PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides doctrine for planning, executing, and managing operational contract support in all phases of joint operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for joint operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

DAVID L. GOLDFEIN, Lt Gen, USAF
Director, Joint Staff
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SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 4-10
DATED 17 OCTOBER 2008

• Breaks operational contract support (OCS) into three functional areas: contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management.

• Introduces a new organizational structure, operational contract support integration cell (OCSIC), as the primary point of contact for integration on all OCS matters at the geographic combatant commander, joint task force, and potentially the service component.

• Provides clarity to the following theater contracting support organizational constructs: lead service for contracting, lead service for contracting coordination, and joint theater support contracting command.

• Adds a new Appendix G, “Analysis of the Operational Contract Support Aspects of the Operational Environment,” that provides guidance to the OCSIC on the best way of building of an OCS estimate and integrating it with the intelligence directorate of a joint staff’s joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment process.

• Incorporates several new appendices, which serve to clarify various OCS boards, processes, and organizations.

• Describes more detailed OCS planning, including OCS planning products and OCS integration into the planning process (phase IV-V transition planning).

• Adds additional OCS phase 0 considerations.

• Adds the terms “theater business clearance” and “contract administration delegation.”

• Increases discussions on ethics.

• Introduces government furnished support (GFS) and a formal GFS coordinator.

• Provides revised requirements determination process and associated responsibilities.

• Introduces OCS aspects of integrated financial operations.

• Introduces homeland defense operations and defense support to civil authorities.

• Revises the Defense Contract Management Agency’s role and role of Services for the conduct of contingency contract administration services.
• Revises contractor (personnel) management in general, to include contractor accountability, combating trafficking in persons, medical support, and evacuation and redeployment.

• Updates content to accurately (or comprehensively) reflect the role of joint OCS-related boards (e.g., joint requirements review board, combatant commander logistics procurement support board, and joint contracting support board.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................. ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- General ..................................................................................................................................... I-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A Programmatic and Functional Approach to Operational Contract Support ..................... I-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Key Terminology ...................................................................................................................... I-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Principles ................................................................................................................................. I-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Command and Contracting Authorities .................................................................................... I-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Operational Contract Support Actions by Phase of Operation ............................................. I-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Prevention of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse .................................................................................. I-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Introduction ............................................................................................................................ II-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Office of the Secretary of Defense Staff ............................................................................. II-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Joint Staff ......................................................................................................................... II-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Departments .............................................................................................................................. II-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Geographic Combatant Commands and Subordinate Joint Force Commands ..................... II-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Functional Combatant Commands .......................................................................................... II-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Service Component Commands ............................................................................................. II-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Functional Component Commands ....................................................................................... II-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Department of Defense Agencies ............................................................................................ II-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTRACT SUPPORT INTEGRATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Overview .................................................................................................................................. III-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Planning and Integration ......................................................................................................... III-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Requirements Determination .................................................................................................. III-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other Key Considerations ...................................................................................................... III-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTRACTING SUPPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- In-Theater Contracting Organization .................................................................................... IV-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- In-Theater Contracting Planning and Coordination ............................................................... IV-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTRACTOR MANAGEMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Overview ................................................................................................................................. V-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Contractor Management Planning Considerations ................................................................. V-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Predeployment Preparation ..................................................................................................... V-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-1</td>
</tr>
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<td>D-2</td>
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<td>G-1</td>
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<td>G-3</td>
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<td>G-4</td>
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<td>H-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Provides an Introduction to Operational Contract Support (OCS)
- Presents an Overview of Roles and Responsibilities for OCS
- Describes Contract Support Integration
- Discusses Contractor Management

Introduction

Operational contract support (OCS) is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations.

The US has always used contracted support in military operations at various levels of scope and scale. The continual introduction of high-tech equipment, coupled with force structure and manning reductions, mission specific force cap restrictions, and high operating tempo mean that contract support will augment military forces in most operations. Accordingly, the geographic combatant commander (GCC), subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs), and their staffs must be familiar with how to plan for and integrate operational contract support (OCS) during military operations. Additionally, the components and supporting combat support agencies (CSAs) play a major role in OCS planning, execution, and integration.

A Programmatic and Functional Approach to OCS

Effective and efficient OCS execution requires a programmatic approach by the JFC. This JFC-centric approach requires commanders and staffs to fully consider cost, performance, schedule, and contract oversight requirements as well as many other contract support-related matters (e.g., risk of contractor failure to perform, civil-military impact, operations security) across the joint force, to include United States Government (USG) departments and agencies and key multinational partners. The three overall supporting functions [contracting support integration, contracting support, and contractor management] and associated tasks help to characterize OCS.
**OCS Principles**

OCS planning and execution requires a programmatic approach on the behalf of the JFC and supporting combatant commanders (CCDRs), Service components, CSAs, and their associated contracting organizations. In addition to this singular, overarching OCS principle, the following principles are key to understanding the potential power and challenges of OCS.

- Contracted support can be a significant force multiplier, but it is only one of numerous sources of support to the joint force.
- Most joint operations will include contracted support.
- Contracted support is not restricted to logistic support; it may include significant non-logistic support.
- There are other non-monetary cost factors associated with contracted support that may not be readily apparent.
- Contracted support and its associated contractor management challenges must be integrated early in the operation planning process.
- Phase 0 activities can have a significant impact on OCS in later phases of the operation.
- OCS actions can have a direct strategic impact on civil aspects of the operation.

**Command and Contracting Authorities**

A unique aspect of contracting support is that only the contracting officer has the authority to obligate the USG. Combatant command (command authority) does not include authority to make binding contracts or modify existing contracts for the USG. It is also important to note that GCCs do not have their own contracting authority. The GCCs direct and coordinate contingency contracting support through their subordinate Service components and CSA.

**Prevention of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse**

Commanders at all levels must take a proactive approach to fighting fraud, waste, and abuse and to conserving resources. All US military and Department of Defense (DOD) civilian personnel should understand and look for indicators of fraud in the procurement process.
Roles and Responsibilities

Office of the Secretary of Defense Staff

The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer develops policy addressing the use of funds as well as the reimbursement of funds for qualifying medical, transportation, and other government-furnished support (GFS) received by contractor personnel in applicable contingency operations. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics serves as the Defense Acquisition Executive and has overall responsibility for the performance of the DOD Acquisition System, including establishing and publishing policies and procedures governing the operations of the DOD Acquisition System and the administrative oversight of defense contracts. Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is responsible for policy, plans, and program development for the total force, which includes military, DOD civilian, and DOD contractor personnel.

The Joint Staff

The Joint Staff (JS) J-1 [Manpower and Personnel] establishes the manpower management, personnel support, and personnel service support policies and procedures for the total force (military, DOD civilian, and DOD contractor) during joint operations and administers oversight of joint personnel issues affecting the force. The JS J-4 [Logistics] ensures OCS is incorporated into CCDR plans. The JS J-5 [Strategic Plans and Policy] ensures contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF) are included in planning policies and procedures for deployment and redeployment (e.g., if applicable, included into time-phased force and deployment data).

Military Departments

The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces assigned or attached to combatant commands (CCMDs). One way Military Departments fulfill their responsibilities is by augmenting military support capabilities with contracted support through their respective Service component commands assigned to the CCMDs.
Executive Summary

**Geographic Combatant Commands and Subordinate Joint Force Commands**

The GCCs and subordinate JFCs play a key role in determining and synchronizing contracted support requirements, contracting planning, as well as execution of OCS oversight. Proper joint force guidance on common contract support-related matters is imperative to facilitate effective and efficient use of commercial source support in joint operations.

**Functional Combatant Commands**

Functional CCMDs and their staffs play a limited role in planning and managing OCS in support of military operations. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has procurement authority for special operations-peculiar equipment and related services. The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) has its own contracting authority. USTRANSCOM contracted support generally involves strategic transportation contracts that have an area of performance outside the operational area.

**Department of Defense Agencies**

The Defense Logistics Agency has its own contracting authority and can provide contracting services related to their designated materiel commodities during contingency operations. The Defense Contract Management Agency is the CSA responsible for providing contract administration service to the DOD acquisition enterprise and its partners to ensure delivery of quality products and services to the operating force. The Defense Contract Audit Agency is responsible for performing all contract audits for DOD, and providing accounting and financial advisory services regarding contracts and subcontracts to all DOD components responsible for procurement and contract administration.

**Contract Support Integration**

**Planning and Integration**

OCS planning and coordination is primarily an operational, not contracting, function.

The GCC, subordinate JFCs, and supporting component commanders determine support requirements and the appropriate source of support (i.e., organic support, multinational support, host-nation support or contracted support). Service theater support contracting and other contracting
Executive Summary

and/or OCS-related organizations and individuals such as the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office and the Army field support brigade Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program planners advise, augment, and assist, but do not lead the OCS planning process. Close coordination between all primary and special staff members is required to ensure OCS planning balances effectiveness with efficiency and risk while seeking to attain the JFC’s directed strategic end state.

Requirements Determination

Requirements determination encompasses all activities necessary to develop, consolidate, coordinate, validate, approve, and prioritize joint force contract support requirements and consists of three major subordinate functions: requirement development, requirement consolidation, and requirement validation. Requirements development is the process of defining actual requirements for contracted support and capturing these requirements in “acquisition ready” contract support requirements packages. When possible, Service component commands and their major support commands should consolidate common contracted service and commodity requirements under a single designated management activity [requirements consolidation]. Requirements validation is the process to coordinate, review, prioritize, and approve contract support requests.

Other Key Considerations

There are numerous other OCS planning and execution considerations that must be considered by the supported GCC, subordinate JFC, and Service component commanders. These considerations range from establishing and maintaining an OCS common operational picture to arranging common contracting support in multinational operations to determining the civil-military impact of OCS in major stability operations.

Contracting Support

In-Theater Contracting Organization

While not necessary for minor single Service operations, the GCC should normally designate an lead Service for contracting (LSC), lead Service for contracting coordination (LSCC), or joint theater
Executive Summary

In-Theater Contracting
Planning and Coordination

Contracting planning is a contracting organizational function executed to some extent by all contracting agencies, not just an LSCC, LSC contracting activities, or JTSCC, which develops and awards contracts in support of GCC-directed operations. Contracting planning, referred to as acquisition planning in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), is executed on a requirement basis and has a particular meaning and application as prescribed in the FAR, Defense FAR Supplement, and contracting authority guidance. The joint contracting support board (JCSB) is the primary JFC mechanism to coordinate and deconflict contracting actions within a designated operational area, normally a joint operations area. The JCSB is the forum for theater support, Service civil augmentation program, and other designated in-theater external contracting organizations to share information, coordinate acquisition strategies, and to minimize chances of competition and redundancies between individual contracts and/or task orders and look for opportunities to optimize filling of like requirements through common contracts.

Contractor Management

Contractor management involves the control, support, and integration of contractor personnel and their associated equipment deploying and operating in the operational area.

Contractor personnel will make up a part of almost any deployed joint force. In some operations, contractor personnel can even make up the majority of the deployed force. In any case, contractors and their equipment impose unique challenges to the JFC and therefore must be treated as a formal part of the deployed force rather than an afterthought when contractor management issues arise.

Contractor Management Planning Considerations

The global nature of the systems and external support contractor base dictates that contractors may deploy CAAF employees and their equipment from anywhere in the world. Proper deployment and in-theater management of CAAF personnel and
Executive Summary

equipment requires early planning, establishment of clear and concise theater-entrance requirements, and incorporation of standard deployment related clauses in appropriate contracts. While the body of annex W [the Operational Contract Support annex for plans and orders] is focused on how the JFC will acquire and integrate contracted support in general, contractor management planning is focused on contractor personnel and equipment tasks to include government obligations under the terms and conditions of the contract to provide support (e.g., deployment, base camp services, force protection [FP]) to contractor personnel. The contractor management plan part of the OCS planning effort should be focused on risk assessments and mitigation actions regarding the impact of contractors in support of military operations.

**Predeployment Preparation**

**Predeployment preparation** includes actions taken by the government and contract companies to ensure CAAF meet GCC directed requirements before entering the operational area. Eligibility, as defined in the Foreign Clearance Guide and other GCC-specific theater entrance guidance processes, may require country and theater clearances, waiver authorities, immunizations, required training and/or issuance of required organizational clothing and individual equipment.

**Deployment and Reception**

Deployment and reception involves managing the flow and reception of CAAF and associated equipment in accordance with established Office of the Secretary of Defense and GCC-approved operational specific policies and procedures. Obtaining and maintaining personnel accountability enables the JFC to control the entrance and exit of CAAF into and out of the operational area. It further allows the JFC to automatically track—by name and location—the movement of deployed CAAF throughout the individual CAAF deployment process. Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration actions vary depending on the contractor deployment methodology.

**In-Theater Management**

In-theater contractor management includes: legal authority and discipline, contractor visibility and
accountability; movement control, GFS; and FP/security. **Legal jurisdiction over contractor personnel** varies depending on contractor personnel nationality, CAAF or non-CAAF designations, operational specific policies, and the type and severity of the disciplinary infraction. Normally, local national contract employees are subject to local laws while US citizens and third country national CAAF may or may not be subject to local laws depending on provisions, if any, documented in existing status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) or other security agreements. **Contractor personnel visibility and accountability** are essential to determine and resource government support requirements such as facilities; life support; FP; personnel recovery; morale, welfare, and recreation; and medical services in uncertain, hostile, and/or austere operational environments. **Intratheater movement control** includes directing contractor movement through DOD, USG departments or agencies, or other partner-contracted support convoys along specified routes and times. Planning and oversight of **GFS actions** is primarily a Service component responsibility. However, DOD policy requires the appointment of a GFS adjudication authority to ensure GFS for contractor personnel is coordinated and approved prior to approval of the contract.

**Redeployment**

CAAF should conduct redeployment actions in the reverse manner of how they deployed. Service components, DOD agencies, USTRANSCOM, and USSOCOM are responsible for ensuring that redeploying CAAF and their equipment are properly managed and controlled.

**Force Protection and Security**

FP and security of contractor personnel and equipment is a shared responsibility between the contractor and the USG. In a permissive environment, the supported GCC and subordinate JFC may have only limited special planning considerations, and this security responsibility would normally fall to the contractor. In hostile environments, contractor related FP and security requirements can be a major challenge to the JFC and subordinate commands.
**Contractor Provided Security**

The GCC may authorize the use of contractors to provide specified security functions, consistent with applicable US, host nation, international law, and any SOFA or other security agreement that may exist for the specified operational area.

**CONCLUSION**

This publication provides doctrine for planning, executing, and managing OCS in all phases of joint operations.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

“...we should acknowledge that operational contract support is no longer a niche capability.”

General Martin E. Dempsey, United States Army Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operational Contract Support Leaders Conference, 6 March 2012

1. General

The US has always used contracted support in military operations at various levels of scope and scale. In recent operations, the use of contracted support has been at the very high end of this continuum. The continual introduction of high-tech equipment, coupled with force structure and manning reductions, mission specific force cap restrictions, and high operating tempo mean that contract support will augment military forces in most operations. Accordingly, the geographic combatant commander (GCC), subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs), and their staffs must be familiar with how to plan for and integrate operational contract support (OCS) during military operations. Additionally, the components and supporting combat support agencies (CSAs) play a major role in OCS planning, execution, and integration.

2. A Programmatic and Functional Approach to Operational Contract Support

Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 2333, and Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS), require the GCCs and Commander, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), when operating as a supported commander, to plan for the proper organization, integration, and synchronization of OCS actions in all combatant commander (CCDR)-directed military operations. Furthermore, a systems approach to operational planning and execution, as described in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, is directly related to OCS planning, especially in

CONTRACT SUPPORT: WORLD WAR II EXAMPLE

At the beginning of World War II, over 1,000 civilian construction workers were employed by the US Navy to expand the airfield on Wake Island. During the actual battle, many of these contractor personnel provided direct support to the Marines by performing tasks such as bearing litters, delivering ammunition, etc. Some of these civilian workers, being World War I veterans, actually picked up weapons and took a direct part in the fight. Of the 1,014 contractor personnel taken prisoner after the battle, approximately 16% (~180) died during captivity, including 98, who were executed on Wake Island in October of 1943.

SOURCE: The Defense of Wake, United States Marine Corps Historical Monograph
complex stability operations where OCS-related actions can have significant direct impact on the civil-military aspects of the operation or campaign. A thorough understanding of how major OCS actions support and otherwise may impact the overall operation or campaign goals requires cross-functional participation by all joint force staff elements, Military Departments, Service components, supporting CSAs, and collaboration with various supporting contracting organizations, other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, and, in some cases, major nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

a. Effective and efficient OCS execution requires a programmatic approach by the JFC. This JFC-centric approach requires commanders and staffs to fully consider cost, performance, schedule, and contract oversight requirements as well as many other contract support-related matters (e.g., risk of contractor failure to perform, civil-military impact, operations security) across the joint force, to include USG departments and agencies and key multinational partners. Specifically, the combatant command (CCMD), in coordination with (ICW) subordinate joint force commands, Service components, supporting CSAs, and multinational partners, should develop a planned, tailored, and sufficiently resourced organizational construct for OCS.

b. OCS is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations. OCS is a multi-faceted joint activity executed by the GCC and subordinate JFCs through boards, centers, working groups, and associated lead Service or joint theater support contracting-related activities. The three overall supporting functions and associated tasks contained in Figure I-1 help to characterize OCS. OCS includes the ability to plan, orchestrate, and synchronize the provision of contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management. These three functions are inextricably linked to achieving favorable operational and acquisition outcomes.

(1) Contract support integration is the ability to plan, coordinate, synchronize, and execute contracted support in a designated operational area in support of CCDR-directed operations. Related tasks include planning, validating, and prioritizing requirements; performing OCS information management; collaborating in boards, centers, cells, and working groups; and conducting assessments and providing recommendations.

(2) Contracting support is the ability to legally obtain supplies or services from commercial sources to support JFC-directed operations in the most effective and efficient manner possible. Contracting support tasks include contracting support planning, coordinating common contracting actions, translating requirements into contract terms, and developing, soliciting, executing, and closing out contracts.

(3) Contractor management is the ability to provide oversight and integrate contractor personnel and associated equipment to support CCDR-directed operations in a designated operational area. Contractor management tasks include planning contractor management, preparing for contractor deployment, deploying or redeploying contractors, managing contractors, and sustaining contractors.
c. This multifunctional approach to OCS, which is applicable to all phases of military operations, is necessary to ensure that programmatic aspects of cost, performance, and schedule are properly planned for and executed. Additionally, complex, large-scale operations during phase IV (stabilize) may require the establishment of mission-specific program management (PM)-like office(s) to plan and manage selected large dollar value service or construction contracts. These types of operations may also require adjustments to OCS staffing and organizations to ensure OCS actions are synchronized with integrated financial operations (IFO) as described in JP 1-06, *Financial Management Support in Joint Operations*, and in Chapter III, “Contract Support Integration,” paragraph 4e, “Operational Contract Support Aspects of Integrated Financial Operations.”
3. Key Terminology

a. General OCS-Related Terms and Related Discussion Points. Commanders and their staffs should have a working knowledge of key OCS-related terms. Since these terms are not widely known outside of the professional acquisition community, a discussion is provided here. Without a basic understanding of these terms, effective planning and execution of this complex source of support is more difficult and may lead to unintended consequences or additional challenges.

(1) **OCS** is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of CCDR-directed operations through the related contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management functions.

(2) **Contingency contracting** is a subset of OCS and includes the process of contracting for supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of contingency operations. Contingency contracting, by definition, is conducted by contracting officers warranted under authorities granted to the Services, CSAs, and functional CCMDs under Title 10, USC, in accordance with (IAW) rules established in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), Service FAR supplements (Title 48, Code of Federal Regulations [CFR]), and applicable contingency contracting acquisition instructions (AIs).

(3) **Requirements determination** encompasses all activities necessary to develop, consolidate, coordinate, validate, approve, and prioritize joint force contract support requirements. **Requirements determination is an operational command function, not a contracting activity function.** Effective and efficient contracted support is driven primarily by timely and accurate requirements. Identifying, synchronizing, and prioritizing requirements are essential precursors to effective contract development and are essential to ensuring the subordinate JFC receives contract support at the right place, at the right time, and at reasonable cost. The subordinate JFC-level requirements validation and approval process is described in detail in Chapter III, “Contract Support Integration.” The requirements development process is primarily a tactical-level function and is outlined in detail in Service publications and tactical-level unit standing operating procedures.

(a) **A requiring activity** is the military or other designated supported organization that is overall responsible for the particular requirement (supplies, services, or
construction) being resourced through commercial means. The requiring activity has specific requirements development responsibilities to include development of “acquisition ready” contract support requirements packages and support to the contract management process by unit-provided trained contracting officer representatives (CORs), technical inspectors, and/or receiving officials.

(b) **The supported unit** is an organization that is the recipient of contracted support. A supported unit may also be the requiring activity, if it initiates the request for support. Even when not officially designated as a requiring activity, supported units play an important role in assisting the JFC and Service component commanders and may be required to provide a COR and receiving officials to assist the requiring activity and supporting contracting officer to monitor contracted support. In almost all situations, supported units will, at a minimum, play a role in integrating selected contractor personnel into local military operations to include such things as contingency base services and force protection (FP).

(4) **Contractor management** is a shared responsibility between the JFC staff, requiring activity, supported unit, base commander, and supporting contracting officer. Contractor management is directly linked to the FAR-based contract administration process used to ensure the USG receives what it has paid for IAW the terms and conditions of the contract with specific focus on matters related to the JFC’s ability to properly integrate contractor personnel and associated contractor equipment into joint operations. Contractor management includes both the management of contractor performance in complying with contractor personnel-related requirements and the management of the government’s responsibilities for life and other support when such support is required by the JFC. Contractor management includes those activities necessary to deploy, receive, manage, and redeploy contractor personnel per DODI 3020.41, *Operational Contract Support (OCS)*, and Chapter V, “Contractor Management.” The contractor performance piece of contractor management is executed via the contract administration process IAW the terms and conditions of the applicable contract. The government piece of contractor management should be executed through the normal staff and command processes.

b. **Key Contracting-Related Terms.** Understanding contracting-related terms and authorities is key to successful OCS planning and integration.

(1) A **contract** is a legally binding agreement for supplies, services, and/or construction awarded by government contracting officers. Contracts used in support of CCDR-directed operations include theater support, systems support, and external support contracts described below.

(2) **Head of contracting activity (HCA)** is the official who has overall responsibility for managing the contracting activity. HCAs do not typically exercise command authority within the operational area. **Additionally, there will always be multiple contracting activities in support of joint operations.**

(3) **Senior contracting official (SCO)** is the staff official designated by a Service HCA to execute contracting authority for a specific command and/or operational area. In joint operations, SCOs are normally commanders of Service component theater support...
contracting activities or designated senior staff officers within a joint theater support contracting command (JTSCC).

(4) **Contracting officer** is the government official (military or civilian) with the legal authority to enter into, administer, and/or terminate contracts. Within all components, the contracting officer is appointed in writing through a warrant (Standard Form 1402). **Only duly warranted contracting officers are authorized to obligate the USG, legally binding it to make payments against contracts.** The three main types of contracting officers are procuring contracting officers (PCOs), administrative contracting officers (ACOs), and termination contracting officers (TCOs). Often, the PCO is also responsible for ACO and TCO functions when there is no separate ACO and/or TCO appointed. Unlike PCOs, ACOs duties are limited to administering the contract.

(5) **Contract administration** is a subset of contracting and includes efforts that ensure that supplies, services, and construction are delivered IAW the terms, conditions, and standards expressed in the contract. Contract administration is the oversight function, from contract award to contract closeout, performed by contracting professionals and designated non-contracting personnel. It includes ensuring that both parties (government and contractor) meet the specified terms and conditions of the contract. Contract administration is composed of more than 90 functions, as described in FAR Part 42 and DFARS Part 242, including monitoring contract compliance, performing property administration, and performing quality assurance. Contract administration conducted during contingency operations is referred to as contingency contract administration services (CCAS).

(6) A **COR** is a US Service member or civilian (not a contractor) or multinational partner service member or civilian nominated by the requiring activity or designated supported unit and appointed in writing by the contracting officer. Primary COR duties include on-site monitoring of contractor performance, providing quality assurance, certifying receipt of services, and acting as a liaison between the requiring activity and the contracting officer. While CORs require formal COR process training and, in many cases, technical subject matter expertise certification, **they do not have authority to change, add to, or otherwise modify a contract or enter into a new contract.**

(7) A **prime contract** is a contract or contractual action entered into by the USG for the purpose of obtaining supplies, materials, equipment, or services of any kind. The prime contractor is the organization that has entered into a prime contract with the United States. Warranted contracting officers are the only USG officials authorized to legally bind the USG to a prime contract. The US has privity of contract only with the prime contractor.

(8) A **subcontract** is a contract or contractual action entered into by a prime contractor, or subcontractor at any tier, for the purpose of obtaining supplies, materials, equipment, or services of any kind under a prime contract. The prime contractor is responsible for the actions of the direct subcontractor. Likewise, subcontractors are responsible for managing any subcontractor at the next lower tier. Subcontractors and their employees should be treated the same as the prime contractor when it comes to contractor management planning and actions.
(9) **Privity of contract** is the legal relationship that exists between two contracting parties, for example, between the prime contractor and the USG. This term is important to the JFC in that only the prime contractor has direct responsibility to the government and therefore, all contract compliance matters must be enforced through the prime contractor. This fact can limit the ability of the JFC and subordinate commanders to directly enforce OCS policies on subcontractors and their personnel. However, flow-down provisions may require prime contractors to enforce OCS policies on lower-tier subcontractors when such policies are prescribed in the terms and conditions of the contract.

c. **Types of Contracted Support.** It is important to understand the different types of contracted support commonly used in support of contingency operations. This construct breaks support contracts into three categories describing the numerous contracting, funding, and contract administration authorities providing support within the operational area.

(1) **Theater support contracts** are contracts that are awarded by contracting officers in the operational area serving under the direct contracting authority of the Service component or designated SCO for the contingency operation. During contingency operations, these contracts are normally executed under expedited contracting authority and provide supplies, services, and minor construction from commercial sources generally within the operational area. Theater support contracts can range from small local contracts for a single unit or operational area-wide contracts in support of the entire force. Also of importance from the contractor management perspective is that local national (LN) personnel commonly make up the bulk of the theater support contractor employees in operations outside the US.

(2) **Systems support contracts** are contracts awarded by a Military Department and USSOCOM contracting offices’ supporting systems program executive offices (PEOs) and PM offices for the provision of technical support, maintenance, and, in some cases, repair parts for selected military weapon and support systems. Systems support contracts are routinely put in place to provide support to newly fielded weapons systems, including aircraft, land combat vehicles, and automated command and control (C2) systems. Systems support contracting authority, contract management, and PM authority resides with the Military Department systems materiel acquisition program offices. Systems support contractor employees, comprised mostly of US citizens, provide support in garrison and often accompany the force in both training and contingency operations.

(3) **External support contracts** are contracts awarded by contracting organizations whose contracting authority does not derive directly from theater support or systems support contracting authorities. As depicted by Figure I-2, external support contracts provide a variety of logistic and other support services. The most common and well-known external support contracts are the Services’ civil augmentation programs (CAPs), which include the Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the Air Force contract augmentation program (AFCAP), the Navy Global Contingency Construction Multiple Award Contract (GCCMAC), and Global Contingency Service Multiple Award Contract (GCSMAC). Other commonly used external support contracts include Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) prime vendor contracts, the Army Intelligence and Security Command global
Chapter I

linguist contract, and military construction agent contracts. External support contracts can include a mix of US citizens, third country nationals (TCNs), and LN contractor employees.


d. **Key Contractor Personnel-Related Terms.** The following contractor personnel-related terms are based in international law and Department of Defense (DOD) policy. These definitions are integral to understanding the legal status of contractor employees as well as determining government-furnished support (GFS) requirements. DODI 3020.41, *Operational Contract Support (OCS)*, codifies these terms within DOD policy.

(1) **Contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF)** are contingency contractor employees and all tiers of subcontractor employees who are specifically authorized through their contract to accompany the force in foreign contingency operations. During international armed conflicts, CAAF are protected as prisoners of war IAW the *Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War*. In situations where US forces are in a host nation (HN) at its request, the terms of any status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) will have to be reviewed to determine their applicability to CAAF. Generally, all US citizens and TCN contingency contractor and subcontractor employees who do not normally reside within the operational area, whose area of performance is in the direct vicinity of US forces, and who routinely reside with US forces (especially in uncertain or hostile environments) are considered CAAF. CAAF also may include some mission-essential LN contractor employees (e.g., linguists) who reside with US forces and receive GFS such as billeting and access to dining facilities. CAAF-related information can be found in Chapter V, “Contractor Management.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logistics Support</th>
<th>Non-Logistics Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base operating support (billeting, food service, laundry and bath, etc.)</td>
<td>Communications services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Linguist/translation services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Port and terminal</td>
<td>Commercial computers and information management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warehousing and other supply support operations</td>
<td>Signal support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilities construction</td>
<td>Physical security*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilities management</td>
<td>Staff augmentation (various functions)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prime power</td>
<td>Intelligence support services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Materiel maintenance</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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*Limited in accordance with Department of Defense policy

Figure I-2. Common External Support Contract Capabilities
(2) **Non-CAAF** includes LN and TCN expatriate contractor employees who are permanent residents or non-resident guest workers in the operational area. These include DOD contractor prime and associated subcontractor employees whose area of performance is not in the direct vicinity of US forces. Non-CAAF are usually non-mission essential personnel (e.g., day laborers, delivery personnel, and cleaning service personnel) who neither reside with US forces nor receive GFS such as billeting and subsistence. During international armed conflict, non-CAAF contingency contractor employees are not entitled to protection under the *Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War*, but may still be afforded protected status under the *Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*. The applicability of any existing SOFA between the US and the HN to non-CAAF will be determined by the terms of that SOFA.

### 4. Principles

OCS planning and execution requires a programmatic approach on the behalf of the JFC and supporting CCDRs, Service components, CSAs, and their associated contracting organizations. In addition to this singular, overarching OCS principle, the following principles are key to understanding the potential power and challenges of OCS.

a. **Contracted support can be a significant force multiplier, but it is only one of numerous sources of support to the joint force.** The supported GCC and subordinate JFCs should judiciously consider the proper mix of different sources of support to include US military support, multinational military support, host-nation support (HNS), and contracted support. Each of these sources of support has advantages and disadvantages that must be carefully weighed by the JFC and subordinate Service component commanders in order to determine the most appropriate source of support.

b. **Most joint operations will include contracted support.** While some limited duration operations, such as noncombatant evacuation operations, may use limited contracted support, all major operations will involve significant contracted support. This is especially true for major, long-term stability operations.

c. **Contracted support is not restricted to logistic support; it may include significant non-logistic support as well.** Non-logistic-related support capabilities can include linguist, signal, and private security contractor (PSC) services.

d. **There are other non-monetary cost factors associated with contracted support that may not be readily apparent.** Hidden, secondary nonmonetary OCS-related costs include, but are not limited to, inability to assign collateral or extra duties to contractor personnel; contract oversight responsibilities (i.e., COR and receiving official duties); security escort responsibilities, and other FP-related requirements. These factors should be carefully weighed when conducting OCS planning, especially in the risk assessment process.

e. **Contracted support and its associated contractor management challenges must be integrated early in the operation planning process.** Proper planning will integrate the contractor force into military operations and mitigate unplanned burdens on the joint force.
such as increased base camp services and FP requirements. The importance of such integrated planning cannot be overemphasized.

f. **Phase 0 activities can have a significant impact on OCS in later phases of the operation.** Consequently, OCS planners should be aware of and pay close attention to phase 0 activities that can provide critical information to support subsequent phases of the operation. Without such effort, OCS actions in support of these later phases of the operation can be much more difficult and potentially more costly.

g. **OCS actions can have a direct strategic impact on civil aspects of the operation.** While the most important factor of OCS is effectiveness of support to the military force, in certain operations the JFC may choose to utilize theater support and some external support contracts to provide a positive economic and social impact on the local populace. Additionally, the use of contracted support as an alternative to deploying US support forces may have other benefits, including minimizing the military footprint in the operational area; reducing force operational tempo; and improving domestic US political support or buy-in. This effort can be especially important in counterinsurgency (COIN) or long-term stability operations.

5. **Command and Contracting Authorities**

Contracting authority is not the same as command authority. Contracting authority is the legal authority to enter into binding contracts and obligate funds on behalf of the USG, while command authority includes the responsibility for effectively using available resources and planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. Command authority does not include the authority to obligate funds or enter into contracts on behalf of the USG. These two different authorities should be closely coordinated to provide effective and efficient contracted support to the joint force.

a. **Contracting Authority.** A unique aspect of contracting support is that only the contracting officer has the authority to obligate the USG. This authority to acquire supplies, services, and construction for the government comes from four sources: the US Constitution; statutory authority; legislative appropriations; and FARs (including DOD and Military Department supplements). Contracting authority in the operational area flows from the US Constitution to the Service/agency head, to the Service senior procurement executives (SPEs) to designated HCAs, then either directly to the contracting officer or to the contracting officer through the SCO. This contracting authority is explicitly documented via the contracting officer’s warrant. A warrant is the document that authorizes a contracting officer to award a contract to obligate the government to expend funds for contracted support requirements. Any restrictions on a contracting officer’s authority to purchase items or services will be explicitly stated on the warrant. The most common restriction is placed on the maximum amount a contracting officer is authorized to obligate per contract action.

b. **Command Authority.** Combatant command (command authority), prescribed in Title 10, USC, Section 164, includes the authority to perform functions involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks and designating objectives, and giving
authoritative direction over all aspects of an operation; it does not include authority to make binding contracts or modify existing contracts for the USG. It is also important to note that GCCs do not have their own contracting authority. The GCCs direct and coordinate contingency contracting support through their subordinate Service components and CSA. Additionally, command authority does not include the authority to direct contractor or contractor personnel actions outside the terms and conditions of their contract. However, in emergency situations, the ranking commander may direct CAAF and non-CAAF working on a US-controlled facility, to take FP or temporary, emergency response actions not specifically authorized in their contract as long as those actions do not require them to perform inherently governmental responsibilities.

c. Avoiding Undue Command Influence. Commanders at all levels must avoid improper command influence, or perception thereof, on the contracting process. The contracting officer must be able to independently exercise sound, unbiased business judgment and contract oversight in the accomplishment of the contracting mission. Contracting officers can only fulfill their responsibilities for safeguarding the interests of the USG in its contractual relationships through functional independence from the requiring activity, allowing them to properly execute their business judgment in the formation, negotiation, award, and administration of contracts. If there is a valid, certified operational need to direct contracts to specific commercial sources, such as in stability operations where the JFC needs to balance civil-military impacts and cost-effectiveness of specific contracts, the contingency HCA is responsible for developing policies to implement this aspect of the operation plan (OPLAN) with appropriate contracting procedures IAW federal law and the FAR. In all cases, care must be taken to avoid unauthorized commitments where non-warranted military or civilian personnel make commitments (without authority) to change existing contractual agreements or request that contractors provide goods or services that are not already under contract.

6. Operational Contract Support Actions by Phase of Operation

OCS and related contracting tasks vary significantly between operation phases. As described in JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, there are six operation phases: phase 0 (shape); phase I (deter), phase II (seize initiative); phase III (dominate); phase IV (stabilize); phase V (enable civil authority). These phases often overlap or may not apply. However, OCS actions can be generalized by phase of operation in focus, complexity, and amount of JFC coordination and direct control required. Figure I-3 and the supporting text below provide an overview of notional OCS tasks by phase of operation. Specific phases of defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) for domestic operations can be found in JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and in Chapter III, “Contract Support Integration,” paragraph 4k, “Homeland Defense Operations and Defense Support of Civil Authorities.”

a. Phase 0 (Shape). Shape phase missions are designed to dissuade or deter adversaries, develop relationships with, and assure multinational partners, as well as to set conditions for the successful execution of contingency plans and are generally conducted through security cooperation activities. Significant OCS-related phase 0 actions include establishment of contract-related boards, cells, and working groups; gathering OCS analysis
Chapter I

of the operational environment information; deliberate planning; and support to security cooperation activities. Contract support to security cooperation activities is generally characterized by low dollar, short-term, locally awarded contracts executed IAW peacetime contracting procedures. OCS security cooperation actions support deliberate OCS planning actions by providing US forces experience and knowledge of the local commercial vendor base and general business climate.

b. **Phase I (Deter).** The **deter** phase is characterized by preparatory actions that indicate the intent to execute subsequent phases of the operation. This phase includes OCS actions in support to deterrence activities such as support to special operations forces (SOF) actions, but contracting support is often limited due to fiscal constraints, lack of emergency procurement authority flexibilities, and the urgent nature of deterrence actions. In some operations where there is a strong likelihood of follow-on military actions, contracted

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**Figure I-3. Notional Operational Contract Support Actions by Phase of Operation**
support may be utilized to establish specific sustainment capabilities, such as a staging base for enabling joint operations in the \textit{dominate} and follow-on phases should deterrence fail.

c. \textbf{Phase II (Seize Initiative).} Phase II actions are focused on applying force to gain access to the operational area and expand friendly freedom of action. Military actions during this time period are characterized by an extremely high operating tempo and freedom of action of maneuvering forces and their supporting organizations. Theater support contracting tasks during the \textit{seize initiative} phase are characterized by limited service and commodity contracts intended to augment organic military support of early deploying units. Maximum use of existing “peacetime” contracting command, support, and contracting authority arrangements should be considered. Additionally, CAP support may also be executed in support of joint reception, staging, onward movement and integration, as well as other traditional rear-area actions. To enable prompt contract support actions, the supported GCC and subordinate JFC should ensure theater support contracting and CAP management organizations are deployed as part of the advanced echelon. Additionally, limited numbers of mission-essential systems support-related CAAF may deploy during phase II operations.

d. \textbf{Phase III (Dominate).} This phase focuses on breaking the enemy’s will to resist or, in noncombat situations, to control the operational environment. During the \textit{dominate} phase, contracting personnel (military and civilian) and CAAF will continue to arrive, though not necessarily at a rate commensurate with the number of troops to be supported. In major operations, a mix of theater support and external support contracts may be utilized. Theater support contracting efforts will focus on satisfying major forces support requirements that are not covered by CAP task orders or other means of support. During the \textit{dominate} phase, deployed Service component contingency contracting teams will normally operate in direct support (DS) of their habitually supported units with effectiveness and responsiveness being paramount; coordination of common contract support will be generally limited to major contract actions in support of operational-level logistics and selected other support requirements; increased numbers of mission-essential systems support-related CAAF deploy and provide support to newly fielded weapon systems.

e. \textbf{Phase IV (Stabilize).} The \textit{stabilize} phase is typically characterized by a shift in focus from sustained combat operations to stability operations. As decisive combat actions come to a close, theater support contracting organizations may be consolidated and transitioned from a DS to a general support arrangement, possibly under direct joint C2. At the same time, the subordinate JFC’s OCS effort will expand from forces support requirements to non-forces support, such as security force assistance (SFA) actions, emergency support to the reconstruction of local civil infrastructure. During this transition, the subordinate JFC will generally expand and formalize the requirements review, validation, and approval process and may implement measures to control the flow of contracted support and the associated personnel from outside the operational area. During the \textit{stabilize} phase, the number of contracts will often increase and become more complex and costly. Therefore, a planned and well-executed programmatic systems approach to OCS actions is imperative. During phase IV, increased use of external support contracts for services such as staff augmentation and SFA tasks can be expected. Additionally, the systems support contract effort may include significant new equipment fielding and existing equipment modification actions. Because of the complexity and importance of contracted actions in
phase IV, the subordinate JFC must also have a detailed OCS plan for ensuring contract support actions are fully coordinated between multinational and interagency partners, have a synchronized acquisition strategy, and are overall supportive of the civil-military aspects of the operation or campaign plan. During this phase of the operation the JFC and the supporting contracting organizations should consider moving away from cost-type contracts (e.g., CAP task orders) to fixed-price contracts if operational conditions are sufficiently stable to support such a transition. Additionally, the subordinate JFC, supporting Service components, CSAs, and their supporting contracting agencies need to be working closely together on phase IV-V transition planning.

f. Phase V (Enable Civil Authorities). This phase of the operation is predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance. During phase V, the subordinate JFC normally applies significantly more stringent controls on new requirements not directly related to the drawdown of forces from the operational area. Typical phase V-related requirements include packing, crating, and freight services; commercial transportation of military equipment; construction and operation of wash racks for vehicles; and environmental cleanup. During the enable civil authority phase, additional focus should be applied to the synchronization of the drawdown of military forces along with associated reduction in OCS requirements. This reduction in contract requirements may entail a reduction in quality of life standards for remaining military personnel and CAAF as they prepare to exit the operational area. Parallel to this effort, supporting contracting activities will focus on contracts termination or closeout. To the extent any contract support capabilities need to remain in place at the end of an operation, arrangements should be made to transition pertinent contract support to the applicable successor organizations, e.g., the Department of State (DOS).

7. Prevention of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse

a. The procurement process in a foreign contingency environment can be very prone to fraud, waste, and abuse (FWA). There are numerous reasons why FWA can be a serious problem, especially in foreign contingency operations, including temporary or ad hoc contracting organizations, local cultural and business environment, scarcity of contract oversight personnel, use of personnel who have little to no experience with the acquisition process, and pressure to meet mission requirements. **Commanders at all levels must take a proactive approach to fighting FWA and to conserving resources. Failure to do so can undermine the commander’s legitimacy to conduct military operations in a foreign environment and at home.** Ethical conduct in the procurement process is particularly important to ensure fair and competitive in-theater acquisition efforts and ensure these processes do not have a negative impact on the JFC’s mission. Problems affecting any aspect of the acquisition process can affect timely provision of support to the commander and in some cases negatively impact the civil-military aspects of the operation or campaign.

b. Associated OCS-related ethical issues are varied but span the gamut of FWA. Commanders at all levels need to set expectations and a framework of training and oversight to ensure the ethical conduct of all personnel associated with the procurement process. Commanders also need to ensure checks and balances are in place to protect the taxpayer and to ensure compliance with laws and regulations while accomplishing the mission. A key
point in preventing waste is the assignment of adequately trained CORs and/or technically qualified subject matter experts (SMEs) to monitor contractor performance and ensuring these personnel are given adequate time to perform these roles, even if on an additional/collateral duty basis. Additional FWA prevention efforts should include regular ethics and procurement training for commanders, contracting personnel, and CORs as well as institution of checks and balances such as segregation of duties between ordering, receiving, and payment functions. All US military and DOD civilian personnel should understand and look for indicators of fraud in the procurement process. If something of an ethical nature is ever in doubt, commanders should contact their legal counsel for advice.

FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE IN RECENT OPERATIONS

During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, a host of audit organizations uncovered numerous instances of fraud, waste, and abuse and recovered over $10 billion between 2003 and 2011. In its final report, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan estimated that wartime contracting waste in Iraq and Afghanistan ranged from 10 percent to 20 percent of the $206 billion spent since fiscal year (FY) 2002 and projected through the end of FY 2011. Additionally, numerous US Government and contractor personnel have been tried, convicted, and sent to jail for acts of fraud in recent operations. Convicted government officials included military members serving as contracting officers, contracting officer representatives, Commander’s Emergency Response Fund project officers, and pay agents.

SOURCE: Commission on Wartime Contracting Final Report August 2011 and numerous other open-source reports
CHAPTER II

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

“A lot of what we have done in terms of reducing the size of active and reserve component force structure means there’s a greater reliance on contractors. And there’s a lot of technology that requires contractor support.”

David McKiernan, Lieutenant General,
Third Army Commander, Atlanta Constitution, 2003

1. Introduction

OCS planning and integration, along with the associated contractor management actions, involves all levels of command and staffs. This chapter outlines the roles and responsibilities of DOD, Joint Staff (JS), and Military Departments, as well as joint and Service commanders and staffs, related to OCS. Understanding the roles and responsibilities of these organizations is important to all commands and staffs that may be involved with planning and managing OCS actions in support of joint operations.

2. Office of the Secretary of Defense Staff

   a. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) OCS responsibilities fall into two general areas: those related to defense acquisition policy and programs oversight, and those related to the assignment and attachment of the forces to the combatant organizations necessary to carry out joint operations. SecDef is responsible for issuing directives, instructions, and executing oversight on the force apportionment process. In some cases, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) may be called upon to assist the supported GCC in resolving and/or providing guidance or additional authorities related to specific organization C2, legal, funding, or other contracting or contractor management operational issues.

   b. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer develops policy addressing the use of funds as well as the reimbursement of funds for qualifying medical, transportation, and other GFS received by contractor personnel in applicable contingency operations.

   c. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) provides advice and assistance on all matters associated with the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DOD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. USD(P) integrates interagency priorities and regional and country-specific assessments into DOD planning. USD(P) OCS-related responsibilities are to:

      (1) Serve as DOD lead for interagency planning and policy guidance and oversee the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

      (2) Serve as DOD lead for developing the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and Defense Planning Guidance, including defense planning scenarios and multi-Service force deployment that drive OCS matters.
d. The **Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L])** serves as the Defense Acquisition Executive and has overall responsibility for the performance of the DOD Acquisition System, including establishing and publishing policies and procedures governing the operations of the DOD Acquisition System and the administrative oversight of defense contracts. While these responsibilities are more traditionally associated with oversight of systems acquisition, USD(AT&L) is also responsible for developing and overseeing the implementation of DOD-level OCS policy. Assistants charged with carrying out related responsibilities are addressed below.

(1) The **Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP)** is responsible for all contracting and procurement policy matters including E-Business in DOD executed through the issuance and updates to the DFARS associated procedures, guidance, and information (PGI) as well as promulgation of acquisition policy found in Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5000.01, *The Defense Acquisition System*, and DODI 5000.02, *Operation of the Defense Acquisition System*. Director, DPAP OCS-related responsibilities are to:

(a) Develop DOD contracting policy and issue necessary directives for effective contracting support of contingency operations to include policies related to the integration of contracts requiring performance or delivery to designated operational areas; operational specific contracting authorities, contract delegations, coordinating relationships, and other operational-specific policies, as required.

(b) Lead and coordinate efforts of Military Department senior acquisition executives, including actions related to GCC support.

(c) Lead the Defense Emergency Procurement Committee. This committee develops solutions to emergent procurement issues affecting the execution of contingency contracting in various contingencies.

(d) Propose legislative initiatives that support the accomplishment of contracting actions in support of specific joint operations.

(e) Maintain a contingency contracting Internet portal that includes guidance and information on policies, tools, and processes; as well as links to GCC-directed, mission-specific OCS policies, procedures, and other related guidance.

(f) Proactively and expeditiously disseminate CCDR-related information and guidance affecting DOD contracting officers at large.

(g) ICW the supported GCC and the Services, develop, issue, and enforce theater business clearance (TBC) and contract administration delegation (CAD) policies and procedures. Provide TBC and CAD technical guidance and training, as required.

(h) In concert with the supported GCC and lead Service for contracting (LSC)/lead service for contracting coordination (LSCC) designated contracting activity or JTSCC (if formed), issue policies supporting the conduct of contracting in support of specific operations, as required.
(i) Develop and implement a DOD-wide contingency contracting-related lessons learned program and ensure validated lessons from this program are disseminated and incorporated into relevant Defense Acquisition University instruction.

(2) **Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support) (DASD[PS])** is responsible for monitoring and managing the implementation of OCS policy. Specific responsibilities include:

   (a) ICW the other OSD staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) develop, integrate, and enforce overarching OCS policies as stated in DODD 3020.49, *Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its Operational Execution*, DODI 3020.41, *Operational Contract Support (OCS)*, and DODI 3020.50, *Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises*.

   (b) Proactively integrate OCS matters across OSD staff and applicable DOD programs and policies.

   (c) ICW USD(P), undertake interagency coordination with respect to OCS, as appropriate.

   e. **Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD[P&R])** is the primary staff assistant and advisor to SecDef for total force management. USD(P&R) is responsible for policy, plans, and program development for the total force, which includes military, DOD civilian, and DOD contractor personnel. Responsibilities relevant to contractor personnel management include:

      (1) ICW USD(AT&L), establish the central repository for contractor personnel accountability information.

      (2) Develop, promulgate, and administer DOD identification (ID) policy and procedures to include specific guidance on government ID card issuance to eligible contractor personnel.

      (3) Establish and issue guidance IAW DODD 1100.4, *Guidance for Manpower Management*, and DODI 1100.22, *Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix*, to be used by all DOD components regarding manpower management, including manpower mix criteria, to ensure contracted services are not inherently governmental or otherwise unsuitable or not allowed for commercial performance.

      (4) Through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness, develop policy and set standards for managing contract linguist capabilities supporting the total force to include requirements for linguists and the tracking of linguists and role players to ensure that force readiness and security requirements are met.

   f. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence OCS-related responsibilities are to:
(1) ICW USD(AT&L), oversee the exercise of acquisition authority by the Directors of the Defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation of DOD policy, programs, and guidance for personnel, physical, industrial, information, and operations security programs.

(2) Assist the USD(AT&L) in determining appropriate contract clauses for intelligence, counterintelligence, and security requirements.

(3) On behalf of SecDef, waive prohibitions of award of certain contracts to entities controlled by a foreign government, according to Title 10, USC, Section 2536(b).

(4) Establish policy for contractor employees under the terms of the applicable contracts that support background investigations.

(5) Provide policy and procedural guidance on screening of foreign contractor companies and personnel.

(6) Coordinate security and counterintelligence policy affecting contract linguists with the Secretary of the Army.

g. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P):

(1) Serves as the principal civilian advisor to SecDef and USD(P) on DOD counter threat finance (CTF) activities, capabilities, and employment of SOF, strategic forces, and conventional forces to engage in CTF activities.

(2) Develops and coordinates CTF policy guidance found in DODD 5205.14, DOD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy.

h. **The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)** is responsible for developing and implementing policies and procedures for medical preparation, screening, and baseline health services requirements of contractor personnel operating in support of contingency operations. Additionally, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) assists in the development of policy addressing the reimbursement of funds for qualifying medical support received by contingency contractor personnel in applicable contingency operations.

i. **The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO)** is designated as the office of primary responsibility by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs for personnel recovery (PR) policy and oversight. As the DOD lead for PR, DPMO is responsible for the coordination among the Services, the JS, the CCMDs, and with all other USG departments and agencies on all matters concerning the isolation of CAAF (and any non-CAAF specifically designated by the GCC or subordinate JFC) from friendly control. DPMO also has the following specific responsibilities:
(1) Account for those CAAF who remain missing when PR efforts have been deemed no longer feasible.

(2) Track circumstances of loss; monitor efforts to locate support, recover CAAF designated as isolated personnel, and oversee the reintegration of CAAF.

(3) Oversee the implementation of the Missing Service Personnel Act to include investigation of circumstances surrounding the missing, staff recommendations to the USD(P) that missing CAAF are covered under the Missing Service Personnel Act, ensure Service Chiefs of concern follow through with assignment of a binding status, and lead efforts that would ultimately result in the recovery and return of the individual or, if deceased, human remains.

For more information on DPMO, see DODD 5110.10, Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO).

j. The Office of General Counsel provides advice to SecDef and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding all legal matters and services performed within, or involving, the DOD and legal advice to OSD organizations and, as appropriate, other DOD components. Responsibilities pertinent to OCS are to:

(1) Provide advice on legal matters, including law of war, military justice, and standards of conduct for CAAF.

(2) Provide legal review and interpretation of FAR and DFARS language.

(3) Coordinate DOD positions on legislation and executive orders.

(4) Provide for the coordination of significant legal issues, including litigation involving the DOD and other matters before the Department of Justice in which DOD has an interest.

(5) Determine the DOD position on specific legal problems and resolve disagreements within the DOD on such matters.

(6) Act as lead counsel for DOD in all international negotiations conducted by OSD organizations.

(7) Maintain the central repository for all international agreements (e.g., acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, mutual logistics support agreements, and SOFAs) coordinated or negotiated by DOD personnel.

3. The Joint Staff

a. CJCS, as the principal military advisor to the President and SecDef, has specific responsibilities in the areas of strategic direction, campaign and contingency planning, joint doctrine, and joint education and training. Principal JS OCS-related responsibilities are as follows:
b. **The Joint Staff J-1 [Manpower and Personnel]** establishes the manpower management, personnel support, and personnel service support policies and procedures for the total force (military, DOD civilian, and DOD contractor) during joint operations and administers oversight of joint personnel issues affecting the force. This includes coordinating manpower and personnel support to CCDRs. Key responsibilities are to:

1. Assist the USD(P&R), USD(AT&L), and Joint Staff J-4 [Logistics] in achieving resolution of personnel service support issues relating to CAAF in joint operations.
2. Establish policy for contractor accountability data in the joint personnel status report.
3. Provide total force strength data and casualty reporting of personnel in a GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR) to CJCS for situational awareness.
4. Provide input, if deemed appropriate by JS J-1, to Joint Staff J-5 [Strategic Plans and Policy] and Joint Staff Joint Directorate for Joint Force Development (J-7), on the integration of personnel service support for CAAF in the CJCS Exercise Program.

c. **The JS J-4** provides policy, guidance, and oversight on joint logistics and is the primary staff directorate on the JS for OCS matters. Specific responsibilities are to:

1. Develop and promulgate OCS planning policy, related procedures, and templates. Ensure such policy and procedures are incorporated into the appropriate CJCS policy documents and doctrinal publications.
2. Interpret OSD policies (and where applicable, regulations, and laws) into joint doctrine and facilitate OSD efforts to implement OCS-related policy within the Military Departments, CCDRs, and CSAs.
3. Ensure OCS is incorporated into CCDR plans.
4. ICW the JS J-7, facilitate the inclusion of OCS learning objectives in joint professional military education, joint doctrine, joint training, and CJCS exercises.
5. ICW JS J-7, institute OCS readiness reporting through development of universal joint tasks and the inclusion of OCS-related joint mission-essential tasks as exercise objectives in CJCS-directed exercises.
6. Ensure OCS-related lessons learned are captured and entered into the Joint Lessons Learned Information System.

d. **The JS J-5** provides policy, guidance, and oversight on joint operation planning. Specific OCS responsibilities are to:

1. Ensure OCS policies and procedures are included in overarching policy documents to facilitate planning for military operations.
(2) Ensure CAAF are included in planning policies and procedures for deployment and redeployment (e.g., if applicable, included into time-phased force and deployment data [TPFDD]).

e. The JS J-7 supports the CJCS and the joint commanders through joint force development in order to advance the operational effectiveness of the current and future joint force. Pertinent JS J-7 responsibilities include the integration of OCS-related collective training requirements for CJCS exercises and joint professional military education programs.

f. The JS Legal Counsel provides legal advice and guidance to the CJCS and other members of the JS and the CCMDs, as directed. Specific OCS responsibilities are to:

   (1) Review and coordinate policy, plans, and other guidance.

   (2) Participate in related working groups.

   (3) Maintain strategic awareness on evolving issues affecting joint contingency contracting and the integration of contractor personnel in joint operations.

   (4) Provide legal review of the OCS aspects of joint force OPLANs and orders.

4. Departments

The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces assigned or attached to CCMDs. One way Military Departments fulfill their responsibilities is by augmenting military support capabilities with contracted support through their respective Service component commands assigned to the CCMDs. The Military Departments are responsible for preparing their forces to execute both requiring activity and contracting authority tasks. All contracting tasks must be accomplished IAW US laws and executive orders, the FAR, DFARS, Service FAR supplements, DOD policy, CJCS policy, joint and Service doctrine, GCC mission-specific directives, and any other applicable regulations and policies. Major Military Department OCS roles and responsibilities are to:

   (1) Provide Service operational forces that are trained, equipped, and organized to perform OCS functions to include operational-level planning, tactical planning, requirements development, and contract management assistance tasks (e.g., COR).

   (2) Provide contingency contracting-related units that are trained, equipped, and organized to meet expected OCS requirements and that contingency contracting support is executed IAW OSD and GCC policies and guidance.

   (3) Participate in, and when designated, lead the development of joint OCS-related policy and capability development (e.g., doctrine, training, concepts) actions.

   (4) Incorporate OSD and joint OCS policy as well as joint doctrine into applicable Service policy, doctrine, training, and leader development and education, as appropriate.
(5) Integrate OCS into training, exercise, and lessons learned programs.

(6) Plan, resource, and execute CAAF deployment as requested by GCCs.

5. Geographic Combatant Commands and Subordinate Joint Force Commands

The GCCs and subordinate JFCs play a key role in determining and synchronizing contracted support requirements, contracting planning, as well as execution of OCS oversight. Proper joint force guidance on common contract support-related matters is imperative to facilitate effective and efficient use of commercial source support in joint operations.

a. GCCs. The supported GCC must work closely with the appropriate subordinate joint force commands, functional CCMDs, theater special operations commands (TSOCs), Service components, and CSAs to determine OCS requirements. GCC OCS responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

(1) Incorporate OCS matters into plans and planning actions IAW strategic planning guidance and JS Policy on OCS planning.

(a) Integrate OCS in GCC planning actions. Develop an annex W (Operational Contract Support) for plans and orders, as required.

(b) Direct Service components and supporting CSAs to participate in the OCS planning process and to develop subordinate annex W, as appropriate.

(c) Ensure OCS planning incorporates multinational and USG department and agency requirements, as appropriate.

(d) Ensure contracting and contract oversight capabilities, to include theater support contracting C2, contracting authorities, and contracting coordination arrangements, are incorporated into plans and all annex W.

(e) Develop, publish, and enforce OCS-related regulations, instructions, and directives necessary for the conduct of efficient and effective OCS support to joint operations.

(f) Direct the establishment and execution of appropriate OCS-related boards, cells, and working groups.

(g) Develop and promulgate CAAF predeployment, deployment, reception, in-theater management, and redeployment guidance and procedures.

(h) Ensure CAAF and associated equipment are incorporated into deployment and in-theater support plans and processes.
(2) In direct coordination with the Service components and supporting CSAs, develop contingency plans to ensure continuation of essential contract services per DODI 1100.22, *Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix*.

(3) ICW DPAP, develop and implement theater-specific TBC and CAD policies and procedures, as required.

(4) Establish and enforce the contractor individual arming policy and use of armed PSCs IAW DODD 5210.56, *Carrying of Firearms and the Use of Force by DOD Personnel Engaged in Security, Law and Order, or Counterintelligence Activities*.

(5) Ensure combating trafficking in persons (CTIP) procedures are in place and followed.

(6) Integrate OCS into joint and GCC-directed exercises, as appropriate.

(7) Review, share, and integrate OCS lessons learned into plans, staff training, and exercises, as appropriate.

(8) ICW the JS, review, develop, and promulgate standardized CAAF predeployment training standards.

(9) ICW DPAP, maintain an unclassified OCS webpage that contains current mission-specific and/or AOR-wide guidance and information pertinent to requiring activities, contracting officers, contractors, and contractor personnel.

b. **Subordinate Joint Force Commands**. Subunified command and joint task force (JTF) commanders play a key role in determining specific contracted support requirements, contracting planning, as well as execution of OCS oversight within a specified operational area. Working closely with the Service components and other elements of the joint force, a subordinate JFC’s unique OCS responsibilities are to:

(1) Implement GCC OCS planning guidance and directives outlined above to include direct control of the joint requirements determination process.

(2) Monitor, integrate, and report OCS matters across the force.

(3) Establish and enforce procedures to ensure contracted support is executed IAW overall priorities of support across the joint force, multinational partners, and USG departments and agencies.

(4) Recommend changes to GCC-directed lead Service or joint contracting arrangements, as required.

(5) Update and enforce operational specific contractor management requirements, directives, and procedures.
(6) Provide contractor personnel with the necessary GFS as required by operational conditions and ensure this support is properly coordinated between the component commands.

6. Functional Combatant Commands

Functional CCMDs and their staffs play a limited role in planning and managing OCS in support of military operations. Specific OCS-related functional CCMD responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

a. As the requirements are being developed and prior to contract award, ensure personnel (both acquisition and non-acquisition) who will manage and oversee contracts during contingency operations are identified and trained.

b. Develop, issue, and enforce, as necessary, OCS-related guidance and procedures IAW established DOD policy, joint doctrine, and GCC operational-specific directives and complementing US laws and executive orders, the FAR, DFARS, and Service component supplements for contracting.

c. Coordinate with supported GCCs to ensure unique roles regarding OCS are integrated as described below:

(1) The USSOCOM has procurement authority for special operations-peculiar equipment and related services. Contracting actions, related to SOF systems may be executed and are normally provided via reachback but in some cases may be executed in the operational area. Non-SOF peculiar contracting support, as coordinated by the appropriate TSOC, is normally provided through Service component or existing joint contracting support arrangements directed by the JFC. Deployed SOF units normally receive theater support contracting support from their parent Service contracting activity or JTSCC (if established).

(2) The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) has its own contracting authority. USTRANSCOM contracted support generally involves strategic transportation contracts that have an area of performance outside the operational area. However, in some cases, these transportation contracts may be fully or partially executed in the operational area (e.g., dignified remains airlift, air ambulance, defense courier, commercial airlift of outsized cargo). In these situations, USTRANSCOM is responsible for coordinating with the supported GCC, as required. Additionally, USTRANSCOM’s surface component command, the US Army Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), may be designated as the port manager and/or operator within an operational area. When so designated, SDDC will normally depend on the Army Contracting Command for contracting support, or otherwise, the Army contracting support brigade (CSB) providing support to the respective operational area, to assist SDDC in procuring stevedore support via theater support contracts in support of port operations. See DOD 4500.9R, *The Defense Transportation Regulation*, for additional guidance related to transportation contracted support and other movement-related activities governed by USTRANSCOM.
7. Service Component Commands

The Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force Service component commands along with their associated Service component contracting organizations plan and execute OCS IAW the guidance received from their respective Military Departments and supported JFC. Specific OCS-related Service component responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

a. Participate in joint OCS planning actions and develop Service component OCS plans per GCC guidance. OCS planning responsibilities are to:

   (1) Support all GCC-directed OCS planning requirements and ensure all primary and special staff members participate in and provide input to the process, as appropriate.

   (2) Establish and ensure the training of a Service component OCS integration cell if determined necessary.

   (3) Determine operational specific requiring activity and contracting and contract oversight personnel force requirements and responsibilities. Capture these requirements in Service component annex W and deployment plans, per JFC guidance.

   (4) Develop contingency plans to ensure continuation of essential contract services per GCC guidance and DODI 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix.

   (5) Plan to provide (or receive) contract support to other Services, SOF elements, DOD agencies, multinational partners, and USG departments and agencies, as directed by the GCC.

   (6) Incorporate all CAAF and their associated equipment into deployment and in-theater reception plans regardless if this deployment is via military means or self-supported.

   (7) Integrate OCS into Service component directed exercises.

b. Execute or support lead Service contracting responsibilities, as directed by the GCC.

c. Execute contracting actions IAW JFC guidance as well as applicable FAR, DFARS policies, PGI instructions, and Service component supplements.

d. Comply with TBC and CAD policies and processes when implemented by GCCs and directed by DPAP.

e. Ensure subordinate requiring activities and/or supported units execute requirements development and contract management requirements (i.e., CORs and receiving official tasks) as directed by the JFC and supporting contracting organizations.

f. Coordinate the provision of JTSCC Service component manning per GCC guidance when directed.
g. Enforce JFC-established priorities of support across the joint force, multinational partners, and USG departments and agencies.

h. Ensure sufficient and correct funds are available to meet contract requirements.

i. Ensure CAAF are received, accounted for, managed, and redeployed IAW established DOD and Service policy along with JFC operational-specific directives.

8. Functional Component Commands

In general, the air, land, and maritime functional component commands (if established) are not directly responsible for OCS actions. Contracting support is a Service Title 10, USC, responsibility that normally falls under the auspices of the Service component commands, and this authority is not normally transferred to joint air, land, or maritime functional commands.

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for more information on joint functional component commands.

9. Department of Defense Agencies

a. DLA is the CSA responsible for providing worldwide logistics support to Military Departments and the CCMDs under conditions of peace and war, as well as to other DOD components and other USG departments and agencies, and when authorized by law, state and local government organizations, foreign governments, and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). The DLA director reports to the USD(AT&L) through the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness. DLA has its own contracting authority and can provide contracting services related to their designated materiel commodities during contingency operations. DLA also includes the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) (see Appendix K, “Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office”).

See DODD 5105.22, Defense Logistics Agency, for more details on the DLA organization and functions.

b. The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is the CSA responsible for providing contract administration service to the DOD acquisition enterprise and its partners to ensure delivery of quality products and services to the operating force. And while not a core mission, DCMA (along with the Services) may also serve as a CCAS force provider in major contingency operations when requested by the supported GCC and as directed by USD(AT&L).

See DODD 5105.64, Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), for more information on DCMA’s CSA mission.

c. The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) is a defense agency under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). DCAA is responsible for performing all contract audits for DOD, and providing accounting and
financial advisory services regarding contracts and subcontracts to all DOD components responsible for procurement and contract administration. These services are provided in connection with negotiation, administration, and settlement of contracts and subcontracts. DCAA also provides contract audit services to other USG departments and agencies on a reimbursable basis. DCAA’s services are provided under contingency contracting situations, both in support of military operations and during a national emergency. DCAA personnel can be deployed, as circumstances warrant, to the operational area. DCAA on-site auditors are responsible for identifying practices needing improvement on a real-time basis and recommending cost avoidance opportunities to selected contingency contracts.

d. The Deputy Chief Management Officer is the principal advisor to SecDef and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for matters relating to the management and improvement of integrated DOD business operations. Specific Deputy Chief Management Officer OCS-related responsibilities are to:

1. Respond to urgent operational specific OCS-related business processes capability gaps.

2. Assist the supported GCC and Service components in refining expeditionary business processes to enhance transparency, fiscal accountability and visibility of in-theater acquisitions.

3. Provide CCMDs and supporting Service component commands subject matter expertise on deployed end-to-end business operations and deploying system architecture development/optimization that solve business problems in theater.
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CHAPTER III
CONTRACT SUPPORT INTEGRATION

"Future overseas contingencies are inherently uncertain, but effective planning for operational contract support can help reduce the risks posed by those uncertainties. The Department of Defense (DOD) has made an effort to emphasize the importance of operational contract support at the strategic level through new policy and guidance and ongoing efforts."

Timothy J. DiNapoli, Acting Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, September 12, 2012

1. Overview

   a. General. This chapter provides an overview of contract support integration actions during military operations. It describes actions the supported GCC can take to ensure the subordinate JFCs, the Service component commands, and supporting CSAs are prepared and organized to plan and manage OCS actions. The supported GCC executes this requirement through directive authority for logistics as prescribed in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. Execution of this requirement may also require changes to contracting authorities that may require coordination by the affected Service SPEs. This chapter also includes significant discussion on other contract support integration considerations to include OCS common operational picture (COP), phase 0 actions; multinational support; interagency support; OCS aspects of IFO; other special programs offices; fiscal authorities, phase IV-V transition, homeland defense (HD) and DSCA; foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), and National Guard (NG) operations under Title 32, USC.

   b. OCS Team. OCS planning and integration is a multidisciplinary team effort. In all joint operations, OCS planning and integration tasks require involvement of many commands, staffs, and supporting contracting activities along with numerous GCC and/or subordinate JFC directed boards, cells, and working groups. No single OCS-related organization is in direct control of all OCS actions in support of a joint operation; rather, multiple joint, Service, and CSA commands and supporting acquisition and contracting organizations coordinate OCS actions through designated boards, centers, cells, and working groups. A general overview of the OCS organizational construct is depicted in Figure III-1.
### Joint Operational Contract Support Planning and Execution Team

**GCC**
- **Mission Guidance**
- OCS Integration Cell – Synchronize OCS actions across all J-staff, Service components, CSAs
- CLPSB – Coordinate major AOR-wide OCS and other requirements support

**SVC Comp/CSA/TSOC**
- OCS Working Group (as required)
- Assists deliberate planning, directly coordinates phase 0 actions, and assists in OCS actions across all phases

**Sub-JFC**
- **Mission Guidance**
- OCS Integration Cell – Synchronize OCS actions across all J-staff, Service components, CSAs, LSC/JTSCC
- JRRB – Review, approve, and prioritize requirements

**Sub-JFC SVC Comp**
- OCS Working Group (as required)
- Develop requirements and assist in contract/contractor management

**LSCC/LSC (TS)/JTSCC**
- Provide theater support contracting services; coordinate common contracting actions

**RM**
- Provide funding approval and RM advice

**Other Contracting Activities**
- Execute contracts in accordance with GCC guidance

**Financial Services**
- Vendor Payments

#### Phase 0 Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV Phase V

### Legend
- **AOR** area of responsibility
- **CLPSB** combatant commander logistic procurement support board
- **CSA** combat support agency
- **GCC** geographic combatant commander
- **JFC** joint force commander
- **JRRB** joint requirements review board
- **JTSCC** joint theater support contracting command
- **LSC** lead Service for contracting
- **LSCC** lead Service for contracting coordination
- **OCS** operational contract support
- **RM** resource management
- **Sub** subordinate
- **SVC Comp** Service component
- **TS** theater support
- **TSOC** theater special operations command

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**Figure III-1. Joint Operational Contract Support Planning and Execution Team**
**c. Organizational Construct.** No single OCS organizational construct applies to every joint operation. In general, there should be a permanent operational contract support integration cell (OCSIC) capability at each geographic CCMD to perform phase 0/steady-state contract support integration functions and to provide oversight of any subordinate joint force command OCSIC (when formed). In addition to the subordinate joint force command OCSIC, there should also be a GCC designated lead theater support contracting activity responsible to coordinate common contracting actions in the operational area. Depending on the operation, there may be additional OCS-related boards, working groups, and cells (see Figure III-2). As with all joint boards, working groups, and cells, the GCC or/and subordinate JFC may combine them, modify them, or create new ones as required by specific operational requirements. **It is important to note that this joint OCS organizational construct, less the CCMD level OCSIC, is not applicable to single Service operations. In these operations, the Service executing the GCC-directed mission is generally responsible for all OCS actions and associated contracting execution requirements.**

2. **Planning and Integration**

   a. **General.** OCS planning and coordination is primarily an operational, not contracting, function. The GCC, subordinate JFCs, and supporting component commanders determine support requirements and the appropriate source of support (i.e., organic support, multinational support, HNS or contracted support). Service theater support contracting and other contracting and/or OCS-related organizations and individuals such as the JCASO and the Army field support brigade (AFSB) LOGCAP planners advise, augment, and assist, but do not lead the OCS planning process. No matter how augmented or advised, the GCC leads the OCS planning effort. Additionally, while the preponderance of contracted support is for logistic services and supplies, OCS functions are not just a logistics matter. Contracted support, no matter what service or supply is being acquired, has both direct and indirect costs and often impacts a variety of non-logistical matters from FP to the civil-military aspects of the campaign. Close coordination between all primary and special staff members is required to ensure OCS planning balances effectiveness with efficiency and risk while seeking to attain the JFC’s directed strategic end state.

   b. **Staff Roles.** All primary and special staff members play specific roles in OCS matters. These responsibilities vary in scope and scale, but many will be applicable to all joint operations. Because the preponderance of contracted support is for logistics services, the logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4) often has logistics-related OCS planning and GFS coordination functions at a significantly greater magnitude than other primary staff members. However, all other staff members still are responsible to plan and coordinate OCS actions for functions related to their staff functions. For example, the manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff (J-1) is responsible for contractor personnel accountability, and the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) is responsible for planning for the use, management, and control of PSCs. Proper OCS synchronization among the collective JS will enable the commander to leverage contracted support to create desired OCS-related effects and achieve operational and strategic objectives. Key OCS-related staff functions are captured in Figure III-3. Additional information on staff responsibilities specifically related to contractor management can be found in Chapter V, “Contractor Management.”
## Operational Contract Support Organizational Structure Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Construct</th>
<th>Area Focus</th>
<th>Primary Function</th>
<th>Duration/Battle Rhythm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CLPSB</td>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Address AOR-wide OCS and other logistic matters to include policies and directives</td>
<td>Permanent board that meets, as needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCSIC</td>
<td>AOR and JOA</td>
<td>General OCS planning, advice, coordination, and maintaining OCS COP</td>
<td>CCMD level: permanent cell Sub-joint force command: full time cell for duration of specified operation Full time or additional/collateral duty function at Service component level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS Working Group</td>
<td>AOR and JOA</td>
<td>Address specific OCS issues across joint force command primary and special staff</td>
<td>Meets as needed—no specific schedule in peacetime or during operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRRB</td>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>Review, approve, and prioritize major contract support requests</td>
<td>Meets per established schedule for duration of specified operation; emergency basis, as needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCSB</td>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>To coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict major common contracting actions in the JOA. Determine best contracting solution</td>
<td>Meets per established schedule; emergency basis, as needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSC, LSCC, or JTSCCC</td>
<td>JOA or AOR</td>
<td>Lead the common contracting coordination effort in the designated JOA or geographic area. Execute coordination function through the JCSB process</td>
<td>Operational command for duration of specific operation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Legend

- **AOR**: area of responsibility
- **CCMD**: combatant command
- **CLPSB**: combatant commander’s logistics procurement support board
- **COP**: common operational picture
- **JCSB**: joint contracting support board
- **JRRB**: joint requirements review board
- **JOA**: joint operations area
- **JTSCC**: joint theater support contracting command
- **LSC**: lead Service for contracting
- **LSCC**: lead Service for contracting coordination
- **OCS**: operational contract support
- **OCSIC**: operational contract support integration cell

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*Figure III-2. Operational Contract Support Organizational Structure Overview*
Primary and Special Staff Operational Contract Support Related Responsibilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Staff Position</th>
<th>Key Operational Contract Support Related Duties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J-1</td>
<td>Maintain CAAF accountability, in-theater reception; postal, MWR support; coordinate/consolidate human resource-related contract support requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>Assist in collection and analysis of selected OCS related JIPOE information; contract company/personnel security vetting; OCS JIPOE information coordinate/consolidate intelligence related; contract support requirements (i.e., contracted interrogator/interpreter/translator support).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-3</td>
<td>Chair/advise JRRB; plan and coordinate force protection (of contractors) and security (from contractors); establish CAAF training requirements; coordinate PR actions; plan for use of private security contractors to include RUF; contractor arming (for self-defense) policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-4</td>
<td>Conduct logistic related planning/coordination; coordinate GFS; chair CLPSP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-5</td>
<td>Develop constraints; risk analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-6</td>
<td>Coordinate/consolidate signal contract requirements; contractor frequency allocation and management; IT security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comptroller</td>
<td>Funding planning/oversight; ensure correct funding streams; financial management planning; JRRB advisor; IFO lead coordinator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Coordinate land and facilities for contractors; construction classification/planning/quality surveillance oversight; coordinate/consolidate construction requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon</td>
<td>Plan/coordinate CAAF medical support; operational specific predeployment medical requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
<td>Provide operational, contract, and fiscal law advice; advise as to the feasibility of asserting US federal criminal jurisdiction over CAAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provost Marshal</td>
<td>Investigate allegations of trafficking in persons, fraud, CAAF criminal activity; develop contractor base access policy/procedures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend

- **CAAF**: contractors authorized to accompany the force
- **CLPSB**: combatant commander logistic procurement support board
- **GFS**: government furnished support
- **IFO**: integrated financial operations
- **IT**: information technology
- **J-1**: manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
- **J-2**: intelligence directorate of a joint staff
- **J-3**: operations directorate of a joint staff
- **J-4**: logistics directorate of a joint staff
- **J-5**: plans directorate of a joint staff
- **J-6**: communications system directorate of a joint staff
- **J-5**: joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
- **JRRB**: joint requirements review board
- **MWR**: morale, welfare, and recreation
- **OCS**: operational contract support
- **PR**: personnel recovery
- **RUF**: rules for the use of force
c. OCS Planning and Coordination Boards, Cells, and Working Groups. The establishment and operation of OCS boards, cells, and working groups determines the success of the overall OCS planning and integration effort. The following is a general discussion on OCS planning and coordination boards to include the combatant commander logistics procurement support board (CLPSB), OCSIC, and the OCS working groups. OCS requirements generation-related (e.g., the joint requirements review board [JRRB]) and contracting coordination-related boards (e.g., the joint contracting support board [JCSB]) are discussed in depth later in this chapter, in Chapter IV, “Contracting Support,” and in Appendix F, “Operational Contract Support Related Boards.”

(1) CLPSB. The CLPSB is not solely an OCS-related board. A CLPSB is established by the GCC to coordinate OCS and related logistics efforts across the entire AOR. This board is normally chaired by a CCMD J-4 and includes representatives from each Service component command, CSA, as well as other military and USG departments and agencies or organizations concerned with general logistics to include OCS-related matters. The CLPSB is normally established as a permanent CCMD-level board, functioning in phase 0 as well as during contingencies and is convened as necessary as directed by the J-4. Examples of OCS-related CLPSB matters include:

(a) Provide acquisition strategy guidance, including appropriate programmatic approaches to acquisitions in support of planned or ongoing joint operations.

(b) Coordinate and approve overarching GCC’s OCS policies and procedures.

(c) Coordinate and approve phase 0 LSCC designations.

(d) Develop initial guidance on TBC entry criteria and parameters.

(e) Provide guidance on and coordinate any major OCS civil-military related initiatives such as LN first procurement initiatives and economic priorities as part of the GCC’s theater shaping initiatives.

(f) Provide initial guidance on use of CAP support.

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**OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT FOR LOGISTIC SERVICES**

In 2008, the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff directed the J-4 [Logistics Directorate] to lead a detailed assessment to determine DOD’s reliance on contracted support in current operations. Using eight quarters of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM contractor personnel census data, it was determined that logistic services represented about 85 percent of all contracted services in support of the joint force. This estimate appeared consistent with historical data from previous military operations.

**SOURCE:** J-4 Briefing to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 4 June 2010
(g) Develop the OCS requirements management strategy to support any GCC directed common-user logistics (CUL) and base operating support-integrator (BOS-I) designations.

(h) Identify requirements that should be centrally managed at the operational level.

(2) OCS Integration Cell. The primary purpose of this cell is to plan, coordinate, and integrate OCS actions across all joint, personal, and special staffs, Service components, CSAs, and lead theater support contracting activity in the operational area. The OCSIC is a permanent, full-time cell at the CCMD level and is normally stood up as a full-time cell at the subordinate joint force command level for the duration of the command’s existence. The OCSIC can be subordinate to a JS or in major operations, may serve as a separate personal staff element. There is no set structure or size for an OCSIC at either level; size and configuration is mission dependent. This cell should be made up of a mixture of specially trained personnel with operational-level logistics and contingency contracting experience. In some operations, this cell could be as small as two individuals, while in other operations it could be significantly larger. The CCMD level OCSIC normally includes two JCASO planners as well as a limited number of permanent CCMD headquarters (HQ) staff, but could include additional temporary augmentation staff, as required. Initial manning of a subordinate joint force command OCSIC is very mission dependent but could include JCASO mission support team (MST) or other augmentation staff along with a liaison officer (LNO) from the lead contracting activity.

Additional details on the OCSIC can be found in Appendix D, “Operational Contract Support Integration Cell Organization and Processes.” Additional information on the JCASO can be found in Appendix K, “Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office.”

(3) OCS Working Group. The OCS working group is an as-needed, temporary coordination mechanism utilized by the GCC or subordinate JFC to plan and coordinate OCS matters across the staff and with key mission partners. OCS working groups are normally chaired by a designated OCSIC member and meet as necessary to work specific OCS-related planning or execution-related issues. The OCS working group members vary depending on the issue/action at hand and normally include a mixture of primary and special staff members as well as selected Service component and/or CSA, or other mission partner representatives, as required. Some CCMD level OCS working groups may also include representatives from the Services, JS, and OSD, when required. Unresolved OCS working group issues may be forwarded to the CLPSB if/when it is deemed necessary.

d. OCS Planning Overview

(1) Introduction. IAW JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, joint operation planning fosters understanding, allowing commanders and their staffs to provide adequate order to ill-defined problems, reduce uncertainty, and enable further detailed planning. There are few areas more uncertain than planning for use of commercially provided services in support of joint operations. Historically, CCDRs and Service component commanders have concentrated deliberate planning on apportioned forces employed in early phases of military
Chapter III

operations based on limited details on logistics support with the exception of transportation feasibility planning. However, recent strategic and operational guidance has recognized our reliance on contracted support, which requires planners to recognize, account for, and integrate contracted support on par with military provided support. This point is especially true in crisis action and execution planning in operations where significant contracted support is anticipated.

(a) Strategic Guidance. DOD-level guidance shapes and directs specific operational guidance developed and enforced by the CCDRs. OCS-related information in national strategic guidance may be found or interpreted from multiple documents, but specific OCS guidance can be found in the GEF and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The GEF, issued by SecDef, provides two-year direction with strategic end states used to inform CCDRs development of theater campaign plans and contingency plans. The GEF states that CCMDs, together with their Service components and relevant CSAs, will plan for the integration of contracted support and the associated contractor personnel (contractor management) into military operations for all phases of military operations. The JSCP, issued by the CJCS, complements the GEF, but does not repeat details already published in the GEF. The JSCP specifically addresses the requirement for CCMDs to synchronize and integrate both contracted support, in general, and the associated contractor personnel in support of the joint force. Of particular note, the JSCP directs OCS planning for all plan levels and types to include commanders’ estimate, base plan, concept plan (CONPLAN), OPLAN, and campaign plan. Additionally, the Logistics Supplement to the JSCP provides guidance for preparation of the annex W (Operational Contract Support). The Logistics Supplement to the JSCP also contains information pertaining to completion of the logistics supportability analysis matrix, an appendix to annex D (Logistics), generated during plan development and refined during plan assessment.

(b) Importance of OCS Planning. DOD increasingly relies on contractors to perform a variety of functions and tasks, some of which are not organic capabilities found in our active or reserve force structure (e.g., dining facilities, ice services). Planning for contracted support has also become increasingly critical due to:

1. Reductions in the size of and changes to the composition of military forces (general reduction in the availability of uniformed support capabilities).

2. Increased operations tempo and nontraditional missions undertaken by the military.

3. Increased complexity and sophistication of weapon systems.

4. Continued emphasis on efficiencies and cost reductions through the outsourcing or privatizing of commercially adaptable materiel support and services.

5. Recognition that in some operations, supplies, and services delivered through contracts may, when planned and executed properly, have positive impacts on the civil-military aspects of the campaign.
6. Need for operational flexibility, including attaining required capabilities in the presence of force caps.

(c) **Value of OCS Planning.** The positive value of proper OCS planning is hard to measure but poor OCS planning assures some decrease in effectiveness, a possible significant reduction in efficiency and an environment more conducive to FWA. Done correctly, OCS planning can:

1. Provide the JFC a very significant ‘force multiplier’ capability when organic military support is not available or organic forces or other sources of support, such multinational or HNS, are not appropriate.

2. Provide commercial augmentation support that can potentially reduce requirements to deploy military support personnel.

3. Synchronize procurement, funding, and mission timelines to ensure effective and efficient use of contracted support.

4. In some operations, allow the JFC to leverage contract support to create positive effects on the civil-military aspects of the operation or campaign.

5. Provide the JFC and supporting components more certainty in the reliability and effectiveness of OCS, reducing the risk of using contracted support, and avoiding the potential increase in costs due to last minute procurements.

6. Ensure that OCS contributes to the commander’s intent and meets other requirements for successful integration and synchronization of contracts and the associated contractor personnel supporting CCDR-directed operations.

(d) **OCS Planning Challenges.** One of the most significant OCS planning challenges stems from the fact that DOD has only recently formally recognized OCS planning as part of the standard joint planning processes. Planning for OCS on the same level of fidelity as forces support represents an important departure from the historical experience of the joint planning and execution community. Specific OCS-related planning challenges include, but are not limited to:

1. DOD’s generally unconstrained resource planning process.

2. Lack of detail related to logistics and other support matters.

3. Lack of phase IV and V planning.

4. General complexity of OCS matters and associated lack of experience and training on this process.

5. Rapidly evolving techniques and tools supporting OCS planning.
6. Needed consistency of OCS planning documents with federal law and the FAR.

7. Large number and diverse nature of requiring activities, customer activities, and supporting contracting organizations.

8. Difficulty and lack of procedures to collect analysis of OCS aspects of the operational environment information.

9. Lack of integration of OCS information in the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) process.

10. General under appreciation of the importance and cost (both direct and indirect) of OCS as a source of support prior to execution.

11. Lack of emphasis on the critical nature of OCS in steady state/phase 0 actions.

12. Required synchronization of contract requirements with the policies of GCCs.

13. Difficulty incorporating OCS planning into IFO.

14. Lack of appreciation for the importance of requirements management and contract oversight.

15. Additional operations security challenges when using commercial support in foreign contingencies.

(e) **Planning for Different Types of Contracted Support.** It is important to understand that there are differences in planning for the use of systems support, theater support, and external support contracts. In general, the GCC and subordinate JFC, through the JCSB process, have control over decisions on the use of theater support and external support contracts. This point is not true for systems support contracts, many of which are in place long before the contingency operation commences or is even contemplated. Also, the JFC should be aware that while CAP support may be more expensive than theater support contracts, it brings significant internal corporate management capabilities not easily duplicated via theater support contracts. Additionally, CAP support is particularly suitable for use early in the contingency and for some large-scale, long-term operations. In any case, the GCC, via the CLPSB if necessary, and in close coordination with the Service CAP program office and LSC/LSCC’s contracting activity or JTSCC, shall provide formal annex W (Operational Contract Support) guidance on the use of CAP support. This planning guidance should include specific services appropriate for CAP (e.g., dining facility services, facilities management) or not appropriate (e.g., private security services, simple services that could be performed via theater support contracts). Additionally, the annex W (Operational Contract Support) or later fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs) should provide guidance on transition of individual CAP capabilities to theater support contracts or other fixed price external support contract if/when appropriate based on operation specific factors such as...
performance and/or cost risk, security considerations, availability of local sources of support, capability of other than CAP contracting, and availability of additional contract management and oversight capabilities. Additional information on contracting planning is covered later in this chapter.

(2) OCS Planning Process Overview. Planners must conduct OCS planning within the larger joint operations planning process that guides the development of plans for the employment of military power within the context of national strategic objectives and national military strategy. The OCS planners in the OCSIC are responsible for leading and integrating all GCC-level OCS planning actions. ICW other geographic CCMD staff elements, subordinate command and CSA logistic and other staff planners and supporting contracting organizations, these OCSIC planners analyze the operational environment from an OCS perspective, develop specific OCS-related courses of action (COAs), and coordinate these COAs and other OCS planning matters across the primary and special staff. OCSIC planners also work directly with the Service components and supporting CSAs to develop back-up plans for essential contract services per DODI 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix. More specifically, OCS planners at both the CCMD, Service component, and supporting CSA planners determine recommended OCS C2, organization, and supporting infrastructure (e.g., designation of lead Service or joint contracting-related organizations; establishment of OCS-related boards, centers, and working groups; ensure contracting and contract support-related organizations are identified and included in the troop list) and integrate OCS into all phases of the operation. HCA authority must also be considered in planning processes, and may require coordination through Service SPEs. Finally, OCS planners coordinate the incorporation of pertinent OCS information into the commander’s plans, orders, and policies, and prompt OCS planning by other staff elements, as appropriate.

(a) Providing Options. In all operations, contract support is a joint force multiplier to some degree. When properly planned, OCS can provide the JFC enhanced operational flexibility and rapid increases in support force capabilities. The use of commercial support available in or near the operational area may enable the JFC to front-load combat power or high-priority military personnel and equipment in the deployment process. Additionally, the JFC may also be able to reduce the uniformed footprint within the operational area by employing contracted support to supplement or replace select military support capabilities, especially in operations where formal force caps apply. Contrary to traditional planning thought, contracted support is not always the source of last resort. Contracted support, along with multinational and HNS, should always be considered when planning support to the joint force. In some operations, contracted support may be considered a primary choice of support, especially in operations which require a minimal uniformed footprint due to the establishment of force caps seen in some recent operations.

(b) Mitigating Operational Risks. Determining acceptable operational risk levels for various contracted services and balancing this risk with the importance of these services to the overall success of the supported operation is a complicated process. Conducting a thorough risk assessment is particularly important when planning for the continuation of mission essential contract services and when determining acceptable levels of risk associated with utilizing LN commercial firms and/or employees. The CCDR and
subordinate JFC should not place overly restrictive guidance on the use of contracted support (e.g., placing sections of the operational area off limits to contractor personnel that prevent mission essential systems support contractors from having access to the supported equipment). Areas of potential operational risk associated with contracted support that must be considered in the OCS planning process include:

1. Inability to accurately define requirements, especially in a rapidly changing operational environment.
2. Overly restrictive requirements and unrealistic contract execution timelines.
3. Increased operations security risks in using foreign contract companies and non-US contract employees.
4. Contractor inability or failure to perform.
5. Ability to secure proper funding (both types and amounts of funds).
6. Quality of the product or service provided by the contractor, especially when utilizing LN contracts.
7. Protection of the contracted workforce and their general ability to provide for their own self-defense.
8. Strategic implications of using armed PSCs.
9. Inability to fully control the flow of contract dollars to inappropriate/unacceptable contract companies with known or suspected links to the adversary and/or criminal elements.
10. Ability to secure required government civilian/military resources to let, manage, and oversee contracted support, such as contracting officers, technical SMEs, and CORs.
11. Obtaining the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) (Department of the Treasury) license to conduct business with entity/individuals on the Specially Designated Nationals or Blocked Persons List.
12. Administrative requirements, time requirements, resource requirements to terminate contracts after entities are identified as part of, or associated with, the Specially Designated Nationals or Blocked Persons List.

(c) **Assessing Nonmonetary Costs.** While contracted support can be a huge force multiplier, this form of support comes with additional nonmonetary costs that should be assessed in the planning process against the potential benefits. These costs include, but are not limited to:
1. Loss of flexibility (every proposed change to the contracted service must be incorporated into the terms and conditions of the contract by the contracting officer, and no change can be outside the general scope of the existing contract).

2. Increased planning workload (planning for contracted support, to include requirements determination process, is much more complex and time consuming than planning for organic military support).

3. Contract oversight costs (supported units can be burdened with significant CORs and receiving official requirements).

4. Increased legal support.

5. Increased security and FP costs (lack of ability of contractors to protect themselves, supported unit security escort duties).

6. Additional complexity in planning and managing GFS (services provided to contractor personnel such as medical, housing, messing, transportation, training) and government-furnished property (GFP) as well as contractor-acquired, government-owned (CAGO) equipment.

(d) **Constant Assessment, Change, and Adaptation.** Plan assessment is a critical element of OCS planning. Plans are constantly assessed and updated, potentially requiring updates to the OCS portions of the plan. The open and collaborative planning process provides common understanding vertically and horizontally across multiple levels of organizations and the basis for adaptation and change. Given the non-static nature of conflict and war and a dynamic operational environment, the joint force must continually assess and learn during execution in order to adapt and update plans to ensure that military actions are effectively contributing to the attainment of the strategic end state. Furthermore, planners must constantly assess whether the military actions, and by extension, OCS support to those actions, remain relevant to the attainment of the commander’s directed end state. Feedback, generated from the assessment process, forms the basis for learning, adaptation, and subsequent refinements to the commander’s guidance and operational concept. The commander and staff must constantly make certain that military actions are effective, correctly aligned with resources, and are contributing to the accomplishment of directed strategic and military end states. **OCS plays a critical role in providing planning options as changes to support requirements and the operational environment occur.** Maintaining an ongoing and current assessment of analysis of the operational environment to include contracting force and existing contract capabilities available allows the force to quickly adapt to changes in the plan.

A detailed discussion of OCS support to JIPOE can be found in Appendix G, “Analysis of the Operational Contract Support Aspects of the Operational Environment.”

(3) **OCS-Related Planning Products.** There are several policy directed OCS-related planning products relevant to the planning process described above. Depending on the level of plan, they may or may not include:
(a) **OCS Estimate.** The OCS estimate is an appendix to the logistics estimate and is the tool that planners use at the CCMD, subordinate command, Service component, and CSA levels to capture OCS information and analysis in the planning process. It is updated as information becomes available and when filled out, informs preparation of the commander’s estimate/base plan, and provides the basic information for annex W (Operational Contract Support) development.

(b) **Contract Statement of Requirement (CSOR).** CSOR provides a summary of projected contracted support requirements by class of supply and major type of contracted service as determined by the appropriate staff element responsible for the particular function requiring contracted support. A mature and properly developed CSOR can:

1. Drive the development and refinement of the annex W (Operational Contract Support).
2. Validate OCS assumptions.
3. Narrow the focus for analysis of OCS aspects of the operational environment efforts.
4. Inform the OCS input to the logistics supportability analysis.
5. Inform a rough order of magnitude of monetary and nonmonetary costs of planned contracting support.
6. Inform subsequent performance work statement (PWS)/statement of work (SOW) development.
7. Allow for development of the OCS requirements management strategy.

(c) **Contracted Support Synchronization Matrix (CSSM).** CSSM is a tool for recording and displaying anticipated major OCS actions across time. The CSSM informs the logistics synchronization matrix by capturing projected contracted support for logistics and selected non-logistics support-related planning actions. As a subordinate OCS planning template to the logistics synchronization matrix, the CSSM also provides the JFC a synchronized display of CAAF estimates by location, phase of operation, type of contracted support, and capability.

(d) **Annex W.** Annex W (Operational Contract Support), is the primary means used by CCMD staff, subordinate staff, Service component, and CSA planners to document OCS in OPLANS/operation orders (OPORDs). Annex W should be included in GCC plans and orders, as required. The level of detail included in annex W varies based on information available and level of command. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance*, for specific details for planning formats.
(4) Application of National and Theater Strategic Guidance. Joint operation planning occurs within Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX), a DOD-level system of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures. APEX and the joint operation planning process (JOPP) share the same problem solving elements, and when combined, promote coherent planning across all levels of operations and echelons of command. JOPP underpins planning at all levels, and helps commanders and their staffs organize OCS planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission, develop an effective, coordinated annex W, and embed key OCS information in other related annexes.

(a) Planning Functions and Activities. Joint operation planning is comprised of a number of elements, including four planning functions: strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan assessment. These planning functions directly correlate to the steps within JOPP. Figure III-4 graphically depicts OCS actions related to the planning functions and JOPP steps as described in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. Additional details of how OCS fits into these individual functions and activities follow. This discussion focuses on deliberate planning, but in general, applies to crisis and execution planning as well.

(b) Strategic Guidance. The strategic guidance function relates to the first two JOPP steps: planning initiation and mission analysis. The staffs’ planning activities initially focus on mission analysis, which develops information to help the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders understand the situation and mission. OCSIC personnel start the process by reviewing strategic planning guidance to extract pertinent OCS information related to the planning effort, and begin collection of analysis of OCS aspects of the operational environment information as part of the theater logistics analysis (TLA). OCS planners use the information extracted from this planning guidance and deduced from the analysis of OCS aspects of the operational environment to inform logistic and operation planners on OCS matters, and to begin populating the OCS estimate and theater logistics overview.

(c) Concept Development. The concept development function includes the COA development, COA analysis and wargaming, COA comparison, and COA approval steps of JOPP. The CCDR’s staff develops, analyzes, and compares viable COAs and develops staff estimates that are coordinated with Service and/or functional components and CSAs when applicable. OCS personnel participate in CCDR’s joint logistics planning and other planning activities to provide OCS expertise and influence in shaping the COAs. They coordinate with staff planners (i.e., logistics, intelligence, operations, signal), Service components, and CSAs to identify major commodities and services that may need to be provided through contracted means and which may need to be captured in a CSOR, depending on the outcome of the concept development process. Based on identified potential contracted support requirements, OCS planners develop an initial concept of OCS for each COA considered and draft CSSMs for each COA. As COAs are refined and assessed, the corresponding concept of OCS and CSSM are also refined. Finally, the GCC’s OCSIC personnel, ICW the other primary and special staff planners, provide assessment of the COAs from an OCS perspective and provide recommendations for COA selection.
(d) **Plan Development.** The plan development function correlates most closely to the plans or order development step of JOPP. During this function, the OCS planners work with other primary and special staff members to gain fidelity on and document where contract support will be utilized.
Plan development includes a number of different planning activities: force, support, and deployment planning; shortfall ID; feasibility analysis; refinement; documentation, plan review and approval; and supporting plan development. The end state of this function is a completed CONPLAN, OPLAN, or OPORD, with required annexes. Within this function, the OCSIC personnel incorporate OCS-related OCS-estimate information for each phase of the operation and in each COA. They also coordinate with other primary and special staff planners, Service components, and CSAs as they complete their detailed force, support, and transportation planning; shortfall ID; and feasibility analysis that result in refined requirements for contracted support. When necessary, the OCSIC personnel should host an OCS working group meeting to resolve OCS planning issues that cross multiple staff lanes. **It cannot be emphasized enough that the JFC must integrate the information and expertise offered by Service components and agencies up front, during plan development to properly identify planned OCS requirements, contractor estimates, and contracting capabilities. Likewise, Service components must identify their OCS requirements to parent Service in order to meet GCC requirements.** CCDR and/or subordinate joint force command level OCS planning must also address the OCS integration mechanisms (e.g., C2, boards, working groups and cells, and other processes) necessary to synchronize, deconflict, and integrate major sources of common contracted support.

During plan development, planners, led by the OCSIC personnel, should analyze OCS-associated risks as well as anticipated monetary cost and indirect, nonmonetary costs (additional contract management requirements, loss of flexibility, FP requirements). The OCSIC personnel recommend mitigation strategies, update OCS planning products (i.e., CSOR and CSSM), integrate contractor support requirements (e.g., base camp services, transportation, deployment support) into the overall plan, and develop required OCS documentation for plans or OPORDs (e.g., annex W with appropriate appendices and tabs, and in other appropriate paragraphs in an OPORD).

Finally, OCSIC personnel, ICW the plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5) and J-3, must carefully consider the civil-military aspects of OCS, especially if phase IV/V actions are contemplated. When not properly planned, monitored, and measured, OCS effects can create risk and unintended impacts to the JFC’s desired military end state. Other special planning considerations including interagency, multinational, DSCA, and phase IV/V transition are all covered later in this chapter and in applicable appendices.

(e) **Plan Assessment.** The plan assessment function does not have a correlating step in JOPP. Plan assessment occurs as required following plan approval. The CCDR extends and refines planning, while supporting and subordinate commanders, if directed, complete their plans for review and approval. The CCDR continues to develop and analyze branch plans and other options. As part of this function, OCS planners continue to evaluate the situation for any changes that would trigger plan refinement, adaptation, termination, or execution. OCS documentation is subsequently updated as needed.

*For more information on the OCS planning process and formats, see CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.* Additionally,
more detailed guidance on contractor personnel and equipment management-related planning can be found in Chapter V, “Contractor Management.”

3. Requirements Determination

As described in Chapter I, “Introduction,” requirements determination encompasses all activities necessary to develop, consolidate, coordinate, validate, approve, and prioritize joint force contract support requirements and consists of three major subordinate functions: requirements development, requirements consolidation, and requirements validation. **Requirements determination is an operational command, not contracting, function.** The JFC and component commanders must ensure that the requiring activities are properly trained and actively participate in the requirements development and validation process, as directed. Identifying, synchronizing, and prioritizing requirements are essential precursors to effective contract development, and essential to ensuring the subordinate JFC receives commercial support at the right place, at the right time, and at a reasonable cost/price. Determining accurate requirements up front has a much higher payoff than trying to modify the requirements during contract execution. Effective contract support is highly dependent on accurate and timely requirements development and validation along with proper in-theater management of the execution of these requirements.

a. **Requirements Development.** Requirements development is the process of defining actual requirements for contracted support and capturing these requirements in “acquisition-ready” contract support requirements packages. This process is normally a tactical level requiring activity function, but in some cases, it can and should be done at the operational level by a Service component or subordinate JFC’s HQ staff. Prior to submitting the contract request to a supporting contracting office or the JRRB as directed by JFC policy, the requiring activity is responsible to clearly determine performance, cost, and scheduling factors to include:

   (1) A clear description of the required commodity, services, or construction to include technical data and standards.

   (2) A cost estimate based on market research.

   (3) Requested commodity and/or service delivery dates/period of required performance.

   (4) Appropriate quality assurance standards.

   (5) Appropriate funding and approval documentation.

b. **Requiring Activity Responsibilities.** Requiring activities are responsible, IAW local command policies, to ensure appropriate approvals are received, adequate funding is available, and required contract management personnel (e.g., unit provided CORs, technical inspectors, and/or receiving officials) are identified prior to submitting the contract support requirements package for approval. Requiring activities also need to take procurement lead time into consideration as they conduct their requirements development planning. **In some operations, it may be necessary for the GCC or subordinate JFC to establish and**
publish standards of support. Standardized support requirements are especially important when it comes to minor construction. In some operations, standards of support can also be an important JFC tool to reduce contracted costs across the force.

*JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, JP 4-0, Joint Logistics,* and *JP 4-08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations,* provide additional information on JFC established standards of support. Detailed discussion on the requirements development process can be found in *Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Publication 4-10,* Operational Contract Support Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.

c. **Requirements Consolidation.** When possible, Service component commands and their major support commands should consolidate common contracted service and commodity requirements under a single designated management activity. Both the JRRB and JCSB are forums to determine recommended contract requirement consolidation actions. Additionally, the CLPSB provides a forum to develop OCS requirements management strategies to determine how CUL requirements will be managed (decentralized/tactical level or centralized/operational level). Advantages of consolidation of contract requirements:

1. Enhanced JFC and Service component commander control of mission critical, often limited LN contracted services and commonalities.
2. A reduction in subordinate unit requirements development and supporting contracting organization workload.
3. Better enforcement of common standards of support.
4. More effective and efficient contracting actions, including increased economies of scale and reduced contract cost.
5. Helps minimize required contracting personnel footprint.

d. **Requirements Validation**

1. **General.** Requirements validation is the process to coordinate, review, prioritize, and approve contract support requests. Depending on the type and estimated cost of the requirement as well as local command policies, the contract support requirements package may be subject to numerous staff reviews. Common staff reviews include:

   a. Staff judge advocate (SJA) reviews contract support requirements for legal sufficiency. These legal reviews encompass funding sources and constraints, contracting methods, and associated issues. They also include operational and jurisdictional issues concerning HN agreements, security agreements, and other contractor personnel-related issues. Legal reviews should also address any statutory and regulatory issues as well as any other pertinent issues (e.g., appropriateness of armed PSC support) that may not have a statutory or regulatory basis but do reflect appropriate judgment and analysis for the best decision.
(b) Manpower review to assess suitability of services for sourcing via contracting per DODI 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix.

(c) Security, FP, antiterrorism staff reviews for requests that involve services with an area of performance on a military controlled installation or facility.

(d) Communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6) review of communications or information technology-related commodity and/or service requests.

(e) Supply officer review of all commodities requests to ensure the item is not readily available through normal military channels.

(f) Joint facilities utilization board review for minor construction requests.

(g) Formal JRRB review, as required.

2) JRRB. The JRRB is the subordinate JFC’s formal mechanism to review, validate, prioritize, and approve selected Service component contract support requests. The JRRB should be established at the subordinate JFC’s level during any sustained operation that includes significant levels of contracted support. It may also be used as a venue to assess possible operational impacts of specific contract support requests and, when appropriate, is used to provide guidance on recommended contract support request consolidation actions as well as acquisition strategy to the JCSB (e.g., the required service is a potential high security threat so guidance is to not use a LN company for this support). It also serves as a mechanism to enforce the subordinate JFC’s cost control guidance. The JRRB is normally chaired by the subordinate deputy commander for support or J-4 and made up of subordinate staff and command representatives. Designated OCSIC members are normally responsible for JRRB secretariat functions. The JRRB also includes non-voting theater support contracting activity, CSA, and Service CAP representatives, as appropriate.

See Appendix F, “Operational Contract Support-Related Boards,” for more details related to the JRRB.

e. Joint Force Command and Requiring Activity In-Theater Contract Management Responsibilities. The GCC, subordinate JFCs, and supporting commanders must understand that contracting is not a “fire and forget” process. Contracting support to military operations requires significant planning and management efforts from the requiring activity, supporting activities, as well as the contracting staff. Supporting Service and CSA contracting activities must comply with the JFC’s operational guidance and command policies. For services and construction contracts, the JFC and component commanders must ensure there are sufficient contract qualified oversight personnel (CORs and associated technical inspectors, if necessary) available to adequately monitor contractor performance to include both technical and tactical matters as required by the approved quality assurance surveillance plan. Units in need of contracted commodities are responsible for identifying and making available requisite receiving officials. These receiving officials are responsible for ensuring that the commodities received meet the contract-related quality, quantity, and delivery stipulations. Additional non-COR support, such as personnel to perform security checks and/or escort the contractors, may also be
Contract Support Integration

required. For cost type contracts, there is also a periodic need to revalidate requirements and ensure that the contractor is operating efficiently. **Without proper command involvement and contract management capabilities in place, the JFC is likely to experience significantly increased operational costs, and more importantly, possible loss of operational effectiveness, increased security and even safety risks.**

### REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION CHALLENGE

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, an Army aviation brigade needed to renovate a building on forward operating base (FOB) Taji. Because of the estimated cost and type of project (minor construction), this requirement required both joint acquisition review board and joint facilities utilization board approval. Since this unit had no engineering expertise on staff, they requested technical assistance from the FOB engineering office, an Air Force Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers, in developing their contract support requirements package. Once approved, the package was sent to Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, which assigned it to the regional contracting center (RCC) Taji. The RCC Taji contracting officer then prepared the solicitation, compared bids, and because the “Iraqi First” program was in effect, awarded the contract to a local construction company. Once the contract was awarded, the Iraqi company had 30 days to complete all work not including Friday “Holy Days” and any delays caused by the government. Since this was a minor construction contract, the unit was required to provide a contracting officer representative (COR) to ensure work was completed IAW [in accordance with] the contract. Again, because this Army unit had no engineer expertise on staff, they went to a local Air Force unit to seek assistance in validating the technical related COR checks. Additionally, since the vendor and his employees were local nationals, the unit was required to provide an armed escort for its employees. This renovation project took approximately 70 days to complete from the time of identification of the requirement to time of completion of the work.

**SOURCE: Contracting Officer, Taji Regional Contracting Center**

### 4. Other Key Considerations

There are numerous other OCS planning and execution considerations that must be weighed by the supported GCC, subordinate JFC, and Service component commanders. These considerations range from establishing and maintaining an OCS COP to arranging common contracting support in multinational operations to determining the civil-military impact of OCS in major stability operations. The following paragraphs provide a general discussion on the challenges related to these OCS considerations.
a. Global Contracting Compliance, Sanctions, and Regulatory Oversight Requirements. As part of OCS, the JFC must ensure that all contracting is in compliance with US law. OFAC of the US Department of the Treasury administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and national security goals against targeted foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other

### ADDITIONAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT

1. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury acts under Presidential national emergency powers, as well as authority granted by specific legislation, to impose controls on transactions and freeze assets under US jurisdiction. Many of the sanctions are based on United Nations and other international mandates, are multilateral in scope, and involve close cooperation with allied governments. OFAC maintains the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List and Blocked Persons List (BPL) which should be consulted prior to the execution of contract support in order to limit the risk of conducting business with individuals and entities subject to US Government sanctions. The SDN List and BPL are not exclusive or exhaustive. Although the SDN List and BPL includes persons meeting the criteria established in the authorities or executive orders that define certain OFAC sanctions programs, transactions with actors not named on the SDN List may nevertheless violate US sanctions due to interests of designated parties in such transactions or prohibitions owing to country-based OFAC administered sanctions programs. List checking alone is insufficient to meet the due diligence requirements due to the fact that OFAC traditionally only designates umbrella organizations. List-checking alone does not guarantee the safe and secure delivery of contracting funds and resources in high risk areas. Therefore, list-checking and compliance capabilities are both parts of a federated risk-based approach that the Department of Defense must employ. See the US Department of the Treasury’s resource center at [http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx](http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx).

2. In addition to OFAC guidelines, the Bureau of Industry and Security in the Department of Commerce issues specific guidance to mitigate the risk of conducting business with individuals and entities subject to export regulations. Specifically, the Bureau of Industry and Security recommends that in the event a company, entity, or person on one of the maintained lists (Denied Persons List, Entity List, Unverified List, and Consolidated Screening List) appears to match a potential party in an export transaction, additional due diligence is required before proceeding. Depending on which list the match was found, a match indicates either there is a strict export prohibition; a specific license requirement; or the presence of a “red flag.” Prior to taking any further actions, users are to consult the requirements of the specific list on which the company, entity or person is identified by reviewing the web page of the agency responsible for the list. See the consolidated interagency website at [http://export.gov/ecr/eg_main_023148.asp](http://export.gov/ecr/eg_main_023148.asp).

Various Sources
threats to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the US. Compliance with the OFAC guidelines in the execution of contract support will allow DOD to reduce the risk of inadvertently conducting business with individuals and entities that have been identified by OFAC and are the subjects of USG sanctions. This risk is inherently higher when DOD executes contract support in or near specific geographic areas that have been the subject of focused scrutiny by OFAC. Restrictions on dealing with key countries, areas, and individuals are published in regulations and executive orders. The SJA must be consulted in contracting to ensure compliance with the most current sanctions and regulatory oversight requirements. In addition to OFAC guidelines, the Bureau of Industry and Security in the Department of Commerce issues specific guidance to mitigate the risk of conducting business with individuals and entities subject to export regulations.

For CTF Policy, see DOD 5205.14, Counter Threat Finance Policy.

b. COP. Establishing and maintaining an effective OCS COP can be a challenge, especially since there are only limited officially fielded automation tools currently available for use to support of this important task. However, there are numerous OSD-developed OCS as well as contracting specific COP-related tools can support joint and Service component HQ and supporting contracting activities in contingencies. These tools can provide both OCSIC and lead contracting activity the ability to capture and track contract visibility, spend data, and other important OCS-related information. When employing these operational prototypes, users must ensure the tools have the appropriate cybersecurity accreditations prior to authorizing their use on command networks. Information on these tools is available from DPAP’s Contingency Contracting Office’s website http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/resources.html).

c. Phase 0 (Support). While sometimes overlooked, OCS is a significant phase 0 enabler. In fact, most phase 0 actions are entirely supported by commercial, vice uniformed military, sources which can provide the CCMD OCSIC with significant analysis of OCS aspects of the operational environment information. DOD has been challenged to provide sufficient warranted or otherwise authorized personnel (i.e., credit card holders) to be able to conduct procurement support of theater security cooperation events. While DOS personnel can provide assistance to some minor operations (i.e., suggest sources of supplies and services), DOD is inherently responsible to execute procurements in support of military-related requirements. Additionally, OCS planners should be aware of special challenges when planning and executing phase 0, OCS actions to include lack of contingency contracting authorities/waivers (i.e., contract support must be executed IAW peacetime contracting procedures), lack of contingency funding, and lack of applicability and clarity of some contractor personnel policies and laws. For additional guidance, see OSD DPAP’s Procurement Support of theater security cooperation website at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/security_assistance_efforts.html.

d. SOF Support. GCCs, as recommended by their OCSIC and ICW their aligned TSOC and the appropriate Service component commands, may designate an LSC or LSCC responsible to assist their TSOC in contracting planning and execution. The designated LSC’s or LSCC’s supporting contracting activity will be responsible to provide dedicated contracting OCS-related planning assistance, requirements development assistance, and
assistance in coordinating specific contracting support arrangements to deployed SOF elements. Normally, theater support contracting will be provided by the Service with the preponderance of forces or the most capable force in the particular mission area unless a JTSCC responsible for all theater support contracting is formed. Additionally, deployed SOF units may receive common logistic and other support services from CAP and other external support contracts. SOF-peculiar contract requirements are the responsibility of USSOCOM.

e. **Multinational Support.** The JFC and the US military lead contracting activity must be cognizant of challenges and potential pitfalls on planning and executing OCS actions in a multinational environment. Every effort must be made to arrange common contracting support, or at a minimum, to share vendor information. Planning for and executing common contracted support in a multinational force is complicated by the lack of a commonly accepted contracting policy and procedures. Additionally, even in alliance operations (e.g., in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization mission), OCS is not something that is routinely trained or exercised.

### MULTINATIONAL SUPPORT IN OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

In July 2006, Kandahar Air Field contracting support for base camp services transitioned from a US Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program task order to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) provided contracting support. This action transitioned the Kandahar Air Field base camp services mission from a lead nation (United States) to a formal multinational contracting support arrangement. This effort included the first use of NAMSA as an operational command responsible for common contracting capability. Called the provision of Real Life Support Arrangement, this support arrangement was codified in a detailed Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed by NAMSA along with the four “stakeholder” nations (Canada, United Kingdom, Netherlands, and the US) and the NATO’s Joint Force Headquarters, Brunssum. This detailed MOA laid out specific organizational procedures to include funding, method of payments, reports, auditing, etc., for this new support arrangement.

**SOURCE:** NATO Real Life Support Arrangement No. 011

(1) **Lead Nation or Role Specialist Nation Contracting Support.** In most multinational operations, the multinational commander will normally designate a lead nation and/or role specialist nation to provide CUL support to the multinational force. Often, the US will be the lead nation responsible for this CUL support, which in many operations may be sourced through a combination of theater support contracts or CAP task orders. Challenges to set up a lead nation or role specialist nation contracting support include, but are not limited to a lack of common standards of support; a lack of standard terms and procedures (e.g., requirements development procedures, contract oversight procedures); difficulty in determining and establishing funding and method of payment arrangements; and a lack of trust in the reliability of this support.
(2) **Transition to Multinational Contracting Organization.** Transition from a lead nation or role specialist nation contracting support methodology may be warranted in some long-term alliance operations. In these situations, planning for such a transition should begin as early as practicable and involve all major troop-contributing nations. Keys to success are the ID of a capable contracting organization and obtaining participant nation approval of a workable and detailed contracting agreement as described in Figure III-5.

(3) **Contract Oversight.** Providing contract oversight, especially CORs, for DOD contracts in support of multinational partners can be a significant challenge. The preferred option is to provide on-site governmental personnel to perform COR functions. Additionally, with a waiver, multi-national military and civilian employees of a foreign government or a NATO/multinational partner can be designated CORs.

f. **Interagency and NGO Support.** Similar to multinational support, US forces may be required to provide CUL support to both USG departments and agencies and NGOs. In many operations, DOD support to USG departments and agencies and NGOs is limited in scope and may not pose a significant challenge to the supported GCC and subordinate JFC. However, in some stability operations, significant effort may be required to ensure the JFC’s OCS actions are properly synchronized with related USG departments and agencies and NGO actions. In most cases, a lead Service will provide this support through theater support contracts or CAP task orders or combination of both. Key to the success of interagency
support is ensuring that CCMD planners, to include the OCSIC, are aware of and are involved in interagency and NGO planning efforts. Planners must address specific DOD contracting support responsibilities to other USG departments and agencies and NGO operations to include specific requirements. Coordination channels to the supported USG departments and agencies and NGOs should be included early in the planning cycle and included as part of coordination mechanisms, including funding procedures (e.g., Economy Act reimbursement or cite to specific Foreign Assistance Act authority) to manage this support in the operational area.

See JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, for more information. Additional interagency support discussion can also be found in Appendix H, “Phase IV-V Transition Planning and Processes.”

g. OCS Aspects of IFO. The JFC, Service components, and supporting contracting officials should be aware that OCS actions can affect more than just the quality and timeliness of forces support. OCS actions, whether intended or not, can produce both positive and negative effects on the civil-military aspects of the overall campaign plan. Theater support contracts, and in some cases external support contracts, such as the Service CAP task orders, utilize local contractor and subcontractor companies and employees to

A PROGRAMMATIC APPROACH TO INTERAGENCY CONTRACT SUPPORT INTEGRATION

Per numerous reports, observations, and lessons from recent operations in Iraq, coordinating and synchronizing contract support in major security force assistance missions can be daunting. In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), the multi-agency reconstruction program faced an array of significant challenges, pushing up costs, and leading to many failed projects and wasted dollars. These challenges, which can occur in any such operation, included a deteriorating security situation, conflicting departmental approaches, weak unity of effort, poor sustainment planning, and most importantly, significant ad hoc management arrangements.

These OIF challenges paint a clear need for a much more formal management approach to planning and executing contingency reconstruction programs in any future operation. Key to success of these efforts is to synchronize contract support related efforts among interagency, interorganizational, and multinational partners. In any future reconstruction efforts, specific program objectives, cost controls, and oversight measures must be agreed to up front by all key reconstruction support entities. Only through such an interagency programmatic approach can we realistically expect to achieve long-term success in such challenging operations.

provide goods and services in support of the joint force. Planned and executed properly, these contract support actions can indirectly support the key IFO aspects of helping to build the local economy, promote goodwill with the local populace, and contribute to long-term HN economic growth and stability. Done without proper planning and oversight, these actions can lead to potentially serious problems that in some situations may undermine the JFC’s operation or campaign objectives.

(1) As described in JP 3-0, Joint Operations, the operational environment includes a set of complex and constantly interacting political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) systems. In major, long-term stability operations, OCS actions can have a significant impact on all PMESII systems. This point is especially true when conducting COIN and SFA missions. Therefore, it is imperative OCS actions in these types of missions be deliberately planned and closely coordinated with all major multinational and interagency partners, especially with the chief of mission (COM) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). When integrating OCS actions into IFO planning and execution, a proper understanding of the operational environment typically requires cross-functional participation by other joint force staff elements, supporting contracting organizations, various intelligence organizations, major USG departments and agencies, and possibly nongovernmental centers that possess relevant expertise to ensure these actions support IFO and the JFC’s overall plan.

(2) In COIN and SFA-related missions, all major contract actions must be synchronized, monitored, deconflicted and, most importantly, measured. This ensures that these contracts are properly supported, and are at least not detrimental to, the key IFO-related aspects of providing funds for economic development and infrastructure projects that win the support of a local population and separate the population from an insurgency. Understanding who benefits from contracting actions by thoroughly vetting potential vendors for possible security concerns, encouraging contractors to hire and mentor local firms, and considering local standards and methods (whenever possible and practicable) when building contract support requirements packages will ensure contract actions are properly aligned to campaign objectives. Also understanding the impact of unique contractor-provided services (e.g., use of armed PSCs) and/or general contract behavior that can have a direct impact on the local populace is also a major consideration. Chapter V, “Contractor Management,” of this publication includes more detail on PSCs and other contractor personnel matters.

(3) In some major COIN and SFA focused operations, special processes and organizations may be required to ensure OCS and IFO actions are properly monitored, analyzed, and integrated across the JFC. In these types of operations, consideration must be given to establishing special teams to include, but not limited to, contractor security vetting cells and interagency IFO task forces. All OCS and IFO actions must be compliant with US laws and sanctions. A special team or task force is not always necessary and can be manpower intensive. Regardless of necessity of a special team or task force, compliance and regulatory requirements still apply, and due diligence requirements must be met. These special teams and task forces are pro-active in order to prevent contracting with inappropriate entities. Staff functions should still familiarize, educate, and train on how to terminate already existing contracts if an entity becomes prohibited.
h. Special Program Offices and Officers. Large scale, long-term phase IV missions, especially those with significant SFA requirements, may require the GCC, subordinate JFC and/or Service component commander to establish functionally focused, dedicated special program offices/offices for selected mission critical, large scale, high-dollar service contracts and/or groups of contracts. These ad hoc program offices are in addition to, or may be combined with, subordinate joint force command OCSIC, the IFO-related organizations discussed in the previous section, commonly deployed military program offices such as the Army LOGCAP-Forward and the two military construction agents, the US Army Corps of Engineers and Naval Facilities Command. While these offices are not formal acquisition PM offices, they act in a similar manner by providing trained, dedicated SMEs to advise and assist major requiring activities to plan for and then control the cost, performance, and scheduling of selected major contracted services and/or consolidated SFA-related programs. Functionally focused special program offices may vary in size and scope from a single logistic SME responsible to over watch a single service contract to actual program manager certified staffs responsible to assist the JFC to plan and coordinate multiple SFA-related service and construction contracts. Special program office purpose and functions can be found in Figure III-6.
i. **Fiscal Authorities.** It is vitally important to ensure that proper funds are used when planning and executing contract support. Special attention must be given to funds that are used in stability operations to ensure proper funding for DOS-related support (Title 22, USC, funds), and special mission specific programs such as the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program. In all operations, careful attention should be paid to ensuring proper separation of minor construction funded through operations and maintenance funds and major construction actions funded through military construction appropriation funds. Additionally, the JFC must be cognizant of issues related to the transition from DOD funding to efforts financed by the US Agency for International Development, specifically, fiscal law reviews from the requiring organization.

### Special Program Office Purpose and Functions

**Purpose**

Provide additional dedicated subject matter expert oversight of selected contracts or groups of related contracts.

**Specific Functions**

- Assist the requiring activity to plan and develop accurate requirements for major service contracts.
- Ensure sustainability is properly incorporated in the planning and requirements development effort.
- Assist in cost control.
- Coordinate, consolidate similar requirements as appropriate.
- Work closely with subordinate supported units and the supporting contracting officer/administrative contracting officer(s) to monitor, analyze contractor performance.
- Keep supported command informed on key trends, issues, etc.

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**A PROGRAMMATIC APPROACH TO OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT**

The following are Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) related examples of operational contract support (OCS) organizational initiatives designed to better plan, manage, and integrate mission critical contracted services.

**143rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC).** The 143rd ESC, the senior sustainment command in OEF, served as the requiring activity for the newly awarded host nation support trucking and air resupply contracts. In order to provide oversight to these two mission critical contracts, the commander directed his OCS cell to include field grade officers individually responsible to coordinate unit oversight of these contracts. While not official program managers, these two officers continually monitored,
assessed, and reported contractor performance and worked with the supporting contracting command to resolve issues, as necessary.

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). In 2010, CSTC-A established a Deputy Commander for Programs responsible to integrate requirements generation, funding, and contract management across the command. This flag officer position was filled by a professional acquisition officer with significant program management experience.

Senior Contracting Official for Afghanistan (SCO-A). The SCO-A established contract support integration cells manned with a contracting officer, a program management certified officer and contractor support at each of the regional command (RC) headquarters. These integration cells, working inside the RC operations centers, provided acquisition advice and directly assisted the RCs to manage the cost, performance, and scheduling of major contracted services.

**SOURCES:** 143rd ESC after action report 14 September 2010, CSTC-A public affairs announcement 25 October 2010, and Contract Magazine article March 2012, respectively

Additional information on fiscal authorities and types of funds can be found in JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations.

**j. Phase IV-V Transition/Drawdown.** Transitioning from phase IV to phase V and/or large scale force drawdown efforts in a major operation will almost always include significant OCS-related challenges. In preparation for this transition/drawdown, the subordinate JFC should strongly consider augmenting the OCSIC to perform this function. This temporary augmentation would most likely come from selected GCC’s and subordinate JFC’s staff members along with additional LNOs from designated JFC contract support-related organizations and key USG department and agency partners. The focus of this effort is to ensure contracted support, with associated CAAF and contractor equipment, is fully considered and incorporated into the subordinate JFC’s transition/drawdown plan. The OCS drawdown plan must be closely coordinated with the J-4 and J-5 and likewise, its execution must be closely coordinated with the J-3. Additionally, the OCSIC would help to coordinate de-scoping of contract requirements and contracts as well as planning the transition of any remaining contracted support to the appropriate multinational, HN, COM, or other USG department and agency partner.

Additional phase IV-V transition information can be found in Appendix H, “Phase IV-V Transition Planning and Processes.”

**k. HD Operations and DSCA.** Planning and executing OCS actions in HD operations and DSCA missions has similarities as well as significant differences from planning and executing OCS actions in foreign contingency operations. For example, utilizing systems support contracts in a DSCA mission is similar to utilizing systems support contracts in foreign contingencies except for the fact that the contractor personnel integration challenges
may be significantly less due to a lower threat level and less stringent predeployment requirements. As described below, planning and execution of theater support and external support contracting actions in HD operations or DSCA-related missions can differ significantly from how we plan and execute this support in a foreign contingency.

(1) HD Operations. DOD is the lead federal agency for all HD operations, and therefore leads the HD response, with other USG departments and agencies in support of DOD efforts. In HD operations, Services are generally responsible for providing contracting support to their own forces in conjunction with HD missions whether inside the continental US or outside the continental US. In some United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) plans, a base support installation (BSI) may be designated to support an HD mission. Under these circumstances, the contracting activity that is responsible for supporting this BSI will be responsible for executing contracting support to DOD forces operating in the vicinity of the BSI.

See JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, for more information on HD operations and the related BSI construct.

(2) DSCA. Normally, as delegated by the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead federal agency during domestic incident responses. When required, USNORTHCOM and United States Pacific Command will coordinate DSCA within their AORs as directed by the President or SecDef. Additionally, both the US Army Corps of Engineers and DLA have DSCA emergency response missions in DS to FEMA, which are not executed under the command authority of a GCC.

(a) Generally, military-related disaster assistance comes in the form of military forces operating under a mission assignment from FEMA. The key value of military support is it deploys with significant internal logistics and other support capabilities. Contracted support to deployed joint forces in DCSA operations is generally very limited, but may increase the scope and scale in a catastrophic, multi-state event that requires much larger scale and more long-term military support. Military-related contract support is focused on providing support to DOD forces, not support to local authorities or local population. The main exceptions to this rule are the US Army Corps of Engineers and DLA, which may contract specific recovery efforts directly related to their federally approved emergency response functions executed outside of the GCC’s command authority. Key advantages to contract support in domestic operations are the well-documented industrial base and the well-developed contracting infrastructure. When performing DSCA missions, the BSI contracting activity will normally provide most tactical level contract support to military forces operating in their designated support area. Service contingency contracting teams or from individual augmentees (IAs) to the BSI contracting activities may provide additional support. The actual size of this contingency contracting team or individual augmentation support depends on the mission. There should be a designated lead contracting activity responsible for common contracting actions for DSCA missions. Key DSCA-related OCS principles and planning considerations follow:
1. FEMA is the lead federal agency responsible for coordinating contracting support to disaster relief operations with the General Services Administration serving as the primary source for FEMA contracting capability augmentation.

2. DOD does not augment other federal agencies with contracting staff, but could, in unusual circumstances, perform specific emergency response-related contracting-related tasks as directed by the President or SecDef.

3. While DOD is not the lead federal agency, the LSC’s contracting organization should continuously coordinate with other federal, state, local, and tribal contracting operations in order to avoid competing for limited local commercial resources.

4. All contract actions must be executed IAW the law (Stafford Act), which requires preference for hiring contractors from the affected area.

5. Established DOD contractor management (accountability, theater entry) policies and contract clauses do not apply to domestic operations; any mission-specific contractor management policies will have to be developed and issued on a mission-by-mission basis and coordinated directly with supporting contracting activities and as necessary with OSD DPAP for DOD-wide implementation.

6. Contract oversight requirements (e.g., CORs, receiving officials) still apply.

(b) DSCA operations are generally conducted in six phases: phase 0 (shape), phase I (anticipate), phase II (respond), phase III (operate), phase IV (stabilize), and phase V (transition). During planning, the GCC establishes conditions, objectives, or events for transitioning from one phase to another phase. Phases are designed to be conducted sequentially, but some activities from a phase may begin in a previous phase and continue into subsequent phases. A DSCA operation may be conducted in multiple phases simultaneously if the joint operations area (JOA) has widely varying conditions and OCS actions within these phases varies considerably. The following six phases, including relevant OCS considerations, are typically used to describe planning for a DSCA type of operation.

1. **Phase 0 (Shape).** Phase 0 is continuous situational awareness and preparedness. Actions in this phase include interagency coordination, planning, ID of gaps, exercises, and public affairs outreach. These activities continue through all phases. Shaping operations are inclusive of normal and routine military activities and various interagency activities to assure or solidify relationships with our key DSCA partners. This phase sets the conditions for expanded engagements in planning, conferences, training programs and exercises, and coordination and interaction. Most contracted support in this phase of DSCA operations involves routine garrison, base operations related contract support.

2. **Phase I (Anticipate).** Phase I begins with the ID of a potential DSCA mission, a no-notice event, or when directed by the President of SecDef. In this phase, the GCC’s plan for a possible contracting effort is response to an event. The GCC’s J-4 will initiate the CLPSB to confirm contracting designation. This CLPSB effort will also focus on BSI contracting capabilities assessments and support arrangements based on overall force
OCS requirements. The GCC may direct the initiation of subordinate JFC and/or Service component OCSICs, the JRRB, and the JCSB. The GCC’s OCSIC monitors the operational situation to determine the need for OCS capabilities and to plan for long lead time requirements such as base life support, base operating support, and line haul transportation in support of forward operating locations. The phase ends with assigned response forces deployed or when the determination is made that there is no event requiring DSCA response. Phase I success is achieved when deployment of defense coordinating officers, emergency planning LNO, and other selected response forces is accomplished. These forces are postured to facilitate quick response after coordination with the primary agency and coordination with state, local, and tribal officials.

3. **Phase II (Respond).** Phase II begins with the deployment of initial response capabilities. During this phase, a BSI or multiple BSIs will be designated (if not designated in phase I) and the CLPSB will convene as necessary. LSC/LSCC designation and/or direction to establish a JTSCC will be completed. The subordinate JTF OCSICs are formed as required. Service component commands and JTFs will submit request for forces (RFFs) to provide necessary forces to staff OCSICs and to augment the designated LSC/LSCC contracting activity as necessary. RFFs will also be issued for contingency contracting forces as required. The phase ends when response forces are ready to conduct operations in the JOA. Phase II success is achieved when forces are deployed with sufficient capability to support civil authorities in accomplishment of the mission. DSCA operations are based on FEMA mission assignment requests, which will be made at different times and for mission that will be completed at different times. Forces will likely deploy into and out of the JOA during the entire DSCA operation.

4. **Phase III (Operate).** Phase III begins when DSCA response operations commence. During the operate phase all OCSICs are stood up and performing their respective OCS functions. The LSC contracting activity is executing common contracting coordination through the JCSB to coordinate with the BSI contracting activities and other key contracting organizations such as DLA. In the case of a complex catastrophe, a JTSCC may be established and is performing as a single command for designated theater support contracting functions as well as conducting common contracting coordination through the JCSB with designated external support contracting organizations. The JRRB, if necessary, is stood up to ensure the validity and correct priority of contract support-related requirements. The BSI is providing general contract support IAW the BSI mission and contingency contracting elements, if required are deployed and providing responsive contracting in DS of the JTF. Phase III ends when military forces begin to complete mission assignments and no further requests for DOD assistance are anticipated from civil authorities. Phase III success is achieved when currently deployed DOD capabilities are sufficient to support civil authorities.

5. **Phase IV (Stabilize).** Phase IV begins when military and civil authorities decide that DOD support will scale down. During the stabilize phase contracting activities will continue to provide support through the methods described in phase III, but the JTF OCSIC ICW the lead contracting activity along with the other Service representatives will begin the planning effort to support transition, including contract closure. Phase IV ends when DOD support is no longer required by civil authorities, and transition criteria are
established. Phase IV success is achieved when all operational aspects of mission assignments are completed.

6. **Phase V (Transition).** Phase V begins with the redeployment of remaining DOD forces. During the transition phase contracting activities will provide support for redeployment actions until all forces have redeployed to their home stations. Contract closeout will continue to the point for all DOD contracting activities. Contingency contracting forces will redeploy and will continue with the contract closeout process from home station until complete. The lead contracting activity will remain stood up and will continue to maintain common contracting coordination authority up until it is determined by the GCC that this joint contracting coordination/command structure is no longer required and the Services will complete any remaining contracting actions without further joint contracting coordination/command guidance. This phase ends when response all forces have been relieved redeployed and operational control is transferred back to their respective commands. Phase V success is achieved when DOD forces have transitioned all operations back to civil authorities.

(3) **Operations under Title 32, USC.** There are many civil support operations that are conducted at the state level by Army and Air NG units providing military support under state active duty or Title 32, USC, authority. When NG units deploy within their states and territories, they normally receive contracting support from their home station. In these situations, they will usually have several government purchase card holders with the unit and, when required, warranted contracting officers from the United States Property and Fiscal Office, Purchasing and Contracting Division. These are generally short-term deployments such as disaster response. When the NG has contracting personnel shortages in a particular state, the National Guard Bureau’s (NGB’s) Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting will coordinate with the appropriate property and fiscal office(s) or Air NG base contracting office(s) in other states to provide short-term contracting personnel support augmentation to the state requesting assistance. In some cases, NGB-Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting may also form and dispatch a “contracting tiger team” of experienced contracting personnel that is capable of soliciting, awarding, and administering large service and military construction contracts. At all times, NG contracting offices have authority to obligate federal funds in support of active component forces. Active component forces may establish support agreements with NG contracting offices to provide contracting support during HD or DSCA operations.

See JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, for more information on DSCA operations and the related BSI construct.

1. **FHA.** FHA operations relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the US. FHA operations are generally limited notice, short-duration where US military support is intended to supplement or complement efforts of HN civil authorities or agencies with the primary responsibility for providing assistance. Similar to DSCA missions, DOD is not the lead agency for FHA missions; and the use of OCS to support forces must not impede or compete with USAID (the lead federal agency in foreign disaster relief-related actions) or HN contracts. Also similar to DSCA missions, OCS focus should be on satisfying mission requirements of the supported DOD
In order to alleviate competition for resources and to synchronize OCS, USAID, other USG departments and agencies, and NGOs should be represented in the JCSB or other contract support coordination forums when appropriate.

*See JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, and DOD Directive 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR), for more information.*

**m. Urgent Systems Development Process.** While not a direct part of OCS, ongoing contingency operations may lead to the ID of urgent operational needs (UONs) for a new or modified materiel system. UONs are appropriate for systems gaps that may lead to mission failure or unacceptable loss of life if not satisfied by a rapidly acquired capability solution. Joint urgent operational needs (JUONs) are UONs affecting two or more DOD components. JUONs are validated through a streamlined staffing process to allow rapid acquisition efforts to field a capability solution in an expedited time frame. JUONs must be endorsed by the CCDR, CCMD deputy commander, or CCMD chief of staff. The Joint Staff J-8 [Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate] is the validation authority for JUONs. The JUON process and requirements are described in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3470.01, *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.*

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**NATIONAL GUARD CONTRACTING SUPPORT**

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the US Property and Fiscal Office, Purchasing and Contracting (USPFO[P&C]) offices and Air National Guard (ANG) base contracting offices from all over the US provided contracting officers to support Louisiana, Mississippi, and other state National Guard units deployed to assist the recovery operations. The ANG Crisis Action Team at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, fielded requests for additional contracting personnel and deployed ANG contracting personnel where needed. Army National Guard units which road marched to the operational area took with them government purchase card holders and received direct contracting support from their home state USPFO(P&C) office during their road march and while deployed.

**SOURCE:** National Guard Bureau, Contracting Office, May 2006
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CHAPTER IV
CONTRACTING SUPPORT

1. In-Theater Contracting Organization

   a. While not necessary for minor single-Service operations, the GCC should normally
designate an LSC, LSCC, or JTSCC in all joint operations to ensure effective and efficient
use of local commercial vendor base and to coordinate common contracting actions with
designated contracting agencies. The GCC may also choose to establish a phase 0 LSCC (or
LSCCs) and in some cases an LSC for specific high priority countries or regions, theater
security cooperation support, or even functions (e.g., TSOC support) to assist the CCMD
level OCSIC in planning, etc. A summary of these options and how they are tasked during
operational phases is depicted in Figure IV-1.

   b. Theater support contracting organizational options are dependent on the specific
mission CUL and BOS-I and other operational factors to include estimated OCS
requirements and extant Service component contracting activity capabilities existing in or
near the operational area. Additionally, theater support contracting organizational
requirements may change as the operation progresses. In any case, the theater support
contracting organization structure should be planned and specifically addressed in annex W
by phase of operation when possible. Common factors used to determine the appropriate

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**Figure IV-1. Lead Contracting Activity Primary Tasks and Phasing Model**

- **JTSCC**
  - Commands theater support contracting; coordinates common contracting actions in the joint operations area via JCSB; assists in OCS analysis of the OE effort. Most applicable in complex, large-scale phase IV operations.

- **LSC**
  - Leads theater support contracting actions tied to lead Service common user logistics, most capable contracting service and/or base operating support-integrator assignments; coordinates common contracting actions via JCSB; assists in OCS analysis of the OE effort. Most applicable to small-scale, long-term, Service centric phase I-III operations.

- **LSCC**
  - Coordinates common contract support via JCSB (if established); assists in OCS analysis of the OE effort. Applicable to phase 0-III small-scale, short-term operations.

**Legend**
- JCSB: joint contracting support board
- JTSCC: joint theater support contracting command
- LSC: lead Service for contracting
- LSCC: lead Service for contracting coordination
- OCS: operational contract support
- OE: operational environment
contracting organizational option are discussed in detail in Appendix E, “Theater Support Contracting Organizational Options.”

c. **Lead Service Options.** There are two separate and distinct contracting-related lead Service organizational arrangements: LSCC with only contracting coordination responsibilities and LSC responsible for designated theater support contracting actions. The primary difference between the two, being the LSCC, has only coordination authority (i.e., JCSB lead function), while the LSC is also responsible for providing designated (by annex W or FRAGORD) common theater support contracting within an operational area, in addition to leading the JCSB. If the LSC is established, then the appropriate Service component contracting activity would provide specified common contracting support to the entire JOA and would have contracting authority over attached Service or CSA contracting augmentation personnel.

(1) **LSCC.** The GCC may designate a specific Service component. In this role, the LSCC’s designated theater support contracting activity is responsible for coordinating theater support contracting and other common external support contract actions for a particular geographical region, normally a country, region, or JOA. The LSCC contracting activity will also assist the subordinate joint force OCSIC (if established) in contract capabilities and business information analysis of OCS aspects of the operational environment matters. This lead Service organizational option is most appropriate for military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities/phase 0 operations as well as smaller scale, short notice, and short duration contingency operations. In this organizational option, the Services retain C2 and contracting authority over their deployed theater support contracting organizations, but a designated lead Service is responsible to coordinate common contracting actions through a JCSB or JCSB-like process as directed in annex W. This organizational option is also applicable to operations where the bulk of the individual Service component units will be operating in distinctly different areas of the JOA, thus limiting potential competition for the same vendor base. In most operations, the LSCC’s contracting activity will either be the Army or Air Force component during contingencies due to other Services’ limited theater support contracting capabilities.

(a) Advantages of the LSCC organizational option:

1. Does not require adjustments to theater support contracting C2 or HCA authorities.

2. Does not require any changes to Service component established habitual C2 or support relationships, standard contracting procedures, or financial support arrangements between contracting organizations and their supported units.

3. Does not require joint manning document (JMD) establishment and fill.

4. Services retain control in meeting their Title 10, USC, responsibilities to provide administration and support of the forces assigned or attached to CCMDs.

(b) Disadvantages of the LSCC organizational option:
1. Less efficient use of limited Service contingency contracting officer (CCO) capability.

2. Provides less direct JFC control of theater support contracting actions and priorities of support.

(2) **LSC.** The GCC may designate a specific Service component, normally the lead Service responsible for most CUL support, as the LSC responsible for GCC designated theater support contracting actions. Normally this is the Service component with the preponderance of CUL/BOS-I responsibilities and/or the most capable Service with theater support contracting capabilities. **In this organizational construct, the designated Service component contracting activity is responsible to provide theater support contracting for specified common commodities and services for a particular geographical region, normally a JOA or major expeditionary base.** The LSC option is most appropriate for smaller scale, long term duration operations when a single Service has a preponderance of forces. Similar to the LSCC construct, the designated Service component contracting activity is responsible to coordinate common contracting actions with designated external support contract agencies through a JCSB or JCSB-like process.

(a) Advantages of the LSC organizational option:

1. Decreases the likelihood of competition for limited local vendor base and affords greater opportunity to reduce or eliminate redundant contracts or to promote cost avoidance through leveraged buys and economies of scale.

2. Provides more efficient theater support contracting by leveraging lead Service contracting capabilities to support all Service component forces.

3. Does not require JMD establishment and fill.

(b) Disadvantages of the LSC organizational option:

1. Will change some Service component habitual C2 or support relationships, standard contracting procedures, and/or financial support arrangements between contracting organizations and their supported units.

2. Still provides less direct JFC control of theater support contracting actions and priorities of support than JTSCC option.

*Appendix E, “Theater Support Contracting Organizational Options,” provides more details on the LSC organizational construct.*

d. **JTSCC.** The JTSCC is a functionally focused JTF with C2, normally tactical control, and contracting authority over contracting personnel assigned and/or organizations attached within a designated operational area, normally a JOA. The JTSCC’s contracting authority is delegated by the SPE of the Service component designated by the GCC to form the nucleus to the JTSCC. Because contracting authority is not resident in CCMD Service components, but instead provided by their parent Military Departments, contracting authority
arrangements must be worked out as part of the planning process and as far in advance as practicable. When the Service SPEs cannot come to agreement on JTSCC contracting authority arrangements, the issue will have to be elevated to OSD for resolution. The JTSCC normally reports directly to a subordinate joint force command and is responsible to execute all theater support contracting actions as well as coordinate common contracting matters with designated contracting organizations executing or delivering contracted support within the JOA. The JTSCC would also be the responsible CCAS. The JTSCC organization option is most applicable to larger, long duration, or more complex phase IV and V operations where the subordinate JFC requires more direct control of common contracting actions than what can typically be provided through either of the lead Service support contracting organizational options.

(1) Advantages of the JTSCC organizational option:

(a) Decreases the likelihood of competition for limited local vendor base and affords greater opportunity to reduce or eliminate redundant contracts or to promote cost avoidance through leveraged buys and economies of scale.

(b) Allows for efficient use of the limited contracting professional staff across the operational area.

(c) Increases the JFC’s ability to enforce a baseline for standards for support.

(d) Allows the JFC to have better control and visibility of the overall theater support contracting and CCAS effort.

(e) Increases the JFC’s ability to link contract support to the civil-military aspects of the OPLAN.

(2) Disadvantages of the JTSCC organizational option:

(a) Requires implementing new organizations, C2 relationships, and contracting procedures.

(b) May require extensive reachback contracting support, complicating coordination efforts, and extending procurement lead times.

(c) May require more lead time to get JMD approval and fill.

(d) Requires a Service to issue HCA designation orders.

(e) May require additional authorities from USD(AT&L) to achieve control over all contracting efforts supporting the operational area.

(f) Requires continuing interface and support from OSD to implement policies that affect DOD contracting activities’ execution or delivery of support in the operational area.
(g) Generally requires an increase in the number of HQ staff personnel to include logistics and administrative support.

(h) Transition of existing contracts will be complicated and could cause confusion with the vendors/contractors, closeout issues, as well as the compilation of historical data/lessons learned.

(i) Additional challenges for the Services to execute their Title 10, USC, responsibilities to provide administration and support of the forces assigned or attached to CCMDs.

Appendix E, “Theater Support Contracting Organizational Options,” provides detailed discussion on the JTSCC organizational construct.

NOTE

There has been some confusion regarding the “T” in the JTSCC abbreviation. The operative term in the JTSCC title is not “theater,” but “theater support contracting.” The JTSCC name comes from the fact the JTSCC commander only commands Service theater support contracting organizations. It is not derived from an operational area (i.e., joint operations area, area of responsibility, theater of war, theater of operations) construct.

2. In-Theater Contracting Planning and Coordination

a. Contracting Planning. Contracting planning is related to and driven by, but not the same as OCS planning. Contracting planning is a contracting organizational function executed to some extent by all contracting agencies, not just an LSCC, LSC contracting activities, or JTSCC, which develops and awards contracts in support of GCC-directed operations. Contracting planning, referred to as acquisition planning in the FAR, is executed on a requirement basis and has a particular meaning and application as prescribed in the FAR, DFARS, and contracting authority guidance. As derived from annex W and other operational guidance as well as FAR, DFARS, Service supplements, and other policy guidance (e.g., DOD directives outlining DLA’s commodity acquisition responsibilities, US Army Intelligence Command’s linguist contract responsibilities), contracting planning in the context of OCS means supporting contracting commands are responsible to plan to ensure contracts provide the required supply, service, and construction in the most effective, economical, and timely manner allowed by regulation and HCA guidance. From a JFC perspective, there are two primary contracting planning concerns: theater support contracting AI development and execution, and common contracting planning related to transitions between external support and theater support contracting actions. Contracting planning also includes planning to ensure contracts are closed out in a timely manner considering personnel turnover and pre-award, contract administration, and other contracting workload. A plan for reachback support of contract closeouts should be included, if required.
(1) Service and Joint AIs. Unless there is a designated JTSCC, individual Service component contracting activities are responsible to follow their own contingency contracting guidance and when necessary, develop mission specific guidance (i.e., AIs). Regardless of the theater support contracting organizational option, Service components will ensure their supporting contracting activities comply with the JFC’s contract coordination guidance. In operations where there is a JTSCC, a joint AI will be developed to ensure standardization of procurement actions to be executed or delivered in the JOA. In addition to providing guidance on the operation of the contracting activity, these AIs capture theater guidance (JFC policies, orders, etc.) that apply to contractors and their personnel in required local provisions and clauses. Given such guidance can change frequently, maintaining an AI and ensuring that provisions and clauses are updated and disseminated in a timely manner to DOD contracting officers is a complicated and labor intensive process. In addition, such contract language will need to be coordinated with the Service that provided the HCA authority as well as OSD DPAP. Theater support contracting AIs are valuable tools to direct individual contracting actions that are consistent with GCC, subordinate JFC, and any theater-specific TBC guidance that applies to systems support and external support contracts. For example, TBC directives may direct external support and systems support contracting organizations to incorporate specific AI provisions and/or clauses in their contracts for delivery or with an area of performance in the operational area.

(2) Transitioning from External Support to Theater Support Contracts. Another major contracting planning challenge is transitioning from external support to theater support contracting authorities. Based on JRRB guidance, the JCSB members should work specific contract transition actions, such as moving the requirements off a cost type CAP task order, to fixed price individual theater support contracts or other types of contracts as appropriate. Review of CAP task orders should be done on a continual basis, especially in missions that transition from a phase III to phase IV focus. In this process, the LSC, LSCC, or JTSCC must work closely with the subordinate JFC (normally through the JRRB), and requiring activity to assess what is the best COA from an operational, versus purely contracting aspect regarding transitioning from external support versus theater support contracts. Some factors to consider are the scope and duration of the type of operation, including “nation first” contracting effects on local economics. Other operational considerations should include quality and benefits to the solution; quality of performance metrics and measurement approach; risks (e.g., FP/security) associated with solution; management approach and controls (contract oversight requirements such as CORs); management team (requirement for ACOs, quality assurance representatives [QARs]); past performance and past experience (e.g., risk of contractor failure to perform).

(3) Contract Closeout. Contract closeout ensures accountability for physical completion of the contract and recoupment of any excess funds remaining on the contract. In joint operations, the LSC or LSCC-designated contracting activity or JTSCC SCO is responsible to ensure there is a plan to properly meet contract closeout requirements. This plan can include additional deployed CCOs or, more preferably contracting reachback arrangements. Any lack of contract closeout support or other major unresolved contract closeout issues should be elevated by the SCO to the appropriate HCA official and to the JFC.
b. In-Theater Contracting Coordination. The JCSB is the primary JFC mechanism to coordinate and deconflict contracting actions within a designated operational area, normally a JOA. The JCSB is the forum for theater support, Service CAP, and other designated in-theater external contracting organizations to share information, coordinate acquisition strategies, and to minimize chances of competition and redundancies between individual contracts and/or task orders and look for opportunities to optimize filling of like requirements through common contracts. It is in this process, the LSC’s/LSCC’s contracting activity or JTSCC develops a contracting COP which is then in turn shared with the subordinate joint force command OCSIC. In order to improve the overall economy and efficiency of contracting actions being delivered or executed in the JOA, the GCC or subordinate JFC should direct the formation of a JCSB in any operation where there will be significant possibility of redundancy and competition between different Service’s or CSA contract actions and coordination would serve to improve the overall economy and efficiency of these contracting actions being delivered or executed in the JOA. The JCSB is supported and convened by LSCC, LSC, or JTSCC, as appropriate, and meets as necessary to accomplish its JFC directed mission. JCSB membership must include appropriate Service CAP and CSA representatives as well as a J-3/J-4 advisor.


c. Contingency Contracting Administration Services

(1) General. CCAS is a process recognized by the DFARS to centrally administer selected contingency contracts through formal CAD procedures and involves a mixture of acquisition corps specialties to include ACOs, contract administrators, QARs, and property administrators, along with Service component provided CORs, and some cases, technical inspectors. CCAS procedures are normally only applicable to large scale, large dollar, mission critical external support (primarily CAP task orders) and theater support contracts. In the absence of GCC-requested, USD(AT&L) directed joint CCAS guidance or when contracts fall below or outside of these pre-established GCC criteria, Service component contracting and CAP organizations are responsible for providing their own CCAS capability, as appropriate. The actual scope of CCAS measures and supporting organizational structure will vary depending on operational requirements. Doctrinally, joint directed CCAS is a JTSCC function that will be overseen by the SCO-CCAS.

(2) Planning Considerations. Generally, USD(AT&L) directed CCAS is only applicable to complex, long-term stability operations where a JTSCC is established and when a TBC process is in place. USD(AT&L)-directed CCAS is manpower intensive and should only be contemplated where the potential results are significantly greater than the anticipated implementation cost. The GCC must determine the scope and scale of the expected JTSCC controlled CCAS requirement and include this requirement in the appropriate annex W.

d. TBC/CAD
(1) **General.** TBC/CAD is a formal acquisition related process designed to allow the JFC and supporting JTSCC, in some cases an LSC contracting activity, to more effectively synchronize and integrate contracted support in joint operations. TBC combines the GCC’s directive authority over logistics and OSD acquisition authority into a formal contract solicitation and contract review process to ensure proper compliance with GCC guidance and to enhance visibility of supporting contracts before they are executed in the operational area. CAD allows the CCDR to exercise control over the assignment of contract administration for that portion of contracted effort that relates to performance in, or delivery to, designated operational area(s). It also allows the CCDR to exercise oversight to ensure the contractor’s compliance with directed policies. TBC/CAD, when fully and properly implemented, provides:

(a) Visibility of all DOD contracts (less those specifically exempted) with an area of performance or delivery in a designated operational area.

(b) Certainty that all DOD solicitations and contracts with an area of performance or delivery in a designated operational area contain appropriate provisions and clauses.

(c) The supporting JFC more control over contract oversight in designated operational area(s).

(d) The designated theater support contracting organization a much more robust capability to perform JCSB functions.

(e) The JFC with the ability to better coordinate and control CAAF theater entrance/exit and GFS requirements.

(f) Both visibility over and assurance that appropriate contract management and oversight has been arranged for contracts with an area of performance in the JOA.

(g) The ability for JTSCC or LSC to centrally manage the contract administration of key external support contracts (e.g., LOGCAP).

(2) **Planning Considerations.** While TBC/CAD is best suited for long-term, large scale operations, it can be applied during any phase of an operation and may change over time. TBC measures could range from simple passive visibility of contract actions with no operational specific requirements to active and detailed level of review and pre-approval of solicitations and contracts that incorporate numerous mandatory local provisions and clauses. TBC entrance and exit criteria and applicability as well as CAD delegation parameters should be determined as part of the planning process. TBC applicability could range from all contracts in the JOA to selected contracts based on predetermined criteria. Criteria for assuming delegation of an external support contract could include risk level, type (cost), high dollar, theater wide performance or other considerations. Implementing robust TBC/CAD processes requires dedication of full-time staff to process and adjudicate TBC/CAD requests. **TBC and CAD processes should only be implemented when the benefits to the Commander exceed the costs.** The cost to implement and sustain these processes can be considerable. The GCC must determine upfront the appropriate depth and breadth of
measures required. The GCC must coordinate upfront with USD(AT&L) to provide the necessary authority to the CCMD to initiate TBC/CAD processes and notify DOD components of the specific requirements. Additionally, proposed mission specific contract language requirements (provisions and clauses) must be cleared with the DOD component providing the contracting authority to the JTSWC or LSC as well as USD(AT&L) DPAP. Normally such guidance would be derived from the lead contracting activity’s AI. CCMD TBC/CAD procedures, including any required provisions and clauses, must be posted to their OCS webpage.

(3) **Implementation.** CAD guidance is normally issued in tandem with TBC guidance. When a JTSWC has been stood up, its SCO-CCAS should review proposed CAD arrangements as part of the approval process and make a determination as to whether it should assume responsibility for contract administration in theater or whether the PCO should retain it. In some cases, reachback support may be required. Similar actions should be taken by the LSC SCO when applicable.

e. **Reachback Contracting.** Reachback contracting is a viable, if somewhat challenging, method to augment deployed theater support contracting capabilities. In general, reachback is most appropriate for large scale, long-term operations with significant levels of contracted support. Types of functions particularly suited for reachback support include:

(1) Complex, large scale contract actions.

(2) TBC-related contract/solicitation reviews.

(3) Contract closeout support.

f. Recent operational experience demonstrates reachback contracting arrangements are best handled by a separate SCO-reachback who operates under the LSC, LSCC, or JTSCC control and HCA authority. Additional operational insights and reachback contracting challenges include, but are not limited to:

(1) Need to coordinate all reachback contracting arrangements with the HCA and USD(AT&L) to ensure proper contingency procurement authorizations are in place (e.g., use of contingency procurement thresholds by a contracting activity located in the US supporting the JOA requires legislative action).

(2) Ensure reachback contracting personnel understand the priorities and operational environment.

(3) Receive proper documentation.

(4) Contractor payment arrangements.
CHAPTER V
CONTRACTOR MANAGEMENT

“Contractors are part of the total military forces.”

General Martin Dempsey, United States Army Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff Operational Contract Support
Leaders Conference, 6 March 2012

1. Overview

a. General. Contractor management involves the control, support, and integration of contractor personnel and their associated equipment deploying and operating in the operational area. While most aspects of contractor management are only relevant to CAAF, some aspects (e.g., base access and security procedures) also can apply to non-CAAF. Furthermore, contractor management often extends to other USG departments and agencies and other mission partner contractor personnel operating in the vicinity of the joint force. The contractor management process is composed of five steps and several associated tasks. The contractor management steps include planning, predeployment preparation, deployment and reception, in-theater management; and redeployment; all of which are discussed in detail in this chapter. Additionally, equipment management, contractor FP/security, use of private security companies, and other USG department and agency contractor management considerations are also addressed.

b. Major Contractor Management Challenges. Contractor personnel will make up a part of almost any deployed joint force. In some operations, contractor personnel can even make up the majority of the deployed force. In any case, contractors and their equipment impose unique challenges to the JFC and therefore must be treated as a formal part of the deployed force rather than an afterthought when contractor management issues arise.

CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL NUMBERS IN RECENT OPERATIONS

In late 2008, US Central Command officially reported a total of 163,000 United States citizen, third country national, and local national contractor personnel in support of US Forces in Iraq. While the local national numbers were based on estimates, the number is still very significant considering the deployed military force numbered about 160,000.

SOURCE: US Central Command Quarterly Contractor Census 4th Quarter 2008

(1) Differences Between Contracted and Military/DOD Civilian Personnel. As discussed briefly in Chapter I, “Introduction,” management and control of contractor personnel is significantly different than C2 of military members and DOD civilians. Unlike military members and DOD civilians, contractor personnel are managed and controlled through contract management and governmental oversight staff IAW the terms and conditions of their contract. Because of this administrative law based process,
commanders do not generally have legal authority to direct contractor personnel to perform tasks outside of their contract; however, in emergency situations (e.g., enemy or terrorist actions or natural disaster), the ranking area or base commander may direct CAAF and non-CAAF working in a military controlled area to take FP or emergency response actions not specifically authorized in their contract as long as those actions do not require them to assume inherently governmental responsibilities or incur any additional cost to the contractor. While the management and control aspect is unique to this category of the “total force,” there are numerous additional risks and challenges the JFC must deal with when utilizing contractor personnel vice military personnel to provide support in the operational area (see Figure V-1).

(2) *Coordinating Contractor Management Planning and Execution Tasks Across Staff Lines.* All primary and special staff members have significant roles to play in contractor management planning and execution. And while the OCSIC can and should assist in the coordination of these matters across the JFC staff, each staff member must take on specific tasks within their area of concern. For example, establishing PSC rules for the use of force (RUF) is a J-3 function. Figure V-2 graphically depicts major contractor management planning and execution-related tasks by primary and special staff positions.

(3) *Providing Military Oversight.* Contractor management is a shared responsibility between commanders, requiring activities, contracting personnel, and contractor company management personnel. Well planned and deliberate military oversight of contractor personnel in support of military operations is imperative to ensure contractor

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**Contractor Management Risks and Challenges**

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<th>Risks</th>
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<tr>
<td>Risk to being able to properly identify and provide adequate government furnished support to contractors accompanying the force</td>
<td>General lack of command and staff knowledge on how to plan and integrate contract personnel and equipment into military operations</td>
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<td>Risk to mission accomplishment from contractor nonperformance</td>
<td>Limited and complex legal authority over contractor personnel</td>
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<td>Increased security risk to the force when utilizing third country national and local national contractors</td>
<td>Administrative burden on supported units in providing government oversight of contract personnel and associated government owned, contractor operated equipment</td>
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<td>Increased force protection/security burden on supported units</td>
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<td>Establishing and maintaining accountability of contractor personnel</td>
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<td>Myriad different contracting organizations with service contracts with areas of performance within the operational area</td>
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<td>Use of multiple tiers of subcontractors</td>
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<td>Government furnished support planning and coordination</td>
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*Figure V-1. Contractor Management Risks and Challenges*
performance, to include contractor personnel management-related functions (e.g., predeployment training, personnel accountability, and equipment reporting) are executed. Additionally, while specific contractor management policy and doctrine have been promulgated over the past several years, contractor management procedures are still not well understood by some commanders and staff officers. Both the GCC’s, and when formed, the subordinate JFC’s OCSIC can assist the other primary and special staff officers in this area of concern, but contractor management remains a responsibility of each staff member for matters related to their functional responsibilities.

(a) Key to success in the contractor management challenge is for the GCC and subordinate JFCs to establish clear, enforceable, and well understood theater entrance, accountability, FP, and general contractor personnel management policies and procedures early in the planning stages for a military operation. The supported GCC and subordinate JFCs must work closely with the Service components and CSAs to ensure that proper contract and contractor management oversight is in place, preferably well before joint operations commence. TBC can be utilized to assist the GCC in contract management policy enforcement.

(b) It is important to understand that the terms and conditions of the contract establish the relationship between the military and the contractor; this relationship does not
directly extend through the contractor supervisor to the contractor’s employees. **Only the contractor’s management personnel can directly supervise contractor employees.** The military chain of command exercises management control through the contract management team. This team normally consists of the contracting officer, COR, and the on-site contract company manager. In some situations, such as with LOGCAP support, this management team may also include ACOs and special contract management organizations such as the Army’s LOGCAP support officers. In general, it is not appropriate to use contractor employees to perform contractor oversight functions, although provisions can be made to use contracted technical inspectors as long as these technical inspector contracts have nondisclosure and non-compete agreements and their work is ultimately overseen by a government employee (contracting officer, QAR, or COR). One of the key challenges for the supported GCC and subordinate JFC is that, for many contracts, the contracting officer may not even be located within the operational area. A similar situation is also true for some contractor supervisors and managers. Many small contract companies may not have actual “on-site” supervisors and instead may only have a limited number of managers deployed to the operational area. **This operational reality is why the CORs are such an important part of the contract management team and the reason the JFC and supporting Service components must ensure appropriate command administration and oversight personnel are in place when using contracts as a major source of support to the deployed force.**

(c) IAW DOD policy, specific contractor management policies and procedures apply equally to prime and subcontractor personnel at all tiers. However, due to privity of contract, the USG has direct contractual relationship only with the prime contractor. In all situations, the prime contractor has the responsibility to ensure contractor management policies and procedures are disseminated to and followed by subcontractors. **Hence multiple tiers of subcontractors performing services in the operational area can significantly add to the JFC challenge in enforcing contractor management policies.**

(4) **Avoiding Unscrupulous Labor Practices.** Per DOD CTIP policy, the GCC is required to establish mission specific CTIP policies and procedures. To ensure appropriate awareness of supporting contracting support organizations and contract companies, these policies and procedures should be posted to the CCMD’s OCS webpage. All supporting contracting organizations are responsible to include the FAR CTIP clause and incorporate any related CCMD CTIP guidance in their contracts. The supported CCMD, subordinate JTF, and Service component commands must take great care to avoid contractor management-related actions that may be construed as trafficking in persons. **Specific concerns in this area include, but are not limited to illegal confiscation of passports, providing substandard housing, forcing sex acts, and use of unlicensed labor brokers (normally through subcontractors) to avoid deployment preparation requirements.** These practices are clearly against international law, US law, Presidential directives, DOD policies, and military alliance policies and will not be tolerated. Commanders should ensure all deployed personnel receive training on CTIP and promptly report any alleged incidences of CTIP to law enforcement to include CTIP involving CAAF, LNs, and TCNs. Commanders should also ensure that routine health and safety inspections are conducted on CAAF working areas and living spaces and ensure that any violations are promptly addressed with the contractor via the COR and contracting officer.
Refer to Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, Title XVII, Sections 1701-1707; National Security Presidential Directive-22, Trafficking in Persons; DODI 2200.01, Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP); FAR clause 52.222-50, Combating Trafficking in Persons, including Alternate 1; DFARS Clause 252.222-1703/PGI 222.1703, Combating Trafficking in Persons; and DFARS Clause 252.225-7040 Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany US Armed Forces Deployed Outside the United States, for more information on this subject.

COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

The Department of Defense (DOD) has made significant progress in implementing combating of trafficking in persons (CTIP) policy and training across DOD. DOD has also developed CTIP related contract clauses and implemented same in the vast majority of applicable contracts. DOD has been less successful, however, in implementing contractor personnel-related CTIP actions at the tactical command and contractor employee levels. Additional work is necessary on developing and implementing contractor related CTIP policies, procedures, and localized training supplements command inspection–programs, along with better CTIP familiarization for non-US citizen contractors personnel.


2. Contractor Management Planning Considerations

a. General. The global nature of the systems and external support contractor base dictates that contractors may deploy CAAF employees and their equipment from anywhere in the world. Even US-based contractors may have personnel originating from foreign locations and/or TCN employees. Proper deployment and in-theater management of CAAF personnel and equipment requires early planning, establishment of clear and concise theater-entrance requirements, and incorporation of standard deployment-related clauses in appropriate contracts.

b. Contractor Management Planning Process Overview. The contractor management plan (CMP) is a major subset of OCS planning discussed in detail in Chapter III, “Contract Support Integration,” of this publication. While the body of annex W is focused on how the JFC will acquire and integrate contracted support in general, contractor management planning is focused on contractor personnel and equipment tasks to include government obligations under the terms and conditions of the contract to provide support (e.g., deployment, base camp services, FP) to contractor personnel. The CMP part of the OCS planning effort should be focused on risk assessments and mitigation actions regarding the impact of contractors in support of military operations. The CMP can also shape the determination of in-theater staff required to oversee and enforce contractor management activities. Related GCC tasks include developing policies and procedures required to ensure proper integration of contractor personnel into the military operations. The CMP development effort requires active involvement of all primary and special staff officers (Figure V-2). To address this challenging situation, the JFC should consider directing the OCSIC establish a contractor management focused working group to address and
Chapter V

synchronize the challenges across all primary and special staff lines. Contractor management planning also occurs in conjunction with other USG departments and agencies (including the appropriate COMs). This planning coordination is necessary to facilitate proper coordination of partner contractor management requirements that may impact on-going or future joint operations.

c. CMP Content, Applicability, and Promulgation. A CCMD level CMP provides AOR or operational area specific contractor personnel and equipment-related guidance to ensure CAAF supporting an operation are qualified to deploy, processed for deployment and redeployment, received in theater, and visible and managed in theater, per GCC guidance and as required under the terms and conditions of the contract. These requirements include, but are not limited to, restrictions imposed by applicable international and HNS agreements; contractor-related deployment, theater reception, accountability, and strength reporting; operations security plans and restrictions; FP; PR; contractor personnel services support; medical support; equipment requirements, and redeployment requirements. The CMP applies to all US citizen and TCN CAAF deploying into the operational area. Parts of the CMP may also be applicable to any LN CAAF as well as some non-CAAF whose area of performance is on a military base or within the vicinity of US forces. For each operation, the GCC and/or subordinate commander should publish a separate CMP appendix to annex W or ensure this CMP guidance is published elsewhere in the OPORD. The GCC should also publish specific CAAF related theater entrance requirements and other CMP guidance as necessary at the CCMD’s OCS website found at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/areas_of_responsibility.html. If/when TBC is in place, the OCSIC should work with the LSC or JTSCC to ensure proper CAAF-related provisions and clauses are included in appropriate solicitations and contracts covered by the operational specific TBC policy.

CJCSM 3122.02C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume III (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution), DFARS Sub-Part 225.74, Defense Contractors Outside the United States, and DFARS PGI 225.7401, Contracts Requiring Performance or Delivery in a Foreign Country, provide additional information on the contractor management planning and procedures.

3. Predeployment Preparation

a. Predeployment preparation includes actions taken by the government and contract companies to ensure CAAF meet GCC directed requirements before entering the operational area. This preparation requirement can include designated mission essential contractor personnel in certain domestic emergencies (e.g., a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear event) where CAAF status does not apply. This process involves coordination among requiring activities, CCDR staff, contracting officers, designated BOS-I, or other organizations providing common support to the force, and company administrators to ensure CAAF meet all predeployment requirements. Eligibility, as defined in the Foreign Clearance Guide and other GCC-specific theater entrance guidance processes, may require country and theater clearances, waiver authorities, immunizations, required training and/or issuance of required organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE). Predeployment actions
also include issuance of ID cards and Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT)-generated letters of authorization (LOAs).

b. Determining Contractor Status. The contracting officer, working with the requiring activity, is responsible to determine contractor employee CAAF/non-CAAF status in all operations outside the US and its territories, as early as possible in the contracting process. For many employees, determining their status is relatively simple; for others, it is not. The key to success is for the contracting officer to be familiar with and follow DOD contractor management policy including applicable DFARS guidance and specific theater requirements. This determination should be made in close coordination with the supporting legal office.

**UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA INVITED CONTRACTOR AND TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM**

United States Forces Korea (USFK) Regulation 700-19, The Invited Contractor and Technical Representatives Program, establishes policies and procedures for the designation of corporations and individuals as invited contractors (ICs) and technical representatives (TRs) who work in support of the US Armed Forces or other armed forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK) in times of armistice, contingency, or war. The current US-ROK status-of-forces agreement defines an IC as a person(s), including (a) corporations organized under the laws of the United States, (b) their employees who are ordinarily resident in the US, and (c) the dependents of the foregoing, present in the ROK solely for the purpose of executing contracts with the US for the benefit of the US Armed Forces. Per USFK policy, only IC and TR designated contractor personnel can qualify for USFK logistics support.

**Various Sources**

(1) The key factors that determine the specific status of a contractor employee are: area of performance (normal proximity to US forces), citizenship, place of hire, normal place of residence, and place of residence in the operational area. For example, all US citizens employed under a systems support contract or subcontract that require the service to be performed in support of deployed equipment, will, consistent with DOD policy, be automatically afforded (except in domestic contingencies) CAAF status. Contractor employees in support of domestic contingencies are not CAAF, however some of these contractor personnel may deploy and live with military forces for short periods of time. In these situations, the local commander may deem it necessary to provide limited base operating support for these individuals. Likewise, all TCN contractor and subcontractor employees who do not normally reside in the operational area, whose area of performance is in the direct vicinity of US forces, and who routinely are co-located with US forces, should be afforded CAAF status. In some cases, mission essential LN contractor employees who are required to work and live on a military facility or in the direct vicinity of US forces may be afforded CAAF status through LOA. A good example of a LN CAAF would be an interpreter who has a habitual relationship with a supported unit. It is imperative that the contracting officer and requiring activities be aware of the appropriate DOD policy and GCC
Chapter V

contractor management guidance when determining the contingency contractor personnel status of TCN and LN employees.

(2) CAAF status will be formally codified by the issuance of a SPOT-generated LOA that reflects the appropriate level of GFS such as security; base camp services; post/base exchange access; morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR); and medical care. The GCC, the subordinate JFC, Service component commanders, and CSAs must be prepared to address issues that arise related to contractor employee status and/or in-theater support.

c. Establishing and Promulgating Theater Entrance Requirements. The supported CCDR, ICW the appropriate subordinate JFC and Service component commanders, determines and publicizes operational specific theater entrance requirements for all CAAF hired outside the operational area through the CMP development process. In cases where there are LN CAAF, these personnel will receive appropriate training and equipment, as required by GCC policy at the place of hire. Theater entrance requirements include, but are not limited to, operational specific administrative preparation, medical preparation, as well as general training, and equipping guidance. For services contracts for support in foreign contingencies, the contracting officer will use standard DFARS deployment clauses to ensure that the contractors understand and are prepared to execute their contract in a contingency environment. While generic in nature, these clauses ensure that contractors understand and comply with basic deployment preparation and in-theater management requirements found at the GCC’s OCS website linked to the DPAP Contingency Contracting Page at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pace/cc/areas_of_responsibility.html.

Overarching DOD policy on theater entrance requirements can be found in DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS). This policy document also provides a comprehensive list of other related DOD, CJCS, and Service policy documents. Additionally, operational specific contractor management requirements are found in DFARS Sub-Part 225.74, Defense Contractors Outside the United States.

d. Overview of Specific Theater Entrance Requirements. The following is a synopsis of the key administrative and other theater entrance requirements that can and will affect the joint force and Service components. The supported CCMD and subordinate staffs should work closely with the Service component staffs, special operations units, and other organizations as required to ensure that they understand, promulgate, and enforce these theater entrance requirements:

(1) ID Cards. All eligible CAAF must be issued an ID card with their Geneva Conventions Accompanying the Force designation. CAAF are required to present their SPOT-generated LOA as proof of eligibility at the time of ID card issuance. Military Departments are responsible to ensure that eligible CAAF receive an ID card prior to beginning deployment to the operational area. Expiration dates on the ID card should correspond to the end date of the contract period of performance, or the end of their deployment. Normally, only replacement cards will be issued in the operational area.

For additional guidance, see JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support. See DODI 1000.13, Identification Cards for Members of the Uniformed Services, Their Dependents, and Other
Eligible Individuals, *DODI 8520.02*, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Public Key (PK) Enabling, and the appropriate Service regulations for more information on issuance of personal ID cards to contractor personnel.

(2) **Letters of Authorization.** A SPOT-generated LOA is required for CAAF to process through a deployment center; and to travel to, from, and within the operational area. LOAs contain specific dates to cover the deployment and are issued to contractor personnel prior to arrival in the operational area. Additionally, the LOAs identify authorizations and GFS that CAAF (to include LN's designated as CAAF) are entitled to under the contract. The contracting officer, ICW the requiring activity, shall validate requirements for and availability of, GFS at the deployment center and within the operational area prior to preparing the final solicitation package and prior to preparing the LOA. Any change in the contract dates or entitlements will result in revocation and reissuance of a new LOA to the contractor. CAAF are required by policy to maintain a copy of their LOA and have it in their possession at all times.

*DOD policy on LOA requirements can be found in DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS).*

(3) **Medical Preparation.** Under the terms and conditions of their contracts, contract companies are responsible for providing employees who are medically and psychologically fit to perform duties as specified in their contracts. Just as military personnel must pass a complete health evaluation, all CAAF must undergo a medical and dental assessment within 12 months prior to arrival at the designated deployment center. The medical preparation of CAAF per theater or location reporting instructions includes deployment health briefings, medical surveillance screening, medical and dental evaluations, DNA [deoxyribonucleic acid] specimen collection, determining prescription and eyewear needs, and immunizations. Specific medical-related theater entrance requirements, such as human immunodeficiency virus screening requirements, are established by the supported CCMD's joint force surgeon in consultation with the subordinate joint force surgeons. This medical-related theater guidance normally covers specific immunization requirements and restrictions applicable to certain TCN or LN personnel for specific mission functions (e.g., food service workers). Dental conditions that may preclude medical clearance include lack of a dental exam within the last 12 months or required dental treatment or re-evaluation for oral conditions, which are likely to result in dental emergencies. Service components and their associated contract management organizations are responsible to validate CAAF meet predeployment medical processing and screening requirements. The GCC shall develop procedures and criteria that require removal of contractor personnel identified as no longer medically qualified and post them on the CCDR OCS website and published in the reporting instructions. Per DOD policy, contracting officers are responsible to incorporate these requirements into all contracts for performance in the AOR via standard contract clauses or mission specific contract language as applicable.

*Additional medical screening and evaluation guidance can be found in DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS); DODD 6490.02E, Comprehensive Health Surveillance; DODI 6490.03, Deployment Health; DODI 6205.4, Immunization of Other Than US Forces (OTUSF) for Biological Warfare Defense; and JP 4-02, Health Services.*
(4) **Protective Clothing and Uniforms.** Normally, contractors are responsible to ensure their employees are outfitted with appropriate occupational specific protective clothing and equipment necessary to safely carry out their contract requirements. Service components are responsible to ensure CAAF have adequate military OCIE as specified in the contract (e.g., helmet, body armor, protective mask equipment) IAW the supported GCC’s directives and Service policies. Normally, contractor personnel will not be issued or wear regulation US Service uniforms and/or other military uniform items that may cause them to be mistaken for a combatant; however, the GCC or designated subordinate can authorize certain contractor personnel to wear standard US Service uniforms (less military patches and other accoutrements) on an operational needs basis. Contractor personnel authorized to wear military uniforms are required by policy to carry written authorization for the wearing of said uniforms on them at all times. When commanders authorize issue of standard uniform items to contractor personnel, care must be taken (consistent with FP measures) to ensure that contractor personnel are distinguishable from military personnel through the use of distinctive patches, arm bands, nametags, or headgear.

(5) **Special Training Requirements for Contractor Personnel.** The Services, DOD agencies, USTRANSCOM, and USSOCOM are responsible for ensuring that current DOD required standard training and any operational specific JFC and Service mandated training is accomplished prior to deployment of CAAF into the operational area. Key contractor personnel training requirements include, but are not limited to:

(a) Legal status familiarization to ensure all CAAF understand their legal status IAW international law to include prohibition and prevention of trafficking in persons information.

(b) Familiarization training for all CAAF on US laws, local laws, and SOFAs that contractor personnel may be subject to.

(c) GFS familiarization for CAAF on what contract authorized support (postal, MWR, medical, etc.) is available to them at their place of performance.

(d) Law of war training commensurate with their duties and responsibilities. Specific training should include, but is not limited to, Geneva Conventions enemy prisoner of war training.

(e) Special training for contractor personnel who may come in contact with enemy prisoners of war or other detainees.

(f) RUF training for contractor personnel authorized to carry weapons.

(g) PR training to inform CAAF of the processes and actions required should they become isolated. This training may include individual survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training as determined by the risk assessment and supported CCMD, the subordinate joint force command, and the Service component commands.
(h) Medical awareness training related to local health risks, medical-related policies, and procedures (required for all CAAF, optional for non-CAAF working on a US installation).

(i) Theater specific requirements to include specific FP and security, hazard awareness to include local commander’s authority, wear and use of military protective gear (if issued), compliance with theater deployment and redeployment accountability standards and requirements, and related information, such as customs and religious awareness training, as determined by the supported GCC, subordinate JFC, or Service component commander (required for all CAAF as directed by subordinate JFCs and Service component commanders; may include in-theater briefings to non-CAAF whose area of performance is on a US base or in the immediate vicinity of US forces).

Along with DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS), other key reference documents for contractor training include FAR Part 22.17, Combating Trafficking in Persons; DFARS Clause 252.222-1703/PGI 222.1703, Combating Trafficking in Persons; DODD 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense; DODD 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program; DODI 1300.23, Isolated Personnel Training for DOD Civilian and Contractors; DODI 6490.03, Deployment Health; DODD 6200.04, Force Health Protection (FHP); JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support; and JP 4-02, Health Services.

e. Contractor Personnel Certification. Service component commanders, heads of DOD agencies, and field activities are responsible for ensuring CAAF being deployed into an operational area are properly certified and fully integrated into the supported GCC and subordinate JTF deployment planning process and reported in SPOT. Per DOD policy, there are three different CAAF certification and deployment methodologies approved for use:

(1) Process with the Supported Unit. This is the preferred method of deployment for CAAF who have a habitual relationship with a specific supported unit such as system support contract-related personnel. This group deployment process involves certification and deployment of CAAF in a coordinated fashion between the supported unit, contracting officer, and the contractor.

(2) Process Non-Unit Related Personnel. Non-unit related personnel (NURP) include CAAF who deploy as individuals or as part of a small group not associated with a particular deploying unit. CAAF NURP are required to be certified by a Service designated replacement center or equivalent certified government run process.

(3) Self-Certification. Self-certification and/or deployment applies to CAAF employees of subcontractor employees of a contract company specifically authorized by a Service to perform self-certification of their deploying employees. Self-certification authorization is usually restricted to major contract companies such as Service CAP contractors. CAAF self-certification must meet or exceed replacement center processing and preparation standards and should be approved and monitored by government standardization/evaluation personnel.
f. **TPFDD.** Contracted support originating outside of the operational area must be formally integrated into the deployment process. This is especially important in uncertain or hostile environments where commercial access may be limited or non-existent. CAAF and related equipment, depending on the operational situation, may move into the operational area using either contractor company or government-arranged transportation as directed in the contract. Both methods require that contractor companies provide cargo and personnel movement details per defined deployment processes to ensure that the supported commander is aware of the timing and extent of contracted support entering the operational area. When the contractor company arranges its own movement, the contractor is required to provide the timing, the gross short tons, and number of personnel entering the operational area. If the government provides transportation support, the contract company is required to provide additional cargo detail (at either level IV or VI, as directed) and the number of personnel to be moved. The requiring activity and/or designated supported commander, assisted by the contracting officer, are responsible for ensuring contractor movements are fully integrated with operational needs and the GCC-approved deployment plan.

*CJCSM 3122.02, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume III (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution), provides additional information on incorporating contract personnel and equipment in the deployment process.*

4. **Deployment and Reception**

Deployment and reception involves managing the flow and reception of CAAF and associated equipment IAW established OSD and GCC-approved operational specific policies and procedures. This step, which includes CAAF reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) has its own unique set of challenges, especially for NURP CAAF. Joint personnel reception centers (JPRCs) are key to proper NURP CAAF in-theater reception.

a. **Coordinating and Tracking Contractor Deployments.** Similar to the three methods of CAAF predeployment processing previously discussed, there are three methods of contractor deployment: deployment as part of the supported unit; deployment as NURP;
and self-deployment. All CAAF deployment and subsequent movements, regardless of the deployment method, should be tracked using automated tools, such as SPOT and the Joint Asset Movement Management System. Obtaining and maintaining personnel accountability enables the JFC to control the entrance and exit of CAAF into and out of the operational area. It further allows the JFC to automatically track—by name and location—the movement of deployed CAAF throughout the individual CAAF deployment process. Contractor self-deployment should include coordination of contractor arranged flights through the air tasking order process.

b. **Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration.** RSOI actions vary depending on the contractor deployment methodology. NURP CAAF RSOI begins at the JFC designated JPRCs, Service, or authorized contract company reception sites. These sites are the points where CAAF predeployment processing is validated and onward-movement guidance is provided. Upon arrival at their area of performance location, NURP CAAF report to their requiring activity or designated supported unit, at which point in-theater oversight and contracted support begins. CAAF deploying as part of a military unit execute the RSOI process with the supported unit. In this process, the supported unit is fully responsible to coordinate all RSOI actions for their habitually related CAAF and to ensure they are fully integrated into the operation at their area of performance location. Per DOD policy, self-deploying CAAF must go through a USG-certified deployment process. Historically, self-deploying CAAF have been LOGCAP employees who went through a prime contractor controlled RSOI process. In this deployment methodology, the prime contractor is responsible for ensuring CAAF in-theater movement and associated equipment is properly coordinated and all their prime and subcontractor personnel are properly integrated into the operation at the area of performance location.

*JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support, provides additional information on the JPRCs.*

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**CONTRACTOR RECEPTION CHALLENGES**

In many recent operations, the joint personnel reception center (JPRC) process was lacking or non-existent even though they are addressed in doctrine (Joint Publication 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support*) and required in policy (Department of Defense Instruction 3020.41, *Operational Contract Support [OCS]*). Without a formal JPRC process, support personnel (referred to as in place, non-unit replacement personnel, to include contractor employees), contractors often become stranded at the point of debarkation and unable to get to their final area of performance in a timely manner. In recent operations, the Army successfully used contracted support to assist in the establishment and execution of an Army-specific CAAF reception center. There are no policy restrictions precluding the joint force command manpower and personnel directorate from using contracted services to help run a JPRC.

Source: Numerous operational lessons learned reports and various operational contract support-related audits
5. In-Theater Management

a. General. In-theater contractor management tasks discussed in this section include: legal authority and discipline, contractor visibility and accountability; movement control, GFS; and, FP/security. The doctrinal guidance below is based on existing DOD and CJCS policies and can, in some major operations, be a significant challenge to the JFC and staff. And, while all primary and special staff officers play at least some role in the in-theater contractor management process, the OCSIC must actively monitor contractor management execution and assist other staff members, as necessary, in dealing with issues under their purview.

b. Contractor Personnel Legal Status and Discipline. As stated earlier in this publication, contractor personnel are not part of the direct chain of command. However, there are existing legal statutes that provide the JFC and subordinate commanders significant legal authority over selected contractor personnel in support of the deployed joint force. It is important to note however, the legal and disciplinary authorities discussed below only apply to foreign contingencies and have restrictions based on any SOFA/security agreement, types of contractor employees, nationality of the employees, type of operation, and nature of the criminal offense.

(1) Types of Contractor Employees and Their Legal Status. As described in DOD policy and Chapter I, “Introduction,” of this JP, DOD contingency contractor employees fall into two primary categories:

(a) CAAF are contractor employees, including all tiers of subcontractor personnel, who are authorized to accompany the force in applicable foreign contingency operations and have been afforded CAAF status through a LOA. CAAF generally include all US citizen and TCN employees not normally residing in the operational area, but whose area of performance is in the direct vicinity of US forces and who are routinely co-located with US forces. In some cases, the JFC may designate mission-essential LN contractor employees (such as interpreters) as CAAF. However, granting CAAF status of LN employee does not automatically grant the JFC legal jurisdiction over these personnel because not all contractor discipline-related federal statutes are applicable to LN employees.

(b) Non-CAAF employees are DOD contingency contractor employees who are not designated as CAAF, such as US citizens operating under contract in the US, LN and TCN employees, or TCN expatriates who are permanent residents in the operational area. Common examples of non-CAAF include LN day laborers, delivery personnel, and supply contract workers.

(2) Contractor Personnel Status and Legal Rights. Law of war treaties (e.g., Hague and Geneva Conventions) establish the status of civilian contractor personnel when supporting military operations during international armed conflict. The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Article 4) provides prisoner of war status upon capture to be extended to, among others, contractor employees, provided that they are authorized to accompany the force. Additionally, some contractor personnel may
be covered by the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilians in Time of War, should they be captured during international armed conflict.

(3) Contractor Personnel Discipline. In contingency operations, commanders, ICW contractor supervisors, and supporting contracting officers, are responsible for ensuring CAAF discipline as it relates to incidents of alleged major misconduct, investigating incidents, apprehending suspected offenders, and addressing the immediate needs of the situation. The GCC and/or subordinate JFC should designate a responsible organization to develop processes for reporting alleged offenses and misconduct by or against contractor personnel, including sexual assault, and investigation of those incidents. CAAF who commit serious legal infractions may be subject to prosecution under both the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). All alleged criminal activity and incidents related to weapons discharge are reportable IAW public law (Section 862, National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2008).

(a) Nonpunitive Disciplinary Options. The supported GCC, subordinate JFC, and Service component commanders can address CAAF disciplinary issues or misconduct through revocation or suspension of clearances, restriction from installations or facilities, revocation of privileges, or redeployment out of the operational area. DFARS rules allow the contracting officer to direct the contract company, at its own expense, to remove and replace any employee who jeopardizes or interferes with mission accomplishment or who fails to comply with or violates applicable requirements of the clause. The process of removing contractor employees is dependent upon the established GCC policies and the extent to which those policies are incorporated in the terms and conditions of the contract. COR reporting and participation in award fee boards may also reduce or preclude contractor fiscal compensation to drive desired behavior of the company and enforce contractor actions and behaviors required by the contract. When confronted with disciplinary problems involving contractors and contractor employees, commanders should seek the assistance of their legal staff, the contracting officer, and the contract company management personnel. This allows for a thorough review of the situation and a recommendation for a COA based on the terms and conditions of the contract, applicable international agreements, and HN or US law.

(b) Legal Jurisdiction. Legal jurisdiction over contractor personnel varies depending on contractor personnel nationality, CAAF or non-CAAF designations, operational specific policies, and the type and severity of the disciplinary infraction. Normally, LN contract employees are subject to local laws while US citizens and TCN CAAF may or may not be subject to local laws depending on provisions, if any, documented in existing SOFAs or other security agreements. CAAF, with some exceptions, are subject to US federal law to include the UCMJ jurisdiction as discussed later in this section. While minor CAAF discipline infractions are normally handled through the contract company management, serious CAAF discipline infractions can and should be addressed through military legal and/or Department of Justice channels. To the extent that commanders determine that disciplinary actions may be necessary for CAAF, they should first coordinate their actions with their SJA and the government contract management team. This coordination is necessary because of potential jurisdiction issues along with possible
Chapter V

impact on contract performance, cost, and government liability as well as determining the appropriate manner to address the situation.

1. **Local/HN Law.** All non-CAAF are subject to local laws. CAAF are also subject to local laws unless specifically exempted by SOFAs other security agreements, and in cases where there is no functioning or recognized HN. **HN law, to include in-transit country law, can directly affect contracting as well as contractor management actions.** The supported GCC, subordinate JFC, and Service component commander must ascertain how these laws may affect contracted support, to the extent feasible, and consider any limiting factors in both deliberate and crisis action planning. Service components are responsible for ensuring contracting officers take these laws into account as they develop and oversee the execution of contracts. Limiting factors may include workforce and hour restrictions; medical, life, and disability insurance coverage; taxes; customs and duties; cost of living allowances; hardship differentials; access to classified information; and hazardous duty pay. This requires the Service components to articulate guidance to the Service contracting organizations to ensure mission specific factors are included in contracts with an area of performance or delivering in the designated operational area.

2. **SOFAs and Other Bi-Lateral Security Agreements.** SOFAs are international agreements between two or more governments that address various privileges, immunities, and responsibilities and enumerate the rights and responsibilities of individual members of a deployed force. They can be, although rarely are, used to define CAAF legal status (e.g., the circumstances of HN criminal and civil jurisdiction) as well as contracting-related legal obligations (e.g., taxes, customs). When applicable, SOFAs may establish legal obligations independent of contract provisions.

3. **US Federal Law.** Barring a SOFA or other security agreement, a HN will generally have primary jurisdiction over offenses committed within its territory. In the absence of any HN jurisdiction or the exercise of it, US federal law may apply to CAAF misconduct. The DFARS requires DOD contractors supporting US Armed Forces outside the US to report alleged offenses against the UCMJ and MEJA and to tell their employees where to report such offenses and where to seek victim and witness protection.

   a. **War Crimes Act of 1996.** Depending on the offense committed, CAAF who are US nationals may be prosecuted for war crimes under the War Crimes Act of 1996. This act defines a war crime to include any grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (such as willful killing or torture) or any violation of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Penalties include fines, imprisonment, or the death penalty if death results to the victim. Prosecutions under the War Crimes Act are the responsibility of federal civilian authorities.

   b. **MEJA of 2000.** In November 2000, the MEJA was passed by Congress and signed into law. This law permits the prosecution in federal court of civilians who, while employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces overseas, commit certain crimes. Generally, the crimes covered are any felony level criminal offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. The law applies to any DOD contractor or subcontractor (at any tier) or their employees provided they are not a national of or a legal
resident of the HN. It does not apply to non-DOD contractor employees unless their employment relates to supporting the mission of DOD. This law authorizes DOD law enforcement personnel to arrest suspected offenders IAW applicable international agreements and specifies procedures for the removal of accused individuals to the US. It also authorizes pretrial detention and the appointment of counsel for accused individuals. Like the War Crimes Act, actual prosecutions under the MEJA are the responsibility of federal civilian authorities.

DODI 5525.11, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed By or Accompanying the Armed Forces Outside the United States, Certain Service Members, and Former Service Members, provides more information on the implementation of this law.

### LEGAL JURISDICTION CHALLENGE IN RECENT OPERATIONS

In 2008, the United States (US) Government and the newly formed Iraqi government signed a formal security agreement that placed US contractor employees under Iraqi legal jurisdiction. In this agreement, US contractor employees were defined as “persons or legal entities, and their employees, who are citizens of the US or a third country and who are in Iraq to supply goods, services, and security in Iraq to or on behalf of the US Forces under a contract or subcontract with or for the US Forces.” This agreement specifically excluded persons normally resident in the territory of Iraq. Prior to the signing of this security agreement, US contractor employees, less local national employees, were immune from the Iraqi legal process per Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17.


Members, provides more information on the implementation of this law.

c. **Uniting and Strengthening America.** In October 2001, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001 was passed by Congress and signed into law. The USA Patriot Act was enacted by Congress in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. One of its provisions allows the US to apprehend and prosecute US citizens and foreign nationals who commit crimes on overseas US bases and facilities. Similar to the War Crimes Act and MEJA, prosecutions under the USA Patriot Act are the responsibility of federal civilian authorities.

d. **Federal Anti-Torture Statute.** Contractor personnel, such as those serving as military interrogators, can also be prosecuted under the federal anti-torture statute. A person found guilty under the act can be incarcerated for up to 20 years or receive the death penalty if the torture results in the victim’s death. Similar to the other federal laws, actual prosecutions under this statute are the responsibility of the appropriate federal civilian agency.
e. **UCMJ.** As expanded by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2007, UCMJ has jurisdiction over persons serving with or accompanying the Armed Forces of the United States in the field, both in times of declared war and during all contingency operations. IAW DOD guidance, the unique nature of this extended UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians requires sound management over when, where, and by whom such jurisdiction is exercised. The UCMJ authority over CAAF must be judiciously applied and carefully coordinated with Department of Justice personnel to ensure that the CAAF discipline infractions are handled in a prompt, thorough manner and within the proper legal framework.

**CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL PROSECUTION**

In July 2008, Mr. Alaa Mohammad Ali, a dual Iraqi/Canadian citizen contracted interpreter supporting the US military in Iraq, was sentenced by a military judge sitting at a general courts martial to five months of confinement. After stabbing a coworker, Mr. Ali pled guilty to making a false statement, wrongful appropriation, and wrongfully endeavoring to impede an investigation. This prosecution and conviction was conducted under the newly approved expansion of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

SOURCE: *United States v. Ali*, 71 M. J. 256, and numerous open source news articles

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c. **Sexual Assault Prevention.** DOD’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program applies to all US citizen CAAF. US citizen CAAF have the same rights and obligations related to this program as do military members and DOD civilians.

*See DODD 6495.01, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program, for detailed policy guidance.*

d. **Personnel Visibility, Accountability, and Casualty Reporting.** Contractor personnel visibility and accountability are essential to determine and resource government support requirements such as facilities, life support, FP, PR, MWR, and medical services in uncertain, hostile, and/or austere operational environments. In some operations, accountability of contractor personnel may be a JFC critical information requirement. DOD policy requires accountability of all CAAF and CCDR or OSD designated non-CAAF contractor employees in SPOT (or successor contractor personnel accountability system) operations outside the US. DOD contracting agencies ensure that contract and contractor personnel data is entered and maintained in the designated joint database, SPOT or its successor. This database provides the supported CCDR and subordinate JFC by name accountability of all CAAF and other designated non-CAAF to include personnel predeployment certification and location data via a point of scan system such as Joint Asset Movement Management System. CAAF casualties will be reported in SPOT IAW SPOT business rules.

*Additional guidance for contractor accountability requirements can be found in DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS).* Specific guidance on SPOT can
be found in the SPOT Business Rules which are maintained at http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/spot.html.

e. **Reporting Law of War Violations.** All CAAF are required to report possible, suspected, or alleged law of war violations. Additionally, CAAF are required to report such incidents to their requiring activity or to the CCMD staff. The supported CCDR, subordinate JFC, and Service component commanders, especially when utilizing PSCs, should ensure that adequate coordination mechanisms are in place to ensure timely and accurate law of war incident reporting.

*DODD 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program, provides detailed policy guidance on law of war incident reporting.*

f. **Movement Control.** Intratheater movement control includes directing contractor movement through DOD, USG departments or agencies, or other partner-contracted support convoys along specified routes and times. The subordinate JFC or lead Service component organization responsible for land movement control must establish, publish, and implement operational specific movement control-related standards and procedures. Depending on the operational situation, there are three general options when it comes to contractor vehicle movements: contractor vehicles are required to be directly integrated into military convoys; contractors are authorized to transit the operational area in convoys made up exclusively of contractor vehicles, but are fully integrated into the military movement control authority; and contractors authorized to transit the operational area outside of the military movement control authority. In general, CAP task order provided transportation services will be integrated into military convoys under direct movement control authority or, at a minimum, operate in an all contractor convoy operating under military movement control authority. Contractor vehicle movement outside of the military movement control authority is most applicable to theater support contract transportation services in low threat environments.

g. **GFS.** IAW DOD policy, contract companies are required to provide life, mission, and administrative support to their employees necessary to perform services unless otherwise directed by the terms and conditions of the contract. However, in austere and/or hostile and uncertain environments, support to CAAF may be more efficiently provided through collective means (potentially via another contract directed by the military) controlled and executed by the JFC and designated Service component(s). Planning and oversight of GFS actions is primarily a Service component responsibility. However, DOD policy requires the appointment of a GFS adjudication authority to ensure GFS for contractor personnel is coordinated and approved prior to approval of the contract. Normally the CCMD Service component responsible for base life services and other CUL support serves as the JOA wide GFS adjudication authority. The designated GFS adjudication authority would be responsible to keep track of major GFS (e.g., base camp services and medical) capabilities across the JOA and serves as the central coordination point for requiring activities and supporting contracting officers in determining what level of GFS available to contractor personnel. **After determining support requirements and availability of such support, the contracting officer will include available GFS in the terms and conditions of the contract and negotiate price accordingly.** Also, the SPOT LOA serves to outline the approved agreement between the government and contractor as to what services will be
provided to their employees operating in the designated operational area. Key GFS-related tasks are discussed below in more detail along with major references for areas of support.

(1) **Base Camp Services.** In permissive and non-austere operations, contractors should arrange for their own lodging, subsistence, and facility support; however, in austere and/or hostile and uncertain environments this may not be practical or operationally desirable. The circumstances under which the military provides this support would be those in which the contractor has no commercial infrastructure from which to draw or when the cost for a contractor to furnish the support is not economical. In situations when contractor-arranged base camp services would impede the government’s efforts to provide FP, generate competition with the military, or adversely influence prices, the military must consider providing the support or, at a minimum, directly coordinating this support within US bases. The supported GCC and subordinate JFC have the authority to direct where CAAF reside, within the terms and conditions of the contract. CAAF must generally be provided the same standard of support applied to DOD civilian personnel of similar grade and level of responsibility.

(a) In some operations or phases of operations, selected CAAF may be required to temporarily live under field conditions. Field conditions are quite different from normal civilian life and are characterized by austere and communal living and a collective responsibility for the living area. **Contracting officers should ensure there is appropriate language in the contract for CAAF expected to perform their duties in field conditions.**

(b) Subsistence may be provided to contractors, either in conjunction with government-provided lodging, or separately, when contractor employees are unable to obtain subsistence for operational reasons. For those CAAF living in field conditions, the food provided might be prepackaged rations with little opportunity for choice; consequently, special diets may not be accommodated. In sustained operations, it may be desirable to have separate contractor-run CAAF dining facilities that provide ethnic based subsistence that may be both less expensive and more appealing to non-US citizen CAAF.

(c) Although it is logical to expect reimbursement from contractors for the cost of lodging and subsistence, the cost for such support would normally be included in the overall cost of the contract. Therefore, when possible, subsistence support should be done on a non-reimbursable basis, eliminating the unnecessary administrative burden of tracking and collecting reimbursement. However, joint force and Service component planners must include the cost of supporting contractors in the overall cost of the operation so that adequate funding is provided.

(d) A subset of base camp services, facility support to contractors is situationally dependent. Facilities support must be planned for as early as possible, especially in austere and/or hostile and uncertain environments where contract companies cannot coordinate their own facility support. In these situations, external and systems support contractor managers must provide any unique facilities requirements during contract negotiations. The contracting officer or designated ACO must then coordinate these requirements with the appropriate joint force or Service component staff engineer. In some
situations, theater support contracts that utilize TCN CAAF vice LN non-CAAF employees may also require government furnished base operating and facilities support.

(2) **PR.** PR is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. The geographic CCMD and subordinate commands must plan for the possible isolation, capture, or detention of CAAF by adversarial organizations or governments. Recovery of isolated personnel may occur through military action, action by NGOs, other USG-approved action, and diplomatic initiatives, or through any combination of these options. IAW DOD policy, all CAAF must be incorporated into the PR program, and therefore be covered in subordinate OPLANs and OPORDs, to include the CMP. The contract and CMP should address how contractors are included in the theater PR plan and receive PR training and support products.

*DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS); DODD 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense; and JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, provide additional details on the PR program.*

(3) **Medical Support and Evacuation.** During contingency operations in austere and/or hostile and uncertain environments, CAAF may be unable to access medical support from local sources. **Generally, DOD will only provide resuscitative care, stabilization, hospitalization at Role 3 medical treatment facilities (MTFs), and assistance with patient movement in emergencies where loss of life, limb, or eyesight could occur.** Hospitalization will be limited to stabilization and short-term medical treatment with an emphasis on return to duty or evacuation by means of the patient movement system. All costs associated with the treatment and transportation of contractor personnel to the selected civilian facility are reimbursable to the USG and shall be the responsibility of contractor personnel, their employer, or their health insurance provider. DOD shall not provide long-term care to contractor personnel.

(a) **Emergency Medical and Dental Care.** All CAAF will normally be afforded emergency medical and dental care if injured while supporting contingency operations. DOD policy requires the supported GCC and subordinate JFC to provide emergency medical and dental care to contractor employees, including CAAF and non-CAAF who are injured while in the vicinity of US forces. Examples of emergency medical and dental care include examination and initial treatment of victims of sexual assault; refills of prescriptions for life-dependent drugs; repair of broken bones, lacerations, infections; and traumatic injuries to the dentition.

(b) **Primary Care.** Normally, primary medical or dental care is not authorized or provided to CAAF at MTFs. When determined necessary and authorized by the GCC or subordinate JFC, this support must be specifically authorized under the terms and conditions of the contract and detailed in the corresponding LOA. **Under no circumstances will primary care be authorized for non-CAAF employees.** MTF provided CAAF primary medical care must be closely planned and coordinated by the joint force surgeon, contracting officer, and SJA, as mission dictates. Primary care includes routine inpatient and outpatient services, non-emergency evacuation, pharmaceutical support, dental services, and other medical support as determined by appropriate military authorities based on recommendations.
from the joint force command surgeon and existing capabilities of the forward-deployed MTFs.

*Much more detailed guidance on medical support to deployed contractor personnel can be found in DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS), DODI 6490.03, Deployment Health, and JP 4-02, Health Services.*

(4) **Postal.** The nationality of the contractor employee usually determines postal support. CAAF who are US citizens that deploy in support of US Armed Forces, may be authorized use of the Military Postal Service (MPS) if there is no reliable or local mail service available and if MPS use is not precluded by the terms of any international or HN agreement. In most circumstances, TCN and LN contract employees are not provided access to the MPS. However, CAAF who are not US citizens are afforded occasional mail service necessary to mail their pay checks back to their homes of record.

*Additional information on postal operations can be found in DOD 4525.6-M, Department of Defense Postal Manual.*

(5) **Mortuary Affairs.** The joint mortuary affairs program is a broadly based military program that provides for the necessary care and disposition of deceased personnel, including personal effects, during military operations. The supported GCC, normally through the Army component acting as the lead Service for mortuary affairs, executes this program in the operational area. This program includes the search, recovery, tentative ID, care, and evacuation or temporary interment, disinterment, and re-interment of deceased personnel, to include all CAAF, within the operational area. The specific nature and extent of the support is determined during the planning process and communicated to military forces and contractors through governing OPLANs/OPORDs and contractual documents.

*Additional information on mortuary affairs can be found in DOD 1300.22, Mortuary Affairs Policy, and JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs.*

(6) **Post/Base Exchange Privileges.** When deployed, CAAF who are US citizens are generally eligible to use military exchange facilities for health and comfort items in operations where CAAF do not have access to similar commercial sources. This privilege depends on the overall operational situation, SOFAs, and individual contract terms and conditions.

*Additional information on exchange privileges for deployed contractors can be found in DODI 1330.21, Armed Services Exchange Regulations.*

(7) **MWR.** In general, contractors have a responsibility to provide MWR and other quality-of-life support to their own employees as much as practical. The availability of MWR programs in the operational area vary with the deployment location. Available MWR activities may include self-directed recreation (e.g., issue of sports equipment), entertainment associated with the United Services Organization and the Armed Forces Professional Entertainment Office, military clubs, unit lounges, and some types of rest centers. The subordinate JFC should authorize CAAF who are US citizens to utilize MWR support on a space available basis when contractor and/or other sources are not available.
6. Redeployment

Redeployment involves movement of CAAF and their equipment out of the operational area upon completion of the designated period of performance or, in some cases, early individual CAAF re-deployment (such as for administrative actions or changes in deployment eligibility). CAAF should conduct redeployment actions in the reverse manner of how they deployed. At the end of the contract period, NURP CAAF should redeploy through the JPRC process to their original point of embarkation. The final part of the NURP deployment processing should be through their designated deployment center where they will return all government provided OCIE (or pay retribution to the Service that issued the OCIE for non-returned OCIE), return government-issued ID cards, and complete any other replacement center directed out processing actions. Habitually associated CAAF can redeploy as a NURP if their individual employment or company period of performance ends prior to unit redeployment. CAAF authorized to self-deploy will redeploy under the direction of their contract company per the terms and conditions of their contract.

a. General Redeployment Tasks. Service components, DOD agencies, USTRANSCOM, and USSOCOM are responsible for ensuring that redeploying CAAF and their equipment are properly managed and controlled. Key redeployment tasks include, but are not limited to updating SPOT, or its successor; recovery of government issued badges and ID cards; recovery and disposition of all government-owned equipment; required intelligence and other required out-briefs/debriefings; and withdrawal of security clearances (as applicable).

b. Transportation Out of Theater. If specified by the contract, the USG will, IAW each individual’s LOA, provide contract employees transportation from the theater of operations to the location from which they deployed, unless otherwise stated in the contract. The contract employee, through their company, will coordinate departure and arrival times and with the appropriate JPRC and/or replacement center. CAAF returning to the US are subject to US reentry customs requirements in effect at the time of reentry. Transportation of CAAF from the replacement center to the home location is a contractor company responsibility.

7. Equipment Management

Major contractor-related equipment items include Class VII GFP, CAGO equipment, and contractor-owned, contractor-operated (COCO) equipment.

a. GFP. GFP includes Service component provided government issue Class VII items. GFP can be provided to the contractor prior to deployment into the operational area or theater provided equipment that is issued to the contractor in the operational area. Actions related to GFP issuance, maintenance, accountability, and return to stock are the responsibility of the Service component providing this equipment and the applicable contracting officer.

b. CAGO Equipment. CAGO (referred to as contractor acquired property in FAR Subpart 45) is equipment acquired by the contractor, normally in a cost reimbursement type
contract, for the performance of the contracted service, but remains the property of the USG. Like GFP, CAGO accountability and disposition is a Service component responsibility and the applicable contracting officer.

c. **COCO Equipment.** COCO equipment consists of items acquired by and owned by the contractor for use in the performance of the contracted service. COCO is normally associated with fixed price contracts and, unlike GFP and CAGO, the government has no legal authority over this equipment. Additionally, the contract company, not the USG, is responsible for COCO disposition and any costs associated with the transport of this equipment in, around, and out of the operational area.

d. **Government Visibility.** Service component visibility of GFP and CAGO is required by DOD policy. More specifically, CAGO accountability is accomplished through a USG-approved contractor equipment accountability system. While GFP and CAGO accountability and disposition is the responsibility of the Service component contracting officer, general GFP and CAGO information is necessary to determine deployment, facilities, and redeployment support. Additionally, in some operations, the supported GCC and subordinate JFC may be involved in determining the disposition of this equipment. For example, in major stability operations, OSD, in consultation with Service HQ, may direct that certain GFP and/or CAGO equipment, if deemed excess to DOD and USG needs, be transferred to the HN or a designated multinational force. If transfer of GFP and/or CAGO equipment is anticipated, the subordinate JTF J-4 should work closely with the appropriate DOS, DOD, and affected Service component organization to ensure that clearly understood and properly coordinated disposition instructions are provided in a timely manner. Legally, the JFC does not get involved in COCO disposition, but may require visibility over major COCO items in situations where the JFC may be required to assist in the transport of this equipment into or out of the operational area.

*Additional information on government-owned contractor equipment can be found in DODI 4161.02, Accountability and Management of Government Contract Property.*

**8. Force Protection and Security**

*FP and security of contractor personnel and equipment is a shared responsibility between the contractor and the USG.* In a permissive environment, the supported GCC and subordinate JFC may have only limited special planning considerations, and this security responsibility would normally fall to the contractor. In hostile environments, contractor-related FP and security requirements can be a major challenge to the JFC and subordinate commands. As stated earlier in this publication, commanders do not have legal authority to direct contractor personnel to perform tasks outside of their contract. However, in emergency situations (e.g., enemy or terrorist actions or natural disaster), the ranking area or base commander may issue warnings or messages urging that CAAF and non-CAAF personnel take emergency actions to remove themselves from harm’s way or take other appropriate self-protective measures. **FP and security of the joint force from contractor-related threats is also the responsibility of the JFC and subordinate component commands.** Controlling base access and screening of contractor personnel are extremely
important FP/security-related tasks, especially when utilizing large numbers of LN employees whose area of performance is on a military base.

a. **Determining Specific Contractor Personnel-Related FP and Security Measures.**
The GCC and subordinate commands at all appropriate levels must plan for the protection of CAAF and selected non-CAAF in the overall FP and security plan in operations where the contractor cannot obtain effective security services, such services are unavailable at a reasonable cost, or threat conditions necessitate security through military means. In general, **military provided FP is the preferred option for operations where there is an on-going or anticipated level II (small-scale, irregular forces conducting unconventional war) or III (conventional forces capable of air, land, or sea attacks) threat level.** In these situations, it is in the best interest of the USG to provide military security to contractor personnel working on military facilities, or at a minimum, closely coordinate the use of PSCs to protect CAAF and selected non-CAAF. Specific security measures will be mission and situation dependent as determined by the GCC and subordinate JFC. Normally, CAAF FP/security measures are the same for DOD civilians accompanying the force.


b. **Security Screening/Biometrics ID Card/Base Access.** The subordinate JFC and individual base commanders are responsible for the security of military facilities within the operational area. Part of this process is the screening and badging of contractor personnel authorized base access. Currently, there is no standard methodology for screening and issuing base access security badges for contractor personnel. The JFC must ensure that local screening and security badge issuance policy and procedures are in place for all contractor personnel requiring access to US facilities. This requirement is especially pertinent to contractor personnel who have not been issued a DOD common access card. Not having these policies and procedures in place can severely reduce the effectiveness, timeliness, flexibility, and/or efficiency of contracted support. This can be a significant issue when changes to the operation require a quick surge of contracted support from one base to another. Delay in contractor access to locations and facilities can increase the cost of a contract and impede contractor ability to provide services in support of operations’ requirements. However, expeditiously facilitating contractor access must be balanced against the risk to forces for obtaining required access.

c. **Establishing FP/Security Requirements in the Contract.** Provided no theater-specific clause has been established for inclusion by the contracting officer, specific security measures are mission and situation dependent as determined by the GCC. **All contingency contractor personnel, not just CAAF, whose area of performance is in the vicinity of US forces shall be required to comply with applicable supported GCC and subordinate JFC FP policies and procedures IAW the terms and conditions of their contract.** Contract support requirements packages and subsequent contracts should include the requirement that non-CAAF requiring base access participate in the local command’s screening and vetting program as a condition of employment. The notification process should be defined to allow/restrict contractor access as appropriate between locations without
impeding contract requirements (driving up costs) or allowing unauthorized access (threatening/compromising FP).

DFARS Sub-Part 225.74, Defense Contractors Outside the United States, and DFARS PGI 225.7401, Contracts Requiring Performance or Delivery in a Foreign Country, provide guidance on placing standard contingency contract language in contracts.

d. **Individual Movement Protection.** Another key concern for the JFC is protection of contractor personnel during individual or small group movements within the operational area. In general, all CAAF should be provided protection during transit within the operational area commensurate with protection provided to DOD civilians. It is important that the JFC and subordinate commanders balance FP requirements with the need for contractor personnel to have ready access to their place of performance. Overly restrictive movement requirements can hinder the responsiveness of contracted support, especially for systems support contractors who are providing support on an area support basis. Too lenient movement restrictions may have a negative effect on contracted support if CAAF become casualties due to the lack of/improper enforcement of movement-related FP and security measures. In operations where more than a level I (agents, saboteurs, sympathizers, terrorist, civil disturbances) threat or a high road crime rate exists, routine military movements should include CAAF. Otherwise, commanders responsible for local FP and requiring activities organizations will need to make special arrangements.

e. **Convoy Protection.** The subordinate JFC or lead Service component responsible for land movement control must establish, publish, and implement operational specific contractor-related convoy FP standards and procedures. Contractor vehicles and personnel required to join military convoys will be included in convoy FP planning and execution. Contractor convoys and movement conducted outside of military movement control channels may include PSC provided FP if so directed IAW the contract. PSC convoy protection is discussed later in this chapter.

See Field Manual 4-01.45/Marine Corps Reference Publication 4-11.3H/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 4-01.3/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.58, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations, for more information on integrating contractor vehicles and personnel into convoy operations.

f. **Issuance of Personal Defense Weapons.** In general, individual contractor personnel should only be armed in exceptional circumstances and require documentation and approval of a waiver (e.g., exception to policy). However, consistent with applicable US, HN, international laws, relevant SOFAs or other international agreements, and DOD policy, the supported CCDR may authorize contractor personnel to carry a government issued or approved individual weapon for personal protection. Arming of individual contractor personnel is strictly voluntary, requires contract company approval, and must be reflected in the terms and conditions of the contract. When military FP and legitimate civil authority are deemed unavailable or insufficient, the CCDR will define RUF IAW US, HN, or international law; SOFAs; or other arrangements with local authorities. Variables such as the nature of the operation, the type of conflict, any applicable SOFA related to the presence of US forces, and the nature of the activity being protected require case-by-case
Contractor Management

determinations. As per DOD policy, the supported CCDR can delegate this authority down to a designated general officer, normally the subordinate JTF joint security officer.

_DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS), provides detailed policy guidance on issuance of personal defense weapons to contractor personnel._

9. Contractor Provided Security

The GCC may authorize the use of contractors to provide specified security functions, consistent with applicable US, HN, international law, and any SOFA or other security agreement that may exist for the specified operational area. PSC functions consist of guarding of personnel, facilities, designated sites, or property, the contractor or subcontractor, for which the employees are required to carry weapons in the performance of their duties. Use of PSCs should be carefully considered by the JFC because PSC provided services, more than any other contracted service, can have a direct impact (sometimes a very negative impact) on the civil-military aspects of the campaign. Use of armed PCSs does not negate the responsibility of the JFC for protecting US forces, facilities, and CAAF.

a. As a general rule, use of armed force by PSCs will be limited to providing protection from criminal or terrorist threats not to exceed Level I threat. Although direct participation of PSC personnel in hostilities is not a violation of international law, it may change their legal status and can subject them to direct attack. Also, combat is identified as an inherently government function, commanders should refrain from using PSCs where the likely threat will involve defense against organized attacks by hostile armed forces (Level II or III) or any offensive operations.

b. Whether a particular use of a PSC to protect military assets is permissible is dependent on the situation and requires detailed operational and legal analysis and coordination by the subordinate JFC and SJA. Variables such as the nature of the threat, the type of conflict, applicable HN laws, and the nature of the activity being protected require case-by-case determinations.

c. PSCs operate under RUF rather than rules of engagement. Operational specific RUF, promulgated by the GCC or designated subordinate flag officer, generally limit PSC use of deadly force to self-defense or the defense of others against criminal violence and other unlawful attack. Defense of others may include the protection of inherently dangerous property or specified critical infrastructure, the loss or destruction of which is likely to lead to loss of life. The authority to use force by PSCs is no greater than the authority for self-defense exercised by other civilians. Armed PSC employees are subject to domestic (US and HN) law and may not be protected by SOFA provisions. PSCs, who exceed the limits imposed by applicable law, may be subject to prosecution by the HN government as well as under USG laws.

d. Commanders must recognize the civil-military related risks when utilizing PSCs in military operations and take measures to manage those risks. For example, the local populace may not distinguish between a PSC and a US military member and misconduct on the part of PSC personnel can be attributed to the US military and any other PSCs operating
in the area, regardless of its quality of performance. Positive or negative behavior of PSCs employed by the US military will almost always be associated with the USG and deployed US military force.

*Additional information on PSCs can be found in Appendix J, “Private Security Company Services Planning and Processes.”*

**10. Coordinating Non-Department of Defense Contractor Management Actions**

a. **Scope of Challenge.** The scope of non-DOD OCS integration requirements are very mission dependent. In some joint operations, the subordinate JFC may have only limited requirements to integrate non-DOD contracted support into military operations while in others there may be major challenges that defy any simple solutions. For example, in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, contractors in support of USG departments and agencies, IGOs, and NGOs could be found throughout the operational area to include significant use of contracted security forces.

b. **Specific Challenges.** In complex, long-term stability operations, there are a myriad of challenges related to USG departments and agencies, and NGO contractors. Key to addressing these requirements is an active civil-military coordination effort to include the use of civil-military operations centers or other mechanisms to facilitate civil-military information sharing and cooperation. Two of the biggest challenges for the JFC are coordinating non-DOD contractor movements and non-DOD contracted security elements.

1. **Movement Coordination/Deconfliction of Non-DOD Contractor Personnel and Equipment.** The subordinate JFC may be required to assist in integrating non-DOD contractor personnel and equipment into both air and surface movements, especially during ongoing major reconstruction and transition to civil authority-related actions in high threat environments. While presenting a planning challenge, it is in the best interest of the subordinate JFC to assist DOS and other non-DOD organizations in contract-related actions within the operational area. The major challenges associated with this support include obtaining advance knowledge of the requirement, determining military responsibility for FP and security requirements, and establishing communications with the contractor.

2. **Coordination and Support to Non-DOD Private Security Company Operations.** Of all of the non-DOD OCS-related coordination tasks, none is more important and challenging than coordinating with non-DOD agencies who utilize PSCs within the operational area. These non-DOD contracted PSCs, sometimes including contracted uniformed foreign military members, may be used by various USG departments and agencies and NGO organizations to provide protection of their personnel in transit and at work sites in high threat areas. Without proper coordination, the risk of an incident involving friendly military forces on contractor employees can be significant. The subordinate JFC and its subordinate component commanders must take great care in establishing adequate visibility (location, mission, RUF) and coordination procedures associated with these non-DOD private security-related contracts.
Additional information on coordinating non-DOD PSCs can be found in Appendix J, “Private Security Company Services Planning and Processes.”

**COORDINATING INTERAGENCY SECURITY CONTRACTORS**

In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Multinational Force-Iraq coordinated directly with the Department of State (DOS) Chief of Mission to ensure that major DOS sponsored reconstruction efforts, to include DOS funded contracted security forces, were properly integrated into military security plans. In this particular operation, the problem was so challenging that a combined DOS-Department of Defense coordination center was stood up to provide the necessary planning capabilities, information sharing, and coordination measures. This effort included establishment of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) that were directly linked into area commander’s operations centers. These PRTs provided the area commanders key information on DOS and US Agency for International Development (USAID) missions being performed within their area of operations. This information was critically important when an area commander was called on to provide back-up security support to DOS missions, facilities, and personnel.

SOURCE: Various DOS and USAID reports and press releases
Chapter V

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APPENDIX A
SERVICES’ SYSTEMS SUPPORT CONTRACT OVERVIEW

1. General

   a. Systems support contracts are contracts awarded by the Services and USSOCOM that provide technical support, maintenance support, and in some cases, Class IX support for selected military weapon and support systems. Systems support contracts routinely provide support to newly fielded aircraft, land combat vehicles, automated C2, as well as other support systems. Systems support contracting, contract management, and program authority reside with the Services’ systems acquisition program offices. Systems support contractor personnel, made up mostly of US citizens, provide support in garrison and often deploy with the force in both training exercises and during contingency operations. Given that systems support contracts are generally let long before and without reference to any particular contingency, and since the supported GCC and subordinate JFC do not maintain resident systems support contracting authority and acquisition oversight, they generally have less control over the formation and execution of systems support contracts in the JOA than other types of contracts.

   b. Systems support contract field service representatives (FSRs) provide key technical support for Service equipment in various locations within the operational area. These FSRs are mission essential CAAF that provide either temporary support during the initial fielding of a system, sometimes called interim contracted support, or long term support for selected materiel systems, often referred to as contractor logistic support (CLS). In addition to FSR support, systems support contracts can also include a new equipment fielding team(s) and technical modification team support. Systems support contract personnel are usually considered mission essential and must be properly integrated into military operations as discussed in Chapter V, “Contractor Management.” The following paragraphs provide an overview of how each Service manages their systems support contracts and associated CAAF.

2. United States Army Support

   The Army uses systems support contracts to support numerous deployable Army systems. Supported systems under the PM authority of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA[ALT]) include, but are not limited to, newly or partially fielded vehicles, weapon systems, aircraft, C2 systems, standard Army management information systems, and numerous communications systems. These systems support contracts can include prearranged contracts with a single habitually associated FSR. The FSR supports units in garrison and throughout contingency and deployed operations as CAAF. Recent operations in support of the thousands of non-standard mine resistant armored protection vehicles used in Afghanistan and Iraq are a prime example. When utilized in contingency operations, these contracts and their associated personnel are managed under teaming arrangements between the ASA(ALT) forward office (when formed), the individual PEO or PM office, the supporting AFSB, and the supported unit.
More detailed discussion on Army systems contract support can be found in Army Techniques Publication 4-91, Army Field Support Brigade.

3. United States Navy-Marine Corps Support

   a. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN[RD&A]) is the Department of the Navy’s Acquisition Executive (NAE) and SPE. The NAE has authority, responsibility, and accountability for all acquisition functions and programs through PEOS and/or PM offices or systems command (SYSCOM) commanders. The Navy SYSCOM commanders act for and exercise the authority of the NAE to directly supervise management of assigned programs, to maintain oversight of cost, schedule, performance, and report directly to the ASN(RD&A) for all matters pertaining to research, development, and acquisition. Common responsibilities for these commanders include serving as HCA for both assigned programs and project manager programs and overseeing in-service support of weapon and informational/technical systems. Navy systems support contracts can therefore be awarded by any of the SYSCOMs for their specific types of systems under their responsibility.

   b. The Marine Corps SYSCOM is one of the Department of the Navy SYSCOMs and the Commandant of the Marine Corps’ agent for acquisition and sustainment of Marine Corps specific systems requirements to include Marine Corps unique chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense materials and equipment; training systems and equipment associated with Marine Corps unique requirements; amphibious raid; and ground reconnaissance systems and equipment. The Marine Corps SYSCOM is responsible to develop and support Marine Corps unique ammunition and weapons, to include procurement, surveillance, and maintenance of associated ordnance items.

   c. The Naval Supply (NAVSUP) SYSCOM acts for and exercises the authority of the NAE to directly supervise, manage, and serve as the logistics support authority in support of other Navy SYSCOMs, PEOS, direct reporting PM offices and subordinate PM offices, and their assigned acquisition programs throughout their life-cycle. The Commander of NAVSUP SYSCOM reports to ASN(RD&A) for overall execution of responsibilities, but also reports to Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps respectively for the execution of in-service logistics support authority responsibilities.

   More information can be found on US Navy systems support contracts in Navy Supply Systems Command Instruction 4230.37D, Navy Contingency Contracting Program, Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5400.15C CH-1, Department of the Navy Research and Development, Acquisition and Associated Life-Cycle Management, and Logistics Responsibilities and Accountability.

   d. Marine Corps Logistics Command (MARCORLOGCOM) is a major command of the United States Marine Corps that is the preferred provider of supply chain management, collaborative maintenance management, and strategic pre-positioning to the operating forces and other Services and agencies. The Contracts Department of MARCORLOGCOM executes the contracting mission for MARCORLOGCOM and supports assigned requirements from Marine Corps SYSCOM and other DOD activities.
Services’ Systems Support Contract Overview

The Contracts Department provides support as tasked to Marine Corps contingency contracting operations and assistance to customers in developing requirements and business strategies to acquire them. The Contracts Department performs the full range of planning, execution, and administration of contractual actions to secure timely and successful delivery or performance. The assigned MARCORLOGCOM contracting personnel, in collaboration with all Marine Corps stakeholders, identify the contract requirements as part of their maintenance and deployment mission. When making these contracting decisions, MARCORLOGCOM considers any GCC-specific contractor management policies and requirements prior to making contracting decisions.

e. The Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement, which implements and supplements the Defense Acquisition Regulation Supplement, contains mandatory policies and procedures including delegations of authority and assignment of responsibilities. The Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement identifies unique acquisition authorities of the multiple Departments of the Navy HCAs. Within the Department of the Navy, the various HCAs (Naval Sea SYSCOM, Naval Air SYSCOM, Space and Naval Warfare SYSCOM, Naval Facilities Engineering Command [NAVFAC] Engineering Command, etc.) have designated acquisition authorities that the other HCAs within the Department of the Navy are not authorized to execute contracts for without appropriate delegated procurement authority.

4. United States Air Force Support

The Air Force uses systems support contracting, referred to as CLS, to support many of its deployable systems. These contracts are executed by Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). The assigned AFMC and AFSPC system PM office, in collaboration with all Air Force stakeholders, identifies the systems support contract requirements as part of the systems life cycle sustainment plan. When making field sustainment decisions, the AFMC and AFSPC program managers consider any GCC-specific contractor management policies and requirements prior to making deployed CLS decisions and directives. Air Force systems support contractors requiring deployment to a particular operational area must comply with the specific GCC-directed contractor personnel management requirements.
APPENDIX B
EXTERNAL SUPPORT CONTRACT OVERVIEW

1. General

External support contracts are prearranged contracts, or contracts awarded during the contingency, from contracting organizations whose contracting authority does not derive directly from the theater support contracting HCAs or from systems support contracting activities. External support contracts provide a variety of logistic and other non-combat related supplies and services. This appendix provides high level details regarding key Service and DLA external support contract capabilities. The Service CAPs are the most commonly and extensively used external support contracts. CAPs provide the supported GCC and subordinate JFC an alternative source for meeting logistic services and general engineering shortfalls when military, HNS, multinational, and theater support contract sources are not available or not adequate to meet the joint force needs. All three Military Departments have their own CAPs, each with some similarities as well as some unique differences.

a. Service CAP similarities:

(1) All serve as a force multiplier capability to organic military capabilities.

(2) All are long-term (four to nine years depending on the program) competitively awarded contracts.

(3) All are indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts and use, or can opt to use, cost-plus award fee task orders.

(4) All potentially compete for the same general commercial support base.

b. Service CAP differences:

(1) Authorized expenditure limit.

(2) Support focus:

(a) LOGCAP focuses on general logistic support and minor construction support. The program utilizes separate support (planning and program support) and performance (task order execution) contracts.

(b) AFCAP focuses on both construction and general logistic services and can also be used for supply support.

(c) GCCMAC focuses exclusively on facility construction support.

(d) GCSMAC focuses on facilities support.

(3) Planning and management capabilities vary between the four programs.
2. Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

a. **General.** LOGCAP is an Army program designed to provide logistics and minor construction support to Army, joint, other USG organizations, and authorized multinational forces through pre-selected performance contract companies. The broad construction of the base LOGCAP contract permits great latitude in providing needed services in virtually any potential theater or operational environment. LOGCAP can be used to support all phases of the operation, but is intended by Army policy as primarily an early entry operations capability. LOGCAP, when selected as a support option, assists the requiring activity to implement a programmatic approach to logistics service executed through competitively awarded task orders. LOGCAP capabilities also include program and planning support through a separately awarded contract.

b. **Capabilities.** LOGCAP task orders are intended to provide minimum level basic life support for initial forces within 30 days of the announced C-day [the unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence] provided planning is sufficiently advanced to permit task order development and award. Following task order award, contract personnel will be on the ground within 72 hours and begin the ramp up to full operational capability for up to 77,000 personnel. Initial capabilities can be established within 30 days of initial contractor deployment, with full operational capability within 6 months (dependent on location and availability of local capabilities). LOGCAP can tailor support from small-scale operations to large, multinational operations lasting a decade or more. While LOGCAP is capable of providing complete base camp service packages, LOGCAP provided services are modular and scalable for integration with other service delivery options. LOGCAP provides a robust change management process to provide commanders with a high degree of strategic and tactical flexibility to adapt LOGCAP provided support to the changing operational environment. Although not intended as a major construction service, LOGCAP (in partnership with Army Corps of Engineers and with appropriate funding) can provide construction services in support of the commander’s objectives, particularly during transitions from expeditionary to enduring operations. Also of note, per Army policy, LOGCAP is not intended to be a source of supply; rather, it is designed to leverage the requiring activity for government-provided commodities to reduce LOGCAP-related supply chain management complexity and duplication.

c. **Planning.** The LOGCAP has the ability to integrate LOGCAP support into a variety of Army component and joint force-level support plans. The AFSB’s LOGCAP planner (or other designated LOGCAP program office personnel as appropriate), in close coordination with the supporting CSB, assists the Army Service component command in OCS planning actions that do or may include LOGCAP support requirements. Additionally, LOGCAP maintains two types of plans: worldwide and focused. Worldwide plans are the contingency plans that generate generic and regional LOGCAP plans for the supported commander, normally at the Army component level. The generic plans provide the baseline for support and differentiate between support in a developed country and that required to support a deployment in a non-developed operational area. Focused planning begins with the ID of a specific mission (often aligned with specific CONPLAN or OPLAN) in crisis action planning. Support for actual operations is tailored based on the concept of support developed for the operation. LOGCAP support is implemented through a “menu of services”
linked to a standardized PWS. Scalability is achieved through workload assumptions, and performance parameters are linked as much as possible to established military doctrine to provide requiring activities with understanding on how LOGCAP services can be seamlessly inserted into operations. When it is determined LOGCAP is the approved source of support, LOGCAP program office personnel work with the requiring activity to develop actual requirements packages, and once these packages are approved, execute the request for proposal for the task order.

d. **Management.** LOGCAP is an Army regulatory program promulgated by Army Regulation (AR) 700-137, *Logistics Civil Augmentation Program.* The Headquarters, Department of the Army G-4 [Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics] is the LOGCAP policy proponent and program execution authority, while the United States Army Materiel Command, through its subordinate command, the Army Sustainment Command, is responsible for program planning and execution. In most circumstances, the Army will deploy a LOGCAP-forward team consisting of a LOGCAP deputy program manager, planning team, and a LOGCAP Support Brigade section, to assist the supported commands and organizations by providing a single focal point for managing LOGCAP execution in the operational area. When deployed, the LOGCAP-forward team is normally attached to the supporting AFSB. Once delegated by the LOGCAP contract PCO, the JTSCC SCO CCAS will provide ACOs, QARs, and property administrators to administer the task orders IAW the base contract and under the technical direction of the LOGCAP deputy program director. If a JTSCC is not formed, the aligned Army CSB will coordinate with the LOGCAP deputy program director to arrange CCAS support. Supported units, under the direction of the requiring activity (normally the Army component to the subordinate JFC) will be required to provide COR support where LOGCAP support is utilized.

*More information on LOGCAP can be found in AR 700-137, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program.*

3. **Air Force Contract Augmentation Program**

a. **General.** AFCAP is a worldwide contingency contract tool available to support the Air Force and joint force along with any USG department or agency in need of urgent engineering and logistics assistance in support of contingency operations. AFCAP, like other DOD CAP programs, is designed to rapidly leverage private industry capabilities as a force multiplier in supplying highly responsive solutions to meet Air Force component mission objectives during military operations. AFCAP contractors have a worldwide capability, coupled with an existing breadth and depth of commercial business interests aligned to be able to meet contingency operations requirements. Unlike the other Service CAPs, AFCAP can be utilized to procure and expeditiously ship just-in-time commodities. Depending on urgency, degree of requirements, development, or task stability, AFCAP can be tailored into firm fixed price, cost-plus fixed fee, or cost-plus award fee task orders as necessary to best match the government’s needs.

b. **Capabilities.** AFCAP is able to provide, as a minimum, 72 core general logistics and other services, such as air traffic management, communication, along with commodity procurement and shipment capabilities. The scope of the AFCAP contract requires that the
Appendix B

contractors provide the personnel, equipment, materials, services, travel, and all other means necessary to provide a quick response, worldwide planning, and deployment capability. The contract provides additional capabilities to allow military missions to continue when there are facilities or service support constraints. AFCAP contractors can provide manpower to complete or augment tasks, full range of just-in-time logistics (acquisitions, deliveries, procurement of commercial off-the-shelf items, heavy equipment, leases, bulk materials, war reserve materiel augmentation, etc.), and expedient design/build construction. Whenever possible, the AFCAP contractor draws upon significant in-place location expertise and worldwide commercial vendors with readily available assets. A major contributing effort for AFCAP is in the area of sustainment and maintenance of the deployed forces and initial force projection effort. AFCAP can also be utilized to provide initial joint force base camp services of non-Air Force personnel (the Air Force has organic military capability for its own life support). AFCAP may be utilized to help transition and upgrade bare bases from initial austere support standard to temporary-standard facilities and utilities. This allows for the recovery and reconstitution of critical war reserve materiel resources for use at other locations or to support additional expansion for a specific mission. Finally, AFCAP can also provide general equipment support, but is not intended to be used for in-depth equipment maintenance or depot-level overhaul, at contingency locations, since the Air Force already has depot programs for these requirements.

c. Planning and Management. The Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) provides PM functions, while the 772nd Enterprise Sourcing Squadron, under AFMC’s Enterprise Sourcing Group, under Air Force Installation Contracting Agency (AFICA), provides contracting support. AFCEC Detachment 1 is located at Tyndall Air Force Base, FL, with PM deployed forward as required. AFCAP planning task orders can be awarded to assist customers with their requirement. The AFCAP PCO delegates all appropriate contract administration and audit services functions to the JTSCC SCO CCAS (if designated) IAW the specific needs of that task order. The JTSCC SCO CCAS will provide ACO support, to include monitoring/reviewing/approving the contractor’s accounting, purchasing, and estimating systems. The SCO CCAS also provides property administration and quality assurance support, as required. The SCO CCAS has the authority to execute no-cost change orders to task orders. Should the SCO CCAS experience a shortfall in field support during the execution of AFCAP, AFCEC will provide field assessment surveillance teams. The AFCEC field assessment surveillance teams are based on a tailorable, multifunctional deployable team concept as needed by task order/location and region–providing oversight, ensuring cost, schedule, and quality task order performance by the AFCAP contractors. The 772nd Enterprise Sourcing Squadron will retain all contracting functions not delegated to SCO CCAS, to include all PCO functions (issuance of all task orders), execution of modifications resulting in price changes to task orders, and execution of modifications to the basic contract (exercise of options, etc.).

4. Navy Global Contract Augmentation Programs

The Navy, through NAVFAC, maintains two world-wide CAP contracts: the GCCMAC and GCSMAC. The GCCMAC is focused on construction while the GCSMAC is focused on facilities support. They are both described in more detail in the following paragraphs.
a. Global Construction Capability Contract. The GCCMAC is a competitively solicited multiple award indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity type contract with provisions for the placement of either cost-plus award fee or firm fixed price task orders. This acquisition vehicle provides pre-qualified sources to provide up to a maximum of $800 million of construction over five years. The contract provides construction, design/build construction, and related engineering services in response to natural disasters, humanitarian assistance missions, conflicts, or projects with similar characteristics. This includes occasional projects to ensure readiness to perform during emergencies and military exercises. GCCMAC is also an acquisition tool that NAVFAC utilizes to support roles for authorized DOD construction agents as outlined in DODD 4270.5, *Military Construction*.

(1) Capabilities. The GCCMAC, under the control of the NAVFAC, provides the joint force, and USG departments or agencies, when authorized, an immediate civilian construction response capability. The scope includes the capability to provide general mobilization services for personnel, equipment, and material in support of naval construction forces mobilization and similar mobilization efforts, and to set up and operate material liaison offices at a deployed site in support of naval construction force operations. Work is predominately construction. However, services incidental to the construction may also be included.

(2) Planning and Management. By contract, each contractor is required to maintain an in-place contingency response plan available to facilitate response to emerging requirements. The plan identifies pre-positioned resources, suppliers, and procedures for rapidly developing, detailed execution plans tailored to the specific requirements of the emergency situation. The GCCMAC is managed by NAVFAC Atlantic in Norfolk, VA. Other NAVFAC components may also be given ordering office authority under this contract. Any orders for the GCCMAC must be coordinated through a NAVFAC contracting officer.

b. GCSMAC. The Navy’s GCSMAC is a competitively solicited multiple award, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity type contract with provisions for the placement of either cost-plus award fee or firm fixed price orders. This performance-based contract is designed to respond to natural disasters, humanitarian efforts, contingencies, or other requirements such as nonperformance by an incumbent contractor or instances where there is an unanticipated lapse in service.

(1) Capabilities. The GCSMAC program is designed to quickly provide short-term facilities support services with incidental construction at various locations (including remote locations) throughout the world. The GCSMAC acquisition vehicle provides six pre-qualified commercial sources to provide up to a maximum of $900 million of facilities support services over five years.

(2) Planning and Management. By contract, each contractor is required to maintain an in-place contingency response plan available to facilitate response to emerging requirements. The plan identifies pre-positioned resources, suppliers, and procedures for rapidly developing, detailed execution plans tailored to the specific requirements of the emergency situation. Any orders for the GCCMAC or GCSMAC must be coordinated through a NAVFAC contracting officer. The GCCMAC is managed by NAVFAC Atlantic.
and the GCSMAC is managed by the NAVFAC Pacific. Other NAVFAC components may be given ordering officer authority under this contract. Any orders for the GCCMAC must be coordinated through a NAVFAC contracting officer.

5. Navy Fleet Husbanding Contracts

a. General Capabilities. The Navy maintains a worldwide network of contracts to support US Navy ship visits in foreign ports. The contracts, some of which are regional (multination), country-wide, or port specific; are maintained by Naval Supply SYSCOM’s fleet logistics centers (FLCs) that are aligned to support Navy operational units, joint maritime component commands, and Navy supporting commands. Many of these contracts contain provisions to provide basic service and materiel support for small-scale military operations or humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions. However, they are not intended as a primary source of support for major, long-term contingency operations.

b. Planning. Husbanding contracts are designed for requirements relating to shipboard operations and adjacent to the pier/port operations. However, they can be a viable source for limited, short-duration contingency support such as vehicle rental, cell phones, and lodging arrangements for advance echelon teams. Because of the limited nature of husbanding contracts, alternative sources of contracted support must be planned for any large scale or long-term support requirements. In all cases, advanced planning and coordination with the applicable FLC is required to obtain support outside of the pre-arranged fleet support arrangements. Finally, husbanding support contracts can be a source, albeit limited, of OCS-related JIPOE information.

c. Management. Fleet husbanding support contracts are managed by AOR, with alignment of FLCs corresponding to the following AORs: FLC Norfolk maintains contracts for support of US NORTHCOM and US Southern Command operations; FLC Sigonella maintains contracts for support of US European Command, US African Command, and US Central Command operations; while FLC Yokosuka maintains contracts for support of US Pacific Command operations.

6. Navy Inland Expeditionary Contracts

These NAVSUP FLC contracts support requirements for land forces in the US Africa Command (FLC Sigonella) and US Southern Command (FLC Jacksonville) AORs. Common services and supplies available in both AORs under these contracts are land transportation, fuel, electrical power, communication services, life support (showers, latrine, potable water, laundry), lodging, and waste collection. The NAVSUP FLC expeditionary inland support contracts are indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity type contracts that can be used by all US naval forces, but ordering authority is maintained by the AOR supporting FLC. Thus, all requirements must be coordinated with the AOR supporting FLC.

7. Defense Logistics Agency Contingency Contracting Functions and Capabilities

a. General. DLA functions as an integral element of the military logistics system by providing worldwide logistics support to the Military Departments and the CCMDs under
conditions of peace and war, as well as to other DOD components and federal agencies. DLA can also provide support to state and local government organizations, foreign governments, and IGOs when authorized by law and when directed. More specifically, DLA is the DOD designated executive agent for the following commodities: subsistence (Class I); bulk fuel (Class III); construction and barrier materiel (Class IV); and medical materiel (Class VIII). DLA supply management-related operational support can be arranged through the CCMD LNO or coordinating directly with DLA HQ. **DLA also provides OCS planning, integration, and exercise support through the JCASO as described in other sections and Appendix K, “Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office.”**

b. **Capabilities.** To successfully perform this mission, DLA has developed significant contracting capabilities. Using a variety of contracting mechanisms, a large network of major suppliers, and forward deployed resources, DLA has the ability to award contracts quickly and effectively. DLA also uses long-term contracts to create efficiencies, working closely with industry to communicate requirements. **DLA employs surge clauses to increase flexibility to meet planned or unplanned demands for items or services to include direct vendor delivery in the operational area when required and feasible.** DLA manages relationships with thousands of contractors employing capabilities in supply chains extending worldwide. DLA’s use of contracted support to contingency operations has allowed Services to apply resources elsewhere, contributing to increased combat power.

c. **Planning and Management.** DLA works through the CJCS with the CCDRs and the Services to consolidate joint and Service requirements for surge and sustainment supplies and services and to execute sourcing and distribution plans, agreements, and contracts to support theater forces. Specific DLA support requirements come from the GCCs, subordinate JFCs, and the Service components commanders. DLA participates in GCC-sponsored planning conferences, developing DLA supporting plans in support of GCCs’ CONPLANs, OPLANs, and OPORDs. During these planning conferences, DLA coordinates with logistics planners for the use of DLA-specific logistics capabilities and provides input to the annex D (Logistics) and annex W (Operational Contract Support), as required. For OPLANs and CONPLANs with TPFDD, DLA develops a supporting plan, providing detailed information on how DLA capabilities will be utilized.

*See DODD 5105.22, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), for information on DLA.*
1. **General**

Theater support contracting capabilities differ between Services. Based on individual mission and organization, each Service has its own approach to develop, train, and deploy contracting personnel. Although differing in organization, training, and experience, each Service’s contingency contracting force personnel must meet the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certification requirements, including appropriate education, training, and experience. However, knowing the individual Services’ organizational approaches, capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses can help the JFC maximize the capabilities provided by each Service.

*For more information on DAWIA certification, see DODI 5000.66, Operation of the Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Workforce Education, Training, and Career Development Program.*

2. **United States Army**

   a. **General.** The Army has recently moved to an integrated, centrally controlled structure for most of its theater support contracting. The Army’s core of commissioned officers and noncommissioned officers trained as CCOs are now part of separate, O-6 level Army Materiel Command CSBs. The Army retains separate, deployable theater support contracting structure in the NGB and US Army Corps of Engineers.

   Refer to Field Manual 4-92, Contracting Support Brigade, for additional information.

   b. **Organization, Alignment, and Primary Functions.** The Army’s CSBs, made up of subordinate contingency contracting battalions and contingency contracting teams, operate under the command and HCA authority of the Expeditionary Contracting Command. CSBs and their down trace units are not fixed structures. The Army deploys mission configured CSB structures as directed by the operational commander. Army CSBs provide theater support contracting services in a DS manner to their aligned Army Service component HQ. CSBs are also the primary contracting support planner and contracting process advisor to their aligned Army Service component. In this duty, the CSB planners provide direct assistance, but do not lead, the development of the Army component annex W. When directed, CSBs can perform LSCC and LSC functions. CSBs can also serve as the basis for a JTSCC when combined with selected higher level Army contracting command HQ staff and supplemented with other Service staff via the JMD process.

   c. **Limitations and Restrictions.** Army CCOs are very well versed in providing theater support contracting services in dynamic, austere field conditions. However, the supporting CSB may require augmentation with more experienced personnel or use reachback support to handle complex service contracts. Additionally, Army policy is to deploy its five person contingency contracting terms as complete teams or as two-person
teams. The Army only deploys a single contracting officer by exception. The Army generally does not deploy individual CCOs except as non-warranted, staff duty IAs.

More details on CSB organization and operations can be found in Army Field Manual 4-92, Contracting Support Brigade.

d. Civilian Augmentation. In addition to its uniformed CCOs and noncommissioned officers, the Army has two other methods to supplement its formal CCO force structure: by deploying volunteer civilian contracting officers and employing reachback capabilities. The Army’s volunteer contracting capability is managed as part of the emergency essential Department of the Army civilian program. These civilian individuals volunteer to deploy via the Army’s G-3 [Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations] Worldwide Individual Augmentation System. These contracting officers deploy as required based on the level of support required, phase of operation, and local security conditions. Reachback support is arranged as necessary to supplement deployed military CCOs and is especially relevant in support of complex, long-term contracts.

3. United States Marine Corps

a. Theater Support Contracting. The Marine Corps maintains an organic theater support contracting capability within each Marine expeditionary force (MEF). The MEF’s contracting capability consist of uniformed personnel who can rapidly deploy and provide theater support contracting services to any size Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) or other deploying Marine unit during exercises, contingency, and humanitarian assistance disaster relief operations. Each MEF’s theater support contracting section is responsible for developing the contracting support plan as part of the overall Marine force logistics support plans that include the number of CCOs required to deploy. The Marine Corps component plans, identifies, and validates mission need for CCO support to the GCC. The Marine Corps component advises the GCC and provides contracting expertise of Marine Corps OCS within the assigned AOR.

b. Operational Contracting Oversight Cell. In large scale operations, the Marine Corps also employs an operational contracting oversight cell within the MEF G-4. The MEF operational contracting coordination cell performs the following functions: OCS planning; requirements development assistance; contract support prioritization and validation processes assistance; and COR management. This cell also provides and coordinates liaison support to the LSC, LSCC, JTSCC, and/or CAP agencies, as required. Finally, the MEF operational contracting coordination cell provides contracting oversight, guidance, and policy for MAGTF theater support contracting actions. The Marine Corps force OCS advisor coordinates liaison support and provides a conduit between the GCC and external contracting support for Marine units in the AOR. The Marine Corps force level CCO provides oversight for US Marine Corps contracting missions in the AOR.

c. Capabilities and Limitations. Marine Corps theater support contracting capability is small, but scalable to the mission and size of the MAGTF and other smaller sized marine organizations. Additionally, Marine Corps contracting officers do not contract for major construction. NAVFAC provides this type of contracting support to the Marine Corps.
Generally, the Marine Corps does not deploy civilian contracting personnel in support of its contracting mission. The Marine Corps force has a limited organic OCS capability that provides liaison and advisory support to the GCC.

4. United States Navy

a. General. The Navy leverages a logistics network infrastructure, which does not include organized contracting forces, to sustain maritime and expeditionary forces operating worldwide. Navy contracting officers assigned to field contracting and systems acquisitions commands, perform theater support contracting functions in support of deployed Navy forces operating afloat and ashore as delegated by their HCA authority. The fleet logistics task force commander is responsible at the tactical level within the Navy service component to resupply maritime forces. NAVSUP is the HCA for the fleet, the Navy Installations Command regional commanders, and their subordinate activities for services and supplies, and for all Navy activities outside the chain of command of other Navy HCAs (e.g., NAVFAC, NAVSEA, MSC). NAVFAC is the HCA for construction or base operating support services. NAVSUP contracting support is delivered through delegation of contracting authority to operational units and through the NAVSUP FLC contracting offices.

b. Supporting JMD Requirements. When a GCC identifies a long-term requirement and obtains the necessary theater support contracting manning via the JMD process, contracting officer billets sourced by the Navy, through US Fleet Forces Command, would result in a uniformed contracting officer being assigned as an IA. IA personnel assignments are currently managed at the Navy-wide level by the Navy Personnel Command. Civilian contracting officers are not utilized in the IA program. NAVSUP may deploy qualified military or civilian contracting officers in support of contingency operations. OCS planning identifies those requirements that can be provided by the Navy either as a force provider (i.e., uniformed contracting officers) or via contractual mechanism.

c. Limitations and Restrictions. Although the Navy has forward deployed contracting offices (i.e., FLC Yokosuka, FLC Sigonella, FLC Bahrain), the Navy does not have dedicated theater support contracting structure to support joint operations and has limited OCS planning and LSC/LSCC capabilities. Additionally, the Navy is not considered to have JTSCC capability. Finally, NAVSUP contracting officers provide supplies, services, and ship husbanding services to supported fleet units but do not have the authority to contract for construction. Only NAVFAC contracting officers have authority to award construction-related contracts. NAVFAC contracting officers support construction, facilities, public works, real estate, and contingency engineering requirements.

5. United States Air Force

a. General. The Air Force meets its theater support contracting needs by developing military contracting professionals, enlisted and officer, who typically spend the majority of their career in this field; augmenting home-base contracting experience with contingency training and exercises; and employing members in a predictable, structured, and managed air expeditionary force deployment process.
b. **Air Force Contracting Officer Development and Unit Readiness.** IAW Air Force policy, military contracting officers spend the majority of their careers gaining expertise through a progression of contracting assignments. Through these assignments, military contracting officers hone their skills and become proficient at a wide range of missions in support of their organization. These missions include acquisition and administration of operational support services, construction, and commodities. Additionally, many contracting officers gain experience in logistics and weapon system acquisition. These skills potentially apply to the contracting requirements faced during contingencies. Each Air Force installation supplements base support experience by providing contingency-specific training and formal exercises. Operational readiness exercises conducted by wing exercise evaluation teams and operational readiness inspections conducted by major command inspector generals gauge the unit’s ability to perform contingency operations.

c. **Organizational Alignment.** The Air Force’s military contracting capability resides in its operational and institutional forces, both of which are part of the air expeditionary force.

(1) Contracting unit type codes are deployed as part of an agile combat support team, in support of the subordinate joint force command, as part of an air expeditionary task force. These contracting unit type codes deploy to form expeditionary contracting squadrons/flights.

(2) Air Force CCOs assigned to the institutional force can be found in staffs above the wing level and within AFICA, AFMC, and AFSPC. The institutional force is required to manage Air Force programs and operations. CCOs assigned to the institutional force support the Secretary of the Air Force’s Title 10, USC, functions and are not identified with unit type codes. However, these Air Force institutional force CCOs are inherently deployable, and normally deploy to fill JMD IA requirements.

d. **Limitations and Restrictions.** The Air Force has a well-trained, experienced, and robust theater support contracting capability. However, Air Force contracting planning capabilities vary by CCMD. For US Pacific Command and US European Command, AFICA provides a significant contracting planning capability via its forward operating locations as well as reachback via its full-up staff, headquartered at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Where Air Force contracting planners are assigned to the component numbered Air Force and not part of AFICA, the Air Force contracting planning capabilities are limited.
APPENDIX D
OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT INTEGRATION CELL
ORGANIZATION AND PROCESSES

1. General

As described in Chapter III, “Contract Support Integration,” the OCSIC is the key organizational element to effective and efficient OCS planning and integration. The primary task of the OCSIC at both the GCC and subordinate JFC level is to lead the OCS planning and execution oversight effort across the joint force. This OCS-focused cell also serves as the primary collector and consolidator for major OCS-related information from various sources, to include the supporting LSC, LSCC, or JTSCC SCO; other related centers, working groups, and boards (e.g., joint logistics operations center, civil-military operations center, IFO-related cells or working groups, other support boards such as the joint facilities utilization board). This information, in its totality, becomes the OCS COP. The OCSIC ensures relevant OCS COP information flow between the subordinate JFC’s primary and special staff members, the designated lead contracting activity, and other key supporting contracting activities such as DLA, the designated military construction agent, Service CAP offices, etc. The information provided can be as simple as a geographic depiction of contracting activities operating in the JOA, or as complex as contractor management reports to include CAAF-related, IFO information, and other mission-specific OCS reports.

2. Establishment and Manning

a. **CCMD Level.** All geographic CCMDs and USSOCOM have permanent OCSICs of various sizes and configuration that include DS JCASO OCS planners and, in some cases, other CCMD assigned staff members. USSOCOM does have OCS planners assigned, but not a permanent OCSIC. In addition, USSOCOM OCS planners are assigned to Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center (Contracts) and aligned under the Director of Procurement. In general, these staffs are comprised of both military and DOD civilians with a variety of logistic planning and contingency contracting experience. During some major operations, it may be necessary to temporarily augment this standing cell.

b. **Subordinate Joint Force Command Level.** When considering the establishment of a subordinate joint force command (normally a subunified command or JTF) OCSIC, the GCC’s OCSIC staff should plan for estimated scope and scale of planned OCS actions within a particular operation. Subordinate joint force command OCSICs fluctuate in size and skill sets based on the phase of operation. In some operations, this subordinate joint force command OCSIC may be very small and never fluctuate significantly in size while in other operations it may start out relatively small, but grow significantly in both scale and scope of expertise during large-scale operations, especially sustained phase IV and transition to phase V operations. In most operations, the subordinate joint force command OCSIC should have an LNO from the lead contracting activity and other organizations as needed. This LNO requirement may significantly expand in major phase IV-V transition operations.
See Appendix H, “Phase IV-V Transition Planning and Processes,” for more information on OCSIC manning and processes in support of major contract support drawdown and transition requirements.

c. **Service Component Level.** The Services’ OCSIC capability varies at CCMD and subordinate joint force levels, but in general, it is very limited. In most component HQs, logistic staff officers perform OCSIC-like functions as an additional/collateral duty when there is no full-time, stand-alone OCSIC. The individual Service component determines the organization and manning of these Service component OCS-focused staffs. They will vary based on specific operational requirements.

d. **JMD/Augmentation Sourcing Options.** The subordinate joint force OCSIC JMD manning and GCC-level augmentation can come from numerous sources. Initial subordinate OCSIC manning may be sourced from the aligned JCASO MST. Other staff members can come from the Services, supporting CSAs, and even contractor augmentation (see Figure D-1). If contractor augmentation is contemplated, ensure the contract support requirements package clearly states the need for non-disclosure and non-competition agreements as part of the terms and conditions of the contract. In no case should the OCSIC chief position itself be occupied by a non-government employee. Also of importance, contracting officers with duty in the OCSIC will not have active contracting warrants. These contracting officers will serve as staff officers focusing on contracting support-related matters, and are not awarding or administering contracts.

See Appendix K, “Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office,” for more information on the JCASO OCS planners and MST.

3. **Tasks and Coordination Requirements**

As discussed above and in Chapter III, “Contract Support Integration,” OCSICs should be established at both the geographic CCMD and subordinate joint force command levels. At each level, OCSICs perform similar functions, but interface with different organizations. Similarities and differences between these cells are discussed below.

a. **Common OCS Integration Tasks.** OCSICs at both the strategic theater and operational levels focus on integrating major OCS-related actions across primary and special staff members, major subordinate commands, and key supporting contracting organizations. These common tasks range from providing OCS command advice to supporting and participating in OCS-related boards, centers, and working groups (see Figure D-2).
b. **CCMD Level Tasks and Coordination Requirements.** At the CCMD level, the OCSIC focuses on OCS deliberate planning, operations oversight, and training. This cell’s functions include all common OCS functions as depicted in Figure D-2 as well as GCC specific functions captured in Figure D-3. This strategic theater-level OCSIC differs from the subordinate JFC cell in that it focuses across the entire AOR, not just on one operation or single JOA. It also is a permanent, vice temporary cell. Geographic CCMD OCSIC personnel may be used to assist in forming the subordinate joint force OCSIC primarily on

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### Subordinate Joint Force Command Operational Contract Support Integration Cell Manning Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Provider</th>
<th>Type of Personnel</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JCASO</td>
<td>Contracting (unwarranted), logistics, and engineer with OCS training</td>
<td>Aligned MST is the primary source of augmentation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCMD OCSIC</td>
<td>OCS planning, contracting</td>
<td>Can be used as staff augmentation, also can serve as liaison officer to CCMD level OCSIC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Logistic planner, contracting and/or program manager</td>
<td>Program manager personnel normally only required in major operation with significant SFA requirements; Army 3C additional skill identifier personnel preferred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLA (non-JCASO)</td>
<td>Logistcian</td>
<td>Serves as liaison officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSC/LSCC</td>
<td>Contracting</td>
<td>Serves as liaison officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Agent</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Serves as liaison officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMA</td>
<td>Contracting, property administration, quality assurance</td>
<td>Augmentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor</td>
<td>Various skills</td>
<td>Not a preferred solution, but can be used if required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**

- **CCMD**  combatant command
- **DCMA**  Defense Contract Management Agency
- **DLA**  Defense Logistics Agency
- **JCASO**  Joint Contingency Acquisition Office
- **JTSCC**  joint theater support contracting command
- **LSC**  lead Service for contracting
- **LSCC**  lead Service for contracting coordination
- **MST**  mission support team
- **OCS**  operational contract support
- **OCSIC**  operational contract support integration cell
- **SFA**  security force assistance

**Figure D-1. Subordinate Joint Force Command Operational Contract Support Integration Cell Manning Sources**
Appendix D

the basis that the geographic CCMD OCSIC, a permanent cell, is most familiar with the specific planning for the contingency. However, the subordinate joint force command OCSIC positions should be filled by other sources as soon as practicable to allow the CCMD OCSIC personnel to return to their AOR-focused mission. The CCMD OCSIC routinely coordinates OCS actions with various supporting and supported organizations to include subordinate joint force command OCSICs if/when established (Figure D-4 is an example of an OCSIC placed in the J-4). It is imperative the CCMD OCSIC keep active contacts and an open dialogue with these organizations. Only through this strategic level teaming approach can OCS actions be properly planned and executed at the operational and tactical levels.

c. Subordinate Joint Force Command-Level Tasks and Coordination Requirements. At the subordinate joint force command level, the OCSIC focuses on execution planning, near-term integration, and single operations oversight. The operational level OCSIC functions include all common OCS tasks listed in Figure D-2 as well as the
Geographic Combatant Command Operational Contract Support Integration Cell Tasks

- Integrate OCS matters across all primary and special staff members.
- ICW the Service components, CSAs, and lead contracting activity collect, analyze, and disseminate phase 0/steady-state OCS-related analysis of the operational environment information.
- Coordinate with the J-2 to identify and analyze business environment-related JIPOE information.
- Coordinate with the J-4 to synchronize theater logistic analysis and OCS-related requirements efforts.
- Plan for and coordinate OCS actions for steady-state/phase 0.
- Plan and support OCS matters in GCC-directed exercises.
- Coordinate OCS training and education for selected staff members (to include OCSIC staff) and subordinate commands.
- Coordinate, develop, present, and assist in resolution of CLPSB OCS matters.
- Ensure GCC-directed, OCS-related policies and guidance are properly implemented.
- Establish and train subordinate OCSIC (when subordinate command is established).
- Maintain direct contact with subordinate OCSICs, and, when directed, detach personnel to augment and/or provide an LNO to same.
- Coordinate OCS issues directly with the JS J-4 and OUSD(AT&L) staff, as required.
- Support national strategic OCS forums, lessons learned programs, and capability development actions, as appropriate.
- Maintain and update CCMD OCS website information.
- Assist in phase IV-V OCS transition planning and integration with USG departments and agencies, OSD, and multinational partners.

Legend

- CCMD combatant command
- CLPSB combatant command logistics procurement support board
- CSA combat support agency
- GCC geographic combatant commander
- ICW in coordination with
- J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff
- J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff
- JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
- JS Joint Staff
- LNO liaison officer
- OCS operational contract support
- OCSIC operational contract support integration cell
- OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
- OUSD(AT&L) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)
- USG United States Government

Figure D-3. Geographic Combatant Command Operational Contract Support Integration Cell Tasks
tasks listed in Figure D-5. This strategic theater-level OCSIC differs from the subordinate joint force command OCSIC in that it focuses across the entire AOR, not just on one operation or single JOA. It also is a permanent, vice temporary cell.

d. Like the CCMD OCSIC, the subordinate OCSIC routinely coordinates OCS actions with various supporting and supported organizations (see Figure D-6, J-4 OCSIC placement example). Unlike the CCMD-level cell, this cell does not have time to build long-term relationships and, with assistance from the CCMD-level OCSIC, initiates these contacts as soon as it is formed. As with the CCMD-level OCSIC, it is imperative the subordinate OCSIC keep active contacts and an open dialogue with these organizations.
Subordinate Joint Force Command Operational Contract Support Integration Cell Tasks

- Collect, analyze, and share analysis of OCS aspects of the operational environment information.
- Integrate OCS matters for a specific operation at the JOA level.
- Establish and maintain OCS COP.
- Develop, refine, and recommend OCS-related EEIs to include mission-specific metrics.
- Track and report OCS CCIRs to the JLOC, recommend changes to same as necessary.
- Participate in/support JLOC daily battle rhythm actions/meetings, as required.
- Share key/OCS relevant battle assessment updates with the LSC/LSCC contracting agency/JTSCC.
- Perform JRRB secretariat function; assist in the development, promulgation, execution, and refinement of JFC JRRB policies and procedures.
- Participate in JCSB as non-voting member policy/procedures development and execution matters.
- Provide JRRB secretariat and JCSB advisor.
- Coordinate with other boards/centers (e.g., JFUB, CMOC), as required.
- Lead phase IV-V OCS transition planning and integration across the JOA with components, supporting CSAs, as well as other USG departments and agencies, and multinational partners.

Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CCIR</th>
<th>commander’s critical information requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>common operational picture</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>combat support agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEI</td>
<td>essential element of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCSB</td>
<td>joint contracting support board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFUB</td>
<td>joint facilities utilization board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JLOC</td>
<td>joint logistic operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRRB</td>
<td>joint requirements review board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTSCC</td>
<td>joint theater support contracting command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSC</td>
<td>lead Service for contracting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSCC</td>
<td>lead Service for contracting coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>operational contract support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Subordinate Joint Force Command Operational Contract Support Coordination

![Diagram of Subordinate Joint Force Command Operational Contract Support Coordination]

Legend:
- CCMD: combatant command
- CMOC: civil-military affairs operations center
- CSA: combat support agency
- JCASO: Joint Contingency Acquisition Office
- JLOC: joint logistic operations center
- JOC: joint operations center
- JPRC: joint personnel reception center
- JTSCC: joint theater support contracting command
- LSC: lead Service for contracting
- LSCC: lead Service for contracting coordination
- OCS: operational contract support
- OCSIC: operational contract support integration cell

Figure D-6. Subordinate Joint Force Command Operational Contract Support Coordination
1. General

As stated in Chapter III, “Contract Support Integration,” there should be an LSC, LSCC, or JTSCC designated for each joint operation. Per Chapter V, “Contractor Management,” the LSCs and the LSCCs designated contracting activity, and the JTSCC have two primary functions: provide theater support contracting services and coordinate common contracting actions through the JCSB or JCSB-like process (Figure E-1) to include TBC and CAD, if directed.

### Contracting Coordination Focus and Functions

#### Primary Focus

- Ensure effective and efficient theater support contracting actions.*
- Coordinate and ensure proper integration of other common contracting actions.

#### Other Major Functions

- Collect, analyze, and share contracting related information of the operational area with the OCSIC and other contracting organizations.
- Coordinate common contracting actions to reduce/eliminate duplication of effort, achieve economic ordering quantities, and eliminate undue competition between Service component theater support and Service/CSA external support contracting actions.
- Assist in implementing cost reduction strategies.
- Provide guidance/direction on consolidation of purchases.*
- Establish and enforce JOA-specific theater support contracting procedures.*
- Coordinate/prescribe payment procedures consistent with currency-control requirements and international agreements.*
- Coordinate and chair the JCSB.

* Functions performed via coordination authority in the lead Service model but would be directive in nature under the JTSCC’s C2 and HCA authority.

### Legend

- **C2**: command and control
- **CSA**: combat support agency
- **HCA**: head of contracting activity
- **JCSB**: joint contracting support board
- **JOA**: joint operations area
- **JTSCC**: joint theater support contracting command
- **OCSIC**: operational contract support integration cell

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*Figure E-1. Contracting Coordination Focus and Functions*
2. Organizational Decision Process

Theater support contracting organizational options are dependent on the specific mission support requirements and a myriad of other operational factors (Figure E-2). Determining the appropriate theater support contracting organizational option is a GCC function that should be conducted in a deliberate process during annex W development. In general, a JTSCC organizational construct should only be considered for large, complex, long-term operations where there will be significant contracted support requirements and a strong likelihood of competition for limited, locally available, commercially provided services and supplies. In less complex, short-term operations, an LSC or LSCC construct would be more appropriate.

3. Contracting Related Lead Service Organization Considerations

   a. General. The LSC and LSCC designations are a GCC-level function. Normally, a GCC institutes LSCC designations for specific geographic areas or regions within their AOR for phase 0 operations. In phase 0 operations, the Services normally retain C2 and HCA contracting authority over their deployed contingency contracting organizations. In most cases, the LSCC would come from the Service component with the preponderance of forces and/or established resources, bases, theater security cooperation activities, etc., in the country or region. In general, the Army and the US Air Force are the most capable Services to perform this mission. When and if warranted by changes to operational requirements, the GCC may direct the transition to an LSC or JTSCC organizational construct.

   b. Organizational Construct. As described in Appendix C, “Service’s Theater Support Contracting Organizations and Capabilities,” Service theater support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theater Support Contracting Organizational Option Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Size, primary mission focus, and expected duration of the operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Expected scope, criticality, and complexity of the contracting coordination requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Most capable Service in theater support contracting capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Existing common-user logistics and/or base operating support–integrator designations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Existing intra-Service support agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Location of supported units as compared to available commercial vendor base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Need for enhanced joint force commander control of the theater support contracting to include contingency contract administration services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Need to implement formal theater business clearance authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Need to more directly synchronize contracting actions with integrated financial operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure E-2. Theater Support Contracting Organizational Option Factors
contracting organizations are designed to meet Service component requirements. In joint operations, the designated LSC contracting activity may require at least limited staff augmentation from the JCASO or other Service contracting activities to perform contracting coordination functions (see Figure E-3). In long-term joint operations, where there is significant support to other Services and/or multi-national partners, the LSC contracting activity may also require augmentation to perform contracting and/or CCAS functions. In any case, LSC augmentation requests would need to be forwarded to and endorsed by both the subordinate JFC and the supported GCC.

c. In determining mission-specific LSC or LSCC coordination cell requirements, care must be taken to not use scarce contracting personnel for positions that could be adequately filled with non-contracting officer military occupational specialties. In any case, the supported GCC should ensure the LSC or LSCC is properly augmented when necessary. Specific LSC or LSCC coordination cell positions, general qualifications, and associated functions include, but may not be limited to:

(1) **Cell Chief.** The contracting cell chief position is a full-time position that should be filled with an individual possessing DAWIA Level III certification in contracting
and significant operational experience. The cell chief primary responsibilities include, but may not be limited to:

(a) Lead the common contracting coordination effort in the operational area.
(b) Serve as JRRB advisor, as directed.
(c) Serve as the JCSB chair, as directed.
(d) Provide contracting advice to supported units, when requested.

(2) **Contracting Plans and Operations Officer(s).** This full-time position (or positions) will always be necessary when forming a contracting coordination cell. The contracting plans and operations officer serves as the coordination cell chief and supplements the existing lead Service theater support contracting activity plans and operations staff to perform the expanded LSC contracting planning and operations mission. This individual (or individuals) should have DAWIA level III contracting certification, preferably with contingency contracting, and if possible, planning experience. The contracting plans and operations officer’s primary duties include, but may not be limited to:

(a) Manage and analyze the effectiveness, efficiency of in-theater contracting organization structure and the joint contracting coordination process.
(b) Continue to collect, analyze, and share analysis of the operational environment as it relates to OCS information.
(c) Analyze and recommend operational area-wide contracting strategies.
(d) Develop and coordinate JCSB agenda.
(e) Work closely with the command’s OCSIC LNO to ensure effective and efficient synchronization of JRRB and JCSB actions.

(3) **Contracting Data Base Manager.** This full-time position will always be necessary when forming an LSC contracting coordination cell. This position does not require DAWIA certification or any specific military occupation specialty. The contracting data base manager’s primary duties include, but may not be limited to:

(a) Tracking contracting organization office/JCSB organization information (e.g., title, contact information, location).
(b) Maintaining information on the contracting force laydown (e.g., number of deployed contracting personnel by organization, DAWIA certification level, contracting warrant levels, location).
(c) Maintaining information on major, mission critical, and other designated contracts and task orders for commonly procured goods and services (e.g., theater support contracts, CAP task orders).

(d) Maintaining contact information of pay agents supporting the JOA (e.g., name, email, phone number, location, units supported).

(e) Sharing all of the above information with the subordinate joint force command OCSIC.

(4) **JCSB Secretary.** The JCSB secretary is a required position that could be either a part-time or full time duty depending on the workload. This position does not require a DAWIA certified person, but should be filled with someone with conference coordination experience and related skills. The JCSB secretary primary responsibilities include, but may not be limited to:

(a) ICW the data base manager, maintain and distribute designated JSCB members contact information.

(b) Develop and promulgate JCSB meeting schedules and agendas.

(c) Prepare and promulgate policies and procedures for JCSB meeting sessions.

(d) Serve as the JCSB meeting coordinator/facilitator.

(e) Capture and distribute critical JCSB decisions, due-outs, etc., and ensure follow-up to questions or issues.

(5) **OCSIC LNO.** This could be a full-time or part time position depending on the specific operational requirement. The person filing this position should be experienced in both planning and contracting. The OCSIC LNO primary responsibilities include, but may not be limited to:

(a) Serve as the day-to-day LSC contracting activity representative to the subordinate joint force command HQ.

(b) Facilitate communications and information sharing between the subordinate JFC and the LSC contracting activity.

(c) Assist subordinate joint force command OCSIC in developing OCS-related plans, orders, and other command guidance.

(d) Provide contracting-related advice to OCSIC members and other subordinate joint force command staff members, as required.
(6) **Service and/or CSA LNO.** These would be full time positions provided by the appropriate Service component theater support contracting activity and/or CSA (normally DLA).

(a) Serve as the day-to-day representative to the LSC contracting activity.

(b) Facilitate communications and information sharing between the Service contracting activity/CSA to the LSC contracting activity.

(c) Assist LSC contracting activities in developing contracting-related plans and strategies.

(7) **Multinational/Interagency Coordinator.** This coordinator position could either be part-time or full-time depending on specific operational factors. An experienced contracting officer, preferably with interagency experience should fill this position. The multinational/interagency coordinator’s primary responsibilities include, but may not be limited to:

(a) ICW the contracting data base manager, establish and maintain contact information on multinational and USG departments and agencies contracting organizations.

(b) Share DOD and collect multinational/interagency contracting information, whenever possible.

(c) Synchronize and deconflict DOD, other USG, and multinational contracting actions to the extent possible.

(d) Assist the subordinate joint force command OCSIC staff to consider, develop, obtain approval for, and implement multinational contracting support agreements.

(e) Assist the subordinate joint force command OCSIC staff to plan and execute contracting support of designated USG departments and agencies.

(f) Assist the subordinate joint force command OCSIC staff to plan and execute the phase IV to V transition of contracting support to other USG departments and agencies.

**Coordination Process.** The designated LSC contracting activity, through its contracting coordination cell and the JCSB process, is responsible for coordinating common contracting actions across multiple contracting organizations operating within the operational area (Figure E-4). The LSC or LSCC contracting coordination cell ensures all in-theater Service, CSA, multinational, and when feasible, other USG departments’ and agencies,’ contracting organizations share contracting-related analysis of OCS aspects of the operational environment information, coordinate/deconflict contract actions and, in general, attempt to avoid undue competition for the same commercial commodities and services within the operational area.
4. Joint Theater Support Contracting Command Considerations

a. **General.** The primary task of the JTSCC is to effectively and efficiently synchronize all theater support contracting under a single C2 structure and provide responsive contracting support to the joint force command. Like the LSC and LSCC construct, the JTSCC would have a key secondary task to execute coordination authority over designated contracting activities supporting the joint force. In some cases, this coordination authority will include specific TBC functions over DOD contracts with performance or delivery in the operational area.

b. **Authorities.** Per Title 10, USC, and JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, the GCC has the authority to establish subordinate joint commands (i.e., a JTSCC) to accomplish specific mission tasks. However, since acquisition authority is not
inherent to combatant command (command authority), the supported GCC coordinates the issuance of an HCA authority designation letter from the Service SPE of the Service component directed to form the building block for the JTSCC SCO contracting authority to support the contingency as directed in the annex W. The GCC would normally pre-coordinate the HCA authority requirement with the appropriate Service SPE with the authority to become effective upon the standup of the JTSCC as directed in the execute order or FRAGORD. The execute order or FRAGORD should also include specific common contracting coordination requirements (i.e., requirement to participate in the JCSB process and follow TBC/CAD guidance) to designated contracting organizations delivering or executing support in the operational area. Such guidance will require pre-coordination and support from USD(AT&L) to extend appropriate authorities to the GCC to ensure DOD components comply with contracting related boards and TBC/CAD guidance.

c. Planning. Planning for the establishment of a JTSCC can be a significant effort due to the complexity of such a command, the associated workload analysis, required staffing, and supporting acquisition authority documentation. Therefore, to ensure there is no gap in contracting support, the GCC should designate an LSC at the earliest possible time with the intent of transforming the LSC contracting activity into a JTSCC, possibly tied to specified operations specific trigger points. The CCMD-level OCSIC will lead the JTSCC planning effort with the designated LSC contracting activity in support. Specific planning considerations are covered in Figure E-5.

d. Organizational and Manning Construct. Like other subordinate joint force command HQ, a JTSCC HQ is organized along the standard joint command and staff model (see Figure E-6). However, there are significant differences when it comes to the organization and manning of some of these staff elements.

e. The subordinate elements organization, manning, and functions are unique to the JTSCC. Specific JTSCC staff and subordinate organizational and manning discussion follows:

(1) HQ Element. The JTSCC HQ element is similar to any other subordinate JFC organization and consists of:

(a) Commanding Officer. The JTSCC commander is normally a one or two-star level flag/general officer with significant contracting experience. The JTSCC commander serves as the HCA and provides contract warrant authority to subordinate SCOs and all attached CCOs.

(b) Aide de Camp. Performs similar functions as any other aide de camp and does not require DAWIA certification.

(c) Senior Enlisted Advisor. Performs similar functions as any other senior enlisted advisor, and while this position does not require DAWIA certification, a senior noncommissioned officer with contracting experience is preferred.

(2) Primary Staff. The JTSCC primary staff element is similar to any other subordinate joint force primary staff organizations with some differences in the intelligence
Theater Support Contracting Organizational Options

Joint Theater Support Contracting Command Establishment Planning Considerations

- Scope of operation to include TBC and CCAS requirements
- Base organization (LSC contracting activity)
- Extant contracting activities in/near the operational area and contract vehicles that can be modified to support the anticipated mission requirements
- Augmentation/staffing requirements to include HQ staff and subordinate contracting elements to include numbers, standards of grade, and/or DAWIA certification levels (should strive to minimize DAWIA-certified positions)
- HCA, TBC, and CAD authority designations and/or policies
- Transition points, milestones, triggers
- Sourcing strategy to include CCMD-aligned Service contracting organizations, the JCASO, CSA, and non-aligned Service organizations (priority to CCMD-aligned organizations)
- Reachback capabilities plan
- Budget estimates
- Location, infrastructure, and other base operating service requirements
- Acquisition instruction (including process for expeditiously translating JFC requirements affecting contractors and their personnel into local guidance [provisions/clauses] and disseminating them)
- Ancillary support requirements (translators, FP, facilities)
- HCA oversight and support arrangements
- Internal staff procedures, training plan

Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>contract administration delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCAS</td>
<td>contingency contract administration services</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCMD</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>combat support agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAWIA</td>
<td>Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>force protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCA</td>
<td>head of contracting activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCASO</td>
<td>Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSC</td>
<td>lead Service for contracting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBC</td>
<td>theater business clearance</td>
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Figure E-5. Joint Theater Support Contracting Command Establishment Planning Considerations

directorate of a joint staff (J-2), J-3, and J-5 functions. At a minimum, a JTSCC primary staff element should consist of the following staff sections and personnel qualifications:

(a) **Chief of Staff.** Performs similar functions as any other chief of staff, but because of the contracting operations focused mission, requires DAWIA level III certification in contracting.
(b) **J-1 Personnel.** Performs similar functions as any other J-1 and does not require DAWIA certification.
(c) **J-2/3/5 Security, Operations, and Plans.** Primary staff position that plans and prioritizes contracting actions for the commander in order to effectively and efficiently support the JFC’s mission. This staff section should be led by a senior DAWIA level III certified contracting officer with significant operational experience. In major long-term operations, the intelligence and contracting plans cell could be separate primary staff. The contracting operations section should include:

1. **Intelligence Branch.** The intelligence directorate may not be required for a JTSCC if the JTSCC can leverage support from the JFC’s J-2. If formed, the JTSCC J-2 performs similar functions as any other J-2, but is more focused on OCS matters within the JIPOE process. This section does not require DAWIA certified personnel.

2. **Contracting Operations Branch.** This branch is responsible for monitoring and providing staff oversight on the day-to-day contracting operations, to include CCAS and TBC/CAD actions affecting the command. If there are major TBC requirements and the TBC process is not otherwise being covered as part of the functions of the OCSIC, this branch could include a separate TBC reachback cell or this mission could be tasked to the SCO reachback. It should be headed by a DAWIA level III certified contracting officer, but its overall staff should be a mixture of DAWIA and non-DAWIA personnel.

3. **External Operations Branch.** This branch is similar to the LSC coordination cell described above. It is responsible for all external coordination efforts to include the JSCB and OCSIC LNO functions. This branch should be headed by a DAWIA level II or III certified contracting officer.

4. **Training Branch.** This branch is responsible for internal staff and subordinate CCO training. It should be headed by a DAWIA level II or III certified contracting officer.

5. **Policy Branch Section.** This branch is responsible to create and maintain the JTSCC AI, and work acquisition-related policy issues and actions with the Service HCA coordination office and subordinate organizations, as required. It should be headed by a DAWIA level II or III certified contracting officer.

6. **Future Plans Branch.** This branch is responsible for working future plans-related actions in close coordination with the higher level J-5 office. This branch should be a mixture of a DAWIA certified contracting officers and non-DAWIA officers with planning experience.

(d) **J-4 Logistics.** Performs similar functions as any other J-4 and does not require DAWIA certified personnel.

(e) **J-6 Communications.** Performs similar functions as any other J-6 and does not require DAWIA certified personnel.

(3) **Special Staff.** The JTSCC will have a very small special staff, with the legal office being of primary importance. Details follow:
(a) **Contract Law.** Performs in a legal advisory capacity for the command in the execution of contracts. This section requires experienced SJA personnel with contract and fiscal law background.

(b) **Other.** A JTSCC may or may not have additional special staffs such as chaplain, public affairs, and comptroller. If these staff positions are not organic to the JTSCC, arrangements for such support should be made with the next higher level command.

(4) **Subordinate Commands.** In some situations, a JTSCC will have multiple SCOs and subordinate contracting organizations.

(a) **SCO.** The SCO serves as the principal contracting representative for the JTSCC commander. The SCO commands, provides mentorship and contracting oversight of subordinate regional contracting centers (RCCs) and regional contracting offices (RCOs). In some operations, there could be a separate SCO for CCAS and for reachback contracting. All SCOs must be DAWIA level III certified contracting officers, preferably with significant operational experience. Responsibilities of SCOs in a typical JTSCC include:

1. **SCO Theater Support.** The SCO for theater support (referred to as simply the SCO if no other JTSCC SCO is established) ensures efficient and effective pre-award processes and contract awards for all in-theater contracting actions.

2. **SCO for CCAS.** The SCO for CCAS is responsible for executing theater-wide contract administration as directed by the JTSCC commander. This includes concept of CCAS support, CAD clearance process, CCAS of selected theater and external support contracts, COR requirements, training, and oversight. JMD manning for this office will include ACOs, QARs, property administration, and where appropriate, technical inspectors. These military or DOD civilian technical inspector SMEs will assist both unit CORs and JTSCC QARs in any and all technical oversight matters. Contracted technical inspection services may be utilized if insufficient military or DOD civilian SMEs are available. All technical inspection services will be executed in strict compliance with the FAR. This SCO works closely with SCO reachback to respond to CAD requests.

3. **SCO Reachback.** The SCO reachback, when formed, is responsible for executing reachback contracting using stateside or forward stationed contracting capabilities as directed by the JTSCC commander. The SCO reachback works very closely with SCO theater support to determine which contracts should be executed in theater or via reachback. SCO reachback may also be responsible for processing TBC/CAD requests, maintaining TBC/CAD data, and working with the OCSIC TBC/CAD on related issues.

(b) **RCCs and RCOs.** RCCs are regionally focused organizations made up of warranted military CCOs and/or civilian contracting personnel tasked to execute contracting actions in support deployed joint forces. RCOs are similar, but smaller, version of the RCCs.

(c) **CCAS Regional Offices.** Regionally focused CCAS offices should be established when there is an SCO CCAS. These offices provide CCAS to JTSCC commander designated theater support contracts and external support contracts (mostly CAP
task orders). These offices are composed of DAWIA certified ACOs, QARs, and property administrators.

(d) **HCA Authority Oversight/Support Office.** As stated at the beginning of this section, the JTSCCs receive their contracting authority from one of the Service SPEs, normally the Army or the Air Force. The Service providing this authority will normally stand-up an HCA authority oversight office to ensure JTSCC contracting is performed IAW the FAR, DFARS, and other contracting authority-related guidance. This Service HCA organization is not covered in the JTSCC JMD, is not deployed, and is not under the C2 of the GCC, but is an important part of the JTSCC operations. These types of operational matters should be worked through the subordinate JFC, to the GCC, and back to the JS in the Pentagon, if necessary. The HCA oversight/support office responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

1. Plan and execute contract management reviews.
2. Assist in the establishment of JTSCC reachback capabilities to include contract closeout support.
4. Approve acquisitions above the JTSCC approval level.
5. Provide legislative coordination/issue support.
6. Review and coordinate local clauses with the Defense Acquisition Regulation System Council.
7. Coordinate contract audit support.
8. Provide reachback contract law support.
APPENDIX F
OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT-RELATED BOARDS

1. General

As discussed in Chapter III, “Contract Support Integration,” the CLPSB, JRRB, and JCSB are the primary OCS-related boards used to ensure OCS actions, to include any operational specific TBC directives, are properly synchronized across the joint force. Like other related joint force command level boards these boards can be held as needed, meet simultaneously, or even be merged as needed.

2. Combatant Commander Logistic Procurement Support Board

a. Purpose. The CLPSB is the GCC’s primary mechanism to establish AOR-wide OCS policies and procedures; determine theater support contracting and coordination organizational options; coordinate with other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, and HNs on OCS issues and actions; and coordinate with DOD and Military Departments on potential loss of contract support and risk management. This board can also address mission specific OCS matters that cannot be resolved at the subordinate joint force command level.

b. Organization and Processes. The CLPSB meets on an as needed basis. The CLPSB has no fixed structure and minimal formal processes. It is chaired by the GCC’s J-4 and made up of selected CCMD primary and special staff, CSA, and Service component logistic staff and contracting activity representatives.

Additional information on the CLPSB can be found in JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

3. Joint Requirements Review Board

a. Purpose. The JRRB is the subordinate JFC’s mechanism to review, validate, prioritize, and approve selected Service component contract support requests. The JRRB is an operations focused, vice contracting focused, board designed to control mission critical, high-dollar contract requests and ensure other sources of support (organic military, multinational, and HNS) have been properly considered before commercial support solutions. The JRRB also serves as the subordinate JFC’s venue to assess possible operational impacts of specific contract support requests and, when necessary, provide operationally focused guidance on acquisition strategy to the JCSB (e.g., the required service is a potential high security threat, so guidance is to not use a LN company for this support; request priority to local commercial sources per “LN first” policy). As on operations focused board, the subordinate JFC needs to ensure the JRRB has proper J-3 staff advisors and/or links to the joint operations center. Finally, the JRRB is also a key mechanism to enforce standards of support, other JOA/theater restrictions, and command cost control measures. Of note, in some operations Service components may establish their own requirements review boards. These Service component boards are often used to ensure Service requirements packages are properly prepared and justified prior to being submitted to the JRRB.
Appendix F

b. **Organization.** The JRRB is normally established during any sustained operation that includes significant levels of contracted support. And while there is no fixed or mandated structure, the JRRB is normally chaired by the subordinate JFC’s deputy commander for support or designated primary staff officer. Its membership normally includes both voting and non-voting representatives from the subordinate JFC’s staff, Service component commands, along with supporting CSAs, and contracting/contract support organizations (Figure F-1). Designated OCSIC members are normally responsible for JRRB secretariat functions. It is also important to note, contractor personnel may not serve as JRRB voting members and any contractor involved in JRRB administrative support must have a signed nondisclosure agreement.

(1) **Primary Member Duties.** Primary members serve as the voting body of the JRRB. They are responsible for reviewing individual requirements packages in a timely and unbiased manner as well as supporting JRRB meetings. Most importantly, primary members must be empowered to represent their staffs/commands in the voting process.

(2) **Advisory Member Duties.** JRRB advisory members’ (to include LSC, LSCC, or JTSCC, CSA, and CAP representatives) main responsibilities are to inform the primary (voting) JRRB members what contracting mechanisms are readily available to meet requested contract support and to provide advice on the limits, constraints, and other issues related to their specific contracted support. **JRRB advisory members must have sufficient expertise to provide sound and timely advice in their respective AOR.**

(3) **Secretariat Duties.** The OCSIC provided JRRB secretariat is responsible for ensuring JFC directed JRRB policies and procedures are enforced. This includes coordinating requirements package processing and recording the JRRB process and results as shown in Figure F-2. The JRRB secretary or other designated OCSIC member should also conduct an on-going analysis of JRRB requests and processes to ascertain:

(a) The general effectiveness and responsiveness of the JRRB process and individual members.

(b) The need to modify the JRRB controlled item list, battle rhythm, membership, and/or processes.

(c) Which common services or commodities should be consolidated under a single requiring activity, normally the Service component or CSA responsible for related CUL or other common support function.

(d) If JFC directed cost control guidance is being enforced and/or if this guidance needs to be modified.

(e) Effectiveness of the JRRB in providing contract sourcing guidance (especially important in COIN operations).

c. **Process.** Initial JRRB guidance is established in the JFC’s annex was coordinated by the CCMD level OCSIC planners. This initial JRRB guidance should be based on established CCMD JRRB policies and procedures adjusted for mission unique requirements.
Operational Contract Support-Related Boards

Initial mission specific JRRB establishment guidance will normally include any changes to primary and advisory membership, battle rhythm, initial thresholds/controlled requirements, contract support requirements package required document list, and meeting methodology (e.g., physical or virtual meeting process). The subordinate joint force command level OCSIC coordinates and publishes mission-specific changes to JRRB policies and procedures via the FRAGORD process.

(1) **Establishing Thresholds and Controlled Services.** Not all requirements need to be controlled by the JFC via the JRRB process. Normally, only high-dollar and mission
critical common support contract support requests will be required to be processed through the JRRB process. As the mission progresses, the JRRB thresholds and controlled services list will be adjusted. For example, the dollar threshold is likely to be increased as the mission progresses from phase III to IV. JRRB controlled commodities and services vary depending on specific mission requirements, but could include the following restricted contract support items:

(a) Service or commodity request that exceeds a designated estimated value (e.g., $1,000,000).

(b) Services with a period of performance in excess of 90 days.

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**Sample Joint Requirements Review Board Contract Support Requirements Package Checklist**

Signature authority of this requirements package certifies the following questions have answered in the affirmative in relations to this contract support request package:

- The item and/or service being requested is a valid and accurately defined requirement.
- This request represents a consolidation of all similar requirements known at this time.
- The deficiency cannot be addressed through organic or other sources of support.

All requirements package items are enclosed and completed in accordance with current command policies:

- [x] letter of justification
- [x] funding document
- [x] performance work statement or statement of work
- [x] quality assurance surveillance plan
- [x] government cost estimate
- [x] contracting officer representative nomination packet (for all service contracts)
- [x] other supporting documents

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Figure F-2. Sample Joint Requirements Review Board Contract Support Requirements Package Checklist
(c) Initial establishment of CAP support and recommended changes to CAP use guidance as appropriate.

(d) Special interest items as determined by the subordinate joint force command chief of staff or J-3 (e.g., armed PSC services, FP supplies).

(e) Minor construction and facility-related services above designated dollar amount (when joint facilities utilization board is not established).

(f) Request for communications and information technology equipment or systems (less ancillary communication-related supplies such as computer/printer cables, compact disks) that will be connected to the network regardless of estimated cost.

(2) Contract Support Requirements Package. All requiring activities will be responsible for developing “acquisition ready” contract support requirements packages IAW guidance issued in annex W and any subsequent FRAGORDs. Specific JRRB documentation requirements vary depending on what is being requested, but there are some basic documents that apply to all packages:

(a) **Justification Memo.** All JRRB contract support requests must have a justification memo that clearly states what the requirement is and what contracted commodity and/or service is being requested to meet the requirement. These memos must include information on how the requiring activity determined the requirement and what other sources of support were considered in this process. Finally, the justification memo must be signed by appropriate level commander as delineated in the JRRB FRAGORD instructions.

(b) **Additional Staff Signatures.** Mission specific JRRB procedures will normally require additional staff signatures. Additional signatures ensure the service or commodity is not available through normal military channels. They also ensure accuracy of the requirement (e.g., supply officer signature certifying a particular commodity is unavailable through, or at zero balance in, the military supply system; staff engineer validates the accuracy of a minor construction-related contract support requirements package). And, they address any special approvals required based on CCMD/subordinate joint force command guidance (e.g., arming approvals). This staff review will normally include an SJA review.

(c) **Funding Documentation.** An appropriate Service requisition document must be included in all contract support requirements packages. Approved funding documents include: Department of the Army Form 3953, Purchase Request and Commitment, Air Force Form 9, Navy Supplement Form 1250-2, Department of Defense Form (DD) 448 (Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request [MIPR]), DD 448-2 (Acceptance of MIPR), Navy Marine Corps Form 2275 and 2276, Air Force Form 4009, DD 1348, and DD 1149.

(d) **PWS/SOW.** All requests for contracted services must include a PWS/SOW that clearly defines the service, to include its specific standards. It is the requiring activities’ responsibility, not the supporting contracting organizations,’ to determine these standards of support. All standards of support should adhere to JFC
Appendix F

guidance if such guidance has been issued. The supporting contracting organization normally provides customers with requirements package checklists but can also provide assistance in ensuring the PWS/SOW is properly formatted and sufficiently detailed.

(e) Independent Government Cost Estimate. All requests for contracted services must also include an independent government cost estimate. Like the PWS/SOW, it is the requiring activities’ responsibility to determine the approximate cost of the required supply or service. As with the PWS/SOW, the supporting contracting organization may be able to provide guidance and assistance in developing this cost estimate.

(f) Other Supporting Documents. The requiring activity should include any supporting documentation that may clarify what is being requested and why it is necessary. Examples include: sole source justification and approval memo, copy of unit property book files, command policy documents that mandate required support. Additionally, DOD policies requires all services-related contract requests to contain a written statement that the work is appropriate to contract and a determination from component manpower official that the requested service is not inherently governmental or exempt from private sector performance.

See DODI 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix, for additional guidance on service contract-related manpower review requirements.

(3) Battle Rhythm and Meeting Process. There are no predetermined JRRB meeting battle rhythms or processes, but the JRRB meeting frequency, venue (e.g., physical or virtual), and processes must be designed to be responsive to specific mission requirements. In any case, JRRB meeting procedures should include an “emergency” contract request process accompanied by specific parameters on what constitutes an “emergency” (e.g., a request for MWR-related services would not be considered an emergency). Basic JRRB steps are addressed below and graphically depicted in Figure F-3.

(a) Requirements that meet JRRB thresholds will be formatted per annex W or subsequent FRAGORD guidance for submission to the JRRB secretariat. Whenever possible, the JRRB secretariat should use automated tasking/routing tools or software packages to improve the efficiency of the requirements review process.

(b) The JRRB secretariat reviews the package for completeness. If the package requires additional items, the JRRB secretariat will engage the requiring activity point of contact for correction of any discrepancies noted. Incomplete packages will not be presented to JRRB members.

(c) The JRRB secretariat assigns a JRRB number to the completed package and forwards it to the JRRB members for review (via automated means or e-mail).

(d) JRRB members review the package, voting members render their vote, and return their comments to the JRRB secretariat within prescribed timelines. During this step, non-voting members have an opportunity to submit any major concerns related to the specific requirement document (e.g., the RM may submit input related to funding concerns). All votes recommending approval will include recommended priority based on priority of
support guidance found in annex D (Logistics) or annex W (OCS). Additionally, the JRRB will provide contract sourcing solution guidance as appropriate.

(e) If minor issues arise, the voting member will normally engage the requiring activity point of contact for resolution. If significant issues arise (e.g., questions on appropriate contract sourcing solution, need for consolidation of contract requirements), the voting board member may request a physical or virtual JRRB meeting to discuss packages.
submitted for review. Non-voting members also may request a JRRB meeting to discuss a specific contract support request or to address general trends. These JRRB meetings will include all primary and advisory members. If a meeting is requested, the JRRB secretariat will schedule the meeting within the prescribed timelines.

(f) If there are no questions or concerns, the JRRB secretariat records the results submitted by voting members and forwards them to the JRRB chairman who makes the final decision.

(g) Approved packages are forwarded to the decision authority (the JFC, normally represented by the chief of staff) for formal approval.

(h) Upon decision authority approval, packages are forwarded to the appropriate resource manager then on to the JCSB where final acquisition decisions take place. The JCSB secretariat will coordinate with the JRRB secretariat to initiate resolution process between them in the event JCSB members do not agree with the JRRB-recommended contract sourcing solution.

(i) The JRRB secretariat will notify requiring activities of disapproved packages. A common misconception is that once the JRRB recommends approval of a contract support request, the requiring activity can expect to see the contract support initiated in very short order. Depending on the urgency and priority of the request and other factors (e.g., whether or not the contract solicitation is required to go out for bid), time from JRRB recommended approval to contract execution can take weeks or even months.

4. Joint Contracting Support Board Function and Processes

   a. Purpose. The JCSB is the subordinate JFC’s primary mechanism to coordinate and deconflict common contracting actions between theater support contracting and external support contracting activities executing or delivering contracted support within the operational area. It is also the major mechanism to implement JRRB guidance when it comes to determining the appropriate contracting mechanism (theater support, CAP task orders, and other common external contract) for major, common services. The goals of the JCSB are twofold: ensure contract support actions support the JFC’s OCS-related command guidance (e.g., maximize the use of LN firms, reduce costs) and maximize contracting capabilities of the JOA while minimizing the competition for limited vendor capabilities. More specific JCSB tasks are captured in Figure F-4.

   b. Organization. A JCSB is normally made up of representatives from the Service component’s theater and external support contracting organizations (to include facility/engineering contracting and CAP offices), DLA, and a representative from the subordinate joint force command OCSIC. The JCSB membership may also include multinational and other USG department and agency representatives, as appropriate. The LSC, LSCC, or JTSCC SCO should work with the OCSIC to address specific JCSB membership issues such as enforcing participation and adding or deleting members. The LSC, LSCC contracting activity or JTSCC are responsible for the JCSB’s administration. Some of the JCSB secretary duties are to:
Joint Contracting Support Board Tasks

- Identify, avoid, reduce, and where possible, eliminate duplication of contracting efforts within the operational area and maximize achievement of economic order quantities.
- Reduce, avoid competition between contracting efforts within the operational area.
- Maximize in-theater contracting officer capabilities.
- Determine appropriate external or theater support contracting mechanism best suited to meet the JFC’s operational requirements and per JRRB specific guidance (when provided).
- Develop, coordinate, and synchronize contracting organizations contracting strategies.
- Assist in the implementation of the JFC’s cost reduction/avoidance guidance.
- Serve as the principal forum for the exchange of information among in-theater contracting activities with emphasis on such matters as sources of supply, prices, and contractor performance.
- Direct consolidation of contracts as appropriate.
- Provide advice (via the JRRB and/or OCSIC) on requirements consolidation.

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<tr>
<th>JFC</th>
<th>joint force commander</th>
<th>JRRB</th>
<th>joint requirements review board</th>
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<tr>
<td>OCSIC</td>
<td>operational contract support integration cell</td>
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Figure F-4. Joint Contracting Support Board Tasks

1. Establish and maintain the JCSB member contact information.
2. Coordinate meeting times, venues (to include technical aspects).
3. Develop and announce meeting agendas.
4. Develop, disseminate, and archive meeting minutes.
Appendix F

In the US Pacific Command’s (USPACOM’s) area of responsibility (AOR), the aligned Service component contracting organizations set up what amounted to an AOR-level standing joint contracting support board (JCSB) which included pre-coordinated and approved standard operating procedures. This USPACOM coordination board, chaired by the US Air Force Pacific’s A7K Contracting Command senior contracting officer, met on a regular basis to coordinate Phase 0 and other major common contracting actions and issues across the AOR. Having this established AOR-level board allowed USPACOM to quickly transition this standing JCSB to a joint operations area level board in support of Operation TOMODACHI.

SOURCE: USPACOM after action report, July 2011

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SOURCE: USPACOM after action report, July 2011

c. Process. The GCC should direct the establishment of a JCSB in any major contingency operation where there will be significant possibility of redundancy and competition between different Services or CSA contract actions. JCSBs can also be utilized in certain steady-state/phase 0 operations. The JCSB is convened and administratively supported by the LSC, LSCC, or the JTSCC as directed by the OPORD annex W or follow-on FRAGORD. JCSB meetings can be physical, virtual, or a combination of both. A JCSB’s battle rhythm should be tied to the subordinate JFC’s battle rhythm, with focus on the JRRB schedule. Of course, off cycle JCSB meetings can be held as necessary. Key to the JCSB battle rhythm is a rapid response to the JRRB approved contract support requests. The content of JCSB agendas, in addition to including reviews of JRRB-approved requests, varies, but can include any and all actions necessary to ensure proper synchronization and deconfliction of contracting actions in the JOA (Figure F-5).
## Joint Contracting Support Board Agenda Items

- Review all JRRB forwarded requests, determine appropriate contracting agency to execute the contract.
- Review and discuss current OCS COP and effects on the overall contacting effort within the JOA.
- Review, compare, share information on major contracts.
  - Identify service contracts and commodity buys that are or could potentially be in competition or duplicative.
  - Identify service contracts and commodity buys for possible consolidation to include establishment of blanket purchase agreements.
  - Review service and commodity request for possible requirements consolidation.
  - Determine contracts that could/should be transferred from one contracting agency to another.
- Review contractor management and oversight procedures, challenges, issues.
- Review, coordinate financial support procedures, challenges, issues.
- Review, coordinate CCO personnel strategies.
- Share OCS business and JIPOE related information such as:
  - Legal and regulatory issues that may affect contracting operations.
  - Currency constraints or issues that would affect payment of invoices.
  - Business environment and trends.
  - Contractor information such as debarment lists, vendor lists.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CCO</td>
<td>contingency contracting officer</td>
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<td>COP</td>
<td>common operational picture</td>
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<td>JIPOE</td>
<td>joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
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<td>joint operations area</td>
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<td>joint requirements review board</td>
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**Figure F-5. Joint Contracting Support Board Agenda Items**
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APPENDIX G
ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT ASPECTS OF
THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1. General

OCS can significantly affect a commander’s ability to execute the mission. However, OCS can also influence diplomatic relations, a nation’s economy, and the enemy. It is imperative that a detailed analysis of the OCS aspects of the operational environment be prepared to help shape COA development and determine the possible intended and unintended outcomes of OCS. The operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Understanding the operational environment is fundamental to identifying the conditions required to achieve stated objectives; avoiding the effects that may hinder mission accomplishment (undesired effects); and assessing the impact of friendly, adversarial, and other actors, such as the local populace, on the commander’s concept of operations and progress toward achieving the JFC’s objectives.

2. Analyzing Operational Contract Support Aspects of the Operational Environment

a. The GCC’s and JFC’s OCSICs are responsible for gathering and analyzing OCS aspects of the operational environment data among the Service components and various staff organizations. This collaboration will strengthen the organization’s holistic view of the operational environment, support COA development, and synchronize contracting activities with the operation. The OCSIC should conduct data analysis using the same methods, techniques, and terminology outlined by joint planning groups or coordination cells. As an example, it is very common for the operational environment to be analyzed through PMESII lenses. The OCSIC should analyze OCS aspects of the operational environment using PMESII factors.

b. Collection and analysis of OCS data is an intensive and complex process involving multiple organizations. Additionally, OCS data will change periodically and there are no automated systems to update the data. It is imperative the GCC’s OCSIC and the LSCC (if designated) prioritize OCS analysis efforts based upon JSCP-directed level three and four plans, theater security cooperation efforts, exercises, and a limited number of other areas. The OCSIC should publish its priority countries, OCS analysis data requirements, frequency of reporting, and duties of the Service components in the GCC’s theater campaign plan. Because information changes frequently, the OCSIC and supporting contracting organizations should strive to maintain OCS analysis data as current as possible. This data will help inform the OCS estimate, theater security cooperation efforts, and multinational objectives throughout the AOR during phase 0.

c. Figure G-1 identifies phase 0, steady state, minimum “known” data elements in the green and blue boxes. Data points identified in the red box are “unknown” and typically gathered, analyzed and coordinated in support of JSCP-directed level three and four plans, theater security cooperation efforts, and specific priority areas designated by the GCC.
d. Figure G-1 shows the use of a “known/unknown” construct to organize OCS aspects of the operational environment. Known data is business and market intelligence already available to the OCSIC and LSCC, which are gathered together to develop the initial OCS analysis. Unknown data is similar information derived from sources outside OCS channels, which the entire staff must analyze to determine its significance and impact on the mission. This list is not comprehensive and may vary based upon the level of preparation in phase 0.

e. The OCSIC will maintain “known” data, sometimes referred to as phase 0 data, and ensure the OCSIC, LSCC, and other contracting organizations share the same analysis. The OCSIC must seek a collaborative response to “unknown” data that is specific to a mission, country, or partners. The OCSIC, in close coordination with the LSCC contracting organization (if designated), must also analyze OCS data and collaborate with various boards.
and working groups. The OCSIC’s analysis of OCS aspects of the operational environment will shape discussions during joint planning groups.

f. Although the OCSIC could determine the significance of unknown data to OCS analysis, it is imperative they develop a holistic view with other staff members. As an example, a specific region’s customary business practices (bribes, workday, etc.) may adversely affect the commander’s plan for that specific region. However, customary business practices in other regions may support the commander’s plan. In this example, a detailed understanding of customary business practices throughout the operational area, coupled with the J-2’s understanding of centers of gravity could drive a specific COA for the commander.

g. Additionally, there are strategic impacts when using OCS and contractors as a major source of support to an operation. As an operational example, political concerns may drive the JFC to desire to set aside contracts to LN contractors to improve the local business climate and provide increased employment opportunities to the local populace. Conversely, the political environment coupled with the availability of skilled and reliable labor may drive a JFC to seek additional military means of support or TCN contractors.

3. Links to Theater Logistics Analysis and Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Processes

a. The J-4 and J-2 prepare and assess the operational environment early in the planning cycle. The J-4 conducts TLA process and the J-2 chairs the JIPOE coordination cell.

b. It is important that the OCSIC planner participate actively in the TLA and JIPOE processes to help shape and ensure a holistic view of the operational environment. The OCSIC’s role is to synchronize OCS analysis of the operational environment and its potential relevance with other JFC staff sections, Service components, interorganizational partners, and OCS community of interest organizations such as the LSCC/LSC/JTSCC (see Figure G-2).

4. Theater Logistics Analysis

a. The OCSIC has a strong connection to the J-4 because eighty percent of the contracting effort in past operations and campaigns supported logistics functions. The TLA process in the J-4 is designed to assist in improving the JFC’s situational awareness and understanding of theater logistics support capabilities to support/execute operations.

b. The TLA process provides a detailed country analysis of key infrastructure, existing projects, and HNS agreements to support planned logistical operations. The TLA process provides the framework for planning, which involves understanding the operational environment and associated logistical problems, determining the operation’s end state, and visualizing an operational approach to logistics.

c. During the TLA process, the J-4 will assess critical capabilities and limitations (constraints and restraints) to lay the groundwork for future contracted capability requirements. This initial information will identify theater OCS capabilities and limitations.
and become the basis for the OCS estimate, the J-4’s theater logistics overview, and the theater posture plan.
5. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

a. JIPOE is the analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the JFC’s decision-making process. The J-2 uses the JIPOE process to formulate and recommend priority intelligence requirements and other information requirements crucial to joint force planning.

b. The JIPOE process consists of four steps described in detail in JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. Figure G-3 outlines OCS considerations in the JIPOE process.

c. The JIPOE coordination cell executes the steps of the JIPOE process. The JIPOE coordination cell has core and non-core members ranging from J-staff, DOD agencies and interagency organizations, to Service component planners. These staff members, combined with the OCSIC, can coordinate a holistic view of the operational environment during mission analysis or on an “as needed” basis. The OCSIC’s collaboration with the JIPOE coordination cell should synchronize contracting activities and help shape those plans during COA development.

6. Example Data Sources

Many potential sources of data exist in phase 0. Figure G-4 lists the most relevant sources; depending on the country or region other sources may exist.

7. Example Operational Contract Support Data Requirements

Local market and business climate information is very important for planning. The following are sample market and business climate data points that should be considered for all operations:

a. Political

(1) What local laws will make contracting with local vendors difficult?

(2) What is the current state of business law? Are laws enforced?

(3) What is the local security climate? Will LN support inside US security perimeters be feasible? Will US and TCN contractors be required to live inside US security perimeters and be afforded CAAF status?

(4) If security climate permits, is there sufficient (quantity and quality) commercially available support (billeting, medical, etc.) for TCN and US citizen contractor personnel or will GFS have to be provided?

(5) Has the local government requested US/multinational forces use specific vendors? If so, why? Do those vendors have ties to the government? What is the impact?
### Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Steps and Operational Contract Support Considerations Crosswalk

#### JIPOE 4-Step Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Define the Operational Environment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Identify the joint force’s operational area.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Analyze the mission and joint force commander’s intent.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Determine the significant characteristics of the operational environment.</td>
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<td>4. Identify the limits of the joint force areas of interest.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Determine the level of detail required and feasible within the time available.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Determine intelligence and information priorities, gaps, and shortfalls.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Collect material and submit requests for information to support further analysis.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Develop a geospatial perspective of the operational environment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Develop a systems perspective of the operational environment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Describe the impact of the operational environment on adversary and friendly capabilities and broad courses of action.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Evaluate the Adversary</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Update or create adversary models.</td>
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<td>2. Identify adversary centers of gravity and decisive points.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Identify adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Determine Adversary Course of Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Identify the adversary’s likely objectives and desired end state.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Identify the full set of adversary courses of action.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Develop each course of action in the amount of detail time allows.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Identify initial collection requirements.</td>
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#### OCSIC Functions of JIPOE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Define the Operational Environment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Provide business environment information to the JIPOE coordination cell.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Synchronize the business environment information between the JIPOE staff and the contracting community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Determine business environment information gaps and submit RFIs to JIPOE coordination cell.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Review the JIPOE cells information gaps to see if OCSIC or LSC/LSCC can answer those gaps.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Conduct a PMESII business environment analysis and determine its impacts to the adversary and friendly forces. Items leveraged by both friendly enemy forces could be skilled labor pools, scarce equipment, corrupt officials and organizations, economic capacity, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Support JIPOE efforts to link system nodes and capabilities to centers of gravity. Use that data to support contracting actions.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Evaluate the Adversary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Determine the ability for the adversary to influence intermediaries (such as bidders on US contracts).</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Support analysis of the “Adversary Perspective Template” to include criminal elements and share with the contracting community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Determine the ability of contracting support to inadvertently influence adversary goals when pure competition is applied (no black list/vetting).</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Analyze which commercial capabilities the adversary could use to their advantage.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determine Adversary Course of Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Determine the adversary’s ability to infiltrate or establish businesses to fund their activities or gain intelligence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Influence how vendors leveraged by the adversary are paid and how to isolate those vendors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Determine the force risk of using US, TCN, and local national contracts or contract personnel to support the force.</td>
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#### Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JIPOE</th>
<th>joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LSC</td>
<td>lead Service for contracting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSCC</td>
<td>lead Service for contracting coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCSIC</td>
<td>operational contract support integration cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMESII</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFI</td>
<td>request for information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>third country national</td>
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**Figure G-3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Steps and Operational Contract Support Considerations Crosswalk**

b. Military
Analysis of the Operational Contract Support Aspects of the Operational Environment

(1) Does the military play any role in securing economic centers or logistics routes (e.g., patrol for pirates and smugglers to protect shipping or provide guards outside of economic COGs)?

(2) Are factions in the HN military or local militia corrupt, and how does this affect business in the country?

(3) Which vendors does/did the HN military use? Could those vendors be used for/against us?

(4) List military-related, locally available commodities by type with rough estimates of amounts that could be procured.

c. Economic

(1) Does the operational area have an austere, moderate, or robust business environment?

(2) Which local taxes will make contracting with local vendors difficult?
(3) Which local customs could affect business operations?

(4) Will customs clearance and export/import regulations be an obstacle?

(5) Is skilled/unskilled labor readily available?

(6) Are there barriers to TCN workers? Are there visa/work permit restrictions?

(7) What are the local labor and other costs for unskilled, construction, and engineering work?

(8) Are local unions a factor in labor relations?

(9) Are vendors capable of responding rapidly?

(10) Are major international companies operating locally? If so, which ones and what products do they produce locally?

(11) What is the local currency, and how fluid/stable is it? Will business have to be conducted in an alternate currency?

(12) What impact could we have on the local economy and/or civilian population if we contracted for large amounts of commodities and services locally?

(13) What is the estimated ratio of total contracts with local vendors vs. the country’s gross domestic product? What are the effects of more money going into specific segments of the economy (e.g., are we destabilizing the national government by strengthening a regional economy)?

(14) What form of payment is typically used in this region?

(15) What type of banking/financial institutions will be available? Is the financial system sound? Are electronic funds transfers possible? Will cash be required?

(16) What trade data is available for cross-referencing in support of vendor vetting processes? What is the current evaluation of anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regulations according to the regional financial action task force?

(17) What regulatory and audit capabilities exist in order to trace, recreate, or monitor transactions? What financial laws, regulations, and organizations exist that are relevant to contracting activities and FP activities?

(18) What informal value transfer systems exist outside the financial sector, that can transfer funds (specifically: cell phone companies that can transfer funds outside of regulatory monitoring requirements, hawalas, virtual currencies). What shadow economy (shadow financial sectors) exist, that should be considered for FP and economic impacts, such as black and grey markets?

d. Social
(1) Will language barriers (including dialects) make contracting with local vendors difficult?

(2) Do cultural issues affect business operations (e.g., local taboos, religious observances)?

(3) Are sub-cultures prevalent? Does sub-culture interaction affect business (e.g., tribal disputes)? Are bribery and extortion acceptable business practices?

(4) What is the local workweek and business hours? Will they affect operational plans or requirements?

(5) How does adverse weather or natural occurrences (earthquakes, fires, tides etc.) affect business? Do they affect contracting?

e. Information

(1) What resources are available to solicit local vendors and what are the culturally accepted “norms” to do so (e.g., television, internet, local community groups, newspapers, underground newspapers)?

(2) Are there ways to train the local communities to respond to request for proposals?

(3) Are any of our existing or planned contracting efforts significant enough to create opposition from outside groups?

f. Infrastructure

(1) How does the J-4’s transportation analysis affect OCS and vice versa (road, bridge, airport, seaport analysis)?

(2) How does the engineer staff estimate affect OCS and vice versa?

(3) Does trained labor and heavy equipment exist in the area country to support various base life support, building construction, road improvements, materials handling equipment, etc.?

(4) Is there a large demand for construction projects above the military construction threshold? What are the post-construction requirements? If construction is for civilian use, is the local government capable of maintaining the building?

(5) Do local energy sources exist? Do they have the capacity to support local requirements? Beyond local requirements? How does that affect contracting (e.g., more generators and contract labor and parts)?
(6) Do any PMESII factors change due to regional or sub-regional considerations (e.g., when doing business in country “y”, electronic fund transfers in the northern region is customary but cash transactions are required in the south)?

(7) What United Nations or IGO logistics infrastructure is already in place?
APPENDIX H
PHASE IV-V TRANSITION PLANNING AND PROCESSES

1. General

Transition between phase IV (stabilize) to phase V (transition to civil authorities) will always include contract support drawdown tasks. In some operations, phase IV-V transition will also include tasks related to transition and/or elimination of selected contracted support services to other USG departments and agencies, HN, and/or multinational partners. The scope and complexity for phase IV to phase V OCS-related transition tasks varies greatly depending on the specific operational environment. In some operations, such as seen in FHA or foreign disaster assistance missions, the contract support drawdown may be very limited and there may be no transition planning required. On the other hand, OCS drawdown and transition tasks in major, long-term stability operations can be significant and involve numerous supporting commands as well as multiple USG departments and agencies, HN,

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**CONTRACT SUPPORT DRAWDOWN IN OPERATION NEW DAWN**

In 2011, as the force drawdown planning was underway, United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) identified the need to closely manage the demobilization of contracts and associated contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF) providing vital support to US forces. Accordingly, a contractor demobilization cell was established to provide centralized contract support planning and execution. This cell, in coordination with USF-I and what was called “the big 7” in contracting/contract support activities which included: Contracting Command Iraq, Defense Contract Management Agency-Iraq, Logistic Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Forward office, Air Force Civil Augmentation Program office, US Army Corps of Engineers, Defense Logistic Agency, and the Army Field Support Brigade, developed specific contract support drawdown objectives and priorities along with operational specific methodology to gain an accurate and complete common operational picture (COP) of all the contracts and associated CAAF in the joint operations area. The “big 7” reviewed all of their associated contracts to ensure that they contained appropriate demobilization clauses and that appropriate actions were taken for all contracts being terminated or expiring due to the drawdown. The “big 7” input was also a vital ingredient in maintaining the accuracy of the self-generated contractor COP database. Additionally, this cell coordinated directly with USF-I and the area commanders to establish base-by-base CAAF census data, to develop a standards of support reduction plan, and a plan to move selected local contracts to LOGCAP task orders. This transition of a limited number of theater support contracts to LOGCAP support was deemed necessary to reduce risk and to enhance the transition of selected contracted services to the Department of State. Overall, this unique operational contract support integration cell proved invaluable in the successful demobilization of multiple hundreds of contracts and many thousands of supporting CAAF in Operation NEW DAWN.

SOURCE: Contractor Demobilization Cell Chief
after action report briefing, September 2011
and multinational partners. In all operations, the CCMD level OCSIC, OCS planners at all levels, and major supporting contracting organizations must work closely with the GCC and subordinate JFC to ensure contract support is fully integrated into any and all phase IV-V transition planning and execution.

2. Planning and Execution

In general, there are two separate OCS planning tasks associated with phase IV-V transitions: descoping of contract support and transition of contract support responsibilities to other USG departments or agencies, HN, and/or designated multinational partners. Descoping of the contract support requirements takes place to some degree in all operations while transition of contract support responsibilities is much more operational-specific requirement. In all operations, this planning and execution must be fully integrated into the overall plan and done in a collaborative manner with all major supporting and supported organizations.

a. Organization and Manning. The CCMD and subordinate staffs, with the OCSIC leading the overall effort, are responsible for OCS-related drawdown planning and execution. In major, long-term stability operations this effort may require some temporary augmentation of the CCMD level OCSIC and possibly significant augmentation to the subordinate joint force command OCSIC. Specific numbers, skill sets, and standards of grade of this augmentation staff are operationally driven.

b. Descoping Contract Requirements. This step starts with the subordinate JFC, working closely with the Service and SOF components and supporting CSAs, to plan the descoping of contract support requirements to include a detailed plan for the phased reduction of standards of support across the JOA. This standards of support reduction plan is especially important in threat environments where contractor personnel would be at significant risk without military-provided FP, hence the need to have contracted support redeploy on a timeline similar to military units. Other contract support descoping considerations range from contractor equipment disposition to base closure plans (see Figure H-1).

c. Timelines. Contract support cannot be terminated immediately without serious operational and financial consequences. Even when the contracted service expires or is terminated, large external support contractors can take up to 30 days or more to prepare and implement CAAF and equipment redeployment tasks. There is no fixed contract support drawdown timeline, but when planning a formal contractor drawdown process, specific timelines must be established, tracked, and rigorously enforced (Figure H-2).

d. OCS Integration Cell Functions. The subordinate joint force command OCSIC is normally responsible to ensure the contract support drawdown progresses according to plan. Contract support drawdown milestones must be aggressively reported, tracked, and analyzed to ensure the overall plan is progressing on JFC-approved timelines. Specific OCSIC contract support drawdown functions are numerous and range from maintaining remaining CAAF numbers by major location to contract closeout status (see Figure H-3).
e. **Liaison Considerations.** At a minimum, the following organizations should provide an LNO to the subordinate joint force command OCSIC when executing major contract support drawdown plans: LSC contracting organization or JTSCC; DLA, the designated construction agent (i.e., United States Army Corps of Engineers or NAVFAC), and Service CAP offices (as appropriate). These LNOs would normally be co-located with the OCSIC in order to facilitate coordination and dissemination of information to and from their respective organizations. Specific contract support drawdown LNO duties are comparable to LNO duties related to other operational functions (see Figure H-4).

3. **Contract Support Transition Organization and Processes**

As stated, transition of contract support responsibilities varies significantly in scope and complexity depending on specific operational factors. In some operations there may be no major OCS transition-related planning and execution requirements. In these operations, the key planning action would be related to acquisition planning focused primarily on contract closeout. In major, long-term stability operations, OCS-related phase IV-V transitions may include significant transition requirements, which must be closely coordinated with other USG departments and agencies, HN, and multinational partners. In some cases, this effort may include limited (in both time and scope) residual DOD support to DOS or other non-DOD organizations upon the termination of an actual military operation.

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**Figure H-1. Descoping Considerations**

- Force protection/security requirements
- Reduction in standards of support
- Contractor notification timelines
- Temporary transition of mission-critical theater support contracts to civil augmentation program task orders
- Repatriation of third country national workers
- Government furnished equipment/contractor acquired, government-owned equipment disposition instructions
- Contractor-owned, contractor-operated equipment disposition/government transportation support requirements
- Overall contractor-provided, contractor-required transportation needs
- Contract closeout plans
- Need for increased contracting reachback support (i.e., contract modification and closeout)
- Base closure/consolidation plans
- Contract source effectiveness/risk assessment
- Costs associated with full or partial termination of contracted work
a. **Transition of Contract Requirements.** The goal of the OCS transition effort is to identify and synchronize OCS requirements and issues, and to collaborate on acquisition strategy among DOD, DOS, and other partners in support of the transition from DOD-provided support to other USG department and agency, HN, or multinational military contracts. It is important to note that DOD does not normally transfer actual contracts to multinational or USG contracting authorities. In some operations, however, OSD may authorize some DOD contracts to be used as a bridge until the multinational or USG departments and agencies can put their own contract vehicles in place. In all transitions, DOD contracting organizations should share contracting-related information with our multinational, HN, and USG partners to assist them in the transfer of these commercially provided support responsibilities.

b. **Process.** The subordinate OCSIC, with direct assistance from the CCMD-level OCSIC and other staff members, will normally serve as the DOD lead for OCS-related transition planning and execution. Key to the success of this process is for the subordinate (or CCMD, if desired) OCSIC to establish an active collaborative forum in the form of a multi-agency contract support transition working group. At a minimum, the following agencies/organizations should be represented at the working group: CCMD OCSIC;
subordinate joint force command OCSIC, CCMD; and subordinate plans offices; LSC/LSCC contracting activity or JTSCC; DOD construction agent; lead Service component logistic plans office (if a lead Service is designated to lead residual DOD support); Service CAP representative (as appropriate); DLA; COM general services officer; USAID; as well as key HN or multinational military partners (as appropriate). Other agencies/organizations that may have interest and equities in the transition of OCS requirements, but not limited to: DASD(PS), DPAP, JS J-4, ASA(ALT), USSOCOM, various supporting Service organizations, as well as additional USG departments and agencies affected by the transition. Contract transition working group functions vary depending on operational specific factors but must include information sharing, ID of transition time lines and other major tasks (see Figure H-5).

c. **Timelines and Battle Rhythm.** The contract support transition working group should be formed as soon as possible and meet as often as necessary to ensure success. As
Liaison Functions

- Provide subject matter expertise of their respective functional area and familiarity with processes within their parent organization.
- Assist their parent organizations to remain current on overall drawdown plans.
- Work with the operations team to ensure provided data is accurate and timely.
- Help resolve data discrepancies.
- Assist the operations team to analyze data, develop trends, identify potential bottlenecks related to their respective organization.
- Assist operations team to resolve issues related to their parent organization.
- Provide suggested improvements to the contract drawdown reporting and collection process and systems.

Contract Support Transition Working Group Functions

- Establish key working group members and other points of contacts necessary to facilitate issue resolution.
- Share contract data and other related information.
- Determine any residual Department of Defense contract support requirements.
- Identify and resolve key matters; refer unresolved issues to the next higher level at the organization(s) as required.
- Maintain operational awareness.
- Facilitate a collaborative acquisition strategy between Department of Defense, Department of State, and other organizations to ensure efficient and effective use of locally available commercial resources.
- Ensure there is proper legal review of plan.

discussed in the contract drawdown section, transitioning contracted support requires significant procurement lead time normally measured in multiple months, not days or weeks. As transition efforts intensify, the frequency of the working group meetings will increase based on the assessment from the group. The primary meeting location will depend on the situation, but will usually be at the HQ of the GCC within appropriate distance; use of technology is encouraged for participants not residing within the local area.
APPENDIX J
PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY SERVICES PLANNING AND PROCESSES

1. General

Private security companies are a legitimate source of support in joint operations, but commercially provided security services require careful planning and very deliberate government execution oversight. The supported GCCs, subordinate JFCs, and associated J-3 and legal staffs should closely review all PSC plans and procedures when contemplating the possibility of utilizing commercial security services to protect US forces (to include DOD contractors), facilities, and supplies. Commanders at all levels must clearly understand the roles, capabilities, limitations, and lines of authority related to use of PSCs in support of military operations. The supported GCCs, subordinate JFCs, and associated J-3 need to work very closely with their legal staffs and with existing DOD policy, which has been revised per current USC to cover all USG PSCs when there is an area of combat operation or other significant military operation and/or requirement for interagency coordination. Questions regarding to PSC policy should be coordinated with DASD(PS).

*Overarching PSC policy guidance can be found in DODI 3020.50, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises. Additional overarching policy guidance can be found in DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS); and DODI 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix. Specific business and operational standards can be found at http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/psc.html.*

2. Planning and Processes Consideration

The supported GCC, subordinate JFC, and/or designated subordinate Service or functional component commanders must ensure that operational specific procedures to coordinate PSC and military provided security/FP support actions (to include incident reporting and investigations) are developed, promulgated, and enforced within the operational area, across key USG departments and agencies, and with other partners. Key PSC planning and process considerations include general procedures and reporting requirements; staff organizational constructs; establishing PSC RUF; and coordination of non-DOD contracted PSC services within the operational area.

a. Establishing General Procedures and Reporting Requirements. The subordinate JFC and/or designated subordinate Service or functional component commanders must ensure that operational specific PSC procedures are developed and promulgated. These procedures should at a minimum include:

(1) Registration and accounting for all DOD PSCs to include US, TCN, and LN contractor employees who are required to carry weapons in the performance of their duties.

(2) Verification by the PSCs’ company that its personnel have met the legal, training, and qualification requirements.
(3) Procedures for the request and authorization for arming PSCs.

(4) Registration in the designated joint database (SPOT or its successor) of armored vehicles, helicopters, and other vehicles operated by PSCs.

(5) Incident reporting and independent review of said reports.

b. **Organizational Considerations.** In operations where there is a significant level of PSC support, the supported GCCs and the subordinate JFC should consider establishing an armed contractor oversight cell as part of the joint security coordination center. This J-3 cell would lead the PSC coordination and oversight effort by maintaining situational awareness of PSC activity throughout the JOA and ensuring PSC services are executed IAW JFC approved plans, procedures, and as stipulated in the terms and conditions of the contract. An armed contractor oversight cell’s functions include, but are not limited to:

1. Work with the supporting contracting offices to ensure PSC-related arming, licensing, and reporting requirements are included in the terms and conditions of all applicable contracts.

2. ICW the subordinate area commanders, coordinate and manage the JOA-wide PSC contract oversight effort.

3. Establish and maintain PSC tracking-related database to include COR information.


5. Facilitate information sharing between PSCs and area commanders.

6. Receive, track, analyze, and report PSC incident reports.

7. Assist in the development and coordination of PSC-related arming requests. Ensure only properly documented requests are staffed for approval by the GCC designated flag officer.

c. **Establishing Private Security Company RUF.** The subordinate JFC is responsible for developing, promulgating, and revising (as necessary) operations-specific PSC RUF. PSC RUF is in turn captured in the terms and conditions of the contract through a common clause requiring all PSCs to be aware of and to follow the most current published PSC RUF guidance. PSC RUF considerations should, at a minimum, include procedures related to:

1. Clear definitions on what constitutes the need for deadly force related to self-protection, defense of facilities/designated protected persons, and/or threat against civilians.

2. Clearly defined graduated force steps to include specific threat warning procedures.
(3) Weapons firing guidance (e.g., fire only aimed shots, ensure due regard for the safety of innocent bystanders).

(4) Strict and clear guidance preventing PSCs from joining military combat operations.

(5) Specific guidance on when and where weapons can be loaded.

*DODD 5210.56, Carrying of Firearms and the Use of Force by DOD Personnel Engaged in Security, Law and Order, or Counterintelligence Activities, describes RUF requirements for civilian guards, to include security contractors.*

d. **Coordination and Support to Non-DOD PSC Operations.** Of all of the non-DOD contracting-related coordination tasks, none is more important and challenging than coordinating with non-DOD or non-USG agencies that hire PSCs that operate within the JOA. These non-DOD associated PSCs, which in some cases may include contracted uniformed foreign military members, are routinely used to provide protection of non-DOD personnel in transit and at work sites in high threat areas. The subordinate JFC and subordinate area commanders must ensure they obtain and maintain adequate visibility (location, mission, RUF) of these non-DOD PSCs operating in their operational area. And as much as feasible, develop procedures to coordinate movements and share threat and other information with them.

e. Key considerations when coordinating non-DOD PSC operations include, but are not limited to:

(1) Is there a memorandum of agreement between the GCC and the COM covering the PSC operations in the AOR? What are the responsibilities of each party and level of command?

(2) Does the subordinate JFC have back-up security support requirements to DOS or other non-DOD organizations? If so, are these organizations using PSCs for protection?

(3) What is the subordinate JFC’s authority, if any, in planning and utilization of non-DOD PSCs?

(4) What other PSCs are operating in the AOR that do not fall under US control? Do we have input into the operations of PSCs contracted by multinational partners? International and other private organizations?

(5) Where are these PSCs operating? What are their RUF? Did the subordinate JFC have input to the non-DOD PSC RUF?

(6) Are there provisions for sharing and maintaining situational awareness over other PSCs that may not be operating under US or partner nation authority? Have communications and reporting format mechanisms been developed between the JFC, COM, and other interested parties? Are communications systems compatible with the on-hand military systems? Has the communication/information sharing plan been exercised?
Appendix J

(7) Are subordinate commanders properly informed of their local requirements? Have they conducted proper coordination with these PSCs and/or rehearsed back-up security actions (as required)?

Title 32, Part 159 of the CFR, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Combat Operations or Other Significant Military Operations, describes requirements for coordinating PSC operational procedures in contingencies and related operations across USG departments and agencies.
APPENDIX K
JOINT CONTINGENCY ACQUISITION SUPPORT OFFICE

1. General

The JCASO was established in compliance with SecDef GEF (Fiscal Years 2010-2015) and Congressional mandates in the National Defense Authorization Acts of 2007 and 2008 that require DOD to establish a capability to orchestrate, synchronize, and integrate PM of contingency acquisition across GCCs, USSOCOM, and for DOD support to USG departments and agencies during joint operations.

2. Mission

The JCASO, under the direction of DLA, provides an enabling capability for the GCCs to develop and execute a programmatic approach to OCS.

3. Organizational Design and Function

a. The JCASO is organized in three major parts: an HQ Section, a Policy Division, and an Operations Division. A brief discussion of each of these major JCASO subordinate elements follows.

(1) HQ Section. The JCASO HQ consist of two flag level personnel (one military and one senior executive service) and various staff members. The HQ section provides the JCASO operational readiness guidance and oversight to the JCASO divisions and serves as an OCS advisor to the DLA Commander.

(2) Policy Division. The Policy Division consists of a small number of DOD civilians, military members, and contractor staff. Its primary mission is to engage in strategic national forums to institutionalize, advance, and mature OCS across DOD and selected interagency actions.

(3) Operations Division. The Operations Division consists of OCS planners, multifunctional MSTs, and reserve component sections all of which are tailorable, as required.

(a) Planners. JCASO planners are DOD employees who are experienced in logistic planning and general OCS matters. JCASO planners are embedded in each geographic CCMD, USSOCOM, US Forces Japan, US Forces Korea, and the JS J-7 to enable OCS planning and integration. While these planners serve as part of the CCMD or subordinate unified command OCSIC, they report to the JCASO HQ for administrative matters as well as to coordinate OCS best business practices issues, lessons learned information, and other related matters. The JCASO planners are part of the CCMD OCSIC.

(b) MSTs. The MSTs are the operational arm of the JCASO. They are headed by an O-6 team leader with significant contracting experience and have additional contracting, logistics and engineer specialty field grade and noncommissioned officers. The JCASO MSTs are available for both contingency and exercise support as discussed in
paragraph 4, “Execution.” When deployed, the JCASO MST personnel report to the JCASO HQ for administrative matters as well as to coordinate OCS best business practices, issues, operational lessons learned, and other related matters.

(c) Reserve Structure. JCASO has a limited number of military staff assigned to the reserve component. This reserve component structure serves as an MST augmentation capability.

4. Execution

a. Planning Support. As part of the CCMD and subordinate unified command OCSICs, the JCASO planners support, and when directed, lead the OCS planning effort. These specially trained staff officers provide significant support and continuity to the support staff. When necessary, JCASO can arrange additional, temporary planning support from JCASO HQ personnel.

b. Exercise Support and Staff Training. The JCASO planners and aligned MSTs support CCMD and subordinate unified command level exercises and staff training actions, as directed. The JS J-7 JCASO planner also is focused on coordinating OCS matters in joint exercises and in selected individual joint training efforts.

c. Contingency Support. JCASO MSTs are a significant enabling capability in support of contingency operations. When requested by the supported GCC, an MST can deploy and serve as the initial building block of a subordinate joint force command OCSIC. In some situations, the MST may also provide augmentation to the GCC, subordinate JFC, LSC/LSCC contracting activity, and/or JTSCC.

d. Doctrine, Policy, Lessons Learned, and Training Support. The JCASO’s Policy Division coordinates and synchronizes the JCASO’s effort to enhance OCS capabilities across the force. ICW the JCASO planners and MST personnel, the Policy Division collects, reviews, and analyzes joint OCS-related observations, insights, and lessons. ICW the JS J-4 and OSD staff, JCASO develops suggested OCS process improvements; participates in policy and doctrinal efforts; assists in the development of and conducts OCS-related training; and participates in various interagency coordination actions.

e. Requesting JCASO Support. GCCs request contingency-related JCASO support by including the JCASO MST in deliberate planning (e.g., annex W) and the TPFDD, if the plan requires. During crisis action planning or for other operations that may require JCASO support, the GCC may request JCASO support through the formal RFF process IAW the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance. An RFF is generally not required for short-term support during peacetime. The JCASO planners will assist the GCC staff in preparing and coordinating RFFs for JCASO MST support as well as short-term JCASO support.
APPENDIX L
REFERENCES

The development of the JP 4-10 is based upon the following primary references:

1. International Law


2. United States Government Publications

   d. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act) of 2001.
   e. Title 5, USC.
   f. Title 10, USC.
   g. Title 22, USC.
   h. Title 32, USC.
   i. FAR Clause 52.222-50, Combating Trafficking in Persons including Alternate 1.
   j. FAR (Title 48, CFR).
   k. FAR (Part 18), Emergency Acquisitions.
   l. FAR (Part 22.17), Combating Trafficking in Persons.
   m. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 24 January 2011, Strategic and Operational Planning for Operational Contract Support and Workforce Mix.
   p. DFARS Clause 252.222-1703/PGI 222.1703, Combating Trafficking in Persons.
   q. DFARS Clause 252.225-7040, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany US Armed Forces Deployed Outside the United States.
Appendix L

r. DFARS Sub-Part 225.74, *Defense Contractors Outside the United States.*
s. DFARS PGI 225.7401, *Contracts Requiring Performance or Delivery in a Foreign Country.*

3. **Department of Defense Publications**

   a. DODD 1100.4, *Guidance for Manpower Management.*
   
b. DODD 1300.22E, *Mortuary Affairs Policy.*
   
c. DODD 2311.01E, *DOD Law of War Program.*
   
d. DODD 3000.6, *Combat Support Agencies.*
   
e. DODD 3002.01, *Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense.*
   
f. DODD 3020.49, *Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its Operational Execution.*
   
g. DODD 4270.5, *Military Construction.*
   
h. DODD 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR).*
   
i. DODD 5105.22, *Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).*
   
j. DODD 5105.64, *Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).*
   
k. DODD 5210.56, *Carrying of Firearms and the Use of Force by DOD Personnel Engaged in Security, Law and Order, or Counterintelligence Activities.*
   
l. DODD 6200.04, *Force Health Protection (FHP).*
   
m. DODD 6490.02E, *Comprehensive Health Surveillance.*
   
n. DODD 6495.01, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program.*
   
o. DODI 1000.13, *Identification (ID) Cards for Members of the Uniformed Services, Their Dependents, and Other Eligible Individuals.*
   
   
q. DODI 1300.23, *Isolated Personnel Training for DOD Civilian and Contractors.*
   
r. DODI 1330.21, *Armed Services Exchange Regulations.*
   
s. DODI 2000.16, *DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards.*
   
t. DODI 2200.01, *Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP).*
References

u. DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS).

v. DODI 3020.50, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises.

w. DODI 4161.02, Accountability and Management of Government Contract Property.


y. DODI 5525.11, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed By or Accompanying the Armed Forces Outside the United States, Certain Service Members, and Former Service Members.

z. DODI 6205.4, Immunization of Other Than US Forces (OTUSF) for Biological Warfare Defense.

aa. DODI 6490.03, Deployment Health.

bb. DODI 8520.02, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Public Key (PK) Enabling.

cc. DOD 5500.07-R, Joint Ethics Regulation (JER).

4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. CJCS Instruction 3170.01H, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.


c. CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.

d. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

e. JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.


g. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

h. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

i. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

j. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.

m. JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*.
n. JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.
o. JP 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*.
r. JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*.
t. JP 4-02, *Health Services*.
u. JP 4-06, *Mortuary Affairs*.
v. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

5. **Service Publications**


b. Field Manual 4-92, Contracting Support Brigade.

c. AR 700-137, *Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)*.


e. Army Tactical Publication 4-91, *Army Field Support Brigade*.

f. NAVSUP Instruction 4230.37D, *Navy Supplies and Services Contingency Contracting Program*.

g. Secretary of the Navy M-5000.2, *Department of the Navy Acquisition and Capabilities Guidebook*. 
APPENDIX M
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: JS J-7, Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The JS doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics (J-4).

3. Supersession


4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

   TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JED//

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697, and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JED.

c. When a JS directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the JS J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, *DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification*, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, *DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information*. 
6. Distribution of Electronic Publications


   b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the CCMDs, Services, and JS. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

   c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the JS J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the CCMDs, Services, and CSAs.
## GLOSSARY
### PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMYS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>administrative contracting officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFCAP</td>
<td>Air Force contract augmentation program</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFCEC</td>
<td>Air Force Civil Engineer Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFICA</td>
<td>Air Force Installation Contracting Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFMC</td>
<td>Air Force Materiel Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFSB</td>
<td>Army field support brigade</td>
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<td>AFSPC</td>
<td>Air Force Space Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>acquisition instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEX</td>
<td>Adaptive Planning and Execution</td>
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<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASA(ALT)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASN(RD&amp;A)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOS-I</td>
<td>base operating support-integrator</td>
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<td>BSI</td>
<td>base support installation</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAAF</td>
<td>contractors authorized to accompany the force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>contract administration delegation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAGO</td>
<td>contractor-acquired, government-owned</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>civil augmentation program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCAS</td>
<td>contingency contract administration services</td>
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<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
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<td>CCMD</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
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<td>CCO</td>
<td>contingency contracting officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Code of Federal Regulations</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCSM</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLPSB</td>
<td>combatant commander logistic procurement support board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLS</td>
<td>contractor logistic support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMP</td>
<td>contractor management plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCO</td>
<td>contractor-owned, contractor-operated</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>COM</td>
<td>chief of mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>concept plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>common operational picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COR</td>
<td>contracting officer representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>combat support agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSB</td>
<td>contracting support brigade</td>
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### Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>CSOR</td>
<td>contract statement of requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSSM</td>
<td>contracted support synchronization matrix</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>counter threat finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTIP</td>
<td>combating trafficking in persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUL</td>
<td>common-user logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DASD(PS)</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAWIA</td>
<td>Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act</td>
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<td>DCAA</td>
<td>Defense Contract Audit Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCMA</td>
<td>Defense Contract Management Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>Department of Defense form</td>
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<td>DFARS</td>
<td>Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLA</td>
<td>Defense Logistics Agency</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
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<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense instruction</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DPAP</td>
<td>Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy</td>
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<td>DPMO</td>
<td>Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office</td>
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<td>DS</td>
<td>direct support</td>
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<td>DSCA</td>
<td>defense support of civil authorities</td>
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<td>FAR</td>
<td>Federal Acquisition Regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS)</td>
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<td>FHA</td>
<td>foreign humanitarian assistance</td>
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<td>FLC</td>
<td>fleet logistics center</td>
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<td>FP</td>
<td>force protection</td>
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<td>FRAGORD</td>
<td>fragmentary order</td>
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<td>FSR</td>
<td>field service representative</td>
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<td>FWA</td>
<td>fraud, waste, and abuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>geographic combatant commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCCMAC</td>
<td>Global Contingency Construction Multiple Award Contract (Navy)</td>
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<td>GCSMAC</td>
<td>Global Contingency Services Multiple Award Contract (Navy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
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<td>GFP</td>
<td>government-furnished property</td>
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<td>GFS</td>
<td>government-furnished support</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCA</td>
<td>head of contracting activity</td>
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<td>HD</td>
<td>homeland defense</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>individual augmentee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAW</td>
<td>in accordance with</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICW</td>
<td>in coordination with</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>identification</td>
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<td>IFO</td>
<td>integrated financial operations</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-1</td>
<td>manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>intelligence directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-3</td>
<td>operations directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-4</td>
<td>logistics directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-5</td>
<td>plans directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-6</td>
<td>communications system directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-7</td>
<td>Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCASO</td>
<td>Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (DLA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCSB</td>
<td>joint contracting support board</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIPOE</td>
<td>joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMD</td>
<td>joint manning document</td>
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<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
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<td>JOPP</td>
<td>joint operation planning process</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPRC</td>
<td>joint personnel reception center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRRB</td>
<td>joint requirements review board</td>
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<td>JS</td>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<td>JTSCC</td>
<td>joint theater support contracting command</td>
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<td>JUON</td>
<td>joint urgent operational need</td>
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<tr>
<td>LN</td>
<td>local national</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOA</td>
<td>letter of authorization</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOGCAP</td>
<td>logistics civil augmentation program</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSC</td>
<td>lead Service for contracting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSCC</td>
<td>lead Service for contracting coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine air-ground task force</td>
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<td>MARCORLOGCOM</td>
<td>Marine Corps Logistics Command</td>
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<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary force</td>
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<td>MEJA</td>
<td>Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
<td>Military Postal Service</td>
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<td>MST</td>
<td>mission support team</td>
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<td>MTF</td>
<td>medical treatment facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>MWR</td>
<td>morale, welfare, and recreation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Glossary

NAE  Navy acquisition executive
NAVFAC Naval Facilities Engineering Command
NAVSUP Naval Supply Systems Command
NG  National Guard
NGB  National Guard Bureau
NGO  nongovernmental organization
NURP  non-unit-related personnel

OCIE  organizational clothing and individual equipment
OCS  operational contract support
OCSIC  operational contract support integration cell
OFAC  Office of Foreign Assets Control (TREAS)
OPLAN  operation plan
OPORD  operation order
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defense

PCO  procuring contracting officer
PEO  program executive office
PGI  procedures, guidance, and information
PM  program management
PMESII  political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
PR  personnel recovery
PSC  private security contractor
PWS  performance work statement

QAR  quality assurance representative

RCC  regional contracting center
RCO  regional contracting office
RFF  request for forces
RSOI  reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
RUF  rules for the use of force

SCO  senior contracting official
SDDC  Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SecDef  Secretary of Defense
SFA  security force assistance
SJA  staff judge advocate
SME  subject matter expert
SOF  special operations forces
SOFA  status-of-forces agreement
SOW  statement of work
SPE  senior procurement executive
SPOT  Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker
SYSCOM  systems command
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TBC</td>
<td>theater business clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>third country national</td>
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<td>TCO</td>
<td>termination contracting officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLA</td>
<td>theater logistics analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment data</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSOC</td>
<td>theater special operations command</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCMJ</td>
<td>Uniform Code of Military Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UON</td>
<td>urgent operational need</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(AT&amp;L)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(P)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(P&amp;R)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness</td>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
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<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
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**PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS**

**administrative contracting officer.** Contracting officer whose primary duties involve contract administration. Also called **ACO.** (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-10)

**civil augmentation program.** Standing, long-term external support contacts designed to augment Service logistic capabilities with contracted support in both preplanned and short notice contingencies. Also called **CAP.** (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**combatant commander logistic procurement support board.** A combatant commander-level joint board established to ensure that contracting support and other sources of support are properly synchronized across the entire area of responsibility. Also called **CLPSB.** (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-10)

**contingency contract.** A legally binding agreement for supplies, services, and construction let by government contracting officers in the operational area as well as other contracts that have a prescribed area of performance within a designated operational area. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-10)

**contingency contracting.** The process of obtaining goods, services, and construction via contracting means in support of contingency operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-10)

**contract administration.** A subset of contracting that includes efforts to ensure that supplies, services, and construction are delivered in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-10)

**contracted logistic support.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**contracting officer.** A Service member or Department of Defense civilian with the legal authority to enter into, administer, modify, and/or terminate contracts. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**contracting officer representative.** A Service member or Department of Defense civilian or a foreign government civilian or military member appointed in writing and trained by a contracting officer, responsible for monitoring contract performance and performing other duties specified by their appointment letter. Also called **COR.** (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**contractor management.** The oversight and integration of contractor personnel and associated equipment providing support to the joint force in a designated operational area. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-10)

**contractors authorized to accompany the force.** Contingency contractor employees and all tiers of subcontractor employees who are authorized to accompany the force in applicable contingency operations and have afforded such status through the issuance of a letter of authorization. Also called **CAAF.** (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
contractors not authorized to accompany the force. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

cost-plus award fee contract. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

cost-type contract. A contract that provides for payment to the contractor of allowable cost, to the extent prescribed in the contract, incurred in performance of the contract. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-10)

external support contract. Contract awarded by contracting organizations whose contracting authority does not derive directly from the theater support contracting head(s) of contracting activity or from systems support contracting authorities. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-10)

field ordering officer. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

fixed price contract. A type of contract that generally provides for a firm price or, under appropriate circumstances, may provide for an adjustable price for the supplies or services being procured. (Approved for replacement of “fixed price type contract” and its definition in JP 1-02.)

head of contracting activity. The official who has overall responsibility for managing the contracting activity. Also called HCA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-10)

independent government estimate. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

joint contracting support board. A board established to coordinate all contracting support and to determine specific contracting mechanisms to obtain commercially procured common logistic supplies and services within the operational area. Also called JCSB. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

joint requirements review board. The joint task force or subunified commander’s established board to review, validate, approve, and prioritize selected Service component contract support requests. Also called JRRB. (Approved for replacement of “joint acquisition review board” and its definition in JP 1-02.)

letter of authorization. A document issued by the procuring contracting officer or designee that authorizes contractor personnel authorized to accompany the force to travel to, from, and within the operational area; and, outlines government furnished support
authorizations within the operational area. Also called **LOA**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-10)

**local procurement.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**local purchase.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**off-the-shelf item.** An item that has been developed and produced to military or commercial standards and specifications, is readily available for delivery from an industrial source, and may be procured without change to satisfy a military requirement. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-10 as the source JP.)

**operational contract support.** The process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations. Also called **OCS.** (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**operational contract support integration cell.** A cell established to coordinate, and integrate operational contract support actions across all primary and special staffs for an operational area. Also called **OCSIC.** (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**performance work statement.** A statement of work for performance based acquisitions that describe the results in clear, specific, and objective terms with measurable outcomes. Also called **PWS.** (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-10)

**prime contract.** A contract or contractual action entered into by the United States Government for the purpose of obtaining supplies, materials, equipment, or services of any kind. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-10)

**privity of contract.** The legal relationship that exists between two contracting parties. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**procurement lead time.** The interval in time between the initiation of procurement action and receipt of the products or services purchased as the result of such actions. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**procuring contracting officer.** A contracting officer who initiates and signs the contract. Also called **PCO.** (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-10)

**production lead time.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**purchasing office.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**ratification.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02)

**receipt into the supply system.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
requirements determination. All activities necessary to develop, consolidate, coordinate, validate, approve, and prioritize joint force contract support requirements. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

requirements development. The process of defining actual contract support requirements and capturing these requirements in acquisition ready contract support requirements packages. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

requiring activity. A military or other designated supported organization that identifies and receives contracted support during military operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-10)

senior contracting official. The staff official designated by a Service head of contracting activity to execute theater support contracting authority for a specific command and/or operational area. Also called SCO. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

supported unit. As related to contracted support, a supported unit is the organization that is the recipient, but not necessarily the requester of, contractor-provided support. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-10)

systems support contract. A prearranged contract awarded by a Service acquisition program management office that provides technical support, maintenance and, in some cases, repair parts for selected military weapon and support systems. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-10)

task order. Order for services placed against an established contract. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-10)

theater support contract. A type of contingency contract awarded by contracting officers in the operational area serving under the direct contracting authority of the Service component or designated joint head of contracting activity for the designated contingency operation. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

unauthorized commitment. An agreement that is not binding solely because the United States Government representative who made it lacked the authority to enter into that agreement on behalf of the United States Government. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-10)
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 4-10 is in the Logistics series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 - Initiation**
- Joint doctrine development community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- JS J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**STEP #2 - Development**
- LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC joint working group

**STEP #3 - Approval**
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**STEP #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature