion of findings on recruit trainers' views, the Commission research captured military leaders' opinions at a single point in time. Perceptions of decline in the quality of IET graduates may have also been prevalent in the past. Without comparable data for previous years, it cannot be determined whether these perceptions of recent graduates' relative performance have become more negative or more positive over the years.

## ***J. Findings and Assessments***

### **1. Operational Units' Perspectives**

The commissioners assessed whether current end-state objectives, and basic training itself, should be modified (in structure, length, focus, program of instruction, training methods, or otherwise) based, in part, on the following: an assessment of operational units' perspective on the quality and qualifications of the initial entry training graduates assigned to those units, considering, in particular, whether the basic training system produces graduates who arrive at operational units with an appropriate level of skills, physical conditioning, and military socialization to meet unit requirements and needs.

The Services' initial entry training continuums appear to be providing the operating forces with soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who, with normal sustainment training, can and do accomplish the many diverse missions that the nation requires them to perform. Each Service has extensively improved its training continuums in the last 18 to 24 months. These improvements must be sustained, and periodically evaluated and modified, as appropriate. (See paragraph K, Conclusions and Recommendations below.)

Generally, the Services have indicated that their operational units have received qualified initial entry training graduates, and the Commission has no reason to disbelieve them. A small percentage of graduates in all Services (typically estimated at around ten percent) arrive in less-than-satisfactory condition. These graduates tend to be overweight, have been injured during initial entry training, or lack motivation. This is where leadership, sustainment training, and leader expectations play a critical role. (See paragraph K, Conclusions and Recommendations below.)

### **2. New Recruits**

The Commission assessed the demographics, backgrounds, attitudes, experience, and physical fitness of new recruits entering basic training, considering, in particular, the question of whether, given the entry-level demographics, education, and background of new recruits, the basic training systems and objectives are most efficiently and effectively structured and conducted to produce graduates who meet Service needs.

Recruits for all Services, like others before them, come from a generation that presents unique challenges to trainers. Recruits are generally smarter, because of the higher standards required by the All-Volunteer Force, but have attitudes shaped in an information age that bombards them with differing agendas. Many are looking for core values, role models,

boundaries, and accountability. The Services, as previously stated, have modified initial entry training substantially to address these issues; however, that initiative must be sustained by all. Each Service has “borrowed good ideas,” such as the defining event, from the other Services. This must also continue. (See paragraph K, Conclusions and Recommendations below.) At present, the Services’ basic training systems and objectives are satisfactory and improving based on changes to initial entry training initiated in the last 18 to 24 months. Process improvement must be continuous.

### **3. Recruit Trainers**

The Commission assessed the perspectives of personnel who conduct basic training, with regard to measures required to improve it. Generally, personnel who conduct recruit training are skilled and motivated. They want to provide the best possible soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines to the operating forces. However, because of the importance of their role, the stress associated with it, and the high visibility of their job, recruit trainers often feel neglected by their Services. The recruit trainer’s job is so important that the Commission has made specific recommendations concerning the selection of recruit trainers (both officer and enlisted) and career-enhancing incentives. In addition, Service leaders should, where appropriate, establish open communication with trainers to allow for input regarding the improvement of the training environment.

### **4. Post-Basic Training**

The Commission assessed the extent to which each Service’s initial entry training program continues, after the basic training phase, to effectively reinforce and advance military socialization (including the inculcation of Service values and attitudes), physical conditioning, and attainment and improvement of knowledge and proficiency in fundamental military skills.

The Services have begun to improve their post-basic training phases to sustain values training and physical fitness. Currently, this is the area that requires the most improvement. In particular, the Navy, as clearly identified by the Chief of Naval Operations, needs to enhance its military skills and core values training at advanced individual training. In addition, the Air Force must address its physical fitness program. The improvements being made by all the Services in post-basic training must be closely monitored. (See paragraph K, Conclusions and Recommendations below.)

## ***K. Conclusions and Recommendations***

***1. Where there is good leadership and a positive command climate, the training environment is healthy and appropriate, and accomplishes what is expected. Commanders need to be allowed to do their jobs. Overly restrictive requirements take away the Commanders' authority to make sound judgments (something we trust them to do with the lives of their men and women), and to act on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Let the Commanders command.***

- ***Unanimous Approval***

The Commission found that commanders responsible for initial entry training sensed that leaders or senior leaders distrusted their ability to execute their duties. A consensus of commanders, as determined through extensive field visits, discussion groups, focus groups, and surveys, felt they were subject to overly restrictive requirements and, often, “micromanagement,” which kept them from being totally effective. The Commission’s assessment of the leaders encountered is that they are professional, dedicated, and committed to transforming young men and women into the world’s finest soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines. Leaders are also committed to training to the highest standards possible. They want to get on with their duties, and minimize time spent reacting to changes in their training curricula and standard operating procedures. Too often, it seems, these changes emerge as reactions to isolated initial entry training incidents, rather than being motivated by systematic analyses. These reactive changes can, over time, create unintended negative consequences. By contrast, proactive decisions based on periodic review, operational unit feedback, shared Service experiences, and trainer input lead to an ever-improving, positive training environment.

***2. Current Armed Forces personnel shortages and increased OPTEMPO appear to be adversely impacting readiness, deployment, and sustainability. Throughout our visits to both basic training organizations and the operating forces of all Services, we heard about the adverse effects of personnel shortages caused by downsizing and increased OPTEMPO. Personnel shortages in the noncommissioned officer ranks, E-5 to E-7, were noted by all. Attrition of these mid-level leaders results in more-senior leaders assuming their duties, with the result that they have no time to guide, mentor, or groom newly arrived trainees from IET into the operating forces organizations.***

- ***Unanimous Approval***

The adage “do more with less” aptly reflects the reality of the Armed Forces today. In discussions with operational leaders, most negative comments directed at the “quality of

recruits” were quickly replaced with comments concerning the more acute challenge of balancing operational requirements with the traditional and necessary development of subordinates. Senior leaders quite often find themselves filling the void created by the absence of these first-line leaders, with little time left to spend with newly arrived trainees.

***3. Provide career-enhancing incentives so that the best personnel seek a tour of duty in recruit training. Screen, select, train, and assign only outstanding enlisted personnel and commissioned officers for this duty.***

- ***Unanimous Approval***

The Commission found that the Services have made many improvements in incentive pay, promotion opportunities, follow-on assignments, uniform allowances, priority-of-post housing, and childcare for enlisted trainers. In addition, the Services have reviewed and appropriately adjusted screening and selection processes. However, this is an area of concern that must not simply be considered now, because of the current attention being paid to initial entry training, and forgotten about later. Attention to this area must be continuous. Recruit trainers are the people most responsible for recruit transformation. They must be the best, wanting to serve and being appropriately compensated and recognized for their efforts.

***4. Leader expectations are an issue across the Services. The Commission recommends that each Service have formal systems through which the operational force can send feedback to schools and training programs on the quality of the trainees they produce. Each Service needs a “leadership expectations” program that clearly tells all leaders what initial entry training is supposed to accomplish, and what standards recruits and new trainees must meet.***

- ***Unanimous Approval***

This recommendation is addressed to both recruit trainers and receiving leaders at the operational units. First, the Commission noted that recruit trainers are selected based on their professional performance, which almost always exceeds that of their peers. As a result, there is a conflict between the Service’s specific minimum standards and the trainer’s personal standards. Often, the trainer’s personal standards are unrealistic for the average recruit to achieve, given his/her training status. This phenomenon can be addressed positively through mentoring and coaching from experienced leaders at the training base.

Second, recruits in all Services are expected to meet the requirements and standards set by their Service, and previously described in this report. These requirements and standards are expected to be sustained and improved upon in the operating forces, as the final phase of transformation. The Commission found that, in some instances where operating unit leaders complained about the capabilities of new personnel arriving from initial entry training, they

were unaware of the Service standards the recruit or trainee had been trained to, and their own role as sustainers of the transformation process. It is important that such leaders understand what standards recruits and new trainees must meet, and their own role in sustaining the transformation process. In some cases, this may reduce first-term attrition.

***5. Recruit trainer continuity is considered essential. We recommend that the Services give priority to full staffing of recruit trainer billets, and to keeping the same trainers with the same unit from the beginning to the end of the training cycle. Additional duties and/or details that remove trainers from their units during the cycle should be minimized.***

- ***Unanimous Approval***

The Commission found that not all Services were fully staffing recruit trainer billets, and that some, the Air Force in particular, did not keep the same trainers with the same unit from the beginning to the end of the training cycle. In addition, many trainers found themselves being pulled away from their training duties to perform details for the base or post. Such removal from the training unit is disruptive and inefficient. Air Force recruits vehemently objected to the practice, stating that they became confused about what standards were expected of them when the enforcers of the standards kept changing. Navy recruits had similar confusion with the Navy's practice of instructor assignment. Equally important, it was evident that recruit trainers are the most responsible for the recruits' transformation into soldiers, sailors, airmen, or Marines. The trainers' example is critical to a successful transformation. When the recruit trainer continually changes, or there are fewer trainers than required, the process is adversely impacted, and less successful.

***6. The Services should continue to study and improve their physical fitness standards and programs. The Services have come far in studying and incorporating improved fitness standards and better understanding of job performance requirements. These studies should be continued, and fitness/performance programs should be continually reviewed and improved. There need to be clearly stated objectives about physical fitness tests and physical performance standards.***

***The Services should take steps to educate servicemembers about the meaning of “physical fitness,” and how it differs from job performance standards. There is widespread misunderstanding about the purpose of the Services’ physical fitness tests. The tests are designed to measure physical health and well-being. Measures of physical fitness must take age and gender into account, as the Services’ tests currently do. Physical fitness tests are not measures of job-specific skills. The Services should maintain this distinction and communicate it to all levels of personnel, including basic trainees.***

- ***Unanimous Approval***

The Commission acknowledges that the Services are currently engaged in extensive research concerning physical fitness and physical conditioning. This must continue and lead to a coherent, understood physical fitness and conditioning program for each Service. Superior physical fitness of individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines is a combat multiplier on the battlefield.

***7. Initial entry training should emphasize military socialization and the inculcation of core values. Values training is very important to the trainees, and must be sustained throughout the training continuum and in the operating forces. Today, as in the past, some recruits enter the military having had life experiences that may increase the challenge of transforming them into servicemembers. Effective transformation can still take place if initial entry training strongly emphasizes military socialization and inculcation of core values.***

- ***Unanimous Approval***

The Commission applauds the efforts of each Service to formalize values training in the basic training portion of individual entry training. Recruits and trainers were quick to tell us how great an impact this training has had on their growth and development. The continuation and sustainment of these core values must occur throughout each Service, including the operational forces.

***8. Reasonable security measures for barracks are appropriate, but the Services should avoid creating the impression of a prison lockup.***

- *Unanimous Approval*

The Commission continues to be concerned that barrack security measures being enacted as a result of the Kassenbaum Baker Committee findings are, in some cases, being carried to an extreme. At some locations, particularly Lackland Air Force Base and Fort Leonard Wood, these security measures leave the impression that the recruits live in a “lockup” similar to a prison. The objectives of individual entry training include developing self-discipline, self-confidence, and a sense of “team” and mutual trust and support. A “lockup” environment does not support attaining these objectives.

In addition, the Army should reevaluate the use of latrines and/or changing rooms in recruit barracks, where trainees undergoing integrated basic training must change their clothes (rather than in their barracks room). The expressed reason for this is to allow mixed-gender drill sergeants access to the barracks. To the degree practical, and based on the number of male and female drill sergeants assigned and the regular times that recruits are required to change their clothes, it may be more logical to manage male or female drill sergeant presence in the barracks at the times when trainees tend to personal hygiene and change clothes.

***9. The Commission encourages supplying the proper resources to the training establishments, to enhance the basic training improvements the Services are currently implementing.***

- *Unanimous Approval*

The Commission observed great initiative and innovation on the part of dedicated cadres to improve through self-help, training facilities, and events. However, in the Navy’s case, individual weapon familiarization/qualification with real ammunition is omitted and replaced by simulators due to the lack of range facilities. To ensure that recruit training is as robust and effective as it should be, the Commission believes that training facilities and events must be fully resourced, and not be left to self-help.

***10. Each Service should establish an oversight program to ensure that recent improvements to recruit training will be sustained over time.***

- *Unanimous Approval*

Each Service has made substantial changes to IET in the past 18 to 24 months. Most of these changes have resulted from self-evaluation; Department of Defense direction, as a result of the Kassenbaum Baker panel findings; and congressional concerns. Generally, the changes represent clear improvements to the training process; however, like all changes, their effects should be periodically reviewed and analyzed to ensure they are serving the purpose for which they were made. Positive changes should be enhanced, while ineffective ones should be dropped or modified, as appropriate. New initiatives should also be considered, if such initiatives will result in better soldiers, sailors, airmen, or Marines.

To be effective, the oversight program must have the Service Chiefs' personal involvement. Each Service Chief should annually review the initial entry training program with his staff; evaluate program results, methodologies being used, and other initial entry training program initiatives; and provide guidance, as appropriate. Chiefs should continually strive to improve their Service's initial entry training process; it is their responsibility under 10 Title, U.S. Code.

***11. There is a need for a Department of Defense forum where all Services periodically exchange ideas, concepts, etc., for sustaining and improving initial entry training.***

- ***Unanimous Approval***

While the Department of Defense has numerous gatherings where initial entry programs can be discussed, the Commission believes that the Department should conduct an annual forum where the Services' personnel chiefs, recruiting commanders, and staff responsible for initial entry training will gather with the corresponding staffs of the Defense and Service Departments. The forum's agenda should include an exchange of ideas and concepts, with the purpose of sustaining the current improvements that have been made to initial entry training, and of seeking additional ones. The Commission's findings clearly show that the Services have borrowed most of the improvements they have made from other Services. The best example of this is that each Service now has a defining event that concludes the basic training part of Initial entry training. All admit that they adopted the event because of the success of the Marine Corps' Crucible event. Open discussion and shared ideas can be powerful tools in providing the nation with the very best trained soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines.

***12. The Commission recommends that the Services develop longitudinal studies as part of their ongoing research programs. Longitudinal data, recognized in social science research as the best way to measure change and its causes, would provide the Services with valuable information.***

- ***Unanimous Approval***

As was noted in *The Study of Military Recruit Attitudes Conducive to Unit Cohesion and Survey of Military Leader Opinions on Recruit Training and Gender-Related Issues*,<sup>111</sup> time constraints made it necessary to measure separate samples of beginning and graduating recruits. Therefore, the study was not longitudinal, that is, it did not measure the same recruits at the beginning of training and at the end of training. Because the Commission believes that longitudinal studies will provide more accurate data from which to draw conclusions, it recommends that such studies be part of the Services' ongoing research programs. These studies would be most informative if they also followed the graduates through their first enlistment term.

***13. It is important to continue “military training” (e.g., physical, military customs and courtesies, and values training) throughout each Service’s training continuum, from accession until assignment to the operating forces.***

- ***Unanimous Approval***

The Commission found instances of a decline in the emphasis on basic military training as a recruit progressed in the training continuum. The cumulative result was a less-than-prepared servicemember arriving at his/her first operational assignment. Military training in the form of physical fitness, core values, drill, and military customs and courtesies must continue throughout all initial entry training phases. These basic requirements should not be a part of basic training only, to be forgotten during advanced individual training. If they are not reinforced or sustained, they will atrophy.

***14. As much as is feasible, each Service should maintain an active pretraining program that encourages the beginning of the military socialization process for recruits in the Delayed Entry Programs (DEP).***

- ***Unanimous Approval***

Pretraining programs conducted by recruiters improve the chance of success for new recruits entering individual entry training. Programs that begin to lay a foundation for the military socialization process that the new recruits will experience should include physical fitness, rudimentary drill, and an introduction to values training. The Commission understands that creating and maintaining such a program in the highly charged, difficult world of recruiting is not easy and, if not managed correctly, can detract from the recruiter's primary mission. The Commission also recognizes that each of the Services has established such a program; however, the Commission's interviews revealed that their programs are not universally conducted by all recruiting stations. The Commission urges the Services to review their Delayed Entry Programs annually as part of the Service Chief's annual individual entry

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<sup>111</sup>Johnson (1999), Volume III “Research” page 134.

training review (which we have also recommended to continually improve individual entry training). Such pretraining should also be discussed at the Department of Defense forum we have recommended for action (see Recommendation 11).

***15. Recruiter assistance duty should not be assigned before a trainee has completed initial entry training, and should not extend beyond 14 days. Trainee participation in recruiter assistance programs should be monitored and regulated.***

- ***Unanimous Approval***

The Commission recognizes that this is an unpopular finding, especially at a time when recruiting is so difficult. Some Services, particularly the Marine Corps, extensively use recruiter assistants and interrupt initial entry training, using those awaiting further advanced training. Unfortunately, the Commission found that, in many cases, trainees participating in the program returned to advanced training or reported to the operating forces in poor physical condition, and having lost the values imparted in basic training. The Commission recommends that the Services that have such a program thoroughly evaluate it for its overall effectiveness, and then ensure that it is closely monitored and regulated.

# INITIAL ENTRY LEVEL (IET) TRAINING CONTINUUM

**ONE STATION UNIT TRAINING (OSUT)** 13 weeks 3 days to 19 weeks 1 day (includes BCT Phase I - III) MOS training continues with the same DS and company. Infantry 11B, 11C, 11M; Combat Engineering 12B, 12C; Field Artillery 13B; Armor 19D; Chemical 54B; Military Police 95B, 95C.

**BASIC COMBAT TRAINING (BCT)** - 9 weeks of basic military subjects and fundamentals of basic combat skills training common to all newly enlisted active Army and reserve component personnel without prior service.

**ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING (AIT)** 4 weeks to 52 weeks (not including BCT)

**OPERATIONAL FORCES/OJT**

| ARMY                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | ACCESSION                                                                                                 | FILL WEEK                                                                                                                                                                   | PHASE I                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                | PHASE II                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                          | PHASE III                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                 | PHASE IV                                                                                                                                                                |                          | PHASE V                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                            |
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|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                             | WEEK 1                                                                                                                                                                                                        | WEEK 2                                                                                                                                                                                                      | WEEK 3                                                                                                                         | WEEK 4                                                                                       | WEEK 5                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | WEEK 6                                                                                                                   | WEEK 7                                                                                               | WEEK 8                                                                                                                                                                          | WEEK 9                                                                                                                                                                  | WEEKS 10 - 13            | WEEKS 14 - COMPLETION                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |                            |
|  <p>RECRUITING<br/>- MEPS (ASVAB)<br/>- MED EVAL<br/>- CONTRACT<br/>DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM<br/>- UP TO 365 DAYS<br/>- ACTIVITIES</p> <p>MEPS (SHIP DAY)<br/>- MED INSPECT<br/>- ACCESS INTO ARMY</p> | <p>NOT CONSIDERED PART OF TRAINING. USED FOR INITIAL IN-PROCESSING</p> <p>Physical Fitness Assessment</p> | <p>STD/CODE CONDUCT<br/>JOINT ETHICS REG<br/>CUSTOMS/COURTESY<br/>EO/POSH<br/><b>3K FOOT MARCH</b><br/>D&amp;C/INSPECTIONS<br/>PHYSICAL TRAINING<br/><b>CORE VALUES</b></p> | <p>GENERAL SUBJECTS<br/>Nuclear, Biological and Chemical<br/>FIRST AID<br/>MILITARY JUSTICE<br/>MAP READING<br/><b>5K FOOT MARCH</b><br/>D&amp;C/INSPECTIONS<br/>PHYSICAL TRAINING<br/><b>CORE VALUES</b></p> | <p>COMMUNICATIONS<br/>NBC<br/>SAEDA<br/>LAW OF LAND WARFARE<br/><b>8K FOOT MARCH</b><br/><b>CONFIDENCE COURSE</b><br/>D&amp;C/INSPECTIONS<br/>PHYSICAL TRAINING<br/><b>CORE VALUES</b><br/>PHASE I TEST</p> | <p>BASIC RIFLE MARKSMANSHIP<br/>D&amp;C/INSPECTIONS<br/>PHYSICAL TRAINING<br/><b>CORE VALUES</b><br/><b>10K FOOT MARCH</b></p> | <p>WEAPONS TRAINING<br/>D&amp;C/INSPECTIONS<br/>PHYSICAL TRAINING<br/><b>CORE VALUES</b></p> | <p>BAYONET ASSAULT CRSE<br/>PUGIL TRAINING<br/>US WEAPONS<br/>NBC CHAMBER<br/>10K FOOT MARCH<br/>HAND GRENADES<br/>HAND TO HAND<br/>D&amp;C/INSPECTIONS<br/>PHYSICAL TRAINING<br/><b>CORE VALUES</b><br/>OBSTACLE COURSE<br/>ITT<br/>PHASE II TEST</p> | <p>ITT TEST<br/>NIGHT INFILTRATION CRSE<br/>APFT<br/>PHYSICAL TRAINING<br/><b>CORE VALUES</b><br/>END OF COURSE TEST</p> | <p>TACTICAL TRAINING<br/><b>WARRIOR FTX</b><br/><b>10K FOOT MARCH 15K</b><br/><b>CORE VALUES</b></p> | <p>OUTBRIEFING<br/>OUTPROCESSING<br/>End Of Course After Action Review<br/>TA50 TURN-IN<br/>D&amp;C/INSPECTIONS<br/>PHYSICAL TRAINING<br/><b>CORE VALUES</b><br/>GRADUATION</p> | <p>Introduction to MOS tasks<br/>Reinforcement training of 36 BCT common skills, Values, traditions<br/>Evaluate behavior as being consistent with Army Core Values</p> | <p>MOS TASK TRAINING</p> | <p>MOS TASK TRAINING<br/>Continued MOS task training. Reinforcement training of 36 BCT common skills, Values, traditions.<br/>Evaluation of MOS skills and behavior as being consistent with Army Core Values.<br/>Leadership environment simulating that in a field unit 72 - 120 hour scenario-driven tactical field training exercise integrating common skills and MOS tasks. May include the End of Course Completion Test to enhance the training and testing value.</p> |                            |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                |                                                                                              |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                                                                 |                                                                                                                                                                         |                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | D&C - DRILL AND CEREMONIES |

| NAVY                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | ACCESSION                                                                                                          | FORMING                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | WEEK 1                                                                                             | WEEK 2                                                                       | WEEK 3                                                                                                                                                                               | WEEK 4                                                                                                                   | WEEK 5                                                      | WEEK 6                                                                                                                                                        | WEEK 7                                                                                                     | WEEK 8                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | SEAMAN/FIREMAN/AIRMAN APPRENTICE TRAINING<br>2-3 WEEKS (GENDETS) | FLEET COMMANDS/OJT<br>(> 30% of all Recruit grads) |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | ACADEMICS<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITIES<br>INITIAL SWIM EVAL/QUAL (3rd CLASS) | ACADEMICS-TEST<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>CONFIDENCE CRSE<br>WATCHSTANDING REQ | ACADEMICS-TEST<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>CONFIDENCE CRSE<br>PERSONAL MONEY<br>FINANCE & MNMGT<br>SEAMANSHIP LAB<br>FIRST AID<br>NAVY SHIPS & AIRCRAFT<br>ORIENTATION<br>WATCHSTANDING | ACADEMICS-TEST<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>SERVICE WEEK<br>INDOC PT TEST 1<br>ASSIGNMENT<br>CLASSIFICATION<br>WATCHSTANDING | "SERVICES WEEK"<br>ASSIGNMENT IN GROUNDS, GYM OR POOL AREAS | ACADEMICS<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>WPNS FAMILIARIZATION<br>CONFIDENCE CRSE<br>FIRE FIGHTING LAB & BASIC DAMAGE CNTRL<br>CAPT'S CUP OLYMPICS<br>WATCH STANDING | ACADEMICS-TEST<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>CONDUCT ASHORE<br>FIREFIGHTING LAB<br>BATTLE STATIONS<br>PT TEST 2 | GRAD WEEK<br>ACADEMICS<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>CHAPLAIN'S BRIEF<br>FAMILY NIGHT<br>PASS-IN-REVIEW<br>GRADUATION<br>CHECK-OUT & TRANSFER<br>MEDICAL EXAM<br>"FIT FOR FULL DUTY"<br>COMPLETE INVENTORY OF TAILORED UNIFORMS<br>DEMONSTRATE PROPER WEARING OF UNIFORM |                                                                  |                                                    |
|  <p>RECRUITING<br/>- MEPS (ASVAB)<br/>- MED EVAL<br/>- CONTRACT<br/>DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM<br/>- UP TO 365 DAYS<br/>- ACTIVITIES</p> <p>MEPS (SHIP DAY)<br/>- MED INSPECT<br/>- ACCESS INTO NAVY</p> | <p>NOT CONSIDERED PART OF TRAINING. USED FOR INITIAL IN-PROCESSING</p> <p>PT-0<br/>Physical Fitness Assessment</p> | PT SCHEDULED 6 DAYS PER WEEK EXCEPT GRAD WEEK. CLOSE ORDER DRILL EVERY WEEK EXCEPT SERVICE WEEK.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                    |                                                                              |                                                                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                          |                                                             |                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |                                                                  |                                                    |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                    | <p>APPRENTICE TRAINING (A-SCHOOL)<br/>4 - 63 WEEKS (Average 10.7 weeks)</p> <p>SPECIALTY TRAINING (C-School)<br/>2 - 58 weeks (Average 7.2 weeks) (&lt;50% of all A-School grads)</p> <p>NAVY MILITARY TRAINING - ALL SAILORS PARTICIPATE FOR FIRST 12 MONTHS OF SERVICE (CONDUCTED BY NAVAL TRAINING COMMANDS AND BY FLEET UNITS)</p> |                                                                                                    |                                                                              |                                                                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                          |                                                             |                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |                                                                  | FLEET COMMANDS/OJT (>50% of A-School grads)        |

| AIR FORCE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | ACCESSION                                                                                                      | FORMING                                                          | WEEK 1                                                                                                                                                      | WEEK 2                                                                                                                                    | WEEK 3                                                                                                                                                               | WEEK 4                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | WEEK 5                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | WEEK 6                             | TECHNICAL TRAINING     |                         |                                                        |                                         |  |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|--|
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                                                                                                                |                                                                  | ACADEMICS<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>CAREER GUIDANCE<br>MEDICAL/DENTAL PROCESSING<br>DENTAL CHECK<br>IMMUNIZATIONS<br>CUSTOMS<br>COURTESIES<br>FAM CARE PLANS | ACADEMICS<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>DRESS/APPEAR<br>MIL ENTITLEMENTS<br>GRADE INSIGNIA<br>GI BILL<br>FITNESS/NUTRITION<br>CAREER INTERVIEW | ACADEMICS<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>CEREMONIAL DRILL<br>CODE OF CONDUCT<br>LAW ARMED CONFLICT<br>SECURITY<br>HUMAN RELATIONS<br>SEXUAL HARASSMENT<br>PRE-MARKSMANSHIP | ACADEMICS<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>AF HISTORY & ORG<br>QUALITY AIR FORCE<br>DRESS/PERS APP<br>CAREER INFO<br>CEREMONIAL DRILL<br>DORM EVALS<br>DRILL & REPORTING EVALS<br>HONOR FLT DRILL<br>RETREAT PRACTICE<br>PFT<br>BASE LIBERTY EARNED | WRITTEN EXAM<br>FIELD TRNG EXER<br>CONFIDENCE CRSE<br>RETREAT CEREMONY<br>OPEN RANKS INSPECT<br>DEPARTURE ORIENTATION<br>ORDERS PICK-UP<br>SHIPPING BRIEFING<br>OPERATIONS BRIEFING<br>MARKSMANSHIP QUAL<br>GRADUATION PARADE<br>TOWN PASS SATURDAY<br>STARTING WEEK 5 | PHASE I<br>ARRIVAL THRU<br>14 DAYS | PHASE II<br>15-28 DAYS | PHASE III<br>29-90 DAYS | PHASE IV<br>MINIMUM 76TH DAY<br>BASED ON ACADEMIC QUAL | PHASE V<br>FROM 181ST DAY TO GRADUATION |  |
|  <p>RECRUITING<br/>- MEPS (ASVAB)<br/>- MED EVAL<br/>- CONTRACT<br/>DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM<br/>- UP TO 365 DAYS<br/>- ACTIVITIES</p> <p>MEPS (SHIP DAY)<br/>- MED INSPECT<br/>- ACCESS INTO AIR FORCE</p> | <p>NOT CONSIDERED PART OF TRAINING. USED FOR INITIAL IN-PROCESSING</p> <p>Physical Conditioning Assessment</p> | EVERY WEEK HAS PT SCHEDULED 6 DAYS A WEEK AND FLIGHT DRILL DAILY |                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 148 AIR FORCE SPECIALTY CODES (AFSC). SCHOOL LENGTH VARIES FROM 4 TO 83 WEEKS. CONTINUUM BUILDS ON VALUES & DISCIPLINE INSTILLED IN BMT<br>USAF PHASE PROGRAM STANDARDIZES TRAINEE DISCIPLINE ACROSS AIR EDUC & TRAINING CMD.                                          |                                    |                        |                         |                                                        |                                         |  |

| MARINE CORPS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | ACCESSION                                                                                                 | FORMING                                                                                         | WEEK 1                                                                                                     | WEEK 2                                                                                                                                                                                   | WEEK 3                                                                                                                                                                                                 | WEEK 4                                                                                                                        | WEEK 5                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | WEEK 6                                                                                         | WEEK 7                                                                                   | WEEK 8                                      | WEEK 9                                                                                                                                                        | WEEK 10                                                                                                         | WEEK 11                                                                                                                                                               | WEEK 12 | BOOT LEAVE | SCHOOL OF INFANTRY                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |  |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |                                                                                                           |                                                                                                 | ACADEMICS<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>PUGIL STICKS<br>LINE TRAINING<br>PHYSICAL TRAINING<br>CLOSE ORDER DRILL | ACADEMICS<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>LINE TRAINING<br>PUGIL STICKS<br>PHYSICAL TRAINING<br>CLOSE ORDER DRILL                                                                               | ACADEMICS<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>3 MILE HIKE (M)<br>5 MILE HIKE<br>DRILL EVAL<br>SDI INSPECTION<br>PUGIL STICKS<br>OBSTACLE COURSE<br>CONFIDENCE CRSE FMLE<br>PHYSICAL TRAINING<br>CLOSE ORDER DRILL | "SWIM WEEK"<br>ACADEMICS<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>SERIES CDR INSPECT<br>COMBAT SWIM<br>PHYSICAL TRAINING<br>CLOSE ORDER DRILL | "BASIC WARRIOR TRNG"<br>ACADEMICS<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>6 MILE NIGHT HIKE<br>CONFIDENCE CRSE<br>COMPANY DRILL EVAL<br>RAPPEL/FAST ROPE<br>BASIC FIELD SKILLS<br>CLOTHING APPT<br>PHYSICAL TRAINING<br>CLOSE ORDER DRILL<br>OBSTACLE CRSE | "GRASS WEEK"<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>PFT<br>10 MILE HIKE<br>MARKSMANSHIP<br>PHYSICAL TRAINING | "RIFLE QUAL WEEK"<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>RIFLE QUAL<br>FIELD MEET<br>PHYSICAL TRAINING | "TEAM WEEK"<br>Mess and maintenance duties. | "FIELD FIRING WEEK"<br>ACADEMICS<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>OBSTACLE CRSE<br>FIELD FIRING<br>DAY INDIV MVMNT CRSE<br>NITE INDIV MVMNT CRSE<br>PHYSICAL TRAINING | "TRANSFORMATION WEEK"<br>ACADEMICS<br><b>CORE VALUES</b><br>COMPANY CO INSPECT<br>CRUCIBLE<br>PHYSICAL TRAINING | "TRANSITION WEEK"<br>SUNDAY BASE LIBERTY<br>MOTIVATION RUN<br>ACADEMICS<br>BN CO INSPECTION<br>RIFLE TURN IN<br>FAMILY DAY/LIBERTY<br>GRADUATION<br>PHYSICAL TRAINING |         |            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |  |
|  <p>RECRUITING<br/>- MEPS (ASVAB)<br/>- MED EVAL<br/>- CONTRACT<br/>DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM<br/>- UP TO 365 DAYS<br/>- ACTIVITIES</p> <p>MEPS (SHIP DAY)<br/>- MED INSPECT<br/>- ACCESS INTO USMC<br/>- IST</p> | <p>NOT CONSIDERED PART OF TRAINING. USED FOR INITIAL IN-PROCESSING</p> <p>INITIAL STRENGTH TEST (IST)</p> | 10 days of leave granted to each graduating Marine prior to reporting to SOI                    |                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                               |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                |                                                                                          |                                             |                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                                                                 |                                                                                                                                                                       |         |            | <p>INFANTRY TRAINING BATTALION</p> <p>Primary MOS School for Infantry Marines. 37 days for Infantry. <a href="#">FLEET MARINE FORCE/OJT</a><br/>An additional 17 days (for a total of 54) for Weapons "specialists". <a href="#">FLEET MARINE FORCE/OJT</a></p> |  |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |                                                                                                           | <p>Marine Combat Training (MCT)<br/>17 training days. Attended by ALL non-infantry Marines.</p> |                                                                                                            | <p>MOS SCHOOL<br/>63 % of MOS Schools combined or collocated with other Services. These schools run in length from 4 to 54 weeks in the more technical fields. Average is 6-8 weeks.</p> |                                                                                                                                                                                                        | FLEET MARINE FORCE/OJT                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                |                                                                                          |                                             |                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                                                                 |                                                                                                                                                                       |         |            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |  |

# *Functions Relating To Gender-Integrated and Gender-Segregated Basic Training*

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As required by Section 562 (b) of the statute, the Commission reviewed parts of the initial entry training programs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps that constitute the basic training of new recruits (referred to as basic training in this report). The review included an examination of the basic training policies and practices of each of the Services with regard to gender-integrated and gender-segregated basic training. For each of the Services, the Commission assessed the effectiveness of gender-integrated and gender-segregated basic training. The statutory language of section 562 (b) is set forth below.

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A. Statutory Requirements

(b) FUNCTIONS RELATING TO GENDER-INTEGRATED AND GENDER-SEGREGATED BASIC TRAINING -- (1) The commission shall review the parts of the initial entry training programs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps that constitute the basic training of new recruits (in this subtitle referred to as "basic training"). The review shall include a review of the basic training policies and practices of each of those Services with regard to gender-integrated and gender-segregated basic training and, for each of the Services, the effectiveness of gender-integrated and gender-segregated basic training. (2) As part of the review under paragraph (1), the commission shall (with respect to each of the Services) take the following measures:

- (A) Determine how each service defines gender-integration and gender-segregation in the context of basic training.
- (B) Determine the historical rationales for the establishment and dis-establishment of gender-integrated or gender-segregated basic training.

(C) Examine, with respect to each service, the current rationale for the use of gender-integrated or gender-segregated basic training and the rationale that was current as of the time the service made a decision to integrate, or to segregate, basic training by gender (or as of the time of the most recent decision to continue to use a gender-integrated format or a gender-segregated format for basic training), and, as part of the examination, evaluate whether at the time of that decision, the Secretary of the military department with jurisdiction over that service had substantive reason to believe, or has since developed data to support, that gender-integrated basic training, or gender-segregated basic training, improves the readiness or performance of operational units.

(D) Assess whether the concept of “training as you will fight” is a valid rationale for gender-integrated basic training or whether the training requirements and objectives for basic training are sufficiently different from those of operational units so that such concept, when balanced against other factors relating to basic training, might not be a sufficient rationale for gender-integrated basic training.

(E) Identify the requirements unique to each service that could affect a decision by the Secretary concerned to adopt a gender-integrated or gender-segregated format for basic training and assess whether the format in use by each service has been successful in meeting those requirements.

(F) Assess, with respect to each service, the degree to which different standards have been established, or if not established are in fact being implemented, for males and females in basic training for matters such as physical fitness, physical performance (such as confidence and obstacle courses), military skills (such as marksmanship and hand-grenade qualifications), and nonphysical tasks required of individuals and, to the degree that differing standards exist or are in fact being implemented, assess the effect of the use of those differing standards.

(G) Identify the goals that each service has set forth in regard to readiness, in light of the gender-integrated or gender-segregated format that such service has adopted for basic training, and whether that format contributes to the readiness of operational units.

(H) Assess the degree to which performance standards in basic training are based on military readiness.

(I) Evaluate the policies of each of the services regarding the assignment of adequate numbers of female drill instructors in gender-integrated training units who can serve as role models and mentors for female trainees.

(J) Review Department of Defense and military department efforts to objectively measure or evaluate the effectiveness of gender-integrated basic training, as compared to gender-segregated basic training, particularly with regard to the adequacy and scope of the efforts and with regard to the relevancy of findings to operational unit requirements, and determine whether the Department of Defense and the military depart-

ments are capable of measuring or evaluating the effectiveness of that training format objectively.

(K) Compare the pattern of attrition in gender-integrated basic training units with the pattern of attrition in gender-segregated basic training units and assess the relevancy of the findings of such comparison.

(L) Compare the level of readiness and morale of gender-integrated basic training units with the level of readiness and morale of gender-segregated units, and assess the relevancy of the findings of such comparison and the implications, for readiness, of any differences found.

(M) Compare the experiences, policies, and practices of the armed forces of other industrialized nations regarding gender-integrated training with those of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

(N) Review, and take into consideration, the current practices, relevant studies, and private sector training concepts pertaining to gender-integrated training.

(O) Assess the feasibility and implications of conducting basic training (or equivalent training) at the company level and below through separate units for male and female recruits, including the costs and other resource commitments required to implement and conduct basic training in such a manner and the implications for readiness and unit cohesion.

(P) Assess the feasibility and implications of requiring drill instructors for basic training units to be of the same sex as the recruits in those units if the basic training were to be conducted as described in subparagraph (O).

B. Process and Methodology

To fulfill its responsibilities, the Commission tasked each of the Services to provide relevant information applicable to the mandate of the Congress. The Commission also conducted visits to initial entry training sites of the four Services, and a number of follow-on technical and advanced individual training locations that are part of initial entry training. In addition, the Commission visited a number of operational units and headquarters in each of the Services, to include overseas operational commands in Bosnia, Germany, and aboard the USS ENTERPRISE. Individual commissioners made authorized visits to several joint commands and the United States Coast Guard basic training facility. The joint visits included the Pacific Command, the Atlantic Command, the Southern Command, and the Southern European Task Force. The Commission also held a number of hearings and conducted research relevant to the matters of inquiry mandated by the statute. These activities, which are detailed elsewhere in this report, informed the Commission in arriving at its determinations and assessments. In summary, the Commission's primary information sources were:

- Expert testimony
- Site visits and discussion groups
- Paper-and-pencil surveys
- Systematic focus groups
- Administrative data analysis
- Examination of existing data
- Literature reviews

Clearly, the issues set forth in the statute are complex to say the least. The Commission not only considered a confluence of information sources (rather than focusing on one or only a few unreliable measures) but also remained cognizant of the limitations of static data in measuring a dynamic environment. With regard to gender format of training, randomized experiments are impractical at best and generally are unavailable in the present context. Potential confounds, such as differences in personnel characteristics (aptitude and education levels), job characteristics, leader characteristics, location, and other factors certainly co-vary with gender format. Further, organizations take time to adapt to change and the military is no exception. Attitudes toward gender issues cannot be expected to change overnight. In addition to considering the complexity of the issues, Commissioners also considered the need to look beyond group characteristics such as gender in assessing and making progress regarding the personnel issues confronting the military.

To present its conclusions and recommendations in a coherent manner, the Commission has organized the rest of this chapter in three sections. Section C reports on key themes and observations applicable to all Services that emerged from the Commission's work. This represents a summary of important results of the Commission's investigations, conclusions, and recommendations for further action. The Commission's Findings and Assessments on each area required in the statute are summarized across Services in Section D with a detailed analysis by Service following in Section E.

C. Conclusions, Recommendations, and Supporting Observations

The Commission adopted three recommendations specific to gender-integrated training. Following are those three recommendations with additional explanations and supporting observations. Of the three recommendations made by the Commission on gender-integrated and gender-segregated training, one was not adopted by unanimous approval. The alternative views of the commissioners who dissented or abstained are presented in chapter 5.

1. The Commission concludes that the Services are providing the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines required by the operating forces to carry out their assigned missions; therefore, each Service should be allowed to continue to conduct basic training in accordance with its current policies. This includes the manner in which basic trainees are housed and organized into units. This conclusion does not imply the absence of challenges and issues associated with the dynamics found in a gender integrated basic training environment. Therefore, improvements to Initial Entry Training that have been made by the Services or are currently being considered must be sustained and continually reviewed.

VOTE: **Yeas: Cantor, Christmas, Dare, Pang, Pope, Segal**
 Nays: Blair, Keys, Moore
 Abstentions: Moskos

Note: Commissioner Keys indicated that he wished to change his vote from “abstention” to “nay” and provided his reasons in the hearing before the Subcommittee on Personnel of the House Armed Services Committee on March 17, 1999. His vote was changed accordingly. Chairman Blair indicated that she wished to change her vote from “abstention” to “nay” and provided her reasons in an e-mail to commissioners on July 6, 1999. Her vote was changed accordingly.

This recommendation is based on the conclusion that, in general, the ways in which the Services are conducting their training, including the gender formats, sustain mission readiness. This is supported by evidence from the visits conducted by the Commission to installations along the training continuum of each Service, including basic training, advanced or technical training, one station unit training (Army OSUT), and operational units. It is also supported by results of the Commission-sponsored research. Just some of the supporting findings are highlighted in this statement.

While all of the Services have much in common, each is unique in many ways. They differ in mission, tradition, size, force structure, rank distribution, gender composition, and positions open to women. The differences combine to create different goals and needs in basic training. Rather than striving for uniformity across the Services in the degree of gender integration in basic training, each Service should have structures and processes in basic training that are compatible with its characteristics. The continuum of training for each Service is, and should remain, based on its operational requirements.

The current gender formats in basic training are consistent with the current combat exclusion policies which the Commission accepted as a given. Men training for direct ground combat positions (Army and Marine Corps) that are open only to men train in all-male units. Men and women training to serve in positions that are open to women do so in gender-integrated basic training units or in the rheostat approach practiced by the Marine Corps. This practice is an entry level training process that functions like a rheostat, moving from gender segregation at boot camp, to partial gender integration at Marine Combat Training, and finally full gender integration at the military occupational specialty (MOS) school. In all cases across

the Services basic training creates an environment that is as close as feasible to the operational environment in which these first-term personnel serve.

During the Commission's visits to operational installations, commanders, senior enlisted personnel, and immediate supervisors of first-term personnel have informed us that they are generally satisfied with the vast majority of new servicemembers they are receiving from initial entry training. This includes their sense that current gender formats in basic training are working well in preparing these young people for their first operational assignment. When asked if they would take these young men and women into battle, the vast majority of these leaders, without hesitation, said "Yes!"

When asked about their major issues, problems, and concerns, leaders did not mention gender until specifically asked about gender issues. Rather, their major concerns center around sustainability. Throughout visits to both basic training organizations and operating forces, the Commission heard about the adverse effects of personnel shortages caused by downsizing and increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO). When asked what the Commission should tell the Congress, a mid-grade Marine Corps officer clearly stated, "personnel or OPTEMPO, fix one or the other."

At the training bases, the Commission heard concerns about specific issues regarding gender-integrated training. However, the Commission was impressed by the generally positive attitudes expressed about training by both trainers and trainees and by the effective training observed.

The Commission observed and had discussions with trainees in all phases of basic training, including graduation. The Commission also observed recruits experiencing their "defining event" and was impressed with the transformation from civilian to soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine. With few exceptions, recruits said that the training was challenging and difficult. Most were quick to tell us that they had undergone significant changes as a result of the training experience in terms of discipline, self-confidence, physical fitness, and trust in and respect for their Service, their fellow recruits, and, most important, their leaders. When respondents were asked to assess themselves on a variety of dimensions at three points in time: prior to basic training, immediately after basic, and currently, the data showed positive changes for the adoption of values, commitment and cohesion, job skills, and self-discipline regardless of gender format. The Commission found that those who had worked with the opposite gender to a greater extent had more positive attitudes about gender-integrated training.¹¹²

Trainers generally supported the basic training format for their respective Service. They emphasized the need for new recruits to learn the culture of their Service from the beginning. Most trainers in gender-integrated units stated that gender-integrated training is effective. They noted challenges and problems, but in the final analysis, they believe that the format is preferable. Similarly, trainers in gender-segregated units (male and female trainers

¹¹² Ramsberger, P., Laurence, J., & Sipes, D., (1999), *Retrospective Survey of Socialization, Values, and Performance in Relation to Recruit Training*, Volume IV "Research" page 46.

in the Marine Corps and male trainers in the Army responsible for male recruits in the all-male combat arms) expressed their strong support for that format for basic training. The trainers who expressed dissatisfaction with gender-integrated training tended to be those who were trainers during a period when significant changes were being made; thus, their daily “routine” was disrupted. The trainers who expressed more positive views of gender-integrated training tended to be those who became trainers after those changes had been made.

Data collected by the Commission directly measured the effect of the current training format of each Service on the degree to which graduating recruits express attitudes of commitment, respect for authority, and group identity.^{113,114} Consistently, for the three Services where comparisons were possible (because there were male recruits in both training formats at the same location),¹¹⁵ there were no effects of training format (gender-integrated versus gender-separated) on the expression of these attitudes upon graduation. That is, graduating recruits were no more likely to express commitment, respect for authority, or group identity as a function of having experienced gender-integrated or gender-separated training environments. Moreover, when 9,270 enlisted members in operational units were asked what gender mix best suits the purpose of basic training, military personnel preferred the training format that they had personally experienced during recruit training.¹¹⁶

Support for segregated training ranged from a low of 19 percent in the Air Force to a high of 66 percent in the Marine Corps. The degree of support for gender segregation was in keeping with Service practices; that is, support for gender segregation was lowest for airmen and highest for Marines. Further, when these enlisted members were asked to evaluate the effect of gender-integration on the quality of basic training, the majority said that gender integration improved or had no effect on training quality (ranging from 41 percent of Marine respondents to 79 percent of Air Force respondents). Moreover, first-term military personnel who completed Commission surveys or participated in focus or discussion groups preferred the training format they had personally experienced during recruit training.¹¹⁷

The observations of the Commission, which were also supported by its research, show that leadership and command climate determine the success of initial entry training. The degree of gender separation has less of an impact on the outcomes of basic training than does the behavior of the leaders. Experienced leaders are especially important. When they

¹¹³ Johnson, C. Ph.D., (1999), *The Study of Military Recruit Attitudes Conducive to Unit Cohesion and Survey of Military Leader Opinions on Recruit Training and Gender-Related Issues* Volume III “Research” pp. 131-133.

¹¹⁴ As noted in Chapter 3, the survey of graduating recruits (see Johnson, 1999) included three primary constructs labeled: 1) commitment; 2) respect for authority; and 3) group identity. It is important to note that there were only four items comprising the scale named “Respect for Authority”. The scale was not statistically very reliable and the label may not be appropriate. The items (along with the response that scored high) were: “The military should take into account the needs of its members when it makes decisions on how to operate” (disagree), “People in authority tend to abuse their power” (disagree), “I should not contradict leaders who have authority over me” (agree), and “What I do in my personal life should be of no concern to my superiors” (disagree). Thus, “respect for authority” may not quite capture the tapped constructs.

¹¹⁵ Such comparisons were precluded for the Marine Corps.

¹¹⁶ Ramsberger, et al. (1999), Volume IV “Research” page 30.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*; Laurence, J., Wright, M., Keys, C., & Giambo, P. (1999), *Focus Group Research*, Volume IV “Research” pages 307-310.

effectively communicate with their subordinate leaders, listen to the concerns and recommendations of their trainers, and implement training and policy changes appropriately and consistently, their training environments are effective and consistent with the core values of the Service. These leaders and their command environments will continue sustaining the mission readiness of the Services.

2. The Services should review their regulations and policies concerning gender relations, to ensure that they are clearly stated, and with the aim of achieving consistency in practice across their training bases and throughout the training continuum.

- ***Unanimous Approval***

The Commission acknowledges and supports the significant enhancements made to both the gender-integrated and the gender-segregated training environments over the last two years. However, the Commission found examples of inconsistent application and knowledge of formal policy, as well as misunderstandings of the official policy intent. Multiple training sites with the same training mission increase the opportunity for inconsistencies and misunderstandings. Multiple editions of implementing policy letters throughout a chain of command often convey “differing” intent. Although the Commission understands and supports local command authority and prerogative, it emphasizes that caution should be exercised when standardization is the desired end.

3. Initial Entry Training issues, to include gender, must continue to be discussed openly at all levels of the Services’ chains of command and legitimate feedback (both positive and negative) from trainers must be encouraged and acted upon.

- ***Unanimous Approval***

The Commission heard from numerous trainers across the Services that they often felt that their recommendations and input were unheard or ignored. Although the exercise of military leadership does not require subordinate concurrence, trainers expressed a clear desire to make the recruit training experience the very best for their respective Services. The Commission found that a positive command climate fosters open communication that results in a positive and effective training environment.

Equally, it is important for those at the Service Departments and the Department of Defense to avoid reactive policy changes as a result of a highly publicized training incident. Reactive policy changes, rather than well thought out proactive ones that have undergone thorough investigation and historical review, often lead to unintended consequences in the

form of reduced standards, declining morale, and less efficient and effective training methods. As indicated previously in this report, commanders must be given the opportunity to address initial entry training problems that will occur periodically and correct them without unnecessary or unwarranted Department interference.

D. Findings and Assessments by Statute Section

In this section, the Commission’s analysis across the four Services is presented for each specific section of the statute. Each section of the statute is presented along with the Commission’s general findings and assessments that are applicable to all the Services.

“(A) Determine how each Service defines gender integration and gender segregation in the context of basic training.”

Army, Navy, and Air Force define gender-integrated training as the consolidation of both genders at the small-unit level (platoon, division, and flight) for the purpose of conducting initial entry training (IET). For the Army, approximately 40 percent of the soldiers attend male-only MOS training as a result of the specialty they choose. Upon completion of basic training at a gender-integrated location, approximately one percent each of Navy and Air Force male personnel assigned to special operations (*e.g.* SEALs, Para-rescue) will undergo special training in a gender-segregated training format. The Marine Corps conducts its Boot Camp in a gender-separated environment. The Marine Corps describes Marine Combat Training (MCT) as partially gender-integrated (the infantry MOS is all-male and requires 44 days of infantry training instead of MCT). In each company of four platoons, one platoon has all women and three have all men. Upon completion of MCT, all non-combat arms Marines train in a fully gender-integrated environment. This is their rheostat approach of increasing gender integration with each phase of IET.

“(B) Determine the historical rationales for the establishment and disestablishment of gender-integrated or gender-segregated basic training.”

The Commission found that the rationales for the training format selected by each Service evolved over the last 25 years. Several critical factors drove the evolution: the end of conscription, establishment of the All-Volunteer Force, end of the Cold War, critical deployments (*e.g.* Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Somalia, Bosnia), adoption on October 1, 1994 of the new direct ground combat definition and assignment rule resulting in the expansion of military occupational specialties open to women, modernization, and technology. All of these factors contributed to the decisions that have led to the current training formats.

The written history of the decisions to conduct or discontinue gender-segregated or gender-integrated training in each Service is only partially documented and is incomplete. Therefore, the Commission sought and received testimony from former Service Chiefs, senior civilian officials and other individuals responsible for past and present policies and practices for gender-segregated or gender-integrated training.

“(C) Examine, with respect to each Service, the current rationale for the use of gender-integrated or gender-segregated basic training and the rationale that was current at the time the Service made a decision to integrate, or to segregate, basic training by gender (or at the time of the most recent decision to continue to use a gender-integrated format or a gender-segregated format for basic training), and, as part of the examination, evaluate whether at the time of that decision, the Secretary of the military department with jurisdiction over that Service had substantive reason to believe, or has since developed data to support, that gender-integrated basic training, or gender-segregated basic training, improves the readiness or performance of operational units.”

The Commission found that throughout the evolution of gender-integrated training, there was earnest and, at times, contentious debate. Further, numerous “experiments” were conducted (in the Services that have gender-integrated training formats) involving a variety of basic training formats. This debate produced data that informed and impelled decisions within the military to retain, alter, or discontinue gender-segregated or gender-integrated training. Fundamentally, leadership at senior levels made an informed decision to adopt or retain the current training formats.

The Commission concludes that the current rationale for the training format used by each Service is sound and supports its unique operational requirements. The decisions of the Service Secretaries, who by law (10 Title, U.S. Code) have responsibility for training, were made after deliberate consultation and coordination with senior military leadership. Further, on the basis of testimony, field discussions, and focus groups with current operational commanders and leaders, the Commission found that there is no adverse impact on readiness created by gender-integrated training as it is currently formatted and found that the overwhelming opinion of those questioned supports that conclusion. The current training format of each Service reflects the operational environment in which individuals will operate.

Of note, gender integration in basic training appears to contribute to readiness. Two-thirds or more of Army, Navy, and Air Force (and just over one-third of Marine Corps) respondents agreed that having men and women in basic training makes it easier to adapt to operational units that include both genders. Further, recruits in basic training perceived male-female interactions positively in that they helped men accept and learn to work with and trust

women. Reservations about gender issues expressed during focus group discussions were less likely among recruits than those in technical training or operational units.¹¹⁸

Further, when asked to determine “ideal” levels of commitment, respect for authority, and group identity for graduating recruits, leaders at all levels surveyed (*i.e.*, E-6/E-7, O-3s, commanders, command noncommissioned officers, and recruit trainers) showed no statistically significant differences in their ratings regardless of their experience in units of varying gender composition.¹¹⁹

“(D) Assess whether the concept of “training as you will fight” is a valid rationale for gender-integrated basic training or whether the training requirements and objectives for basic training are sufficiently different from those of operational units so that such a concept, when balanced against other factors relating to basic training, might not be a sufficient rationale for gender-integrated basic training.”

“Train as you fight” is a long-standing, fundamental principle. Military organizations have always trained to fight cohesively and win battles. The U.S. Army formally wrote this principle into doctrine in the 1980’s. It was directed primarily at the operational force with the intent to communicate that training resources and time are constrained; therefore, commanders and leaders need to focus on their wartime tasks. In time, the precept became a slogan, transcending all training regimes. It continues to support most training plans and programs.

“Train as you fight” is not, nor should it be, the sole justification for gender-integrated training. Basic training is the initial process of the individual transformation from citizen to soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine. Each Service causes this transformation to occur differently according to its culture, its operational requirements, and at different points along the continuum of training. That is healthy and ensures the strength of the Armed Forces. Each Service establishes standards for tasks to be performed both individually and as an operational unit. The standards are the same for both basic training and within the operational force. Perhaps, “train to standard” would more aptly describe the basic training environment, regardless of the format used.

“(E) Identify the requirements unique to each service that could affect a decision by the Secretary concerned to adopt a gender-integrated or gender-segregated format for basic training, and assess whether the format in use by each service has been successful in meeting those requirements.”

¹¹⁸ Ramsberger, et al (1999), Volume IV “Research” page 35 ; Laurence, et al. (1999) Volume IV “Research” pages 307-308.

¹¹⁹ Johnson (1999), Volume III “Research” page 92.

Fundamentally, the requirement of all the Services is to field a highly trained and qualified fighting force of individuals and units capable of performing myriad complex operations. Within this requirement, the separate Services have unique accession and training demands that reflect the gender utilization policies of each.

The Commission's assessment is that the current training formats of each Service are very successful in meeting the current, and poised to meet the future, operational requirements demanded by the nation.

“(F) Assess, with respect to each service, the degree to which different standards have been established, or if not established are in fact being implemented, for males and females in basic training for matters such as physical fitness, physical performance (such as confidence and obstacle courses), military skills (such as marksmanship and hand-grenade qualifications), and nonphysical tasks required of individuals and, to the degree that differing standards exist or are in fact being implemented, assess the effect of the use of those differing standards.”

The Commission found that except for gender and age norming used for physical fitness testing, standards for basic training tasks do not differ by gender.¹²⁰ Established Service-specific standards are required to be met by each recruit before graduation. The Commission observed numerous training events, including obstacle/confidence courses, live fire ranges, bayonet, hand-to-hand training, and physical fitness training. These events were physically and mentally challenging.

The Commission concluded that gender-integrated training has no adverse effect on training rigor. In talks with recruits as well as trainers, the common theme heard was that the training curriculum is challenging to all and has not been diluted to accommodate gender-integrated training. Survey responses did show that many male recruits think basic training is less challenging than anticipated. However, probes via more in-depth discussions show ample evidence that this is not a result of gender-integrated training, (especially since this response also was expressed by male recruits in all-male USMC training), but rather is a result of unrealistic expectations of encountering harsh treatment, perhaps to the point of hazing. The most common response received when asked the question, “What did you think basic training would be like?” was, “I thought it would be like *Full Metal Jacket*.”¹²¹

The Commission found, on rare occasions, that waivers were granted to males and females that failed to complete a mandatory training event. The waivers are controlled and

¹²⁰ The use of gender and age norming for physical fitness testing has evolved for all Services and is an appropriate way to measure physical fitness according to physical fitness experts and physiologists. See Chapter III, Appendix H, Appendix N, and testimony of 10 and 18 November 1998 in Volume II for further information about physical fitness, including distinguishing it from job performance requirements.

¹²¹ *Full Metal Jacket* is the title of a movie about the Vietnam War.

normally approved at senior-leader level (O-6 or above) for unique situations. For example, in the Army there is the requirement to complete all foot marches. A recruit may have missed an intermediate march of a lesser distance but completed longer marches at a later date. In this case, because of time, a waiver may be granted for the shorter march. Another example is an injury that occurs during an event, precluding completion of that event. The Commission witnessed this while observing the Crucible at Parris Island. A recruit was injured and could not complete this mandatory event. In its wisdom, considering the spirit and past performance of this recruit, the leadership made the decision to allow him to become a Marine.

“(G) Identify the goals that each service has set forth in regard to readiness, in light of the gender-integrated or gender-segregated format that such service has adopted for basic training, and whether that format contributes to the readiness of operational units.”

The immediate readiness goal of each Service for basic training is to deliver to the next phase of initial entry training soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who are physically, mentally, socially, and morally fit to continue and successfully complete their training and qualify for assignment to the operating forces. Refer to the training continuum foldout at the end of chapter 3.

The Commission found during the collection of quantitative and qualitative data from the operational forces personnel that the current training formats are providing them with qualified, motivated personnel. This conclusion is supported by the exemplary professional performance of the U.S. military, which is engaged in a variety of demanding operations throughout the world.

Surveys and interviews with servicemembers in 40 units that have opened to women since 1993 showed that the majority of both men and women felt that in light of their training and physical and mental preparedness, they were well or very well prepared to perform their wartime jobs. The overwhelming majority of women and the majority of men said that the impact of women on unit readiness was not evident or it was positive. According to the General Accounting Office, over 80 percent of men and women rated their readiness as medium or high. Also, the majority of both men and women (75 percent and 71 percent, respectively) viewed their personal readiness positively in all areas, and indicated they could deploy on short notice with no or few problems. Men and women reported similar levels of “moderate” (20 percent and 23 percent) and “major” (5 percent each) problems. Both men and women reported high levels of confidence (86 percent and 80 percent, respectively) in their units’ wartime readiness. Readiness concerns centered around personnel shortages, training, leadership, and other non-gender issues. Stereotypes of women were a cause of concern for women and perceived preferential treatment of women was an issue raised by

some men. The effects of pregnancy on deployment, particularly in light of personnel shortages, were noted by both men and women as needing attention.¹²²

Given the current OPTEMPO of each Service, the Commission concludes that operational force readiness is not adversely affected by gender-integrated training as currently conducted. At every operational force visit, Commissioners asked leaders at all levels, “Would you go to war with your people?” In every case, there was a resounding “Yes.” Some leaders say that gender integration in basic training (and also one station unit training for the Army) contributes to readiness in combat support units by preparing recruits early to work in mixed-gender operational units. The concerns expressed by these leaders centered on key personnel shortages and an increasing OPTEMPO that affected their ability to “grow” personnel and sustainability.

“(H) Assess the degree to which performance standards in basic training are based on military readiness.”

The Commission determined that the current curriculum of each Service’s basic training is based primarily on the stated needs of the operational force. Each Service has provisions for feedback from the operational force to the training base that result in adjustments to that curriculum. However, there is some evidence that these procedures can be improved. In addition, the Commission observed during its visits to the training sites that basic training provides the initial rigor, challenge, discipline, and inculcation of values that contribute to the readiness of the force.

“(I) Evaluate the policies of each of the services regarding the assignment of adequate numbers of female drill instructors in gender-integrated training units who can serve as role models and mentors for female trainees.”

The Commission has determined that the Services have policies or practices that allow for the adequate assignment of female instructors. However, the pool of qualified female noncommissioned officers from which trainers are selected occasionally does not support full manning authorizations. In addition, the Commission found that more important than the gender of the drill instructor is the professionalism and leadership that are crucial dimensions to be considered in their selection. To be role models and mentors, drill instructors, whether female or male, must first be good leaders.

¹²² General Accounting Office, (1999, May), *Gender Issues: Perceptions of Readiness in Selected Units* (GAO/NSIAD-99-120). Washington, DC.

“(J) Review Department of Defense and military department efforts to objectively measure or evaluate the effectiveness of gender-integrated basic training, as compared to gender-segregated basic training, particularly with regard to the adequacy and scope of the efforts and with regard to the relevancy of findings to operational unit requirements, and determine whether the Department of Defense and the military departments are capable of measuring or evaluating the effectiveness of that training format objectively.”

Measuring effectiveness is complicated, to say the least. There is no single measure of performance and likewise no single antecedent that can be linked directly even to its core components. Personnel selection, training, and maintenance are geared toward enhancing effectiveness. That is, beyond age and citizenship requirements, standards for aptitude, education, moral character, and medical and physical fitness are set to maximize job performance and retention. In addition, it is necessary to consider additional dimensions that tap motivational aspects of performance as well as the contribution of experience in any assessment of effectiveness. The Services consider such a confluence of factors in selecting and assigning members. Training and leadership shape the conglomeration of individuals with appropriate characteristics into an effective and cohesive force.¹²³

The Department of Defense and, in particular, the military departments are the most capable to assess the effectiveness of their training, no matter what the format. Each Service has specific operational requirements to which it must train and perform. The measure of how well the operating forces, as units and individual servicemembers, perform is found in mission accomplishment. The Commission found no evidence of mission failures.

The commissioners with the most expertise in quantitative research reviewed some of the studies that have been conducted by the Department of Defense and the Services to assess the relative effectiveness of gender-integrated basic training. It was their judgment that these studies were generally carefully designed and executed evaluations. These commissioners found no evidence of lack of objectivity in the design of these studies.

“(K) Compare the pattern of attrition in gender-integrated basic training units with the pattern of attrition in gender-segregated basic training units and assess the relevancy of the findings of such comparison.”

The effects of gender-segregated or gender-integrated training on attrition during initial entry training are not formally monitored by the Services. Using the best available data,

¹²³ Laurence, J. (in press). “Performance of the All-Volunteer Force.” In M.J. Eitelberg & J.H. Laurence, *America’s All-Volunteer Force*. New York: Greenwood.

the Commission found that there are no significant differences in attrition based on training format. Although attrition rates over the course of the first term of enlistment are higher for women than for men, rates did not rise for either gender coincident with gender-integrated training. A common malady of basic training is stress fractures, which are notably higher for female recruits. However, this is unrelated to gender segregation and gender integration. Medical disqualifications overall are not consistently higher for women. Rather, male and female rates are comparable over first term enlistments.

“(L) Compare the level of readiness and the morale of gender-integrated basic training units with the level of readiness and the morale of gender-segregated units, and assess the relevancy of the findings of such comparison and the implications, for readiness, of any differences found.”

The Commission found little if any differences in the morale, enthusiasm, cohesion, and motivation of recruits in basic training, regardless of format. Commission research designed to measure desired attitudes of graduating recruits found no significant differences due to gender format.¹²⁴ Generally, the format used to train was essentially the format that was desired by the majority of recruits, recruit trainers, and leaders associated with the recruit training. Open-ended responses from military leaders to the Commission’s survey¹²⁵ regarding recruit quality suggest that some senior enlisted advisors and commanding officers find today’s recruits “smart” but noticed that they tended to question authority – wanting to know “why.” Leaders with these views address the role of leadership in shaping the behavior of recruits and express disappointment in leaders’ instruction, guidance, direction, and accountability but not in the recruits themselves. Negative comments about basic training tended to convey frustration with the pace of operations and being “pressed to the limit.” Only a very few of these senior enlisted advisors and commanders mentioned gender-integrated training and most of these comments were positive in nature.¹²⁶

The Commission found trainers who are dissatisfied with their training environment. In a few cases, the dissatisfaction was attributed directly to gender-integrated training. In many cases, the dissatisfaction was a result of “changes” that occurred during the tenure of a particular trainer. The majority of data collected on trainer dissatisfaction indicates that the major dissatisfaction is a result of the hours, rigors, and constant changes in the recruit training environment. There are challenges to gender-integrated training. But there are special procedures, rules, and responsibilities associated with this format. The Commission found that the attitudes and actions of leaders at all levels made the difference in the training

¹²⁴ Johnson (1999), Volume III “Research” page 132.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, Appendix C, page 181.

¹²⁶ Analysis of open-ended comments for leaders other than recruit trainers were not conducted as part of the original analyses (see Johnson, 1999). However, the commissioners did content code the comments of commanders who were among the almost 1,600 late respondents. Of these, 415 respondents were senior enlisted advisors or commanders, of which 221 had comments and represent 11 percent of all such leaders queried. The codes used were those developed for the analysis of the “on-time” recruit trainers, however, the controls used on the original analyses were not in place.

environment. In short, the command climate determined unit effectiveness. Readiness and morale are leadership responsibilities and have little to do with the training format.

Further, the results of the Commission's research on servicemembers with one to eight years of service shows that most soldiers, sailors, and airmen say that gender-integrated training makes it easier to adapt to a gender-integrated unit. Data analysis on actual outcomes confirms this. For example, those who worked with the other gender more frequently during basic training reported being better prepared by basic for advanced training and their first assignment and better prepared for service in a gender-integrated unit.¹²⁷

“(M) Compare the experiences, policies, and practices of the armed forces of other industrialized nations regarding gender-integrated training with those of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.”

Scholarly research shows that the participation of women in the military of a nation is affected by aspects of the military of that nation, as well as by social and cultural factors.¹²⁸ The U.S. military is unique. So, too are its international strategic purpose and vision. No other military is comparable in size and deployment. These facts have direct effects on the role and mission of its military Services. Further, the U.S. military is studied more comprehensively than any other military (either internally within the military itself or by the civilian academe). As such, it is also unique in the integration of women as well as the training of its personnel. Certainly the gender-integration experiences of other militaries can inform the United States, but such information may be limited because of historical and cultural differences. Nevertheless, to comply with the statute, the Commission gathered data on the integration of women into militaries cross-nationally. Specifically, it brought individuals knowledgeable about the Israeli and Dutch cases to testify. Other cases are included to show various levels of gender integration. Other nations' experiences with gender-integrated training can be informative if their culture is similar to ours in relevant ways and if they are in a similar stage in gender integration in their military Services. Of all the other countries examined, Canada is the most similar to ours in these dimensions (see Appendix F).

“(N) Review, and take into consideration, the current practices, relevant studies, and private-sector training concepts pertaining to gender-integrated training.”

The Commission was tasked by Congress to examine nonmilitary experiences in integrating women into occupations. Women have recently become better represented in the

¹²⁷ Ramsberger, et al (1999), Volume IV “Research” page 466; Laurence, et al. (1999), Volume IV “Research” pages 286, 301-302, 308.

¹²⁸ Segal, M. “Women’s military roles cross-nationally: Past, present, and future,” *Gender & Society*, Vol. 9, No. 6 (December 1995), pages 757-775.

Coast Guard, fire fighting, and local and federal law enforcement. An analysis of women's integration into these sectors provides information relevant to the integration of women in the U.S. Armed Forces. Although the experiences in these sectors are informative, they are somewhat limited in their relevance to the basic training and gender integration of women in the military because of the unique mission of the U.S. military (see Appendix G).

Several facts emerge from our examination of these occupations. First and foremost, the use of gender-integrated training is widespread in all of these settings. Second, any physical fitness tests used are gender normed, similar to the practice in the military Services. Third, tests of job-specific skills (including physical performances) are gender-neutral and must be carefully and scientifically validated to job performance in order to meet strict legal requirements of nondiscrimination (*i.e.*, on the basis of gender, ethnicity, *etc.*). That is, training is the same for men and women, but selection tests and tests for graduation have to be demonstrably predictive of performance on the job.

“(O) Assess the feasibility and implications of conducting basic training (or equivalent training) at the company level and below in separate units for male and female recruits, including the costs and other resource commitments required to implement and conduct basic training in such a manner and the implications for readiness and unit cohesion.”

In the three Services that practice gender-integrated training wholly or in part, the Commission found no appreciable difference between gender-integrated and gender-segregated platoons, divisions, and flights. The training format did not affect the morale, unit cohesion, or readiness of recruits to advance to the next phase of training.

In conducting the assessment required under this subsection, the Commission found that a directive to organize training units as suggested is feasible but is not advisable. The requirement implies that readiness and unit cohesion would be enhanced if the genders were separated rather than integrated at the lowest level (platoon, division, and flight). However, this is not what the evidence shows. Commission research on first-term soldiers, sailors and airmen shows that those who worked with the other gender more frequently during basic training reported being better prepared by basic for advanced training and their first assignments and better prepared for service in a gender-integrated unit.¹²⁹

The Commission could find no compelling evidence that there would be any positive effect from such a change and there could be negative effects. As noted throughout this report, the current formats, which are the result of substantial improvements over the last 24 months, are delivering well-trained soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines to the operational forces. Selection of training cadre, adjustments to curricula, security enhancements, and leadership emphasis all have contributed to a positive, safe, and secure training environment. The result of such a change suggested in this subsection of the statute could disrupt and

¹²⁹ Ramsberger, et al (1999), page 46; Laurence, et al. (1999), Volume IV “Research” pages 301-302, 308.

undermine the objectives and readiness levels the Services are on course toward achieving. A common complaint the Commission heard from trainers across the board centered on the number of arbitrary changes imposed on them. Such changes were disruptive and created unnecessary turbulence in the training regime. For more detail see the Service-specific portion in Section E of this chapter and Service Secretaries' responses in Appendix H.

“(P) Assess the feasibility and implications of requiring drill instructors for basic training units to be of the same sex as the recruits in those units if the basic training were to be conducted as described in subparagraph (O).”

The Commission does not support the basic training format suggested in subparagraph (O) for all Services. The Services are best able to determine who their trainers should be and how to conduct training along their initial entry training continuums. Requiring drill instructors to be of the same sex as the recruits implies a lack of trust in the corps of professional and dedicated noncommissioned officers who are carefully screened and selected to train recruits. It also distorts the reality of leadership throughout the continuum and creates an assignment dilemma for three of the Services because it imposes a disproportionate burden on the female noncommissioned officers. For more detail see the Service-specific portion in Section E of this chapter and Service Secretaries' responses in Appendix H.

E. Detailed Analyses of the Statute by Service

All of the preceding recommendations and findings are based on the research and observations of this Commission and reflect the many improvements and enhancements that each Service has incorporated over the past 18 to 24 months. The Commission finds that the Services' current formats are successful and are not in need of major restructuring. The nation is getting well-trained soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines.

The following presents information about each Services' approach to gender-integrated training and includes the Commission's findings and assessments. The preponderance of the content is the Service-provided responses to the statute.

1. Army

a. Structure and Policies

Defining Gender Integration

In the Army, *gender integration* denotes the practice of combining male and female personnel at the platoon level (or lower) *for training purposes only*. Billeting remains segregated by floor, wing, or bay, depending on building structure. Gender-integrated training employs the same drill sergeants, committee instructors, training areas/equipment, and so forth to train men and women at the same time on the same tasks. Approximately 60 percent of recruits are trained in a gender-integrated environment, whereas 40 percent of recruits enter into male only military occupational specialties (MOS) and are trained separately. For the

Army, basic combat training (BCT) is primarily gender-integrated, while one station unit training (OSUT) is predominantly male only. OSUT training for Career Management Fields (CMF) 11- Infantry and 19 - Armor, as well as for Field Artillery MOS 13B and Combat Engineer MOS 12B, is not open to women. OSUT for CMF 95 – Military Police and 54 – Chemical, as well as Bridge Crewmember MOS 12C, however, is fully integrated.

Standards for Men and Women

The Commission found that except for gender and age norming for physical fitness testing, standards for BCT tasks do not differ for the genders. Specific minimum standards have been established, and each recruit is required to meet or exceed these standards before graduation. The Commission observed numerous training events, including obstacle and confidence courses, live-fire ranges, bayonet and hand-to-hand training, and physical fitness training. These events were physically and mentally challenging. The Commission concluded that these training events are in no way adversely affected by gender-integrated training. The Commission talked to recruits and trainers, and the common theme heard was that the training curriculum is challenging to all and has not been diluted to accommodate gender-integrated training. In physical fitness, the Army assigns individuals to “ability groups” based on initial diagnostic Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) results, thus allowing each individual to perform to his/her best. Ability grouping has been successful in the Army in reducing stress fractures and increasing individual scores

The point scale on the APFT varies according to the soldier’s age and gender. In the early 1980s, push-ups, sit-ups, and the two-mile run were selected to measure upper body and mid-body muscular strength, endurance, and aerobic capacity and to meet the directive for testing worldwide without any equipment. It was not intended to be a combat-readiness test that directly assessed the skills essential for mission accomplishments, *e.g.*, Rangers, Special Forces. The Army age- and gender- norms the APFT because of physiological differences among age groups and between men and women. Specifically, there is variation in upper-body muscular strength endurance (*e.g.*, 50 to 55 percent difference between men and women). The minimum required is 60 points in each event. Experts indicated that the level of fitness among both male and female soldiers has increased dramatically since the early 1980s.¹³⁰

Soldiers, particularly women, have improved their performance since the APFT standards were last established in 1984, and the physical performance gap between the genders is closing. As of February 1999, all soldiers, male and female, of the same age are required to do the same number of sit-ups. The number of push-ups and the time required for the two-mile run continues to vary on according to age and gender.

At the end of BCT or OSUT Phase III, a soldier must pass the APFT with a minimum of 50 points in each event, 150 points total. At the end of advanced individual training (AIT)

¹³⁰ Cellucci, COL Steve, USA, Commandant, US Army Physical Fitness School, Volume II, “Transcripts” page 42 (10Nov98, pp. 167-169).

or OSUT Phase V, a soldier must pass the APFT with a minimum of 60 points in each event, 180 points total.

Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT)

Male					Female				
Push-ups					Push-ups				
AGE	17-21	22-26	27-31	32-36	AGE	17-21	22-26	27-31	32-36
60 pts	42	40	39	36	60 pts	19	17	17	15
50 pts	35	31	30	26	50 pts	13	11	10	9
Sit-ups					Sit-ups				
60 pts	53	50	45	42	60 pts	53	50	45	42
50 pts	47	43	36	34	50 pts	47	43	36	34
2-mile run					2-mile run				
60 pts	15:54	16:36	17:00	17:42	60 pts	18:54	19:36	20:30	21:42
50 pts	16:36	17:30	17:54	18:48	50 pts	19:42	20:36	21:42	23:06

Source: APFT Update Study Briefing Nov 98. Ages 17 – 36 correspond with minimum/maximum age allowed for initial enlistment.

Male and female soldiers negotiate the same obstacle and confidence courses to the same standards and must meet the same requirements to successfully meet IET graduation requirements (see chapter 3). Basic Rifle Marksmanship and the Hand Grenade Qualification Course do not make allowances for gender. The following chart identifies the requirements for specific awards:

Basic Rifle Marksmanship		Hand Grenade Qualification	
EXPERT	36-40 target hits	EXPERT	pass 7 of 7 stations
SHARPSHOOTER	30-35 target hits	FIRST CLASS	pass 6 of 7 stations
MARKSMAN	23-29 target hits	SECOND CLASS	pass 5 of 7 stations
UNQUALIFIED	less than 23 target hits	UNQUALIFIED	pass less than 5 stations

Female Drill Instructors

Drill sergeants are assigned according to the type of training being conducted. BCT and OSUT companies each are authorized 12 drill sergeants. Each company conducting gender-integrated BCT is authorized a minimum of two female drill sergeants. Each AIT company training a gender-integrated MOS is assigned a minimum of one female drill sergeant.

In BCT, 33 percent of drill sergeant authorizations come from Career Management Field (CMF) 11 Infantry, 17 percent come from other Combat Arms MOSs, 25 percent come from Combat Support MOSs, and 25 percent come from Combat Service Support MOSs. In OSUT and AIT, drill sergeants are drawn from the MOS they are training.

Additional Commission Observations

Survey responses showed that many male recruits think basic training is less challenging than anticipated.¹³¹ However, qualitative evidence from discussion groups conducted during Commission site visits and from research focus groups¹³² reveals that this is not a result of gender-integrated training, but rather a result of misperception. The most common response received when asking the question, “What did you think BT would be like?” was “I thought it would be like *Full Metal Jacket*.”¹³³

The Commission found that waivers were granted on rare occasions to individuals who failed to complete a mandatory training event. The waivers are controlled and normally approved at senior leader level (O-6 or above) for unique situations. An example is the requirement to complete all foot marches. A recruit may have missed a shorter intermediate march but completed longer marches at a later date. In this case, because of time, a waiver may be granted for the shorter march.

The Commission heard from a number of recruits who stated adamantly that gender-integrated training enhanced the training experience. Common quotes that were recorded include: “Having the males training with us makes us try harder to prove that we are just as motivated as they are.” “When I’m running the two miles on the PT test, I push myself harder when I see a female going all out. I won’t let her beat me.” “The females try just as hard as we do, and many of them are even better than some of the guys.” When the Commission spoke with recruits about to graduate from AIT or OSUT, men and women commented “We are Green – we’re more than just brothers and sisters, we’re soldiers.” The Commission often heard from instructors and recruits that they had come to AIT or OSUT with perceptions about what they thought men or women could do. Working side by side, day after day and being exposed to men and women working together changed those perceptions. At one of the graduation ceremonies observed at Fort Jackson, each company had at least one woman recognized as being first in each of the award categories. Fort Jackson’s Fiscal Year 1998 data for these areas are shown in the following table:

Fort Jackson Fiscal Year 1998 Graduation Data

	Soldier of the Cycle	Soldier Leader of the Cycle	High BRM	High APFT	Total
MALE	81 (64%)	86 (68%)	142 (80%)	79 (60%)	388 (73%)
FEMALE	45 (36%)	41 (32%)	36 (20%)	54 (40%)	146 (27%)

¹³¹ Johnson (1999), Volume III “Research” pages 352-355.

¹³² This information comes from Commission discussion groups; see also Laurence, et al., 1999, Volume IV “Research” Appendix B, pages 307-318.

¹³³ *Full Metal Jacket* is the title of a movie about the Vietnam War.

b. Historical and Current Rationales

The Commission found that formal record keeping was lacking for gender-integrated training. Although there are those who believe that the Army's initial decision to move to a gender-integrated training format may have been a result of political pressure, General Gordon R. Sullivan, former Army Chief of Staff, emphatically stated that was not the reason for his decision.¹³⁴ The decision to conduct gender-integrated training beginning in 1994 was based on sound decision making. General Sullivan testified that based on the conclusions of the Presidential Commission on Women in the Armed Forces, his own observations of the performance of women in Operation Just Cause, in the Gulf War, and on the early phases of operations in Somalia, he believed it was time to revisit the integration of initial entry training. As a result, in the fall of 1993 he decided to integrate IET for the Combat Support and Combat Service Support MOSs that are gender-neutral.¹³⁵

Historical Overview of Gender Integration

In the immediate post-Vietnam War period, numerous changes took place in the Women's Army Corps (WAC) and in the demographic makeup of the Army. In 1972, only one-quarter of MOSs were open to women; by January 1976, 92 percent (403 of 438) of the MOSs were considered "gender interchangeable." However, approximately 70 percent of women in the Army were in traditional career fields, such as medical, administrative, communications, personnel, and supply. The numbers of women and the ratio of women to men also underwent substantial changes. Women increased from representing two percent of the Army's active component enlisted members in FY 1973 to around eight percent by FY 1978. They reached 10 percent by FY 1984 and today account for 15 percent of active duty soldiers. Among accessions, female representation levels are higher.

The Army formally implemented gender-integrated basic training in the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, over the years, the Army has experimented with varying levels of integration. The history of gender-integrated training, before this period, is not well documented. There is evidence that skill training in the Adjutant General School was integrated in 1952. Similarly, the U.S. Army Medical Training Center implemented various gender-integrated skill courses during the 1960s. In 1973, the Army began integrating women into all AITs. In the absence of the draft, the Army looked to expand its potential manpower pool. Against that background, in June 1975 the Secretary of the Army told Congress that the WAC was no longer needed as a separate corps, and legislation to that effect passed in June 1976. The Corps was to be gradually phased out, and final elimination was scheduled for October 1978. At that time, decisions were made on the premise that the "new Army" would be totally gender-integrated, including training.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Sullivan, GEN Gordon R., USA (Ret), Volume II "Transcripts" page 5 (2Dec98, pp.17-20).

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, page 2, (pp. 4-6).

¹³⁶ See Handy, K. & Saunders, P., (1999) Appendix J "Executive, Legislative, and Policy Chronology Regarding Women in the Military".

After standardizing basic combat training for male and female soldiers in 1974 and the successful testing of a common program of instruction for men and women in a single gender environment in 1976, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) approved common basic training on February 7, 1977. The integration of BCT had its formal start in FY 1978. Beginning in July 1977, OSUT was integrated with Military Police, followed closely by Signal in October of the same year. Studies of the effects on mission performance under field conditions of various percentages of women assigned to combat support and combat service support units conducted in 1976 and 1977 showed no statistically significant differences. Increasing percentages of women did not impair unit performance, and male soldiers' resistance to female soldiers abated with experience in an integrated environment.¹³⁷ Further, complementary analyses of war game exercises in Germany indicated that the presence of female soldiers did not impair the performance of combat support or combat service support units. There were no differences in group performance ratings between all-male and mixed groups.¹³⁸

From 1978 to 1982, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) conducted integrated BCT. This policy was suspended in 1982. The decision to resegregate men and women in basic training was coincided with the "pause" in expanding the numbers, percentages, and roles of Army women.¹³⁹ Changes in women's roles in the Army had occurred rapidly and had necessitated substantial organizational adaptation. Through the 1980s and 1990s, women's new roles in the Army became institutionalized. Women's presence in many previously all-male units became more routine and accepted, and their successful performance in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm contributed to positive views of military women. Combined with larger percentages of women among new recruits, this gave further impetus to considering gender-integrated training at an earlier stage.

Former Chief of Staff of the Army (1979 to 1983), General Edward C. Meyer, USA, (Retired) gave the Commission written testimony on his reason for the 1982 change away from gender-integrated basic training and why there are no studies, reports, or other documentation that substantiate his decision. General Meyer stated that he had received many calls and letters in reference to integrated training along with a letter and call from General Ulmer, Commanding General of Division in Europe, about the poor quality of male soldiers arriving in the division. General Meyer asked retired General Ace Collins to do a private survey of training focusing on integrated and female training. The details of this

¹³⁷ Army Research Institute, (1977). *Women Content In Units Force Deployment Test (MAX WAC)*. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

¹³⁸ Johnson, C., Cory, B., Day, R., & Oliver, L., (1978). *Women Content in the Army – REFORGER 77 (REF WAC 77)*. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

¹³⁹ Holm, J. (1992). *Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.

research are sketchy, at best. General Meyer's written testimony stated that the report¹⁴⁰ indicated standards had been lowered at training centers and that no women ever made "best" of platoon, squad, or company. In January 1981, in time for the new presidential administration, General Meyer reinstated separate general basic training for enlistees at all Army basic training camps. Women remained integrated within advanced individual training. General Meyer wrote that his prime reason for the change was that women in general were not able to excel in BCT, which was primarily physical, and that men were held back by procedures. He also began a review of unit assignment policies and promotion opportunities for women within the non-commissioned officer (NCO) and officer ranks. Along with General Maxwell Thurman, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, General Meyer focused on this and other related matters for three years.

It is important to note that at this time (from 1976 to 1980) that there was an error in norms for the enlistment screening test—the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)—resulting in an influx of large numbers of low-aptitude personnel. This error affected the Army to a greater extent than the other Services, and the overwhelming majority of the low-aptitude soldiers were men. For example, in 1980, the Army reported that 10 percent of its accessions were in AFQT Category IV, the lowest eligible score range. The truth was that on the basis of correct test norms, 52 percent were in this low-aptitude range. Although the problem was not formally noted and corrected until November 1979, field reaction to recruit quality included adjustments to AIT entry requirements because of high failure rates.¹⁴¹

Major General Richard (Steve) Siegfried testified that he had commanded Fort Jackson where BCT and AIT were conducted. "AIT, for more than two and a half decades, has been gender-integrated, you know, right down to squad level, from day one of AIT. So our initial entry training has been gender-integrated, you know, for more than four decades. So it's not a social experiment. It is something that we had been doing for some time." Major General Siegfried also stated that in early January 1992, he received a call from General Franks, TRADOC commander, asking why the Army did not conduct gender-integrated training. After an initial answer, Major General Siegfried asked for permission to look into it more fully to give General Franks a more complete answer. Major General Siegfried testified,

"...the first thing I did when the boss said 'go do this' is I went back and tried to determine and see what the heck happened here. I couldn't find out. The only answer I got was from a fellow who knows. He

¹⁴⁰ Testimony by officers who were involved with gender-integrated training during this time provided a different opinion. Williamson, BG Myrna H., USA, (Ret), Former Commander, 1st Battalion, Training Brigade, U.S. Army Military Police School/Training Center, Ft. McClellan, AL, stated on 21 December 1999, "... (I was) in the Pentagon in 1982. To me, gender-integration was a success. No major problems of any kind. ... someone pointed out to me ... they were stopping gender-integration training and I said, 'What?' ... I couldn't believe it... I said, 'Can you tell me who did this? Why and who? Why is it stopping?' I never did get an [appropriate] answer, except for one that was a stretch, I do believe." Volume II "Transcripts" pages 297-98 (21Dec98, pp. 265-66). Foote, BG Evelyn P., USA (Ret), Vice Chairman, Sexual Harassment Senior Review Panel; Former 1st Commander, Second Basic Training Battalion, U.S. Army Military Police School, Ft. McClellan, AL, testified on 22 December 1999, "... There is no audit trail of empirical data to be found which supports that decision. There is apparently no 'paper trail' which documents the thought process out of which such a decision grew, and any assertion that integrated training was a failed experiment reflects someone's personal bias and does [not] reflect a rigorous, scientifically-based and rational assessment of the process." Volume II, "Transcripts" page 336 (22Dec98, p. 163).

¹⁴¹ Laurence, J. & Ramsberger, P. (1991), *Low Aptitude Men in the Military: Who Profits, Who Pays?* New York: Praeger.

said, ‘Well, the chief made up his mind and, with a stroke of the pen, stopped it.’ I didn’t find any empirical data or any institutional memory about what had gone on and why it had gone on.”¹⁴²

After spending a year working on the issue, Major General Siegfried informed General Franks that he needed some help from social scientists and from the Army Research Institute (ARI).¹⁴³ In June 1993, TRADOC tasked ARI to study the attitudes and opinions of soldiers and drill sergeants toward gender-integrated training. A study of gender-integration was conducted among ten companies (four segregated and six integrated, down to the squad level) at Fort Jackson. No differences were found between men and women trained in single-gender and gender-integrated companies. These results replicated an earlier (September 1, 1991 – August 1992) pilot study of gender-integration at Fort McClellan. Furthermore, the Army had conducted a series of experiments regarding the effects of gender mix on unit performance in the late 1970’s. The presence of women in units was not associated with lower unit performance.¹⁴⁴ Major General Siegfried testified that the results of the study were positive for integrating BCT rather than AIT.

“I have told folks over and over again; all I did was move the start date, didn’t create anything new. It wasn’t a social experiment. ...you need to start them out together from day one. The study told us that. But what was foremost in my mind was, hey, you’re talking about soldiers who have elected to go into an MOS where they’re going to be working together with other soldiers, and you’d better make sure, starting from day one, whether or not they can do what they have said they want to do. ...But , still, when I got to Jackson, I had no earthly idea that I was going to be the infantryman that would recommend to the United States Army that they gender-integrate basic combat training. I had no earthly idea. But I’m the guy that’s guilty of doing that. And I’m very proud of it, by the way.”¹⁴⁵

Although gender-integrated basic training was approved following the results of the 1993 study, the CSA directed that ARI continue to document this approach and extended the study for an additional two years. The 1994 study was conducted at Fort Leonard Wood with 4 companies showing mixes ranging between 25 percent female and 75 percent male. The 1995 study was conducted at Fort Jackson and Fort Leonard Wood with seven gender-integrated companies that varied from 23 percent female to 48 percent female. These ARI studies¹⁴⁶ provided the empirical data on performance, soldierization (as defined by ARI in

¹⁴² Siegfried, MG Richard (Steve), USA (Ret), Chairman, Sexual Harassment Senior Review Panel (1996-97); former Commander, Ft. Jackson, SC (1991-94), Volume II “Transcripts” page 56 (21Dec98, p. 221).

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ Army Research Institute (1977); Johnson, et al. (1978).

¹⁴⁵ Siegfried, MG, Volume II “Transcripts” page 285 (21Dec98, pp. 189-193).

¹⁴⁶ Mottern, J., Foster, D., Brady, E., & Marshall-Mies, J. (1997). *The 1995 Gender Integration Basic Combat Training Study* (Study Report 97-01). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

third bullet below) and drill sergeant preparation that strongly supported gender-integrated basic training. Findings from these studies include the following:

- The physical condition of recruits, especially female, entering BCT was poor.
- Gender-integrated training improved physical fitness performance for male and female soldiers; no differences in marksmanship or individual proficiency tests.
- Gender-integrated training was associated with higher levels of soldierization (*i.e.*, self-reported levels of identification with the Army, commitment, performance improvement, individual and unit morale, teamwork, and cohesion) for female soldiers; over time, attitudes of male soldiers improved.
- Attitudes of drill sergeants toward gender-integrated training affected soldierization
- There was no relationship between gender-integrated training and BCT attrition.

In addition to findings from empirical studies of gender-integrated training, Department of Defense guidance influenced the Army's policy. On January 13, 1994, the Secretary of Defense rescinded the Risk Rule and provided a new direct ground combat definition. On October 1, 1994, the following Rule and Definition were adopted and remain in effect:

Rule. Servicemembers are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground, as defined below.

Definition. Direct ground combat is engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force's personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect.¹⁴⁷

These actions resulted in the opening of new positions to women. Each Service was tasked to develop its individual proposal on how they would implement the new policies. On July 28, 1994, the Secretary of Defense approved the Army's plan (along with the other Services').

Current Assessment

General Sullivan stated that "(y)oung men and women entering the Army from an environment where genders are mixed and operating in very close proximity to each other, in my view, didn't benefit from a brief period of artificial separation. In other words, what I had picked up since the seventies when I had started to deal with women soldiers in large numbers was that, first of all, they wanted to be treated as soldiers up front, soldiers with a capital 'S,'

¹⁴⁷ Secretary of Defense Memorandum. Subject: Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule. January 13, 1994.

and they didn't want to get into all of this other stuff, and I felt that mixing them in gender-integrated training made sense.”^{148, 149}

The Army's current rationale for conducting gender-integrated training is sound and is conducted only for recruits who will serve in gender-integrated MOSs. Elimination of conscription, establishment of an all-volunteer force, expansion of MOSs open to women resulting in a higher accession of the same - all created the catalyst to move to a gender-integrated training format. Senior Army leaders believe, as does the Commission, that gender-integrated training does not adversely affect readiness. Whether it improves the readiness or performance of the operational force is subjective. The data collected, both scientific and anecdotal, clearly indicate that gender-integrated training is not considered an issue that affects readiness.

Major General Siegfried testified, “(w)e're doing something good here. We are building a team of soldiers who have confidence in each other, that they can go off and perform their combat support and combat service support roles more efficiently. And we are also doing our job as trainers by addressing this problem before they get to the field. You see, when you really get into it and the guy gives you the mission, you say, 'Okay. Do we have to train them together?' Sure, we do.”¹⁵⁰

The Army chose to integrate BCT on the basis of sound training management principles supported by empirical research conducted by ARI and described above. These studies show that women perform better, and men perform equally well, in gender-integrated basic combat training. Gender integration produces well-trained soldiers.

The focal point of BCT is at the platoon, not the company-level. Separating trainees at platoon level and below (*e.g.*, squads) would virtually eliminate gender-integrated basic training.

Renewed emphasis on educating all soldiers in acceptable values and principled leadership is an effective means of promoting professional behavior among all soldiers in the gender-integrated environment of today's Army. Furthermore, the Army has taken additional steps to ensure that high quality officers and noncommissioned officers are in the training base, has increased the rigor of BCT, and has improved the living standards for men and women that provide for both safety and separation.

¹⁴⁸ Sullivan, GEN, Volume II “Transcripts” page 2 (2Dec98, pp. 3-13).

¹⁴⁹ Note also that Major General Julius W. Becton, Jr. U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Agency, recommended that “women should be accepted as soldiers and not as females. An immediate step forward in this issue would be the integration of Basic Combat Training so that all soldiers are similarly trained in entry level soldierly skills.” Army Research Institute (1977) MAX WAC Study, Section V, Operational Test and Evaluation Agency review and assessment.

¹⁵⁰ Siegfried, MG, Volume II “Transcripts” page 53 (21Dec98, page 210).

Train as You Fight

The definition of this training concept is useful background for understanding its application to basic training:

“The goal of combat-level training is to achieve combat-level standards. Every effort must be made to attain this difficult goal. Within the confines of safety and common sense, leaders must be willing to accept less than perfect results initially and demand realism in training. They must integrate such realistic conditions as smoke, noise, simulated NBC [nuclear, biological, chemical], battlefield debris, loss of key leaders, and cold weather. They must seize every opportunity to move soldiers out of the classroom into the field, fire weapons, maneuver as a combined arms team, incorporate protective measures against enemy actions, and include joint and combined operations.”¹⁵¹

This concept, “Train as you fight,” originated in the 1980s and over the years has evolved into a slogan. “Train as you fight” is not, nor should it be, the sole justification for training. Because IET is the tough, comprehensive process that transforms civilians into soldiers – a process called soldierization – “Train as you fight” may not be the best slogan. However, the Commission found that many of the tasks trained and tested to standard in IET are individual soldier’s tasks that are standardized throughout the Army continuum. “Train to standard” would more aptly describe the training environment regardless of the format used.

During the Commission’s visit to Fort McClellan, the Commission heard from a group of drill sergeants who train military police in a gender-integrated OSUT format. A drill sergeant commented, “This is not unusual to us. We have been doing this so long that we can’t imagine doing it any other way. When these MPs get to the field, they will work and patrol together in two- and three-person teams. They need to develop as MPs from day one in order to have the amount of confidence necessary to work in this job.”

At a visit with instructors at the Drill Sergeant School at Fort Jackson, a group of instructors said that integrated training is the only way to train those MOS; that would be working together. Their experience also is that perceptions change by exposing men and women recruits to each other as early as possible. Many said they came to the schools with certain biases about what women could and could not do. Those biases lessened the more they worked with male and female recruits.

Evaluation of Gender Integration

Part of the Army’s rationale for reintroducing and maintaining gender-integrated training lies in the results of empirical evaluations conducted from 1993 through 1995. Outcomes considered included performance, soldierization, and drill sergeant preparation. The results of these assessments support gender-integrated basic training. In particular, in

¹⁵¹ Army Field Manual 25-100, November 15, 1988, *Training the Force*, Chapter 1, pages 1-3.

terms of objective performance measures, there were either improvements associated with gender integration or similar performance levels regardless of gender mix.

In physical fitness, women improved in gender-integrated conditions in all cases. Compared with separate gender training, men improved in two of three physical fitness events when trained in an integrated situation. Gender format showed no relationship to marksmanship or end-of-course individual proficiency test outcomes. In subjective indices of attitudes, mixed training was enhancing for women but not as positive for men. Data from 1993 assessments showed somewhat lower levels of cohesion, satisfaction, and morale for men in mixed-gender settings. This may be at least partly due to different leadership quality: they rated their drill sergeants lower. However, in the 1994 and 1995 studies, male soldiers from gender-integrated companies reported the same or higher levels of cohesion, satisfaction, and morale as their counterparts in the 1993 all-male companies. Also, it is noteworthy that male soldiers' ratings of drill sergeant support were higher in gender-segregated than in gender-integrated companies, but here too, ratings rose over time. Thus, gender integration did not have a deleterious effect on actual performance for men, and it had an enhancing effect for women. Initial resistance, as gleaned from attitudes, was lessened by time and experience with gender integration.

Aside from the ARI research (both sets from the 1970s and 1990s) on gender-integrated field exercises and basic training, other studies are also pertinent. Data gathered on more than 800 Army trainees in 1979 from official training records and questionnaires also showed that integrated training was associated with better physical performance for women and less discrepancy between the genders with regard to satisfaction. Here, too, attitude change, or favorable attitudes among men, lagged performance outcomes.¹⁵² A recent study by RAND researchers¹⁵³ of the integration of women into newly opened MOSs and its effects on readiness and morale showed modest effects. This study sampled among non-deployed units, conducting surveys, focus groups, and interviews with five Army units, seven Navy units, and two Marine Corps units. In addition, command personnel from additional units were included. Commanders and personnel in the units studied indicated that gender integration had not had a major effect on the units' readiness. Any divisions caused by gender were minimal or invisible in units with high cohesion. Gender appeared to be an issue only among conflicting groups, and even in these cases, gender took a back seat to divisions along work groups and on grade lines. This finding was supported by the Commission's Focus Groups. In both studies, there were reports that gender had a positive effect on cohesion and raised the level of professional standards within the unit. Gender was almost never mentioned as affecting morale; rather, leadership was regarded as having the most important influence on morale. Again, both the RAND study and the Commission's own research show that under gender integration conditions in units, men feel that they are more able to discuss frustrations and other personal issues with female colleagues and that such opportunities reduce reliance on destructive outlets, such as excessive drinking or fighting. RAND's survey results showed

¹⁵² Greene, B. & Wilson, K. (1981), "Women Warriors: Exploring the New Integration of Women in the Military." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 9:241-254.

¹⁵³ Harrell, M. & Miller, L. (1999), *New Opportunities for Military Women*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

that a majority of both sexes preferred gender-integrated basic training: about three-quarters of the women and just over half of the men preferred gender integration.

In the Army's active personnel research program, female representation, cohesion, and readiness are among the topics of study. Among recent findings are that cohesion and readiness are associated with the acceptance of women.¹⁵⁴ Further, independent assessment of previous ARI research corroborates findings that led to the initial introduction and the reintroduction of gender integration.¹⁵⁵ In field exercises and performance, gender integration has no detrimental effects on men and facilitates women's performance. Attitudes lag performance, but they are improving.

General Sullivan testified, "My job as the Chief of Staff of the Army was to give the Army and the combatant commanders competent soldiers who could in fact produce results - desired results at day one, and that was what I was trying to do. And I felt then, when I made the decision, that it was the right one to make, and I feel that way now."¹⁵⁶

c. Readiness Implications

Service-Specific Requirements

The goal of initial entry training is to produce motivated, disciplined, team-oriented soldiers who are inculcated with and understand Army values and who are technically, physically, and mentally prepared to meet the challenges of the Army. Male soldiers who are in male-only specialties train in male-only units in IET. Upon graduation, they will join operational units that are staffed the same way. Specialties that are integrated train male and female soldiers together. The ability of men and women to work together in units is a soldierization issue that begins on the first day they enter the Army in mixed-gender specialties. This process starts in the training environment that provides the most supervisory control, basic combat training, with one drill sergeant for every 17-20 soldiers. The skills of being a team member and rapidly developing into a cohesive unit carry forward when soldiers complete IET and go to their operational units. Once soldiers graduate from one station unit training or advanced individual training (OSUT or AIT), they have demonstrated the technical and tactical skills, physical conditioning, and degree of military socialization necessary to join the ranks in the field.

Readiness Goals

The Army measures readiness by matching the mission to trained personnel and units, operational equipment, and unit leadership. BCT does not fully prepare an individual to go to war, but clearly a BCT event is mandatory for follow-on training and assignments that develop soldiers technically and tactically and prepare them for military operations. Readiness

¹⁵⁴ Rosen, et al. (1996), "Cohatio." *Armed Forces and Society*, 22: 537-553.

¹⁵⁵ Schrieber, E. & Woelfel, J. (1979). "Effects of Women on Group Performance in a Traditionally Male Occupation: The Case of the U.S. Army." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 7: 121-134.

¹⁵⁶ Sullivan, GEN, Volume II "Transcripts" page 211 (2Dec98, p. 8).

is affected by the kinds of people who are recruited by each Service, how they are trained, and what their skills are when they are delivered to the operational forces. The standardization of individual and collective tasks throughout the Army was completed in the late 1970's and early 1980's to enhance readiness. For example, the individual task to "engage a target with a M16 rifle" is completed by all soldiers to the same standard regardless of unit or job specialty. In that regard, the performance standards for standardized individual tasks trained in BCT are based on readiness. It is important in this phase for soldiers to learn how to work as a team with the kinds of soldiers who will be part of their operational units. Thus soldiers who will enter gender-integrated MOS's train with both genders as much as feasible.

The format of IET supports unit operational combat effectiveness by taking soldiers (regardless of gender) through phase training in which soldiers are taught basic and critical skills needed to perform their jobs in operational combat units. For instance, in Phase I, soldiers are taught Army values, traditions, and ethics and basic soldiering skills. Soldiers become familiar with the conduct and actions required in their units. In Phase II, soldiers develop basic combat skills, with special emphasis on weapon proficiency. This phase enables soldiers to contribute very quickly to the readiness of their units. Phase III teaches more tactical proficiency and develops and fosters an understanding of the importance of the teamwork that is critical to all units.

Performance Standards

A soldier in IET learns the same tasks and is trained to the same standard that he or she will perform in Army units. Objectives listed for IET are some of the same objectives used in judging the combat readiness of units. For instance, a soldier who graduates from IET must be physically fit and technically and tactically function as a member of a team. Each of these tasks is taken into account in judging the combat effectiveness of a unit. Soldiers who can accomplish these critical tasks can, and do, very quickly make significant contributions to the readiness of their assigned units.

As described above, gender-integrated training has no deleterious effects on performance. Because the presence of women in the Army is not in dispute, the neutral to positive findings regarding gender integration and performance and cohesion for men and women support maintaining the Army's training formats.

Attrition

Army statistics on attrition in terms of the percent of attrition from initial entry training are as follows:¹⁵⁷

Initial Entry Training (IET) Attrition

*FY COHORT	Gender	BCT	OSUT	AIT
1996	Male	3.9%	4.5%	2.9%
	Female	11.5%	2.0%	4.9%
1997	Male	4.1%	3.8%	3.7%
	Female	12.7%	1.5%	6.4%
1998**	Male	5.7%	5.0%	2.1%
	Female	17.3%	1.4%	2.9%
NOTES: *FYCOHORT consists of all soldiers who report to a Reception Station during the Fiscal Year. **FY 1998 AIT incomplete.				

The effect of gender format on training cannot be determined from these figures because of the simultaneous influences of a multitude of other factors, including gender composition, location, drill sergeant characteristics, and so forth. These factors have been shown to affect training attrition.¹⁵⁸


As part of the Commission’s research program, analyses of first-term attrition among enlisted personnel from FY 1991 through FY 1996 accession cohorts were conducted.¹⁵⁹ Such analyses revealed that attrition rates at the 36-month point for Army personnel were

¹⁵⁷ Source: ATRRS, DAPE-MPT, 28 April 1999.

¹⁵⁸ Department of the Army. (1984, December). *A review and analysis of the Army’s Trainee Discharge Program*. Fort Monroe, VA: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command.

¹⁵⁹ Sipes, D. & Laurence, J. (1999), *Performance Data Modeling: An Examination of First-Term Enlisted Attrition in Relation to Gender and Training Format*, Volume IV “Research” pages 577-662.

quite consistent for cohort years 1991 through 1996. The following figure summarizes the rates separately for men and women.



Three facts are worth noting here. First, attrition rates for Army women were consistently 10 to 15 percentage points higher than the rates for the Army men in the same cohort.

Second, the apparent drop in attrition in 1996 is an artifact of the timing of the data captured for this analysis. Thirty-six months had not passed since some of the 1996 cohort entered Service; therefore, the 36-month attrition rates are underestimated.


Third, note that the attrition rates for the 1995 cohort are comparable to, and indeed, slightly lower than, the attrition rates for previous years. This cohort was the first to undergo fully implemented gender-integrated basic training. Although comparisons between cohort years must be made with some caution,¹⁶⁰ there is evidence, nonetheless, that gender-integrated training did not adversely affect retention rates for either men or women.

The patterns of reasons for discharge also were consistent across years. The next three figures depict the rates at which the three most common discharge reasons (within the entire cohort) were recorded separately for men and women.


The most commonly cited reason for discharge was *failure to meet minimum behavioral and performance criteria*. This accounted for 62 to 65 percent of all 36-month attrition for each cohort year. The first figure in the set indicates two notable facts. First, this reason was much more common for male attrition than for female attrition; there was a 20 to

¹⁶⁰ Comparisons between cohort years within a single Service (e.g., the Army) are valid. However, certain factors, such as policy changes and the state of the civilian economy, may affect various cohorts differently. Therefore, the reader should make such comparisons judiciously.

26 percentage point different between genders each year. Second, this reason accounted for a consistent proportion of overall attrition for each gender in each cohort year. The male rate for this discharge reason was extremely stable at about 70 percent. The female rate for this discharge reason was more variable, ranging from 42 percent to 49 percent. The introduction of gender-integrated training in the 1995 cohort year had no discernible effect on the rate of this discharge reason.




The second most common reason for attrition was medical disqualification, accounting for 25 to 28 percent of 36-month attrition for each cohort year. As the next figure shows, this reason was cited at similar rates for both men and women, with a slight increase over time.¹⁶¹



¹⁶¹ The increase in 1996 may be an artifact of data truncation and might disappear if a complete 36-month data set were available. However, the slightly increasing trend through 1995 may be of import.

The third most common reason for discharge was *other separations or discharge*. This accounted for 6 to 8 percent of all 36-month attrition. The final figure elucidates two facts. First, this reason accounted for a greater proportion of female attrition than male attrition; there was a 20 to 27 point difference each year. Second, the trends over time are interesting. Of the women who were classified as “*Other...*” 64 to 74 percent left service due to pregnancy and 23 to 34 percent were coded as leaving due to parenthood. Although the rates for men were very consistent, ranging from 1.5 to 3 percent per year, the rate for women declined each year, from a high of 30 percent in 1991 to 22 percent in 1995.¹⁶²



Gender Integration and Readiness and Morale

The Commission found little if any differences in the morale, enthusiasm, cohesion, or desire expressed by recruits in BCT, regardless of format.¹⁶³ The general finding was that the format used to train was essentially the format that was desired by the majority of recruits, recruit trainers, and leaders associated with recruit training.

The Commission did find trainers who were dissatisfied with their training environment. In a few cases, this dissatisfaction was attributed to gender-integrated training. In many cases, the dissatisfaction was a result of significant changes that occurred during the tenure of a particular trainer. Trainers who began their tenure after a significant change had been instituted at a training location were satisfied with those procedures since they had not experienced the disruption of a procedural change.

¹⁶² The lowest point is 21 percent in 1996. However, this will be ignored in this trend analysis because of the data truncation problem cited earlier.

¹⁶³ Johnson (1999), Volume III “Research” pages 109-115.

The format or gender composition of basic training has had no significant effect on the morale of soldiers in operating or training units. Data show no differences in self-reported morale for males and females in gender-integrated and gender-segregated training companies.¹⁶⁴ Results from the question “How would you rate your current level of morale?” for males and females in BCT reveal that although there are gender differences in reported morale (males are more positive than females), there are no differences between soldiers trained in gender-segregated companies and soldiers trained in gender-integrated companies.¹⁶⁵

The morale of soldiers in operational units is monitored through the Army’s Sample Survey of Military Personnel (SSMP), which is administered twice yearly. The SSMP is administered to a large random sample of soldiers of all ranks. When asked “How would you rate your current level of morale?” by rank, results showed a slight decreasing trend from the Spring 1992 survey to the Spring 1997 survey. This trend does not coincide with the advent of gender-integrated BCT but is attributed to downsizing and erosion of benefits.

Commission Research Findings

In addition to reviewing literature and culling from relevant Army studies, the Commission initiated a number of research projects to address the issues presented in its governing statute. Systematic focus groups were conducted with enlisted personnel throughout the continuum—basic training through operational unit participation. Among the 42 focus group sessions were 11 with soldiers at Forts Jackson, Benning, McClellan, and Hood.¹⁶⁶

To a greater extent than gender, teamwork, the quality of instructors, field exercises, and personnel shortages together with high OPTEMPO are perceived as key factors influencing individual and unit readiness. Effective teamwork builds cohesion and trust, and experience working as a team facilitates teamwork. A major barrier to performance are those few who loaf or otherwise do not contribute fully to the team effort. This is not to say that poorer performers were a hindrance. In fact, the team was often strengthened and overall unit performance improved when the recruits banded together to assist a poor performer who was motivated and was trying to be successful. In the Army, more experienced people mentor and instruct new soldiers, thus enhancing individual proficiency. Physical fitness is recognized as important, and injuries detract from performance. Many soldiers expressed in hindsight that they wish they were more prepared physically. But time and again, teamwork and leadership were key dimensions that increase morale and cohesion.

¹⁶⁴ Mottern, et al. (1997), page 28.


¹⁶⁵ Mottern, et al. (1997).

¹⁶⁶ Laurence et al. (1999), Volume IV “Research” page 274.

Over the course of the commissioners’ site visits, drill sergeants were heard to make similar remarks. That is, with experience and exposure to gender-integrated training, came endorsement.

In addition to these in-depth focus group discussions, structured surveys were conducted with enlisted members at different points in their careers. As the accompanying figure shows, male graduating soldiers from gender-integrated and male-only basic training units responded similarly to survey items designed to measure commitment, group identity, and respect for authority. The figure shows both “raw” and adjusted (“adj”) responses. Adjusted data reflect controls for age, educational level, and race/ethnicity. (Theoretical ranges for these scales were approximately 5 to 25 for commitment and group identity and 2 to 12 for respect for authority). In addition, only around one-third of Army leaders (ranging from 27 percent of commanders to 37 percent of O-3s) who responded to the survey (representing both integrated and male-only formats) said that gender-separate basic training, regardless of MOS, was best.¹⁶⁷

Army Graduating Recruit Survey (Males)



Leader opinions of what gender mix best facilitates the purpose of basic training varied by gender and location. The following table shows the percentage of drill sergeant respondents who endorsed gender-separate training in all cases. The remaining drill sergeant respondents, on the other hand, endorsed training men and women together or gender-separate training for all-male combat specialties only, or they indicated that it did not matter and had no

¹⁶⁷ Johnson (1999), Volume III “Research” page 121.

opinion either way. Of the three male-only training installations (Benning, Knox, and Sill), complete gender separation was the majority opinion only at Fort Benning.¹⁶⁸

Percentage of Drill Sergeant Respondents Who Endorsed Gender-Separate Basic Training

Location (type of training) (number of respondents)	Percentage Male DS Respondents	Percent- age Female DS Respon- dents
Fort Sill (male-only BCT/OSUT) (n = 132)	30	NA
Fort McClellan (GI OSUT) (males: n = 93; females: n = 21)	31	0
Fort Leonard Wood (GI BCT & OSUT; male-only OSUT) (males: n = 163; females: n = 38)	45	24
Fort Knox (male-only BCT/OSUT) (n = 73)	42	NA
Fort Benning (male-only OSUT) (n = 229)	53	NA
Fort Jackson (GI BCT) (males: n = 197; females: n = 45)	35	7

NOTE: NA- not applicable, male-only training

The majority of data collected on trainer dissatisfaction indicated that the real dissatisfaction is a result of the hours and rigors of the recruit training environment. It is accurate that there are challenges to gender-integrated training. It is also true that there are special procedures, rules, and responsibilities associated with this format. The Commission found that the attitude and actions of leaders at all levels made the difference in the training environment. In short, the command climate determined unit effectiveness.

When asked if mixing males and females in basic training results in lower standards for all, most Army leaders did not agree. Only around one-third of leaders who took part in the survey expressed such agreement. Further, although a greater percentage of leaders agreed, there was not a majority who believed that quality declined when men and women went through basic training together. The lack of endorsement by the majority of respondents is salient, particularly in light of the fact that some leaders had little or no experience with gender-integrated training and that response rates from these leaders may have been overrepresented.

¹⁶⁸ Johnson 1999 Data Set, at Commission request, a special data run separated Army drill sergeants by location to produce the table shown above.

Given the Commission’s continuum perspective, surveys of enlisted personnel with one to eight years of service also shed light on the issues that Congress asked to be addressed. Enlisted members were asked to reflect on their training experiences as well as to assess their current levels of morale, proficiency, and performance.¹⁶⁹ When asked, “How well did your entry training (basic and advanced) prepare you for assignment to a gender-integrated unit?” nearly two-thirds (62 percent) of Army respondents who had participated in integrated training reported being very well prepared or well prepared. Another 21 percent felt that they were moderately well prepared.

When asked what gender mix best suits the purpose of basic training, the results for Army respondents were as follows:

- Integrated 31 percent
- Separate-Male Only MOS 15 percent
- Segregated 31 percent
- Doesn’t Matter/Don’t Know 23 percent

Further, when asked about the effect on the quality of basic training of having males and females in the same unit 58 percent of the 2,996 Army respondents reported that gender-integrated training improved or had no effect on basic training.

- Improves 36 percent
- Stays the Same 22 percent
- Declines 42 percent

Similarly, as shown in the table below, when asked about the effect of gender-integrated training on a number of dimensions, the response given by the most respondents is that it has a positive effect on individual performance and group performance.

Retrospective Survey of Enlisted Members with 1-8 Years of Service (Army) Selected Items¹⁷⁰

Survey Item	Percentage that Strongly Agree/Agree	Percentage that Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Percentage that Strongly Disagree/Disagree
GIT has a positive effect on individual performance.	35	31	35
GIT has a positive effect on group performance.	41	27	31
GIT results in lower standards for all.	38	25	37
GIT makes it easier to adapt to a GI unit.	62	22	15
GIT reduces likelihood of later problems.	30	27	43
GIT reflects experience in civilian life.	43	40	18

¹⁶⁹ Ramsberger, et al. (1999), Volume IV “Research” pages 32-36

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pages 32-36.


In addition to examining simple relationships, multivariate analyses were conducted. More specifically, researchers tested the association of a variety of potential influences and an outcome variable while controlling for the influence of other potentially confounding factors. Analysts first entered and tested the effects of demographics, then added Service-related data (e.g., tenure, job), followed by gender-related information (training type, percent of women in current unit), and finally interactions between gender and Service-related factors (e.g., gender, tenure). Attitudes toward gender-integrated training were found to be related to certain background factors. There was a positive linear relationship between amount of time spent working with the other gender during basic training and support for gender-integrated training. For example, the percentage of soldiers who said that gender-integrated training was the best basic training mix ranged from 59 percent among those who said that in basic training they worked with members of the other gender all the time to 13 percent of those who had not worked with members of the other gender at all. Soldiers in combat MOSs and those with longer tenure had less positive attitudes towards gender-integrated training. There was little indication that gender format of training had any impact on career intentions, personal and unit readiness, personal and unit morale, dedication to team, group orientation and commitment, performance dimensions, or adoption of core values. Length of service typically accounted for more variation in response than any other factor, including gender-related factors.

The Commission found no data, scientific or otherwise, that supports any theory that gender-integrated training affects these processes. In fact, the Commission had questions added to the Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS) in an attempt to find out if a gender-integrated environment would affect an individual's decision to select or reject service. The data showed an almost complete indifference to gender-integrated training as a reason to enlist or not to enlist. The Commission, as a body, agreed to defer from Service comparisons because of each Service's unique mission, accession requirements, number of career fields open to females, ratio of Combat Arms to Combat Support, Combat Service Support positions, etc.

Current recruiting difficulties cannot be linked validly to gender format of initial entry training (see following chart). Rather, there is ample evidence that economic conditions are strongly related to recruiting outcomes.¹⁷¹ The research shows rather dramatically that enlistment contracts mirror unemployment trends. There is also a substantial relationship between level of recruiting resources and enlistment contracts.

¹⁷¹ See Kearn, C., Horne, D., & Gilroy, C. (1990). "Army Recruiting in a Changing Environment." *Contemporary Policy Issues, Volume VIII, (Number 4)*, 68-78; Murray, M. & McDonald, L. (1999). *Recent Recruiting Trends and Their Implications For Models of Enlistment Supply*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND; Warner, J.T. (1999). *Navy College Fund evaluation study*. Briefing for Department of Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy; Warner, J.T. "Military recruiting programs during the 1980s: Their success and policy issues." *Contemporary Policy Issues, Volume VIII, (Number 4)*.

High-Quality Male Enlistments and Male (16-21 years) Unemployment



Therefore, the Commission finds it spurious to suggest that the USMC training format (gender separate) accounts for their past recruiting success. Given the current OPTEMPO of each Service and the exemplary execution of each assigned mission, the Commission concludes that the operational forces are not being adversely affected by gender-integrated training.

d. Feasibility and Implications of Imposing Gender Segregation of Trainees and Instructors

Gender Segregation of Training

The Commission found that the predominant reason cited for opposition to gender-integrated training was the perception that the proximity between males and females in training creates a distraction. The Commission does not agree that a decision to separate by gender at platoon level would alleviate this perceived distraction. The Commission has concluded that this often-cited distracter does not affect the training process as negatively as some may think. As reflected in chapter 3, where there is good leadership and a positive command climate, the training environment is healthy and appropriate, and accomplishes what is expected. This conclusion is a result of discussions with literally hundreds of recruits, trainers, and leaders who, the Commission believes, were honestly commenting that gender-integrated training is working and that each day they get better at executing it.

The cost of segregating basic training units depends on the level at which the segregation occurs. Gender segregation at the company level only minimally increases

facility costs but significantly increases operating costs. At the platoon level, the facilities cost is significant. After a preliminary analysis of the training load, the Army estimates it would require approximately an additional \$271 million to house recruits in a segregated manner at platoon level. The breakout is as follows:

Location	No. & Type of Building	Cost (in millions)
Fort Jackson	2 Starships	\$90M
	2 Starships	\$90M
Fort Leonard Wood	1 Modified Starship (RS)	\$23M
	1 Starship	\$45M
Fort Sill	1 Modified Starship (RS)	\$23M
BCT TOTAL		\$271M
Notes: Starship: Building consisting of 5 wings with platoon areas on the second and third floors separated by common stairwell and doors that can be secured. RS: Reception Station. 1 Starship Barracks costs approximately \$45M. 1 Modified Starship Barracks costs approximately \$23M.		

Gender-segregated barracks require male and female BCT soldiers to be housed in separate facilities, either in separate buildings, separate wing/bays, separate floors, or on the same floor separated by permanent walls. Infrastructure costs are based on assumptions that, first, unit integrity will be maintained to reinforce the command and control of training units and, second, soldiers will be assigned in a manner that results in one training company per barrack or wing.

Gender of Drill Sergeants

Leadership is an important issue to consider. More fundamental than the gender of trainers are their quality and integrity. Perhaps the key factor in bringing attention to gender issues in training was the failure in leadership and the inexcusable abuse of power on the part of a very small minority of leaders. It should be noted that this failure in leadership occurred within the AIT and not the BCT environment.

Requiring drill sergeants to be of the same sex as their trainees will have a degrading effect on Army readiness. Implementing such a proposal would require additional female drill sergeants and also would require a significant decrease in the number of women serving in operational units. The alternative, recruiting fewer women, is unacceptable. The Army estimates it would require 245 additional female drill sergeants if drill sergeants are required to be the same sex as their recruits. There are simply not enough female noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to assign to the training base without depleting the ranks of female soldiers from the operational jobs that represent their primary military mission.

The Army would have to move female NCOs from operational units to assignments as drill sergeants. The Army is already struggling with a complex array of personnel readiness

challenges, including a shortage of as many as 6,000 NCOs. Pulling qualified female leaders out of the field will create turbulence in their personnel system and exacerbate the skill imbalances caused by the shortage of NCOs. In addition, it would create MOS shortfalls in such skills as Signal, Quartermaster, Military Intelligence, and Ordnance that cannot be filled by displaced male NCO drill sergeants holding primarily Combat Arms MOSs. In short, requiring drill sergeants to be the same sex as their trainees will have a profound detrimental impact on the readiness of the warfighting units at a time when they are already contending with serious readiness challenges.

The Army would require 245 additional female drill sergeants to meet the TRADOC policy that the same drill sergeants who conduct the training and are with the trainees during the day are in the barracks area at night to conduct reinforcement training as well as to mentor, counsel, and supervise trainees as required.¹⁷²

The U.S. Army has been and continues to be successful on the battlefield and in countless other missions it is asked to perform around the world. This success is the direct result of the skills and teamwork of trained and ready soldiers.

2. Navy

a. Structure and Policies

Defining Gender-Integration

Ninety-seven percent of ratings within the Navy are open to women. To best satisfy its operational requirements, basic training in the Navy is gender-integrated and has identical requirements for men and women, except for minimal differences based on physiology in physical fitness standards. Although the 9.2-week transformation process from civilian to sailor is integrated, men and women are housed separately during that time.

The Navy conducts the training for all recruits at one site. Upon arrival at Recruit Training Command (RTC), Great Lakes, Illinois, recruits are assigned to divisions of approximately 88 members. Each division is assigned to a training barracks referred to as a “ship.” The typical layout of a ship is four living areas, referred to as “compartments,” on each deck of the ship. Female recruits are berthed on the third deck, separated from the male recruits, who are berthed on the first and second decks of the ship. The manner of separate berthing areas for men and women closely replicates the berthing on most Navy ships. There is only one entrance to the ship, a formal ceremonial Quarterdeck that is staffed by recruits under the direction of RTC personnel. Central stairways (“ladders” in Navy terminology) from the ground floor Quarterdeck provide access to the decks. The emergency egress doors and ladders of each deck have electrical alarms that signal opening at a supervisory panel on the Quarterdeck. In addition, the doors have tamper-detection seals affixed that are monitored by random security watch at least once per hour at night.

¹⁷² See Appendix H “Service Secretaries Responses Pursuant to Public Law 105-85, Sec. 562 (e)(2).”

In contrast to the housing arrangements, for actual training activities, half of the women from a compartment are paired with half of the men to form a distinct integrated training division. The remaining half of the women from the source compartment are paired with the remaining half of the men from their source compartment to form another distinct integrated training division. Although Navy policy stipulates such gender-integrated training, sufficient numbers of females are unavailable to integrate all training divisions. Because less than 20 percent of Navy recruits are female, there are some all-male training divisions. Over the course of the past fiscal year, the Navy reported no statistical performance difference between the cumulative performance scores of all-male and gender-integrated divisions.

Following basic training, all recruits attend some type of initial skill training before reporting to their duty stations. In Fiscal Year 1998, approximately 52,000 sailors attended initial skill training, commonly referred to as “A” and “C” schools. Navy A and C schools are gender-integrated with the exception of those that serve fleet skill areas from which women are restricted from serving (*i.e.*, submarine specific skills and special warfare [Sea, Air, Land (SEAL)] forces). Integration continues in the fleet within the majority of ratings.

Standards for Men and Women

The Navy’s recruit training program is designed to minimize differences between recruits: they must meet the same performance standards. Subgroup differences in requirements exist only with respect to the physical readiness test. Physical fitness standards vary by both gender and age. However, the Navy-wide standards were recently revised to make the run times for women more stringent, thereby bringing them more in line with the standards for men. All recruits are required to pass the physical fitness test with a score of “good” or better in each category (push-ups, curl-ups and run), based on the standards for the recruit’s age and gender as specified in the following table.

Physical Readiness Test

Event	Maximum Score Each Event	17-19 year Min Required	20-29 year Min Required	30-34 year Min Required
MEN				
Push-Ups	67=100 pts	51=84 pts	42=75 pts	36=69 pts
Curl-Ups	100=100 pts	60=60 pts	50=50 pts	40=40 pts
1½ Mile Run	8:10=100 pts	11:00=83 pts	12:00=77 pts	13:45=66 pts
Passing Point Score		227 pts	202 pts	175 pts
WOMEN				
Push-Ups	67=100 pts	24=57 pts	17=50 pts	11=44 pts

Notes: (1) Recruits are tested per OPNAVINST 6110.1E. (2) Recruits are required to be within the height/weight limits or body composition limit as outlined in OPNAVINST 6110.1E. Maximum body composition limits are ≤ 22 percent for men and ≤ 33 percent for women.

Physical Readiness Test

Curl-Ups	100=100 pts	52=52 pts	45=45 pts	39=39 pts
1½ Mile Run	8:10=100 pts	13:30=68 pts	14:15=63 pts	15:30=56 pts
Passing Point Score		177 pts	158 pts	139 pts

Notes: (1) Recruits are tested per OPNAVINST 6110.1E. (2) Recruits are required to be within the height/weight limits or body composition limit as outlined in OPNAVINST 6110.1E. Maximum body composition limits are ≤ 22 percent for men and ≤ 33 percent for women.

Although misperceptions exist among sailors in training and in the fleet regarding the purpose of physical fitness standards, it is important to keep in mind that absolute differences between the genders do not constitute relative differences in fitness levels. That is, men and women meet standards indicative of appropriate fitness levels for their gender. The standards are developed so that men and women at the same score are at the same level of physical fitness for their gender.

No differences in standards exist for other dimensions of performance, including the following:

- physical performance (such as Battle Stations, confidence course and swimmer qualifications)
- military skills (such as Battle Stations, fire fighting, gas mask wear, weapons familiarization)
- nonphysical tasks required of individuals (such as academic testing).

Female Drill Instructors

Three recruit division commanders (RDCs) are assigned to each division with at least one female RDC for each gender-integrated division. Staffing status as of March 1999 showed 93 female and 584 male RDCs on board—meeting the Navy Personnel Command’s target (13.5 percent) for proportional representation of female RDCs relative to female recruits.

All RDCs perform the same duties regardless of gender and are responsible for the overall training of the recruits entrusted to their care. RDCs are screened from among Petty Officers and Chief Petty Officers to serve as experienced leaders, role models, counselors, and motivators. RDCs of both genders provide a working example for all recruits to emulate. Assignment as an RDC is considered one of the Navy's toughest and most demanding duties, and these trainers report RDC duty provides unmatched personal and professional satisfaction.

Focus group participants, especially recruit trainees, spoke repeatedly about the critical importance of leaders to individual and unit performance.¹⁷³ For individual performance, instructors and other superiors not only train members in specific skills but also

¹⁷³ Laurence, et al. (1999), Volume IV “Research” page 287.

serve as role models, communicating appropriate behaviors, attitudes, and values. There was almost universal reverence for basic training instructors, including RDCs. For some, women superiors were perceived as being harder on subordinates, whereas other participants viewed women superiors as more fair or compassionate. Others perceived that men still need to learn to take orders better from a female superior.

b. Historical and Current Rationales

Overview of Gender Integration

In the Navy, men and women serve in all but two officer and three enlisted specialties. Both men and women are assigned and serve together in combat units where, regardless of gender, all will engage in combat if their unit is so engaged. In addition, opportunities for women have expanded and now include officer and enlisted crew assignments and commanding officer assignments to combatant ships. The current direct ground combat definition and assignment rule excludes women from assignment to Marine Corps combat units and the Navy's Special Warfare units.¹⁷⁴ Habitability considerations are the sole factor in determining women's assignments to combatant ships. As a result, even in peacetime, as a routine part of the Navy's forward presence responsibilities, men and women live and work in proximity and under the unique challenges of serving aboard a warship. Lieutenant General Carol Mutter, USMC (Ret), offered some insights on the Navy's methodology of integrating women aboard ships:

“...They [Navy] learned some very good lessons and did it [gender integration] very, very well—integrating women first aboard the non-combatant ships—so that when women needed to go aboard combatant ships, they had a very good process...”¹⁷⁵

Of the Navy's 94 ratings, 91 are open to women. Enlisted women are restricted from only three ratings that are associated exclusively with submarines:

- Sonar Technician (submarines)
- Missile Technician
- Fire Control Technician

Female officers are restricted from the following designators:

- Submarine Warfare Officer (112X)
- Special Warfare Officer - SEALs (113X)
- Warrant Officer—Special Warfare Technician (715X)

¹⁷⁴ Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject: Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, January 13, 1994.

¹⁷⁵ Mutter, LtGen Carol A., USMC, Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps, Volume II “Transcripts” page 342 (22Dec98, page 199).

Navy women, as noted below, are restricted from permanent assignment on the following ships:

- Submarines (officer and enlisted)
- Minehunter, Coastal (MHC) (enlisted)
- Mine Countermeasure Ships (MCM) (enlisted)
- Coastal Patrol Boats (PC) (officer and enlisted)

The Navy has made the following significant modifications to its training policy or practices relevant to the differences between the sexes over the last 30 years:

- Before 1968, all female recruits received their training in Bainbridge, Maryland, in a gender-segregated environment. All male recruits were trained at either San Diego or Great Lakes.
- RTC Orlando was established 1 July 1968. At that time, the Navy relocated female recruits from Bainbridge to Orlando to undergo recruit training. RTC Orlando began the integration of women into all aspects of the training program with the exception of fire fighting, small arms, and fleet-related training. They retained separate male and female companies because of berthing constraints (e.g., separate barracks). RDCs were of the same gender as the company they were training.
- In 1974, RTC Orlando began training women using the same curriculum as men, including fire fighting, small arms, and fleet-related training issues. The genders were still separated outside the classroom (e.g., separate companies and barracks).
- The 1987 and 1990 Women’s Study Groups both indicated an increasing need to integrate men and women with the 1990 group, reporting:

“...non-acceptance of women began at the training centers. Creating a less isolated, more realistic, and appropriately disciplined but interactive environment within recruit training will foster professionalism, cooperation and team building from the start.”¹⁷⁶

The Secretary of the Navy directed the implementation of a 1992 pilot program¹⁷⁷ to integrate accession training in Orlando. During the pilot program, one male and one female RDC were assigned to each integrated company. In addition, four different berthing arrangements were tested to maximize bed space for each open-bay berthing area while maintaining separate gender sleeping and head (toilet and bathing areas) facilities. Numerous recruits, interviewed by the *Navy Times* before the graduation of the pilot program, testified in April 1992 that:

¹⁷⁶ 1990 Navy Women’s Study Group, (1991, April). *An Update Report on the Progress of Women in the Navy*, Department of the Navy, page III-21.

¹⁷⁷ Scarpate, J. & O’Neill, M. (1992) *Evaluation of Gender Integration at Recruit Training Command, Orlando Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida*. Patrick Air Force Base: Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute.

“...the coed approach achieved one of the Navy’s stated goals – fostering teamwork among the sexes. Many [recruits] told of being pushed to better performances both physically and scholastically by the presence of the opposite sex.”¹⁷⁸

- As a result of the pilot program, women were fully integrated into all aspects of the training environment, including marching, physical training, and classroom participation. Integrated divisions were berthed in the same building but in separate berthing compartments with RDCs assigned without regard to the gender of the recruits.
- Review and update of the Combat Exclusion Law and DOD Risk Rule.
- After a thorough review of the Navy’s policies and practices for the integration of women in the Navy, the Standing Committee on Military and Civilian Women in the Department of the Navy, the Secretary of the Navy opened the majority of job skills (Navy ratings) to women in 1992. The decision was based on nearly 20 years of women, officer and enlisted, successfully performing in aviation, support and supply ships, tenders, etc.
- In 1994, the Navy consolidated all of its basic training at RTC Great Lakes. Female recruits continue to be fully integrated in all aspects of the training environment. Male and female divisions share the same barracks, but they are berthed in separate compartments on different floors, simulating shipboard conditions. Each integrated division is assigned, at a minimum, one female RDC.
- The Navy determined that the integrated training experience best trains recruits for the integrated environment they will be exposed to in the fleet.

During his testimony before the Congressional Commission, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt explained the Navy’s progression toward gender integration as follows:

“I was ... the person who sought to break down both the race barrier and the gender barrier during my watch [as Chief of Naval Operations] from 1970 to 1974. We [the Navy] began the experiment to prove to our males that females could do everything that they [males] could do on sea duty by assigning them [women] to the one ship which it was legal to assign women, the hospital ship SANCTUARY, where they served with great credit in the traditional male ratings for the three years of life left for the hospital ship. And we also began the then very controversial program of training women to be pilots. ... within a year or two, women were flying hurricane aircraft into the eyes of a hurricane and doing every bit as well as their male counterparts.

... I think that the record is very good with regard to the women in their service. I think that, by and large, we maintain professional relationships in close quarters about as well as they can be done. I think

¹⁷⁸ Zolton, M., (April 20, 1992). “Together! Coed Boot Camp Proves Physical, Academic Success,” *Navy Times*, page 1.

that the advent of gender-integrated training was a natural and appropriate progression of events, given the proximity in which Navy men and women now live and serve. I think it's important for them to start right off at the beginning, finding out the way in which they have to live together and be together. I'm convinced, therefore, that gender-integrated training is the best way to prepare them.

I think it is important for Navy leadership to be provided with sufficient flexibility to work around those areas where there are special problems, and there is no doubt in my mind that the time to introduce the gender-based integrated training is right after they've gotten into the Navy.”¹⁷⁹

Current Assessment

From its increased reliance on women and experience with gender integration, the Navy has concluded that its gender-integrated training environment and the training methods generated within that environment provide the most effective means to prepare sailors to live, operate, fight, and win aboard deployed gender-integrated ships and squadrons. On the basis of the premise, well supported by social science research, that early experiences shape subsequent behavior, the Navy asserts that its initial training program is designed to enable men and women to report to their first ship/squadron prepared to deploy and to fight.

Training requirements, objectives, and opportunities instill and enforce the warrior ethos of sacrifice, endurance, teamwork, and dedication and simulate life aboard fleet operational units. A Recruit Training Blue Ribbon Panel directed by the Chief of Naval Operations reinforced this training philosophy in 1993. This august group determined that the Navy's gender-integrated training, which began in 1992, was successful in promoting a professional relationship between men and women.

Navy training programs reflect the gender related rules, regulations, and living/working conditions encountered onboard ship. Deferring integration until after recruit training transfers the burden to the fleet, especially for the 30 percent of the force (40 percent of whom are women) who report directly to their first assignment with only 2 weeks of initial skills training following recruit training. These sailors are commonly referred to as GENDETs, general detail sailors. The Navy strongly believes that the fleet is *not* the place to introduce its sailors to a gender-integrated environment, but rather recruit training is the best place.

Train as You Fight

The Navy trains as it assigns, deploys, and fights. It has found the gender-integrated training environment the most effective in preparing its recruits for the integrated environment they will be exposed to in the fleet. Because the Navy maintains a maritime presence with gender-integrated crews and will enter combat situations with gender-integrated crews, the

¹⁷⁹ Zumwalt, ADM Elmo R., USN (Ret), Former Chief of Naval Operations (1970-74), Volume II “Transcripts” pages 413-414 (28Jan99, pp. 300-303)

Navy considers it essential to combat readiness that preparation and development begin on the very first day of the recruit's exposure to the Navy.

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) expressed the Navy's views in official testimony before the Commission when he stated:

“... I believe very firmly that what we're doing out there [RTC, Great Lakes] now is imbedding and instilling pride in these young men and women and not fear when they come in the door, and that's very important. ... I would further state that I believe we've gone smart and not soft and I'm very comfortable saying that. Yes, we've changed Great Lakes-all for the better in my view. ... When we get them in the door, what we're concerned about as priority one is really baselining them and imbedding in them the Navy's core values of honor, courage, and commitment. You've got to do that-you have to make the investment up front. Once that happens and you've established that, you've built that foundation, now we can talk about warrior ethos, fighting skills, and more traditionally considered matrices for getting somebody ready to go to sea. The recruit [training] experience is fundamental to the 21st century Navy.”¹⁸⁰

Evaluation of Gender Integration

Over the years, the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations conducted several efforts to evaluate and improve recruit training. In 1991 through 1992, the Secretary of the Navy's Standing Committee on the Military and Civilian Women in the Department of the Navy reviewed 20 years of data associated with gender-integrated training. In 1993, an extensive review of recruit training was conducted by the aforementioned Standing Committee. This review led to a significant restructuring of recruit training to better focus training to meet fleet requirements. Until this time, training was found to be a collection of topics not related to a desired outcome. Accordingly, Fleet and Force Master Chiefs, Training Command representatives, and educational specialists worked together to define and focus the recruit training mission and objectives on “sailorization;” that is, the transformation from civilian to sailor, involving socialization to the Navy's culture, including values, ethics, norms, language, and ways of doing things. Emphasis was shifted from classroom training to experience-based training. The rigor of physical training was increased, and goals were shifted from collective group performance at minimum standards to individual achievement at full capability.

Since 1993, three formal fleet reviews of recruit training have ensured that fleet needs are met by Basic Military Training. Based on such reviews, some significant enhancements to the rigor and intensity of Navy recruit training were made, including implementation of Battle Stations; physical readiness training six times a week; the standard of “good” in each category of the Navy-wide physical fitness test; technology for classroom training; live fire fighting for

¹⁸⁰ Johnson, ADM Jay L., USN, Chief of Naval Operations, Volume II “Transcripts” pages 433-434 (29Jan99, pp. 83-87).

Battle Stations; fleet-type inspection system; fleet terminology; all-weather gas chamber training; fire fighting team training; introduction of a confidence course; line-handling laboratory for seamanship; and assignment of 3 RDCs per recruit division.

Overall, feedback on the actual success of recruits in the fleet is received through the Navy Training Requirements Review process, Low Quality Recruit Reports, surveys and visits to RTC by (1) prospective commanding officers of fleet units as part of their training before assuming command and (2) senior fleet enlisted personnel and senior enlisted academy attendees. In other words, training format, content, and outcomes are monitored continually.

c. Readiness Implications

Service-Specific Requirements

Today's Navy is a gender-integrated force in which women serve with men in most skills and units throughout the fleet. A training format replicates life at sea and is designed to instill the habits of personal behavior and self-discipline required by Navy standards. The performance of the young sailors in meeting the increasing demands placed on them today shows that the training that prepares them for the fleet is working.

Because the Navy maintains a maritime presence with gender-integrated crews and will enter combat situations with gender-integrated crews, it feels strongly that preparing and developing men and women, from day one, to be an unmatched team of maritime warriors is essential to combat readiness.¹⁸¹ The Commission concurs with this training approach to produce qualified sailors.

While all sailors attend some type of initial skills training following basic training, GENDET training is only two weeks long. If basic training were not integrated, leaders would be responsible for integrating men and women when they reached the operational commands, in addition to the other on-the-job training required.

Readiness Goals

The Navy's goal is to develop sailors who are motivated, willing to learn, proud to serve, and confident to perform basic seamanship skills and whose behavior is consistent with their standards and values. Every training objective at Recruit Training Command is directly related to a situation or event that could be encountered in the fleet environment. These training objectives include small-arms marksmanship, seamanship, fire fighting, and swimmer qualifications. The culminating event of recruit training is Battle Stations, an intense, realistic test under conditions similar to a combat deployment. By successfully completing Battle Stations, recruits demonstrate sacrifice, dedication, teamwork, and endurance-qualities that will assist them in succeeding in an operational environment.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

The Chief of Naval Operations reported to the Commission the following:

“Recruit training is an intense screening and transformational experience that provides the foundation for technical and leadership training. With it, young Americans become capable warriors. By single-siting and fully integrating recruit training, the Navy believes it has strengthened the foundation on which all future personal and professional development rests in combat. In order to ensure that recruits have the ability to perform their newly learned tasks under intense conditions similar to those on board a ship, their recruits are exposed to realistic conditions that require application of their new skills. Accepting the hypothesis that men and women cannot train together suggests to recruits that it is equally impossible for them to work together. It is imperative for combat capability that sailors learn that they can and must depend on each other regardless of their gender. The foundation a sailor acquires in recruit training continues to be developed as they progress through specialized skill training. In this training environment, which is the interval between basic training and assignment to the fleet, Navy concentrates its efforts to ensure every sailor is (1) technical competent, (2) holds a common perspective on the real importance of the Navy's core values of honor, courage and commitment, and (3) understands the whole character of a warrior. In a less intensely controlled, but nevertheless structured environment that continues to approximate shipboard life, students have the opportunity to practice personal decision-making and leadership skills learned in recruit training. They practice balancing personal and professional demands, learn to operate in a chain of command and continue to develop shoulder-to-shoulder as members of the profession of arms.”¹⁸²

The Navy defines readiness as “...providing well maintained, adequately supplied platforms with sufficient resources to carry out required naval missions and functions.” Readiness includes maintenance, supply, personnel, and training. As applied to recruit training, readiness involves measures of recruiting, retention and training.¹⁸³

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁸³ Lautenbacher, VADM Conrad C., Jr., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Volume II “Transcripts” page 443 (29Jan99, pp. 140-145).

Performance Standards

The following table highlights the Navy’s recruit training performance standards.

Recruit Training Performance Standards			
Physical	Academic Exams	Skill	Fleet Readiness
Battle Stations (12 consecutive events demonstrating basic skills, Navy core values, teamwork, & endurance)	Four academic exams covering such topics as knowledge of seamanship, Navy heritage, watchstanding, & fire fighting. Exams graded on a 5.0 scale. Scores < 3.2 = failing. After two failures, recruits are set back in training and remediated.	Battle Stations (12 consecutive events demonstrating basic skills, Navy core values, teamwork, & endurance)	Final medical evaluation: “Fit for Full Duty”
Physical readiness testing (must take 2 physical readiness tests, passing the second with a minimum score of “GOOD” in each category, thereby exceeding acceptable "SATISFACTORY" standard)		Third Class Swimmer Qualifications-enter water (feet first) from 10-foot tower; tread water 3.5-5 minutes; swim 50 yards-any stroke.	Medical immunizations
		Fire Fighting classes & field application lab. Serve as the Nozzleman during a "charged hose" evolution.	Possess a complete and tailored seabag
		Weapons Familiarization class for M16 (simulator). “Fire” total of 50 rounds into simulated 100-yard target with no safety violations.	Demonstrate proper wearing of uniform
			Conduct Precautions Ashore Training (Anti-Terrorism Training)

Through screening, outfitting, training, and developing an attitude conducive to naval service, recruit training transforms civilians into enlisted apprentice sailors ready for follow-on training or assignment to the fleet. The transformation process gives each individual tools that will enable them to do the following:

- Emulate Navy core values.
- Possess basic military and Navy knowledge and discipline (*e.g.* fire fighting, damage control, Navy heritage, seamanship, *etc.*).
- Possess enthusiasm and understanding about their future in the Navy and shipboard life.
- Exceed minimum fleet PT standards (“good” in each category).

- Succeed in the fleet’s gender-integrated environment.
- Arrive ready for duty (medically and dentally fit).
- Possess strong, positive self-esteem and team commitment.
- Understand Navy rights and responsibilities, military courtesies, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and watchstanding.
- Be a recruiter by presenting positive image and exemplary military bearing.
- Understand the “what and why” of zero tolerance as it applies (drug/alcohol abuse, sexual harassment, *etc.*).
- Succeed in the fleet’s multiracial and multicultural environment.
- Wear with pride and properly care for the Navy uniform.

Recruit training begins the transition from civilian to Navy life, focusing on fundamental skills and knowledge and on the military socialization process. The goal is to develop sailors who are motivated, willing to learn, proud to serve, and confident to perform basic seamanship skills and whose behavior is consistent with the standards and values of the U.S. Navy.

Attrition

The Navy does not monitor attrition relative to participation in gender-integrated or gender-separated recruit training. Since 1993, all Navy female recruits have participated in gender-integrated recruit training. Available attrition data are presented in the following table.

Initial Entry Training (IET) Attrition


Fiscal Year	Gender	RTC	A School	C School
1996	Male	12.8%	6.1%	4.9%
	Female	14.1%	7.0%	4.1%
1997	Male	14.0%	6.0%	5.0%
	Female	14.0%	7.0%	3.0%
1998	Male	15.3%	6.2%	5.8%
	Female	19.1%	6.2%	4.0%

Notes: A School: Apprentice training following Recruit Training. C School: Advanced training following apprentice training for some personnel in highly technical Navy ratings (skills).

Although not restricted to initial entry training, an analysis of attrition rates at the 36-month point for Navy personnel were fairly consistent for cohort years 1991 through 1996.¹⁸⁴ The figure below summarizes the rates separately for men and women. Two facts are worth

¹⁸⁴ Sipes & Laurence (1999), Volume IV “Research” page 624.


noting. First, overall attrition climbed steadily from 1991 through 1995, from 27 percent to 35 percent. The apparent drop in attrition in 1996 is an artifact of the timing of the data capture for this analysis. Thirty-six months had not yet passed since some of the 1996 cohort entered Service; therefore, the 36-month rates are underestimated. Gender-integrated training was implemented during the 1994 cohort; it had no clear impact on the trend.



Second, attrition rates for Navy women were initially higher than the attrition rates for Navy men (five percentage points in 1991 and 1992, three percentage points in 1993). In 1994 and 1995, however, the rates were identical. In 1996, the pattern reversed; the men’s attrition rate was approximately one percentage point higher than the women’s rate.


The reasons for discharge also were consistent across years. The following three figures depict the rates for the three most common discharge reasons recorded. The most commonly cited reason for discharge was *failure to meet minimum behavioral and performance criteria*. This accounted for roughly 65 to 73 percent of all 36-month attrition. The first figure indicates two notable facts. First, this reason was much more common among men than among women; there was a 17 to 26 percentage point difference between genders each year. Second, this reason accounted for an increasing proportion of overall attrition for each gender in years 1993-1996.

Percentage of Navy Attrition Attributable to Failure to Meet Minimum Behavioral and Performance Criteria



The second most common reason for attrition was *medical disqualification*, which accounted for approximately 12 to 17 percent of 36-month attrition. As the corresponding figure demonstrates, this discharge reason was cited slightly more often for women than men (one to seven percentage point difference each year), and both genders exhibited a slight increase over time.¹⁸⁵


Percentage of Navy Attrition Attributable to Medical Disqualification



The third most common reason was *other separations or discharge*. This accounted for approximately 8 to 21 percent of all 36-month attrition. This reason consistently accounted for a greater proportion of female attrition than male attrition; there was a 10 to 24 point differential each year. Among men, erroneous enlistments accounted for 24 to 83 percent of

¹⁸⁵ The increase in 1996 may be an artifact of data truncation and might disappear if a complete 36-month data set were available. However, the slightly increasing trend through 1995 may be of importance.

other separations or discharges; most of the remainder was classified as “Other”. Among women, pregnancy accounted for 49 to 55 percent and parenthood constituted 20 to 34 percent of *other separations or discharge*. The trend over time also was notable. The rates for men climbed in the first three years (from 19 percent to 27 percent), then exhibited a precipitous drop to 7 percent in 1994, after which they were stable. No specific policy changes could be readily identified that would explain the timing of this drop, but evidently a greater proportion of attrition was given specific definitions and the need for the “Other” category was reduced. The rate for women declined each year, from a high of 43 percent in 1991 to 23 percent in 1995.



Gender Integration and Readiness and Morale

The morale of a unit is a function primarily of the leadership of that unit. Because gender-integrated training began in Fiscal Year 1995, graduates of this format are junior personnel in their first terms who have not yet assumed positions of leadership and whose influence on the morale of a unit would be minimal. However, because these individuals are so junior, they are in an ideal position to be exposed early to both men and women as role models and as respected leaders. This exposure is expected to be significant as these individuals progress through their naval careers and assume their positions of leadership. The experienced petty officers and chief petty officers who serve as recruit division commanders and instructors then return to the fleet in leadership positions. They are the ones that will have an opportunity to convey the positive aspects of gender-integrated training, with emphasis on the fact that the standards are equal for both men and women.

A 1992 survey on the effects of gender integration in the Navy showed no deleterious effects of gender integration on academic or physical performance in training. According to this survey gender integration caused no clear negative or positive behavioral effect on training but it may have a positive effect on attitudes.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁶ Scarpace & O’Neill, 1992.

Commission Research Findings

The results of 42 focus groups conducted at 10 installations (including 11 sessions with sailors at Great Lakes, Illinois and Norfolk, Virginia) with enlisted members from basic training, technical training, and operational units across the Services suggested that to a greater extent than gender issues, operating tempo is a cause for concern. Personnel shortages were noted as detracting from the provision of hands-on experience. Learning to work effectively as a team was reported to be of paramount importance. Factors that facilitate the development of effective teamwork include positive relationships between team members, leadership, and experience working as a team. Factors that hinder teamwork and reduce morale include people who do not pull their weight, resource shortages (staff, materials, and time), not knowing how to lead or be led by peers, and perceptions of unfair expectations or treatment.¹⁸⁷

As previously discussed, only when gender integration was explicitly raised as a topic of discussion during focus group sessions did misperceptions regarding equitable standards and treatment surface. What people said about their perceptions of favoritism show that confusion abounds about different treatment based on individual differences versus gender. That is, service members may have confused an instance of “teacher’s pet” with gender favoritism. In addition, the privileges and responsibilities associated with rank may be misinterpreted as different treatment of men and women. Given that supervisors (including peers in roles of authority) are more likely to be men, the privileges and responsibilities resulting from their roles may be attributed erroneously to their gender. For example, when a supervisor and subordinate are involved in an inappropriate relationship, the punishment administered to the supervisor is likely to be harsher than the punishment of the subordinate. Since such relationships are more likely to involve a male than female supervisor, some sailors mistakenly attribute the differential punishment to gender, rather than to rank. As pointed out in chapter 2, the Commission finds it often appropriate for higher ranking personnel to get harsher punishment in inappropriate relationships or for the same offenses.


Although many men claimed that women were the beneficiaries of unfair standards and treatment, their examples of such treatment were devoid of concrete incidents from first-hand experience. Rather, they tended to make vague generalizations about “all women” or engage in labeling, blaming, and grouching. When men spoke of first-hand experience, they often said the women with whom they worked were competent and hard working. As one male sailor from an operational unit stated:

“This gender mess with males and females, that’s what, to tell the truth, it’s emphasized on too much. If we [have] to work together, leave it alone... There’s just so much emphasis put on harassment and fraternization and gender...”

¹⁸⁷ Laurence, et al., (1999) Volume IV “Research” pages 288-290.

By and large, the results of surveys of graduating recruits and enlisted members in operational units indicate that training format with regard to gender is unrelated to perceptions of authority, group identity, commitment, values, assessments of training effectiveness, and performance indicators.

Navy Graduating Recruit Survey



Male graduating sailors from gender-integrated and gender-segregated training responded similarly to items designed to measure commitment, group identity and respect for authority. The theoretical ranges for these scales were approximately 5 to 25 for commitment and group identity and 2 to 12 for respect for authority. These findings held regardless of adjustments (“adj”) for age, education, and racial/ethnic differences between training format groups. Further, a minority of Navy leaders (ranging from 15 percent of Lieutenants (O-3s) to 33 percent of RDCs) indicated that they believed gender-segregated basic training was the best format.¹⁸⁸

A separate survey of enlisted members with one through eight years in service asked several questions about the basic training experience. A majority of personnel in each Service felt that basic training prepared them well for serving in gender-integrated units. For the Navy, 77 percent of the sailors reported that IET prepared them at least moderately well for serving in a gender-integrated unit.

When asked what gender mix best suited the purpose of basic training, results for Navy respondents were as follows:

- Integrated 44 percent
- Separate -- Male Only MOS 6 percent
- Segregated 20 percent
- Doesn't Matter/Don't Know 30 percent

Further, when asked about the effect on the quality of basic training of having males and females in the same unit 66 percent of the 2,035 Navy respondents reported that gender-integrated training improved or had no effect on basic training.

¹⁸⁸ Johnson (1999), Volume III “Research” page 122.

- Improves 39 percent
- Stays the Same 27 percent
- Declines 35 percent

Similarly, as shown in the table below, when asked about the effect of gender-integrated training on a number of dimensions, the majority of sailors indicated that it has a positive effect on individual performance and group performance.¹⁸⁹

Retrospective Survey of Enlisted Members with 1-8 Years of Service (Navy) Selected Items¹⁹⁰

Survey Item	Percentage that Strongly Agree/Agree	Percentage that Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Percentage that Strongly Disagree/Disagree
GIT has a positive effect on individual performance	39	36	25
GIT has a positive effect on group performance	46	31	22
GIT results in lower standards for all	25	29	45
GIT makes it easier to adapt to a GI unit	64	24	12
GIT reduces likelihood of later problems	31	29	40
GIT reflects experience in civilian life	46	37	17

The effects of gender-related variables on attitudes and performance/effectiveness assessments were evaluated, controlling for individual demographics and military environment. When significant effects were found, they tended to be small, indicating that gender-related variables are not prime predictors of performance. Rather than gender-related variables, tenure was related to career intentions in the Navy (and all other Services). For the Navy, those with less tenure and a higher percentage of women in the unit reported being better prepared for their initial operational assignment. Also for the Navy, those with higher percentages of women in the current unit reported having been better prepared for a gender-integrated unit. Higher levels of gender interaction in basic training were associated with greater endorsement of integrated training. Conversely, those with no women in the current unit were more likely to view gender-integrated training as having a negative effect.

Respondents rated themselves on military-relevant dimensions at three points in time: before basic training, after basic training, and now. The greatest change was in terms of knowledge and belief in the military value system. The least amount of change was regarding job/technical skills. These ratings were unrelated to gender format of training, trainer gender mix, interaction with the opposite sex, and other gender variables.

All in all, those who worked with the opposite gender more frequently during basic training maintained a more positive attitude toward gender-integrated training. Cohesion and teamwork assessments were not associated with gender-related variables in any systematic

¹⁸⁹ Ramsberger, et al. (1999), Volume IV “Research” pages 32-36.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

fashion. Commitment, group identity, and core values were, however, positively related to tenure.

There was only one consistent relationship uncovered in regard to performance indicators. Higher levels of education were associated with greater numbers of awards and honors and fewer reprimands or formal punishments.

In summary, positive assessments of gender-integrated training were made by Navy personnel. Gender interactions during basic training and the percent of women in the current unit were related to more positive assessments of gender-integrated training. Tenure was most strongly related to such outcomes as career intention, evaluation of basic training, readiness, and morale. Overall, gender-related issues appear to have little effect on outcomes.

d. Feasibility and Implications of Imposing Gender Segregation of Trainees and Instructors

Gender Segregation of Training

In compliance with the statute, the Commission received the following response from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) on the feasibility and effect of gender-separated recruit training:

Recruit Training Command, Great Lakes, does not have the facilities, land or manning to accommodate segregation of genders at the recruit and staff levels. Based on existing facilities, the minimum cost for separate recruit training facilities is in excess of \$350M. This does not include the cost for acquisition of land, nor the utility infrastructure required to support these new facilities.

The gender integrated recruit training environment has been established as the Navy's most effective means to best prepare Sailors to live, deploy, operate, fight, and win aboard gender integrated ships and squadrons. The rigorous evolution prepares the recruit for follow-on training and ultimate assignment to fleet service. The process ensures the recruit is physically and mentally ready for the rigors of the fleet environment by instilling discipline and proper behavior and emphasizing wellness and physical fitness. Each recruit must demonstrate dedication, teamwork and endurance through practical application of basic Navy skills and Core Values of Honor, Courage and Commitment.

Early experiences are relevant. Recruits are taught from day one that the Navy's business is to deploy and to arrive on station ready to fight. The initial training program is designed to enable men and women to report to their first ship/squadron fully prepared to meet that challenge. The Navy's basic training requirements and objectives maximize training opportunities for replicating life aboard fleet operational units

and instilling and enforcing the warrior's ethos of sacrifice, endurance, teamwork and dedication. The CNO-directed, Recruit Training Blue Ribbon Panel reinforced this training philosophy in 1993. The panel determined that the Navy's gender integrated training, which had begun in 1992, was very successful in promoting professional relationships between men and women. The unique relationship established during recruit training between shipmates is exclusive of gender, and is an essential contributor to follow-on Navy unit cohesion.

Deferring gender-integration until after recruit training transfers the burden of the fleet or follow-on technical training commands. If the Navy forestalls gender integration of its Sailors until they enter the fleet or begin follow-on technical training, the impact at Recruiting Training Command would be as follows:

Gender Segregated Berthing and Facilities. Based on projected female accessions, gender segregated berthing at RTC Great Lakes would require the use of three barracks buildings. Extensive modifications of existing structures would be necessary. The estimated cost for these renovations would be \$1.1M.

Separate training creates numerous scheduling and facility utilization inefficiencies. There will be built-in inefficiencies of berthing assignments, classroom utilization, etc., due to arrival numbers and population onboard. Two sets of classrooms, labs, instructors, etc., would have to be used to support gender segregation when only one would be necessary with integrated divisions. During surge months (May-November), boot camp capabilities are stretched to the limit. Scheduling must be even more precise. Gender segregated berthing would create unoccupied spaces at the time when space is needed most.

Manning. Gender segregation would require a significant increase in female RDC billets (from 88 to 114). The Navy is already severely challenged to provide numbers of female RDCs for current operations; there simply are not enough females available for this demanding duty.

Training. Gender segregated training at the division level and below would impose dramatic limitations on the existing training plan. Currently, classroom instruction is provided for two divisions simultaneously, regardless of gender, and is scheduled based on the divisions' DOT for the particular lesson being taught. Segregating training by gender would impose inefficiency when odd numbers of male or female divisions require instruction on the same lesson topics. Fourteen additional instructors would be required to provide adequate training in the Naval Orientation, Fire Fighting and Seamanship courses. To facilitate single-division instruction, two additional fire

fighting classrooms would be required (approximate cost \$1.2M). To facilitate training of basic seamanship skills, construction of a second Marlinespike trainer (ship mock-up) would be required (approximate cost \$1.4M) or a reduction in the amount of hands-on training currently provided would be necessary. These basic skills are used extensively during Battle Stations; a reduction in the amount of hands-on training would significantly degrade the recruit's ability to successfully complete this culminating event of recruit training.

Training separately, in areas such as fire fighting, would deprive recruits of the team building that is essential for warfighting readiness. Navy ships do not employ separate male and female fire fighting parties. Many recruits are only weeks away from assignment to deployed units and squadrons. Gender integration in training labs and during Battle Stations allows all recruits to develop the synergy required for working in gender integrated units. In post-Battle Stations surveys of recruits the male recruits reported having learned analytical skills from female counterparts; females reported having learned to develop and use their physical strengths.

Readiness and Unit Cohesion. In 1987 and 1990, noting the increasing need to improve integration of women into the fleet, SECNAV directed initial and follow-on Navy Women's Study Groups. The 1990 study indicated that "non-acceptance of women began at the training centers"; this finding prompted implementation of a 1992 pilot program to integrate accession training in Orlando.

Habitability considerations are the sole factor in determining women's assignability to combatant ships. As a result, even in peacetime as a routine part of the Navy's forward-presence responsibilities around the world, men and women live and work in close proximity, sharing the unique challenges of serving aboard a warship.

Navy recruit training is designed to minimize differences between recruits; they must meet the same performance standards. The only required variant is physical readiness testing. Navy physical fitness standards for both age and gender apply to all Service members. The standards were recently revised to make the minimum standards for the female run more challenging, in line with male standards. All recruits are required to pass the Navy's physical fitness test with a score of 'good' or better in each category (pushups, curl-ups and run), based on the standards for the recruit's age and gender.

The morale of a unit is a function primarily of the leadership of that unit. Gender integrated training commenced in FY95. Graduates of this format are "first-termers" (our most junior personnel), who have not yet

assumed positions of leadership, and whose influence on the morale of a unit would be minimal.

However, since these individuals are so junior, they are ideally positioned to be positively influenced by both male and female role models and respected leaders. This influence is essential in preparing recruits to become Sailors who will progress through their Naval careers and gradually assume higher positions of leadership. Following their experience as recruit division commanders and instructors, experienced Petty Officers return to fleet leadership positions, where they can continue to convey the positive aspects of gender integrated training.

The Navy has found the integrated training experience ideal to train recruits for the integrated environment they will meet in the fleet.¹⁹¹

Gender of Drill Instructor

In compliance with the statute, the Commission received the following response from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) on the feasibility and impact on personnel of assigning trainers of the same gender as the recruits.

To be fully prepared to enter an operational unit, Sailors must understand, from day one, that the Navy is gender integrated throughout all levels of the chain of command. It is essential that RDCs be allowed to train recruits of the opposite gender. It is useful both for the men and the women to see women in authority positions and as valued and qualified instructors throughout the recruit training environment. Without exposure to an RDC of the opposite sex (whether it is male or female) the training foundation could be adversely impacted and ultimately impact the development of unity, trust and teamwork.

Gender segregation would require a significant increase in the number of female RDCs (from 88 to 114) assigned to Great Lakes for duty.¹⁹²

¹⁹¹ See Appendix H “Service Secretaries’ Responses”.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

3. Air Force

a. Structure and Policies

Defining Gender Integration

Ninety-nine percent of Air Force enlisted job specialties are open to women. A gender-integrated workplace is the rule, not the exception, in Air Force operations. Because of this, the Air Force maintains that gender-integrated basic training is required in order to be realistic in preparing new airmen.

Readiness is affected by every airman's ability to conduct himself or herself appropriately at all times, especially under stressful conditions. Appropriate conduct involves accepting opposite gender airmen as both peers and leaders and being able to discipline oneself in the conduct of professional relationships so that personal behavior does not impair unit discipline or mission accomplishment. Recruits who can demonstrate gender discipline and professional work relationships with members of the opposite gender are clearly prepared to operate in a gender-integrated environment.

The Air Force recognizes that there will certainly be distractions in a gender-integrated environment. The goal, however, is to teach Air Force recruits how to deal with these distractions without affecting performance. Senior Air Force leaders believe that the best way to accomplish this is in the most controlled environment available – basic and technical training.

Finally, the Air Force's record of operational success clearly demonstrates that gender-integrated training works for them. Gender-integrated training ensures that airmen are better prepared for the challenges of the real Air Force when "trained as they will operate" – in units that are diverse in nature.

The Air Force now has more than 20 years of experience with gender-integrated training, and its training effectiveness measures indicate that it works well. Today, approximately 35,500 new recruits (both sexes) begin basic training each year. Last year, 9.06 percent of all these entries did not graduate from basic training and an additional 1.95 percent failed to make the cut in technical school for various reasons. This is the lowest attrition rate of any Service and in line with USAF historical averages.

Standards for Men and Women

Graduation requirements are exactly the same for men and women with the exception of the Physical Conditioning test. The variation in the physical conditioning test requirements for men and women does not constitute a difference in standards. The standards are based on physiological factors and result in equal physical conditioning end-states for men and women.

Physical Conditioning Test

	Males (<29 yrs)	Males (≥30 yrs)	Females (<29 yrs)	Females (≥30 yrs)
Two-mile run	18 min	21 min	21 min	23 min
Push-ups w/in two minutes	30 push-ups	30 push-ups	14 push-ups	14 push-ups
Sit-ups w/in two minutes	45 sit-ups	45 sit-ups	38 sit-ups	38 sit-ups

The Air Force has the same standards for men and women regarding confidence course stations/obstacles. There is no gender norming. Marksmanship standards are the same for both men and women, as are standards for nonphysical tasks. Currently, the USAF School of Aerospace Medicine is conducting a USAF- directed study that will revisit physical fitness and gender-based standards. The Commission urges the Air Force to pursue this study diligently and enact its findings in order to ensure that physical conditioning is maintained not only in basic training but also throughout Technical Training and is sustained in the operational forces.

Female Drill Instructors

Military training instructors (MTIs) are the Air Force's premier military role models. They are responsible and accountable for the training, safety, and protection of their recruits. The Air Force's goal is to have an MTI force whose gender composition approximates recruit demographics. As a matter of policy, all MTIs are volunteers. Experience has shown that volunteers are better trainers and role models. After completing a 14-week school, MTIs may be assigned to flights of same, opposite, or mixed gender.

The job of an MTI is a demanding but rewarding one. Applicants must be in the ranks of E-4 to E-7 for the first tour. They undergo an intensive screening process that includes review of previous five performance evaluations; Commander's recommendation and certification of integrity; background check for derogatory information; and a psychological assessment. MTI school lasts 14 weeks and includes training in human relations, learning theory, communication, core values, and dress/appearance. In addition, on-the-job training includes flight management, physical fitness, and flight administration. MTIs are supervised by section supervisors who are, in turn, supervised by senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Education is ongoing throughout the MTI's career. At the present, women comprise some 18 percent of the MTI cadre.

A study conducted for the Commission collected data from some 2,300 airmen on their basic training experience. It found that 85 percent of men and 89 percent of women reported having at least some female MTIs during basic training.¹⁹³

¹⁹³ Ramsberger, et al. (1999), Volume IV "Research" page 26.

b. Historical and Current Rationales

Historical Overview of Gender Integration

The USAF decision to train in a gender-integrated environment is connected to societal trends. During the 1970s, the number of women in the military began to increase as a result of changing societal views on the role of women in America and the military transition to an all-volunteer force. The Air Force faced labor-force constraints brought about by the abolition of conscription in 1973. At the same time, women began to enter the Air Force in increasing numbers, consistent with the rise of women in the U.S. labor force.

The rising number of women meant that the investment in training women in a segregated environment was growing proportionately. The senior leadership of the Air Force noted that continuance of separate, redundant systems of basic training required overlapping organizational structures, facilities, and training cadre that were both inefficient and costly. Although records are not exact on documenting the reason for going to integrated training, it was intuitive that it was a more efficient way to use training resources and a more economical way to develop and maintain the supporting infrastructure (*i.e.*, training staff, living quarters, classrooms, *etc.*).

Female airmen did not belong to the line of the Air Force until the Women in the Air Force (WAF) Corps was abolished in the early 1970s. The earliest Air Force policy/practice change relevant to gender-integrated training occurred in April 1974, when administrative, personnel and disciplinary matters pertaining to women transferred from a WAF squadron to the unit to which the airman was assigned. In addition, male MTIs began to supplement female MTIs in supervision of female flights, and the Obstacle Course was added to female basic training (not required for graduation) to provide additional physical enhancement for female trainees.

In 1975, a test program was implemented and female MTIs began teaching male flights. The Obstacle Course was made mandatory for females, and the same performance standards for males and females on the Confidence Course (name changed from Obstacle Course to Confidence Course) were adopted.

In 1976, gender integration of MTIs within flights was totally implemented, thus including women along with men as leaders and role models for both men and women in Basic Military Training (BMT). Male and female curriculum course documents also were combined to provide all recruits with the same training

In 1977, green uniforms (previously blue) were issued to female trainees, creating clothing uniformity between the genders. Male and female flights began to run the Confidence Course together, establishing teamwork between genders in the training environment. In this same year, integration of BMT squadrons began. A squadron that previously trained only males began training both male and female flights; men and women lived in separate wings but shared dining, recreational, and housekeeping facilities. These changes eliminated 9-10 training hours (cosmetology) and 7 clothing-issue hours for female

recruits and aligned total training hours between males and females. In addition, females began M-16 training rifle qualification in 1978 for the first time.

By December 1990, all BMT squadrons were gender integrated. In September 1992, BMT issued its first policy letters on sexual harassment, defined sexual harassment, and issued a commander's policy letter. One-on-one opposite gender private counseling was eliminated.

In 1995, a totally new Physical Conditioning program was implemented in BMT for both males and females. It changed the run distance to 2.0 miles, incorporated tougher running times and upper-body strength training, and added pushups, sit-ups, and 20 station-workout circuits.

The first field training exercise (FTX) in BMT was implemented in 1996. The intent was to instill a warrior spirit and to teach trainees that they have joined a profession of arms. Also in 1996, a "Zero Tolerance" view on sexual harassment was instituted. Air Force Pamphlet 36-2705, "Discrimination and Sexual Harassment," is issued to all recruits during BMT.

In 1997, one-on-one opposite gender private counseling rules were toughened. If counseling an opposite gender trainee, another member of that gender must be present, thus reducing the risk of unprofessional conduct by any party. Combined flight formations also were implemented throughout BMT, providing for maximum opportunity for gender-integrated basic training

In 1998, policy regarding one-on-one opposite gender private counseling sessions between MTIs and trainees changed again; it now required the presence of two permanent party personnel, eliminating the use of another trainee as a witness during counseling sessions. Other changes included increasing physical conditioning to six days per week and clustering female dormitory bays on the top floor of each Recruit Housing and Training (RH&T) facility to enhance gender security and privacy as suggested in the Secretary of Defense's response to the Kassebaum Baker committee recommendations.

Current Assessment

Currently, the USAF BMT program of instruction calls for a 6.4-week (47 calendar days) course of instruction. The main components include military training, processing, academics, physical conditioning, and warrior training. There is an annual throughput of some 34,000 recruits, 28 percent of whom are female. Average class size is 58 trainees per flight, with a ratio of trainers to trainees of 1.5 to 58. Approximately 60 percent of flights are gender-integrated.

The USAF rationale for continuing gender-integrated training is based on two pillars. First, leaders believe it is essential for personnel to be trained in the very way they operate. The Air Force, with over 99 percent of its career fields open to both genders, operates in a gender-neutral environment. From their first day, airmen are expected to conduct themselves

professionally and accept and work with others as both peers and leaders, regardless of gender. Second, gender-integrated basic training has been an essential element in developing this professional culture for more than 20 years. BMT has been very successful in providing the military preparation necessary to ensure the highest state of operational readiness.

The most commonly heard criticism of gender-integrated training is that the distraction of mixing males and females adversely affects training. The Air Force acknowledges that this distraction may exist – in fact, they believe that it is a very compelling reason that training together is the correct method when the objective is a totally gender-integrated force. One of the goals of basic military and technical training is to teach new recruits to deal with these distractions without any degradation in either mission accomplishment or desired training objectives. The best way to instill and reinforce the fundamentals of professional relationships is in the most controlled environment –basic military and technical training.

Air Force leaders believe that foundations are built at the beginning, not in the middle or at the end of any construction process. Therefore, they require gender-integrated basic training in order to teach and reinforce these standards of appropriate conduct from the first day of duty. This establishes a strong and correct foundation upon which to build further training and ensure that the highest possible level of mission-ready airmen arrive at operational units.

The Air Force points out that the gender-integrated training concept used by the Air Force for more than 20 years has been adopted successfully in the civilian sector. Fire fighting schools and police academies across the country train from day one the way they will work, in a totally gender-integrated environment without any degradation in training standards. Just as in the military, this shared training experience is essential if graduates are to function professionally as a team on duty.

The Air Force argues that young recruits of both genders may well be challenged to focus on training and to maintain a professional decorum. However, singling out sexuality as too difficult or distracting to control during basic training sends the wrong message to recruits – if it is too difficult to do during basic training, what will be the affect when they assume critical positions in operational units?

Air Force leaders state that the need for gender-integrated training is reinforced by the more difficult global challenges the Air Force faces today. Since the end of the Cold War, the Air Force has been engaged continuously in contingency operations across the spectrum of conflict. These challenges have been well met – as a diverse yet totally integrated professional team. As the transition from a threat-based Cold War garrison force to a capabilities-based expeditionary force continues, so must the evolution to an aerospace force. This means embracing a culture and an approach that emphasizes more rapid and more effective operations, with forces trained to the tasks they will need to do from day one in the way they will operate.

Surveys conducted for the Commission found that 49 percent of airmen with one to eight years of tenure felt that gender-integrated training is the best format, with an additional

22 percent indicating that it does not matter one way or the other. Some 79 percent of the sample indicated that basic training improves or remains the same when it is gender-integrated. Although 59 percent stated that gender-integrated training has a positive effect on group performance, 47 percent said it positively affects individual performance.

Also, 67 percent agreed that mixed-gender basic training eases the transition to gender-integrated operational units. Finally, multivariate analysis showed that first term airmen who had worked with the opposite gender more frequently during basic training reported being better prepared by basic for technical training and their first assignment than those who had had less opportunity to work with the opposite gender in basic training.¹⁹⁴

Train as You Fight

The dichotomy of separate but equal is eschewed by the Air Force. It believes segregated training would create the wrongful perception that the proper role of women requires that they be kept apart from men. For those who enter the Air Force without any preconceived notions or problems with gender integration, separation would create them. They feel strongly that the views of those who have difficulty working in such an environment would be reinforced, and this perception and the resulting problems would resurface at the operational unit level. The ultimate goal is a single Air Force made up of members of both genders, and the Air Force believes the best way to accomplish this is to start at day one. Of note, basic military training in the Air Force has been gender integrated for 20 years. It has been successful and to reverse that direction could cause grave damage.

Evaluation of Gender Integration

During the last decade, the Air Force has continually reviewed the impact of gender integration on the operational climate within its ranks. The 1988 and 1995 Department of Defense surveys on sexual harassment¹⁹⁵ indicated that the Air Force has an extremely low incidence of gender-related misconduct, the lowest of any Service. Any misconduct is inappropriate, and the Air Force strives to continually improve its performance. This low incidence rate can be attributed at least in part to successful acclimation and operation in a gender-integrated environment, an environment that begins in day one of basic training.

Within the Air Force, other indicators are used to assess organizational climate. One such measure is documentation of incidences of inappropriate behavior. Even though the Air Force's position is that "one case is too many," the statistics are encouraging. A factor used to assess the relative risk of misconduct is to compare the number of incidents to the overall number of airmen trained during a given period; this is called the "incidence rate." If this factor is applied to calendar years 1994 through 1998, the incidence rate of trainee to trainee misconduct during this period was 0.00002 (3 divided by 150,000). The instructor-to-trainee misconduct incidence rate was 0.00005 (7 divided by 150,000).


¹⁹⁴ Ramsberger, et al. (1999), Volume IV "Research" page 46.

¹⁹⁵ Mason, R., Kavee, J., Wheelless, S., George, B., Riemer, R., & Elig, T., (1996, December). *The 1995 Armed Forces Sexual Harassment Survey: Statistical Methodology Report* (DMDC Report No. 96-016). Arlington, VA: Defense Manpower Data Center.

In another measure, BMT continually surveys technical training school cadres to ascertain their degree of satisfaction with the basic discipline and preparedness of BMT graduates. With very little deviation, the results of these surveys have averaged 4.3 on a 5.0 scale. This assessment instrument is known as the Military Training Leader Survey (MTLS), and it has been administered for over two fiscal years.

Research conducted for the Commission revealed that the preponderance of Air Force leaders feel that integrated training best facilitates the purpose of basic training.¹⁹⁶ This view was endorsed by 49 percent of E-6s/E-7s, 65 percent of O-3s, 59 percent of commanders, 57 percent of command noncommissioned officers, and 40 percent of recruit trainers who were sampled and responded. These data further indicated that those graduating from mixed-gender basic training scored similarly to individuals from segregated units on measures of such as commitment, group identity, and respect for authority.

Air Force Graduating Recruit Survey (Males)



Military readiness is complex and built on many components. The major component that Air Force BMT contributes is that of military discipline. The goal is to graduate individuals who are disciplined, physically fit, and ready to live the Air Force Core Values of “integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all we do.” These are the foundations upon which others build.

c. Readiness Implications

Service-Specific Requirements

Over time, the Air Force’s process has evolved and has institutionalized the philosophy of “We train the way we operate.” The Air Force now has more than 20 years of experience with gender-integrated training, and training effectiveness measures appear to

¹⁹⁶ Johnson (1999), Volume III “Research” page 122.

indicate that it works well. Today, approximately 35,000 raw recruits begin basic training each year. Last year, 9.06 percent did not graduate from basic training and an additional 1.05 percent failed to make the cut in technical school for various reasons. This is in line with historical averages and constitutes the best success rate for the Department of Defense.

With the demands of an emerging Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) and the current high operations tempo, airmen must quickly assimilate and function in their operational units after basic and technical training. To make this process a seamless continuum, the Air Force employs realistic training scenarios and strategies conducted in a realistic environment. Because over 99 percent of enlisted job specialties are open to women, operational worksites are integrated, and 18 percent of the enlisted force is female, training scenarios include both genders in order to be realistic. Therefore, the essential elements of the Air Force's BMT format include rigorous gender-integrated physical conditioning combined-gender flight formations, gender-integrated classrooms and field exercises, and separate-gender dormitory bays within a common RH&T facility. That the current gender format is working is further supported by the research results from airmen with one to eight years of service showing the positive relationship between frequency of working together with the opposite gender in basic training and being better prepared by basic for their first assignment.¹⁹⁷

Readiness Goals

The Air Force understands that readiness is affected by every airman's ability to conduct himself or herself appropriately at all times, especially under stressful conditions. Appropriate conduct involves accepting the opposite gender airmen as both peers and leaders; knowing how to interact with the opposite sex because operational environments are mixed gender; and being able to discipline oneself in the conduct of professional relationships so that personal behavior does not impair unit discipline or mission accomplishment. The Air Force feels strongly that it needs gender-integrated basic training in order to teach and reinforce these standards of appropriate conduct from the first day of duty and to establish a strong and correct foundation upon which to build further training and ensure that the highest possible level of mission-ready airmen arrive at operational units. The Commission concurs that this is the best training format.

These essential elements mirror the expectations of Air Force operational units who train together, work together, and deploy together. Thus, the Air Force's BMT format and philosophy mirror the operational environment as much as practical from the first day the recruit enters the Air Force. This supports the EAF concept of using procedures, doctrine, and organization to allow for the most effective use of people and resources to meet the national security requirements of the 21st century.

Trainees who can demonstrate gender discipline and work well with members of the opposite sex are more ready to operate in a gender-integrated environment. Gender-integrated training operations are consistent with Air Force employment and deployment scenarios; because this is so, basic training is the best preparation for professional life. Women stand

¹⁹⁷ Ramsberger, et al (1999), Volume IV "Research" page 46.

shoulder to shoulder with male airmen daily in the routine execution of the mission. Conducting basic training in a segregated environment, therefore, would prepare trainees for a false reality and thus would place a burden on operational units to expose and reeducate new airmen about technical and operational environments. The effect of gender-segregated basic training would be to shift the burden of making airmen “mission ready” from BMT to technical schools and first duty stations.

BMT shares a training continuum with advanced schools, so another measure of merit with regard to the current practice of gender-integrated training is the technical school’s survey of their graduate effectiveness as evaluated by operational units. Of all who graduate basic and technical training, 94 percent are rated satisfactory or higher by their first line supervisor in both job-related skills and military bearing. This suggests that graduates of our schools are extremely well prepared to make a positive contribution to unit readiness.

Gender-integrated training ensures that airmen are better prepared for the challenges of the real Air Force when trained as they will operate – in units that are diverse. The training requirements for basic training are similar to those of operational units because the Air Force employs reality-based training scenarios whenever possible in order to demonstrate learning objectives. Separating the genders in events such as field training exercises, confidence courses, M-16 qualification, and Warrior Week would affect resource scheduling and imply the use of different standards and a different culture for men and women.

Finally, gender-integrated basic training has been validated and linked to readiness by the BMT Review Committee, whose members are senior officers and enlisted personnel throughout the Air Force. Every aspect of the basic training program of instruction is based on operational requirements that are established and validated by line officer and enlisted leadership through the BMT review, which is accomplished at least once every three years.

Performance Standards

Air Force BMT is an intensive 6.4-week program that includes processing activities, academic classes, and warrior training. The standards are identical for men and women in all regards with the exception of Physical Conditioning, as outlined previously. In the general area of Military Training, recruits are expected to demonstrate proficiency in the following areas:¹⁹⁸

- Following instructions
- Paying attention to detail
- Demonstrating a sense of mission
- Understanding and fostering teamwork
- Respecting authority
- Demonstrating a positive attitude

¹⁹⁸ Standards are in accordance with 737 Training Group Instruction (TRGI) 36-3, *Basic Military Training*, the Basic Military Training Manuals (BMTM) (1997, September).

- Demonstrating self-discipline
- Demonstrating honorable conduct
- Demonstrating responsibility
- Firing the M-16 rifle
- Demonstrating an improvement in overall physical fitness
- Meeting fitness standards

Knowledge of military studies must be demonstrated by obtaining a minimum score of 70 percent on an end-of-course test. The following topics are covered:

• **Air Force Customs and Courtesies**

- Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel
- Air Force Rank Insignia
- Rendering Courtesies

• **Air Force History and Organization**

- Air Force History
- History of the USAF Enlisted Forces
- The Organizational Structure of the Air Force

• **Military Responsibilities**

- Military Citizenship
- Ethics
- The Code of Conduct
- The Law of Armed Conflict
- Environmental Awareness
- Air Force Resource Protection
- Quality in the Air Force
- The Air Force Substance Abuse Control Program

• **Security**

• **Career Information**

- The Enlisted Force Structure
- Career Progression
- The Air Force Quality Force Program
- Educational Opportunities

• **Personal Affairs**

- Military Entitlements
- Financial Management
- Staff Referral Agencies

• **Human Relations**

• **Health/Fitness and Nutrition**

- Health

- Fitness Concepts
- Individual Exercise
- Nutrition

Warrior training involves four components, as follows:

- Field Training Experience.** Trainees go through mobility orientations, tactical briefings and applications, and various team-building exercises.
- Confidence Course.** 1.5-mile, 20-obstacle course designed to instill confidence and teamwork and to test physical capabilities. Trainees perform the course twice in the training program.
- Physical Conditioning.** Trainees develop cardiovascular and strength through a six-day-per-week program. Each day consists of pre/post 15-minute warm up/stretching routines, a 30-minute exercise session, or a 20-30 minute run.
- M-16 Weapon Familiarization.** Trainees learn the function of the M-16 rifle, fire at stationary targets, and dismantle, clean, and reassemble the weapons for full qualification.

Attrition

Air Force attrition rates in basic training and technical training from Fiscal Year 1996 through Fiscal Year 1998 are as follow:


BASIC TRAINING

FISCAL YEAR	GENDER	ENTRY	ATTRITION	PERCENT	FY ATTRITION
1996	MALE	24,821	2,236	9.01	10.3%
	FEMALE	8,994	1,049	11.60	
1997	MALE	24,569	2,062	8.30	9.69%
	FEMALE	9,752	1,072	10.99	
1998	MALE	26,182	1,978	7.55	9.06%
	FEMALE	9,691	1,024	10.57	

TECHNICAL TRAINING

FISCAL YEAR	GENDER	ENTRY	ATTRITION	PERCENT	FY ATTRITION
1996	MALE	29,736	724	2.4	2.15%
	FEMALE	9,685	182	1.9	
1997	MALE	29,977	725	2.4	2.15%
	FEMALE	10,396	198	1.9	
1998	MALE	36,481	683	1.9	1.95%
	FEMALE	12,428	252	2.0	

Information on attrition was extracted from one of the reports generated specifically for the Commission.¹⁹⁹ In this analysis, 36-month attrition rates were examined by gender and cause. Efforts also were made to use the existing data to determine what factors were predictive of premature end of service.



As seen in the figure above, attrition rates at the 36-month point for Air Force personnel were fairly consistent for cohort years 1991 through 1996. Three findings are worth noting here. First, aside from a small dip in 1992 (to 22 percent), attrition rates held relatively steady at 24 to 26 percent. Second, the apparent drop in attrition in 1996 is an artifact of the timing of the data captured for this analysis. Thirty-six months had not passed since some of the 1996 cohort entered Service; therefore, the 36-month attrition rates are underestimated. Third, attrition rates for Air Force women were higher than the rates for Air Force men in the same cohort. This gap decreased from 12 percentage points to 5 percentage points over the years 1991-1995.²⁰⁰

Reasons for Discharge

The patterns of reasons for discharge were also consistent across years. The figures below depict the rates at which the three most common discharge reasons were recorded. Each rate is reported separately for men and women.


The most commonly cited reason for discharge was *failure to meet minimum behavioral and performance criteria*. This accounted for 59 to 64 percent of all 36-month attrition.²⁰¹ This reason was much more common for males than for females; there was a 24

¹⁹⁹ Sipes et al (1999), Volume IV "Research" pages 577-662.

²⁰⁰ The gap was even smaller in 1996 -- only 4 percentage points -- but this may be an artifact of the truncated data set and thus is being ignored.

²⁰¹ The 1996 rate of 68 percent is omitted because of the data truncation.


to 29 percentage point difference between genders each year. The patterns of the trends were similar for men and women.



The second-most-common reason for attrition was *medical disqualification*, which accounted for 19 to 26 percent of 36-month attrition. This reason was cited more frequently for women than for men; there was a 9 to 14 point difference each year. Both genders exhibited a slight increase from 1992 to 1994. In 1995, women had a slight decrease.²⁰²


²⁰² The decrease in 1996 may be an artifact of data truncation and might disappear if a complete 36-month data set were available.

Percentage of Air Force Attrition Attributable to Medical Disqualification



The third most common reason for discharge was *other separations or discharge*. This accounted for 8 to 17 percent of all 36-month attrition. This reason accounted for a greater proportion of female attrition than male attrition; there was a 14 to 18 point difference each year. The trends indicate that this “Other” category was used less frequently over time.

Percentage of Air Force Attrition Attributable to Other Separations or Discharge



Gender Integration and Readiness and Morale

The Air Force has used the gender-integrated basic training format successfully for more than 20 years. Because the format is such an integral part of the institution, the Air Force does not isolate it as a separate variable in the readiness equation. However, Air Force BMT has evaluated gender-integration as it affects its trainees and MTI cadre perceptions.

When questioned, Air Force recruits overwhelmingly express their surprise that gender-segregated training formats are under consideration. They have grown up and been educated in a highly diverse, gender-integrated environment. Their expectations are to continue in such an environment. In addition, peers who went on to other occupations and careers also are expecting a gender-integrated environment (college or job). From this background, recruits conclude that any effort to provide “separate but equal” training would be strongly perceived as “separate but unequal” training. Separate training runs counter to a long-standing Air Force practice of providing all new entrants to the enlisted corps a common shared experience that breaks class, race, and gender barriers in order to build unit cohesion.

The strength of training cadre support for gender-integrated basic training is equally impressive. On 3 June 98, the basic training headquarters polled all MTIs present for duty and asked them which approach, gender-integrated or gender-segregated basic training, was better for the Air Force. This was a non-attribution poll with confidentiality of response maintained by squadron commanders, who aggregated overall numbers in their reports. No less than 95 percent of the MTIs favored gender-integrated training. Of the remaining five percent, most did not object to gender-integrated training but rather to combined-gender flight formations because of the increased workload associated with this method of flight management.

Research conducted for the Commission included a survey of 2,272 airmen with one to eight years of experience. When asked about the effect on the quality of basic training of having males and females in the same unit 79 percent of the Air Force respondents reported that gender-integrated training improved or had no effect on basic training.

- Improves 51 percent
- Stays the Same 28 percent
- Declines 21 percent

Among other things, they were asked about the effect of gender-integrated training on a variety of outcomes. The table below summarizes these responses.

Retrospective Survey of Enlisted Members with 1-8 Years of Service (Air Force) Selected Items²⁰³

Survey Item	Percentage that Strongly Agree/ Agree	Percentage that Neither Agree nor Disagree	Percentage that Strongly Disagree/ Disagree
GIT has a positive effect on individual performance.	47	34	19
GIT has a positive effect on group performance.	59	25	16
GIT results in lower standards for all.	15	23	62
GIT makes it easier to adapt to a GI unit.	67	20	13
GIT reduces the likelihood of later problems.	35	30	36
GIT reflects experience in civilian life.	53	32	15

As the data displayed demonstrate, generally small percentages of respondents disagreed with the notion that gender-integrated training positively affects performance,

²⁰³ Ramsberger, et al. (1999), Volume IV “Research” pages 32-36.

makes it easier to adapt to integrated units, and reflects experience in civilian life. Somewhat surprisingly, there was a relatively equal split in opinions about the effect of gender-integrated training on later problems, such as fraternization and harassment. Finally, only 15 percent supported the position that mixing males and females in basic training results in lower standards for all. Although females were over-represented in the Air Force portion of the retrospective study (58 percent to 42 percent), multivariate analyses revealed no relationships between respondent gender and the attitudes summarized above. The only significant predictor of these views was how frequently the respondent worked with the opposite gender during basic training; those who did so more often were more likely to have positive views of gender-integrated training. When the same survey respondents were asked to assess themselves on performance-related dimensions prior to basic training, immediately following basic training, and currently, there were ratings of positive change regardless of gender-related variables.²⁰⁴

During the course of conducting 42 focus-group sessions (including 10 among airmen at Lackland and Langley Air Force Bases) with enlisted personnel from basic training through operational unit settings, acceptance and even endorsement of gender-integrated training was the norm. Personnel shortages rather than gender issues surfaced as a key issue detracting from morale, cohesion, and performance. Peer-leadership problems were noted, particularly by airmen in basic and technical training. Learning how to lead and be led was a salient issue in promoting teamwork and cohesion.²⁰⁵

Air Force focus group participants were least likely of all the Services to volunteer a gender-related issue before the moderator specifically asked about gender. Female airmen were among those heard to lament that the inappropriate behavior of a few women was often generalized to all women. Airmen reported that gender was not an important issue or at least no different from gender issues in the civilian world. As one airman in an operational unit put it:

“I don’t care if you’re a guy or a girl. If you can do the job, do it well and protect me while I protect you, I don’t care if you’re male or female, or if you’re green, you’re black, you come from Mars, who you love and who you don’t love. Just as long as you keep that personal, and you do your job and you do it well, I don’t care.”

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ Laurence, et al, (1999) Volume IV “Research” pages 289-290.

d. Feasibility and Implications of Imposing Gender Segregation of Trainees and Instructors

Gender Segregation of Training

The Air Force would be required to expend significant resources in order to implement a gender-segregated mode of BMT. However, these operations and maintenance expenditures would mainly involve one-time start-up costs associated with activating and adding Recruit Housing and Training (RH&T) facilities.

Reshuffling recruits to permit a transition to a gender-segregated housing policy would cause inefficiencies in capacity utilization because of the Air Force's inability to billet males and females in the same facility. There would be massive under-utilization of dormitory bays in the RH&Ts dedicated to female recruits. It would impair the ability to meet training requirements during certain peak-load times of the year because of capacity constraints (a summer surge is a typical example). So, ultimately, BMT would have to expand into a seventh RH&T to accommodate a gender-separate housing/training format.

The cost of activating the seventh facility is estimated to be \$1.4 million. The annual operating cost would be \$1.3 million. Two officers and four enlisted personnel for staffing the seventh squadron's additional command structure also would be needed. However, activating the seventh and last remaining BMT RH&T facility means that no "spare" RH&T facility would be available to handle emergencies. At least one spare facility is needed as a backup to address contingencies (utility failure or natural disaster) that would disable one of the operational RH&Ts. Basic Training has twice in the past year had to relocate recruits from one RH&T to another (in whole or in part) because of facility failure. In addition, this spare RH&T maintains a reserve capacity to meet unforeseen training production-surge requirements.

An eighth RH&T facility would be needed (as a spare) if gender-segregated training were implemented. Since only seven RH&Ts are currently configured to BMT standards, a former RH&T facility which now houses office workers on a different part of Lackland AFB, would be required as a spare. To make it available for BMT use, existing tenants would have to be relocated to alternative quarters and the RH&T would need to be reconfigured to meet recruit training standards. Therefore, the costs associated with acquiring the backup (eighth) RH&T would be the cost of relocating existing tenants (\$3.7 million) and refurbishing and equipping the facility to meet BMT needs (\$8.0 million for refurbishing, \$1.4 million for equipping).²⁰⁶

The costs outlined above are rough order-of-magnitude estimates. A detailed itemization of expenses would require three months to research.

²⁰⁶ See Appendix H "Service Secretaries' Responses."

Gender of Drill Instructors

Under conditions of gender-segregated training, the need for female (same sex) MTIs would increase. It is feasible to provide female MTIs out of in-house assets, but to do this, Basic Training would have to restrict assignment of female MTIs to flight-level positions. This is due to staffing constraints; only 18 percent of the MTI corps are women even though 28 percent of the basic-trainee population is female. This assignment restriction would ultimately hurt female MTI advancement into supervisory and other career-enhancing leadership positions and, therefore, to volunteer for Military Training Instructor duty. As was indicated previously, volunteers are preferred for this arduous duty.²⁰⁷

4. Marine Corps

a. Structure and Policies

Defining Gender Integration

All Marine Corps recruits start their training with 12 weeks of gender-segregated recruit training. All female recruits are trained at Parris Island, South Carolina where males are assigned to one of three male-only recruit training battalions and females are assigned to a separate female-only recruit training battalion. Male recruits from the eastern half of the United States (delineated by the Mississippi River) train separately at Parris Island, and those from the western half of the United States train at an all-male depot in San Diego, California. Marine Corps drill instructors (DIs), as well as all series and company personnel, are the same sex as their recruits; however, recruits may receive specialized instruction (*e.g.*, swimming, marksmanship, self-defense) from trainers of the opposite gender. Most training takes place at the platoon and series level. The same-gender battalions live, eat, and, except as described above, train separately.

After boot camp, Marine infantrymen attend the School of Infantry (East) at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, or the School of Infantry (West) at Camp Pendleton, California. Marines not designated for the infantry attend Marine Combat Training (MCT), a 17-day, scenario-based field training exercise also located at Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton. (MCT is also referred to as “Operation Leatherneck.”) Female Marines attend MCT only at Camp Lejeune. The Marine Corps describes MCT as partially gender-integrated. In each company of four platoons, one platoon is all-female and three are all-male. The male and female platoons eat and train together but billet separately. The platoon-level staffs are of the same sex as the Marines under training with an MOS 0369 infantry staff noncommissioned officer (SNCO) (male) as the platoon commander. Company-level personnel are a combination of male and female officers and noncommissioned officers.

After MCT, Marines attend their military occupational specialty (MOS) school; 62 percent of those schools are conducted by other Services. All non-combat arms MOS schools conducted by the Marine Corps are fully gender-integrated, that is, men and women live, eat,

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

and train together without any unit limitations. Men and women live in dormitory-style barracks and are billeted on separate floors. Women usually occupy the top floor, and men occupy the lower levels. This arrangement is at the discretion of the school’s commanding officer.

Standards for Men and Women

Although Marine Corps recruit training is gender-segregated, male and female recruits participate in the same training and are subject to the same graduation standards of marksmanship, physical fitness, combat water survival, general military subjects, personal appearance, and completion of the Crucible. In addition, recruits must be within weight or body-fat standards.

All graduation standards are identical for men and women except for the Physical Fitness Test (PFT). The PFT gender-based standards provide different upper-body strength and endurance events for men (pull-ups) and women (flexed-arm hang); and an adjusted 3.0-mile run standard for men and women. Body weight and body-fat requirements are also gender-based.

In October 1996, the Marine Corps implemented changes to recruit training to increase its rigor and in doing so, increased the training and graduation standards, including increasing the length of training to a 12-week regimen for male and female recruits. All recruits must meet the standards shown in the following table for graduation.

RECRUIT TRAINING GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS

PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST Minimum Passing Score: 135 out of 300 points			
	EVENT	MAXIMUM STANDARDS	MINIMUM STANDARDS
MALE	Pull-ups	20	3
	Ab crunches	100 reps (2 minutes)	50 reps
	3-Mile Run	18 minutes or less	28 minutes
FEMALE	Flexed Arm Hang	70 seconds	15 seconds
	Ab crunches	100 reps (2 minutes)	50 reps
	3-Mile Run	21 minutes or less	31 minutes
QUALIFICATION WITH THE SERVICE RIFLE Minimum Qualification: 190 out of 250 points			
COMPLETION OF THE COMBAT WATER SURVIVAL (CWS) TEST			
CWS CLASS – 4 (Minimum)	In the utility uniform (w/o boots) – enter shallow (1 meter) water – swim 25 meters		
	Using the “abandon ship” technique – step from a minimum height of 8 ft into deep water		
	Tread water and demonstrate “drown proofing” for 2 minutes		
	Without exiting the water – inflate the uniform blouse – float for 1 minute – deflate the blouse and swim 25 meters		
ACADEMIC PROFICIENCY Minimum 80%, General Military Subjects			
FINAL INSPECTION Pass Battalion Commander’s Inspection			
CRUCIBLE			

Female Drill Instructors

The Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, assigns female recruits to all-female platoons, each with a female platoon commander and three female DIs. These platoons are part of an all-female “Series” with an all-female staff. Male platoons and Series are identically configured. Most training takes place at the platoon and Series levels. This training is provided by the all-female or all-male platoon or Series staff or by other male or female instructors from the various training-event staffs; for example, weapons instruction, qualification firing, gas chamber, and swimming.

There is extensive screening of all prospective Marine Corps DIs, regardless of gender, before and during their training program. A four-phase screening process begins before any Marine is accepted for DI training and continues after assignment to a recruit training regiment (RTR). The four-phase screening begins with an initial screening at the Enlisted Assignments Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), with a thorough review of the Marine’s official military personnel file. In accordance with MCO 1326.6C, *Selecting, Screening, and Preparing Enlisted Marines for Drill Instructor, Recruiter, and Independent Duties*, the second and most critical screening is undertaken by the Marine’s commanding officer (CO). It is the CO who knows and works with the candidate and truly plays the most important role in screening because of personal knowledge of the individual and access to the Marine’s records and performance information not readily available to HQMC. The CO’s screening is designed to assess whether the potential DI has the maturity, leadership, and judgment required for “making Marines.” The CO’s screening encompasses the following areas:

- Education (DI education should equal that of the majority of recruits)
- Disciplinary record
- Medical qualification
- Physical fitness (Required 1st Class Physical Fitness Test score)
- Height-weight and/or body fat standards
- Financial stability
- Family stability (Not currently enrolled in family advocacy programs)

After acceptance to DI School, there is a screening process that continues throughout the course of instruction by the DI School staff (all former DIs). The staff evaluates the students against the Marine Corps’ Individual Training Standards (ITSs) established for the DI MOS (8511), which require evaluation through written and performance tests or both. The staff also evaluates the student’s desire, commitment, integrity, character, and core values. Early in the training process, the students complete a psychological profile administered by the Medical Health Unit (MHU) aboard each recruit depot. The profile is designed to identify “potential-risk drill instructors.” The MHU staff screens the results and has historically directed 10-15 percent of each class to complete additional evaluative testing via the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-1 (MMPI-1) test, which is a more comprehensive psychological testing and screening tool. The MHU staff screens the results

and interviews students who display specific indicators that may pose future problems as a DI. Historically, one to two students per year at each DI School fail psychological screening and are disenrolled.

b. Historical and Current Rationales

Historical Overview of Gender Integration

Although recruit training always has been (and continues to be) gender-segregated, several training changes have occurred over the past three decades that are consistent with the changing role of women in the Marine Corps. From 1967 to 1986, recruit training reflected the limited role of women, particularly the unlikely probability that they would be involved in combat. Women's initial entry level training prepared them to serve in the traditional administrative, fiscal, and selected technical occupational fields. From 1986 to the present, as the role of women in the Corps evolved and expanded, so did entry-level training for women.

An examination of the history of Marine Corps recruit training highlights the fact that many of the issues, conflicts, and challenges faced by today's recruit trainers were similarly confronted by yesterday's commanders and DIs. Recruit training today is more structured and standardized, including a single program of instruction for male and female recruits, and a command relationship between the recruiting and recruit training commands that is a critical enhancement to the Marine Corps' entry-level training pipeline.

In 1968, recruit training for women was increased from 7 to 8 weeks, with a greater emphasis on the "image and development of Women Marines." Recruit training for men was increased to 9 weeks in 1970 and to 11 weeks in 1972. In 1976, the physical fitness test standards for women were increased and assignment of women to DI school began.

In 1981, women began participating in a modified familiarization marksmanship course, which provided closer alignment to men's training. Hand to hand training was reinstated for men (after having been eliminated in 1974), and defensive combat training was initiated for women. In 1985, the gas chamber, obstacle course, and confidence course were initiated for female recruits.

In 1985, the Commandant of the Marine Corps issued MCO 1500.24D, *Training Policy for Women Marines*, which was directed at the need to provide women with the same training as men, except direct combat. Training for women was increased from 8 to 11 weeks to mirror the male recruit training schedule. Female recruits began the full marksmanship qualification course in 1986, which constituted a new graduation requirement for women.

Marine Battle Skills Training/Basic Warrior Training was established for all recruits in 1988 to enhance combat skill training. Female recruit training was increased to 12 weeks, and female MCT was conducted in the 12th week. Marine Combat Training (MCT) for males was initiated at the Schools of Infantry (East) and (West) the following year.

Fourteen hours of Core Values Training was added to the program of instruction for all recruits in 1994. Revisions were made to female recruit training in that year to more closely align it with male recruit training.

In 1996, recruit training for men and women was increased to 12 weeks (63 training days). The Crucible event was added to recruit training for all recruits, and a single program of instruction was implemented. In 1997, female Marines conducted MCT with male Marines at the School of Infantry (East).

Current Assessment

Male and female recruits currently undergo training under a single program of instruction and are required to meet the same graduation requirements regardless of gender. The end result is not a male Marine or a female Marine who graduates from recruit training, but simply a basically trained Marine.

Train As You Fight

Central to the Marine ethos is to fight as units, not as individuals. Therefore, the “train as you fight” philosophy does not apply to Marine Corps initial entry-level training. The purpose of recruit training is to produce a basic Marine. Marine Combat Training takes the recruit-training graduate and teaches him or her basic *individual* combat skills. Follow-on MOS schools provide basic *individual* occupational-field skill training. The key point is that the focus of all training in the initial entry-level training pipeline is the *individual*. However, the Marine Corps does not fight as a group of individuals; rather, it fights as a task-organized group of units. For units, “train as you fight” takes on particular importance and is one of the basic tenets of all unit training that takes place in the operational units. This is considered part of sustainment training, which occurs after initial entry training. As a result, from an institutional perspective, “train as you fight” has significance only when applied to unit training.

Evaluation of Gender Integration

The Marine Corps does not conduct gender-integrated basic training. Gender-segregated recruit training has a significant effect on operational unit combat readiness/effectiveness, not because of the military skills it teaches but because of the way it teaches them. It is the cornerstone of the Marine Corps rheostat approach to gender integration. By separating the genders at recruit training, partially integrating them at MCT, and then fully integrating them at the various MOS schools, the Marine Corps has created a progressive training program that senior leaders believe develops mutual respect and appreciation among Marines. The rheostat approach to training is designed to make the individual first into a Marine, no matter the gender, and then to produce effective operational units through unit and sustainment training. This works well for the Marine Corps because of their mission, composition, and culture.

c. Readiness Implications

Service-Specific Requirements

The purpose of recruit training is simple: Make Marines. The young men and women who arrive at the recruit depots to begin that process are generally away from home for the first time. In general, they arrive with immature, undeveloped, and unfocused thoughts on professionalism and professional conduct. The only thing they have in common is their desire to be a Marine. By capitalizing on that desire, recruit training transforms these individuals from many diverse backgrounds into Marines imbued with a common set of values and standards.

Although recruit training teaches basic military skills, such as physical fitness, close-order drill, and marksmanship, it does not train the recruit to fight and survive in combat – that comes later at Marine Combat Training. Instead, recruit training is more accurately a socialization process. Civilians are transformed into basic Marines. It is a physically and mentally challenging ordeal, one that requires constant supervision. DIs control and manage that transformation through 24-hour around-the-clock interaction with their recruits. They teach core values, institutional “rights” and “wrongs,” and what constitutes proper authority. This teacher-student, father-son, mother-daughter relationship is the heart and soul of the recruit training experience, and success or failure of the socialization process rests squarely on it.

Marine Corps leaders believe that, in this gender-segregated recruit training, the strong, positive role of the DI gives impressionable young men and women appropriate role models without the distracting undercurrent of sexual attraction. For women, it also removes the stereotype that only men can be authority figures. They see strong female role models not only in control of them and their group but also interacting positively with other male DIs. As a result, women recruits come to realize very early in their training cycle that they can be strong, assertive leaders and that they play an integral part in the success of the Corps. They also believe, based on their strict and arduous training regime, that gender-segregated training also provides an environment free from latent or overt sexual pressures, thereby giving new and vulnerable recruits the opportunity to focus on and absorb Marine standards of behavior.

Readiness Goals

The first element and the key to building effective, cohesive, gender-integrated operational units is creating a training environment that builds progressively to that end. The Marine Corps believes that it has achieved that goal through a process that is much like a rheostat moving from gender segregation at Recruit Training, to partial gender integration at Marine Combat Training, and finally to full gender integration at MOS-producing schools.

A second element of the initial entry-level training format that has a significant effect on the operational unit’s combat effectiveness is the Unit Cohesion Program. Unit cohesion is defined as the intense bonding of Marines, strengthened over time, resulting in absolute trust, subordination of self, and an intuitive relationship in collective actions of the unit. To achieve this, the Marine Corps forms teams of Marines during their initial entry-level training and subsequently assigns them to operational units in the fleet. Changing from individual


assignment to unit assignment is a major change, but it is one that senior leaders feel will improve combat efficiency on the battlefields of tomorrow.

Performance Standards

All recruits, male or female, must meet several standards for graduation: physical fitness test, qualification with the service rifle, completion of the Combat Water Survival test, academic proficiency, final inspection and the Crucible. Graduation requirements have always been based on the mission and organizational needs of the Corps. More simply said, “What does the Corps want a basic Marine to be capable of doing?” That definition has changed over time, and graduation requirements have reflected those changes. Recruits are required to master all graduation requirements so that operational commanders receive a basic Marine trained to a common standard.

Attrition


Attrition rates at the 36-month point for Marine Corps personnel were relatively consistent for cohort years 1991 through 1996.²⁰⁸ The overall attrition rates ranged from 28 to 31 percent. Attrition rates for Marine women were consistently higher than the rates for Marine men in the same cohort; this gap ranged from 11 to 20 percentage points. The apparent drop in attrition in 1996 is an artifact of the timing of the data capture for this analysis. Thirty-six months had not passed since some of the 1996 cohort entered Service; therefore, the 36-month attrition rates are underestimated.




The patterns of reasons for discharge were also consistent across years. The next three figures depict the rates at which the three most common reasons were recorded. Each rate is reported separately for men and women. The most commonly cited reason was *failure to*

²⁰⁸ Sipes & Laurence (1999), Volume IV “Research” page 655.


meet minimum behavioral and performance criteria. This accounted for an increasing proportion of all 36-month attrition, from 45 percent in 1991 to 66 percent in 1995. The figure indicates two notable facts. First, this reason was more common for males than for females; there was a 7 to 18 percentage point difference between genders each year. Second, this reason accounted for an increasing proportion of overall attrition for each gender in each cohort year (except for women in 1994).



The second most common reason for attrition was *medical disqualification*, which accounted for a decreasing proportion of 36-month attrition, from 48 percent in 1991 to 20 percent in 1995. The trend over time differed by gender. Men exhibited a steady decrease; women decreased from 1991 through 1993, then jumped above the male rate in 1994. There was a small decrease for women subsequently.



The third most common reason for discharge was *other separations or discharge*. This accounted for 5 to 14 percent of all 36-month attrition over time. The figure elucidates two findings. First, this reason accounted for a greater proportion of female attrition than male attrition; there was a decreasing gap each year, starting from a high of 26 percentage points in 1991 to a low of 5 percentage points in 1995.²⁰⁹



Commission Research Findings

The results of 42 focus groups conducted at 10 installations (including 10 sessions with Marines at Parris Island, South Carolina, and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina) with enlisted members from basic training, MOS schools, and operational units across Services indicated negative perceptions of women's contributions.²¹⁰ However, on the basis of first-hand experience, male Marines saw female Marines as competent and hard working. Gender surfaced as an issue prior to a direct question about gender most frequently among Marine focus-group participants. Almost all male Marines and many, if not most, of the women favored gender-segregated training. Some women lamented what they perceived as less emphasis on physical fitness in their training in comparison to men. This perception may be dated, given Marine Corps initiatives to bring training for women in line with that for men.

The results of surveys of graduating recruits and enlisted members in operational units generally did not show a relationship between training format relating to gender and constructs such as perceptions of authority, group identity, commitment, values, assessments of training effectiveness, and performance indicators. Gender format comparisons were not

²⁰⁹ The smallest gap is 2% in 1996. However, this will be ignored in this trend analysis because of the data truncation problem cited earlier.

²¹⁰ Laurence, et al. (1999), Volume IV "Research" pages 291, 301, 307-310.

possible for the Marine Corps. Marine leaders (ranging from 84 percent of E-6s and E-7s to 90 percent of commanders) indicated that they believed gender-segregated basic training is the best format.

A separate survey of enlisted members having one through eight years in service asked several questions about the basic training experience.²¹¹ A majority of personnel in each Service felt that basic training prepared them well for serving in gender-integrated units. For the Marine Corps, 77 percent reported that IET prepared them at least moderately well for serving in a gender-integrated unit.

When asked what gender mix best suited the purpose of basic training, results for Marine respondents were as follows:

- Integrated 9 percent
- Separate-Male Only MOS 9 percent
- Segregated 66 percent
- Doesn't Matter/Don't Know 16 percent

Further, when asked about the effect on the quality of basic training of having males and females in the same unit, a minority (41 percent) of the 1,967 Marine Corps respondents reported that gender-integrated training improved or had no effect on basic training.

- Improves 20 percent
- Stays the Same 21 percent
- Declines 58 percent

Similarly, when asked about the effect of gender-integrated training on a number of dimensions, the majority of Marines indicated that it has a deleterious effect on individual performance and group performance.

Retrospective Survey of Enlisted Members with 1-8 Years of Service (Marine Corps) Selected Items²¹²

Survey Item	Percentage that Strongly Agree/Agree	Percentage that Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Percentage that Strongly Disagree/Disagree
GIT has a positive effect on individual performance.	16	23	62
GIT has a positive effect on group performance.	20	25	55
GIT results in lower standards for all.	49	28	24
GIT makes it easier to adapt to a GI unit.	37	32	31
GIT reduces likelihood of later problems.	22	23	55
GIT reflects experience in civilian life.	38	38	24

²¹¹ Ramsberger, et al. (1999), Volume IV “Research” pages 5-250.

²¹² Ramsberger, et al. (1999), Volume IV “Research” pages 32-36.

The effects of gender-related variables on attitudes and performance/effectiveness assessments were evaluated, controlling for individual demographics and military environment. When significant effects were found, they tended to be small, indicating that gender-related variables are not prime predictors of performance. Rather than gender-related variables, tenure was related to career intentions in the Marine Corps (and all other Services). Higher levels of gender interaction were associated with greater endorsement of integrated training. Conversely, those with no women in the current unit were more likely to view gender-integrated training as having a negative effect.

Respondents rated themselves on military-relevant dimensions at three points in time: before basic training, after basic training, and now. The greatest change was in terms of knowledge of and belief in the military value system. The least amount of change was in job/technical skills. These ratings were unrelated to gender format of training, trainer-gender mix, interaction with the opposite sex, or other gender variables.

All in all, cohesion and teamwork assessments were not associated with gender-related variables in any systematic fashion. Commitment, group identity, and core values were, however, positively related to tenure. Tenure was most strongly related to such outcomes as career intention, evaluation of basic training, readiness, and morale. Only one consistent relationship was uncovered for performance indicators: higher levels of education were associated with higher numbers of awards and honors and fewer reprimands or formal punishments. In sum overall, gender-related issues appear to have little effect on outcomes, and more negative assessments of gender-integrated training were made by Marines.

d. Feasibility and Implications of Imposing Gender-Segregation of Trainees and Instructors

This section of the statute is not at issue for the Marine Corps because it already trains in this fashion. Gender-segregation of trainees and instructors is the rule in the Marine Corps and thus is feasible with no budgetary implications.

F. Summary

In the preceding sections of this chapter, the Commission has presented its findings concerning the functions relating to gender-integrated and gender-segregated basic training. Of the three conclusions and recommendations adopted only one was not by unanimous approval of the commissioners. Alternative views concerning the only conclusion and recommendation of the Commission not agreed to unanimously are found at chapter 5. The majority of the commissioners found that the Services are providing the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines required by the operating forces to carry out their assigned missions and, therefore, should be allowed to continue to conduct basic training in accordance with its current policies. However, the commissioners also strongly recommend that the recent improvements to initial entry training that have been made by the Services or are currently being considered must be sustained and continually reviewed.

Alternative Views on Gender-Integrated and Gender-Segregated Basic Training

Part I: Alternative View of Commissioner Moskos

This is to explain my abstention from the Commission's recommendation that each Service be allowed to conduct initial entry training (IET) as it presently does (Chapter 4. C., Recommendation 1.) I do concur with the overall finding that the Services are, by and large, providing the trained personnel to carry out their assignment missions. But I am not in full accord with the overall tone of the recommendation as it implies there are no serious problems in IET beyond those identified by the Services.

My evaluation is based on information the Commission collected from a variety of sources: quantitative survey data, analyses of comments written on surveys, focus groups, field observations, and training statistics. I was particularly struck by the significant numbers of trainers who report that something is seriously flawed in gender-integrated training. (See table below.) At the same time, it must be noted that recruits in gender-integrated settings are much more positive about IET than are the trainers.

To be sure, many of the problems noted by the trainers – quality and attitude of trainees, excessive time spent on supervisory activities, understaffed training base, *etc.* – are of a non-gender nature. Indeed, the unanimous recommendations of the Commission go a long way toward addressing these problems. I commend my fellow commissioners for their hard work and judgment on these complex issues.

But we ought not ignore the recurrent theme among trainers that a core set of problems does derive from gender-integrated settings. These include physical strength differences between the sexes, maintenance of privacy of the sexes, sexual distractions, and perceptions of double standards applied to men and women in disciplinary actions and accusations of sexual harassment.

Although the overall state of gender relations in the Services is positive, this should not exclude consideration of alternatives in the physical training of women and men at the IET level. What the precise nature of such partial separation for physical training might be, I cannot state. But testing some alternate models from the status quo on a limited basis ought not be ruled out. I am particularly perturbed by the high physical injury rate of women trainees compared to men. Likewise, I am put off by the double-talk in training standards that often obscures physical strength differences between men and women. The extraordinarily high dropout rate of women in IET cannot be overlooked (nor should the fact that females are more than twice as likely to be non-deployable than are male servicemembers). The bottom line must be what improves military readiness.

Finally, I note persistent complaints among the trainers are that their concerns are not attended to by the higher command or oversight groups such as the Commission. Rather than ignore the widespread concerns of the trainers, I abstain from the recommendation that each Service be allowed to conduct initial entry training as it presently does.

Trainers’ Attitudes Toward Gender-Integrated Training²¹³

“In your opinion, what is the effect on the quality of recruit training of having males and females in the same units during basic training?”

Table 1.

	Quality Improves		Quality Declines	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Army Trainers*	14%	47%	52%	26%
Navy Trainers	14%	16%	53%	64%
Air Force Trainers	14%	47%	48%	17%

* Army Recruit Trainers at Fort Jackson, South Carolina.

Part II: Alternative Views of Commissioners Blair, Keys, and Moore

A. Background

On March 15, 1999, the Commission delivered to Congress a *Statement and Status Report* presenting the Commission’s conclusions and recommendations, all but one of which had been adopted unanimously. The only non-unanimous recommendation concerned gender-integrated and gender-segregated basic training.

²¹³ The table reflects opinions of Recruit Trainers who conduct gender-integrated training. Johnson, C. (1999), *The Study of Military Recruit Attitudes Conducive to Unit Cohesion and Survey of Military Leader Opinions on Recruit Training and Gender-Related Issue*, Volume III “Research” pages 124-125.

Commissioners Pang, Cantor, Christmas, Dare, Pope, and Segal voted to recommend “Each Service should be allowed to conduct basic training in accordance with its current policies.” Their majority report on this subject is in chapter 4.

Commissioner Moskos abstained, stating, “I am not in full accord with the overall tone of [that] recommendation as it implies there are no serious problems in IET beyond those identified by the Services.” His statement is immediately preceding this part of Chapter 5.

Commissioners Blair, Keys, and Moore opposed the same recommendation, stating to Congress:

“We write separately to add our view that, not only is there evidence of serious problems in gender-integrated training, but there is also substantial evidence that gender-separate training produces superior results. The Marine Corps is the only service that uses gender-separate basic training. The Army, Navy and Air Force have made it clear to this Commission that they are satisfied with their current training and do not plan to change from gender-integrated to gender-separate basic training, even in view of the Kassebaum Baker recommendations (the vast majority of which were readily adopted by those Services). We believe the Army, Navy and Air Force should (a) collect data to permit objective evaluation of existing gender-integrated training; and (b) test alternate models to generate comparative data on the military effectiveness of gender-integrated versus gender-separate training. These studies should be performed under the auspices of qualified, impartial outside organizations.”

This chapter contains the factual findings, assessments, and recommendations of Commissioners Blair, Keys, and Moore relating to the issue of gender-integrated versus gender-separate training as specified under Section 562(b) and Section 562(d)(1) of the Statute. Chapter 5 is organized as follows:

- A. Background
- B. Introduction
- C. Summary
- D. Gender-Integrated/Gender-Segregated Basic Training Policies and Practices (subparas. A, I, F of Section 562(b)(2))
- E. Historical and Current Rationales (subparas. B, C, D, E, J)
- F. Readiness Implications (subparas. G, H, K, L)
- G. Comparative Studies (subparas. M, N)
- H. Feasibility and Implications of Proposals (subparas. O, P)
- I. Conclusion and Recommendations

B. Introduction

Subsection 562(b) of the Statute requires the Commission to review the basic training policies and practices of each Service with regard to gender-integrated and gender-segregated basic training and, for each Service, the effectiveness of gender-integrated and gender-

segregated basic training. As part of its review, the Commission was required to take certain measures, both in the form of factual determinations and in the form of qualitative assessments.

I. Study Methods

The Commission conducted inspection tours of representative sites where each of the Services conduct initial entry training. Commissioners observed training events, inspected facilities, and talked with individuals and groups of recruits, trainers, commanders and other personnel from all levels. Commissioners met with randomly selected individuals in discussion groups that were all-male, all-female and mixed. Discussion sessions were conducted informally, out of the presence of superiors and on an “off-the-record” basis.

Department of Defense (DoD) and Service representatives briefed the Commission on Department of Defense and individual Service responses to the Kassebaum Baker committee recommendations.²¹⁴ The General Accounting Office (GAO) provided a briefing on its review of three recent studies, including the Kassebaum Baker committee report and the January 1998 DACOWITS report,²¹⁵ as well as an update on the GAO’s progress in completing various studies relating to gender integration in the military, as requested by Senator Charles Robb in 1997.²¹⁶

The Commission also solicited testimony from numerous experts on various aspects of basic training and gender-related issues, including individuals who witnessed or participated in previous decisions regarding the format of basic training; experts in male and female physiology and physical performance; persons familiar with foreign countries’ practices related to gender integration in military services; and representatives from civilian agencies and organizations with relevant experiences.²¹⁷

The Commission compiled and reviewed existing studies and reports on the subject of gender-integrated and gender-separate training; the resulting annotated Bibliography is Appendix K. In addition the Commission ordered new reports and studies, including professionally conducted surveys and focus groups,²¹⁸ principally aimed at collecting new information about gender-integrated and gender-separate basic training (see Appendix E).

²¹⁴ The Services accepted nearly all of the Kassebaum Baker committee recommendations concerning basic training generally. The Army, Navy, and Air Force rejected two recommendations that would have changed their policies concerning gender-integrated basic training and recruit housing by sex.

²¹⁵ General Accounting Office, (March 1998) *Analysis of Methodologies in Reports to the Secretaries of Defense and the Army* (GAO/NSIAD-98-125).

²¹⁶ Appendix K “Bibliography” page 460.

²¹⁷ Appendix C “Commission Hearing Dates and Witnesses.”

²¹⁸ Informal discussions and focus groups provided valuable insight about the perceptions, beliefs, and feelings of recruits, trainers, and other personnel, but these types of interviews are ordinarily not reliable for factual information or expert opinion.

2. Limitations

Several factors limited the Commission’s ability to gather as much relevant and material evidence as might have been desired. As a bipartisan, egalitarian body, the Commission adopted a legislative-style fact-finding process similar to that of a congressional committee. A more judicial-style process might have yielded more credible and complete information. For example, the Commission had no power to compel witnesses or testimony, and some individuals who could have supplied highly material information declined to appear.²¹⁹ The Commission did not require sworn testimony or adhere to rules of evidence, nor did the hearing format afford opportunity for meaningful cross-examination. More formal, trial-type procedures would have been helpful, especially to distinguish fact from opinion and personal knowledge from hearsay.

The Commission scheduled multiple inspection trips to training locations in an effort to give every Commissioner the opportunity to observe training first-hand and speak directly with recruits, trainers, and other personnel. The past 18 months have seen dramatic and dynamic changes in basic training, primarily as a result of the Services’ implementation of the majority of the recommendations of the Kassebaum Baker committee. Because of the rate and volume of recent changes, even the commissioners who completed all inspection trips over a period of 10 months,²²⁰ are unlikely to have observed the same activities or even the same policies being implemented.

The Commission contacted several thousand servicemembers, either face to face or through written surveys. Although this may be an impressive number for research purposes and the respondents may be statistically representative of all Service members, it must be remembered that the Commission communicated with only a minute fraction of the 1.4 million who serve in the Armed Forces.

From beginning to end, all of the Services emphasized that their decisions about gender-integrated or gender-separate training are final, and they will not willingly change, reconsider, or even review those decisions.²²¹ On this subject, the Services and the Department of Defense willingly provided information that served their stated interests, but they were somewhat less forthcoming with information adverse to their stated positions and conclusions.²²² We do not denigrate the Services or the Department of Defense for defending

²¹⁹ *E.g.*, former Army Chief of Staff GEN Edward C. Meyer USA (Ret) and former Army TRADOC Commander GEN Fred Franks, who were said to be responsible for changing the format of basic training in 1982 and 1993 decisions (respectively) were invited, but did not appear before the Commission. GEN Meyer supplied a written outline to the Commission, but GEN Franks did not.

²²⁰ Appendix D “Trip Maps and Trip Matrices.”

²²¹ The Kassebaum Baker committee unanimously recommended separate training for male and female recruits in basic training at the platoon/division/flight levels in December 1997. In March 1998, the Army, Navy, and Air Force all nonconcur with this recommendation and stated that they would not change their policies. The Services reiterated the same position to the Commission in briefings on 17 November 1998 and 29-30 January 1999.

²²² *E.g.*, Appendix H “Service Secretaries’ Responses Pursuant to Public Law 105-85, Section 562 (e)(2)” [cited as “Service Secretaries Responses”]. The General Accounting Office contradicted the Services’ estimates of the cost of implementing same-sex barracks. See section E.8.

their policies; indeed, we appreciate the reasons why military personnel refrain from criticizing the orders they have been given. For our part, we regarded ourselves as evaluators of, not collaborators with, the Services and the Department of Defense. We would have failed our duty as commissioners had we accepted uncritically everything told us by the Services, Department of Defense or any other witness or source.

The issue of gender-integrated versus gender-separate training is difficult politically because it does not readily admit compromise positions. A program cannot be “a little bit integrated” or “a little bit separate.” It must be either one or the other; it cannot be both. The search for resolution, therefore, must take place at another level. Where one stands on this issue ultimately seems to depend on how one defines the primary purpose of basic training, or indeed the primary purpose of the military in a democratic society. The studies sponsored by this Commission, as well as those done by others, undoubtedly contain judgments that reflect the glass through which the researchers themselves view these subjects.

Given the relatively short term and broad mandate of this Commission, the commissioners inevitably had to draw their work to a conclusion with some questions still outstanding. Because of these limitations, we have taken special care not to assume “facts” that have not been proven and not to draw conclusions unless supported by the weight of evidence. Nevertheless, looking at the trend of the evidence, we strongly believe that additional information, if accurate and complete, would only reinforce, and not weaken, our conclusions.

3. General Comments

Proponents of gender-integrated basic training frequently invoke certain general arguments, which we address briefly below.

ARGUMENT: Gender integration is a matter of basic fairness and justice, just like racial integration.

ANSWER: Many people confuse race discrimination and gender discrimination. The two concepts are not the same. It is invariably wrong to discriminate on the basis of race. Mere skin color is never a legitimate rationale for any decision about how to treat a group. Sex is a different matter. Sex organs and sex hormones create fundamental physical differences between men and women. Sometimes the differences do not matter, sometimes they do. Privacy issues are illustrative: We have never encountered any servicemember who believes that men and women should, under normal conditions, sleep or shower together or share open toilet facilities.²²³

It is one thing to conjure unsupported “reasons” to discriminate, but it is equally wrong to ignore real, meaningful, material differences between individuals or groups. Such

²²³ We learned from troops in Bosnia that the original plan to house men and women together by unit in the same tents was quickly abandoned by mutual consent. Both women and men desired privacy from the opposite sex. “Coed tents” are considered appropriate only for very short-term use, and even then, men and women observe privacy rules that would not apply in a same-sex group.

thoughtlessness yields arbitrary, irrational, ineffectual policies—the essence of injustice and unfairness—that ultimately hurt everyone.

ARGUMENT: Some women perform better than some men. If anything, recruits should train in ability groups, but not separated by sex.

ANSWER: To be sure, a small number of women can compete physically with some men. The question then arises: Should those few women train in units that are overwhelmingly male? We heard from female military leaders that it is “unfair” and it would “set up a self-fulfilling prophecy of failures” for women to be so underrepresented in a unit.²²⁴

Privacy issues do not disappear just because a woman can do pull-ups. Is it reasonable to establish separate quarters for one or two or a few unusual women training with men? Department of Defense rules specify that occupational fields may be closed to women if the cost of providing appropriate living arrangements is prohibitive.²²⁵ We find the economic efficiency argument compelling for other reasons, eloquently stated by Dr. Laura Miller:

“It may be problematic to argue for individual rights in an organization where even the most privileged members have sacrificed some of their rights for the good of the military as a whole. This organization is particularly unwilling to sacrifice efficiency for the sake of individual rights because the possible stakes are life and death, not reduced profit margins.”²²⁶

ARGUMENT: Studies confirm that gender-integrated basic training produces the same, or better, results than gender-separate training.

ANSWER: Among the Services that use gender-integrated basic training, the Air Force made no comparative studies and the Army and Navy conducted extremely limited comparative studies with mixed results.²²⁷ Other studies, including those sponsored by this Commission, seem to show that gender-integrated or gender-separate formats have no particular effect on training outcomes. If that is true, then there is no reason why the Services should expend the extra effort and expense for gender-integrated training. We wonder, however, whether it is true that there are no differences in training outcomes.

Studies of gender-integrated training have focused primarily on issues of sociological and psychological, but not necessarily military, interest. Many observers worry that the “warrior spirit” is disappearing in the military. Rarely, if ever, does the social science

²²⁴ Section G.1.c.

²²⁵ General Accounting Office, *Gender Issues: Information on DOD’s Assignment Policy and Direct Ground Combat Definition* (GAO/NSIAD-99-7, Oct. 1998), page 3.

²²⁶ Miller, L., *Feminism and the Exclusion of Army Women from Combat* (Harvard University John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Project on U.S. Post Cold War Civil Military Relations, Working Paper No. 2, December 1995), page 31.

²²⁷ See section D below.

literature²²⁸ on gender integration in basic training address the characteristics of a warrior: one who must be well-disciplined, hard-working, appropriately aggressive, cool-headed, quick, self-motivated, enterprising, tenacious, and indefatigable. Perhaps measuring these qualities objectively or quantitatively is difficult, but they are important and should not be ignored.

ARGUMENT: Gender integration is not a problem in basic training.

ANSWER: Trainers and commanders often stated to us that gender integration is not a problem in basic training. Some would go to great lengths to deny that “gender issues” exist, maintaining that any policy that affects both men and women is, by definition, not a gender issue. For example, we heard that the use of changing rooms is not a gender issue because the rule applies to both male and female recruits. When asked whether male recruits were permitted to hold the ankles of women doing sit-ups, trainers at one base told us there was no problem, because all recruits, male and female, are required to wear spandex shorts under their baggy PT shorts. In this way, gender-integrated training abounds with redundant “solutions” that by definition, cannot be termed “problems.”

In fact, as trainers described their very long workdays, it was apparent that they must continually deal with the complications of training male and female recruits together. Dressing in “changing rooms” slows down the process of getting privates ready in the morning; platoons whose members sleep in different bays need extra time to form up; fitness standards and training techniques are different for men and women; night-time security measures (charge of quarters (CQ), fire guards, duty personnel) are governed by the necessity to separate male and female recruits. As a drill sergeant at Fort Leonard Wood told commissioners:

“Gender integration is a constant every day, something you have to constantly think about. Are they making plans? writing notes? Little things – smokin’ and jokin’ with the girls – happen more because girls are there. Like they’re back in high school, trying to impress each other, fighting over females. ... All of that creates a distraction from where their minds should be.”

²²⁸ Over-reliance on the social psychological approach can be misleading. See Laurence, J., Wright, M., Keys, C., and Giambo, P. (1999), *Focus Group Research*, Volume IV “Research” pages 251-575, 317-326. (Keenan, P. & Laurence, J. *Gender-Integrated Training: A Social Psychological View*). Citing *Aggression: A Social Learning Approach*, a 1973 book by Albert Bandura, the authors discount the idea of gender differences in aggression. According to social learning theory, aggression is a learned behavior and “females can learn to be as aggressive as males.” More recent biological studies, however, definitively link aggression and testosterone. “Both the results of literally scores of individual studies (e.g., Gentry, 1970; Harris, 1974b, 1992; Lagerspetz, Bjorkqvist, & Peitonen, 1988) and the findings of meta-analyses performed on these studies (Eagly & Steffen, 1986), point to the following conclusion: Males are indeed somewhat more likely than females to engage in overt physical aggression.” Baron, R. & Richardson, D. (1994) *Human Aggression* (2d ed.) page 238. “The facilitating effect of testosterone on aggression has been demonstrated in studies where the hormone has been injected, resulting in increased aggression.” Renfrew, J. (1997) *Aggression and Its Causes: A Biopsychosocial Approach* page 37.

ARGUMENT: You can't turn back the clock.

ANSWER: Most of the predominantly male institutions in American society assimilated women in the 1970s or earlier, responding to legal and cultural forces. Military institutions resisted the trend until the early 1990s. Meanwhile, progress has overtaken them, and they are once again behind the times.

In the 1970s, people confidently believed that women and men are basically alike and essentially interchangeable, that “gender” is a result of culturally imposed norms, not innate, natural dispositions. Modern science, especially genetics and biochemistry, now tends to confirm the wisdom of the pre-ERA era: Men and women are different. It is ironic that the Army, Navy, and Air Force now cling to the notion that women cannot succeed unless they are trained alongside men, while in the civilian world increasing numbers of young women choose to attend all-female classes, schools, and colleges because they believe they will gain more from a single-sex educational experience.²²⁹ The superlative performance of Marine women recruits, trained in a single-sex format, supports that judgment in the context of military service.

Even so, following trends is a poor substitute for intelligent decision-making. If the clock will not be turned back, it is only because the clock's very reason for being is to mark the passage of time. If the United States military, charged to defend the nation and fight and win its wars, insists upon taking a lesson from the clock, let it be this one: Understand your mission, and refuse to be deterred from it.

C. Summary

This section presents a summary only of our findings relating to each subparagraph of section 562(b)(2) of the Statute (reprinted in boxed italics). Please refer to sections D through H for more detailed facts and analysis.

1. Summary: GI/GS Basic Training Policies and Practices (Ref: Section D)

(A) Determine how each service defines gender-integration and gender-segregation in the context of basic training.

(I) Evaluate the policies of each of the services regarding the assignment of adequate numbers of female drill instructors in gender-integrated training units who can serve as role models and mentors for female trainees.

²²⁹ An example of this trend is the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL), an all-female, military style program at Mary Baldwin College in Staunton, Virginia. Cadet First Captain Trimble Bailey, VWIL'99, who testified before the Commission on 29 January 1999, was the number-one ranked cadet for three consecutive years in the VMI-VWIL Air Force ROTC program (of approximately 120-150 cadets).

Only the Marine Corps trains men and women separately during basic training. The Army trains men separately if they are destined for combat specialties. The balance of Army training and all Navy and Air Force basic training are gender-integrated at the lowest level of organization (platoon/division/flight). In gender-integrated basic training, men and women sleep in separate quarters, but otherwise participate together in classroom, field, and physical training.

Although Marine Corps drill instructors are the same sex as their recruits; specialized training instructors (*e.g.*, swimming) may be of either sex. Army combat OSUT drill sergeants are all male. Army and Navy policies call for assigning a minimum number of female trainers to any companies that include female recruits. The Air Force assigns military training instructors without regard to sex. (For an evaluation of these policies, please see section H below.)

(F) Assess, with respect to each service, the degree to which different standards have been established, or if not established are in fact being implemented, for males and females in basic training for matters such as physical fitness, physical performance (such as confidence and obstacle courses), military skills (such as marksmanship and hand-grenade qualifications), and nonphysical tasks required of individuals and, to the degree that differing standards are in fact being implemented, assess the effect of the use of those differing standards.

All of the Services purport to apply the same standards to all recruits without regard to sex. The exception is physical fitness standards, which are gender-normed in each Service.

Although standards are defined and applied in a gender-neutral manner, some standards are defined in such a way that they permit individuals to fail at certain tasks, even critical ones, yet still pass the overall test. The three Services that use gender-integrated basic training say they do not maintain records in a way that would show whether gender differences exist in the ability to perform specific tasks that may be subsumed within a more general standard. We also found that, despite official policies not to grant waivers of graduation requirements, some recruits who cannot meet published standards do receive waivers.

Data show that women recruits suffer higher injury rates than men in basic training in all Services. On average, women perform well below men in terms of strength, endurance, and aerobic capacity. Experts agree that “the maintenance of physical fitness requires regular periods of physical training of sufficient frequency, duration, and intensity.” Physical training that is sufficiently intense for men to achieve or maintain fitness is likely to be excessively intense for most women.

It is obvious to any observer of basic training that there are differences in physical performance between men and women. *De facto* differences in performance (whether or not

meeting standards) create the appearance of unequal, or unequally applied, standards. This suggests that standards or testing may be manipulated to permit lower-performing recruits to pass.

We recommend that fitness training and other physical task training be conducted in all-male and all-female groups in basic training.

2. Summary: Historical and Current Rationales (Ref: Section E)

(B) Determine the historical rationales for the establishment and disestablishment of gender-integrated or gender-segregated basic training.

Because of a lack of official records, documenting the specific rationales for past decisions to adopt or discontinue either gender-integrated or gender-separate training is difficult. Having reviewed both historical research and witness materials and testimony, we conclude that political, public relations, or other nonmilitary considerations were major factors motivating these actions.

(C) Examine, with respect to each service, the current rationale for the use of gender-integrated or gender-segregated basic training and the rationale that was current as of the time the service made a decision to integrate, or to segregate, basic training by gender (or as of the time of the most recent decision to continue to use a gender-integrated format or a gender-segregated format for basic training), and, as part of the examination, evaluate whether at the time of that decision, the Secretary of the military department with jurisdiction over that service had substantive reason to believe, or has since developed data to support, that gender-integrated basic training, or gender-segregated basic training, improves the readiness or performance of operational units.

Each Service's current rationale for its method of basic training (gender-integrated or gender-separate) is in Appendix H "Service Secretaries' Responses." None of the Services currently collects data or conducts formal studies to determine whether its chosen method of basic training (gender-integrated or gender-separate) improves the readiness or performance of operational units (see Section E.3.6).

The most recent decisions of each Service to change their gender-integrated or gender separate formats for basic training occurred in 1992 to 1997.

The Army commissioned a three-year study of gender-integrated basic training by the Army Research Institute (ARI) in 1993. The Army's 1994 final decision to gender-integrate basic combat training was well before the ARI study was completed. The predetermined outcome may have affected the conduct and reporting of that study.

The Navy's decision to gender-integrate basic training in 1992 was made based on a Navy Women's Study Group recommendation relating to sexual harassment, without formal studies. The 1992 Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) study sometimes cited as supporting the Navy's decision in fact found that gender-integrated training did not improve physical performance.

The Air Force's original 1977 decision to gender-integrate basic training applied only at the squadron (equivalent to company) level. That format continued until 1997, when the Air Force decided to correct the "visual incongruity" by establishing gender-integrated training flights (equivalent to platoon). Both decisions were reviewed only internally and not by outside agencies.

The Marine Corps has never changed its policy of gender-separate basic training. The Marine Corps is the only Service that has maintained continuous experience with all-male, all-female, and mixed training. The Marine Corps has not conducted formal studies but reviews its basic training policies internally.

(D) Assess whether the concept of "training as you will fight" is a valid rationale for gender-integrated basic training or whether the training requirements and objectives for basic training are sufficiently different from those of operational units so that such concept, when balanced against other factors relating to basic training, might not be a sufficient rationale for gender-integrated basic training.

Slogans such as "train as you fight" and "train as you operate" do not apply to basic training. The purpose of basic training is not to teach tactics or job skills. Basic training is a military socialization process for transforming young civilians into soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines. Basic training should teach recruits respect for authority, discipline, self-respect, and self-confidence, all of which transcend any notion of "gender" familiarity.

(E) Identify the requirements unique to each service that could affect a decision by the Secretary concerned to adopt a gender-integrated or gender-segregated format for basic training and assess whether the format in use by each service has been successful in meeting those requirements.

The Services differ in their operational requirements, but basic training itself—the initial transformation of a civilian into a military servicemember—is something all Services

must do and must succeed at. The decision on whether to adopt a gender-integrated or gender-separate format for basic training should be determined by requirements relevant to gender. The gender-separate basic training format is most successful in ensuring privacy for members of each sex, in adjusting training techniques and emphasis to accommodate generic physiological differences, and in preventing sexual misconduct. Each Secretary needs to consider whether the results justify the extra efforts necessary to overcome naturally occurring and invariable sex differences.

(J) Review Department of Defense and military department efforts to objectively measure or evaluate the effectiveness of gender-integrated basic training, as compared to gender-segregated basic training, particularly with regard to the adequacy and scope of the efforts and with regard to the relevancy of findings to operational unit requirements, and determine whether the Department of Defense and the military departments are capable of measuring or evaluating the effectiveness of that training format objectively.

The Services advised the Commission that no such efforts exist. Because none of the Services (with the possible exception of the Marine Corps) maintains the types of training formats needed to provide a basis for comparison, we conclude that it is not possible for the Department of Defense or the Army, Navy, or Air Force to measure or evaluate the effectiveness of their gender-integrated training format objectively.

3. Summary: Readiness Implications (Ref: Section F)

(G) Identify the goals that each service has set forth in regard to readiness, in light of the gender-integrated or gender-segregated format that such service has adopted for basic training and whether that format contributes to the readiness of operational units.

(H) Assess the degree to which performance standards in basic training are based on military readiness.

As applied to basic training, readiness demands sufficient numbers of personnel capable of being trained to perform needed functions. Only the Marine Corps (which is the only Service that has gender-separate basic training) is meeting its recruiting objectives. According to the Youth Attitudes Tracking Study (YATS), overwhelming majorities of young people in general and those with a propensity to enlist say that the gender-integrated or gender-separate format of basic training makes no difference to them.

Performance standards for basic training must reflect a balance between sufficiency of numbers and adequacy of training. Recruiting shortfalls may exert a powerful temptation to

reduce or waive qualification and performance standards in order to graduate sufficient numbers.

Performance standards in basic training generally aim to produce a Service member who is physically fit, who understands and accepts the Service's organizational values, who knows and complies with the Service's norms of behavior, and who is ready to receive further training. Performance standards in basic training support readiness only when they are kept appropriately high and rigorously enforced.

Many of the more physically demanding military occupations are beyond the capabilities of the great majority of women. The Services should seriously consider the full implications of relying on greater numbers of women to meet recruitment objectives.

(K) Compare the pattern of attrition in gender-integrated basic training units with the pattern of attrition in gender-segregated basic training units and assess the relevancy of the findings of such comparison.

Comparisons of attrition patterns between gender-integrated and gender-segregated units within each Service are impractical because of the lack of comparable groups in both formats. In general, attrition rates are high in all Services, and women leave the Services at all stages (basic training, first year, first term) at higher rates than men, especially in the Army and the Marine Corps. The significantly higher attrition of women suggests that those Services should conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine the best and most economical policies for training women.

(L) Compare the level of readiness and morale of gender-integrated basic training units with the level of readiness and morale of gender-segregated units, and assess the relevancy of the findings of such comparison and the implications, for readiness, of any differences found.

Readiness is a measure not usually applied to basic training units. Among enlisted personnel in operational units those in the Marine Corps and Air Force were most likely to report high levels of personal and unit readiness and morale.

At the basic training level, well over 80 percent of graduating recruits, regardless of their training format, felt that basic training had helped them understand and identify more closely with their military Service.

Recruit trainers, on the other hand, complained about the quality of recruits (motivation, fitness, respect for authority), regardless of gender-integrated or gender-separate format. We believe that the opinions of trainers must carry the most weight, because they themselves are most familiar with today's recruits and the basic training programs now being

implemented. Large numbers of recruit trainers report problems in basic training, including problems arising out of gender integration. These issues are bound to affect trainers' morale, as well as the quality of training.

We do not have sufficient information to determine whether a gender-integrated or gender-separate format for basic training has any effect on the incidence of sexual harassment or "problems" generally in operational units. This is a complex subject which has not been addressed with sufficient attention to all the important variables.

It is obvious that a gender-separate format reduces the opportunity for sexual harassment and other sexual misconduct in basic training. Removing the distraction of the opposite sex for the few weeks of basic training would remove a burden from trainers and allow them more time to devote to military training.

4. Summary: Comparative Studies (Ref: Section G)

(M) Compare the experiences, policies, and practices of the armed forces of other industrialized nations regarding gender-integrated training with those of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.

The United States is the world's only superpower and has one of the largest and most sophisticated forces. It is interesting to note aspects of other countries' practices, but it is important to bear in mind that those practices exist symbiotically within systems and cultures quite different from those in the United States.

In the United States, about 200,000 women serve in the military, constituting about 15 percent of the total force. In other countries, the armed forces are much smaller, and the percentage of women serving is much lower – e.g., 4 percent in Denmark; 6 percent in the Netherlands; 7.5 percent in France; and 11 percent in Canada.

Several countries ostensibly allow women to serve in combat units; extremely few women serve in such units. Moreover, countries that admit women in combat units claim that they do not relax any physical requirements or make any special efforts to help women succeed in those units (such as recruiting a cohort of women who can provide psychological support to one another). We heard from female military leaders in the United States who say that it is important to have a "critical mass" of women in any unit where they serve in order to increase women's chances of success.

(N) Review, and take into consideration, the current practices, relevant studies, and private sector training concepts pertaining to gender-integrated training.

Public safety agencies (police, fire department) have confronted “gender” issues similar to those facing the military. Unlike the military, however, civilian agencies are subject to civil liability under anti-discrimination laws. Therefore, they have been obliged to develop specific job-related physical performance standards so that they can avoid or defend lawsuits arising out of employment decisions. Objective job performance standards, if generally accepted, fairly applied, and competitively graded, improve professionalism and morale among public safety workers and enhance public confidence in their work.

5. Summary: Feasibility and Implications of Proposals (Ref: Section H)

(O) Assess the feasibility and implications of conducting basic training (or equivalent training) at the company level and below through separate units for male and female recruits, including the costs and other resource commitments required to implement and conduct basic training in such a manner and the implications for readiness and unit cohesion.

(P) Assess the feasibility and implications of requiring drill instructors for basic training unit to be of the same sex as the recruits in those units if the basic training were to be conducted as described in subparagraph (O).

In March 1999, the GAO published a report concluding that “the services would not incur additional construction costs if they housed male and female recruits in separate barracks.” The Department of Defense disagreed and endorsed the cost estimates provided by the Army (\$271 million), Navy (up to \$3.7 million) and Air Force (\$1.4 million, plus additional annual operating cost of \$1.3 million.) We concur with the GAO’s findings.

Regarding the assignment of trainers at the company level it may be true that the Army, Navy, and Air Force currently lack sufficient numbers of female trainers to assign same-sex trainers exclusively. At the platoon (or equivalent) level, however, we believe that matching trainers and trainees by sex, if not exclusively then at least predominantly, should be feasible.

Gender-integrated basic training imposes many costs, especially in time and efficiency, which the Army, Navy and Air Force seem unwilling to recognize. An example is the addition of “changing rooms” to barracks, where trainees must go to change their clothes, simply so that trainers of either sex may enter recruits’ general living quarters at any time. This is a costly and absurd solution to a completely unnecessary problem.

6. Summary: Conclusion and Recommendations (Ref: Section I)

We recognize the hard work and dedication of everyone involved in basic training in all the Services. Nonetheless, it is misleading to suggest that Congress need not be concerned about the status quo as it relates to gender-integrated basic training.

Basic training, whether gender-separate or gender-integrated, presents challenges. But gender-integrated training entails special problems that simply do not arise in gender-separate training. These problems revolve around the difficulties of providing appropriate privacy for both sexes, accommodating fundamental physiological differences, and controlling sexual conduct.

There is no way to tell whether the benefits of gender-integration outweigh the costs. None of the Services has compared alternatives or evaluated the costs and benefits. Indeed each Service has told the Commission that it is not conducting and has no plans to conduct any studies to evaluate the effectiveness of gender-integrated training in comparison to gender-separate training. Readiness would be improved if the Services recognized the real problems associated with gender integration and addressed those problems as they do others.

In the all-volunteer force, women provide the margin that allows the Services to recruit fewer, but better qualified, men. But women are not interchangeable with men. We believe that the Services should seriously consider the full implications of relying on greater numbers of women to meet recruitment objectives.

The nonlinear battlefield exposes many support and even Service personnel to the risks of battle. Therefore, we should be more, not less, concerned about providing noncombat arms personnel a program of basic training that emphasizes survivability. The principle of military effectiveness should dictate how the Services train, and it should not be subordinated to any other goal.

There are serious open questions about the relative effectiveness of gender-integrated versus gender-separate training. The Services have closed the book prematurely. At a minimum, we believe the Services should do the following:

- Collect data to permit objective evaluation of existing gender-integrated programs.
- Carry out limited tests of different models to generate comparative data on gender-integrated versus gender-separate training. (An economical place to start would be separation at the platoon/division/flight level during the first weeks of basic training, as was recommended by the Kassebaum Baker committee.)
- Conduct these studies and data gathering under the auspices of impartial, disinterested outside organizations.

We can understand why the Congress would be loath to substitute its judgment for the judgment of experienced commanders about how military training should be conducted. Nevertheless, the Congress should know that the Services have told this Commission in strong terms that they are committed to continuing the gender-integrated training policies they now have, without studying their effectiveness or comparing the policies to other alternatives. It may be necessary, if Congress desires things to be done any differently, for Congress to order it through legislation.

D. Gender-Integrated/Gender-Segregated Basic Training Policies and Practices

(A) Determine how each service defines gender-integration and gender-segregation in the context of basic training.

(I) Evaluate the policies of each of the services regarding the assignment of adequate numbers of female drill instructors in gender-integrated training units who can serve as role models and mentors for female trainees.

1. Definition of Terms and Assignment Policies

The following information is based on responses provided by each Service to the Commission's request for data and personal observations by commissioners.

a. GI/GS Definitions and Policies - Army

The Army defines "gender-integrated training" as "males and females training together in the same squad or below." (A squad is a subunit of a platoon.) The Army divides its initial entry training programs into two types: basic combat training (BCT) followed by advanced individual training (AIT), or one-station unit training (OSUT). OSUT is conducted at one installation, in one unit, under the same cadre, with a program of instruction tailored to a specific military occupational specialty (MOS).

New soldiers in Infantry, Armor, Cannon Crewmember MOS 13B, and Combat Engineer MOS 12B train in all-male units throughout approximately 17 weeks of OSUT.²³⁰ Recruits in Bridge Crewmember MOS 12C, Military Police (MP) MOS 95B, and Chemical MOS 54B receive OSUT training in gender-integrated units. Likewise, new soldiers in all other noncombat specialties receive approximately nine weeks of BCT in gender-integrated units.

Gender-integrated units in the Army include both men and women at the squad level. A squad consists of 12 to 15 soldiers. There are normally four squads per platoon. Because men generally outnumber women even in noncombat specialties, some training platoons may be all male, but each company includes at least some gender-integrated platoons. Platoons that are gender-integrated can be up to half male and half female.

In all OSUT, the drill sergeants and company cadre are of the same career management field (CMF) as that which is being trained; therefore, in all-male infantry, armor, and artillery OSUT, the trainers are the same sex. By Fiscal Year 2000 gender-integrated OSUT will be consolidated at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The Army also conducts gender-integrated BCT at Forts Jackson, South Carolina and Leonard Wood. Because of the smaller

²³⁰ These all-male combat OSUT units account for about 30 percent of Army active-duty recruits.

number of female accessions, some units in gender-integrated BCT or OSUT may be all male. Drill sergeants are assigned to platoons without regard to sex; however, Army policy calls for assigning at least two female drill sergeants to each company that includes female recruits.

b. GI/GS Definitions and Policies – Marine Corps

The Marine Corps distinguishes between “full gender integration” (males and females live, eat, train, and operate together, down to the squad level), “partial gender integration” (separate at the platoon level), and “gender segregation” (same-sex units that do not live, eat, train, or operate with individuals or units of the opposite sex).

All Marine recruits start their training with 12 weeks of gender-separate boot camp. All female recruits are trained at Parris Island, South Carolina. Male recruits from the eastern half of the United States (delineated by the Mississippi River) train separately at Parris Island; those from the western half of the United States train at an all-male depot in San Diego, California. Marine drill instructors, as well as all series and company personnel, are the same sex as their recruits; however, recruits may receive specialized instruction (*e.g.*, swimming, marksmanship, self-defense) from trainers of the opposite sex.

Following boot camp, Marine infantrymen attend the School of Infantry (East) at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, or the School of Infantry (West) at Camp Pendleton, California. Marines not designated for the infantry attend Marine Combat Training (MCT), a 17-day, scenario-based field training exercise located at Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton. (MCT is also referred to as “Operation Leatherneck.”) Female Marines attend MCT only at Camp Lejeune. The Marine Corps describes MCT as “partially gender-integrated.” In each company of four platoons, one platoon is all-female and three are all-male. The male and female platoons eat and train together but billet separately. The platoon-level staff is of the same sex as the Marines under training. The exception is the platoon commander, who is an 0369 Infantry Staff Noncommissioned Officer.²³¹ Company-level personnel include both male and female officers and noncommissioned officers.

After MCT, Marines report to a Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) school; 62 percent of those schools are conducted by other Services. All noncombat arms MOS schools conducted by the Marine Corps are fully gender-integrated, that is, men and women live, eat, and train together without any unit limitations.

c. GI/GS Definitions and Policies-Navy

Navy recruit training divisions are gender-integrated and are formed as follows: Recruits are assigned to divisions of approximately 88 members. Each division is assigned to a training barracks referred to as a “ship.” The typical layout of a ship is four living areas, referred to as “compartments,” on each deck (Navy term for floor) of the ship. There are 3 decks in each ship, for a total of 12 compartments. Female recruits are berthed on the third

²³¹ This is a Combat Arms MOS and open only to men.

deck, separated from the male recruits who are berthed on the first and second decks of the ship.

When recruits leave their compartments for training external to the ship, one-half of the females from one compartment are paired with half of the males in another compartment to form a distinct integrated training division. The remaining half of the females of that female source compartment are paired with the remaining half of the males of that male source compartment to form another distinct integrated training division.

Because less than 20 percent of Navy recruits are female, there are not sufficient numbers of females to integrate all training divisions. As a result, many training divisions remain all male. All-male divisions may have either male or female Recruit Division Commanders (RDCs); divisions that include female recruits preferably include at least some female RDCs. Subsequent to recruit training, sailors participate in gender-integrated training for apprentice (A schools) and specialty skills (C schools) instruction.

d. GI/GS Definitions and Policies – Air Force

The Air Force defines gender-integrated training as “male and female recruits training together as a team during all components of basic military training and technical training. Both genders work together within a common environment.” The Air Force also states that “gender-integrated basic training has been an essential element in developing this professional culture for over twenty (20) years.”

Current Air Force policy (effective July 1997) is called “Combined Flight Training.” The procedure is “[a]ssign a maximum of 60 trainees per flight. Form two relatively equal size flights regardless of gender. Gender is considered only for dorm assignments to protect privacy.” In theory, the male trainees in one dorm bay are paired with the female trainees in another dorm bay to form a combined flight of 120 trainees under the management of an “Instructor Team.”²³² As with the Army and Navy, because of fewer female accessions, some flights are all male. Even all-male flights, however, are composed of recruits from at least two dorm bays; hence the “Combined Flight” policy applies to all. Before July 1997, the Air Force assigned recruits to same-sex flights on the basis of their dorm bays. Squadrons included both all-male and all-female flights.²³³ The Air Force assigns Military Training Instructors (MTIs) without regard to their sex or that of the recruits they supervise. This has been Air Force policy since the late 1970s.

²³² Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command Memorandum subject: Policy Memorandum for Combined Flight Training (December 8, 1997).

²³³ Hamlin, Col Mary, USAF, email subject: Gender-Integrated Flights-HNSC Staffer (Mieke Eoyang) Question (10 Mar 98). “Although USAF implemented gender integrated training in 1976, trainee formations (flights) were segregated by gender until July 1997 merely for reasons of logistical convenience. However in July 1996, it was recognized that gender segregated flights presented a visual incongruity with our gender integrated training policy.” See discussion at section E.1 below.

e. GI/GS Assignment Policies: Evaluation

See section H below (discussion under subparagraphs O and P) for an evaluation of Service policies regarding assignment of adequate numbers of female drill instructors in gender-integrated training units who can serve as role models and mentors for female trainees.

(F) Assess, with respect to each service, the degree to which different standards have been established, or if not established are in fact being implemented, for males and females in basic training for matters such as physical fitness, physical performance (such as confidence and obstacle courses), military skills (such as marksmanship and hand-grenade qualifications), and nonphysical tasks required of individuals and, to the degree that differing standards are in fact being implemented, assess the effect of the use of those differing standards.

2. Physical Fitness Standards

Each Service reports that it applies the same performance standards to all recruits, male and female, except for physical fitness. The physical fitness standards for male and female trainees and service members in each Service are summarized below. (For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 3.)

ARMY: The Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) consists of push-ups, sit-ups, and a 2-mile run. To pass the APFT, a soldier must score at least 50 points in each event by the end of Phase III of BCT or OSUT and at least 60 points in each event by the end of Phase V in AIT or OSUT. As of February 1, 1999, the APFT requirements are as shown in the following table.

Army Physical Fitness Test Requirements								
ARMY	Age 17-21		22-26		27-31		32-36	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Push-Ups								
60 PTS	42	19	40	17	39	17	36	15
50 PTS	35	13	31	11	30	10	26	9
Sit-Ups								
60 PTS	53	53	50	50	45	45	42	42
50PTS	47	47	43	43	36	36	34	34
2-Mile Run								
60 PTS	15:54	18:54	16:36	19:36	17:00	20:30	17:42	21:42
50 PTS	16:36	19:42	17:30	20:36	17:54	21:42	18:48	23:06

NAVY: The Navy physical readiness test consists of three events: push-ups, curl-ups, and a 1.5 mile run. Recruits must score a minimum number of points in each event, as shown in the following table.

Navy Physical Readiness Test Minimum Requirements							
NAVY	Max. Score	Age 17-19 MIN		Age 20-29 MIN		Age 30-34 MIN	
		M	F	M	F	M	F
Push-ups	67=100 pts	51=84	24=57	42=75	17=50	36=69	11=44
Curl-ups	100=100 pts	60=60	52=52	50=50	45=45	40=40	39=39
1.5 Mile Run	8:10=100 pts	11:00	13:30	12:00	14:15	13:45	15:30
		=83	=68	=77	=63	=66	=56
Recruit Passing Score		227	177	202	158	175	139

AIR FORCE: The Air Force physical fitness test consists of three events: push-ups, sit-ups, and a 2-mile run. The minimum standards are shown in the following table.

Air Force Physical Fitness Test Minimum Standards				
AIR FORCE	Age 29 or under		Age 30 or over	
	M	F	M	F
Push-ups / 2 mins	30	14	30	14
Sit-ups / 2 mins	45	38	45	38
2-mile run	18:00	21:00	21:00	23:00

MARINE CORPS: The Marine Corps physical fitness test (PFT) consists of three events: pull-ups for men and a flexed-arm hang for women, abdominal “crunch,” and a 3-mile run. The minimum passing score is 135 out of 300 points. The minimum and maximum standards are shown in the following table.

Marine Corps Physical Fitness Test Passing Scores				
USMC	Maximum		Minimum	
	M	F	M	F
Pullups (M only)	20	--	3	--
Flexed-arm hang (F only)	--	70 sec.	--	15 sec.
Abdominal “crunches”	100 / 2 min	100 / 2 min	50	50
3-mile run	18:00 or less	21:00 or less	28:00	31:00

3. Assessment of Fitness Standards

Expert witnesses who testified before the Commission agreed that physical fitness standards should be different for men and women. Fitness is measured relative to a

demographic group; thus, both gender- and age-norming are appropriate and fair.²³⁴ The Commission investigated whether the Services have selected the proper components and the proper forms of measurement for their fitness tests. In general, witnesses agreed that the events and tests developed by the Services are appropriate.²³⁵

There was discussion about whether the Services should include, as part of their fitness test requirements, other measures, especially those in which women would have advantages to perform better. For example, flexibility is a component of overall fitness, but it is difficult to measure objectively. Women have more lower-body than upper-body muscles, but lower-body strength and endurance are hard to measure without equipment.²³⁶ The Services emphasized that, because fitness tests may be administered in many different environments, including on deployments, any test that requires more than minimal equipment is impractical. The Commission also explored the question of body composition (fat and muscle). Again, it would be difficult to obtain accurate or useful measurements, especially considering the numbers of personnel potentially involved.²³⁷

Based on the evidence, we conclude that the Services have developed appropriate and fair, albeit different, standards and tests for physical fitness for men and women.

4. Physical Performance, Military Skills and Non-Physical Tasks

Merely being “fit” does not necessarily mean that an individual can perform required tasks. All the Services require basic trainees to participate in a number of physical activities, in addition to fitness training and tests, some of which must be completed successfully as a condition for graduation. Chapter 3, which describes the basic training “continuum” for each Service, includes details of the specific physical and nonphysical requirements for all trainees. The following is a summary of the physical task requirements for graduation in each service.

²³⁴ Testimony of Hodgdon, James A., Ph.D., Research Physiologist, Naval Health Research Center: “But, nonetheless, a basis for gender-free norming doesn’t appear to exist now. If you—And so to develop one, you need an outcome measure and I don’t think we have a database that allows us to determine that right now.” Cellucci, Col. Steve, USA, Commandant, Army Physical Fitness School: “It was gender- and age-normed, as it should be, because there are physiological differences between men and women, specifically when you look at upper body muscular strength endurance. You’re looking at a 50 to 55 percent difference or an advantage for men over women when you talk about the push-up or the pull-up or that type of thing, and that’s significant.” Laub, Col. James L., USAF, Air Force Medical Operations Agency: “Gender differences do exist in human physiology, so we’ve developed a two-tiered evaluation program for both physical fitness and physical ability. These programs clearly highlight our efforts to maintain effective duty performance while accommodating the known physical differences between men and women.” Volume II “Transcripts” pages 41, 55, 69 (10Nov98, pp. 83, 169, 249).

²³⁵ Gebhardt, Deborah L., Ph.D., President, Human Performance Systems, Inc., Bishop, Phillip A., Ed.D., Professor, Human Studies, University of Alabama, Farmer, Ph.D., Director, Wellness Research, College of Health and Human Performance, University of Maryland, College Park, Volume II “Transcripts” pages 255-261 (18Nov98, pp. 255-261).

²³⁶ Farmer, C., pages 176-77 (pp. 283-286).

²³⁷ Bishop, P., page 178 (pp. 290-292).

- **Army** trainees must complete physical tasks, including marksmanship, hand-grenade training, obstacle and confidence courses, bayonet and pugil fight training, hand-to-hand combat training, protective-mask confidence course, foot marches, and field training exercises.
- **Marine Corps** trainees must complete physical tasks, including marksmanship, combat water-survival test, individual combat basic tasks (such as hand-to-hand training), and the Crucible field training exercise.
- **Navy** trainees must complete physical tasks, including simulated weapons training; fire fighting, damage control, and seamanship; swim qualification; and the Battle Stations exercise.
- **Air Force** trainees must complete physical tasks, including confidence course, marksmanship, and the Field Training Exercise.

With only one exception,²³⁸ the Services advised the Commission that all standards and procedures, physical and nonphysical, are gender-neutral. While this statement is true, we also note that many physical performance requirements are defined in a way that permits individuals to pass without actually completing all the tasks, including tasks one might consider essential. For example, the Army hand grenade training standard requires recruits to complete five out of seven events²³⁹ and throw two live hand grenades. We learned, however, that a recruit who passes five events but does not demonstrate good throwing ability may be excused from the live-grenade throw requirement and be regarded as having met the standard.²⁴⁰ Another example is “completion” of obstacle and confidence courses. Typically, recruits need not actually negotiate confidence course events; they are required only to make an attempt. Commissioners observed Air Force recruits, predominantly female, walk around confidence course barriers rather than scale them (or attempt to).

Physical performance standards in basic training tend to be pass-fail, which means there is little or no advantage in exerting extra effort to excel.²⁴¹ We found variations among and even within the Services in the degree to which recruits are encouraged to compete and excel in physical performance tasks. Comparing the intensity of combat skills training from

²³⁸ The Marine Corps confidence course is slightly different for women, reflecting differences in average height and average upper body strength of men and women. Recruits must attempt, but need not successfully complete, each obstacle on the confidence course.

²³⁹ Under the Army standard for the Hand Grenade Qualification Course, a recruit must pass five of seven stations, with no more than two throws per station. Only 2 of the 7 stations require a recruit to throw a distance of more than 20 meters; a recruit can fail those two stations and still pass.

²⁴⁰ Accuracy is important in grenade-throwing, but the critical safety factor is distance. As noted below, the average throw for men is 34.7 meters, and for women, 17.6 meters. See section D.6.

²⁴¹ This is a recognized phenomenon. See Gebhardt, D., Volume II “Transcripts” page 175 (18Nov98, p. 272). “We wanted to review all the data over a four- or five-year period from one of our clients, and we’re going ‘They’re all the same scores,’ and we went, ‘Wait a minute. They went to exactly what they had to do and quit,’ and that was it. There was no above or below. We had very little data below. And so that’s one of the problems.”

Fort Jackson (gender-integrated BCT) to Fort McClellan (gender-integrated OSUT) to Fort Benning (gender-separate OSUT), one can hardly imagine that all three belong to the same branch of service.

To assess gender-related differences in basic training standards, we must ask not only whether the standards are different, but also what the results of applying the same, gender-neutral standards are. Do they create advantages or disadvantages for either women or men?

Applying identical physical performance standards to both men and women may yield serious disadvantages for both. Injury data show that women are injured in basic training at rates about twice that of men.²⁴² There is also evidence that basic training is less challenging for men today. According to a Commission survey, a much larger percentage of graduating male recruits (47 percent) than female recruits (23 percent) thought their basic training should have been tougher.²⁴³ Whether it is reasonable and effective to apply the same physical performance standards to men and women in basic training is debatable.

5. Physiological Sex Differences

The Commission received testimony and materials about physiological sex differences as well as sex differences in physical performance of men and women in basic training. Women and men are physically different, and those differences affect their relative physical performance, especially in activities requiring strength, endurance, or aerobic capacity.

As summarized in Table V-1 below, the physical and physiological characteristics of women in general cause them to move and perform differently than men. The physiological differences between men and women yield substantial, measurable differences in performance. The Institute of Medicine's 1998 report, *Assessing Readiness in Military Women: The Relationship of Body Composition, Nutrition and Health*²⁴⁴ presents the following findings:

“According to a review of strength training efforts by the Army (Sharp, 1993), the average woman soldier weighs 20 percent less and has 10 percent more body fat and 30 percent less muscle than the average male soldier. As mentioned earlier, lifting and carrying are strongly associated with FFM [fat-free muscle]. Muscle strength can be classified in two ways: isometric strength (no movement) and dynamic strength (isotonic and isokinetic strength).

²⁴² See section D.6.

²⁴³ Johnson, C. (1999), *The Study of Military Recruit Attitudes Conducive to Unit Cohesion and Survey of Military Leader Opinions on Recruit Training and Gender-Related Issues*, Volume III “Research Studies” Figure 4-42, page 129. This is a different question than what recruits expected; the survey asked graduating recruits both what they *expected* and what they *would have preferred*. See Appendix C, Basic Training Survey questions, page 203.

²⁴⁴ Institute of Medicine, Food and Nutrition Board, Committee on Military Nutrition Research, Committee on Body Composition, Nutrition and Health of Military Women, *Assessing Readiness in Military Women: The Relationship of Body Composition, Nutrition and Health* (National Academy Press: 1998) [cited as “INST MED”]. Although the studies cited involved Army women, it is reasonable to infer that the same general findings would apply to Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force women.

Women soldiers demonstrate 60 to 70 percent of the isometric strength of men. Women's relative lower body strength is greater than their upper body strength, similar to the female-to-male ratios of upper- and lower-extremity muscle mass. In addition, correction of strength for muscle mass causes most of the gender differences to disappear, suggesting that male and female muscle does not differ much in its ability to exert force, per se.

“When dynamic strength is compared between men and women, women soldiers exhibit 50 percent of men's ability on the incremental dynamic lift, but 60 percent of men's ability on a box lift task, which suggests that training plays a role and when the task is familiar, women may be better able to adapt and vary their technique.”²⁴⁵

Although training improves women's performance, it should not be expected to equalize differences between men and women.

“Men and women increase their percentage of muscle mass equally with equivalent training, but the actual absolute increase is greater in men. While BCT increases FFM in men and women, it does not change the female-to-male strength ratio. Increases in isometric strength of 40 to 60 percent would be necessary to achieve parity between women and men. Such an increase would be highly unlikely (increases of 4-16% are reported). In addition, several studies have found that women who possessed higher upper body strength at the beginning of BCT improved far less during the 8-wk period than those with less upper body strength, which suggests that the training might have been less than adequate for these stronger women (Nindl et al. 1995). With endurance training also, the greatest improvement occurs in those whose fitness was poor to begin with. Contradictory findings have been obtained regarding whether military training significantly increases the female:male ratio of VO_2 max.”²⁴⁶

²⁴⁵ INST MED, pages 77-78.

²⁴⁶ INST MED, page 78.

Summary of Some Morphological Differences Between the Sexes in Relation to Exercise Performance²⁴⁷

Characteristics	Results
<i>Skeletal system</i>	
Women usually are smaller and shorter	Lighter body frame
Women have a wider pelvis, the thighs slant inward toward the knees, and the lower leg bones are less bowed than in men	Different running mechanics; some believe more prone to injury because of knee instability
Women have shorter limbs (relative to body length)	Shorter level arms for movement (important for use of implements)
Women have narrower shoulders with more slope	Different mechanics of upper limb musculature
<i>Body composition</i>	
Women have a larger percent body fat and concentration of subcutaneous adipose tissue	Contours more rounded and less angular
Women have less LBM (less bone and muscle)	Physique less mesomorphic and more endomorphic Less metabolically active tissue More buoyant
Women have a smaller muscle mass	Lower absolute strength

6. Sex Differences in Basic Training Physical Performance

Regarding specific performance differences between men and women in Army basic training, the Institute of Medicine reported:

“[The] injury rate in women both in basic training and field maneuvers is greater than that in men (Jones et al., 1992; Moore, 1996). Jones and coworkers (1992) have studied injuries among men and women in Army basic training over a 10-y [year] period, assessing the factors contributing to injury risk. They have found that women have a higher risk of all types of lower-extremity, musculoskeletal injury than men, including stress fracture of the tibia.”²⁴⁸

The same report states:

“Studies have shown that a significant percentage of female Army personnel, particularly those in the youngest age groups, fail the Army physical fitness test (for example, the failure rate of women in the 18-21 age group is 36%).”²⁴⁹

²⁴⁷Wells, Christine L. , *Women, Sport, & Performance: A Physiological Perspective* (2d ed. 1996) Table 1.3, at page 17.

²⁴⁸ INST MED, page 68.

²⁴⁹ INST MED, page 12.

Another 1998 report from the Institute of Medicine, *Reducing Stress Fracture in Physically Active Military Women*,²⁵⁰ provides insight on how “equal” training of men and women tends to hurt women.

“Stress fracture rates among female military trainees during basic training are more than twice those reported for males. This greater incidence appears to be due in part to the initial entry level of fitness of the recruits and specifically the ability of bone to withstand the sudden large increase in physical loading. Some studies that controlled for aerobic fitness were unable to demonstrate a difference in the incidence of injury between males and females when individuals of the same fitness level were compared. Factors such as increased stride length (shorter women having the same stride length as tall men in “co-ed” marching situation) and variations in specific exercise activities (different loading force during drop-knee push-ups) may contribute to the different site distribution of stress fractures in military women compared with men. When training regimens are imposed to deliver the necessary level of physical fitness to meet standards, the resultant stress on the less physically fit (usually women) increases the likelihood of injury. According to military fitness experts, the fitness level of all new recruits has been decreasing over the past years. Reversing the trend in fitness in recruits may require setting higher and more relevant standards for entry. Preventing injury once recruits are in basic training may require reassessing methods used to achieve the desired improvement in fitness. A careful analysis of methods designed to achieve the desired degree of physical fitness during basic training without incurring an excessive injury rate with its associated loss of training time seems appropriate at this time.”²⁵¹

The Institute of Medicine acknowledged, “As emphasized by Knapik (1996) at a symposium on physical performance in the military, the maintenance of physical fitness requires regular periods of physical training of sufficient frequency, duration, and intensity.”²⁵² The problem is how to achieve sufficient intensity for both women and men, given the differences in physical ability applicable to most members of each group.²⁵³ The Institute of Medicine panel studying readiness and women’s health recommended a different fitness program for women in basic training.

²⁵⁰ Institute of Medicine, Food and Nutrition Board, Committee on Military Nutrition Research, Committee on Body Composition, Nutrition and Health of Military Women (1998), *Reducing Stress Fracture in Physically Active Military Women*. [cited as “INST MED STRESS”]

²⁵¹ INST MED STRESS pages 51-52.

²⁵² INST MED page 69.

²⁵³ Gregor, William J., Ph.D., Volume II “Transcripts” pages 221-222 (2Dec98, pp. 73-74), illustrating the small degree of overlap in physical performance between groups of male and female ROTC cadets. Another witness, Bishop, Philip J. Ed.D., stated that the best method is individual measurement. He admitted, however, that it is impractical to do that when dealing with thousands of trainees. Volume II “Transcripts” pages 170-180 (18Nov98, pp. 245-306).

“A fitness program for individuals who are not prepared to enter military basic training should be designed that starts women at a lower level of activity and gradually increases the activity level to prepare them for entry into basic training.”²⁵⁴

Consideration of physiological differences extends beyond fitness, encompassing tasks associated with field exercises and military life. A 1997 Army Research Laboratory (ARL) study²⁵⁵ evaluated women and men marching the same distance at the same pace and carrying the same load, as well as performing other field activities. This study found that male soldiers “completed the marches significantly faster than the female soldiers,” and men “maintained a relatively constant pace throughout the march even though heart rate increased from the first segment to the second.” The women, on the other hand, “maintained a relatively constant heart rate while march velocity progressively declined (at least until the final march segment).”²⁵⁶ The ARL study also noted:

“Many soldiers in this march were competitive and wanted to see how fast they could complete the course with the various loads, while others walked at less competitive rates for the whole march. Generally, the male soldiers were more competitive and wanted to finish before others while some of the females walked in groups despite verbal instructions not to do so.”²⁵⁷

Besides marching, the ARL study also compared women’s and men’s abilities in grenade-throwing and jumping. The results were consistent with differences in strength calculated in previous scientific studies.

“Women threw the grenades only about 51% of the men’s throwing distance. This is most likely because of power differences between men and women.²⁵⁸ Women generally have 55% of the strength of men in the upper body (Knapik, Wright, Kowal & Vogel, 1980; Laubach, 1976). Myers, Gebhardt, Crump, and Fleischman (1993) found that women’s softball throw for distance was 44% that of men.”²⁵⁹

²⁵⁴ INST MED STRESS page 55.

²⁵⁵ Harper, W., Knapik, J., de Pontbriand, R. (1997), *Female Load-Carrying Performance* (Army Research Laboratory, ARL-TR-1176.) [cited as “ARL”]. This Army study evaluated the performance of male and female soldiers marching at the same rates and distances with the same loads, as well as some other physical activities.

²⁵⁶ ARL, page 46.

²⁵⁷ ARL, page 46.

²⁵⁸ In the ARL study, men threw grenades an average of 34.7m, and women threw an average of 17.6m. See section D.4 above on the Army’s standards for grenade-throwing.

²⁵⁹ ARL, page 51.

“Women jumped an average of 63% that of the men,²⁶⁰ and this corresponded with a 62% difference in the calculated peak power. Strength studies showing that women have about 70% to 80% the maximum voluntary leg strength of men (Knapik et al., 1980; Laubach, 1976) may account for much of the difference.”²⁶¹

The ARL study concluded that female soldiers are able to meet the Army’s marching standard, but warned that any higher standard would be of concern.

“To the extent that [the standard] load and march requirements are *not drastically increased* in field operation, there appears to be no problem in meeting these guidelines. More to the point of this study, female soldiers, despite recognized lower strength and size, fully met the stated mission objectives. The indication is that no special accommodation (e.g., selection, placement, training, redesign) is required to incorporate female soldiers into military march operations at the stated levels.

“A possible concern arises when performance requirements are higher than such guidelines recommend.”²⁶² [Emphasis added]

Another possible concern arises when any physical performance standard is calibrated so that most women can pass it without regard to the fitness needs and capacities of the great majority of recruits, who are male. Still another concern arises when there may exist a substantial class of servicemembers (predominantly female) who can meet *only* minimum physical performance standards and no more. It is no excuse that these personnel are destined for “noncombat” positions: In today’s nonlinear battlefield, they can be as likely to be exposed to hazard as combat personnel. Their very survival (and that of their buddies) may depend on their ability to move quickly, to carry heavy loads, and to use weapons effectively.

7. Assessment of Basic Training Physical Performance Standards

Except for physical fitness standards, the Services apply the same standards, including physical performance standards, to all recruits, male and female. Even so, different performance standards exist *de facto* for men and women in basic training. The physiological fact is that male and female performance, on average, will always differ.²⁶³ In general, physical performance standards designed to challenge most men will be beyond the ability of most women. Physical performance standards that most women can meet will fail to challenge men. To allow most members of each sex to achieve their personal best, fitness training and other physical task training should be gender separate.

²⁶⁰ On the vertical jump, men averaged 45.7 cm and women averaged 28.7 cm. ARL, page 30.

²⁶¹ ARL, page 52.

²⁶² ARL, page 52 [*emphasis added*].

²⁶³ Gebhardt, D., Volume II “Transcripts” page 179 (18Nov98, p. 300). “One of the biggest things we face is, we’re looking at physically demanding jobs. Our adverse impact is always gender-adverse impact. It is never racial-adverse impact.”

The purpose of physical training ordinarily should be to stretch, not break, recruits. It may not be possible to impose uniform physical task requirements that stretch most male recruits without breaking many female recruits. The Marine Corps should evaluate its policy of imposing identical physical performance requirements on male and female recruits, to determine whether the benefits outweigh the costs and whether there may be alternative, sex-appropriate methods of physical training that would reduce injury rates.

E. Historical and Current Rationales

(B) Determine the historical rationales for the establishment and disestablishment of gender-integrated or gender-segregated basic training.

1. Historical Rationales: Background

In the mid- to late 1970s, all Services experimented with different ways of adding more women into the forces. Two main factors provided the impetus for these decisions: One was the end of the draft in 1973, making it necessary to fill the ranks with volunteers instead of conscripts,²⁶⁴ and the other was the “women’s liberation movement,” which was very active in the 1970s.²⁶⁵ In 1976 Congress opened the Service academies to women.

In 1977, the Army began to integrate women in OSUT²⁶⁶ training for military police. In 1978, both the Army and the Air Force commenced “gender-integrated”²⁶⁷ basic training. In the same year, a federal district judge ordered the Navy to lift its bar against women serving on ships; however, the Navy did not change its policy of gender-separate basic training at that time.²⁶⁸ In 1982, the Army discontinued gender-integrated BCT but left gender-integrated OSUT (for certain noncombat specialties) in place. Beginning in 1992, the Navy, followed by the Army (1994) and then the Air Force (1997), instituted gender-integrated basic training at the lowest unit level of organization.

²⁶⁴ Zumwalt, Admiral Elmo R. Jr., USN (Ret), who was Chief of Naval Operations from 1970 to 1974, testified to the Commission: “I also had my eye very much on the fact that we knew that we were being told that we were inevitably going to have an all-volunteer force, and Mel Laird, the Secretary of Defense, was predicting we’d have it by 1973. There would no longer be draft pressure and, in my view, it was clearly beneficial to be able to bring in men of [ASVAB=Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, cited in chapter 3] group one and two [and] women, instead of the group three and four male that we would have had to bring in without draft pressure as we knew from previous experience.” Volume II “Transcripts” page 413 (28Jan99, page 301).

²⁶⁵ The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was passed by Congress in 1972 but failed for lack of state ratifications in 1982.

²⁶⁶ One-Station Unit Training (OSUT) combines basic combat training (BCT) with advanced individual training (AIT) for some Army military occupational specialties (MOS).

²⁶⁷ Note, however, that the Air Force’s definition of “gender-integrated” at that time meant same-sex flights (equivalent to platoon) in gender-integrated squadrons. See discussion below.

²⁶⁸ A group of women Navy officers sued to be allowed to serve on ships. *Owens v. Brown*, 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978). Enlisted women with whom we spoke were not eager to serve on ships. The different attitudes of female officers versus enlisted women have been noted in the Rand study and elsewhere. See Harrell, M. & Miller, L., (1977) *New Opportunities for Military Women: Effects upon Readiness, Cohesion and Morale* (MR-896-OSD).

The Marine Corps has made many changes in its program of basic training over the years, but it has never varied from its practice of training men and women separately in boot camp. The Marine Corps began its practice of limited gender integration (with one all-female platoon per company) in post-basic Marine Combat Training (MCT) in 1996.

In the following sections, we trace the history of decisions in the Army, Navy, and Air Force to change the gender-integrated or gender-separate format of their basic training.

a. Historical Rationale-Army

The Army stopped the program of gender-integrated basic combat training (but not gender-integrated OSUT) in 1982. The Army was not able to provide the Commission official documentation about the reasons for this change. According to some witnesses and some commentators, the 1982 change was “a surprise,” “a step backwards,” and “smack[ed] of the old argument of separate but equal.”²⁶⁹ We note, however, that none of these witnesses or commentators had any first-hand knowledge about the decision process or rationale.

In the absence of official records, we believe that the most credible and reliable source of information about this decision is the Chief of Staff of the Army (1979-1983), General Edward C. Meyer USA (Ret). General Meyer did not appear before the Commission, but he submitted a written outline for the record informing the Commission as follows:

- Received many calls and letters re integrated training.
- Letter and call from General Ulmer, CG of Division in Europe, re poor quality of male soldiers arriving in the division.
- Asked retired General Ace Collins to do a private survey of training with focus on integrated and female training.
- His report indicated standards had been lowered at training centers, and that no women ever made best of platoon, squad, or company.
- When new administration came in, in January 1981, I changed the policy and reinstated separate general basic training for enlistees at all Army Basic Training Camps.
- Women were integrated at the advanced individual training as before in early 1981.
- Prime reason for change – women in general were not able to excel in BCT, which was primarily physical. Men were held back by procedures.

²⁶⁹Handy, K. (1999), Appendix J “*Executive, Legislative, and Policy Chronology Regarding Women in the Military*,” page 431.

General Meyer's recollections of the reasons for changing back to gender-separate training are supported by contemporaneous news accounts and by research quoted in the 15 November 1992 report of the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces.²⁷⁰

The Army conducted separate basic training (from the company level down) from approximately 1981 until early 1993. General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA (Ret), who was Army Chief of Staff from 1991 to 1995, testified before the Commission about the decision to gender-integrate Army basic training.²⁷¹ He said the idea was raised by then-TRADOC Commander General Fred Franks in 1992, and the Army Research Institute conducted a series of experiments beginning in January 1993.²⁷² General Sullivan denied that he was influenced by political pressure:

I made the decision based on – It seemed like a good idea at the time when Freddie said it to me – And I saw him this morning. He was out running up the street, and he told me that he had talked to somebody over here and he might come over and talk to you. He said, “Hell, it was an appropriate recommendation for me to make to you.” Then we looked at it. I told him I didn't want to do it based on some willy-nilly idea or some fuzzy-headed idea that someone had. We needed to look at the facts, and that's where the 75/25 [ratio of men to women] came from. And there are data on this. This is not some pipedream here. So at any rate, I wasn't getting any pressure from anybody.²⁷³

Major General Richard (Steve) Siegfried, USA (Ret), who was the commander of Fort Jackson at the time, also testified before the Commission about his recollections of the decision process.²⁷⁴

In early January of 1992, I had just taken command of Fort Jackson. I got a call from the then-TRADOC commander, General Freddie Franks. And General Franks said, “Steve, I have been asked a question that I'm not sure I really know the answer to. And the question is, why don't we gender-integrate basic?”²⁷⁵

²⁷⁰ See also Donnelly, Elaine, President, Center for Military Readiness, Volume II “Transcripts” pages 494-505 (29Jan99, pp. 451-512), (prepared testimony submitted for Commission files). Mrs. Donnelly was a member of the Presidential Commission.

²⁷¹ E.g., Sullivan, GEN Gordon R., USA (Ret), Volume II “Transcripts” pages 210-219 (2 Dec 98, pp. 4-58).

²⁷² *Ibid.*, page 210 (pp. 4-5).

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, page 212 (pp. 18-19). General Franks did not appear before the Commission.

²⁷⁴ Siegfried, MG Richard (Steve), USA, (Ret), Chairman, Sexual Harassment Senior Review Panel (1996-97); Former Commander, Ft. Jackson, SC (1991-94), Volume II “Transcripts” pages 284-296 (21 Dec 98, pp. 183-258).

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, page 284 (page 184).

MG Siegfried said he initially told General Franks:

“So what we do is we try to build into [trainees] some self-worth and some pride and some discipline and those sorts of things before we get them together and start handling this man-woman thing.”²⁷⁶

MG Siegfried testified he gave General Franks a written response to that effect, but then reconsidered:

“So what I asked for was permission to look into it more fully so I could give him a more complete answer. And General Franks said, ‘Okay, Steve, go do that.’”²⁷⁷

MG Siegfried testified that he “messed around with it for about a year ...”

“But after that year, I told him – I said, I’ve got to tell you one thing that I think people misunderstand. First of all, no combat arms officer or soldier goes to basic combat training. They all go to OSUT. The next thing is that every male soldier who comes to basic combat training is in a gender-integrated MOS and will be expected to go to war side-by-side with a teammate who may or may not be a woman.”²⁷⁸

Nothing in the record indicates that the Army was responding to any specific problems (such as injury rates) when it decided to test gender-integrated basic training beginning in 1993. To the contrary, MG Siegfried’s testimony suggests that the Army had a major concern about preserving all-male combat arms training. It appears that General Franks became interested in the idea of expanding Army gender-integrated training in January 1992, at the same time the Navy began testing gender-integrated basic training.

b. Historical Rationale-Navy

The Navy conducted two “Navy Women’s Study Groups” in 1987 and 1990, prompted by disclosure and investigation of several sexual harassment incidents beginning in 1987. The *Update Report on the Progress of Women in the Navy* prepared by the 1990 Navy Women’s Study Group is the source cited by the Navy for its decision to initiate gender-integrated basic training. That report contains only one reference to gender-integrated basic training. Chapter Three of that report, titled “Equal Opportunity Climate as it Impacts Women,” deals with issues of sexual harassment and sex discrimination. In that chapter, the Study Group’s Finding No. 6 states (in full):

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, page 284 (page 185).

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, page 284 (pp. 186-187).

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, page 284 (page 187).

“The non-acceptance of women begins at the training centers.

“a. The entry point into Naval service for enlisted men is at one of three training centers—San Diego, Great Lakes or Orlando. All enlisted women are trained with male recruits at a co-located training site in Orlando. Each site prepares new recruits for service in the fleet by exposure to Navy traditions and values. The recruit acculturation process not only provides basic knowledge of the Navy, but also instills values associated with personal ethics, professionalism, and both mutual and self-respect. Experience at Recruit Training Command (RTC) should emphasize group and team success, and these teams should reflect the diverse representation of ability, race, and gender that exists in the fleet. The initial training environment thus becomes an influential factor in developing the right attitudes for young women and men to carry with them to their first assignments. Creating a less isolated, more realistic, and appropriately disciplined but interactive environment within recruit training will foster professionalism, cooperation and team building from the start.

“b. The mixed-gender recruit training site co-locates female and male recruits at the same site but does not integrate them, i.e., women and men sit on opposite sides of the classroom, they march separately, they are in segregated “sister” and “brother” companies, they PT separately, and they cannot talk socially under any circumstances. There are few if any evolutions in which they work together as equal partners to accomplish a mission, large or small, simple or complex.

“c. Every Department of Defense service varies in their basic training with regard to co-location and integration (Appendix A to the chapter summarizes). For example, the U.S. Coast Guard co-locates female and male recruit training at Cape May, New Jersey, with a fully integrated company, while the U.S. Army co-locates women and men at two of their six training sites. Army platoons are segregated and women and men are trained separately.”²⁷⁹

In February 1992, the Navy initiated a pilot program of gender-integrated basic training at Recruit Training Command Orlando, Florida.²⁸⁰ According to a contemporaneous news report:

²⁷⁹ 1990 Navy Women’s Study Group (April 1991), *Update Report on the Progress of Women in the Navy III-21* [cited as “1990 NWSG”].

²⁸⁰ Navy Memorandum subject: 1990 NWSG Recommendations Status Update (26 Aug 92).

“The move also followed several highly publicized incidents of sexual harassment and assault [sic] at the Orlando base in 1990. Base officials blamed the incidents, in part, on a lack of a team atmosphere and mutual respect between the recruit classes.”²⁸¹

A companion article²⁸² described the then-Commanding Officer, Recruit Training Command, Orlando, CAPT Kathleen M. Bruyere, as “[o]ne high-ranking Navy official who thinks the Navy should have adopted coed training years ago”²⁸³ and identified her as “one of six women whose lawsuit against the Navy first allowed women to serve aboard Navy ships.”²⁸⁴ The article went on, “It was Bruyere who commissioned a group at the Naval Training Center here to study how to integrate the sexes in recruit training after a Navy women’s study group recommended such a move in April 1991.”

CAPT Bruyere, now retired, testified before the Commission. Describing the original pilot program, she said:

“We had no model to follow, really, and we decided we would put together a system to keep them working together, training together, going through physical activity together, that sort of thing, and try to instill in them the importance of depending on each other, which they may have to do when they would get to their ships, for their lives.

“And that’s how it all started. It wasn’t a result of, as I say, some major study that went on for years and scientists came in and looked at it. It really was the leaders coming to that conclusion.

“And what we heard following it – You have to keep in mind, too, in all fairness, that these people were in the limelight. As [Commissioner] Barbara [Pope] remembers,²⁸⁵ it was major publicity.

“And at the time, as far as the Navy was concerned, it was – because Tailhook was still in the news, it was probably one of the few pockets of good news the Navy had.”²⁸⁶

²⁸¹ Zolton, M. , “Together! Coed boot camp proves physical, academic success,” *Navy Times*, Apr. 20, 1992.

²⁸² Zolton, M., “Planting roots for future understanding,” *Navy Times*, Apr. 20, 1992.

²⁸³ Bruyere, CAPT Kathleen M., USN (Ret), Former Special Assistant for Women’s Policy (1988-91); Former Commanding Officer, Recruit Training Command, Orlando, FL., Volume II “Transcripts” page 368 (28Jan99, p. 27). CAPT Bruyere testified to the Commission: “I am a firm believer in full integration. Always have been, always will be. I think that there is – and having been a victim myself of being told I couldn’t do something simply because of my gender or what someone thought the culture would allow, which was offensive to me and made me mad as hell – to the point where I went outside the organization and took it through the courts – I think that there is no way that men and women can be full partners in doing what needs to be done in the military if you don’t allow them to be full partners and work together.”

²⁸⁴ *Owens v. Brown*, 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978). The case was not appealed above the trial court level.

²⁸⁵ Commissioner Barbara Pope was an Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1989 to 1993.

²⁸⁶ Bruyere, CAPT, Volume II “Transcripts” page 365 (28Jan99, pp. 11-12).

The Navy's pilot program for gender-integrated basic training was not specifically designed to accomplish any goal other than having male and female recruits do things together. The origin of the Navy's decision to establish gender-integrated basic training was concern about sexual harassment and sex discrimination. Paradoxically (and presciently) the 1990 NWSG reached another conclusion in Chapter III of its report:

“The existence of any instructor/student harassment at training commands has a particularly detrimental effect on the acculturation process of highly vulnerable and impressionable junior enlisted personnel and sets the pattern for their future behavior.”²⁸⁷

It appears that the recommendation to gender integrate Navy basic training was somewhat improvidently tossed into an April 1991 report focused on sexual harassment. In the wake of the September 1991 Tailhook scandal, the Navy was eager for “good news”-to show in any way possible that it was doing everything it could to combat sexual harassment. The connection, if any, between gender-integrated basic training and preventing or reducing sexual harassment has not been demonstrated.²⁸⁸

c. Historical Rationale – Air Force

The Air Force began gender-integrated basic training in 1977. The Air Force did not provide specific documentation of the rationale but cited the end of the draft and general societal trends as the reasons for its decision. At that time, and until July 1997, the term “gender-integrated” as applied to the Air Force meant that basic training squadrons included both men and women, organized in all-male and all-female flights. In July 1997, the Air Force adopted a policy of “Combined Flight Training.” As noted above under section (A), the procedure for forming Combined Flights is “Assign a maximum of 60 trainees per flight. Form two relatively equal size flights regardless of gender. Gender is considered only for dorm assignments to protect privacy.” Thus, male trainees quartered in one dorm bay are paired with the female trainees in another dorm bay to form a combined flight of 120 trainees under the management of an Instructor Team.²⁸⁹

In response to an inquiry from House National Security Committee staff in March 1998, the Air Force replied, “in July 1996, it was recognized that gender-segregated flights presented a visual incongruity with our gender-integrated training policy. Therefore, we began

²⁸⁷ 1990 NWSG, III-24 (Conclusion No. 18).

²⁸⁸ In deed, recent events at Great Lakes Training Center tend to show the opposite. See Naval Inspector General Report of Investigation Case No. 980364 (25 Aug 98) (assessment of recruit division commander suitability screening and training, monitoring of RDC conduct and performance, and safety and security of recruits at Recruit Training Command, Great Lakes, Illinois).

²⁸⁹ Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Policy Memorandum for Combined Flight Training (8 Dec 97). Because of fewer female accessions, some flights are all male. Even all-male flights, however, are composed of recruits from at least two dorm bays, so the “Combined Flight” policy applies to all.

to question segregated gender flight formations and ponder the ramifications of either continuing the segregated formations or transitioning to integrated formations.”²⁹⁰

The “visual incongruity” that became apparent in July 1996 coincided with the publication of a GAO report in June 1996 that stated, “the operating level of recruit training, the flight, is single gender. Although each flight is paired with a brother or sister flight and the pairs often train side by side, flight integrity is maintained during basic training.”²⁹¹ In March 1998, after the Air Force rejected the Kassebaum Baker committee recommendation to conduct gender-separate training at the squadron level, Acting Air Force Secretary F. Whitten Peters asked the Air Force, “Several on the Hill say we changed because of a GAO report critical of our claim of integrated training at BMT. Is there any fact basis for that?”

The Air Force responded, “While the Group Commander at AF Basic Military Training (BMT) was aware of the GAO report, it was not the catalyst behind the change to ‘split flight’ procedures.” The reply referred to the six-part process described above and concluded:

“The Kassebaum Committee visited Lackland AFB, TX just as the AF was beginning the final deployment phase and as with any new program there are a few bumps that must be smoothed out. Contrary to a comment made by a member of the Kassebaum Committee, we have applied the split flight concept to all of our flights and not just the gender-mixed flights. Again, it needs to be emphasized that the seventeen month study, and not the GAO observation, is the reason the AF changed its training procedures beginning with the prototype flights in Jul 97.”²⁹²

(C) Examine, with respect to each service, the current rationale for the use of gender-integrated or gender-segregated basic training and the rationale that was current as of the time the service made a decision to integrate, or to segregate, basic training by gender (or as of the time of the most recent decision to continue to use a gender-integrated format or a gender-segregated format for basic training), and, as part of the examination, evaluate whether at the time of that decision, the Secretary of the military department with jurisdiction over that service had substantive reason to believe, or has since developed data to support, that gender-integrated basic training, or gender-segregated basic training, improves the readiness or performance of operational units.

²⁹⁰ Hamlin, Mary, Col, USAF, e-mail, subject: Gender Integrated Flights – HNSC Staffer (Mieke Eoyang) Question (10 Mar 98). See also section E.1.c.

²⁹¹ General Accounting Office, (June 1996) *Basic Training: Services Using A Variety Of Approaches To Gender-Integration* GAO/NSIAD 96-153).

²⁹² Air Force Memorandum dated 24 Mar 98, subject: Response to Mr. Peters’ Question on Gender Integrated BMT Flights (from Cropper, Col. James W., USAF).

2. Current Rationales

When the Army and Air Force decided in the late 1970s to adopt gender-integrated basic training, they had little or no experience on which to draw. Those efforts were necessarily trial-and-error. The Navy's decision to gender-integrate basic training in 1992 followed more than a decade of the experience of other Services. The Navy also had some institutional experience with gender-integration since the first admission of women to the Naval Academy occurred in 1976.

The following section summarizes the current rationale for gender-integrated training in the Army, Navy, and Air Force²⁹³ and for gender-separate training in the Marine Corps. The subsequent section evaluates the information relied by each Service in making its decision.

ARMY: Following is a summary of the Army's response to information requests from this Commission:

“Gender Integrated Training fully prepared soldiers for the gender-integrated Army environment with a clear understanding of Army standards and policies from day one. Gender Integrated training embodies the: ‘train as you fight’ methodology. It prepares soldiers for the tasks and missions they will be called upon to perform. Gender Integration at the platoon level and below is essential to the early development of teamwork and unit cohesion.”

NAVY: According to the Navy, gender-integrated basic training “provide[s] the Navy with the most effective means to best prepare our Sailors to live, operate, fight, and win aboard deployed gender integrated ships and squadrons.” The Navy also states, “Deferring integration until after recruit training transfers the burden to the fleet especially for the 30 percent of the force (40 percent of whom are women) who report directly to their first assignment without receiving any technical training (commonly referred to as GENDETs – General Detail Sailors).”

AIR FORCE: The Air Force states:

“The USAF rationale for continuing gender-integrated training is based on two pillars. First, it is essential that we train the very way we operate. The Air Force, with over 99 percent of its career fields open to both genders, operates in a gender-neutral environment. From their first day, airmen are expected to conduct themselves professionally and accept and work with the opposite gender as both peers and leaders, regardless of gender. Second, gender-integrated basic training has been an essential element in developing this professional culture for over twenty (20) years.”

²⁹³ For a statement of current rationales of the Army, Navy and Air Force, see Appendix H, “Service Secretaries’ Responses.”

MARINE CORPS: The Marine Corps states:

“The key to building effective, cohesive, gender integrated operational units is in creating a training environment that builds progressively to that end. The Marine Corps believes it has achieved that goal through a process that is very much like a rheostat moving from gender segregation at Recruit Training, to partial gender integration at Marine Combat Training, and finally to full gender integration at [integrated] MOS producing schools. This process reinforces the Marine Corps ethos, best supports its mission and is considered to be the best method for the Corps.”

a. Evaluation of Decisions-Army

Before examining the rationale for the Army’s latest decision in 1994 to gender-integrate BCT, it is appropriate to review its previous (1982) decision to discontinue gender-integrated BCT. The Army’s 1982 decision to separate men and women in BCT was based on empirical observations but not a scientific study. Later studies, however, tend to support the Army’s rationale for that decision.

According to then-Army Chief of Staff General Edward Meyer, the Army reverted to gender-separate BCT in 1982 because it found that in gender-integrated BCT women suffered high rates of injuries and men were not sufficiently challenged. Critics of this decision say it was not based on any scientific research or study at the time. We note, however, that the Army at that time was conducting both separate and mixed training in its OSUT programs—separate for combat specialties and mixed for military police and certain other specialties. Furthermore, the Army’s experience with all-female BCT, ended only about three years earlier, was still fairly fresh. Thus, the Army had both institutional and individual experience to assess the physical performance of men in BCT (compared, for example, with combat OSUT) and to decide whether female injury rates were too high in gender-integrated BCT (compared with both the previous all-female BCT and current gender-integrated OSUT). It was not at all unreasonable for the Army to want to minimize injuries and maximize physical performance for both sexes in BCT and to achieve those goals efficiently through gender-separate training.²⁹⁴

The Commission heard from several experts in physiology and physical fitness, and all agreed that there are substantial physiological differences between men and women, especially in strength and endurance.²⁹⁵ Of interesting note is that the British Army has just

²⁹⁴ Had the decision been simply “anti-woman,” surely the Army would have discontinued gender-integrated OSUT at the same time. But note that women in military police, the pioneer gender-integrated OSUT specialty, must meet greater physical requirements than BCT-bound female recruits.

²⁹⁵ *E.g.*, representatives from the U.S. Army Physical Fitness School, the Naval Health Research Center and the USAF School of Aerospace Medicine, as well as university researchers and expert consultants. See discussion under section D.2 above.

decided to change from gender-integrated back to gender-separate training platoons at its largest training base, primarily because of concerns about women's high injury rates and low first-time pass rates.²⁹⁶

We conclude that the Army's 1982 decision to end gender-integrated BCT was based on at least the fact that, in general, substantial physiological differences exist between women and men, making it impractical to achieve acceptable results for both sexes in mixed training. Subsequent experience and scientific studies have confirmed these facts. The Army's decision to separate men and women in BCT was a reasonable response, directly related to solving the identified problems, without incurring other inefficiencies.

The Army's decision to gender-integrate basic training in 1993 followed a test at Fort Jackson. The Army Research Institute (ARI) conducted a three-year study from 1993 to 1995. According to the ARI's 1995 report:

"For the pilot study/test [in 1993], Fort Jackson selected a training battalion to gender-integrate to the squad level. They compared the training performance (scores on first-time-go rifle qualification, individual proficiency tests, and final physical fitness tests for push-ups, sit-ups and run times) of males and females in single-gender and gender-integrated companies. Fort Jackson found no differences in performance between males and females trained in single gender and gender-integrated companies. Fort Jackson recommended no change to the current system. The Commander, TRADOC then requested that ARI study the attitudes and opinions of soldiers and drill sergeants toward gender-integrated training.

"The 1993 ARI study was conducted at a large training center and included soldiers-in-training from two battalions. In each battalion, there were all male, all female, and gender-integrated companies (integrated down to the squad level). Compared with single gender companies, training performance greatly improved for females in the gender-integrated companies, while training performance for males in the gender-integrated companies was slightly decreased.

"The 1994 ARI study was conducted at a second training center [Fort Leonard Wood] with a battalion that was gender-integrated to the squad level. The training battalion used information from the 1993 study to "trouble shoot" the implementation of gender-integrated training and involved the training cadre in planning the program. The Program of Instruction (POI) was not changed to

²⁹⁶ See section G.1.c. below.

accommodate gender-integrated training nor were the standards for graduation altered. Both the males and females trained in gender-integrated companies in the 1994 study exceeded the performance of males and females in the 1993 study.”²⁹⁷ [*Emphasis added.*]

Army representatives repeatedly cited the ARI study to the Commission as the scientific basis for the Army’s conclusion that gender-integrated basic training is superior. In fact, after the 1993 ARI studies (the first of which had to be repeated to get the results desired by TRADOC), the Army and the ARI never again compared single-gender and gender-integrated training units. After the initial 1993 studies, the Army and the ARI tested only gender-integrated units because they were trying to determine the best male-female ratio for a unit. The 1994 and 1995 tests, to the extent they may have involved any comparison against single-gender units, used the results from the single-gender units in the 1993 test.

Furthermore, the Fort Leonard Wood test lasted from June to August 1994. In August 1994, before any results of that test could possibly have been tabulated or analyzed, the Army Chief of Staff announced that Army BCT would be gender-integrated effective 1 October 1994. In fact, gender-integrated basic training had already been put forward as part of a proposal, approved by Secretary of Defense William Perry on 28 July 1994, describing how the Army would implement the new definition of “direct ground combat” then coming into effect.

We conclude that the decision to gender-integrate Army basic training was made before (and probably independently of) the completion of ARI studies. The predetermined outcome may have affected how the ARI conducted and reported its studies. Even assuming that the ARI studies validly and adequately support the Army’s decision to gender-integrate BCT, the Army has not abided by what it reports to be the lesson of the studies. We heard repeatedly from first-hand witnesses, such as General Sullivan and General Siegfried, that the ARI studies demonstrated that the best ratio of men to women in basic training units is 75:25.²⁹⁸ Currently, however, Army gender-integrated training units typically range up to 50 percent women.

Without knowing what problems the Army was seeking to solve by adopting gender-integrated training, it is difficult to evaluate that decision. There were deficiencies in the ARI studies on which the Army says it relies. The Army made its final decision without waiting for the study results, and then proceeded to ignore the results.

²⁹⁷ Mottern, J., Foster, D., and Brady, E., (1997) *The 1995 Gender Integration of Basic Combat Training Study* (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Studies), pages 4-5.

²⁹⁸ E.g., Sullivan, Gordon R. , GEN, USA (Ret), Volume II “Transcripts” page 214 (2 Dec 98, p. 31). “What the ARI study showed is if you get more than 25 percent women, then you start, the males start performing at a lower level. Now, why is that? I don’t know. ... Males start behaving like-funny. Okay? I’m just going to leave it at that.”

b. Evaluation of Decisions – Navy

As support for its 1992 decision to gender-integrate basic training the Navy cites a study by the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) dated July 1992.²⁹⁹ That study compared gender-integrated and gender-separate (all-male and all-female) companies. The DEOMI study showed mixed results, summarized as follows:

“The perceptual results indicate that, if given a choice, both males and females would prefer to be assigned to an integrated company, and a positive effect on attitude could be expected; however, behavioral data do not translate this preference to a measurable increase in performance in academics and physical training.”³⁰⁰

“Females in the integrated companies failed [physical training] at a **much higher** rate [7.8 percent] than females in all-female companies [1.7 percent], and males in integrated companies failed at a **lower** rate [1.8 percent] than males in all-male companies [3.7 percent]. A possible explanation for these differences might be the often-suggested hypothesis that men are more competitive and women less competitive when in a mixed-gender environment.”³⁰¹

Sample comments from trainees quoted by the researchers are all in favor of gender-integrated training. The study report does not indicate what questions were asked or how the interviews were conducted other than that they were “structured” and “designed to elicit personal thoughts and feelings concerning the integration process.”³⁰² The DEOMI study surveyed only trainees, not trainers or commanders. The DEOMI study report refers to increases and decreases in attitude scores but does not state whether the variations are statistically significant. The one score that looks obviously significant is the physical-training failure rate of women in integrated companies, which is nearly four times that of women and double that of men in single-sex companies. In spite of this finding, which surely demonstrates a significant negative effect on gender-integrated physical training for women, the DEOMI report concluded:

“Based on this data, it appears that integration has had neither a clear positive nor negative behavioral impact on training at RTC Orlando. It has neither interfered with nor degraded the quality of training of the recruits; however, the perceptions of the recruits indicate a positive attitudinal impact on training. This aspect of the integration could have a favorable impact on mission accomplishment in the Fleet.”³⁰³

²⁹⁹ Scarpace, J., and O’Neill, M. (1992), *Evaluation of Gender Integration at Recruit Training Command Orlando Naval Training Center* (Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute). [cited as “Scarpace and O’Neill”]

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, page 4.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, page 5 (*emphasis in original*).

³⁰² *Ibid.*, page 1.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, page 5.

After approximately one year of gender-integrated basic training, the Navy convened a review in February 1993. According to records of that review, it concluded, “Mixed gender training develops growth in mutual respect and understanding and a professional bonding between males and females.” The review group also noted:

“b. The Company Commanders felt mixed gender training was more difficult than training all male or all female companies. They have to use different motivators for males and females.”

“c. Recruit graduates and a cross-section of Company Commanders cited a number of problem areas with the current process [including] nightly switches of berthing areas and head usage. ...”³⁰⁴

The berthing issues were resolved by allowing gender-separate training within the ships (barracks) but requiring gender-integrated training outside the ships. Subsequent experience exposed additional problems in the Navy’s gender-integrated basic training program, especially involving sex, both consensual and unwanted, and occurring both among trainees and between trainees and trainers.³⁰⁵

The Navy initiated its gender-integrated training program in response to criticisms about sexual harassment. The theory that gender-integrated basic training prevents or discourages sexual harassment was not proven then and has not been proven since. Evidence supporting the Navy’s 1992 decision to gender-integrate basic training was lacking at the time and remains elusive.

c. Evaluation of Decisions – Air Force

As described above, the Air Force changed from gender-integrated squadrons to gender-integrated flights in July 1997. In a memorandum dated March 10, 1998, responding to a question from House National Security Committee staff, the Air Force outlined the process of its decision to gender-integrate flights. The Air Force stated:

“Although USAF implemented gender integrated training in 1976, trainee formations (flights) were segregated by gender until July 1997 merely for reasons of logistical convenience. However in July 1996, it was recognized that gender segregated flights presented a visual incongruity with our gender-integrated training policy. Therefore, we began to question segregated gender flight formations and ponder the ramifications of either continuing the segregated formations or transitioning to integrated formations.”³⁰⁶

³⁰⁴ Navy Memorandum subject: Recruit training review conference conducted 8-12 February 1993, Page 8, Item 8 (15 April 1993).

³⁰⁵ See Naval Inspector General Report of Investigation Case No. 980364 (25 Aug 98) (assessment of recruit division commander suitability screening and training, monitoring of RDC conduct and performance, and safety and security of recruits at Recruit Training Command, Great Lakes, Illinois).

³⁰⁶ Hamlin, Mary, Col, USAF, e-mail, subject: Gender Integrated Flights – HNSC Staffer (Mieke Eoyang) Question (March 10, 1998). The full text of this memorandum appears at the end of this chapter.

Like “several on the Hill,” we find it too coincidental that the Air Force decided to review its 20-year-old training policy because of a suddenly recognized “visual incongruity”—only 1 month after the GAO pointed out that the Army and Navy were “more” gender-integrated in basic training than the Air Force. The Air Force has offered no other reason for changing from the previous (1977-1997) format, which by Air Force accounts was very successful.

“Resolv[ing] visual incongruity” seems an insufficient reason to make such a substantial change in training format. Despite 17 months of planning, the change from single-sex to gender-integrated flights involved a good deal of stress and dislocation.³⁰⁷ Problems with instructor assignments (which seem to have coincided with the “combined flight” policy) still persist, and the Commission has not been apprised of any recent improvements in training outcomes that would provide further support for the 1997 decision.

d. Evaluation of Decisions – Marine Corps

The Marine Corps has made many changes to its basic training program over the years, but it has never varied its practice of training men and women separately in boot camp. In recent years, the Marine Corps has had many occasions to consider whether it should gender-integrate boot camp, but has never elected to do so.

According to the Marine Corps, separating the sexes in basic training and having instructors of the same sex provide strong, positive figures and leadership with whom recruits can identify, offering impressionable young men and women appropriate role models without the distracting undercurrent of sexual and other less obvious cross-gender distractions or tensions. Separate basic training enables women to realize early in training that they can be strong, assertive leaders. The gender-separate approach creates a secure environment free from latent or overt sexual pressures, thereby giving new and vulnerable recruits the opportunity to focus on and absorb their Service’s standard of behavior in all areas of military life. The Marine Corps believes that gender-integrated training interferes with that critical dynamic and causes both sexes to be distracted.

We find nothing to criticize in the Corps’ decision to keep boot camp separate for men and women. There is much common sense, supported by experience, in holding that it is unnecessary and counterproductive to mix genders in this most unique, focused, and stress-filled environment that is so profoundly important to military socialization.

In addition, the practice of training men and women in separate battalions offers operational efficiencies and economies of scale. The other Services tax themselves with artificial limitations, such as maintaining convertible “unisex” barracks and filling platoons, companies, and cadre positions based on predetermined ratios and quotas. The Marine Corps system avoids those costs and inconveniences.

³⁰⁷ The Kassebaum Baker committee report noted (at page 16): “The Air Force has tried to deal with this problem by splitting all units, not just the ones with females assigned, so that no flight has an advantage. The committee observed that this approach, only recently initiated, has only compounded the problem.” See also section E.1.c. above.

Furthermore, among all the Services, only the Marine Corps has continuous institutional experience with multiple models of gender integration: Marine basic training units are all-male or all-female up to the battalion level. Marine Combat Training (MCT) is gender-integrated above the platoon level, Military Occupational Specialty school, is fully gender-integrated. Unlike the other Services, which have no current experience with all-female training and limited or no experience with all-male training, the Marine Corps maintains a full range of training models and can draw from that experience as it makes decisions about how to improve its programs. We find the Marine Corps position regarding the gender mix of its training format reasonable and appropriate.

(D) Assess whether the concept of “training as you will fight” is a valid rationale for gender-integrated basic training or whether the training requirements and objectives for basic training are sufficiently different from those of operational units so that such concept, when balanced against other factors relating to basic training, might not be a sufficient rationale for gender-integrated basic training.

3. “Train as You Fight” Not a Valid Rationale

Only the Army specifically cited “train as you fight” as part of its rationale for gender-integrated basic training. This phrase originated in the 1970s as shorthand for describing Army doctrine that combat training should take place in as realistic a setting as practical. It is a misleading and overused slogan when applied to gender integration and basic training.

The Navy and Air Force, as well as the Army, cited “train as you operate” (or a variation of that phrase) as a rationale for gender-integrated training. Although this phrase has less of a tactical connotation, it still fails as a rationale for gender-integrated basic training. This is because the purpose of basic training is not to provide tactical or job skills. It is to transform young civilians into soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines.

As General Keys testified before the House Armed Services Military Personnel Subcommittee on 17 March 1999:

“The purpose of basic training is not complicated. Most recruits can tell you in a sentence the experience is designed as a rite of passage to make them into real soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. What is most remembered and spoken of about one’s military service is time spent “in basic” and their initiation into combat, fortunate or unfortunate as the case maybe. Recruit training is the gateway from civilian identity to a professional identity that serves a “higher good.” It is a unique and powerful transformation that takes place at the singular point when the learning curve is initialized at ground zero and then is maximized by the impact and quality of the basic training experience. It is a one-time opportunity that can not be duplicated elsewhere, or arguably, ever truly made up for at a later date. Consequently, the military

preparedness of graduating recruits and their ability to contribute to the operational readiness of the Commands they join, is extremely sensitive to any variation in the quality of their basic training. The success of recruit socialization and the transition from civilian to professional has profound consequences (immediate and long-term) for each Service.

“Basic training does not teach recruits to fight and survive in combat. Basic training teaches basic military skills such as physical fitness, close order drill and marksmanship. It is a military socialization process – civilians are transformed into soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines. This training provides recruits the basic military skills needed to integrate into an operational unit. It does not teach war-fighting skills nor should it be the staging ground for “gender” etiquette skills.³⁰⁸ It should, however, teach respect for authority, discipline, self-respect, and self-confidence, which transcend any notion of “gender” familiarity. The focus of basic training is (or should be) on the individual: to transform the civilian into a self-confident, disciplined person who is ready to proceed to additional training as a “professional.” The slogan “train-as-you-fight” or any similar slogan does not, in my opinion, have anything to do with basic training.”

(E) Identify the requirements unique to each service that could affect a decision by the Secretary concerned to adopt a gender-integrated or gender-segregated format for basic training and assess whether the format in use by each service has been successful in meeting those requirements.

a. Service-Unique Requirements Inapplicable

Several generic categories of differences among the Services have been cited: mission, tradition, size, force structure, rank distribution, gender composition, and positions open to women.³⁰⁹ No one would dispute that Service-unique requirements exist. No one knows, however, exactly how any of those factors should be considered or weighed in a decision on whether basic training should be gender-integrated or gender-separate.

Service-unique requirements do and should affect the content and conduct of basic training. For example, the Navy properly emphasizes fire fighting; the Army rightly focuses on rifle training. Operational needs must not be overlooked in designing basic training

³⁰⁸ “I do not buy into the notion that boys and girls have to “learn” to work together. These young people entering the services are, arguably, more “gender-integrated,” “gender-sensitive” and “gender-aware” than generations past.” [Footnote from General Keys’ original testimony] The full text of General Keys’ testimony is at the end of this chapter.

³⁰⁹ *Commission Statement and Status Report* (17Mar99), page 35.

programs. Official representatives of the Services have told the Commission, in testimony and in written submittals, that the Services are satisfied with the quality of graduates of their basic training programs.³¹⁰

The Commission's studies revealed, however, that personnel in the operational forces are much more reserved in their enthusiasm. The Commission's survey asked servicemembers to evaluate recent IET graduates. Large majorities say the quality of graduates has declined over the past five years. Although today's graduates are thought to be smarter than those of five years ago, they are also considered (by large majorities of those surveyed) deficient in discipline, in their ability to adjust to military life, and in their willingness to accept authority.³¹¹

Military service itself is unique and, in significant ways, not comparable to a civilian job. In a civilian job, male and female employees typically do not live and work together; nor are they subject to a hierarchical command structure in which bosses have almost absolute power over them; nor if they disobey the rules are they subject to possible criminal action. These "unique" considerations also could affect the choice between gender-integrated or gender-separate basic training.

The Services differ in their operational requirements, but basic training itself—the initial transformation of a civilian into a military servicemember—is something all Services must do and must succeed at. Although the Services may have unique characteristics, basic trainees do not come in corresponding categories. Instead, they are all young, they are all civilians, some are men, and some are women. Human elements are common and fundamental for all Services.

The decision on whether to adopt a gender-integrated or gender-separate format for basic training should be made with reference to the most relevant (and potentially intractable) issues, namely, privacy, physiology, and sexual conduct. We observed that the gender-separate basic training format is most successful in ensuring privacy for members of each sex; in adjusting training techniques and emphasis to accommodate generic physiological differences, and in preventing sexual misconduct. Gender-integrated training, on the other hand, requires major efforts to work around these natural and unavoidable issues. Each Secretary needs to consider whether the actual performance results justify the extra efforts necessary to overcome naturally occurring and invariable sex differences.

³¹⁰ See Appendix H "Service Secretaries' Responses."

³¹¹ See generally Johnson, C., (1999), and Miller, L., and Januscheitis, G., (1999), *Content Analysis of Written Comments Provided on the Recruit Trainer Surveys*, Volume III, "Research." One may argue that older generations always find fault with younger generations, but this does not explain trainers' *positive* comments about today's recruits. We find the trainers' comments consistent with our own experience and that reported by others.

(J) Review Department of Defense and military department efforts to objectively measure or evaluate the effectiveness of gender-integrated basic training, as compared to gender-segregated basic training, particularly with regard to the adequacy and scope of the efforts and with regard to the relevancy of findings to operational unit requirements, and determine whether the Department of Defense and the military departments are capable of measuring or evaluating the effectiveness of that training format objectively.

b. No Objective Measurements of Effectiveness

The GAO published a report in June 1996 titled, “Basic Training: Services Are Using a Variety of Approaches to Gender Integration.”³¹² The GAO noted “data with which to compare the effectiveness of integrated training and segregated training was limited due to curriculum changes, a limited history of integration, and few records documenting trainees’ performance.”³¹³ The GAO’s recommendation was:

“To evaluate the effectiveness of each service’s approach to the integration of recruit training, we recommend that the secretary of defense direct the Services to retain and analyze comparative performance data for men and women in single-gender and gender-integrated training units.”³¹⁴

The Department of Defense concurred with the findings and recommendations in this report, and stated:

“The DOD will instruct each of the Services to retain and analyze comparative performance data for men and women in single gender and gender integrated training units over a one year time period to be completed by fiscal year (FY) 1998.”³¹⁵

Despite making multiple requests for data and studies responsive to subparagraph (J), the Commission received none and was informed that none exist. The Commission asked each Service in writing what, if any, objective measures they use to evaluate the effectiveness of their gender-integrated and gender-separate basic training. Each Service reported it has no current or planned efforts to study that issue.

³¹² GAO/NSIAD-96-153 (June 1996) [cited as “GAO 96-153”]

³¹³ GAO 96-153 at page 4. The GAO report goes on to say (at 5), “The data that is available, however, indicates that gender-integrated basic training programs do not negatively affect the performance of trainees.” We make the same objections noted in our discussion under section E.2. above, and further note that the GAO reached this conclusion in early 1996, before the effect of the Aberdeen, Fort Leonard Wood, and Great Lakes sex scandals.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, page 7.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, page 12.

The Army replied: “The Army studied this topic for three consecutive years and their [sic] is no empirical evidence to indicate that further study is required. Consequently, there are no ongoing studies that evaluate the effectiveness of gender-integrated and gender-separate Basic Combat Training (BCT).”

The Air Force stated: “The objective effectiveness of gender-integrated training is not directly measured in Basic Military Training (BMT). However, there are some related measurements [sexual harassment, Military Training Leader Survey on satisfaction with BMT graduates] that can provide useful insight.”

The Navy and Marine Corps referred only to their standards for graduation for basic training and fleet satisfaction surveys, all of which are non-gender-specific.

A proper study evaluating the effectiveness of gender-integrated versus gender-separate training would require three groups: all male, all female, and mixed. None of the Services (with the possible exception of the Marine Corps)³¹⁶ would be in a position to conduct such a study, because none of the Services except the Marine Corps trains women separately at any level. We therefore conclude that it is not possible for the Department of Defense or the Army, Navy, or Air Force to measure or evaluate the effectiveness of their gender-integrated training format objectively.

F. Readiness Implications

(G) Identify the goals that each service has set forth in regard to readiness, in light of the gender-integrated or gender-segregated format that such service has adopted for basic training and whether that format contributes to the readiness of operational units.

(H) Assess the degree to which performance standards in basic training are based on military readiness.

1. Readiness Goals

The Commission asked each Service to provide a briefing on “readiness,” with emphasis on personnel and training issues.

³¹⁶ Only the Marine Corps has continuous institutional experience with multiple models of gender-integration: all-male, all-female, and mixed. Other than Army combat training (which is all-male), all levels of training in the Army, Navy, and Air Force are fully gender-integrated.

ARMY: The Army defines “military readiness” as “a measure of capabilities against requirements.” As applied to basic training, readiness demands a training base with the ability to develop skilled soldiers. According to the Army’s briefing to the Commission:

“Quality soldiers are the most important factor in current readiness.

Teamwork is essential.

Tough, realistic training is the only way to ensure soldiers are prepared.

We train as we fight.

Our training strategy should:

Ensure we can perform our mission

Build effective teams

Uphold and instill Army values”³¹⁷

The Army relies on its system of phase training³¹⁸ to teach soldiers “the basic skills and critical skills needed to perform their jobs in operational combat units.” The Army also stated to the Commission:

“As part of the training process, men and women in gender integrated specialties learn how to function as a team – building a cohesive unit from day one. The skill of becoming a team members and developing a cohesive unit, carry forward when soldiers complete IET and go to their operational unit. This has a positive effect on combat readiness.”

NAVY: The Navy defines “readiness” as “the functional area that deals with providing well maintained, adequately supplied platforms with sufficient resources to carry out required Naval missions and functions.” The functional components of readiness include maintenance, supply, personnel, and training. As applied to basic training, readiness involves measures of recruiting, retention, and training. In Fiscal Year 1998, the Navy’s recruiting accessions were 7,000 short of goals, and further shortages are projected through May 1999. The Navy stated to the Commission:

The Navy’s objective is to develop sailors who are motivated, willing to learn, proud to serve and confident to perform basic seamanship skills, and whose behavior is consistent with the standards and values of the United States Navy. Every training objective at RTC is directly related to an evolution or event that could be encountered in the fleet environment.

³¹⁷ E.g., Bolt, LTG William J., USA, TRADOC, Deputy Commanding General, Initial Entry Training, Ohle, LTG David H., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Burnette, LTG Thomas N., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations Plans, Volume II “Transcripts” pages 385-399 (28Jan99, pp. 130-214).

³¹⁸ See chapter 3 (description of Army basic training continuum).

... In order to ensure that recruits have the ability to perform their newly learned tasks under intense conditions similar to those on board a ship, the recruit needs to be exposed to realistic conditions that require application of their new skills. Accepting the hypothesis that men and women cannot train together suggests to recruits that it is equally impossible for them to work together. It is imperative for combat capability that sailors learn that they can and must depend on each other regardless of their gender.

AIR FORCE: The Air Force told the Commission that readiness is a complex subject, and readiness resources include personnel, equipment, training, and enablers. The Air Force reported that its overall readiness is down 18 percent since 1996 and its Air Combat Command Stateside Active Readiness is down 56 percent since 1996. The Air Force missed its recruiting goals two out of three months in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 1999. Lower retention rates have made it necessary to increase recruiting goals by 1,000 this year. The Air Force cited “concern” over second-term reenlistment rates in several categories of warfighting skills and “major concern” over pilot retention, projecting a shortage of 2,000 pilots by 2002.³¹⁹

As readiness applies to gender-integrated basic training, the Air Force also noted to the Commission:

Readiness is impacted by every airman’s ability to conduct themselves appropriately at all times, especially under stressful conditions. Appropriate conduct involves accepting opposite gender airmen as both peers and leaders; knowing how to interact with the opposite sex since our operational environments are mixed gender; and being able to discipline one’s self [*sic*] in the conduct of professional relationships so that personal behavior does not impair unit discipline or mission accomplishment. Therefore, the Air Force needs gender-integrated Basic Training in order to teach and reinforce these standards of appropriate conduct from the first day of duty and establish a strong and correct foundation upon which to build further training and insure that the highest possible level of mission ready airmen arrive at operational units.

MARINE CORPS: The Marine Corps defines “readiness” as “a unit’s ability to perform its wartime missions and taskings.” The Marine Corps maintains an average of 23,000 Marines forward deployed. The Marine Corps stated to the Commission:

³¹⁹ *E.g.*, Esmond, Lt Gen Marvin R., USAF; Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Pelak, Maj Gen Andrew J., Jr., USAF, Commander, 2nd Air Force, Keesler AFB, Barksdale, Brig Gen Barry W., USAF, Commander, 37th Wing, Lackland AFB, Volume II “Transcripts” pages 457-473 (29Jan99, pp. 228-322). It should be noted that this report was given in January 1999, some time before the action over Yugoslavia.

“The use of the term readiness has been applied to a growing list of subjects from quality of life issues, to education opportunities for dependent children overseas, to morale. These areas, of course, are important, but the Marine Corps’ number one priority has always been current operational readiness. We will go to great lengths to ensure this readiness, even at the expense of other areas such as modernization, infrastructure or quality of life. We do not like to do business this way, but fiscal realities in a resource constrained environment have forced us to do so. ...

“As the nation’s by-law force-in-readiness, the Marine Corps must be ready to deploy on short notice to crises around the world. ...

“Because of this expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps, each Marine must be prepared to deploy upon reporting to an operational unit. This requirement explains why Marine Corps entry level training is longer than that of the other Services and why Marine Combat Training is conducted for all non-infantry Marines (male and female) following recruit training. This training, in conjunction with follow-on Military Occupational Specialty training, ensures all Marines are trained and able to fight and survive in a combat environment.”³²⁰

a. Readiness: Recruiting

In each case, the measure of readiness includes measures of *personnel* (How many? What qualifications?) and *training* (Mission capable? How well qualified? How current?). Recruiting is key to maintaining adequate numbers of personnel. The Army, Navy, and Air Force currently are experiencing serious recruiting shortfalls, while the Marine Corps continues to meet its recruiting objectives. There are many differences among the four Services, but one notable difference between the Marine Corps and the other three Services is their policies regarding mixed- or separate-sex basic training. It is reasonable to ask whether these policies may affect recruiting and whether changing the policies might improve recruiting results.

The Youth Attitudes Tracking Study (YATS) is an annual survey conducted under the auspices of the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). The 1998 YATS survey involved telephone interviews of a nationally representative sample of 10,000 young men and women, age 16-24. At the Commission’s request, DMDC this year added three questions designed to determine attitudes of young people toward gender-integrated and gender-separate training. Those questions and results are shown below.³²¹

³²⁰ E.g., Huly, BGen Jan C., USMC, Director, Operations Division, Plans, Policies and Operations, HQMC, Jones, BGen T.S., USMC, Director, Training and Education Division, HQMC, Volume II “Transcripts” pages 473-485 (29Jan99, pp. 223-296).

³²¹ Laurence, J., & Wetzel, E. (1999), *Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS): A Review of Selected Results*, Volume IV “Research,” pages 663-688.

Q664T. Assuming for a moment that you were seriously considering enlisting in the military, would the requirement that males and females train together make you *[more likely / less likely / have no effect on decision]* to enlist?

	Males	Females
More likely	11%	8%
Less likely	5%	14%
No effect	83%	77%

Q664U. Assuming for a moment that you had already made the decision to enlist in the military, would you (a) prefer to go through basic training where males and females train together; (b) go through basic training with your own sex only; or (c) would it make no difference to you?

	Males	Females
Together	17%	11%
Separate	8%	24%
No difference	76%	64%

Q664V. In your opinion, does having both males and females training together in military basic training improve the overall quality of the training? Would you say it: (a) improves the quality; (b) lowers the quality; or (c) makes no difference?³²²

	Males	Females
Better	28%	34%
Worse	11%	9%
No difference	60%	57%

The great majority of both men (83 percent) and women (77 percent) said it would make no difference to them whether basic training were conducted with or without the opposite sex.³²³ Among women, 14 percent said they would be less likely to join if training were gender-integrated, and 24 percent said they preferred gender-separate training. Conversely, among men, 11 percent said they would be more likely to join if training were gender-integrated, and 17 percent said they preferred gender-integrated training.

The preferences of young men are important, because men make up about 80 percent of enlistees. The YATS has reported a slightly downward trend in the percentage of young men who “definitely or probably” would enlist, from about 30 percent in 1989-1991 to

³²² Totals do not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

³²³ In the past, the YATS has asked respondents whether they believe women should train under the same conditions as men. Large majorities of both men and women agree that this should be either permitted or required. Unfortunately, the question is ambiguous about whether women and men should train under the same conditions together or separately. Therefore, this question is not helpful in assessing attitudes about gender-integrated and gender-separate training. See Laurence and Wetzel (1999), pages 674-675.

slightly under 25 percent today. Among women, the percentage who “definitely or probably” would enlist has stood at or just above 10 percent consistently since at least 1986.³²⁴

Some have speculated that gender integration of the armed forces has made military service less attractive to young men, who may be more interested in seeking physical challenge. The YATS results tend to confirm that young men are more interested than young women in physical challenge, and young men perceive the Air Force and the Navy as less physically challenging than the Marine Corps and the Army.³²⁵

Q528C1. How important is physical challenge? (Is this extremely, very ... important to you?)

	<i>Males</i>	<i>Females</i>
<i>Extremely important</i>	18%	14%
<i>Very important</i>	38%	30%
<i>Somewhat important</i>	34%	41%
<i>Not important</i>	9%	14%

Q528C4. Would you be physically challenged if you joined the [Service]?

Men	Definitely	Probably	Prob. Not	Def. Not
Army	47%	32%	13%	7%
Navy	38%	39%	16%	6%
USMC	55%	28%	11%	6%
Air Force	31%	46%	18%	3%

Women	Definitely	Probably	Prob. Not	Def. Not
Army	48%	39%	7%	6%
Navy	47%	33%	10%	9%
USMC	61%	26%	5%	4%
Air Force	33%	49%	9%	6%

Only the Marine Corps and the Army have all-male training, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that this enhances their image of being physically challenging. Overall, the results of the 1998 YATS suggest that the Army, Navy, and Air Force would suffer no loss in terms of recruiting (and might gain) if they decided to change, in whole or in part, from gender-integrated to gender-separate basic training.

b. Readiness: Performance Standards

Readiness is most often evaluated in terms of operational units. By definition, basic training does not involve operational units. Basic training “units” are formed only for the period of basic training, and upon graduation the new service members disperse for

³²⁴ Laurence and Wetzel (1999), Volume IV “Research” page 673.

³²⁵ Laurence and Wetzel (1999), Volume IV “Research” pages 678-679.

specialized operational training.³²⁶ Basic training performance standards are relevant to readiness to the extent that basic training produces new servicemembers capable of being trained to serve effectively in operational units.

Basic training performance standards must reflect a balance between personnel (accession) needs and training needs. Recruiting shortfalls such as the Army, Navy, and Air Force are now experiencing may impose pressure to reduce training standards so that increased numbers can graduate. Readiness requires that basic training performance standards be kept appropriately high and rigorously applied.

Performance standards in basic training generally aim to produce a servicemember who is physically fit, who understands and accepts the Service's organizational values, who knows and complies with the service's norms of behavior, and who is ready to receive further training. To this extent, the basic training performance standards, as defined, support military readiness goals.

Whether basic training performance standards *as applied* support military readiness is another question. Readiness requires sufficient numbers of trained personnel who are capable of performing necessary functions. If basic training performance standards are diluted or manipulated in a way allows that lower- performing recruits to pass, then readiness will suffer as unqualified graduates enter advanced training and even the operational forces.

Different fitness standards for men and women, although scientifically valid, have created confusion among many service members about women's "fitness" to perform job tasks. The Commission has recommended that the Services take steps to educate their personnel about the difference between physical fitness standards and job performance standards.

Gender-normed fitness standards are appropriate, but gender-normed job performance standards are not. Unfortunately, there remains a perception in all the Services that women are allowed to serve in occupational specialties for which they are not physically qualified. This perception exists in basic training as well as in the operational forces.

Several factors feed the perception that women are less physically qualified. One is the lack of objective job performance standards. The Institute of Medicine, in its 1998 report, *Assessing Readiness in Military Women: The Relationship of Body Composition, Nutrition and Health*,³²⁷ noted:

³²⁶ The Marine Corps Unit Cohesion Program begins in Military Occupational Specialty Training or School of Infantry after completion of boot camp and MCT.

³²⁷ "Military readiness encompasses optimum health, fitness, and performance." Institute of Medicine, Food and Nutrition Board, Committee on Military Nutrition Research, Committee on Body Composition, Nutrition and Health of Military Women (1998), *Assessing Readiness in Military Women: The Relationship of Body Composition, Nutrition and Health* at page 1 [cited as "INST MED"].

“Testing of strength and task performance (as one of the qualifications for placement in military operational [sic] specialties [MOSs]), such as that currently used by most municipal fire fighting services and many law enforcement agencies, is limited to the Air Force at the present time and to a very small number of MOSs in other branches of service.”³²⁸

Citing a GAO recommendation, the Institute of Medicine noted:

“The GAO recommended that the Services assess whether a significant problem exists in physically demanding occupations and identify solutions. Recommended solutions included establishing valid performance standards to increase job sustainment, utilization of personnel, and safety; providing additional job training; and redesigning tasks (GAO, 1996).”³²⁹

Another factor feeding the perception that women are not physically qualified for their jobs is the statistical fact that, indeed, many of the more physically demanding occupations are beyond the capabilities of the great majority of women. As noted by the Institute of Medicine:

“Although few data have been collected by any of the branches regarding assessment of task performance capability, since 1989 the Army has collected such data for a select number of MOSs. These data show that fewer than 15 percent of women in heavy-lifting MOSs were strength-qualified for their jobs by the end of advanced individual training. This suggests either that they would be unable to perform parts of their jobs, that the jobs were misclassified, or that task adaptation would prevent their inability to lift the required weight from interfering with their performance (Teves et al., 1985).”³³⁰

“For example, of the 277 current MOSs, 175 require occasional lifting of 100 lb. [45 kg] or more and frequent lifting of 50 lb. [23 kg] or more. Approximately 20 percent of military-age males and 80 percent of military-age females are reported to be incapable of performing at this level (Headley and Rice, 1996).”³³¹

The Services expressed confidence that their training programs root out individuals (male or female) who lack the physical ability to perform tasks required under their MOS.³³²

³²⁸ INST MED at page 4.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, page 71.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, page 70.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, page 79.

³³² *E.g.*, Bolt, GEN, Volume II “Transcripts” pages 54-68 (10Nov98, pp. 160-247). Prior to GEN Bolt’s appearance, the Commission submitted written questions to which the Army responded in writing for the record. “The average man’s physical performance will always exceed the average woman’s physical performance because, on the average, men have higher levels of strength and endurance. However, experience has shown that women can perform jobs in their Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) as well as men because women are able to perform MOS tasks as well as men and have served well in these MOSs.”

On the other hand, the Services' pervasive emphasis on teamwork can mask individual weaknesses. As the GAO noted:

“According to DOD and Army officials, the Services rely upon the absence of complaints filtering up from operational units as an indicator that widespread performance problems do not exist. Supervisory personnel we spoke with, however, indicated they would work around [*footnote in original—see text immediately below*] individual performance capability problems or redistribute tasks and that it was unlikely such information would be channeled to higher levels unless widespread problems were encountered.”

[*Footnote text*] “According to servicemembers we spoke with, one or more other servicemembers would work together to complete a task that was too demanding for one person to do. Servicemembers we spoke with considered this approach realistic as long as sufficient numbers of personnel were available to lend assistance.”³³³

The strong emphasis on teamwork and cooperation begins in basic training. In gender-integrated basic training, commissioners observed recruits redistributing tasks according to team members' individual physical strength and ability. In practical effect, this meant that male trainees did the heavy lifting and female trainees performed the less physically demanding (and perhaps more mentally demanding) tasks. Teamwork and cooperation are laudable and desirable, but there is evidence that gender-integrated training may be reinforcing, rather than eliminating, male-female stereotypes.³³⁴ “Teamwork” that effectively consists of assigning tasks by sex deprives both sexes of essential experience. For training purposes at least, all trainees should demonstrate their ability to do all required tasks. We believe that gender-separate training is more effective in breaking down sex stereotypes and exposing trainees to a wider range of experience.

Finally, in light of current personnel shortages, it is vitally important that recruits eventually become capable of doing the jobs that need to be done. It is also critical to morale that servicemembers have confidence in one another that they are qualified and able to perform all tasks incident to their jobs. The Services should develop substantiated, objective standards for demanding physical tasks.³³⁵ Readiness and morale will be much improved if recruits and other service members know that objective, gender-neutral job-related

³³³ General Accounting Office, (July 1996), *Physically Demanding Jobs: Services Have Little Data on Ability of Personnel to Perform* (GAO/NSIAD-96-169), page 5.

³³⁴ To give a few examples of such stereotyping, when asked how they liked training alongside men, female trainees often responded in terms like these: “The guys really help us.” “They motivate us.” “They lift heavy stuff for us.” “We trade—we do their ironing, and they clean our floors.” Male trainees in gender-integrated units had similar views about working with women: “We each do the things we’re better at.” In contrast, female Marine recruits, training separately, could not pass off dirty or difficult jobs to men; they had to find a way to do everything for themselves.

³³⁵ “The Secretary of Defense is required by law to prescribe physical performance standards for any occupation for which the Secretary determines strength, endurance, or stamina are essential to performance.” General Accounting Office (Nov. 1998) *Gender Issues: Information to Assess Servicemembers' Perceptions of Gender Inequities is Incomplete* (GAO/NSIAD-99-27) page 10, citing Section 543, Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 103-160, Nov. 30, 1993).

performance standards exist and are applied and that they serve as the basis for determining the minimum physical qualifications for enlistment, as well as performance standards in basic training.

(K) Compare the pattern of attrition in gender-integrated basic training units with the pattern of attrition in gender-segregated basic training units and assess the relevancy of the findings of such comparison.

2. Attrition Patterns

Comparisons of attrition patterns between gender-integrated and gender-segregated units within each Service are impractical because of the lack of comparable groups in both formats. In general, women leave the Services at all stages (basic training, first year, first term) at considerably higher rates than men. We found no evidence that gender-integrated or gender-separate training affects attrition rates. We note, however, that some amount of attrition is appropriate; concern arises only when attrition rates are too high or too low.

ARMY: The Army provided the following information in response to this item.³³⁶

Army Active Component Discharges	BCT	OSUT	AIT
FY96 Cohort			
• Male	3.9%	4.5%	2.9%
• Female	11.5%	2.0%	4.9%
FY97 Cohort			
• Male	4.1%	3.8%	3.7%
• Female	12.7%	2.0%	6.4%
FY98 Cohort*			
• Male	5.7%	5.0%	2.1%
• Female	17.3%	1.4%	2.9%

* FY98 AIT incomplete.

³³⁶Most men in OSUT training are training for combat MOSs, while most women are training for either MP or Chemical MOS. Women who join the MPs must meet taller height requirements than women who attend BCT.

Cohort consists of all soldiers who report to a Reception Station during FY.

<i>Army Attrition by Training Base</i>			
	FY96	FY97	FY98*
GIBT Ft Jackson	8.1%	8.5%	13.3%
GIBT Ft L. Wood	8.8%	8.4%	10.1%
GSBT Ft Sill	6.7%	5.3%	4.4%
GSBT Ft Knox	6.5%	7.4%	9.3%
*through July 98			

NAVY: The Navy provided the following information in response to this item.

“Navy has no specific attrition records for males in categories of gender-integrated or gender-separated recruit training. Since 1993, all Navy female recruits have participated in gender-integrated recruit training. Available attrition data follows.”

<i>Navy Initial Entry Training (IET) Attrition</i>			
	RTC	A School	C School
FY 96			
Male	12.8%	6.1%	4.9%
Female	14.1%	7.0%	4.1%
FY 97			
Male	14.0%	6.0%	5.0%
Female	14.0%	7.0%	3.0%
FY 98			
Male	15.26%	6.2%	5.8%
Female	19.08%	6.2%	4.0%

A School: Apprentice training following Recruit Training

C School: Advanced training following apprentice training for some personnel in highly technical Navy ratings (skills)

AIR FORCE: The Air Force provided the following information in response to this item.

<i>Air Force Attrition Rates from FY96 Through FY98</i>				
Basic Training	Entry	Attrition	Percent	FY Attrition
FY96				
Males	24,821	2,236	9.01	10.3%
Females	8,994	1,049	11.6	
FY97				
Males	24,569	2,062	8.39	9.69%
Females	9,752	1,072	10.99	
FY98				
Males	26,182	1,978	7.55	9.06%
Females	9,691	1,024	10.57	

Technical Training	Entry	Attrition	Percent	FY Attrition
FY96				
Males	29,736	724	2.4	2.15%
Females	9,685	182	1.9	
FY97				
Males	29,977	725	2.4	2.15%
Females	10,396	198	1.9	
FY98				
Males	36,481	683	1.9	1.95%
Females	12,428	252	2.0	

MARINE CORPS: The Marine Corps does not train gender-integrated at the same level it trains gender-segregated and therefore has no patterns to compare. Marine Corps attrition rates for males and females in boot camp (first 12 weeks of training) are as follows:

<i>Marine Corps Boot Camp Attrition Rates</i>			
	Parris Island (M)	Parris Island (F)	San Diego (M)
FY96	13.41%	24.84%	11.59%
FY97	14.40%	21.60%	11.95%
FY98	17.12%	22.15%	12.60%

First-Term Enlisted Attrition

The Commission sponsored a study of first-term enlisted attrition addressing the question of whether basic training format affects subsequent military performance.³³⁷ The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) provided data from the files of all active-duty enlisted accessions from fiscal years 1991 to 1996 for each Service. The data were analyzed on a year-by-year basis, by Service, to determine which factors may be predictors of leaving the service prematurely.³³⁸

Shown below are tables displaying data extracted from the study. The tables show, for each Service, the total number of accessions for each year, followed by the percentages of entering recruits who were male and female; then the total percentage of recruits who left within 36 months, and the percentages who were male and female; then the percentages of men and women who left the Service for the reasons designated. The three top categories of reasons cited for discharges are as follow:

- (1) “failure to meet minimum behavioral and performance criteria” (noted on the table as “Behav”);
- (2) “medical disqualifications” (“Med”); and
- (3) “other separations or discharge” (“Other”).

These three categories of reasons accounted for the vast majority of discharges.³³⁹

<i>Army Accessions/Attrition/Reasons for Discharge, by Cohort</i>												
ARMY	Acces	% M F		Attrit	% M F		Behav %		Med %		Other%	
	N=			%All			M	F	M	F	M	F
1991	78655	85	15	31	29	44	68.1	41.9	25.1	23.9	2.9	29.6
1992	77251	84	16	31	28	43	69.8	44.0	24.8	24.4	1.9	26.9
1993	77372	84	16	33	31	44	69.2	48.9	26.0	21.1	1.5	25.3
1994	67416	82	18	33	31	44	67.5	45.1	27.4	23.5	1.6	26.5
1995	62259	82	18	31	28	43	68.4	42.8	27.1	31.0	1.5	22.1
1996*	72809	80	20	28	25	39	66.0	43.1	30.1	33.5	1.4	20.6

*Incomplete cohort period.

Other = 64-74% pregnancy; 23-34% parenthood³⁴⁰

³³⁷ Sipes, D. & Laurence, J (1999), *Performance Data Modeling: An Examination of First-Term Enlisted Attrition in Relation to Gender and Training Format* Volume IV “Research” pages 577-662.

³³⁸ On the issue of whether the gender-integrated or gender-segregated training format affects attrition, the researchers concluded, in summary: (see footnotes 340 to 343).

³³⁹ Sipes & Laurence (1999), Volume IV “Research” pages 605-606.

³⁴⁰ Army: “These results show absolutely no impact of gender-integrated training on attrition rates.”

NAVY	Acces	%		Attrit	%		Behav%		Med%		Other%	
	N=	M	F	%All	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
1991	68526	91	9	27	26	31	66.0	42.2	12.0	13.1	19.2	42.9
1992	58590	86	14	29	28	33	63.2	43.4	12.3	15.0	22.0	39.2
1993	63269	87	13	32	32	35	60.6	43.9	10.7	18.2	26.9	36.7
1994	53577	83	17	34	34	34	72.9	49.1	18.5	23.3	6.6	25.8
1995	48064	80	20	35	35	35	74.9	49.2	19.3	26.1	3.9	23.3
1996*	47893	85	15	30	30	29	76.6	53.6	16.1	20.8	5.6	23.5

*Incomplete cohort period.

Other = 49-55% pregnancy; 20-34% parenthood³⁴¹

USAF	Acces	%		Attrit	%		Behav%		Med%		Other%	
	N=	M	F	%All	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
1991	29822	78	22	25	22	34	66.3	41.8	16.8	27.8	13.2	27.4
1992	34869	78	22	22	20	29	72.0	45.5	16.5	26.0	7.1	25.4
1993	31425	78	22	24	23	30	67.9	43.3	21.9	32.1	6.2	22.0
1994	30142	76	24	25	23	30	68.6	40.5	22.7	37.1	4.8	19.4
1995	31225	76	24	26	25	30	70.0	45.9	23.4	32.9	3.7	18.9
1996*	30970	74	26	23	22	26	75.8	50.9	18.3	27.6	3.4	19.5

*Incomplete cohort period.

Other = ³⁴²

USMC	Acces	%		Attrit	%		Behav%		Med%		Other%	
	N=	M	F	%All	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
1991	29761	95	5	29	28	48	46.3	34.7	48.7	35.9	2.5	27.8
1992	31804	95	5	28	27	45	50.9	43.2	42.1	28.1	5.0	26.9
1993	34740	95	5	28	28	48	60.9	53.5	23.3	19.7	13.3	25.0
1994	31778	95	5	30	29	40	61.8	44.4	23.8	28.6	12.1	24.2
1995	32115	94	6	31	30	44	67.0	53.8	19.8	27.6	11.2	16.4
1996*	32784	93	7	25	25	34	67.3	60.3	17.5	23.8	13.4	15.4

*Incomplete cohort period.

Other = ³⁴³

According to the study’s logistic regression, Army enlisted women leave the service prematurely at about twice the rate of men. Navy women and men are about equally likely to leave early. In the 1995 cohort, the odds of women leaving early (over men) are about 1.29 in

³⁴¹Navy: “Training format could only be assessed in 1994, when both gender-segregated and gender-integrated training were utilized. The analysis revealed that sailors who had undergone training after the introduction of gender integration were less likely to succumb to attrition than sailors who had been trained in a gender-segregated format.”

³⁴²Air Force: “The effect of training format could not be assessed for the Air Force, because gender-integrated training was implemented throughout the study period.”

³⁴³Marine Corps: “There was no ‘training format’ variable for the Marine Corps; all training is gender-segregated.”

the Air Force (down from 1.84 in 1991) and 1.8 in the Marine Corps (down from 2.8 in 1991 and 1993). In the Marine Corps, women constituted a very small percentage of the cohort, so their higher attrition rates hardly affected the total attrition rate. In the Army, women constituted up to 20 percent of total accessions, and women's higher attrition rates yield an overall attrition rate that is about three percentage points higher than the male-only attrition rate.

The study indicated that a very high proportion of enlisted women's departures for "other" reasons during their first 36 months in Service are due to pregnancy or parenthood. (The study did not specify details about "other" reasons for the Air Force and Marine Corps data.) For the most part, women are less likely than men to be discharged for failure to meet minimum behavioral and performance criteria, but women's higher rates of medical and "other" discharges more than make up the difference.

In general, women leave the Services at all stages (basic training, first year, first term) at considerably higher rates than men. One can hypothesize all sorts of explanations; an obvious one is that young women of an age to serve in the military are also of child-bearing age, and they may reasonably decide they prefer a less demanding career when they are having and raising children. White women leave the Service at higher rates than minority women. It has been suggested that white women have more opportunities that they can pursue outside the Service; likewise, minority women may perceive that the military is better than other employers in terms of equal opportunity.³⁴⁴

As demonstrated by the YATS data, only a small percentage of women have a positive propensity to join the Services. Those who join are more likely than men to drop out before they finish their initial term. This makes women on average more expensive to train than men, because the Service is more likely to lose the opportunity to recoup its training investment. The higher attrition rates of women suggest that the Services should conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine the best and most economical policies for recruiting and training women.

(L) Compare the level of readiness and morale of gender-integrated basic training units with the level of readiness and morale of gender-segregated units, and assess the relevancy of the findings of such comparison and the implications, for readiness, of any differences found.

3. Readiness and Morale Generally

Readiness is a measure not usually applied to basic training units. In a Commission survey, enlisted servicemembers were asked to rate their level of individual and unit readiness

³⁴⁴ Stone, A., "White Female Enlistees Leaving Military at an Alarming Rate," *USA Today* (Mar. 15, 1999) at 1A. "Charles Moskos, the Northwestern University military sociologist who gathered the statistics and provided them to USA TODAY, says an explanation for the exodus is that white women unhappy in the military might feel they have more economic alternatives outside."

and morale. As shown below, those in the Marine Corps and the Air Force were most likely to report higher levels of personal and unit readiness and morale.³⁴⁵

<i>Individual and Unit Readiness and Morale, by Service</i>				
	Army	Navy	USMC	USAF
Readiness (% Very/Well Prepared)				
Individual	58	54	67	61
Unit	52	53	69	73
Morale (% Very High/High)				
Individual	35	38	46	37
Unit	23	27	32	25

The goal of the study was to examine differences, if any, between personnel whose basic training was gender-integrated or gender-separate, in terms of their socialization, values and attitudes toward the military and their careers. The authors concluded, “Overall, there is little indication that training-related variables had any impact on the current status outcome measures.”³⁴⁶

a. Attitudes Among Recruits and Trainers

Another Commission study surveyed beginning and graduating recruits on attitudes conducive to unit cohesion and commitment, as well as military leaders’ opinions on training and gender-related issues.³⁴⁷ At the basic-training level, well over 80 percent of graduating recruits, regardless of their training format, felt that basic training had helped them understand and identify more closely with their military Service.³⁴⁸

The same study measured the inculcation of attitudes in graduating recruits considered conducive to cohesion. The attitudes were commitment, respect for authority, and group Service identity. Marine Corps graduating recruits scored highest on those attitudes; in fact, female Marine recruits score at the highest levels of all graduating recruits measured.³⁴⁹ Although it is risky to draw conclusions from cross-Service comparisons, these results suggest that it would be worthwhile for the Army, Navy, and Air Force to consider whether separate training might be more effective and beneficial than mixed training for women.³⁵⁰

Recruit trainers, in contrast, had many complaints about the quality of recruits (motivation, fitness, respect for authority), regardless of gender-integrated or gender-separate

³⁴⁵ Ramsberger, P., Laurence, J., Sipes, D. (1999), *Retrospective Survey of Socialization, Values, and Performance in Relation to Recruit Training*, Volume IV “Research” Table 9, page 40.

³⁴⁶ Ramsberger, Laurence and Sipes (1999), Volume IV “Research” page 52.

³⁴⁷ Johnson (1999), Volume III “Research” pages 13-33.

³⁴⁸ Johnson, Data Set Introduction (Feb. 1, 1999), Table 99 (#165).

³⁴⁹ Johnson (1999), Volume III “Research” page 131.

³⁵⁰ The Kassebaum Baker committee reported the same thing: “The committee observed impressive levels of confidence, team-building, and esprit de corps in the all-female training platoons at the Marine Corps Parris Island training base. Female recruits in the other Services were more divided as to whether their basic training was producing these outcomes.” *Report of the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues to the Secretary of Defense* (Dec. 16, 1997), page 16.

format.³⁵¹ The most commonly expressed sentiments from recruit trainers who added written comments on their survey questionnaires were summarized as follows:

- Over the past five years, entering recruits have possessed greater intelligence and education, although that often times has meant they have a harder time adjusting to military culture.
- Overall, however, recruit quality has declined in the past five years in terms of motivation, work ethic, physical fitness, respect for authority, and willingness to work as a team rather than as an individual.
- Recruit trainers are not permitted to use the tools they need to properly motivate and discipline new recruits.
- Basic training has become too focused on producing a large quantity of graduates, and not on producing high quality graduates.
- Overall, graduating recruits are ill-prepared for the combat environment.
- Fraternalization and adultery within units or the chain of command can be seriously detrimental to unit cohesion, soldier morale, and military readiness.
- Major problems currently plague gender-integrated training: fraternization, recruit distraction with the opposite sex, harassment or fear of harassment charges, complications in organizing the two genders, and differences in the physical standards for men and women.
- Given the numerous obstacles recruit trainers face, boot camp would be more effective if recruits were separated by gender until advanced/follow-on training.
- High-ranking military officers and civilians do not realize what basic training requires, or they are overly concerned with their careers and political correctness, rather than what is best for the troops.
- Recruit trainers' responses to these surveys will not likely make a difference in military policy or be taken seriously by anyone in a decision-making position.³⁵²

³⁵¹ See Miller and Januscheitis (1999), Volume III "Research" pages 651-652.

³⁵² Miller and Januscheitis (1999), Volume III "Research" at 652. The last item is especially affecting, for recruit trainers certainly have one of the most difficult and demanding jobs in all the Armed Services, and their views deserve attention.

In one Commission survey, recruit trainers were asked about gender-integrated versus gender-separate training, with these results.³⁵³

<i>What gender mix within basic training best facilitates the purpose of basic training?</i>				
RECRUIT TRAINERS	Army	Navy	USAF	USMC
(number of respondents)	n=1098	n=225	n=132	n=835
Together for everything %	27	36	40	2
Separate for everything %	37	44	33	88
Separate for all-male specialties %	16	2	2	3
Does not matter %	15	13	23	4

<i>Agree/Disagree: "Mixing males and females in basic training courses causes unnecessary distractions in training."</i>								
Recruit Trainers	Army		Navy		USAF		USMC	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
# respondents	n=966	n=132	n=188	n=37	n=108	n=24	n=740	n=95
Agree %	57	33	67	68	68	38	84	83
Neither %	18	16	11	16	10	21	4	6
Disagree %	20	51	21	16	20	42	7	7

b. Attitudes Among Other Personnel

Another Commission survey asked enlisted personnel (not necessarily recruit trainers) their opinion about the best basic training mix. The authors of the study reported “A third or less of respondents felt that segregated basic was the best training mix, except in the Marine Corps where two-thirds agreed with this statement.”³⁵⁴ In fact, the opinions of enlisted personnel³⁵⁵ were more diverse and less decisive than this conclusion implies. The survey asked respondents to select one of several answers, including “Doesn’t matter,” “Don’t know,” and “Segregated male MOS.” The chart below shows the results when “Doesn’t matter” (“DM”) and “Don’t know” (“DK”) votes are included with the votes for “Integrated” (“GI”) and “Segregated” (“GS”).

Best Basic Training Mix: % of Respondents who chose Gender-Integrated (GI)								
+ “Doesn’t Matter” (DM) + “Don’t Know” (DK) + Segregated Male MOS (MOS)								
	GI	DM	GI+DM	DK	GI+DK	GI+DM+DK	MOS	GI+DM+DK+MOS
Army	31	17	48	6	37	54	15	69
Navy	44	23	67	7	51	74	6	80
USMC	9	11	20	5	14	25	9	34
USAF	49	22	71	5	54	76	5	81

³⁵³ Johnson (1999), Volume III “Research” pages121-124

³⁵⁴ Ramsberger, Laurence, & Sipes (1999), Volume IV “Research” page 30.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, Figure 4, page 30.

Best Basic Training Mix: % of Respondents who chose Gender-Segregated (GS) + “Doesn’t Matter” (DM) + “Don’t Know” (DK) + Segregated Male MOS (MOS)								
	GS	DM	GS+DM	DK	GS+DK	GS+DM+DK	MOS	GS+DM+ DK+MOS
Army	31	17	48	6	37	54	15	69
Navy	20	23	43	7	27	50	6	56
USMC	66	11	77	5	71	82	9	91
USAF	19	22	41	5	24	46	5	51

When one adds to the “decided” votes the votes of those who do not know or who believe training format makes no difference, one could argue that 46 percent to 76 percent of enlisted personnel either endorse or do not oppose gender-separate training. Adding those who support separate training for all-male MOSs produces a range of 51 percent to 91 percent of enlisted personnel favoring, or not opposing, some form of gender-separate training. We point this out not because we find these figures particularly persuasive in deciding which format actually is better, but merely to demonstrate that there are many shades of opinion and that the issue is far from settled. It is certainly true that enlisted personnel tend to favor the type of training format their own Service uses.

In the final analysis, we believe that the opinions of trainers must carry the most weight, because they themselves are most familiar with today’s recruits and the basic training programs being implemented. Large numbers of recruit trainers report problems in basic training, including problems arising from gender-integration. These issues are bound to affect trainers’ morale as well as the quality of training.

a. Sexual Harassment and Morale

Another subject related to morale, and frequently raised in connection with gender-integrated basic training, is sexual harassment. The Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) provided the Commission with a report summarizing data from the Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (MEOCS). According to this report, “MEOCS data indicate that, for the most part, over time assessments of sexual harassment moved in a more positive direction: suggesting less sexual harassment and fewer sexist behaviors.”³⁵⁶

The MEOCS report presents a “Sexual Harassment/Discrimination Scale” comparing the Services’ ratings from 1994 to 1998. The Air Force generally rated highest (from less than 3.8 to over 4.0); the Army’s ratings were steadily second or third (from about 3.7 to 3.8); and the Navy’s ratings fluctuated widely during the period (3.7 to 4.0 to 3.6 to 3.8). The Marine Corps showed a slight upward trend from just below 3.6 to just above 3.6.³⁵⁷ Evaluating the differences, the author of the report states: “While many factors may contribute to the USMC

³⁵⁶ Dansby, M., (1999), *Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (MEOCS): Overview of Results Related to the Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues*, Volume IV “Research” page 693.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, page 704. The text of the report confirms that higher scores are better, but the report does not indicate precisely how the ratings were calculated, or the possible range of ratings, or whether the ratings are significantly different among the Services.

women’s lower scores, some have suggested gender-segregated basic training as a contributing factor (i.e., Marine men and women start off their military careers separated physically, and this separation may contribute to continued psychological separation throughout their careers).”³⁵⁸

This statement deserves further analysis. The MEOCS report equates sexual harassment with sex discrimination. Legally and factually, the two are not the same. Sex discrimination is the unlawful practice of awarding or denying jobs, pay, or promotion on the basis of sex. Sexual harassment, as the term is used and applied in the Services, comprises virtually any kind of offensive behavior related to sex (ranging from rape to “sexist” jokes).

There is no evidence in the MEOCS report that sexual harassment is more prevalent in the Marine Corps than in other Services. The MEOCS reviewers apparently did not consider the possibility that there may be a higher perception of sex discrimination in the Marine Corps, where ground combat—limited by law to men—is the predominant occupation. Another important factor to consider in reviewing the MEOCS report is that it is based entirely on service members’ subjective perceptions about the climate in their organizations. These are not objective measures of actual claims.

Regarding actual claims of sexual harassment, the MEOCS report cites results of the NIOSH Surveys of Navy Women from 1989 to 1995, showing substantial declines since 1991.³⁵⁹

<i>Those Experiencing at Least One Incident in the Previous Year</i>				
NAVY	1989	1991	1993	1995
Officer Women	26%	33%	20%	15%
Enlisted Women	42%	44%	33%	29%

Even these more straightforward findings may not reflect an actual decline in real sexual harassment. According to *Update Report on the Progress of Women in the Navy* prepared by the 1990 Navy Women’s Study Group,

“The Study Group and 1989 EO Climate surveys, as well as Study Group interviews, indicated that the most common forms of sexual harassment are unwanted sexual teasing, jokes, remarks, gestures.”³⁶⁰

Could the higher incidence of reports of sexual harassment in 1989 merely reflect a heightened sensitivity to teasing and jokes, after some highly publicized incidents? What does the decline in reports of sexual harassment after 1991 actually reveal? The *Update Report* provides a flavor of the disciplinary climate in the Navy after 1989:

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, page 704.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, page 719.

³⁶⁰ *Update Report on the Progress of Women in the Navy* (1990 Navy Women’s Study Group) at III-16.

“The Navy’s policy of zero tolerance of sexual harassment is well known throughout the organization. Navy leadership direction since 1987 has clearly promulgated the unacceptability and inappropriateness of sexual harassment. The message has been received. The EO Manual and other directives have been updated. Training material is in the field. A new sexual harassment prevention training video was distributed in October 1990. The majority of women and men feel that things are being done in the Navy to stop sexual harassment. Headquarters, for the most part, has implemented the majority of 1987 recommendations.

“In spite of all the effort, sexual harassment, in the majority opinion of our Navy personnel, still occurs at their commands. Subtle forms, primarily words and gestures, are pervasive, especially among junior personnel. Commanding officers sense that sexual harassment is ‘out there’ but have difficulty assessing its existence or prevalence. Formal complaints by women who are sexually harassed are not reported for a number of reasons. It is the view of many men that, whether they are rightly or falsely accused, zero tolerance is a ‘big hammer’ from which they cannot recover. Training through GMT and, as required, by CMEO occurs in varying degrees of quality throughout the Navy. It appears that the training has not changed attitude and behavior to the necessary extent.

“One of the changes in perception that seems to have occurred since the 1987 Study involves the definition of sexual harassment. Interviews in 1987 judged it clear and unambiguous. In 1990, however, there is a general consensus that the definition is ambiguous and allows far too much subjectivity of judgment to the alleged victim. As a result, charges of sexual harassment are difficult to prosecute.”³⁶¹

We note that the policy of “zero tolerance” persists in the Navy and continues to provoke the same reactions in men: that they are continually subject to false accusations from which they can never be fully exonerated. To some degree, the same perception exists among men in all Services, and it is especially noteworthy among recruit trainers.³⁶²

A Commission survey of enlisted personnel shows that large numbers disagree that gender-integrated basic training reduces problems for trainees in their later military careers. The authors stated: “Somewhat surprisingly, the preponderance of respondents from each Service disagreed that integrated basic training serves to reduce later problems. The distribution across Services was fairly consistent in this case, with the exception of the Marine Corps where a higher percentage registered disagreement.”³⁶³

³⁶¹ *Update Report* (1990 NWSG) at III-13 and III-14.

³⁶² See Miller and Januscheitis (1999), Volume III “Research” pages 371-376.

³⁶³ Ramsberger, Laurence & Sipes (1999), Volume IV “Research” page 36.

<i>"GI Basic Training Reduces Problems" – Results of Adding % "Neither" Answers to % "Agree" and % "Disagree" Answers</i>					
	Agree	OR	Neither	OR	Disagree
Army	30	57	27	70	43
Navy	31	60	29	69	40
USMC	22	45	23	78	55
Air Force	35	65	30	66	36

We do not have sufficient information to determine whether a gender-integrated or gender-separate format for basic training has any effect on the incidence of sexual harassment, or “problems” generally, in operational units. This is a complex subject that has not been addressed with sufficient attention to all the important variables.

From what we have heard and observed, it is obvious that a gender-separate format reduces the opportunity for sexual harassment and other sexual misconduct in basic training. Studies by the Commission’s legal experts indicate that a substantial amount of effort in gender-integrated basic training is devoted to enforcing disciplinary rules against sexual contacts between recruits.³⁶⁴ We question whether this is a good use of the limited time available in basic training. We believe that the Services that use gender-integrated basic training would be well advised to consider whether the time devoted to managing and trying to prevent inevitable sexual contacts among recruits might not be better spent. Removing the opposite sex during the few weeks of basic training would allow trainers more time to inculcate habits of discipline and promote military values and socialization in recruits.

G. Comparative Studies

(M) Compare the experiences, policies, and practices of the armed forces of other industrialized nations regarding gender-integrated training with those of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.

1. Policies and Practices of Other Industrialized Nations

The Commission reviewed the experiences, policies, and practices of other industrialized nations regarding gender-integrated training. Appendix F³⁶⁵ is a summary of that review. The United States is the world’s only superpower, its Services ranking among the largest and most sophisticated forces. Our traditions and system of government also are different in significant ways from those of other countries. Aspects of other countries’ practices concerning gender integration in their armed forces are interesting, but it is important to bear in mind that those practices exist symbiotically within systems and cultures that are quite different from those in the United States.

³⁶⁴ E.g., *Legal Consultants Report*, Volume II “Transcripts and Legal Consultants Report” pages 541-604 (30Jan99).

³⁶⁵ Handy, K. (1999), Appendix F “*Gender Integration of Militaries Outside of the United States.*”

a. Israel

On the advice of knowledgeable experts, the Commission chose to focus on the experience of the Netherlands and Israel in integrating women into their forces. Shoshana Bryen, director of special projects of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, spoke to the Commission about women in the Israeli Defense Force. According to Ms. Bryen, women are subject to the draft in Israel, but obtaining an exemption, either for marriage or because of religious convictions is easy. About 60 percent of Israeli women serve.

“They look at their time spent in the Israeli service as useful and important to the State, but it’s a duty to be accomplished and hopefully forgotten about fairly quickly.”³⁶⁶

“All women start in the women’s training base, but they then move on depending on what they’re doing. If the women move on to educational functions, they essentially stay with women all the way through. They don’t ever really need to go to places where men are. Then there are other women who file papers and serve coffee. After their basic training, they are sent to offices, and they file paper and they serve coffee, and essentially they’re just waiting to get out. They are the basic conscripts. They do not wish to remain in the military. They look at it as a holding pattern: maybe they’ll find a husband, maybe they won’t. That’s probably about 30 percent of the women.”³⁶⁷

Women in the IDF are subject to the CHEN, the women’s auxiliary corps. Harassment complaints are reported and dealt with through the CHEN chain of command. Contrary to some reports, women do not serve in combat in the IDF. According to Ms. Bryen,

“The myth of the Israeli female soldier was born in the War of Independence, which was now fifty years ago, and they simply didn’t have enough people in the country to man the armed forces, so they used women. But it was their only experience with women in combat. It was a very unsuccessful experience. There were women who were taken prisoner by Syrians and Iraqis and that was basically the end of women in combat for the Israeli armed forces ... because culturally it was unacceptable to have female prisoners in Arab male hands.”³⁶⁸

Although Israeli women soldiers are not deployed in combat, women soldiers serve as trainers of men in various combat skills, including tanks, artillery, and airplanes. According to Ms. Bryen:

³⁶⁶ Bryen, Shoshana, Director of Special Projects, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), Volume II “Transcripts” page 324 (22 Dec98, page 88).

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, page 329 (page 119).

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, page 328 (page 112).

“Women ... have taken over the role of combat arms trainers. All of the trainers in Israeli armed forces now are people who do not serve in combat.”³⁶⁹

“One of our cadets suggested that men don’t want to fail in front of women. And so if a woman can drive a tank, you’d better be able to drive it better. Israel is a very macho society and there’s a level at which ... they still operate that way.”³⁷⁰

b. Netherlands

Vivian van de Perre, formerly a captain in the Army of the Netherlands, spoke to the Commission about women in the Dutch armed forces. She stated, “Since 1978, almost all functions of the Dutch armed forces, with the exception of submarine units and the Marine Corps, have been open to women, and training has been fully integrated.”³⁷¹ She also reported, “When I was a cadet, all physical requirements were exactly the same for men and women in 1985. By being subjected to the same standards, we undoubtedly gained the respect of many male cadets.”³⁷²

Ms. van de Perre noted that the Netherlands recently discontinued its draft (which was limited to men).³⁷³ She expressed uncertainty about gender-integration policies in the future, when there may be a greater need for women to fill slots: “Since we’ve done away with conscription and we need to have more volunteers, we have to rely more on women because we have difficulties filling the posts right now and we go out to the market and advertise the Army.”³⁷⁴

c. Comparing U.S. and Foreign Militaries

In the United States, about 200,000 women serve in the military, constituting about 15 percent of the total force. In other countries, the armed forces are much smaller, and the percentage of women who serve is much lower: *e.g.*, 4 percent in Denmark, 6 percent in the Netherlands, 7.5 percent in France, and 11 percent in Canada.³⁷⁵ Some countries use gender-integrated basic training, and others maintain at least some level of separation. The British Army recently decided to change from gender-integrated back to gender-separate training platoons at its biggest training base.³⁷⁶

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, page 324 (page 87).

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, page 329 (page 116).

³⁷¹ van de Perre, Captain Vivian, Former Chief, Office of Female Military Personnel, Royal Dutch Army, Volume II “Transcripts”, page 322 (22Dec98, page 76) .

³⁷² *Ibid.*, page 323 (page 80).

³⁷³ *Ibid.*, page 322 (page 78).

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, page 327 (page 105).

³⁷⁵ K. Handy, Appendix F “*Gender Integration of Militaries Outside of the United States.*”

³⁷⁶ See “A Squad of Their Own,” *Newsweek* (Feb. 9, 1999) Periscope item. For the original story, see “Army hits the target with female units,” *London Sunday Times*, Feb. 8, 1999.

Several countries ostensibly allow women to serve in combat units; even so, the same countries may prohibit women from certain kinds of service (e.g., marine units, submarines). Those countries that permit women to serve in combat units apparently do not relax any physical requirements or make any special efforts to help the women succeed (such as recruiting a cohort of women who can provide psychological support to one another).³⁷⁷ Other countries do not seem to be as concerned as the U.S. with attaining a “critical mass” of women in a unit. Instead, they simply open the unit to women who are willing and able to meet the “male” standards. As a practical result, extremely few women serve in those units.³⁷⁸

Would similar policies or outcomes be acceptable in the United States? On this issue, LtGen Carol A. Mutter USMC testified to the Commission:

“Do we want to get to the point where we don’t pay any attention at all to how many women go in which units? Because the numbers—the percentage is so small in the Marine Corps of women, we have already situations where we have one woman lance corporal in a company of 300 men. That happens on occasion and I think that’s not good for very young people to be put in that type of situation. I think that puts a lot of pressure on individuals, both men and women, that is very unfair to them and I think the American people expect more from us than that.”³⁷⁹

BG Evelyn P. Foote USA (Ret.) testified:

“I believe that if women are going into new fields they will never, never have a voice in that field unless the numbers in which they are serving within that unit represent something attuned to a critical mass, whatever that number may be. But I think to put one or two or ten even, in a company of 200 is sort of to set up a self-fulfilling prophecy of failures for those women. I think it would be somewhat overwhelming.”³⁸⁰

³⁷⁷ E.g., Australia will admit women in combat units if, in full combat uniform, they can run two miles in 16 minutes, carrying a rifle and a 66-pound backpack. Ham, P., “Australia puts women in the front line,” *London Times*, (Jan. 10, 1999). The British Royal Marines announced in May that they will accept women who meet the same standards as men, which include “long marches, little food or sleep and being forced to live rough on Dartmoor. Recruits must show they can climb a 30ft rope, run for 200 metres carrying a colleague, and complete a nine-mile battle march in 90 minutes in full kit, then shoot accurately on the range afterwards.” McManners, H., “Women soldiers set to join the marines,” *London Sunday Times* (May 23, 1999).

³⁷⁸ “A ruling by Canada’s Human Rights Commission last year held that women could no longer be excluded from any military role except in submarines. The Canadian experience has not been heartening for those who seek to end the combat-exclusion rule in this country. Only seventy-nine women were recruited into the infantry training program and only one completed the course. She has since requested a transfer out of the infantry.” Moskos, C., “Army Women,” in *The Atlantic Monthly* (Aug. 1990 at page 77).

³⁷⁹ Mutter, LtGen Carol A., USMC, Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps, Volume II “Transcripts” page 337 (22Dec98, pp. 167-168).

³⁸⁰ Foote, BG Evelyn P., USA (Ret), Vice Chairman, Sexual Harassment Senior Review Panel (1996-97); Former 1st Commander, Second Basic Training Battalion, U.S. Army Military Police School, Ft. McClellan, AL, Volume II “Transcripts” page 311 (22Dec98, page 169).

In summary, other countries may appear to follow more liberal practices than the United States in training and assigning women in the military. Upon examination, however, one finds that women are a small percentage of the force and practically absent from combat units.

In any event, appearances may be misleading. Ms. van de Perre recalled:

“When I worked as the Chief of the Female Military Personnel Office, a lot of times we got questions—from the U.S. military mainly, and sometimes from DACOWITS, sometimes through other channels—questions about the integration of women and our policy of having women in combat roles. And we had to give politically-correct answers, so we would throw some statistics at the question-asker and we would say some politically vague and correct things and that was it.”³⁸¹

Questioned by Commissioner Segal on this point, Ms. van de Perre added: “Yes, you can make statistics look any way you want to. But the point is that you would never say officially that something doesn’t work easily or it has to be really bad, but in general everything works okay.”³⁸²

(N) Review, and take into consideration, the current practices, relevant studies, and private sector training concepts pertaining to gender-integrated training.

2. Private-Sector Training Concepts and Policies

Appendix G³⁸³ is a report prepared by Commission staff reviewing current practices, relevant studies, and private-sector training concepts pertaining to gender-integrated training. The Commission focused its attention on gender-integration experience in law enforcement (Federal Bureau of Investigation), fire fighting and the Coast Guard. As summarized in Appendix G:

“These non-military examples of gender-integration into traditionally all-male occupations are comparable to the military experience, but there are some very important distinctions. For example, it was suggested in testimony that the FBI’s training is more comparable to military officer training rather than initial entry training for enlisted personnel because, among other reasons, prospective agents are college graduates and the environment of FBI agent training is academic. Also, there are obvious technical equipment differences with military training (water hoses vs. machine guns). Additionally, basic military training is more physically demanding than that of law enforcement or fire

³⁸¹ van de Perre, V., Volume II “Transcripts” page 332 (22Dec98, at page 130).

³⁸² *Ibid.*, page 332 (page 135).

³⁸³ Handy, K., (1999) Appendix G “Women’s Integration in Non-Traditional Work Sectors.”

fighting. And finally, the social organization of law enforcement / fire fighting training is less rigidly structured (FBI agents have weekends off, for example). Nevertheless these examples are informative because policing and fire fighting, like military service, are civil responsibilities that are directly related to the protection of individuals and public goods. Furthermore, non-traditional military assignments, such as peacekeeping or border patrols are looking more and more like civilian policing. So, while there is a limit to how well these examples can inform the military experience, they should not be discarded as entirely irrelevant.”³⁸⁴

Public safety work can be a dangerous, demanding, high stakes, life-or-death job. Public safety agencies have confronted “gender” issues similar to those faced by the military: privacy (living arrangements); physiological differences; sexual conduct; morale and cohesion. Unlike the military, however, civilian agencies are subject to civil liability under anti-discrimination laws. Essentially, civilian agencies have been obliged to develop specific, objective job-related physical performance standards so that they can avoid or defend lawsuits arising out of employment decisions.³⁸⁵

We believe that the success of civilian agencies in assimilating women into formerly all-male occupations is due, in substantial part, to the existence of objective job performance standards, generally accepted and fairly applied. Furthermore, when job standards are applied on a competitive, rather than pass-fail, basis, it improves professionalism and morale among co-workers, and it also enhances confidence among the general public that the public safety is in the hands of the *best* qualified persons available.

H. Feasibility and Implications of Proposals

(O) Assess the feasibility and implications of conducting basic training (or equivalent training) at the company level and below through separate units for male and female recruits, including the costs and other resource commitments required to implement and conduct basic training in such a manner and the implications for readiness and unit cohesion.

(P) Assess the feasibility and implications of requiring drill instructors for basic training unit to be of the same sex as the recruits in those units if the basic training were to be conducted as described in subparagraph (O).

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, page 400.

³⁸⁵ See generally Davis, Paul O., Ph.D., Volume II “Transcripts” pages 156-170 (18Nov98, pp. 161-245).

1. Facilities Costs

The Army, Navy, and Air Force provided their estimates of the costs and other resource commitments required to conduct basic training at the company level and below through separate units for male and female recruits.

The Army estimated that separate housing for male and female recruits at the company level “only minimally increases facility costs, but significantly increases operating costs.” The Army cited “logistical and morale problems when one group is crowded and the other has more space, or when large groups of trainees and drill sergeants experience significant down time while awaiting sufficient soldiers to fill a gender-segregated company.” The Army estimated additional costs of approximately \$271 million to house recruits separately at the platoon level.³⁸⁶

The Navy estimated that the cost of renovating barracks for separate berthing would be \$1.1 million and added that gender-separate training at the division level would require two additional fire-fighting classrooms (approximate cost \$1.2 million) and a second Marlinespike trainer (approximate cost \$1.4 million).³⁸⁷

The Air Force estimated the cost of activating a new Recruit Housing and Training (RH&T) facility at \$1.4 million, with an annual operating cost of \$1.3 million, plus staff for an additional command structure.³⁸⁸

The Marine Corps already trains and billets male and female recruits separately and thus would incur no new costs.

In March 1999 the GAO published a report concluding, “the Services would not incur additional construction costs if they housed male and female recruits in separate barracks.”³⁸⁹ The Department of Defense disagreed with the GAO report and endorsed the Army, Navy, and Air Force positions.³⁹⁰

Responding to objections by the Army, the GAO noted:

“We agree that unit integrity is an important element of the Army’s training doctrine. However, limiting a barracks to a single training unit would leave large areas of some buildings unoccupied if female recruits were moved to separate buildings. Spending \$271 million to build additional barracks, yet leaving entire barracks floors vacant would, in our opinion, be wasteful. Using the Army’s own argument, the principle of unit integrity would already be

³⁸⁶ Appendix H “Service Secretaries’ Responses” pages 2-3.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, part 2, page 2.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, attachment page 4.

³⁸⁹ General Accounting Office (March 1999), *Military Housing: Costs of Separate Barracks for Male and Female Recruits in Basic Training* (March 1999) at page 2 [cited as “GAO HOUSING”].

³⁹⁰ GAO HOUSING at 4-5.

broken by housing female members of training units in separate buildings. Housing different training companies in separate areas or on separate floors of a single barracks would not appear to erode unit integrity to any additional extent yet would provide more efficient use of space and minimize construction costs.”³⁹¹

We concur with the GAO analysis and conclusions. We would not begrudge the Services, especially the Navy, additional money to improve their recruit training facilities and housing. We do, however, reject the contention that gender-separate training would require substantial additional investment.

2. Trainer Assignments

The major drawback to separate training at the company level is that it would require the Services to fill entire companies of female recruits at once. This could take additional time and coordination because women enter the Services in much smaller numbers than men. Although it might be relatively practical in summer surge months, it could become complicated and costly to set up all-female companies at other times of the year. On the other hand, we note that the Marine Corps, which has the smallest number of female accessions among all the Services, fills all-female companies at all times of the year. The Marine Corps accomplishes this by designating specific dates when female recruits are received.

Each Service except the Air Force already has a policy of assigning at least some female instructors to serve in companies that include female recruits. The Air Force, which assigns instructors without regard to sex, nevertheless has the highest percentage of women among all the Services. Thus, we believe that all of the Services are able to assign at least some female trainers to all-female training units.

At the company level, it may be true that the Army, Navy, and Air Force lack sufficient numbers of female trainers to be able to assign exclusively same-sex trainers. At the platoon level, however, we believe that it should be feasible to match trainers and trainees by sex, if not exclusively then at least predominantly.

The Army, Navy, and Air Force argue that it is necessary to expose male recruits to female leadership and therefore female trainers must be kept available for assignment to all-male or mixed platoons. We know of no scientific basis for this claim. Virtually all young men today will have grown up surrounded by women in authority; indeed, these days many will have grown up without fathers or other male authority figures.

3. Other Costs

When the senior enlisted representative for each Service testified before the Commission, Commissioner Moskos asked:

³⁹¹ GAO HOUSING at 4.

“If you had an all-male military of the same quality that we presently have, from a senior NCO’s position, would the job of leadership—the task of leadership be easier, the same or harder than it is with the mixed-gender military?”³⁹²

The responses from the Navy, Army, and Air Force representatives were as follow:

“Yes, it would be tremendously easier.”³⁹³

“It would be a lot simpler.”³⁹⁴

“Obviously if you have one gender, regardless of what the gender is, you know, facilities are less of a problem and all the other things that go with it.”³⁹⁵

The Marine Corps representative replied:

“I had eighteen years of service [before] I served in my first integrated unit. In all honesty, in all fairness, it has been no more challenging leadership-wise than the ones I served in previously.”³⁹⁶

Although the Army, Navy, and Air Force have implemented almost every other recommendation from the Kassebaum Baker committee’s report, they continue to reject its recommendations concerning same-sex platoon/division/flight training. As long as these Services pretend that gender integration has no associated problems (or “challenges”), they will incur costs and inefficiencies, some of them truly absurd. Here are a few of the unnecessary, costly and distracting “challenges” still posed by gender-integrated basic training:

Confusion. Two or three platoons and at least six trainers “own” a single sleeping bay.

Inconvenience. Having the training unit living in multiple locations is inefficient. Time is wasted while the unit forms up. Messages go astray. The most useless waste of time we found in gender-integrated basic training is the policy that requires trainees to change clothes in the lavatory (or “changing rooms”³⁹⁷) rather than in the open bay area next to the recruit’s locker and bed. This is so that a trainer of the opposite sex may enter the bay at any time.

³⁹² Moskos, Charles, Ph.D., Volume II “Transcripts” page 410 (28Jan99, page 282).

³⁹³ Herdt, Master Chief James L., USN, Volume II “Transcripts” page 410 (28Jan99, page 283).

³⁹⁴ Hall, SMA Robert E., USA, Volume II “Transcripts” page 411 (28Jan99, page 284).

³⁹⁵ Benken CMS Eric W., USAF, Volume II “Transcripts” page 411 (28Jan99, page 285).

³⁹⁶ Lee, SgtMaj Lewis G., USMC, Volume II “Transcripts” page 412 (28Jan99, page 286).

³⁹⁷ Bolt, LTG, Volume II “Transcripts” page 391 (28 Jan 99, page 166).

Loss of Informal Contacts. Trainers must make special arrangements to gather their unit together. The informal footlocker talks of old now take place by appointment only, on neutral territory, with everyone's "battle buddy" present.

Stress. Trainers already understaffed and overworked must spread themselves even thinner when they work with a mixed male and female group. They must use different techniques to teach men and women; they must deal with a broader range of physical abilities—and all within a 24-hour day.

"No Talk, No Touch." Probably the most demanding duty of trainers is to prevent improper sexual contacts among recruits. This leads to "no talk, no touch" rules. Our colleagues believe that "leadership" is the answer to this problem. We do not think that it is possible to create mature judgment in 18- and 19-year-olds within the time of basic training (7 to 10 weeks), even if one exercised leadership nonstop. We believe that the trainers who impose "no talk, no touch" rules are only trying to keep order the best way they reasonably can.

Loss of Discipline. In the basic training environment, rules need to be black and white. In a mixed-sex environment, what is "sexual" and what is merely friendly is unclear. Discipline erodes when the rules are vague and ambiguous. Apparent double standards, even if justified, also break down discipline.

Successful basic training lays a foundation upon which the operational force can build. Advocates of gender-integrated training claim that such training will teach recruits proper judgment about dealing with the opposite sex. Good judgment, however, is a function of maturity and experience. Recruits need the foundation of discipline before they can acquire the skills and habits of good judgment. Separating male and female recruits in basic training units will assist them in learning discipline and self-control, the most valuable foundation to build maturity and judgment.

I. Conclusion and Recommendations

We recognize the hard work and dedication of everyone involved in basic training in all the Services. Nonetheless, it is misleading to suggest that Congress need not be concerned about the *status quo* as it relates to gender-integrated basic training.

Basic training, whether gender separate or gender-integrated, presents challenges. But gender-integrated training involves special problems that simply do not arise in gender separate training. These problems revolve around the difficulties of providing appropriate privacy for both sexes, accommodating fundamental physiological differences, and controlling sexual conduct.

There is no way to tell whether the benefits of gender integration outweigh the costs. None of the Services has compared alternatives or evaluated the costs and benefits. In fact, each Service has told the Commission that it is not conducting, and has no plans to conduct,

any studies to evaluate the effectiveness of gender-integrated training in comparison to gender-separate training.³⁹⁸

There are problems associated with gender-integrated training, and it concerns us greatly that the Services seem to minimize or ignore those problems. The Army, Navy, and Air Force have declared gender integration a success, and servicemembers are strongly discouraged from even expressing concerns about gender integration, much less criticizing any aspect of it. Obviously, the Services cannot tolerate dissent from legitimate orders, but it is foolish to stifle legitimate criticism in the process.

Stress on the military forces, which arises from many causes, is hurting readiness. One undeniable source of stress is the confusion and distraction caused by the unavoidable issues associated with gender integration. Unfortunately, this burden falls heaviest upon some of the hardest-working and most dedicated servicemembers, those who train new recruits.

It would improve readiness if the Services acted to reduce this kind of stress on trainers and trainees. To do so, however, the Services must recognize the real problems associated with gender integration and address those problems as they do any others. In that case, one would expect a process something like this: *Learn all the relevant facts. Compare the alternatives. Evaluate costs and benefits. Make decisions based on sound, principled reasons. Watch the results, and revisit as appropriate.* Unfortunately, the Services have performed only part of this process, and they say that they have no plans to pursue the rest.

All the Services say that they “could not do [their] job without women.” In the all-volunteer force, it is true that women provide the margin that allows the Services to recruit fewer, but better qualified, men. But women are not interchangeable with men. A force that is 15 percent female can do the job, but could the same be said of a force that was 50 percent female—or somewhere in-between?

We believe the Services should seriously consider the full implications of relying on higher numbers of women to meet recruitment objectives. Rather than change the military to make it more accessible to women, perhaps it would be wiser to change recruiting policies so that sufficient numbers of combat and general-replacement personnel can be ensured.

The subject is military training, so we must consider how the training given recruits will enable the force to fight, survive, and win. The nonlinear battlefield exposes many support and even service personnel to the risks of battle. This means that we should be more, not less, concerned about providing noncombat arms personnel with a program of basic training that emphasizes survivability. The principle of military effectiveness should dictate how the Services train, and it should not be subordinated to any other goal.

³⁹⁸ Only the Marine Corps has continuous institutional experience with multiple models of gender-integration: Marine basic training units are all-male or all-female up to the battalion level. Marine Combat Training is gender-integrated above the platoon level, and Advanced Individual Training is fully gender-integrated. Other than Army combat training, all levels of training in the Army, Navy, and Air Force are fully gender-integrated.

There are serious open questions about the relative effectiveness of gender-integrated versus gender-separate training. The Services have closed the book prematurely. At a minimum, we believe the Services should follow these recommendations:

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Collect data to permit objective evaluation of existing gender-integrated programs.
- Carry out limited tests of different models to generate comparative data on gender-integrated versus gender-separate training. (An economical place to start would be separation at the platoon/division/flight level during the first weeks of basic training, as was recommended by the Kassebaum Baker committee.)
- Conduct these studies and data gathering under the auspices of impartial, disinterested outside organizations.

We can understand why the Congress would be loath to substitute its judgment for the judgment of experienced commanders about how military training should be conducted. Nevertheless, the Congress should know that the Services have told this Commission in strong terms that they are committed to continuing the gender-integrated training policies they now have, without studying their effectiveness or comparing other alternatives. It may be necessary, if Congress wants things to be done any differently, for Congress to order it through legislation.

Air Force Reply (refer to Section E.2.c)

Part I – Issue Development (July 96 – Oct 96)

Although USAF implemented gender integrated training in 1976, trainee formations (flights) were segregated by gender until July 1997 merely for reasons of logistical convenience. However in July 1996, it was recognized that gender segregated flights presented a visual incongruity with our gender-integrated training policy. Therefore, we began to question segregated gender flight formations and ponder the ramifications of either continuing the segregated formations or transitioning to integrated formations. We also began to formulate a strategy to establish a formal study group (PAT Team) and rudimentary guidelines were developed to describe PAT Team membership and charter.

Part II – Policy Pre-work (Oct 96 – Mar 97)

Ensured that the PAT Team's structure and methodology were in accordance with Air Force Handbook 90-502, "The Quality Approach." Feedback during informal visits with the MTIs was also used to help determine the various approach strategies and to gauge [sic] the organization's overall attitude toward changing to gender integrated flights. It was determined that the PAT Team membership would include representatives from the five operational squadrons, two support squadrons and the MTI School.

Part III – PAT Team Study (Mar 97 – Jul 97)

Using the data collected from the pre-work phase, two specific plans emerged, one to create a flight consisting of 120 Trainees (Super Flight) and the other using the existing flight size (Approx. 58 Trainees). The PAT Team studied the proposals from 11 April – 22 May and specific action plans were developed for each option. The plans were solidified and external logistical support requirements were discussed with outside agencies. The draft proposal was completed on 12 Jun and forwarded to the 737th Training Group Commander on 14 Jun. The proposals were presented to the Senior NCO and officer leadership. Ultimately, the super flight concept was abandoned in favor of the existing flight size concept which we currently refer as the combined flights concept. To achieve the advantages of improved standardization, gender mixing, and peer group interaction, combined flights called for two flights combining into a mixed formation from adjacent dormitories. This now occurs for all flights including those which are male only. The final action plan was then developed.

Part IV – Prototype Implementation (Jul 97 – Aug 97)

We held training sessions with the MTIs who were due to pick up combined flights from 11-16 July and implemented our first prototype of the combined flight concept on 16 July. Real world implementation encountered unforeseen logistical and organizational obstacles which were addressed weekly. It was decided that an individual Tiger Team would be formed to recommend permanent modifications to accommodate implementation challenges.

Part V – Tiger Team Study (Aug 97 – Oct 97)

The Tiger Team consisted of MTI Training Superintendents and the Academic Training Flight Chief from the Support Squadron. The Team was chaired by the Group Superintendent/Senior Enlisted Advisor. The Team deconflicted processing problems and resolved all outstanding implementation issues. They presented results to the PAT Team on 10 Oct and then to the Group Commander for approval.

Part VI – Final Deployment Phase (Oct 97 – Dec 97)

All elements of the action plan, as modified, were formalized with an update to appropriate chapters of 737th Training Group Instruction 36-3, “Basic Military Training.”

QUESTION: How long was the study process before implementation of integrated flights?

ANSWER: Seventeen months as outlined in the chronology above.

QUESTION: Who made the decision to integrate flights, i.e., at what level was the decision made?

ANSWER: The strategic guidance to resolve the visual incongruity of segregated flight formations came from the Commander, Air Education and Training Command. The implementation of the specific combined flight methodology came from the Commander, 737th Training Group.³⁹⁹

³⁹⁹ Hamlin, Mary, Col, USAF, e-mail subject: Gender Integrated Flights – HNSC Staffer (Mieke Eoyang) Question (10Mar98).

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM M. KEYS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL U. S. MARINE CORPS (Ret)

BEFORE THE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

MARCH 17, 1999

Mr. Chairman, I want to clear up any misunderstanding concerning my vote⁴⁰⁰. I do not concur with the recommendation of the majority of the Commission concerning basic training, which, I believe, endorses Gender-Integrated Training (GIT) as the best and preferred method of training recruits. The final report will record my vote as a “no.” I also agree with the observations and reservations of Charles Moskos. I personally feel the Basic Training period is absolutely critical to the recruit’s future success and performance while on active duty. To that end, basic training should be done in the purest environment and with as few distractions as possible, in order to achieve its maximum effectiveness.

I do not envision as a result of this Commission or even recommend that the Services be directed to change from their current method of training recruits. I would, however, hope that they be visionary enough to avoid being locked into a system of training that currently does not address the concerns of a very significant number of recruit trainers and gives rise to other prevailing issues that will be mentioned in the final report.

As indicated earlier, this Commission visited many bases, talked to numerous military personnel of all ranks, including the Service Chiefs themselves, each of whom I consider to be an exceptional competent and responsible individual. All of the Services were very cooperative and willingly assisted in our search for information. In the end, however, after all of the Commission’s hard work, we still were able to get information only from what I consider a relatively small part of the military. Given the constraints of time and resources provided to the Commission, I do not believe a credible conclusion based upon a complete assessment can be derived in favor of Gender-Integrated Training.

⁴⁰⁰ Statement provided to the Chairman, Military Personnel Subcommittee, House Committee on Armed Services, by Lieutenant General Keys to clarify his original vote on gender-integrated training as always being negative and not concurring with the majority recommendation of endorsing gender-integrated training as the preferred method of basic training for new recruits.

I think it important that before providing rationale for a position that favors separate basic training for males and females, to first make clear why the quality of basic training is important, and why any variation in its quality has a lasting impact on servicemembers and the operational readiness of the military as a whole.

The purpose of basic training is not complicated. Most recruits can tell you in a sentence the experience is designed as a rite of passage to make them into real Soldiers, Sailors, Airman and Marines. What is most remembered and spoken of about one's military service is time spent "in basic" and their initiation into combat, fortunate or unfortunate as the case maybe. Recruit training is the gateway from civilian identity to a professional identity that serves a "higher good." It is a unique and powerful transformation that takes place at the singular point when the learning curve is initialized at ground zero and then is maximized by the impact and quality of the basic training experience. It is a one-time opportunity that can not be duplicated elsewhere, or arguably, ever truly made up for at a later date. Consequently, the military preparedness of graduating recruits and their ability to contribute to the operational readiness of the Commands they join, is extremely sensitive to any variation in the quality of their basic training. The success of recruit socialization and the transition from civilian to professional has profound consequences (immediate and long-term) for each Service.

Basic training does not teach recruits to fight and survive in combat. Basic training teaches basic military skills such as physical fitness, close order drill and marksmanship. It is a military socialization process – civilians are transformed into Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. This training provides recruits the basic military skills needed to integrate into an operational unit. It does not teach war-fighting skills nor should it be the staging ground for "gender" etiquette skills.⁴⁰¹ It should, however, teach respect for authority, discipline, self-respect, and self-confidence, which transcend any notion of "gender" familiarity. The focus of basic training is (or should be) on the individual; to transform the civilian into a self-confident, disciplined person who is ready to proceed to additional training as a "professional." The slogan "train-as-you-fight" or any similar slogan does not, in my opinion, have anything to do with basic training.

Separating the sexes in basic training and having instructors of the same sex, provides strong, positive figures and leadership of the same gender, offering impressionable young men and women appropriate role models without the distracting undercurrent of sexual and other less obvious cross-gender distractions or tensions. Separate basic training allows women to realize early in training that they can be strong, assertive leaders. The gender-segregated approach creates a secure environment free from latent or overt sexual pressures, thereby allowing new and vulnerable recruits the opportunity to focus on and absorb their service's standard of behavior in all areas of military life. My belief is that gender-integrated training interferes with that critical dynamic and causes both sexes to be distracted.

⁴⁰¹ I do not buy into the notion that boys and girls have to "learn" to work together. These young people entering the Services are, arguably, more "gender-integrated," "gender-sensitive" and "gender-aware" than generations past.

Even without the data collection assessments, common sense tells the reasonable men and women that it is unnecessary and counterproductive to mix genders in this most unique, focused, and stress-filled environment that is so profoundly important to military socialization. But even leaving common sense aside for a moment, what did the Commission find in the empirical assessment of the recruit attitudes?

The Commission's most comprehensive and extensive study measured the inculcation of attitudes in graduating recruits considered conducive to cohesion. The attitudes were commitment, respect for authority and group/Service identity. The results speak for themselves. It was in fact the gender-separated training of the Marine Corps that produced the highest scores among graduating recruits on all three attitudes, significantly higher than all other formats of any other Service. In addition and perhaps even more telling, is that gender-separate Marine female recruits scored at the very highest levels of all graduating recruits measured. Female Marine recruits were the highest scoring group among the four Services' different gender formats in basic training on these three desired attitudes. The results tell me that gender-separate training produced the highest scores on desired military socialization attitudes; and most obviously, the female separate-training format is at the top of that list. One can conclude from the evidence, that instead of being held back, gender-separate recruit training produces clearly positive outcomes and benefits female recruits more than all other formats in DoD. As a former Marine, I naturally, concur with Marine basic training and know it produces a superb product. I would, however, recommend gender-segregated basic training even if the Marines did it differently.

I would make another point that is related to the opinion findings we gathered from military leaders of the four Services. General Krulak, alone among the Service Chiefs, indicated his objection to mixing males and females in Recruit Training because it creates unnecessary distractions at the exact time when recruits must remain completely focused on becoming a Marine. I believe this same message was articulated by other Marine Flag Officers, in previous testimony before your Committee, Mr. Chairman. I was therefore moved when we found that many of the military leaders in commands who answered our survey consistently indicated that mixing males and females together in basic training caused an "unnecessary distraction" to training. This was particularly true of the recruit trainers of the four Services--2,290 of them or 62% of all currently serving recruit trainers on active duty. These enlisted leaders are those unsung heroes who have day-to-day responsibility for implementing the GIT policies. From all four Services, sixty-eight percent (68%) of the male and fifty-four (54%) of the female recruit trainers, indicated that mixing males and female in basic training causes "unnecessary distractions in recruit training." These recruit trainer majorities were true for the Navy Recruit Division Commanders (67%), Air Force Military Training Instructors (62%), Army Drill Sergeants (54%), Marine Drill Instructors (84%); all reflecting the same negative conclusion on Gender-Integrated Training (GIT).

Gender-Integrated Training is a policy, not based on any articulable military necessity, at least, not from the information the Services provided to the Commission. It appears that the rationale and changes were based more on the changing political environment and the end of the Draft--which I personally believe would be very good for this country to reinstitute--rather than military relevance.

The contribution of women to the Armed Services, clearly, has been significant. On many occasions women have served with honor and distinction; however, they did not then, and should not now, be placed in billets that could possibly place them in positions of direct combat. Gender-Integrated Training, in my opinion, has coincided with an increase in the number of women now serving in combat-related billets. Some, today, would argue that as a result their deployment to Desert Storm and Bosnia, that women indeed are serving in combat and doing it well. I would strongly disagree and feel these new policies to greatly expand combat-related MOSs for women have not really been tested. We have not, in my opinion, engaged in real, sustained combat since Vietnam.

In summary, I do not consider the Armed Forces of this country to be a platform for social engineering. Their job is too important. They exist for one primary reason and that is to be ready to defend our nation and our way of life and to honor those commitments we have made to our allies. Clearly, we must provide these young men and women who serve the best possible military foundation with which to protect themselves and the nation. The only rationale I have consistently heard for those advocating GIT, has been based on some variation of the notion that "men and women have to learn to work together from day one." Well, from my experience, smooth inter-gender relations is not and should not be a military purpose in basic training. If basic training is done the right way, when men and women come together they will be better behaved and better disciplined. Finally, mixing males and females in basic training causes a wholly unnecessary distraction at, arguably, the most crucial period of character formation in the entire military process.

Respectfully submitted,



WM. M. KEYS
Commissioner

Commission Members

<u>Commission Members</u>	<u>Congressional Source of Appointment</u>
Anita K. Blair, Esq.*	Senate Armed Services Committee
Honorable Frederick F.Y. Pang**	Senate Armed Services Committee
Nancy Cantor Ph.D.	Senate Armed Services Committee
LtGen George R. Christmas, USMC (Ret.)	House National Security Committee ¹
CSM Robert A Dare, Jr., USA (Ret.)	House National Security Committee
LtGen William M. Keys, USMC (Ret.)	Senate Armed Services Committee
Thomas Moore	House National Security Committee
Charles Moskos, Ph.D.	Senate Armed Services Committee
Honorable Barbara Spyridon Pope	House National Security Committee
Mady Wechsler Segal, Ph.D.	House National Security Committee

*Chairman

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¹ Renamed the House Armed Services Committee in the 106th Congress

ANITA K. BLAIR, ESQ.

Born in Washington, D.C, Nov 15, 1950; married to Douglas Welty.

Education: B.A. (with high honors), University of Michigan 1971, J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 1981. Executive Editor, Virginia Journal of International Law.

Bar Memberships: District of Columbia (1981) and Virginia (1988).

Public Appointment: Virginia Military Institute Board of Visitors (term: July 1, 1995- June 30, 1999).

Attorney in Private Practice of Law: Co-founded Welty & Blair, P.C., in October 1991. Formerly associated with Brownstein Zeidman and Schomer (1981-1984) and Crowell & Moring (1984-1987), both Washington, D.C. law firms. Also former Vice President and General Counsel, Precision Tune, Inc., Sterling, Virginia (1988-1991).

Areas of Concentration:

Constitutional Law, Nonprofit Corporations.

President (1993-1995 and April, 1999 to present) and Executive Vice President and General Counsel (1995-1999) of Independent Women's Forum, Arlington, VA.

In addition to executive management duties, oversee IWF's participation as amicus curiae in constitutional equal protection cases including *United States v. Virginia* (U.S. 1996); *Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson* (9th Cir. 1997 cert. denied 1997). *Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway v. Taxman* (3d. Cir. 1996; U.S. appeal dismissed 1997); *Cohen v. Brown University* (1st Cir. 1996, cert. denied 1997).

Author and commentator on legal and economic issues concerning women, including affirmative action, "gender" issues, women in business, women in the military, single-sex education and violence against women.

Publications include articles in the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Washington Post*, the *Washington Times*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *New York Times*. Media appearances include CNN's *Crossfire*, C-SPAN's *Washington Journal*, NBC's *Today Show*, and PBS's *NewsHour*. Testimony before Congressional Committees. Frequent public speaking engagements.

Business Franchise, Licensing and Distribution Law.

Professional Associations:

American Bar Association Forum on Franchising (1981-present)
Virginia State Bar Section on Antitrust, Franchise and Trade Regulation (Member, Board of Governors, 1991-present; Chairman, 1998-1999).

International Bar Association Committee on International Franchising (1983-1996).

Union Internationale des Avocats Commission de la Franchise (Vice-President, 1988-1992).

Government / Industry Advisory Committees:

North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) Franchise Advisory Committee (1990-1996).

American Arbitration Association Panel of Commercial Arbitrators (1985-present).

International Franchise Association Legal / Legislative Committee (Vice-Chairman, 1989-1990); Council of Franchise Suppliers (1991-1996).

FREDERICK F.Y. PANG

Mr. Pang is the President and founder of Fred Pang Associates (FPA), Inc. FPA provides professional and technical services to business and government. These services include matters involving: the substance and processes of human resource management; corporate and business development; government relations; and the operation and management of healthcare systems.



Prior to founding FPA, Mr. Pang served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy. As Assistant Secretary he acted on matters pertaining to military and civilian manpower and personnel in the Department of Defense. In this position Mr. Pang had Defense-wide policy responsibility for the recruitment, training, career development, compensation, retention, quality of life, equal opportunity, and readiness of Defense personnel. In addition, Mr. Pang was designated as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

Previously Mr. Pang served as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs where he acted on matters pertaining to Navy and Marine Corps personnel, reserve, and medical policies and programs within the Department of the Navy.

Before his appointments in the Executive Branch, Mr. Pang served as a professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee. In this key role, he exercised policy and legislative oversight on Defense-wide personnel, reserve, and medical programs.

Prior to joining the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mr. Pang served as a regular officer in the United States Air Force. He attained the grade of colonel before retiring with 27 years of service in 1986.

During his Air Force career, he served in a variety of operational and staff assignments including tours of duty in Vietnam, Headquarters United States Air Force, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In the Office of the Secretary of Defense, he served as the Director of Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management and as the Director of Compensation before he retired from active duty.

Mr. Pang grew up in Honolulu, Hawaii. He graduated from McKinley High School in 1954, and graduated from the University of Hawaii in 1958 with a Bachelors Degree in Education. He earned a Masters Degree in Business Administration in 1972 from the University of Hawaii under the Air Force Institute of Technology Civilian Institutions

Scholarship Program, and completed the National and International Security Program at Harvard University in 1988.

Mr. Pang is married to Brenda W.I. Tom, of Honolulu, and they reside with their daughter, Susan in Arlington, Virginia. Their son, Douglas, is a Lieutenant in the United States Navy. His mother, Mrs. Henry K. Pang, lives in Honolulu, Hawaii.

NANCY CANTOR, Ph.D.

Dr. Cantor received her A.B. from Sarah Lawrence College in 1974 and her Ph.D. at Stanford University in 1978. She currently serves as Provost and Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs at the University of Michigan. Prior to this appointment, Dr. Cantor served as Vice Provost for Academic Affairs-Graduate Studies and Dean of the Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies at the University of Michigan.

Prior to July, 1996, Dr. Cantor served as Chair of the Department of Psychology and Professor of Psychology at Princeton University. She spent ten years as faculty member in the Department of Psychology and the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, serving as Associate Dean for Faculty Programs at the Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies from 1989-1991 when she left Michigan to join the faculty at Princeton. Among her many publications in the area of personality and social psychology, Dr. Cantor has contributed a monograph with John Kihlstrom (Personality and Social Intelligence 1987) and a recent review article (Life Task Problem Solving: Situational Affordances and Personal Needs, Personality and Social Intelligence Bulletin, 1994). Dr. Cantor received the Distinguished Scientific Award for an Early Career Contribution to Psychology of the Psychological Association (1985), and was President of Society for Personality and Social Psychology (Division 8, APA 1992-1993). She has served as Associate Editor of Psychological Bulletin (1986-1989), Journal of Personality (1986-1988), and Personality and Social Psychology Review, (1996-98).

Dr. Cantor has been a member of several panels and advisory boards at the National Science Foundation, and served on the task force that recommended establishing a new directorate of Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences (1990-1991). She served as a member of the National Research Council Committee on National Needs in Biomedical and Behavioral Science Research (1992-1993), and as a member (1993-1996) and Vice-Chair of the National Council Committee on Women in Science and Engineering (1995-1996). She recently served as a member of the National Research Council Advisory Committee for the Office of Scientific and Engineering Personnel (1997-1998). Dr. Cantor serves on the Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues (1998-1999) and on the Board of Trustees for the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation (1998-present).

**LIEUTENANT GENERAL GEORGE R. CHRISTMAS,
USMC, (Retired)**

Lieutenant General George R. Christmas retired from the U.S. Marine Corps on July 26, 1996. His last active duty assignment was as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC.

LtGen Christmas was born on March 11, 1940 in Philadelphia, PA. Upon graduation from the University of Pennsylvania with a B.A. degree in 1962, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps Reserve through the NROTC program. He also holds a M.S. degree from Shippensburg University (1982).

After completion of The Basic School at Quantico, VA, LtGen Christmas was assigned as a platoon commander in Company L, 3^d Battalion, 2^d Marines, 2^d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, NC. He later served as the Battalion Personnel Officer. While at Camp Lejeune, he was promoted to first lieutenant in December 1963. He augmented into the regular establishment in 1965.

In May 1965, he was assigned to the Marine Barracks, 8th & I Sts., S.E. Washington, DC, where he served as the Executive Officer, and upon promotion to Captain in June 1966, as Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company.

He transferred to the Republic of Vietnam in July 1967 where he served successively as Commanding Officer, Service Company, Headquarters Battalion, and Commanding Officer Company H, 2^d Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division, FMF. During the Battle for Hue City, Tet Offensive, 1968, LtGen Christmas was severely wounded and evacuated to the Philadelphia Naval Hospital. For his actions in Hue City, he was awarded the Navy Cross.

After hospitalization, he was assigned to the staff of The Basic School, MCDEC, Quantico, VA, in October 1968 and subsequently attended the Amphibious Warfare School graduating with distinction. Following graduation in July 1969, he was assigned as an instructor at the U.S. Army's John F. Kennedy Institute for Military Assistance, Ft. Bragg, NC.

Transferring to Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington D.C. in July 1971, LtGen Christmas served as the Special Assistant and Aide to the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, until April 1973. During his assignment at Headquarters, he was promoted to Major in February 1972.

He returned to The Basic School where he served successively as the Company Tactics Chief, Commanding Officer, Student Company A, and the Tactics Group Chief. From The Basic School, he transferred to the Marine Corps Command and Staff College as a student.

LtGen Christmas returned overseas in July 1975, for duty as the Operations Officer and later, Executive Officer 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, 3rd Marine Division, FMF, on Okinawa. He transferred back to the States in August 1976 and was assigned as the

Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Annapolis, MD. While there, he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in September 1978.

From August 1979 until May 1981, he was assigned as the Commanding Officer, First Recruit Training Battalion, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, SC. He was selected to attend the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA and participated in the Cooperative Degree Program at Shippensburg University, leading to his Master's Degree in Public Administration.

In July 1982, LtGen Christmas served for a year as a Naval Operations Officer, J3 Directorate, USCINCPAC, Camp H.M. Smith Hawaii, and upon selection to colonel assumed duties as Chief of Protocol, USCINCPAC. In September 1984, he was reassigned as Commanding Officer, 3^d Marine Regiment (Reinforced), 1st Marine Amphibious Brigade.

In July 1986, LtGen Christmas was assigned duty as Director, Amphibious Warfare School. While serving in this capacity, he was selected for promotion to Brigadier General in December 1987. He was advanced to Brigadier General on May 13, 1988 and assigned duty as the Assistant Division Commander, 3^d Marine Division, FMF/Commanding General, 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade Okinawa, Japan in June 1988. He assumed command of the 3^d Force Service Support Group on August 18, 1989. On 18 May 1990, he again took command of the 9th MEB in addition to his duties as Commanding General 3^d FSSG. He was advanced to Major General on June 27th, 1991.

LtGen Christmas was assigned duty as the Director for Operations (J3), U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith Hawaii on July 26th 1991. He was advanced to Lieutenant General on July 8th 1993 and assumed duties as Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, California the same day. On July 15, 1994, he assumed duties as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

His personal decorations and medals include: the Navy Cross; Defense Distinguished Service Medal; Navy Distinguished Service Medal; Defense Superior Service Medal; Purple Heart; Meritorious Service Medal; and three gold stars in lieu of consecutive awards; the Army Commendation Medal and the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with palm.

LtGen Christmas is married to the former Sherrill J. Lownds. They have four children, Tracy, Jim, Kevin and Brian. His current projects include being a Senior Mentor for Marine Corps and Joint Training; serving on various advisory boards; and as President, Marine Corps Heritage Foundation.

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR ROBERT A. DARE, USA, (Retired)

Command Sergeant Major Robert A. Dare Jr., USA (Ret) was born in Lansing, Michigan on 9 September 1950. He joined the Army in June 1968 after graduation from high school. He served in numerous assignments during his 28 year career including tours with the 24th Infantry Division at Forts Riley and Stewart, the 23rd Infantry Division (AMERICAL), Republic of Viet Nam, the 82nd Airborne Division, the 25th Infantry Division, Hawaii and the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea.

CSM Dare served as a drill sergeant from 1974 to 1978 at Fort Ord, California and Fort Gordon, Georgia. He served as First Sergeant of Company A, the Commander in Chief's Guard, 3rd U.S. Infantry, The Old Guard, Washington D.C. from April 1983 through June 1986. He served as an instructor at the Operations and Intelligence course U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas, from January 1987 through December 1987. He served in every NCO leadership position from team leader through Command Sergeant Major. Including Command Sergeant Major, Special Troops Battalion, 3rd Corps Support Command, Wiesbaden, Germany, Sergeant Major, 5th Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry Division, Germany. Command Sergeant Major 2nd Brigade, 8th Infantry Division. Division Command Sergeant Major, 2nd Brigade 1st Armored Division.

In September of 1987 CSM Dare was selected to serve as Command Sergeant Major, 25th Infantry Division (light) and United States Army, Hawaii. He served in that position until 31 January, 1994 when he was selected to serve as Command Sergeant Major, United States Army, Pacific. In June 1995, CSM Dare was selected to serve as Command Sergeant Major, United States Army, Forces Command. He served in that position until his retirement on 1 July, 1996.

CSM Dare is a graduate of the 25th Infantry Division NCO Academy, Airborne School, Infantry Advanced NCO Course, Master Fitness Trainer, Operations and Intelligence Course and Class 28 of the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy. He has a liberal arts degree from St. Leo College. His awards and decorations include: the Combat Infantryman's Badge, the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star, the Meritorious Service Medal and the Army Commendation.

CSM Dare and his wife Karen, reside in Duluth, Georgia. Their son Matt is a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Wyoming. Their daughter Wendi is married to Sergeant Shawne Maile, a New York State Trooper.

Since his retirement from the Army in 1996, CSM Dare (Ret.) has served as a Marketing Manager for an Atlanta-based technology company.

**LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM M. KEYS,
USMC (Retired)**

Lieutenant General William M. Keys (Ret) was the Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic; Commanding General Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic; Commanding General II Marine Expeditionary Force; Commander, Marine Striking Force, Atlantic, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South (Designate); and the Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe (Designate). He was advanced to his present grade and assumed his duties on June 25, 1991.

A native of Fredericktown, PA, LtGen Keys was commissioned a second lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps upon his graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy with a B.S. degree in June 1960. His professional education includes The Basic School; Amphibious Warfare School and the Command and Staff College, at Quantico, VA. LtGen Keys is also a graduate of the National War College in Washington, DC, and holds a M.S. degree from American University and a Ph.D. in Public Service from Washington and Jefferson College.

Designated an Infantry officer, LtGen Keys has served at every level of operational command: initially as a platoon leader with 3d Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment; as a company commander with the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment in Viet Nam; as Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment; as Regimental Commander of the 6th Marines; and as Commanding General, 2d Marine Division during DESERT STORM combat operations in Southwest Asia. There he led the Division in its successful assault across the Kuwaiti border, breaching Iraqi barriers and minefields, and into Kuwait City. He also served an early tour with the Marine Detachment aboard the USS Long Beach, and a second tour in Vietnam as an advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

He has held the following principal staff assignments: Infantry Officers' Monitor, Personnel Management Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Corps Liaison Officer to the US. Senate; Special Projects Directorate in the Office of the Commandant; Aide de Camp to the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps; Deputy Director, and subsequently Director, Personnel Management Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs Department, HQMC; and the Deputy, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.

LtGen Keys' decorations and medals include: the Navy Cross; Distinguished Service Medal with one star, Silver Star Medal; Legion of Merit with Combat "V"; Bronze Star with Combat "V"; Defense Meritorious Service Medal; Combat Action Ribbon; Presidential Unit Citation; Navy Unit Commendation; Meritorious Unit Commendation; National Defense Service Medal; Vietnam Service Medal with four bronze stars, Republic of Viet Nam Cross of Gallantry with Palm and Silver Star; Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Honor Medal (First Class); Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Gallantry Cross Color); Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation (Civil Actions Color); and the Republic of Viet Nam Campaign Medal.

THOMAS MOORE

Thomas Moore is a Washington-based writer, military historian, and national security analyst. Currently he is Director of International Studies (formally, Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Center for International Studies) at The Heritage Foundation, one of America's leading public policy research institutions, where he is responsible for the day-to-day management of national defense and foreign policy studies. Prior to joining Heritage, he was a Professional Staff Member on the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, where he was responsible for defense policy, global strategy, inter-national security, and military operations abroad. Before taking the Committee staff position, he was Senator Malcolm Wallop's (R-WY) chief aide on defense and foreign policy, and served six years in the Reagan Administration, ending his Executive branch service in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

A native of Charleston, South Carolina, Moore was graduated from The Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina; studied in France under the Fulbright program, and earned a Masters degree in national security affairs from Georgetown University. He has lived in Europe, speaks French and German; and has traveled throughout the Middle East, Russia, the Far East, the Caribbean, and South America. He was an Army Reserve officer (Major, Armor), and held numerous troop unit and staff assignments in the U.S. and Germany.

CHARLES MOSKOS, Ph.D.

Charles Moskos is professor of sociology at Northwestern University at Evanston, Illinois where he holds the Anderson Chair in the College of Arts and Sciences. He received his bachelor's degree, cum laude, at Princeton University in 1956. After graduation from college, he served as a draftee in the U.S. Army combat engineers in Germany. Following his military service, he attended the University of California at Los Angeles where he received his Ph.D. in 1963. Since 1988, he has been chairman of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.

Professor Moskos is the author of many books including The American Enlisted Man, The Military-More than Just a Job?, Soldiers and Sociologists, The New Conscientious Objection, A Call to Civic Service, and Reporting War When There is No War. His latest book (with John Butler), All That We Can Bear, Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way, has attracted national political attention and won the Washington Monthly award for the best political book of 1997. In addition to over one hundred articles in scholarly journals, he has published pieces in the *New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Chicago Tribune*, *Atlantic Monthly*, and *The New Republic*. His writings have been translated into fourteen languages.

The Wall St. Journal calls Dr. Moskos the nation's "most influential military sociologist." His research has taken him to combat units in Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Korea, Germany, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Dr. Moskos testifies frequently before Congress on issues of military personnel policy. He was appointed by George Bush to the President's Commission on Women in the Military (1992). In 1993, he advised Nelson Mandela on ways to racially integrate a post-apartheid military in South Africa. In 1994, President Clinton cited Professor Moskos on national television in announcing the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy on homosexuals in the military and again in 1996 as the inspiration for his national service program.

The Department of Defense awarded Dr. Moskos a medal for his research in DESERT SHIELD/STORM. He holds the Distinguished Service Medal the U.S. Army's highest decoration for a civilian. Dr. Moskos has also been decorated by the governments of France and the Netherlands for his international research on armed forces and society. Dr. Moskos has appeared on national television numerous times including Night Line, Cross Fire, and Larry King Live.

Charles Moskos has been a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, an Annenberg Fellow, and a Guggenheim Fellow. He is listed In Who's Who in America and Who's Who in the World.

HONORABLE BARBARA SPYRIDON POPE

Barbara Spyridon Pope is president of The Pope Group, a management firm committed to developing client-tailored programs in the areas of human resource management and government liaison. She is a management expert with 20 years of leadership experience, who serves as a Title VII expert for the Department of Justice. Pope is certified as a federal mediator and as an administrator of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator.

The Pope Group has successfully assisted its clients in the design, development and implementation of innovative programs to address executive development, leadership, work force "diversity," sexual harassment and other management issues. Mrs. Pope has an extensive record of developing creative solutions to difficult problems and coalescing disparate groups to generate unified policies.

Mrs. Pope utilizes the Ethical Arts Players, a unique educational performing troupe of skilled professional actors, to present real-life workplace situations involving harassment, diversity, ethics and other leadership issues. In contrast to traditional lectures and panel formats, presenting hypothetical scenarios using dramas, comedy, and improvisation allows the most subtle and complex issues to be raised. This format has proven to turn the most dreaded training seminars into memorable sessions that are as effective as they are popular.

The first female Assistant Secretary and senior female in the Navy's 217 year history, Mrs. Pope served from 1989 to 1993. She was responsible for recruiting, educating, housing, childcare, medical delivery, and discipline for the nation's sailors, Marines, civilians and their families.

As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Family Support, Education and Safety), from 1986 to 1989, Mrs. Pope was responsible for the Department of Defense Dependents Schools (ninth largest U.S. school), the Family Policy Office, the DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Explosive Safety Board, and the Safety and Occupational Health Policy Office. Prior to 1986, Mrs. Pope served as the Acting Chief of Staff for the Small Business Administration and the Executive Director to President Reagan's Advisory Committee on Women Business Ownership. She began her career on Capital Hill on Senator Barry Goldwater's staff.

Mrs. Pope is a frequent speaker for conferences, seminars, television and radio including CNN, McNeil/Lehrer, Crossfire, National Public Radio, Canadian Public Radio, Australian Dateline and the Larry King Radio Show.

MADY WECHSLER SEGAL, Ph.D.

Mady Wechsler Segal earned her Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. She is Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland, and faculty affiliate of the Women's Studies Program and the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). Professor Segal is the Associate Director of the Center for Research on Military Organization at the University of Maryland. She serves on the Advisory Board of Women in International Security (WIIS).

Professor Segal has served as chair of the Scientific Advisory Committee for the U.S. Army Research Institutes Army Family Research Program. She is currently on the Council of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS), Vice President of the Research Committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution of the International Sociological Association, and Chair-Elect of the Section on Peace, War, and Social Conflict of the American Sociological Association.

While Dr. Segal has spent most of her professional life in the academic world, in positions ranging from Lecturer on Sociology at Eastern Michigan University to Professor of Sociology and Associate Dean at the University of Maryland, her career has been punctuated by involvement with the American armed forces over a 26-year period.

*In 1973-1974--the first years of the volunteer force--she was a Senior Research Scientist at the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences conducting research on manpower accession.

*From 1980-1982 she was a Research Sociologist, and from 1982-1990 a Guest Scientist, in the Department of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, conducting research on military families and military women.

*In 1981-1983, she was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces.

*From 1983-1989 she was a member of the National Research Council/ National Academy of Sciences Committee on the Performance of Military Personnel which dealt with the appropriateness of criteria used to select and assign first-term personnel to occupational specialties.

*In 1988-1989, she was Distinguished Visiting Professor in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the United States Military Academy, West Point.

*In 1992-1993, she served as a Human Resource Consultant to the Secretary of the Army, advising the Secretary on issues of diversity.

*From 1993-1994, she served as a special assistant to the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, dealing with family separation of soldiers on peacekeeping missions.

* From 1996-1998 she served as a member of the Board of Visitors of the United States Military Academy, West Point. In 1997 and 1998, she was appointed to the executive committee of the West Point Board of Visitors.

*In 1996-1997, the Secretary of the Army appointed her as a consultant to the Secretary of the Army's Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment.

*In 1998, she was appointed by the U.S. House of Representatives to the Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues.

Mady Segal's recent research has focussed on military personnel issues, with particular attention to military women and military families. Her publications include "Gender and the Military" (in Chafetz, ed., Handbook of Gender Sociology, 1999); "Gender and the Propensity to Enlist in the U.S. Military" (Gender Issues, 1998); "Value Rationales in Policy Debates on Women in the Military: A Content Analysis of Congressional Testimony, 1941-1985"; (Social Science Quarterly, 1992); "The Military and the Family as Greedy Institutions" (Armed Forces & Society, 1986); "Military Women in NATO" (Armed Forces & Society, 1988); "The Nature of Work and Family Linkages: A Theoretical Perspective" (in Bowen and Orthner, eds. The Organization Family, 1989); "Women's Military Roles Cross-Nationally: Past, Present, and Future" (Gender & Society, 1995); and "Gender Integration in Armed Forces: Recent Policy Developments in the United Kingdom" (Armed Forces & Society, 1996). Dr. Segal is the primary author of a report for military leaders on the policy implications of research findings on military families. ("What We Know About Army Families") and a co-author of How to Support Families during Overseas Deployments: A Sourcebook for Service Providers (both published by the Army Research Institute). She has written (with David R. Segal) a book on Peacekeepers and their Wives.

Among the courses Professor Segal teaches at the University of Maryland are Military Sociology, Women in the Military, Military Families, and Introductory Statistics for Sociology. She was named Distinguished Scholar-Teacher in 1985, and was honored as the university's Outstanding Woman Faculty Member in 1988. In 1994 she was awarded the first Teaching Mentorship Award by the College of Behavioral and Social Sciences. She was named the 1994 Helen MacGill Hughes Lecturer on Women and Social Change by Sociologists for Women in Society. In addition to these and other academic honors and awards, in 1989 Professor Segal was awarded the Department of the Army Outstanding Civilian Service Medal.

A. Definitions

Flight: Lowest Air Force basic training unit.

Small unit level: flight, 50-58 recruits.

Soldierization: the tough, comprehensive process that transforms civilians into soldiers. It results from the total immersion in a positive environment established by active, involved leadership. This environment sets high standards, provides positive role models, and uses every training opportunity to reinforce basic soldier skills.

Technical Training (TT): The Air Force equivalent of the Army's Advanced Individual Training (AIT)

B. Abbreviations

AFB.....	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AIT	Advanced Individual Training
APFT	Army Physical Fitness Test
ARI.....	Army Research Institute
ASD (FMP).....	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy)
ASEC	Analytical Systems Engineering Corporation
ASVAB	Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
BAHR	Bentley, Adams, Hargett, Riley & Company, Inc
BCT.....	Basic Combat Training
BG.....	Brigadier General
BMT	Basic Military Training
BT	Basic Training
CAPT	Captain (Navy O-6)
CG.....	Commanding General

CINC	Commander in Chief
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps or Command Master Chief
CMF	Career Management Field
CMTGRI	Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CO	Commanding Officer
COL	Colonel
CPT	Captain (Army O-3)
CQ	Charge of Quarters
DEP	Delayed Entry Program
DI	Drill Instructor
DMDC	Defense Manpower Data Center
DoD	Department of Defense
DS	Drill Sergeant
DSS	Drill Sergeant School
EAP	Expeditionary Air Force
EOCT	End of Course Test
EO	Equal Opportunity
EPT	Existed Prior to Service
FTU	Fitness Training Unit
FTX	Field Training Exercise
GAO	General Accounting Office
GI	Gender-Integrated
GIT	Gender-Integrated Training
GS	Gender-Segregated/Separated
HR	Human Relations
HumRRO	Human Resources Research Organization
IET	Initial Entry Training
ID	Identification
IG	Inspector General
ITR	Individual Training Records
JAG	Judge Advocate General
KP	Kitchen Patrol
LCPO	Leading Chief Petty Officer
LDRSHIP	Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage
LTC (LtCol)	Lieutenant Colonel
MCM	Manual for Courts Martial
MCT	Marine Combat Training
MCRD	Marine Corps Recruit Depot
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MEOC	Military Equal Opportunity Climate Study
MEPS	Military Entry Processing Station
MFT	Master Fitness Trainer
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty

MTI	Military Training Instructor
MTL	Military Training Leader
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NJP	Non-judicial Punishment
NMT	Navy Military Training
OCS	Officer Candidate School
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSUT	One Station Unit Training
PCC	Pre-Command Course
POI	Program of Instruction
POSH	Prevention of Sexual Harassment
PRASP	Permissive Recruiter Assistant Program
RDC	Recruit Division Commander
REG	Regulation
RET	Retired
RH&T	Recruit Housing and Training Facility
RTC	Recruit Training Command
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SNCO	Staff Non-commissioned Officer
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
TJAG	The Judge Advocate General
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TSP	Training Support Package
TT	Technical Training
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USS	United States Ships
XO	Executive Officer
YATS	Youth Attitude Tracking Study

Commission Hearing Dates and Witnesses

12 OCTOBER 1998

Briefing: Good Order and Discipline Task Force

The Honorable Rudy de Leon, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

The Honorable Frank Rush, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Policy

Lieutenant General Normand G. Lezy, USAF, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy

Accompanied By:

Colonel Robert E. Reed, Associate Deputy General Counsel for Military Justice and Personnel Policy, Office of General Counsel

Colonel Paul L. Black, Director of Legal Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

10 NOVEMBER 1998

Physiology, Physical Fitness and Physical Conditioning--U.S. Navy Testimony:

Commander Richard A. Shaffer, MSC, USN, Head, Clinical Epidemiology Division, Naval Health Research Center

James Hodgdon, Ph.D, Research Physiologist, Human Performance Dept.,
Naval Health Research Center

Lieutenant Commander Neal A. Carlson, USN, Head, Health and Physical
Fitness, Navy Personnel Command

Physiology, Physical Fitness and Physical Conditioning--U.S. Marine Corps Testimony:

Lieutenant Colonel Leon M. Pappa, USMC, Deputy Branch Head, Training
Programs Branch, Training and Education Division, MCCDC

James Hodgdon, Ph.D., Research Physiologist, Human Performance
Department, Naval Health Research Center

Physiology, Physical Fitness and Physical Conditioning--U.S. Army Testimony:

Lieutenant General William J. Bolt, USA, TRADOC, Deputy Commanding
General, Initial Entry Training

Colonel Stephen D. Cellucci, USA, Commandant, U.S. Army Physical Fitness
School

Colonel Maureen K. LeBoeuf, USA, Professor, U.S. Military Academy

Dr. Joseph J. Knapik, Research Physiologist, U.S. Army Center for Health
Promotion and Preventative Medicine

Dr. Louis F. Tomasi, Research Physiologist, U.S. Army Physical Fitness
School

Physiology, Physical Fitness and Physical Conditioning--U.S. Air Force Testimony:

Colonel James L. Laub, USAF, Aerospace Medicine Division Chief, Air Force
Medical Operations Agency, Office of the Surgeon General

Major Neal Baumgartner, USAF, School of Aerospace Medicine, Brooks Air
Force Base

17 NOVEMBER 1998

DACOWITS Review of 1997 and 1998 Base Visit Reports:

Ms. Elizabeth T. Bilby, Present Chair, DACOWITS

Ms. Holly Hemphill, Esq., 1997 Chair, DACOWITS

Dr. Judith Youngman, 1996 Chair, DACOWITS

Defense Counsel / Non-Service Commentary on Cross-Gender Relationships

Lieutenant General Richard G. Trefry, USA (Ret)

Brigadier General Gerald L. Miller, USMC (Ret.), Director of the Exchange,
Association of Trial Lawyers of America

Judge Advocate General (JAG) Review of Services' Policies on Cross-Gender Relationships, Including Adultery, Fraternization and Sexual Harassment

Colonel Ronald W. White, Chief, Criminal Law Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army

Colonel Joseph Composto, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

Captain William A. DeCicco, Judge Advocate General's Corps., Legal Counsel, Bureau of Naval Personnel, U.S. Navy

Colonel David W. Madsen, Chief, Military Justice Division, U.S. Air Force Legal Services Agency, Bolling Air Force Base, U.S. Air Force

Colonel Georgette M. Toews, Director, Personnel Force Development, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force

18 NOVEMBER 1998

Office of the Secretary Of Defense (OSD) Consolidated Services' Responses to the Kassebaum Baker Recommendations

U.S. Army Response:

Lieutenant General William J. Bolt, TRADOC, Deputy Commanding General, Initial Entry Training

Brigadier General Clayton E. Melton, Director of Human Resources, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters, Department of the Army

Lieutenant Colonel Monica M. Gorzelnik, Human Resources Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff For Personnel, Headquarters, Department of the Army

Lieutenant Colonel Bruce W. Batten, Program Division, Office of the Chief For Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Army

U.S. Marine Corps Response:

Brigadier General Thomas S. Jones, Director, Training and Education
Division, MCCDC

Lieutenant Colonel Leon M. Pappa, Deputy Head, Training Programs Branch,
Training and Education, MCCDC

U.S. Navy Response:

Rear Admiral Edward Hunter, USN, Commander, Great Lakes Training Center

Captain Randy Abshire, Staff, USN, Chief of Naval Education and Training
Staff, Chief of Naval Education and Training

Captain Craig Hansen, USN, Commanding Officer, Recruit Training
Command, Great Lakes Training Center

OSCM(SW) Richard J. Sheridan, USN, Recruit Training Command, Great
Lakes Training Center

U.S. Air Force Response:

Major General Andrew J. Pelak, Jr., Commander, 2nd Air Force, Keesler, Air
Force Base

Lieutenant Colonel George J. Nixon, Deputy Commander, 737th Training
Group, Lackland Air Force Base

OSD Response:

Captain Martha E. McWatters, USN, Director, Officer and Enlisted Personnel
Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense

**Physiology, Physical Fitness and Physical Conditioning: Civilian Sector Physical
Training Concepts**

Paul O. Davis, Ph.D., President and Founder of Applied Research Associates,
Inc., A Research Consulting Group For Sports Teams, Fire Fighting, Law
Enforcement, and the Military

Physiology, Physical Fitness and Physical Conditioning

Deborah L. Gebhardt, Ph.D., President, Human Performance Systems, Inc.

Phillip A. Bishop, Ed.D., Professor, Human Studies, University of Alabama

Colleen Farmer, Ph.D., Director, Wellness Research Lab, College of Health

and Human Performance, University of Maryland, College Park

1 DECEMBER 1998

General Accounting Office (GAO) Panel:

Mr. Mark E. Gebicke, Director

Dr. William E. Beusse, Assistant Director

Mr. Colin L. Chambers, Senior Evaluator (Department of Defense Combat Exclusion Policy)

Mr. George Delgado, Senior Evaluator (Review of the Study Methodologies)

Mr. John W. Nelson, Senior Evaluator, (Physical Fitness and Body Fat Standards)

2 DECEMBER 1998

History of Gender-Integrated Training

General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA (Ret), Former Chief of Staff of the Army

Study of Gender-Integrated Training Pertaining to Physical Conditioning

Dr. William J. Gregor, Study on Gender-Integrated Training

History of Gender-Integrated Training

Mr. Brian Mitchell, Author, *Women in the Military: Flirting With Disaster* (Regnery, 1998) and *Weak Link: The Feminization of the American Military* (Regnery, 1989)

Physiology, Physical Fitness and Physical Conditioning: Civilian Sector Physical Training Concepts

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Panel:

Mr. John O. Loudon, Chief, Investigative Training Section, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA

Mr. Thomas Lyons, Chief, Physical Training Unit, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA

Mr. Kevin J. Crawford, Supervisory Special Agent, FBI Fitness Program Manager, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA

Mr. Edward T. Daerr, Supervisory Special Agent, FBI Defensive Tactics
Program Manager, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA

21 DECEMBER 1998

General Michael E. Ryan, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

History of Gender-Integrated Training

General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Ret), Former Chief of Staff of the Army
(1979-1983) (Submitted outline of testimony but did not appear)

History of Gender-Integrated Training

Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, U.S. Army

History of Gender-Integrated Training

Rear Admiral Thomas J. Barrett, USCG, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard

Captain Sally Brice-O'Hara, USCG, Commanding Officer, U.S. Coast Guard
Training Center, Cape May, NJ

History of Gender-Integrated Training

Major General Richard Siegfried, USA (Ret), Chairman, Sexual Harassment
Senior Review Panel (1996-1997); Former Commander, Ft. Jackson, SC
(1991-1994)

History of Gender-Integrated Training

Brigadier General Myrna H. Williamson, USA (Ret), Former Chief, Enlisted
Education Department Staff and Faculty, U.S. Army Women's Army Corps
School and Training Center, Ft. McClellan, AL (Integrated Male/Female
Committee Trainers) (1974-1979), Former Commander, 1st Battalion, Training
Brigade, U.S. Army Military Police School / Training Center, Ft. McClellan,
AL (1977-1979)

Colonel Karen Frey, USA (Ret), President, KLF Group; Former Commander,
Gender-Integrated Training Company (1974)

22 DECEMBER 1999

Leadership and War-fighting

Professor Charles G. Percy, Professor of Strategy, Industrial College of the

Armed Forces, Ft. McNair, DC

Mackubin T. Owens, Ph.D., Professor of Strategy and Force Planning, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI

Gender Integration of Other Nations' Military

Israeli Armed Forces:

Lieutenant Colonel Lavi Amiram, IAF, Israeli Assistant Air Attaché to the United States (Submitted a statement, but did not appear)

Mrs. Shosana Breyen, Director of Special Projects, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA)

Royal Dutch Military:

Captain Vivian van de Perre (Ret), Former Chief, Office of Female Military Personnel, Royal Dutch Army

History of Gender-Integrated Training

Lieutenant General Carol A. Mutter, USMC, Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps

Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote, USA (Ret), Vice Chairman, Sexual Harassment Senior Review Panel (1996-1997); Former 1st Commander, Second Basic Training Battalion, U.S. Army Military Police School, Ft. McClellan, AL

11 JANUARY 1999

General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps

28 JANUARY 1999

History of Gender-Integrated Training

Captain Kathleen M. Bruyere, USN (Ret), Former Special Assistant for Women's Policy (1988-1991); Former Commanding Officer Recruit Training Command, Orlando, FL

General Dennis J. Reimer, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Updates on Initial Entry Training / Secretary of the Army Response to PL 105-85, SEC. 562.(e)(2)(O)(P) / Readiness--U.S. Army Panel:

Lieutenant General William J. Bolt, USA, TRADOC, Deputy Commanding General,
Initial Entry Training

Lieutenant General David H. Ohle, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Lieutenant General Thomas N. Burnette, Jr., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff,
Operations Plans

Senior Enlisted Officers' Panel:

Sergeant Major of the Army Robert E. Hall, 11th Sergeant Major of the Army

Sergeant Major Lewis G. Lee, 13th Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps

Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy James L. Herdt, 9th Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy

Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force Eric W. Benken, 12th Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force

History of Gender-Integrated Training

ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Ret), Former Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy (1970 to 1974)

29 JANUARY 1999

Captain H. Denby Starling II, USN, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Eisenhower

Admiral Jay L. Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy

Updates on Initial Entry Training / Secretary of the Navy Response to PL 105-85, SEC. 562.(e)(2)(O) and (P) / Readiness--U.S. Navy Panel:

Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments

Rear Admiral Edward Hunter, USN, Commander, Great Lakes Training Center

Captain Craig L. Hanson, USN, Commanding Officer, Recruit Training Command, Great Lakes Training Center

OSCM (SW) Richard J. Sheridan, USN, Recruit Training Command, Great Lakes Training Center

Updates on Initial Entry Training / Secretary of the Air Force Response to PL 105-85, SEC. 562.(e)(2)(O)(P) Readiness--U.S. Air Force Panel:

Lieutenant General Marvin R. Esmond, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force

Major General Andrew J. Pelak Jr., USAF, Commander, 2nd Air Force, Keesler Air Force Base

Brigadier General Barry W. Barksdale, USAF, Commander, 37th Wing, Lackland Air Force Base

Updates on Initial Entry Training / Secretary of the Navy Response to PL 105-85, SEC. 562.(e)(2)(O)(P) / Readiness--U.S. Marine Corps Panel:

Brigadier General Jan C. Huly, USMC, Director, Operations Division, Plans, Policies and Operations (PP&O), HQMC

Brigadier General Thomas S. Jones, USMC, Director, Training and Education Division, HQMC

Gender Separate Training

Elaine Donnelly, President, Center for Military Readiness

Brenda Bryant, Director, Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL), Mary Baldwin College, Staunton, VA, accompanied by VWIL Cadets:

Ms. Trimble L. Bailey

Ms. Sherri L. Sharpe

30 JANUARY 1999

Review and Discussion With Legal Consultants on PL 105-85, SEC. 562.(a)(1)-(3)

Colonel Thomas Abbey, U.S. Air Force (Ret)


Brigadier General Thomas Cuthbert, U.S. Army (Ret)

Mr. Charles Gittins

Lieutenant Colonel Henry Hamilton, U.S. Army (Ret)

Captain Gerald Kirkpatrick, U.S. Navy (Ret)

CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES SITE VISITS



**CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING
AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES EUROPEAN SITE VISITS**



COMMISSIONER INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING (IET) TRIP ATTENDANCE MATRIX

	Parris Island	SOI(E) / MCSSS	Great Lakes	Lackland, AFB	Fort Benning	Fort Jackson	Fort McClellan	Fort Leonard Wood
Visit Dates	11-15 Aug 8-12 Sept	23-25 Aug 14-17 Sept	14-16 June 20-23 July 15-16 Feb	12-15 July 4-7 Aug 21-22 Sept	2-4 Sept	6-9 July 21-24 Sept	27-30 July 5-7 Oct	5 April 1999
Blair	11-15 Aug	23-25 Aug / 16 Sept	20-23 July	4-7 Aug	2-4 Sept	6-9 July	5-6 Oct	5 Apr
Pang	8-9 Sept	DNA	21-22 July	4-7 Aug	DNA	21-22 Sept	6-7 Oct	5 Apr
Cantor	8-9 Sept	DNA	20-23 July	21-22 Sep	DNA	22-23 Sept	DNA	DNA
Christmas	8-10 Sept	SOI (W) 24 July	14-16 June	12-15 July	2-4 Sept	22-24 Sept	DNA	5 Apr
Dare	11-15 Aug	23-26 Aug	14-16 June 15-16 Feb	12-15 July 21-22 Sep	DNA	6-9 July	27-29 July	5 Apr
Keys	11-15 Aug	23-25 Aug	15-16 Feb	12-15 July	2-3 Sept	DNA	6-7 Oct	DNA
Moore	11-15 Aug	23-25 Aug	14-16 June	4-7 Aug	2-4 Sept	6-9 July	27-30 July	DNA
Moskos	8-10 Sept	DNA	15-16 Feb	DNA	2-3 Sept	21-23 Sept	DNA	DNA
Pope	DNA	DNA	21-22 July	12-15 July	DNA	8-9 July 21-22 Sept	28-29 July	5 Apr
Segal	11-15 Aug	16 Sept	14-16 June	12-15 July	2-4 Sept	6-9 July	DNA	5 Apr

*DNA--Did Not Attend

Trip Matrix

Place	Date	Group	By rank, MOS or other type	Total number	By gender	Note
Great Lakes (various briefings)	14-16 Jun 98	1	Recruits	10	Mixed-gender	Breakfast w/ recruits during BSs- (random sample of recruits)
		2	RDCs & Instructors	10	Mixed-gender	Different ships (6 M, 4 F)
		3	RDC students	10	Mixed-gender	7 assigned, 3 volunteers
		4	Recruites	10	5M, 5F	“brother/sister” divisions
		5	LCPOs	~12	Mixed-gender	Each in charge of different Ships
		6	Junior Officers	~12	Mixed-gender	Command different Ships
		7	“A” School students	~40	Mixed-gender	Joined existing class after regularly scheduled class
Fort Jackson	6-9 Jul 98	1	CG MG Van Alstyne			Command Briefing
		2	Recruits	11	All male	Obstacle course, C-Co. 2-28 th (Week 6)
		3	Recruits	11	All female	Obstacle course, C-Co. 2-28 th (Week 6)
		4	Recruits	10	Male and female	Lunch w/those finished BRM, B-Co. 2-13 th (wk 5) (5 M, 5 F)
		5	Drill SGT leaders	~6	*	Instructors at the Drill Sergeant school
		6	Drill SGTs	21	All male	From different Companies. At Drill Sgt. School
		7	Chaplains	16	*	At base chapel 13 Chaplains, 3 Chaplain candidates
		8	CSMs	6	Mixed	Working breakfast
		9	Recruits	10	5M, 5F	B Co. 2-39 th Pugil Training (Wk 2)
		10	Recruits	10	5M, 5F	B Co. 2-39 th Pugil Training (Wk 2)
		11	Recruits	5	All male	Victory Tower, C Co. 2-60 th (Wk 2)
		12	Recruits	5	All female	Victory Tower, C Co. 2-60 th (Wk 2)
		13	Drill SGTs	11	All female	From diff. companies. At Drill Sgt. School.
		14	AIT school	10	5M, 5F	Wheel Vehicle Mechanics
		15	Self selected group	10	All male	A Co. 2-39 th
		16	Self selected group	10	All female	A Co. 2-39 th
		17	CG, CG SSI, PCSM BDE CDRS	*	Mixed	Dinner w/ Cms, Blair, Dare, Moore, Pope and Segal.
		18	Drill Sergeants	10	7 male, 3 female	

* no details

**The details of female individuals participating in conference groups at Great Lakes are as follows:

Time on deck	Divisions trained	Hod billets
4 years	11	2 (6 mos FAST. 9mos PASS)
2 years	7	on hold
2 years	5	on hold
2 years	7	0 (by request)
2y 3m	8	on hold
1y 6m	1	on hold
9 months	4	0
2y 7m	2	4
3 y 9m	3	3

Place	Date	Group	By rank, MOS or other type	Total number	By gender	Note
Fort McClellan	27-30 Jul 98	1	CG, Installation Stf & Ldrshp	*	*	Command Briefing
		2	Recruits	8	All female	BRM Range, 5 active 3 ANG; B Co. 82 CM, PH II
		3	Recruits	8	All male	BRM Range 7 USA, 1 USAR; B Co. 82 CM, PH II
		4	Recruits	10	All female	FTX, A Co., 795 MPs, PH IV
		5	Recruits	10	All male	FTX, A Co., 795 MPs, PH IV
		6	Chaplains	6	*	
		7	Entire graduating Co.	*	*	B Co., 795 MP, PH V
		8	Drill SGTs	11	All male	CMs and MPs, 6 volunteers/5 assigned, Attended DSS at Benning (5), Jackson (4) and McClellan (2)
		9	Recruits	8	All male	FTX PH III, Co. C 795 MPs (dinner?)
		10	Recruits	8	All female	FTX PH III, Co. C 795 MPs (dinner?)
		11	CSMs	*	*	
		12	Recruits	*	*	Impromptu discussion, c/82 CMC
		13	Recruits	*	All male	C/795 MP
		14	Recruits	*	All female	C/795 MP
		15	Drill SGT Tms	12	11M, 1F	Co. D, 795 MPs, 10 volunteers, 6 assigned (?)
		16	Drill SGTs	11	All female	5 MPs, 3 CM, 1 AG, 5 volunteers, 6 assigned
School of Infantry (West) LtGen Christmas (solo trip)	24 Jul 98	1	CO, Col Bizac	*	*	Discussed quality of training issues
		2	Marines	10	*	Randomly selected midway through MCT
		3	NCOs	*	*	Open discussions
		4	Junior Officer Trainers	*	*	Open discussions
Lackland AFB	4-7 Aug 98	1	Airmen	16	All female	4 th -6 th week of training, 2 ANG, 14 active AF; 320 TRS for 737 TRG
		2	Airmen	16	All male	6 th week of training; All from different flights; 3 ANG/Reserve 13 active AF; 320 TRS for 737 TRG; 8 in integrated flights
		3	MTIs	12	All male	
		4	New TIs	4		Supertors were present during meeting
		5	Airmen	~20	Male/female mix	Brief discussion
		6	Airmen	16	8M, 8F	Combined from flight 479, day before graduation, 7ANG/Reserve, 9 active AF
		7	Airmen	7	All male	Last week of BMT
		8	MTLs	9	*	7 MTLs, 2 supervisors, 37 th Training group—Tech training
		9	Airmen	13	6M, 7F	All active AF, Phase II of advanced train; going through RIBs training—Tech training
		10	Tech students	6	3M, 3F	All tech students, Tech training
		11	Tech. Training Instruct.	14	10M, 4F	No supervisors present. Military Training Leaders.

Place	Date	Group	By rank, MOS or other type	Total number	By gender	Note
Parris Island	11-15 Aug 98	1	SGT Majors	6	5M, 1F	Breakfast. Battalion and Regimental level
		2	Recruits	24	12M, 12F	Pugil stick training
		3	Officers	7	All male	Series commanders
		4	Recruits	16	8M, 8F	Pool (impromptu discussion group—not scheduled)
		5	Recruits	4	All female	4 th week. Core values
		6	DI School Instructors	8	6M, 2F	DI School. Gy Sgt or higher
		7	DI students	8	All female	DI School (7 students, 1 instructor) Wk 6
		8	DI students	10	All male	DI School Wk 6
		9	Recruits	4	All female	4 th week. Core values.
		10	DIs	7	All female	4 th week. Core values.
		11	Co. 1 st Sgts./Series GySgt	8	4M,4F	Dinner
		12	Co. Grade Officers	7	All female	Lunch
		13	Recruits disc. group	10	All male	3 rd week
		14	Recruits disc. group	10	All female	3 rd week
		15	DIs	9	All male	
		16	PMI Coaches	4	All males	E-6, E-5, E4 (breakfast)
		17	Chaplains	7	6 male, 1 female	
		18	Recruits	11	All male	Week 10
		19	Recruits	10	All female	Week 7 & 10
Camp Lejeune SOI (E)/MCSSS	23-25 Aug 98	1	SOI CO, Staff Offs, Sgts Major, SNCOs	7	All male	Breakfast
		2	MCT students	25	All female	MCT, Training day 5 (impromptu)
		3	MCT students	10	All female	2 nd Squad, 4 th Platoon. Lunch discussion group
		4	MCT students	10	All male	2 nd Squad, 2 nd Platoon. Discussion group
		5	MCT NCO group	10	8M, 2F	E4 and E5
		6	MCSSS Instructors	8	4M, 4F	MCSS
		7	ITB Squad leaders	10	All male	A Co. ITB, 9 NCOs and 1 Corpsman
		8	ITB Students	12	All male	A Co.

Place	Date	Group	By rank, MOS or other type	Total number	By gender	Note
Fort Benning	2-4 Sep 98	1	DCG, Bde Cdr	*	*	Installation/ITB/Reception Bn/FTU briefing
		2	Chaplains discuss. grp	7	All amle	Mixed denomination
		3	CSMs	7	6M, 1F	Brigade and Battalion
		4	Recruits	5	All male	PH III, Rifle Bayonet Fighting, A/1-38 Infantry—Moskos, Segal, Christmas
		5	Recruits	5	All male	PH III, Rifle Bayonet Fighting, A/1-38 Infantry—Blair, Keys, Moore
		6	Recruits	6	All male	PH II, ITT Hand Grenades, C/1-38 Infantry—Moskos, Moore Segal
		7	Recruits	6	All male	PH II, ITT Hand Grenades, C/1-38 Infantry—Christmas, Blair
		8	Drill SGTs	15	All male	Different companies
		9	CG, MG Ernst			Christmas, Segal, Moore, Clair, Moskos
		10	Recruits	10	All male	PH II, Squad Tactical Training, E/1-19 Infantry
		11	Drill SGT candidates	4	All female	Week 5
		12	Drill SGT leaders	7	All male	Instructors at the Drill SGT School
		13	Drill SGT candidates	8	All male	Week 5
Parris Island	8-11 Sep 98	1	Recruits	9	All male	3 rd – 4 th week training
		2	Recruits	10	All female	All in same series, 3 rd – 4 th week training
		3	DI school instructors	10	8M, 2F	GySgts.
		4	DI students	9	All female	Half were volunteers
		5	Recruits	8	4M, 4F	Pugil sick demo
		6	Drill instructors	8	All female	6 volunteered, 2 assigned
		7	Drill instructors	8	All male	7 volunteered, 1 assigned
		8	Recruits	10	All male	In 9 th week, all from same series, but diff. platoons
		9	Recruits	10	All female	All in 9 th week
Camp Lejeune (SOI)	16 Sep 98	1	MCT Students	10	All female	The 10 were taken from both squads- Discussion group Day 8
		2	MCT students	10	All male	Discussion group Day 8
		3	MCT NCOs	8	5M, 3F	
		4	ITB Students	10	All male	Discussion group
		5	MCSSS students	12	All female	Discussion group
		6	MCSSS students	9	All male	Discussion group
Lackland AFB	21-22 Sep 98	1	MTIs	8	4M, 4F	Breakfast
		2	Airmen	8	All female	Lunch
		3	Airmen	12	Mixed	Group discussion, Field training site
		4	Airmen	8	All male	Dinner

Place	Date	Group	By rank, MOS or other type	Total number	By gender	Note
Fort Jackson	21-24 Sep 98	1	CG, MG Van Alstyne			Commanding brief
		2	Recruits	9	All male	PH I, Bayonet Assault Course, E/2-60 Infantry
		3	Recruits	8	All female	PH I, Bayonet Assault Course, E/2-60 Infantry
		4	Recruits	5	All male	PH II, Confidence Course, A/2-13 Infantry
		5	Recruits	5	All female	PH II, Confidence Course, A/2-13 Infantry
		6	Drill SGTs	11	All female	Different companies
		7	Recruits	14	10M, 4F	Victory Forge, Sta. 1, Build a bridge, impromptu discussion
		8	Chaplains	13	*	
		9	CSMs	10	9M, 1F	Brigade and Battalion. Breakfast
		10	Recruits	6	3M, 3F	FTU, impromptu discussion
		11	Recruits	6	3M, 3F	PTRP, impromptu discussion
		12	Drill SGT school instructors	8	6M, 2F	Instructors at Drill SGT Sch. And participants from Drill SGT Sch. Proponency Office.
		13	Recruits	10	5M, 5F	Range 5, lunch, A/2-39 Infantry, 3 rd -5 th week
		14	Soldiers	6	All male	AIT, 369 th AG Bn
		15	Soldiers	6	All female	AIT, 369 th AG Bn
		16	Drill SGTs	10	All male	Different Companies
		17	Drill SGTs	*	All female	Different Companies
		18	CG, DC, PCSM, Bdcdrs		All male	Dinner w/ Lt. Gen Christmas
Fort McClellan	5-7 Oct 98	1	CG, DCG			CG, MG Wooten & DCG, BG Ryder office call w/ Blair
		2	Bde/Bn Cdrs	6	5M, 1F	Breakfast with Blair
		3	Drill SGTs	10	All male	Different companies
		4	Drill SGT Tms	8	4M, 4F	Different companies. 4 teams: 3MPs, 1 Chem—train together
		5	Drill SGTs	9	All female	Different companies, lunch with Blair
		6	USMC students	10	5M, 5F	Students assigned to the USMC. 3 NCOs—1M, 2F
		7	USMC cadre	3	1M, 2F	Support cadre to the USMC detachment met with Blair
		8	Soldiers	10	All male	Week 10, Radiological Instruction, 2/A82 CML bn, same platoon
		9	Soldiers	10	All female	Week 10, Radiological Instruction, 2/A82 CML bn, different platoons
		10	Chaplains	6	All male	
		11	Installation leadership			Dinner w/ Blair, Pang, and Keys arrived later
		12	CSMs	6	All male	Brigade & Battalion SGMs, breakfast w/ Pang and Keys
		13	USMC cadre	*	All male	Keys
		14	Soldiers	10	All male	Ph V, M17/M12 Decon Apparatus, 3.4/B82 CML Bn
		15	Soldiers	10	All female	Ph V, M17/M12 Decon Apparatus, 3.4/B82 CML Bn
		16	Co Cdrs/1 st SGs	10	9m, 1F	Lunch
		17	Soldiers	10	All female	PH V, Patrol Incidents, C/795 MP Bn (1-hr discussion), Week 15
		18	Soldiers	10	All male	PH V, Patrol Incidents, C/795 MP Bn (15-min) Week 15

Place	Date	Group	By rank, MOS or other type	Total number	By gender	Note
Fort Leonard Wood	5 Apr 99	1	MG Flowers (CG and Commandant)			Informal discussion
		2	Bn Cdrs and CSMs	10	8M, 2F	5 pairs, 1 pair female, 4 OSUT, 2 AIT, 4 BT (2 BNs OSUT/AIT combined—e.g. 3 Cos OSUT, 1 CO AIT)
		3	Co Cdrs and 1SGTs	10	All male	OSUT/BT/AIT—all GIT Cos, but range from a few females to 30-40% (1 Co had 60% female mix)
		4	DS Candidates	12	7M, 6F	Lunch at rifle range
		5	DS Teams	10	5M, 5F	2-person male/female teams
		6	DSs	10	5M, 5F	
		7	DSs	10	5M, 5F	

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FOREWORD

Kathleen M. Wright, Ph.D., Research Director

The research program—ten projects in all—was notable for its size and scope, and, inescapably, for what some may regard as the ambiguity of its findings. They seem to reach no definitive, overarching conclusion. Indeed, the implications of the data collected in one project may appear to contradict the implications of the data in another. Recruit trainers, for example, insist the quality of recruits has declined; nonetheless, recruits show a level of commitment that meets or exceeds Service expectations and by most measures appear to do well. Or, some Marine and Army leaders believe that mixing men and women in basic training causes an “unnecessary distraction”; many Navy and Air Force leaders, however, seem to think it does not. Meanwhile, comparison within a Service, between recruits trained in gender-separated versus gender-integrated format, revealed no effect on cohesion and commitment as a function of training format. The research findings should be considered as a whole. They represent a triangulation of findings with regard to the broad issues at hand. Failure to find significant differences does not represent an inconsequential finding; rather, it can be used to rule out a suspected moderator of performance.

As a practical matter, advocates of conflicting points of view about basic training or gender-integrated training may find support for their views by selectively reading the research reports, and extracting the parts that most please them. But they are likely to limit their understanding of basic training and gender integration if they do. The research reports require a broader, more disinterested, reading. They show that there are no easy answers to the questions about basic training and gender integration, and that further study of complex issues is required. Although Commission researchers amassed a great deal of information indicating broad trends, time constraints precluded longitudinal studies; that is, the same recruits could not be tracked at the beginning and end of their training, and then later in their operational units. Different samples had to be assessed, which made comparisons between the two groups invalid.

While the research findings proved valuable, it is important to note that there are limitations. Certainly, it is not uncommon to expedite research, but this comes at a price. Measures were limited and time-bounded out of necessity. For example, the short cut to “standards setting,” in which leaders were asked via group administered, paper-and-pencil survey to respond as they believed graduating recruits should respond, may have increased the imprecision and unreliability over more controlled exercises in which experts participate interactively in a number of workshop activities so as to create a unified mind set. Field research such as that in an operational military setting presents a number of challenges. Without random assignment to a particular Service or unit within a Service, it is essential to be wary of, and control to the extent possible, potential confounds that could lead to erroneous significant differences.

The Services follow different training formats; the duration of training and the level of gender-integration varies. Therefore, the Commission cautions against cross-Service comparisons. At the same time, the training does not exist in a vacuum; recruiting problems, increased operational tempos, manpower shortages, and attrition and retention rates all have

an impact on how it is conducted. Meanwhile, training formats have undergone much change in the last 18 to 24 months, and the long-range effects have not yet worked their way through the military system. Mindful of this, the Commission has recommended that “the Services develop longitudinal studies as part of their ongoing research programs.” Such studies would enable cross-time, within-Service comparisons.

The Commission's research program was made up of two types of activities. New data were collected, and existing documents and literature were assembled and analyzed. Every effort was made to follow the General Accounting Office requirements that researchers use more than a single methodology and that the methodologies, as well as the scope, objectives, and limitations of the research, be clearly defined. Thus the research was designed to measure the continuum of recruit experience, beginning with the first contacts with the military and continuing through graduation from the initial entry training program to assignment to the receiving or operational units. The objective was to measure recruit socialization and the development of military values and attitudes, and to assess the effect of the training experience as recruits were assigned to their new units and began their military careers.

To achieve this, surveys and interviews were conducted with a wide range of servicemembers. A project to assess the relevant attitudes of beginning and graduating graduates on unit cohesion and commitment, as well as the opinions of military leaders on training and gender-related issues, for example, used a sample of approximately 9,000 recruits and 2,300 recruit trainers. There was also a leader sample of approximately 10,000 officers and senior non-commissioned officers; this included a stratified random sample of O-3 and E-6/7 military leaders, as well as a mail survey of operational unit battalion, squadron, and ship commanders and their senior enlisted advisers.

Another project, assessing the open-ended comments of recruit trainers from across the Services, provided information on their perceptions of basic training, gender-integrated training, and adultery and fraternization policies. A thematic assessment of open-ended comments from the surveys of approximately 3,000 graduating recruits supplemented the data on the recruits' training experiences. Finally, the open-ended comments from all recruit and military leader samples were transcribed for the record.

The research projects mentioned above may be thought of as “focusing in,” measuring the values, attitudes, and experiences of servicemembers currently associated with, or connected to, basic training. A complementary project, however, focused out; it surveyed some 10,000 enlisted personnel from across the Services with one through eight years of military experience. The basic training assessment section of this survey overlapped the data collected for the projects above, although other questions in the survey addressed the attitudes of the enlisted personnel on assignments and career progress, proficiency levels and gender-interaction policies.

Researchers also conducted 42 focus groups, with approximately 420 participants, organized by gender, Service, career level, and the extent of gender integration in their current units. Content analyses of the transcripts provided in-depth, qualitative descriptions of varied topics: performance, equitable standards and treatment, superior/subordinate relationships, social

interactions and their effect on performance, the clarity and effectiveness of regulations about gender interactions, and viewpoints on gender in the military.

Three additional research projects evaluated existing survey data on recruit training and gender-integration issues. These secondary analyses provided a longitudinal perspective without the need to follow servicemembers over a period of time. The Performance Data-Modeling project compared attrition rates by gender and job category for cohorts of servicemembers who enlisted from Fiscal Years 1991 through 1996. Another project reviewed data from the annual Youth Attitude Tracking Study of 10,000 male and female respondents, 16 to 24 years of age, on enlistment propensity. The Study added questions about gender-integrated training at the researchers' request. The Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey also provided data that were used to evaluate equal opportunity and organizational effectiveness trends for 800,000 servicemembers from 6,000 units.

The remaining projects included a report on Presidential Executive Orders, Congressional legislation, and policies on women in the military, documenting the changes since 1947; and an annotated bibliography and review of the literature on gender-integrated training, women in the military, women's integration into nontraditional work sectors, and women in foreign militaries.

*The Study of Military Recruit Attitudes
Conducive to Unit Cohesion
&
Survey of Military Leader Opinions on
Recruit Training and Gender-Related Issues*

Executive Summary

Charles B. Johnson, Ph.D.

INTRODUCTION

Background

The *Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues* was created in 1998 by an Act of Congress under Title V, Subtitle F of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 98. The Commission was tasked with assessing the quality of basic training in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps and to make recommendations to Congress on improvements to those programs. The Commission was also tasked with reviewing the effects and application of policies and regulations governing cross-gender relationships of members of the Armed Forces and with making recommendations on improvements to those policies, programs and restrictions. As part of their work, the Commission generated a number of independent research projects in order to provide Commissioners with relevant data on the decision-making issues.

Premise

Recruit training is an institutional gateway from civilian status to a professional identity expected by military leaders. This unique transformation process takes place at a singular point when an individual's learning curve is initialized at ground zero and then maximized by the intensity of the basic training experience. Consequently, the preparedness of graduating recruits, and therefore their ability to contribute to the operational readiness of the Commands they join, is extremely sensitive to any variations in the quality of the basic training they experience.

Research Objectives

The study had three basic objectives in measuring the attitudes of graduating recruits and two objectives in surveying military leaders. In recruit attitudes, the first objective was to document the current state of inculcating desired cohesion attitudes in graduating recruits of the four Services. The second objective was to analyze whether gender-format within basic training was related to either high or low attitude scores. The third objective was to assess the difference between graduating recruit scores on cohesion attitudes and the scores expected by enlisted leaders of their Service. Concerning surveying military leaders, the first objective was to document their opinions concerning the quality of current initial entry graduates in the military, as well as their opinions on current policies of gender integration/separation in basic training. The second objective was to assess leader opinions on other gender-related policies in the military that were pertinent to the Commission’s charter.

Sampling

Samples for this research included nearly 9,000 active duty military recruits (reserve recruits excluded) across all the Services and all basic training sites, as well as 2,290 Recruit Trainers from all Services. In addition to Recruit Trainers, other leader samples consisted of over 10,000 officers and senior enlisted, to include stratified random samples of E-6/E-7 and O-3 leaders, and a majority (61% and 63% respectively) of all Battalion/Squadron/Ship-Level operational commanders and their senior enlisted advisors. Table 1 provides a summary of the study’s research samples. A supplemental content analysis study focused on the open-ended written comments made by 1,430 Recruit Trainers on their surveys. The analysis of Recruit Trainer comments provided in-depth information on these leaders’ perceptions on the conduct of basic training by Service (See Appendix A). Additional work on written comments included a thematic assessment of open-ended comments made by nearly 3,000 graduating recruits on their surveys (See Appendix B). Finally, open-ended comments from all other military leaders (approximately 10,500 wrote comments) were transcribed for the record and included within the data set.

Table 1. Research Samples - All Services

	Total Number “N”	Male	Female	Survey Admin	% of Population	Return Rate	Army “N”	Navy “N”	Air Force “N”	Marine Corps “N”
Beginning Recruits	3,971	2,707	1,264	On-site	2.7%*	N/A	1,379	1,018	1,090	484
Graduate Recruits	4,988	3,759	1,229	On-site	2.7%*	N/A	2,262	742	982	1,002
E-6/E-7s	4,402	2,953	1,449	Mailed	1.7%	48%	1,177	1,171	1,073	981
Recruit Trainers	2,290	2,002	288	On-site	62%	N/A	1,098	225	132	835
O-3s	3,288	2,023	1,265	Mailed	7.7%	53%	1,065	830	884	509
BN/SQ/Ship Commanders	1,126	1,037	89	Mailed	61%	61%	216	195	626	89
CMD NCO/ Sgt Major	1,185	1,091	94	Mailed	63%	63%	251	273	539	122
Total	21,250	15,572	5,678	N/A	N/A	54%	7,448	4,454	5,326	4,022

* Based on FY98 and FY99 DoD non-prior service accession data.

Research Limitations

It is important to note that this study was not longitudinal. That is, the study did not measure the “same” recruits at the beginning of training and then again at the end of their training. Due to time constraints, it was necessary to measure separate samples of beginning and ending recruits. As much as one would like to connect the attitude levels of beginning recruits with those measures of the ending recruits, it was not appropriate to draw conclusions from such a connection.

Survey Instruments

The research employed three survey instruments: the *Basic Training Survey*, the *Military Leader Survey* and the *Commander & Command Sergeant Major Survey* (See Appendix C). The methodology of attitude construct measurement (multiple survey items relating to the same attitude) required respondents to rate survey items on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Initially, items for the surveys were drawn from studies of military cohesion, organizational commitment and professional identity. Cohesion attitude constructs of commitment, respect for authority, group identity, loyalty, trust, and the sharing group norms, were the theoretical premise for desired attitudes. The remaining items of the survey instruments fell into two categories: (1) background demographic items for recruits and leaders, and (2) military leaders’ opinion items on the quality of current entry-level graduates, gender-integration in basic training, and other gender-related issues.

Cohesion Attitude Measurement

In the final instruments, 31 Likert-scaled survey items were selected to measure desired cohesion attitudes. However, only 20 of the items were found to hold up consistently in factor analysis as fitting one of three cohesion attitude constructs: commitment, respect for authority, and group identity. The stratified random sample of Enlisted leaders (E-6/E-7s of all Services) provided the weighting standard for each survey item. These factor weights were then applied to all recruit and leader samples in the same way to measure the cohesion constructs under review.¹ Mean scores of recruit samples were then compared by and within Service, gender, and gender-format of the recruit training the respondent experienced. It should be noted, however, that not all cohesion constructs appear to have the same degree of item reliability. It is acknowledged that the attitude construct of “respect for authority,” like “trust” and “loyalty,” was a difficult attitude construct to capture using a written survey. The reader is referred to Chapter 4, Table 4-2, to review survey items for each cohesion construct, as well as their associated factor weights and construct alpha coefficients.

¹ Johnson, C. (1999), *The Study of Military Recruit Attitudes Conducive to Unit Cohesion and Survey of Military Leader Opinions on Recruit Training and Gender-Related Issues*, “Research” Volume III, page 89.

Basic Research Results

Research results are summarized in three sections: (1) recruit sample mean scores for cohesion attitudes, (2) recruit sample regression analysis predicted mean scores, and 3) opinion measurements from military leader samples and graduating recruit samples. The cohesion attitude mean scores were computed based on how respondents answered Likert-scale survey items indicating their propensity to hold attitudes of commitment, respect for authority, and group identity. Military leaders responded to the same items on their surveys, only in their case, “as they would hope graduating recruits would respond.” The E-6/E-7 enlisted leader responses represented the Service’s expectation for recruits.

Sample mean scores are depicted for the reader on restricted scales to show the standard error and associated confidence interval.² The confidence interval is a statistical measure of the spread of individual mean scores around the overall sample mean. In those depicted mean estimates where confidence intervals between samples overlap, their respective mean scores are said to be “similar.” However, in the depicted means where confidence intervals do not overlap, the difference in the means implies “statistical significance” at the .05 level. In such cases, statistical significance implies that the difference in those means is not explained by random error alone, and can be stated so with some level of confidence (e.g., 95% confidence interval represented by the upper and lower bound plotted for each mean depiction).


Opinion measurements reflect response rates showing how surveyed military leader groups and graduating recruits answered different opinion items in their respective surveys. It should be noted that military leader opinions do not necessarily imply comparable direct experience in all cases. “Opinions” are more than “impressions” and less than certain “knowledge.” It is clear that sampled leaders differ in experience level on certain issues. For example, Marine leaders and some portion of Army leaders (especially certain Recruit Trainers) may have opinions on gender-integrated recruit training, but presumably lack the same level of direct experience with gender-integrated training that many Navy and Air Force leaders may have (since gender-integrated training is the latter’s current policy in recruit training). In the same vein, Air Force, Navy, and some Army leaders may have opinions on gender-separate recruit training, but presumably lack the level of direct experience that Marine Corps and some Army leaders have with gender-separate recruit training formats. The reader should take into account the differences in experience level that separate leader samples represent in this research.

² *Ibid.*, p. 43.

Cohesion Attitudes - Mean Score Estimates for Graduating Recruits:

- Army graduating recruit mean scores for Commitment were 19.22 for males and 19.60 for females. The combined DoD E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Commitment was 19.15 (Figure 1).
- Navy graduating recruit mean scores for Commitment were 19.53 for males and 19.50 for females. The combined DoD E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Commitment was 19.15 (Figure 1).
- Air Force graduating recruit mean scores for Commitment were 19.37 for males and 20.07 for females. The combined DoD E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Commitment was 19.15 (Figure 1).
- Marine graduating recruit mean scores for Commitment were 20.69 for males and 21.32 for females. The combined DoD E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Commitment was 19.15 (Figure 1).


Figure 1. Graduating Recruits by Gender - Commitment



APPENDIX E


- Army graduating recruit mean scores for Respect for Authority were 5.90 for males and 6.17 for females. The combined DoD E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Respect for Authority was 7.31 (Figure 2).
- Navy graduating recruit mean scores for Respect for Authority were 5.86 for males and 5.93 for females. The combined DoD E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Respect for Authority was 7.31 (Figure 2).
- Air Force graduating recruit mean scores for Respect for Authority were 6.05 for males and 6.21 for females. The combined DoD E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Respect for Authority was 7.31 (Figure 2).
- Marine graduating recruit mean scores for Respect for Authority were 6.36 for males and 6.51 for females. The combined DoD E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Respect for Authority was 7.31 (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Graduating Recruits by Gender - Respect for Authority



- Army graduating recruit mean scores for Group Identity were 18.39 for males and 18.80 for females. The combined DoD E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Group Identity was 18.81 (Figure 3).
- Navy graduating recruit mean scores for Group Identity were 17.95 for males and 18.41 for females. The combined DoD E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Group Identity was 18.81 (Figure 3).
- Air Force graduating recruit mean scores for Group Identity were 18.02 for males and 18.68 for females. The combined DoD E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Group Identity was 18.81 (Figure 3).
- Marine graduating recruit mean scores for Group Identity were 19.16 for males and 19.50 for females. The combined DoD E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Group Identity was 18.81 (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Graduating Recruits by Gender - Group Identity




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Figures 4, 5 and 6 show graduating recruit mean scores (male and female recruits combined together by Service) together with each Service’s E/6/E7 enlisted leader mean score for the same cohesion construct.


- Army graduating recruit mean score for Commitment was 19.28. The overall Army E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Commitment was 19.14 (Figure 4).
- Navy graduating recruit mean score for Commitment was 19.52. The overall Navy E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Commitment was 18.66 (Figure 4).
- Air Force graduating recruit mean score for Commitment was 19.69. The overall Air Force E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Commitment was 19.36 (Figure 4).
- Marine graduating recruit mean score for Commitment was 20.80. The overall Marine E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Commitment was 20.16 (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Graduating Recruits by Their Service E-6/E-7 Expectation - Commitment



- Army graduating recruit mean score for Respect for Authority was 5.94. The overall Army E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Respect for Authority was 7.10 (Figure 5).
- Navy graduating recruit mean score for Respect for Authority was 5.88. The overall Navy E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Respect for Authority was 7.20 (Figure 5).
- Air Force graduating recruit mean score for Respect for Authority was 6.12. The overall Air Force E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Respect for Authority was 7.49 (Figure 5).
- Marine graduating recruit mean score for Respect for Authority was 6.38. The overall Marine E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Respect for Authority was 7.77 (Figure 5).


Figure 5. Graduating Recruits by Their Service E-6/E-7 Expectation-Respect for Authority



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- Army graduating recruit mean score for Group Identity was 18.45. The overall Army E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Group Identity was 18.75 (Figure 6).
- Navy graduating recruit mean score for Group Identity was 18.07. The overall Navy E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Group Identity was 18.71 (Figure 6).
- Air Force graduating recruit mean score for Group Identity was 18.34. The overall Air Force E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Group Identity was 18.78 (Figure 6).
- Marine graduating recruit mean score for Group Identity was 19.23. The overall Marine E-6/E-7 enlisted leader expectation for Group Identity was 19.37 (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Graduating Recruits by Their Service E-6/E-7 Expectation–Group Identity



Recruit Cohesion Attitudes – Regression Analysis Predicted Mean Scores:³

- In regression analysis, measurements of combined graduating recruits by their gender format (mixed in Army, Navy, and Air Force versus single gender in all four Services) indicated that format did not appear to influence (positively or negatively) the predicted scores on commitment, respect for authority, or group identity (Figure 7). In addition, male recruits in mixed-gender units within the Army, Navy, and Air

³ Regression scores are graphed on a scale large enough to include the entire range of all constructs. See Johnson (1999), Volume III Table 4-5 page 92.

Force scored similarly compared with other male recruits within their Service who were in male-only units. Because the Marine Corps had the only female-only recruit training format, no training format comparisons could be made with that Service. Figures 8, 9, and 10 show predicted mean scores by gender format for the Army, Navy and Air Force graduating recruits.

- The measurement of a different sample of beginning recruits in their first week of training showed no significant differences between male and female recruit scores on commitment, respect for authority, and group identity. Some differences by Service existed in the beginning recruit samples on some cohesion attitudes (Navy and Marine beginning recruits similar to each other and higher than Army and Air Force in commitment; Marines, Army and Air Force similar to each other but significantly lower than Navy beginning recruits in respect for authority).
- When all graduating recruits were combined by gender, female scores were predicted to be significantly higher in commitment, respect for authority, and group identity than combined male graduating recruits (not always true by individual Service).

Figure 7. Gender Format Predicted Scores – All Constructs





Figure 8. Predicted Male Scores by Gender Format – Commitment



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Figure 9. Predicted Male Scores by Gender Format – Respect for Authority





Figure 10. Predicted Male Scores by Gender Format – Group Identity



Opinion Measurements – Military Leaders and Recruits:

As indicated earlier, it should be noted that military leader “opinions” do not necessarily imply direct experience in all cases. Opinions are more than “impressions” and less than certain “knowledge.” It should also be noted that the sampled leaders differ in experience level for their opinions.


- When leaders were combined by grade, between 86% and 90% of all samples indicated that “the quality of recruit training has a direct effect on operational readiness.” Similar majorities of leaders also agree that “there is a relationship to what recruits learn in basic training and their success in operational units” (Figure 11).

Figure 11. Importance of Recruit Training to Operational Readiness



- Military leaders who responded to the survey indicated the “overall” quality of current entry-level graduates has declined when compared to entry-level graduates 5-years ago (Marine Leaders were less likely to indicate a decline compared to other Services) (Figures 12, 13, 14 and 15). Leaders identified the qualities of discipline, accepting authority, and ability to adjust to military life as having particularly declined in current entry-level graduates of all Services. The same Leaders indicate, however, that entry-level graduates were similar to, or more intelligent than past graduates, and generally as able in military skill proficiency as entry-level graduates five years ago. Marine Leaders indicated, more than the other Services, that acceptance of core values has stayed the same, or improved, over the past 5-years in entry-level graduates.

Figure 12. Army Initial Entry Graduate Evaluation – Overall



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Figure 13. Navy Initial Entry Graduate Evaluation – Overall




Figure 14. Air Force Initial Entry Graduate Evaluation – Overall





Figure 15. Marine Corps Initial Entry Graduate Evaluation – Overall



- When combined, between 83% to 88% of all military leaders who responded to the survey indicated that the primary purpose of basic training is to transform recruits into military group members of cohesive military units.
- Overall, leaders from the Army, Navy, and Air Force had mixed opinions about “which gender format within basic training best facilitates the purpose of basic training.” Marine leaders, however, predominately favored separate training for males and females (Figures 16, 17, 18 and 19).

Figure 16. Army Views on Gender Format





Figure 17. Navy Views on Gender Format



- Army and Marine leaders generally agreed that “mixing males and females causes an unnecessary distraction in recruit training.” Opinions among Navy and Air Force leaders were mixed.
- When asked in another way, leaders predominantly indicated disagreement that “mixing males and females in basic training is a necessary distraction in recruit training.”

APPENDIX E

- Army and Marine leaders indicated that they believed that the “quality of basic training declined” when males and females were present in the same basic training units. Air Force and Navy leaders’ responses were mixed.

Figure 18. Air Force Views on Gender Format





Figure 19. Marine Corps View on Gender Format



Recruit Trainer Opinions:

- Recruit trainers who responded to the survey were not satisfied with the quality of entry-level graduates or with the constraints that are placed on trainers in doing their job (Figure 12, 13, 14, 15).⁴
- 62% of Air Force Recruit Trainers, 54% of Army Recruit Trainers, 67% of Navy Recruit Trainers (including 67% of the female Navy Recruit Trainers indicating the

⁴ Also see Miller, L. and Januscheitis, G. (1999), *Content Analysis of Written Comments Provided on the Recruit Trainer Surveys*, Volume III ‘Research’ pages 372-373 and 375-376.

same), and 84% of Marine Recruit Trainers indicated that “mixing males and females in basic training causes unnecessary distractions in recruit training” (Figures 20 and 21).

Figure 20. Unnecessary Training Distraction – Males




Figure 21. Unnecessary Training Distraction – Females



- Recruit Trainers in the Navy and Air Force were more likely than other leader groups of their Service to indicate men and women should train separately in basic training. Marine leaders (male and female), by overwhelming percentages, supported their current policy of separate basic training for male and female recruits (Figures 17, 18, and 19).
- 48% of Army Recruit Trainers, 55% of Navy Recruit Trainers, 42% of Air Force Recruit Trainers and 75% of Marine Recruit Trainers indicated that the quality of basic training declines when male and female recruits are in the same units.
- Overall, 73% of male Recruit Trainers and 68% of Female Recruit Trainers indicated “that female recruits need female trainers as role models.” Marines had the highest percentage affirming this item with 96% of female and 86% of male Recruit Trainers. Air Force had the lowest percentage affirming this item with 42% of female and 28% of male Recruit Trainers.

Graduating Recruit Opinions:

- Twice as many male graduating recruits, than female recruits, indicated basic training should have been tougher (Figure 22). Male Marine graduating recruits responded more frequently than recruits in other Services that they prefer recruit training be “tougher.” Graduating recruits from the Army and Marines indicated that basic training was “easier than expected,” while recruits from the Navy and Air Force provided more mixed responses.


Figure 22. Recruit Training Toughness



Fraternization and Adultery Opinions:


When asked if there are different fraternization standards for officers and enlisted leaders, officers tended to respond that there were “not different standards,” whereas enlisted leaders tended to indicate “the standards favored officers” (Figure 23).

Figure 23. Differences Between Officer and Enlisted




- When asked if there are different fraternization standards for males and females, female leaders were more likely to say that there were “no differences” or that “they favored males,” whereas male leaders were more likely to indicate they “favored females” (Figures 4-51 to 4-52).
- When asked if there are different adultery standards for officers and enlisted leaders, officers tended to respond that there were “not differences,” whereas enlisted leaders tended to indicate “the standard favors officers”.
- Nearly one half of the leaders surveyed indicated that the standards concerning adultery were no different for males and females.
- A majority of leaders surveyed indicated that adultery rules were applied differently by different commands within their Service.
- Military leaders overwhelmingly indicated they wanted a single DoD policy for all Services governing fraternization (Figure 24).

Figure 24. Single DoD Policy for Fraternization



- Military leaders overwhelmingly indicated they wanted a single DoD policy for all Services governing Adultery (Figure 25).

Figure 25. Single DoD Policy for Adultery



APPENDIX E

Assessments of Measurements

Graduating Recruit Measurements

The Army, Navy and Air Force graduating recruits scored similarly on the three cohesion constructs: commitment, respect for authority, and group identity. Marine Corps graduating recruits scored significantly higher than the other Services on the three cohesion constructs. In addition, female Marine recruits were the highest scoring recruit sample measured in this study for all three cohesion constructs. However, the reader is cautioned about differences in each Service's recruit training programs identified in Chapter 2 of this study's research report.⁵ Besides gender format differences among Services, the length of training, the number and gender of Recruit Trainers assigned to recruits, and overall training objectives and standards are, as a rule, Service-specific. In addition, even though this study was not longitudinal in terms of connecting the attitude scores of beginning and ending recruits, it is often believed that some measure of self-selection occurs when a person first chooses to join one Service over another

Basic Training Gender Format

Recruits who experienced the mixed-gender recruit training formats in the Army, Navy and Air Force scored similarly to male recruits experiencing a single-gender (all male) training format within those same three Services. In addition, no adverse or positive effects were measured in males of mixed-gender training formats versus males of single-gender training formats of the Army, Navy, or Air Force. In those three Services, gender format did not appear to be a factor that helped or hindered male attitude scores.

Male and Female Differences

When all Services were combined by gender, graduating female recruits attitudes on the cohesion constructs were higher than the same attitudes in graduating male recruits. Normative data on gender differences for cohesion constructs, as well as longitudinal data to track changes in recruit attitude over the course of training, are necessary to determine with certainty whether female recruits are indeed gaining more from the recruit training experience than male recruits are.

Meeting Service Expectation.

For all Services, graduating recruit scores on "commitment" met, or exceeded, the level expected by their respective E-6/E-7 Service expectation. However, at the same time, graduating recruits for all Services scored significantly lower than their E-6/E-7 Service expectation in "respect for authority."

⁵ See Johnson (1999), Volume III "Research" page 49.

Military Leader Evaluation

Military leaders who responded to the survey perceived a decline in the overall quality of entry-level recruit training graduates over the past 5 years. Consistent majorities of military leaders indicated that discipline, acceptance of authority, and the ability to adjust to military life have declined in current recruit graduates when compared to graduates 5 years ago. Recruit Trainers particularly stand out in their frustration over the current recruit quality and with the multiple complications of recruit training duty. On the other hand, leaders indicated that military skill development and intelligence of current entry-level recruit training graduates had remained the same, or improved, over the last five years.

Military Leader Consensus

With some exceptions, military leaders within a given Service gave similar views on questions posed to them. However, Recruit Trainers who responded were generally more likely than other leaders to say the quality of training declines when men and women are trained together. These same enlisted trainers were also more likely than other leaders to indicate that mixing men and women in basic training causes an unnecessary distraction in training. Military leader opinions were not always exactly consistent with their respective Service policy on the issue addressed. For example, approximately one-third of Army leaders indicated that basic training should be gender-separate for all, approximately one-third indicated it should be gender-mixed for all, and approximately one-third indicated they favor current Army policy of gender-separate (OSUT) training for combat arms and gender-mixed training for all others. Although inconsistencies existed, there were no inconsistencies in Marine leader views on current policy. The Marine leader samples were consistently and overwhelmingly opposed to gender integration of recruit training.

Cross-Gender Military Policies

Military leaders responding to the survey perceived that military policies governing fraternization and adultery are applied inconsistently between the genders, between grades of officer and enlisted, and across different commands within their Services. These same leaders overwhelmingly indicated the need for a single DoD policy for all Services for fraternization and a single DoD policy for all Services for adultery.

Observations

To “assess,” means to study the condition of the subject under review. In this research, basic training of the four Services was the subject of assessment. The research attempted to determine the condition of basic training by measuring graduating recruit attitudes that were believed integral to military socialization: commitment, respect for authority, and group identity. The data collection also included military leader opinions (E-6/E-7 Enlisted leaders, Recruit Trainers, O-3 Junior Officers, Operational Commanders and their Senior Enlisted

Advisors) concerning the quality of basic training graduates and other gender-related issues. Finally, the written comments of 1,430 currently serving Recruit Trainers were assessed in a content analysis⁶ and the written comments of 2,980 graduating recruits in a theme assessment.⁷

There is evidence in the data to suggest that recruit training can and should be improved and that such improvements are sought by military leaders. Even though “commitment” measurements of graduating recruits were positive in relation to Service expectation, the “respect for authority” measurements of recruits were significantly below what was expected by their Service enlisted leaders. In addition, there is also indication in the differences in attitude measurements by gender, military leader opinion data, and in the Recruit Trainer and graduating recruit written comments, to suggest that recruits may not be challenged in basic training to a level necessary for military socialization to optimally occur. Finally, consistent majorities of military leaders indicated that there has been a decline over the past five years in discipline, acceptance of authority, and ability to adjust to military life in entry-level graduates.

Recommendations

Recruit Training Policy

Military policy should facilitate a positive command climate where leaders (as a result of that policy) are provided a higher probability of succeeding at assigned missions. Policies that create unnecessary obstacles in that environment are inherently counter-productive to mission success. The Services should assess whether, or not, current recruit training policies create the “optimum training environment” for Recruit Trainers to succeed in the mission of transforming civilians into soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines.

Recruit Trainer Success

The Officer Corps is the responsible body for military policy. However, the molding of civilians into soldiers, airmen, sailors, and Marines is uniquely an enlisted expertise and experience. That crucial transformation process is managed and supervised by the very best enlisted leaders of each Service. The Officer Corps should take into full account the professional views of their enlisted leadership, and particularly their respective Recruit Trainers, in developing policies that affect the recruit training process or environment. An argument can be made from the data, to include the assessment of written comments by Recruit Trainers, that trainers would benefit from policies that simplify, not complicate, the recruit training environment.

⁶ Miller and Januscheitis (1999), Volume III “Research” page 367.

⁷ Shrader, L. (1999), *Thematic Assessment of Graduate Recruit Written Comments*, Volume III “Research” page 655.

Mitigate Leader Perceptions

This research indicated a perception among military leaders that rules and regulations governing fraternization and adultery are applied inconsistently. Leaders indicated a strong desire for a single DoD policy for all Services to apply to each of these respective cross-gender areas. Whether a single DoD policy in each area will change leader perceptions of inconsistency is beyond the scope of this assessment. However, the leader perception of inconsistency in the application of cross-gender policies is real and should be dealt with as such until the perceptions are mitigated.

Service-Specific Research

The time constraints in data collection precluded a longitudinal assessment of recruits from their entry to graduation from basic training. A longitudinal design would have been extremely valuable, revealing the “growth” of desired recruit attitudes, skills, and performance over the course of the training cycle. There is every indication from the results of this study that such a Service-specific assessment would provide critical information to decision-makers concerning their recruit training policies, procedures, and priorities. An outline of a longitudinal research design is presented in Appendix L of the study’s research report.⁸ The purpose of Appendix L is to offer an option for review by Service leaders of a research design that may help achieve and evaluate Service-specific goals for their graduating recruits.

⁸ Johnson (1999), Volume III “Research” page 357.

Content Analysis of Written Comments Provided On The Recruit Trainer Surveys

Executive Summary

Laura L. Miller, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Sociology, UCLA
Staff Sergeant Gregory L. Januscheitis, U.S. Army

This supplementary report contains the results of a content analysis of comments written by recruit trainers on questionnaires distributed by the Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues. The Commission research team transcribed these written comments from the surveys into an electronic database. Coding categories were systematically applied to the data using HyperRESEARCH, a computer software package designed for coding and analyzing qualitative data in a quantitative manner. In the full report, the data are presented in tabular form, broken out by Service, then by gender, then by gender and Service. Overall, these qualitative data analysis results appear very similar and/or complementary to the quantitative data results. This consistency was obtained independently: we did not have the survey results when our codes and analyses were developed, so the qualitative codes were in no way “adjusted” to be consistent with the quantitative data.

The full report also includes general summaries of the majority and minority opinions expressed through recruit trainers' statements. These summaries are presented in this executive summary. The raw data in each coding category are provided in the full report, separated out by gender and Service. The length and tone of the raw data provide a sense of the sentiment and emotion behind the comments that cannot be captured in a table or descriptive summary of the written comments.

Summary of Comments on Quality

Comments Linking Quality to Whether Training Is Gender-Integrated or Not

The survey asked recruit trainers to comment on their answers to questions on whether recruit quality has changed in the past five years. At this point in the survey, virtually no one wrote anything about the relationship between gender integration and the quality of basic training or entry-level training graduates. No more than 3 percent of men or women mentioned this topic. Most of the survey content up to this point did not mention gender, and the questionnaire items that trainers were asked to comment on made no mention of gender. The latter part of the survey contained many items about the dynamics of gender in basic training and in the Armed Forces at large. Thus, most people who wrote about gender integration or separation in basic training did so in the additional comment field at the end of the survey.

Positive Comments About Recruits and About Basic Training

Overall, only a minority of recruit trainers made positive assessments of recruit quality (15 percent) or basic training in general (6 percent). The most common positive response was that recruits are smarter or more educated, although very often those statements were qualified with a “but” or “however.” In the following presentation of the raw data, we have included in parentheses many of these “buts” to illustrate how many of the positive comments were paired with more negative assessments overall. Trainers often asserted that negative qualities outweigh or counteract the positive benefits of increased intelligence. Some responses described how “smarter” often translated into recruits too often questioning orders, rules, and decisions; or using their “smarts” to “outsmart” the system. Frequently trainers also distinguished between “book smart,” in which they saw recruits improving in quality, and “common sense,” which they perceived to be increasingly lacking in recent years. Marine men stood out in being most likely to make positive comments about recruits. (So did Air Force women, but the number surveyed and who wrote comments is so small that we hesitate to draw any conclusions from that difference.)

Positive comments about basic training in general make up no more than 11 percent of any subgroup of recruit trainers. Marines in particular, but also a few Army trainers, found the recent emphasis on values training a positive improvement in recruit training. Other, though less frequently mentioned improvements included better equipment and training facilities.

Negative Comments About Recruits and Basic Training

While positive comments about recruits and basic training take up little more than 12 pages in length, negative comments make up more than 75 pages—six times the space of the positive comments. Of all the kinds of comments written about quality, 46 percent included negative comments about the quality of recruits (compared with 15 percent who made positive comments about recruits), and 43 percent included negative comments about the quality of basic training in general (compared to 6 percent who made positive comments about basic in general).

Women drill instructors were less likely than men to have negative comments about the training itself and were more likely to place the negative emphasis on the quality of recruits. While roughly half of Air Force and Army instructors gave a negative evaluation of basic training, only about a third of Marine and Navy instructors had a similar evaluation of their training program.

Negative comments about recruits were wide-ranging. Trainers complained that people accepted in the Service were unfit to begin with, entering with physical problems, for example. New recruits were frequently characterized as lazy, selfish, out of shape, undisciplined, lacking in morals, challenging every order or decision or rule, having no respect for authority, lacking in pride or self-esteem, lacking any attention span or ability to focus on the long term, unwilling to endure hardships or put forth much effort, and unwilling to shift from an individual mentality to a team orientation.

Because we cannot compare these responses to previous generations, we do not know if these negative attitudes toward the youth are a recent trend or consistent pattern. Throughout American history, one can find complaints by older generations that the younger generations are somehow lacking. Rather than speculate on whether these attitudes are new or not, it may be more productive to explore whether these drill sergeants' negative attitudes toward recruits interfere with their job or helps to motivate them in it. On one hand, trainers are charged with transforming ordinary civilians into military personnel who can perform well under the stress and hardships of the combat environment. Thus, they should view entering recruits as needing to undergo a significant transformation. On the other hand, it is possible that negative evaluations of incoming civilians could be excessive and detrimental. Recruit trainers with overly negative impressions of recruits may have trouble forming productive trainer/trainee relationships, or may discourage youth who pick up on their trainers' perceptions that they do not belong in the military.

Another important focus of many of the trainers' comments was the perceived lack of tools for properly shaping civilians for military service. Most commonly, instructors complained that they have few options for training what they see as terribly unfit recruits into ideal military personnel. Although several trainers commented that the harsh discipline of the past might have gone too far, many argued that the pendulum had swung too far in the opposite direction. Trainers expressed anger that they could not fail or expel recruits who did not meet standards; that they could not raise their voices or curse to motivate recruits verbally; and that they had no recourse when recruits “talked back” or refused to do what they were supposed to do. Respondents also argued that boot camp has shifted from a focus on preparing youth for military service, to avoidance of scandals and or hurting the feelings of recruits or impinging upon their rights. Further obstacles to effective training cited include underfunding and understaffing, requirements to teach irrelevant or too much material at once, expectations that they achieve too many changes in too short a period of time, and pressure to push as many people through the training as possible without any regard for quality of the outcome.

Other Quality-Related Comments

Most of the comments that fall into this “other” category fell into two groups. The first includes neutral responses about the change in quality—comments that quality has not changed or general statements that some aspects are better and some are worse. The second group includes complaints that quality instilled during basic training was not upheld in follow-on training, advanced schools, or once new recruits reached their first job assignment. Other miscellaneous quotes related to quality were also included here.

Conclusion

In summary, the majority of recruit trainers who wrote comments on their surveys believe that the quality of recruits has seriously diminished. Even in the one area they tend to agree is an improvement—intelligence—they qualified their answers by describing how this quality can also be problematic because it encourages individualism and constant questioning of military orders or traditions. Because drill instructors tend to view recruits as requiring much more effort to train in recent years, they are particularly dissatisfied with what they see as the

elimination of forms of discipline and training that have been available in the past. Clearly, drill instructors are calling for a reinstatement of some of the prior tools for discipline, and possibly education in new forms of motivation and discipline as well.

Summary of Comments on Fraternization/Adultery

The overwhelming opinion of recruit trainers who wrote comments about fraternization and/or adultery was that these behaviors can wreak havoc and harm unit cohesion, soldier morale, and military readiness. Roughly 10 pages of comments reflect the minority opinion that these behaviors are not a problem; just over 6 pages of comments reflect the even smaller minority opinion that these are only a problem under certain circumstances. In contrast, approximately 36 pages of comments reflect the majority sentiment that fraternization and/or adultery can lead to numerous kinds of problems.

Not a Readiness-Related Problem

A significant minority of recruit trainers (20 percent of men and women) held the belief that fraternization and/or adultery have nothing to do with readiness. The general attitude in this category was that people's personal lives are private and have nothing to do with their work environment. Responses in this category also include those stating that these behaviors rarely occur, and thus are not a problem, or that they happen all the time but do not cause significant problems.

Only a Problem in Certain Contexts/Under Certain Conditions

A second minority view stressed that fraternization and/or adultery should not be of concern to the military unless work performance or the chain of command are affected. These responses emphasized that as long as people are professional, perform their jobs, and keep their personal lives out of the workplace, unit, and chain of command, then fraternization and/or adultery should not be treated as a problem. One might characterize this perspective as a sort of “don't ask, don't tell” policy on these issues. This view was expressed by 13 percent of all respondents, with women generally more likely to make this argument than men.

Can't Stop It From Happening

A few people (2 percent) made comments that rules and regulations will not stop people from engaging in fraternization or adultery. No gender differences were apparent.

A Readiness-Related Problem

Women were more likely than men to argue that fraternization and/or adultery can threaten military readiness (24 percent compared with 14 percent). Comments in this category typically asserted that these behaviors distract people from their jobs or their missions, and thus undermine individual and unit effectiveness.

An Interaction-Related Problem

Sixteen percent of all trainers who wrote comments on fraternization and/or adultery argued that these acts can have a negative impact on morale and/or unit cohesion. Respondents explained how such behavior can create tension in the workplace and lead to mistrust, gossip, conflict, and the general breakdown of the group's ability to work together as a team.

Negative Effect on Command

Ten percent of respondents noted the potential negative effect on the chain of command. Common were statements that fraternization can lead to either real or perceived favoritism; that subordinates lose respect for leaders who fraternize, and thus fraternization makes it difficult for commanders to enforce rules and lead troops.

Additional Problems

Seven percent of respondents argued that fraternization and adultery are problematic behaviors because they violate military policy and because adultery is immoral. Therefore, anyone who ignores the rules displays a lack of character, discipline, and integrity and cannot be trusted.

Six percent of respondents commented that enforcement of these policies is the problem. These trainers said that commanders either look the other way or blow the situation out of proportion. Common were complaints that the rules are enforced differently for officers than for enlisted, or that different commanders have different standards for enforcement.

General statements that fraternization and/or adultery disrupt good order and discipline were made by 3 percent of recruit trainers. Another 3 percent of comments made reference to the negative impact on the family, home life, and relationships with spouses. Four percent of people made references to civilian standards, and in particular, they held up the example of President Clinton.

Summary of Recruit Trainers' Most Commonly Expressed Views

The following statements reflect the most common sentiments expressed by recruit trainers through written comments on the questionnaires:

1. Over the past five years, entering recruits have possessed greater intelligence and education, although that oftentimes has meant they have a harder time adjusting to military culture.
2. Overall, however, recruit quality has declined in the past five years in terms of motivation, work ethic, physical fitness, respect for authority, and willingness to work as a team rather than as an individual.
3. Recruit trainers are not permitted to use the tools they need to properly motivate and discipline new recruits.
4. Basic training has become too focused on producing a large quantity of graduates and not on producing high-quality graduates.
5. Overall, graduating recruits are ill-prepared for the combat environment.
6. Fraternization and adultery within units or the chain of command can be seriously detrimental to unit cohesion, soldier morale, and military readiness.
7. Major problems currently plague gender-integrated training: fraternization, recruit distraction with the opposite sex, harassment or fear of harassment charges, complications in organizing the two genders, and differences in the physical standards for men and women.
8. Given the numerous obstacles recruit trainers face, boot camp would be more effective if recruits were separated by gender until advanced/follow-on training.
9. High-ranking military officers and civilians do not realize what basic training requires, or they are overly concerned with their careers and political correctness, rather than what is best for the troops.
10. Recruit trainers' responses to these surveys will not likely make a difference in military policy or be taken seriously by anyone in a decision-making position.

In sum, recruit trainers reported that the problems with basic training encompass much more than gender. Marines, who separate the genders for basic training, were as likely as respondents from the other Services (who integrate men and women in basic) to register lengthy complaints about the quality of recruits and boot camp in general. Furthermore, the gender-related problems reported often were not limited to the basic training environment. Overall, it appears that managing gender is but one of a whole host of problems facing drill instructors today. Because recruit trainers are not permitted to motivate and discipline recruits in the manner they see fit, they would prefer as few distractions as possible.

Thematic Assessment of Graduate Recruit Written Comments

Executive Summary

Lawrence J. Shrader, Staff Researcher

Background

The Basic Training Survey was administered on-site at all 10 entry-level basic training sites among the four Armed Services between the dates of 4 November 1998 and 10 December 1998. There were 3,978 beginning recruits and 4,983 graduating recruits who took the survey. Of those graduating recruits, 59.8 percent (2,980 recruits) offered open-ended comments on the last page of the survey where item # 89 stated:

“Please give any comments you have on your basic training experience.”

The purpose of the theme search assessment was to identify major themes in those comments concerning two areas of interest to the Commission: *basic military training* and *gender-related issues*. In order to quantify the qualitative open-ended responses on the surveys, all comments were first transcribed into an electronic database for analysis. Then, comments reflecting themes relevant to the two areas of interest, which were selected based on the quantitative analysis of the Basic Training Survey, were identified through a word search on that database. An independent coding verification was conducted on a subset of the data to ensure that the selected comments reflected the appropriate themes.

Three predominant themes were identified in the area of basic military training: discipline, separated into positive and negative comments; difficulty of overall basic training; and difficulty of physical training. The difficulty of overall basic training and physical training were each divided into two categories: any comment which expressed that the training was “easy” “too easy,” “easier than expected”; and any comment which expressed that the training was “hard,” “too hard,” “harder than expected.” Under gender-related issues, the comments were organized as either as positive or negative toward gender-integrated training; or as other general comments about gender-related issues that did not specifically mention gender-integrated or gender-segregated basic training.

The results of the assessment were tabulated as a percentage of recruits in each Service by gender who made any comments about a particular basic military training or gender-related theme. A graphical presentation of the results is provided as Attachment 1. The percentages on the graphs represent the number of recruits organized by gender and Service who made comments about a particular theme out of all those recruits of the same gender and Service who made any comments. For example, 11.8 percent of Army men made either positive or negative comments about discipline, and 88.2 percent made no comment, either positive or negative, about discipline.

Summary of Recruit Comment Rates

The following summarizes findings on the selected themes from graduating recruits who wrote comments. The figures below provide a graphical representation the data.

Basic Military Training

Discipline

Positive Comments: Air Force men and women and Marine men had the highest frequency of positive comments about discipline. This category indicated the satisfaction that basic training had provided the recruit with discipline and self-control. Marine men (9.6 percent) commented on this theme more than all other recruits. Both Air Force men and women commented on this theme in the 7 percent range, followed by 5.4 percent of Marine women. Army and Navy recruit comments occurred less than 4 percent of the time.

Negative Comments: Negative comments indicated a recruit's dissatisfaction with the quality of discipline in basic training. Army and Marine men had more negative perceptions of discipline (above 8 percent) than all other recruits, followed by Army women at 5.8 percent and Navy men at 4.3 percent. Less than 3 percent of all other recruits, Air Force recruits of both genders and Navy and Marine women, commented on this theme.

Overall Experience

Basic training was easy, easier than expected, or too easy: Almost 25 percent of Marine men offering comments said that the overall training experience was easy, easier than expected, or too easy. Men in the Army and Navy mentioned this about 10 percent of the time. Air Force men commented at 2.6 percent. Of the women recruits, Army women had the highest rate at 12.2 percent, followed by Marine women at 11.7 percent. Air Force and Navy women commented on this theme less than 5 percent of the time.

Basic training was hard, harder than expected, or too hard: Nine and one-half percent of Marine women offering comments tended to feel that basic training was hard, too hard, or harder than expected, more than all other recruits. Navy women and Marine men were around 6 percent. About 3 percent or fewer of all other recruits commented on this theme.

Physical Training

PT was easy, easier than expected, or too easy: From 15 percent to 18 percent of both men and women Marines who wrote comments found physical training easy, easier than expected, or too easy. This was higher than recruits in other Services, whose comments on this theme occurred at 5 percent or less.

PT was hard, harder than expected, or too hard: Very few recruits across Services and gender commented on this theme. The highest percentage was found for Air Force women at 2.4 percent, followed by all other recruits at 1 percent or less.


Gender-Related Issues

Positive Comments: Except for Navy women (10.9 percent), recruits from other Services commented at 3 percent or less on this theme.


Negative Comments: Marine recruits, both men and women, had the highest negative comment rate about gender-integrated training at about 5 percent. Navy women had no negative comments on this theme.

General Comments: General comments reflected gender-related issues other than gender integration. Air Force women (9.2 percent) and Army women (6.4 percent), along with Navy men (6.4 percent) and women (7.8 percent), were more likely to comment about these general points. All other recruits commented less than 3.5 percent within their respective Serviced and gender categories on this theme. Overall, a smaller percentage of Marine recruits, both men and women, commented about gender-related issues than recruits in other Services.


Comment Frequency - Expressed as Percent of Recruits in Each Service Who Wrote Comments



Comment Frequency - Expressed as Percent of Recruits in Each Service Who Wrote Comments




Comment Frequency - Expressed as Percent of Recruits in Each Service Who Wrote Comments



APPENDIX E

Comment Frequency - Expressed as Percent of Recruits in Each Service Who Wrote Comments



Retrospective Survey of Socialization, Values, and Performance in Relation to Recruit Training

Executive Summary

Peter F. Ramsberger, Ph.D.
Janice H. Laurence, Ph.D.
D.E. (Sunny) Sipes, Ph.D.

Background

The Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues was authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Subtitle F of Public Law 105-85). Among the responsibilities of the Commission was to examine the effectiveness of military basic training formats to include degree of gender integration. Toward this end, quantitative and qualitative research studies were designed and executed.

Other research performed for the Commission examined recruit attitudes towards and perceived impact of gender-integrated training (GIT) in the timeframe immediately surrounding recruit training. The goal of this study was to shed light on the longer view. Are there differences between those who undergo gender-integrated and gender-segregated recruit training in terms of their socialization, values, and attitudes towards the military and their careers? If so, what form do they take? When do they appear and how long do they last? What other factors such as individual differences, other characteristics of recruit training, and subsequent military experience are related to such perceptual and attitudinal variations?

Methodology

General Considerations

A survey of enlisted personnel from each of the Services was considered to be the most efficient and appropriate method to obtain the needed data. The sample was restricted to those with eight years or less of service. This period encompasses two typical terms of service, and therefore would be the timeframe when any impact of gender-integrated training would likely surface.

Survey Development

A variety of relevant existing surveys were reviewed and items selected as candidates for inclusion in this instrument. In addition, the survey of those in basic training, also being conducted for the Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues, was reviewed both for items that would be pertinent to the retrospective survey and for items where there might be interest in comparing the two populations (e.g., recent enlistees, longer-term incumbents). The final instrument includes 42 separate questions, with a minimum of 124 responses.

Sampling and Distribution

Four respondent characteristics were deemed to be particularly relevant for the purposes of this study: Service, gender, tenure, and military occupation group (combat, combat support, combat service support). The goal was to obtain sample sizes of approximately 3,600, equally distributed across strata.

In-person administration of the survey was deemed necessary given the short time frames available. This was not possible in the Air Force because the dispersion of personnel did not allow for sufficiently large groups to be assembled. Thus, a mail survey was conducted for this Service.

Results

Response Rate. The survey response rates were as follows:

<u>Service</u>	<u>Number Sent</u>	<u>Number Returned</u>	<u>Response Rate</u>
Army	4,700	3,503	74%
Navy	4,200	2,527	60%
Marine Corps	3,000	2,105	70%
Air Force	7,000	2,307	33%

Sample Characteristics. The gender make-up of the sample varied widely by Service. The percentage of males was as follows: Army 69%; Navy 73%; Marine Corps 77%; Air Force 42%. The vast majority of respondents had at least a high school diploma, and two-thirds or greater were in pay grades E3-E4.

Basic Training. Just about half of respondents reported that they attended integrated basic training, except in the Marine Corps which does not have units of this type. Among those in integrated units, the highest degree of interaction with members of the other gender during training was reported by Army personnel, followed by Navy and Air Force. The vast majority of respondents indicated that their basic training instructors were mostly or all men.

Respondents were asked several questions about their basic training experience. The vast majority agreed that it left them well prepared for advanced training, except in the Navy where about one-third each said they were well, moderately well, and not well prepared. Similar results were found when respondents were asked for how well basic prepared them for their first assignment, although the percentages saying “well prepared” were not as high. This is to be expected given that advanced training is necessary for on-the-job performance in most military occupations. A majority in each Service felt that basic training prepared them well for serving in gender-integrated units.

Two-thirds of Marine Corps respondents indicated that segregated basic training provides the best mix. This number was much smaller in the Army (31%), Navy (20%), and Air Force (19%). Similarly, whereas nearly 60% of Marines said that integrated basic results

in a decline in training quality, the corresponding figure in the Army (42%), Navy (35%), and Air Force (21%) was considerably lower.

Again, with the exception of the Marine Corps, the majority of respondents either agreed or were neutral when it came to statements such as: integrated training has a positive effect on individual/group performance and reduces the likelihood of problems such as fraternization.

Detailed Analyses. Multivariate analyses were conducted to assess the relationships between the outcome variables (e.g., evaluation of basic training, current readiness and morale, performance indicators) and predictors (e.g., type of basic training attended, instructor mix, tenure). These analyses offer the ability to control for the impact of all other variables while assessing such relationships. Thus, we can examine the impact of attending integrated training on evaluation of that training while accounting for other variables such as respondent gender and years in service.

These results showed that length of service accounted for more variation in response than any other factor. Tenure was associated with a wide range of outcomes including career intent, readiness, and morale. More years of service was positively associated with knowledge and understanding of fraternization, adultery, and harassment policies and regulations. Those with longer tenure were also found to be less likely to feel that such policies are applied differentially by gender or rank.

The extent to which individuals worked with members of the other gender during training was found to be positively related to a number of basic training outcomes and attitudes, including being better prepared for AIT and first assignment (Navy, Air Force) and feeling that integrated basic has an overall positive impact on basic training (all Services).

Perhaps most significant was the general lack of relationships between gender-related basic training experiences/attitudes and subsequent outcomes. This suggests that this factor plays a relatively minor role in determining training success and future in-service results.

Focus Group Research

Executive Summary

Janice H. Laurence, Ph.D.
Mareena M. Wright, Ph.D.
Carol S. Keys, Ph.D.
Pamela A. Giambo

Focused interviews were conducted on behalf of the Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues as one means to assess issues relevant to its mandated areas of inquiry (i.e., cross-gender relationships, gender-integrated basic training; and basic training in general). Focus groups were conducted with enlisted personnel from the four Services at three career levels: basic training, technical/job training, and operational units.

These focus groups were intended to provide a more in-depth understanding of issues related to training effectiveness overall and gender interactions. A structured, standardized protocol was developed covering multiple topics including:

- Performance,
- Equitable standards and treatment,
- Superior/subordinate relationships,
- Social interactions and their effect on performance,
- Clarity and effectiveness of military regulations regarding gender interactions, and
- Viewpoints on gender in the military.

Methodology

A *Systematic Qualitative Research* approach was followed in conducting the focus groups. The goal of the participant and site selection plans was to conduct focus groups that were representative of the range of unit gender integration in the four Services and the core military occupational specialties. The groups were organized around two levels of unit gender integration (none-to-low/moderate-to-high) with random selection of the participants from the core military occupational specialties that fell within the specified gender-integration levels. In collaboration with members of the Commission, the research team developed a protocol that addressed the key issues in an appropriate way for all subgroups

Members of the research team traveled to 10 military bases over a 6-week period from December 1998 through January 1999 to conduct the 42 focus groups. For each focus group, two staff members were present, a facilitator and a note taker. In addition, all sessions were tape recorded. The facilitators were always the same sex as group participants. All note takers were female. Transcripts from the focus groups were summarized and content analyzed. The report summarized major themes of the focus groups and presented them with representative quotes.

Findings

Despite the transparency of the Commission's focus, gender was not the only, or necessarily the first, concern of those who participated in our discussions. Women were more likely than men to mention women in the military as a salient issue early on, yet in some groups, gender did not surface as an issue until the discussion was formally led in that direction.

Teamwork, the quality of instructors, field exercises, and personnel shortages together with high OPTEMPO were key factors perceived to influence individual and unit readiness. Positive social interaction generally increases team cohesion and trust. A major barrier to performance is the presence of individuals who dodge their duties or otherwise avoid making a sufficient contribution to the team effort. In addition to such active work avoidance behaviors, physical injuries (sustained mostly in training) and pregnancy are seen as more benign or passive detractors from performance.

Superiors have a profound impact on service members' attitudes, motivation, and behaviors. They serve as mentors and role models, aiding individual and unit performance and adjustment.

The above issues and concerns were echoed by both men and women; however, barriers to performance may be heightened for women. The focus group sessions provided many examples in which women, simply because they were female, were presumed incompetent until they proved themselves competent. This was not the case for men. The limited and constrained interactions between men and women likely contribute to such stereotypes and misperceptions. Such attitudes, in many cases, were not based upon concrete behavioral observations but were vague and emotional in nature. Many men also noted that the women they actually knew were indeed proficient.

Formal and informal policies regulating gender make social interactions, important for teamwork and performance, more difficult for women. Men are warned to avoid female peers, and instructors and supervisors are prohibited from counseling women one-on-one, to avoid accusations of impropriety. Such strict rules for male-female interactions may impede information flow, teamwork, and trust. On the positive side of gender interactions, some men and women reported that women often served as peer counselors, aiding the adjustment to military life.

Women reported feeling isolated, highly visible, cut out of core assignments, shunted to clerical duties, and devalued. These psychological affronts to self-confidence and cohesion can be expected to take their toll on performance.

Misperceptions regarding equitable standards and treatment surfaced from discussions with enlisted members. Differences in physical fitness requirements were noted. Women reported being motivated by competition with men. Although some men expressed resentment about perceived “easier” physical standards for women, many of them discussed the complexity of physiological differences and gender norms and recognized that “different” regimens could yield equivalent fitness levels.

Men perceived that women made sex-related complaints too easily. They also believe that in cases of alleged sexual discrimination or harassment, the chain of command tends to “side” with the woman’s version of events. With regard to this perception, it is important to consider that women are more likely than men to feel threatened in an inappropriate sexual situation. Further, they are instructed by their supervisors to report even minor incidents the first time they occur, or suffer the consequences.

Although most participants stated that they understood the rules regarding fraternization and adultery, their discussions revealed they did not. For example fraternization was used synonymously with harassment. Some military members recognized the role of rank in fraternization policy, but most often, fraternization discussions centered on inappropriate *gender* interactions. Military members expressed dissatisfaction with sexual harassment/diversity training in lecture format; some indicated that a discussion format would be more effective.

Based on what people said about their perceptions of favoritism, confusion abounds about differential treatment based on individual differences versus gender. That is, service members may have confused an instance of “teacher’s pet” with gender favoritism. Also, the privileges and responsibilities associated with rank may be misinterpreted as differential treatment of men and women. Given that supervisors (including peers in roles of authority) are more likely to be men, the privileges and responsibilities resulting from their roles may be attributed erroneously to their gender.

The focus group findings suggest the need for targeted training, designed to model appropriate behavior and foster positive gender interactions. Current sole reliance on lecture and punishment is contraindicated. Punishment tends to lead to avoidance of the offending behavior *and* of the target of the behavior—women. Ideally, training effectiveness would be enhanced by an interactive format to include modeling by those in authority as well as discussions *between* men and women and instructors and students. Together with exposure and experience working with members of the opposite sex, appropriate training should promote cohesion and teamwork.

In addition to working together as respected peers, another critical ingredient in promoting cohesion between and within gender groups is congruent communication. That is, inadvertent signals that denigrate women, especially by those in positions of authority, can undermine progress.

It is important to note that in all Services, positive comments regarding gender-integration were made loudly and clearly by both men and women. Further, focus group

participants noted significant improvements over time. Beyond the issue of gender-integration, an appropriate focus would be on personnel challenges—on specific actionable factors and issues that detract from training effectiveness rather than on broad demographic characteristics. The findings from these focus groups can inform the establishment of more positive gender interactions and hence teamwork, organizational commitment, and effectiveness.

Performance Data Modeling

Executive Summary

D. E. (Sunny) Sipes, Ph.D.

Janice H. Laurence, Ph.D.

Among the methods employed by the research staff of the Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues was modeling of archived performance data. This methodology was used in conjunction with other research tools to provide information to the Commission relevant to its governing statute, which covers cross-gender relationships, gender-integrated basic training, and basic training in general.

More specifically, personnel and attrition data were obtained from files maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). DMDC data for cohorts who enlisted from Fiscal Year 1991 through 1996 were examined. The modeling effort addressed the question of whether basic training format affects subsequent military performance. Of primary concern is whether attrition rates differ based on whether or not military personnel participated in a gender-integrated training environment. Analyses were conducted separately by Service and by cohort year and took into consideration gender, various other demographics (e.g., aptitude and education levels, race/ethnicity), and, when available, the incumbent's job category.

Following are the major findings for each branch of Service.

Army

Gender-integrated training was fully implemented in Fiscal Year 1995. The impact of gender-integrated training was assessed by comparing attrition rates in 1991 to 1994 to the rates in subsequent years. The earlier years represent gender-segregated training; the latter years reflect gender-integrated training in noncombat military occupational specialties. The attrition rates for the 1995 cohort were comparable, indeed slightly lower than, the attrition rates for previous years. The 36-month attrition rate in 1996 could not be adequately assessed because the data files were generated before a full 36 months had elapsed for the 1996 cohort. Therefore, 12-month attrition rates were calculated for 1991 through 1996. This analysis revealed that overall, 12-month attrition rates have been relatively stable over time. After an increase from 15.6 percent in 1992 to 17.5 percent in 1993, the rates have been very consistent. The 1995 and 1996 cohorts, which both experienced gender-integrated basic training, had 12-month attrition rates of 16.8 percent and 17.6 percent, respectively. These rates are negligibly lower than the 1994 rate of 17.7 percent. These results show absolutely no impact of gender-integrated training on attrition rates, and they are untainted by the 1996 data issue raised above.

Attrition rates for Army women were consistently 10 to 15 percentage points higher than the rates for Army men in the same cohort.

Navy

Training format could only be compared directly in 1994, when both gender-segregated and gender-integrated training were used. The analysis revealed that sailors who had undergone training after the introduction of gender integration were significantly less likely to succumb to attrition than sailors who had been trained in a gender-segregated format. In addition to this comparison, it is noteworthy that overall 36-month attrition steadily increased from 1991 to 1995, from 27 percent to 35 percent. This trend was unaffected by the introduction of gender-integrated training.

Attrition rates for Navy women were initially higher than the attrition rates for Navy men (5 percentage points in 1991 and 1992, 3 percentage points in 1993). In 1994 and 1995, however, the rates were identical.

Air Force

The effect of training format could not be assessed for the Air Force because gender-integrated training was implemented throughout the study period. However, it could be determined that attrition rates for Air Force women were higher than the rates for Air Force men in the same cohort; this gap decreased from 12 percentage points to 5 percentage points over the years 1991 to 1995.

Marine Corps

The effect of training format could not be assessed for the Marine Corps because all training was gender segregated. Attrition rates for Marine women were consistently higher than the rates for the Marine men in the same cohort; this gap ranged from 11 to 20 percentage points.

This report provides the details of these analyses. A set of recommendations for additional data capture is provided; these data would facilitate more precise analyses in future studies.

*Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS):
A Review of Selected Results*

Executive Summary

Janice H. Laurence, Ph.D.
Eric S. Wetzel

Among the methods employed by the research staff of the Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues was examination of existing data. Such data were used in conjunction with other research tools to provide information to the Commission relevant to its governing statute, which covers cross-gender relationships, gender-integrated basic training, and basic training in general.

More specifically, data were drawn from Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS) conducted annually by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). Topic areas drawn from the YATS and reported here include: propensity, gender-integrated training, sexual harassment and equal opportunity, boot camp and physical challenge of Service, reason for (or not) joining the military, and finally a look at propensity as a function of perceptions of equal opportunity and gender-integrated training.

The primary purpose of YATS is to gauge the propensity of American youth toward service in the Armed Forces. The results examined here repeat previously noted findings that men, individuals who score in the bottom half of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score distribution, younger individuals, minorities, and individuals with less education are all more likely to exhibit positive propensity to serve.

When asked about gender-integrated training, the overwhelming majority of individuals (83 percent of men and 77 percent of women) indicated that the gender integration of basic training would have no effect on their decision to enlist. The majority of respondents (76 percent of men and 64 percent of women) also indicated that training format (integrated or not) made no difference to them. Women were more likely than men to voice a preference for separate training (24 percent of women and 8 percent of men). In terms of the quality of training, practically all respondents (88 percent of men and 91 percent of women) felt gender integration of training would either make no difference or that it would improve training.

Respondents were also asked about perceived differences in sexual harassment and equal opportunity in the military and civilian sectors. Most respondents felt the likelihood of the prevention of sexual harassment was equal in the military and civilian sectors (66 percent of men and 74 percent of women). As far as equal opportunities for women and men, respondents felt this was most likely in the Navy and Air Force and somewhat less likely in the Army or Marine Corps.

In another relevant section of YATS, respondents were asked about their perceptions of the “toughness” of boot camp and desire for physical challenge. In general, women (40 percent) were more likely than men to agree with the statement, “Military boot camp is too

tough,” but one out of every four male respondents also agreed with this statement. Men tended to be more likely than women to indicate that a physical challenge is important to them (56 percent of men and 44 percent of women). Similar proportions of men (53 percent) and women (57 percent) felt that they were likely to be physically challenged in the military. By Service, respondents indicated that a physical challenge was most likely in the Marine Corps.

Men and women tended to give very similar responses when asked for reasons why they would or would not join the military. The rank ordering of the top five reasons for joining the military were the same for men and women. The reasons, in order, were: money for education, job training, duty to country, pay, and travel. In terms of reasons for not joining, men and women rated the same reasons as the top five, although in a slightly different order. These reasons included: military lifestyle, family obligations, commitment is too long, other interests, and threat to life.

This report also assessed relationships between propensity and both equal opportunity and gender-integrated training. For men, propensity and equal opportunity importance ratings were not statistically related. Regardless of propensity group, about 75 percent of men responded that equal opportunity for women was important. Although equal opportunity was also important to both negative and positive propensity women, women in the former category were more likely to rate equal opportunity as important than women who expressed positive enlistment propensity. Regardless of propensity, both men and women were much more likely to say that they believe men and women should either be allowed or required to train together.

***Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (MEOCS):
Overview of Results Related to the Congressional Commission on Military
Training and Gender-Related Issues***

Executive Summary

Mickey Dansby, Ph.D.

With input from Janice H. Laurence, Ph.D. and Eric S. Wetzel

Among the methods employed by the research staff of the Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues was examination of existing data. Such data were used in conjunction with other research tools to provide information to the Commission relevant to its governing statute, which covers cross-gender relationships, gender-integrated basic training, and basic training in general.

For this report, data were drawn from the operational Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (MEOCS), conducted upon unit command request by the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute. Among other topics, these data address cross-gender relationships. Commission staff requested MEOCS data on perceptions of equal opportunity and organizational effectiveness over time by Service, gender, and unit gender integration level. These constructs are correlated: more positive equal opportunity behaviors are associated with higher job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and perceived work group effectiveness.

MEOCS data indicate that, for the most part, over time assessments of equal opportunity moved in a more positive direction, suggesting less sexual harassment and sexist behaviors. With regard to organizational effectiveness, ratings were relatively consistent except for noted declines between 1991 and 1992 and between 1997 and 1998, periods coinciding with the drawdown and increased operating tempo.

Equal opportunity assessments made by women were somewhat less favorable than those made by men. Marine Corps women had the lowest such ratings of all the Services. Men and women had similar ratings with regard to organizational effectiveness. Finally, units that had lower levels of gender integration were less positive with regard to organizational effectiveness, satisfaction, and commitment.

*Executive, Legislative, and Policy Chronology
Regarding Women in the Military*

Executive Summary

Kristina Handy and Pamela Saunders, Staff Researchers

The report is divided into two sections. The first section is a policy chronology of women in the U.S. military. The chronology begins just after World War II with the Army-Navy Nurse Act, which established a permanent Nurse Corps in the Army and Navy in 1947. It concludes with 1997 and the deployment of 5,000 servicewomen to Bosnia. The chronology covers a range of events that have had direct and significant impact on women's levels of participation in the military. Such a chronology was compiled to provide broad but relevant contextual information about the change in gender-integrated and gender-segregated training policies over time.

The second part of the report is a more specific review of the available information about the rationale for policy changes from gender segregation to gender integration for each military Service. Each military Service approaches the training of its recruits differently, and each Service has different historical patterns in the level of gender integration/gender segregation of its basic training. The historical rationale for these different patterns and for the changes in training policies across the four Services is unclear. During the periods where policy changes were announced and implemented, official and even public statements are difficult to document.

The Army and the Air Force were the first two Services to gender-integrate their basic training in 1978, but the Army, Air Force, and Navy began standardizing their basic training curricula for male and female recruits earlier. Prior to this, training standards for men and women were different. Technically, the Marine Corps did not standardize its training for men and women until 1996. So, while the Marine Corps' basic training is gender segregated, the training that male and female recruits receive is the same. Although the Army reverted back to gender-segregated training in 1982, it changed back again to gender-integrated training in 1994. The Navy decided to gender-integrate its boot camp in 1992.

Literature Reviews and Annotated Bibliographies

Executive Summary

Kristina Handy, Staff Researcher

The bibliography was originally conceived to inventory and document the range and magnitude of knowledge available on the subject of gender integration in the U.S. military. As this issue is embedded in the broader topics of women in the military, military training, nonmilitary gender integration (e.g., law enforcement, policing, etc.), and gender-integration experiences of militaries outside of the United States, the literature review's scope is comprehensive to include these broader subjects. One of the objectives of the literature review is to inform the research staff and Commissioners of the existing body of literature relevant to gender-integrated training.

The bibliography is divided into six sections as listed below:

1. Gender-Integrated Basic Training and Related Studies. This section includes a detailed annotation of studies that are specifically relevant to gender-integrated basic training. The annotation includes the following components:
 - Summary
 - Quantitative review
 - Characteristics of the sample
 - General research design
 - Findings
 - Questions for further research/recommendations or utilization of findings
 - A brief summary of the strengths and weaknesses of the research

2. Women in the Military. The bibliography is broken down by the following subsections:
 - General or Current Status
 - Integration into the Service Academies, ROTC, OCS
 - Combat Exclusion
 - Historical Patterns and Cycles
 - Consequences for Women's Participation in the Military
 - AVF/Conscription/Citizenship
 - Women's Health/ Adjustment
 - Public Opinion and Women in the Military
 - Miscellaneous

3. Military Training. This section includes a literature search of documents and studies pertaining to the issue of military training dating back to 1988.
4. General Accounting Office (GAO) Reports. This section is a list of all GAO reports that are relevant to the issue of women in the military and military training.
5. Women's Integration in Nontraditional Work Sectors. This section includes a report as well as a literature search on women in the U.S. Coast Guard, women in fire fighting, and women in law enforcement.
6. Women in Militaries Outside of the U.S. This section includes a report as well as a literature search on women's integration into militaries outside of the United States. The main focus is on Western industrialized nations.

Gender Integration of Militaries Outside of the United States

Kristina Handy, Staff Researcher

“(562(b)(2) (M) Compare the experiences, policies, and practices of the armed forces of other industrialized nations regarding gender-integrated training with those of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.”

Scholarly research shows that the participation of women in the military of a nation is affected by aspects of the military of that nation, as well as by social and cultural factors.¹ The United States military is unique. No other military is comparable in size and deployment. In addition, the United States’ international strategic purpose and vision are unique. These facts have direct impact on the role and mission of its military services. Finally, the U.S. military is studied more comprehensively than any other military (either internally within the military itself or by the civilian academe). As such, it is also unique with respect to the integration of women as well as the training of its soldiers.

Although the gender-integration experiences of other militaries can certainly inform the U.S. military, such information may be limited because of historical and cultural differences. Nevertheless, to comply with the congressional statute this Commission has gathered data on the integration of women into militaries cross-nationally. Specifically, it brought individuals knowledgeable about the Israeli and Dutch cases to testify. Their testimonies are recorded in full but the most relevant information is summarized here. Other cases were included because of their various levels of gender integration.

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<sup>1</sup> Segal, Mady W., “Women’s Military Roles Cross-Nationally: Past, Present, and Future,” *Gender & Society*, Vol. 9, No. 9, No. 6 (December 1995), pp. 757–75.

## *Australia*

On 10 January 1999, Chief of the Australian Defense Force (ADF) Admiral Chris proposed a plan to allow women to join combat units.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps the most controversial feature of the ADF's move is to allow women to apply to serve in the special forces if, in full combat uniform, they can run 2 miles in 16 minutes, carrying a rifle and a 66-pound backpack.<sup>3</sup> In addition, women may also be able to join the Special Air Service Regiment, Australia's most elite combat unit.

In a recent presentation to The Australian Defense Force Academy, the Minister for Veteran's Affairs summarized the status of women in combat roles in the ADF:

“Gender should not be an issue in deciding if **an individual can do** a job. However, gender should be a consideration when making judgements about how units and organisations can operate effectively as social and work groups.

Put at its simplest and least subtle, when we talk about integrating women into more roles in the ADF, we need to consider whether or not adequate social and psychological support will be available for the individual women involved to perform to their potential.

This may mean that we need a “critical mass” of women in given specialisations or units to consider opening up some areas to women.”<sup>4</sup>

At present, some 13 percent of the Defence Force are women. The ADF has initiatives in place to increase the numbers of women who join the Service.

## *Canada*

Comparatively, Canada has one of the most advanced policies regarding women and the military. Women constitute approximately 11 percent of all Canadian military forces.<sup>5</sup> For nearly a decade, women have made up slightly less than 2 percent of the combat arms. Canada carried out extensive experimentation and careful analysis of results before making these policy decisions. Canada's Defence Minister, Art Eggleton, stated in an August 1998 *Vancouver Sun* article that “women have just as much at stake as men in defending the society that affords us the equality we value so highly.”

Gender integration is a matter of policy in the Canadian Force (CF). As the Canadian Defence Department's May 1997 *Defense 2000 News* reports, “Gender integration covers a

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<sup>2</sup> Ham, Paul, “Australia puts women in the front line,” *London Times*, January 10, 1999.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Scott, Bruce, The Hon., MP Minister for Veterans' Affairs and Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence, *Australian Women and Defence: A Century of Service*, presented at “Women in Uniform: Pathways and Perceptions, Australian Defence Force Academy, May 1999.

<sup>5</sup> “Wartime women: Canadian military struggling to attain equality in combat,” *Calgary Herald*, June 21, 1998.

variety of activities to rid the Canadian Forces of practices that restrict the employment of women. The aim of gender integration is to adapt the CF so that women can serve in equitable fashion rather than forcing them to ‘fit’ into a male organization.”

Basic training in Canada is conducted at Canadian Forces Base Garrison Saint-Jean, which Commissioner Segal visited on 29 July 1998 as part of a field trip arranged for members of the Research Committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution of the International Sociological Association.

Basic training is 10 weeks long. A group of instructors stays with a platoon for the entire 10 weeks. As in the United States, the days are long, with reveille at 0530 and lights out at 2300. Men’s heads are shaved (1/8 inch is the shortest it can be); women must have their hair above their collars (a few have had their hair shaved or very, very short). Instruction includes physical training, military instruction, drill, first aid, weapons training, training on living in the field, and ethics training (which includes sexual harassment awareness).

The socialization to values of service is emphasized, as in the United States. Also as in the United States, signs with the list of values are omnipresent. The core values are presented in a written document, in English and French, entitled “Statement of Defence Ethics,” as follows: “As members of the Canadian Forces, liable to the ultimate sacrifice, and as employees of the Department of National Defence having special obligations to Canada, we are dedicated to our duty and committed to: Respect the Dignity of All Persons; Serve Canada before Self; Obey and Support lawful Authority. Guided by these fundamental principles, we act in accordance with the following ethical obligations:

Loyalty: We dedicate ourselves to Canada. We are loyal to our superiors and faithful to our subordinates and colleagues.

Honesty: We honour the trust placed upon us. We value truth and candour, and act with integrity at all times.

Courage: We face challenges, whether physical or moral, with determination and strength of character.

Diligence: We undertake all tasks with dedication and perseverance. We recognize our duty to perform with competence and to strive for excellence.

Fairness: We are equitable in our dealings with others. We are just in our decisions and actions.

Responsibility: We accept our responsibilities and the consequences of our actions.

All Canadian Forces basic training is gender-integrated, with men and women in the same platoon. Men and women are housed in separate sections on the same floor of the barracks. Recruits are housed in groups of 30. Barracks areas provide more privacy than in

the United States; each recruit has his/her own space within the barracks section (with partial partitions separating them from the next recruit's area). If a male trainer enters the women's bay, he announces himself first. The top noncommissioned officer at the recruit school has strongly suggested that men go in pairs at night to prevent being charged with misconduct. There are no regulations regarding behavior between male and female trainees except that no sexual behavior is allowed. Note passing in class is considered a lack of discipline and may be punished. Recruits may speak to each other at meals and during personal time. Weekends are considered personal time and behavior is not controlled unless it brings discredit to the Canadian Forces. After 7 weeks in training, the recruits spend 2 weeks in the field, where the tents are interspersed male and female; usually they sleep in 1-person parkas, but when it is cold they are in 8-person tents, which are gender-integrated. Briefers said that when problems occur between men and women, they are mostly with the training cadre, not from other recruits.

### ***Denmark***

In February of 1998, to increase the number of women in the military, the Danish parliament adopted a law allowing women to serve in the military for a shorter period of time. Before the adoption of the law, women could join only if they made the military their career.<sup>6</sup> There is a mandatory 1-year conscription for men. Starting in 1988, the Danish military allowed women to train for combat and join fighting units. Starting in 1981, women were allowed to serve in the Navy (but it was not until 1998 that women were allowed on submarines). Women have served in the Army and Air Force since 1984. In 1981 the Navy ran a 4-year experiment using mixed sea trials to measure women's performance. Some problems were reported: There were 5 pregnancies and 2 marriages at sea and women exhibited a lack of physical strength to do heavy lifting. They also tended to show nervousness during gunnery exercises. Nevertheless, the overall conclusion was that gender-integrated sea crews outperformed all-male units in some basic ways. For example, the Navy stated that female sailors tended to be more highly motivated and that their professional abilities tended to equal or even surpass the professional abilities of corresponding male sailors.<sup>7</sup> During the Gulf crisis in 1990, Denmark sent a warship with women crew members to enforce a United Nations trade blockade against Iraq.<sup>8</sup> The Danish uniformed military is approximately 20,000 people. Though its goal is to have a military including about 10 percent women, as of February 1998 only about 800 women served.<sup>9</sup>

### ***Israel***

Israel is one of the few nations in the world that conscripts women for service. Because of this and the women-in-combat images that were common during the Israeli War of Independence, many still believe that women now serve as front-line troops. But the first and last time women fought in combat was during the 1948 War of Independence. Since then, women have served in combat units but are barred from front-line positions. They have

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<sup>6</sup> "Denmark offers short-term military service for women," *The Associated Press*, February 19, 1998.

<sup>7</sup> Moseley, Ray, "Danes push female combat role," *Chicago Tribune*, May 20, 1988.

<sup>8</sup> "Women in the military, a world view," *The Associated Press*, April 29, 1993.

<sup>9</sup> "Denmark offers short-term military service for women," *The Associated Press*, February 19, 1998.

mainly support and training roles. Women in the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) are now allowed to fly combat aircraft.

According to the Director of Special Projects of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, “The myth of the Israeli female combat soldier was born in the War of Independence, which was now 50 years ago, and they simply didn’t have enough people in the country to man the armed forces, so they used women. But it was their only experience with women in combat. It was a very unsuccessful experience. There were women who were taken prisoner by Syrians and Iraqis and that was basically the end of women in combat for the Israeli armed forces....Because culturally it was unacceptable to have female prisoners in Arab male hands.”<sup>10</sup>

Reuven Gal, former chief psychologist of the Israeli Defense Force, maintains that, though some women were in combat in the 1948 War of Independence, women were excluded from combat roles in the Israeli Defense Force from the formation of the state of Israel due to pressure from Orthodox Jews.<sup>11</sup> The compromise was to conscript women, but not assign them to combat roles. Women are assigned to combat units, but do not deploy with the units into combat.

The Director of Special Projects also noted that approximately 60 percent of women are conscripted and that it is easier for women to receive exemptions. She stated,

“A woman can be exempted for two reasons. One is if she marries. And in Israel, there’s a lot of relatively young married. And the other is religious conviction.”<sup>12</sup> She also stated, “American men and women join the military to defend the United States. They join to acquire discipline and skills. They join to have adventures. They join for educational reasons....But in Israel the reason to join the military is to defend the state....And so compulsory service creates a whole different paradigm for them. You can choose among elite combat units, combat units, and other units, and women do not have the option for the first two. So even when you start out, women are not on par with men...they are drafted and they are essentially not terribly important.”<sup>13</sup>

“Different things rub up against each other in Israeli society and American society. [Americans] tend to look in the military at male/female relations and gay/straight relationships. The Israelis tend to look at people who serve versus people who don’t serve.” For example, the Israeli Supreme Court ruling that the exemption for Yeshiva students was illegal created a greater uproar than the Supreme Court ruling about women training as fighter pilots.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Bryen, Shoshana, Director of Special Projects, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Volume II “Transcripts” page 328 (22Dec98, page 112).

<sup>11</sup> Gal, Reuven, *A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986).

<sup>12</sup> Bryen, S., Volume II “Transcripts” page 326 (22Dec98, page 102).

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, page 323 (pp. 83-84).

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, page 323 (p. 85).

Another dissimilarity between the United States and Israel is that “women have taken over the role of combat arms trainers. All of the trainers in Israeli armed forces now are people who do not serve in combat.”<sup>15</sup> Women train men in all sorts of combat skills: “Tanks, airplanes, artillery.” The Director of Special Projects added, “In answer to the question why women train men in combat arms.... One of our cadets suggested that men don’t want to fail in front of women. And so if a woman can drive a tank, you’d better be able to drive it better. Israel is a very macho society and there’s a level at which...they still operate that way.”<sup>16</sup> She continued, “All women start in the women’s training base, but they then move on depending on what they’re doing. If the women move on to educational functions, they essentially stay with women all the way through. They don’t ever really need to go to places where men are. Then there are other women who file papers and serve coffee. After their basic training, they are sent to offices and they file paper and they serve coffee, and essentially they’re just waiting to get out. They are the basic conscripts. They do not wish to remain in the military. They look at it as a holding pattern: maybe they’ll find a husband, maybe the won’t. That’s probably about 30 percent of the women.”<sup>17</sup>

### ***Netherlands***

A retired Dutch Army captain, former Chief, Office of Female Military Personnel, Royal Dutch Army, testified before the Commission. Relevant parts of her testimony are summarized here. The draft was abolished 2 years ago. In basic training men and women occupy separate rooms, but not separate buildings. The size of the Dutch military is approximately 50,000. If it deploys outside of the Netherlands, it usually deploys on peacekeeping operations. The military also has a joint corps with the Germans as well as cooperative arrangements with the French and the Belgians. Meanwhile, although the percentage of women in the Dutch military is only about 6 percent, gender-integration is carried out to a greater extent than in almost any other country. The captain stated, “Since 1978, almost all functions in the Dutch armed forces, with the exception of submarine units and the Marine Corps, have been open to women and training has been fully integrated.”<sup>18</sup> “I think that if one is going to have integrated units, then the training should be integrated as well, starting with basic training. This is the only way to effectively train a unit and to bring out the message to the members of a unit that gender-integration is possible and desirable and should not be looked upon as something special.”<sup>19</sup>

“Since we’ve done away with conscription and we need to have more volunteers, we have to rely more on women because we have difficulties filling the posts right now and we go out to the market and advertise the Army.” “I think the atmosphere is changing for women because the level of education is going down by getting rid of conscription.... The whole atmosphere is changing...and I think it’s getting worse for women.”<sup>20</sup> There is a different

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<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, page 324 (page 87)

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, page 329 (page 116)

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 329 (page 119)

<sup>18</sup> van de Perre, Captain Vivian (Ret), Former Chief, Office of Female Military Personnel, Royal Dutch Army, Volume II “Transcripts” page 322 (21Dec98, page 76).

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, page 322 (pp. 77-78).

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, page 327 (page 105).

incentive structure in the Netherlands for getting college-bound people to enlist, because the Dutch university education system is free. So the Dutch government must offer smaller incentives, such as free driver's licenses that are otherwise very expensive."

She continued, "The newest recruits are most open to gender integration and have the least problems with it. The longer they are in the military, the more they become affected by the military culture, which seems to regard cross-gender relations as something out of the ordinary. Secondly, ... education level influences the extent to which men and women will integrate smoothly. The lower the education, the more problems are generally likely to emerge. This implies that a different approach may be required, for example, for pilots than for infantry riflemen."<sup>21</sup> "I would like to address briefly the complicated issue of physical requirements. When I was a cadet, all physical requirements were exactly the same for men and women in 1985. By being subjected to the same standards, we undoubtedly gained the respect of many male cadets."<sup>22</sup>

"A lot of women drop out during basic training mostly because of physical problems, but also because of acceptance problems. The fighter pilots, the first 5 to 10 women over a series of years all dropped out because everybody's watching them. They're in the newspaper all the time."<sup>23</sup> Everyone knows about their mistakes.

### *United Kingdom*

According to a 12 July 1998 Sunday Telegraph article, the British Army is opening 1,300 jobs to women, including commando positions. Women will now be able to take the commando test, one of the most physically challenging tests for any branch of the British military. Women would still be barred from the Marines. Nevertheless, when Marines deploy, they are almost always accompanied by commando support units. Those support units perform such front-line tasks as clearing mines and preparing beachheads.<sup>24</sup>

Women became eligible to fly noncombat aircraft in 1990. But by 1994 women were training to fly combat aircraft. By 1994 the only Royal Air Force (RAF) combat positions closed to women were RAF firemen and RAF regiment gunner.<sup>25</sup> Women are now allowed to compete for about 70 percent of all Army jobs.<sup>26</sup>

Recently the British Army decided to train recruits in same-gender units. An 8 February 1999 London Times article states that England's largest training center, Pirbright, has introduced all-female training platoons. The hope is to reduce the number of physical injuries to the lower limbs. Initial reports show that all-female training units have reduced

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, page 322 (pp. 78-79).

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, page 323 (page 80).

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, page 330 (page 124).

<sup>24</sup> Gilligan, Andrew "Now women can become commandos: Front line jobs to go to female soldiers," *Sunday Telegraph*, July 12, 1998.

<sup>25</sup> Von Radowitz, John "Now women pilot a way to the stars," *The Press Association*, February 24, 1994.

<sup>26</sup> Evans, Michael "Army hits target with female units," *London Times*, February 8, 1999.

injuries among women (ages 16–25) by 50 percent. Pass rates among women have increased 70 percent. The Army expects that approximately 300 more female recruits will pass through Pirbright than last year when training was coed.<sup>27</sup>

### *Miscellaneous*

*Belgium.* The Army has been open to women since 1975. Women can join combat units, but an Army spokesman says few take or pass physical tests needed to become a combat soldier. Most women serve in support units or in administrative positions in fighting units. Women also serve on ships.<sup>28</sup>

*France.* In 1980 women comprised 1.9 percent of the Army, 8 percent of the Air Force, and 1.3 percent of the Navy. In 1989 they comprised 3.2 percent, 10 percent, and 3.5 percent, respectively.<sup>29</sup> By 1997 women made up about 7.5 percent of the entire military and 4 percent of its Officer Corps.<sup>30</sup>

*Italy.* Italy is moving to include women in its military. According to a 30 July 1998 Associated Press report, a bill allowing women to join the Italian military overwhelmingly passed the lower house of Parliament. Italian men are required to serve at least 10 months in the military. Italy is the last North Atlantic Treaty Organization country to bar women from military service.

*Spain.* There is no explicit policy banning women from combat roles, but they are not permitted to serve in certain units, including the paratroopers, special forces, and submarine crews. A woman military doctor is serving with Spanish peacekeeping troops in Bosnia.<sup>31</sup>

*Sweden.* The first women joined the military in 1983 but were not allowed into combat units until 1993. Women today are eligible for all officer careers if they complete basic training. Generally, Swedish society is in favor of equal gender opportunities and responsibilities.

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<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> “Women in the military, a world view,” *Associated Press*, April 29, 1993.

<sup>29</sup> Landay, J.S., and Chaddock, G.R. “Sex issues in US military puzzle, fascinate the world,” *Christian Science Monitor*, June 18, 1997.

<sup>30</sup> James Hyde, “Gender gap narrows in allied Services, but women will fight for combat roles,” *Armed Forces Journal International*, June 1989.

<sup>31</sup> Anguita, R.M. “Sisters up in arms: Rosa Maria Anguita reports on Spanish women soldiers,” *The Guardian*, May 18, 1993.

# *Women's Integration in Non-Traditional Work Sectors*

*Kristina Handy, Staff Researcher*

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“562(b)(2) (N) Review, and take into consideration, the current practices, relevant studies, and private-sector training concepts pertaining to gender-integrated training.”

The Commission was tasked by Congress to examine nonmilitary experiences relevant to the integration of women into occupations. Women have recently become better represented in the Coast Guard, fire fighting, and local and federal law enforcement. An analysis of women's integration into these sectors may provide some relevant information regarding the integration of women into the U.S. Armed Forces. While the experiences of these sectors are informative, they are somewhat limited in their relevance to the basic training and gender integration of women in the military because of the unique mission of the American military. Although many themes are raised in the discussion of gender integration into nontraditional occupations, the most salient issue was the impact, reliability, and necessity for gender differences in and gender-norming of physical training standards.

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Coast Guard

The experiences of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) with gender integration, including those in training, are especially relevant to the issues involved in gender-integrated training in the Department of Defense Armed Forces because the USCG is an armed force. Because of its peacetime missions, the USCG is within the Department of Transportation, but during war or national emergency it becomes part of the Department of the Navy. The USCG has had gender-integrated training since 1974, making it the Service with the longest experience with

GIT. To learn about USCG training and experience with GIT, the Commission received testimony from officials knowledgeable about training and Commissioner Mady Wechsler Segal visited the USCG training center at Cape May, NJ, on 1 July 1998.¹

All USCG basic training (boot camp) is conducted at Cape May. Recruit training is organized into companies of usually 50 to 60 recruits with at least 3 company commanders who are petty officers of varied ranks. A company may have as many as 90 recruits with 3 to 4 company commanders. There are four squad bays on a deck in the barracks. A company is formed on the basis of how many recruits arrive that week. The number of squad bays to a company depends on the size of the company. Most have two, one for men and one for women. Some have three; two male and one female. Some have four: two male and two female. As the number of women is small compared to men, the women's berthing area is smaller than the men's.

The U.S. Coast Guard is the most gender-integrated of the Armed Services. The Coast Guard Academy integrated in 1976, as did the three Service academies. It was the only academy that had decided to integrate before the Department of Defense mandate. Starting that first year, female cadets were to receive the same training as male cadets, including participation on the summer cruises. Currently, 30 percent of all cadets at the Academy are women. The Coast Guard today is completely gender-integrated in both enlisted and officer training. In addition, there are no occupational restrictions on women—all Coast Guard jobs are open to female “Coasties.”

The Coast Guard's policy with regard to maintaining a gender-integrated environment at the Recruit Training Center is clear. Male and female training center graduates must be prepared to move directly into completely gender-integrated operating units. As such, the eight-week recruit training is gender-integrated throughout. Men and women are assigned to units together as they arrive for training. The proportion of women in a company is determined by the proportion of women among arriving recruits. Perhaps one of the unique aspects of Coast Guard boot camp at Cape May is the way men and women are berthed. There are four barracks at Cape May, two of which have been renovated to allow an entire company to be berthed in squad bays immediately adjacent to one another. The male squad bay and the female squad bay are adjacent, separated by movable partitions. The movable partitions not only allow for easy access by the company commander to all of the company members simultaneously, but also allow for variation in the size of the squad bays for times when the male to female ratio may change. In other words, the partitions can be adjusted

¹ On her visit, Dr. Segal's activities included the following observations and tours: observation of fire control training; observation of pistol marksmanship and discussion with instructors; tour of physical training equipment in the gymnasium, discussion with chief fitness instructor, and informal briefing on PT standards and process; tour of all barracks configurations; tour of seamanship classrooms (that are equipped with displays of shipboard items and have hand-on training equipment) and discussion with instructors and supervisors of instructors; and tour of outdoor boat-docking facility (that is not in the water but has been built to simulate a ship). Dr. Segal also held discussions with the following groups: health care professionals (e.g., physician, dentist, nurse, psychologist, medic); work life staff (e.g., chaplain, social worker, wellness instructor); honor recruits from one company (scheduled to graduate the next day); the entire recruit company scheduled to graduate the next day; an entire company in the seventh week of training; a group of women (three enlisted women who had been in the USCG for about one year, two chief petty officers, and two officers).

based on the numbers of incoming male and female recruits. The movable partitions are ostensibly permanent in that they can be moved only by an engineering team and it takes hours to move them. The partitions appear and function as permanent walls.

The renovated barracks are in stark contrast to the old barracks in which male and female squad bays were separated by a one-to-two floor distance. The newly designed barracks work better for accessibility. Under the old design, when companies fell out, it was sometimes the case that, because of the distance, half the company was forgotten. With the new berthing design, that no longer happens. The distance created problems with communication, teamwork, and simple logistics. And although men and women are berthed on the same floor, no passageway connects the male and female squad bays. They are separate.²

In addition to berthing, the Coast Guard offers a unique approach to its physical fitness requirements. The Coast Guard emphasizes health and wellness in its physical training. As for physical testing, there are different standards for men and women in push-ups, sit-ups, and the 1.5-mile run, but the swimming portion of the physical fitness test is the same for men and women. All recruits must swim 100 meters in 5 minutes, tread water for 5 minutes, and don exposure gear in the water within 5 minutes. Physical fitness is measured on an individual scale. Because the Coast Guard recognizes the fact that recruits arrive at Cape May at different levels of fitness, fitness plans are individualized to bring everyone to a higher standard, with attention paid to those who need more fitness training. This human performance technology approach views fitness as an extended process and not one that ends when recruits graduate. The approach is an integrated one, through the lifetime of a Coastie.³

No occupations are closed to women in the Coast Guard. For example, one of the most physically demanding jobs is the aviation survivalman. This occupation has both selection and training performance criteria that are the same for men and women. Though it is perhaps the most physically demanding occupation in the Coast Guard, a small number of women are aviation survivalmen.⁴

² e.g., Barrett, RADM Thomas J., USCG, Director of Reserve and Training and Brice-O'Hara, Sally CAPT, USCG, Commander, Training Center, Cape May, NJ, Volume II "Transcripts" pages 272-84 (21Dec98, pp. 115-182).

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

In a pattern similar to what the Commission found in the Department of Defense Services, Coast Guard personnel and recruits express a preference for training the way they do: in a gender-integrated format. This includes the senior personnel who testified to the Commission. It also includes the personnel with whom Dr. Segal spoke on her site visit to Coast Guard boot camp at Cape May.⁵

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has an interesting history with regard to the introduction of women as special agents. Some features of gender-integration in the FBI are comparable to that of gender-integration in the military.⁶ It is commonly known that former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was opposed to diversifying the makeup of FBI special agents in any appreciable way (whether by gender or ethnicity). The first two women joined FBI agent training on July 17, 1972, soon after Hoover's death. According to Sanford J. Ungar, "Initially, FBI officials went to an extreme to prove that they were not making things any easier for the women than for men, and the physical part of the training, designed for men and their particular physical capabilities, was a special problem" because women often did not know how to perform certain physical skills and no one was teaching them (344).⁷ But far worse than the physical stress was the initial isolation that women felt being in an extreme minority.

⁵ Dr. Segal reports that virtually everyone she spoke with expressed a strong preference for gender-integrated training. They articulated various reasons that resemble what the Commission heard in the Department of Defense Services that conduct gender-integrated training. Senior personnel emphasized the importance of recruits getting used to gender integration during boot camp because of its "tighter environment" than later training and on ships. They argued that "it is more effective to have men and women working together to teach them how to work than sit them in a classroom." It also improves effectiveness and helps the formation of positive attitudes to have women in leadership positions, such as female chief petty officers. They also noted that separation of the sexes produces tension because recruits wonder what happened to the others while they were separated and produces derogatory language. The very few cases of problems that exist were attributed to leadership failures.

Dr. Segal found that the enlisted women and female officers unanimously supported gender-integrated training. They emphasized the importance of training in a gender-integrated environment to teach recruits how to work in a gender-integrated Coast Guard environment. They said that recruits must be "taught the right values from the start of basic training." If some recruits are "not prepared to deal with a gender-integrated work environment, they should get out of the Coast Guard." They also said that "when you separate people, they think something special is happening with the other group." They believed that the attention to gender-integrated training was a result of attention to isolated instances, such as the misbehavior at Aberdeen Proving Ground, and that there was no reason "to punish everyone for the actions of a few."

The recruits also expressed positive views of gender-integrated training in their meetings with Dr. Segal. They said that men and women work together as a team, as they do in the field. Men develop respect for women. They said they think of each other as shipmates and have respect for every shipmate, whether male or female. Indeed, the men said "we don't think of them as women; we think of them as shipmates." When asked specifically about the potential distraction of sexual attraction and violating rules against sexual behavior, the recruits emphatically said that they are not interested in having sex in boot camp; they are too tired and are concentrating on the work they have to do.

⁶ Ungar, Sanford J., *FBI*, 1976, Little, Brown and Company, Boston. Most of the information contained in this section comes from Chapter 14 history of the FBI. Most of this historical information is derived from primary sources, such as interviews with female FBI agents who were present during the early years of gender integration.

⁷ Initially women were held to the same minimum height standard as men (5'7") so female agents were significantly taller than the average American woman.

Women were also handicapped by the unspoken understanding that they would not make effective agents and that their male partners would shield them from dangerous assignments. There were, however, some noted advantages that women had, at least initially. For example, female agents were not as easily recognized as their black-suit-and-tie, crew-hair-cut male counterparts. Anecdotal evidence suggests that female agents entering a bar, or female agents driving a typical Bureau car, were not recognized as a potential threat by the criminals they were pursuing. This fact often gave female agents an advantage over their male partners.

It is estimated that female agents now make up 13 percent of the Bureau. The FBI, like the military, has made assignment concessions to female and male agents who married, so they can transfer to new jobs together. The concession caused some disgruntlement among single agents who may not have been afforded such flexibility. In general, with the increase of women in the FBI's ranks, the Bureau became a much more family-friendly agency.⁸

The Commission heard testimony from the FBI Section Chief of Investigative Training at Quantico, VA, the Unit Chief for Physical Training, and Supervisory Special Agent instructors about the physical training of FBI agents. The FBI Section Chief began by explaining that the FBI does not currently set a physical training standard for trainees. Trainees are only required to pass a 1.5-mile pretraining run. Fitness is required, but it is part of the FBI's agent training, not a prerequisite. In fact, physical fitness is the responsibility of the agent and it is understood that agents take responsibility for their own fitness as part of their career with the FBI.⁹

Agents' physical fitness (health and wellness) is tested twice yearly, but there is no pass/fail mechanism tied to the test. The FBI representatives who testified favored gender-norming physical fitness standards and said men's and women's fitness must be measured differently. However, in areas such as firearms, defensive tactics, and academics, gender-norming does not occur because it has no desirable function. That is, women and men must meet the same requirements because those are job-related tests (JRTs). There was another test developed by Dr. Paul O. Davis, from whom the Commission heard testimony on work-related standards; that the FBI used that was supposed to be a JRT, but they had to discontinue its use because it was not a fair test: Their Office of General Counsel judged it to be insupportable in a court of law because it could not be validated as job-related and also was biased against women.¹⁰

⁸ Ungar notes that this is in large part due to the leadership of Acting Director Patrick Gray. It was during his administration that women were first admitted to the Bureau.

⁹ Loudon, John O., Chief, Investigative Training Section, FBI Academy; Thomas Lyons, Chief, Physical Training Unit, FBI Academy; Kevin J. Crawford, Supervisory Special Agent; FBI Fitness Program Manager, FBI Academy; Edward Daerr, Supervisory Special Agent, FBI Defensive Tactics Program Manager, FBI Academy; Volume II "Transcripts" page 242 (2Dec98, pp. 195-96).

¹⁰ *Ibid*, pages 243-44 (pp. 204-06).

In areas such as firearms, defensive tactics, and academics, however, gender-norming does not occur because it has no desirable function. That is, women and men must meet the same requirements because these are job-related tests (JRTs).

Other relevant information about the FBI that came from the testimony of the officials at the FBI Training Academy was that their program is gender integrated throughout training. It is a 16-week residential program. Men and women training to be agents are housed together on the same floors of the dormitory in different rooms.

Issues in Physical Training

One aspect of women integrating into traditionally all-male occupations is the physical requirements that some of those occupations demand. The most salient questions in this regard are these: How is physical fitness defined in those occupations? How do we know if the established physical requirements are validated by real-life necessity? More specifically, how does the military measure up in answering these questions?

First, there are inconsistencies across military Services in defining fitness. Second, a person's fitness in one area does not guarantee fitness in another—so different types of fitness require different measures. Third, the military does not do an adequate job of linking the issues of physical performance and health (i.e., lack of sickness). Abundant research suggests that there is a positive relationship between good physical fitness and better health. The military's fitness components are generally defined as aerobic fitness, flexibility, body composition, muscular strength, and muscular endurance. According to expert witnesses, the U.S. military is weakest in its definition of flexibility.¹¹ None of the branches included flexibility in its PT requirements at either basic or advanced individual training. Flexibility is the range of motion around a joint—which means that a more flexible person has more time over which to accelerate, which results, theoretically, in greater force.

Also, lower body strength is often not included in measures of strength. This is significant to the gender issue because women tend to use their lower body strength differently from men. For example, women tend to bend their knees to pick up a 60-pound box whereas men will use their back and upper shoulder girdle (upper body) to complete the same task. Incorporating measures of lower-body strength would better assess women's physical capacity. The way strength is now tested, women come off as being worse than they really are. In this sense, the physical strength tests are unfairly biased in favor of male physiology.¹²

The purpose of gender norming of physical fitness tests is not well understood by many military personnel. Because they misunderstand the purpose by thinking that the tests are intended to measure job skills (rather than general physical fitness, health, and wellness),

¹¹ *e.g.*, Gebhardt, Deborah, President, Human Performance Systems, Inc.; Phillip Bishop, Professor, Human Studies, University of Alabama; Colleen Farmer, Associate Staff, College of Health and Human Performance, University of Maryland., Volume II "Transcripts" page 170-80 (18Nov98, pp. 245-306).

¹² *Ibid.*

they perceive gender norming as unfair. Physiological differences between men and women, particularly the fact that women carry approximately 10 percent more body fat than men and approximately 2 grams less hemoglobin, result in a deficit in running performance. As such, women and men's mile-run requirements are differentiated by 3–4 minutes (depending on the Service). These are physiological facts that gender-norming attempts to deal with. Expert witnesses agreed that a gender-free total fitness assessment was not possible. If the aim is to measure fitness, gender-norming is required. If the aim is to assess total fitness, additional measures are required.¹³

Finally, there is the issue of testing muscular strength versus muscular endurance. Many experts agree that testing muscular strength is unnecessary and not informative of an individual's fitness. To begin with, it is a rare situation in either military or civilian occupations in which exerting maximal force is a common or even occasional component of a job. Particularly in the military, physical exertion becomes an issue of repetitive force—that is, repeating the same activity. Measuring fitness for repetitive force requires a measure for muscular endurance. And testing for muscular strength has its costs in injury risk to a much greater extent than tests for muscular endurance. In addition, the correlation between muscular endurance and muscular strength for the same muscle sets is high, 0.7–0.8, so the utility of measuring both is questionable. Collateral information about physical fitness is included in the fire fighting and policing section below.

Fire Fighting and Policing

Women's representation in nontraditional occupations, such as policing and fire fighting, has increased over the past decade, as the table below shows.¹⁴

	Women as a percentage of the total employed			
	1985	1990	1995	1997
Supervisors, police, and detectives	4.6	8.6	12.9	17.4
Fire fighting and fire prevention	1.4	2.4	2.7	3.4
Fire fighting	.8	1.2	2.3	3.1
Police and detectives	10.1	13.8	13.5	16.4
Police and detectives, public service	8.2	12.1	10.4	11.8
Sheriffs, bailiffs, & other law enforcement officers	8.2	12.8	16.3	22.2
Correctional institution officers	16.6	17.7	17.8	22.9

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Handbook of Labor Statistics* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1989), Table 18; Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment and Earnings* (Washington, DC: GPO, January 1991), Table 22; Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment and Earnings* (Washington, DC: GPO, January 1996), Table 11; Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment and Earnings* (Washington, DC: GPO, January 1998), Table 11. The table was organized by Women's Research and Education Institute.

Terese Floren, Executive Director of the Women in Fire Service, Inc.,¹⁵ notes that the history of women in fire fighting is fragmented. Most of the history has been lost. Women generally began to be more involved in fire fighting when there were not enough men to do the job. For example, in wartime the need for female fire fighters was acute, both in the United States and in Europe. According to Floren, the Auxiliary Fire Service in the United Kingdom involved “large numbers of fire women, some of whom lost their lives in the line of duty.” She also notes that some U.S. military bases during wartime had all-women fire brigades.

There are some points of comparison between the integration of women in military and the integration of women in fire fighting, such as berthing, physical requirements, and unit cohesion. Women generally performed their jobs to the satisfaction of their peers. The same is true for women in policing. Initial studies performed on the integration of women in law enforcement suggest that women were able to perform police work with no degradation to civic safety. For example, the Police Foundation’s 1974 final report of *Policewomen on Patrol* states that “sex is not a bona fide occupational qualification for doing police patrol work.”¹⁶ In another study¹⁷ it was found that, on average, women’s arrest rates were lower than men’s, but that women’s police style promoted a less aggressive, more preventive approach to law enforcement. This study also found that community acceptance of the police is enhanced when women play increasing roles.¹⁸ But one of the more difficult questions is how to deal with physical strength differences in training and what standards should be used to determine who should fight crime and quell fires.

Paul O. Davis, president of Applied Research Associates, testified about a scientific basis for establishing work-related standards. His emphasis was on physical performance related to job-specific requirements. He pointed out that “the science of establishing work-related standards is a fairly new phenomenon. [It] basically came as a consequence of wartime mobilization with large numbers of individuals who were seeking employment in nontraditional areas.”¹⁹ He also notes there were limits to what training could do to improve a person’s level of performance—both in the military and in fire fighting. Heredity plays a significant role in determining a person’s upper limit of physical performance. But the science of establishing work-related standards has advanced to the extent at which physiologists can empirically measure actual energy costs of specific activities with “reasonable certitude” to “pinpoint what are the physical performance requirements for a specific job.”²⁰

¹⁵ Floren, Terese, “Blazing a heritage: Women in fire fighting before Title VII.” Paper prepared for the Women’s Research and Education Institute 1998 Women in Uniform Conference, Washington, DC, December 10–11.

¹⁶ Police Foundation, *Policewomen on Patrol* (Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 1974), page 1.

¹⁷ Sherman, Lewis J., “An evaluation of policewomen on patrol in a suburban police department,” *Journal of Police Science and Administration* 3 (1975): pp. 434–438.

¹⁸ Sherman, page 436.

¹⁹ Davis, Paul, O., President, Applied Research Associates, Inc., Volume II “Transcripts” pages 156-57 (18Nov98, pp. 163-64).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, page 157 (page 169).

But, according to testimony, admission to jobs like the military and fire fighting takes a back seat to societal factors in employment. For example, fire fighting is one of the most admired professions. With “very generous working conditions, it’s not surprising that we have applicants sometimes outnumbering the number of positions by thousands.”²¹ Therefore, selection for these jobs should be based on a meritocracy system rather than a pass/fail basis. Part of the problem is the fact that people are confused over the definition of fitness and how it relates to job performance. According to Davis, “Fitness is a relative term...[It] is a definition that exists in your own mind and it needs to be nailed down relative to some sort of a meaningful standard.”²²

Some experts approach public safety questions from a worst-case scenario point of view. In other words, an individual must be “fit” to perform tasks that are the most physically demanding but may not occur with any regularity. Approaching physical standards in this manner is the best way to ensure public safety. With regard to gender-norming, Davis states, “if we are talking about fitness relative to job performance, the norming approach is inappropriate” because it is the intrinsic nature of the task or occupation that defines the physical requirements necessary for it to be completed.²³ The most important contribution that Davis’ testimony provided the Commission was his finding that there are systematic ways to measure the necessary physical requirements for certain specific training tasks.

Others experts provided a counterpoint to Davis’ assessments. Brenda Berkman, Lieutenant, FDNY, wrote²⁴ that there is a similarity in the debate over gender-based physical standards in the military and in the police and fire services. She notes that the need to define physical requirement for those professions was first recognized when women started applying for those nontraditional jobs. One example is the Buffalo Fire Department, which had no test to measure physical ability until 1977, when women were allowed to apply. And in some cases, women were given physical ability tests while their male contemporaries were not. She also claims that, “when entry-level physical abilities tests were changed, if women were applying it was assumed that the tests were changed to make passing easier for women, even when the tests were changed for other reasons (e.g., to make the test more job-related by allowing for changes in equipment or performance techniques).”

Berkman argues that some assumptions about the necessity and desirability of physical abilities testing in nonprofessional occupations have a “disparate adverse impact on women.” Echoing Davis’ testimony, the most commonly stated reason against gender-norming physical standards to allow more hiring of women for public high-risk occupations (such as policing and fire fighting) is that it will compromise public safety. Such an assumption, Berkman states, ignores the fact that “training and ability” may compensate for other factors. Certainly there is a complexity of issues other than brute force that must be considered when measuring

²¹ *Ibid.*, page 158 (page 170).

²² *Ibid.*, page 158 (page 172).

²³ *Ibid.*, page 163 (page 205).

²⁴ Berkman, Brenda, “Physical fitness and abilities testing in the fire service and other ‘nontraditional’ careers for women: Job related or artificial barriers to employment.” Paper prepared for the Women’s Research and Education Institute 1996 Women in Uniform Conference, Washington, DC, December 10–11.

performance, such as mental and psychological abilities, flexibility, endurance, and so forth. But as Berkman also notes, many studies have questioned the “assumption that the physical abilities tests being used accurately predict performance” in the real world of policing, fire fighting, or combat.²⁵ In other words many factors, historical and sociological, may create bias in the theoretical relationship between the physical abilities test and that test’s relevance to real-life fire fighting or policing situations.

Conclusion

These nonmilitary examples of gender-integration into traditionally all-male occupations are comparable to the military experience, but there are important distinctions. For example, it was suggested in testimony that the FBI’s training is more comparable to military officer training than initial entry training for enlisted personnel because, among other reasons, prospective agents are college graduates and the environment of FBI agent training is an academic one. Also, there are obvious technical equipment differences with military training (water hoses for fire fighters versus machine guns for soldiers). In addition, basic military training is more physically demanding than that of law enforcement or fire fighting. And finally, the social organization of law enforcement/fire fighting training is less rigidly structured (FBI agents have weekends off, for example). Nevertheless these examples are informative because policing and fire fighting, like military service, are civic responsibilities that are directly related to the protection of individuals and public goods. Furthermore, nontraditional military assignments, such as peacekeeping or border patrol, are looking more and more like civilian policing. So, while there is a limit to how well these examples can inform the military experience, they should not be discarded as entirely irrelevant.

²⁵ Berkman refers to two articles in particular: Colker, Ruth. 1986. Rank-order physical abilities selection devices for traditionally male occupations as gender-based employment discrimination. *U.C. Davis Law Review* (Summer): 761–866; and Mark Kelman. 1991. Concepts of discrimination in ‘general ability’ job testing. *Harvard Law Review* 104: 1157–1248.

*Service Secretaries' Responses
Pursuant to Public Law
105-85, Section 562(e)(2)*

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**SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON**

January 25, 1999

Ms. Anita K. Blair
Chairman
Congressional Commission on Military Training
and Gender-Related Issues
1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 940
Arlington, Virginia 22202-3283

Dear Chairman Blair:

In your correspondence dated December 31, 1998 you requested that I respond to two questions ((O) and (P)) set forth in Section 562(e)(2) of your charter. I appreciate the opportunity to provide my views on these important issues. The questions and responses are set forth below:

(O) Assess the feasibility and implications of conducting basic training (or equivalent training) at the company level and below through separate units for male and female recruits, including the costs and other resource commitments required to implement and conduct basic training in such a manner and the implications for readiness and unit cohesion.

While it may be feasible to conduct basic combat training at the company level and below through separate units for male and female recruits, it would be detrimental to readiness and cohesion and result in increased costs during a time of constrained resources.

The U.S. Army trains in segregated units in those military occupational specialties (MOSs) that are not open to women. Virtually all of our combat MOS soldiers (about 30 thousand a year) are trained in a gender-segregated environment. Therefore, the question for the Army is the feasibility, costs, and implications of training men and women in separate units with respect to those combat support and combat service support MOSs in which both men and women serve.

Empirical studies show that women perform better, and men perform equally well, in gender-integrated basic combat training. Moreover, gender-integrated training is an important part of the soldierization process for soldiers who will serve in gender-integrated units.

Basic combat training is a critical period of time when we transform young men and women into soldiers. During this time, the ratio of leaders (drill sergeants) to soldiers is higher than at any other point in a soldier's career. During this period, soldiers must learn "the rules" of being on the Army team, including treating every soldier, regardless of race, gender, or creed, as a valued member of the team. Our experience is very clear-it is best to begin from

"day one" learning acceptable behavior for the environment our soldiers will face daily, throughout their term of service. Postponing the integration of male and female soldiers only defers this responsibility to either advanced individual training or our operational units. There is no reason to believe that "later" is an easier or better time to introduce this concept. Indeed, there is reason to believe it is the wrong time.

Segregated training creates perceptions of inequality of desire, ability, and achievement. It runs counter to the imperatives of teamwork and cohesion, which are at the heart of why soldiers are willing to sacrifice for each other. In other words, perceived inequality erodes unit cohesion and tears at the spirit of a fighting force. Integrated training causes soldiers to learn to rely on each other and builds confidence in each other's training and abilities. The Army cannot afford to foster in its new soldiers the prejudices that can result from segregated training.

Separating trainees at the company level and below virtually eliminates gender-integrated training. Indeed, basic combat training is primarily conducted at the platoon level and below. Gender segregation by company or platoon would create two separate and different training experiences, resulting in the perception that the others training was inferior-competition and divisiveness would likely replace cooperation and team spirit.

The cost of segregating basic training units depends on the level at which the segregation occurs. Gender segregation at the company level only minimally increases facility costs, but significantly increases operating costs. At the platoon level, the facilities cost is significant. After a preliminary analysis of the training load, the Army estimates it would require approximately an additional \$271 million (M) to house recruits in a segregated manner at platoon level. The breakout is as follows:

Location	No. & Type of Building	Cost
Fort Jackson	2 Starships	\$90M
Fort Leonard Wood	2 Starships	\$90M
	1 Modified Starship (RS)	\$23M
Fort Sill	1 Starship	\$45M
	1 Modified Starship (RS)	<u>\$23M</u>
BCT TOTAL		\$271 M

Notes: Starship: Building with 5 wings with platoon areas separated by doors that may be secured. Usually a 3-story building.

RS: Reception Station.

1 Starship Barracks costs approximately \$45M.

1 Modified Starship Barracks costs approximately \$23M.

Segregating male and female recruits by company does not allow for the full and best utilization of the barracks or manpower. During the summer months, when the greatest numbers of recruits undergo basic training, the gender composition of the new recruit classes

is not predictable. With fixed, gender-segregated facilities, logistical and morale problems would result when one group is crowded and the other has more space, or when large groups of trainees and drill sergeants experience significant down time while awaiting sufficient soldiers to fill a gender-segregated company. Equity of treatment is important when recruits are struggling to adjust to the rigors of the basic training environment. Furthermore, a workload imbalance in gender-segregated training will create divisiveness between the cadres of the segregated companies.

(P) Assess the feasibility and implications of requiring drill instructors for basic training units to be of the same sex as the recruits in those units if the basic training were to be conducted as described in subparagraph (O).

Army readiness will be degraded if drill sergeants are required to be of the same sex as their trainees. Implementing such a proposal would require a significant increase in the number of women assigned as drill sergeants and a decrease in women serving in operational units. The alternative, recruiting fewer women, is unacceptable.

The Army would have to move female non-commissioned officers (NCOs) from operational units to assignments as drill sergeants. The Army is already struggling with a complex array of personnel readiness challenges, including a shortage of as many as 6,000 NCOs. Pulling qualified female leaders out of the field will create turbulence in our personnel system and exacerbate the skill imbalances caused by the shortage of NCOs. Additionally, it would create MOS shortfalls in such skills as Signal, Quartermaster, Military Intelligence and Ordnance that cannot be filled by displaced male NCO drill sergeants holding primarily combat arms MOS. In short, requiring drill sergeants to be the same sex as their trainees will have a profound, detrimental impact on the readiness of our warfighting units at a time when they are already contending with serious readiness challenges.

We estimate the Army will require 245 additional female drill sergeants if drill sergeants are required to be the same sex as their recruits. We simply do not have enough female NCOs to assign to the training base without depleting the ranks of female soldiers from the operational jobs that represent their primary military mission. To do so would impact their opportunities, morale, and willingness to serve.

Additionally, the separation of drill sergeants by gender would negatively affect the training of women soldiers. In the majority of cases, basic training is our sole opportunity to establish a baseline training of combat skills by a mix of drill sergeants from the combat, combat support and combat service support branches. Separating women drill sergeants, to train women recruits, takes from that mix the combat arms experience that we deliberately intersperse into our training base. This does a disservice to both the female soldiers trained, the drill sergeants training them, and the operational units that will receive them after training. Additionally, restricting female drill sergeants to training female recruits precludes male recruits from experiencing female leadership and authority—an experience that is important for all soldiers, but especially for those recruits who grew up in male-oriented environments.

CONCLUSION:

The United States Army has been successful on the battlefield and in countless other missions the Army is asked to perform around the world. This success is the direct result of the skills and teamwork of trained and ready soldiers.

Without question, the Army's method of integrated training produces world class soldiers for our country. The commissioned and noncommissioned officers who will be called to lead these soldiers in combat are convinced they are doing gender-integrated training right and respectfully ask to be able to continue to train in the manner they think best: in the manner they will fight.

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to provide my views and I hope that as the Commission completes this difficult but important work, its recommendation will preserve the Army's flexibility to train America's soldiers in the way experience has taught us works best.

Sincerely,



Louis Caldera

**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000**

22 JAN 1999

The Honorable Anita K. Blair
Chairman, Congressional Commission on Military Training and
Gender-Related Issues
1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 940
Arlington, VA 22202-3283

Dear Madam Chairperson:

Thank you for your letters of December 31, 1998 to the Secretary of the Navy requesting information from Navy and Marine Corps pertinent to your final set of hearings on 28-29 January 1999. Service responses appear as enclosures to this letter.

ASN (M&RA) points of contact are CDR E. Carson, 693-0696, and LCDR D. Goodwin, 693-0229. If I may be of further assistance, please let me know.

//s//

CAROLYN H. BECRAFT
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower
and Reserve Affairs)

Enclosures

PART 2

H. R. 1119, 562 (b) (2) (o) - Assess the feasibility and implications of conducting basic training (or equivalent training) at the company level and below through separate units for male and female recruits, including the costs and other resource commitments required to implement and conduct basic training in such a manner and the implications for readiness and unit cohesion.

Recruit Training Command, Great Lakes does not have the facilities, land or manning to accommodate segregation of genders at the recruit and staff levels. Based on existing facilities, the minimum cost for separate recruit training facilities is in excess of \$350M. This does not include the cost for acquisition of land, nor the utility infrastructure required to support these new facilities.

The gender integrated recruit training environment has been established as the Navy's most effective means to best prepare Sailors to live, deploy, operate, fight, and win aboard gender integrated ships and squadrons. The rigorous evolution prepares the recruit for follow-on training and ultimate assignment to fleet service. The process ensures the recruit is physically and mentally ready for the rigors of the fleet environment by instilling discipline and proper behavior and emphasizing wellness and physical fitness. Each recruit must demonstrate dedication, teamwork and endurance through practical application of basic Navy skills and Core Values of Honor, Courage and Commitment.

Early experiences are relevant. Recruits are taught from day one that the Navy's business is to deploy and to arrive on station ready to fight. The initial training program is designed to enable men and women to report to their first ship/squadron fully prepared to meet that challenge. The Navy's basic training requirements and objectives maximize training opportunities for replicating life aboard fleet operational units and instilling and enforcing the warrior's ethos of sacrifice, endurance, teamwork and dedication. The CNO directed, Recruit Training Blue Ribbon Panel reinforced this training philosophy in 1993. The panel determined that the Navy's gender integrated training, which had begun in 1992, was very successful in promoting professional relationships between men and women. The unique relationship established during recruit training between shipmates is exclusive of gender, and is an essential contributor to follow-on Navy unit cohesion.

Deferring gender-integration until after recruit training transfers the burden to the fleet or follow-on technical training commands. If the Navy forestalls gender integration of its Sailors until they enter the fleet or begin follow-on technical training, the impact at Recruit Training Command would be as follows:

Gender Segregated Berthing and Facilities. Based on projected female accessions, gender segregated berthing at RTC Great Lakes would require the use of three barracks buildings. Extensive modifications of existing structures would be necessary. The estimated cost for these renovations would be \$1.1M.

Separate training creates numerous scheduling and facility utilization inefficiencies. There will be built in inefficiencies of berthing assignments, classroom utilization, etc., due to arrival numbers and population onboard. Two sets of classrooms, labs, instructors, etc., would have to be used to support gender segregation when only one would be necessary with integrated divisions. During surge months (May-November), boot camp capabilities are stretched to the limit. Scheduling must be even more precise. Gender segregated berthing would create unoccupied spaces at the time when space is needed most.

Manning. Gender segregation would require a significant increase in female RDC billets (from 88 to 114). The Navy is already severely challenged to provide numbers of female RDCs for current operations; there simply are not enough females available for this demanding duty.

Training. Gender segregated training at the division level and below would impose dramatic limitations on the existing training plan. Currently, classroom instruction is provided for two divisions simultaneously, regardless of gender, and is scheduled based on the divisions' DOT for the particular lesson being taught. Segregating training by gender would impose inefficiency when odd numbers of male or female divisions require instruction on the same lesson topics. Fourteen additional instructors would be required to provide adequate training in the Naval Orientation, Fire Fighting and Seamanship courses. To facilitate single-division instruction, two additional fire fighting classrooms would be required (approximate cost \$1.2M). To facilitate training of basic seamanship skills, construction of a second Marlinespike trainer (ship mock-up) would be required (approximate cost \$1.4M) or a reduction in the amount of hands-on training currently provided would be necessary. These basic skills are used extensively during Battle Stations; a reduction in the amount of hands-on training would significantly degrade the recruit's ability to successfully complete this culminating event of recruit training.

Training separately, in areas such as fire fighting, would deprive recruits of the team building that is essential for warfighting readiness. Navy ships do not employ separate male and female fire fighting parties. Many recruits are only weeks away from assignment to deployed units and squadrons. Gender integration in training labs and during Battle Stations allows all recruits to develop the synergy required for working in gender integrated units. In post-Battle Stations surveys of recruits the male recruits reported having learned analytical skills from female counterparts; females reported having learned to develop and use their physical strengths.

Readiness and Unit Cohesion. In 1987 and 1990, noting the increasing need to improve integration of women into the fleet, SECNAV directed initial and follow-on Navy Women's Study Groups. The 1990 study indicated that "non-acceptance of women began at the training centers;" this finding prompted implementation of a 1992 pilot program to integrate accession training in Orlando.

Habitability considerations are the sole factor in determining moments assignability to combatant ships. As a result, even in peacetime as a routine part of the Navy's forward-

presence responsibilities around the world, men and women live and work in close proximity, sharing the unique challenges of serving aboard a warship.

Navy recruit training is designed to minimize differences between recruits; they must meet the same performance standards. The only required variant is physical readiness testing. Navy physical fitness standards for both age and gender apply to all Service members. The standards were recently revised to make the minimum standards for the female run more challenging, in line with male standards. All recruits are required to pass the Navy's physical fitness test with a score of 'good' or better in each category (pushups, curl-ups and run), based on the standards for the recruit's age and gender.

The morale of a unit is a function primarily of the leadership of that unit. Gender integrated training commenced in FY95. Graduates of this format are 'first-termers" (our most junior personnel), who have not yet assumed positions of leadership, and whose influence on the morale of a unit would be minimal.

However, since these individuals are so junior, they are ideally positioned to be positively influenced by both male and female role models and respected leaders. This influence is essential in preparing recruits to become Sailors who will progress through their Naval careers and gradually assume higher positions of leadership. Following their experience as Recruit Division Commanders and Instructors, experienced Petty Officers return to fleet leadership positions, where they can continue to convey the positive aspects of gender integrated training.

The Navy has found the integrated training experience ideal to train recruits for the integrated environment they will meet in the fleet.

H. R. 1119.562 (b) (2) (p) - Assess the feasibility and implications of requiring drill instructors for basic training unit to be of the same sex as the recruits in those units if the basic training were to be conducted as described in subparagraph (O).

To be fully prepared to enter an operational unit, Sailors must understand, from day one, that the Navy is gender integrated throughout all levels of the chain of command. It is essential that RDCs be allowed to train recruits of the opposite gender. It is useful both for the men and the women to see women in authority positions and as valued and qualified instructors throughout the recruit training environment. Without exposure to an RDC of the opposite sex (whether it is male or female) the training foundation could be adversely impacted and ultimately impact the development of unity, trust and teamwork.

Gender segregation would require a significant increase in the number of female RDCs (from 88 to 114) assigned to Great Lakes for duty.

**STATEMENT OF
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES
29 JANUARY 1999**

Good morning, Madame Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Commission. In response to part one of your 31 December, 1998, letter regarding “revisions or updates” to initial entry level training, we can simply say that we have made no changes since our brief to you in June, 1998. You have seen our training at the Recruit Depots, Schools of Infantry and some of our MOS producing schools. Nothing has changed since your visits and we do not anticipate making any changes in the foreseeable future.

In part two, you asked for an assessment of the “feasibility and implications” of training men and women in separate units at the company level and below. As you well know, we have historically done just that and we continue to do it that way today. You also asked about “requiring Drill Instructors...to be the same sex as the recruit.” Again, as you know, that is how we conduct our gender segregated recruit training at the Marine Corps Recruits Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina.

For us then, there are no assessments to make. As a result, I am prepared to answer your questions.



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

JAN 27 1999

Ms. Anita K. Blair
Chairman, Congressional Commission on Military and Training
and Gender-Related Issues

Dear Ms. Blair:

Thank you for the opportunity to provide an assessment regarding the feasibility and implications of providing separate basic military training for male and female recruits at the flight level and below in separate units. Our response covers the issues of readiness and unit cohesion, as well as the feasibility and implications of requiring drill instructors to be of the same sex as the recruits.

Since this is a final request for information and culminates your inquiry, our expanded response provides a restatement of our training philosophy, a historical perspective, as well as the specific information requested in the congressional language. We believe you will find this a useful summary of the Air Force position on gender integration throughout our training continuum and into our operational units.

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to respond to your questions. We have and will continue to support the efforts of your commission in this most important inquiry.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "F. Whitten Peters", written over a horizontal line.

F. Whitten Peters
Acting Secretary of the Air Force

Attachment:
Air Force Response

AIR FORCE RESPONSE
TO THE
CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING
AND GENDER RELATED ISSUES

Introduction:

Required by PL 105-85, Section 562(b)(2) and (e)(2), and at the behest of the Congressional Commission, the Air Force was asked to provide a written assessment regarding the feasibility and implications of conducting basic training at the flight level and below through separate units for male and female recruits. The response is required to include an assessment of the costs and other resource commitments required to implement and conduct basic training in such a manner and the implications for readiness and unit cohesion.

Also, we were asked to assess the feasibility and implications of requiring drill instructors for basic training units to be of the same sex as the recruits in those units if the basic training were to be conducted as described in the previous paragraph.

Background

During the 1970s, the number of women in the military began to increase as a result of changing societal views on the role of women in America and the transition of the military to an all-volunteer force. The Air Force faced labor force constraints brought about by the abolition of conscription in 1973. Women began to enter the Air Force in increasing numbers after the inauguration of the all-volunteer force, and this was consistent with the rise of women in the U.S. labor force, which also began a sustained increase in the 1970s.

The rising number of women meant that the investment in training women in a segregated environment was growing proportionately. The senior leadership of the Air Force noted that continuance of separate, redundant systems of basic training required overlapping organizational structures, facilities, and training cadre that were both inefficient and costly. While records are not exact on documenting the reason for going to integrated training, it was intuitive that it was a more efficient way to employ our training resources and more economical to develop and maintain the supporting infrastructure (i.e., training staff, living quarters, classrooms, etc.).

Over time our process has evolved and has been institutionalized and instilled in our philosophy which is, " we train the way we operate/fight" . . . integrated from day one. We now

have more than twenty years of experience with gender integrated training and our training effectiveness measures indicate it works well. Today, approximately 35,000 raw recruits begin basic training each year. Last year, 8.3 percent did not graduate from basic training and an additional 5-6 percent failed to make the cut in technical school, for various reasons. This is in line with historical averages and the best success rate in The Department of Defense.

The implications of gender separate training

The current rationale for the use of gender integrated Basic Military Training (BMT) is based on the fact that readiness is impacted by our airmen's ability to conduct themselves appropriately at all times, especially under stressful conditions. Appropriate conduct involves accepting opposite gender airmen as both peers and leaders. It involves knowing how to interact with the opposite sex, because our operational environments are also mixed gender; and it involves being able to discipline one's self in the conduct of professional relationships so that personal behavior does not impair unit discipline or mission accomplishment. Foundations are built at the beginning, not in the middle or at the end of any construction process. Therefore, the Air Force prefers gender integrated basic training in order to teach and reinforce these standards of appropriate conduct from the first day of duty. From this starting point we establish a strong and correct foundation upon which to build further training and insure that the highest possible level of Mission Ready Airmen (MRA) arrive at operational units.

Young recruits of opposite gender may well be challenged to focus on training and to maintain a professional decorum. But singling out sexuality as too difficult or distracting to control during basic training sends the wrong message to recruits. It also argues that, if it's too difficult to do during basic training, in a tightly controlled training environment, it will be far more difficult in advanced skill training or when they are manning critical positions in operational units.

We also feel it is essential to expose both men and women to female Military Training Instructors (MTIs) during basic training. This not only affords a positive role model for women but also allows young men to accept the fact that women will routinely and successfully occupy high positions throughout the USAF rank structure. Mixed gender flight formations promote inter-gender teamwork, training standardization, and a mutual acceptance of each other as peers.

The implication of a gender segregated training environment is to risk losing the opportunity to expose our recruits to the reality of military life from a social and operational perspective from the first day of active duty.

Implications for readiness and unit cohesion

Trainees who can demonstrate gender discipline and work well with members of the opposite sex are more ready to operate in a gender integrated environment. Gender integrated training operations are consistent with Air Force employment and deployment scenarios, and because this is so, basic training is the best preparation for professional life. Since 99 percent of our career fields are open to women, they stand shoulder to shoulder with male airmen daily in the routine execution of our mission. To conduct basic training in a segregated environment, therefore, would be to prepare trainees for a false reality and thus would place a burden on operational units to expose and re-educate new airmen about technical and operational environments. The impact of gender segregated basic training would be to shift the burden of making airmen "mission ready" from BMT to technical schools and first duty stations.

BMT shares a training continuum with advanced schools, so another measure of merit with regard to the current practice of gender integrated training is the technical school's survey of their graduate effectiveness as evaluated by operational units. Of all who graduate basic and advanced training, 94 percent are rated satisfactory or higher by their first line supervisors in both job-related skills and military bearing. This suggests that graduates of our schools are extremely well prepared to make a positive contribution to unit readiness.

Also, as previously discussed, the evidence supporting a positive link between our decades-long practice of gender integrated training is our long record of success across the spectrum of operations. This is no accident. Gender integrated training ensures airmen are better prepared for the challenges of the real Air Force when trained as they will operate--in units that are diverse in nature. The training requirements for basic training are similar to those of operational units because our Service employs reality-based training scenarios whenever possible in order to demonstrate learning objectives. Separating the genders in events such as our field training exercise, confidence course, M-16 qualification, and soon to be implemented Warrior Week would impact resource scheduling and imply different standards and a different culture for men and women.

Finally, gender integrated basic training has been validated and linked to readiness by the BMT Review Committee whose members are senior officers and enlisted personnel throughout the Air Force. Every aspect of the basic training Plan of Instruction (POI) is based on operational requirements which are established and validated by line officer and enlisted senior leadership through the BMT Review (a sort of board of directors) which is accomplished at least every three years.

Implications for safety and security

The Air Force approaches the security and safety of its new recruits with the same seriousness it applies to training. Again, we start early in BMT teaching the discipline of

living and training together so problems with distraction can be corrected early. Strong, well-trained leadership and good discipline policy, not reorganizing, is the key to producing MRA. Our data show no evidence of discipline problems as evidenced by the fact that less than one in thirty-four hundred BMT airmen (0.03%) have had misconduct requiring UCMJ discipline.

In BMT, security is tight in the one thousand person living quarters with strict, but fair, rules of social conduct and access control. Men and women live in separate bays and are separated by steel doors, locks, and permanent party monitors twenty-four hours per day. Control rosters and identification badges limit access to the building and routine/random inspections are performed to ensure compliance. BMT leadership is actively involved to ensure trainee security and safety and hold the permanent party personnel and students themselves accountable to properly manage the barracks' security programs. Security is a top priority, and we continue to seek new and innovative ways, with enhanced technology, to improve.

While BMT's billeting procedures do not put male and female recruits in totally separate buildings, we believe the gender separation by floor or bays, coupled with strict entry procedures and validated by the very low rate of disciplinary actions, meet the highest standards reasonably possible to ensure safety and security for our trainees. There is no evidence that providing separate living quarters for men and women will provide a measurable improvement in the safety or security for our recruits.

Cost and resource commitments and resulting inefficiencies

Gender integrated basic training fosters more effective and efficient resource management. Conversely, gender separate training would impose artificial barriers to resource effectiveness. A good example may be found in dormitory utilization.

Each of our squadrons is housed in a self-contained facility, which sleeps up to 1,000 trainees, referred to as Recruit Housing and Training Facilities (RH&T). With the activation of the 324th Training Squadron on 1 March 1999, BMT will utilize six of the seven available facilities. The unused RH&T will be rotated until the remaining three RH&Ts can complete renovation in FY02. In the short term, placing males and females in separate facilities would require use of the seventh RH&T and would preclude this phase renovation program from being completed. Long term, it would result in under-utilization and uneconomical dorm loading since only 26 percent of recruits are women. It is estimated that gender segregated training would result in approximately a 65 percent average occupancy rate.

In addition, the cost to activate a new facility is roughly estimated to be \$1.4M. The annual operating cost would be \$1.3M. Finally, we would also need two officers and four enlisted personnel to staff an additional command structure.

Human resource commitments and implications of requiring drill instructors to be the same sex as their recruits.

Modern notions of human resource management involve selecting, training, and employing people with the right talent/job match. A segregated training environment would force us to put trainees into student leadership positions based on gender and not on the best use of their potential. It would make us assign MTIs according to gender and not best utilization. It could lead to the widening of gaps between genders in the standardization of their training and in their readiness to meet Air Force standards and would not be reflective of operational realities.

It would also pose training force management barriers and place disproportionate burdens on the training cadre. For example, it is feasible to provide same sex drill instructors. However, to do this, we would have to restrict our assignment of female training instructors at flight level positions due to staffing constraints. Currently, women comprise 18 percent of the USAF. Female MTIs make up 18 percent of our cadre. However, currently 27 percent of the basic trainee population is female. Assignment restriction would ultimately hurt female MTI advancement into supervisory and other career enhancing leadership positions. In our opinion, this factor alone would hurt female instructor recruiting.

Same sex drill instructors would not allow recruits to routinely interact with role models of the opposite gender. A crucial aspect of learning and internalizing values involves practice and learning through observation. The absence of an opposite gender role model sends the strong message that diversity is too tough to deal with in basic training and therefore must be too tough to deal with at the operational level. This postpones and transfers the need to deal with the inevitability of later gender integrated interactions that will occur in the field, adding an extra burden on the field commander. Same gender training does not reflect the reality of the Air Force.

Summary


The overriding goal and rationale of the basic training process is to transform civilian recruits into airmen-warriors whose behavior is consistent with the standards, values, and beliefs of the Air Force. Entry-level training molds the individual's personal approach to military duty, ethics, and relationships with others, and it serves as the foundation for building this airmanship. Gender integrated basic training provides the smoothest transition into the operational, gender integrated Air Force.

As the controlled environment of basic military training is the starting point for military professionalism, the teaching of discipline and professional relationships must not exclude related gender issues generated by the interaction of men and women at the most basic unit in their training--that of the flight. Such training prepares young airmen for the realities of a gender integrated Air Force where 99 percent of all career fields are open to women. It also prevents passing the burden of responsibility to do this on to technical training and operational commanders.

Research Findings on Gender-Integrated Training in Support of Chapter 4

The Commission and its staff reviewed relevant literature, existing data, and the results of research efforts conducted on its behalf with regard to gender format of recruit training. In general, findings were neutral to positive with regard to gender-integrated training. Attitudes and perceptions regarding gender-integrated basic training were in keeping with Service policies and practices. That is, Air Force and Navy recruits, enlisted members, and leaders favored complete gender integration, whereas Army survey respondents preferred a mixture of integrated and male-only training—the latter was preferred for One Station Unit Training (OSUT), which combines basic and technical training. The Marine Corps, with its emphasis on combat and relatively few women, overwhelmingly favored its practice of complete gender segregation during basic training. Servicemembers generally favored their Service’s practice, whether it was gender-segregated or gender-integrated.

On survey items designed to measure commitment, respect for authority, and group identity, similar mean scores were obtained from graduating recruits who had participated in gender-integrated and gender-segregated basic training formats.¹



¹ Johnson, C. (1999), *The Study of Military Recruit Attitudes Conducive to Unit Cohesion and Survey of Military Leader Opinions on Recruit Training and Gender-Related Issues*, Volume III “Research” page 132.

The following table shows leaders' opinions regarding preferred gender format for basic training. Only in the case of the Marine Corps was gender segregation preferred by a majority of leaders.²

Leaders' Opinions of Best Gender Mix for Basic Training by Service and Leader Level (Percent)

"best gender mix for basic training"	Army					Navy				
	E-6/7 (1177)	O-3 (1065)	Cmdr (216)	Cmd NCO (251)	RT (1098)	E-6/7 (1171)	O-3 (830)	Cmdr (195)	Cmd NCO (273)	RT (225)
Gender-integrated training	28	32	31	32	27	46	50	38	61	36
Gender-segregated training	34	37	27	32	37	29	23	29	19	44
Separate only for all-male specialties	22	19	29	20	16	7	7	7	4	2
Does not matter	11	4	3	11	15	12	7	7	9	13
"best gender mix for basic training"	Air Force					Marine Corps				
	E-6/7 (1073)	O-3 (884)	Cmdr (626)	Cmd NCO (539)	RT (132)	E-6/7 (981)	O-3 (509)	Cmdr (89)	Cmd NCO (122)	RT (462)
Gender-integrated training	49	65	59	57	40	4	5	7	2	2
Gender-segregated training	26	14	18	23	33	85	87	90	89	88
Separate only for all-male specialties	7	9	9	6	2	6	5	1	5	3
Does not matter	12	6	7	10	23	3	1	0	4	4

Source: Johnson (1999).

Commission research surveyed enlisted members with one to eight years of service and found that they endorsed gender-integrated training in accordance with their individual Services' policies and practices.³ That is, the majority of soldiers, sailors, and airmen (58 percent, 66 percent, and 79 percent, respectively) reported that gender-integrated training improved or had no effect on the quality of basic training. Marines, on the other hand, were more likely to perceive a decline in quality as a function of gender-integrated training (58 percent). Endorsement of "total" gender segregation among enlisted members surveyed ranged from 66 percent among Marines to 19 percent among airmen. Corresponding percentages among soldiers and sailors were 31 percent and 20 percent respectively supporting gender segregation.⁴ Other relevant assessments of gender integrated training are provided in the table below by Service. Again, response patterns were in keeping with Service policy-most favorable assessments were made by those in the Air Force and Navy. The Army was generally supportive of the outcomes of gender-integrated training, but soldiers were less positive than sailors or airmen. Marines were more critical, though it is important to note that these servicemembers did not respond on the basis of direct personal experience with gender integration in recruit training.

² *Ibid*, pages 121-122.

³ Ramsberger, P., Laurence, J., and Sipes, D. (1999), *Retrospective Survey of Socialization, Values, and Performance in Relation to Recruit Training*, Volume IV "Research" page 30.

⁴ *Ibid*.

Assessments of the Effects of Gender-Integrated Training by Enlisted Members with 1-8 Years of Service by Service (Percent)

Survey Item	Army			Navy		
	Strongly Agree/ Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Strongly Disagree/ Disagree	Strongly Agree/ Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Strongly Disagree/ Disagree
Gender-integrated training has a positive effect on individual performance	35	31	35	39	36	25
Gender-integrated training has a positive effect on group performance	41	27	31	46	31	22
Gender-integrated training results in lower standards for all	38	25	37	25	29	45
Gender-integrated training makes it easier to adapt to a gender-integrated unit	62	22	15	64	24	12
Gender-integrated training reduces likelihood of later problems	30	27	43	31	29	40
Gender-integrated training reflects experience in civilian life	43	40	18	46	37	17
Survey Item	Air Force			Marine Corps		
	Strongly Agree/ Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Strongly Disagree/ Disagree	Strongly Agree/ Agree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Strongly Disagree/ Disagree
Gender-integrated training has a positive effect on individual performance	47	34	19	16	23	62
Gender-integrated training has a positive effect on group performance	59	25	16	20	25	55
Gender-integrated training results in lower standards for all	15	23	62	49	28	24
Gender-integrated training makes it easier to adapt to a gender-integrated unit	67	20	13	37	32	31
Gender-integrated training reduces likelihood of later problems	35	30	36	22	23	55
Gender-integrated training reflects experience in civilian life	53	32	15	38	38	24

Source: Ramsberger, Laurence, & Sipes (1999).

APPENDIX I

Focused interviews were conducted on behalf of the Commission with enlisted personnel from the four Services at three career levels: basic training, technical/job training, and operational units. In all, 42 focus group sessions took place at 10 installations and included a total of 420 participants. Focus group sessions used a structured protocol and transcripts from the sessions were summarized and content analyzed.⁵ Despite the transparency of the Commission's focus, gender was not the only, or necessarily the first, concern of those who participated in the discussions. Women were more likely than men to mention *women in the military* as a salient issue early on, yet in some groups, gender did not surface as an issue until the discussion was formally led in that direction.

The researchers found that teamwork, the quality of instructors, field exercises, and personnel shortages, together with high OPTEMPO, were key factors perceived to influence individual and unit readiness.⁶ Commission discussion groups reinforced this concern, expressed by operational commanders across the Services.

Other findings from the focus group research included the following. Positive social interaction generally increases team cohesion and trust. A major barrier to performance is the presence of individuals who dodge their duties or otherwise avoid making a sufficient contribution to the team effort. In addition to such active work avoidance behaviors, physical injuries (sustained mostly in training) and pregnancy are seen as more benign or passive detractors from performance.⁷

Leaders have a profound impact on servicemembers' attitudes, motivation, and behaviors. They serve as mentors and role models, aiding individual and unit performance and adjustment. Often, interaction with the training instructor represents the new recruit's first experience within the Service and thus it is often the most critical experience.⁸

The above issues and concerns were echoed by both men and women; however, barriers to performance may be heightened for women. The focus group sessions provided many examples in which women, simply because they were female, were presumed incompetent until they proved themselves competent. This was not the case for men. The limited and constrained interactions between men and women likely contribute to such stereotypes and misperceptions.⁹ Attitudes, in many cases, were not based upon concrete behavioral observations, but were vague and of a "hearsay" nature. Many men also noted that the women they actually knew were indeed proficient.¹⁰

The researchers conclude that it is important to note that in all Services, positive comments regarding gender integration were made loudly and clearly by both men and women. Further, focus group participants noted significant improvements over time. Beyond

⁵ Laurence, J., Wright, M., Keys, C., and Giambo, P. (1999), *Focus Group Research*, Volume IV "Research" pages 251-575.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Keenan & Laurence (1999).

¹⁰ Laurence, Wright, Keys and Giambo.(1999), Volume IV "Research" pages 307-323.

the issue of gender integration, an appropriate focus would be on personnel challenges-on specific actionable factors and issues that detract from training effectiveness, rather than on broad demographic characteristics. The findings from these focus groups can inform the establishment of more positive gender interactions and hence teamwork, organizational commitment, and effectiveness.¹¹

Commission research also included an evaluation of the patterns of first-term attrition among active duty enlisted members for each of the Services' 1991 through 1996 accession cohorts. Although in all Services, attrition rates tended to be higher for women, the rates were not higher subsequent to the introduction (or furthering) of gender-integrated training in the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In fact, attrition rates were comparable if not slightly lower after integration.¹²

For the most part, the Commission found no significant differences in outcomes for gender-integrated and gender-segregated environments. These assessments were made by considering the confluence of research findings and observations and comparing, where appropriate, responses of servicemembers with different training experiences. Comparisons among the Services are inappropriate from both technical and logical perspectives. The Commission understands that such comparisons are spurious relationships that fail to consider training lengths, trainer to recruit ratio, variations in recruit temperament and other characteristics across the Services. To avoid comparisons, the Commission reviewed and assessed along each Service's continuum of training (See Basic Training Continuum in chapter 3, page 93). The Services are unique, with varying missions, organizational and personnel characteristics, and hence training emphases and philosophies.

Weighing the evidence from numerous sources, the Commission's opinion is that current Service practices, with regard to basic training gender format, are appropriate and effective. This conclusion considers multiple measures, to include: public opinion surveys (e.g., Youth Attitude Tracking Study), personnel quality, proficiency, attrition, and morale—all of which influence personnel readiness. Operational commanders' evaluations of the caliber of the men and women they were receiving into the operational units were critical. Current recruiting difficulties cannot be validly linked to gender format of basic training. Rather, there is ample evidence that economic conditions are strongly related to recruiting outcomes.¹³ For example, the following figure shows rather dramatically that enlistment contracts mirror unemployment trends.¹⁴ There is also a substantial relationship between level of recruiting resources and enlistment contracts.


¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Sipes, D. and Laurence, J. (1999), *Performance Data Modeling*, Volume IV "Research" pages 606, 624, 641.

¹³ Kearn, Horne, & Gilroy (1990); Murray & McDonald (1999), Warner (1999), Warner (1990).


¹⁴ Kearn, Horne, & Gilroy, 1990.

High-Quality Male Enlistments and Male (16-21 years) Unemployment




In addition, data from the 1998 nationwide administration of the Department of Defense’s Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS) bolster the Commission’s conclusion that gender-integrated training does not affect recruiting adversely. The majority of respondents (ages 16-24) indicated that gender integration of basic training would have no effect on their decision to enlist (83 percent of men and 77 percent of women).¹⁵

YATS Respondents
Effect of Gender-Integrated Training on Enlistment Propensity




¹⁵Laurence, J. and Wetzel, E. (1999), *Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS)*, Volume IV “Research” page 674.

Regarding training format preference, the majority of the YATS respondents indicated that it would make no difference to them (76 percent of men and 64 percent of women). Further, practically all respondents (88 percent of men and 91 percent of women) indicated that gender integration either made no difference or improved the quality of training.¹⁶



**YATS Respondents
Opinion About Effect on Training Quality of Having Both
Males and Females Train Together in Military Basic Training**



¹⁶ *Ibid.*, page 675.

APPENDIX I

Despite our conclusion, the Commission recognizes that there are challenges that must be met with regard to both gender-integrated and gender-segregated training. The transformation process from civilian to soldier, sailor, airman and Marine is a critical process that only begins in basic training. The objective of basic training is to prepare the individual for the next phase of training (see Basic Training Continuum in chapter 3, page 93). Regardless of gender format of training, it is vital that men and women receive adequate training and military socialization that will enable them to perform their duties efficiently and effectively when they arrive at their operational assignments.

The presence of women in the military has increased over the course of the All-Volunteer Force. Testimony from all the Service Chiefs reiterated the importance of women within their respective Services. The Commission recommendations focus on institutionalizing the improvements that have been made to the continuum of training. Progress toward cohesion among military members—men and women—should be continued and monitored. It is time to concentrate on recruiting, training, and maintaining a force with the right constellation of characteristics to meet its myriad of missions.

Executive, Legislative, and Policy Chronology Regarding Women in the Military

Kristina Handy and Pamela Saunders, Staff Researchers

1947 Army-Navy Nurse Act, Public Law 36-80C¹

- The Act established a permanent nurse corps in the Departments of Army and Navy.
- It integrated women into the officer ranks with the opportunity for promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel or commander.

1948 Women's Armed Services Integration Act, Public Law 625²

- The Act further placed a 2 percent ceiling on the enlistment of female recruits.
- In April 1948, the USSR cut off access to the city of Berlin, Germany, thus provoking the United States and Great Britain to operate the largest airlift in history to supply Berlin. Women pilots were not asked to take part in the mission even though women pilots has flown during WWII. The military opted to ask male pilots to return to active duty to perform the mission. The onset of the Cold War induced Congress to enlist more troops. With that view, Congress debated a new draft law for men and simultaneously created permanent women's units in various branches of Service.
- The Act also included provisions that excluded women from combat or combat-support assignments. It was commonly known as the Combat Exclusion Law.³
- The Coast Guard was not included as a part of Public Law 36-80C.

¹ Sherrow, Victoria, 1996; *Women and the Military, An Encyclopedia 1*; page 227, and *Public Law 36-80C*.

² *Ibid.*; page 36, *Berlin Airlift*.

³ *Ibid.*; page 71, *Combat Exclusion Law*.

1951 Executive Order 10240⁴

- Signed by President Truman on 27 April 1951, Executive Order 10240 empowered military officials to discharge women from the Service if they were pregnant or responsible for minor children. The Order applied to all women regardless of status, rank, grade, or length of Service. Although the Order did not force Service branches to terminate women, it assisted the Services to adopt the policy throughout the 1950's and 1960's. Opponents of the policy believed that the Order and subsequent Service policies discriminated against women solely on gender. Servicemen who had family responsibilities were not affected. The main protest issue was the discharging of women who had minor children living with them.

1951 Defense Advisory Council on Women in the Services (DACOWITS)⁵

- The Department of Defense created DACOWITS, which consisted of retired military officers, educators, businesswomen, attorneys, politicians, and women from the arts. The purpose of DACOWITS was to increase women recruitment in the military. DACOWITS set an agenda, after its initial hearing in 1951, to advertise the need for more servicewomen, advocate military Service as a beneficial career, and raise the social status of military careers. Since DACOWITS began, it has remained active, even though the agenda changes with the inception of each new council. DACOWITS continues to advocate for more career fields for military women.

1967 PL 90-130⁶

- Congress removed the 2-percent cap on the enlistment of female recruits. The law allowed the Women's Army Corps (WAC), Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES), Women in the Air Force (WAF), and Women Marines to hold permanent grades up through the rank of O-6. Women became eligible for appointment to flag/general officer.⁷ The law also authorized the Service secretaries to prescribe the grade distribution for the women components so that the promotion and career opportunities for women officers could be governed generally by the same standards that apply to male officers. It applied the same attrition and elimination provisions to women officers as apply to men officers. The only exception was a special authority for the selective continuation of nurses.

⁴ Sherrow, Victoria, 1996, *Women and the Military, An Encyclopedia 1*, page 113, *Executive Order 10240*.

⁵ *Ibid.*, page 92, (*DACOWITS*).

⁶ *Ibid.*, page 227, *Public Law 90-130*, Pub.L. 90-130, 8 November 1967.

⁷ *Women in the Military*, 2nd ed., WREI, 1998;,page 3.

1971 Air Force allows pregnancy waiver⁸

- The Air Force was the first Service to allow pregnant women to request a waiver of the discharge policy. The Air Force also changed its recruiting rules to allow the enlistment of women with children.

1971 *Fronteiro v. Richardson*⁹

- The Supreme Court ruled that men and women could not be treated differently with respect to eligibility for dependents' benefits. Before the ruling, military women had to prove that their husbands were dependent on them for more the 50 percent of their support, while military men did not have to prove their wives' dependence.

1973 Selective Services Act Expires¹⁰

- In 1973, during the administration of President Richard M. Nixon, Congress ended the military draft and created an All-Volunteer Military Force (AVF). The new law increased goals for women's accession into the military.
- First female Naval aviators received their wings.
- Congress repealed Title 14 USC Section 762 to remove the distinction between men's and women's reserves and allow women to serve in the regular Coast Guard. The action inadvertently removed the combat exclusion provisions for women in the Coast Guard.¹¹

1974 Army women aviators received their wings.¹²

1975 PL 94-106¹³

- The law, passed by Congress in 1975, allowed women admission into the military Service academies of the Navy, Army, and Air Force. Women began coeducational classes in 1976.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 2nd ed.; WREI, 1998; page 4.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 2nd ed.; WREI, 1998; page 4.

¹⁰ Sherrow, Victoria, *Women and the Military, An Encyclopedia I*; 1996; p. 11, *All-Volunteer Force (AVF)*.

¹¹ *Women in the Military*, 2nd ed.; WREI, 1998; page 4.

¹² *Ibid.*; WREI, 1998; page 4.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, *Women and the Military*, page 227, *Public Law 94-106*.

1975 Pregnancy Policy¹⁴

- Two Supreme Court cases in 1974 contested policies that required pregnant women to leave certain civilian jobs. Threatened with similar lawsuits, the Pentagon changed its policy in 1975. The policy change stated that the DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE would permit women to remain on active duty while pregnant and return to their jobs after giving birth. Also, women who adopted children or acquired stepchildren as a result of marriage were also permitted to remain on active in active duty.

1976 Title 10 USC 6015¹⁵

- The Act specified that women could not serve on ships.
- The House Armed Services Committee conducted a hearing and received congressional testimony.

1977 The first female Air Force aviators received their wings.¹⁶

1978 Owens v. Brown¹⁷

- A U.S. District Court ruled that 10 USC 6015 was unconstitutional. As a result, in the FY79 defense authorization bill Congress amended the law to allow the permanent assignment of women to noncombatant ships.
- The Navy initiated its Women in Ships program.
- The Coast Guard removed all gender-based assignment restrictions.

1980 Defense Officer Personnel Manpower Act (12 December 1980)¹⁸

- The Act placed women in all Service branches on the same promotion lists as men. The Act was specifically targeted for the Army, Navy, and Marines, as the Air Force had already incorporated women on the same promotion lists as men before the enactment of the Act. It set boundaries for parallelism; it was not necessarily gender driven.

1981 The Joint Services sent a confidential memo to the Reagan Transition Team regarding a request to hold the line on women and refrain from implementing planned recruitment goals and end strengths.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, page 223, *Pregnancy*.

¹⁵ 10 USCA 6015, Repealed. Pub.L. 103-160, Div. A, Title V S 541(a), Nov. 30, 193, 1107 Stat. 1659.

¹⁶ *Women in the Military*; page 4.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, page 5.

¹⁸ *Women and the Military, An Encyclopedia 1*; page 93 (DOPMA).

1983 Operation Urgent Fury and Libya¹⁹

- The United States invaded Grenada. A total of 170 women soldiers and Air Force women were deployed.
- Air Force women were crew members on KC-135 and KC-10 tanker aircraft that participated in the raid on Libya.

1988 Risk Rule²⁰

- The Rule was developed to give various Service branches a standard for determining how women could serve. Noncombatant positions were to be closed to women when the positions involve risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire, and so forth, if such are equal to or greater than that experienced by associated combat units in the same theater of operations. A total of 30,000 new positions were opened to women.

1989 Operation Just Cause²¹

- The United States invaded Panama. A total of 770 women were deployed for the operation (600 women were already in Panama). Women flying Black Hawk helicopters came under fire and were awarded the Air Medal.

- 1990
- General Thomas Hickey testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that he believed that women were capable of doing any Air Force combat jobs, i.e., “fly fighters, pull Gs, and are physically and emotionally capable” for combat.
 - The repeal of the ban on women flyers serving in combat missions began.²²

1991 Gulf War²³

- The United States deployed approximately 40,872 women for Desert Shield/Storm. Thirteen women were killed and 2 were taken prisoner of war.
- The Kennedy-Roth Amendment repealed the 10 USC that barred women from flying aircraft in combat missions.²⁴

¹⁹ *Women in the Military*, page 5.

²⁰ *Women and the Military, An Encyclopedia I*; p. 72, *Combat Exclusion Law*.

²¹ *Women in the Military*, page 5.

²² *Women and the Military, An Encyclopedia I*; page 73, *Combat Pilots*.

²³ *Women and the Military, An Encyclopedia I*; page 73, *Combat Pilots*.

²⁴ *Women in the Military*, page 5.

1992 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Services

- The Commission was formed to evaluate the combat exclusion clauses of the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948 that integrated women in the military.²⁵

1993 Secretary of Defense Memos

- Defense Secretary Les Aspin dismissed the Presidential Commission's recommendation and ordered that the ban on women from serving in combat aviation jobs be lifted. He also directed the Navy to repeal the combat ship exclusion. Aspin advised all four branches of Service to investigate and justify any policies that exclude women from combat duty; that process led to the repeal of the Combat Exclusion Law.²⁶

1994 • More than 1,000 women participated in U.S. operations in Somalia (1992–1994).²⁷

- The Risk Rule was rescinded. As a result 32,700 Army positions and 48,000 Marine Corps positions were opened to women.
- Almost all Navy ships were open to women, with the exception of some submarines and small ships because of privacy problems.

1995 • The ban was lifted regarding women in the Navy; they were allowed to fly combat jets, prop aircraft, and helicopters.

- More than 1,200 women were deployed to Haiti for peacekeeping.
- Women Marine Corps aviators received their wings.

1997 Bosnia

- More than 5,000 women have been deployed in Bosnia.

²⁵ *Women and the Military, An Encyclopedia 1*; page 224, *Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Services*.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pages 72–73, *Combat Exclusion Law* and *Combat Pilot*, respectively.

²⁷ *Women in the Military*, page 6.

History and Rationale for Policy Change: Gender-Integrated/Segregated Recruit Training

Each military Service approaches the training of its recruits differently and each Service has different historical patterns in the level of gender integration/segregation of its basic training. The historical rationale for the different patterns and for the changes in training policies across the four Services is unclear. During the periods in which policy changes were announced and implemented, official and even public statements are difficult to document.

1978–1982—Army and Air Force

Although the Army and the Air Force were the first two Services to gender-integrate their basic training in 1978, the Army, Air Force, and Navy began standardizing their basic training curricula earlier (in 1974 for the Army and Navy and in 1976 for the Air Force). Technically, the Marine Corps did not standardize separate boot camps for men and women until 1996. In addition, certain training, such as Adjutant General School, some Army medical specializations, Officer Candidate School, Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), advanced individual training, and then, of course, the military academies were gender-integrated starting in the 1950's, 1960's, and early–mid 1970's respectively. Brian Mitchell suggests that the integration of women in the Service academies was a result of Congress introducing legislation based on the public mood of the time, which was to integrate. Mitchell indicates that members of Congress believed that the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) would pass and that, as a result, the military academies would have to integrate anyway.²⁸

The policy shift to gender-integrate basic training in the Air Force was preceded by gender-integrating military training instructors as early as 1974. This was probably due at least in part to the fact that during 1974 there was a severe shortage of female military training instructors with a simultaneous increase in accessions of female trainees. By 1977, male and female airmen were running the confidence course together and basic military training squadrons began to gender integrate. In 1978 the first flight was gender integrated.

The Army also gender-integrated their basic training in 1978 after directly testing single-gender environments. The rationale for why both the Army and the Air Force gender-integrated their basic training is embedded in the larger American (civilian) social context of the increasing presence of women in the workplace and nontraditional career fields as well as other phenomena, such as the introduction of coed college dormitories, public debates about Equal Rights Amendment, not to mention the accession demands created by the all volunteer force. It is also important to note that the Carter Administration, elected in 1976, was committed to greater and more representative participation of women in the public sphere. While all these events should be considered as important environmental factors to the 1978 Army and Air Force change in basic training policy, it is not the case that they have ever been directly and causally linked to the change. Several studies, however, raised the question of gender-integrated basic training.

²⁸ Mitchell, Brian, *Women in the Military: Flirting with Disaster* (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1998), pages 23–33.

Between the years 1976 and 1982, the Army conducted the following nine studies:²⁹

- Women in the Army—WITA (ODCSPER—1976)
- Utilization of Women in the Army (MILPERCEN—1977)
- Women Content in Units—MAX WAC (ARI—1977)
- Evaluation of Women in the Army—EWITA (ODCSPER—1978)
- Women Content in the Army—REF WAC (ARI—1978)
- Comprehensive Evaluation of Total Integration of Women in the Army (ODCSPER—1980)
- Enlisted Women in the Army (AAA—1982)
- Lost Time Utilization (ARI—1982)
- Women in the Army Policy Review—WITAPR (ODCSPER—1982)

The *Women in the Army* study and the MAX WAC study were completed before the 1978 change to GIBT. One important conclusion of the WITA study was that the numbers of women and the numbers of positions open to women could be increased. The MAX WAC study also positively supported increasing numbers for women. But perhaps more important for the purpose of understanding the change in policy is a critique of the Army Research Institute (ARI) study by the Army's Operational Test and Evaluation Agency signed by General Julius Becton.³⁰ Several recommendations were made in the Becton response, one of which was that the Army's basic training should be integrated. According to Stiehm, however, the Army increased women's participation and opportunities at the behest of the Department of Defense³¹ and was always reluctant to do so.

It was, in fact, in 1982 that the Army reversed its gender-integrated basic training policy. According to Stiehm, "memos had been circulating since March" discussing "gender pure basic training."³² The new Reagan administration halted many of the accession and end-strength goals of the Carter administration. According to a 19 January 1981 *Air Force Times* article,³³ a joint-Service manpower report to the Reagan Pentagon transition team asked the new administration permission to keep the numbers of female enlistees down until their impact on readiness could be determined. The request was presented in a position paper on

²⁹ Stiehm, Judith Hicks, *Arms and the Enlisted Woman* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), page 137.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, page 141.

³¹ Stiehm, page 54, Carter appointed many individuals who specifically monitored women's roles in the military and, as such, any kind of dissent to the policies of increasing women's participation in the Army was muted, or at least took place in the form of reluctance. Holm in her work, *Women in the Military* (1992), concurs with Stiehm that most of the studies undertaken by the Army during the late 1970's and early 1980's were attempts to stem the tide of increased participation of women. As Holm writes about the results of the MAX WAC and REFWAC studies, "It was found then that women generally performed their tasks as well as men and that any unit degradation was negligible or statistically insignificant. That was not what the Army had expected to find" (401). Brian Mitchell would disagree with that assessment. He states that the studies were designed to "paper over the holes of knowledge" to show the "apparent ability of women to perform all kinds of tasks without degrading unit performance" (1998, 84). The tests he refers to are MAX WAC, REFWAC, EWITA, and others.

³² *Ibid.*, page 62.

³³ Philpott, Tom, , "Slow Female EM Recruiting," *Air Force Times* 19 January 1981, page 4.

women in the military, as part of the manpower report.³⁴ Because the report is not available, it is unclear whether or not the issue of GIBT was discussed (there is no indication that it was); however, what was clear was that the Services felt that Carter's female recruiting goals did "not appear attainable if desired quality standards [were] to be maintained." In fact, the Army went ahead and informed the Senate Armed Services Committee in testimony about a pause in female recruitment even before informing the Department of Defense of the decision.³⁵ In the 26 February 1981 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Manpower Subcommittee, the Army's Acting Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, William Clark, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, LTG. Robert Yerks, explained that although the Army was cutting back its female end-strength and recruitment goals, that did not mean that women were not "valuable and productive soldiers." And, according to testimony, the "womanpause" was not due to the combat-risk debate because the Army had "accepted the fundamental premise that women will be killed and wounded and captured in the event of the next war."³⁶

Mitchell notes that the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Meyer, in the fall of 1980 initially proposed the "womanpause" for the Army and, a month after Reagan was inaugurated, Secretary of Defense Weinberger was informed of the freeze.³⁷ Once the Reagan defense team was in place and the female enlistee pause policy was officially underway, it was explained that the change was due to a reassessment of military needs. By June of 1981 the Army had stopped enlisting women.

Though the Air Force maintained the gender integration of its training flights, it too went through its own pause/reduction in women's enlistment goals. In July of the same year the Air Force announced a one-third reduction in its female end-strengths.³⁸ It was less clear why the Air Force, which, up to that point, had more progressive policies, higher percentages of women, and fewer military occupational specialty restrictions than any of the Services, had abruptly altered its female accession policy. Holm postulates that Air Force leadership feared the Defense Department would pressure the Air Force to pick up the Army's slack in recruiting women. So, in a preemptive move, the Air Force touted the need to cap and even reduce levels of female airmen in order to maintain readiness.³⁹

³⁴ This position paper is not readily available. Stiehm actually calls the report a "confidential memo" and says all four Services participated (54). Holm describes the event somewhat differently and states that the Army and Air Force "secretly" submitted proposals, but it was unclear if the Navy and Marine Corps had actually participated in the report (387). According to Mike Dugan, Archivist at the Reagan Library, transition team materials are considered the President's personal papers and are not released to the Presidential Libraries (in other words, this document is not available from the Reagan Library).

³⁵ Stiehm, 55. Holm also states that the Army's move to announce the pause before it went to The Department Of Defense was contrary to policy. She states, "the move had all the earmarks fo an end-run power play between the Army and the Senate Armed Services Committee. The reaction of the new Defense officials, as described by one insider, was 'incredulous'" (391).

³⁶ Quoted in Holm (1992), page 388.

³⁷ Mitchell, Brian, (1998), pages 101-103.

³⁸ Stiehm, page 56.

³⁹ Holm, page 391.

It is widely recognized that under the new Reagan administration the Services were given much more leeway to decide personnel policy than they had had under Carter's Department of Defense.⁴⁰ As such, many policies were changed during the first two years of the new administration, including the Army's gender-integrated basic training. In April of 1982 the Army announced it would end its four-year-old policy of gender-integrated basic training. According to Stiehm, the policy took almost everyone by surprise: neither DACOWITS nor the Defense Department's Equal Opportunity Office had been informed. And the Defense Department neither announced nor affirmed the policy shift.⁴¹ A 17 May 1982 *Army Times* article quotes Colonel Charles Fountain as explaining that the presence of women in basic training has a detrimental psychological impact on men. A 16 August 1982 *Army Times* article states that the official reason for the shift in policy was that men were not being physically challenged enough because of the differences in physical strength between male and female enlistees. Major General Mary Clarke, who had retired as head of the Pentagon's Human Resources Development in October 1981, was quoted in the same 16 August 1982 *Army Times* article as saying that ending gender-integrated basic training was a "step backward."

At the time, another study, the "Women in the Army Policy Review," was underway and was supposed to be published in the fall of 1981. The study had been delayed several times with little explanation. The chair of DACOWITS at the time, Maria Elena Torralva, was quoted in a 4 August 1982 *Washington Post* article as saying that Army officials had told her that no major policy change involving women would be issued until the study had been completed. Nevertheless the Army had reversed its gender-integrated basic training policy in April, before the following November release of the report. Sharon Lord, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity and Safety, criticized the policy by saying that it "smacks of the old argument of separate but equal. It looks like the decision was made that implies women aren't performing well."⁴² After the Army announced its change in gender-integrated basic training, The Women's Equity Action League (WEAL) sent a letter to the Army asking why the policy had been reversed. The Army's public affairs office wrote that in the gender-segregated training units there was higher morale. The policy, according to the letter, was based on the judgment of the training center commanders and the noncommissioned officers (NCO) who were in daily contact with trainees. Apparently the decision was not based on any systematic study or comparative test of different kinds of basic training.⁴³ Gender-segregated basic training remained in force until 1994, after the policy had been reassessed again.

⁴⁰ It is also important to keep in mind that the military personnel situation at the time of Reagan's transition into office was wrapped up with what Holm describes as a doubting of our military's "war-detering and war-fighting capabilities." She explains that "The Iranian hostage seizure, followed by a botched rescue attempt, had conveyed a message of military incompetence; and with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the public perceived a growing disparity in defense expenditures between the United States and the Soviet Union....The growing public sentiment was that the U.S. military had become a 'hollow' force—neglected to the point that its ability to defend the nation's interest was in jeopardy" (383–84).

⁴¹ Stiehm, pages 61–62.

⁴² *Washington Post*, 4 August 1982, page A17.

⁴³ Stiehm, page 61.

1990s—Army and Navy

The Navy changed its policy toward gender-integrated basic training in 1992. The Army reverted to gender-integrated basic training in 1994. Just as the environment of the mid-late 1970's allowed women greater participation in the military, it could be argued that there was a similar environment of change before the Navy's boot camp gender-integration that may have eased apprehension or disbelief toward women's abilities to perform.

Granada and Panama were the first two tests of women being deployed for actual military operations. But in both operations women's presence was rather small and, as such, neither Granada nor Panama was considered adequate evidence that the coed military was working. Panama (1989) was the most controversial because of the stories that emerged after Operation Just Cause was initiated. There were stories involving women soldiers who met with varying degrees of enemy fire, from light to heavy.⁴⁴ This was basically the first time it was publicly recognized that women had been explicitly targeted as combatants.

The imposition of the 1987 Risk Rule was seen as both a boon and a detriment for women in the military. After the Risk Rule went into effect about 30,000 noncombatant positions were opened to women.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, people who were advocates of increased roles for women in the military saw the Risk Rule as an arbitrary barrier. Holm was one noted critic. She claimed that the Risk Rule was theoretically based on the faulty premise that it is possible to protect women while allowing them to be soldiers, which is, after all, a risky profession. Furthermore, she argues, "modern weapons do not distinguish between combatants and noncombatants."⁴⁶

Most would argue and many have that Desert Shield/Storm, the first major operational deployment of women, proved to military and political leadership alike that women were indeed soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. The Persian Gulf deployment was not without its gender-integration problems, but it was the most obvious impetus for increasing women's roles. An important additional intervening factor to keep in mind after the Gulf deployment is the effect of the drawdown, particularly within the Navy.

It was during those years that both the Army and the Navy changed their recruit training policies to gender integrate. The Navy undertook a study in 1987 entitled "The Navy Study Group's Report on Progress of Women in the Navy." It was completed and released in December 1987. According to the executive summary of the study, the Secretary of the Navy tasked the group to study in particular the command environment and quality of life with regard to equality of treatment of men and women. Of particular concern to the Secretary was the issue of fraternization and sexual harassment.⁴⁷ Chapter 3 of the report indicates that in

⁴⁴ The story of Captain Bray commanding an MP company to take an enemy dog kennel was initially exaggerated in a *Los Angeles Times* article that stirred up controversy that the Department of Defense was trying to make women appear more capable than they were. Nevertheless, three Army women (all three of them pilots who flew missions under heavy enemy fire) received Air Medals and two of them received a "V" for valor (Holm, 435).

⁴⁵ Victoria Sherrow, *Women and the Military: An Encyclopedia* (Denver: ABC-CLIO, 1996), page 72.

⁴⁶ Holm, page 433.

⁴⁷ "Navy Study Group's Report on Progress of Women in the Navy"(1987), ES-1.

the 70 commands studied, in 10 geographic locations in the continental United States, the Pacific, and Europe, sexual harassment aimed at women was widespread. In fact, the majority of women interviewed in the study indicated that they had experienced sexual harassment themselves and almost all women interviewed said that they had observed some form of it.⁴⁸ A progress report of the study group was issued in 1990. It stated that by 1990, sexual harassment still existed in all its previous forms, though less than was reported in 1987. An additional finding was that the non-acceptance of women begins at the training centers. The report states:

Experience at Recruit Training Command (RTC) should emphasize group and team success, and these teams should reflect the diverse representation of ability, race, and gender that exists in the fleet....Creating a less isolated, more realistic, and appropriately disciplined but interactive environment within recruit training will foster professionalism, cooperation and team building from the start. The mixed-gender recruit training site co-locates female and male recruits at the same site but does not integrate them, i.e., women and men sit on opposite sides of the classroom, they march separately, they are in segregated “sister” and “brother” companies, they PT separately, and they cannot talk socially under any circumstances. There are few if any evolutions in which they work together as equal partners to accomplish a mission, large or small, simple or complex.⁴⁹

One recommendation that the study made was to develop a pilot program at recruit training that would teach men and women how to work together in teams. If this program proved to be effective, then, the report recommended, the Navy should consider gender-integrating boot camp and then implementing the team-building program under a gender-integrated training environment.⁵⁰ In 1992, the Division of Policy Planning Research under the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute published their study of the effects of gender-integration on basic military trainees (the study was done at the Orlando Naval Training Center). Based on the results of the study, it was recommended that integration should continue. It was also noted in the Presidential Commission’s Report that the Commander of the Recruit Training Command and the Commander of the Navy Recruit Training Center recommended to the Presidential Commission that the integrated training program be made permanent.⁵¹ The 1993 Blue Ribbon Panel Report states that as a result of this pilot program:

⁴⁸ Navy Study Group, 3-1.

⁴⁹ Update Report --Navy Study Group (1990), III-21.

⁵⁰ It should also be noted that the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces was released in November of 1992. In it the Commission recommended that entry-level training may be as gender-specific as necessary (8 Commissioners voted yes on this issue while 6 voted no; 1 Commissioner abstained), pp. 9–10.

⁵¹ Presidential Commission, Appendix C-79, Item 2.4.1C.

“Women were fully integrated into all aspects of the training environment including marching, physical training, and classroom participation. Integrated companies/divisions were berthed in the same building but in separate berthing compartments. RDCs were assigned without regard to the gender of the recruits that they were assigned to train, i.e., males [sic] RDCs could be assigned to train female companies and vice versa.⁵²

Additionally in 1994, due to the effects of downsizing, the Navy consolidated its boot camp to one site, Great Lakes. By 1994 all Navy recruits trained in integrated units.

The Army’s reversion to gender-integrated basic training followed a similar path. In 1994 the Army Chief of Staff authorized gender-integrated basic training at the squad level. Starting in 1993 the Army Research Institute was tasked to evaluate the reintroduction of gender-integrated basic training at Fort Jackson. Research indicated that gender-integrated basic training produced better-trained female soldiers and did not negatively affect male soldiers.⁵³ Aside from the environmental factors discussed earlier (*e.g.*, Desert Shield/Desert Storm), it is unclear why the Army initiated the ARI studies in the first place.

⁵² 1993 Blue Ribbon Panel, Attachment 1.

⁵³ Mottern, Jacqueline, et al., “The Gender Integration of Basic Combat Training Study” (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1997).

Bibliography

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Gender-Integrated Basic Training and Related Studies

DeFleur, Lois B. 1985. Organizational and ideological barriers to gender integration in military groups. *Work and- Occupations* 12:206-228.

Summary

In this article DeFleur summarizes salient factors affecting gender-integration in traditionally all-male fields. She draws some parallels between the gender-integration process in all-male fields and the integration of male racial and ethnic minorities in military groups. She does not test a specific hypothesis, rather she summarizes information and survey data from military group studies. In essence, the author's data are from secondary sources (previous studies and research). DeFleur's goal in writing this article is to compare forces that impede gender-integration in the military (different branches) to the same forces in civilian groups.

Quantitative review. N/A

Characteristics of the sample N/A

General research design

The author's intent is not to test a specific hypothesis but to synthesize information from various studies of gender-integration. She begins with a general and somewhat theoretical discussion of the organization and ideological factors affecting gender-integration. Her discussion functions as a critical and useful literature review of gender-integration theory. Based on this information, she follows with a review of the factors that affect gender-integration/segregation in military groups and most specifically the Air Force.

Findings

Based on her analysis of previous civilian work-force and military studies, DeFleur concludes that female soldiers have been accommodated into military culture but not assimilated, which means they are still peripheral to the organization. The author writes, "In light of the parameters of many of the organizational variables such as opportunity structures, power systems, distinctive characteristics of people attracted to these organizations, and the roles they perform, the present slow course of sex integration in the military and other comparable occupational groups is not surprising" (226). Full integration will require organizational, individual and societal changes. However, because there is little pressure for change in the service academies as well as other military groups, the present situation that defines gender- integration, will remain.

Questions for further research / Recommendations or Utilization of findings.

None provided

Brief summary of strengths and weaknesses of the research.

While DeFleur's analysis is internally consistent and theoretically rich, it provides very little in the way of insightful recommendations that the services can take to successfully increase gender- integration at any or all levels, including basic training. Additionally, the article is 12 years old and the proportion of women's representation in the military has increased, counter to her projections, specifically with regard to the Air Force. Nevertheless, this work provides a very important and relevant theoretical discussion of gender-integration that many studies completely ignore.

Devilbiss, M.C. 1985. Gender integration and unit deployment: A study of GI Jo. *Armed Forces and Society* 11:523-552.

Summary

Devilbiss' study is of women and men performing operational combat support functions together in a field-deployed military unit on a combat exercise. The focus of the research is on gender- integration and the identification of interpersonal and organizational effects of incorporating women into a predominantly male environment.

Quantitative review

1. Report of statistical results.

- N/A (main methodology was participant observation, no quantitative analysis was made).

2. Availability of data.

- Data were gathered by author's personal observations (in a small notebook). Her conclusions are summarized and analyzed in the article.

3. Time period of research / data collection

- The data were gathered during a combat exercise, March 27 to April 10, 1982

Characteristics of the sample

- The sample studied was a recently formed rapid deployment force (RDF) that was undergoing a Joint Chief of Staff field exercise to test the force under simulated combat conditions in a desert environment.
- Devilbiss was a member of a unit participating in the exercise. Her rank was E-4.
- The observation took place in a radar squadron of the Air National Guard.
- The author's East coast unit deployed to the West coast with about 200 squadron personnel and its equipment.
- All personnel who participated in the operation lived and worked under field conditions.
- Empirical data from official records on demographics and social background were not collected. However, based on general observation, the author notes that virtually all of the enlisted personnel had high school degrees with the majority having technical or blue-collar skills. Most of the officers had a college degree and/or had mostly white-collar civilian jobs. There were some full time students and some with advanced degrees. Most members of the unit were from the Northeast, most came from small towns. Racial minorities comprised approximately 10 percent-12 percent of the unit's personnel. About 10 percent of the personnel were women.

General research design

Devilbiss' main data collection methodology was participant observation. The author was both researcher and member of the sampled RDF unit. The nature of the RDF exercise created an isolated social system which facilitated an environment where the author could observe virtually all deployed personnel at least once. Most frequent observations made were

of the researcher's own work group (5-15 people), tent mates (3-6 women) and another group of 20-30 individuals in other work sections. Living conditions during the exercise were primitive and dangerous. The researcher recorded observations on a small notebook, as unobtrusively as possible, making notes as soon after the observed event as possible. Her method of systematically analyzing the observations was a "grounded theory approach." Observations were made during deployment in order to be examined and interpreted later using a gender-integration effects framework (content analysis). Her theoretical/content analysis draws on several theories, noted in her study.

Findings

Devilbiss notes that the effect of military women on cohesion is not fully known because previous studies had tended to focus exclusively on a physical analysis and less on interpersonal factors. Additionally, much research shows that some men in all-male units are very ineffective. As such, Devilbiss concludes that there are factors other than cohesion that influence combat effectiveness, and that to understand the cohesiveness of a group, issues in addition to gender must be taken into account.

Devilbiss' findings are grounded in the gender-integration literature:

- Gender-consciousness. The research indicates that perhaps individual feelings about the field environment may be gender-neutral except for this notion of gender-consciousness that women uniquely experience. She noted that she felt very conscious of her gender during the deployment (which is not normal for her). This was perhaps because women as a class, at a proportion of 10 percent were highly "visible." A second explanation is perhaps because women's presence challenges traditional norms of women's work. Thirdly, women are not seen as sharing the same risks as men because they are barred from combat duties. This factor filters down to the individual and his or her attitudes, particularly when combat is generally defined as the most important role in military missions.
- Feminine hygiene. Field facilities were available (toilets and showers and a place to wash clothing). Both men and women were somewhat fastidious about cleanliness. Some notable exceptions were one or two women who wore perfume or painted her nails. However, there were a number of men who brought grooming implements with them as well. As for whether or not menstrual periods affected the women's performance, there was not evidence to suggest that it did. In sum, hygiene tended to be a personal and not a gender-related issue.
- Mental and physical survival of women in the field environment. Both men and women experienced difficulties with mental toughness, perhaps men with more frequency or even more chronically. Though when women did experience what the author calls "losing it," it was described as being gender-related and not based on the individual's personality or particular situation, as it was with men who "lost it." In other words, men's individual negative behavior was attributed to personal character and experience and women's individual negative behavior was attributed to her class as a woman. As for the physical nature of survival, women were expected to have more injuries but whether they did or not

was unclear. Also, many minor injuries that women experienced stemmed from ill-fitting clothing and equipment that was not designed for women.

- Effects on combat readiness. Inter-gender norms changed from the beginning of the exercise to the end of the exercise to where the situation became characterized as “every person for him/herself.” The author did say she derived a sense of comfort from being in the presence of larger individuals (usually men), but she questions whether or not she is confusing size with the ability to protect. Also, if men protect women in the field as opposed to share their survival knowledge and tools, then perhaps they are in fact exposing women to more danger thus not protecting them at all.
- Unit bonding. Devilbiss felt more closely bonded to her mixed-gendered work group than her gender-group. This sentiment was echoed by at least one other in her study. Commonality of experience is perhaps more of an explanation for bonding, and not commonality of gender (in fact, gender may be incidental). Non-sexual bonding between men and women did occur in the field.
- Unit cohesion. Commonality of experience, shared risk, mutual experiences of hardship and not gender differences are probably the defining factors in understanding unit cohesion.
- Combat readiness. Devilbiss defines combat readiness as how well a unit does its job to achieve its mission. The author feels that women’s participation in the field exercise enhanced readiness. The women who were deployed were deployed because their skills were critical to the unit’s operation (gender was, again, incidental).

Questions for further research / Recommendations or Utilization of findings

The author poses several questions for further research:

- Will both men and women use field hygiene facilities to the same extent when they are available to them?
- Would either sex have been more or less meticulous about personal grooming in a single-sex environment?
- Testing the battle protection hypothesis for gender effects could be done by controlling for gender by seeing if smaller men felt comforted in the presence of larger men and asking large, combat-experienced men if they felt protective of smaller men or of inexperienced troops.

Brief summary of strengths and weaknesses of the research

The author herself lists a number of weaknesses in her participant observation research design. Such methodology is limited in scope (it has a “spatial and temporal uniqueness”) and results are often not generalizable. Observations are anecdotal. Analysis tends to be impressionistic—in other words, there is too much potential of observer effect and bias. One strength in participant observation is that it allows the researcher to be an active participant in the study, which has great potential for giving him or her additional insight that a passive observer or researcher may never have otherwise.

Greene, Byron, D. III and Kenneth L. Wilson. 1981. Women Warriors: Exploring the New Integration of Women into the Military. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 9:241-254.

Summary

This study provides an analysis of the consequences of various forms of gender-integration in basic training. The analysis is based on a sample of over 800 Army trainees in the south in 1979 (no specification of where in the south is noted). “The data were gathered from official training records and questionnaires. Three integration contexts are identified which vary in the amount of male-female contact and in the structured nature of the contact. It was found that the structural context significantly alters the effects of amount of contact. Specifically, the moderate integration context produces the greatest polarization between the sexes on attitudes toward the female role, the most dissatisfaction, and the lowest levels of performance. The notion of “contextual-contact” was introduced as a conceptual tool for explaining the effects of variations in both the structural setting and frequency of interaction within the settings” (241).

Quantitative review

1. Report of statistical results.

- Chi-square comparisons among the 3 integration contexts are provided as are the LISREL estimates for the 3 integration contexts.

2. Availability of data.

- Not noted in article.

3. Time period of research / data collection.

- 1979

Characteristics of the sample

1. Results are based on a sample of 800 male and female soldiers in basic training on one Army base in the south (231 female soldiers and 582 male soldiers. Exact southern location not given). Women were over-sampled and the sample of men represent a simple random sample of approximately 50 percent of the male population within the sampled units.
2. Data were gathered from official training records and questionnaires.
3. The data are a stratified random sample taken from a single military base.

General research design

Greene and Wilson provide a context for their analysis by creating three ideal types or variations of gender-integration among their sampled units—whether there is integration at the company, platoon or squad levels. The complete-integration context is where there is gender-integration at all three levels. Moderate integration is integration only at the platoon and company levels (with same-sex squads) and the least integration context is integration

that only occurs at the company level (with same-sex platoons). This is the model, which they call the “contextual-contact” model, through which their analysis takes place.

The data were gathered by personally administered questionnaires and official records provided by the installation’s authorities. There are 9 variables which form the analysis: 1. Final exam (composed of performance measures at time of final exam); 2. Physicals (composed of 3 fitness tests—push-ups, sit-ups and time to run a mile); 3. Satisfaction (composed of questionnaire items); 4. Attitude toward women (using a tested attitude scale); 5. Sex (male—19.5 years is the mean for men and female—20.2 is the mean for women); 6. Age; 7. Race; 8. Education (scale of 1—less than high school to 8—graduate school); and 9. AFQT-Armed Forces Qualification Test (derived from official records). Coefficients in the analysis are estimated using a LISREL, maximum likelihood estimating program through 2 procedures: 1. Estimated coefficients for groups assuming no differences between groups and 2. A Chi-square statistic which compares the resulting estimates with a covariance matrix.

Findings

It was hypothesized by Greene and Wilson that the analysis of intergroup differences will show that the contextual-contact, (in other words, the 3 male-female integration alternatives) would each have unique social processes. This was indeed what the LISREL analysis demonstrated. Most significant was the fact that, with regard to attitudes toward woman, moving from the least integration to the most integration, discrepancies by gender were not reduced. As the authors state, “In fact, male attitudes toward women are more conservative than female attitudes, and to about the same extent, in both the least integration and complete integration context. The moderate integration context exhibits the greatest amount of polarization between the sexes” (249). With regard to satisfaction with military life, “the complete integration setting is associated with the least amount of discrepancy between the satisfactions of male and female soldiers” (249). However, female soldiers in the least integrated setting are more dissatisfied with military life than male soldiers. This statistic is of a greater magnitude for women in the moderate integrated setting. Additionally, with regard to performance on physicals, it was found that women do worse in the physical testing than men, however, this discrepancy is reduced in the complete integration setting, but is greatest in the moderate integration setting. In sum, the authors claim that the most integrated training context reduces discrepancies for satisfaction of military life, physicals and final exam, but does not have much of an effect on attitudes towards women. The greatest polarization of the sexes on the variables, attitudes towards women, satisfaction and performance on physicals, took place in the context of moderate contextual-contact (or the mid-level of gender-integration in training).

Questions for further research / Recommendations or Utilization of findings

A more thorough understanding of the failure of the moderate level of integration may help the Army to understand the successes of the complete-integration context. The authors claim this is something that should be researched. Questions the authors consider (253): “How do men and women in civilian life react to sex integration of traditionally male occupations?” How do men and women who have gone through integrated basic training

react to integrated life in the main force?” “What are the effects on female fire fighters police and construction workers?”

Brief summary of strengths and weaknesses of the research

According to the authors, the results are not generalizable beyond basic training and they are probably only generalizable in the context where basic training has already been gender-integrated at some level.

Harrell, Margaret C. and Laura L. Miller. 1997. *New opportunities for military women: Effects upon readiness, cohesion and morale*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Summary

Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) responding to the 1997 Defense Authorization Act, requested the National Defense Research Institute to study and assess the extent and effect of the integration of women in all four of the US armed services. The study is a short-term analysis that, in essence, evaluates the progress of integrating women into MOSs and units previously closed to them. There are 3 components to the study: 1. An analysis of how each service implements the opening of new MOSs; 2. The progress in carrying out integration as dictated by congressional guidance; and 3. An assessment of the effects of gender-integration on readiness, cohesion and the morale of units. According to Harrell and Miller, whether or not and to what degree women fill the new MOSs open to them depends on a number of factors such as training or retraining times, levels of interest, etc. One result is clear—some progress in integrating women into the new MOSs in all services has been made. There are still limitations to women, however, and these limitations function in both informal and formal ways. The most important finding is that gender-integration is perceived to have a relatively small effect on readiness, cohesion and morale in the units studied, whereas leadership and training and other factors are perceived to have much more significant influence.

Quantitative review

1. Report of statistical results.

- For each questionnaire item an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used (F-score given). A test of significant variation along gender, rank, race, unit and service was also performed. Open-ended questions were systematically coded and responses are presented in tables.

2. Availability of data.

- Questionnaires are provided in appendices.
- Aggregate data of questionnaires, focus groups and interviews are also provided.
- The authors provide an immense amount of data regarding women's participation and women's opportunities in each of the services throughout their study and also in their various appendices.

3. Time period of research / data collection.

Data were collected in response to an FY97 Defense Authorization Bill. The work was published in 1997. Some of the information gathered for the study was based on participants' recollections of past events, dating back to the change in policy in 1993.

Characteristics of the sample

Since Harrell and Miller were limited to units that were not deployed, the sample selection methodology was constrained both by time and location. The surveys, interviews and focus groups were conducted from 5 Army units, 7 Naval units, and 2 Marine Corps units.

Because of the way women had been assigned into new Air Force MOSs, the researchers could not include a sample of Air Force personnel without violating several principles of the research design. As such, the Air Force was omitted for some, but not all of the analysis. Army command personnel from units other than the 5 units listed above were interviewed (including units that had MOSs traditionally open to women, units where they were just opened to women and those units that had been closed to women— including, combat arms, combat support and combat service support units). The researchers visited 3 Navy combat ships and 4 Navy aviation units, 3 of which were recently opened to women (the sample consisted of different sized ships, from destroyer to aircraft carrier and different types of aviation units). Two Marine Corps units were selected: one that had been open to women prior to the legislation but also had women in newly opened occupations and the other one which had previously been closed to women. There were 934 survey respondents, 492 focus-group participants (320 of which were men and 172, women).

General research design

The research was a short-term analysis. The first task performed was to assess the rate that the services were integrating women into the newly opened MOSs. This was done primarily through interviewing officials from each service and then interviewing the referrals of those individuals who were involved in the integration process in 1993-1994. Answering the questions about gender-integration and its effects on readiness and morale began with a data collection process to determine where women actually served in the new MOSs. A random sample of women was not used because the researchers were restricted to CONUS locations (units that were not deployed). As such, an exploratory research was used which functioned to sample as many different cases of women's integration as possible. Once the sample was taken, the research methodology was based around interviews, focus groups and surveys. Interviews were conducted with commanding and executive officers, and ranking enlisted leaders. Focus groups were conducted with one or two researchers and a group of approximately 10 individuals. These focus groups were divided by grade and gender into 8 groups, as shown here

:

Rank	Gender
E1 - E4	Female
E1 - E4	Male
E7, E8, E9	Female
E7, E8, E9	Male
E5, E6	Female
E5, E6	Male
Officers	Female
Officers	Male

The Focus group participation was voluntary. The discussions centered on many issues, including, gender differences in performance of duties, treatment of women compared to treatment of men, personal concerns about family and job satisfaction, whether or not men and women treat subordinates differently, how gender-integration has changed the unit, preparations for integration made by the command structure, etc. Questionnaires were

completed by all personnel who participated in the focus groups and by additional personnel who had not participated in the focus groups.

Findings

In terms of the effects on readiness, morale and cohesion, Harrell and Miller found that gender-integration is perceived to have a relatively small effect on readiness, cohesion and morale in the units studied. Commanders and personnel in units studied indicated that gender-integration had not had a major effect on the units' readiness. However, the most cited effect on readiness was pregnancy (particularly in units with many women and/or understaffed units). Any divisions caused by gender were minimal or invisible in units with high cohesion. Gender appeared to be an issue only with conflicting groups. But even in these cases, gender took a "back seat" to divisions along work groups on grade lines. When gender was an issue, the researchers postulate that this was because gender is one way that people break into categories when conflict surfaces. They also found that gender was an issue when there was dating within the unit. However, gender was also mentioned as having a positive effect on cohesion as well as well as having the effect of raising the level of professional standards within the unit.

In terms of unit morale, gender was almost never mentioned in issues affecting morale. It was, in fact, leadership that was regarded as the most important influence on unit morale. In the focus groups when gender was an issue the two most frequently cited problems were sexual harassment and double standards. The majority of both men and women stated that sexual harassment does not occur within their units. Another positive effect of gender-integration noted, particularly with regard to morale, was that with women around, men are more able to discuss frustrations and other personal issues with female colleagues more than with their male colleagues. This particular opportunity, it was cited by participants, gives men less destructive outlets, such as excessive drinking or fighting.

- Other findings related to gender:

1. A majority of both sexes preferred gender-integrated basic training. 25 percent of women and 39 percent of men preferred gender-segregated basic training.
2. Over half of the enlisted men surveyed and over 80 percent of the women surveyed, favored some kind of relaxation of the ground combat exclusion policy.
3. All but 14 percent men and 18 percent women were split between favoring the assignment of women across all units or having a gender-blind assignment process. The 14 percent and 18 percent represent the men and women, respectively who favor concentrating women in fewer units.

- Other findings related to basic training:

The following question was asked, with the following results (by gender in percentages): Do you think men and women should be segregated during basic training or integrated?

	Men (n=673)	Women (n=245)
Segregated for both enlisted and officers	39	25
Segregated for enlisted but integrated for officers	6	5
Integrated for enlisted but segregated for officers	1	4
Integrated for both enlisted and officers	54	67

For gender, $p < 0.001$. Service, grade, unit and race were not significant. Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

A clear majority are in favor of integration, but a significant minority favors segregation.

Questions for further research / Recommendations or Utilization of findings

Harrell and Miller recommend that further research be conducted to determine the extent of the trends identified in their research and to evaluate specific gender-related policies. They also strongly recommended that new policies should avoid establishing double standards based on gender and that double standard policies in existence now should be eliminated. It was clear based on the Navy's experience of assigning women leaders prior to or at the same time as junior women, that several of the integration problems were avoided. A policy of ensuring senior leadership in integrated units may not be feasible in all cases, but it is a desirable factor when it is feasible. Finally, it is apparent that new norms need to be established during times of transition, where women are integrating into new positions. For example, clearer guidance on what is acceptable behavior needs to be established, as well as establishing a fair sexual harassment policy.

Brief summary of strengths and weaknesses of the research

This study is very comprehensive in scope with regard to women's increasing participation in certain MOSs. The study is also very comprehensive in the sense that it covers the history of women's integration and a multitude of other factors related to women's increasing integration. It is an excellent information source on policy and practices with regard to women's roles within today's military. One flaw which the authors are self critical about is the lack of a literature review. The study does not, though it could, place itself within a very extensive and rich body of literature. An analysis of how the study's findings corroborate or disprove other research would be very helpful. The extensive bibliography, while useful is not enough.

Johnson, Cecil. D., Bertha H. Cory, Roberta W. Day and Laurel W. Oliver, et al. 1978. *Women content in the Army – REFORGER 77* (REF-WAC 77). Alexandria, VA: Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Summary (taken from the report's abstract)

The annual REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) exercises in Germany involved 1½ weeks of realistic war games with division-sized forces on each side. The US Forces on one side were transported from one or two installations in the US, while the other forces were those already stationed in Germany. The soldiers from the US were absent from

their home installations for about 6 weeks, 3 weeks of which were under field conditions in Germany. Since some support units on both sides of the REFORGER 77 exercise contained close to 10 percent women, the Army decided to follow closely the performance of women soldiers related to deployability and to time lost from duty. Small teams or work groups with a sizeable number of women were compared with similar all-male units performing the same tasks in both the first part and latter part of REFORGER 77. The Army Research Institute addressed the question of whether performance during the extended field exercise was affected by fatigue and stress more adversely in units containing women than in all-male units. The REF-WAC study was very similar to the MAXWAC study but instead of evaluating the performance of women in a 72-hour field exercise, the REF-WAC study was designed to look at women's levels of participation in a more extended field test duration. The objective of REF-WAC, like the MAXWAC study, was to test the hypothesis that there would be no difference between all-male and mixed gender group performance and no difference between enlisted female and matched enlisted male individual performance which would impair unit performance. The REF-WAC study increases the credibility of the MAXWAC study because the same basic research design and results were replicated in the former.

Quantitative review

1. Report of statistical results.

- A quantitative analysis was executed for:
 1. Performance data for group events, individual event ratings and daily performance ratings. Analysis of variance using an F-test was performed at a 99 percent confidence level. Additionally, correlation tables were run for daily performance and adjusted individual events ratings across the time periods for the total sample.
 2. The utilization of enlisted men and enlisted women. A statistical comparison of means for many different measures was performed.
 3. Deployability data. Various comparisons of means were performed.
 4. Questionnaire data on background characteristics and attitudes of enlisted women and men. Various comparisons of means were performed.

2. Availability of data.

- All instruments and aggregated data are included in the REF-WAC report (in appendices). The instruments used were as follows:
 1. Group event rating form
 2. Individual event rating form
 3. Daily record of work availability
 4. Pretest officer questionnaire
 5. Pretest NCO questionnaire
 6. Pretest enlisted questionnaire
 7. Posttest officer questionnaire
 8. Posttest NCO questionnaire
 9. Posttest enlisted questionnaire
 10. Supervisors' supplemental questionnaire

11. Company deployability record
12. Worksheet for individual deployability
13. Enlisted deployability interview schedule
14. Critical incident report form
15. Topical outline for REFWAC Test Directorate Team (after action) reports
16. Interview schedule for NCO data collectors
17. Interview schedule and self-report inventories for enlisted women participants

3. Time period of research / data collection.

- The first performance rating was made prior to the field training exercise (FTX), prior to September 13, 1977.
- Performance ratings were again made during the first part of the FTX on 13-15 September.
- Ratings were made again during the middle part of the FTX on September 16-18.
- Ratings were made at the final part of the FTX on September 19-22.

Characteristics of the sample

- The sample consisted of Army personnel in selected units who were participating in REFORGER 77. Approximately 1500 personnel were from Fort Riley (1st Infantry Division): 1st Medical Battalion, 1st Supply and Transportation, 1st MP Company, 701st Maintenance Battalion and 121st Signal Battalion.
- Also, about 1400 personnel were from USAREUR: 3rd MP Company, 385th MP Battalion, 1st MP Detachment (forward), 1st Maintenance Battalion, and 3rd Supply and Transportation.
- Three subsamples were taken: Officers (commissioned and warrant), NCOs (E-5 to E-9, in supervisory positions) and Enlisted (E-1 to E4 and some E5s in non-supervisory positions).
- Other information about the sample: the percentage of women deploying in each unit was just under 10 percent, the percentage of enlisted women in pay grades E3 and E4 was higher than that of enlisted men (81 percent versus 70 percent), the average ages of men and women in the study were the same (approximately age 21), enlisted women had a higher level of education than men and fewer enlisted women than men were married (21 percent versus 32 percent). The majority for both men and women had never been married.

General research design

The primary null hypothesis was that there was no difference in performance, over time or at each point of time tested, between all-male and mixed groups who were participating in the training exercise. The secondary hypothesis was that there was no difference between individual enlisted women and matched individual enlisted men, in terms of performance. There were several comparisons that were made: 1. The daily performance of all female soldiers as a group with a group of matched male soldiers; 2. The individual female's performance was matched with the performance of a male doing the same task; and 3. The performance of groups containing one or more females was compared with the performance of all-male groups. Also, comparisons were made based on gender and non-

deployability. Like the earlier MAXWAC study, performance was evaluated in specific Category II and III type units: maintenance, medical, military police, signal, and supply and transportation units during their field training exercise or FTX (called Carbon Edge). Performance data were collected on a daily basis from unit supervisors through observations of group and individual performance by independent officer evaluators and by ARI administration of questionnaires to unit personnel before and after the FTX. Data collectors collected performance ratings based on ARTEP-type group events (The Army Training and Evaluation Program—these were the same group performance measures used in the MAXWAC study) as well as individual events. Evaluators also made unstructured observations on other events relevant to the research design. Since the research effort was directed not to interfere with the field training exercise, evaluators had to select target of opportunity groups for testing. For group events, evaluators were to focus on events most likely to recur for both a female or mixed group and for one or more matching all-male groups(s). For individual event ratings, evaluators were to select, for each enlisted woman on who a rating was obtained, an enlisted man performing the same task. All performance ratings were made on a seven-point scale.

Findings

“The presence of female soldiers on REFORGER 77 did not impair the performance of combat support and combat service support units observed when unit mission was defined in terms of the REFORGER 77 scenario.” There were no differences exhibited in group performance ratings during the first and last periods of the exercise between all-male and mixed groups. Likewise, there were no consistent patterns of differences during the entire exercise between individual male and female performance. When daily performance ratings by supervisors in high stress companies were considered separately, enlisted women initially performed more poorly than enlisted men during the first 3 days of the exercise but gained in equality of performance by the last 3 days of the exercise.

Other or supplemental finding:

- More women than men were not deployable from CONUS to REFORGER for a variety of reasons (women at 29 percent compared to men at 15 percent).
- Enlisted women were proficient in their MOS tasks, both traditional and non-traditional and demonstrated improvement. However there was still considerable concern at the troop level as to their ability to perform their MOS in support units.
- Enlisted women did not perform as well in tactical and sustenance tasks as their matched male counterparts. However none of the women observed was the product of the new basic training.
- Enlisted women’s performance, more than men’s was affected by leadership and management deficiencies or policies.
- Bias against women was observed in the units. As a group, women tended to be rated poorly according to questionnaire responses, however when rated individually they were rated as highly as their male counterparts (as taken from performance observations).
- Other findings (too extensive to summarize here) were based on the following criteria: 1. Impact on unit effectiveness; 2. Training for tactical and sustainment tasks in the field; 3.

MOS proficiency; Stamina and endurance; 4. Leadership and management; 5. Bias against women; 6. Field clothing for women; 7. Female field health and sanitation; 8. Female leadership; 9. Female migration from non-traditional specialties; and 10. Female content in units.

Questions for further research / Recommendations or Utilization of findings

The following recommendations were made by authors of the REF-WAC study. First of all, it was clear that women sustained themselves adequately in the field and accomplished their MOS-related duties. However, additional training and indoctrination are still needed for both male and female soldiers, as well as for their supervisors. Secondly, there seemed to be a consensus among unit supervisors that a couple of factors should be considered when assigning women to teams: the proportion of women in the MOS and in teams, the strength requirements of the tasks and the potential proximity to combat.

Finally, if such a study is to be repeated, the researchers recommend that more women be sampled, that there be a more controlled deployment, that a predetermined AIT graduates fill of both male and female soldiers in exercise units be tested, and that an insertion of exercise-compatible scoring events on a limited basis be used.

Brief summary of strengths and weaknesses of the research

There were several constraining factors in the analysis. First of all, since the evaluators were under an obligation not to interfere with the training exercises, they were only free to move, observe and interview on a “non-preemptive” basis. This meant that no action could be taken to increase the number of women sampled nor increase the number of observations of individual and unit performance. Secondly, a significant number of observable events did not occur because of the low levels of activity in combat support and combat service support units. For example, a medical and maintenance battalion remain in one location for 2 weeks. Finally, in the small sample base of 229 women in the 4 CONUS and 3 USAREUR battalions that participated in the study, 38 percent of these women were employed in traditional roles as clerks and cooks. As such, the sample size is very small. However, despite this limitation, over 1800 observations of female performance were made.

Mottern, Jacqueline A., David A. Foster, Elizabeth J. Brady and Joanne Marshall-Mies. 1997. *The 1995 gender integration of basic combat training study*. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Summary (taken from the report's abstract)

This report summarizes a series of studies from 1993 through 1995 of the attitudes of soldiers-in-training and their training cadre during squad-level, gender-integrated Basic Combat Training (BCT) for soldiers in Combat Support and Combat Service Support military occupational specialties. During each of the three phases, soldiers completed a pre-training and post-training questionnaire, and the training cadre completed a post-training questionnaire. Focus groups were conducted with all-male and/or all-female groups from each of the participating companies and with male and female training drill sergeants. Training performance and soldierization in gender-integrated environment were more positive for female soldiers and as positive as single-gender training for male soldiers. Preparation of drill sergeants—especially training to work with and train female soldiers—is key to the success of gender-integrated BCT. Chain of command support is necessary for continued success of gender-integrated training.

Quantitative review

1. *Report of statistical results.* The survey analysis consisted of paired comparisons between pre and post-training results for soldiers (1995 study); comparisons between training conditions (1993-single gender, 1993-gender - integrated, 1994-gender - integrated and 1995-gender - integrated); and comparisons between male and female respondents in sample companies who dropped out of BCT (no detailed analysis was conducted based on the attrition questionnaire data because of the small number of respondents). Student's t for paired comparisons (of pre and post training surveys) and Student's t for independent samples were used for training conditions and gender differences at a 99 percent confidence level. Actual statistical data are recorded throughout the report.

2. *Availability of data.*

- Pre-training (80 questions), post-training (123 questions), drill sergeant (84 questions) and attrition (65 questions) questionnaires are found in appendix of report.
- Soldier and drill sergeant focus group protocols are found in appendix.
- Cumulative questionnaire results are published in the report.

3. *Time period of research / data collection*

- August - November 1993
- June – August 1994
- April – September 1995

Characteristics of the sample—ARMY

1. 1995 study: 1 training battalion of 4 companies at Fort Leonard Wood and 3 companies each of 2 battalions at Fort Jackson formed the sample.
2. 1994 study: 1 training battalion of 4 companies at Fort Leonard Wood formed the sample.

3. 1993 study: 2 training battalions of 10 companies at Fort Jackson formed the sample.
4. A total of 1842 completed questionnaires were returned by soldiers assigned to the sample companies. Of those completed, 74 percent were completed by male soldiers and 26 percent by female soldiers. 77 percent of male soldiers were white, 16 percent were black, 60 percent of female soldiers were white, 32 percent were black. There were no significant differences by gender on education level or marital status (90 percent of both genders were single with no dependents). There were no gender differences in terms of employment status or where the respondents grew up.

General research design

The 1995 study was conducted from April – September 1995 at Fort Jackson and Fort Leonard Wood. All of the companies were gender - integrated with female:male percentages that varied from 23 percent female to 48 percent female. The 1994 study was conducted from June – August 1994 at Fort Leonard Wood. All of the companies sampled were integrated with female:male percentages of 25 percent female and 75 percent male. The 1993 study was conducted from August – November 1993 at Fort Jackson. In each battalion one company was all male, one was all female, 2 were 75 percent male and 25 percent female and one company was 50 percent male and 50 percent female. “During each study ARI staff/contractors administered a pre-training survey for soldiers while at the Reception Battalions, a post-training survey for soldiers during the last week of training, and a post-training survey of drill sergeants during the last week of training. ARI staff/contractors also conducted separate focus group discussions with male and female soldiers from each company and separate focus groups with male or female drill sergeants. As additional features of the 1995 study, a short questionnaire was given to all soldiers who attrited from the sample companies, and complete records of soldiers’ Army Physical Fitness Tests (APFT) during BCT were obtained from the training battalions” (vii).

Findings

The 1995 study focused on several key topics:

1. *The physical condition of soldiers arriving at the training centers.* The physical condition of most soldiers entering BCT is poor—especially the condition of female soldiers.
2. *The effect, if any, on training in gender-integrated squads on soldier performance and on soldierization.* Female soldiers who trained under gender-integrated conditions improved performance on all measures of physical fitness and male soldiers in gender-integrated training units improved in 2 of 3 events in the 1995 study. No significant differences were found in end-of-day-qualify on Basic Rifle marksmanship, (but there were significant differences for 1st-time-qualify for soldiers in some of the 1995-study battalions) and there were no significant differences found in end-of-cycle Individual Proficiency Tests.
Soldierization process: Female soldiers in gender-integrated companies reported higher levels of soldierization than female soldiers trained in all-female training companies. In the 1994 and 1995 studies, male soldiers from gender-integrated companies reported the same or higher level of soldierization as their counterparts in the 1993 all-male companies. There were battalion differences in soldierization measures in the 1995 study. Other key

issues: Both female and male soldiers and female and male drill sergeants reported that some male drill sergeants expected less of and treated differently the female soldiers compared to their male counterparts. Unequal treatment based on gender was reported as occurring during training.

3. *The opinions of drill sergeants about gender-integrated training.* “In the 1995 study, drill sergeants were not consistent in their evaluation of gender-integrated BCT. There is a difference between battalions and between drill sergeants from the Combat Arms and Combat Support/Combat Service Support MOSs. Battalions whose drill sergeants were most negative about gender-integrated training had lower levels of soldierization and had soldiers who rated their drill sergeants lower on showing support for soldiers and platoon. A command climate that support gender-integrated BCT is essential to training success” (viii).
4. *The training drill sergeants receive for conducting gender-integrated training.* “Drill sergeants believe that the Drill Sergeant Course does not adequately prepare them to conduct BCT in a gender-integrated environment” (viii) (see p. 54).
5. *Attrition during training.* Soldiers questioned who dropped out of BCT were less committed to the Army and they were less confident in their abilities to perform in BCT. There was no evidence in the study to suggest that attrition increases as a result of gender-integrated BCT (see p. 55).

Questions for further research / Recommendations or Utilization of findings

None stated.

Brief summary of strengths and weaknesses of the research

The Mottern, et al. report is, perhaps, the most comprehensive and methodologically sound of its kind in specifically analyzing the effects of gender-integration on BCT. However more emphasis should be placed in the report on providing a definition of and explaining the importance of “soldierization” in BCT. For example, how does soldierization affect readiness or unit cohesion, or does it at all? Additionally there is no attempt to integrate the data analysis. Results are provided in discrete units: i.e. the physical conditioning process, gender-integration and drill sergeant training. More analysis needs to be performed on how these spheres interact.

Rosen, Leora N. et al. 1996. Cohesion and readiness in gender-integrated combat service support units: The impact of acceptance of women and gender ratio. *Armed Forces and Society* 22: 537-553.

Summary

This study addresses the question of whether the minority-proportion discrimination hypothesis is a better explanatory model than the tokenism hypothesis for understanding the effects of female proportional representation on cohesion and readiness in Army units. Also of interest to Rosen et al. was whether the impact of gender ratio on these variables has changed since Panama and the Gulf wars.

Quantitative review

Report of statistical results.

See General research design section, below.

Availability of data.

Data were derived from a Defense Women's Health Research Program study.

3. Time period of research/data collection

May 1988

Characteristics of the sample

The sample for Rosen et al.'s work was obtained from a survey of combat service support soldiers conducted at a US-based infantry post in May 1988.

Soldiers from 6 battalions reported for duty on the day that the survey was taken and were asked to participate. Approximately 90 percent of the soldiers completed the questionnaire. The 6 battalions included 4 support battalions, a HQ battalion and a nuclear, biological and chemical group.

1,584 soldiers from 21 companies completed the questionnaire.

There were not enough senior female NCOs in the sample to permit a separate analysis of that group.

Since there were 2 companies that had fewer than 3 women in the ranks of E1-E4, those companies were eliminated from the study, leaving 19 companies for analysis.

General research design

Several variables were included in the survey: 1. Demographic information; 2. General well being; 3. Horizontal and vertical cohesion; 4. Combat readiness; 5. Acceptance of women; 6. Gender ratio; and 7. Proportion expecting to go to war.

For individual level analysis, men and women in the ranks of E1-E4 were compared by t-tests on the variables 2 through 5 (as number above). Zero-order correlations were computed for male and female junior enlisted soldiers and male NCOs separately.

For group level statistics, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) interclass reliability coefficients (ICC2) was used to determine whether variables were suitable for group level analysis.

Additionally, zero-order correlations were computed separately for group level variables for male and female junior enlisted and male NCOs.

A multiple regression analysis was performed to examine the proportion of female soldiers and the variable, “acceptance of women,” as predictors of group level cohesion and combat readiness for male soldiers.

Findings

Male junior enlisted soldiers scored significantly higher than female soldiers on horizontal cohesion, combat readiness and general well-being.

Female soldiers scored significantly higher than their male counterparts on acceptance of women.

Correlations among cohesion and readiness scales tended to be high within each of the 3 test groups. Junior enlisted male soldiers differed from female soldiers in that the acceptance of women variable was correlated with combat readiness, vertical cohesion and general well-being for men, whereas acceptance of women was not correlated with these variables for female junior enlisted soldiers. However, for both male and female junior enlisted, horizontal cohesion was correlated with the acceptance of women.

Horizontal cohesion, combat readiness and general well-being were positively correlated with acceptance of women for NCOs.

36 percent of women and 16 percent of men did not expect to be deployed with their unit. The overall proportion of “nogos” did not correlate significantly with any other variable, including gender ratio, for either male or female junior enlisted soldiers. However, it was significantly correlated with gender ratio for male NCOs.

Correlations among the readiness and cohesion scales were significant within all 3 test groups. For junior enlisted female soldiers there was a significant positive correlation between acceptance of women and horizontal cohesion. For junior enlisted male soldiers an increase in the proportion of women was associated with a decrease in acceptance of women, but negatively correlated with proportion of women.

The multiple regression analysis indicates that gender ratio is the only significant predictor of horizontal cohesion for junior enlisted men, accounting for 43 percent of the variance, while acceptance of women was the only significant predictor of combat readiness, accounting for 35 percent of the variance (the sample size was small, so the results should be interpreted with caution).

Based on these results, Rosen et al. conclude that the minority-proportion discrimination hypothesis may best explain the impact of gender ratio on unit cohesion. Based on women being in minority ratios, the study shows that there is a decided negative effect on the majority’s rating of total group cohesion.

There is significant individual-level correlations between horizontal cohesion and general well-being which may suggest that for both men and women, positive perceptions of working relationships with peers are related to positive mental health.

Another interesting finding is that men were more likely than women to rate female soldiers as less competent, but women were less likely than men to want to work with female soldiers.

Questions for further research / Recommendations or Utilization of findings

None stated.

Brief summary of strengths and weaknesses of the research

Many terms are not well defined such as, horizontal and vertical cohesion. Furthermore, not enough data are provided with regard to the variables to adequately grasp or hypothesize about why certain variables correlate or do not correlate with each other. Also, several interpretive conclusions that the authors make based on the statistical results seem trivial. For example, Rosen et al. states that one explanation as to why women were less likely than their male counterparts to want to work with other women, is because some women may choose nontraditional occupations because they prefer to work with men. This explanation is the same as saying female soldiers do not prefer to work with women because they prefer to work with men. On the other hand, perhaps some female soldiers select non-traditional MOSs because of other factors, such as promotion opportunities and the fact that men are in those MOSs is, perhaps incidental. More theoretical depth would add meaning to the quantitative analysis. Finally, the authors' question about whether or not the impact of gender ratio on unit cohesion has changed since Panama and the Gulf war was never addressed.

Scarpate, Jerry C. and Mary Anne O'Neill. 1992. *Evaluation of gender integration at recruit training command, Orlando Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida*. Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute.

Summary

In November 1991 the Commander of the Recruit Training Command (RTC) at the Naval Training Center requested that the Division of Policy Planning Research at DEOMI conduct a study to measure the effect of gender-integration on basic trainees. A survey of new recruits was conducted in January – June of 1992 to examine basic trainee perceptions of teamwork, fraternization and impact of gender-integration on training. Based on the data gathered, the researchers concluded that gender-integration had neither a clear positive nor negative behavioral impact on training at the RTC in Orlando.

Quantitative review

1. *Report of statistical results.* Analysis of the data consisted of a comparison of questionnaire results among the 3 different types of companies (all-female, all-male and gender - integrated); a comparison of the second administration of the questionnaire to the first; a comparison of the questionnaire results between all male and all female companies; and the same comparisons listed here, but using academic and physical training data—then analyzing the relationship between these behavioral data and the questionnaire data. A qualitative comparison of group means (based on a 5-point Likert scale) was performed.
2. *Availability of data.*
 - Questionnaire available in report.
 - Aggregate questionnaire results (means) are provided in charts and tables in the report.
3. *Time period of research / data collection.*
 - January 13 - June 1, 1992

Characteristics of the sample—NAVY

1. Nine all-male companies, four all-female companies and nine gender-integrated companies were surveyed, for a total of 22 recruit companies.
2. 1621 naval recruits were surveyed. Breakdown of male / female ratios or any other demographic information were not provided in the report. Demographic information was obtained when completing the survey (included were: sex, ethnicity, age, marital status, level of education, prior service experience, and whether or not the trainee was in a gender - integrated or same sex company).

General research design

From January – June 1992, 1621 recruits from 22 recruit companies were surveyed to obtain their perceptions on teamwork, fraternization, and the impact of gender-integration on basic training. The questionnaire was given in a proctored environment on the third day of the first week of training and then re-administered to the same companies in the seventh of the

eight-week basic training program. Additionally, 56 structured half-hour interviews were conducted with a randomly-selected number of trainees from each of the surveyed companies. The interviews were designed to elicit anecdotal information based on recruit perceptions of the gender-integration process. With questionnaire responses, RTC personnel extracted and provided DEOMI the recruits' academic, physical and personal training performance data.

Findings

The information taken from survey data indicates there is an overall positive attitude of the 3 factors measured in the survey (teamwork, fraternization and gender-integration). In other words, if given the choice, both male and female Naval recruits would prefer to be assigned to gender-integrated companies. There is not, however, a measurable increase in performance among integrated groups in academic and physical training. There are not significant differences in academic scores between integrated and same-gender training groups. There were significant differences in the physical training scores that are seemingly related to company and gender. "Females in integrated companies failed at much higher rates than females in all-female companies and males in integrated companies failed at a lower rate than males in all-male companies. A possible explanation for these differences might be the often-suggested hypothesis that men are more competitive and women less competitive when in a mixed-gendered environment" (5). The researchers concluded that gender-integration caused no clear negative or positive behavioral impact on training at the RTC in Orlando. In fact, they inferred from the results of the study that gender-integration may have a positive attitudinal impact on training.

Questions for further research / Recommendations or Utilization of findings

1. Integration as currently structured should be continued at RTC Orlando (5).
2. The research should be replicated to eliminate the possibility of any "halo effect" that may have been present in this study.
3. A follow-on survey should be conducted of graduates to determine if integration has impacted mission effectiveness.

Brief summary of strengths and weaknesses of the research

First of all, it was obvious in the questionnaire that the information which was being sought from trainees was their opinion on the differences between gender-integrated and same-gender companies. This may have caused some bias in respondents, since the purpose of the study was transparent. Secondly, the methodology description not detailed enough to critique in any depth. Thirdly, a simple statistical analysis could have been performed to compare differences in sample means. In other words, based on the report's results, we cannot know if the results are statistically significant. As such, interpretation of the data is impressionistic. When gender differences were found, suspect alternative explanations were provided to explain the differences. The research design does not anticipate alternative explanations.

Schreiber, E.M. and John C. Woelfel. 1979. Effects of women on group performance in a traditionally male occupation: The case of the U.S. Army. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 7:121-134.

Summary

The effects of the presence of up to 25 percent women on company performance during three-day field exercises were investigated in 29 combat-support and combat-service support companies in the Army during 1976-1977. Company performance was evaluated by 4 officers from other companies and by the enlisted persons in the companies that were being evaluated. On the basis of these performance ratings, companies with higher proportions of women did not perform less well than companies with lower proportions of women (or no women). This experimental design points to the conclusions that for at least up to a 25 percent fill, the Army can gender-integrate its noncombat companies without harming field performance and that an upper limit for the proportion of women that such companies can contain is not yet empirically established. It should be noted that this article is a secondary analysis of the data used for the Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) MAXWAC study.

Quantitative review

1. Report of statistical results.

- See annotation on MAXWAC study, included in the bibliography. See also, Findings, below.

2. Availability of data.

- See annotation on MAXWAC study, below.

3. Time period of research / data collection.

- See annotation on MAXWAC study, below.

Characteristics of the sample

- See annotation on MAXWAC study, below.

General research design

Schreiber and Woelfel use the 1977 MAXWAC study's research design and data to derive a second measure of company performance. They compare the MAXWAC team ratings and the questionnaire ratings to see if they are related to the proportion of women in the companies. They state that to the extent that the MAXWAC team ratings and the questionnaire ratings are related in a similar fashion to the proportion of women in the companies, then confidence in the MAXWAC findings is enhanced.

Findings

- Company performance ratings did not show a consistent linear decrease as the proportion of women in the company increased. This same absence of relationship appeared whether company performance was measured by the MAXWAC team or by the soldiers in the company.
- The zero-order correlations between proportion of women in the company and the MAXWAC team ratings and between the proportion of women in the company and the company total ratings signify the absence of a linear relationship. It is possible that there is a slight parabolic trend appearing in the data for all 6 company categories.
- To test whether there was a parabolic trend, an additional test was performed using a parabolic equation, regressing each of the 2 main indicators of company performance on percentages of women in the 29 different test companies. The result was that neither multiple correlations resulting from the test was significant. As such, the curvilinear hypothesis was rejected.
- Most importantly, it was concluded that a company's performance during field exercises was not related to the proportion of women that it contained.
- Inspecting the relationship between rating of women's performance and the difference between women's and men's performance ratings by proportion of women in the company shows that except by women themselves, women's performance was rated lower than men's performance in companies with 20 percent or fewer women and that the rating of neither women's performance nor men's performance were directly related to the proportion of women in the company.
- There was also significant difference, by gender, in the amounts of reported time that it took to perform field tasks during the ARTEPs. According to the MAXWAC data, Men and women interpret women's performance differently. So, according to Schreiber and Woelfel, either men are attempting to maintain their dominant position by under-evaluating the performance of women or women are over-inflating their performance evaluations. Another explanation could be that men and women are socialized differently and because of this, they evaluate performance differently.
- The most significant conclusion is that both the MAXWAC study as well as this study by Schreiber and Woelfel, indicate that there is no upper limit on the proportion of fill for women in Army units that will portend degraded performance in those units.

Questions for further research/ Recommendations or Utilization of findings

The authors noted that further research should make use of other measures of time spent on field activities and include additional controls.

Brief summary of strengths and weaknesses of the research

This study acts as a test for the MAXWAC study. In other words, the authors are testing the results of another work by performing a separate analysis, though using the same data as the earlier study. It is a sound analysis which strengthens the credibility of the MAXWAC report.

U.S. Senate. 1997. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Personnel. *Gender integration in basic training: The services are using a variety of approaches to gender-integration*. Testimony prepared by Mark E. Gebicke. Washington, DC: U.S. GAO.

AND

U.S. House. 1996. Committee on National Security. Subcommittee on Military Personnel. *Basic training: Services are using a variety of approaches to gender-integration*. Report Prepared by Mark E. Gebicke. Washington, DC: U.S. GAO.

Summary

In a 1997 testimony before the Subcommittee on Personnel, Senate Armed Services Committee, Mark Gebicke, Director of Military Operations and Capabilities Issues of the National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), provided a statement on his office's report on gender-integrated basic training. The statement addressed the extent to which each service has gender-integrated their basic training and how the performance in these integrated settings compare with performance in same-gender training. The report concluded, based on the 1992 Scarpate and O'Neill Naval study and the 1996 Simutis and Mottern Army study, that gender-integration does not negatively affect trainees' performance. However, the report also states that data on the impact of gender integration/segregation in basic training are limited. As such, the author recommends to The Department of Defense that more data are collected. The Department of Defense concurred with this recommendation. The report states that The Department of Defense was in the process of collecting data.

Quantitative review

1. *Report of statistical results*. N/A

2. *Availability of data*.

- No data are available in the report/testimony. Data were derived from secondary sources or directly from the services.

3. *Time period of research / data collection*.

- The data from the reports summarized in this publication were gathered from 1976 to time of publication.

Characteristics of the sample N/A

General research design

Data were gathered from secondary sources to form a current-status report on the issue. No analysis was performed.

Findings

1. During 1995, 18 percent of the 179,068 recruits that the services trained were women:
 - 18 percent of the 75,616 Army basic training graduates were women. In 1995 the Army trained all of its women and 49 percent of its men in integrated units composed of 20-50 percent women—trainees are mixed at the operating level.
 - 20 percent of the 40,813 Navy basic training graduates were women. In 1995 the Navy trained all of its women and 25 percent of its men in integrated units composed of 50 percent of each gender—trainees are mixed at the operating level.
 - 24 percent of the 30,515 Air Force basic training graduates were women. Trainees are not mixed at the operating level—the flights. Though male and female flights are often paired during training, they do not mix, except during physical conditioning training, when men and women train together.
 - 5 percent of the 32,124 Marine Corp basic training graduates were women. Men and women train separately. Prior to 1996 men received a 24-day course of marine combat training after their basic. Women only received an additional week of basic that incorporated a truncated course of Marine combat training. This was changed in 1996. Now the Marine combat training is the same for both men and women.
2. In all four services women and men followed the same program of instruction with the exception of medical examinations, hygiene classes and the physical fitness standards test. Additionally men and women are berthed separately.
3. Early records of gender - integrated training (1976 to early 1980s) identify several problems observed for women during the first-time integration. These problems were avoided when gender-integrated training was re-established in 1993, except for the issue of drill-instructor preparation in gender-integrated units.
4. No adequate data exist to compare current and previous gender-integrated programs.

Questions for further research / Recommendations or Utilization of findings

It was recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the services to retain and analyze comparative performance data for men and women in single-gender and gender-integrated training units. The Department of Defense concurred with this recommendation and stated that it would instruct the services to collect and analyze such data over a 1-year period, ending fiscal year 1998.

Brief summary of strengths and weaknesses of the research

The Senate Testimony and House Report serve as official statements on the status of gender-integrated training as of June 5, 1997.

U.S. Senate. 1997. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Personnel. *Gender-integrated Training and Related Matters: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Personnel of the Committee on Armed Services*. 105th Cong., 1st sess. 5 June.

Summary

The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Personnel met pursuant to notice SH—216 on June 5, 1997 to receive testimony concerning gender-integrated basic training in the U.S. Armed Forces. Prepared statements were made by in the following order: **Judith Youngman**, Chair, DACOWITS; **Elaine Donnelly**, President, Center for Military Readiness; **Susan Barnes**, Legislative Director of WANDAS; **Nancy Campbell**, Co-President, National Women’s Law Center; **Vice Adm. Patricia Tracey**, USN, Chief of Naval Education and Training; **Gen. William Hartzog**, Commanding General, USA, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; **Gen. Lloyd W. Newton**, USAF, Commander, Air Education and Training Command; and, **Gen. Paul Van Riper**, USMC, Commanding General, marine Corps Combat Development Command. Following the first panel’s testimony, several questions were asked. The second panel consisted of **S. Sgt Mary Wilson**, USMC; **S. Sgt. John McNeirney**, USA; **Sr. M.Sgt. Harry Creacy**, USAF, Ret.; **Donna Carson**, former enlisted member, USA; **Michelle Danko**, Former enlisted member, USN; and, **SFC. Allison Smith**. Additionally, the subcommittee received testimony **from Kathryn Rogers**, Executive Director, NOW LDEF; **Mark Gebicke**, U.S. GAO; and **William Cohen**, Secretary of Defense.

Quantitative review N/A

Characteristics of the sample N/A

General research design N/A

Findings

1. Summary of Judith Youngman:

- The U.S. cannot go to war without women in uniform. Gender-integration in the military is working but it can and will improve. Threats to mission readiness and strong national defense are not coming from gender-integration but unprofessional conduct which affect morale and readiness. 1995 DMDC data show an inverse correlation between number of positions open to women in each service and rates of reported incidents of gender-discrimination. This correlation suggests gender-integration does not lead to a breakdown in professional relations between genders. DMDC survey data also show a decline since 1988 of sexual harassment (particularly in the Navy). “When gender incidents occur in training they are not about failures of gender-integrated training—but of individuals” (14).

2. Summary of Elaine Donnelly :

- Elaine Donnelly systematically goes through the various arguments for and against gender-integrated basic training, critiquing the 1996 GAO Report (included in this

annotated bibliography), as well as the 1997 ARI study (also included here). She also closely scrutinized the Marine training model stating that, with reservation, the Center for Military Readiness supports the Corp's single-gender approach. As Donnelly points out, the GAO and ARI reports conclude that women's training is enhanced by being exposed to gender-integration at the basic training level. But as Donnelly argues, in the ARI study, "proficiency" and "soldierization" was defined in the report based on women's morale and not on military necessity. Additionally, it is at least anecdotally apparent that female marines are well trained and do not suffer from gender-segregation at basic. Donnelly also discussed in depth the arguments about what should be done with regard to the interface between sexual misconduct and gender-integrated basic training, specifically looking at single-gender training, leadership, using racial analogies, military culture, increased percentages of women in the military, the "train as we fight" argument," Tailhook, a separate complaint system, the quality of the AVF, and Congressional interference in military personnel issues. Many of Donnelly's arguments and conclusions are drawn from The 1992 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces. Donnelly concludes by calling on Congress to 1. re-segregate basic training based on gender, and 2. end recruiting quotas. National security and not equal opportunity should come first.

3. Summary of Susan Barnes:

- Barnes makes several points: 1. Gallup polls indicate the U.S. public does not regard women in the military as a social experiment (she cites a May 23, 1997 Gallup poll conducted for USA Today and CNN); 2. De-segregating training based on gender will be detrimental to readiness ("Women presently exceed more than 16 percent of the fighting force and their numbers are climbing toward 20 percent. It is critical to military preparedness that 15-20 percent of the fighting force be treated respectfully as the valued equal members that they are... Most women regard sex segregated training as unfair and inherently relegating them to second class status in the military"[39]); 3. Gender-integrated training works (as is shown in the GAO and ARI studies. Also, the Marine Corps which trains men and women separately, has the highest rate of sexual harassment); 4. There is no evidence that gender-integrated basic training is the cause of the recent spate of sexual harassment problems.

4. Summary of Nancy Campbell:

- Campbell refers to the 1997 ARI, 1997 GAO and the 1992 DEOMI reports/studies to demonstrate that gender-integration in basic training should be maintained. She points out that until it can be demonstrated that gender-integration is interfering with performance or harming readiness that Congress should defer judgement about the issue to the services. Campbell also points out that gender-integration is economical. Reverting to gender - segregated training could cost the services particularly the Navy, millions of dollars. With regard to sexual misconduct and harassment, most sociological and psychological studies indicate that as women's presence in traditionally male dominated jobs reaches a critical mass (around 25 percent), the incidence of sexual harassment decreases.

5. Summary of Vice Adm. Patricia Tracey:

- Vice Admiral Tracey noted that Naval men and women serve in *all* but 2 officer and 3 enlisted specialties; Men and women are assigned together to combat units and all will engage in combat if their unit is engaged; “Habitability considerations are the sole factor in determining women’s assignability to combatant ships” (47). Of the 350 ships in the Navy today, approximately 127 have women assigned to the ship’s company or embarked air wing. The Vice Admiral’s conclusion is that the Navy must train as it fights, in combat teams, trained to the same standards, committed to the same mission and framed by shared values. Segregating training at the boot camp level would be costly and would be infeasible in the case of specialized training. The Vice Admiral notes that “men and women who suspect they have been trained to different standards cannot have confidence in one another to boldly go in harm’s way” (48).

6. Summary of Gen. William Hartzog:

- General Hartzog begins his statement by going over the history of gender-integrated basic training in the Army. For FY1997 a total of 23,400 women were trained at the three BCT centers. Hartzog states, “Society is not segregated by gender—the Army chooses to mirror society” (52). He concludes with the thought that it is not a man’s army, it is a U.S. citizen’s Army.

7. Summary of Gen. Lloyd W. Newton:

- General Newton states his opinion that the proposal that would separate basic training by gender in Air Force would be a step backward and it would add operating and maintenance (O&M) costs. According to the General, it would cost an estimated \$5.7 million per year (at a minimum) in personnel, facility, support, equipment, utilities and supply costs to train women separately. He concludes, “We believe legislation that sets initial military training on an opposite track from our society, higher education, corporate culture and even the rest of our military will seriously undermine the relevance and effectiveness of the successful system we have built” (56).

8. Summary of Gen. Paul Van Riper:

- “The key to building effective, cohesive, gender-integrated operational units is in creating a training environment that builds progressively to that end. The Marine Corps believes it has achieved that goal through a building process that moves from gender-segregation at recruit training to partial gender-integration at Marine combat training, and finally full gender-integration at applicable military occupational specialty producing schools. The process reinforces the Marine Corps ethos, thus supports its mission, and is considered to be the best method for the Marine Corps” (57). Entry-level recruit training is gender-segregated, Marine combat training is partially integrated and MOS training (with the exception of combat arms MOSs) is fully gender-integrated.

9. Summary of Secretary William S. Cohen:

- As part of the hearing's record, Secretary Cohen wrote a statement in opposition to HR 1559 which would require each service to conduct gender-segregated basic training. He wrote that each service should have the flexibility to establish their own training programs.

Questions for further research/ Recommendations or Utilization of findings N/A

Brief summary of strengths and weaknesses of the research N/A

U.S. Army Research Institute. 1977. *Women content in units force development test (MAXWAC)*. Alexandria, VA: Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Summary

The rationale for the MAXWAC study was to assess the effects of different percentage levels of women who were assigned to category II and III TOE units (combat support and combat service support) on the capability of those units to perform their missions under field conditions. In 1974 the DCSPER recognized that as the percentages of women in Army TOE units (operational units) were increasing, as were the number of MOSs that women had access to fill, that the content levels for women in these units would be an important future issue and one about which the Army needed more information.

Quantitative review

1. Report of statistical results.

- An experimental design was used--a repeated measures approach (longitudinal).
- Unit performance was the dependent variable, measured by the 3-day ARTEP (described below). Scores were awarded by evaluators to the various critical tasks performed. Equal weight was given to each rated task and simple averages were used to represent company scores. Difference scores were used to compute a correlated observation t-test. Difference scores were also used to test the effect of going from 0 percent women to 15 percent and the effect of going from 15 percent to 35 percent. In each case, a t-statistic was computed and compared to the tabled t-value for four degrees of freedom (for $p < .05$ and 4 df, $t=2.78$). To test the significance of the difference in performance between the companies with 0 percent women and those with 35 percent, a group comparison t-test was used since different companies were involved at the two levels of fill.
- To evaluate differences in characteristics among sample groups, chi-square tests were performed.
- A qualitative analysis was also performed: The MAXWAC report was divided into two sections—the qualitative and quantitative analysis. The initial report was subject to a qualitative review. The qualitative data were drawn from the test directorate team's site visit reports, ARI staff visit trip reports and hypotheses constructed from ARTEP observations

2. Availability of data.

- Instruments used: ARI was directed to use the standard operational Army test to assess the level of performance by company. The Army Training and Evaluation Program, or ARTEP, was the instrument used to measure company performance. ARTEP was chosen over the Army training Programs and Army Training Tests (ATPs and ATTs, respectively) because the two latter were considered to be more procedure-oriented and less performance-oriented. An example of the ARTEP evaluator score sheet is provided in the report.
- Questionnaires. Instruments were not available in printed copy.
- Statistical results were presented throughout the report in aggregate form.

3. *Time period of research / data collection.*

- The first test cycle began fall 1976. The second followed about 6 months later in the spring of 1977.

Characteristics of the sample

- The sample for this research consisted of Army personnel (enlisted) in selected units.
- The sample units were derived from 8 companies that each came from 5 different types of units—medical, maintenance, military police, transportation and signal.
- Questionnaires were administered to 6,070 of the 6,963 personnel in the test companies.
- Attention was given to unit performance and not individual performance.
- In the test companies, women who participated in the test were required to be MOS qualified; it was also required by the research design that the women be assigned throughout the company.

General research design

The stated null hypothesis was that increases in the proportion of female soldiers in certain units would not impair the performance of those units. The researchers attempted to isolate the effect, if any, of different percentages of enlisted female soldiers on the performance of combat support and combat service support companies. There were 40 combat support and combat service support companies that were tested in the study. Within each of the 5 units types, listed above, each of the 8 companies were designated as an experimental group, a control group or a calibration group. The 2 experimental and 2 control companies were tested twice; the former at varying percentage levels of enlisted women and the latter with stabilized percentages for both tests. There was a 6-month time period between each test. The 5 calibration companies were tested only once with whatever percentages of female soldier they had at the time of the testing. The fill-levels of enlisted women for each type of unit was as follows:

Test Season	Experimental		Control 1 company	Calibration	
	1 company	1 company		2 companies	3 companies
Fall 1976	0 %	15 %	% as found	% as found	--
Spring 1977	15%	35%	same	--	% as found

Fifteen of the companies were tested twice (3 of each company) and 25 were tested once (5 of each type), for a total of 55 field tests.

The major statistical comparisons were made between the experimental and control companies that went from 0 percent-15 percent of women and those that went from 15 percent-35 percent of women. The test instrument, the ARTEP was conducted over a 3-day period. As such, the duration of each field evaluation was 3 days. A total of 55 ARTEPS were administered (10 experimental and 5 control companies which were tested twice and 25 calibration companies which were tested once).

In addition to the ARTEPS, collateral questionnaires were administered to a majority of the personnel in the 40 test companies. Four questionnaires were given to collect attitudes and opinions from the participants. The questionnaires were designed to provide additional insight into the organizational and individual factors that impact on morale and performance in the units tested, specifically with regard to the content of women in those units. The 4 questionnaires were:

1. Field questionnaire. This was administered to all enlisted personnel toward the end of the exercise while they were still in the field. It elicited opinions about how well the company performed during the exercise.
2. General enlisted questionnaire. All enlisted company personnel were administered this more comprehensive exam, usually at the beginning of the week following the exercise. It repeated the field questionnaire and assessed any changes of opinion.
3. Supervisor's questionnaire. A sample of first-line supervisory NCOs were given this questionnaire to explore duty assignment practices with attention to whether gender influences the organization of work crews.
4. Officer's questionnaires. This questionnaire was given to the company's officers. The content of the questionnaire was similar to the general enlisted questionnaire with additional questions about command practices.

Findings

- MAXWAC study: In the 0 percent-15 percent of enlisted women group, on average, there was a slight decrease in performance scores while in the 15 percent-35 percent of women group there was a slight increase in performance scores. However in neither case were the changes in performance levels statistically significant. "Performance differences between the first and second ARTEP administration were small enough to be caused by chance. An effect due to the change in content of women was not established. The ARI interpretation is that women soldiers, up the percent tested, do not impair unit performance during intensive 72-hour field exercises" (I-2). The report states that there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that resistance to female soldiers tend to abate when male soldiers have first-hand experience working with them.
- The qualitative evaluation of the MAXWAC study:
 1. Generally women experienced problems performing tasks requiring great individual strength. However, given equal training, women can perform MOS tasks with a proficiency equal to their male counterparts, except for those MOSs that require above-average female physical strength.
 2. The higher percentage of women in a unit, the less pampering was observed the more women were treated as equals.
 3. When the chain of command expresses attitudes regarding women in units (negative or positive), the attitude is reflected by the unit members. In other words, acceptance is a function of attitude
 4. While the female soldier is usually technically qualified in her MOS, she is often deficient in basic military skills and field experience.

5. Previously all-male units will not readily accept women without some prior conditioning and training.
6. When the need for personnel is high, as in understrength or overtasked units, women are more readily integrated. Utilization of women is a function of need.
7. No degradation of unit performance in any of the units was experienced by the assignment of women to the units.

Questions for further research / Recommendations or Utilization of findings

“It is predicted that a repetition of this Force Development Test (FDT) with more companies, improved instrumentation, and better controls of extraneous factors would yield essentially the same conclusion” (I-2). Several issues regarding the utilization of women surfaced in the MAXWAC study: the physical strength and stamina of women, the advisability of placing women in jobs that could involve them in combat and public opinion with regard to women’s casualties during war. These are all questions that the authors found needed further examination. One further question that was taken up by the REF-WAC 77 study was the question of the impact of women on a unit’s ability to complete its mission in a field test of more extended length.

Brief summary of strengths and weaknesses of the research

The MAXWAC study was very comprehensive and methodologically detailed and reliable. All relevant data were presented in the report, such as test schedules, MOS quotas for the selection of female soldiers, etc. The report raised the fact that there were too few and in some cases no women in leadership roles (NCOs and officers) to make this a part of the overall analysis.

Literature Search: Women in the Military

General / Current Status

Binkin, Martin. 1993. *Who will fight the next war?* Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

Blacksmith, E. A., ed. 1992. *Women in the military*. The Reference Shelf, vol. 64. New York: H.W. Wilson Co.

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Elshtain, Jean Bethke and Sheila Tobias. 1990. *Women, militarism and war: Essays in history, politics and social theory*. Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Fletcher, Jean W. Joyce S. McMahon, and Aline O. Quester. 1994. *Women in the Navy: The past, the present and the future*. Occasional paper. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis.

Francke, Linda Bird. 1997. *Ground zero: the gender wars in the military*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

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Gebicke, Mark E. 1993. *Women in the military: Deployment in the Persian Gulf War*. Report to the Secretary of Defense. Washington, DC: GAO.

Goldman, Nancy Loring. 1982. *Female soldiers--combatants or noncombatants? Historical and contemporary perspectives*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Howes, Ruth H. and Michael R. Stevenson, eds. 1993. *Women and the use of military force*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner .

Jaggar, Alison M., ed. 1994. *Living with Contradictions: Controversies in Feminist Social Ethics*. Boulder: Westview Press.

A collection of articles from this book focuses on the central theme of militarism. Judith Hicks Stiehm in, "The Protected, The Protector, The Defender" explains how the stratified positions of gender in Western politics is oppressive to both sexes. Helen Michalowski in "The Army Will Make a 'Man' Out of You," offers up the opinion that military life teaches and reinforces violence, which could encourage domestic violence. She proposes that feminists teach men to nurture life instead of advocating putting women in that world. In "Some of the Best Soldiers Wear Lipstick," Cynthia Enloe suggests that the military wants to keep women from combat because the military desires to use women when

convenient yet deprive the women of equal status. Sara Ruddick does not mind being portrayed as traditionally feminine in, "Notes Toward a Feminist Maternal Peace Politics". She feels that Western images of maternity can be redefined to emphasize and teach peace as a public practice. The final article in this collection, "We Speak for the Planet," by Barbara Omolade, discusses the omission of women of color from any of the other peace activists' concerns.

Macdonald, Sharon, Pat Holden and Shirley Ardener. 1987. *Images of women in peace and war: Cross-cultural and historical perspectives*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Mitchell, Brian. 1998. *Women in the military: Flirting with disaster*. Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway.

Mitchell, Brian. 1989. *Weak link: The feminization of the American military*. Washington DC: Regnery Gateway.

The author presents several arguments against expanding women's role in the U.S. Armed Forces. He contends that women are physically and emotionally weaker than men which has a negative impact on their ability to handle the stresses of combat and other military roles. In addition, increasing the number and roles of women in the military has feminized the institution which has discouraged recruits from serving in the military. Though several studies are used to support these arguments, citations are not provided.

Moore, Brenda. 1996. *To serve my country, to serve my race: The story of the only African American WACs stationed overseas during World War II*. New York: New York University Press.

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Weinstein, Laurie and Christie White. 1997. *Wives and warriors: Women and the military in the United States and Canada*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.

Wekesser, Carol and Matthew Polesetsky, eds. 1991. *Current Controversies: women in the military*. San Diego: Greenhaven Press.

Subjects include: 1. Should women serve in the military? Pro: (F.M. Eckman, Dorothy and Carl Schneider, and C. Barkalow) Con: (B. Mitchell, J. Yarbrough, E. Donnelly and H. Vozenilek) 2. Should women serve in combat? Pro: (M. Beck, P. Roush, L. Dusky, J. Holm, P. Schroeder, and K. Snyder) and Con: (B. Mitchell, and J. Bruen) 3. Does discrimination harm women in the military? (C. Moskos) Yes: (Dorothy and Carol Schneider, M. Rustad, and R. Rogers) No: C. Barkalow and A. Raab, anonymous, and D. Dent). 4. How have other nations integrated women into the military? (S. Saywell, B. Jancar, M. Suh, E. Unterhalter and A. Bolscher and I. Megens)

Women's Research and Education Institute. 1998. *Women in the Military: Statistical Update*. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Women's Research and Education Institute.

Youngman, Judith A. 1998. Current events shaping the future of women in the military.

Invited address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, Military Psychology Division, 15 May, San Francisco, California.

Integration into the Service Academies: ROTC / OCS

Adams, J., H.T. Prince, R.F. Priest, and R.W. Rice 1980. Personality characteristics of male and female leaders at the U.S. Military Academy. *Journal of political and military sociology* 8:99-105.

Armed Forces and Society. 1978. Special Issue on Women as New Manpower. Volume 4, number 4.

Article topics include: Gender-integration in the Academies, Morale and Attrition, the use of NATO and women, etc.

Barkalow, Carol with Andrea Raab. 1990. *In the men's house: An inside account of life in the Army by one of West Point's first female graduates*. Poseidon Press.

Burke, Carol. 1996. Pernicious cohesion. In *It's our military too! Women and the U.S. military*, edited by Judith Hicks Stiehm. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

The place of women within the culture and folk practices of the U.S. Naval Academy is the central theme of this essay. Burke describes a situation where women students must simply accept traditions in which they cannot fully participate and where they learn early that

the best way to “survive” is by calling limited attention to themselves. Burke is critical of the military academies of all services in their failure “to examine traditions both in light of their relevance to the practice of modern warfare and in light of their appropriateness to the training of an increasingly diverse force” (213). However, the author also presents the arguments of the proponents of such traditions. Specifically, this entails the belief that such traditions inculcate an esprit de corps essential to cohesion which, therefore, suggests a “homogeneity that protects the group and makes it more efficient in the face of danger” (216).

DeFleur, Lois B. and R.L. Warner 1987. Air Force Academy graduates and nongraduates: Attitudes and self-concepts. *Armed Forces and Society* 13:517-533.

Dorn, Edwin, ed. 1989. *Who defends America: Race, Sex, and Class in the Armed Forces*. Washington, DC: Joint Center for Political Studies Press.

Dornbusch, S.M. 1955. The military academy as an assimilating institution. *Social Forces* 33:316-21.

Dunivin, Karen O. 1988. Gender and perceptions of the job environment in the U.S. Air Force. *Armed Forces and Society* 15:71-91.

The author tests Kanter’s theory which proposes that structures of opportunity, power, and the relative number of women in an organization will affect the way employees perceive their employing organization. Survey data from Air Force personnel were used to assess attitudes toward these three determinants. While men were found to be more satisfied with their organization than women, women’s job satisfaction was higher than men’s job satisfaction. Further, women in less traditional career fields, such as pilots, had very similar attitudes toward their work environments than their male counterparts. Other career fields yielded different results. The author concludes that a bi-dimensional model, in which sex ratio and perception of traditional work roles, may be more appropriate to predict women’s attitudes toward the military than Kanter’s model. The author finds that women in traditional roles with a low ratio of women to men are likely to have less positive attitudes toward the Air Force than men, those in nontraditional roles with few women are found to have similar attitudes as men, and women in traditional fields with many women are found to have more positive attitudes toward the military than men.

Durning, K.P. 1978. Women at the Naval Academy: The first year of integration. *Armed Forces and Society* 4:569-588.

Francke, Linda Bird. 1997. The underground world at the academies: token women and the rites of male passage. In *Ground zero: the gender wars in the military*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Galloway, Judith M. 1976. The impact of the admission of women to the service academies on the role of the woman line officer. *American Behavioral Scientist* 19:646-664.

Priest, Robert F. and Johnston Beach. 1998. Value changes in four cohorts at the U.S. Military Academy. *Armed Forces and Society* 25:81-102.

Rice, R.W., J.D. Yoder, J. Adams, R.F. Priest, H.T. Prince 1984. Leadership ratings for male and female military cadets. *Sex Roles* 10:885-901.

Stiehm, Judith. 1981. *Bring me men and women: Mandated change at the U.S. Air Force Academy*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Thomas and Prather. 1976. Integration of females into a previously all-male institution. In *Proceedings of the Fifth symposium on Psychology in the Air Force* 100-01. US Air Force Academy, Department of Behavioral Science and Leadership.

U.S. Senate. 1993. *Naval Academy Gender and Racial Disparities: Report to the Chairman, Committee Armed Services, U.S. Senate*. Washington, DC: GPO.

Youth and Society. 1978. Special Issue on Women in the Military. Volume 10, number 2.

Article topics include: Research and policy issues, young Navy women, attitudes of cadets during early integration, etc.

Combat Exclusion

Addis, Elisabetta, Valerie E. Russo, and Lorenza Ebesta, eds. 1994. *Women soldiers: Images and realities*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Military Affairs and Justice. 1991. The combat exclusion laws: An idea whose time has gone. *Minerva* 9: 1-55.

Campbell, D'Ann. 1991. Women in combat: The World War II experience in the United States, Great Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union. *Journal of Military History* 57: 301-323.

Center for Military History. Staff Support Branch. 1980. *Women in combat and as military leaders: a survey*. Washington, DC: Staff Support Branch, U.S. Army Center for Military History.

Christmas, George R. 1994. *Assignment of Army and USMC women under new definition of ground combat*. Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel. Washington, DC: GPO.

Cooke, Miriam. 1996. Subverting the Gender and Military Paradigms. In *It's our military, too!*, edited by Judith Hicks Stiehm. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Cooke discusses war and gender as paradigms that have previously been viewed as disparate. She posits that women's presence challenges basic beliefs that are fundamental to the military enterprise namely: war is manly, warriors protect, and soldiers are substitutable. Most feminists support the opening of opportunities for women to serve but "hope" women will kill "only when there is no other choice." She discusses new ways of thinking: the threat

of war is a kind of war and; how men and women “fill in for each other” by exchanging traditionally prescribed roles.

Cooke, Miriam and Angela Woollacott, eds. 1993. *Gendering war talk*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Cooper, Helen. 1989. *Arms and the woman*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Cornum, Rhonda. 1996. Soldiering: The enemy doesn't care if you're female. In *It's our military too!*, edited by Judith Hicks Stiehm. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Cornum uses her personal career experiences in the Army to base her opinions about women's ability to participate in combat. Cornum began her career in the Army in 1978 as a medical researcher and later decided to become an Army flight surgeon where she learned to fly helicopters. In the fall of 1990, Cornum was deployed with the 229th Attack Helicopter Battalion to serve in Operation Desert Shield. During her tour she was taken as a POW. Women, Cornum contends, perform as well as men under combat conditions; some are more able to handle the stresses of combat, others are less capable. Given the opportunity and good leadership, she argues, men and women can work well together under combat stress. The author concludes the military policies should be based on what soldiers can do, not what they are.

Cottam, K.J. 1981. Soviet women in combat during WWII: The rear services, partisans, and political workers. *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual*. 5:275-293.

Cropsey, Seth. 1980. Women in Combat? *The Public Interest* 61 (Fall): 58-73.

D'Amico, Francine. 1996. Feminist Perspectives on Women Warriors. *Peace Review* 8 (3): 379-384.

De Pauw, Linda. 1981. Women in combat. *Armed Forces and Society* 7: 209-26.

Devilbiss, M.C. 1990. Women in Combat: A Quick Summary of the Arguments on Both Sides. *Minerva* 8:29-31.

This article contains a brief summary of the five “pro” and five “con” arguments on the issue of military women in combat roles. The arguments addressed in this essay allude to the underlying assumptions concerning the roles and capacities of men and women. Essentially, “those who support the exclusion of women in combat roles typically support a belief in highly segregated gender roles and ascriptive criteria for this job selection, while those who support the inclusion of women in combat roles largely favor diffuse gender roles and achievement-related criteria” (30-31). Devilbiss concludes with the thought that “the question of women in combat roles is a microcosm of larger societal issues and assumptions” (31).

Diestenfrey, Stephen. 1988. Women veterans' exposure to combat. *Armed Forces and Society* 14: 549-88.

“Using interview data collected in a 1984 Veterans Administration survey of F veterans (N = 3,003), the characteristics of F veterans who were exposed to combat situations while serving in the US armed forces are described. The definition of combat exposure ranges from "service in a war zone," such as in England during WWII, to being "shot at or being a POW." Slightly over 5 percent of the Rs met the definition. Particular attention is paid to Rs who served during WWII, the Korean conflict, & the Vietnam era. Results indicate those who were exposed to combat were primarily Army nurses who served in WWII – primarily white, older women with postsecondary education. 2 Tables.”

Dunivin, Karen O. 1994. Military culture: Change and continuity. *Armed Forces and Society* 20: 531-547.

Military culture is a unique way of life, it possesses the four characteristics of a “culture/ideal-type”: 1. Military culture is learned (i.e. training); 2. Military culture is broadly shared by its member (i.e. saluting); 3. Military culture is adaptive to the change conditions (i.e. integration of blacks); and 4. Military culture is symbolic in nature (i.e. rank, insignia, language, jargon) (533). Military culture is also characterized by its own paradigm: combat-masculine-warrior. Everything within the military is permeated by the definition of combat and by the image of a masculine-warrior. If the military retains its combat-masculine paradigm, and moves in a cultural direction contrary to that of its egalitarian society, it could become an isolated counterculture -an alienated warrior class divorced from the society it defends.

Eitelberg, Mark J. 1990. Your mother wears combat boots...But should she pack a gun? A Paper prepared for the 98th Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, August 1990.

Francke, Linda Bird. 1997. Ground zero: the siege of the combat exclusion laws. In *Ground zero: the gender wars in the military*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Goldman, Nancy L. 1982. Introduction. In *Female soldiers-combatants or noncombatants? Historical and contemporary perspectives*, edited by Nancy L. Goldman. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

In her introduction to this edited volume, Goldman attempts to make some generalizations concerning women's historical participation in combat based on the cross-national studies presented throughout the book. She concludes that women are used most frequently in combat in revolutionary settings or when the very existence of the society is threatened. For the most part, though, over the last two-hundred years, women have not participated very extensively in combat. With few exceptions, the performance of women who have been in combat has been highly praised. However, participation in combat never appears to be accompanied by equality either during or after the war. It is also noted that women have almost never been sent into combat outside their own nation's borders.

Marlowe, David H. 1983. The Manning of the force and the structure of battle: Part 2—men and women. In *Military requirements, social values and the All-Volunteer Force conscripts and volunteers*, edited by Robert K. Fullinwider. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld.

As Marlowe states in the abstract of his chapter, he argues in favor of opening up women's combat roles in air and sea, and in favor of women's roles in defensive combat operations as well as combat support and service support, but argues against including women in offensive ground combat roles. He looks at the following issues in defense of his position: 1. War and Biology; 2. Combat and masculinity; 3. The brotherhood of soldiers. In the final section Marlowe discusses the appropriate roles for women in the realm of combat. He lists off skills that women tend to possess at higher rates than men, such as finer-grained muscle movements and control, more sensitive touch thresholds, keener sense of smell, etc. and how these characteristics should pertain to specific MOSs that women should fill.

McNamara, Maura A. 1994. Women in combat: The history, debate and theoretical issues pertaining to women in the United States Military. M.A. thesis, Sarah Lawrence College.

Norman, Elizabeth. 1990. *Women at war: The story of fifty military nurses who served in Vietnam*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Peach, Lucinda J. 1996. Gender ideology in the ethics of women in combat. In *It's our military, too! Women and the U.S. Military*, edited by Judith H. Stiehm. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 156-194.

Peach examines the three ethical perspectives which are used to analyze the issue of women in combat: accountability, justice, and care. These ethics are dominated by gender ideology which centers around the masculinity of war, linking men to combat as an expression of manhood, and the myth of protection, which establishes men as the protectors and women as the protected. The ethic of justice is primarily used by proponents of women's participation in combat. This perspective raises issues of equal opportunity, equal rights, and equal responsibilities for men and women. The care ethic is used by individuals who would argue against the participation of women in combat. This ethic emphasizes peace and nonviolence and views the military as a "fundamentally immoral institution" (p. 178) This ethic has been criticized for its failure to account for the necessity of national defense.

Peach, Lucinda J. 1993. *Women at war: The ethics of women in combat*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana Center on Global Change and World Peace, Indiana University.

Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces. 1992. Report to the President. Washington, DC: GPO.

As an amendment to the 1992 Defense Authorization Act, a presidential commission was established to study "the legal, military and societal implications of amending the [combat] exclusionary laws" which effectively bar female military members from particular occupations in the armed forces. For eight months the Commission undertook a research

study which included document reviews, social science research, testimony from citizens, retired and active duty service personnel, surveys and law and policy reviews. This report to President Clinton includes the following 17 issues with recommendations concerning each: quotas and goals, voluntary v. involuntary duty, fitness/wellness standards, occupational physical requirements, basic training standards, pre-commissioning standards, gender-related occupational standards, parental and family policies, pregnancy and deployability policies, combat roles for women, ground combat, combat aircraft, combatant vessels, special operations, risk rule, transition process, conscription. The appendix includes the research findings, meeting agendas, and statements submitted for the record.

Quester, George H. 1982. The problem. . In *Female soldiers-combatants or noncombatants: Historical and contemporary perspectives*, edited by Nancy Loring Goldman. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

The author reviews the history of women's participation in the U.S. military to find evidence that would suggest how well women would do in combat. The author finds that while women have participated in many wars including World War I and II, few have been cited as combatants. However, Quester found that women have successfully served in anti-aircraft battalions, as aircraft pilots, and in espionage operations through much of World War II and have been in combat areas in many other wars (though usually in medical fields). Restrictions of women's participation in the military imposed by congress during WWII have remained in effect until the 1980's when a number of issues including the end of conscription, a declining pool of eligible males, and an increased focus on gender equality conspired to make Congress and other military officials expand restrictive policies. The author concludes that while women continue to be restricted from combat service, historical precedence suggests that women perform no less well than men.

Rierner, Jeffrey W. 1998. Durkheim's "heroic suicide" in military combat. *Armed Forces and Society* 25:103-120.

Roush, Paul E. 1990. The exclusionists and their message. *Naval Law Review* 39: 163-170.

Ruddick, Sara. 1989. Mothers and men's wars. In *Rocking the ship of state*, edited by Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Saywell, Shelley. 1985. *Women in war*. Markham, Ontario, Canada: Penguin.

Segal, David R., Nora Scott Kinzer and John C. Woelfel 1977. The concept of citizenship and attitudes toward women in combat. *Sex Roles* 3:469-477.

The authors use the historical relationship between citizenship status and military service to examine contemporary attitudes towards women's roles in the military. They find that with the advent of mass armies during the 19th century, western nations have continued to extend citizenship status in concordance with military service. The authors predict that those with liberal attitudes and higher education would be more open to expanding women's roles to include combat than conservatives and those with less education. Using data from two

surveys of Army soldiers and a survey sample of Detroit residents, the authors found that women were significantly more open to having women serve in combat than men but the relationship was not significant. Further, majorities of both men and women did not support the expansion of women's roles to include combat. While liberals were found to be more open to allowing women in combat, the relationship between education and expansion of women's roles was less clear.

Segal, Mady Wechsler. 1982. The argument for female combatants. In *Female Soldiers-Combatants or Non-Combatants: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, edited by Nancy Loring Goldman. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

It is important to note that Segal is not arguing for female combatants in this article as the title leads us to believe. She simply refutes, logically, scientifically and historically the popular arguments against female combatants. The major arguments that Segal discusses start with the nature of combat. This must be clearly defined before a fair debate can occur. Citizen equality and military effectiveness are two goals in the U.S. that have to be considered and weighed when discussing any change to the military or status quo.

Spencer, Dorothy. 1978. *Toward the army of the 1980's: A study of male attitudes toward women as combatants*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Stiehm, Judith. 1983. *Women and men's wars*. New York: Pergamon Press.

Stiehm, Judith H. 1989. Military Opinion. In *Arms and the enlisted woman*, edited by Judith H. Stiehm. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

In this chapter Stiehm examines the opinions of military personnel regarding women's service in the military. Her most significant conclusion is that men's and women's views on this topic have differed both consistently and significantly. Men see women as being favored and performing worst than men. Women, on the other hand, see themselves as discriminated against and performing their jobs well. In terms of opinion on women's role in combat, women, in general, do not want to be barred from combat or forced to serve in combat. Men favor combat for women more often than women do.

Tuten, Jeff M. 1982. The argument against female combatants. In *Female soldiers-combatants or noncombatants: Historical and contemporary perspectives*, edited by Nancy Loring Goldman. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 237-265.

This paper reviews the historical and current justifications given for the exclusion of women from combat roles in the U.S. Armed Forces. The author concludes that women should be excluded from combat until the U.S. fights a war in which female volunteer are assigned to combat units and evaluated positively on their performance. The article begins with an overview of the trends of women's inclusion and exclusion in the services, paying particular attention to social forces in civilian society. Next, through presentation of selective "evidence" (and often cultural opinion), the author advances the opinion that physical, mental,

psychological, and social/organizational considerations, taken seriously, justify women's exclusion from the warrior role. The author recommends the current combat exclusions be retained and reinforced because the further expansion of women's roles and participation the military could cause the U.S. to lose the next war.

U.S. House. 1994. Committee on Armed Services. *Assignment of Army and Marine Corps women under the new definition of ground combat. Hearing before the Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services*. 103rd Cong., 2nd sess. 6 October.

U.S. House. 1993. Committee on Armed Services. *Women in Combat: Hearing before the Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services*. 103rd Cong., 1st sess. 12 May.

Webb, James. 1979. Women can't fight. *The Washingtonian* (November): 44-148, 273-282.

James Webb is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, former Secretary of the Navy and author of several books. In this article, he discusses his ideas about why women should not be in combat and other previously "all male" environments e.g. Military Academies, Marine Basic Training. Webb uses anecdotal information to support his position.

Historical Patterns and Cycles

Alsmeyer, Marie Bennet. 1981. *The way of the WAVES: Women in the Navy*. Conway, AK: HAMBAA books.

Armor, David J. 1996. Race and Gender in the U.S. Military. *Armed Forces and Society* 23: 7-27.

This article reviews the degree of representation of blacks and women in the military to determine whether recruitment policies regarding these groups need to be reformed. Blacks are generally over-represented in the military while women are under-represented. Armor argues that recruiting objectives and job restrictions (i.e. -combat exclusion policies) have been the primary inhibitor of women's participation in the armed services while education and mental aptitude tests have been the primary inhibitor for recruitment of African Americans. The author concludes that any restriction to women's service (both in number and degree of service) is not warranted.

Brooks-Pazmany, Kathleen. 1991. *United States Women in Aviation, 1919-1929*. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute Press.

Boom, Kathleen Williams. 1983. Women in the AAF. *In The Army Air Forces in World War II*, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lee Cate. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History.

- Chrisman, Catherine Bell. 1989. *My war: W.W.II. As experienced by one woman soldier.* Denver: Maverick Publications.
- Cole, Jean Hascall. 1992. *Women Pilots of World War II.* Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
- De Pauw, Linda Grant. 1998. *Battle Cries and Lullabies: Women in war from prehistory to the present.* Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Devilbiss, M.C. 1990. *Women and military service: A history, analysis, and overview of key issues.* Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press
- Diedrich, Maria, ed. 1990. *Women and war: The changing status of American women from the 1930's to the 1940's.* New York: Berg Publishers.
- Douglas, Deborah G. 1990. *United States women in aviation, 1940-1985.* Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Ebbert, Jean and Marie-Beth Hall. 1993. *Crossed currents: Navy women from WWI to Tailhook.* Washington, DC: Brassey's.
- Ellet, Elizabeth. 1969. *Women and the American Revolution, Volume 3.* New York: Haskell House.
- Evans, Sara. 1989. *Born for liberty: A history of women in America.* New York: The Free Press.
- Fletcher, Marjorie H. 1989. *The WRNS: A history of the Women's Royal Naval Service.* Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Frank, Mary E. V. 1985. *Army and Navy nurses held as prisoners of war during World War II.* Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense.
- Gavin, Lettie. 1997. *American women in World War I: They also served.* Niwot, CO: University Press of Colorado.
- Goldman, Nancy, 1973. The Changing Role of Women in the Military. *American Journal of Sociology* 78:892-911.
- Granger, Byrd Howell. 1991. *On final approach: The women airforce service pilots of W.W.II.* Scottsdale, AZ: Falconer Publishing.
- Gruhzt-hoyt, Olga. 1995. *They also served: American women in World War II.* New York: Carol Publishing Co.

- Gunter, Helen Clifford. 1992. *Navy WAVE: Memories of World War II*. Fort Bragg, CA: Cypress House Press.
- Hall, Richard. 1993. *Patriots in disguise: Women warriors of the Civil War*. New York: Paragon House.
- Higonnet, Margaret, Sonya Michel, Jane Jensen, and Margaret Weitz, eds. *Behind the lines: Gender and the two world wars*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Holm, Jeanne. 1992. *Women in the military: An unfinished revolution*. Revised ed. Novato, CA: Presidio.
- Laffin, John. 1967. *Women in battle*. London: Abelard-Schuman.
- Marshall, Kathryn. 1987. *In the combat zone: An oral history of American women in Vietnam, 1966-1975*. New York: Penguin.
- Merryman, Molly. 1998. *Clipped Wings : The rise and fall of the Women Airforce Service Pilots (Wasps) of World War II*. New York: New York University Press.
- Meid, Pat. 1968. *Marine Corps women's reserve in World War II*. Historical Branch, G-3 Division, U.S. Marine Corps.
- Mitchell, Davis. 1966. *Women on the warpath: The story of the women of the First World War*. London: Lowe & Brydone.
- Morden, Bettie J. 1990. *The Women's Army Corps, 1945-1978*. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, U.S. Army.
- Moskos, Charles. 1993. From citizens army to social laboratory. *Wilson Quarterly* 17:83-94.
- Noggle, Anne. 1990. *For god, country and the thrill of it: Women Airforce service pilots in World War II*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.
- Oakes, Claudia M. 1991. *United States women in aviation, 1930-1939*. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Putney, Martha S. 1992. *When the nation was in need: Blacks in the Women's Army Corps in World War II*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow.
- Rowbotham, Shiela. 1972. *Women, resistance, and revolution: A history of women and revolution*. New York: Pantheon Press.
- Rupp, Leila J. 1978. *Mobilizing women for war: German and American propaganda, 1939-1945*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Schneider, Dorothy and Carl J. Schneider. 1991. *Into the breach: American women overseas in World War I*. New York: Viking Press.

Segal Mady Wechsler, and David R. Segal. 1983. Social change and the participation of women in the American military. In *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, vol. 5, edited by Louis Kriesberg. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Segal, Mady Wechsler. 1993. Women in the armed Forces. In *Women and the Use of Military Force*, edited by Howes, Ruth H. and Michael R. Stevenson. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

This chapter is a review of the historical participation of women in the military cross-nationally: Significant changes as have occurred in the United States, possible affects of the current downsizing on the representation of women, the emphasis on technology, citizenship rights and obligations, traditional family roles, labor force participation and legislation concerning women are discussed.

Segal, Mady Wechsler 1995. Women's military roles cross-nationally past, present, and future. *Gender and Society* 9:757-775.

This article presents a model that is designed to predict the degree and nature of women's participation in the armed forces in history and across nations. The degree of representation and the nature of activities performed by women is predicted to be a function of several military, social structural, and cultural factors. Military factors, for example, include a nation's security situation, level of technology employed by its armed forces, the combat support ratio, and other aspects of the force organization and structure.

Sherman, Jannan. 1990. They either need these women or they do not: Margaret Chase Smith and the fight for regular status for women in the military. *Journal of Military History* 54: 47-78.

Soderbergh, Peter A. 1994. *Women Marines in the Korean War era*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.

Stremlow, Mary V. 1986. *A history of the women Marines, 1946-1977*. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

Truby, J. David. 1977. *Women at war*. Boulder, CO: Paladin.

Consequences for Women's Participation in the Military

Albrecht-Heide, Astrid. 1981. The Peaceful Sex. In *Loaded questions: Women in the military*, edited by Wendy Chapkis. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.

Binkin, Martin, and Bach, Shirley. 1977. *Women and the military*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute.

Bystydzienski, Jill M. 1993. Women in groups and organizations: Implications for the use of force. In *Women and the use of military force*, edited by Howes, Ruth H. and Michael R. Stevenson. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 39-52.

The status and roles of women in groups and organizations and the gender gap is the starting point for this essay. Political literature concerning women is then researched to discover how increasing representation of women may impact governmental and military policy. The conclusion of this article is that women entering positions which are male-dominated must seek out and be supported by feminist organizations and positions in order to affect positive change.

Campbell, D'Ann. 1992. Combating the gender gulf: Women in the military during the Persian Gulf War. *Minerva* 10: 3-40.

This article explores the roles that female soldiers played during the Gulf War and how well they performed. Women made up almost 7 percent of the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in the Gulf region in February of 1991. They performed a variety of roles which, on occasion, resulted in their engagement with the enemy, capture, or death. Their service was without incident or problem. During deployment, about 9 percent of women were found to be non-deployable (about half due to medical conditions), as opposed to less than 3 percent of men. While privacy issues are often cited as reason to exclude women from certain military situations, the Gulf war demonstrated that these issues are not insolvable. Men and women found ways to share crowded tents, toilets, and shower facilities. Campbell also discusses the sexual harassment, much of this came from Saudi men who assumed that American women were "loose." There was also some concern as to how the public would react to the wounding, capture, and death of American women by the Iraqis. This concern was largely demonstrated to be unfounded.

Campbell, D'Ann. 1984. *Women at war with America: Private lives in a patriotic era*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Chapkis, Wendy, ed. 1981. *Loaded questions: Women in the military*. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.

Collins, Winifred Quick. 1997. *More than a uniform: A Navy woman in a Navy man's world*. Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press.

Dean, Donna. 1997. *Warriors without weapons: The victimization of military women*. Pasadena, MD: Minerva Center.

Enloe, Cynthia. 1983. *Does khaki become you? The militarisation of women's lives*. Boston: South End Press.

Eisenhart, R.W. 1975. You can't hack it little girl: A discussion of the covert psychological agenda of modern combat training. *Journal of Social Issues* 31: 13-23.

Firestone, Juanita M. and Richard J. Harris. 1997. Organizational climate, leadership and individual responses to sexual harassment in the active duty military. *Free Inquiry in Creative Sociology* 25:211-17.

This article explores patterns of response to harassment experiences that had the greatest effect on the 20,249 of those who responded to the 1988 Dept of Defense Survey of Sex Roles in the Active-Duty military. Respondent's perceptions about the effectiveness of their responses & the efforts of senior military leadership of immediate supervisors to stop sexual harassment are analyzed. Results indicate that in order to curb sexual harassment there must be a focus on two simultaneous efforts: 1. lowering the actual incidence of harassment and 2. providing a safe environment in which policies to redress incidents can be utilized without fear of negative consequences.

Harrell, Margaret C and Laura Miller. 1997. *New opportunities for military women: Effects upon readiness, cohesion, and morale*. Santa Monica: RAND.

Herbert, Melissa S. 1998. *Camouflage isn't only for combat: gender, sexuality and women in the military*. New York: New York University Press.

Hosek, James R. and Christine E. Peterson. 1990. *Serving her country: An analysis of women's enlistment*. Santa Monica: RAND.

Karpinos, Bernard D. 1975. *Recruiting of women for the military: Assessment of the mental and medical standards and their present and potential effects on recruiting needs*. Report prepared for Directorate for Manpower Research, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization, Eastern Division.

Miller, Laura L. 1997. Not just weapons of the weak: Gender Harassment as a form of protest for army men. *Social Psychology Quarterly* 60:32-51.

Martindale, M. 1991. Sexual harassment in the military: 1988. *Sociological Practice Review* 2:200-215.

Morris, Madeline. 1996. By force of arms: Rape, war and military culture. *Duke Law Review* 45:651-780.

Richman-Loo, Ninan and Weber, Rachel. 1996. Gender and weapons design. In *It's our military, too! Women and the U.S. Military*, edited by Judith H. Stiehm. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 136-155.

This chapter examines how technology can either limit or facilitate women's participation in the military. Conventional wisdom tells us that technology cuts across gender barriers (such as physical strength requirements), but as these authors point out, to date most military technologies have been designed for men. They look specifically at the Joint Primary Aircraft Training Systems (JPATS) as their main case study. The authors analyze specifically

what designs were or were not implemented and what percentages of women these technologies affected. Then they discuss how the design alterations that needed to be made to accommodate women were negotiated politically. The authors, in their conclusion, reiterate that technology is not genderless and that new technologies being built now should take into consideration the physical accommodation for women's bodies, specifically as we see more and more combat exclusion policies being discarded.

Rosen, Leora N. and Martin Lee. 1997. Sexual harassment, cohesion, and combat readiness in U.S. Army support units. *Armed Forces and Society* 24:221-44.

Rosenfeld, Paul. Carol. E. Newell and Sharon Le. 1998. Equal Opportunity climate of women and minorities in the Navy: Results from the Navy Equal Opportunity/Sexual Harassment (NEOSH) Survey. *Military Psychology* 10:69-86.

Slaphey, Mary McGowan. 1986. *Exploring military service for women*. New York: Rosen Publishing Group.

Steinberg, Alma G., Beverly C. Harris and Jacquelyn Scarville. 1993. Why promotable female officers leave the Army. Alexandria, VA: Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences.

U.S. House. 1992. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security. *Operation Desert Storm: Race and gender comparison of deployed forces with all active duty forces*. Fact sheet for the Chairman, Legislation and National Security Subcommittee, Committee on Government Operations. Washington, DC: GAO.

U.S. House. 1992. Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services. Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee. *Women in the military: the Tailhook affair and the problem of sexual harassment: Report of the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee and Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services*. 101st Cong., 2nd sess.

U.S. House. Committee on Armed Services. *Sexual harassment of military women and improving the military complain system: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services*. 103rd Cong., 2nd sess. 9 March.

U.S. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Navy Women's Study Group. 1990. *An update report on the progress of women in the Navy*. Chief of Naval Operations.

U.S. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Navy Women's Study Group. 1987. *Navy study on progress of women in the Navy*. Chief of Naval Operations.

Verges, Marianne. 1991. *On silver wings: The women Air Force service pilots of World War II, 1942-1944*. New York: Ballentine Books.

Webster, Evelyn G., & Richard F. Booth 1976. Success and failure among male and female Navy paramedical specialists. *Journal of Community Psychology* 4: 81-88.

AVF / Conscription / Citizenship

Devilbiss, M.C. 1980. *Women and compulsory military service*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York, 28 August.

Enloe, Cynthia. 1989. Lessons from other times, other places. In *Who defends America: Race, Sex, and Class in the Armed Forces*, edited by Edwin Dorn. Washington, DC: Joint Center for Political Studies Press.

Ruddick, Sara. 1983. Drafting women: Pieces of a puzzle. In *Conscripts and Volunteers: Military Requirements, Social Values and the All-Volunteer Force*, edited by Robert K. Fullinwider. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld.

Ruddick's chapter raises several issues germane to the subject of drafting women for military service. Ruddick asks, if conscription violates a citizen's rights, should the state, out of fairness, violate all citizens rights (women's as well as men's)? In this chapter Ruddick explores women's relationship to the state, to war and to military personnel policy. She concludes several things. First of all, she notes that the "right to fight" is every citizen's right, but this right does not mean that women have a duty to fight. Secondly, she concludes that "no conscription law we have can be justified in terms of the obligations of citizens to take responsibility for the violence of their state" (p. 222). As such, women's political obligation neither justifies conscription of women nor men. Thirdly, in response to critics of the AVF as being unfair, she concludes that a draft is "unreliable and a morally costly instrument of fairness" (p. 215). So, while it is true, she reasons, that women should be included in a draft with men (out of fairness), the argument cannot stand against the fact that no one should bear the burdens of something as morally suspect as conscription.

Women's Health / Adjustment

Abel, E., E. Adams, and R. Stevenson. 1996. Sexual risk behavior among female Army recruits. *Military Medicine* 161:491-494.

Bishop, George D. 1984. Gender, role, and illness behavior in a military population. *Health Psychology* 3 (6): 519-534.

This article is an investigation of the effects of gender and role stress on reporting and response to symptoms in a military population. 46 female and 44 male enlisted soldiers (mean age 22.9 years) who were members of administrative or combat support units, were interviewed and asked to keep a health diary for 30 days. Results show that although females reported twice as many health problems in the initial interview, there were no significant gender differences observed in symptom reporting on the health diary. Significant differences were obtained, however, between members of administrative and support units, with members of combat support units reporting twice as many symptoms in the diary. Overall, the results

are interpreted as emphasizing the impact of occupational stress and group cohesion rather than gender as influences on illness behavior.

Clark, Michelle 1986. Alcoholism first. Special issue: A woman's recovery from the trauma of war. *Women and Therapy* 5(1): 71-76.

Dvoredsky, A.E., Cooley, W. 1985. The health care needs of women veterans. Special issue: Women and health. *Hospital and Community Psychiatry* 36 (10): 1098-1102.

Hoiberg, Anne 1978. Women in the Navy: Morale and attrition. *Armed Forces and Society* 4: 659-671.

Hoiberg, Anne 1984. Health status of women in the U.S. military. *Health Psychology* 3 (3): 273-287.

This article examines health-related issues concerning women in the military (i.e., pregnancy-related conditions, physical injuries and capabilities, stress-related disorders). It is noted that the most frequent reason for being hospitalized among Navy women who enlisted from 1974-1979 was for a pregnancy-related condition. Comparisons of injury-related hospitalizations indicated that these women had the highest hospitalization rates across occupational groups and pay grades. Women assigned to nontraditional jobs had somewhat higher admission rates for injuries than women in traditional jobs. Rates for injury- and stress-related conditions tended to decrease with increasing pay grade levels. Programs designed to improve women's physical conditioning, enhance job-related capabilities, and expand their opportunities are discussed.

Hourani, L.L., H. Yuan, W. Graham, L. Powers, C. Simon-Arndt and B. Appleton. 1997. The mental health status of women in the Navy and Marine Corps: preliminary findings from the 1995 Perceptions of Wellness and Readiness (POWR) Assessment. San Diego: US Naval Health Research Center Report. Report No. 97-40.

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Institute of Medicine, Committee on Body Composition, Nutrition and Health of Military Women. 1998. *Reducing stress fractures in physically active military women*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

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Levenberg, Stephen, B. 1983. Vietnam combat veterans: From perpetrator to victim. *Family and Community Health* 5(4): 69-76.

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- Resnick, Heidi S., Dean G. Kilpatrick, Bonnie S. Dansky, Benjamin E. Saunders, and Connie L. Best. 1993. Prevalence of civilian trauma and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in a representative national sample of women. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* 61: 984-991.
- Schuckit, Marc A. and E. K. Eric Ginderson. 1974. Psychiatric incidence rates for Navy women: Implications for an all-volunteer force. *Military Medicine* 139: 534-36.
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Public Opinion and Women in the Military

Smith, A. Wade. 1989. Public attitudes. In *Who defends America: Race, Sex, and Class in the Armed Forces*, edited by Edwin Dorn. Washington, DC: Joint Center for Political Studies Press.

Public Opinion Polls:

1940

George H. Gallup. 1972. *The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1935-1971*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 253-54, 316, 401.

In 1940, 48 percent of the U.S. population agreed that it was ready to start drafting 21-35 year old women. The approval rate raised to 68 percent after Pearl Harbor was bombed (and the wording of the survey question was changed to "single" women in the latter questionnaire). Again, the dramatic change in percentages does not necessarily reflect real attitudinal shifts, but is, in large part, an artifact of the change in questionnaire wording.

1942

George H. Gallup. 1972. *The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1935-1971*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 253-54, 316, 337.

In 1942 52 percent of respondents believed that 18 and 19 year old boys should **not** be drafted for military service (42 percent believed they should). Opinion about the draft is an important context for opinion about women and conscription, as noted in the above section. It is also interesting to compare this data to the polls collected during the Vietnam era.

1943

George H. Gallup. 1972. *The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1935-1971*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 401.

The approval rate of drafting women by 1943, dropped to 45 percent (48 percent of respondents did not approve and 7 percent were undecided).

George H. Gallup. 1972. *The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1935-1971*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 406, 412, 420.

When asked if the Army should draft either 300,000 single women, aged 21-35, for the WACS in non-fighting positions, or the same number of married men with families for the same work, 81 percent 73 percent and 78 percent (in three different months) agreed that the women should be drafted. When broken down by gender, greater percentages of women tended to be in agreement with the idea compared with men. Again, the wording of the question is an important factor in understanding such high percentages compared to questionnaires from earlier years.

1945

George H. Gallup. 1972. *The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1935-1971*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 485.

In February of 1945, 73 percent of those polled approved of the proposal that was before Congress to draft nurses to serve with the Army and Navy.

1947

George H. Gallup. 1972. *The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1935-1971*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 667.

In August of 1947 only a slight majority of those polled were in favor of peacetime enlistment of women, at 53 percent (Women were only slightly more in favor of the idea at 54 percent compared to men at 52 percent).

1951

George H. Gallup. 1972. *The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1935-1971*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 972.

When asked, "many typing and clerical jobs in the U.S. Armed Forces are now filled by servicemen. Would you favor or oppose having Congress pass a law now to draft young single women to do such jobs," 48 percent were in favor of the proposal, while 44 percent opposed it. A slight majority of women at 51 percent were in favor and 41 percent opposed, while only 46 percent of men were in favor and 47 percent were opposed.

1954

George H. Gallup. 1972. *The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1935-1971*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1244-1245.

In June of 1954, 55 percent of respondents favored drafting women (for non-combat duty) in the event of a third world war. A clear majority of professionals and white collar job holders were in favor of the idea, while a minority of farmers held the same opinion. This poll was one of the few that broke down respondents by profession.

1969

George H. Gallup. 1972. *The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1935-1971*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2180.

In 1969, 62 percent of those polled said they were in favor of continuing the draft. Compare these results to the results of the 1942 Gallup survey, above.

George H. Gallup. 1972. *The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1935-1971*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2192.

In 1969, 79 percent of those surveyed agreed that men should be required to serve one year of compulsory military service, but only 44 percent believed women should be required to do the same.

1977

George H. Gallup. 1978. *The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1972-1971*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 952-55.

In 1977, 62 percent of those polled believed men should be drafted for national service but just over 50 percent opposed any sort of compulsory national service for women.

1979

George H. Gallup. 1980. *The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1979*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 150-153.

In this poll, 43 percent of participants said that women should be incorporated into a future draft; however, fewer than 20 percent approved of women in combat positions.

1980

George H. Gallup. 1981. *The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1980*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 54, 59, 146-149.

This poll, like its predecessor of 1979, found that almost 51 percent of those polled favored women's conscription and slightly more, at 22 percent (compared to 20 percent in 1979) approved of women in combat positions. Also, a clear majority, 59 percent believed the U.S. should return to the draft.

1981

George H. Gallup. 1982. *The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1981*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 182-83.

Sixty percent of those polled agreed with the 1981 Supreme Court decision that women could be exempt from draft registration. This seems to be inconsistent with the previously listed finding.

1982

"Women and the Draft." April 1982. *Glamour*, 31-32.

Glamour readers supported the draft registration for women at a rate of 44 percent. They also preferred single women to be drafted at a rate of 62 percent over fathers. Also, 33 percent believed women should be allowed in combat, but 40 percent felt women's presence in combat positions would create too many problems in the ranks. There is no easy way to know how scientifically-based this survey was, but it does appear to have a self-selection problem with its sample (those polled were readers of the magazine).

James, A. Davis, Jennifer Lauby, and Paul B. Sheatsley. 1983 *Americans View the Military: Public Opinion in 1982*. National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, 30-42.

Results of this rather extensive nation-wide survey show several things: 1. Eighty-four percent (84 percent) "wish to keep or increase the proportion of women in the services" (p. 30); 2. Eighty-four percent (84 percent) of those "favoring National Service would conscript both women and men" (p. 30); 3. Eighty-one percent (81 percent) "believe that the increased number of women in the services has either raised or had no effect on military effectiveness" (p. 30); 4. Ninety-three percent (93 percent) support women as nurses in combat zones, 83 percent support women as truck mechanics, 62 percent support women as fighter pilots, 59 percent support women as missile gunners, 58 percent support women as a commander of a large base, 57 percent support women as crew on combat ships, 34 percent approve of women fighting hand-to-hand combat, an only 20 percent believed women actually raised the effectiveness of the military (p. 34); 5. The NORC survey also looked at who held the most favorable attitudes toward women's military service. Those most favorable are ones who are more highly educated, younger adults, from the northern United States, and less religiously devout.

1984

James, A. Davis and Paul B. Sheatsley. 1985. *Americans View the Military: A 1984 Update*. National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, 25.

Wartime service for American men is seen by a large percentage of the population as an obligation at 84 percent, compared to 46 percent of the population who see it as an obligation for women. "Peacetime military service for men (33 percent) or women (18 percent) is seen as a civic obligation by only a minority.

1991

"Americans Oppose Moms at War." *Washington Times*, February 21, 1991, 9. Associated Press Poll.

In this February 1991 poll, over 60 percent of respondents believed that it was "unacceptable" for women with young children to be sent off to war.

1992

Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces. August 1992. *Attitudes Regarding the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces: The Public Perspective*. The Roper Organization, 1-10.

The results of the survey indicated a general public support for women in the military, especially women in combat. These are the results: 1. Thirty-nine percent (39 percent) believe that "there are too few women in the Armed Forces" (p. 8); 2. Sixty-nine percent (69 percent) thought women should be assigned as fighter or bomber pilots (or as a member of the crew), 38 percent felt women should be assigned as an infantry soldier; 59 percent thought women should be assigned to special operating behind enemy lines; 58 percent thought women should be assigned as an artillery gunner engaging the enemy on ground; 69 percent felt women should be assigned to combat duty in the Navy; 58 percent felt women should be assigned as a tank crew member; and 42 percent felt women should be assigned as a marine landing on shore to attack the enemy. 3. The results also showed that 47 percent disagreed

that women should not be subjected to the possibility of being POWs; 52 percent agreed that our enemies would consider our armed forces more vulnerable if women were allowed in direct combat; 61 percent agreed that because the nature of modern warfare obscures an exact line between combat and support zones, there is no good reason to exclude women from direct combat; and 51 percent disagreed that they were opposed to women being assigned to combat positions on a voluntary basis because they feared it would lead to women being drafted and forced to serve in combat duties involuntarily. 4. In terms of stereotyped attributes, 68 percent disagreed that women are not aggressive enough to serve in combat, 75 percent agreed that if women can meet the physical qualifications, they should be able to serve in combat, 76 percent agreed that national security depends on selection of the best qualified individuals, regardless of gender, 67 percent agreed that in excluding women, the military risks losing the skills women have to offer, 69 percent believe that if women receive the same training as men, their effectiveness would be equal to men. 5. Finally, 47 percent opposed the military policy which stipulates that women are not to be assigned to combat positions, compared to 44 percent who supported the policy.

1997

Associated Press Poll. February 18-23, 1997. *Women in the military*. ICR Survey Research Group, Associated Press. The major topics covered in the poll are: 1. Military training based on gender, 2. Affect of sexual misconduct on female enrollment, 3. Misconduct in the military, and 4. Family/self in military service. There are 35 variables in the poll and 1010 individuals were polled.

Miscellaneous

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Article topics include: "American youth and military representation," "Social and value integration of youth in the military," "The military as an educational and training institution," "Drug use and military plans of high school seniors," and "Affiliative processes in military units."

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