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COLD WAR WORKING GROUP (CWWG)

Summary Remarks:

     The Cold War Working Group (CWWG) met in 3 half-day sessions, November 9-10, 1999, to discuss the priorities, issues, and future work of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission (USRJC) on POW/MIAs.  Mr. A. Denis Clift and Colonel Vladimir Konstantinovich Vinogradov co-chaired the working group.  Specific discussion topics included: (1) Admiral Novyy's status report on the progress and future requirements on the investigation on the fate of U.S. Air Force Major Eugene Posa, following the Soviet shootdown of the RB-47 over the Barents Sea on July 1, 1960; (2) Commission approval to provide Admiral Novyy with official credentials as a bone fide researcher on behalf of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission; (3) Discussions and clarification on the transfer of Soviet Northern Fleet special materials and documents from various Russian archives to Lubyanka in Moscow; (4)  Status reports and discussions on the progress and direction of future requirements for the unresolved Cold War shootdown incidents; (5)  The memoir of a former Soviet citizen regarding alleged American POWs held in the Gulag of the former Soviet Union; (6)  Mr. Connell's status report on the progress and future outlook for the investigation of the April 8, 1950 shootdown of the U.S. Navy PB-4Y2 over the Baltic Sea near Liepaja, Latvia; (7) U.S. contributions to the determination of the fate of five Russian MIAs from the war in Afghanistan; (8) U.S. inquiry and questions on the case of John William Adkin; (9) Russian questions and doubts regarding U.S. information and salvage on the Soviet K-129 that sank in the Pacific in 1968; (10) Results of the U.S. re-examination of its diplomatic and intelligence reporting in support of Russian MIA accounting from the war in Afghanistan, and (11) Discussions about developing a cooperative investigative mechanism between the Commission and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) that emulates the U.S. Coast Guard’s and FSB’s cooperative engagement program.   

Working Group Proceedings:

     The Cold War Working Group (CWWG) began its deliberations on November 9, 1999, with a traditional exchange of welcoming remarks and introductions by the group's co-chairmen, Mr. Clift and Colonel Vinogradov, both of whom noted that a year had past since the USRJC and the CWWG had met.

     Colonel Vinogradov reported that the Russian side recently determined the fate of 5 Russian MIAs from the war in Afghanistan.  He noted with appreciation that the information provided by the U.S. contributed significantly to the determination of these Russian MIAs.  He then passed a new list of 9 former Soviet POWs from the war in Afghanistan and requested U.S. assistance to locate them.  Clift accepted the list.

     Next, Admiral Novyy provided a comprehensive report regarding the investigation into the fate of U.S. Air Force Major Eugene Posa, who disappeared following the Soviet shootdown of his RB-47 aircraft on July 1, 1960 over the Barents Sea.  He recounted the shootdown, the rescue of Majors Olmstead and McKone and the recovery of Major Palm’s remains.  He said that over several years, he had interviewed more than 70 people regarding the incident.  His research had identified 19 people who he believed could shed additional light on Major Posa’s fate.  Recently, his investigative research has pursued two lines of inquiry based on the interviews and recollections of the Northern Fleet's former Chief of Medical Services and Chief of Staff.

     According to the first approach, Major Posa may have been buried in the Murmansk region at the Severomorsk-II or Safonovo cemeteries near the Navy Hospital 1018 in Rosta.  Admiral Novyy spent two days researching burial records in these cemeteries.  He conducted site surveys, and he interviewed grounds keepers.  He also traveled throughout Murmansk and Severomorsk to pursue investigative leads, but, unfortunately, he did not locate Major Posa’s grave.

     Novyy reported numerous anomalies.  He said that his investigation had uncovered only a partial chain of custody for Major Posa’s remains.  Records indicated that a Soviet fishing trawler (SKR-28) recovered Major Posa's body on October 14, 1960, three months after the shootdown.  Also, a second trawler, SKR-56, retrieved parts of the American RB-47 aircraft’s wings.  On October 15, 1960, Major Posa’s remains and the recovered wing wreckage were transferred to SKR-56 and transported to Severomorsk.  Archival reports and an interview with the SKR-56 captain and 2 crewmen indicate that Major Posa’s remains were offloaded in Severomorsk on October 19, 1960, shortly after 8:00AM.  Beyond that, the chain of custody is uncertain.  The investigation has not found any log entries or release documents to confirm Major Posa’s removal from SKR-56 or to indicate where his remains were brought, stored, examined or buried.

     Soviet communication logs indicate that a speedboat was ordered to transport Major Posa’s remains and the RB-47’s wing wreckage from Severomorsk to Murmansk.  The speedboat departed Severomorsk for Murmansk on October 20, 1960 with the wing wreckage aboard, but it is not clear if Major Posa’s remains were aboard or if they had been transported elsewhere separately.

     Although not a certainty, Novyy concluded that Major Posa’s post mortem forensic examination probably was performed at the 1815th Naval Hospital and Morgue in Rosta.  KGB communications and interviews with medical personnel support this conclusion.

     According to the second line of inquiry, Novyy reported that Major Posa could be buried on Kildin Island.  Thus, he chartered a speedboat and went there to conduct a site survey.  He surveyed and photographed three graves, any one of which may contain the remains of Major Posa.  However, he did not have any authorization to excavate the graves.

     Novyy said that he reported his findings and recommendations to Admiral Rossoko on his trip to the Kola Peninsula and Kildin Island when he returned to St. Petersburg. He recommended excavation of the Kildin Island graves in the Spring during good weather.  In the interim, he suggested that the Commission direct its focus on archival research at the Gatchina Archive.  He offered the following plan of action:

  1. Locate a list of the 1815th Naval Hospital and Morgue personnel in Rosta for 1960.

  2. Locate and interview former Rosta Garrison Komendartura personnel, including Lieutenant Andropov and Warrant Officer Repet regarding Major Posa’s chain of custody.

  3. Locate the deck logs for Soviet fishing trawler SKR-56.

  4. Request the KGB communications logs between Moscow and Murmansk, including the order for the speedboat transport of the wing wreckage to Murmansk and possibly to clarify Major Posa’s chain of custody and disposition.

  5. Locate and interview the former lieutenant of the speedboat, Yuriy Mikhailovich Antonov, and his communications/codes officer, who transported the RB-47’s wing wreckage and possibly Major Posa to Murmansk.

  6. Contact the firm that has built coffins for the Northern Fleet since before the 1960s to determine if they made a coffin for Major Posa.

  7. Research records at the 2 NORFLT naval bases (Belomorskoye and Severodinsk/Arkangel'sk).

     However, Novyy noted the Russian side does not have a centralized database that can be searched.  Thus, all inquiries must be made individually to the local authorities and Commissariats, a procedure which could make the investigation very time- and labor-intensive.

     In his personal assessment, Novyy noted that many people who may have known about Major Posa’s fate have already died over the past 40 years since the shootdown.  However, he emphasized that there must have been a formal chain of custody and documentation of events.  He recalled that Major Palm’s (RB-47’s pilot) chain of custody was uncovered, and he believes that Major Posa’s can be too.  Despite the challenges, Novyy strongly encouraged the Commission to keep hope alive and not to give up the search.  He also said that the Commission should not view its inability thus far to locate Major Posa as a failure because it has closed out and eliminated several possibilities, which ultimately represents progress.  Clift concurred and thanked Novyy for his dedicated research and encouraged him to press ahead on this and other unresolved Cold War shootdowns.

     In a final point, Novyy requested that the Commission provide him an official letter of credentials as a bone fide researcher for the Commission.  Clift encouraged the Russian side to provide Novyy with the proper credentials for him to continue his research unabated.  He added that Novyy’s investigative leads must be followed and that the U.S. side would like to work with Novyy to follow up with excavation on the Kildin Island site survey.  Later, Vinogradov reported that Zolotarev also concurred and that the Russian side would take immediate steps to provide Novyy with the requested credentials.  Clift thanked Novyy for his meticulous report, which he said was grounded squarely in scientific method and professionalism.

     Turning to the confusing transfer of archival documents, Clift said that prior to 1966, files from the Soviet Central Naval Archive files at Gatchina were transferred to Moscow.  He asked if the Russian side knew where they went.  Vinogradov clarified that materials from special departments of the Soviet Navy were transferred to Lubyanka in Moscow.  Clift commented that it was difficult to understand and follow the transfer of some documents to Lubyanka, Podol’sk, or other archives from Gatchina, and we looked forward to further explanation.

     Vinogradov turned to Mr. Cherepkov to expound on the transfer of special Navy documents and their search of Special Department files of the Soviet Northern Fleet (NORFLT).  Mr. Cherepkov said the reason that the Special Department materials of the NORFLT had been moved was to comply with security regulations and directives.  However, he clarified that the FSB reviewed and searched for the NORFLT’s special naval materials on Major Posa in two stages – 1992 and 1996.  They determined that, according to regulations, supervisory documents were kept in Moscow, while general investigative documents remained in Murmansk.  However, he noted that all special materials and documents -- supervisory, personnel, general and NORFLT -- remain under the overall control of the Headquarters, Federal Security Service, to facilitate oversight and supervisory control of the NORLT investigation.

     Clift commented that sometimes the most obvious points are missed.  He said that Majors McKone and Olmstead were brought to Lubyanka Prison in Moscow and asked if the Russian side had explored all special files about their imprisonment with respect to Major Posa’s fate.  They were held for nearly 8 months.  The files must be enormous and maybe information on Major Posa’s fate was moved into those special files to consolidate the holdings on the incident, Clift suggested.

     Cherepkov replied that the Russian side had considered this possibility and that its investigation also was moving in this direction.  However, he said that the McKone and Olmstead files are not so extensive and that the Russian side had been going through them to correlate the information.  Thus far, there are no records of any interrogations of Major Posa or answers regarding his fate.  Cherepkov noted Major McKone's observation that Major Posa had been killed during the shootdown attack.  Major Olmstead said that he had seen a parachute.  Neither officer could offer any information regarding Major Posa’s recovery.  Cherepkov concluded that there was not a single hint about Major Posa's fate reflected in the McKone and Olmstead files.

     Cherepkov also reported that the Murmansk Division of the Special Materials Fond (collection) requested information from the case management section of the Central Murmansk Archive on Major Posa’s burial.  He said that, unfortunately, they did not find any information on the details regarding his burial.  They also interviewed veteran officers of the Special Department in Murmansk and Severomorsk, with no additional results.  He concluded that all findings had been sent to the Commission previously.  Thus, Cherpekov said that the Commission’s investigation does not require additional searches of the former Communist Party, FSB, or Special Material Fond.  He noted the Russian side has done all that is possible on investigating the fate of Posa.

     Vinogradov added that the KGB reviewed and studied all special coded messages and documents related to this incident, including those from the Murmansk region.  He commented that it might be possible for the U.S side of the Commission to gain access to these special documents on behalf of the Commission through General Zolotarev.

     Mr. Jim Connell reminded Vinogradov of the longstanding U.S. request for declassified access to these special documents and asked Vinogradov to check with Zolotarev on the status of the request.

     Next, Clift provided the working group with a short overview of the progress on the following six Cold War incidents that he viewed as having the highest potential for accounting and resolution:

  1. The RB-47 shootdown on July 1, 1960 involving Major Posa.

  2. The PB-4Y2 shootdown on April 8, 1950 over the Baltic Sea.

  3. The PV-2 shootdown on November 6, 1951 over the Sea of Japan.

  4. The RB-29 shootdown on June 13, 1952 over the Sea of Japan..

  5. The RB-50 shootdown on July 29, 1953 over the Sea of Japan.

  6. The RB-47 shootdown on April 17, 1955 over the Bering Sea.

     Clift commented that research on the April 17, 1955 shootdown clearly indicated Soviet Security Service involvement and that the Aviation Air Defense Forces (APVO) conducted the shootdown, not naval units.  The Commission's research on this case should therefore be directed at the Podol’sk rather than the Gatchina Archive, he noted.  Clift then remarked that the former Soviet Union did not appear to have played any role in the U.S. RB-50 aircraft lost over the Pacific Ocean on September 10, 1956, but that new information always would be welcomed.  A similar request for further assistance was made in the case of the RB-47 aircraft lost over the Black Sea on December 14, 1956, about which little has been learned so far.

     With regard to the July 29, 1953 shootdown Clift noted that one crewman survived and was rescued by a U.S. destroyer.  He said that there was substantial evidence that the Soviet Union also conducted a major search and rescue operation and that Admiral Rossoko had commanded one of the search and rescue units at that time.  Also, references from the Gatchina archive have established communications between the Soviet Navy and KGB Border Guards regarding the incident.  Next, he expressed his hope that the Russian side would expand access by Commission researchers to specified Russian archives for this and other cold war incidents.

     Vinogradov commented skeptically about the materials that Clift claimed to possess regarding the July 29, 1953, as well as the Russian search and rescue effort.  He asked if the Russian side could see and read these materials with their own eyes because to his knowledge there were no such witnesses.  Clift agreed and said that the U.S. side would pass the materials that he had requested through the Commission's Executive Secretariat.

     Turning to the “anonymous” memoir, Vinogradov expressed significant skepticism.  He questioned the allegations and where the eyewitnesses of past events have been all this time.  He concluded that the memoir gives significant cause for caution and discounted it as series of allegations by imaginative people based largely on personal conversations and not subject to verification.  Vinogradov said the Russian side intends to read the memoir with great care and under close scrutiny.  He expressed serious misgivings regarding the references to Major Samuel Bush and the alleged registration of foreign POWs.  He discounted and discredited the memoir as a fantasy and likened it to an ancient fairy tale.

     Vinogradov proclaimed confidently that, in general, the Russian side does not believe that American servicemen were held as POWs in the former Soviet Union.  He said that he and his Russian colleagues believe that, during the Cold War, U.S. military aircraft were shot down but that personnel and remains were always returned.  Clift listened and thanked Vinogradov for his candor, assured him that the U.S. does not invent such documents from archives, and insisted that the Russian side seriously examine the memoir in detail and respond to issues it raises.

     Vinogradov also asked the U.S. side to identity the author of the memoir.  He said that the Russian side is not interested in the source for any reason other than to verify his claims and relationship to the events and places cited in the memoir.  He criticized the secrecy of the author’s identity as games of, "We know, but won’t tell you."  He also labeled the composition of the memoir as “quite clumsy.”

     The Russian Co-chairman commented that there is no reason for the Russian side to conceal anything.  He said that information about the former communist regime of the Soviet Union is well known, and the Russian side is not hiding anything.  He concluded that the Russian side would fulfill the Commission’s request, although it is not sure about how or where to begin.  Clift stressed his interest in the Cold War discussion of the memoir and said broader issues should be discussed and decided by Generals Zolotarev and Lajoie.  In response, Vinogradov reiterated his request for whatever supporting documents the U.S. side possessed on the aircraft losses, including records from U.S. search and rescue operations, and transcripts of conversations.

     Clift then recounted several of the specific accounts described in the memoir regarding the June 13, 1952 shootdown.  He noted several recurrent themes in the memoir as well as the alleged activities and events in Svobodnyy near Blagoveshchensk and the Zeya River.  Clift also sought further clarification about the June 13, 1952 shootdown and the specific references to the fates of Major Busch and MSgt Moore as noted in the memoir.

     Clift stated that this was a new account of the incident and that we understood the Russian side’s concerns.  He said that the U.S. side valued the Russian side's research and assistance.  He also cited Admiral Novyy's remark that the author of the memoir had offered several credible points that could and should be considered.

     Vinogradov agreed and said the Russian side also would check the information against camp records.  Connell commented that the labor camp records, maps and locations are still classified and that the U.S. side would like to have the Russian map of the camp’s locations.  Vinogradov replied that the Germans had been given the locations and information on the camps but there were no Americans in them.  Connell clarified that we had received the map of the “GUPVI” system of camps, which can be referenced in the book, The First Guidebook to Prisons and Concentrations in the Soviet Union by Avraham Shifrin.  However, the U.S. was interested more in the maps and records of the camps for political prisoners and criminals, which are not addressed in Shifrin's book and do not correlate to the GUPVI system of camps.  Vinogradov commented that it would not be too difficult for him to check this information and he concluded that if the information exists, it would not be impossible to access it.

     However, Vinogradov claimed that it would have been impossible for American POWs to be interned in the same Soviet camps with felons and convicts.  He was sure that the camp system was organized very well and that the reference to transporting prisoners aboard slave ships also was impossible.  He said that these stories reminded him of old U.S. movies about the Soviet GULag, which also were fantasies.  However, Vinogradov promised that the Russian side would investigate the allegations.

     Turning to the K-129 incident, known in the U.S. as the Golf-class submarine incident, Vinogradov said that he did not understand the Commission’s difficulties on this issue.  He said this inquiry had taken on the psychology of a criminal that had been caught and now claimed that guilt must now be proved.  He commented that, although the Russian side was grateful for all the answers it had received thus far, Russian experts still had doubts.  He noted that a televised documentary had been done on the K-129 incident and it also expressed similar doubts.

     Clift answered that the U.S. had provided Russia with a full explanation of the incident.  He added that it would be difficult to say more.  He recalled that last year the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had reviewed its files again to be absolutely sure that there was no more information on this incident, and that during the 15th Plenum he had passed to the Russian side the CIA's response in a letter dated September 18, 1998.  Clift recounted that in 1994, Ambassador Toon formally address the Commission on this issue.  Further, Former CIA Directors Gates and Woolsey met with Russian President Yeltsin to review the information that we had passed to the Russian side on the K-129 incident.  Clift also noted that he had participated with Ambassador Toon and Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) representatives in the proceedings during which the K-129's bell was returned to the Russian side.  Citing the remarks made by General Lajoie at the Plenum's Opening Session, Clift reiterated that the U.S. side has exhausted its research and resources regarding the K-129 incident.

     Novyy commented that a special memorial service was held last year in St. Petersburg for the K-129 loss.  He said several U.S. naval officers attended the memorial service.  He noted that it was a sensitive and emotional church service that included family members from the Russian K-129 and U.S.S. Thrasher submarine losses.

     Next, Connell updated the working group on the current investigation and research on the April 8, 1950 Soviet Cold War shootdown of the U.S. Navy PB-4Y2 aircraft over the Baltic Sea near Liepaja, Latvia.  He explained that the Latvians uncovered three sets of unknown remains in the Liepaja cemetery in July 1999.  Circumstantial evidence indicated that they might have been part of the 10-person U.S. Navy PB-4Y2 crew.  As a result, the Latvian Government, the U.S. Ambassador to Latvia and the Commission asked the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii (CILHI) to participate in a joint U.S.-Latvian forensic examination.  A CILHI team went to Latvia to examine the remains and the burial site.  It also brought the dental records for each of the 10 missing crewmen.  The joint forensic examination determined that, based on dental records and other physical characteristics of the skeletal remains, the unidentified remains could not be those of the American crewmen.  Connell commented that, although the U.S. side was disappointed, it remains hopeful.  He concluded that other witnesses have come forward, and not all leads on this incident have been exhausted.

     In response, Vinogradov requested copies of the U.S. documents regarding the U.S. investigation of the April 8, 1950 shootdown.  He praised the U.S. side's efforts, which he said serve as a model for the Russian Government and people.  Connell commented that most of the documents related to this investigation have come from Russian archives and sources but that he would put together a package for Zolotarev.  He noted that Commission investigators continue to search for the underwater divers who were involved in the initial Soviet search and rescue operation on the PB-4Y2 in 1950.

     Next, Connell provided the working group with an update and point paper on the John William Adkin case (file number 74943 in the St. Petersburg Archive of the Federal Security Service).  He reported that he had discussed this case with Zolotarev, Novyy, and Mr. Edward Purdue of Massachusetts during lunch and that he also had passed the point paper to Zolotarev.  Vinogradov commented that the Russian side had sent the photographs and passed the information already, but the recipient had not received it yet.

     Turning to Gatchina, Clift said that he hoped more could be developed through Novyy’s and Kazachenko’s work in the archive.  Kazachenko commented that decisions about research priorities for Gatchina should be established and followed.  He recommended that the Commission request a directed search of certain files by specific people in order to coordinate the working group's combined activities.

     Clift commented that he would direct Lt Col Cerrone and Mr. Connell to develop a draft proposal with a specific plan of action in response his recommendation.  Additionally, Clift identified the July 29, 1953 shootdown near Vladivostok as a definite priority for intensified research and investigation.  He said that files had been transferred from the Gatchina Archive to the Podol’sk Archive and that records indicated that three Soviet ships - The Polyarnik, BO-122 and BO-123 - were in the area during the incident; yet no one had been able to locate any deck logs for those vessels.  Kazachenko acknowledged that deck logs were missing but clarified that the business of the Gatchina Archive generally is not analysis.

     Regarding Russian losses in Afghanistan, Clift said the U.S. side went back and re-examined its diplomatic and classified intelligence reporting, with special attention to voluminous reporting from Kabul.  The results of this review were to reaffirm that the U.S. side already had passed everything it possessed on the subject to the Russian side.  Vinogradov replied that the Russian side had undertaken a similar approach to declassify archival information and that it could also request intelligence information and Border Guard records.  He commented that there are no limitations on requests for humanitarian information.

     In response, Clift proposed that the Commission develop a new cooperative effort similar to the Russian Federal Security Service – U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) cooperative engagement program.  He said that he had been encouraged about the concept during his conversation with the head of the USCG, Admiral Loy.  With this in mind, Clift said that he would send Vinogradov a letter with the updates on the six cases we are following so that the Commission could pass them to the Border Guards.

     Vinogradov noted proudly that it was the FSB Border Guard’s report which led the Commission to Captain Dunham’s recovery on Yuriy Island.  He added that the Security Service routinely participates in these events following the downing of an aircraft.  Thus, he encouraged Clift to forward to him the proposed letter with updates on the 6 cases for further investigation and inquiry, as well as his concept for a Commission - FSB cooperative engagement program.  Clift replied that the U.S. side would provide Vinogradov with as much information as possible.

     In closing, Vinogradov commented that Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich Kalinin’s future role in the Commission would be very limited and that, although he would be missed, the Commission's work would continue.  He said that his new work does not include archival research and that he is now dealing with Russia’s current internal problems.

     With that, Colonel Vinogradov and Mr. Clift agreed to adjourn the working group.

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