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PREFACE

This briefing is one of the publications comprising the Joint Doctrine Joint Force Employment Briefing Modules. It has been specifically designed as a definitive briefing guide for joint doctrine presentations and focuses on establishing a joint force, assigning a mission or objective to the Joint Force Commander, establishing command relationships, assigning or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the JFC with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission. All the material found in the Joint Doctrine Joint Force Employment Briefing Modules is drawn directly from approved joint doctrine, without interpretation, and may be reproduced and distributed to advance a better understanding of joint warfare and the principles of joint doctrine.

The module is organized into two main sections. The first section contains slides and a briefing script. A briefing slide is depicted on the left hand page along with its accompanying script on the facing page. The particular Joint Doctrine Publication from which the material is drawn is identified as (**Source**) on the briefing script. Appendix A contains an outline of the briefing script.

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SECTION II

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Section I

Joint Force Employment Briefing Slides and Script



Joint Force Employment



Joint Doctrine

J-7 OPERATIONAL PLANS AND INTEROPERABILITY DIRECTORATE

Slide 1. Joint Doctrine for Joint Force Employment

Joint Doctrine for Joint Force Employment

What is the guidance to accomplish the mission as a joint force commander?

Joint Force Employment



- λ ***So . . . You Are a Joint Force Commander***
 - υ **What Is the Authoritative Guidance for How You Should Employ Your Forces and Accomplish the Mission?**
 - υ **What Does Approved Joint Doctrine Say?**

Slide 2. Joint Force Employment

Joint Force Employment

Now I will explain the authoritative guidance for how a joint force commander proceeds in discharging his mission. I will try to describe for you, at the top level, what the doctrine says. This will enable the commander to know where to go to get information and what that information contains.

Joint Warfare



The Nature of Modern Warfare Demands We Fight As A Team

- λ *Defense of the National Security*
 - υ Rests first on deterrence
 - υ If deterrence fails, our objective is winning the nation's wars -- when we fight, we fight to win
 - υ Purpose of military operations other than war is to promote national security and protect our national interests
- λ *American Military Power Is Employed Under Joint Force Commanders*
- λ *Joint Doctrine Represents the Authoritative Guidance for the Joint Employment of the Armed Forces*

"Joint Warfare Is Team Warfare"

JP 1, "JOINT WARFARE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES"

Slide 3. Joint Warfare

Joint Warfare

The Armed Forces of the United States hold in trust, for the people of the United States of America, military power greater than any in history. Defense of the national security rests first on the concept of deterrence. By demonstrating national resolve and maintaining the ability to deal successfully with threats to the national interests, we deter those who would use military power against us. Readiness and military professionalism lessen the risk of our having to fight at all. If deterrence fails, then our single objective is winning the nation's wars. When we fight, we fight to win. (**JP 1, Chapter I**)

We also have a long history of military support for national goals short of war, ranging from general military service to the nation to a wide range of actions abroad in support of foreign policy. In all military operations other than war (MOOTW), our purpose again is to promote the national security and protect our national interests.

An important implication of the basic purpose for our military service is that we focus on common action to achieve common goals. Defense of our nation is the fundamental basis for military service and **joint warfare** is indispensable to that defense. The reason for our existence demands unity in our efforts.

Joint Force Employment



- ***Begins with Mission Being Given to JFC***
- ***Along with Mission Goes Resources***
- ***Authority to Use the Resources***

CINC, Subunified CMDR, or JTF CMDR Authorized to Exercise COCOM or OPCON Over JT Forces

Forces Assigned or Attached (Almost All Service Forces Are Assigned to CINCs - Single Chain of Command)

- ◆ May Define Operational or Joint Areas
- ◆ Has Full Authority to Assign Missions, Redirect Efforts, Direct Coordination
- ◆ Has Authority to Organize Forces to Best Accomplish Assigned Mission

JP 0-2, "UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES (UNAAF)" and JP 3-0, "DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS"

Slide 4. Fundamentals of Joint Force Employment

Fundamentals of Joint Force Employment

In order to achieve our goals of deterrence (winning wars when necessary, promoting security, and protecting national interests) we must maintain unity of effort, starting with unified direction. For US military operations, unified direction is normally accomplished by establishing a joint force, assigning a mission or objective to the joint force commander (JFC), establishing command relationships, assigning or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the JFC with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission. **(JP 0-2, Chapter I, para 4c)**

A JFC is a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) or operational control (OPCON) over a joint force. **(JP 1-02)**


Almost all Service forces are assigned to combatant commands. Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified. A combatant commander exercises COCOM over forces assigned or reassigned by the National Command Authorities (NCA). Subordinate JFCs will exercise OPCON over assigned or reassigned forces. **(JP 0-2, Chapter III, paras 2, 2a and 2b)**

Both COCOM and OPCON provide the authority to organize and employ commands and forces, assign tasks, designate objectives, and give authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission and also to delineate functional responsibilities and geographic joint operations areas of subordinate JFCs. **(JP 0-2, Chapter III, para 4)**

JFC Organizes Forces



JFCs Organize Forces to Accomplish the Mission Based on the JFC's Vision and Concept of Operations



Slide 5. JFC Organizes Forces

JFC Organizes Forces

The key individual in the chain of command is the **JFC**, who is given the **authority to organize forces** to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations. The organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the contemplated operations and any development that may necessitate a change in plan. (**JP 0-2, Chapter IV, para 1c**)

The JFC will establish subordinate commands, assign responsibilities, establish or delegate appropriate command and support relationships, and establish coordinating instructions for the component commanders. Sound organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. All joint forces include Service component commands, because administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through Service component commands. The JFC also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders.

The JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct operations. Functional component commands can be appropriate when forces from two or more Military Departments must operate in the same dimension or medium or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. Joint force land, air, maritime, and special operations component commanders are examples of functional components. Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional component commands with operational responsibilities.

The JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of the Service and functional component commanders; however, the Service responsibilities (i.e., administrative and logistic) of the components must be given due consideration by the JFC. The JFC has full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of the JFC while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the Service organizations. (**JP 0-2, Chapter IV, para 1c**)

The responsibilities and authority of a functional component command must be assigned by the establishing JFC. The JFC must designate the military capability that will be made available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command relationship(s) the functional component commander will exercise (e.g., a joint force special operations component commander normally has OPCON of assigned forces and a joint force air component commander [JFACC] is normally delegated tactical control [TACON] of the sorties or other military capability made available). (**JP 0-2, Chapter IV, paras 10b and 10c**)

Operational Art: Overview of Operational Art



Joint force commanders employ operational art, in concert with strategic guidance and direction received from superior leaders, in developing campaigns and operations



JP 3-0, "DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS"

Slide 6. Overview of Operational Art

Overview of Operational Art

JFCs employ operational art, in concert with strategic guidance and direction received from superior leaders, in developing campaigns and operations. **Operational art** is the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.

Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure. Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint and multinational cooperation. Operational art is practiced not only by JFCs but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders.

Joint operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces but also at the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. Joint operational art, in particular, focuses on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces.

Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions: What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends); What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways); How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means); and What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions? (**JP 3-0, Chapter II, para 2c & JP 3-0, Chapter III, para 5**)

Operational art is characterized by the following fundamental elements: Synergy, simultaneity and depth, anticipation, balance, leverage, timing and tempo, operational reach and approach, forces and functions, arranging operations, centers of gravity, direct vs. indirect approach, decisive points, culmination and, finally, termination. (**JP 3-0, Exec Summary**)

Employment Considerations: Considerations At the Outset of Combat



As combat operations commence, joint force commanders seek decisive advantage quickly, before close combat if possible, by exploiting full dimensional leverage to shock, demoralize, and disrupt opponents immediately.

Force Projection	Dimensional Superiority	Direct Attack	Special Operations	Force Protection
Opposed Unopposed	Air Sea Space C4I Fire Mobility	Direct attack of enemy strategic centers of gravity		<p>Make personnel, systems, and units difficult to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Locate Strike Destroy <p>Consider and make provision for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Health Welfare Morale Maintenance

JP 3-0, "Doctrine For Joint Operations"

Slide 7. Considerations at the Outset of Combat

Considerations at the Outset of Combat

As combat operations commence, JFCs need to exploit full dimensional leverage to shock, demoralize, and disrupt opponents immediately. JFCs seek decisive advantage quickly, before close **combat** if possible. The major **considerations** are as follows.

Force Projection: Force projection usually begins as a rapid response to a crisis. Alert may come with little or no notice, bringing with it tremendous stress on personnel and systems, accompanied by requests from the media for information. In any event, rapid, yet measured, response is critical. Joint forces participate in force projection operations in both war and operations other than war. These operations may be either unopposed or opposed by an adversary. When opposed, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry coordinated with strategic airlift and sealift, and prepositioned forces. Both types of operations demand a versatile mix of forces that are organized, trained, equipped, and poised to respond quickly. JFCs sequence, enable, and protect the arrival of forces to achieve early decisive advantage. The projection of forces will often be a friendly center of gravity (COG) during early entry operations. JFCs introduce forces in a manner that enables rapid force buildup into the structure required for anticipated operations and simultaneous protection of the force.

Dimensional Superiority: JFCs will normally seek to secure air and maritime superiority early in the conduct of joint operations. Although air and maritime superiority are not ends in themselves, history shows that control of the sea and/or the air has been a pivotal wartime factor. JFCs also seek to achieve superiority immediately in command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) — space control is a necessary precursor to this superiority. As another example of seeking early superiority before close combat, land commanders may seek to first achieve counterbattery or indirect fire superiority, thereby enhancing protection of their forces. Additionally, JFCs can seek to achieve a mobility differential by selectively attacking key enemy forces and transportation networks to degrade enemy maneuver.

Direct Attack of Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity: As part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against enemy COGs. Where possible, specific operations may be conducted to directly attack strategic COGs by air, missile, special operations, and other deep-ranging capabilities. There are several purposes to these attacks. They may in themselves be decisive. If they are not, they begin the offensive operation throughout the enemy's depth that can cause paralysis and destroy cohesion.

Special Operations: Special operations enhance the power and scope of full dimensional operations and tend to be asymmetrical in their application. Innovative special operations can directly and indirectly attack enemy COGs that may be difficult to reach by conventional action. Special operations forces (SOF) frequently require support from other forces, but can also support other forces in operations. They are a complement to, not a substitute for, conventional forces.

Force Protection: JFCs strive to conserve the fighting potential of the joint force by protecting various aspects of the joint force. For example, JFCs counter the enemy's firepower and maneuver by making personnel, systems, and units difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. JFCs also give attention to the health, welfare, morale, and maintenance of the personnel. JFCs make safety an integral part of all joint training and operations. Additionally, JFCs make every effort to reduce the potential for fratricide. Commanders should seek to minimize the potential for fratricide while not limiting boldness and audacity in combat. (JP 3-0, Chapter IV, para 2-a, b, c, d, e)

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Campaign Planning



- thru*
- **Joint Campaigns/Operations**
 - ◆ Functional and Service components conduct subordinate and supporting operations -- not independent campaigns
 - ◆ The goal is to increase the total effectiveness of the joint force, not necessarily to involve all forces or to involve all forces equally

- **The Campaign Plan**
 - ◆ Incorporates the commander's intent -- concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired end state
 - ◆ Often contains the concept of operations -- the what, where, and how the joint force will affect the enemy or situation -- provides sufficient detail for the staff and subordinate commanders to understand what they are to do without further instructions

JP 5-0, "DOCTRINE FOR PLANNING JOINT OPERATIONS"

Slide 8. Campaign Planning

Campaign Planning

Now that we have discussed some of the supporting capabilities, let us turn to a centerpiece of operational art: the joint campaign. (**JP 5-0, Chapter II, Section F**)

The theater **campaign plan** embodies the combatant commander's vision of the arrangement of related major operations necessary to attain strategic objectives. Preparation of a campaign plan is appropriate when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. A campaign is a series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. A campaign plan describes how a series of joint major operations are arranged in time, space, and purpose to achieve a strategic objective. It orients on the enemy's COGs; achieves simultaneous and synchronized employment of all available land, sea, air, space-based assets, and special operations forces; clearly defines an end state that constitutes success, failure, mission termination, or exit strategy; and serves as the basis for subordinate planning.

Two of the most important aspects of this plan are the synchronized employment of forces and the concept for their sustainment. Campaign plans are the operational extension of a combatant commander's theater strategy. They translate strategic concepts into unified plans for military action by specifying how operations, logistics, and time will be used to attain theater strategic objectives. Through theater campaign plans, combatant commanders define objectives; describe concepts of operations and sustainment; arrange operations in time, space, and purpose; organize forces; establish command relationships; assign tasks; and synchronize air, land, sea, space, and special operations, often in coordination with allies, interagency operations, nongovernmental operations, and even United Nations operations.

Campaign planning is a primary means by which combatant commanders arrange for strategic unity of effort and through which they guide the planning of joint operations within their theater.

It communicates the commander's purpose, requirements, objectives, and concept to subordinate components and joint forces, as well as to supporting commands and Services, so that they may make necessary preparations. In addition, by means of a campaign plan, combatant commanders give the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information needed for intertheater coordination at the national level.


There are two types of campaign plans. Theater campaigns are conducted by joint forces. They may follow more than one line of operation. Theater campaigns synthesize deployment, employment, sustainment, and subordinate operations into a coherent whole. Subordinate JFCs may develop subordinate campaign plans or operation plans that accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of) theater strategic objectives. Thus, subordinate unified commands typically develop campaign plans to accomplish assigned missions. Also, joint task forces (JTFs) can develop and execute campaign plans if missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration and cannot be accomplished within the framework of a single major joint operation. Functional and Service components conduct subordinate and supporting operations, not independent campaigns.

Campaign Phases



“Campaigns represent the art of linking battles and engagements in an operational design. . . . oriented on the enemy’s strategic and operational centers of gravity They serve as the unifying focus for our conduct of warfare Campaigns of the Armed Forces of the United States are Joint.”

JP 1, “JOINT WARFARE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES”



Slide 9. Campaign Phases

Campaign Phases

Theater campaign plans may involve a series of phases. The arrangement of major operations relates directly to the commander's decision on phasing. A phase represents a period during which a large portion of the forces are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities (deployment, for example). A transition to another phase — such as a shift from deployment to defensive operations — indicates a shift in emphasis. Phasing may be sequential or concurrent. Phases may overlap. The point where one phase stops and another begins is often difficult to define in absolute terms. During planning, commanders establish conditions for transitioning from one phase to another. The commander adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the enemy or to react to unforeseen situations. Phasing assists commanders to think through the entire operation and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, and time. **(JP 3-0, Chapter III, para 5i)**

The primary benefit of phasing is that it assists commanders in achieving major objectives, which cannot be attained all at once, by planning manageable subordinate operations to gain progressive advantages, and so achieving the major objectives as quickly and affordably as possible.

Campaign phasing should consider aspects such as prehostilities (including predeployment activities), lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and posthostilities (including redeployment). Actions during a prehostilities phase may be for deterrence or to seek to set the terms for battle and enhance friendly and limit enemy freedom of action. The friendly force should not seek battle until it has set the terms or established the conditions for battle in its favor and should avoid being rushed into battle before such conditions are established, if possible.

A lodgment phase allows the movement and buildup of a decisive combat force in the operational area. In operations during peacetime, deployment will normally include movements to host nation air or sea ports. In operations conducted before and during combat, initial deployment may require forcible entry, followed by the occupation and expansion of lodgment areas.

A decisive combat and stabilization phase initially focuses on the rapid buildup of joint force capabilities. The appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational area can contribute greatly to the stabilization of the situation. Further, deployment of forces may serve as a deterrent to hostilities, but if deterrence fails, deployment will permit JFCs to build up full dimensional capabilities rapidly to conduct decisive action as early as possible. Such decisive action focuses on winning, that is, achieving the objectives defined by the NCA and JFC, and may include control of enemy territory and population and destruction of the enemy's ability and will to continue.

During a follow-through phase, JFCs synchronize joint force activities to bring the operation to a successful conclusion. Follow-through includes those actions that ensure the political objectives are achieved and sustained.

During the posthostilities and redeployment phase, JFCs may retain responsibility for operations or they may transfer control of the situation to another authority and redeploy their forces. Logistics is crucial to phasing. Joint force planners consider establishing logistic bases, opening and maintaining lines of communications (LOC), establishing intermediate logistic bases to support new phases, and defining priorities for services and support.

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Intelligence Support



Critical to Operational Success Is Gaining Intelligence Domination of the Battlespace

The JFC Seeks to Get Inside the Adversary's Decision Making Cycle

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE



*Central Principle of Intelligence:
Know the Adversary*

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE

- JFC Is Responsible for Intel Support to Ops
- Synchronize Intel with Ops
- Use Same Approach for Support of MOOTW and War
- J-2 Should Participate from Outset
- Ensure Unity of Intel Effort
- Recognize CI as a Source of Info
- Prioritize Component Intel Requirements

ATTRIBUTES OF INTEL QUALITY

Timeliness	Completeness	Accuracy
Usability	Objectivity	Relevance
	Readiness	

Intel Helps the JFC Clearly Define the Desired End State and Determine When That End State Has Been Achieved

JP 2-0, "JOINT DOCTRINE FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS"

Slide 10. Intelligence Support

Intelligence Support

Intelligence, logistics, and command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems **support** are all critical to the successful accomplishment of the joint force's mission. Key to operational success is gaining intelligence dominance of the battlespace. Gaining and maintaining intelligence dominance enhances the JFC's flexibility by opening additional operational options. Intelligence requirements are identified based on the JFC's guidance and direction, estimate of the situation, and objectives. The commander's requirements must be the principal driver of intelligence system components, organization, services, and products. **(JP 2-0, Chapter I, paras 1c and 1d)**

The intelligence cycle is the process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. The US intelligence cycle has the following five steps: planning and direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination. To better understand intelligence and its cycle, it is important to recognize the clear and critical distinction between information and intelligence. Information is data that have been collected but not further developed through analysis, interpretation, or correlation with other data and intelligence. The application of analysis transforms information into intelligence. **(JP 2-0, Chapter II, para 4)**

The role intelligence (including counterintelligence) plays in full-dimensional operations cannot be overstated. Intelligence provides insights concerning exploitable opportunities to defeat the adversary and helps JFCs clearly define the desired end state and when that end state has been achieved. "Exploiting the information differential," as called for in Joint Pub 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States," occurs throughout the joint force as fused and tailored intelligence helps synchronize multiple efforts and contributes to the success of the joint team. Intelligence is fundamental to effective planning, security, and deception. **(JP 2-0, Chapter III, paras 1 & 2)**

C4 Systems Support




The Joint Force Must Have Information to Operate

C4 Principles

- ▶ Interoperability
- ▶ Flexible
- ▶ Responsive
- ▶ Mobile
- ▶ Disciplined
- ▶ Survivable
- ▶ Sustainable

C4 Systems Objectives

- ▶ Produce Unity of Effort
- ▶ Exploit Total Force Capabilities
- ▶ Properly Position Critical Info
- ▶ Information Fusion



The Command and Control Support (C2S) System Is the JFC's Principle Tool Used to Collect, Transport, Process, Disseminate, and Protect Data and Information

The JFC CONTROLS THE C2S SYSTEM to Ensure that Data and Information Get to the Right Place and Time in a Form Quickly Useable



JP 6-0, "JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTER (C4) SYSTEMS SUPPORT TO JOINT OPERATIONS"

Slide 11. C4 Systems Support

C4 Systems Support

In order to employ these forces, JFCs must have the ability to effectively exercise command and control (C2) of assigned, attached, and supporting forces.

Command is as much a problem of information management as it is of carrying out difficult and complex warfighting tasks. The fundamental objective of **C4 systems** is to get the critical and relevant information to the right place in time to allow forces to seize the opportunity and meet the objectives of assigned missions across the range of military operations. (**JP 6-0, Chapter I, paras 1 & 2**)

Over time, superior C2 systems have enabled victorious commanders to maintain the unity of effort to apply their forces' capabilities at the critical time and place to win. Victory demands that commanders effectively link decision making to execution through the concept of C2. The focus of C2 in a joint force is the JFC. The command and control support (C2S) system enables the JFC with the means to exercise authority and direction of assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The JFC uses information to support decision making and communicate or coordinate actions that will influence friendly and enemy forces to the JFC's advantage. The structure of the joint force drives specific information flow and processing requirements. The information requirements of the joint force drive the general architecture and specific configuration of the C2S system. The C2S system is comprised of five major subsystems including C2 facilities, decision support, information exchange, surveillance, and control and management.

Basic doctrine for C4 systems includes the following tenets: C4 systems must provide the rapid, reliable, and secure flow and processing of data to ensure continuous information exchange throughout the chain of command; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the combatant commands, Defense Information Systems Agency, and Military Services, ensures that commanders at each echelon have the communications necessary to accomplish their assigned missions; effective C4 systems are vital to planning, mounting, and sustaining a successful joint operation; regardless of the source, C4 systems provided to combatant commanders operate under their authority; JFCs must develop operational procedures that provide interoperable, compatible, C4 networks; and the complexity of joint operations and the finite amount of C4 resources may require the JFC to adjudicate or assign subordinate command responsibilities for providing C4 systems support.

Logistics Support Operations



Logistics Is the Foundation of Combat Power -- The Bridge Connecting a Nation's Economy to a Nation's Warfighting Forces

Logistics Principles

Responsiveness
Simplicity
Flexibility
Economy
Attainability
Sustainability
Survivability

Contributor to Flexibility

- Increases Employment Options

Force Multiplier

- Increases Endurance of the Force

Deterrent

- Adequate Resources
Convey National Will and Ability to Fight a Protracted Conflict

Logistics Functions

Supply Systems
Maintenance
Transportation
Engineering
Health Services
Misc. Services

Extender of Operational Reach

- Influenced by Length, Efficiency and Security of LOC
- Ability to Phase Reserves and Materiel Forward
- Gaining Control of Enemy C4 Centers, Transportation Nodes, Base Areas

Combatant Commanders Must Ensure Their Campaign Plans Fully Integrate Operations and Logistics Capabilities

JP 4-0, "DOCTRINE FOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT OF JOINT OPERATIONS"

Slide 12. Logistics Support Operations

Logistics Support Operations

In the words of Rear Admiral Henry Eccles, USN, “The essence of flexibility is in the mind of the commander; the substance of flexibility is in logistics.” **(JP 1, Chapter III)**

Logistics provides the foundation of our combat power. It can be described as the bridge connecting a nation’s economy to a nation’s warfighting forces. Logistics is the process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of a military strategy and operations. The art of logistics is how to integrate the strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, and supplies in support of the employment concept of a geographic combatant commander. The relative combat power military forces can bring to bear against an enemy is constrained by a nation’s capability to deliver forces and materiel to the required points of application across the range of military operations. **(JP 4-0, Chapter I, para 1a)**

The JFC’s concept for logistics is a key part of the synchronization of the joint effort. Through the logistic concept, JFCs enable the deployment, entry, buildup, application, and redeployment of joint forces. JFCs identify and reinforce priorities between combat and logistic requirements. **(JP 3-0, Chapter III, para 6f)**

Operational reach is the distance over which military power can be concentrated and employed decisively. Operational reach is influenced by the length, efficiency, and security of the LOC. Operational reach also depends on the ability to phase reserves and materiel forward. Finally, it must include the operating ranges and endurance of combat forces and sustainment. Operational reach may be improved by establishing advanced bases or depots and by improving the security and efficiency of the LOC. **(JP 4-0, Chapter IV, paras 3 & 4a, 4b and 4c)**


Correlation’s of combat power between opposing forces are often so close that a small advantage gained by one side over the other can prove decisive. Logistics plays a significant role, both offensively and defensively, in attaining the leverage potential from a given force configuration. It does this primarily by increasing the endurance of the force. Logistic forces and the activation of logistic Reserve forces play a key role in deterrence. Adequate logistic resources and capabilities convey a national will to fight a protracted conflict. The composition and disposition of military forces and logistic resources are important considerations in developing flexibility. Essentially, logistics increases the employment options of the combatant commanders’ forces.

Joint Operations Area (JOA)



JFCs Define Operational Areas to Assist in Coordinating and Deconflicting Joint Actions

- Air Sorties Are Not Constrained by Land Boundaries, Per Se
- JFC Uses Airspace Control Measures to Deconflict Multiple Users



JOA

LAND AO

NAVAL AO

Areas of Operations (AOs)

- Do not typically encompass the entire JOA
- But should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their mission and protect their forces

JP 3-0, "DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS"

Slide 13. Joint Operations Area (JOA)

Joint Operations Area (JOA)

One of the ways that JFCs shape the battlefield is by the use of operational areas. JFCs may define operational areas or joint areas to assist in the coordination and deconfliction of joint action. The size of these areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations. For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, geographic combatant commanders can employ the following operational areas: A **joint operations area** is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a JTF commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A joint special operations area (JSOA) is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities, for use by a joint special operations component or Joint Special Operations Task Force for the conduct of special operations. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area. **(JP 3-0, Chapter II, paras 8a and 8b)**

The joint rear area facilitates the protection and operation of bases, installations, and forces that support combat operations. The amphibious objective area (AOA) includes the objectives to be secured by an amphibious task force. It needs to be large enough for necessary sea, air, land, and special operations. The airspace associated with the geographical area of the AOA is included in the AOA. The commander, amphibious task force, is responsible for airspace control within the AOA. JFCs may define areas of operations (AOs) for land and naval forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. AOs do not include the authority for control of the airspace above the surface area.

JFCs at all levels can designate areas of interest (AOIs) to monitor enemy activities outside the operations area. An AOI is usually larger than the operational area and encompasses areas from which the enemy can act to affect current or future friendly operations.

When warranted, geographic combatant commanders may designate theaters of war and, perhaps, subordinate theaters of operations for each major threat. Geographic combatant commanders can elect to directly control operations in the theater of war or theater of operations, or may establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose, allowing themselves to remain focused on the broader theater. In time of war, the NCA or a geographic combatant commander may elect to define a theater of war within the geographic combatant commander's area or responsibility (AOR). The theater of war is that area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander's entire AOR and may contain more than one theater of operations. Geographic combatant commanders may further define one or more theaters of operations — that area required to conduct or support specific combat operations — within the theater of war. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. Subordinate unified commanders are typically assigned theaters of operations.

Geographic combatant commanders may also establish combat zones and communications zones (COMMZs). The combat zone is an area required by forces to conduct large-scale combat operations. It normally extends forward from the land force rear boundary. The COMMZ contains those theater organizations, LOCs, and other agencies required to support and sustain combat forces. The COMMZ usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and theater of war and reaches back to the continental United States base or perhaps to a supporting combatant commander's AOR.

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Some Key Responsibilities



JFACC Is Supported Commander For:

- Overall Air Interdiction
- Counterair Operations
- Theater Airborne RSTA
- Strategic Attack When JT Air Provides Bulk of Capability



Within Their AOs Land/Naval Commanders

- Are Designated Supported Commanders and Are Responsible for Synch of Maneuver, Fires, and Interdiction
- Designate Target Priority, Effects, Timing of Interdiction Operations

JP 3-0, "DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS"

Slide 14. Some Key Responsibilities

Some Key Responsibilities

It is important to discuss the **key responsibilities** and relationships within a joint force that will be functioning in these operational areas. Establishing supported and supporting relationships between components is a useful option to accomplish needed tasks. Each subordinate element of the joint force can support or be supported by other elements. The size, shape, and positioning of land or naval force AOs will be established by JFCs based on their concept of operations and the land or naval force commander's requirement for depth to maneuver rapidly and to fight at extended ranges. **(JP 3-0, Chapter II, para 5e)**

Within these AOs, land and naval operational force commanders are designated the supported commander and are responsible for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs. **(JP 3-0, Chapter IV, para 3f)**

The JFACC functions as the supported commander for counterair operations; strategic attack operations, when joint air operations constitute the bulk of the capability needed to directly attack enemy strategic centers of gravity; theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance; and the overall air interdiction effort. **(JP 3-56.1, Chapter II, para 4i)**

Control and Coordinating Measures



Airspace Control

JP 3-52, "DOCTRINE FOR JOINT AIRSPACE CONTROL IN THE COMBAT ZONE"

Airspace Control Authority -- Who May be the JFACC -- Uses Airspace Control Measures to Coordinate and Deconflict the Requirements of Airspace Users, e.g., Restricted Operating Zone (ROZ), High Density Airspace Control Zone (HIDACZ)



JP 3-0, "DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS"

Fire Support Coordinating Measures

Established and Adjusted by the Land & Amphibious Cmdrs in Consultation with Other Cmdrs

Restrictive -- e.g., Airspace Coordination Area (ACA), Restrictive Fire Area (RFA)

Permissive -- e.g. Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL)

Not a "Boundary," But Applies to All Fires on Surface Targets

Short of FSCL, All Fires Controlled by Land and Amphibious Force Cmdrs

Forces Attacking Targets Beyond FSCL Must Inform All Affected Cmdrs

Place at SUFFICIENT Depth So As to Not Limit Maneuver and to Ease Coordination Requirements

Slide 15. Control and Coordinating Measures

Control and Coordinating Measures

In addition to mapping out operational areas, **JFCs employ various maneuver and movement control and fire support coordinating measures to facilitate effective joint operations.** These measures include boundaries, phase lines, objectives, coordinating altitudes to deconflict air operations, air defense areas, amphibious objective areas, submarine operating patrol areas, and minefields. **(JP 3-0, Chapter III, paras 7, 7a and 7b)**

Boundaries define surface areas to facilitate coordination and deconfliction of operations. In land and sea warfare, a boundary is a line by which areas between adjacent units or formations are defined. A naval boundary may be designated for seas adjacent to the area of land conflict to enhance coordination and execution of naval operations. JFCs may use lateral, rear, and forward boundaries to define AOs for land and naval forces. Such areas are sized, shaped, and positioned to enable land or naval force commanders to accomplish their mission while protecting deployed forces. Theater air sorties are not constrained by land boundaries, per se. However, since the airspace above surface areas is used by all components of the joint force, JFCs promulgate airspace control measures to deconflict the multiple uses required of this space. Boundaries may require relatively frequent adjustment based on the actual and projected rate of maneuver and the operational environment.

Joint fire support coordinating measures and the procedures associated with those measures assist in the C2 of joint forces. Within their AOs, land and amphibious commanders employ permissive and restrictive fire support coordinating measures to enhance the expeditious attack of targets; protect forces, populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance; and set the stage for future operations. Commanders position and adjust fire support coordinating measures consistent with the operational situation and in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders.

Fire Support Coordination Lines (FSCLs) are permissive fire support coordinating measures. They are established and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the ground. FSCLs facilitate the expeditious attack of targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure.

Supporting elements may attack targets beyond the FSCL, provided the attack will not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line. The FSCL is not a boundary — the synchronization of operations on either side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the establishing commander out to the limits of the land or amphibious force boundary. The decision on where to place or even whether to use an FSCL requires careful consideration. If used, its location is based on estimates of the situation and concept of operations. Location of enemy forces, anticipated rates of movement, weapons capabilities, and tempo of the operation are considered in the commander's estimate, as well as other factors deemed appropriate.

By establishing an FSCL at sufficient depth so as to not limit high-tempo maneuver, land force commanders ease the coordination requirements for attack operations within their AOs by forces not under their control, such as naval gunfire or air interdiction. FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, or sea weapon systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. An associated benefit of employing an FSCL is the reduction in potential for fratricide.

Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land force commander. Commanders employ restrictive measures to enhance the protection of friendly forces operating beyond an FSCL. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. Finally, this coordination assists in avoiding conflicting or redundant attack operations. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources. The land force commander adjusts the location of the FSCL as required to keep pace with operations. In high-tempo maneuver operations, the FSCL may change frequently, such as every several hours. Anticipated adjustments to the location of the FSCL are normally transmitted to other elements of the joint force sufficiently early to reduce potential disruptions in their current and near-term operations.

The joint force may also employ airspace control measures. The high-density airspace control zone allows ground and/or Marine air-ground task force commanders to restrict a volume of airspace from users not involved with ongoing operations. It is an area in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous and varied weapons or airspace users. The minimum risk route is an airspace control measure used primarily by cross-forward line of friendly troops operations. It is a temporary corridor of defined dimensions recommended for use by high speed fixed-wing aircraft. **(JP 3-52, Appendix B)**

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Joint Theater Missile Defense



4 Elements: Passive and Active Defense, Attack Ops, C4I

Attack Operations

- Handling is Analogous to Interdiction
- JFACC Plans for and Maintains JOA-Wide Visibility
- JFACC is Supported Outside Surface AOs, Inside Surface AOs, Is Either in Supporting Role or Informs (e.g., Beyond FSCL)
- Component Commanders Supported Inside Their AOs

JFACC Supported
JOA

JFACC Supporting

JFLCC Supported

LAND AO

JFLCC Supporting

NAVAL AO

JFMCC Supporting

Active Defense

JFC Designates Critical Assets and Forces to Protect Integrated with Air Defense Forces Under OPCON of Their Components Employed Using Weapons Control Procedures and Measures Established by AADC – May Be the JFACC

JP 3-01.5, "DOCTRINE FOR JOINT THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE"

Slide 16. Joint Theater Missile Defense

Joint Theater Missile Defense

Another responsibility of the JFC is theater missile defense (TMD), which is inherently a joint mission. It is necessary for joint force components, supporting combatant commanders, and multinational force TMD capabilities to be integrated toward the common objective of neutralizing or destroying the enemy's theater missile (TM) capability. **(JP 3-01.5, Chapter I, para 3)**

Joint theater missile defense (JTMD) is composed of four operational elements: passive defense, active defense, attack operations, and TMD C4I. This threat can only be countered by the synergistic performance achieved by coordinating and integrating all four operational elements into cohesive and coherent combat operations. **(JP 3-01.5, Chapter I, para 5)**

The JFC will normally assign responsibility for the planning and execution of JTMD attack operations outside the other component commanders AOs to the JFACC. Since the location of these AOs may change with the maneuver of forces or with changes in JFC guidance, the JFACC should also plan for and maintain visibility on the theater and/or joint operations area (JOA)-wide attack operations effort. The JFACC plans and executes attack operations in the "theater - and/or JOA-wide" based on JFC guidance. Because of the need for the JFACC to maintain "theater - and/or JOA-wide" visibility on JTMD attack operations and the integrated relationship between attack operations, active defense, and the other operational elements of JTMD, the JFC may assign the responsibilities of the area air defense commander to the JFACC. **(JP 3-01.5, Chapter II, para 4a and 4b)**

Passive defense is necessary to provide essential individual and collective protection for friendly forces, population centers, and critical assets. Passive defense measures should be planned whenever US forces might face a TM threat. **(JP 3-01.5, Chapter III, para 12)**

The role of active defense operations is to protect selected assets and forces from attack by destroying TM airborne launch platforms and/or TMs in flight. Active defense must consist of defense in depth against all classes of TMs. **(JP 3-01.5, Chapter III, para 17)**

The JFC exercises control of active defense operations by integration of JTMD systems and forces into the C4I systems supporting theater and/or JOA air defense. The JFC normally assigns overall responsibility for theater and/or JOA air defense, to include active defense TMD, to the area air defense commander (AADC). Active defense forces are under the operational control of their component commanders, who employ these forces under the weapons control procedures and measures established by the AADC and approved by the JFC. **(JP 3-01.5, Chapter III, para 19)**

Attack operations are characterized by offensive actions intended to destroy and disrupt enemy TM capabilities before, during, and after launch. The objective of attack operations is to prevent the launch of TMs by attacking each element of the overall system, including such actions as destroying launch platforms, reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition platforms, C2 nodes, and missile stocks and infrastructure. Attack operations is not a mission in itself, but a way of characterizing those offensive attacks against launch

platforms and their supporting infrastructure, including logistics. Designation of engagement areas, assignment of AOs, and coordination of JTMD attack operations is prescribed by the JFC. When ground forces have been deployed and if a JFACC has been designated, the JFC will normally task the JFACC as the supported commander to plan for and conduct, as apportioned, attack operations against longer range TMs outside the other component commanders' AOs. The JFACC should also plan for and maintain visibility on the theater - and/or JOA-wide attack operations effort. **(JP 3-01.5, Chapter III, paras 22a and 22b)**

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Joint Air Operations



JFC Normally Appoints a JFACC

A Commander Who Plans, Coordinates, Allocates, Tasks, and Directs Execution of (e.g., Redirect, Retarget) Joint Air Ops -- Based on JFC Concept of Ops and Air Apportionment (Which JFACC Recommends)

JFC Determines Command Relationships and What Resources the JFACC Has, Normally:

- OPCON for Assigned and Attached
- TACON for "Made Available"

For Example:

JSOTF



LAND AO

COMPONENT DIRECT SUPPORT AIR
AOA

COMPONENT DIRECT SUPPORT AIR

NAVAL AO

JP 3-56.1 Also Discusses:

- Planning JT Air Ops
- Targeting
- Tasking JT Air Ops

JP 3-56.1, "COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR JOINT AIR OPERATIONS"

Slide 17. Joint Air Operations

Joint Air Operations

The potential for force enhancement represented by **joint air operations** requires that the JFC integrate the efforts of all components. Joint air operations are those air operations performed with air capabilities and/or forces made available by components in support of the JFC's operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force. Joint air operations do not include those air operations that a component conducts in direct support of itself. **(JP 3-56.1, Chapter I, para 2)**

The JFC will normally designate a JFACC to exploit the capabilities of joint air operations. The JFACC directs this exploitation through a cohesive joint air operations plan (centralized planning) and a responsive and integrated control system (decentralized execution). **(JP 3-56.1, Chapter I, para 3a)**

The air capabilities and/or forces made available for JFACC planning and tasking are determined by the JFC, in consultation with component commanders, and based on the assigned objectives and the concept of operations. Component commanders make capabilities and/or /forces available to the JFC for tasking to support the joint force as a whole based on assigned component missions and JFC guidance. These capabilities and/or forces are tasked directly by the JFC or by the JFACC based on the JFC's air apportionment decision. **(JP 3-56.1, Chapter II, paras 1 and 1a)**

The authority and command relationships of the JFACC are established by the JFC. These typically include exercising OPCON over assigned and attached forces and TACON over other military capabilities and/or forces made available for tasking. **(JP 3-56.1, Chapter II, paras 3 & 4)**

As an example, SOF may enhance joint air operations with unique personnel and platform capabilities, such as providing a tailored joint special operations task force, under the TACON of the JFACC, to assist in locating deep targets. **(JP 3-56.1, Appendix B, para 3b)**

The JFC may also establish supporting and supported relationships between components to facilitate operations. The JFC normally assigns missions and issues mission-type orders to all components. With receipt of the mission goes the authority to conduct operations in accordance with the JFC's intent and concept of the operation.

The responsibilities of the JFACC are assigned by the JFC. These include, but are not limited to planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of joint air operations based on the JFC's concept of operations and air apportionment decision. The responsibilities of the JFACC, airspace control authority (ACA), and AADC are interrelated and should normally be assigned to one individual. The functions and responsibilities of the JFACC, ACA, and AADC must be integrated in order to unite joint air operations with joint airspace control and joint air defense operations in support of the JFC's campaign. If appointed the AADC, the JFACC is responsible for integrating the joint force air defense effort. If appointed the ACA, the JFACC is responsible for developing, coordinating, and publishing airspace control procedures and for operating the airspace control system in the AOR and/or JOA. **(JP 3-56.1, Chapter II, paras 3 & 4)**



Military Operations Other Than War

JP 3-07, "JOINT DOCTRINE
FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS
OTHER THAN WAR"

MOOTW	WAR
NONCOMBAT	COMBAT

λ *Political Objectives Drive MOOTW*

- υ All Military Personnel Should Understand Political Objectives and Impact of Inappropriate Actions
- υ Commanders Continue to Assess Impact of Changes in Political Objectives and Operational Situation

λ *MOOTW Can Involve Noncombat and Combat Operations*

- υ Use of Military in Peacetime Helps Keep Day-to-Day Tensions Below the Threshold of Armed Conflict
- υ Force May Be Necessary to Compel Compliance If Deterrence Fails Between Nations Below the Threshold of Armed Conflict

Slide 18. Military Operations Other Than War

Military Operations Other Than War

Military operations other than war can become just as crucial as operations during wartime, for they support our primary goal of deterrence. MOOTW encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These operations can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power. MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises. MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and noncombat operations in peacetime, conflict, and war situations. MOOTW involving combat, such as peace enforcement, may have many of the same characteristics of war, including active combat operations and employment of most combat capabilities. **(JP 3-07, Chapter I, paras 1 thru 5)**

All military operations are driven by political considerations. However, MOOTW are more sensitive to such considerations due to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities. In MOOTW, political considerations permeate all levels and the military may not be the primary player. As a result, these operations normally have more restrictive rules of engagement than in war. As in war, the goal is to achieve national objectives as quickly as possible and conclude military operations on terms favorable to the United States and its allies.

However, the purposes of conducting MOOTW may be multiple, with the relative importance or hierarchy of such purposes changing or unclear. The Department of Defense is often in a support role to another agency, such as the Department of State in humanitarian assistance operations. Although MOOTW are generally conducted outside of the United States, some types may be conducted within the United States in support of civil authorities consistent with established law.

Political objectives drive MOOTW at every level from strategic to tactical. A distinguishing characteristic of MOOTW is the degree to which political objectives influence operations and tactics. Two important factors about political primacy stand out. First, all military personnel should understand the political objectives and the potential impact of inappropriate actions. Secondly, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations. MOOTW contribute to attainment of national security objectives by supporting deterrence and crisis response options. In peacetime, the Armed Forces of the United States help to deter potential aggressors from using violence to achieve their aims. Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. US forces need to be able to respond rapidly either unilaterally or as a part of a multinational effort.

MOOTW--Principles and Types



Military Support to Civilian Authorities



Humanitarian Assistance
Arms Control



NEO



Strikes & Raids

Freedom of Navigation and Overflight

Maritime Interception Ops

Protection of Shipping

Show of Force

Plans Prepared in a Similar Manner As Plans for War

MOOTW Principles

OBJECTIVE -- same as principle of war
Direct Every Military Operation Toward a Clearly Defined, Decisive, and Attainable Objective

UNITY OF EFFORT -- similar to principle of war
Seek Unity of Effort in Every Operation

SECURITY -- same as principle of war
Never Permit Hostile Factions to Acquire a Military, Political, or Informational Advantage

RESTRAINT
Apply Appropriate Military Capability Prudently

PERSEVERANCE
Prepare for the Measured, Protracted Application of Military Capability in Support of Strategic Aims

LEGITIMACY
Committed Forces Must Sustain the Legitimacy of the Operation and of the Host Government, Where Applicable



Peace Ops

Exclusion Zone Enforcement



Nation Assistance
Counterinsurgency

Support to Insurgency
Combatting Terrorism

Counterdrug
Recovery Ops



JP 3-07, "JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR"

Slide 19. Military Operations Other Than War — Principles and Types

Military Operations Other Than War — Principles and Types

Now I would like to emphasize the principles that govern MOOTW. MOOTW encompass a broad range of military operations and support a variety of purposes, including: supporting national objectives, deterring war, returning to a state of peace, promoting peace, keeping day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict, maintaining US influence in foreign lands, and supporting US civil authorities consistent with applicable law. **(JP 3-07, Chapter II, para 1)**

Support of these objectives is achieved by providing military forces and resources to accomplish a wide range of missions other than warfighting. The principles of war, though principally associated with large scale combat operations, generally apply to MOOTW, though sometimes in different ways. However, political considerations and the nature of many MOOTW require an underpinning of additional principles.

There are six **MOOTW principles**: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. While the first three of these principles are derived from the principles of war, the remaining three principles are MOOTW-specific. Every military operation must be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. JFCs must understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort. Although defining mission success may be more difficult in MOOTW, it is important to do so to keep US forces focused on a clear, attainable military objective. Specifying measures of success helps define mission accomplishment and phase transitions. **(JP 3-07, Chapter II, paras 2 and 2a)**

Seek unity of effort in every operation. In MOOTW, achieving unity of effort is often complicated by a variety of international, foreign, and domestic military and non-military participants, the lack of definitive command arrangements among them, and varying views of the objective. Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage. The inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or hostile intent applies in all operations. JFCs should avoid complacency and be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation. **(JP 3-07, Chapter II, paras 2b and 2c)**

Apply appropriate military capability prudently. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful balancing of the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby damaging the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while possibly enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party. Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some MOOTW may require years to achieve the desired results. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. Often the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is a requirement for success. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable. In MOOTW, legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions. **(JP 3-07, Chapter II, paras 2d, 2e and 2f)**

Conclusion



- λ *Doctrine Is Neither Policy Nor Strategy*
 - υ Deals with the Fundamental Issue of How Best to Employ the National Military Power to Achieve Strategic Ends
- λ *Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines Use Doctrine -- Guided by Our Values*
 - υ Integrity
 - υ Competence
 - υ Physical Courage
 - υ Moral Courage
 - υ Teamwork
- λ *Doctrine Cannot Replace Clear Thinking or Alter a Commander's Obligation to Determine the Proper Course of Action*

"Joint Warfare Is Team Warfare"

Slide 20. Conclusion

Conclusion

Let me now summarize what I have just discussed. As we described it, doctrine is neither policy nor strategy. Joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issues of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends. As such, it represents authoritative guidance for the joint employment of the Armed Forces of the United States.

However, it's the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen who have to use this doctrine. The use of this doctrine is guided by our values of joint warfare. Our military service is based on these values, those experiences that have proven to be the bedrock of our combat success. These values are common to all Services and represent the essence of our professionalism.

First and always is integrity. In the case of joint action, as within a Service, integrity is the cornerstone for building trust. We know as members of the Armed Forces that whatever issue is at hand, we can count on each other to say what we mean. This allows us to rely with confidence on others to carry out assigned tasks. This is an enormous advantage for building effective teams. Competence is at the center of our relationship with the American people and cements the mutual cohesion between leader and follower. Our fellow citizens expect that we are competent in every aspect of warfare; those we lead into battle deserve no less.

Each of the Services has organized, trained, and equipped superbly competent forces whose ability to fight with devastating effectiveness in the air, on land, and at sea is the foundation on which successful joint action rests. Since warfare began, physical courage has defined warriors. The United States of America is blessed with its Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen whose courage knows no boundaries. Even in warfare featuring advanced technology, individual fighting spirit and courage remain the inspiration for battle teamwork.

Moral courage is also essential in military operations. This includes the willingness to stand up for what we believe is right even if that stand is unpopular or contrary to conventional wisdom. Other aspects of moral courage involve risk taking and tenacity: making bold decisions in the face of uncertainty, accepting full responsibility for the outcome, and holding to the chosen course despite challenges or difficulties. We must also have the courage to wield military power in an unimpeachable moral fashion. We respect human rights. We observe the Geneva Conventions not only as a matter of legality but from conscience.

Lastly, teamwork is the cooperative effort of the members of a group to achieve common goals. The Armed Forces of the United States are the team. Deterring aggression and, if need be, winning our wars are the team's common goals. This provides the Armed Forces of the United States a solid basis upon which to build effective joint teams. Several elements support effective teamwork: trust and confidence, delegation, and cooperation. Doctrine provides the distilled insights of wisdom that have been gained through our collective experience of warfare. However, doctrine cannot replace clear thinking or alter a commander's obligation to determine the correct course of action under the circumstances that were present at the time of the decision.

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APPENDIX A

Section II

Joint Force Employment
Outline of Briefing Script

Joint Force Employment Outline of Briefing Script

I. Joint Doctrine for Joint Force Employment

A. What is the guidance to accomplish the mission as a joint force commander?

II. Joint Force Employment

A. Now I will explain the authoritative guidance for how a joint force commander proceeds in discharging his mission.

B. I will try to describe for you, at the top level, what the doctrine says. This will enable the commander to know where to go to get information and what that information contains.

III. Joint Warfare

A. The Armed Forces of the United States hold in trust, for the people of the United States of America, military power greater than any in history.

1. Defense of the national security rests first on the concept of deterrence. By demonstrating national resolve and maintaining the ability to deal successfully with threats to the national interests, we deter those who would use military power against us.
2. Readiness and military professionalism lessen the risk of our having to fight at all. If deterrence fails, then our single objective is winning the nation's wars. When we fight, we fight to win. **(JP 1, Chapter I)**

B. We also have a long history of military support for national goals short of war, ranging from general military service to the nation to a wide range of actions abroad in support of foreign policy. In all MOOTW, our purpose again is to promote the national security and protect our national interests.

C. An important implication of the basic purpose for our military service is that we focus on common action to achieve common goals. Defense of our nation is the fundamental basis for military service and joint warfare is indispensable to that defense. The reason for our existence demands unity in our efforts.

IV. Fundamentals of Joint Force Employment

A. In order to achieve our goals of deterrence, winning wars when necessary, promoting security, and protecting national interests, we must maintain unity of effort, starting with unified direction.

B. For US military operations, unified direction is normally accomplished by establishing a joint force, assigning a mission or objective to the JFC, establishing command relationships, assigning or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering

the JFC with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission. **(JP 0-2, Chapter I, para 4c)**

C. A JFC is a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise COCOM or OPCON over a joint force. **(JP 1-02)**

D. Almost all Service forces are assigned to combatant commands. Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands.

1. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified.
2. A combatant commander exercises COCOM over forces assigned or reassigned by the NCA. Subordinate JFCs will exercise OPCON over assigned or reassigned forces. **(JP 0-2, Chapter III, paras 2, 2a and 2b)**

E. Both COCOM and OPCON provide the authority to organize and employ commands and forces, assign tasks, designate objectives, and give authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission and also to delineate functional responsibilities and geographic joint operations areas of subordinate JFCs. **(JP 0-2, Chapter III, para 4)**

V. JFC Organizes Forces

A. The key individual in the chain of command is the JFC who is given the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations.

B. The organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the contemplated operations and any development that may necessitate a change in plan. **(JP 0-2, Chapter IV, para 1c)**

C. The JFC will establish subordinate commands, assign responsibilities, establish or delegate appropriate command and support relationships, and establish coordinating instructions for the component commanders.

1. Sound organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution.
2. All joint forces include Service component commands, because administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through Service component commands.
3. The JFC also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders.

D. The JFC can establish functional component commands, to conduct operations.

1. Functional component commands can be appropriate when forces from two

or more Military Departments must operate in the same dimension or medium or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission.

2. Joint force land, air, maritime, and special operations component commanders are examples of functional components. Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional component commands with operational responsibilities.

E. The JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of the Service and functional component commanders; however, the Service responsibilities (i.e., administrative and logistic) of the components must be given due consideration by the JFC.

1. The JFC has full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders.
2. JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of the JFC while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the Service organizations. **(JP 0-2, Chapter IV, paras 10b and 10c)**

F. The responsibilities and authority of a functional component command must be assigned by the establishing JFC.

1. The JFC must designate the military capability that will be made available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command relationship(s) the functional component commander will exercise
2. (e.g., a joint force special operations component commander normally has OPCON of assigned forces and a JFACC is normally delegated TACON of the sorties or other military capability made available).

VI. Overview of Operational Art

A. JFCs employ operational art, in concert with strategic guidance and direction received from superior leaders, in developing campaigns and operations.

B. Operational art is the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.

C. Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives.

1. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure.
2. Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint and multinational cooperation.

3. Operational art is practiced not only by JFCs but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders.

D. Joint operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces but also at the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. Joint operational art, in particular, focuses on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces.

E. Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions:

1. What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends);
2. What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways);
3. How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means); and
4. What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions? (**JP 3-0, Chapter II, para 2c & JP 3-0, Chapter III, para 5**)

F. Operational art is characterized by the following fundamental elements: Synergy, simultaneity and depth, anticipation, balance, leverage, timing and tempo, operational reach and approach, forces and functions, arranging operations, centers of gravity, direct vs. indirect approach, decisive points, culmination and, finally, termination. (**JP 3-0, Exec Summary**)

VII. Considerations at the Outset of Combat

A. As combat operations commence, JFCs need to exploit full dimensional leverage to shock, demoralize, and disrupt opponents immediately. JFCs seek decisive advantage quickly, before close combat if possible. The major considerations are as follows.

1. Force Projection. Force projection usually begins as a rapid response to a crisis. Alert may come with little or no notice, bringing with it tremendous stress on personnel and systems, accompanied by requests from the media for information. In any event, rapid, yet measured, response is critical.
 - a. Joint forces participate in force projection operations in both war and operations other than war.
 - b. These operations may be either unopposed or opposed by an adversary. When opposed, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry coordinated with strategic airlift and sealift, and repositioned forces.
 - c. Both types of operations demand a versatile mix of forces that are organized, trained, equipped, and poised to respond quickly. JFCs sequence, enable,

and protect the arrival of forces to achieve early decisive advantage. The projection of forces will often be a friendly COG during early entry operations.

d. JFCs introduce forces in a manner that enables rapid force buildup into the structure required for anticipated operations and simultaneous protection of the force.

2. Dimensional Superiority. JFCs will normally seek to secure air and maritime superiority early in the conduct of joint operations. Although air and maritime superiority are not ends in themselves, history shows that control of the sea and/or the air has been a pivotal wartime factor.

a. JFCs also seek to achieve superiority immediately in C4I — space control is a necessary precursor to this superiority. As another example of seeking early superiority before close combat, land commanders may seek to first achieve counterbattery or indirect fire superiority, thereby enhancing protection of their forces.

b. Additionally, JFCs can seek to achieve a mobility differential by selectively attacking key enemy forces and transportation networks to degrade enemy maneuver.

3. Direct Attack of Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity. As part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against enemy COGs.

a. Where possible, specific operations may be conducted to directly attack strategic COGs by air, missile, special operations, and other deep-ranging capabilities.

b. There are several purposes to these attacks. They may in themselves be decisive. If they are not, they begin the offensive operation throughout the enemy's depth that can cause paralysis and destroy cohesion.

4. Special Operations. Special operations enhance the power and scope of full dimensional operations and tend to be asymmetrical in their application. Innovative special operations can directly and indirectly attack enemy COGs that may be difficult to reach by conventional action.

a. SOF frequently require support from other forces, but can also support other forces in operations.

b. They are a complement to, not a substitute for, conventional forces.

5. Force Protection. JFCs strive to conserve the fighting potential of the joint force by protecting various aspects of the joint force.

a. For example, JFCs counter the enemy's firepower and maneuver by making

personnel, systems, and units difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. JFCs also give attention to the health, welfare, morale, and maintenance of the personnel. JFCs make safety an integral part of all joint training and operations.

b. Additionally, JFCs make every effort to reduce the potential for fratricide. Commanders should seek to minimize the potential for fratricide while not limiting boldness and audacity in combat. **(JP 3-0, Chapter IV, para 2a, b, c, d, e)**

VIII. Campaign Planning. The joint campaign is considered the centerpiece of operational art. **(JP 5-0, Ch II, Sec F)**

A. The theater campaign plan embodies the combatant commander's vision of the arrangement of related major operations necessary to attain strategic objectives. Preparation of a campaign plan is appropriate when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation.

1. A campaign is a series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.
2. A campaign plan describes how a series of joint major operations are arranged in time, space, and purpose to achieve a strategic objective. It orients on the enemy's COGs; achieves simultaneous and synchronized employment of all available land, sea, air, space-based assets, and special operations forces; clearly defines an end state that constitutes success, failure, mission termination, or exit strategy; and serves as the basis for subordinate planning.

B. Two of the most important aspects of this plan are the synchronized employment of forces and the concept for their sustainment.

1. Campaign plans are the operational extension of a combatant commander's theater strategy. They translate strategic concepts into unified plans for military action by specifying how operations, logistics, and time will be used to attain theater strategic objectives.
2. Through theater campaign plans, combatant commanders define objectives; describe concepts of operations and sustainment; arrange operations in time, space, and purpose; organize forces; establish command relationships; assign tasks; and synchronize air, land, sea, space, and special operations, often in coordination with allies, interagency operations, nongovernmental operations, and even United Nations operations.

C. Campaign planning is a primary means by which combatant commanders arrange for strategic unity of effort and through which they guide the planning of joint operations within their theater.

1. It communicates the commander's purpose, requirements, objectives, and concept to subordinate components and joint forces, as well as to supporting commands and Services, so that they may make necessary preparations.
2. In addition, by means of a campaign plan, combatant commanders give the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information needed for intertheater coordination at the national level.

E. There are two types of campaign plans:

1. Theater campaigns are conducted by joint forces. They may follow more than one line of operation. Theater campaigns synthesize deployment, employment, sustainment, and subordinate operations into a coherent whole.
2. Subordinate JFCs may develop subordinate campaign plans or operation plans that accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of) theater strategic objectives. Thus, subordinate unified commands typically develop campaign plans to accomplish assigned missions.
3. Also, JTFs can develop and execute campaign plans if missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration and cannot be accomplished within the framework of a single major joint operation.
4. Functional and Service components conduct subordinate and supporting operations, not independent campaigns.

IX. Campaign Phases

A. Theater campaign plans may involve a series of phases. The arrangement of major operations relates directly to the commander's decision on phasing.

1. A phase represents a period during which a large portion of the forces are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities (deployment, for example). A transition to another phase — such as a shift from deployment to defensive operations — indicates a shift in emphasis.
2. Phasing may be sequential or concurrent. Phases may overlap. The point where one phase stops and another begins is often difficult to define in absolute terms. During planning, commanders establish conditions for transitioning from one phase to another. The commander adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the enemy or to react to unforeseen situations.
3. Phasing assists commanders to think through the entire operation and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, and time. **(JP 3-0, Chapter III, para 5i)**

B. The primary benefit of phasing is that it assists commanders in achieving major objectives, which cannot be attained all at once, by planning manageable subordinate

operations to gain progressive advantages, and so achieving the major objectives as quickly and affordably as possible.

C. Campaign phasing should consider aspects such as prehostilities (including predeployment activities), lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and posthostilities (including redeployment). Actions during a prehostilities phase may be for deterrence or to seek to set the terms for battle and enhance friendly and limit enemy freedom of action. The friendly force should not seek battle until it has set the terms or established the conditions for battle in its favor and should avoid being rushed into battle before such conditions are established, if possible.

D. A lodgment phase allows the movement and buildup of a decisive combat force in the operational area.

1. In operations during peacetime, deployment will normally include movements to host nation air or sea ports.
2. In operations conducted before and during combat, initial deployment may require forcible entry, followed by the occupation and expansion of lodgment areas.

E. A decisive combat and stabilization phase initially focuses on the rapid buildup of joint force capabilities.

1. The appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational area can contribute greatly to the stabilization of the situation. Further, deployment of forces may serve as a deterrent to hostilities, but if deterrence fails, deployment will permit JFCs to build up full dimensional capabilities rapidly to conduct decisive action as early as possible.
2. Such decisive action focuses on winning, that is, achieving the objectives defined by the NCA and JFC, and may include control of enemy territory and population and destruction of the enemy's ability and will to continue.

F. During a follow-through phase, JFCs synchronize joint force activities to bring the operation to a successful conclusion. Follow-through includes those actions that ensure the political objectives are achieved and sustained.

G. During the posthostilities and redeployment phase, JFCs may retain responsibility for operations or they may transfer control of the situation to another authority and redeploy their forces.

1. Logistics is crucial to phasing.
2. Joint force planners consider establishing logistic bases, opening and maintaining LOC, establishing intermediate logistic bases to support new phases, and defining priorities for services and support.

X. Intelligence Support

A. Intelligence, logistics, and C4 systems support are all critical to the successful accomplishment of the joint force's mission.

1. Key to operational success is gaining intelligence dominance of the battlespace. Gaining and maintaining intelligence dominance enhances the JFC's flexibility by opening additional operational options.
2. Intelligence requirements are identified based on the JFC's guidance and direction, estimate of the situation, and objectives.
3. The commander's requirements must be the principal driver of intelligence system components, organization, services, and products. **(JP 2-0, Chapter I, paras 1c and 1d)**

B. The intelligence cycle is the process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users.

1. The US intelligence cycle has the following five steps: planning and direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination.
2. To better understand intelligence and its cycle, it is important to recognize the clear and critical distinction between information and intelligence.
3. Information is data that have been collected but not further developed through analysis, interpretation, or correlation with other data and to maintain intelligence. The application of analysis transforms information into intelligence. **(JP 2-0, Chapter II, para 4)**

C. The role intelligence (including counterintelligence) plays in full-dimensional operations cannot be overstated.

1. Intelligence provides insights concerning exploitable opportunities to defeat the adversary and helps JFCs clearly define the desired end state and when that end state has been achieved.
2. "Exploiting the information differential," as called for in Joint Pub 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States," occurs throughout the joint force as fused and tailored intelligence helps synchronize multiple efforts and contributes to the success of the joint team.
3. Intelligence is fundamental to effective planning, security, and deception. **(JP 2-0, Chapter III, paras 1 & 2)**

XI. C4 Systems Support.

A. In order to employ these forces, JFCs must have the ability to effectively exercise C2

of assigned, attached, and supporting forces.

1. Command is as much a problem of information management as it is of carrying out difficult and complex warfighting tasks.
2. The fundamental objective of C4 systems is to get the critical and relevant information to the right place in time to allow forces to seize the opportunity and meet the objectives of assigned missions across the range of military operations. **(JP 6-0, Chapter I, paras 1 & 2)**

B. Over time, superior C2 systems have enabled victorious commanders to maintain the unity of effort to apply their forces' capabilities at the critical time and place to win.

1. Victory demands that commanders effectively link decision making to execution through the concept of C2. The focus of C2 in a joint force is the JFC.
2. The C2S system enables the JFC with the means to exercise authority and direction of assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.
3. The JFC uses information to support decision making and communicate or coordinate actions that will influence friendly and enemy forces to the JFC's advantage. The structure of the joint force drives specific information flow and processing requirements.
4. The information requirements of the joint force drive the general architecture and specific configuration of the C2S system. The C2S system is comprised of five major subsystems including C2 facilities, decision support, information exchange, surveillance, and control and management.

C. Basic doctrine for C4 systems includes the following tenets:

1. C4 systems must provide the rapid, reliable, and secure flow and processing of data to ensure continuous information exchange throughout the chain of command;
2. the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the combatant commands, Defense Information Systems Agency, and Military Services, ensures that commanders at each echelon have the communications necessary to accomplish their assigned missions;
3. effective C4 systems are vital to planning, mounting, and sustaining a successful joint operation;
4. regardless of the source, C4 systems provided to combatant commanders operate under their authority;

5. JFCs must develop operational procedures that provide interoperable, compatible, C4 networks; and
6. the complexity of joint operations and the finite amount of C4 resources may require the JFC to adjudicate or assign subordinate command responsibilities for providing C4 systems support.

XII. Logistics Support Operations.

A. In the words of Rear Admiral Henry Eccles, USN, “The essence of flexibility is in the mind of the commander; the substance of flexibility is in logistics.” **(JP 1, Chapter III)**

B. Logistics provides the foundation of our combat power. It can be described as the bridge connecting a nation’s economy to a nation’s warfighting forces.

1. Logistics is the process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of a military strategy and operations.
2. The art of logistics is how to integrate the strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of units, personnel, and supplies in support of the employment concept of a geographic combatant commander.
3. The relative combat power military forces can bring to bear against an enemy is constrained by a nation’s capability to deliver forces and materiel to the required points of application across the range of military operations. **(JP 4-0, Chapter I, para 1a)**

C. The JFC’s concept for logistics is a key part of the synchronization of the joint effort.

1. Through the logistic concept, JFCs enable the deployment, entry, buildup, application, and redeployment of joint forces.
2. JFCs identify and reinforce priorities between combat and logistic requirements. **(JP 3-0, Chapter III, para 6f)**

D. Operational reach is the distance over which military power can be concentrated and employed decisively.

1. Operational reach is influenced by the length, efficiency, and security of the LOC. Operational reach also depends on the ability to phase reserves and materiel forward.
2. Finally, it must include the operating ranges and endurance of combat forces and sustainment. Operational reach may be improved by establishing advanced bases or depots and by improving the security and efficiency of the LOC. **(JP 4-0, Chapter IV, paras 3 & 4a, 4b and 4c)**

D. Correlations of combat power between opposing forces are often so close that a small advantage gained by one side over the other can prove decisive.

1. Logistics plays a significant role, both offensively and defensively, in attaining the leverage potential from a given force configuration. It does this primarily by increasing the endurance of the force.
2. Logistic forces and the activation of logistic Reserve forces play a key role in deterrence. Adequate logistic resources and capabilities convey a national will to fight a protracted conflict.
3. The composition and disposition of military forces and logistic resources are important considerations in developing flexibility. Essentially, logistics increases the employment options of the combatant commanders' forces.

XIII. Joint Operations Area

A. One of the ways that JFCs shape the battlefield is by the use of operational areas.

1. JFCs may define operational areas or joint areas to assist in the coordination and deconfliction of joint action. The size of these areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations.
2. For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, geographic combatant commanders can employ the following operational areas:
 - a. A joint operations area is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a JTF commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission.
 - b. A joint special operations area (JSOA) is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities, for use by a joint special operations component or Joint Special Operations Task Force for the conduct of special operations. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area. (**JP 3-0, Chapter II, paras 8a and 8b**)

B. The joint rear area facilitates the protection and operation of bases, installations, and forces that support combat operations.

1. The AOA includes the objectives to be secured by an amphibious task force. It needs to be large enough for necessary sea, air, land, and special operations. The airspace associated with the geographical area of the AOA is included in the AOA.
2. The commander, amphibious task force, is responsible for airspace control

within the AOA. JFCs may define AOs for land and naval forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. AOs do not include the authority for control of the airspace above the surface area.

C. JFCs at all levels can designate AOIs to monitor enemy activities outside the operations area. An AOI is usually larger than the operational area and encompasses areas from which the enemy can act to affect current or future friendly operations.

D. When warranted, geographic combatant commanders may designate theaters of war and, perhaps, subordinate theaters of operations for each major threat.

1. Geographic combatant commanders can elect to directly control operations in the theater of war or theater of operations, or may establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose, allowing themselves to remain focused on the broader theater. In time of war, the NCA or a geographic combatant commander may elect to define a theater of war within the geographic combatant commander's AOR.
2. The theater of war is that area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander's entire AOR and may contain more than one theater of operations.
3. Geographic combatant commanders may further define one or more theaters of operations — that area required to conduct or support specific combat operations — within the theater of war. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. Subordinate unified commanders are typically assigned theaters of operations.

E. Geographic combatant commanders may also establish combat zones and COMMZs.

1. The combat zone is an area required by forces to conduct large-scale combat operations. It normally extends forward from the land force rear boundary.
2. The COMMZ contains those theater organizations, LOC, and other agencies required to support and sustain combat forces. The COMMZ usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and theater of war and reaches back to the continental United States base or perhaps to a supporting combatant commander's AOR.

XIV. Some Key Responsibilities

A. It is important to discuss the key responsibilities and relationships within a joint

force that will be functioning in these operational areas.

1. Establishing supported and supporting relationships between components is a useful option to accomplish needed tasks.
2. Each subordinate element of the joint force can support or be supported by other elements. The size, shape, and positioning of land or naval force AOs will be established by JFCs based on their concept of operations and the land or naval force commander's requirement for depth to maneuver rapidly and to fight at extended ranges. **(JP 3-0, Chapter II, para 5e)**

B. Within these AOs, land and naval operational force commanders are designated the supported commander and are responsible for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs. **(JP 3-0, Chapter IV, para 3f)**

C. The JFACC functions as the supported commander for counterair operations; strategic attack operations, when joint air operations constitute the bulk of the capability needed to directly attack enemy strategic centers of gravity; theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance; and the overall air interdiction effort. **(JP 3-56.1, Chapter II, para 4i)**

XV. Control and Coordinating Measures

A. In addition to mapping out operational areas, JFCs employ various maneuver and movement control and fire support coordinating measures to facilitate effective joint operations. These measures include:

1. boundaries, phase
2. lines,
3. objectives,
4. coordinating altitudes to deconflict air operations,
5. air defense areas,
6. amphibious objective areas,
7. submarine operating patrol areas, and
8. minefields. **(JP 3-0, Chapter III, paras 7, 7a and 7b)**

B. Boundaries define surface areas to facilitate coordination and deconfliction of operations.

1. In land and sea warfare, a boundary is a line by which areas between adjacent

units or formations are defined.

2. A naval boundary may be designated for seas adjacent to the area of land conflict to enhance coordination and execution of naval operations.
3. JFCs may use lateral, rear, and forward boundaries to define AOs for land and naval forces. Such areas are sized, shaped, and positioned to enable land or naval force commanders to accomplish their mission while protecting deployed forces.
4. Theater air sorties are not constrained by land boundaries, per se. However, since the airspace above surface areas is used by all components of the joint force, JFCs promulgate airspace control measures to deconflict the multiple uses required of this space.
5. Boundaries may require relatively frequent adjustment based on the actual and projected rate of maneuver and the operational environment.

C. Joint fire support coordinating measures and the procedures associated with those measures assist in the C2 of joint forces.

1. Within their AOs, land and amphibious commanders employ permissive and restrictive fire support coordinating measures to enhance the expeditious attack of targets; protect forces, populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance; and set the stage for future operations.
2. Commanders position and adjust fire support coordinating measures consistent with the operational situation and in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders.

D. Fire Support Coordination Lines are permissive fire support coordinating measures.

1. They are established and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders.
2. Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the ground. FSCLs facilitate the expeditious attack of targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure.

E. Supporting elements may attack targets beyond the FSCL, provided the attack will not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line.

1. The FSCL is not a boundary — the synchronization of operations on either side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the establishing commander out to the limits of the land or amphibious force boundary.

2. The decision on where to place or even whether to use an FSCL requires careful consideration. If used, its location is based on estimates of the situation and concept of operations. Location of enemy forces, anticipated rates of movement, weapons capabilities, and tempo of the operation are considered in the commander's estimate, as well as other factors deemed appropriate.
- F. By establishing an FSCL at sufficient depth so as to not limit high-tempo maneuver, land force commanders ease the coordination requirements for attack operations within their AOs by forces not under their control, such as naval gunfire or air interdiction.
- G. FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, or sea weapon systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. An associated benefit of employing an FSCL is the reduction in potential for fratricide.
- H. Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land force commander.
1. Commanders employ restrictive measures to enhance the protection of friendly forces operating beyond an FSCL. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and special operations forces.
 2. Finally, this coordination assists in avoiding conflicting or redundant attack operations.
 3. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources.
 4. The land force commander adjusts the location of the FSCL as required to keep pace with operations. In high-tempo maneuver operations, the FSCL may change frequently, such as every several hours. Anticipated adjustments to the location of the FSCL are normally transmitted to other elements of the joint force sufficiently early to reduce potential disruptions in their current and near-term operations.
- I. The joint force may also employ airspace control measures. The high-density airspace control zone allows ground and/or Marine air-ground task force commanders to restrict a volume of airspace from users not involved with ongoing operations.
1. It is an area in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous and varied weapons or airspace users. The minimum risk route is an airspace control measure used primarily by cross-forward line of own troops operations.
 2. It is a temporary corridor of defined dimensions recommended for use by high speed fixed-wing aircraft. **(JP 3-52, Appendix B)**

XVI. Joint Theater Missile Defense

A. Another responsibility of the JFC is TMD, which is inherently a joint mission. It is necessary for joint force components, supporting combatant commanders, and multinational force TMD capabilities to be integrated toward the common objective of neutralizing or destroying the enemy's TM capability. **(JP 3-01.5, Chapter I, para 3)**

B. Joint theater missile defense is composed of four operational elements: passive defense, active defense, attack operations, and TMD C4I. This threat can only be countered by the synergistic performance achieved by coordinating and integrating all four operational elements into cohesive and coherent combat operations. **(JP 3-01.5, Chapter I, para 5)**

C. The JFC will normally assign responsibility for the planning and execution of JTMD attack operations outside the other component commanders AOs to the JFACC.

1. Since the location of these AOs may change with the maneuver of forces or with changes in JFC guidance, the JFACC should also plan for and maintain visibility on the theater-and/or JOA-wide attack operations effort.
2. The JFACC plans and executes attack operations in the theater/JOA based on JFC guidance.
3. Because of the need for the JFACC to maintain theater-and/or JOA-wide visibility on JTMD attack operations and the integrated relationship between attack operations, active defense, and the other operational elements of JTMD, the JFC may assign the responsibilities of the area air defense commander to the JFACC. **(JP 3-01.5, Chapter II, para 4a and 4b)**

D. Passive defense is necessary to provide essential individual and collective protection for friendly forces, population centers, and critical assets. Passive defense measures should be planned whenever US forces might face a TM threat. **(JP 3-01.5, Chapter III, para 12)**

E. The role of active defense operations is to protect selected assets and forces from attack by destroying TM airborne launch platforms and/or TMs in flight. Active defense must consist of defense in depth against all classes of TMs. **(JP 3-01.5, Chapter III, para 17)**

F. The JFC exercises control of active defense operations by integration of JTMD systems and forces into the C4I systems supporting theater and/or JOA air defense.

1. The JFC normally assigns overall responsibility for theater and/or JOA air defense, to include active defense TMD, to the area air defense commander (AADC).
2. Active defense forces are under the operational control of their component commanders, who employ these forces under the weapons control procedures and measures established by the AADC and approved by the JFC. **(JP 3-01.5, Chapter III, para 19)**

G. Attack operations are characterized by offensive actions intended to destroy and disrupt enemy TM capabilities before, during, and after launch.

1. The objective of attack operations is to prevent the launch of TMs by attacking each element of the overall system, including such actions as destroying launch platforms, reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition platforms, C2 nodes, and missile stocks and infrastructure.
2. Attack operations is not a mission in itself, but a way of characterizing those offensive attacks against launch platforms and their supporting infrastructure, including logistics. Designation of engagement areas, assignment of AOs, and coordination of JTMD attack operations is prescribed by the JFC.

H. When ground forces have been deployed and if a JFACC has been designated, the JFC will normally task the JFACC as the supported commander to plan for and conduct, as apportioned, attack operations against longer range TMs outside the other component commanders' AOs. The JFACC should also plan for and maintain visibility on the theater-and/or JOA-wide attack operations effort. **(JP 3-01.5, Chapter III, paras 22a and 22b)**

XVII. Joint Air Operations

A. The potential for force enhancement represented by joint air operations requires that the JFC integrate the efforts of all components.

1. Joint air operations are those air operations performed with air capabilities/forces made available by components in support of the JFC's operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force.
2. Joint air operations do not include those air operations that a component conducts in direct support of itself. **(JP 3-56.1, Chapter I, para 2)**

B. The JFC will normally designate a JFACC to exploit the capabilities of joint air operations. The JFACC directs this exploitation through a cohesive joint air operations plan (centralized planning) and a responsive and integrated control system (decentralized execution). **(JP 3-56.1, Chapter I, para 3a)**

C. The air capabilities and/or forces made available for JFACC planning and tasking are determined by the JFC, in consultation with component commanders, and based on the assigned objectives and the concept of operations.

1. Component commanders make capabilities and/or forces available to the JFC for tasking to support the joint force as a whole based on assigned component missions and JFC guidance.
2. These capabilities and/or forces are tasked directly by the JFC or by the JFACC based on the JFC's air apportionment decision. **(JP 3-56.1, Chapter II, paras 1 and 1a)**

D. The authority and command relationships of the JFACC are established by the JFC. These typically include exercising OPCON over assigned and attached forces and TACON over other military capabilities and/or forces made available for tasking. **(JP 3-56.1, Chapter II, paras 3 & 4)**

E. As an example, SOF may enhance joint air operations with unique personnel and platform capabilities, such as providing a tailored joint special operations task force, under the TACON of the JFACC, to assist in locating deep targets. **(JP 3-56.1, Appendix B, para 3b)**

F. The JFC may also establish supporting and supported relationships between components to facilitate operations.

1. The JFC normally assigns missions and issues mission-type orders to all components.
2. With receipt of the mission goes the authority to conduct operations in accordance with the JFC's intent and concept of the operation.

G. The responsibilities of the JFACC are assigned by the JFC.

1. These include, but are not limited to planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of joint air operations based on the JFC's concept of operations and air apportionment decision.
2. The responsibilities of the JFACC, ACA, and AADC are interrelated and should normally be assigned to one individual. The functions and responsibilities of the JFACC, ACA, and AADC must be integrated in order to unite joint air operations with joint airspace control and joint air defense operations in support of the JFC's campaign.
3. If appointed the AADC, the JFACC is responsible for integrating the joint force air defense effort.
4. If appointed the ACA, the JFACC is responsible for developing, coordinating, and publishing airspace control procedures and for operating the airspace control system in the AOR and/or JOA. **(JP 3-56.1, Chapter II, paras 3 & 4)**

VIII. Military Operations Other Than War

A. Military operations other than war can become just as crucial as operations during wartime, for they support our primary goal of deterrence.

1. MOOTW encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These operations can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power.

MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises.

2. MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and noncombat operations in peacetime, conflict, and war situations. MOOTW involving combat, such as peace enforcement, may have many of the same characteristics of war, including active combat operations and employment of most combat capabilities. **(JP 3-07, Chapter I, paras 1 thru 5)**
- B. All military operations are driven by political considerations. However, MOOTW are more sensitive to such considerations due to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities.
1. In MOOTW, political considerations permeate all levels and the military may not be the primary player. As a result, these operations normally have more restrictive rules of engagement than in war.
 2. As in war, the goal is to achieve national objectives as quickly as possible and conclude military operations on terms favorable to the United States and its allies.
- C. However, the purposes of conducting MOOTW may be multiple, with the relative importance or hierarchy of such purposes changing or unclear.
1. The Department of Defense is often in a support role to another agency, such as the Department of State in humanitarian assistance operations.
 2. Although MOOTW are generally conducted outside of the United States, some types may be conducted within the United States in support of civil authorities consistent with established law.
- D. Political objectives drive MOOTW at every level from strategic to tactical.
1. A distinguishing characteristic of MOOTW is the degree to which political objectives influence operations and tactics.
 2. Two important factors about political primacy stand out.
 - a. First, all military personnel should understand the political objectives and the potential impact of inappropriate actions.
 - b. Secondly, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations.
 3. MOOTW contribute to attainment of national security objectives by supporting deterrence and crisis response options. In peacetime, the Armed Forces of

the United States help to deter potential aggressors from using violence to achieve their aims. Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. US forces need to be able to respond rapidly either unilaterally or as a part of a multinational effort.

XIX. Military Operations Other Than War — Principles and Types

A. MOOTW encompass a broad range of military operations and support a variety of purposes, including supporting national objectives, deterring war, returning to a state of peace, promoting peace, keeping day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict, maintaining US influence in foreign lands, and supporting US civil authorities consistent with applicable law. **(JP 3-07, Chapter II, para 1)**

B. Support of these objectives is achieved by providing military forces and resources to accomplish a wide range of missions other than warfighting.

1. The principles of war, though principally associated with large scale combat operations, generally apply to MOOTW, though sometimes in different ways.
2. However, political considerations and the nature of many MOOTW require an underpinning of additional principles.

C. There are six MOOTW principles: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.

1. While the first three of these principles are derived from the principles of war, the remaining three are MOOTW-specific.
2. Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. JFCs must understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort.
3. Although defining mission success may be more difficult in MOOTW, it is important to do so to keep US forces focused on a clear, attainable military objective. Specifying measures of success helps define mission accomplishment and phase transitions. **(JP 3-07, Chapter II, paras 2 and 2a)**

D. Seek unity of effort in every operation. In MOOTW, achieving unity of effort is often complicated by a variety of international, foreign and domestic military and nonmilitary participants, the lack of definitive command arrangements among them, and varying views of the objective.

1. Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational

advantage.

2. The inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or hostile intent applies in all operations. JFCs should avoid complacency and be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation. **(JP 3-07, Chapter II, paras 2b and 2c)**

E. Apply appropriate military capability prudently.

1. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful balancing of the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective.
2. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby damaging the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while possibly enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party.
3. Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.
4. Some MOOTW may require years to achieve the desired results. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. Often, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is a requirement for success.
5. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable. In MOOTW, legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions. **(JP 3-07, Chapter II, paras 2d, 2e and 2f)**

XX. Conclusion.

A. As we described it, doctrine is neither policy nor strategy. Joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issues of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends. As such, it represents authoritative guidance for the joint employment of the Armed Forces of the United States.

B. However, it's the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen who have to use this doctrine.

1. The use of this doctrine is guided by our values of joint warfare. Our military service is based on these values, those experiences that have proven to be the bedrock of our combat success.
2. These values are common to all Services and represent the essence of our professionalism.

C. First and always is integrity.

1. In the case of joint action, as within a Service, integrity is the cornerstone for building trust. We know as members of the Armed Forces that whatever issue is at hand, we can count on each other to say what we mean. This allows us to rely with confidence on others to carry out assigned tasks. This is an enormous advantage for building effective teams.
2. Competence is at the center of our relationship with the American people and cements the mutual cohesion between leader and follower. Our fellow citizens expect that we are competent in every aspect of warfare; those we lead into battle deserve no less.

D. Each of the Services has organized, trained, and equipped superbly competent forces whose ability to fight with devastating effectiveness in the air, on land, and at sea is the foundation on which successful joint action rests.

1. Since warfare began, physical courage has defined warriors. The United States of America is blessed with its Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen whose courage knows no boundaries.
2. Even in warfare featuring advanced technology, individual fighting spirit and courage remain the inspiration for battle teamwork.

E. Moral courage is also essential in military operations.

1. This includes the willingness to stand up for what we believe is right even if that stand is unpopular or contrary to conventional wisdom. Other aspects of moral courage involve risk taking and tenacity: making bold decisions in the face of uncertainty, accepting full responsibility for the outcome, and holding to the chosen course despite challenges or difficulties.
2. We must also have the courage to wield military power in an unimpeachable moral fashion. We respect human rights. We observe the Geneva Conventions not only as a matter of legality but from conscience.

F. Lastly, teamwork is the cooperative effort of the members of a group to achieve common goals.

1. The Armed Forces of the United States are the team. Deterring aggression and, if need be, winning our wars are the team's common goals. This provides the Armed Forces of the United States a solid basis upon which to build effective joint teams.
2. Several elements support effective teamwork: trust and confidence, delegation, and cooperation.
3. Doctrine provides the distilled insights of wisdom that have been gained

through our collective experience of warfare. However, doctrine cannot replace clear thinking or alter a commander's obligation to determine the correct course of action under the circumstances that were present at the time of the decision.