

JOINT DOCTRINE

Joint Force Employment

The CD-ROM is labeled "JOINT FORCE EMPLOYMENT Briefings" and "JFE CD-ROM Vol. 1, No. 1 March 1997". It features the Joint Chiefs of Staff seal and the logo for "q666" (OC Incorporated).

The laptop screen displays a presentation slide titled "Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Achieving National Security Objectives". The slide includes a progress bar and a flowchart with three main categories:

- Desires:**
 - Control & Use of Space
 - Global Communications
 - Power of Culture
- Forward Presence:**
 - Enhanced Capabilities
 - Land Operations and Logistics
 - Strategic Program Stability
 - Flexible Global Response Capability
- Crisis Response:**
 - Intelligence Fusion
 - High Speed Support
 - Timely and Effective

To the right of the laptop is a stack of white documents, with the top one showing a smaller version of the presentation slide and a list of bullet points.



Military Operations Other Than War

J-7 OPERATIONAL PLANS AND INTEROPERABILITY DIRECTORATE

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PREFACE

This briefing is one of the publications comprising the Joint Doctrine Joint Force Employment Briefing Modules. It has been specifically designed as a definitive briefing guide for joint doctrine presentations and focuses on military operations other than war (MOOTW). It will address many aspects of MOOTW including the purpose, principles, types of operations and planning considerations. MOOTW encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. All the material found in the joint doctrine Joint Force Employment Briefing Modules is drawn directly from approved joint doctrine, without interpretation, and may be reproduced and distributed to advance a better understanding of joint warfare and the principles of joint doctrine.

The module is organized into two main sections. The first section contains slides and a briefing script. A briefing slide is depicted on the left hand page along with its accompanying script on the facing page. The particular Joint Doctrine Publication from which the material is drawn is identified as **(Source)** on the briefing script. The second section contains an outline of the briefing script and forms Appendix A.

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
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Section I

Military Operations Other Than War Briefing Slides and Script

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR



Slide 1. Overview of MOOTW

Overview of MOOTW

This briefing has been created to discuss military operations other than war (MOOTW). It will address many aspects of MOOTW including the purpose, principles, types of operations and planning considerations. MOOTW encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war.

We will begin with the differences between war and MOOTW. When instruments of national power are unable to achieve national objectives or protect national interests any other way, the US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, placing the United States in a wartime state.

On the other hand, MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises. MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and noncombat operations in peacetime, conflict, and war situations. MOOTW involving combat, such as peace enforcement, may have many of the same characteristics of war, including active combat operations and employment of most combat capabilities.

All military operations are driven by political considerations. However, MOOTW are more sensitive to such considerations due to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities. In MOOTW, political considerations permeate all levels and the military may not be the primary player. As a result, these operations normally have more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) than in war. As in war, the goal of MOOTW is to achieve national objectives as quickly as possible and conclude military operations on terms favorable to the United States and its allies.

The purposes for conducting MOOTW may be multiple, with the importance or hierarchy of such purposes changing or unclear; for example, to deter potential aggressors, protect national interests, support the United Nations (UN), or provide humanitarian assistance (HA). In HA operations the Department of Defense (DOD) can be in either a support role to another agency or operate as the lead agency.

Although MOOTW are generally conducted outside of the United States, some types may be conducted within the United States, in support of civil authorities consistent with established law. **(JP 3-07, Chapter I, para 2)**

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

Political Objectives and MOOTW



Political Objectives drive MOOTW at every level, from strategic to tactical. A distinguishing characteristic of MOOTW is the degree to which political objectives influence operations and tactics.

Political Primacy

1 All military personnel should understand the political objective and the potential impact of inappropriate actions

It is not uncommon in some MOOTW, peacekeeping, for example, for junior leaders to make decisions which have significant political implications

2 Commanders should remain aware of changes in the operational situation and also in political objectives that may warrant an alteration in military operations

Changes may not always be obvious but it is imperative that they are recognized because failure to do so early on may lead to ineffective or counterproductive military operations

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Slide 2. Political Objectives and MOOTW

Political Objectives and MOOTW

Political objectives drive MOOTW at every level, from strategic to tactical. A distinguishing characteristic of MOOTW is the degree to which political objectives influence operations and tactics. Two important factors about political primacy stand out.

First, all military personnel should understand the political objective and the potential impact of inappropriate actions. It is not uncommon in some MOOTW, for example, peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions which have significant political implications.

Secondly, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious, but it is imperative that they are recognized, because failure to do so early on may lead to ineffective or counterproductive military operations. **(JP 3-07, Chapter I, para 3)**

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Attaining National Security Objectives



MOOTW contribute to attainment of national security objectives by supporting deterrence, forward presence, and crisis response options. In peacetime, the Armed Forces of the United States help to deter potential aggressors from using violence to achieve their aims.



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Slide 3. Attaining National Security Objectives

Attaining National Security Objectives

MOOTW contribute to attainment of national security objectives by supporting **deterrence**, **forward presence**, and **crisis response** options. In peacetime, the Armed Forces of the United States help to deter potential aggressors from using violence to achieve their aims.

Deterrence stems from the belief of a potential aggressor that a credible threat of retaliation exists, the contemplated action cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh any possible gains. Thus, a potential aggressor is reluctant to act for fear of failure, cost, or consequences. Threats directed against the United States, allies, or other friendly nations — ranging from terrorism to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) — require the maintenance of a full array of response capabilities. Peace enforcement, strikes and raids are all examples of MOOTW combat options that support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve to use force when necessary. HA and peacekeeping support deterrence by enhancing a climate of peaceful cooperation, thus promoting stability.


Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. Forward presence activities include forces stationed overseas and afloat, periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, port visits, and foreign community support, to name a few. Given their locations and knowledge of the region, these forces could be the first committed to MOOTW.

Crisis response is when US forces are able to respond rapidly either unilaterally or as a part of a multinational effort. This response may include, for example, employment of overwhelming force in peace enforcement, a single precision strike, or emergency support to civil authorities. The ability of the United States to respond rapidly with appropriate MOOTW options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional stability. (**JP 3-07, Chapter I, para 4**)

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Range of MOOTW



MOOTW provides the National Command Authorities (NCA) with a wide range of possible response options, from noncombat operations to combat operations.



DURATION: MOOTW may be of both short and long term duration, depending on the type of operation

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Slide 4. Range of MOOTW

Range of MOOTW

MOOTW provides the National Command Authorities with a wide range of possible response options, from noncombat operations such as HA to combat operations such as peace enforcement, strikes, and raids. I will now outline three specific types of MOOTW.

MOOTW involving the use or threat of force: In spite of efforts to promote peace, conditions within a country or region may result in armed conflict. When other instruments of national power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force or threat of its use may be required. The focus of US military operations during such periods is to support national objectives — to deter war and return to a sustainable state of peace. Combatant commanders may employ US forces to deter an adversary's action. The physical presence of these forces, coupled with their potential employment, can serve as a deterrent and facilitate achieving strategic aims. Should this deterrence fail, force may be required to compel compliance, in the forms of strikes or raids. There exists a singularly important threshold which may be crossed by use (or threat of use) of military force of any kind. In the range of military operations, this threshold marks the distinction between noncombat and combat operations.

MOOTW not involving the use or threat of force: Use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict or war and maintains US influence in foreign lands. Such operations include HA, disaster relief, arms control, support to US civil authorities, and peacekeeping. Such operations are inherently joint in nature. Although these operations do not normally involve combat, military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and respond to changing situations.

Simultaneous Operations: MOOTW often involve simultaneous operations. Noncombat MOOTW may be conducted simultaneously with combat MOOTW, such as HA in conjunction with peace enforcement operations (PEO). It is possible for part of a theater to be in a wartime state while MOOTW is being conducted elsewhere within the same theater. For example, during the final stages of Operation DESERT STORM, US Central Command conducted a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) in Somalia. In such situations, geographic combatant commanders should pay particular attention to integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing the effects and activities of their operations with US ambassadors, Department of State (DOS), and other agencies. Furthermore, whenever a possibility of a threat to US forces exists, even in a noncombat operation, commanders should plan for and be prepared to either transition to combat operations or leave the area. **(JP 3-07, Chapter I, para 5)**

Duration of Operations: Many MOOTW may be conducted on short notice and last for a relatively short period of time (for example, strikes and raids). On the other hand, some types of MOOTW may last for an extended period of time to achieve the desired end state. **(JP 3-07, Chapter I, para 6)**

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Six Basic Principles of MOOTW



MOOTW encompass a broad range of military operations and support a variety of purposes. The principles of war often apply to MOOTW.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR THAT APPLY TO MOOTW

Objective:

Direct military operations toward clearly defined, decisive, and obtainable objective

Unity of Effort:

Ensure that all efforts are directed to a common purpose

Security:

Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political or informational advantage

MOOTW-SPECIFIC PRINCIPLES

Restraint:

Prudent application of appropriate military capability

Perseverance:

Prepare for measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims

Legitimacy:

Sustain perception of legality, morality, and rightness

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Slide 5. Six Basic Principles of MOOTW

Six Basic Principles of MOOTW

As we have discussed, MOOTW encompass a broad range of military operations and support a variety of purposes. The principles of war, though primarily associated with large scale combat operations, generally apply to MOOTW. There are six MOOTW principles: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. The first three are derived from the principles of war, and the remaining three are MOOTW-specific.

Objective: The objective of MOOTW is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. Joint force commanders (JFCs) must understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort. Inherent in the principle of objective is the need to understand what constitutes mission success, and what might cause the operation to be terminated before success is achieved. Defining mission success may be more difficult in MOOTW but specifying measures of success helps define mission accomplishment. JFCs should translate their political guidance into appropriate military objectives through continuous mission and threat analysis. Finally, JFCs should be aware of shifts in the political objectives, or in the situation itself, that necessitate a change in the military objective.

Unity of Effort: The goal here is to seek unity of effort in every operation. This MOOTW principle is derived from the principle of war, unity of command. It emphasizes the need for ensuring all means are directed to a common purpose. In MOOTW it is important that JFCs rely heavily on consensus building to achieve unity of effort. Commanders must also establish procedures for liaison and coordination to achieve unity of effort.

Security: The goal here is to never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage. This principle enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. The inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or hostile intent applies in all operations. JFCs should avoid complacency and be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation. Operations security is an important component of this principle of MOOTW. Although there may be no clearly defined threat, the essential elements of US military operations should still be safeguarded. Security may also involve the protection of civilians or participating agencies and organizations.

Restraint: Here we must apply appropriate military capability prudently. Judicious use of force is necessary, carefully balancing the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective. Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure their personnel know and understand the ROE and are quickly informed of changes, otherwise it can result in fratricide, mission failure, and national embarrassment. ROE in MOOTW are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war.

Perseverance: The purpose of this is to prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some MOOTW may require years to achieve the desired results. It is important to assess possible responses to a crisis in terms of each option's impact on the achievement of the long-term political objective. Often the patient,

resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is a requirement for success.


Legitimacy: The goal here is to have committed forces sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable. In MOOTW, legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions. If an operation is perceived as legitimate, there is a strong impulse to support the action, and in MOOTW, legitimacy is frequently a decisive element. Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and fairness in dealing with various factions. Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed upon a government through the perception of the populace which it governs. **(JP 3-07, Chapter II, para 2)**

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Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Operation PROVIDE COMFORT



This slide shows the principles illustrated by a recent example: Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. This operation was established in 1991 to provide Humanitarian Assistance to the Kurds in northern Iraq.



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Slide 6. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

This slide shows the principles we have just discussed in action through a recent example, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. In 1991, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was established to provide HA to the Kurds who were being brutalized and oppressed by the Iraqi government.

Objective: PROVIDE COMFORT was established to assist Kurds suffering from hunger, disease, and exposure to harsh elements. The initial objective was to provide HA by airdropping food and other necessities, establishing relief centers, supervising distribution of food and water, and improving sanitation and medical care. Later the objective was expanded to include providing protection from Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's oppressive actions.

Unity of Effort: US leadership effectively orchestrated the multinational and civilian-military consensus through mutual trust, cooperation, and coordination of common interests. The US made an effort to ensure that all the multinational partners agreed to the mission's objectives. US military forces included special operations forces (SOF), US Army infantry and attack helicopter battalions, an Amphibious Ready Group, combat support units, and US Air Force airlift units. These forces worked with eleven countries to achieve their objectives. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT exhibited unity of effort in the joint, multinational and interagency arenas.

Security: A security force, Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo, was set up during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT where US and coalition ground combat and combat support units provided area security. JTF Bravo capitalized on the experience of Royal Marines, directly out of Northern Ireland, for expertise in patrolling urban areas. The psychological effect of this force helped deter aggression against PROVIDE COMFORT participants.

Restraint: Restraint kept a potentially explosive situation with Iraqi armed forces in check. US adhered to strict ROE when the ground exclusion zone was expanded with the air exclusion zone, allowing the Kurds to return home from temporary shelters. As the security zone expanded, US forces demonstrated increased readiness, but used restraint when confronting the Iraqi forces.

Perseverance: JFCs developed and executed plans that enabled US forces to continue the mission of providing HA and security to the Kurds indefinitely.


Legitimacy: Legitimacy of the operation can be perceived from numerous points of view. The international community initially deemed the operation legitimate in the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 688. The US public believed the operation to be legitimate based on the perceived threat posed by Iraq's actions. And the Kurdish population welcomed the assistance and security. The forces involved also perceived the operation as legitimate. Three factors contribute to the overall sense of legitimacy: a consistent demonstration of restraint, risk to US personnel has been kept to a minimum essential for mission accomplishment, and tangible evidence of successfully aiding the Kurds. (JP 3-07, Chapter II, para 3)

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

Types of MOOTW



There are several types of MOOTW that are appropriate for different situations.



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Slide 7. Types of MOOTW

Types of MOOTW


There are several types of MOOTW that are appropriate for different situations, which I will now discuss.

Arms Control: This is a concept that connotes any plan, arrangement, or process, resting upon explicit or implicit international agreement. Arms control governs any aspect of the following: the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapon systems (including the command and control, logistic support arrangements, and any related intelligence gathering mechanism); and the numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment or employment of the armed forces retained by the parties (it encompasses disarmament). Although it may be viewed as a diplomatic mission, the military can play an important role. They may be involved in seizing WMD, escorting authorized deliveries of weapons, or dismantling, destroying, or disposing of weapons and hazardous material, all actions which help reduce threats to regional security. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2a)**

Combatting Terrorism: This involves actions taken to oppose terrorism from wherever the threat. It includes antiterrorism and counterterrorism. Antiterrorism programs are defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts and form the foundation for effectively combatting terrorism. Counterterrorism is offensive measures taken to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism, which provides response measures that include preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations. DOD provides specially trained personnel and equipment in a supporting role to governmental lead agencies. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2b)**

DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations: Department of Defense supports federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in their effort to disrupt the transfer of illegal drugs into the United States. They have three major counterdrug responsibilities: to act as the single lead agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States; to integrate the command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence assets of the United States that are dedicated to interdicting the movement of illegal drugs into the United States; and to approve and fund State governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard to support drug interdiction and enforcement agencies. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2c)**

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Types of MOOTW: 2



Slide 8. Types of MOOTW:2

Types of MOOTW:2

Enforcement of Sanctions and/or Maritime Intercept Operations: These are operations which employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. The political objective of these operations is to compel a country or group to conform to the objectives of the initiating body. The military objective is to establish a barrier which is selective, allowing only those goods authorized to enter or exit. Sanction enforcement normally involves some combination of air and surface forces. An example of sanctions enforcement is Operation SUPPORT DEMOCRACY conducted off the coast of Haiti beginning in 1993. (**JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2d**)

Enforcing Exclusion Zones: An exclusion zone is established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specified activities in a distinct geographic area. These zones can be established in the air, sea, or on land. The purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of sanctions, or use or threat of force. The measures are usually imposed by the UN, or other international bodies of which the United States is a member. However, they may also be imposed unilaterally by the United States. Examples of enforcement of exclusion zones are Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq, initiated in 1992, and Operation DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia, initiated in 1993. (**JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2e**)

Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight: These operations are conducted to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate sea or air routes. International law states that a coastal state may exercise jurisdiction and control within its territorial sea and it accords the right of “innocent” passage to ships of other nations. Freedom of navigation by aircraft through international airspace is another well-established principle of international law. Aircraft threatened by nations or groups through the extension of airspace control zones outside the established international norms will result in legal measures to rectify the situation. (**JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2f**)

Humanitarian Assistance: HA operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the United States. HA provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration, and is intended to supplement or complement efforts of host-nation civil authorities or agencies. The US military can respond rapidly to emergencies or disasters and achieve order in austere locations. HA operations can cover a broad range of missions. There are three basic types of HA operations: those coordinated by the UN, those where the United States acts in concert with other multinational forces, or those where the United States responds unilaterally. Examples of HA are Operations SEA ANGEL I, conducted in 1991, and SEA ANGEL II, conducted in 1992, in Bangladesh. (**JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2g**)


Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA): These operations provide temporary support to domestic civil authorities when permitted by law, and are normally taken when an emergency overtaxes the capabilities of the civil authorities. They can consist of temporary augmentation of air traffic controllers and postal workers during strikes, restoration of law

and order after a riot, protection of life and federal property, or providing relief in the aftermath of natural disaster. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of federal military forces to enforce or otherwise execute laws unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress. Examples of MSCA are disaster relief provided during Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki in 1992, and deployment of troops during a civil disturbance in California in 1992. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2h)**

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Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

Types of MOOTW: 3



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Slide 9. Types of MOOTW:3

Types of MOOTW:3

Nation Assistance and/or Support to Counterinsurgency: Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than HA) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. Nation assistance operations support a host nation (HN) by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. These programs can be security assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), and humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA).

Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales.

FID programs encompass the total political, economic, informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency. US military support to FID should focus on assisting HN personnel to anticipate, preclude, and counter these threats. Typically, US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused on helping another nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow the government. US FID programs may address other threats to an HN's internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. FID is a principal special operations mission.

HCA programs are provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises, and must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. They generally encompass planned activities in the following categories: medical, dental and veterinary care, construction of surface transportation systems, well drilling, and construction or repair of sanitation and public facilities. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2i)**

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations: These operations normally relocate threatened noncombatants from a foreign country. NEO methods and timing are significantly influenced by diplomatic considerations. Ideally, these operations meet with little or no opposition, however, commanders should anticipate opposition and plan the operation like any combat operation. NEOs are similar to a raid in that the operation involves swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of objectives, and ends with a planned withdrawal. They differ from a raid in that force used is normally limited to that required to protect the evacuees and the evacuation force. The DOS is responsible for the protection and evacuation of American citizens abroad and for guarding their property. The US Ambassador, or Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, is responsible for the preparation of Emergency Action Plans that address the military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign country. Examples of NEO are Operations EASTERN EXIT, conducted in Somalia in 1991, and QUICK LIFT, in 1991 in Zaire. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2j)**

Peace Operations (PO): PO are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement and are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict. Military PO are categorized as peacekeeping operations (PKO) and PEO.

PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. PEO are the application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Unlike PKO, PEO does not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict.


US military peace operations support political objectives and diplomatic objectives. In addition to PO, the military may conduct operations in support of the following diplomatic peace activities: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2k)**

Protection of Shipping: When necessary, US forces provide protection of US flag vessels, US citizens, and their property against unlawful violence in and over international waters. Protection of shipping includes coastal sea control, harbor defense, port security, countermining operations, and environmental defense. It requires the coordinated employment of surface, air, space, and subsurface units, sensors, and weapons, as well as a command structure both ashore and afloat, and a logistics base.

Protection of shipping is accomplished by a combination of operations. Area operations, land- or sea-based, are designed to prevent a hostile force from obtaining a tactical position from which to attack friendly or allied shipping. Threats not neutralized by area operations must be deterred or addressed by escort operations. Escorts are associated with convoys, although individual ships or a temporary grouping of ships may be escorted for a specific purpose. Mine countermeasures operations are integral to successful protection of shipping and are an essential element of escort operations. An example of protection of shipping is Operation EARNEST WILL, the reflagging of Kuwaiti ships in 1987. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2l)**

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Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Types of MOOTW:4



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Slide 10. Types of MOOTW:4

Types of MOOTW:4

Recovery Operations: Recovery operations are conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel or human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. These operations are generally sophisticated activities requiring detailed planning in order to execute them. They may be clandestine, covert, or overt. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2m)**

Show of Force Operations: These operations, designed to demonstrate US resolve, involve increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that if allowed to continue may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. US forces deployed abroad lend credibility to US promises and commitments, increase its regional influence, and demonstrate its resolve to use military force if necessary. Show of force operations are military in nature but often serve both political and military purposes. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2n)**

Strikes and Raids: Strikes are offensive operations conducted to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective for political purposes. Strikes may be used for punishing offending nations or groups, upholding international law, or preventing those nations or groups from launching their own offensive actions. A raid is usually a small-scale operation involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2o)**


Support to Insurgency: An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. The US Government may support an insurgency against a regime threatening US interests. US forces may provide logistic and training support to an insurgency, but normally do not themselves conduct combat operations. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2p)**

We have just discussed several operations that are representative of a wide range of MOOTW. We will now go on to discuss the planning considerations of MOOTW.

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) *Introduction of Planning Considerations of MOOTW*



Plans for MOOTW are prepared in a similar manner as plans for war.



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Slide 11. Introduction of Planning Considerations of MOOTW

Introduction of Planning Considerations of MOOTW

Plans for MOOTW are prepared in a similar manner as plans for war. The mission analysis and command estimate processes are as critical in planning for MOOTW as they are in planning for war. Of particular importance in the planning process for MOOTW is the development of a clear definition, understanding, and appreciation of all potential threats. Moreover, efforts should be made to include an intelligence element in the first deployment package and commanders should always plan to have the right mix of forces available to quickly transition to combat operations or evacuate. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2)**


Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) MOOTW Command and Control Options



No single C2 option works best for all MOOTW. JFCs and their subordinates should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to meet specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort.


US Unilateral Operations

Interoperability of Communications is Critical to Success



Multinational Operations

Extend a Communications Umbrella over Multinational Forces



JP 3-07, "JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR" 12

Slide 12. Unit Integrity


Unit Integrity

Planners should attempt to maintain **unit integrity**. US forces train as units, and are best able to accomplish a mission when deployed intact. When personnel and elements are drawn from various commands, effectiveness is decreased. Even if political restraints on an operation dictate that a large force cannot be deployed intact, commanders should select smaller elements for deployment that have established internal structures and have trained and operated together. When deploying into a situation which may involve combat operations, commanders should deploy with appropriate joint force combat capability, including elements that have had the opportunity to train together and develop common operating procedures. In order to provide JFCs with needed versatility, it may not be possible to preserve unit integrity. In such cases, units must be prepared to send elements which are able to operate independently of parent units. Attachment to a related unit is the usual mode. (**JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2a**)



Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Intelligence and Information Gathering

Since MOOTW requires multi-disciplined, all-source, fused intelligence, a single source approach cannot support all requirements.



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Slide 13. Intelligence and Information Gathering

Intelligence and Information Gathering

Since MOOTW requires multi-disciplined, all-source, fused intelligence, a single source approach cannot support all requirements. Some sources of intelligence are: manned and unmanned aerial intelligence sensors, remote sensing systems, data from space systems, sensors on space and aerial platforms. Communications systems using space-based resources can provide secure, reliable dissemination of intelligence and other information where there is little or no existing communications infrastructure.

In MOOTW conducted outside the United States, human intelligence (HUMINT) may provide the most useful source of information. HUMINT can supplement other intelligence sources with psychological information not available through technical means. Specific essential elements of information which drive collection management process in MOOTW may differ in focus from those targeted in war. Intelligence collection in MOOTW often requires a focus on understanding the political, cultural, and economic factors that affect the situation. It will demand a depth of expertise in all aspects of the operational environment, including the people, their cultures, politics, religion, economics, and related factors. Intelligence collection must focus quickly on transportation infrastructure in the area of responsibility and/or joint operations area, to include capabilities and limitations of major seaports, airfields, and surface lines of communications.


In MOOTW involving coordination or interaction with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) or private voluntary organizations (PVO) and UN operations, the term “information gathering” should be used rather than the term “intelligence.” This will help military forces to foster better communications with other agencies, and thereby benefit from their valuable knowledge.

Counterintelligence operations are as important in MOOTW as they are in war. Protection of the force requires that essential elements of friendly information be safeguarded, to counter belligerent HUMINT efforts. Members of NGOs and PVOs working closely with US forces may pass information to belligerent elements that enables them to interfere with the mission. Equally important is their critical role during multinational MOOTW in establishing procedures and safeguards regarding the protection, handling, and release of classified or sensitive information to coalition partners, allies, and supported elements. JFCs must be alert to the possibility that covert intelligence operations may be conducted against them by a coalition partner. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2b)**

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Multinational Operations



When planning for operations involving multinational partners, JFCs should assign missions based on each multinational partner's capabilities.



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Slide 14. Multinational Operations

Multinational Operations

Multinational operations planning should take into account the following considerations: political climates, language barriers, cultural backgrounds, military capabilities and training, equipment interoperability and logistic support system coordination.

When planning for operations involving multinational partners, JFCs should assign missions based on each multinational partner's capabilities. Each nation's political considerations will influence its degree of involvement in a specific MOOTW. Early determination and resolution of these considerations with partner nations during the planning process is critical. JFCs should plan for increased liaison and advisory requirements when conducting multinational operations. Language barriers, varied cultural backgrounds, and different military capabilities and training may detract from effective coordination with multinational partners.

Liaison and advisory teams must be adequately organized, staffed, trained, and equipped to overcome these detractors. SOF-unique capabilities in language and cross cultural training, regional orientation and forward deployment, and focus on independent small unit actions, make them one of the principal forces of choice to complement and support multinational operations objectives. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2c)**

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

MOOTW Command and Control Options



No single C2 option works best for all MOOTW. JFCs and their subordinates should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to meet specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort.


US Unilateral Operations

Interoperability of Communication is Critical to Success



Multinational Operations

Extend a Communications Umbrella over Multinational Forces



JP 3-07, "JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR"

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Slide 15. MOOTW Command and Control Options

MOOTW Command and Control Options


No single command and control (C2) option works best for all MOOTW. JFCs and their subordinates should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to meet specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort. Communications planners must be prepared for rapid changes in mission that alter the types and priority of support provided. Interoperability of communications systems is critical to the success of the operation. In US unilateral operations, C2 arrangements may vary based on necessary coordination with US civil authorities, or federal, state, and local agencies involved in domestic and foreign operations. C2 arrangements during support to US civil authorities must be planned with unity of effort in mind, and provide communications links to appropriate US agencies. In a disaster situation, routine communications may be disrupted and civil authorities may have to rely on backup communications systems. Military leaders should be prepared to establish communication linkages with these authorities. Outside the United States, even when US forces operate unilaterally, some communications links will be required with local civil authorities or international agencies, depending on the situation.

Planners must be prepared to extend a communications umbrella over multinational forces. Some effective options for C2 of multinational forces include: the **lead nation option**, where a nation agrees to take the lead in the accomplishment of an international mandate. This simplifies unity of command; the **parallel option**, which allows multinational partners to retain greater operational control of their forces. The mandating organization selects a commander for the force. The force commander has operational control of forces of the multinational partners, but to a lesser degree than in the lead nation option; the **regional alliance option**, which depends on the ability of regional nations to lead a coalition effort. Existing alliances may serve as a basis for C2 of forces involved in MOOTW. (JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2d)

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Public Affairs



The worldwide media coverage provided by satellite communications makes planning for public affairs more important than ever. This is especially critical in MOOTW, where there can be significant political impact.



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Slide 16. Public Affairs

Public Affairs

The worldwide media coverage provided by satellite communications makes planning for **public affairs** more important than in the past. This is especially critical in MOOTW, where there can be significant political impact. The media can affect the perceived legitimacy of an operation and, therefore, influence the success or failure of that operation. JFCs should develop a well-defined and concise public affairs plan to minimize adverse effect upon the operation by the media, and include their public affairs officer early in the planning process.


Public affairs plans should provide open and independent reporting and provide ways to communicate information about an operation to fulfill the US military's obligation of keeping the American public informed. Such a plan also enhances force protection to avoid the media attempts to acquire and publicly disseminate classified information. Public affairs plans must also anticipate and pre-plan response to possibly inaccurate media analysis. (**JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2e**)

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

Civil Affairs (CA)



CA units contain a variety of specialty skill that support MOOTW. CA capabilities are normally tailored to support particular operational requirements.



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Slide 17. Civil Affairs (CA)

Civil Affairs

Civil affairs (CA) units contain a variety of specialty skills that support MOOTW. CA capabilities are normally tailored to support particular operational requirements. CA units may provide assessments of the civil infrastructure, assist in the operation of temporary shelters, and serve as liaison between the military and various NGOs and PVOs. CA forces can also provide expertise on factors which directly affect military operations such as culture, social structure, and host-nation support capabilities. CA may also include forces conducting activities which are normally the responsibility of local or indigenous governments. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2f)**

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Psychological Operations



Psychological Operations can provide significant support in MOOTW.



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Slide 18. Psychological Operations

Psychological Operations

Psychological operations (PSYOP) forces can provide significant support in MOOTW. Military PSYOP constitute a planned, systematic process of conveying messages to and influencing selected target groups. These messages may include safety, health, public service, and messages designed to favorably influence foreign perceptions of US forces and operations. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2g)**

*Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
Coordination with NGOs and PVOs*



In, MOOTW, JFCs should be prepared to coordinate civilian and military actions.



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Slide 19. Coordination with NGOs and PVOs


Coordination with NGOs and PVOs

In MOOTW, JFCs should be prepared to **coordinate** civilian and military actions. One method to build unity of effort and conduct this liaison is to establish a civil-military operations center (CMOC). There is no established structure for a CMOC, and its size and composition depend on the situation. Members of a CMOC may include representatives of US military forces and US Government agencies, other countries' forces, HN organizations, and **NGOs and PVOs**. Through a structure such as a CMOC, the JFC can gain a greater understanding of the roles of NGOs and PVOs and how they influence mission accomplishment. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2h)**

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Interagency Operations



MOOTW will often involve other departments and agencies.



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Slide 20. Interagency Operations


Interagency Operations

MOOTW will often involve other departments and agencies. Within the United States, the Federal Emergency Management Agency normally leads the response to a natural disaster, while the Department of Justice or Department of Transportation could be expected to lead in a counterterrorist operation. For MOOTW outside the United States, the lead agency will normally be the DOS and the US Ambassador will coordinate US activities through an established Country Team with representation from all US departments and agencies in that country, including the Department of Defense. (**JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2i**)

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

Legal Requirements

MOOTW may present unique legal issues. In addition to traditional skills necessary in military justice, legal personnel may require expertise in these areas.



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
Slide 21. Legal Requirements

Legal Requirements

MOOTW may present unique legal issues. In addition to traditional skills necessary in military justice, legal personnel may require expertise in areas such as refugees; displaced and detained civilians; fiscal law; rules of engagement; psychological operations; civil affairs; medical support; local culture, customs, and government; international law and agreements; military and political liaison; claims; and contingency contracting. HN legal personnel should be integrated into the command legal staff as soon as practical to provide guidance on unique HN domestic legal practices and customs. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2j)**

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Logistics

In MOOTW, logistics elements may be employed in quantities disproportionate to their normal military roles and in nonstandard tasks.



JP 3-07, "JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR"

Slide 22. Logistics

Logistics


In MOOTW, logistics elements may be employed in quantities disproportionate to their normal military roles, and in nonstandard tasks. Logistics elements may precede other military forces or may be the only forces deployed. Logistics personnel may be deployed to a foreign nation to support either US or multinational forces. These forces must be familiar with and adhere to any applicable status-of-forces agreement or legal, regulatory, or political restraints to which the United States is a party. Logistics planners should analyze the capability of the HN economy to accommodate the logistic support required by the US or multinational forces and exercise care to limit adverse effects on the HN economy. Logistics units, like all others, must also be capable of self-defense.

Early mission analysis must also consider transportation requirements. Airfields and ports must be assessed, and any delay in completing the assessment directly impacts the flow of strategic lift assets into the region. Additional support forces may be required to build supporting infrastructure. Procedures must be established to coordinate movement requirements and airfield slot times with other participants in the operation. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2k)**

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Medical Operations



There is usually a requirement to provide medical support to US forces engaged in MOOTW.



JP 3-07, "JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR" 20

Slide 23. Medical Operations


Medical Operations

There is usually a requirement to provide medical support to US forces engaged in MOOTW. The US military has unique, rapidly deployable, mobile medical personnel and units which are frequently called upon to provide a large portion of the medical support. Rapid and early integration of preventive medicine units and practices is perhaps the most important medical operation that must be planned. Medical support operations protect US personnel and enhance mission capability by reducing the threat of uncontrolled disease problems. Medical examination of indigenous and coalition personnel and their environments will frequently provide unique operational insights to the JFC during MOOTW. When planning for MOOTW, the potential to treat the HN indigent population or allied military personnel must be considered. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2l)**

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Active/Reserve Mix



MOOTW may require units and individuals not found in the active component.



↓ = Activated Unit

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Slide 24. Active/Reserve Mix

Active and Reserve Mix

MOOTW may require units and individuals not found in the active component. In that case, reserve units will be called upon which can include units from CA, PSYOP, airlift, linguist units, medical, port security, and engineers. Most Reserve component participation will be through volunteer support. Planners should determine what Reserve component capabilities are required, and how long it will take for the units to be trained and ready for deployment. They should also review personnel and equipment authorizations for Reserve component units to ensure compatibility with active forces.

For example, a reserve unit equipped with commercial cargo vehicles would not be able to operate as well in rough terrain as an active unit equipped with tactical vehicles. On the other hand, use of active forces may impact on those forces' ability to respond to their wartime taskings in the near term because of the time needed to redeploy and repair or replace equipment. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2m)**

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) **Transition From Wartime Operations to MOOTW**



A commander's campaign plan should include a transition from wartime operations to MOOTW. Joint force commanders may need to realign forces or adjust force structure to begin postconflict operations.



JP 3-07, "JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR" 22

Slide 25. Transition From Wartime Operations to MOOTW


Transition From Wartime Operations to MOOTW

A commander's campaign plan should include a transition from wartime operations to MOOTW. Commanders plan for this transition at the very outset of hostilities. This ensures desired political objectives continue to be pursued after the cessation of wartime operations. JFCs may need to realign forces or adjust force structure to begin postconflict operations. Military forces may largely be in support of other US and international agency efforts. Typical postconflict activities include transition to civil authorities, support to truce negotiations, CA support to reestablish a civil government, PSYOP to foster continued peaceful relations, and continuing logistic support from engineering and transportation units. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2n)**

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Termination of Operations



As in war, MOOTW operational planning includes actions to be taken as the operation is complete.



JP 3-07, "JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR" 23

Slide 26. Termination of Operations


Termination of Operations

As in war, MOOTW operational planning includes actions to be taken as soon as the operation is complete. These actions may include transition to civil authority, marking and clearing minefields, closing financial obligations, pre-redeployment activities, and redeploying forces. It is important to note that the manner in which US forces terminate their involvement may influence the perception of the legitimacy of the entire operation. Planners should schedule redeployment of specific units as soon as possible after their part in the operation has been completed. This is critical for maintaining readiness for future operations. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2o)**

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Education and Training



Readying forces for MOOTW require building on the primary purpose of the Armed Forces, to fight and win the nation's wars. Some MOOTW, however, require more than warfighting skills.



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Slide 27. Education and Training

Education and Training

Readying forces for MOOTW requires building on the primary purpose of the Armed Forces — to fight and win the nation’s wars. For most types of MOOTW, military personnel adapt their warfighting skills to the situation. However, for some MOOTW, like HA and PKO, warfighting skills are not always appropriate.

Training for MOOTW requires a two-pronged approach. The first prong is the professional military education of all officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). This education begins with basic leadership training and culminates at the senior Service or academy level. The focus of MOOTW education is to ensure leaders at all levels understand the objectives, principles, and characteristics of MOOTW, and can plan and conduct these operations.

The second prong is the training of individuals, units, and staffs. The focus of this training is to ensure that individuals and units have the necessary skills for a given MOOTW, and that the staffs can plan, control, and support the operation. Some of the training includes joint training exercises and military skills training at individual and unit levels. There will most likely be insufficient time to train for a specific operation, which is why the two-pronged approach to preparing for MOOTW is critical. A well-trained force can adapt to MOOTW under the leadership of officers and NCOs educated in the principles and types of MOOTW. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 3)**

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

Purpose



The purpose of this discussion has been to explain how MOOTW differs from large-scale, sustained combat operations by addressing its purpose and principles.

“Consolidating (the Cold War) victory requires a continuing US role and new strategies to strengthen democratic institutions. Military civic action can, in concert with other elements of US strategy, be an effective means of achieving US objectives around the globe.”

General Fred F. Woerner, Jr.
(US Army, Retired)

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Slide 28. Purpose

Purpose

The purpose of this discussion has been to explain how MOOTW differs from large-scale, sustained combat operations by addressing its purpose principles. Additionally, we have reviewed, in-depth, the sixteen types of MOOTW and the fifteen planning considerations associated with MOOTW.

To emphasize the importance of MOOTW, I will leave you with a quote from General Fred F. Woerner, Jr. (US Army, Retired):

“Consolidating (the Cold War) victory requires a continuing US role and new strategies to strengthen democratic institutions. Military civic action can, in concert with other elements of US strategy, be an effective means of achieving US objectives around the globe.”

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APPENDIX A

Section II Military Operations Other Than War Outline of Briefing Script

Military Operations Other Than War Outline of Briefing Script

I. Overview of MOOTW

A. We will begin with the differences between war and MOOTW.

1. When instruments of national power are unable to achieve national objectives or protect national interests any other way, the US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, placing the United States in a wartime state.
2. On the other hand, MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises.
3. MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and noncombat operations in peacetime, conflict, and war situations.
4. MOOTW involving combat, such as peace enforcement, may have many of the same characteristics of war, including active combat operations and employment of most combat capabilities.

B. All military operations are driven by political considerations. However, MOOTW are more sensitive to such considerations due to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities.

1. In MOOTW, political considerations permeate all levels and the military may not be the primary player. As a result, these operations normally have more restrictive rules of engagement than in war.
2. As in war, the goal of MOOTW is to achieve national objectives as quickly as possible and conclude military operations on terms favorable to the United States and its allies.

C. The purposes for conducting MOOTW may be multiple, with the importance or hierarchy of such purposes changing or unclear: examples being, to deter potential aggressors; protect national interests; support the United Nations ; or provide humanitarian assistance. In HA operations the Department of Defense (DOD) can be in either a support role to another agency or operate as the lead agency.

D. Although MOOTW are generally conducted outside of the United States, some types may be conducted within the United States, in support of civil authorities consistent with established law. (**JP 3-07, Chapter I, para 2**)

II. Political Objectives and MOOTW

A. Political objectives drive MOOTW at every level, from strategic to tactical. A distinguishing characteristic of MOOTW is the degree to which political objectives influence operations and tactics. Two important factors about political primacy stand out.

1. First, all military personnel should understand the political objective and the potential impact of inappropriate actions. It is not uncommon in some MOOTW, for example peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions which have significant political implications.

2. Secondly, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious but it is imperative that they are recognized because failure to do so early on may lead to ineffective or counterproductive military operations. **(JP 3-07, Chapter I, para 3)**

III. Attaining National Security Objectives

A. MOOTW contribute to attainment of national security objectives by supporting **deterrence, forward presence, and crisis response** options.

B. In peacetime, the Armed Forces of the United States help to deter potential aggressors from using violence to achieve their aims.

1. **Deterrence** stems from the belief of a potential aggressor that a credible threat of retaliation exists, the contemplated action cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh any possible gains.

a. Thus, a potential aggressor is reluctant to act for fear of failure, cost, or consequences. Threats directed against the United States, allies, or other friendly nations — ranging from terrorism to weapons of mass destruction require the maintenance of a full array of response capabilities.

b. Peace enforcement, strikes, and raids are all examples of MOOTW combat options that support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve to use force when necessary. HA and peacekeeping support deterrence by enhancing a climate of peaceful cooperation, thus promoting stability.

2. **Forward presence** activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access.

a. Forward presence activities include forces stationed overseas and afloat, periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, port visits, and foreign community support, to name a few.

b. Given their locations and knowledge of the region, these forces could be the first committed to MOOTW.

3. **Crisis response** is when US forces are able to respond rapidly either unilaterally or as a part of a multinational effort.
 - a. This response may include, for example, employment of overwhelming force in peace enforcement, a single precision strike, or emergency support to civil authorities.
 - b. The ability of the United States to respond rapidly with appropriate MOOTW options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional stability. **(JP 3-07, Chapter I, para 4)**

IV. Range of MOOTW. MOOTW provides the National Command Authorities with a wide range of possible response options, from noncombat operations such as HA to combat operations such as peace enforcement, strikes, and raids. I will now outline three specific types of MOOTW.

A. MOOTW involving the use or threat of force

1. In spite of efforts to promote peace, conditions within a country or region may result in armed conflict. When other instruments of national power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force or threat of its use may be required. The focus of US military operations during such periods is to support national objectives — to deter war and return to a sustainable state of peace.
2. Combatant commanders may employ US forces to deter an adversary's action. The physical presence of these forces, coupled with their potential employment, can serve as a deterrent and facilitate achieving strategic aims. Should this deterrence fail, force may be required to compel compliance, in the forms of strikes or raids.
3. There exists a singularly important threshold which may be crossed by use (or threat of use) of military force of any kind. In the range of military operations, this threshold marks the distinction between noncombat and combat operations.

B. MOOTW not involving the use or threat of force

1. Use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict or war and maintains US influence in foreign lands. Such operations include HA, disaster relief, arms control, support to US civil authorities, and peacekeeping. Such operations are inherently joint in nature.
2. Although these operations do not normally involve combat, military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and respond to changing situations.

C. **Simultaneous Operations:** MOOTW often involve simultaneous operations.

1. Noncombat MOOTW may be conducted simultaneously with combat MOOTW, such as HA in conjunction with peace enforcement operations
2. It is possible for part of a theater to be in a wartime state while MOOTW is being conducted elsewhere within the same theater. For example, during the final stages of Operation DESERT STORM, US Central Command conducted a noncombatant evacuation operation in Somalia.
3. In such situations, geographic combatant commanders should pay particular attention to integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing the effects and activities of their operations with US ambassadors, Department of State, and other agencies.
4. Furthermore, whenever a possibility of a threat to US forces exists, even in a noncombat operation, commanders should plan for and be prepared to either transition to combat operations or leave the area. (**JP 3-07, Chapter I, para 5**)

D. **Duration of Operations:** Many MOOTW may be conducted on short notice and last for a relatively short period of time (for example, strikes and raids). On the other hand, some types of MOOTW may last for an extended period of time to achieve the desired end state. (**JP 3-07, Chapter I, para 6**)

V. **Six Basic Principles of MOOTW.** As we have discussed, MOOTW encompass a broad range of military operations and support a variety of purposes. The principles of war, though primarily associated with large scale combat operations, generally apply to MOOTW. There are six MOOTW principles: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. The first three are derived from the principles of war, and the remaining three are MOOTW-specific.

A. **Objective.** The objective of MOOTW is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. JFCs must understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort. Inherent in the principle of objective is the need to understand what constitutes mission success, and what might cause the operation to be terminated before success is achieved.

1. Defining mission success may be more difficult in MOOTW, but specifying measures of success helps define mission accomplishment.
2. Joint force commanders should translate their political guidance into appropriate military objectives through continuous mission and threat analysis.
3. Finally, JFCs should be aware of shifts in the political objectives, or in the

situation itself, that necessitate a change in the military objective.

B. Unity of Effort: The goal here is to seek unity of effort in every operation.

1. This MOOTW principle is derived from the principle of war, unity of command. It emphasizes the need for ensuring all means are directed to a common purpose.
2. In MOOTW it is important that JFCs rely heavily on consensus building to achieve unity of effort. Commanders must also establish procedures for liaison and coordination to achieve unity of effort.

C. Security: The goal here is to never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage.

1. This principle enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. The inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or hostile intent applies in all operations.
2. JFCs should avoid complacency and be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation. Operations security is an important component of this principle of MOOTW. Although there may be no clearly defined threat, the essential elements of US military operations should still be safeguarded. Security may also involve the protection of civilians or participating agencies and organizations.

D. Restraint: Here we must apply appropriate military capability prudently. Judicious use of force is necessary, carefully balancing the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective.

1. Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure their personnel know and understand the ROE and are quickly informed of changes; otherwise it can result in fratricide, mission failure, and national embarrassment.
2. ROE in MOOTW are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war.

E. Perseverance. The purpose of this is to prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.

1. Some MOOTW may require years to achieve the desired results. It is important to assess possible responses to a crisis in terms of each option's impact on the achievement of the long-term political objective.
2. Often, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is a requirement for success.

F. **Legitimacy.** The goal here is to have committed forces sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable.

1. In MOOTW, legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions. If an operation is perceived as legitimate, there is a strong impulse to support the action and in MOOTW, legitimacy is frequently a decisive element.
2. Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and fairness in dealing with various factions. Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed upon a government through the perception of the populace which it governs. **(JP 3-07, Chapter II, para 2)**

VI. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. This slide shows the principles we have just discussed in action through a recent example, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. In 1991, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was established to provide HA to the Kurds who were being brutalized and oppressed by the Iraqi government.

A. **Objective.** PROVIDE COMFORT was established to assist Kurds suffering from hunger, disease, and exposure to harsh elements.

1. The initial objective was to provide HA by airdropping food and other necessities, establishing relief centers, supervising distribution of food and water, and improving sanitation and medical care.
2. Later the objective was expanded to include providing protection from Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's oppressive actions.

B. **Unity of Effort.** US leadership effectively orchestrated the multinational and civilian-military consensus through mutual trust, cooperation, and coordination of common interests.

1. The US made an effort to ensure that all the multinational partners agreed to the mission's objectives. US military forces included special operations forces, US Army infantry and attack helicopter battalions, an Amphibious Ready Group, combat support units, and US Air Force airlift units.
2. These forces worked with eleven countries to achieve their objectives. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT exhibited unity of effort in the joint, multinational and interagency arenas.

C. **Security.** A security force, Joint Task Force Bravo, was set up during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT where US and coalition ground combat and combat support units provided area security.

1. JTF Bravo capitalized on the experience of Royal Marines, directly out of Northern Ireland, for expertise in patrolling urban areas.

2. The psychological effect of this force helped deter aggression against PROVIDE COMFORT participants.

D. **Restraint.** Restraint kept a potentially explosive situation with Iraqi armed forces in check.

1. US adhered to strict ROE when the ground exclusion zone was expanded with the air exclusion zone, allowing the Kurds to return home from temporary shelters.
2. As the security zone expanded, US forces demonstrated increased readiness, but used restraint when confronting the Iraqi forces.

E. **Perseverance.** JFCs developed and executed plans that enabled US forces to continue the mission of providing HA and security to the Kurds indefinitely.

F. **Legitimacy.** Legitimacy of the operation can be perceived from numerous points of view.

1. The international community initially deemed the operation legitimate in the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 688.
2. The US public believed the operation to be legitimate based on the perceived threat posed by Iraq's actions. And the Kurdish population welcomed the assistance and security.
3. The forces involved also perceived the operation as legitimate. Three factors contribute to the overall sense of legitimacy: a consistent demonstration of restraint, risk to US personnel has been kept to a minimum essential for mission accomplishment, and tangible evidence of successfully aiding the Kurds. **(JP 3-07, Chapter II, para 3)**

VII. Types of MOOTW. There are several types of MOOTW that are appropriate for different situations, which I will now discuss:

A. **Arms Control.** This is a concept that connotes any plan, arrangement, or process, resting upon explicit or implicit international agreement.

1. Arms control governs any aspect of the following: the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapon systems, as well as the numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment, or employment of the armed forces retained by the parties.
2. Although it may be viewed as a diplomatic mission, the military can play an important role. They may be involved in seizing WMD, escorting authorized deliveries of weapons, or dismantling, destroying, or disposing of weapons and hazardous material, all actions which help reduce threats to regional security. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2a)**

B. Combatting Terrorism: This involves actions taken to oppose terrorism from wherever the threat. It includes antiterrorism and counterterrorism.

1. Antiterrorism programs are defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts and form the foundation for effectively combatting terrorism.
2. Counterterrorism is offensive measures taken to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism, which provides response measures that include preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations. DOD provides specially trained personnel and equipment in a supporting role to governmental lead agencies. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2b)**

C. DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations: Department of Defense supports federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in their effort to disrupt the transfer of illegal drugs into the United States.

1. They have three major counterdrug responsibilities:
 - a. To act as the single lead agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States;
 - b. To integrate the command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence assets of the United States that are dedicated to interdicting the movement of illegal drugs into the United States; and
 - c. To approve and fund State governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard to support drug interdiction and enforcement agencies. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2c)**

VIII. Types of MOOTW:2

A. Enforcement of Sanctions and/or Maritime Intercept Operations. These are operations which employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area.

1. The political objective of these operations is to compel a country or group to conform to the objectives of the initiating body.
2. The military objective is to establish a barrier which is selective, allowing only those goods authorized to enter or exit. Sanction enforcement normally involves some combination of air and surface forces. An example of sanctions enforcement is Operation SUPPORT DEMOCRACY conducted off the coast of Haiti beginning in 1993. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2d)**

B. Enforcing Exclusion Zones.

1. An exclusion zone is established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specified activities in a distinct geographic area.

2. These zones can be established in the air, sea, or on land. The purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of sanctions, or use or threat of force.
3. The measures are usually imposed by the UN, or other international bodies of which the United States is a member. However, they may also be imposed unilaterally by the United States.
4. Examples of enforcement of exclusion zones are Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq, initiated in 1992, and Operation DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia, initiated in 1993. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2e)**

C. Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight.

1. These operations are conducted to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate sea or air routes.
2. International law states that a coastal state may exercise jurisdiction and control within its territorial sea and it accords the right of “innocent” passage to ships of other nations.
3. Freedom of navigation by aircraft through international airspace is another well-established principle of international law. Aircraft threatened by nations or groups through the extension of airspace control zones outside the established international norms will result in legal measures to rectify the situation. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2f)**

D. Humanitarian Assistance.

1. HA operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the United States.
2. HA provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration, and is intended to supplement or complement efforts of host-nation civil authorities or agencies. The US military can respond rapidly to emergencies or disasters and achieve order in austere locations.
3. HA operations can cover a broad range of missions. There are three basic types of HA operations:
 - a. those coordinated by the UN; or
 - b. those where the United States acts in concert with other multinational forces; or

c. those where the United States responds unilaterally. Examples of HA are Operations SEA ANGEL I, conducted in 1991, and SEA ANGEL II, conducted in 1992, in Bangladesh. (**JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2g**)

E. Military Support to Civil Authorities. These operations provide temporary support to domestic civil authorities when permitted by law, and are normally taken when an emergency overtaxes the capabilities of the civil authorities.

1. They can consist of temporary augmentation of air traffic controllers and postal workers during strikes, restoration of law and order after a riot, protection of life and federal property, or providing relief in the aftermath of natural disaster.
2. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of federal military forces to enforce or otherwise execute laws unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress.
3. Examples of MSCA are disaster relief provided during Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki in 1992, and deployment of troops during a civil disturbance in California in 1992. (**JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2h**)

IX. Types of MOOTW:3

A. Nation Assistance and/or Support to Counterinsurgency. Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than HA) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation.

1. Nation assistance operations support a host nation by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions.
2. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. These programs can be security assistance, foreign internal defense, and humanitarian and civic assistance.
3. Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales.
4. FID programs encompass the total political, economic, informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency. US military support to FID should focus on assisting HN personnel to anticipate, preclude, and counter these threats. Typically, US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused on helping another nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow the government.
 - a. US FID programs may address other threats to an HN's internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism.

b. These threats may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. FID is a principal special operations mission.

5. HCA programs are provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises, and must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. They generally encompass planned activities in the following categories: medical, dental and veterinary care, construction of surface transportation systems, well drilling, and construction or repair of sanitation and public facilities. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2i)**

B. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. These operations normally relocate threatened noncombatants from a foreign country. NEO methods and timing are significantly influenced by diplomatic considerations.

1. Ideally, these operations meet with little or no opposition, however, commanders should anticipate opposition and plan the operation like any combat operation.
2. NEOs are similar to a raid in that the operation involves swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of objectives, and ends with a planned withdrawal. They differ from a raid in that force used is normally limited to that required to protect the evacuees and the evacuation force.
3. The DOS is responsible for the protection and evacuation of American citizens abroad and for guarding their property. The US Ambassador, or Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, is responsible for the preparation of Emergency Action Plans that address the military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign country. Examples of NEO are Operations EASTERN EXIT, conducted in Somalia in 1991, and QUICK LIFT, in 1991 in Zaire. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2j)**

C. Peace Operations. PO are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement and are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict. Military PO are categorized as peacekeeping operations (PKO) and PEO.

1. PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.
2. PEO are the application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Unlike PKO, PEO does not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict.

3. US military peace operations support political objectives and diplomatic objectives. In addition to PO, the military may conduct operations in support of the following diplomatic peace activities: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2k)**

D. Protection of Shipping: When necessary, US forces provide protection of US flag vessels, US citizens, and their property against unlawful violence in and over international waters.

1. Protection of shipping includes coastal sea control, harbor defense, port security, countermine operations, and environmental defense. It requires the coordinated employment of surface, air, space, and subsurface units, sensors, and weapons, as well as a command structure both ashore and afloat, and a logistics base.
2. Protection of shipping is accomplished by a combination of operations. Area operations, land- or sea-based, are designed to prevent a hostile force from obtaining a tactical position from which to attack friendly or allied shipping. Threats not neutralized by area operations must be deterred or addressed by escort operations.
 - a. Escorts are associated with convoys, although individual ships or a temporary grouping of ships may be escorted for a specific purpose.
 - b. Mine countermeasures operations are integral to successful protection of shipping and are an essential element of escort operations. An example of protection of shipping is Operation EARNEST WILL, the reflagging of Kuwaiti ships in 1987. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2l)**

X. Types of MOOTW:4

A. Recovery Operations. Recovery operations are conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel or human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. These operations are generally sophisticated activities requiring detailed planning in order to execute them. They may be clandestine, covert, or overt. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2m)**

B. Show of Force Operations. These operations, designed to demonstrate US resolve, involve increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that if allowed to continue may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives.

1. US forces deployed abroad lend credibility to US promises and commitments, increase its regional influence, and demonstrate its resolve to use military force if necessary.
2. Show of force operations are military in nature but often serve both political and military purposes. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2n)**

C. **Strikes and Raids.** Strikes are offensive operations conducted to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective for political purposes.

1. Strikes may be used for punishing offending nations or groups, upholding international law, or preventing those nations or groups from launching their own offensive actions.
2. A raid is usually a small-scale operation involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2o)**

D. **Support to Insurgency.**

1. An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.
2. The US Government may support an insurgency against a regime threatening US interests. US forces may provide logistic and training support to an insurgency, but normally do not themselves conduct combat operations. **(JP 3-07, Chapter III, para 2p)**

XI. Introduction of Planning Considerations of MOOTW

A. Plans for MOOTW are prepared in a similar manner as plans for war.

B. The mission analysis and command estimate processes are as critical in planning for MOOTW as they are in planning for war. Of particular importance in the planning process for MOOTW is the development of a clear definition, understanding, and appreciation of all potential threats.

C. Moreover, efforts should be made to include an intelligence element in the first deployment package and commanders should always plan to have the right mix of forces available to quickly transition to combat operations or evacuate. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2)**

XII. Unit Integrity. Planners should attempt to maintain unit integrity.

A. US forces train as units, and are best able to accomplish a mission when deployed intact. When personnel and elements are drawn from various commands, effectiveness is decreased.

1. Even if political restraints on an operation dictate that a large force cannot be deployed intact, commanders should select smaller elements for deployment that have established internal structures and have trained and operated together.
2. When deploying into a situation which may involve combat operations,

commanders should deploy with appropriate joint force combat capability, including elements that have had the opportunity to train together and develop common operating procedures.

3. In order to provide JFCs with needed versatility, it may not be possible to preserve unit integrity. In such cases, units must be prepared to send elements which are able to operate independently of parent units. Attachment to a related unit is the usual mode. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2a)**

XIII. Intelligence and Information Gathering

A. Since MOOTW requires multi-disciplined, all-source, fused intelligence, a single source approach cannot support all requirements.

1. Some sources of intelligence are manned and unmanned aerial intelligence sensors, remote sensing systems, data from space systems, sensors on space and aerial platforms.
2. Communications systems using space-based resources can provide secure, reliable dissemination of intelligence and other information where there is little or no existing communications infrastructure.

B. In MOOTW conducted outside the United States, human intelligence may provide the most useful source of information.

1. HUMINT can supplement other intelligence sources with psychological information not available through technical means. Specific essential elements of information which drive collection management process in MOOTW may differ in focus from those targeted in war.
2. Intelligence collection in MOOTW often requires a focus on understanding the political, cultural, and economic factors that affect the situation. It will demand a depth of expertise in all aspects of the operational environment, including the people, their cultures, politics, religion, economics, and related factors.
3. Intelligence collection must focus quickly on transportation infrastructure in the area of responsibility and/or joint operations area, to include capabilities and limitations of major seaports, airfields, and surface lines of communications.

C. In MOOTW involving coordination or interaction with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) or private voluntary organizations (PVO) and UN operations, the term “information gathering” should be used rather than the term “intelligence.” This will help military forces to foster better communications with other agencies, and thereby benefit from their valuable knowledge.

D. Counterintelligence operations are as important in MOOTW as they are in war.

1. Protection of the force requires that essential elements of friendly information be safeguarded, to counter belligerent HUMINT efforts.
2. Members of NGOs and PVOs working closely with US forces may pass information to belligerent elements that enables them to interfere with the mission.
3. Equally important is their critical role during multinational MOOTW in establishing procedures and safeguards regarding the protection, handling, and release of classified or sensitive information to coalition partners, allies, and supported elements.
4. JFCs must be alert to the possibility that covert intelligence operations may be conducted against them by a coalition partner. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2b)**

XIV. Multinational Operations

A. **Multinational operations** planning should take into account the following considerations: political climates, language barriers, cultural backgrounds, military capabilities and training, equipment interoperability, logistics support system coordination.

1. When planning for operations involving multinational partners, JFCs should assign missions based on each multinational partner's capabilities.
2. Each nation's political considerations will influence its degree of involvement in a specific MOOTW. Early determination and resolution of these considerations with partner nations during the planning process is critical.
3. JFCs should plan for increased liaison and advisory requirements when conducting multinational operations. Language barriers, varied cultural backgrounds, and different military capabilities and training may detract from effective coordination with multinational partners.

B. Liaison and advisory teams must be adequately organized, staffed, trained, and equipped to overcome these detractors. SOF-unique capabilities in language and cross cultural training, regional orientation and forward deployment, and focus on independent small unit actions, make them one of the principal forces of choice to complement and support multinational operations objectives. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2c)**

XV. MOOTW Command and Control Options

A. No single command and control option works best for all MOOTW. JFCs and their subordinates should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to meet specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort.

1. Communications planners must be prepared for rapid changes in mission that alter the types and priority of support provided. Interoperability of

communications systems is critical to the success of the operation.

2. In US unilateral operations, C2 arrangements may vary based on necessary coordination with US civil authorities, or federal, state, and local agencies involved in domestic and foreign operations.
3. C2 arrangements during support to US civil authorities must be planned with unity of effort in mind, and provide communications links to appropriate US agencies. In a disaster situation, routine communications may be disrupted and civil authorities may have to rely on backup communications systems. Military leaders should be prepared to establish communication linkages with these authorities.
4. Outside the United States, even when US forces operate unilaterally, some communications links will be required with local civil authorities or international agencies, depending on the situation.

B. Planners must be prepared to extend a communications umbrella over multinational forces.

1. Some effective options for C2 of multinational forces include: the **lead nation option**, where a nation agrees to take the lead in the accomplishment of an international mandate; this simplifies unity of command; the **parallel option**, which allows multinational partners to retain greater operational control of their forces.
3. The mandating organization selects a commander for the force. The force commander has operational control of forces of the multinational partners, but to a lesser degree than in the lead nation option; and the **regional alliance option**, which depends on the ability of regional nations to lead a coalition effort. Existing alliances may serve as a basis for C2 of forces involved in MOOTW. (JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2d)

XVI. Public Affairs

A. The worldwide media coverage provided by satellite communications makes planning for **public affairs** more important than in the past. This is especially critical in MOOTW, where there can be significant political impact.

1. The media can affect the perceived legitimacy of an operation and, therefore, influence the success or failure of that operation.
2. JFCs should develop a well-defined and concise public affairs plan to minimize adverse effect upon the operation by the media, and include their public affairs officer early in the planning process.

B. Public affairs plans should provide open and independent reporting and provide ways to communicate information about an operation to fulfill the US military's obligation

of keeping the American public informed.

1. Such a plan also enhances force protection to avoid the media attempts to acquire and publicly disseminate classified information. Public affairs plans must also anticipate and pre-plan response to possibly inaccurate media analysis. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2e)**

XVII. Civil Affairs (CA)

A. **Civil affairs** units contain a variety of specialty skills that support MOOTW. CA capabilities are normally tailored to support particular operational requirements. CA units may provide assessments of the civil infrastructure, assist in the operation of temporary shelters, and serve as liaison between the military and various NGOs and PVOs.

B. CA forces can also provide expertise on factors which directly affect military operations such as culture, social structure, and host-nation support capabilities. CA may also include forces conducting activities which are normally the responsibility of local or indigenous governments. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2f)**

XVIII. Psychological Operations

A. **Psychological operations** forces can provide significant support in MOOTW.

1. Military PSYOP constitute a planned, systematic process of conveying messages to and influencing selected target groups.
2. These messages may include safety, health, public service, and messages designed to favorably influence foreign perceptions of US forces and operations. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2g)**

XIX. Coordination with NGOs and PVOs

A. In MOOTW, JFCs should be prepared to **coordinate** civilian and military actions. One method to build unity of effort and conduct this liaison is to establish a civil-military operations center (CMOC).

B. There is no established structure for a CMOC, and its size and composition depend on the situation. Members of a CMOC may include representatives of US military forces and US Government agencies, other countries' forces, HN organizations and **NGOs and PVOs**.

C. Through a structure such as a CMOC, the JFC can gain a greater understanding of the roles of NGOs and PVOs and how they influence mission accomplishment. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2h)**

XX. Interagency Operations

- A. MOOTW will often involve other departments and agencies.
- B. Within the US, the Federal Emergency Management Agency normally leads the response to a natural disaster, while the Department of Justice or Department of Transportation could be expected to lead in a counterterrorist operation.
- C. For MOOTW outside the United States, the lead agency will normally be the DOS and the US Ambassador will coordinate US activities through an established Country Team with representation from all US departments and agencies in that country, including DOD. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2i)**

XXI. Legal Requirements

- A. MOOTW may present unique legal issues.
- B. In addition to traditional skills necessary in military justice, legal personnel may require expertise in areas such as refugees; displaced and detained civilians; fiscal law; rules of engagement; psychological operations; civil affairs; medical support; local culture, customs, and government; international law and agreements; military and political liaison; claims; and contingency contracting.
- C. HN legal personnel should be integrated into the command legal staff as soon as practical to provide guidance on unique HN domestic legal practices and customs. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2j)**

XXII. Logistics

- A. In MOOTW, logistics elements may be employed in quantities disproportionate to their normal military roles, and in nonstandard tasks.
 - 1. Logistics elements may precede other military forces or may be the only forces deployed. Logistics personnel may be deployed to a foreign nation to support either US or multinational forces.
 - 2. These forces must be familiar with and adhere to any applicable status-of-forces agreement or legal, regulatory, or political restraints to which the United States is a party.
 - 3. Logistics planners should analyze the capability of the HN economy to accommodate the logistic support required by the US or multinational forces and exercise care to limit adverse effects on the HN economy.
 - 4. Logistics units, like all others, must also be capable of self-defense.
- B. Early mission analysis must also consider transportation requirements.
 - 1. Airfields and ports must be assessed, and any delay in completing the assessment directly impacts the flow of strategic lift assets into the region.

2. Additional support forces may be required to build supporting infrastructure. Procedures must be established to coordinate movement requirements and airfield slot times with other participants in the operation. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2k)**

XXIII. Medical Operations

A. There is usually a requirement to provide medical support to US forces engaged in MOOTW.

1. The US military has unique, rapidly deployable, mobile medical personnel and units which are frequently called upon to provide a large portion of the medical support.
2. Rapid and early integration of preventive medicine units and practices is perhaps the most important medical operation that must be planned.
3. Medical support operations protect US personnel and enhance mission capability by reducing the threat of uncontrolled disease problems.
4. Medical examination of indigenous and coalition personnel and their environments will frequently provide unique operational insights to the JFC during MOOTW.
5. When planning for MOOTW, the potential to treat the HN indigent population or allied military personnel must be considered. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2l)**

XXIV. Active and/or Reserve Mix

A. MOOTW may require units and individuals not found in the active component. In that case, reserve units will be called upon which can include units from civil affairs, psychological operations, airlift, linguist units, medical, port security, and engineers. Most Reserve component participation will be through volunteer support.

1. Planners should determine what Reserve component capabilities are required, and how long it will take for the units to be trained and ready for deployment.
2. They should also review personnel and equipment authorizations for Reserve component units to ensure compatibility with active forces.
 - a. For example, a reserve unit equipped with commercial cargo vehicles would not be able to operate as well in rough terrain as an active unit equipped with tactical vehicles.
 - b. On the other hand, use of active forces may impact on those forces' ability to respond to their wartime taskings in the near term because of the time needed to redeploy and repair or replace equipment. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV,**

para 2m)

XXV. Transition From Wartime Operations to MOOTW

- A. A commander's campaign plan should include a transition from wartime operations to MOOTW. Commanders plan for this transition at the very outset of hostilities. This ensures desired political objectives continue to be pursued after the cessation of wartime operations.
- B. JFCs may need to realign forces or adjust force structure to begin postconflict operations.
- C. Military forces may largely be in support of other US and international agency efforts. Typical postconflict activities include transition to civil authorities, support to truce negotiations, CA support to reestablish a civil government, PSYOP to foster continued peaceful relations, and continuing logistic support from engineering and transportation units. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2n)**

XXVI. Termination of Operations

- A. As in war, MOOTW operational planning includes actions to be taken as soon as the operation is complete. These actions may include transition to civil authority, marking and clearing minefields, closing financial obligations, pre-redeployment activities, and redeploying forces.
- B. It is important to note that the manner in which US forces terminate their involvement may influence the perception of the legitimacy of the entire operation.
- C. Planners should schedule redeployment of specific units as soon as possible after their part in the operation has been completed. This is critical for maintaining readiness for future operations. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 2o)**

XXVII. Education and Training

- A. Readyng forces for MOOTW requires building on the primary purpose of the Armed Forces — to fight and win the nation's wars. For most types of MOOTW, military personnel adapt their warfighting skills to the situation. However, for some MOOTW, like HA and PKO, warfighting skills are not always appropriate.
 - 1. Training for MOOTW requires a two-pronged approach. The first prong is the professional military education of all officers and noncommissioned officers.
 - 2. This education begins with basic leadership training and culminates at the senior Service or academy level.
 - 3. The focus of MOOTW education is to ensure leaders at all levels understand the objectives, principles, and characteristics of MOOTW, and can plan and

conduct these operations.

B. The second prong is the training of individuals, units, and staffs. The focus of this training is to ensure that individuals and units have the necessary skills for a given MOOTW, and that the staffs can plan, control, and support the operation. Some of the training includes joint training exercises and military skills training at individual and unit levels.

1. There will most likely be insufficient time to train for a specific operation which is why the two-pronged approach to preparing for MOOTW is critical.
2. A well-trained force can adapt to MOOTW under the leadership of officers and NCOs educated in the principles and types of MOOTW. **(JP 3-07, Chapter IV, para 3)**

XXVIII. Purpose

A. The purpose of this discussion has been to explain how MOOTW differs from large-scale, sustained combat operations by addressing its purpose principles. Additionally, we have reviewed, in-depth, the sixteen types of MOOTW and the fifteen planning considerations associated with MOOTW.

B. To emphasize the importance of MOOTW, I will leave you with a quote from General Fred F. Woerner, Jr. (US Army, Retired):

“Consolidating (the Cold War) victory requires a continuing US role and new strategies to strengthen democratic institutions. Military civic action can, in concert with other elements of US strategy, be an effective means of achieving US objectives around the globe.”

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