

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

The US acts to meet various challenges, protect national interests, and achieve strategic aims in a variety of ways depending on the nature of the strategic environment. The figure below shows the range of military operations.

When other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, placing the US in a wartime state. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the US and its multinational partners.

Operations other than war are an aspect of military operations that focus on deterring war and promoting peace. In spite of efforts to promote peace, conditions within a country or region may result in armed conflict. When other instruments of national power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability, support the other instruments of national power, or terminate the situation on favorable terms. The general goals of US military operations during such periods are to support national objectives, deter war, and return to a state of peace. Such operations involve a greater risk that US forces could become involved in combat than operations conducted to promote peace.

Combatant commanders, at the direction of the National Command Authorities, may employ US forces to deter an adversary's action. The physical presence of these forces, coupled with their potential employment, can serve as a deterrent and facilitate achieving strategic aims. Should this deterrence fail, force may be required to compel compliance, for example, in the form of raids or strikes. Other such operations include peace enforcement, counterterrorism, enforcement of sanctions, support to insurgency and counterinsurgency, maritime interception, and evacuation of noncombatants.

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS			
	Military Operations	General US Goal	Examples
COMBAT	War	Fight & Win	Large-scale Combat Operations: Attack / Defend / Blockades
	NONCOMBAT Operations Other Than War	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement / NEO Strikes / Raids / Show of Force Counterterrorism / Peacekeeping Counterinsurgency
Promote Peace		Antiterrorism / Disaster Relief Peacebuilding Nation Assistance Civil Support / Counterdrug NEO	

At any point when force or the threat of its use is contemplated, those responsible for ordering, planning, or executing such action should remember Clausewitz's dictum that the use of force and violence introduces the fear, physical strain, and the uncertainty that are some of the hallmarks of the nature of warfare. Just as there are important political, diplomatic, and legal differences between war and operations other than war, there is also a singularly important threshold where using military force of any kind or the threat of its use comes into play. In the range of military operations, this threshold is the distinction between combat and noncombat operations.

Use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict and maintains US influence in foreign lands. Such operations include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, nation assistance, security assistance, foreign internal defense, counterdrug operations, arms control, support to US domestic civil authorities, evacuation of noncombatants, and peacekeeping. Such operations are typically joint in nature and may involve forward-presence forces or units deployed from another theater or continental US or a combination of both. These operations, by definition, do not involve combat, but military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and respond to a changing situation.

Operations other than war can involve simultaneous actions within an area of responsibility. These actions may or may not involve the use of force at times; part of the theater could also be in a wartime state. In such situations, geographic combatant commanders should pay particular attention to integrating and coordinating the effects and activities of forces toward a common purpose that supports attaining theater, national, and multinational strategic objectives.

Some military operations may be conducted for one purpose. Disaster relief operations, for example, are peacetime military operations with a humanitarian purpose. A strike or raid — such as Operation EL DORADO CANYON, the 1986 joint operation to coerce Libya to conform with international laws against terrorism — can be an example of a military operation for a specific purpose of compelling action or deterrence. Often, however, military operations will have multiple purposes, such as the 1992-1993 operations in Somalia (Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE) that combined humanitarian assistance efforts with peace enforcement operations.

In war and operations other than war, combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders work with US ambassadors, the Department of State, and other agencies to best integrate the military with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power.

Related Terms

military operations other than war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND TARGET ACQUISITION

reconnaissance

A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. JP 1-02

surveillance

The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. JP 1-02

target acquisition

The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons. JP 1-02

General. The primary objective of reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) operations is to support military operations across the range of military operations. RSTA operations are performed by forces with a primary RSTA mission and other forces with either a collateral mission or the capability to perform such a mission. Modern intelligence collection systems can accumulate vast amounts of information. To be useful, the information must be relevant, accurate, analyzed, properly formatted, and disseminated in a timely manner to the appropriate user. Also, the information must be appropriately classified to protect the RSTA system and its technology but sanitized to the degree necessary to allow dissemination to the appropriate user level.

RSTA Mission Areas. RSTA mission areas are essentially the same for the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations and interest. However, the tasking within these mission areas will vary based on the level, focus, need, and forces available. RSTA mission areas include indications and warning (I&W), planning and employment, and assessment.

Indications and Warning. Strategic- and operational-level RSTA operations provide information necessary to assess forces and installations that threaten the United States and its allies. It may be used to enhance an allied nation's ability to conduct military operations on a global, theater, or regional basis. RSTA missions may require both continuous surveillance and as-required reconnaissance to provide timely I&W of a threat or impending attack. RSTA assets can assist in monitoring or verifying compliance with international agreements, e.g., arms control agreements.

Tactical RSTA operations provide information and intelligence similar to the strategic and operational level necessary to assess force strength and deployment, defensive and offensive capabilities, and other factors that may affect US and/or allied military plans and operations. RSTA missions may require both continuous surveillance and as-required reconnaissance. They can assist in providing I&W of a threat or impending attack in sufficient time for an appropriate response.

Planning and Employment. Strategic RSTA operations may be used to support the planning and conduct of nuclear and nonnuclear operations for all military environments, including the following:

- Monitoring centers of gravity critical to a nation's warmaking capability.
- Single Integrated Operational Plan/limited attack option data base planning, adaptive planning, Unified Command Plan responsibilities, and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan taskings.
- Information on system capabilities, location, and other installations for the National Target Base and other target bases.

Operational RSTA operations provide commanders with current data on areas to include the environment, organizations, infrastructures, and forces necessary for planning theater campaigns and major operations, including contingencies. Additionally, they can provide for adaptive real time planning for current operations. RSTA operational-level support includes the following:

- Monitoring centers of gravity critical to a nation's warmaking ability and enemy orders of battle against which the joint force commander (JFC) must concentrate his operations.
- Strategic conventional attack data base planning.
- Information on enemy offensive and defensive system capabilities, locations, and other data bases.
- Collection of information on the conduct of combat or support operations across the range of military operations.

Tactical RSTA operations forces and assets can provide the required detailed information (i.e., terrain, enemy disposition, orders of battle, movement, offensive and defensive capabilities) needed to plan and to employ forces successfully. This support includes providing target detection and acquisition, near real time intelligence, that provide opportunities for offensive and defensive actions and help reduce casualties and achieve victory.

Assessment. RSTA operations provide assessment support to all levels of command before, during, and after the conduct of military operations. They can provide an important means for assessing friendly deception efforts. Assessments like battle damage assessment can provide information on the success of military operations and the need for follow-up or new operations. They can assist in determining where and when to employ scarce resources and concentrate efforts. Such assessments will affect the formulation of policy and military plans at all levels of conflict.

Operations Security (OPSEC). Operations security must be used when generating RSTA resources, while sustaining and protecting the forces, and in planning and conducting reconnaissance and surveillance operations. The purpose is to enhance combat effectiveness by gaining and maintaining essential secrecy about friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations. (See figure below.)

RSTA operations and planning must be closely coordinated with primary mission strategies and objectives to ensure activities and communications do not reveal indications of the primary mission that may be exploited by adversaries. Essential secrecy is required about the specific characteristics of sensors and data links, wartime reserve mode designs, deployment intentions, areas under surveillance, when and where reconnaissance will take place, patterns of operations that may imply operational objectives, and processing capabilities.

Military Deception. RSTA operations may be used in four ways to support military deception. The first way tasks RSTA assets to identify and locate appropriate targets for military deception within the enemy command and control structure. The second way involves RSTA operations to monitor enemy actions or inactions relative to deception plans being



implemented by the JFC. Enemy actions may include troop movement in reaction to perceived friendly movement or increased surveillance activity by the enemy in attempts to monitor friendly activities. Third, increased RSTA activity in a specific area away from the main thrust of a planned operation may deceive the enemy into thinking that friendly forces may be preparing an operation into a specific area. Such RSTA activities, along with other military deception inputs, confuse enemy commanders, allowing friendly commanders to exploit the situation. And fourth, RSTA assets may be used to support detection of enemy military deception.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-55 Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
Support for Joint Operations

RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION

Those actions taken by one nation prior to, during, and following an attack by an enemy nation to minimize the effects of the attack, rehabilitate the national economy, provide for the welfare of the populace, and maximize the combat potential of remaining forces and supporting activities. JP 1-02

RECOVERY OPERATIONS

Following a theater missile attack, units should be restored to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources. Reconstitution may include reestablishing or reinforcing command and control; reallocating or replacing communications, personnel, supplies, and equipment; conducting essential training, reestablishing unit cohesion; and repairing battle damage. In some instances of mass devastation, whole unit replacement may be necessary.

Reconstitution actions taken by a commander to restore a unit to a desired level of combat effectiveness include reestablishment of command and control; cross-leveling or replacement of personnel, supplies, and equipment; and conduct of essential training. Reconstitution sites in the joint rear area may require security augmentation and should be considered in joint rear area coordinator and component command security plans.

On the nuclear, biological, and chemical battlefield, organizations may be subject to catastrophic losses. When such losses occur, each affected unit must be brought back to operational effectiveness or replaced. The reconstitution role of Service components is to restore debilitated or destroyed units from available assets. First, there must be an assessment of the criticality of the function. If the function is determined to be critical, it must be resumed. Second, the unit must be assessed for remaining capability in terms of personnel and equipment. Using the surviving assets as a base, component commanders must determine what personnel and equipment each unit will need to return to an acceptable level of effectiveness. Personnel may come from the replacement system, medical channels, or other organizations that perform less critical functions. The required equipment may come from the supply system, maintenance facilities, or other organizations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-01.5	Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense
JP 3-10	Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations
JP 3-11	Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense

RECOVERY OPERATIONS

Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. JP 1-02

Recovery operations are conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel or human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. These operations are generally sophisticated activities requiring detailed planning in order to execute them, especially when conducting them in denied areas. They may be clandestine, covert, or overt. Other recovery operations may be conducted in friendly areas, particularly when the host nation does not have the means to provide technical assistance in conducting the recovery. An example of a recovery operation is Operation FULL ACCOUNTING conducted to account for and recover the remains of US service members lost during the Vietnam War.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07	Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
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RECURRENT OPERATIONS

For scheduling purposes, theater airlift is conducted on either a recurrent or surge basis. Recurrent operations establish a scheduled flow of individual aircraft to make the most of available aircraft and ground support assets. However, such operations require low-threat environments because they often involve aircraft flying predictable schedules and route structures, making them relatively easy to detect and attack. For other than low-threat environments, surge operations maximize the ability of air defense forces to protect airlift assets because they usually reduce movements in time and space, and thereby reduce their vulnerability to detection and attack. Surge operations may disrupt the efficiency of the overall theater airlift system. Aircraft already loaded and serviced may wait unproductively on the ground, for example, until all the aircraft in the surge are ready for the mission.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

REDEPLOYMENT

The transfer of a unit, an individual, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area, or to the zone of interior for the purpose of further employment. JP 1-02

Redeployment may include waste disposal, port operations, closing of financial obligations, clearing and marking of minefields and other explosive ordnance disposal activities, and ensuring appropriate units remain in place until their missions are complete. Redeployment must be planned and executed in a manner that facilitates the use of redeploying forces and supplies to meet new missions or crises.

Related Terms

mobilization

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING

Redeployment planning is directed toward the transfer of units, individuals, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area, or to the continental US for the purpose of further employment. The demobilization of Reserve forces is considered during redeployment planning.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

REDUCING TARGETING EFFECTIVENESS

Reducing Targeting Effectiveness. Joint force commanders (JFCs) and component commanders are responsible for protecting forces against the effects of missile attack through the following:

Operations Security (OPSEC). The communications security, signature reduction, and security aspects of OPSEC deny enemy sensor and reconnaissance assets timely acquisition and identification of friendly targets. Signature reduction measures include camouflage, commonality of vehicle appearance, an emission control program for infrared, electromagnetic, and acoustic emissions, and cover and concealment. Local unit security is an important element in denying accurate targeting data to enemy special operations forces or other enemy agents. Frequent movement of units (inside the enemy's intelligence cycle) is of singular importance.

Deception. Deception misleads enemies by manipulating, distorting, or falsifying friendly actions. This can cause enemies to deplete their tactical missile (TM) resources by attacking false targets through the use of decoys, missing intended targets, and denying them accurate battle damage assessments. Deception influences enemy decision makers by feeding their intelligence collectors what appears to be credible information or by denying the enemy the ability to gain tactical, operational, and strategic information when using reconnaissance and surveillance systems. TM deception is an integral element of the JFC's overall plan for deception and is included in the JFC's operation plan. The deception effort should be specifically tailored to counter or exploit the enemy's collection capability.

Mobility. Mobility reduces vulnerability and contributes to survivability of certain systems by limiting exposure to reconnaissance and targeting.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-01.5 Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense

REDUCING VULNERABILITY

Hardening. Hardening reduces the effect of attack on systems and facilities (i.e., aircraft, air base support equipment and facilities, nuclear delivery systems, nuclear storage areas, command and control (C2) elements, communications nodes, and theater logistic facilities). Hardening should be accomplished or begun in peacetime. However, political and fiscal constraints may preclude certain prehostility hardening measures, such as construction of fixed fortifications. Protection for mobile ground forces and equipment may be best accomplished by careful site selection, field fortifications, and other field-expedient methods.

Redundancy and Robustness. A principal means of preserving combat power is duplication of critical capabilities that are particularly vulnerable to tactical missile attack and for which other passive measures may be less appropriate. Of primary concern are "soft" targets such as C2 nodes and sensors, and fixed sites such as airfields and ground stations for airborne sensors. The capabilities provided by these systems can be preserved through redundancy and robustness. That is, by having systems capable of backing up or duplicating the roles of other systems and having many systems with similar or identical capabilities.

Dispersal. Dispersal reduces target vulnerability by decreasing concentration and making a target less lucrative. Combined with mobility and deception, dispersal increases enemy

uncertainty as to whether a particular location is occupied and, if so, whether it will be occupied when the attack is executed. It forces the enemy to search more locations, which requires more resources and more time.

Training Civilian Authorities. Civilian authorities should be trained to organize and instruct their populations on actions to take upon warning of missile attack. This training will facilitate civilian protection efforts and may reduce the political impact of missiles hitting civilian areas and facilities.

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense. The elements of passive defense against NBC weapons are contamination avoidance, force protection, and decontamination. These form a hierarchy that protects the force, sustains operational effectiveness, and minimizes casualties. Units employ detection and NBC reconnaissance to avoid contamination, thus minimizing or eliminating NBC casualties, mission performance degradation, and logistical intensive decontamination requirements. If units fail to avoid being attacked or contaminated with NBC weapons, they use individual and collective protection to sustain operations and reduce the impact on NBC weapons on the unit. Individual protection uses physical protection devices, medical immunization and prophylaxis, and NBC casualty medical treatment. Collective protection provides relief from sustained operations in full NBC protective equipment, shelters sensitive equipment not easily decontaminated, and provides clean environments for operations that cannot be performed under NBC-contaminated conditions. Decontamination removes NBC hazards from personnel and equipment. Decontamination also minimizes the hazard and spread of contamination and facilitates the prompt restoration of normal operations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-01.5 Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense

REHEARSAL

Rehearsal is the process of learning, understanding, and practicing a plan in the time available before actual execution. Rehearsing key combat and logistic actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan. This process assists them in orienting themselves to their surroundings and to other units during execution. Rehearsals also provide a forum for subordinate leaders to analyze the plan, but caution must be exercised in adjusting the plan in order to prevent errors in synchronization. While rehearsals with combat units usually occur at the tactical level, headquarters at the operational level can rehearse key aspects of a plan using command post exercises, typically supported by computer-aided simulations. While the joint force may not be able to rehearse an entire operation, joint force commanders should identify key elements for rehearsal.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

RELEVANCE

For intelligence to be truly relevant, it must also meet the qualitative criteria of being complete, accurate, timely, objective, and usable. Intelligence should be relevant to

RELIABILITY

determining, planning, conducting, and evaluating operations. It must contribute to the joint force commander's (JFC's) understanding of the adversary and the JFC's own situation relative to the adversary. Intelligence must be appropriate to the purposes for which it is needed and how it will be applied for the operation.

Related Terms

intelligence

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

RELIABILITY

Command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems must be available when needed and must perform as intended. The reliability of C4 systems is achieved by designing equipment and systems with low failure rates and error correction techniques, standardizing equipment, establishing standardized procedures and supervising their execution, countering computer attacks and electromagnetic jamming and deception, and establishing effective logistic support programs.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
Systems Support to Joint Operations

RELIGIOUS MINISTRY SUPPORT


The entire spectrum of professional duties to include providing for or facilitating essential religious needs and practices, pastoral care, family support programs, religious education, volunteer and community activities, and programs performed to enhance morale and moral, ethical, and personal well being. Enlisted religious support personnel assist the chaplain in providing religious ministry support.

JP 1-02

Activities. Religious ministry support activities cover a wide range of professional functions accomplished across the entire operational continuum. Because there may be no precise boundary where one condition (peace, conflict, and war) ends and another begins, changes in religious ministry support activities will be more a matter of changing intensity and emphasis than dramatically altered duties. Chaplains and enlisted religious support personnel support the accomplishment of operational objectives through one or more of the following activities discussed and shown in the figure below.

Advising. Chaplains advise the joint force commander (JFC) on matters of religion, morals, ethics, and morale and provide recommendations as to how the religious ministry support assets of the command can be most effectively employed. The chaplain advises the JFC on the role and influence of indigenous religious customs and practices as they affect the command's mission accomplishment. Chaplains also provide ethical decision making and moral leadership recommendations to the commander.

Supporting. Chaplains provide religious worship services, rites, sacraments, ordinances, and ministrations. The primary focus of this activity is to nurture the living, care for the sick or wounded, minister to prisoners or prisoners of war, and honor the dead. They accompany



US forces during operations to implement the commander's religious ministry support plan. In addition, chaplains assist military personnel and family members in dealing with personal concerns such as faith issues, stress, anxiety, redeployment or reunion issues, moral and ethical values, and social concerns. They combine care and pastoral counseling skills to provide spiritual comfort, moral support, and encouragement.

Chaplains help to resolve problems by making appropriate referrals to command channels or social service agencies. They also assist military personnel in requesting emergency leave, compassionate reassignments, and hardship discharges.

Chaplains conduct liaison with, and support humanitarian efforts by working with, humanitarian relief agencies, civil affairs, and public affairs, where appropriate. Their skill and experience in public relations allows them to bring an added dimension and perspective to the command's total mission.

Coordinating. As staff officers, chaplains coordinate a comprehensive religious ministry support plan that makes worship opportunities and pastoral care available to all members of the command. Chaplains coordinate religious ministry support plans with higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters to ensure a balance of faith group coverage throughout the force.

RESOURCE AREAS

Coordinating instructions should be stated clearly in operating procedures or the religious ministry support annex of operation, contingency, concept summary, and exercise plans. At a minimum, these will supply the following:

Analyzing. In this area, chaplains, as staff officers:

- analyze joint force mission and religious ministry support requirements;
- identify religious, ethical, and moral needs of the command;
- research and interpret cultural and religious factors pertinent to a given area of operations.

Work with civil affairs personnel in analyzing local religious organizations, customs and practices, doctrines, symbols, and the significance of shrines and holy places. Prepare area assessments and estimates of the local religious situation.

Planning. Chaplains work continuously with staffs and other chaplains at all echelons to determine the best methods of employing religious ministry support assets to accomplish assigned missions, review after-action data from previous operations and apply appropriate lessons learned, and maintain current standing operating procedures.

Writing. Chaplains draft proposed estimates, assessments, agreements, instructions, operation plans, annexes, and other documentation relevant to use of chaplaincy assets and resources.

Training. Chaplains are responsible for professional training and will identify the training needs of subordinate chaplains, enlisted religious support personnel, and lay readers or lay leaders. They provide personnel, materiel, guidance, coordination, and appropriate training activities to ensure readiness and a high level of professional development.

Supervising. As supervisors, chaplains provide coordination and functional guidance to their chaplains and enlisted religious support personnel of the combatant command or subordinate task forces. Supervisory chaplains at all levels manage assets for ministry to ensure that chaplains are trained, equipped, and prepared to perform their duties. Chaplains in supervisory positions coordinate with appropriate staff agencies to ensure that subordinate chaplains and enlisted religious support personnel receive appropriate support, professional guidance, and performance evaluations.

Evaluating. In a system where evaluation and feedback are highly valued, chaplains continually review and analyze religious ministry support to determine its effectiveness in supporting common objectives.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 1-05 Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations

RESOURCE AREAS

National resources in the 12 resource areas (manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, health service support, communications, host-nation support, environment, legal authorities, and funding) are focused on defense needs. Military mobilization requires the assembly and organization of resources in 12 interdependent resource areas. Mobilization planners and decision makers should understand that activities occurring in any one area may have an influence on each of the others; (e.g., activating additional manpower creates demands for additional materiel and equipment, transportation, and additional workloads at affected facilities). Depending on the situation, it could also generate requirements for additional industrial production, training base capacity, health service support, communications support, and host-nation support.

Increasing levels of manpower and other resources may also create conflicts with environmental protection statutes, especially at various facilities in the US. Some mobilization actions may be delayed until these conflicts are resolved by either complying with environmental protection standards or by requesting temporary waivers. The appropriate legal authorities and funding would also have to be obtained to enable the callup. Mobilization decisions in each resource area, therefore, should be made with an understanding of the effect the decision could have on other resource areas.

Mobilization planners deal with resource area interactions during deliberate and crisis action planning through staff coordination and the exchange of information among supported and supporting organizations. Thorough coordination and effective communications will ensure that mobilization activities initiated in a resource area can be supported by the other areas.

Related Terms

mobilization

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

RESTRAINT

Apply appropriate military capability prudently. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful balancing of the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby damaging the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while possibly enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party.

Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure their personnel know and understand the rules of engagement (ROE) and are quickly informed of changes. Failure to understand and comply with established ROE can result in fratricide, mission failure, and national embarrassment. ROE in military operations other than war (MOOTW) are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war, consistent always with the right of self-defense. Restraint is best achieved when ROE issued at the beginning of an operation address most anticipated situations that may arise. ROE should be consistently reviewed and revised as necessary. Additionally, ROE should be carefully scrutinized to ensure the lives and health of military personnel involved in MOOTW are not needlessly endangered.

Related Terms

military operations other than war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

RESTRICTED OPERATIONS AREA

Airspace of defined dimensions, designated by the airspace control authority, in response to specific operational situations/requirements within which the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted. JP 1-02

The Restricted Operations Area (ROA) is airspace of defined dimensions created in response to specific operational situations or requirements within which the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted. ROA is also known as a restricted operations zone. An ROA is

RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AND HERBICIDES

an airspace control measure used to separate and identify areas. For example, artillery, mortar, naval gunfire support, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operating areas, aerial refueling, concentrated interdiction areas, areas of search and rescue (SAR), special operations forces operating areas, and areas in which the area air defense commander has declared “weapons free.” ROA’s are commonly used for drop zones, landing zones, SAR areas, UAV launch and recovery sites, UAV mission areas, and special electronics mission aircraft. ROA can adversely affect air defense operations; therefore, air defense missions generally have priority over ROAs. The point of contact for an ROA is the airspace control authority.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AND HERBICIDES

riot control agent

A substance which produces temporary irritating or disabling physical effects that disappear within minutes of removal from exposure. There is no significant risk of permanent injury, and medical treatment is rarely required. JP 1-02

Riot Control Agents (RCAs) and Herbicides Use in Wartime. The US has renounced first use of herbicides in war except under regulations applicable to domestic use or for control of vegetation within US bases and installations and around their immediate perimeters. The US has renounced the first use of RCAs in war. US forces will only use RCAs in war in defensive modes to save lives as approved by the President. In wartime, use of RCAs outside the war zone is authorized as prescribed for peacetime as described in the paragraphs and figure below.

For RCA and herbicide use, war is any period of armed conflict no matter how it may be characterized, including declared and undeclared war, counterinsurgency, and any other uses of armed forces in engagements between US military forces and foreign military or paramilitary forces. Armed conflict is conflict between states in which at least one party has resorted to the use of armed force to achieve its aims. It also may involve conflict between a state and uniformed or non-uniformed groups within that state, such as organized resistance groups.

Commanders must recognize that, while the US does not consider herbicides and RCAs to be chemical weapons, some other countries do not draw a distinction. Commanders must consider international ramifications and rules of engagement before recommending the use of herbicides or RCAs.

RCAs and Herbicides Use in Peacetime. The Secretary of the Army, as Executive Agent for the Department of Defense for civil disturbance operations, has promulgated instructions governing the use of RCAs in civil disturbances in the US, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and US possessions and territories. RCAs may be used on US bases, posts, embassy grounds, and installations for protection and security purposes, riot control, installation security, and evacuation of US noncombatants and foreign nationals. The US-controlled portions of foreign installations are considered US installations.

Chemical aerosol-irritant projectors may be used by military law enforcement personnel for the performance of law enforcement activities. They may be used in the following areas:

- on-base and off-base in the US and its territories and possessions;
- on-base overseas;

RIOT CONTROL AGENTS (RCAs) AND HERBICIDES

WARTIME

The United States has renounced first use of herbicides in war except under regulations applicable to domestic use or for control of vegetation within US bases and installations and around their immediate perimeters. The US has renounced the first use of RCAs in war. US forces will only use RCAs in war in defensive modes to save lives as approved by the President.

PEACETIME

RCAs may be used on US bases, posts, embassy grounds, and installations for protection and security purposes, riot control, installation security, and evacuation of US noncombatants and foreign nationals. Herbicides may be used within US bases, posts, and installations for control of vegetation. The Secretary of Defense may authorize the use of RCAs or herbicides in peacetime.

- off-base overseas in those countries where such use is specifically authorized by the host-country government.

RCAs may be used off-base (world-wide) for the protection or recovery of nuclear weapons under the same conditions as those authorized for the use of lethal force. (See DOD Directive 5210.56.) RCAs may be used in training. A review of current treaties and/or status-of-forces agreements between the host country and US forces may be required in determining whether or not training with RCAs is authorized.

Herbicides may be used within US bases, posts, and installations for control of vegetation. Use of herbicides off-base overseas must be in accordance with host-country laws and agreements, US Environmental Protection Agency requirements, or Service regulations, whichever are the most stringent.

Authority. Only the President may authorize the following:

- Use of RCAs in war, including defensive military modes. However, advance authority to use RCAs for protection or recovery of nuclear weapons has been delegated to the Secretary of the Defense.
- Wartime use of herbicides, including installation vegetation control.

The Secretary of Defense may authorize the following:

- Use of RCAs or herbicides in peacetime.
- Use of RCAs in wartime for the protection or recovery of nuclear weapons.

Combatant commanders and Service component commanders may authorize the following:

RISK

- The use of RCAs in peacetime on US installations for riot control, installation security, civil disturbance operations, and noncombatant emergency evacuation operations. The US-controlled portions of foreign installations are considered US installations.
- The movement and storage of RCAs and herbicides, as necessary, to support requirements, provided US control is maintained.
- The off-base use of RCAs in peacetime for the protection or recovery of nuclear weapons under the same situations as authorized for the use of lethal force.
- The use of herbicides in peacetime within and, when authorized by the host-country government, around US bases for control of vegetation.
- The use of chemical aerosol-irritant projectors by military law enforcement personnel during peacetime for the performance of law enforcement activities on-base and off-base in the US and its territories and possessions; on-base overseas; and off-base overseas in those countries where such use is specifically authorized by the host-country government.
- Authority for use of RCAs in peacetime situations not covered by the above (for example, to save lives in counterterrorist operations) will be addressed in plans and requested by the combatant commanders for Secretary of Defense approval.

Related Terms

nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-11 Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense

RISK

Risk is inherent in military operations. In peacetime operations, commanders consider a variety of risks — such as the implications of failure to national prestige or to joint force morale, or risk to the safety of individual joint force members. In combat or potential combat situations, commanders carefully identify conditions that constitute success — both for the envisioned end state and for the major operations or stages that lead to that end state. To the extent that these conditions are met, commanders reduce the risk. When these conditions are not met, or only partially met, commanders identify the risk associated with continuing. To alleviate or reduce risk, commanders may apply additional force — by reallocating combat forces or by shifting supporting operations, for example. Or they may decide the risk is acceptable. Commanders consider many factors as they identify risk in combat or potential combat situations. As in peacetime operations, commanders consider the risk to joint force members. It is for this reason, in part, that an indirect approach to enemy centers of gravity, attacking enemy vulnerabilities rather than strengths, is important in the design of campaigns and major operations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

ROLES, MISSIONS, AND FUNCTIONS

As illustrated in the figure below, the terms “roles, missions, and functions” are often used interchangeably, but the distinctions between them are important. “Roles” are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services and the US Special Operations Command

ROLES, MISSIONS, AND FUNCTIONS

The primary **function** of the Services and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is to provide forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform a **role** - to be employed by the combatant commander in the accomplishment of a **mission**.

ROLES

"Roles" are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services and the USSOCOM were established by Congress in law.

MISSIONS

"Missions" are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders.

FUNCTIONS

"Functions" are specific responsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense to enable the Services and USSOCOM to fulfill their legally established roles.

(USSOCOM) were established by Congress in law. "Missions" are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. "Functions" are specific responsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense to enable the Services and USSOCOM to fulfill their legally established roles. Simply stated, the primary function of the Services and USSOCOM is to provide forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform a role — to be employed by the combatant commander in the accomplishment of a mission.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

ROUTINE SUSTAINMENT

Routine sustainment theater airlift operations involve the administrative air movement of materiel and personnel to reinforce or resupply forces already deployed and/or employed in operations. These operations normally deliver the user's requirements with the minimum expenditure of airlift resources. Routine sustainment planning usually assumes that user requirements and the general air and ground security situation allow some flexibility in the actual delivery times of specific loads. Thus, flight schedules and load plans are usually made to get maximum throughput from available allowable cabin loads and support resources. When practical, routine sustainment should be planned to utilize backhaul capacity. Depending on theater and user priorities, typical backhaul loads might include wounded personnel, other friendly evacuees, enemy prisoners of war, excess or reparable weapons and materiel of moderate to high value, as well as mail.

Related Terms

theater airlift

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. JP 1-02

Joint forces operate in accordance with applicable rules of engagement (ROE), conduct warfare in compliance with international laws, and fight within restraints and constraints specified by superior commanders. Objectives are justified by military necessity and attained through appropriate and disciplined use of force. ROE, which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces conduct operations other than war or begin or continue combat, are promulgated by the National Command Authorities. Many factors influence ROE, including national command policy, mission, operational environment, commander's intent, and international agreements regulating conduct. ROE always recognize the inherent right of self-defense. Properly developed ROE are clear and tailored to the situation. ROE will typically vary from operation to operation and may change during an operation.

Joint force commanders (JFCs) should give early attention to developing ROE that are appropriate to the situation and can be employed by all member forces. This task is often difficult, requiring the participation and cooperation of senior political and military representatives from member nations. Complete consensus or standardization of ROE may not be achievable because of individual national values and operational employment concepts. However, JFCs should strive to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailored by member forces to their particular situation.

In many cases, commanders of deployed member forces may lack the authority to speak on behalf of their nation in the ROE development process. This lack of authority may require considerable support from coalition political leadership both within and outside the operational area to coordinate and implement appropriate ROE.

Related Terms

law of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

SABOTAGE

An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises or utilities, to include human and natural resources. JP 1-02

Sabotage is conducted from within the enemy's infrastructure in areas presumed to be safe from attack. It is designed to degrade or obstruct the war-making capability of a country by damaging, destroying, or diverting war material, facilities, utilities, and resources. Sabotage may be the most effective or only means of attacking specific targets that lie beyond the capabilities of conventional weapon systems. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and materiel. Once accomplished, these incursions can further result in the enemy spending excessive resources to guard against future attack.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

SANITIZE

Revise a report or other document in such a fashion as to prevent identification of sources, or of the actual persons and places with which it is concerned, or of the means by which it was acquired. Usually involves deletion or substitution of names and other key details. JP 1-02

Intelligence should be sanitized when personnel who need it cannot be cleared for knowledge of its sources and methods, cannot meet the security requirements for that category of intelligence material, or the timeliness for application is jeopardized. Security by sanitizing is attained by effectively separating intelligence from its sources and methods.

The policy for sanitizing intelligence must ensure timely access and application to operations. The interpretation of this policy should be accomplished by the joint force commander (JFC) who, with the Director of Intelligence (J-2), has the best appreciation of the criticality, utility, and time sensitivity of the intelligence. Establishment of sanitization policy should be accomplished by the chain of command prior to, or at the outset of, joint operations. This is of particular importance for JFCs who will be operating with multinational forces.

The reasoning used in developing and applying the policies and guidelines for intelligence security and accessibility should include consideration of the value of intended and potential uses of the intelligence, future value of intelligence sources and methods in light of national and theater military strategies and operational objectives, and situations of threat and opportunity.

Where the sources and methods of critical information cannot be protected (i.e., the intelligence cannot be sanitized), the senior commander assigned the military objective or mission and the J-2 should be apprised. When the protection of the information sources and methods is paramount, the commander can then make a reevaluation of objectives in light of the probable outcome of operations without the intelligence.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

Related Terms

intelligence

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign scientific and technical information which covers: a. foreign developments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering techniques; and b. scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and materiel, the research and development related thereto, and the production methods employed for their manufacture. JP 1-02

Scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence is intelligence on foreign developments in basic and applied sciences and technologies with warfare potential. It includes S&T characteristics, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and limitations of all weapon systems, subsystems, and associated material; research and development related thereto; and the production methods employed for their manufacture. S&T intelligence also addresses overall weapon systems and equipment effectiveness and the foreign material program.

Related Terms

intelligence

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

SECURITY

1. Measures taken by a military unit, an activity or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. 3. With respect to classified matter, it is the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security. JP 1-02

Security in the Joint Rear Area (JRA). The security function addresses those measures or activities used to protect against hostile threats to ensure survival and sustainment of mission capability. It also includes the specific category of security operations that contributes to the security of the joint force.

The joint force commander (JFC) is responsible for providing sufficient forces to ensure the security of the JRA. All US forces in the JRA have an inherent responsibility to contribute as many forces as possible for base defense and local security for themselves, their facilities, installations, and activities. This must be done without seriously degrading their capabilities to perform their primary mission. Headquarters will frequently be collocated with host nation (HN) counterparts. The security of the area will be enhanced by close cooperation with HN authorities. Additionally, the integration of HN security personnel with US facility and

personnel detachments is invaluable in evaluating and resolving issues and incidents with the local population and with HN authorities.

Objectives of Security Operations in JRA. (See figure below.)


Prevent or Minimize Disruption of Support Operations. Commanders should take all reasonable measures, including camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, and movement to avoid becoming engaged with threat forces that could disrupt forward support of combat forces.

Prevent or Minimize Enemy Interference with Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I). US forces should establish effective C4I for day-to-day operations and for successful security operations. Security forces should protect key C4I facilities to prevent or minimize enemy interference.

Protect Personnel and Facilities. Units should take active and passive measures that protect themselves and high value assets in the JRA.

Protect JRA Lines of Communications (LOCs). Protection of land, water, and air routes within the JRA that connect an operating military force with its theater base of operations is essential to sustaining campaigns. Geographic features may be used, and friendly security forces and uncommitted combat units should be employed to maximize LOCs security. Responsibility for overall protection of JRA LOCs is assigned to the joint rear area coordinator (JRAC) with active participation and coordination by the respective component commanders.

Find, Fix, Contain, and Defeat Enemy Incursions. US forces should use all means of intelligence, counterintelligence, reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, law enforcement agency support, surveillance, and detection to anticipate and locate enemy incursions. Surveillance and warning assets and fighting forces should be linked together as simply, robustly, and reliably as possible. Once located, enemy forces should be contained or defeated quickly.



SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Plan and Execute Area Damage Control (ADC). Commanders at all levels must prepare plans, establish specific responsibilities, and ensure all available assets are prepared for operations to ensure continuous support and restoration of assets. Comprehensive intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement agency information regarding threats to the rear area are key to the prior planning in ADC that will prevent or minimize casualties or physical damage associated with enemy attacks against JRA facilities and personnel.

Assess and Prioritize Bases. The JRAC ensures component commanders, in accordance with JFC priorities and the nature of the threat, assess and prioritize bases for protection and damage repair in order to ensure that operational and logistics planners are able to identify key bases, establish security and ADC requirements for those bases, and position other assets. This process should help to maximize defense force and ADC efforts.

Related Terms

national security; principles of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-10 Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations

SECURITY ASSISTANCE


Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. JP 1-02

Security assistance (SA) refers to a group of programs by which the US provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Some examples of US security assistance programs are Foreign Military sales, Foreign Military Financing Program, International Military Education and Training Program, Economic Support Fund, and commercial sales licensed under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). SA surges accelerate release of equipment, supplies, or services when an allied or friendly nation faces an imminent military threat. SA surges are military in nature and are focused on providing additional combat systems (weapons and equipment) or supplies, but may include the full range of SA, to include financial and training support.

SA is a principal instrument in the US foreign internal defense (FID) effort. Like FID itself, SA is a broad, encompassing topic and includes efforts of civilian agencies as well as those of the military. By definition, SA is the provision of defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of US national policies and objectives. SA, while integral to our FID program, is also much broader than FID alone. The preponderance of SA (80 to 90 percent), is aimed at enhancing regional stability of areas of the world facing external rather than internal threats. This relationship of SA to FID is depicted in the figure below. Note that only a portion of the overall SA effort fits into the FID area, but that it is a large part of the overall FID effort. Also, it is important to note that the direct support (not involving combat operations) category makes up the preponderance of the remaining military operations.


The SA program is authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the AECA of 1976, as amended, and is under the supervision and general direction of the Department of State (DOS). The military component of SA, implemented by the Department

THE RELATIONSHIP OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE



of Defense in accordance with policies established by DOS, has as its principal components the foreign military financing program, International Military Education and Training, foreign military sales, and peacekeeping operations. These components, combined with the Economic Support Fund and commercial sales licensed under the AECA provide the SA tools that the United States can use to further its national interests and support the overall FID effort. The specific procedures for requesting and approving host nation SA requests and integrating the SA tool into the combatant commanders' military plans to support a FID program are complex. This area will be examined in more detail later in this publication. The figure below offers a general overview of the SA management process and lists the key military programs.

US SECURITY ASSISTANCE



Related Terms

foreign internal defense; nation assistance

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
JP 3-07.1 JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

SEIZING AND MAINTAINING THE INITIATIVE

Seizing and maintaining the initiative is an American military tradition. Because the United States of America is not an aggressor nation, we may initially find ourselves forced to fight defensively for a time. However, our actions should be offensive in spirit, exploiting the full leverage of balanced, versatile joint forces to confuse, demoralize, and defeat the enemy. Taking calculated risks to throw an opponent off balance or achieve major military advantage may be required. In any case, retaining the initiative relies on the ability of our military people to think for themselves and execute orders intelligently — the ingenuity that has always been an American trademark.

Related Terms**Source Joint Publications**

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND

A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under the command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command, or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. JP 1-02

General. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces assigned or attached to combatant commands. They fulfill their responsibilities by exercising administrative control through the commanders of the Service component commands assigned to combatant commands.

All joint forces include Service component commands because administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through Service component commands. Service forces may be assigned or attached to subordinate joint forces without the formal creation of a Service component of that joint force. The joint force commander (JFC) also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. This relationship is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service forces for conducting operations.

A combatant command-level Service component command consists of the Service component commander and all the Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations, including the support forces, that have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations may operate directly under the Service component commander and contribute to the mission of the JFC. When a Service command is designated as the “Service component” to multiple combatant

commanders, the commander and only that portion of the commander's assets assigned to a particular commander of combatant command (CINC) are under the command authority of that particular CINC.

Designation of Service Component Commanders. With the exception of the commander of a combatant command and members of the command's joint staff, the senior officer of each Service assigned to a combatant command and qualified for command by the regulations of the parent Service is designated the commander of the Service component forces, unless another officer is so designated by competent authority. The assignment of any specific individual as a Service component commander of a combatant command is subject to the concurrence of the combatant commander.

Responsibilities of Service Component Commanders. Service component commanders have responsibilities that derive from their roles in fulfilling the Services' support function. The JFC also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders or, at lower echelons, Service force commanders. In the event that operational control of Service component forces is delegated by the JFC to a Service component commander of a subordinate joint force command, the authority of the Service component of the superior JFC is described as administrative control that includes responsibilities for certain Service-specific functions. Service component commanders are responsible to the JFC for the following:

- Making recommendations to the JFC on the proper employment of the forces of the Service component.
- Accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.
- Selecting and nominating specific units of the parent Service component for assignment to other subordinate forces. Unless otherwise directed, these units revert to the Service component commander's control when such subordinate forces are dissolved.
- Conducting joint training, including the training, as directed, of components of other Services in joint operations for which the Service component commander has or may be assigned primary responsibility, or for which the Service component's facilities and capabilities are suitable.
- Informing their JFC (and their combatant commander, if affected) of planning for changes in logistic support that would significantly affect operational capability or sustainability sufficiently early in the planning process for the JFC to evaluate the proposals prior to final decision or implementation. If the combatant commander does not approve the proposal and discrepancies cannot be resolved between the combatant commander and the Service component commander, the combatant commander will forward the issue through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for resolution. Under crisis action or wartime conditions, and where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, Service component commanders will implement directives issued by the combatant commander.
- Developing program and budget requests that comply with combatant commander guidance on warfighting requirements and priorities. The Service component commander will provide to the combatant commander a copy of the program submission prior to forwarding it to the Service headquarters. The Service component commander will keep the combatant commander informed of the status of combatant commander requirements while Service programs are under development.
- Informing the combatant commander (and any intermediate JFCs) of program and budget decisions that may affect joint operation planning. The Service component commander will inform the combatant commander of such decisions and of program and budget changes in a timely manner during the process in order to permit the combatant commander

to express his views before final decision. The Service component commander will include in this information Service rationale for nonsupport of the combatant commander's requirements.

- Providing, as requested, supporting joint operation and exercise plans with necessary force data to support missions that may be assigned by the combatant commander.

Responsibilities of Subordinate Service Component Commanders. Service component commanders in joint forces at any level within a combatant command are responsible to the combatant command-level Service component commander for the following:

- internal administration and discipline;
- training in own Service doctrine, tactical methods, and techniques;
- logistic functions normal to the command, except as otherwise directed by higher authority;
- Service intelligence matters and oversight of intelligence activities to ensure compliance with the laws, policies, and directives.

Communication With a Chief of Service. Unless otherwise directed by the combatant commander, the Service component commander will communicate through the combatant command on those matters over which the combatant commander exercises combatant command (command authority) or directive authority. On Service specific matters such as personnel, administration, and unit training, the Service component commander will normally communicate directly with the Chief of the Service, informing the combatant commander as the combatant commander directs.

Logistic Authority. The operating details of any Service logistic support system will be retained and exercised by the Service component commanders in accordance with instructions of their Military Departments, subject to the directive authority of the combatant commander. Joint force transportation policies will comply with the guidelines established in the Defense Transportation System.

Related Terms

functional component command.

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT ZONE

See weapon engagement zone.

Short Range Air Defense Engagement Zone (SHORADEZ)

Description. Areas of short-range air defense (SHORAD) deployment may fall within a low-altitude missile engagement zone or high-altitude missile engagement zone. It is possible that some areas may be solely defended by SHORAD assets. A SHORADEZ can be established to define the airspace within which these assets will operate. Because centralized control over the SHORAD weapons may not be possible, these areas must be clearly defined and disseminated so friendly aircraft can avoid them.

Uses. SHORADEZ is normally established for the local air defense of high-value assets. From an airspace control perspective, SHORADEZ provides airspace users with the location of the engagement zone of short-range air defense systems for mission planning purposes.

Considerations. Centralized control of SHORADEZ may not be possible.

Point of Contact. Area air defense commander.

SHOW OF FORCE

Related Terms

air corridor; coordinating altitude; fighter engagement zone; high altitude missile engagement zone; high-density airspace control zone; joint engagement zone; low-altitude missile engagement zone; positive identification radar advisory zone; restricted operations area.

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

SHOW OF FORCE

An operation, designed to demonstrate US resolve, which involves increased visibility of United States deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation, that if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to United States interests or national objectives. JP 1-02

Show of force operations, designed to demonstrate US resolve, involve increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that if allowed to continue may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. US forces deployed abroad lend credibility to US promises and commitments, increase its regional influence, and demonstrate its resolve to use military force if necessary. In addition, the National Command Authorities order shows of force to bolster and reassure friends and allies. Show of force operations are military in nature but often serve both political and military purposes. These operations can influence other governments or politico-military organizations to respect US interests as well as international law.

A show of force involves the appearance of a credible military force to underscore US policy interests or commitment to an alliance or coalition. Political concerns dominate a show of force. Military forces conduct these operations within legal and political constraints. The force coordinates its operations with the country teams affected. A show of force can involve a wide range of military forces including joint US military or multinational forces. Additionally, a show of force may include or transition to joint or multinational exercises.

As an example of a show of force, Operation Joint Task Force-Philippines, was conducted by US forces in 1989 in support of President Aquino during a coup attempt against the Philippine government. During this operation, a large special operations force was formed, US Air Force fighter aircraft patrolled above rebel air bases, and two aircraft carriers were positioned off the Philippines.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

SIMPLICITY

"Everything is simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult"

Clausewitz: On War, 1812

Simplicity is one of the principles of war. The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize

misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to success in combined operations.

Related Terms

principles of war

Source Joint Publications


JP 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

SIMULTANEITY AND DEPTH

General. The concepts of simultaneity and depth are foundations of deep operations theory. (See figure below.) The intent is to bring force to bear on the opponent's entire structure in a near simultaneous manner that is within the decision making cycle of the opponent. The goal is to overwhelm and cripple enemy capabilities and enemy will to resist.

Simultaneity. Simultaneity is a key characteristic of the American way of war. It refers to the simultaneous application of capability against the full array of enemy capabilities and



SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS

sources of strength. This does not mean that all elements of the joint force are employed with equal priority or that even all elements of the joint force will be employed. It refers specifically to the concept of attacking appropriate enemy forces and functions in such a manner as to cause confusion and demoralization.

Simultaneity also refers to the concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Tactical commanders fight engagements and battles, understanding their relevance to the operational plan. Joint force commanders (JFCs) set the conditions for battles within a major operation to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Geographic combatant commanders integrate theater strategy and operational art. At the same time, they remain acutely aware of the impact of tactical events. Because of the inherent interrelationships between the various levels of war, commanders cannot be concerned only with events at their respective echelon.

Depth. The evolution of warfare and advances in technology have continuously expanded the depth of operations. Airpower can be projected at greater distances while surface forces are able to maneuver more rapidly and project their influence at increasing depths. To be effective, JFCs should not allow an enemy sanctuary or respite. Joint force operations should be conducted across the full breadth and depth of the operational area, creating competing and simultaneous demands on enemy commanders and resources. Just as with simultaneity, the concept of depth seeks to overwhelm the enemy throughout the battle area from multiple dimensions, contributing to its speedy defeat or capitulation. Interdiction, for example, is one manner in which JFCs add depth to operations.

The concept of depth applies to time as well as to space (geographically). Operations extended in depth, in time as well as space (geographically), shape future conditions and can disrupt an opponent's decision cycle. Depth contributes to protection of the force by destroying enemy potentials before its capabilities can be realized and employed.

Simultaneity and depth place a premium on situational awareness at the operational level. JFCs should exploit the full capabilities of the joint force and supporting capabilities to develop and maintain a clear picture of events in the operational area as well as their linkage to future operations and attainment of strategic objectives.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) often involve simultaneous operations. Noncombat MOOTW may be conducted simultaneously with combat MOOTW, such as humanitarian assistance in conjunction with peace enforcement operations. It is also possible for part of a theater to be in a wartime state while MOOTW is being conducted elsewhere within the same theater. For example, during the final stages of Operation DESERT STORM, US Central Command conducted a noncombatant evacuation operation in Somalia. In such situations, geographic combatant commanders should pay particular attention to integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing the effects and activities of their operations with US ambassadors, Department of State, and other agencies. Furthermore, whenever a possibility of a threat to US forces exists, even in a noncombat operation, commanders should plan for and be prepared to either transition to combat operations or leave the area.

Related Terms**Source Joint Publications**JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

SINGLE-SERVICE LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Each Service is responsible for the logistic support of its own forces, except when logistic support is otherwise provided for by agreements with national agencies or allies, or by assignments to common, joint, or cross-servicing. The combatant commanders may determine that common servicing would be beneficial within the theater or a designated area. If so, the combatant commander may delegate the responsibility for providing or coordinating service for all Service components in the theater or designated area to the Service component that is the dominant user.

Related Terms**Source Joint Publications**JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

SKIP-ECHELON INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

Senior commanders should authorize skip-echelon direct intelligence support when necessary to provide timely critical intelligence for operating forces being constituted, in transit, or engaged. Analyst-to-analyst exchange is a form of skip-echelon support. Intelligence analysts at all levels can contribute important perspectives to other intelligence organizations collecting, processing, and producing intelligence. Command authorization of skip-echelon intelligence support does not alleviate the requirement to provide the same intelligence to intermediate commands through the chain of command and to supporting commands and organizations.

Related Terms**Source Joint Publications**JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

SMALL AUSTERE AIRFIELD

A small austere airfield is an unsophisticated airfield, usually with a short runway and limited in one or a combination of the following: taxiway systems, ramp space, security, materials handling equipment, aircraft servicing, maintenance, navigation aids, weather observing sensors, and communications. The greatest disadvantage of airfields is their relatively limited availability, particularly in lesser-developed regions of the world. Many of the available facilities may have limited space as a result of other combat forces beddown. They may be targeted as the focus of enemy forces and are often too far from surface combat units to be efficient destination terminals for combat sustainment operations.

Related Terms

landing zone

Source Joint PublicationsJP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

SOURCES AND METHODS

Sharing intelligence sources and methods, including cooperative intelligence collection and production, may help attain the common objectives of the alliance members or coalition partners. When, however, intelligence sources and methods cannot be shared among allied or coalition nations, the intelligence should be provided after it is sanitized by effectively separating the information from the sources and methods used to obtain it. This sanitizing process must also be exercised in peacetime for both known and probable allies. Intelligence production agencies should consider use of tear lines to separate that intelligence and/or information within a given report that may be immediately disclosed to alliance members or coalition partners.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

SPAN OF CONTROL

Span of control is the joint force commander's ability to command and control actions. Span of control is based on the number of subordinates, number of activities, and the area of responsibility/joint operations area. Span of control is related to the duration and scope of joint air operations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT AIRLIFT MISSIONS

Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAMs) provide airlift to satisfy unique customer requirements and are funded directly by the requesting organization. These requirements may be due to constraints of time, geographic location, and/or type of cargo that preclude the use of surface transport, established airlift channel service, or other transportation means.

Theater airlift is usually divided between channel and SAAMs. Channel missions provide common-user general airlift service, usually on relatively fixed schedules and route structures, over an extended period of time. However, channel missions can also be event driven, i.e., based on mission requirements to move cargo or personnel outside of the established schedule. SAAMs provide dedicated airlift for specific requirements, usually at times, places, and in load configurations requested by a specific user. SAAM operations may involve any level of activity, from a single aircraft sortie to operations involving large formations or many sorties over extended periods of time.

SAAMs provide service for the exclusive use of an agency to meet special considerations of pickup, delivery, classification, off-route requirements, or other factors that preclude the use of channel airlift. In effect, this is a chartered mission supporting that particular request. Units submit their request through their component validator to the theater validator. If approved, the theater validator forwards the requests to the joint air operations center for tasking.

Related Terms

theater airlift

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17

JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

SPECIAL FORCES

US Army forces organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Special forces have five primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, and counterterrorism. Counterterrorism is a special mission for specially organized, trained, and equipped special forces units designated in theater contingency plans. Also called SF. JP 1-02

General. Although all Army forces have an inherent capability to support special operations (SO), Army units specifically designated by the Secretary of Defense are prepared, trained, and task organized especially for SO. Core special operations forces (SOF) designated by the Secretary of Defense include active and reserve component special forces (SF), Ranger, and separate operating agency. In addition, the Secretary of the Army has designated civil affairs and psychological operations forces as Army special operations forces.

Special Forces Group. The SF group is a multipurpose combat force organized, trained, and equipped to plan, conduct, and support a variety of SO in all operational environments throughout the operational continuum. Although principally structured for unconventional warfare (UW), SF units are capable of task-organizing their composition to meet more specific requirements.

Organization. SF are organized into groups of three battalions, each with one support and three operational companies. Each company is composed of a headquarters element and six operational detachments of 12 personnel. SF units are regionally oriented to specific areas of the world and possess language training and cultural familiarity.

Missions. The primary missions generally assigned to SF are UW, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, direct action (DA), and counterterrorism (CT). Also, certain SF units are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct CT as a principal mission.

Capabilities. The command, control, and support elements of an SF group can:

- function as the Army component of a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) or as a JSOTF when augmented by resources from other Services;
- command, control, and support organic and attached elements;
- establish and operate with the group headquarters (HQ) a special forces operations base and up to three forward operations bases by employing its organic battalion HQ (C detachments);
- provide up to three command and control (C2) elements (B detachments) to corps or higher conventional headquarters or to specified operational areas. B detachments can also operate as tactical C2 elements.

The operational detachment-Alpha (ODA) of an SF group can:

- infiltrate or exfiltrate specified operational areas by air, land, or sea;
 - conduct operations in remote areas and hostile environments for extended periods of time with appropriate support or resupply;
 - plan and conduct SO unilaterally or as part of a larger force;
-

- develop, organize, equip, train, and advise or direct indigenous forces of up to a battalion in size.
- organize, train, advise, and assist US, allied, and other friendly military and paramilitary forces or agencies in the conduct of SO, especially in environments requiring language proficiency and area and/or cultural orientation;

Limitations. SF units:

- generally require specialized support from other military Services and nonmilitary agencies for infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply;
- are restricted in their ability to conduct sustained combat operations by limited firepower, mobility, organic combat support, and combat service support assets;
- dependent upon the resources of the theater Army component to support and sustain operations;
- endurance and fatigue as influenced by terrain, mode of transport, environment, enemy situation, and weather.

Employment. SF may be employed as individuals, teams, or larger units up to group in size. The principal operating element is the ODA. SF elements are frequently task-organized for specific missions, but are rarely, if ever, employed outside their specific area of orientation.

Rangers. Rangers are rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized and trained to conduct highly complex joint DA operations in coordination with or in support of other SO units of all Services. Also, they can execute DA operations in support of conventional missions conducted by a combatant commander and can operate as conventional light infantry when properly augmented with other elements of combined arms.

Organization. Rangers are organized into a regiment of three battalions. Battalions are organized into a headquarters company and three rifle companies, each composed of three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon.

Mission. When employed in SO, Rangers are primarily tasked to conduct DA and other special light infantry missions. They may conduct these operations independently, in support of conventional forces or other SOF.

Capabilities. The Ranger regiment can:

- deploy quickly to conduct operations on all types of terrain and in all weather conditions;
- establish a credible US military presence in any part of the world to demonstrate US interest or resolve;
- infiltrate and exfiltrate an area of operations and assault an objective by land, sea, and air;
- conduct DA missions consisting of raids, ambushes, and recovery operations.

Related Terms

special operations forces

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS BASE

A command, control, and support base established and operated by a special forces group or battalion from organic and attached resources. The base commander and his staff coordinate and synchronize the activities of subordinate and forward-deployed forces. A special forces operations base is normally established for an extended period of time to support a series of operations. Also called SFOB. JP 1-02

The special forces operations base (SFOB) is established by a special force group to synchronize the activities of subordinate forward operations bases and/or advanced operations bases. The SFOB normally serves as an Army special operations component or Army special operations task force headquarters directly subordinate to the joint force special operations component commander.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-05.3 Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

After the Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP) is approved by the joint force air component commander (JFACC) (joint force commander (JFC) under the JFC staff option), detailed preparations continue by Combat Plans section on the joint air tasking order (ATO), special instructions (SPINS), and the airspace control order (ACO) (provided by the airspace control authority (ACA)). JFC and JFACC guidance, target worksheets, the MAAP, and component requirements are used to finalize the ATO/SPINS/ACO. Components may submit critical changes to target requests and asset availability during this final phase of joint ATO development. The ACA and area air defense commander (AADC) instructions must be provided in sufficient detail to allow components to plan and execute all missions tasked in the joint ATO. These directions must enable combat operations without undue restrictions, balancing combat effectiveness with the safe, orderly, and expeditious use of airspace. ACA instructions must provide for quick coordination of task assignment or reassignment. The AADC must direct aircraft identification and engagement procedures and rules of engagement that are appropriate to the nature of the threat. ACA and AADC instructions should also consider the volume of friendly air traffic, friendly air defense requirements, identification, friend or foe technology, weather, and enemy capabilities. ACA and AADC instructions are contained in monthly, weekly, and daily SPINS, and also in the ACO that is updated as frequently as required.

The joint ATO, ACO, and SPINS provide operational and tactical direction at appropriate levels of detail. The level of detail should be very explicit when forces operate from different bases and multi-component and/or composite missions are tasked. By contrast, less detail is required when missions are tasked to a single component or base.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, nonspecial operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. JP 1-02

Special operations (SO) are a form of warfare characterized by a unique set of objectives, weapons, and forces. (See figure below.)

A mission, under a certain set of environmental constraints, may require the application of SO skills and techniques. Change one or more of those characteristics, and the mission may no longer fit the category of SO. For example, the Grenada operation was designed to rescue a large number of American citizens and publicly demonstrate US resolve. As such, it required a visible, conventional operation on a relatively large scale, with SO in support and targeted at specific objectives. Conversely, had the goals been to recover a small number of detained personnel and to limit US presence, SO might have been selected as the preferred option. SO

SPECIAL OPERATIONS CHARACTERISTICS

Unique set of objectives, weapons, and forces

Individual and small unit proficiency

Specialized, unconventional combat skills

Adjunct to existing, conventional forces

Quickly task-organized and rapidly deployed

are not bound by any specific environment. They are described by the transitory characteristics and the constraints placed upon a given mission.

Employment of conventional forces usually involves movement of large operational units and requires extensive support structures. Such force movement and employment generally are observable and traceable to the US. However, the capabilities of special operations forces (SOF) primarily are a function of individual and small unit proficiency in a multitude of specialized, often unconventional, combat skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, innovation, and self-reliance. The small size, unique capabilities, and often self-sufficient (for short periods) nature of SOF operational units provide the US with feasible and appropriate military responses that do not entail the degree of political liability or risk of escalation normally associated with employment of necessarily larger, or more visible, conventional forces.

SOF are not a substitute for strong conventional forces but a necessary adjunct to existing conventional capabilities. Depending upon requirements, SOF can operate independently or in conjunction with conventional forces. SOF can complement and reinforce conventional forces so that they can achieve an objective that might not otherwise be attainable. The special skills and low visibility capabilities inherent in SOF also provide an adaptable military response in situations or crises requiring tailored, precisely focused use of force.

SOF can be quickly task-organized and rapidly deployed to provide the National Command Authorities (NCA) a selective, flexible crisis response capability. Often, SOF may be the force of choice for the NCA to provide a capability that falls between diplomatic initiatives and the overt commitment of conventional force. SOF are designed for specific principal missions. Properly employed, they provide an added dimension for the combatant commander. An imprecise understanding of SOF capabilities or the improper employment or support of SOF at any level of command can result in mission failure, attendant political costs, and possible loss of the entire force.

SO are usually joint, but they may be conducted as single-Service operations. Even single-Service conduct of SO requires joint support and coordination. The planning process may be staffed jointly, while the execution and command and control (C2) structure may be either joint or single-Service. This publication describes SOF interoperability requirements and provides for employment of SOF in coordination with conventional forces.

Characteristics of Special Operations. SO are marked by certain characteristics that cumulatively distinguish them from conventional operations.

- They are principally offensive, usually of high physical and political risk, and directed at high-value, critical, and often perishable targets. They offer the potential for high returns, but rarely a second chance should a first mission fail.
- They are often principally politico-military in nature and subject to oversight at the national level. They frequently demand operator-level detailed planning and rapid coordination with other commands, Services, and Government agencies.
- They often require responsive joint ground, air, and maritime operations and the C2 architecture permanently resident in the existing SOF structure.
- They may frequently be covert or clandestine.
- They are frequently prosecuted when the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible for either military or political reasons.
- They rely on surprise, security, and audacity and frequently employ deception to achieve success.
- They are often conducted at great distances from established support bases, requiring sophisticated communications and means of infiltration, exfiltration, and support to

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

penetrate and recover from hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.

- They may require patient, long-term commitment in a given operational area to achieve national goals through security assistance and/or nation assistance activities or extended unconventional warfare operations. Often, the training and organization of indigenous forces are required to attain these objectives.
- They frequently require discriminate and precise use of force; a mix of high and low technology weapons and equipment; and often rapid development, acquisition, and employment of weapons and equipment not standard for other Department of Defense forces.
- They are primarily conducted by specially recruited, selected, and trained personnel, organized into small units tailored for specific missions or environments. Missions often require detailed knowledge of the culture(s) and language(s) of the country where employed.
- They require detailed intelligence, thorough planning, decentralized execution, and rigorous detailed rehearsal.

Related Terms

special operations forces

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Those active and reserve component forces of the military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. JP 1-02

As specified by law in title 10, US Code Section 167, special operations forces (SOF) are units of the armed forces that meet one of the following criteria:

- identified as core forces or as augmenting forces in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Annex E;
- described in the Terms of Reference and Conceptual Operations Plan for the Joint Special Operations Command, as in effect on April 1, 1986;
- designated as SOF by the Secretary of Defense.

Under certain circumstances, conventional forces may provide the capabilities required to conduct a specific special operation. However, designated SOF are principally structured to be the force of choice under most circumstances. They possess unique capabilities designed to address those missions, regardless of where they are conducted in the operational continuum. (See figure below.)

US Army. Active and Reserve component forces include Special Forces, Ranger, Special Operations Aviation, psychological operations and civil affairs units.

US Navy. Active and Reserve component forces include sea-air-land team, sea-air-land team delivery vehicles and special boat units.

US Air Force. Active and Reserve component forces include:

- fixed-wing and vertical-lift aircraft and aircrews to conduct infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply; aerial fire support; and aerial refueling;
- composite special tactics teams composed of combat control and pararescue forces, weather, communications, and other combat support units.



The demands of special operations (SO) require forces with attributes that distinguish them from conventional forces. Commanders must be familiar with these characteristics to ensure that missions selected for SOF are compatible with their capabilities. Personnel may undergo lengthy selection processes or extensive mission-specific training programs above basic military skill training to achieve entry-level SO skills. Units are small and necessarily maintain high personal and professional levels of maturity and experience, usually in more than one principal field. The complex SO selection and long leadtime objective and subjective maturation process make any rapid replacement of personnel or capabilities very difficult.

SOF are often organized jointly and routinely plan, execute, command, and control operations from a joint perspective. Area orientation is often required and includes the capability to execute all foreseeable operations in the full range of the area's environmental conditions. Detailed area orientation, including mastery of language and culture, requires long-term, dedicated training and may be applicable to air, ground, and maritime SOF units, depending upon mission assignment. To develop and maintain skills, SOF should train and exercise under conditions resembling the operational environment in which they intend to operate.

Related Terms

special forces; special operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-05

Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

SPECIFIED COMMAND

SPECIFIED COMMAND


A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department. JP 1-02

A specified command is a command that has broad continuing missions and that is established by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (See figure below.) Although a specified command normally is composed of forces from one Military Department, it may include units and staff representation from other Military Departments.

When units of other Military Departments are transferred (assigned or attached) to the commander of a specified command, the purpose and duration of the transfer will normally be indicated. Such transfer, in itself, does not constitute the specified command as a unified command or a joint task force. If the transfer is major and to be of long duration, a unified command normally would be established in lieu of a specified command.

The commander of a specified command has the same authority and responsibilities as the commander of a unified command, except that no authority exists to establish subordinate unified commands.

Related Terms



combatant command; unified command

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT

Planning, coordinating, and managing joint use of the electromagnetic spectrum through operational, engineering, and administrative procedures, with the objective of enabling electronic systems to perform their functions in the intended environment without causing or suffering unacceptable interference. JP 1-02

The complexity and vast distances involved in joint warfighting makes control and management of the electromagnetic spectrum a crucial factor in the joint force commander's (JFC's) ability to influence decisive action. The horizontal flow of information between adjacent subordinate commands is equally critical during mission execution and demands continuous and uninterrupted access to the electromagnetic spectrum to support highly mobile, fast moving operations. The JFC ensures that favorable electromagnetic compatibility exists through the comprehensive management of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Related Terms

electronic warfare

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
Systems Support to Joint Operations

STAFF CHANNEL

The staff channel is the term used to describe the channel by which commanders interact with staffs. It also describes the channel by which staff officers contact their counterparts at higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters. These staff-to-staff contacts are for coordination and cooperation only. Higher headquarters staff officers exercise no independent authority over subordinate headquarters staffs, although staff officers normally honor requests for information.

Related Terms

command channel

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

STANDARDIZATION

The process by which the Department of Defense achieves the closest practicable cooperation among the Services and Defense agencies for the most efficient use of research, development, and production resources, and agrees to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use of: a. common or compatible operational, administrative, and logistic procedures; b. common or compatible technical procedures and criteria; c. common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, weapons, or equipment; and d. common or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding organizational compatibility. JP 1-02

General. The broad objectives of the National Communications System and the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN), coupled with the need for tactical command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems to interface with facilities of the DISN, require

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT FORCES

that C4 systems be standardized as far as practical. Standardization includes aspects of compatibility, interoperability, and commonality. Plans for standardization must ensure that the essential requirements of all Services and agencies are accommodated. Space, weight, or other limitations may prevent systems used by different Services and agencies from taking the same form. In such cases, the equipment should include the maximum possible number of components common to all Services, and operational characteristics must be coordinated between the Services and agencies concerned.

Objectives. The following are objectives of standardization:

- minimize the addition of buffering, translative, or similar devices for the specific purpose of achieving workable interface connections;
- achieve the maximum economy possible from cross-servicing and cross-procurement;
- permit emergency supply assistance among Services;
- facilitate interoperability of functionally similar joint and Service C4 systems;
- avoid unnecessary duplication in research and development of new technology.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
Systems Support to Joint Operations

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT FORCES

The US establishes air lines of communications by coordinating the operations of three distinct components of airlift forces. Strategic airlift forces (also called intertheater or global airlift forces) primarily provide common-user airlift into theater terminals from outside the theater.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

STRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES

Strategic defense forces combine the capabilities of air defense, ballistic missile defense, and space defense for North America. The Commander in Chief, US Space Command, is the coordinating authority for strategic defense, and is the combatant commander responsible for ballistic missile defense of North America, missile warning support to theaters, and space defense missions. The Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command, provides attack assessments of strategic defense.

Strategic defense forces provide direct support to geographic combatant commanders through global surveillance, tactical warning and attack assessment, ballistic missile warning, and by providing a secure mobilization base to support regional conflicts. During wartime, geographic combatant commanders continue to receive missile defense support consistent with both the degree and nature of the threat of attacks against US strategic assets.

Combat operations conducted within a theater may contribute to strategic defense through detection and/or attrition of hostile aerospace forces in the process of attack on the United States. These operations include theater sea control, antisubmarine warfare, counterair, theater ballistic missile defense, or special operations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-01.5 Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense

STRATEGIC END STATE

The desired end state should be clearly described by the National Command Authorities before Armed Forces of the United States are committed to an action. An end state is the set of required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives. There may be a preliminary end state — described by a set of military conditions — when military force is no longer the principal means to the strategic aim. There may also be a broader end state that typically involves returning to a state of peace and stability and may include a variety of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military conditions. The relative emphasis among these instruments of national power will vary according to the nature of the crisis.

Although military end state conditions normally will represent what combatant commanders want their campaigns to achieve, commanders are rarely concerned with only those conditions. Often, combatant commanders may be required to support the other instruments of national power as directed by national and multinational leadership.

Defining the end state, which may change as the operation progresses, and ensuring it supports achieving national objectives are the critical first steps in the estimate and planning process. Additionally, clearly defining the desired end state reduces the wasting of scarce resources and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the operation. In order to clearly describe the desired end state, planners should consider what may be necessary to end the armed conflict and the period of postconflict activities likely to follow. Commanders at all levels should have a common understanding of the conditions that define success before initiation of the operation.

Achieving the desired end state seldom, if ever, ends US national efforts to protect interests in a situation. The term “end state” simply represents the set of conditions necessary to resolve a crisis and transition from predominant use of the military instrument of national power to other instruments.

Related Terms

end state

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

The estimate of the broad strategic factors that influence the determination of missions, objectives, and courses of action. The estimate is continuous and includes the strategic direction received from the National Command Authorities or the authoritative body of an alliance or coalition. JP 1-02

The strategic estimate is a tool available to combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) as they develop campaign plans and subordinate campaign and operation plans. JFCs use strategic estimates developed in peacetime to facilitate the employment of military forces across the range of military operations. The strategic estimate

is more comprehensive in scope than estimates of subordinate commanders, encompasses all strategic concepts, and is the basis for combatant command strategy.

In the strategic estimate, commanders focus on the threat and consider other circumstances affecting the military situation as they develop and analyze courses of action. Items contained in strategic estimate are shown in the figure below.

The result of the estimate is a visualization of the current enemy and friendly situation, including opportunities available for exploitation. The estimate includes a visualization of what these states must look like to accomplish the mission and a clear expression of alternatives to achieve that state. Commanders employ the estimate to consider the enemy's likely intent and courses of action and compare friendly alternatives that result in a decision.

The strategic estimate process is continuous and based on direction from national and multinational leadership. Estimates for the current operation can often provide the basis for estimates for future operations.

JFCs develop strategic estimates after reviewing the strategic environment, potential threats, the nature of anticipated operations, and national strategic direction. The strategic estimate process helps clarify the strategic end state and supporting military conditions. Both supported and supporting JFCs prepare strategic estimates based on assigned tasks. Combatant commanders who support multiple JFCs prepare estimates for each supporting operation.

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

- **Assigned objectives from national authorities**
- **Translation of national objectives to objectives applicable to the combatant command or theater**
- **Visualization of the strategic environment and how it relates to the accomplishment of assigned objectives**
- **Assessment of the threats to accomplishment of assigned objectives**
- **Assessment of strategic alternatives available, with accompanying analysis, risks, and the requirements for plans**
- **Considerations of available resources, linked to accomplishment of assigned objectives**

Related Terms

estimate; logistic estimate of the situation

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

STRATEGIC LEVEL OF WAR

The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. JP 1-02

The strategic level is that level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national or multinational objectives. The National Command Authorities (NCA) translate policy into national strategic military objectives. These military objectives facilitate theater strategic planning.

A geographic combatant commander usually participates in discussions with the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with allies and coalition members. The theater strategy is thus an element that relates to both US national strategy and operational activities within the theater. Strategy, derived from policy, is the basis for all operations.

Related Terms

operational level of war; tactical level of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

STRATEGY

The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. JP 1-02

General. National security strategy and national military strategy, shaped by and oriented on national security policies, provide strategic direction for combatant commanders. Combatant commanders, in turn, provide guidance and direction through their combatant command strategies and plans for the employment of military forces, in conjunction with interagency and multinational forces, in the conduct of military operations. These strategies integrate national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military concepts (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies (means). The figure below illustrates national strategic direction.

National Security Strategic Content. The US approaches its global commitments with a strategy founded on deterrence and buttressed by the capability to project power to safeguard its national interests. Successful military operations may not, by themselves, achieve the desired strategic end state. Military activities across the full range of operations need to be



synchronized with other instruments of national power and focused on common national aims.

National Military Strategy. National military strategy is derived from the national security strategy. National military strategy attempts to promote peace, deter aggression, and, failing that, fight and win. But in the larger context, defeating an enemy military force is rarely sufficient, in and of itself, to ensure a long-term solution to a crisis. The national military strategy and defense policy provide strategic guidance for the employment of military forces. The National Military Strategy (NMS) provides advice of the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as to the recommended NMS and fiscally constrained force structure required to attain the national security objectives. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides guidance for planning purposes to the combatant commanders and the Chiefs of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. This guidance capitalizes on US strengths and permits it to exploit the weaknesses of those who may threaten our national interests. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the National Command Authorities.

Related Terms

military strategy; national strategy

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

STRATEGY DETERMINATION

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System function in which analysis of changing events in the international environment and the development of national strategy to respond to those events is conducted. In joint operation planning, the responsibility for recommending military strategy to the National Command Authorities lies with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in concert with supported commanders. In the deliberate planning process, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is produced as a result of this process. In the Crisis Assessment Phase of the crisis action planning process, Crisis Action Planning procedures are used to formulate decisions for direct development of possible military courses of action. JP 1-02

The strategy determination function furnishes direction from the national level for developing courses of action. It assists the National Command Authorities and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in formulating appropriate options to counter the threat. Strategy determination involves formulating politico-military assessments, clearly defining political and military objectives or end states, developing strategic concepts and options, apportioning forces and other resources, and formulating planning guidance.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

STRIKES AND RAIDS

strike

An attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective. JP 1-02

raid

An operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. JP 1-02

Strikes are offensive operations conducted to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective for political purposes. Strikes may be used for punishing offending nations or groups, upholding international law, or preventing those nations or groups from launching their own offensive actions. A raid is usually a small-scale operation involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. An example of a strike is Operation URGENT FURY, conducted on the island of Grenada in 1983. An example of a raid is Operation EL DORADO CANYON conducted against Libya in 1986, in response to the terrorist bombing of US Service members in Berlin.

SUBORDINATE COMMANDER

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

SUBORDINATE COMMANDER

In addition to other responsibilities that change according to circumstances, all subordinate commanders possess the general responsibilities to provide for the following:

- The accomplishment of missions or tasks assigned by the plans and orders of the superior. Wide latitude is normally given to the subordinate commander to select the methodology for accomplishing the mission; however, this latitude may be limited by coordinating directives issued by the superior commander to ensure effective joint operations. When required by a changing situation, a subordinate commander may depart in some measure from the plan if the action will not jeopardize friendly forces and is in the best interest of better accomplishing the overall objective. Any such departure from the plan by a subordinate commander should, if possible, be coordinated with other concerned commanders prior to departure from the plan. In addition, the departure must be communicated as soon as practicable to the superior.
- Advice to the superior commander regarding employment possibilities of and consequences to the subordinate command, cooperation with appropriate government and nongovernment agencies, and other matters of common concern.
- Timely information to the superior commander relating to the subordinate commander's situation and progress.

Related Terms

superior commander


Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND

A command established by commanders of unified commands, when so authorized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be established on an area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands and exercise operational control of assigned commands and forces within the assigned joint operations area. JP 1-02

When authorized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands (also called subunified commands) to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. (See figure below.) A subordinate unified command may be established on a geographical area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands and exercise operational control of assigned commands and forces and normally over attached forces within the assigned joint operations area or functional area. The commanders of



components or Service forces of subordinate unified commands have responsibilities and missions similar to those listed for component commanders within a unified command. The Service component commanders of a subordinate unified command will normally communicate directly with the commanders of the Service component command of the unified command on Service-specific matters and inform the commander of the subordinate unified command as that commander directs.

Related Terms

joint task force; unified command

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

SUPERIOR COMMANDER

Although specific responsibilities will vary, every superior commander possesses the general responsibilities to provide the following:

- Timely communication of clear-cut missions or tasks, together with the role of each subordinate in the superior's plan. Tasks must be realistic and leave the subordinate as much freedom of execution as possible.
- Forces and other means in a timely manner to immediate subordinates for accomplishing assigned tasks. This includes the requisite time to plan and prepare for military action.
- All available information to subordinates that bears on the changing situation including changes in plans, missions and tasks; resources; and friendly, enemy, and environmental situations.
- To delegate authority to subordinates commensurate with their responsibilities.

Related Terms

subordinate commander

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

SUPPLY

The procurement, distribution, maintenance while in storage, and salvage of supplies, including the determination of kind and quantity of supplies. a. producer phase — That phase of military supply which extends from determination of procurement schedules to acceptance of finished supplies by the military Services. b. consumer phase — That phase of military supply which extends from receipt of finished supplies by the Military Services through issue for use or consumption. JP 1-02

A geographic combatant commander's responsibilities for supply are illustrated in the figure below. Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for effectively coordinating supply support between the Service components, establishing supply buildup rates, and stating theater stockage levels. When practical to improve economy of effort, common-item support may be assigned to a Service component command, normally the dominant user. Geographic combatant commanders are also responsible for the allocation of critical logistic resources within their theaters. They must ensure that statements of the requirements of assigned forces (including mutual support arrangements and associated inter-Service support agreements) are prepared and submitted in accordance with existing directives of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Chiefs of the Services.

Subject to combatant commanders' responsibility and authority as outlined above, commanders of the Service component commands are responsible for logistic support of their forces and direct communication with appropriate headquarters on all supply matters, and related requirements, such as the deployment of supplies, materiel, and equipment into

**GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDERS'
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SUPPLY**

- Coordinating supply support
- Establishing supply buildup rates
- Stating theater stockage levels
- Allocating critical logistic resources
- Reviewing statements of requirements
- Providing supplies to civilians
- Recommending the priority of the phase buildup and cutback

the area of responsibility. Commanders of component commands will keep the geographic combatant commander informed of the status of supply matters affecting readiness of their forces.

Commanders of subordinate commands may be assigned the responsibility for providing supply support to elements or individuals of other Services within the theater or designated area. The geographic combatant commander is responsible for provision of supplies to civilians in occupied areas in accordance with current directives, obligations, and treaties the US recognizes. The geographic combatant commander is responsible for recommending to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the priority of the phased buildup and cutback of supplies, installations, and organizations essential to the mission.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0

Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

SUPPORT

1. The action of a force which aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit which helps another unit in battle. Aviation, artillery, or naval gunfire may be used as a support for infantry. 3. A part of any unit held back at the beginning of an attack as a reserve. 4. An element of a command which assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat.

JP 1-02

Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force.

Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. This includes the National Command Authorities designating a support relationship between combatant commanders as well as within a combatant command. The designation of supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to commanders and staffs who are planning or executing joint operations. The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague, but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority (the common superior commander) is responsible for ensuring that both the supported and supporting commander understand the degree of authority the supported commander is granted.

The supported commander should ensure that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. The supporting commander will then provide the assistance needed, subject to the supporting commander's existing capabilities and other assigned tasks. When the supporting commander cannot fulfill the needs of the supported commander, the establishing authority will be notified by either the supported or supporting commander. The establishing authority is responsible for determining a solution.

An establishing directive is normally issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. It should also include:

- the forces and other resources allocated to the supporting effort;
- the time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort;
- the relative priority of the supporting effort;
- the authority, if any, of the supporting commander to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency;


- the degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the supporting effort.

Unless limited by the establishing directive, the supported commander will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.

The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to be employed in providing this support. The supporting commander will advise and coordinate with the supported commander on matters concerning the employment and limitations (e.g., logistics) of such support, assist in planning for the integration of such support into the supported commander's effort as a whole, and ensure that support requirements are appropriately communicated into the supporting commander's organization.

The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported force and take action to fulfill them within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

Several categories of support have been defined for use within a combatant command to better characterize the support that should be given. These are shown in the figure below.



Related Terms

close support; direct support; general support; inter-Service support; mutual support

Source Joint Publications


JP 0-2

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING RELATIONSHIPS

Establishing supported and supporting relationships between components is a useful option to accomplish needed tasks. Each subordinate element of the joint force can support or be supported by other elements. Joint force commanders (JFCs) will often assign one of their components or subordinate joint forces as a supported activity for a certain purpose and time. In fulfilling that responsibility, the supported commanders must coordinate and synchronize the fighting activity of supporting commands in conjunction with their own forces under the overall supervision and authority of the JFC. More than one supported command may be designated simultaneously. For instance, a joint force special operations component may be supported for direct action missions, while a joint force maritime component is supported for sea control. (See figure below.)

Supporting activities can take many forms as air, land, sea, special operations, and space forces support one another. For instance, close support occurs when the supporting force acts against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting attack with fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force. Examples include air support to land (close air support, tactical airlift); sea support to land (naval gunfire and missile support); and land support for air (suppression of enemy air defenses).



SUPPORTED COMMANDER

Other forms of support do not require coordination with fire and movement of the supported commander. Some examples are air support to sea (aerial sea mining, air delivery to ships); sea support to land (sea lift); sea support to air (sea delivery of fuel and ammunition); land support to air (seizure and protection of air bases, antimissile defense of air bases); land support to sea (seizure or protection of naval bases and choke points); and space support to air, land, and sea (force enhancement).

All these forms of support constitute important ways in which JFCs can obtain leverage from the interaction of their forces. Support relations require careful attention by JFCs, component commanders, and their staffs to integrate and harmonize.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 1	Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations

SUPPORTED COMMANDER

The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JP 1-02

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) organizes the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) for joint operation planning by establishing supported and supporting command relationships between the combatant commands. A supported commander is identified for each planning task, and supporting commanders, Services, US Special Operation Command, and agencies are designated as appropriate. This process provides for unity of command in the planning and execution of joint operations and facilitates unity of effort within the JPEC.

The supported commander is the combatant commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans, campaign plans, or operation orders in response to CJCS requirements.

Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. This includes the National Command Authorities designating a support relationship between combatant commanders as well as within a combatant command. The designation of supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to commanders and staffs who are planning or executing joint operations. The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague, but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority (the common superior commander) is responsible for ensuring that both the supported and supporting commander understand the degree of authority the supported commander is granted.

The supported commander should ensure that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. The supporting commander will then provide the assistance needed, subject to the supporting commander's existing capabilities and other assigned tasks. When the supporting commander cannot fulfill the needs of the supported commander, the

establishing authority will be notified by either the supported or supporting commander. The establishing authority is responsible for determining a solution.

An establishing directive is normally issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. It should also include:

- the forces and other resources allocated to the supporting effort;
- the time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort;
- the relative priority of the supporting effort;
- the authority, if any, of the supporting commander to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency;
- the degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the supporting effort.

Unless limited by the establishing directive, the supported commander will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.

The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to be employed in providing this support. The supporting commander will advise and coordinate with the supported commander on matters concerning the employment and limitations (e.g., logistics) of such support, assist in planning for the integration of such support into the supported commander's effort as a whole, and ensure that support requirements are appropriately communicated into the supporting commander's organization.

The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported force and take action to fulfill them within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

Related Terms

supporting commander

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0

Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

SUPPORTING COMMANDER

A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. JP 1-02

Supporting commanders are designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Relationships between the supported and supporting commander will be in accordance with Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)." Supporting commanders determine their ability to support each of the proposed military courses of action (COAs), as shown in the figure below, and identify the actual units and associated movement data.

Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. This includes the National Command Authorities designating a support relationship between combatant commanders as well as within a combatant command. The designation of supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to commanders and staffs who are planning or executing joint operations. The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague, but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority (the common superior commander) is responsible for ensuring that both the supported and supporting commander understand the degree of authority the supported commander is granted.



The supported commander should ensure that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. The supporting commander will then provide the assistance needed, subject to the supporting commander's existing capabilities and other assigned tasks. When the supporting commander cannot fulfill the needs of the supported commander, the establishing authority will be notified by either the supported or supporting commander. The establishing authority is responsible for determining a solution.

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- the forces and other resources allocated to the supporting effort;
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- the relative priority of the supporting effort;
- the authority, if any, of the supporting commander to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency;
- the degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the supporting effort.

Unless limited by the establishing directive, the supported commander will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.

The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to be employed in providing this support. The supporting commander will

advise and coordinate with the supported commander on matters concerning the employment and limitations (e.g., logistics) of such support, assist in planning for the integration of such support into the supported commander's effort as a whole, and ensure that support requirements are appropriately communicated into the supporting commander's organization.

The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported force and take action to fulfill them within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

Related Terms

supported commander; supporting plan

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0

Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

In amphibious operations, those operations conducted by forces other than those assigned to the amphibious task force. They are ordered by higher authority at the request of the amphibious task force commander and normally are conducted outside the area for which the amphibious task force commander is responsible at the time of their execution. JP 1-02

In amphibious operations, supporting operations are those operations conducted by forces other than those assigned to the amphibious task force (ATF). They are ordered by higher authority at the request of the commander, amphibious task force (CATF) and normally are conducted outside the area for which the CATF is responsible at the time of their execution. Supporting operations conducted in the amphibious objective area (AOA) before or during the amphibious operation will be coordinated with the CATF. The CATF exercises authority through the commanders of the task organizations, who exercise authority through their respective chains of command. Examples of supporting operations are as follows, and are depicted in the figure below:

- Military deception operations conducted to induce favorable enemy actions that contribute to the accomplishment of the ATF mission.
- Isolation of the landing area by the conduct of interdiction operations.
- Operations designed to assist in gaining or maintaining air, ground, or naval superiority in the landing area.
- Air, surface, subsurface, or special operations designed to secure information.
- Special operations designed to disrupt, delay, or confuse the enemy.
- Mine countermeasures operations conducted in the vicinity of the intended landing area(s) before the establishment of the AOA.
- Special operations, in and along the beachhead area(s) prior to the establishment of the AOA, to gather intelligence and/or clear obstacles.

Preassault operations are not supporting operations. Preassault operations are conducted in the AOA by elements of the ATF before the arrival of the major assault elements.

SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

Military deception operations conducted to induce favorable enemy actions that contribute to the accomplishment of the amphibious task force mission

Isolation of the landing area by the conduct of interdiction operations

Operations designed to assist in gaining or maintaining air, ground, or naval superiority in the landing area

Air, surface, subsurface, or special operations designed to secure information

Special operations designed to disrupt, delay, or confuse the enemy

Mine countermeasures operations conducted in the vicinity of the intended landing area(s) before the establishment of the amphibious objective area

Special operations, in and along the beachhead area(s) prior to the establishment of the amphibious objective area, to gather intelligence and/or clear obstacles

Related Terms

amphibious operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-02

Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations

SUPPORTING PLAN

An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander or a subordinate commander to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander's plan. JP 1-02

Supporting plans are prepared as tasked by the supported combatant commanders in support of their deliberate plans. They are prepared by supporting combatant commanders, subordinate joint force commanders, component commanders, or other agencies. These commanders or agencies may, in turn, assign their subordinates the task of preparing additional supporting plans. Employment plans normally are the responsibility of the commander who will direct the forces when the supported plan is implemented. In many cases, however, the political or military situation cannot be clearly forecast, so employment planning may be delayed until circumstances require it. In the absence of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions to the contrary, the combatant commanders responsible for the supported plans will review and approve supporting plans.

Related Terms

supported commander; supporting commander

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

Support provided to an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. JP 1-02

An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. The US Government may support an insurgency against a regime threatening US interests. US forces may provide logistic and training support to an insurgency, but normally do not themselves conduct combat operations. An example of support to insurgency was US support to the Mujahadin resistance in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion.

Related Terms

military operations other than war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

SURPRISE

The purpose of surprise is to strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which it is unprepared. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in decision making, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; operations security; and variations in tactics and methods of operation.

SUSTAINABILITY

Related Terms

principles of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

SUSTAINABILITY

Sustainability is a measure of the ability to maintain logistic support to all users throughout the theater for the duration of the operation. Sustainability focuses the supporting commander's attention on long-term objectives and capabilities of the supported forces. Long-term support is the greatest challenge for the logistician, who must not only attain the minimum essential materiel levels to initiate combat operations (readiness) but must also sustain those operations.

Sustaining operations at the strategic and operational levels underwrites agility, extension of operations, and freedom of action. Strategic and theater logistics and deployment concepts are integral to combat success. These concepts are driven by the plans and orders of joint force commanders and supported by the Services, by other supporting commands, and often by host-nation support from allies and friends. Logistic standardization (to include deployment procedures and equipment interoperability where practical) will also enhance sustainment of joint force operations.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

SUSTAINMENT PLANNING

Sustainment planning is directed toward providing and maintaining levels of personnel, materiel, and consumables required to sustain the planned levels of combat activity for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity. Sustainment planning is the responsibility of the combatant commanders in close coordination with the Services and Defense agencies.

Related Terms


Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

SYMMETRICAL AND ASYMMETRICAL ACTIONS

As shown in the figure below, symmetric engagements are battles between similar forces where superior correlation of forces and technological advantage are important to ensure victory and minimize losses. Examples of symmetric conflict are land versus land (Meuse-Argonne in World War I); sea versus sea (the Battle of Jutland in World War I); air versus air (the Battle of Britain in World War II).

Asymmetric engagements are battles between dissimilar forces. These engagements can be extremely lethal, especially if the force being attacked is not ready to defend itself against the threat. An example is air versus land (such as the air attack of land targets in the Korean War).



Other examples are air versus sea (air attack of ships as in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in 1943); sea and air versus land and air (strike operations and anti-air warfare as in the raid on Libya in 1986); and land versus air and sea (denial of enemy air and naval bases as when Allied ground forces overran German air, missile, and naval bases along the Atlantic coast of Europe in 1944). Special operations may function in all these modes. The concept also extends to space forces (for example, space-based jamming of terrestrial communications or terrestrial attack against an enemy ground space installation).

Joint operations should also shield the joint force against enemy asymmetric action. Protective action and posture, usually including joint offensive action, should be taken to defend our forces from potentially effective asymmetric attack. Antiterrorism is one example of friendly force protection. In another instance, to counter the Iraqi tactical ballistic missile threat during Operation DESERT STORM, the combination of space-based warning,

antitactical missile defenses, friendly force protective measures, and active efforts to destroy SCUD launchers provided a full-dimensional joint shield.

Both types of engagements support the joint campaign. Symmetric actions are often delegated to component commands for planning and execution within the overall framework of the campaign. Asymmetric engagements may require greater supervision by the joint force headquarters and offer tremendous potential efficiencies. The properly functioning joint force is powerful in asymmetric attack, posing threats from a variety of directions with a broad range of weapon systems to stress the enemy's defenses. The land attack on a submarine pen, the sea-launched cruise missile strike or special operations force raid against a key air defense radar, the air strike against a vital ground transportation node — such asymmetric attacks afford devastating ways to attack or create enemy weaknesses and can avoid casualties and save resources.

Being alert to seizing or creating such opportunities is the business of the joint force as a whole, including not only joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs but their component commanders and staffs. “Cross-talk” and cross-fertilization of ideas often produce cheaper, better, and faster solutions to combat problems.

The key to the most productive integration of these supporting capabilities, and to the joint campaign as a whole, is attitude. In years past, the sea was a barrier to the Soldier and a highway to the Sailor; the different mediums of air, land, sea, and space were alien to one another. To the joint force team, all forms of combat power present advantages for exploitation.

When required to employ force, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. As Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,” indicates, JFCs are uniquely situated to seize opportunities for asymmetrical action and must be especially alert to exploit the tremendous potential combat power of such actions.

Force interaction with regard to enemy forces is another way for JFCs to achieve concentration in the various dimensions. The history of joint operations highlights the enormous lethality of asymmetrical operations and the great operational sensitivity to such threats. Asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against enemy weaknesses and maneuver in time and space can provide decisive advantage. Asymmetrical operations are particularly effective when applied against enemy forces not postured for immediate tactical battle but instead operating in more vulnerable aspects — operational deployment and/or movement, extended logistic activity (including rest and refitting), or mobilization and training (including industrial production). Thus, JFCs aggressively seek opportunities to apply asymmetrical force against an enemy in as vulnerable an aspect as possible. There are literally dozens of potential modes of attack to be considered as JFCs plan the application of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces against the various aspects of enemy capabilities.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications


JP 1	Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations

SYNCHRONIZATION

1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.
 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operational plan.
- JP 1-02

Synchronizing interdiction and maneuver (both land and sea) provides one of the most dynamic concepts available to the joint force, and is shown in the figure below. Interdiction and maneuver should not be considered separate operations against a common enemy, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve the joint force commander's (JFC's) campaign objectives. Moreover, maneuver by land or naval forces can be conducted to interdict enemy surface potential. Potential responses to synchronized maneuver and interdiction can create an agonizing dilemma for the enemy. If the enemy attempts to counter the maneuver, enemy forces can be exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the enemy employs measures to reduce such interdiction losses, enemy forces may not be able to counter the maneuver. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational level.

As a guiding principle, JFCs should exploit the flexibility inherent in joint force command relationships, joint targeting procedures, and other techniques to resolve the issues that can arise from the relationship between interdiction and maneuver. When maneuver is employed, JFCs need to carefully balance doctrinal imperatives that may be in tension, including the needs of the maneuver force and the undesirability of fragmenting theater/joint operations area (JOA) air assets. The JFC's objectives, intent, and priorities, reflected in mission assignments and coordinating arrangements, enable subordinates to exploit fully the military potential of their forces while minimizing the friction generated by competing requirements. Effective targeting procedures in the joint force also alleviate such friction. As an example, interdiction requirements will often exceed interdiction means, requiring JFCs to prioritize



requirements. Land and naval force commanders responsible for synchronizing maneuver and interdiction within their area of operations (AOs) should be knowledgeable of JFC priorities. Component commanders aggressively seek the best means to accomplish assigned missions. JFCs alleviate this friction through clear statements of intent for theater/JOA-level interdiction (that is, interdiction effort conducted relatively independent of surface maneuver operations). In doing this, JFCs rely on their vision as to how the major elements of the joint force contribute to accomplishing strategic objectives. The campaign concept articulates that vision. JFCs then employ a flexible range of techniques to assist in identifying requirements and applying resources to meet them. JFCs define appropriate command relationships, establish effective joint targeting procedures, and make apportionment decisions.

Interdiction is not limited to any particular region of the joint battle, but generally is conducted forward of or at a distance from friendly forces. Interdiction may be planned to create advantages at any level from tactical to strategic with corresponding impacts on the enemy and the speed with which interdiction affects front-line enemy forces. Interdiction deep in the enemy's rear area can have broad theater strategic or operational effects; however, deep interdiction normally has a delayed effect on land and naval combat which will be a direct concern to the JFC. Interdiction closer to land and naval combat will be of more immediate operational and tactical concern to maneuver forces. Thus, JFCs vary the emphasis upon interdiction operations and surface maneuvers depending on the strategic and operational situation confronting them. JFCs may choose to employ interdiction as a principal means to achieve the intended objective (with other components supporting the component leading the interdiction effort).

Where maneuver is part of the JFC's concept, JFCs may synchronize that maneuver and interdiction. For the joint force campaign level, JFCs synchronize maneuver and interdiction to present the enemy with the dilemma previously discussed. Indeed, JFCs may employ a scheme of maneuver that enhances interdiction operations or vice versa. For instance, actual or threatened maneuver can force an enemy to respond by attempting rapid maneuver or resupply. These reactions can provide excellent and vulnerable targets for interdiction.

All commanders should consider how their capabilities and operations can complement interdiction in achieving campaign objectives and vice versa. These operations may include actions such as deception operations, withdrawals, lateral repositioning, and flanking movements that are likely to cause the enemy to reposition surface forces making them better targets for interdiction.

Likewise, interdiction operations need to conform to and enhance the JFC's scheme of maneuver during the campaign. JFCs need to properly integrate maneuver and interdiction operations to place the enemy in the operational dilemma of either defending from disadvantageous positions or exposing forces to interdiction strikes during attempted repositioning.

JFCs are responsible for the conduct of theater/JOA operations. To facilitate these operations, JFCs may establish boundaries within the theater/JOA for the conduct of operations. Within the joint force theater of operations, all missions must contribute to the accomplishment of the overall objective. Synchronization of efforts within land or naval AOs is of particular importance.

Land and naval commanders are directly concerned with those enemy forces and capabilities that can affect their near-term operations (current operations and those required to facilitate future operations). Accordingly, that part of interdiction with a near-term effect on land and naval maneuver normally supports that maneuver to enable the land or naval commander to achieve the JFC's objectives. In fact, successful operations may depend on successful

interdiction operations, for instance, to isolate the battle or weaken the enemy force before battle is fully joined.

The size, shape, and positioning of land or naval force AOs will be established by JFCs based on their concept of operations and the land or naval force commander's requirement for depth to maneuver rapidly and to fight at extended ranges. Within these AOs, land and naval operational force commanders are designated the supported commander and are responsible for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs.

The supported commander should articulate clearly the vision of maneuver operations to those commanders that apply interdiction forces within the supported commander's boundaries to attack the designated interdiction targets or objectives. The supported commanders should clearly state how they envision interdiction enabling or enhancing their maneuver operations and what they want to accomplish with interdiction (as well as those actions they want to avoid, such as the destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain munitions in a specific area). However, supported commanders should provide supporting commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of their operations.

Once they understand what the supported commanders want to accomplish and what they want to avoid, interdiction-capable commanders can normally plan and execute their operations with only that coordination required with supported commanders.

Joint force operations in maritime areas often require a higher degree of coordination among commanders because of the highly specialized nature of some naval operations, such as submarine and mine warfare. This type of coordination requires that the interdiction-capable commander maintain communication with the naval commander. As in all operations, lack of close coordination among commanders in naval operating areas can result in fratricide and failed missions, especially in those areas adjacent to naval forces. The same principle applies concerning joint force air component mining operations in areas where land or naval forces may maneuver.

Interdiction target priorities within the land or naval force boundaries are considered along with theater/JOA-wide interdiction priorities by JFCs and reflected in the apportionment decision. The joint force air component commander will use these priorities to plan and execute the theater/JOA-wide interdiction effort.

JFCs need to pay particular attention to, and give priority to, activities impinging on and supporting the maneuver of all forces. In addition to normal target nomination procedures, JFCs establish procedures through which land or naval force commanders can specifically identify those interdiction targets they are unable to strike with organic assets within their boundaries that could affect planned or ongoing maneuver. These targets may be identified, individually or by category, specified geographically, and/or tied to desired effects and time periods. The purpose of these procedures is to afford added visibility to, and allow JFCs to give priority to, targets directly affecting planned maneuver by land or naval forces.

Related Terms

interdiction; maneuver


Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

SYNERGY

Synergy results when the elements of the joint force are so effectively employed that their total military impact exceeds the sum of their individual contributions. Synergy is reinforced when operations are integrated and extended throughout the theater, including rear areas. The full dimensional joint campaign is in major respects “non-linear.” That is, the dominant effects of air, sea, space, and special operations may be felt more or less independently of the front line of ground troops. The impact of these operations on land battles, interacting with the modern dynamics of land combat itself, helps obtain the required fluidity, breadth, and depth of operations. In the same way, land operations can provide or protect critical bases for air, land, sea, and space operations and enable these operations to be supported and extended throughout the theater. (See figure below.)

Joint force commanders (JFCs) employ air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in a wide variety of operations in war and in operations other than war. JFCs not only attack the enemy’s physical capabilities but also the enemy’s morale and will.



When required to employ force, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. Engagements with the enemy may be thought of as symmetrical, if our force and the enemy force are similar (for example, land versus land) or asymmetric, if forces are dissimilar (for example, air versus sea, sea versus land). As Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,” indicates, JFCs are uniquely situated to seize opportunities for asymmetrical action and must be especially alert to exploit the tremendous potential combat power of such actions.

It is difficult to view the contributions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in isolation. Each may be critical to the success of the joint force, and each has certain unique capabilities that cannot be duplicated by other types of forces. Given the appropriate circumstances, any dimension of combat power can be dominant — and even decisive — in certain aspects of an operation or phase of a campaign, and each force can support or be supported by other forces. The contributions of these forces will vary over time with the nature of the threat and other strategic, operational, and tactical circumstances. The challenge for supported JFCs is to integrate and synchronize the wide range of capabilities at their disposal into full dimensional operations against the enemy.

The synergy achieved by synchronizing the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in joint operations and in multiple dimensions enables JFCs to project focused capabilities that present no seams or vulnerabilities to an enemy to exploit. JFCs are especially suited to develop and project joint synergy given the multiple unique and complementary capabilities available only within joint forces.

The synergy of the joint force depends in large part on a shared understanding of the operational situation. JFCs integrate and synchronize operations in a manner that applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. The JFC’s vision of how operations will be conducted includes not only how to arrange operations but also a clear understanding of the desired end state.

Related Terms

operational art

Source Joint Publications

JP 1	Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations

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T

TACTICAL CONTROL

Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also called TACON. JP 1-02

Tactical control (TACON) is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. TACON is inherent in operational control.

TACON provides the authority to give direction for military operations and control designated forces (e.g., ground forces, aircraft sorties, missile launches, or satellite payload management). TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support; the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise these authorities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive.

TACON is typically exercised by functional component commanders over military capability or forces made available to the functional component for tasking.

Related Terms

combatant command; combatant command (command authority); operational control

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

TACTICAL LEVEL OF WAR

The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.

JP 1-02

Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to use their full potential. An engagement is normally short in duration and fought between small forces, such as individual aircraft in air-to-air combat. Engagements include a wide variety of actions between opposing forces in the air, on and under the sea, or on land. A battle consists of a set of related engagements. Battles typically last longer; involve larger forces such as fleets, armies, and air forces; and could affect the course of a campaign.

TACTICAL WARNING

Related Terms

operational level of war; strategic level of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

TACTICAL WARNING

1. A warning after initiation of a threatening or hostile act based on an evaluation of information from all available sources. 2. In satellite and missile surveillance, a notification to operational command centers that a specific threat event is occurring. The component elements that describe threat events are: Country of origin — country or countries initiating hostilities. Event type and size — identification of the type of event and determination of the size or number of weapons. Country under attack — determined by observing trajectory of an object and predicting its impact point. Event time — time the hostile event occurred. Also called integrated tactical warning. JP 1-02

Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for establishing theater event reporting systems to acquire, process, and disseminate warning information to joint force components and population centers. They are also responsible for implementing tactical event system architectures into local operations and intelligence nets. Component commanders are responsible for providing warning to assigned forces. Tactical warning triggers passive defense actions. Warnings are both general (that missile launches are imminent or have occurred) and specific (that specific units or areas of the battlefield or theater are in danger of attack). The geographic combatant commanders' tactical warning requirements are supported by national and theater intelligence systems.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-01.5 Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense

TANKER AIRLIFT CONTROL ELEMENT

A mobile command and control organization deployed to support strategic and theater air mobility operations at fixed, en route, and deployed locations where air mobility operational support is nonexistent or insufficient. The Tanker Airlift Control Element provides on-site management of air mobility airfield operations to include command and control, communications, aerial port services, maintenance, security, transportation, weather, intelligence, and other support functions, as necessary. The Tanker Airlift Control Element is composed of mission support elements from various units and deploys in support of peacetime, contingency, and emergency relief operations on both planned and "no notice" basis. Also called TALCE. JP 1-02

Tanker Airlift Control Elements (TALCEs) are mobile command and control units deployed to support strategic and theater air mobility operations. When deployed specifically to support theater air mobility operations, TALCEs should be attached to the command of a geographic combatant commander as an element of the Theater Air Control System. Tanker/Airlift Control

Center decisions to position TALCE assets will be based upon strategic and theater mobility support requirements. It is a theater responsibility to identify requirements for such support.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17

JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

TARGET DEVELOPMENT

The target development portion of the targeting process is the systematic evaluation of potential target systems and their components to determine which elements of the target system(s) military action should, or could, be taken against to achieve the given objectives. All sources of intelligence are reviewed and potential target systems and components are selected for consideration. Potential targeted systems and their components are then analyzed for their military, economic, and political importance; priority of attack; and weapon systems required to determine the required level of disruption, destruction, neutralization, or exploitation.

Targeteers must identify key target systems that are relevant to objectives and guidance and suitable for disruption, degradation, neutralization, or destruction. To accomplish this task, targeteers must understand target system characteristics, target linkage, and interdependence. In addition, targeteers must identify critical nodes, prepare preliminary documentation, validate the target, identify recommended aim points for attack, and develop a potential prioritized target list. This list is then used for weaponeering assessment.

Targeted systems have a number of characteristics. First, a targeted system is oriented toward a goal, objective, or purpose that is achieved through the system's components. These components are interdependent; a change in one causes a change in one or more of the other components. Second, each targeted system is a component of another more inclusive system.

Target linkage is the connection between targets performing identical, similar, or complementary activities or functions. Target interdependence is the mutual relationships among targets where the activity of one is contingent, influenced, controlled, or determined by another.

Targeted system activities are those actions or functions performed by target system components in pursuit of system goals. This is the area where targeteers should focus their efforts. Once enemy activities that must be modified or defeated have been identified, targeteers can identify key activities of the targeted system or components that should be attacked, degraded, or exploited to produce the desired effect.

Target development focuses on identifying critical nodes within key target systems that will satisfy targeting objectives and conform to joint force commander (JFC) guidance. Critical nodes are points within a targeted system that will produce a cascading destructive, disruptive, or crippling effect on the targeted system.

Preliminary documentation includes identification of prohibited targets, incorporation of targets directed by higher headquarters, verification of targets recommended by components or other agencies, and identification of targets suitable for attack by specialized systems.

Targets are validated by evaluating and approving candidate targets. Certain questions need to be considered during this portion of the target development process: Does the targeting process meet JFC objectives and guidance received? Does the target contribute to the enemy's capability and will to wage war? Is the target significant, operationally, or politically sensitive?

TARGETING

What psychological impact will operations against the target have on the enemy? Have all applicable laws of armed conflict or rules of engagement been considered?

The end product of the target development process is an unconstrained prioritized list of potential targets. It reflects relative importance of targets to the enemy's ability to wage war. This list is the basis for the weaponeering assessment phase.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-55 Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
Support for Joint Operations

TARGETING

1. The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. 2. The analysis of enemy situations relative to the commander's mission, objectives, and capabilities at the commander's disposal, to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander's purpose through delaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying enemy forces or resources critical to the enemy. JP 1-02

Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. As with all actions of the joint force, targeting and attack functions are accomplished in accordance with international law, the law of war, and international agreements and conventions, as well as rules of engagement approved by the National Command Authorities (NCA) for the particular operation. Military commanders, planners, and legal experts must consider the desired end state and political aims when making targeting decisions.

Targeting occurs at all levels of command within a joint force and is performed at all levels by forces capable of delivering fires or attacking targets with both lethal and nonlethal disruptive and destructive means. Targeting is complicated by the requirement to deconflict duplicative targeting by different forces or different echelons within the same force and to synchronize the attack of those targets with other dimensions of the joint force.

Joint force commanders (JFCs) establish broad planning objectives and guidance for attack of enemy strategic and operational centers of gravity and interdiction of enemy forces as an integral part of joint campaigns and major operations. With the advice of subordinate commanders, JFCs set priorities, provide targeting guidance, and determine the weight of effort to be provided to various operations. Subordinate commanders recommend to JFCs how to use their combat power more effectively to achieve the objective. Weight of effort for any aspect of joint targeting, for instance, may be expressed in terms of percentage of total available resources; by assigning priorities for resources used with respect to the other aspects of the theater campaign or operation; or as otherwise determined by the JFC.

The targeting process is cyclic. (See figure below.) It begins with guidance and priorities issued by the NCA, JFCs, or headquarters senior to JFCs and continues with identification of requirements by components, the prioritization of these requirements, the acquisition of targets or target sets, the attack of targets by components, the assessment of the effects of those missions by both components and JFCs, and continuing guidance from JFCs on future fires or attack of targets.

THE TARGETING PROCESS



Targeting mechanisms should exist at multiple levels. Joint force components identify requirements, nominate targets that are outside their boundaries or exceed the capabilities of organic and supporting assets (based on JFC's apportionment and subapportionment decisions), and conduct execution planning. After the JFC makes the targeting and apportionment decisions, components plan and execute assigned missions.

Targeting mechanisms should exist at multiple levels. The NCA or headquarters senior to JFCs may provide guidance, priorities, and targeting support to JFCs. Joint force components identify requirements, nominate targets that are outside their area of operations or exceed the capabilities of organic and supporting assets (based on the JFC's air apportionment decision), and conduct execution planning. After the JFC makes the targeting and air apportionment decisions, components plan and execute assigned missions.

The JFC may establish and task an organization within the JFC staff to accomplish these broad targeting oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander (e.g., joint force air component commander (JFACC)). Typically, the JFC organizes a Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB). If the JFC so designates, a JTCB may be an integrating center to accomplish the broad targeting oversight functions, or a JFC-level review mechanism. In either case, it needs to be a joint activity comprised of representatives from the staff, all components, and if required, their subordinate units.

The JFC defines the role of the JTCB. Typically, the JTCB reviews targeting information, develops targeting guidance and priorities, and may prepare and refine joint target lists. The JTCB must also maintain a complete list of restricted targets and areas where special operations forces are operating to avoid endangering current or future operations.

TARGET SYSTEM ANALYSIS

The JTCB may assist the JFC in developing or revising the targeting guidance and/or priorities. The JTCB maintains a macro-level view of the area of responsibility/joint operations area and ensures targeting nominations are consistent with the JFC's campaign plan.

The JFC will normally delegate the authority to conduct execution planning, coordination, and deconfliction associated with joint air targeting to the JFACC/JFC staff and will ensure that this process is a joint effort. The JFACC/JFC staff must possess a sufficient command and control infrastructure, adequate facilities, and ready availability of joint planning expertise. A targeting mechanism, tasked with detailed planning, weaponeering, and execution, is also required at the component level to facilitate the process.

Related Terms

Joint Targeting Coordination Board

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

TARGET SYSTEM ANALYSIS

Target system analysis is a systematic approach to determine enemy vulnerabilities and weaknesses to be exploited. It determines what effects will be achieved against target systems and their activities. A target analysis must review the systems and their interactions between components and elements of a target system to determine how the system works and, subsequently, how to attack that system so it becomes inoperable.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-05.5 Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures

TECHNOLOGY AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER

In the post-Cold War era, US military forces are tasked with a wide variety of missions, from disaster relief to peacekeeping to fighting a major regional conflict. Historically, the US military has relied on technology as a force multiplier to accomplish assigned missions as efficiently as possible while preserving human life and limiting the destruction of property. The use of sophisticated information technologies as a force multiplier is the latest example of this trend.



The Defense Information Infrastructure links mission support and intelligence infrastructures and puts vital information at DOD user's work stations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-13.1 Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)

TERMINATION

General. Properly conceived conflict termination criteria are key to ensuring that victories achieved with military force endure. To facilitate conception of effective termination criteria, US forces must be dominant in the final stages of an armed conflict by achieving the leverage sufficient to impose a lasting solution. Because the nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations, it is fundamentally important to understand that conflict termination is an essential link between national security strategy, National Military Strategy, and posthostility aims — the desired outcome. This principle holds true for both war and military operations other than war. (See figure below.)

Political Considerations. There are two general means for obtaining objectives by force. The first seeks domination or overthrow of the opponent's military strength and political policy — an imposed settlement. The second seeks concession through coordinated military and negotiating actions. War is an instrument of policy. Negotiating power in armed conflict springs from two sources: military success and military potential. Military success provides military, geographic, political, psychological, or economic advantage and the quid pro quo for negotiations. Military potential establishes the threat of further advantage accruing to the possessor, which forces the opposing nation to consider a negotiated conclusion. Negotiating an advantageous conclusion to conflict requires time and power and the demonstrated will to

TERMINATION

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Seeks domination or overthrow of the opponent's military strength and political policy an imposed settlement; seeks concession through coordinated military and negotiating actions.

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

Military strategic advice to political authorities regarding national military objectives for termination should include estimates of military feasibility, adequacy, and acceptability and estimates of the time, costs, and military forces required to achieve the objectives.

WHEN TO TERMINATE

Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is a component of strategy and operational art.

WAR TERMINATION

Terminating a global war involving the use of large numbers of weapons of mass destruction on both sides and the degradation or destruction of their central means of control could be vastly more difficult than ending a theater or regional nuclear conflict involving the relatively constrained use of a limited number of nuclear weapons.

TERMINATION STRATEGY

United States nuclear forces, supporting command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence systems, and employment planning must provide the capability to deny enemy war aims, even in a conflict of indefinite duration.

TERMINATION OF OPERATIONS

The manner in which United States forces terminate their involvement may influence the perception of the legitimacy of the entire operation, and application of this principle of military operation other than war requires careful planning.

use both. In addition to imposed and negotiated termination, there is an armistice or truce, which is a negotiated intermission in hostilities, not a peace. In effect, it is a device to buy time pending negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of hostilities. A nation needs to consider the advantages accruing to a truce and the prospects for its supervision.

Even when pursuing an imposed termination, the government requires some means of communication with the opponent(s). Declarations of intentions, requirements, and minor



Coalition commanders communicate war terminating conditions to Iraq military leadership during Operation DESERT STORM.

concessions may speed conflict termination, as the enemy considers the advantages of early termination versus extended resistance in the light of fading leverage.

The issue of conflict termination centers on national will and freedom of action. Once the opponent's strategic aim shifts from maintaining or extending gains to reducing losses, the possibilities for negotiating an advantageous termination improve. Military, economic, diplomatic, and informational effort need to be coordinated toward causing that shift and, once made, toward exploiting it. Conflict termination should be considered from the outset of planning and should be refined as the conflict moves toward advantageous termination.

Military Considerations. In its strategic context, military victory is measured in the achievement of the overall political aim and associated termination objectives. Operational and tactical victory is measured by its contribution to strategic success. Military objectives may differ significantly for a negotiated settlement than for an imposed one. Military strategic advice to political authorities regarding national military objectives for termination should include estimates of military feasibility, adequacy, and acceptability and estimates of the time, costs, and military forces required to achieve the objectives. Implementing military commanders need to understand the overall political aim and military objectives for termination and should request clarification from higher authority in the absence of the political authorities.

Another military consideration is the follow up political exploitation of completed military action and the military role in the transition to peace. This exploitation includes matters such as military government, civil affairs, and humanitarian assistance and requires early planning and coordination both at the national level and in theater among diplomatic, military, and political leadership.

When to Terminate. Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is a component of strategy and operational art. Before forces are committed, JFCs must know how the National Command Authorities (NCA) intend to terminate the operation and ensure its outcomes endure, and then determine how to implement that strategic design at the operational level. In war, termination design is driven in part by the nature of the war itself. Wars over territorial disputes or economic advantage tend to be interest-based and lend themselves to negotiation, persuasion, and coercion. Wars fought in

the name of ideology, ethnicity, or religious or cultural primacy tend to be value-based and reflect demands that are seldom negotiable. Often, wars are a result of both value and interest-based differences.

The underlying causes of a particular war — such as cultural, religious, territorial, or hegemonic — must influence the understanding of conditions necessary for termination of hostilities and resolution of conflict. Ideally, national and allied or coalition decision makers will seek the advice of senior military leaders concerning how and when to end combat operations. Passing the lead from the military to other agencies to achieve final strategic aims following conflict usually requires the participation of JFCs.

Military operations typically conclude with attainment of the strategic ends for which the NCA committed forces. In some cases, these aims will be military strategic aims that, once achieved, allow transition to other instruments of national power and agencies as the means to achieve broader aims. World War II and the transition from the end of the war to other means to achieve a free and independent Europe is an example.

Commanders strive to end combat operations on terms favorable to the US and its allies or coalition partners. The basic element of this goal is gaining control over the enemy in the final stages of combat. When friendly forces can freely impose their will on the enemy, the opponent may have to accept defeat, terminate active hostilities, or revert to other types of conflict such as geopolitical actions or guerrilla warfare. Nonetheless, a hasty or ill-designed end to the operation may bring with it the possibility that related disputes will arise, leading to further conflict. There is a delicate balance between the desire for quick victory and termination on truly favorable terms.

JFCs and their subordinate commanders consider the conditions necessary to bring operations to a favorable end. They translate political aims into strategy and operational design. They provide decision makers with critical information on enemy intent, objectives, strategy, and chances of success in obtaining desired goals. JFCs and subordinate commanders consider the nature and type of conflict, the objective of military force, the plans and operations that will most affect the enemy's judgment of cost and risk and the impact on alliance and coalition warfare.

If the conditions have been properly set and met for ending the conflict, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the enemy from renewing hostilities. Moreover, the strategic aims for which the US fought should be secured by the leverage that US and multinational forces gained and can maintain. Wars are fought for political aims. Wars are only successful when political aims are achieved and these aims endure.

A period of postconflict activities exists from the immediate end of the conflict to the redeployment of the last US Service member. A variety of operations other than war occur during this period. These operations involve all instruments of national power and include those actions that ensure political objectives are achieved and sustained. Part of this effort may be to ensure the threat (military and/or political) does not resurrect itself. The effort focuses on ensuring that the results achieved endure and the conditions that resulted in the conflict do not recur.

Even as forces transition from combat operations to postconflict activities, requirements for humanitarian assistance will emerge. Working with Department of Defense and other US Government agencies, as well as nongovernmental organizations, JFCs prepare to meet the requirements of humanitarian support, including the provisioning of food and shelter and the protection of various groups against the depredations of opposing groups.

During postconflict operations, JFCs may transfer control to other authorities and redeploy forces. JFCs should identify postconflict requirements as early as possible so as to facilitate

transition and to permit the simultaneous redeployment of forces no longer required.

War Termination. The fundamental differences between a potential nuclear war and previous military conflicts involve the speed, scope, and degree of destruction inherent in nuclear weapons employment, as well as the uncertainty of negotiating opportunities and enduring control over military forces. Depending on the scope and intensity of a nuclear war, how and under what conditions it is brought to a conclusion may be very different from previous wars. Terminating a global war involving the use of large numbers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on both sides and the degradation or destruction of their central means of control could be vastly more difficult than ending a theater or regional nuclear conflict involving the relatively constrained use of a limited number of nuclear weapons. In the latter case, war-termination strategies may more readily lead to a cessation of hostilities, assuming that the belligerents' interests in war termination are mutual.

Termination Strategy. The objective of termination strategy should be to end a conflict at the lowest level of destruction possible, consistent with national objectives. However, there can be no assurances that a conflict involving WMD could be controllable or would be of short duration. Nor are negotiations opportunities and the capacity for enduring control over military forces clear. Therefore, US nuclear forces, supporting command control, communications, computer, and intelligence systems (e.g., sensors, communications, command facilities), and employment planning must provide the capability to deny enemy war aims, even in a conflict of indefinite duration.

Reserve Forces. Adequate nuclear reserve forces reduce opportunities for another nation to dominate or coerce behavior before, during, or after the use of WMD. Such forces provide the US with the capability to continue to deny enemy war aims, influence other nations, and exert leverage for war termination.

Military Operations Other Than War. As in war, military operations other than war (MOOTW) operational planning includes actions to be taken as soon as the operation is complete. These actions depend on the specific operation and may include the items listed in figure below. The manner in which US forces terminate their involvement may influence the perception of the legitimacy of the entire operation, and application of this principle of

TERMINATION OF OPERATIONS ACTIONS

May include but are not limited to:

- Transition to civil authority
- Marking and clearing minefields
- Closing financial obligations
- Pre-redeployment activities
- Redeploying forces

TERRORISM

MOOTW requires careful planning for this phase. Additionally, proper accountability of funds and equipment facilitates disbursement of funds and reimbursements any outstanding claims.

Planners should schedule redeployment of specific units as soon as possible after their part in the operation has been completed. This is critical for maintaining readiness for future operations in either the primary role of fighting the nation's wars or deploying for subsequent MOOTW. Forces that have been performing noncombat types of MOOTW, such as peacekeeping operations, may be degraded in combat proficiency. If the MOOTW tasks are significantly different from their combat tasks, forces may require proficiency training prior to being deployed as warfighters.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

Pub 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations
Pub 3-07	Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

TERRORISM


The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. JP 1-02

General. Acts of terrorism span the globe and are an inescapable element across the range of military operations. Each joint force commander (JFC) must institute continuous and aggressive programs to combat terrorism in his area of responsibility/joint operations area. These include use of psychological operations support to develop operations that encourage international acceptance of US actions.

Response to Terrorism. Responses to terrorism can occur with either of the two measures summarized in the figure below and discussed in the text following.

Antiterrorism (Defensive Measures). The basis of this program includes the collection, analysis, and dissemination of timely threat information, the conduct of threat awareness programs, and the implementation of sound defensive programs. The joint rear area coordinator (JRAC) and component commanders ensure that these measures are incorporated into security operations. Counterintelligence serves as the main source for collection, analysis, and dissemination of antiterrorism information for the JRAC.

Counterterrorism (Offensive Measures). The responsive phase of combatting terrorism is based on extensive preparations and planning, as well as response measures that can include preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations. The type forces and command and control structure used depend on the location, type of incident, and degree of force required. The JRAC and area commanders support counterterrorism operations within force capabilities.



Related Terms

antiterrorism; combatting terrorism; counterterrorism

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-10 Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations

THEATER AIR CONTROL SYSTEM

The organization and equipment necessary to plan, direct, and control theater air operations between Services. It is composed of control agencies and communications-electronics facilities which provide the means for centralized control and decentralized execution of missions. JP 1-02

The Theater Air Control System (TACS).

Air Operations Center (USAF) (AOC). The AOC serves as the central node of the Air Force command and control system called the TACS. The TACS, which also comprises the Air Force element of the Army/Air Force Air-Ground Operations System, consists of fixed- and mobile-units and facilities that provide the AOC with the information and communications required to monitor the ongoing air operation and control Air Force aircraft in theater air operations. The broad organization and functions of these units and facilities are discussed here in their relationship to theater airlift.

Control and Reporting Center (CRC). Directly subordinate to the AOC and charged with broad air defense, surveillance, and control functions, the CRC provides the means to flight-follow, direct, and coordinate the support and defense of theater airlift aircraft and formations operating in the area of operations.

Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). TACPs consist of Air Force personnel equipped and trained to assist US ground commanders to plan and request tactical air support, including theater airlift.

Wing Operations Center (WOC). As the command and control facility of Air Force wings, WOCs provide control and communications facilities to link wing commanders to the AOC and enable them to command their forces. To facilitate joint operations, Army Ground Liaison Officers or other component representatives may be assigned to a WOC.

Tanker Airlift Control Element (TALCE). TALCEs are mobile command and control units deployed to support strategic and theater air mobility operations. When deployed specifically to support theater air mobility operations, TALCEs should be attached to the command of a geographic combatant commander as an element of the TACS. Tanker airlift control center (USAF) (TACC) decisions to position TALCE assets will be based upon strategic and theater mobility support requirements. It is a theater responsibility to identify requirements for such support.

Mission Support Team (MST). Smaller than TALCEs, MSTs perform similar functions at locations where airlift command and control otherwise would not exist.

Combat Control Team (CCT). CCTs are small, task-organized teams of Air Force parachute and combat diver-qualified personnel, trained and equipped to quickly establish and control drop, landing, and extraction zone air traffic in austere or hostile conditions. These teams survey and establish terminal airheads as well as provide guidance to aircraft for airlift operations. They provide command and control and conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and survey assessments of potential airfields or assault zones and perform limited weather observation and removal of obstacles or unexploded ordinance with demolitions.

Theater Airlift Liaison Officers (TALOs). TALOs are rated airlift officers aligned under TACPs supporting the Army at corps, division, and separate brigade or regiment levels. Air Mobility Command (AMC) liaison officers (LNOs) are normally assigned to a Marine expeditionary force. The AMC LNOs perform similar functions as the TALOs, but are not designated as TALOs. TALOs advise ground commanders on the capabilities and limitations of airlift, and assist in planning, requesting, and using airlift resources.

Airborne Elements. As airborne command and control nodes of the TACS, the airborne battlefield command and control center and the Airborne Warning and Control System may perform AOC functions in support of theater airlift operations. This may occur either early in a campaign (before the regular AOC is established) or during operations conducted in the presence of enemy air and ground threats.

Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR). A DIRMOBFOR may be established to assist in the coordination of airlift issues within the theater. The DIRMOBFOR will normally be a senior officer who is familiar with the area of responsibility or joint operations area and has an extensive background in airlift operations. The DIRMOBFOR may be sourced from the theater's organizations, or nominated by US Transportation Command, or United States Atlantic Command. When established, the DIRMOBFOR serves as the designated agent of the joint force air component commander or air force component commander for all airlift issues. The DIRMOBFOR exercises coordinating authority between the airlift control center, air mobility element (AME) (or TACC if no AME is deployed), joint movement center, and the joint air operations center in order to expedite the resolution of any airlift problems.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17

JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

THEATER AIRLIFT

That airlift assigned to the combatant command (command authority) of a combatant commander other than Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command, which provides air movement and delivery of personnel and equipment directly into objective areas through air landing, airdrop, extraction, or other delivery techniques; and the air logistic support of all theater forces, including those engaged in combat operations, to meet specific theater objectives and requirements.

JP 1-02


Categories of Theater Airlift. Theater airlift operations are categorized in different ways for different purposes and are shown in the first figure below.

Missions. Theater airlift is usually divided between channel and special assignment airlift missions (SAAMs). Channel missions provide common-user general airlift service, usually on relatively fixed schedules and route structures, over an extended period of time. However, channel missions can also be event driven, i.e., based on mission requirements to move cargo or personnel outside of the established schedule. SAAMs provide dedicated airlift for specific requirements, usually at times, places, and in load configurations requested by a specific user. SAAM operations may involve any level of activity, from a single aircraft sortie to operations involving large formations or many sorties over extended periods of time.

Scheduling. For scheduling purposes, theater airlift is conducted on either a recurrent or surge basis. Recurrent operations establish a scheduled flow of individual aircraft to make the most of available aircraft and ground support assets. However, such operations require low-threat environments because they often involve aircraft flying predictable schedules and route structures, making them relatively easy to detect and attack. For other than low-threat environments, surge operations maximize the ability of air defense forces to protect airlift assets because they usually reduce movements in time and space, and thereby reduce their vulnerability to detection and attack. Surge operations may disrupt the efficiency of the overall theater airlift system. Aircraft already loaded and serviced may wait unproductively on the ground, for example, until all the aircraft in the surge are ready for the mission.

Movement Planning. For movement planning purposes, theater airlift aircraft are either administrative- or combat-loaded. Administrative-loading gives primary consideration to achieving maximum use of aircraft passenger and cargo capacities, without regard to ground force tactical considerations. Administrative-loaded materiel usually requires unloading and sorting before it is used. Combat-loading arranges personnel and materiel to arrive at their intended destination in an order and condition so that they are ready for immediate use. Administrative-loading maximizes the use of the volumes and weight capacities of airlift aircraft, their allowable cabin load (ACL), while combat-loading maximizes the combat readiness of the organizations and equipment being moved.

Theater Airlift Missions Basic Tasks. For operational planning purposes, most theater airlift missions perform one of six basic tasks, as shown in the second figure below and then discussed: deployment, employment, routine sustainment, combat sustainment, redeployment, or force extraction. Each of these tasks is different and has specific applications to distinct



phases of a campaign or operation. This categorization is useful because it relates directly to the problem of maximizing theater airlift support to immediate requirements, while also maximizing its contribution to the long-term requirements of the theater campaign.

Deployment. Deployment theater airlift operations involve the administrative or combat movement of personnel, units, and materiel into or within an area of responsibility (AOR) or joint operations area (JOA) before they engage in operations. Ideally, deployment airlift should operate in a low-threat environment. They can operate in higher threat environments, but their tactics, escort requirements, and objective area support requirements could reduce the throughput of the overall theater airlift system and individual aircraft cargo capacity. Backhaul airlift — the efficient rearward movement of personnel, intelligence materials, mail, reparable items, and other materiel could be an important planning consideration, even at the start of a deployment operation.

Employment. Employment theater airlift operations involve the combat movement of units as an integral part of their operations. Usually, employment airlift moves combat-loaded units to maximize their readiness for immediate combat operations. Given the assumption of immediate combat, user requirements should drive scheduling and load planning. However, for large-scale operations or increased threat situations, it may be necessary to

THEATER AIRLIFT MISSION TASKS

DEPLOYMENT

Administrative or combat movement of personnel, units, and materiel into or within an area of responsibility (AOR) or joint operations area (JOA) before they engage in operations

EMPLOYMENT

Combat movement of units as an integral part of their operations

ROUTINE SUSTAINMENT

Administrative air movement of materiel and personnel to reinforce or resupply forces already deployed and / or employed in operations

COMBAT SUSTAINMENT

Combat movement of supplies, materiel, and personnel to reinforce or resupply units already engaged in combat operations

REDEPLOYMENT

Combat or administrative air movement of personnel, units, and materiel from deployed positions within an AOR or JOA

FORCE EXTRACTION

Combat air movement of personnel, units, and materiel from positions in the immediate vicinity of enemy forces

adjust the user's plans or operations to accommodate the ACL limitations, tactical procedures, and defensive support requirements of the theater airlift force. In most cases, employment airlift could be provided through surge operations, given the requirement to deliver combat-ready units in the minimum time possible. Defensive arrangements for both the forces and airlift assets involved depend on the situation; they could possibly be high at the beginning of an operation and then taper off as the delivered units establish their operational effectiveness. Backhaul airlift is seldom feasible or worth the risk during employment operations, except for the rearward movement of essential items of intelligence, wounded personnel or other friendly evacuees.

Routine Sustainment. Routine sustainment theater airlift operations involve the administrative air movement of materiel and personnel to reinforce or resupply forces already deployed and/or employed in operations. These operations normally deliver the user's requirements with the minimum expenditure of airlift resources. Routine sustainment planning usually assumes that user requirements and the general air and ground security situation allow some flexibility in the actual delivery times of specific loads. Thus, flight schedules and load plans are usually made to get maximum throughput from available ACLs and support resources. When practical, routine sustainment should be planned to utilize backhaul capacity.

THEATER AIRLIFT FORCES

Depending on theater and user priorities, typical backhaul loads might include wounded personnel, other friendly evacuees, enemy prisoners of war, excess or repairable weapons and materiel of moderate to high value, as well as mail.

Combat Sustainment. Combat sustainment theater airlift operations involve the combat movement of supplies, materiel, and personnel to reinforce or resupply units already engaged in combat operations. Combat sustainment planning usually assumes that user requirements and general threat situations allow little or no flexibility in the delivery times, locations, and configurations of specific loads. Combat sustainment usually involves individual aircraft or small formations employing combat tactics to deliver loads to terminals in close proximity to the enemy; it may also be conducted as an air flow operation, depending on requirements and threats. Only essential backhaul requirements justify the increased risks for theater airlift assets involved in these operations. Priority consideration should be given to retrograde of critical repairable items from forward areas to rear echelon repair activities.

Redeployment. Redeployment theater airlift operations involve the combat or administrative air movement of personnel, units, and materiel from deployed positions within an AOR or JOA. Redeployment operations are conducted to move the maximum force in the minimum time or with the fewest resources possible. They normally require a low-threat situation. If circumstances permit, backhaul should be accomplished with whatever capacity is not used by the primary movement.

Force Extraction. Force extraction theater airlift operations involve the combat air movement of personnel, units, and materiel from positions in the immediate vicinity of enemy forces. Because the purpose of these movements may range from withdrawal operations to the lateral movement of forces to new operating locations, the relationship of operational and logistic considerations can vary widely. These operations generally are planned to accomplish a movement with the minimum expenditure of airlift resources. However, in higher threat situations it may also be necessary to preserve the combat capabilities of departing units for as long as possible at the departure terminal, while building them up as rapidly as possible at the arrival terminal. In such cases, operational requirements may be more important than the efficient use of ACLs. In the latter stages of a complete extraction of friendly forces from a combat area, planners should provide suitable operational assets to protect both the extracting forces and the airlift forces engaged in their movement. Extractions are logistical backhaul operations. Commanders must evaluate the risk of extracting materiel as compared to the impact of abandonment and replacement.

Related Terms

strategic airlift

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17

JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

THEATER AIRLIFT FORCES

The US establishes air lines of communications by coordinating the operations of three distinct components of airlift forces. Strategic airlift forces (also called intertheater or global airlift forces) primarily provide common-user airlift into theater terminals from outside the theater. Theater airlift forces primarily provide common-user lift between terminals within a theater. Organic airlift forces, drawn mainly from Service elements, are not common-user assets, and primarily provide specialized lift to specific users, usually between terminals within a theater.



Theater airlift operations provided for the timely distribution of cargo and passengers during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM — perhaps the most impressive short-term buildup of people and materiel in the history of warfare.

In daily operations, airlift forces sometimes operate at bases and carry loads that overlap with the strategic, theater, and organic airlift missions. They may also operate aircraft of the same type or design. These operational and technological overlaps have complicated many past efforts to establish distinct organizational boundaries between airlift forces. However, they also provide an opportunity and an obligation to organize and operate each airlift force in ways that satisfy its primary customers, while also maximizing the effectiveness of the overall theater airlift system.

Theater airlift forces exist to support the plans, operations, and priorities of the geographic combatant commander by operating air transport aircraft and ground support assets for all theater forces. Theater airlift forces have a dual identity; they are both air operating forces and they are an element of the logistic support system. Planning and organization of theater airlift forces should reflect this dual nature.

Related Terms

strategic airlift forces

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17

JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

THEATER AIRLIFT LIAISON OFFICER

An officer specially trained to implement the theater air control system and to control tactical airlift assets. Theater airlift liaison officers are highly qualified, rated airlift officers, with tactical (airdrop) airlift experience, assigned duties supporting US Army units. Also called TALO. JP 1-02

Theater airlift liaison officers (TALOs) are rated airlift officers aligned under tactical air control parties supporting the Army at corps, division, and separate brigade or regiment levels. Air Mobility Command (AMC) liaison officers (LNOs) are normally assigned to a Marine expeditionary force. The AMC LNOs perform similar functions as the TALOs, but

THEATER MISSILE

are not designated as TALOs. TALOs advise ground commanders on the capabilities and limitations of airlift, and assist in planning, requesting, and using airlift resources.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations

THEATER MISSILE

A missile, which may be a ballistic missile, a cruise missile, or an air-to-surface missile (not including short-range, non-nuclear, direct fire missiles, bombs, or rockets such as Maverick or wire-guided missiles), whose target is within a given theater of operation. JP 1-02

Potential adversaries possessing theater missiles (TMs) pose a threat to US security interests and forward-deployed forces. The proliferation of TMs and advances in missile and associated technologies, coupled with the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, can provide these adversaries with potentially decisive attack capabilities which can include the use of WMD against critical friendly targets.

TMs may be as much a political weapon as a military weapon. In many cases, their political impact may outweigh their military significance. Commanders must consider the political as well as the military impact of TMs. The precise time, location, and nature of TM employment is uncertain, thus complicating the determination of friendly force composition and method of power projection to overcome specific threats. The nature and extent of US global interests require that theater missile defense (TMD) forces be rapidly deployable or employable from the US, forward bases, and/or ships. Furthermore, the intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition systems, weapon systems, and communication architectures and resources required to conduct TMD operations must be flexible enough to provide timely and accurate support throughout the area of interest. Geographic combatant commanders should plan for TMD operations within the theater in support of contingencies and national military strategy.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-01.5 Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense

THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS

When directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA), joint force commanders plan for the employment of theater nuclear weapons by US forces in a manner consistent with national policy and strategic guidance. The employment of such weapons signifies an escalation of the war and is an NCA decision. The Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command's capabilities to assist in the planning of all nuclear missions are available to support nuclear weapon employment.

Related Terms**Source Joint Publications**JP 3-12.1 Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations


THEATER OF OPERATIONS

A subarea within a theater of war defined by the geographic combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. JP 1-02

When warranted, geographic combatant commanders may designate theaters of war and, perhaps, subordinate theaters of operations for each major threat. Geographic combatant commanders can elect to directly control operations in the theater of war or theater of operations, or may establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose, allowing themselves to remain focused on the broader theater (i.e., the area of responsibility).

Geographic combatant commanders may further define one or more theaters of operations — that area required to conduct or support specific combat operations — within the theater of war. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. Subordinate unified commanders are typically assigned theaters of operations.

OPERATIONAL AREAS WITHIN A THEATER



This example depicts a combatant commander's AOR, also known as a theater. Within the AOR, the CINC has designated a theater of war with two subordinate theaters of operations. Also within the theater of war is a JSOA. To handle a situation outside the theater of war, the CINC has established a JOA, within which a JTF will operate. JOAs could also be established within the theater of war or theaters of operations.

Related Terms

theater of war

Source Joint Publications


JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

THEATER OF WAR

Defined by the National Command Authorities or the geographic combatant commander, the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander's entire area of responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations. JP 1-02

When warranted, geographic combatant commanders may designate theaters of war and, perhaps, subordinate theaters of operations for each major threat. Geographic combatant commanders can elect to directly control operations in the theater of war or theater of operations, or may establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose, allowing themselves to remain focused on the broader theater (i.e., the area of responsibility (AOR)).

OPERATIONAL AREAS WITHIN A THEATER



This example depicts a combatant commander's AOR, also known as a theater. Within the AOR, the CINC has designated a theater of war with two subordinate theaters of operations. Also within the theater of war is a JSOA. To handle a situation outside the theater of war, the CINC has established a JOA, within which a JTF will operate. JOAs could also be established within the theater of war or theaters of operations.

In time of war, the National Command Authorities or a geographic combatant commander may elect to define a theater of war within the geographic combatant commander's AOR. The theater of war is that area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander's entire AOR and may contain more than one theater of operations.

Related Terms

area of responsibility; theater of operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

THEATER PATIENT MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS CENTER

The second integral part of patient regulating is the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center (TPMRC). TPMRCs assume responsibilities formerly performed by the Joint Medical Regulating Office and theater aeromedical evacuation control centers. Active TPMRCs are located in US European Command and US Pacific Command. Other TPMRCs would be established in US Atlantic Command, US Central Command, US Southern Command, and the continental US as the need arose. The primary role of TPMRCs is to generate theater plans and schedules, and then modify (as needed) and execute Global Patient Movement

THEATER STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

Requirements Center (GPMRC)-delivered schedules, ultimately delivering the patient to the medical treatment facility (which includes both fixed and deployable, Veterans Administration, Department of Defense, and National Disaster Medical System hospitals).

The TPMRC is under the control of the joint force surgeon and coordinates and controls, in terms of identifying bed space requirements, the movement of patients within and out of the assigned area of responsibility. TPMRCs generate theater plans and schedules, and then modify (as needed) and execute GPMRC-delivered schedules, ultimately delivering the patient to the medical treatment facility. The TPMRC should be task-organized to maintain flexibility in response to the tactical situation and mission of the combatant commander.

Related Terms

global patient movement requirements center

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

THEATER STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

Theater strategic concepts are statements of intent as to what, where, and how operations are to be conducted in broad, flexible terms. These statements must incorporate a variety of factors, including nuclear and conventional deterrence, current or potential alliances or coalitions, forces available, command and control capabilities, intelligence assets, anticipated postconflict measures, mobilization, deployment, and sustainability. Theater strategic concepts allow for the employment of theater nuclear forces, conventional and special operations forces, space assets, military assistance from all Services and supporting commands, and interagency and multinational forces in each course of action.

Theater strategic concepts should provide for unity of effort and strategic advantage. Strategic advantage is the favorable overall relative power relationship that enables one nation or group of nations to effectively control the course of politico-military events to ensure the accomplishment of objectives through national, international, and theater efforts.

Combatant commanders use the advantages and capabilities of assigned, attached, and supporting military forces, as well as alliance, coalition, and interagency relationships and military assistance enhancements in theater as the basis of military power. Combatant commanders also consider the other instruments of national power for their contribution to gaining and maintaining strategic advantage.

Though geographic and functional responsibilities of the combatant commanders may differ, there are several common strategic considerations. Strategic concepts must integrate ends, ways, and means and consider the following:

- Protection of US citizens, forces, and interests and implementation of national policies.
- Integration of deterrence measures and transition to combat operations.
- Adjustments for multinational, interagency, or United Nations circumstances.
- Identification of conflict termination criteria and postconflict objectives and measures.
- Identification of potential military requirements across the range of military operations.
- Support for security assistance or nation assistance.
- Inputs to higher strategies or subordinate planning requirements.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

THEATER STRATEGY

The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater. JP 1-02

Theater strategy translates national and alliance strategic tasks and direction into long-term, regionally focused concepts to accomplish specific missions and objectives. The National Military Strategy and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan guide the development of this strategy that incorporates peacetime and war objectives and reflects national and Department of Defense policy and guidance. Peacetime goals will normally focus on deterring hostilities and enhancing stability in the theater. Foreign internal defense is an integral part of this strategy. The determination of the desired end state for the theater is an important element in the strategy process. This determination establishes the theater's strategic direction on which planners base campaign plans as well as other plans. There is no specific format for developing or documenting the theater strategy. In general, the theater strategy will normally include an analysis of US national policy and interests, a strategic assessment of the area of responsibility, a threat analysis, the combatant commander's vision, and a statement of theater missions and objectives.

Theater campaign plans are operational extensions of the theater strategy. They provide the commander's vision and intent through broad operational concepts and provide the framework for supporting operation plans.

Related Terms

joint strategic capabilities plan; national military strategy; national security strategy; strategy

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

THREAT ASSESSMENT

In antiterrorism, threat assessment brings together the threat analysis and the vulnerability analysis, as depicted in the figure below. The threat assessment concerns people or items essential to the mission or function of the installation, port, base, or unit. It also applies to people or facilities that, by virtue of their symbolic value to a terrorist group (as determined by the threat assessment), are probable targets. The threat assessment is provided by the supporting counterintelligence staff element. Based on the threat assessment, the commander and staff should identify and prioritize critical personnel, facilities, and equipment, and should conduct a vulnerability assessment for each. Assessing the vulnerability of a unit, installation, base, facility, material, or personnel to the terrorist threat helps uncover and isolate security weakness. Steps can then be taken to reduce or eliminate the weakness. Once the vulnerability assessment is completed, steps should be taken (planning, training, and if necessary, design or redesign of construction projects) to correct or reduce these vulnerabilities. The installation commander and staff should review this vulnerability assessment at least annually to ensure that it remains accurate in view of the changing threat, installation makeup, and unit missions.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

THREAT ASSESSMENT

Concerns people or items essential to the mission or function of the installation, port, base, or unit; applies to people or facilities that, by virtue of their symbolic value to a terrorist group, are probable targets.

Based on the threat assessment, the commander and staff should identify and prioritize critical personnel, facilities, and equipment, and should conduct a vulnerability assessment for each.

VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

Assessing the vulnerability of a unit, installation, base, facility, material, or personnel to the terrorist threat helps uncover and isolate security weakness.

Once the vulnerability assessment is completed, steps should be taken to correct or reduce these vulnerabilities.

Related Terms

antiterrorism

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07.2 JTTP for Antiterrorism

THREAT DISTRIBUTION

Threat distribution and phase duration are useful tools for determining the allocation of resources. Using threat distribution, the joint force commander (JFC) will assign destruction of a portion of the enemy's total combat capability (i.e., forces, installations, organizations) to Service component commands. An example of threat distribution would be to assign destruction of a certain percentage of enemy mechanized, armor, follow-on forces, and artillery forces during an air operations phase among the Services. The remaining percentage of the threat, increased intentionally to provide a deliberate total overlap, would be distributed among the Services during the ground maneuver operations phases. Phase duration is the JFC's projection of how long a specific phase of an operation is expected to last. Two examples of phase duration: the air operation will last a certain number of days (time oriented) or the air operation will last until a certain percentage of enemy ground threat is destroyed (objective oriented). Threat distribution and phase duration help identify where the weight of the

campaign will fall during various phases to prevent unnecessary duplication of support to different components.

Related Terms

phase duration

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

TIMELINESS

Intelligence must be available in time to be effective. Timely intelligence enables the commander to make sound decisions, use the principles of war, and to act decisively. Timeliness is influenced by the intelligence process of developing essential elements of information, identifying and stating requirements, and collecting and producing intelligence. The commander must inform the Intelligence Directorate (J-2) of intent and the J-2 must identify intelligence requirements to supporting intelligence organizations in a timely manner.

Related Terms

intelligence

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

TIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT DATA

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including: a. In-place units. b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation. c. Routing of forces to be deployed. d. Movement data associated with deploying forces. e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces. f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. JP 1-02

Time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) is the list of units and sustainment requirements needed to execute the operation plan (OPLAN). It phases them into the theater of operations at the times and places required to support the concept of operations. Its development and refinement are critical to achieving executable OPLANs and to developing executable operation orders when using an approved TPFDD in crisis action planning.

US Transportation Command uses TPFDD to analyze the flow of forces and cargo from their points of origin to arrival in theater. They distribute the apportioned strategic transportation resources. During this process, Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command follows the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance and coordinates all major decisions with the supported combatant commander.

Related Terms

joint operation planning

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-01.3 JTTP for Movement Control

TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETS

Those targets requiring immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose) a clear and present danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity. JP 1-02

Time-sensitivity can play an important part in categorizing a target and determining its appropriateness as a special operations target. Time-sensitivity can be viewed from either a targeting or mission planning perspective or a combination of both, as in the case of personnel recovery missions.

A target is time-sensitive when it requires an immediate response because it poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces or is highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity. Time-sensitive targets are usually mobile, such as a mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, or they may lose their value quickly, such as a bridge being used for an enemy advance or withdrawal.

Related Terms

targeting

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-05.5 Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures

TIMING AND TEMPO


The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy. (See figure below.) With proper timing, joint force commanders (JFCs) can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the enemy's ability to react. In its 1940 attack on France, for instance, Germany combined the speed, range, and flexibility of aircraft with the power and mobility of armor to conduct operations at a pace that surprised and overwhelmed French commanders, disrupting their forces and operations. France capitulated in little more than one month.

The tempo of warfare has increased over time as technological advancements and innovative doctrines have been applied to military requirements. While in many situations JFCs may elect to maintain an operational tempo that stretches the capabilities of both friendly and enemy forces, on other occasions JFCs may elect to conduct operations at a reduced pace. This reduced pace may be particularly appropriate when enemy forces enjoy a mobility advantage or when friendly forces are not yet able to conduct decisive operations.

JFCs may vary the tempo of operations. During selected phases of a campaign, JFCs may elect to reduce the pace of operations, frustrating enemy commanders while buying time to build a decisive force or tend to other priorities in the operational area such as relief to displaced persons. During other phases, JFCs may conduct high-tempo operations designed specifically to exceed enemy capabilities.

Just as JFCs carefully select which capabilities of the joint force to employ, so do they consider the timing of the application of those capabilities. Timing refers to the effects achieved as well as to the application of force. While JFCs may have substantial capabilities available, they selectively apply such capabilities in a manner that synchronizes their application in time, space, and purpose. Defining priorities assists in the timing of operations.

JFCs plan and conduct operations in a manner that synchronizes the effects of operations so that the maximum benefit of their contributions are felt by the opponent at the desired



time. Although some operations of the joint force can achieve near-immediate effects, JFCs may elect to delay their application until the contributions of other elements can be brought to bear in a synchronized manner. Additionally, commanders and planners strive to ensure that effects achieved through combat operations build toward decisive results but are not unduly or inappropriately felt by opponents long after their defeat.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

TOTAL FORCE

The total force policy is one fundamental premise upon which our military force structure is built. It was institutionalized in 1973 and caused a shift of substantial military roles and missions to the Reserve component along with the resources necessary to maintain high levels of readiness, especially in units that are needed early in a crisis. As the total force policy matured, military retirees, Department of Defense (DOD) civilian personnel, contractor personnel, and host-nation support personnel were brought under its umbrella to reflect the

value of their contributions to our military capability. Total force policy focuses awareness and energy on sound, thorough mobilization planning and the development of procedures that are essential to the timely activation of reserve military power. The total force policy was tested by the war in the Persian Gulf, which involved the largest mobilization and deployment of Reserve forces since the Korean War. There was significant reliance on military retirees, DOD civilian personnel, contractor personnel, and host-nation support for critical skills and performance of many essential tasks.

Reserve Forces Preparedness — Legacy of the '80s

During the 1980s, major improvements were made in Reserve Component (RC) force readiness to perform wartime missions. By the fall of 1990, modernization efforts had given the RC the ability to field approximately 84 percent (in dollar value) of the equipment they required for war. The DOD policy of “First to fight, first to equip” required resourcing both Active and RC units in the sequence in which they were required to perform their wartime missions. Successful recruiting efforts, the assignment to the RC of important peacetime and wartime responsibilities, and substantially improved training opportunities, also contributed significantly to improved RC force readiness.

The increase in RC readiness levels in the 1980s occurred concurrently with the largest ever expansion of the RC peacetime structure. From 1980 to the end of the decade, the number of Selected Reservists increased by 35 percent, growing from approximately 850,000 to more than 1,150,000. This growth did not come at the expense of personnel readiness. On the contrary, throughout the decade, the Services devoted considerable resources to ensure individual proficiency of Selected Reserve members. During this same period, more emphasis was placed on the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), the pool of pre-trained individuals.

Individual RC volunteers were integrated into the Active force from the start of the Persian Gulf crisis, even before the involuntary Reserve call-up. By 22 August, more than 10,500 volunteer RC members already were serving on active duty. Their contributions were essential to provide capabilities required from the first days of the crisis — particularly strategic airlift — and to perform missions almost exclusively assigned to Reserve units including, for example, water purification and port security.

Thousands of Air Reserve Component (ARC) personnel volunteered within hours of the initial US response to support the time-sensitive movement of US personnel and materiel to the Persian Gulf. ARC volunteers flew 42 percent of all strategic airlift missions and 33 percent of the aerial refueling missions. They also provided continental United States (CONUS) base maintenance, medical, civil engineering, aerial port, and security police support to deploying Air Force units and airlift mission. By 22 August, Air Force Reserve volunteers had moved seven million tons of cargo and 8,150 passengers to the theater. As of 25 August, Air Force Reserve volunteers began operating Westover AFB, MA as a major eastbound staging operation on a 24-hour basis. Westover continued to operate on a volunteer basis for four months until these same volunteers were mobilized on 3 December.

Related Terms

mobilization

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

TRAINING BASE

The Services expand their institutional training bases to train nonprior Service personnel to support and sustain an expanded force structure. The training base also provides reclassification and refresher training for pretrained individual manpower who need it. Based on the rate of force expansion and attrition due to casualties, training base output requirements, over time, are determined and compared to available capacity. If there is a shortfall, additional capacity is added by mobilizing additional training organizations from the Reserve component, by hiring Department of Defense civilian employees, and by contracting for additional instructors and other training resources from the private sector. Sources, options, and actions for expanding training base capacity are listed in the figure below.

EXPANDING TRAINING BASE CAPACITY: SOURCES AND OPTIONS			
SITUATION	SOURCES OF ADDITIONAL TRAINING BASE CAPACITY	TRAINING BASE EXPANSION OPTIONS	ACTIONS REQUIRED
Any Level of emergency			Military Departments act to expand their institutional training establishments:
	Wartime policies and programs of instruction	Implemented wartime training policies and programs	Implement wartime programs of instruction; extend the training day and training week; increase class size.
	Reserve Component training units	Expand existing training centers and schools	Call up Reserve component training base augmentation units as required.
	New training centers and schools	Add new training centers and schools	Call up remaining Reserve component training base augmentation units; activate new training units, acquire new training facilities and support.

Related Terms

mobilization

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS AND FACILITIES

A commander of a combatant command (CINC) has the authority to issue and implement directives to transfer civil engineering functions between or among Service components within the area of responsibility during war or military operations other than war. However, in

TRANSIENT FORCES

peacetime, the CINC must obtain the concurrence of the affected Service or refer the matter through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

A CINC's directive authority is not intended to abrogate Service responsibility for civil engineering support. Every effort will be made to obtain the Service's concurrence through coordination with Service component commands or directly to the headquarters of the appropriate Service. Under all conditions, the implementation of such directed transfers, including administrative and procedural aspects, is the responsibility of the Service component commander involved. The CINC retains the responsibility for overseeing and resolving issues.

Related Terms

directive authority for logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-04 Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support

TRANSIENT FORCES

Forces which pass or stage through, or base temporarily within, the area of responsibility or joint operations area of another command but are not under its operational control. JP 1-02

In accordance with the "Forces for Unified Commands" and the "Unified Command Plan," except as otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, all forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a combatant command shall be assigned or attached to and under the command of the commander of that command. Forces directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense may conduct operations from or within any geographic area as required for accomplishing assigned tasks, as mutually agreed by the commanders concerned or as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Transient forces do not come under the chain of command of the area commander solely by their movement across area of responsibility (AOR)/joint operations area boundaries.

Transient forces within the assigned AOR of a combatant commander are subject to the area commander's orders in some instances, e.g., for coordination for emergency defense or allocation of local facilities. However, transient forces are not part of the area commander's command, and the area commander is not in their normal chain of command.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

TRANSPORTATION

Transportation enables the joint campaign to begin and continue. The projection of power relies upon the mobility inherent in air, naval, and land forces, supported by the defense transportation system. Transportation at the strategic and operational levels of war is a complex operation. It can best be served by a single, sound deployment concept that reflects en route and theater constraints and undergoes minimum rapid changes (which may create unforeseen, cascading effects). Experience has shown that the cooperation of all supporting combatant commands and Services is required to ensure the efficient coordination and execution of a major deployment. Furthermore, transportation requires control of the necessary lines of

communications. Without secure air, sea, space, and land lines of communications we cannot reliably move forces and materiel, reinforce forward-deployed forces, or sustain the campaign.

The Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS) has the mission to provide strategic air, land, and sea transportation to deploy, employ, and sustain military forces to meet national security objectives across the range of military operations. Combatant



The sealift element of the Strategic Mobility Triad provides logistics support with almost unlimited capacity.

commanders coordinate their movement requirements and required delivery dates with USCINCTRANS who, with the transportation component commands, provides a complete movement system from origin to initial theater destination. This system includes the effective use of military and commercial assets. Finally, USCINCTRANS has the authority to procure commercial transportation services through component commands (within legal constraints) and to activate, with approval of the Secretary of Defense, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, Ready Reserve Force, and Sealift Readiness Program.

Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command, and Military Traffic Management Command transportation facilities and supplies not assigned to the geographic combatant commander are normally exempted from the logistic authority of the geographic combatant commander. Combatant commanders should communicate their requirements and priorities for modification of existing facilities and establishment of new transportation facilities to Service component commanders and USCINCTRANS.

Most airports and seaports located outside the continental US are operated and controlled by host nations but may be augmented by US forces. During wartime, each Service has primary responsibility for loading and unloading its military units. The responsibilities of AMC and individual units moving via AMC or AMC-controlled aircraft are contained in multi-Service publications.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0

Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

TRANSPORTATION REFINEMENT

Transportation refinement simulates the planned movement resources to ensure that the plan is transportation feasible. US Transportation Command uses computer simulation to determine transportation feasibility. In turn, the supported commander adjusts timed-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) requirements as necessary to remain within lift capability.

Transportation refinement is conducted by Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS) in coordination with the Joint Staff, Services, and supported and supporting commands. USCINCTRANS will normally host transportation refinement conferences. The purpose of transportation refinement is to adjust the flow of operations plans to ensure they are transportation feasible and consistent with the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Joint Staff, and Service guidance.

Related Terms

joint operation planning

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

All the land, water, and air routes and transportation assets engaged in the movement of US forces and their supplies during peacetime training, conflict, or war, involving both mature and contingency theaters and at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. JP 1-02

The employment of military forces and combat power decides the outcome of campaigns and operations. The success of these forces often depends on sound, timely deployment and support. A well-defined, integrated transportation system is a critical part of this support. It provides time and place utility for units and sustainment. Inadequate control of logistic movement results in waste, reduced efficiency, and loss of potential combat power.

The three elements of a transportation system, shown in the figure below, are mode operations (surface, water, air), terminal operations, and movement control. Movement control is the

ELEMENTS OF A TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM



Mode Operations (Surface, Water, Air)



Terminal Operations




Movement Control

most critical component of the system. It must coordinate the transportation assets of all modes, terminals, Services, commands, and host nations during deployment, sustainment, and redeployment.

Force deployments occur in five phases. The phases are predeployment, movement to a port of embarkation (POE), strategic movement, in-theater reception at a port of debarkation, and theater onward movement. The figure below shows this process, using the continental US (CONUS) as the origin. In general, predeployment activities are a Service responsibility and movement to a POE within CONUS is shared between the Services and the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). Commercial movement to a POE within CONUS is arranged by USTRANSCOM's Military Traffic Management Command. Additionally, USTRANSCOM executes the strategic movement to the theater. The last two phases, in-theater reception and onward movement, are the responsibility of the supported geographic combatant commander.

The transportation system also encompasses patient and enemy prisoners of war evacuations, noncombatant evacuation operations, and force redeployment. Redeployments can take twice as long as deployments, and planners must address them early in an operation. The transportation system must be capable of moving joint forces by multiple modes. It must move forces over long distances and through an array of different types of terminals. It must accomplish all this while adhering to the timetable of the supported joint force commander.

The complexity of the transportation system requires that both the providers and users develop integrated, executable movement plans. An effective interface between the strategic and theater movement systems is crucial. The supported combatant commander and



TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command, along with other supporting combatant commanders, are responsible for establishing that interface.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-01.3 JTTP for Movement Control

UNCERTAINTY

Friction, chance, and uncertainty still characterize battle. Their cumulative effect comprises “the fog of war.” We have, for instance, no precisely defined picture of where, when, for how long, or why we may be obliged to use force in the defense of our nation or its friends and allies. We must be prepared for a broad range of possibilities. Modern technology will not eliminate friction, chance, or uncertainty from military undertakings. Indeed, the massive quantity of information available to modern commanders produces its own component of uncertainty. Instead, friction, chance, and uncertainty are an inevitable part of the medium in which we operate. We should prepare mentally, physically, and psychologically to deal with this.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW. JP 1-02

Unconventional warfare (UW) includes guerrilla warfare (GW) and other low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, and evasion and escape (E&E). (See figure below.) GW consists of military and paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces in enemy-held or hostile territory. It is the overt military aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement. Guerrilla forces primarily employ raid and ambush tactics against enemy vulnerabilities. In the latter stages of a successful insurgency, guerrilla forces may directly oppose selected, vulnerable enemy forces while avoiding enemy concentrations of strength.

Subversion is an activity designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime or nation. All elements of the resistance organization contribute to the subversive effort, but the clandestine nature of subversion dictates that the underground elements perform the bulk of the activity.

Sabotage is conducted from within the enemy’s infrastructure in areas presumed to be safe from attack. It is designed to degrade or obstruct the warmaking capability of a country by damaging, destroying, or diverting war material, facilities, utilities, and resources. Sabotage may be the most effective or only means of attacking specific targets that lie beyond the capabilities of conventional weapon systems. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and materiel. Once accomplished, these incursions can further result in the enemy spending excessive resources to guard against future attack.



In UW, the intelligence function must collect, develop, and report information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of the established government or occupying power and its external sponsors. In this context, intelligence activities have both offensive and defensive purposes and range well beyond military issues, including social, economic, and political information that may be used to identify threats, operational objectives, and necessary supporting operations.

E&E is an activity that assists military personnel and other selected persons to:

- move from an enemy-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control;
- avoid capture if unable to return to an area of friendly control;
- once captured, escape. Special operations personnel often will work in concert with the Joint Search and Rescue Center of the joint force commander (JFC) while operating in an E&E network.

UW is the military and paramilitary aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement and may often become a protracted politico-military activity. From the US perspective, UW may be the conduct of indirect or proxy warfare against a hostile power for the purpose of achieving US national interests in peacetime; UW may be employed when conventional military involvement is impractical or undesirable; or UW may be a complement to conventional operations in war. The focus of UW is primarily on existing or potential insurgent, secessionist, or other resistance movements. Special operations forces (SOF) provide advice, training, and assistance to existing indigenous resistance organizations. The intent of UW operations is to exploit a hostile power's political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by advising, assisting, and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish US strategic or operational objectives.

When UW is conducted independently during military operations other than war or war, its primary focus is on political and psychological objectives. A successful effort to organize and mobilize a segment of the civil population may culminate in military action. Strategic UW objectives may include the following:

- Undermining the domestic and international legitimacy of the target authority.

- Neutralizing the target authority’s power and shifting that power to the resistance organization.
- Destroying the confidence and will of the target authority’s leadership.
- Isolating the target authority from international diplomatic and material support while obtaining such support for the resistance organization.
- Obtaining the support or neutrality of the various segments of the society.

When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives. However, the political and psychological implications remain. UW operations delay and disrupt hostile military activities, interdict lines of communications, deny the hostile power unrestricted use of key areas, divert the hostile power’s attention and resources from the main battle area, and interdict hostile warfighting capabilities. Properly integrated and synchronized UW operations can extend the depth of air, sea, or ground battles, complement conventional military operations, and provide the JFC with the windows of opportunity needed to seize the initiative through offensive action.

During war, SOF may directly support the resistance movement by infiltrating operational elements into denied or politically sensitive areas. They organize, train, equip, and advise or direct the indigenous resistance organization. In situations short of war, when direct US military involvement is inappropriate or infeasible, SOF may instead provide indirect support from an external location.

UW may be conducted by all designated SOF, but it is principally the responsibility of Army special forces. Augmentation other than SOF, will usually be provided as the situation dictates by psychological operations and civil affairs units, as well as other selected conventional combat, combat support, and combat service support forces.

Related Terms

special operations

Source Joint Publications

3-05


Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

UNIFIED ACTION

A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and non-governmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands.

JP 1-02

The term “unified action” is a broad generic term referring to the wide scope of activities (including the synchronization of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. Within this general category of operations, subordinate commanders of forces conduct either single-Service or joint operations to support the overall operation. It integrates joint, single-Service, special, and supporting operations; in conjunction with interagency, nongovernmental, private voluntary organizations, multinational, or United Nations (UN) operations, into a unity of effort in the theater or joint operations area. Unified action within the military element of national power supports the national strategic unity of effort through close coordination with the other instruments of national power as they apply within the theater environment and its unity of effort. (See figure below.)



Success often depends on these unified actions. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all combatant commanders are in pivotal positions to ensure unified actions are planned and conducted in accordance with the guidance and direction received from the National Command Authorities in coordination with other authorities (i.e., alliance or coalition leadership). Combatant commanders should ensure that their unified action synchronizes joint operations and single-Service operations in time, space, and purpose with the actions of supporting combatant commands and other military forces (multinational operations) and non-military organizations (Department of Defense and other federal government agencies such as the Defense Logistics Agency, the Agency for International Development, nongovernmental organizations such as religious relief agencies, corporations, private and nongovernment volunteer organizations, international agencies such as the International Red Cross, and the UN).

Unified action of the Armed Forces of the United States starts with unified direction. For US military operations, unified direction is normally accomplished by establishing a joint force, assigning a mission or objective to the joint force commander, establishing command relationships, assigning or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the joint force commander with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission.

Related Terms

joint task force; subordinate unified command; unified command

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)


UNIFIED COMMAND

A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. JP 1-02

General. A unified command is a command with broad continuing missions under a single commander and is composed of forces from two or more Military Departments, established by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (See figure below.) The unified commander can adapt a command structure using any of the following six options: subordinate unified command; joint task force; functional component; Service component; single-Service force (normally the commander of a combatant command (CINC) assigns operations requiring a single-Service force to a Service component); or specific operational forces that, because of mission assigned and the urgency of the situation, must remain immediately responsive to the CINC. These options do not in any way limit the commanders' authority to organize their forces as they see fit. Unless authorized by the Secretary of Defense, the commander of a unified command will not act as the commander of a subordinate command.

Criteria for Establishing a Unified Command. When either or both of the following criteria apply generally to a situation, a unified command normally is required to secure the necessary unit of effort.

- A broad continuing mission exists requiring execution by significant forces of two or more Military Departments and necessitating a single strategic direction.
- Any combination of the following exists and significant forces of two or more Military Departments are involved: a large-scale operation requiring positive control of tactical execution by a large and complex force; a large geographic or functional area requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of the operations therein; and necessity for common utilization of limited logistic means.



The commander of a unified command will have a joint staff. Normally, a member of the joint staff will not also function as the commander of a subordinate force. The commander of a unified command has the authority to communicate to the Services his views on the nomination of senior officers serving in the command for immediate follow-on assignment, further joint assignments, and promotional potential.

Primary Responsibilities of the Commander of a Unified Command. The combatant commanders are responsible for the development and production of joint operation plans. During peacetime, they act to deter war and prepare for war by planning for the transition to war and military operations other than war. During war, they plan and conduct campaigns and major operations to accomplish assigned missions. Combatant command responsibilities include the following:

- Planning and conducting military operations in response to crises, to include the security of the command and protection of the US, its possessions and bases against attack or hostile incursion. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan tasks the combatant commanders to prepare joint operation plans that may be operation plans (OPLANs), concept plans with or without time-phased force and deployment data, or functional plans.
- Maintaining the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- Carrying out assigned missions, tasks, and responsibilities.
- Assigning tasks to, and direct coordination among, the subordinate commands to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the assigned missions.
- Communication directly with the Chiefs of the Services on single-Service matters as deemed appropriate; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on other matters, including the preparation of strategic, joint operation, and logistic plans, strategic and operational direction of assigned forces, conduct of combat operations, and any other necessary function of command required to accomplish the mission; the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with applicable directives; subordinate elements, including the development organizations, of the Defense agency or the Military Department directly supporting the development and acquisition of the combatant commander's command and control system in coordination with the Director of the Defense agency or Secretary of the Military Department concerned.
- Keeping the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly advised of significant events and incidents that occur in the functional or geographic area of responsibility, particularly those incidents that could create national or international repercussions.

Authority of the Commander of a Unified Command in an Emergency. In the event of a major emergency in the geographic combatant commander's area of responsibility (AOR) requiring the use of all available forces, the geographic combatant commander may assume temporary operation control (OPCON) of all forces in the assigned AOR, except those forces scheduled for or actually engaged in the execution of specific operational missions under joint OPLANs approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would be interfered with by contemplated use of such forces. The commander determines when such an emergency exists and, on assuming temporary OPCON over forces of another command, immediately advises the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the appropriate operational commanders, and the Chief of the Service of the forces concerned of the nature and estimated duration of employment of such forces.

The authority to assume temporary OPCON of forces in the event of a major emergency will not be delegated. Unusual circumstances in wartime, emergencies, or crises involving military operations other than war (such as a terrorist incident) may require a geographic

combatant commander to directly exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) through a shortened chain of command to forces assigned for the purpose of resolving the crisis. Additionally, the combatant commander can assume COCOM, in the event of war or an emergency that prevents control through normal channels, of security assistance organizations within the commander's general geographic AOR, or as directed by the National Command Authorities. All commanders bypassed in such exceptional command arrangements will be kept advised of all directives issued to and reports sent from elements under such exceptional command arrangements. Such arrangements will be terminated as soon as practicable, consistent with accomplishment of the mission.

Assumption of Temporary Command. In the temporary absence of a combatant commander from the command, interim command will pass to the deputy commander. If a deputy commander has not been designated, interim command will pass to the next senior officer present for duty who is eligible to exercise command, regardless of Service affiliation.

Related Terms

combatant command; subordinate unified command(s)

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

The document, approved by the President, which sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. Also called UCP. JP 1-02

The Unified Command Plan contains descriptions of the geographic boundaries assigned to combatant commanders. It provides that, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, when significant operations overlap the boundaries of two combatant commands, a joint task force will be formed and assigned an appropriate joint operations area. Command of this joint task force will be determined by the National Command Authorities and forces transferred to the appropriate combatant commander.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

UNIT INTEGRITY

Planners should attempt to maintain unit integrity. US forces train as units, and are best able to accomplish a mission when deployed intact. By deploying as an existing unit, forces are able to continue to operate under established procedures, adapting these to the mission and situation, as required. When personnel and elements are drawn from various commands, effectiveness is decreased. By deploying without established operating procedures, an ad hoc force is less effective and takes more time to adjust to requirements of the mission. This not only complicates mission accomplishment, but may also have an impact on force protection. Even if political restraints on an operation dictate that a large force cannot be deployed intact, commanders should select smaller elements for deployment that have established internal

UNITY OF COMMAND

structures and have trained and operated together. Additionally, when deploying into a situation which may involve combat operations, commanders should deploy with appropriate joint force combat capability, including elements that have had the opportunity to train together and develop common operating procedures. In order to provide joint force commanders with needed versatility, it may not be possible to preserve unit integrity. In such cases, units must be prepared to send elements which are able to operate independently of parent units. Attachment to a related unit is the usual mode. Units not accustomed to having attachments may be required to provide administrative and logistic support to normally unrelated units.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

UNITY OF COMMAND

The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.

Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. In multinational and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort — coordination through cooperation and common interests — is an essential complement to unity of command.

Related Terms

principles of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

UNITY OF EFFORT

Unity of Effort. Unity of effort, as shown in the figure below, requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, nongovernmental organizations, and among nations in any alliance or coalition. National unified action is influenced by the Constitution, federal law, international law, and the national interest.

Responsibilities for strategic coordination established in law and practice are as follows:

- The President of the US, advised by the National Security Council, is responsible to the American people for national strategic unity of effort.
- The Secretary of Defense is responsible to the President for national military unity of effort for creating, supporting, and employing military capabilities. Unity of effort among the Military Services at the national level is obtained from the authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense, by the strategic planning of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by cross-Service efforts by the Military Departments. The Secretary of Defense exercises authority, direction, and control over the Services through the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of their forces assigned to combatant commanders.

UNITY OF EFFORT

NATIONAL STRATEGIC
UNITY OF EFFORT



PRESIDENT

NATIONAL MILITARY UNITY OF
EFFORT FOR CREATING,
SUPPORTING, AND
EMPLOYING MILITARY
CAPABILITIES



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

- **The National Command Authorities (NCA) exercise authority over the Armed Forces through combatant commanders and through the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chiefs of the Services, for those forces not assigned to the combatant commands.**
- **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff functions under the authority, direction, and control of the NCA and transmits communications between the NCA and combatant commanders, and oversees activities of combatant commanders as directed by the Secretary of Defense.**
- **Commanders of combatant commands exercise combatant command (command authority) over assigned forces and are directly responsible to the NCA for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform assigned missions.**
- **In a foreign country, the US Ambassador is responsible to the President for directing, coordinating, and supervising all US Government elements in the host nation, except those under the command of a combatant commander.**

- The National Command Authorities (NCA), consisting of the President and the Secretary of Defense, or their authorized alternates, exercise authority over the armed forces through the combatant commanders for those forces assigned to the combatant commands and through the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chiefs of the Services for those forces not assigned to the combatant commands.
- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff functions under the authority, direction, and control of the NCA and transmits communications between the NCA and combatant commanders and oversees activities of combatant commanders as directed by the Secretary of Defense.
- Commanders of combatant commands exercise combatant command (command authority) over assigned forces and are directly responsible to the NCA for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform assigned missions.
- In a foreign country, the US Ambassador is responsible to the President for directing, coordinating, and supervising all US Government elements in the host nation, except

those under the command of a combatant commander. Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for coordinating with US Ambassadors in their geographic area of responsibility as necessary across the range of military operations.

Multinational Unity of Effort. As shown in the figure below, there are some general principles for attaining unity of effort among allied or coalition forces.

Unity of command may not be politically feasible but should be a goal if at all possible. Although important, it is only one of the components of unity of effort, and the others must be attained in any case. First, there must be common understanding among all national forces of the overall aim of the multinational force and the concept for its attainment. Simplicity of plan and organization is essential.

Coordinated policy, particularly on such matters as alliance or coalition commanders' authority over national logistics (including infrastructure) and intelligence, is required. Coordinated planning for rules of engagement, fratricide prevention, deception, electronic warfare, communications, special weapons, source and employment of reserves, and timing of operations is essential for unity of effort. Actions to improve interoperability and the ability to share information need to be addressed early (as early as the development of military systems for formal alliances). Nations should exchange qualified liaison officers at the earliest opportunity to ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort.

Finally, commanders and their representatives must establish and maintain trust and confidence among the multinational forces. Plain and objective communication, together with common courtesy, is essential.

PRINCIPLES OF MULTINATIONAL UNITY OF EFFORT

COMMON UNDERSTANDING

Among all forces of the overall aim and the concept of its attainment. Simplicity of plan and organization is essential.

COORDINATED POLICY

Nations should exchange qualified liaison officers at the earliest opportunity to improve interoperability and mutual understanding.

TRUST AND CONFIDENCE

Must be established and maintained by commanders and their representatives. Plain and objective communication, together with common courtesy, is essential.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

UNITY OF INTELLIGENCE EFFORT


For a particular area of interest, there should be unity of intelligence effort to ensure complete, accurate, and current intelligence to develop the best possible understanding of the adversary and the situation, and to reduce unnecessary redundancy and duplication. Joint force commanders (JFCs) have the responsibility and authority to determine, direct, and coordinate all mission-related collection and analysis through centralized or apportioned collection and production management efforts. When liaison personnel are provided by national intelligence and/or combat support agencies, the Intelligence Directorate (J-2) should integrate their efforts with the joint intelligence center/joint intelligence support element. These liaison personnel are normally organized into a national intelligence support team and support the JFC as an integral part of the J-2 organization. Access to intelligence capabilities to support mission responsibilities must be without regard to organization or command configurations. This approach allows the commander and J-2 to orchestrate pertinent intelligence activities to meet joint force intelligence requirements.

The JFC should have assured access to all necessary national and theater intelligence capabilities. If higher priority or competing tasks preclude optimum support to the JFC, that commander and the senior commander assigning the mission must be informed so they may make timely and alternative provision for intelligence or assess the effects of gaps in intelligence to the operation.

Subordinate commanders employ organic intelligence capabilities to support their assigned missions. At the same time, those capabilities must be available to assist the joint effort under the J-2's concept of synchronizing all forces' intelligence requirements. The J-2 must establish a flexible and tailored architecture of procedures, organizations, and equipment focused on the joint commander's needs. This intelligence system of systems complements and reinforces the organic capabilities at each echelon and, when necessary, provides direct support to subordinate commanders whose organic capabilities cannot be brought to bear.

The keys to unity of intelligence effort for joint operations are ensured access to any needed mission-related intelligence capability and coordination of all intelligence efforts in or about the area of interest. Cooperation of intelligence organizations is important, but it is not a substitute for a unified and coordinated effort.

The JFC should ensure that the subordinate commands assist each other in collecting and evaluating intelligence needed to the maximum extent compatible with the requirements of their respective commands and the joint force. As shown in the figure below, this includes sharing intelligence sources, collection assets and operations, collection management, data bases, intelligence analysis, production, and communications. This principle of sharing also applies to other forces and to intelligence organizations that support the joint force. Sharing is an affirmative responsibility of commands and organizations that have the ability to support joint operations. Sharing and mutual support are essential to integrating all resources and capabilities into a unified system that will best fulfill the prioritized intelligence needs for joint operations. The JFC will establish the command relationships for all assigned forces, including intelligence assets. Normally, components having organic intelligence staffs and forces will remain the assets of that component commander. If the JFC wants organic intelligence assets of a component to support other units, the JFC will usually assign that intelligence support mission to the component commander. Separate intelligence units and organizations assigned to the joint force will receive one of the four standard support missions from the JFC.



Related Terms

intelligence

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE

A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Ballistic or semiballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles. Also called UAV. JP 1-02

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are operated in the airspace control area by each component of the joint force. The established principles of airspace management used in manned flight operations will normally apply to UAV operations. The UAV is difficult to acquire and does not provide a clear radar signature, presenting a potential hazard to high performance aircraft. Therefore, UAV operations should be coordinated with all appropriate airspace control agencies to provide safe separation of UAVs and manned aircraft and prevent

engagement by friendly forces. UAV airspace control considerations are shown in the figure below.

Present reconnaissance assets available to the commander are generally large, costly, and usually manned, or are satellite systems. The unmanned aerial vehicle provides an additional capability to the commander to conduct day or night reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA), rapid battle damage assessment (BDA), and battlefield management (within line-of-sight of the ground control station) in high-threat or heavily defended areas where the loss of high-value, manned systems is likely and near real time information is required. Employment of UAVs in Vietnam and Operation DESERT STORM proved the capability of the UAV in a combat environment. UAVs require relatively few maintenance, control, and operating personnel or transportation assets for deployment (versus manned fixed-wing, helicopter, or radio units). Satellite systems are national assets and may not be available, or it may take too long to get the information from these assets to the supported commander. UAVs provide commanders with an enhanced capability to collect, disseminate, and exploit combat intelligence information in near real time.

UAVs are significant force enhancers. When first introduced, the UAVs were referred to as remotely piloted vehicles. With the development of Department of Defense-approved class categories, the name has been changed to UAV.

Future improvements promise mission area growth. The UAV also provides fire support agencies an ability to target and adjust supporting arms at significantly greater distances and at reduced risk when compared to current forward observer, forward air controller, and forward air controller (airborne) procedures. The UAV provides near real time target information and weapon designation capabilities, which can reduce the risk to manned aircraft performing air-to-surface weapon spotting and delivery. UAV assets can be task-organized, and UAV class categories can be selected to achieve maximum flexibility and mission success. Present mission assignments center on the UAV's ability to perform RSTA and BDA.

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV) AIRSPACE CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS

- UAVs are launched from UAV launch and recovery sites, which may be either airfields, unimproved tactical field locations, or flight decks afloat. They then climb to a transit altitude (normally above the coordinating altitude), fly to the UAV mission area, then return via the UAV transit altitude for recovery.
- UAV operations should be addressed in the air control plan and air control order and adhere to the procedures established by the air control authority. As appropriate, UAV missions should be included in the air tasking order and special instructions.
- Because UAV missions can occur as preplanned or immediate, this information must be disseminated through the airspace control system in a timely manner.

Related Terms

airspace control

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
3-55.1 JTTP for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

USABILITY

The form in which intelligence is provided to the joint force commander (JFC) should be tailored for particular applications or be suitable for general use without additional analysis or manipulation. As much as practicable, intelligence must be in a form suitable for application when it is received. Intelligence production and the tailoring of particular materials for operational and tactical commanders must be done in the perspective of the JFC's need for timely application. Dissemination must be direct and concise with the command mission and the intelligence purpose in mind. The commander should be able to quickly identify and apply relevant intelligence. Common terminology and multimedia methods must be employed in the communication of intelligence so that it is understandable and useful given the capabilities and time constraints of the commander. Provision of useful intelligence requires producers to understand the circumstances under which their products are used, and implies the JFC's responsibility to communicate his operational intent or situation and any particular requirements of content, form, medium, or presentation.

Related Terms

intelligence

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0

Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

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VALUES

Our military service is based on values — those standards that American military experience has proven to be the bedrock of combat success. These values are common to all the Services and represent the essence of our professionalism.

First and always is integrity. In the case of joint action, as within a Service, integrity is the cornerstone for building trust. We know as members of the armed forces that whatever the issue at hand, we can count on each other to say what we mean and do what we say. This allows us to rely with confidence on others to carry out assigned tasks. This is an enormous advantage for building effective teams.

Competence is at the center of our relationship with the American people and cements the mutual cohesion between leader and follower. Our fellow citizens expect that we are competent in every aspect of warfare; those we lead into battle deserve no less. Each of the Services has organized, trained, and equipped superbly competent forces whose ability to fight with devastating effectiveness in the air, on land, and at sea is the foundation on which successful joint action rests.

For the dedicated professional, building Service competence is an intense, lifelong affair. In addition, many serve in assignments requiring an additional competency in joint skills; and all members of the armed forces must understand their fellow Services to the extent required for effective operations. Moreover, those who will lead joint forces must develop skill in orchestrating air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces into smoothly functioning joint teams.

Since warfare began, physical courage has defined warriors. The United States of America is blessed with its Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen, whose courage knows no boundaries. This publication recounts examples of splendid acts of heroism. Even in warfare featuring advanced technology, individual fighting spirit and courage remain the inspiration for battle teamwork.

Moral courage is also essential in military operations. This includes the willingness to stand up for what we believe is right even if that stand is unpopular or contrary to conventional wisdom. Other aspects of moral courage involve risk taking and tenacity: making bold decisions in the face of uncertainty, accepting full responsibility for the outcome, and holding to the chosen course despite challenges or difficulties.

We also must have the courage to wield military power in an unimpeachable moral fashion. We respect human rights. We observe the Geneva Conventions not only as a matter of legality but from conscience. This behavior is integral to our status as American fighting men and women. Acting with conscience reinforces the links among the Services and between the Armed Forces of the United States and the American people, and these linkages are basic sources of our strength.

Lastly, teamwork is the cooperative effort by the members of a group to achieve common goals. The Armed Forces of the United States are the team. Deterring aggression and, if need be, winning our wars are the team's common goals. Americans culturally respond to and respect teamwork as an important value. This provides the Armed Forces of the United States a solid basis upon which to build effective joint teams. Several elements support effective teamwork.

- Trust and Confidence. Trust — defined as total confidence in the integrity, ability, and good character of another — is one of the most important ingredients in building strong

teams. Trust expands the commander's options and enhances flexibility, agility, and the freedom to take the initiative when conditions warrant. Trust does not result from good feelings or devout wishes but is based on the mutual confidence resulting from honest efforts to learn about and understand the capabilities each member brings to the team. Trust and confidence within a joint force are built the same way as within a Service tactical unit: by hard work, demonstrated competence, and planning and training together. Trust has often been singled out by key members of the most effective US joint forces as a dominant characteristic of their teams.

- **Delegation.** The delegation of authority commensurate with responsibility is a necessary part of building trust and teamwork. Oversupervision disrupts teamwork. Military history demonstrates that delegation unleashes the best efforts and greatest initiative among all members of military teams. Delegation is especially important in joint warfare where Service expertise is the essential building block.
- **Cooperation.** This aspect of teamwork can be at tension with competition. Both are central human characteristics, but the nature of modern warfare puts a premium on cooperation with each other to compete with the enemy. Higher echelons should never have to mandate cooperation. Cooperation requires team players and the willingness to share credit with all team members.

In conclusion, military analysts have long pointed out that unit cohesion is a most important cause of excellence in combat. At a higher organizational level, cultivation of the values discussed here helps master the challenges inherent in building joint cohesion from individual Service elements and produces a shared loyalty among the members of a joint team.

Joint Warfare is Team Warfare

“When a team takes to the field, individual specialists come together to achieve a team win. All players try to do their very best because every other player, the team, and the home town are counting on them to win.

So it is when the Armed Forces of the United States go to war. We must win every time.

Every soldier must take the battlefield believing his or her unit is the best in the world.

Every pilot must take off believing there is no one better in the sky.

Every sailor standing watch must believe there is no better ship at sea.

Every Marine must hit the beach believing that there are no better infantrymen in the world.

But they all must also believe that they are part of a team, a joint team, that fights together to win.

This is our history, this is our tradition, this is our future.”

General Colin L. Powell

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 1

Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

WAR

When other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, placing the US in a wartime state. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the US and its multinational partners.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

WARNING ORDER

1. A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow. (DOD)
2. A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of courses of action by a supported commander and requests that a commander's estimate be submitted.
3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. JP 1-02

During Phase III of crisis action planning, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally publishes the WARNING ORDER, a planning guidance message to the supported commander and other members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community. The WARNING ORDER establishes command relationships (designating supported and supporting commanders) and states the mission, objectives, and known constraints. The WARNING ORDER usually allocates forces and strategic lift or requests the supported commander to develop force and strategic lift requirements using Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). A tentative C-day and L-hour are provided in the WARNING ORDER, or the supported commander is requested to propose a C-day and L-hour. Finally, the WARNING ORDER directs the supported commander to develop courses of action (COAs). If time permits, the supported command should use JOPES automated data processing and begin entering preliminary force movement requirements. If a specific COA is already being considered, the WARNING ORDER will be used to describe that COA and request the supported commander's assessment. The WARNING ORDER establishes a deadline for US Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM's) preliminary force deployment estimate and force closure profile and for the supported commander's response — the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE. Time permitting, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct USTRANSCOM to develop a DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE for analytical purposes.

In extremely time-sensitive situations, the WARNING ORDER may be issued orally or even omitted. When the WARNING ORDER is omitted, a PLANNING ORDER or ALERT ORDER may be issued. When issued in lieu of a WARNING ORDER, the PLANNING or ALERT ORDERS will contain the force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information.

WEAPONNEERING

Related Terms

alert order; execute order; planning order

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)

WEAPONNEERING

The process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal weapons required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target, considering target vulnerability, weapon effect, munitions delivery accuracy, damage criteria, probability of kill, and weapon reliability. JP 1-02

During the weaponneering/allocation phase, targeting personnel quantify the expected results of lethal and nonlethal weapons employment against prioritized targets. The joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL), the prioritized listing of potential targets, constructed during the target development phase, provides the basis for weaponneering assessment activities. All approved targets are weaponneered on target worksheets, which detail recommended aim points, recommended number/type aircraft and weapons, fuzing, target identification and description, target attack objectives, target area threats, and probability of destruction. The final prioritized targets are then included into the Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP). The resulting MAAP is the plan of employment that forms the foundation of the joint air tasking order. The MAAP is a key element of the concept of joint air operations. The development of the MAAP includes the review of joint force commander and joint force air component commander guidance; component direct air support plans and support requests from components; updates to target requests; availability of capabilities/forces; target selection from the JIPTL; and aircraft allocation.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

WEAPON ENGAGEMENT ZONE

In air defense, airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with a particular weapon system. Also called WEZ. a. fighter engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with fighter aircraft. Also called FEZ. b. high-altitude missile engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with high-altitude surface-to-air missiles. Also called HIMEZ. c. low-altitude missile engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with low- to medium-altitude surface-to-air missiles. Also called LOMEZ. d. short-range air defense engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with short-range air defense weapons. It may be established within a low- or high-altitude missile engagement zone. Also called SHORADEZ. e. joint engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within which multiple air defense systems (surface-to-air missiles and aircraft) are simultaneously employed to engage air threats. Also called JEZ. JP 1-02

In air defense, a weapons engagement zone (WEZ) is airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement normally rests with a particular weapon system. These include fighter engagement zone, high-altitude missile engagement zone, low-altitude missile engagement zone, short-range air defense engagement zone, and joint engagement zone.

WEZ defines air defense areas by weapon system. From an airspace control perspective, WEZ provides airspace users with location of the air defense engagement for mission planning purposes. Design of the WEZ is dependent on specific weapon system capabilities. The point of contact for designation of a WEZ is the area air defense commander.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52

Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

In arms control usage, weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. JP 1-02

As weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferate, the likelihood of their use against friendly forces increases not only in war but also in operations other than war. An enemy's use of such weapons can quickly change the nature of a campaign, perhaps even affecting the combatant commander's strategic objectives. The use or the threat of use of these weapons

can cause large-scale shifts in strategic and operational objectives, phases, and courses of action. Thus, planning for the possibility of both friendly and enemy use is important to campaign design.

It may not be the sheer killing power of these weapons that represents the greatest effect. It is the strategic, operational, psychological, and political impacts of their use that can affect strategic objectives and campaign design.

The effective combination of conventional offensive and defensive operations can help reduce the effectiveness or success of an enemy's use of WMD. Offensive measures include raids, strikes, and operations designed to locate and neutralize the threat of such weapons. Joint force commanders (JFCs) implement defensive nuclear, biological, and chemical measures and plan for effective air and theater missile defense with different systems.

Multinational operations become more complicated with the threat of employment of these weapons. An enemy may use WMD against other coalition members, especially those with no or little defense against these weapons, to disintegrate the coalition.

Intelligence systems and planners advise JFCs of an opponent's capability to employ WMD and under what conditions that opponent is most likely to do so. This advice includes an assessment of the enemy's willingness and intent to employ these weapons. It is important to ensure that friendly force dispositions do not provide lucrative targets for enemy WMD.

When directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA), JFCs plan for the employment of theater nuclear weapons by US forces in a manner consistent with national policy and strategic guidance. The employment of such weapons signifies an escalation of the war and is an NCA decision. The Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command's capabilities to assist in the planning of all nuclear missions are available to support nuclear weapon employment.

If directed to plan for the use of theater nuclear weapons, JFCs typically have two escalating objectives. The first is to deter or prevent an enemy attack that employs WMD. To make opponents understand that friendly forces possess and will use such weapons, JFCs may simply communicate that to the enemy, using psychological operations (PSYOP) or other means. Regardless, JFCs implement measures to increase readiness and preserve the option to respond, including the alert and forward positioning, if required, of appropriate systems. Attempts at prevention or denial may include targeting and attacking enemy WMD capability by conventional and special operations forces.

If deterrence fails, JFCs respond appropriately, consistent with national policy and strategic guidance, to enemy aggression while seeking to control the intensity and scope of conflict and destruction. That response could be conventional in nature, but may include the employment of WMD.

Force protection is imperative in this environment. The joint force can survive use of WMD by anticipating their employment. Commanders can protect their forces in a variety of ways, including training, PSYOP, operations security, dispersion of forces, use of protective clothing, inoculation, and proper use of terrain for shielding against effects. Enhancement of force protection by using all available measures reduces incentives for a first strike by an enemy with NBC weapons.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) is the system that provides the means for operational direction and technical administrative support for command and control of US military forces. It supports joint operation planning and implementation. WWMCCS furnishes the multipath channel of secure communications that transmits tactical warning and assessment intelligence to the National Command Authorities (NCA) and direction from the NCA to the combatant commanders. WWMCCS consists of the National Military Command System, the command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems of the combatant commanders, the WWMCCS-related management and information systems of the Military Departments, the C4 systems of the Service component commands, and the C4 support systems of Department of Defense agencies. The automated data processing system supports four basic functional areas: resource and unit monitoring, conventional planning and execution, nuclear planning and execution, and tactical warning and attack assessment intelligence.

WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN) provides planners with the means to review, update, and transfer data rapidly between WWMCCS locations. It permits real time secure communications. WIN enables commanders and staffs to work critical compartmented plans and operation orders by innate characteristics of user identification and other system safeguards. Within WIN, the telecommunications network permits access to computer resources at separate WWMCCS locations and use of those resources. The WIN file transfer service supports the exchange of large volumes of data such as time-phased force and deployment data files between members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). The WIN teleconference enables interconnected members of the JPEC to confer and exchange textual information simultaneously.

Related Terms

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

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