

M

MAIN OPERATIONS BASE

In special operations, a base established by a joint force special operations component commander or a subordinate special operations component commander in friendly territory to provide sustained command and control, administration, and logistical support to special operations activities in designated areas. Also called MOB. JP 1-02

Special operations forces (SOF) component commanders will identify facilities and construction requirements to support their operations. They will submit these requirements through their Service components. Construction in response to time-sensitive missions requires expedient work. Deviations from standards must be approved by the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) and the geographic combatant commander. SOF normally operate from one or more main operations bases (MOBs) and a variable number of forward operations bases and advanced operations bases.

A MOB is a base established by a JFSOCC or a subordinate SOF component commander in friendly territory to provide sustained command and control, administration, and logistic support to special operations activities in designated areas. The MOB is normally the location of an Army special operations task force, Air Force special operations component (AFSOC), or naval special warfare task group. The special forces Group calls its MOB the Special Forces operations base. The AFSOC calls its MOB the Air Force special operations base.

Related Terms

advanced operations base; forward operations base

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-05.3 Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures

MAINTAINING FREEDOM OF ACTION

Maintaining freedom of action is vitally important. There are many components to securing the freedom to act. Effective diplomatic, economic, military, and informational components of national security strategy are needed to provide the freedom to act at the national level. Adequate logistic support is essential, as is maintaining the operations security of plans and gaining the fullest possible surprise. Having a force structure that provides insurance against unanticipated developments or the underestimation of enemy strengths is important as well.

Several aspects of modern warfare tend to restrict freedom of action. Sophisticated information technology and the nature of modern news reporting, for instance, make the tasks of ensuring operations security and surprise more difficult. But as Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD, and DESERT STORM showed, tight operations security — even at the expense of some staff efficiency — can work to achieve effective surprise. Joint forces should understand these sorts of very demanding security precautions are a likely part of future operations and should accommodate stringent operations security in exercises and training in order to practice staff efficiency and public affairs activities under realistic conditions.

Finally, the role of deception in securing freedom of action should never be underestimated. Indeed, military thinkers since Sun Tzu have stressed the central nature of deception in successful warfare. Deception can provide a highly leveraged means to confuse our enemies

MAINTENANCE AND SALVAGE

and cause them to miscalculate our intentions, deploy their forces poorly, and mistakenly estimate our strengths and weaknesses, while helping to preserve our own freedom of action. Deception at the joint force level requires clear themes around which all components can focus their efforts.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

MAINTENANCE AND SALVAGE

maintenance

1. All action taken to retain materiel in or to restore it to a specified condition. It includes: inspection, testing, servicing, classification as to serviceability, repair, rebuilding, and reclamation. 2. All supply and repair action taken to keep a force in condition to carry out its mission. 3. The routine recurring work required to keep a facility (plant, building, structure, ground facility, utility system, or other real property) in such condition that it may be continuously utilized, at its original or designed capacity and efficiency, for its intended purpose. JP 1-02

salvage

1. Property that has some value in excess of its basic material content but which is in such condition that it has no reasonable prospect of use for any purpose as a unit and its repair or rehabilitation for use as a unit is clearly impractical. 2. The saving or rescuing of condemned, discarded, or abandoned property, and of materials contained therein for reuse, refabrication, or scrapping. JP 1-02

Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for coordination of maintenance and salvage within the theater. Where practical, maintenance facilities for joint or cross-Service use should be established, and inter-Service use of salvage assets should be emphasized. However, Service-peculiar item maintenance support should remain the responsibility of Service component commanders. Maintenance priorities should emphasize mission-essential weapon systems that can be rapidly returned to combat readiness. An effective maintenance program (including preventive maintenance) can minimize retrograde and supply needs for major end-items and enhance battle damage repair efforts.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

MANEUVER

1. A movement to place ships or aircraft in a position of advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.

JP 1-02

The principal purpose of maneuver is to gain positional advantage relative to enemy centers of gravity in order to control or destroy those centers of gravity. The focus of both land and naval maneuver is to render opponents incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and physical cohesion (their ability to fight as an effective, coordinate whole) rather than to destroy them physically through attrition. This condition may be achieved by attacking enemy forces and controlling territory, populations, key waters, and lines of communications (in all dimensions). Land and naval maneuver (which includes the action of air assets organic to the surface force) is required to control population, territory, and key waters.

There are multiple ways to attain positional advantage. A naval expeditionary force with airpower, cruise missile firepower, and amphibious assault capability, within operational reach of enemy centers of gravity, has positional advantage. Land force attack aviation, if able to strike at the opponent's centers of gravity, also has positional advantage. Maintaining dimensional superiority contributes to positional advantage by facilitating freedom of action.

Maneuver of forces relative to enemy centers of gravity can be key to the joint force commander's (JFC's) campaign or major operation. Maneuver is the means of concentrating forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and physical momentum. Maneuver may also exploit the effects of massed and/or precision firepower or weapons of mass destruction.

JFCs consider the contribution of special operations in attaining positional advantage. Through special reconnaissance, direct action, or support of insurgent forces, special operations forces may expose vulnerabilities and attack the enemy at tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

At all levels of war, successful maneuver requires not only fire and movement but also agility and versatility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations. It requires designating and then, if necessary, shifting the main effort and applying the principles of mass and economy of force.

- At the strategic level, deploying units to and positioning units within an operational area are forms of maneuver if such movement seeks to gain positional advantage. Strategic maneuver should place forces in position to begin the phases or major operations of a campaign.
- At the operational level, maneuver is a means by which JFCs set the terms of battle by time and location, decline battle, or exploit existing situations. Operational maneuver usually takes large forces from a base of operations to an area where they are in position to achieve operational objectives. As shown by the Commander in Chief, United States Central Command's concept of operations in Operation DESERT STORM, the ability to maneuver must be a trait not only of combat forces but also of the logistic resources that support them.

MANPOWER

- Once deployed into battle formations into the operational area, maneuver is typically considered tactical in nature.

The concept for maneuver, both naval and land, needs to be articulated in the JFC's concept of operations includes timing, sequencing, and method and location of entry into the operational area. Types of joint force maneuvers include forcible entry, sustained action at sea and from the sea, and sustained action on land.

Related Terms

interdiction; operational art; principles of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

MANPOWER

manpower resources

Human resources available to the Services which can be applied against manpower requirements.

JP 1-02

"People and not things are the fundamental factor determining the outcome of war."

General Lo Jui-Ching
May 1965

Manpower mobilization augments the peacetime Active component (AC) military end strength. Sources of military mobilization manpower include members of the Reserve component (RC), military retirees, volunteers with prior service, and nonprior service personnel who volunteer or are drafted. These resources are organized by law to provide responsiveness in crises. The figure below associates these sources of manpower with manpower mobilization options and the actions required to initiate a callup. The legal authorities required for the callup of the various manpower pools are listed with the corresponding option.

In addition to the callup of manpower from reserve and retiree manpower pools and conscription, three other actions can be taken to ensure optimum availability and utilization of manpower during mobilization. These are stop-loss, stop-movement, and personnel redistribution actions. Stop-loss actions allow the Military Departments to retain personnel beyond their terms of service. Stop-movement actions refer to a number of policy and procedural actions that can be taken by the Military Departments to stabilize AC personnel and ensure the maximum number are available for assignment to theaters of operation or other high-priority duties. These activities may include canceling temporary and permanent change of station travel, changing tour length policies, and curtailing attendance at Service schools. Redistribution actions are also taken within the Military Departments during a crisis to ensure that high-priority units are maintained at the highest level of personnel readiness until an efficient personnel fill and replacement pipeline can be established.

Civilian manpower is an integral part of the Department of Defense Total Force Concept. Future crises across the range of military operations will require careful management of the civilian work force to support military operations in overseas theaters of operations and the continental US.

In theaters, civilians with skills essential to support military missions may remain after other US civilians and their families have been evacuated. The Services and Defense agencies

designate these personnel as emergency-essential and provide necessary training and other support for their crisis and wartime duties to include the intrinsic responsibility of providing protection to US civilians in the area of responsibility consistent with the capabilities and operational mission. Other civilian employees with critical skills may deploy to the theater individually or with supported military units. The geographic combatant commander determines admission requirements to the theater, and the respective Services and agencies implement those requirements for their employees. Some foreign-national civilian employees

MILITARY MANPOWER MOBILIZATION: SOURCES AND OPTIONS

SITUATION	SOURCES OF MANPOWER	MOBILIZATION OPTIONS	ACTION REQUIRED
Domestic Emergency (e.g., natural disaster, civil disturbance)	Army National Guard and Air National Guard	Federalize National Guard troops under 10 USC 12406 and 331-333	President publishes proclamation and executive order.
Any level of emergency (with or without a declared national emergency)	Volunteers from the National Guard and Reserve	Call for volunteers under 10 USC 12301(d)	Secretaries of the Military Departments solicit volunteers with needed skills and publish callup orders.
	Regular and Reserve retirees with 20+ years of active service	Recall retirees under 10 USC 688(a)	Secretaries of the Military Departments publish callup orders.
	Volunteer enlistees	Enlist qualified volunteers	Military Departments accept qualified applicants in accordance with DOD and Service standards and policies.
	Selected Reserve -Units -Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA)	Call to active duty up to 200,000 Selected Reservists under 10 USC 12304 (PSRC)	President publishes Executive order. Military Departments publish callup orders based on SECDEF implementing instructions. President must report to the Congress within 24 hours on anticipated use of forces.
	Draftees	Initiate conscription	NCA requests amendment to the Selective Service Act (50 USC app. 451 et seq.) authorizing conscription. Presidential proclamation of a national emergency and an
War or National Emergency	Ready Reserve -Units -Individual Ready Reserve -IMAs	Call to active duty up to 1,000,000 Ready Reservists for up to 24 months under 10 USC 12302(a) (Partial Mobilization)	Executive order (or congressional declaration of national emergency). Military Departments publish call up orders based on SECDEF implementing instructions.
	Remaining Ready Reserve	Call to active duty remaining Reserve Component personnel under 10 USC 12301 (Full Mobilization)	Passage of legislation or a joint resolution of the Congress declaring war or national emergency. Military Departments publish callup orders.
	Retired Reserve		
	Standby Reserve		
	New units and personnel	Add new force structure and personnel necessary to achieve national security objectives (Total Mobilization)	Passage of legislation authorizing additional force structure and manpower.

MARITIME ENVIRONMENT

(local or third country nationals) may also remain to support the mission based on the need for their skills, level of danger, and agreements with the host country.

In the US, the Services and Defense agencies reallocate incumbent civilian personnel from peacetime to the highest priority functions through detailing, reassignment, and cross training. When a crisis begins, the Services and agencies activate Recruiting Area Staffing Committees to find joint, local solutions for meeting these requirements.

Manpower mobilization options provide great flexibility to the National Command Authorities for responding to a crisis. Response levels are tied to the legal authorities available before a Presidential declaration of national emergency or a congressional declaration of national emergency or war. Before a declaration of national emergency, the Secretaries of the Military Departments can call for RC volunteers who have needed skills and activate them for short periods of time. RC volunteers were used effectively during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. Volunteer Reservists and recalled retirees were used in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in the Persian Gulf. Presidential Selective Reserve Callup (PSRC) authority makes up to 200,000 Selected Reservists available for up to 270 days. It was also used effectively in the Persian Gulf and during recent operations in Haiti. This authority can be used to send a strong signal of US resolve to friends and foes alike and can serve as a prelude to mobilization.

A Presidential declaration of national emergency and invocation of the partial mobilization authority makes up to one million Ready Reservists available for up to 24 consecutive months. This partial mobilization authority, also used for the first time in the Persian Gulf crisis, includes members of the individual ready reserve, which is a source of pretrained manpower to be used as Service needs dictate. Like the PSRC, activations under this authority can be made incrementally or all at once to meet the needs of the crisis as it develops. A congressional declaration of a national emergency or war is required before full mobilization may be ordered. Under full mobilization the Retired and Standby Reserves become available, as well as Ready Reserves not called previously. Manpower requirements for force expansion beyond the peacetime-authorized force structure and sustainment in a protracted conflict may require legislation authorizing activation of the Selective Service System for the conscription of additional forces.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

MARITIME ENVIRONMENT

The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including amphibious objective areas. JP 1-02

Joint Operations in the Littoral or Maritime Environment. Depending on the situation, joint force commanders (JFCs) may conduct operations in the littoral to achieve or support joint force objectives. The littoral area contains two parts. First is the seaward area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. Second is the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. Control of the littoral area is often essential to dimensional superiority. Naval operations in the littoral can provide for the seizure of an adversary's port, naval base, or coastal air base to allow entry of other elements of the joint force.

Controlled littorals often offer the best positions from which to begin, sustain, and support joint operations, especially in operational areas with poor infrastructure for supporting operations ashore. Sea-based airpower and sea-launched land combat power are formidable tools that JFCs can use to gain and maintain initiative. Naval forces operating in littoral areas can dominate coastal areas to mass forces rapidly and generate high intensity offensive power at times and in locations required by JFCs. Naval forces' relative freedom of action enables JFCs to position these capabilities where they can readily strike opponents. Naval forces' very presence, if made known, can pose a threat that the enemy cannot ignore.

Even when joint forces are firmly established ashore, littoral operations provide JFCs with excellent opportunities to achieve leverage over the enemy by operational maneuver from the sea. Such operations can introduce significant size forces over relatively great distances in short periods of time into the rear or flanks of the enemy. The mobility of naval forces at sea, coupled with the ability to rapidly land operationally significant forces, can be key to achieving JFC objectives. These capabilities are further enhanced by operational flexibility and the ability to identify and take advantage of fleeting opportunities.



Destroyers can provide a dominating presence, which joint force commanders can use in the littoral area to achieve objectives.

JFCs can operate from a headquarters platform at sea. Depending on the nature of the joint operations, a naval commander can serve as the JFC or function as a joint force air component commander while the operation is primarily maritime, and shift that command ashore if the operation shifts landward in accordance with the JFC's concept of operations. In other cases, a naval headquarters may serve as the base of the joint force headquarters, or an other-than-naval JFC may use command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence facilities aboard ship. Naval air and missile defense can project that coverage inland, during both entry operations and sustained operations ashore.

Transferring command and control (C2) from sea to shore requires coordination throughout the joint force in order to maintain uninterrupted C2 for current operations. Such a transition may involve a simple movement of flags and supporting personnel, or it may require a complete change of joint force headquarters. The new joint force headquarters may use personnel and equipment, especially communications equipment, from the old headquarters, or it may require augmentation from different sources. One technique is to transfer C2 in several stages. Another technique is for the JFC to satellite off the capabilities of one of the components ashore until

MARITIME POWER PROJECTION

the new headquarters is fully prepared. Whichever way the transition is done, staffs should develop detailed checklists to address all of the C2 requirements and the timing of transfer of each. The value of joint training in this transition is evident.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

MARITIME POWER PROJECTION

Power projection in and from the maritime environment, including a broad spectrum of offensive military operations to destroy enemy forces or logistic support or to prevent enemy forces from approaching within enemy weapons' range of friendly forces. Maritime power projection may be accomplished by amphibious assault operations, attack of targets ashore, or support of sea control operations. JP 1-02

Maritime power projection in and from the maritime environment includes a broad spectrum of offensive military operations to destroy enemy forces and logistic support and to prevent enemy forces from approaching within enemy weapons' range of friendly forces. Maritime power projection is accomplished by amphibious operations; attack against targets ashore; support of sea control operations; and strike warfare.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-04 Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations (AIR)

MARSHALLING

1. The process by which units participating in an amphibious or airborne operation group together or assemble when feasible or move to temporary camps in the vicinity of embarkation points, complete preparations for combat, or prepare for loading. 2. The process of assembling, holding, and organizing supplies and/or equipment, especially vehicles of transportation, for onward movement. JP 1-02

"Move upon the enemy in one mass on one line so that when brought to battle you shall outnumber him."

Napoleon

General. Marshalling is the process of assembling units or moving them to temporary camps near embarkation points to complete preparation for combat or to prepare for loading. It includes the preparations required to plan, document, and load equipment and personnel aboard aircraft.

The marshalling area is usually located near departure camps and airfields to conserve resources and reduce the opportunity for observation. When the number of departure airfields

is limited or when requirements dictate dispersion, loading may be accomplished on a phased schedule.

The Air Force component portion of the marshalling operation is developed during air movement planning and consists of instructions regulating aircraft movement and the aircraft parking plan. These procedures are in the air movement annex to the operation order (OPORD).

Preparations.

Planning. The joint force commander staff coordinates with administrative and logistic agencies for maximum support during marshalling. This support includes transportation, communications, and housekeeping details (campsite construction, operation, and maintenance; messing; and religion, recreation, and other morale services) and permits the unit to concentrate on preparation for the movement. Support may also include local security personnel to supplement normal Air Force security at the departure airfield. For details on air base ground defense.

Logistics. The unit logistics officer prepares the marshalling plan. The plan is an appendix to the service support annex of the OPORD or an annex to the administrative and logistics order of the airlifted force. It should contain procedures for cover and deception. The marshalling plan includes procedures for moving units from marshalling areas through the alert holding and call forward areas to the ready line. Finally, it includes methods for loading troops and equipment into individual aircraft.

Selection of Marshalling Areas and Departure Airfields. The selection of marshalling areas and departure airfields is based on the air movement plan and influenced by several common factors. There is no order of priority among these factors, but any one of them could become the basis for final selection. To avoid concentration of forces, multiple marshalling areas and departure airfields should be selected. Excessive dispersion, however, makes command and control more difficult and may diminish the effectiveness of supporting activities. The factors affecting selection of marshalling areas and departure airfields are illustrated in the figure below.

FACTORS AFFECTING SELECTION OF MARSHALLING AREAS AND DEPARTURE AIRFIELDS

- Mission to be accomplished
- Airfields (number, location, type)
- Air support available
- Communications
- Initial location of participating units
- Vulnerability to enemy action
- Distance to the objective area
- Logistical support required and available
- Unit integrity
- Adequacy of air defense
- Capacity of each airfield to handle sustained operations
- Security requirements, to include camouflage, concealment, and deception measures
- Health hazards and expected weather
- Surface lines of communications
- Types of airlift aircraft used

Unit Preparation. For security reasons, marshalling should be accomplished quickly. To prepare for marshalling, deploying units establish liaison with the departure airfield control group (DACG), obtain equipment and supplies as early as possible, and issue prepackaged supplies and equipment to the airborne forces to expedite loading operations. They also perform final preparation of vehicles and equipment, ensure that adequate shoring and dunnage materials are readily available and receive parachutes and other air items and prepare airdrop loads in coordination with the responsible airdrop support unit.

The deploying unit is responsible for preparing and certifying aircraft load plans (appropriate Air Force officials verify and approve load plans), personnel, and equipment manifests (and annotating any hazardous materials by class), and submitting them through the DACG to the supporting airlift elements. En route messing is a deploying unit responsibility.

Unit commanders or team chiefs plan and coordinate the use of available facilities and areas at departure airfields for command post, communications centers, briefing areas, and equipment and supply handling points. Ensure unit equipment, including individual clothing and equipment not required in the objective area, is packed in suitable containers and stored at the rear echelon or installation.

Dispersal Procedures. Dispersal techniques should be considered during marshalling. One technique involves moving personnel and equipment to departure airfields where an airlift may be staged. Another technique is to fly airlift aircraft to onload bases where personnel and equipment are located. Personnel and equipment are subsequently airlifted to the originating departure airfields. Any combination of these procedures may be used.

Responsibilities. Arrival and departure airfield operations are conducted by Air Force and the deploying component units. The Air Force units, consisting of tanker airlift control element (TALCE), mission support team (MST), and mission support element (MSE) teams, are typically assigned to either composite or provisional organizations tailored to meet the specific task at hand. These teams are responsible for marshalling the deploying unit and associated equipment for airlift. The organization employed depends on the size of the unit being deployed and the number of aircraft involved.

The arrival/departure airfield control group (A/DACG) is the deploying Service component's counterpart to the TALCE, MST, and MSE. This organization is sized to support the unit being deployed. Specific marshalling responsibilities are outlined in the figure below.

Marshalling Responsibilities

A/DACG

Coordinate with the TALCE, MST, or MSE and deploying unit.

Ensure offload teams and required support teams are available.

Accept responsibility for each planeload at the established release point from the TALCE.

Release each load to the deploying unit. Provide fueling and minor maintenance for deploying unit vehicles.

Deploying Unit

Appoint a plane team or troop commander for each mission aircraft carrying passengers.

Coordinate with the A/DACG.

Complete final preparation of vehicles, equipment, pallets, containers, and required documentation.

Ensure all required shoring and dunnage are on hand.

Assemble personnel and equipment into plane loads according to preplanned load plans.

Provide safety equipment to loading crew members.

Ensure personnel and equipment arrive at the alert holding area according to the established timetable. Correct any load or documentation discrepancies identified by the A/DACG or TALCE.

Assist in loading and unloading aircraft as instructed by the TALCE load team chief.

Departure and Arrival Airfield Installation Commander

Provide a marshalling area.

Provide any logistical or administrative support as identified during the planning process.

Execution. The deploying unit, DACG, and TALCE work together to ensure the unit is ready for air movement as quickly, orderly, and safely as possible. The deploying unit assembles, prepares, and documents its cargo and personnel for air movement. Discrepancies are identified and corrected prior to air movement. There are four separate areas of activity in departure airfield operations. Each activity takes place in a designated area and involves specific tasks. The figure below shows the four separate areas of activity and outlines the major functions of each area.

Deploying unit cargo, vehicles, and equipment to loading sites based on required loading and scheduled station times published in the air movement plan. The deploying unit's installation major command provides transportation to move personnel and chalk loads to aircraft. Whenever possible, movements are made at night to maximize operations security. Personnel in charge of aircraft chalk loads should receive mission briefings concerning the route to their respective aircraft. Personnel and equipment should arrive at onload airfields in accordance with prescribed times published in the air movement plan. The TALCE controls

DEPARTURE AIRFIELD OPERATIONS

MARSHALLING AREA

Deploying unit responsibility. Prepare vehicles, equipment cargo and personnel into chalk loads for delivery to the DACG alert holding area for air movement.

ALERT HOLDING AREA


Departure airfield control group area of responsibility. The DACG ensures the movement of vehicles, equipment, and cargo from the alert holding area to the call forward area in orderly fashion. The reception of aircraft loads and conducting preinspections are accomplished here.

CALL FORWARD AREA

Dual DACG and TALCE area of responsibility. Joint inspection and discrepancy corrections are conducted in this area. Chalk loads are moved from the call forward area and released into the TALCE at the ready line.

READY LINE / LOADING RAMP AREA

TALCE area of responsibility. Receives control of chalks from the DACG and conducts additional briefings / inspections as required. Responsibility for all air movement operations.



MAJOR FUNCTIONS

- Prepares personnel and cargo manifests
- Prepares other documentation agreed upon during the joint planning conference
- Conducts initial inspection of each chalk
- Releases each chalk to the DACG at the alert holding area

DACG Departure Airfield Control Group

MAJOR FUNCTIONS

- Accepts chalk from deploying unit
- Conducts inspection
- Establishes traffic flow pattern
- Establishes communications with deploying units and other functional areas, provides backup communications with TALCE

MAJOR FUNCTIONS

- Conducts joint inspection
- Conducts final briefing and performs final manifest corrections
- Compiles statistical data
- Provides area for correction of discrepancies identified during the joint inspection

TALCE Tanker Airlift Control Element

MAJOR FUNCTIONS

- Establishes aircraft parking plan
- Receives load at ready line, directs to aircraft and, in conjunction with aircraft load master or load team chief, supervises the supported component while loading and restraining cargo aboard aircraft



Proper marshalling of deploying units enables forces to be transported with minimum confusion or delay.

airlift movement at the departure airfield. Routes to and from loading areas should be clearly marked. Strict control of air and ground traffic is maintained on and across runways and strips.

Preparation of Platform Loads. If airdrop is part of the operation, platform loads are prepared during marshalling. When planning the preparation and marshalling of platform loads, the following factors should be anticipated:

- Additional lead time may be required.
- Skilled rigging supervision is needed.
- Required materials handling equipment.
- Adequate facilities, to include a relatively clean and illuminated rigging area, should be provided if tactically feasible.

Cross-Loading. Whether administrative or combat-loaded, aircraft also may be cross-loaded. Cross-loading distributes supplies among aircraft to ensure that the entire supply of one item is not lost by an abort or loss of one or some other small number of aircraft. Cross-loading does not alter the desirability of keeping ground force crews in the same aircraft as their vehicles, weapon systems, or other crew-served equipment.

Arrival Airfield Operations. Although arrival operations are not part of the marshalling process, they are important in air movement. If not orderly, arrival operations could adversely affect the mission. Arrival operations take place in three main areas — the offloading ramp, holding area, and unit area. Cargo is offloaded from aircraft and shipped to the specified arrival airfield control group (AACG) offloading ramp. The AACG then processes and releases the cargo load to the deployed unit. Finally, the deployed unit is responsible for moving its cargo to the marshalling area, thus concluding air movement operations. This process prevents congestion on the flight line and ensures arrival operations do not interfere with the planned air flow. This process may be modified or streamlined for combat offload operations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

MASS

1. The concentration of combat power. 2. The military formation in which units are spaced at less than the normal distances and intervals. JP 1-02

The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the enemy's sources of power in order to destroy or neutralize them. In theory, destruction or neutralization of enemy centers of gravity is the most direct path to victory. However, centers of gravity can change during the course of an operation, and, at any given time, centers of gravity may not be apparent or readily discernible. For example, the center of gravity might concern the mass of enemy units, but that mass might not yet be formed. In such cases, determining the absence of a center of gravity and keeping it from forming could be as important as defining it.

The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the place and time to achieve decisive results. To achieve mass is to synchronize appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass must often be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

Related Terms

principles of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

MASS CASUALTY

Any large number of casualties produced in a relatively short period of time, usually as the result of a single incident such as a military aircraft accident, hurricane, flood, earthquake, or armed attack that exceeds local logistical support capabilities. JP 1-02

Mass casualties (MASCAL) may result from combat operations, and procedures for handling the casualties are required. Particular emphasis is placed on the flexibility of health service support (HSS) units to respond to sudden changes in the casualty situation. Successful management of MASCALs is a complex task where success relies as much on well-practiced logistics and communications as it does on skilled medical treatment. While many medical personnel receive basic exposure to the principles of battlefield triage and emergency management, there is much less familiarity with communications, transportation, evacuation, and supply management in a simulated MASCAL or combat setting. Joint force surgeons must ensure that the MASCAL plan is rehearsed with all components represented. Particular emphasis must be placed on the flexibility of HSS units to respond to changes in the casualty situation.

Enemy employment of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons produces an unusually large number of casualties and may impair existing provisions for HSS. An NBC weapons attack significantly hinders all operations, including HSS operations.

In an effort to provide adequate HSS in an NBC environment, definitive planning and coordination are mandatory at all command levels. Higher headquarters must distribute timely, well-understood plans and directives to subordinate units.

Related Terms

health service support

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

MASTER AIR ATTACK PLAN

A plan that contains key information that forms the foundation of the joint air tasking order. Sometimes referred to as the air employment plan or joint air tasking order shell. Information which may be included: joint force commander guidance, joint force air component commander guidance, support plans, component requests, target update requests, availability of capabilities/forces, target information from target lists, aircraft allocation, etc. Also called MAAP.

JP 1-02

General. During the weaponeering/allocation phase, targeting personnel quantify the expected results of lethal and nonlethal weapons employment against prioritized targets. The joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL), the prioritized listing of potential targets, constructed during the target development phase, provides the basis for weaponeering assessment activities. All approved targets are weaponeered on target worksheets, which detail recommended aimpoints, recommended number/type aircraft and weapons, fuzing, target identification and description, target attack objectives, target area threats, and probability of destruction. The final prioritized targets are then included into the master air attack plan (MAAP). The resulting MAAP is the plan of employment that forms the foundation of the joint air tasking order. The MAAP is a key element of the concept of joint air operations. The development of the MAAP includes the review of joint force commander and joint force air component commander guidance; component direct air support plans and support requests from components; updates to target requests; availability of capabilities/forces; target selection from the JIPTL; and aircraft allocation.

Related Terms

air tasking order

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

MASTER MOBILIZATION GUIDE

Basic guidance to direct and coordinate mobilization planning within the Department of Defense (DOD) is contained in the DOD Master Mobilization Guide (MMG), which implements DOD responsibilities under the National Security Council national security emergency preparedness policy. The MMG is the first level of mobilization planning. It identifies mobilization responsibilities for DOD components and describes the tasks to be performed in peacetime and at the time of mobilization. It provides a common foundation for the preparation of detailed mobilization plans by the Joint Staff, Military Departments, and Defense agencies.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

MATERIEL

All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair parts, and support equipment, but excluding real property, installations, and utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. JP 1-02

“When a nation is without establishments and a military system, it is very difficult to organize an army.”

Napoleon I
Maxims of War

General. The materiel and equipment resource area includes all classes of supply. It includes equipment on hand in units, war reserves, pre-positioned equipment, and the output of the depot maintenance system and industrial base. Additional sources include items in the security assistance pipelines and off-the-shelf items from domestic and foreign commercial sources. These sources and the options and actions for obtaining them are listed in the figure below.

Materiel and equipment mobilization consists of many activities that can be grouped under two major tasks: increasing the availability of materiel and equipment to accommodate the needs of a larger active force, and alleviating shortages by allocating or redistributing materiel and equipment in accordance with emergency priorities. These activities can be undertaken either separately or in combination to equip and sustain the mobilized force.

Increasing Materiel and Equipment Availability. Decision options that increase materiel and equipment availability include the release of war reserve and depot stocks, accelerating the output of the depot maintenance system, diverting items from foreign military sales and other security assistance programs, accelerating production rates of existing contracts for consumable items like clothing and rations, and procurement of commercial substitutes from domestic or foreign sources. Each of these actions increases the number of items in the supply pipeline. Except for the diversion of items earmarked for security assistance programs, these options are exercised by the Military Departments, Defense Logistics Agency, and other Defense agencies as they provide for the logistic needs of their forces assigned to the combatant commanders. Action to divert items from security assistance programs could have a significant effect on our relations with affected allies and must be taken at the National Command Authorities (NCA) level. However, once diverted and allocated to a Military Department, they are distributed as determined by the owning Military Department.

Allocating Materiel and Equipment Shortages. Shortages of Service-unique items are resolved by priority and allocation decisions taken internally by the Military Departments based on operation plan priorities and guided by the Department of Defense policy to equip earlier deploying units before those scheduled to deploy later, regardless of Service component. When confronted with a materiel or equipment shortage common to two or more US military claimants, the Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, determines priorities among the Services. The Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB) executes this responsibility. The JMPAB is chaired by the Logistics Directorate of the Joint Staff and includes other Joint Staff directors as well as general or flag

MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT MOBILIZATION: SOURCES AND OPTIONS

SITUATION	SOURCES OF MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT	MOBILIZATION OPTIONS	ACTION REQUIRED
Any level of emergency	Equipment on hand in units	Redistribute based on emergency priorities	Military Department decisions based on supported commanders' requirements and priorities.
	War reserve and prepositioned stockpiles	Release stocks	Military Department decisions for retail items. JMPAB decisions for wholesale stocks insufficient to meet demands of all claimants.
	Depot system	Accelerate output	Military Department decisions based on supported commanders' requirements and priorities.
	Industrial Base	Accelerate output	Military Departments and Defense agencies act to surge production of needed materiel and equipment.
	Materiel and equipment in security assistance pipelines	Divert needed equipment from security assistance pipelines	NCA decision based on a determination that national security requirements outweigh political consequences.
Domestic and foreign commercial vendors	Purchase off-the-shelf products that meet military requirements	Military Department and Defense agency decisions based on Federal acquisition regulations.	

JMPAB Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board

officer representatives from the Military Departments. In coalition warfare, the United States may be responsible for providing significant materiel and equipment support to one or more allies. When shortages occur, priority and allocation decisions for resolving conflicts among allies, or between US claimants and allies, are made by the NCA.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE

That category of intelligence resulting from collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign medical, bio-scientific, and environmental information which is of interest to strategic planning and to military medical planning and operations for the conservation of the fighting strength of friendly forces and the formation of assessments of foreign medical capabilities in both military and civilian sectors. JP 1-02

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) develops and disseminates medical intelligence. The two major intelligence categories of primary use to the health service support (HSS) planner are general military intelligence and medical. For DIA, medical intelligence is

MEDICAL REGULATING

produced by the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), Ft. Detrick, Maryland. AFMIC currently produces and disseminates finished intelligence products via studies, message traffic, and online electronic systems.

Department of Defense military medical personnel frequently use the term “medical intelligence” incorrectly to mean any medical information of military importance; however, the term “medical intelligence” officially refers to finished intelligence on medical and related matters. By this definition, medical intelligence includes only finished intelligence products produced by an authorized intelligence agency such as AFMIC through the intelligence cycle. Medical intelligence is intended to provide HSS operations and planning staffs with basic guidance for understanding, acquiring, using, and applying intelligence and intelligence systems in the conduct of HSS operations, medical threat analysis and management, threat-based concept development, medical research, and doctrine development. Other sources of medical information may be used in assessing potential threats (e.g., Naval Environmental and preventative medicine units, Defense Pest Management Information Analysis Center, and the World Health Organization).

Accurate and timely intelligence is a critical combat support tool for planning, executing, and sustaining military operations. It is equally important in achieving optimum planning, execution, and sustainment of HSS operations, the medical readiness of the command, and the overall combat readiness of the unit.

Related Terms

health service support

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations


MEDICAL REGULATING

The actions and coordination necessary to arrange for the movement of patients through the echelons of care. This process matches patients with a medical treatment facility which has the necessary health service support capabilities, and it also ensures that bed space is available. JP 1-02

General. Medical regulating of patients will occur by the same process across the range of military operations. The movement of casualties to or between medical treatment facilities (MTFs) within the combat zone or forward of corps level is a Service component responsibility. If, in the opinion of the attending physician, a casualty cannot be returned to duty within the theater evacuation policy, the originating MTF will request that the patient be regulated to another MTF for more definitive care. Patients may be regulated to destinations within the theater, to another theater, or to the continental US (CONUS). Patient regulating includes accounting for bed availability, medical airlift capability, and patient in-transit visibility (the ability to track an individual patient’s status and location). This will be accomplished through a command and control system known as Transportation Command’s Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES).

TRAC2ES. TRAC2ES is a multi-nodal system composed of three basic collaborative parts. (See figure below.)

The first of these is the Global Patient Movements Requirements Center (GPMRC) located at Scott Air Force Base, IL. The GPMRC coordinates aeromedical evacuation worldwide and encompasses those duties formerly associated with the Armed Services Medical Regulating Office and the Aeromedical Evacuation Coordination Center (AECC). In practice, the GPMRC



will coordinate and allocate assets to the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Centers (TPMRCs). It will also collaborate and integrate TPMRC schedules and plans, and communicate lift/bed requirements.

The second integral part of patient regulating is the TPMRC. TPMRCs assume responsibilities formerly performed by the Joint Medical Regulating Office and theater AECCs. Active TPMRCs are located in US European Command and US Pacific Command. Other TPMRCs would be established in US Atlantic Command, US Central Command, US Southern Command, and CONUS as the need arose. The primary role of TPMRCs is to generate theater plans and schedules, and then modify (as needed) and execute GPMRC-delivered schedules, ultimately delivering the patient to the MTF (which includes both fixed and deployable, Veterans Administration, Department of Defense, and National Disaster Medical System hospitals).

The last part of the patient regulating process is the respective MTF that receives/sends patients.

Related Terms

health service support; patient evacuation

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

MEDICAL SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Special operations forces (SOF) are specially organized, trained, and equipped forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Force that conduct the following operations: unconventional warfare, strategic reconnaissance, direct action, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, civil affairs, and psychological operations. The nature of special operations requires that units be small, highly skilled, self-contained teams that can be easily inserted and extracted by air, sea, and

MEDICAL THREAT

land delivery methods. Medical support of special operations units is characterized by an austere structure and a limited number of medical personnel with enhanced medical skills.

The special operations medical personnel provide emergency treatment and a basic level of medical care at the team level. To meet the operational requirements of SOF infiltration and exfiltration, characteristics of larger medical elements of Echelons II, III, and IV cannot be applied or incorporated. Medical support provided to the teams in the area of operations is planned and conducted by SOF surgeons and medical personnel. Provision of medical support beyond this area of influence or capability depends on the thoroughness of advanced planning so that the conventional medical support structure umbrella is extended to cover lack of capability or meet requirements for additional medical assets (i.e., medical evacuation). Medical capability that is not part of a Service conventional medical system will be based on a complete mission analysis and a coordinated support plan developed by the medical planner. SOF should be provided all functions of health service support at the point their personnel enter the conventional force medical structure.

Related Terms

special operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

MEDICAL THREAT

A collective term used to designate all potential or continuing enemy actions and environmental situations that could possibly adversely affect the combat effectiveness of friendly forces, to include wounding, injuries, or sickness incurred while engaged in a joint operation. JP 1-02

The medical threat is the composite of all ongoing or potential enemy actions and environmental conditions that could reduce the effectiveness of friendly forces. (See figure below.) These actions and conditions include wounds, injuries, or diseases. Information to assess the medical threat caused by enemy actions should be obtained from the Intelligence Directorate and Operations Directorate of a joint staff community.

Infectious diseases which occur naturally are also referred to as endemic disease. Historically, infectious diseases have been responsible for more casualties than battle injuries. Many naturally occurring infectious diseases have short incubation periods. They may cause significant numbers of casualties within the first 48 hours of a deployment or contact. Others with longer incubation periods may not create casualties for several weeks.

Extreme environmental conditions in the form of heat, cold, high humidity, and high altitude can pose significant health hazards to an unacclimated, unprepared, and poorly conditioned military force. Employment of US forces into areas where these conditions exist without adequate opportunity for acclimatization may significantly decrease combat performance.

Conventional warfare munitions include small arms, high velocity weapons, rockets, bombs, artillery, bayonets, and other wounding devices, either individual or crew-served. This threat may be encountered in all geographic areas and can be employed by adversaries across the range of military operations. Research and development in smart munitions and extended range artillery, coupled with more powerful high explosives, will increase the threat from these types of weapons. Area denial munitions are likely to be present and pose a major psychological and physical threat. Wounds from booby traps, mines, and nontraditional weapons can also be encountered.

Biological warfare is the employment of biological agents to produce casualties in humans or animals or cause damage to plants or materiel. The intentional use of these disease-causing organisms (pathogens), toxins, or other agents of biological origin is designed to weaken resistance to attack and reduce the will to wage war.

- Historically, biological warfare has primarily involved the use of pathogens to sabotage food and water supplies and spread contagious disease among populations. These pathogens have generally fallen into one of the following categories: naturally occurring,

MEDICAL THREATS

Infectious Diseases

Such as:

Acute diarrheal diseases

Viral hepatitis

Japanese encephalitis

Scrub typhus

Malaria

Sexually transmitted diseases

Leishmaniasis

Leptospirosis

Arbovirus infections

Hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome

Schistosomiasis

Extreme Environmental Conditions

Such as:

Heat

Cold

High humidity

High altitude

Conventional Warfare Munitions

Such as:

Small arms, high velocity weapons, rockets, bombs, artillery, bayonets, and other wounding devices

Biological Warfare

Such as:

Disease-causing organisms, toxins, other agents of biological origin

Chemical Munitions

Such as:

Nerve and blister agents

Directed-Energy Weapons

Such as:

Radio frequency, laser, and charged particle beam

Blast Effect Weapons

Such as:

Fuel and air explosives

Flame and Incendiary Systems

Such as:

Napalm and white phosphorus

Nuclear Warfare

Such as:

All nuclear weapons

unmodified infectious agents; toxins, venoms, and their biologically active fractions; modified infectious agents; bioregulators and physiologically active compounds.

- Biotechnology is a tool for the production of biological warfare agents. Naturally occurring infectious organisms can be made more virulent, drug resistant, and can be manipulated to render protective vaccines ineffective. Such developments could greatly complicate the ability to detect and identify biological warfare agents and the ability to operate in areas contaminated by these agents. The causative agents for anthrax, tularemia, plague, and cholera, as well as botulinum toxin, staphylococcus, enterotoxin, and mycotoxin, are believed to have been developed as biological warfare agents by potential US adversaries.

As a result of confirmed chemical warfare agent use by Iraq against Iranian forces, probable use by the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and reported use of chemical agents and toxins in Southeast Asia, there is continuing heightened interest in the use of chemical munitions and delivery methods. Nerve and blister agents appear to be the agents most available in developing countries.

Directed-energy weapons focus radiation on a target to induce electronic, thermal, or structural and human (particularly eye) damage and can cause mission failure. The radiation is composed of three types: radio frequency, laser, and charged particle beam. There have been numerous reports of personnel sustaining eye damage while using optic devices and being exposed to a bright flashing light emanating from warships or other sources. These reports suggest an increasing threat from lasers to both air and ground forces.

Blast effect weapons such as fuel and air explosives represent an emerging medical threat. Gas-filled body organs such as ears, lungs, and digestive tract are the most susceptible to primary blast injury. This emerging threat may result in lower lethality but a greater number of wounded and a significantly increased workload.

Strategic mobility of US forces is a major element of US political and military strategy. Alert forces may be required to operate without rest for extended periods of time during mobilization, staging, airborne transportation, and combat insertion into hostile areas. Modern combat, with its increased lethality, rapid maneuvers, technological skill requirements, exposure to nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and day or night all-weather operations, will stress personnel to their endurance limits. Under these conditions, the significance of stress as a major contributor of casualties cannot be overstated.

Flame and incendiary systems include napalm and white phosphorus for aerial delivered bombs. Possible uses of flame and incendiary weapons include the clearing of difficult defensive positions such as caves, bunkers, buildings, and soft shelter or vehicular targets. Flame has also been used quite effectively in previous conflicts in an antitank role.

Until recently, the primary nuclear warfare threat has been from the Soviet Union. However, open-source information suggests that other countries may develop nuclear weapons capability within the next decade. Planners expect a minimum of 10 to 20 percent casualties within a division-size force that has experienced a nuclear strike. This percentage may be a low estimate, since proximity to ground zero is the critical factor in determining weapon effects on the force. In addition to casualties, a nuclear weapon detonation can generate an electromagnetic pulse that will result in catastrophic failure of some electronic equipment components.

The Threat to Health Support Service (HSS) Personnel and Operations. Commanders can anticipate increased casualty densities among HSS personnel over those experienced in most previous conflicts. Medical threat elements with the greatest potential for force degradation during combat operations are:

- battle injuries because of artillery, small arms, and fragmentation weapons;
- casualties caused by combat stress;
- NBC and combined casualties;
- premeditated attack upon medical organizations, personnel, or Class VIII supplies;
- the continually increasing range of indirect fire weapons;
- the enhanced wounding capability and destructiveness of munitions and weapon systems;
- the collective effects of conventional, chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons;
- significant increases in casualty densities that cause local or general overloads of the HSS system, resulting in physical and psychological stress;
- infectious diseases and environmental extremes.

Enemy combat operations in friendly rear areas will interdict lines of communications and disrupt necessary logistic activity. This disruption will produce a serious negative effect on the ability of personnel to retrieve and evacuate wounded, injured, and sick personnel and deliver health care. Although enemy combat operations may threaten the HSS combat mission by disrupting HSS operations or threaten the survival of HSS, they are not considered to be medical threats for our purposes.

Prolonged periods of intense, continuous operations will tax HSS personnel to the limit of their psychological and emotional endurance. This stress and fatigue will cause both quantitative and qualitative degradation in the ability of the HSS system to deliver health care at a sustained level. Proper training, such as taking vital signs, or minor surgical procedures of dental personnel to augment medical staff, may provide some temporary relief.

HSS organizations are not expected to be the primary target for biological or chemical attacks; however, logistic base complexes may be prime candidates for such enemy operations. As elements of logistic complexes, medical organizations must anticipate collateral contamination from attacks on adjacent facilities. Forward HSS assets have an even higher probability of being required to operate in or in proximity to areas contaminated by biological and chemical weapons.

The Medical Threat in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The medical threat is traditionally evaluated for its impact on US forces alone. When preparing for and conducting operations during MOOTW, elements of the medical threat to the indigenous population must also be assessed. The impact of the medical threat as a contributing factor to social, political, and economic stability in both peace and other operational environments must be considered. The general environment in which these types of operations are conducted ranges from peaceful, developing countries with no apparent internal or external instabilities to countries with limited resources and a poorly led population assailed by active insurgent movements, diseases, and dependent on humanitarian assistance (HA).

Within the military operations, US efforts may focus on foreign internal defense operations such as security assistance, HA, or host nation (HN) logistic support. These operations are often conducted in areas where social services have been disrupted, resulting in poor sanitation, inadequate food distribution, possible lawlessness, and general civil unrest. Significant medical threats are likely to be naturally occurring infectious diseases and environmental extremes.

There are varied scenarios under which US forces could be employed in nation assistance, disaster relief, and HA missions involving Third World countries. In general, areas where assistance teams and units may be employed will likely have a very low standard of living and high levels of endemic infectious diseases. Many of these diseases could be considered exotic to most US HSS personnel. US forces serving in these areas will enter with very little, if any, natural immunity to many endemic diseases. The degree of cultural and social interaction required to support the mission, as well as the sharing of food, quarters, and recreational

METHODS OF AIRSPACE CONTROL

facilities with local nationals, will increase exposure of US personnel to diseases endemic to the host country. For the most part, assistance operations will last a relatively extended period of time (past 30 days) and will increase the exposure to and raise the risk from endemic disease.

In these environments, protection afforded to medical treatment facilities and HSS personnel by the Geneva Conventions may not be recognized by insurgent or terrorist forces. HSS activities may be perceived as prime targets by these groups, especially if these facilities are seen as making a major contribution to the HN government. Medical facilities will also be vulnerable to theft and raids on Class VIII supplies by insurgents or terrorists for their own support or to support black market activities.

In some situations, the in-country components of the US logistic system in support of US assistance forces will be austere. Often the HSS structure will require significant reliance on contracting for local food, water, sanitation, public health, localized medical treatment, and health industry resources. There will be increased reliance on tactical medical support and evacuation. Coordination with Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command for intertheater patient evacuation can be greater in these operations than in other war scenarios. US Navy and US Marine Corps transportation assets should be used to support all aspects of HSS in military operations other than war scenarios, based on the availability and location in coastal waters. These circumstances will demand solid HSS planning. This planning must be based on current, accurate medical intelligence and include the total involvement of the Country Team prior to the execution of operations.

Related Terms

health service support

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

METHODS OF AIRSPACE CONTROL

Enemy forces will attempt to degrade airspace control capabilities by direct attack and electronic measures directed against control nodes or other specific targets. The methods of airspace control vary throughout the range of military operations from war to military operations other than war that include both combat and noncombat activities. The methods range from positive control of all air assets in an airspace control area to procedural control of all such assets, with any effective combination of positive and procedural control measures between the two extremes.

Airspace control plans (ACP) and systems need to accommodate these methods based on component, joint, and national capabilities and requirements. Full positive control would rely on radars, other sensors, identification, friend or foe/selective identification feature, digital data links, and other elements of the air defense network command, control, communications, and computer system to positively identify, track, and direct air assets. Full procedural control would rely on previously agreed to and promulgated airspace control measures such as comprehensive air defense identification procedures and rules of engagement, low-level transit routes, minimum-risk routes, minimum-risk levels, aircraft identification maneuvers, fire support coordination measures, and coordinating altitudes. In any case, all missions remain subject to the airspace control order. The figure below summarizes both methods of airspace control. The airspace control structure needs to be responsive to evolving enemy threat conditions and changing tactical situations. It is up to the joint force commander, through the ACP, to decide the appropriate method based on the concept of operations.

METHODS OF AIRSPACE CONTROL

FULL POSITIVE CONTROL

POSITIVELY IDENTIFIES, TRACKS & DIRECTS AIR ASSETS USING:

- Radars
- Other sensors
- Identification, friend or foe/selective identification system
- Digital data links
- Other elements of the command, control, communications, and computer system

FULL PROCEDURAL CONTROL

RELIES ON PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO & PROMULGATED AIRSPACE CONTROL MEASURES SUCH AS:

- Comprehensive air defense ID procedures and rules of engagement
- Low level transit routes
- Minimum risk routes
- Aircraft ID maneuvers
- Fire support coordination measures
- Coordinating altitudes

Related Terms

airspace control in the combat zone

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52

Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) JP 1-02

General. Military civic action (MCA) programs offer the foreign internal defense (FID) planner a civil-military operations opportunity to improve the host nation (HN) infrastructure and the living conditions of the local populace, while enhancing the legitimacy of the HN government. These programs use predominately indigenous military forces at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and other areas that contribute to the economic and social development of the nation. These programs can have excellent long-term benefits for the HN by developing needed skills and by enhancing the legitimacy of the host government by showing the people that their government is capable of meeting the population's basic needs. MCA programs can also be helpful in gaining public acceptance of the military; which is especially important in situations requiring a clear, credible demonstration of improvement in host-military treatment of human rights. MCA is a tool combatant commanders and other joint force commanders should use, whenever possible, to bolster the overall FID plan.

MCA Examples. US forces may advise or assist the HN military in conducting the MCA mission. This assistance may occur in conjunction with security assistance (SA) training or as a combatant commander's separate initiative. In all cases, the actual mission must be performed by the HN military. Some of the most common MCA projects are in the areas of construction.

MCA Coordination and Control. Coordination for MCA missions is slightly less involved than for humanitarian assistance (HA) and humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) missions. First, the US level of involvement is generally less than that required for other types of FID missions. Second, the program is essentially a US military to HN military project. As with all FID programs, however, the Ambassador and Country Team should be aware of all operations in their assigned country. If the US military support to MCA is provided through SA, normal SA coordination procedures apply, but, if it is provided through a separate combatant commander's initiative using operation and maintenance funds, most of the coordination will be internal to the command.

MCA Employment Considerations. Many of the same considerations apply to employing US military personnel in support of MCA as in supporting HA and HCA. The essential difference is that in MCA, US personnel are limited to training and advisory roles. In addition to this general point, commanders should also consider the following employment guidelines when planning or executing MCA programs:

- Select projects that are simple and achievable and can be maintained by the HN. If the HN military is unable to accomplish the mission, confidence in the local government and military may be significantly damaged.
- HN forces will do the work required to accomplish the mission.

- Because of the nature of MCA missions, commanders will normally include civil affairs (CA), psychological operations, other special operations forces trainers, and combat support and combat service support elements to support MCA missions.
- Coordinate projects with the Country Team. The US Agency for International Development representative should be consulted for assistance on any major MCA developmental project and should be informed of all MCA efforts.

Civil Affairs Activities in MCA. Civil affairs activities in MCA, as part of more comprehensive US Government (USG) security and economic assistance programs, may originate from a national plan and entail specific projects, central funding, authorization to use indicated resources, and joint participation with other USG agencies. The long-range goal of MCA is to nurture national development. Projects may be in areas closely paralleling those of the CA functional specialty areas. Projects include, but are not limited to, those in education, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to HN economic and social development. The fundamental tenet of any successful civic action program is civilian self-help. Civil affairs assets are trained either to plan MCA programs or to provide professional advice and assistance to the HN military forces or agencies in establishing local expertise and providing skills and materiel assistance not available to the local civilian participants identified to assume the leadership roles for future long-term development. Other US military forces are capable of participating in MCA programs. Within the scope of their organization, funds, mission, and terms of agreements with the HN, these forces can undertake projects of their own or can assist and motivate HN counterparts to develop their own programs and plan projects, procure equipment needed, or train participating personnel. In developing countries, military organizations often possess a large share of skilled and semiskilled manpower, mobility, funds, and technical equipment essential to socio-economic development.

Related Terms

civil affairs; foreign internal defense

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07.1 JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
JP 3-57 Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs

MILITARY DECEPTION

Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The five categories of military deception are: a. strategic military deception — Military deception planned and executed by and in support of senior military commanders to result in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator's strategic military objectives, policies, and operations. b. operational military deception — Military deception planned and executed by and in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned and conducted in a theater of war to support campaigns and major operations. c. tactical military deception — Military deception planned and executed by and in support of tactical commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted to support battles and engagements. d. Service military deception — Military deception planned and executed by the Services that pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems. e. military deception in support of operations security (OPSEC) — Military deception planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the prevention of the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions. Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities.


JP 1-02

General. The role of deception in securing freedom of action should never be underestimated. Indeed, military thinkers since Sun Tzu have stressed the central nature of deception in successful warfare. Deception can provide a highly leveraged means to confuse our enemies and cause them to miscalculate our intentions, deploy their forces poorly, and mistakenly estimate our strengths and weaknesses, while helping to preserve our own freedom of action. Deception at the joint force level requires clear themes around which all components can focus their efforts. (See first figure below.)

Military deception is defined as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.

Principles of Military Deception. Just as the principles of war provide general guidance for the conduct of military operations, six principles of military deception provide guidance for the planning and execution of deception operations, they are illustrated in the second figure below.

Focus. The deception must target the adversary decision maker capable of taking the desired action(s). The adversary's intelligence system is normally not the target. It is only the primary conduit used by deceivers to get selected information to the decision maker.



Objective. The objective of the deception must be to cause an adversary to take (or not to take) specific actions, not just to believe certain things.

Centralized Control. A deception operation must be directed and controlled by a single element. This is required in order to avoid confusion and to ensure that the various elements involved in the deception are portraying the same story and are not in conflict with other operational objectives. Execution of the deception may, however, be decentralized so long as all participating organizations are adhering to a single plan.

Security. Knowledge of a force's intent to deceive and the execution of that intent must be denied to adversaries. Successful deception operations require strict security. Need-to-know criteria must be applied to each deception operation and to each aspect of that operation. Along with an active operations security (OPSEC) effort to deny critical information about both actual and deception activities, knowledge of deception plans and orders must be carefully protected.

Timeliness. A deception operation requires careful timing. Sufficient time must be provided for its portrayal; for the adversary's intelligence system to collect, analyze, and report; for the adversary decision maker to react; and for the friendly intelligence system to detect the action resulting from the adversary decision maker's decision.

Integration. Each deception must be fully integrated with the basic operation that it is supporting. The development of the deception concept must occur as part of the development of the commander's concept of operations. Deception planning should occur simultaneously with operational planning.

As part of the command and control warfare (C2W) warfighting strategy, military deception conducted in support of joint operations seeks to influence adversary military commanders and to degrade their command and control (C2) capabilities. When supporting joint operations, military deception is done in conjunction with the overall C2W effort. It reinforces and is reinforced by the execution of other C2W tools.

Deception and Intelligence. Intelligence and counterintelligence are critical to deception during the planning, execution, and termination phases of every deception operation.

PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY DECEPTION

Focus

The deception must target the adversary decision maker capable of taking the desired action(s)

Objective

To cause an adversary to take (or not to take) specific actions, not just to believe certain things

Centralized Control

A deception operation must be directed and controlled by a single element

Security

Knowledge of a force's intent to deceive and the execution of that intent must be denied to adversaries

Timeliness

A deception operation requires careful timing

Integration

Each deception must be fully integrated with the basic operation that it is supporting

Intelligence and counterintelligence perform the following essential functions for deception planners:

- Identify adversary decision makers and assesses the vulnerability of the decision makers to deception.
- Determine the adversary's perceptions of friendly capabilities and possible courses of action.
- Provide estimates of adversary actions under differing scenarios and war games possible outcomes with the deception planner.
- Establish and monitor feedback channels to evaluate success of the deception operation through observation of the adversary's reaction.
- Identify adversary information gathering capabilities and communication systems to determine the best deception conduits.
- Penetrate adversary OPSEC measures and deceptions in support of C2 protection.

Deception planners must keep intelligence analysts aware of ongoing deception operations. The analysts must look for feedback about the operation and consider the impact, both intended and unintended, of those operations as they seek to identify possible future adversary courses of action.

Deception and Psychological Operations (PSYOP). Similar to military deception, military PSYOP is a systematic process of conveying tailored messages to a selected audience. It promotes particular themes that result in desired foreign attitudes and behaviors that can augment US efforts to achieve specific objectives. PSYOP normally targets groups while deception targets specific individuals. An individual targeted by deception may also be part of a PSYOP target group.

Groups that might be suitable for targeting by PSYOP in support of deception operations include adversary command groups, planning staffs, specific factions within staffs, nonmilitary interest groups who can influence military policies and decisions, and intelligence systems analysts.

Through the skillful use of associated truths, PSYOP can magnify the effects of and reinforce the deception plan. Dedicated PSYOP dissemination assets can discretely convey intended information to selected target audiences through appropriate “key communicator” backchannel networks.

PSYOP actions convey information not only to the intended target audiences but also to foreign intelligence systems. Therefore, PSYOP objectives and actions must be consistent with the other C2W objectives and actions.

Additionally, some deception actions will not only convey information to the deception target but also to the PSYOP audience. This provides the opportunity for mutual support if deception and PSYOP are carefully coordinated.

Deception and Operations Security. OPSEC is the process for denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting the generally unclassified evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive activities. This unclassified evidence (called OPSEC indicators) is created by friendly detectable actions or is available in open-source information.

OPSEC measures are those actions that organizations take to control their OPSEC indicators. This is done to deny critical information to an adversary. Critical information is that information an adversary requires to counter friendly operations.

OPSEC and deception have much in common. Both require the management of indicators. OPSEC seeks to limit an adversary’s ability to detect or derive useful information from observing friendly activities. Deception seeks to create or increase the likelihood of detection of certain indicators in order to cause an adversary to derive an incorrect conclusion.

Deception can be used to directly support OPSEC. Cover stories provide plausible explanations for activities that cannot be hidden. False vehicle or aircraft markings disguise the deployment of specific forces. Major deception operations create numerous false indicators making it more difficult for adversary intelligence analysts to identify the real indicators that OPSEC is seeking to control.

The OPSEC process supports deception. The OPSEC process identifies the key questions about friendly capabilities and intentions to which adversary commanders need answers to effectively prepare to counteract friendly operations. The process also identifies the critical information that answers many of those questions. Deception planners set out to provide another set of answers to those questions — answers that provide the adversary with plausible information that induces certain desired actions.

An OPSEC analysis of a planned activity or operation will identify potential OPSEC vulnerabilities. Those vulnerabilities may be useful to deception planners as possible conduits for passing deceptive information to an adversary.

Deception actions often need their own OPSEC protection. The existence of a deception operation, in and of itself, may convey OPSEC indicators that reveal to the opposing commander the actual friendly intentions. An OPSEC analysis of the planned deception is needed to protect against just such an inadvertent or unintentional outcome.

Deception and Electronic Warfare (EW). EW is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack an adversary. Deception, in conjunction with OPSEC, supports EW operations by being used to protect the development, acquisition, and deployment of sensitive EW capabilities. Deception can also be used to support the employment of EW units and systems.

In turn, EW can be used to support deception. Electromagnetic deception is a form of electronic attack and a technical means of deception. EW can be used in support of feints, demonstrations, and displays. The positioning of a majority of a command's EW systems in a particular area can be used to create an indicator of the command's intended main effort. The disruption of an adversary's intelligence and command communications capabilities can facilitate the insertion of deceptive information. EW attacks on intelligence collection and radar systems can be used to shape and control the adversary's ability to see certain activities.

EW planning should be closely coordinated with deception and intelligence planners to ensure that EW does not disrupt any adversary C2 systems that are being used as deception conduits or that are providing intelligence feedback.

Deception and Physical Destruction. The relationship of deception and physical destruction is very similar to that of deception and EW. Deception, used in conjunction with OPSEC, can be used to protect the development, acquisition, and deployment of physical destruction systems. It can mislead an adversary as to true capabilities and purpose of a weapon system.

Physical destruction can support deception by shaping an adversary's intelligence collection capability by destroying or nullifying selected intelligence systems or sites. Attacks can be used to mask the main effort from the adversary.

Deception Terms. Knowledge of military deception terminology is necessary for understanding the deception planning process.

Deception Objective. The deception objective is the desired result of a deception operation expressed in terms of what the adversary is to do or not to do at the critical time and/or location. Military deception planners must distinguish between the joint force commander's (JFC's) operational objective and the deception objective. The JFC's operational objective is what the JFC wants achieve as the result of friendly force operations. The deception objective is the action(s) (or inaction) that the JFC wants the adversary to take.

A deception objective is always stated in terms of specific actions such as "have the adversary move its reserve force from Point A to Point B prior to H-Hour." A statement such as "have the adversary think that we will make our main attack on its left flank" is not a deception objective. It is a desired perception. Having the adversary decision maker think a certain way is important only as a step toward getting that decision maker to make the decision that will result in the desired action that is the deception objective. Thoughts without action are of little military value.

Deception Target. The deception target is the adversary decision maker with the authority to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective. Each situation must be analyzed to identify the adversary commander who has the authority to take the desired action. For

example, if the deception objective is to have an enemy reserve division be moved from its current position to a position more favorable to intended friendly operations, then the deception target would be the enemy corps or army commander. Subordinate commanders do not normally have the authority to direct their own positioning. They must be directed to do so by their commanders. The adversary's intelligence system is normally not the deception target. It is a conduit that is used to get deceptive information to the target.

Desired Perception. The desired perception is what the deception target must believe in order for it to make the decision required to achieve the deception objective. Deception operations seek to identify and then create or reinforce those perceptions that will lead the deception target to make certain decisions.

Determining the desired perception is difficult. It requires understanding the target's historical, cultural, and personal background. Generally it is much easier, and historically more effective, to reinforce an existing belief than to establish a new one. In addition, the target must believe that it is in its best interest to take the action required by the deception objective.

Deception Story. The deception story is a scenario that outlines the friendly actions that will be portrayed to cause the deception target to adopt the desired perception. A deception story identifies those friendly actions, both real and simulated, that when observed by the deception target will lead it to develop the desired perception.

The story normally takes the form of a concept of operation statement: "We will portray that we are preparing to attack the enemy's left flank in three days with two armored divisions reinforced by a Marine air-ground task force." The story does not address the means that will be used to portray the outlined actions.

Deception Means. Deception means are the methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the deception target. Deception means are used to portray the deception story. They are used to create a complete adversary intelligence picture that supports all aspects of the deception story. Means are tailored to the adversary's intelligence collection capabilities. Whether or not the deception target relies upon any particular intelligence source should be considered when selecting means. If the target is known to trust one intelligence source over all others, then means should be selected to exploit that trust.

There are three categories of deception means: physical, technical, and administrative. Physical means include displays of troop movements and concentration, feints and demonstrations by maneuver units, false logistic activity, and false headquarters. Technical means include false communications nets, false radar emissions, and the use of smoke and other obscurants. Administrative means include the staged compromise or loss of classified documents.

Deception Courses of Action (COA). Deception COAs are the schemes developed during the estimate process in sufficient detail to permit decision making. At a minimum, a deception COA will identify the deception objective, target, desired perception, story, and, in general terms, means. It answers the questions: who, what, where, when, how, and why.

Deception Events. The deception event is a deception means executed at a specific time and location in support of a deception operation. For example, a deception means is the passing of false messages over radio nets. A deception event identifies what unit would pass the desired message, when the unit would broadcast the message, and from where. Deception events are developed during the deception planning process.

Deception Action. A deception action is a collection of related deception events that form a major component of a deception operation. A deception action is a combination of related

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

deception events that are used to portray a main element of a deception story. The four major types of deception actions are feints, demonstrations, displays, and ruses.

Deception in the Yom Kippur War, 1973

On 6 October 1973, the Egyptian 3rd Army surprised the Israeli Defense Force by attacking across the Suez Canal. Egyptian forces gained a significant foothold in the Sinai and began to drive deeper until a determined defense and counterattack drove them back.

To achieve the initial surprise, Egyptian forces conducted deception operations of strategic, operational, and tactical significance to exploit Israeli weaknesses. At the strategic level, they conveyed the notions that they would not attack without both a concerted Arab effort and an ability to neutralize the Israeli Air Force, and that tactical preparations were merely in response to feared Israeli retaliation for Arab terrorist activity. At the operational level, Egyptian forces portrayed their mobilization, force buildup, and maneuvers as part of their annual exercises. Egyptian exercises portraying an intent to cross the canal were repeated until the Israelis became conditioned to them and therefore did not react when the actual attack occurred. At the tactical level, Egyptian forces expertly camouflaged their equipment, denying information to Israeli observers and creating a false impression of the purpose of the increased activity.

For their part, Israeli forces were overconfident and indecisive at the operational and strategic levels. In spite of the deception, tactical observers reported with increasing urgency that the Egyptian buildup and activity were significant. Their reports caused concern, but no action. Egyptian forces exploited these vulnerabilities and timed the attack to occur on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, when they perceived the response of Israeli forces would be reduced.

As a result of their deception efforts, synchronized with other operations of the force, Egyptian forces quickly and decisively overwhelmed Israeli forces in the early stages of the Yom Kippur War.

Related Terms

command and control warfare; deception

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 3-58 Joint Doctrine for Military Deception

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. JP 1-02

General. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These operations can be

applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power. To understand MOOTW, it is useful to understand how they differ from operations in war.

War. When instruments of national power are unable to achieve national objectives or protect national interests any other way, the US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, placing the US in a wartime state. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the US and its multinational partners.

Military Operations Other Than War. MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises. As the figure below indicates, MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and noncombat operations in peacetime, conflict, and war situations.

MOOTW involving combat, such as peace enforcement, may have many of the same characteristics of war, including active combat operations and employment of most combat capabilities. All military operations are driven by political considerations. However, MOOTW are more sensitive to such considerations due to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities. In MOOTW, political considerations permeate all levels and the military may not be the primary player. As a result, these operations normally have more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) than in war. As in war, the goal is to achieve national objectives as quickly as possible and conclude military operations on terms favorable to the US and its allies.

However, the purposes of conducting MOOTW may be multiple, with the relative importance or hierarchy of such purposes changing or unclear; for example, to deter potential aggressors, protect national interests, support the United Nations or other regional organizations, satisfy treaty obligations, support civil authorities, or provide humanitarian assistance (HA). The specific goal of MOOTW may be peaceful settlement, assistance

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS			
	Military Operations	General US Goals	Representative Examples
COMBAT	War	Fight & Win	<u>Large Scale Combat Operations</u> Attack / Defend / Blockade
	NONCOMBAT Military Operations Other Than War	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement Counterterrorism Show of Force/Raid/Strike Peacekeeping/NEO Nation Assistance Counterinsurgency
Promote Peace & Support US Civil Authorities		Freedom of Navigation Counterdrug Humanitarian Assistance Protection of Shipping US Civil Support	

rendered to civil authorities, or providing security for HA. The Department of Defense (DOD) is often in a support role to another agency, such as the Department of State (DOS) in HA operations. However, in certain types of operations DOD is the lead agency, such as in peace enforcement operations (PEO). These operations usually involve interagency coordination and may also involve nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or private voluntary organizations (PVOs). Finally, although MOOTW are generally conducted outside of the US, some types may be conducted within the US in support of civil authorities consistent with established law.

Primacy of Political Objectives. Political objectives drive MOOTW at every level from strategic to tactical. A distinguishing characteristic of MOOTW is the degree to which political objectives influence operations and tactics. Two important factors about political primacy stand out. First, all military personnel should understand the political objectives and the potential impact of inappropriate actions. Having an understanding of the political objective helps avoid actions which may have adverse political effects. It is not uncommon in some MOOTW, for example peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions which have significant political implications. Secondly, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious.

However, commanders should strive, through continuing mission analysis, to detect subtle changes which, over time, may lead to disconnects between political objectives and military operations. Failure to recognize changes in political objectives early may lead to ineffective or counter-productive military operations.

Strategic Aspect. MOOTW contribute to attainment of national security objectives by supporting deterrence and crisis response options. These contributions are shown in the figure below and then discussed.

MOOTW CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ATTAINMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES

DETERRENCE

Potential aggressor is reluctant to act for fear of failure, cost, or consequences

FORWARD PRESENCE

Demonstrates commitment, lends credibility to alliances, and enhances regional stability

CRISIS RESPONSE

Responding rapidly with appropriate MOOTW options to potential or actual crises

Deterrence. In peacetime, the Armed Forces of the United States help to deter potential aggressors from using violence to achieve their aims. Deterrence stems from the belief of a potential aggressor that a credible threat of retaliation exists, the contemplated action cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh any possible gains. Thus, a potential aggressor is reluctant to act for fear of failure, cost, or consequences. Although the threat of nuclear conflict has diminished, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and conventional advanced technology weaponry is continuing. Threats directed against the US, allies, or other friendly nations — ranging from terrorism to WMD — require the maintenance of a full array of response capabilities. Various MOOTW combat options (such as peace enforcement or strikes and raids) support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve to use force when necessary. Other MOOTW (such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping) support deterrence by enhancing a climate of peaceful cooperation, thus promoting stability.

Forward Presence. Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, forward presence activities include periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, multinational exercises, port visits, foreign military training, foreign community support and military-to-military contacts. Given their location and knowledge of the region, forward presence forces could be the first which the combatant commander commits to MOOTW.

Crisis Response. US forces need to be able to respond rapidly either unilaterally or as a part of a multinational effort. Crisis response may include, for example, employment of overwhelming force in peace enforcement, a single precision strike, or emergency support to civil authorities. The ability of the US to respond rapidly with appropriate MOOTW options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional stability. Thus, MOOTW may often be planned and executed under crisis action circumstances.

Range of Military Operations Other Than War. MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, supporting civil authorities, and promoting peace. These operations provide the National Command Authorities (NCA) with a wide range of possible response options, ranging from noncombat operations such as HA to combat operations such as peace enforcement and strikes and raids.

Military Operations Other Than War Involving the Use or Threat of Force. In spite of efforts to promote peace, conditions within a country or region may result in armed conflict. When other instruments of national power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force or threat of its use may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability, support the other instruments of national power, or terminate the situation on favorable terms. The focus of US military operations during such periods is to support national objectives — to deter war and return to a sustainable state of peace. Such operations involve a risk that US forces could become involved in combat.

Combatant commanders, at the direction of the NCA, may employ US forces to deter an adversary's action. The physical presence of these forces, coupled with their potential employment, can serve as a deterrent and facilitate achieving strategic aims. Should this deterrence fail, force may be required to compel compliance, for example, in the form of strikes, raids, and other contingency operations. Other such operations include peace enforcement, counterterrorism, some foreign internal defense (FID), enforcement of sanctions, support to insurgency and counterinsurgency, and evacuation of noncombatants.

The use of force introduces the fear, physical strain, and uncertainty which are among the hallmarks of the nature of warfare. Although there are important political, diplomatic, and

legal differences between war and military operations other than war, there exists a singularly important threshold which may be crossed by use (or threat of use) of military force of any kind. In the range of military operations, this threshold marks the distinction between noncombat and combat operations.

Military Operations Other Than War Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force. Use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict or war and maintains US influence in foreign lands. Such operations include HA, disaster relief, some nation assistance, FID, most support to counterdrug operations, arms control, support to US civil authorities, evacuation of noncombatants in a permissive environment, and peacekeeping. Such operations are inherently joint in nature. Although these operations do not normally involve combat, military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and respond to changing situations.

Simultaneous Operations. MOOTW often involve simultaneous operations. Noncombat MOOTW may be conducted simultaneously with combat MOOTW, such as HA in conjunction with PEO. It is also possible for part of a theater to be in a wartime state while MOOTW is being conducted elsewhere within the same theater. For example, during the final stages of Operation DESERT STORM, US Central Command conducted a noncombatant evacuation operation in Somalia. In such situations, geographic combatant commanders should pay particular attention to integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing the effects and activities of their operations with US ambassadors, DOS, and other agencies. Furthermore, whenever a possibility of a threat to US forces exists, even in a noncombat operation, commanders should plan for and be prepared to either transition to combat operations or leave the area.

Duration of Operations. Many MOOTW may be conducted on short notice and last for a relatively short period of time (for example, strikes and raids). On the other hand, some types of MOOTW may last for an extended period of time to achieve the desired end state. For example, the US has been a partner with ten other nations in the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai since 1982. Short duration operations are not always possible, particularly in situations where destabilizing conditions have existed for years or where conditions are such that a long term commitment is required to achieve objectives.

"Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you create a political committee, a civil military operations center (CMOC) to interface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as opposed to a combat or fire-support operations center."

LtGen A. C. Zinni, USMC, CG, I MEF

General Principles. MOOTW encompass a broad range of military operations and support a variety of purposes, including: supporting national objectives, deterring war, returning to a state of peace, promoting peace, keeping day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict, maintaining US influence in foreign lands, and supporting US civil authorities consistent with applicable law. Support of these objectives is achieved by providing military forces and resources to accomplish a wide range of missions other than warfighting. The principles of war, though principally associated with large scale combat operations, generally apply to MOOTW, though sometimes in different ways. Strikes and raids, for example, rely on the principles of surprise, offensive, economy of force, and mass to achieve a favorable outcome. However, political considerations and the nature of many MOOTW require an underpinning of additional principles described in this chapter. MOOTW that require combat operations (such as some forms of peace enforcement, or strikes and

raids) require joint force commanders (JFCs) to fully consider principles of war and principles of MOOTW.

Principles of Military Operations Other Than War. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” delineates six MOOTW principles: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. While the first three of these principles are derived from the principles of war, the remaining three are MOOTW-specific. These principles are shown in the figure below and then discussed.

Objective. Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. JFCs must understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort. Inherent in the principle of objective is the need to understand what constitutes mission success, and what might cause the operation to be terminated before success is achieved. As an example, excessive US casualties incurred during a peacekeeping operation may cause abandonment of the operation.

Although defining mission success may be more difficult in MOOTW, it is important to do so to keep US forces focused on a clear, attainable military objective. Specifying measures of success helps define mission accomplishment and phase transitions. The political objectives which military objectives are based on may not specifically address the desired military end state. JFCs should, therefore, translate their political guidance into appropriate military objectives through a rigorous and continuous mission and threat analysis. JFCs should carefully

PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

OBJECTIVE

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective

UNITY OF EFFORT

Seek unity of effort in every operation

SECURITY

Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage

RESTRAINT

Apply appropriate military capability prudently

PERSEVERANCE

Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims

LEGITIMACY

Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable

explain to political authorities the implications of political decisions on capabilities and risk to military forces. Care should be taken to avoid misunderstandings stemming from a lack of common terminology.

Change to initial military objectives may occur because political and military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation, or it may occur because the situation itself changes. JFCs should be aware of shifts in the political objectives, or in the situation itself, that necessitate a change in the military objective. These changes may be very subtle, yet they still require adjustment of the military objectives. If this adjustment is not made, the military objectives may no longer support the political objectives, legitimacy may be undermined, and force security may be compromised.

Unity of Effort. Seek unity of effort in every operation. This MOOTW principle is derived from the principle of war, unity of command. It emphasizes the need for ensuring all means are directed to a common purpose. However, in MOOTW, achieving unity of effort is often complicated by a variety of international, foreign and domestic military and non-military participants, the lack of definitive command arrangements among them, and varying views of the objective. This requires that JFCs, or other designated directors of the operation, rely heavily on consensus building to achieve unity of effort.

While the chain of command for US military forces remains inviolate (flowing from the NCA through the combatant commander to the subordinate joint force commander), command arrangements among coalition partners may be less well-defined and not include full command authority. Under such circumstances, commanders must establish procedures for liaison and coordination to achieve unity of effort. Because MOOTW will often be conducted at the small unit level, it is important that all levels understand the informal and formal relationships.

Security. Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage. This principle enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. The inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or hostile intent applies in all operations. This protection may be exercised against virtually any person, element, or group hostile to the operation: for example, terrorists, or looters after a civil crisis or natural disaster. JFCs should avoid complacency and be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation. All personnel should stay alert even in a non-hostile operation with little or no perceived risk. Inherent in this responsibility is the need to plan for and posture the necessary capability to quickly transition to combat should circumstances change.

In addition to the right of self-defense, operations security is an important component of this principle of MOOTW. Although there may be no clearly defined threat, the essential elements of US military operations should still be safeguarded. The uncertain nature of the situation inherent in many MOOTW, coupled with the potential for rapid change, require that operations security be an integral part of the operation. Operations security planners must consider the effect of media coverage and the possibility coverage may compromise essential security or disclose critical information.

Security may also involve the protection of civilians or participating agencies and organizations. The perceived neutrality of these protected elements may be a factor in their security. Protection of an NGO or PVO by US military forces may create the perception that the NGO or PVO is pro-US. Therefore, an NGO or PVO may be reluctant to accept the US military's protection.

Restraint. Apply appropriate military capability prudently. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful balancing of the need for security, the conduct of operations,

and the political objective. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby damaging the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while possibly enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party.

Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure their personnel know and understand the ROE and are quickly informed of changes. Failure to understand and comply with established ROE can result in fratricide, mission failure, and national embarrassment. ROE in MOOTW are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war, consistent always with the right of self-defense. Restraint is best achieved when ROE issued at the beginning of an operation address most anticipated situations that may arise. ROE should be consistently reviewed and revised as necessary. Additionally, ROE should be carefully scrutinized to ensure the lives and health of military personnel involved in MOOTW are not needlessly endangered.



A Cuban refugee undergoes a security check at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba before boarding a transport to safe haven in Panama during Operation ABLE MANNER.

Perseverance. Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some MOOTW may require years to achieve the desired results. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. It is important to assess possible responses to a crisis in terms of each option's impact on the achievement of the long-term political objective. This assessment does not preclude decisive military action, but frames that action within the larger context of strategic aims. Often, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is a requirement for success. This will often involve political, diplomatic, economic, and informational measures to supplement military efforts.

Legitimacy. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable. In MOOTW, legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions. This audience may be the US public, foreign nations, the populations in the area of responsibility/joint operations area, or the participating forces. If an operation is perceived as legitimate, there is a strong impulse to support the action. If an operation is not perceived as legitimate, the actions may not be supported and may be actively resisted. In MOOTW, legitimacy is frequently a decisive element. The prudent use of psychological operations and humanitarian

MILITARY PLANNING

and civic assistance programs assists in developing a sense of legitimacy for the supported government.

Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and fairness in dealing with various factions. It may be reinforced by restraint in the use of force, the type of forces employed, and the disciplined conduct of the forces involved. The perception of legitimacy by the US public is strengthened if there are obvious national or humanitarian interests at stake, and if there is assurance that American lives are not being needlessly or carelessly risked.

Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed upon a government through the perception of the populace which it governs. Because the populace perceives that the government has genuine authority to govern and uses proper agencies for valid purposes, they consider that government as legitimate.

Related Terms

political objectives in MOOTW

Source Joint Publications


JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

MILITARY PLANNING

Military planning includes two broad categories of planning: force planning and joint operation planning. (See figure below.)

Force Planning. Force planning is associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments, Services, and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and is conducted under administrative control that runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the Chiefs of the Services. The Services recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to combatant commands and administer and support these forces. USSOCOM has similar responsibility for special operation forces, with the exception of organizing Service components.

Joint Operation Planning. Joint operation planning is the focus of this document. It is directed toward the employment of military forces within the context of a military strategy to attain specified objectives for possible contingencies. Joint operation planning is conducted within the chain of command that runs from the National Command Authorities to the combatant commanders and is primarily the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. At the national level, the Chairman of the Joint



Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Chiefs of the Services, is principally responsible for the unified planning to employ the armed forces in support of national security objectives. Joint operation planning includes the preparation of plans (e.g., operation plans and campaign plans) and orders (e.g., operation orders) by the combatant commanders as well as those joint planning activities that support the development of these operation plans or orders. These activities also incorporate the functions of the Military Departments and Services. Joint operation planning is a sequential process performed simultaneously at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

Related Terms

force planning; joint operation planning

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense to foster mutual assistance and support between the Department of Defense and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies. Also called MSCA. JP 1-02

Military support to civil authorities (MSCA) operations provide temporary support to domestic civil authorities when permitted by law, and are normally taken when an emergency overtaxes the capabilities of the civil authorities. Support to civil authorities can be as diverse as temporary augmentation of air traffic controllers and postal workers during strikes, restoration of law and order in the aftermath of riots, protection of life and federal property, or providing relief in the aftermath of a natural disaster. Authority for additional support to law enforcement officials is contained in Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5525.5, “DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials,” and permits such support as loan of equipment, use of facilities, training, and transfer of information. Support is constrained in some instances by the Economy Act (31 US Code Section 1535) which may require the requesting agency to provide reimbursement.

Limitations on military forces in providing support to civil authorities include, among others, the Posse Comitatus Act, Title 18, US Code Section 1385 — Use of Army and Air Forces as Posse Comitatus. This Act prohibits the use of federal military forces to enforce or otherwise execute laws unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress. Statutory exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act which allow active duty military members to respond to civil disturbances are included under Title 10 Sections 331 to 333: Request from a State (331), Enforcement of Federal Law (332), and Protection of Civil Rights (333). Additional important exceptions to Posse Comitatus are found in Title 10 Sections 371-380.

Examples of military support to civil authorities are disaster relief provided during Hurricanes Andrew in Florida and Iniki in Hawaii in 1992, and deployment of troops during a civil disturbance in California in 1992. Under DOD Directive 3025.1, “Military Support to Civil Authorities,” the Secretary of the Army is designated the Executive Agent for MSCA.

Related Terms

military operations other than war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

MISSILE ENGAGEMENT ZONE

Missile engagement zone (MEZ) operations are ideal for point defense of critical assets, protection of maneuver units in the forward area, and area coverage of rear operations. MEZ operations offer the joint force commander the ability to meet the enemy with a high- and low-altitude, all-weather capability. Advanced surface-to-air missile systems have long-range, high-firepower capability that can engage enemy aircraft beyond the forward line of own troops or disrupt massed enemy air attacks prior to committing fighter assets. Properly employed, MEZ operations are effective across the full range of air defense operations and enemy threats. MEZ operations need to be designed to maximize the full range and capabilities of various systems. Finally, MEZ operations within the airspace control area should not result in undue restraints on the flexibility and ability of friendly air assets to respond to the changing enemy threat and should not result in attacks on friendly assets.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

MISSION

The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. JP 1-02

The mission statement is the impetus for the detailed planning that follows. It is the joint force commander's expression of what the joint force must accomplish and why. Orders contain both specified and implied tasks. During mission analysis, commanders translate these tasks into missions for their subordinates. Commanders do so by analyzing the mission statement and concept of operations, understanding the intent of senior commanders, assessing the current situation, and organizing all resources available to achieve the desired end. Clarity of the mission statement and its understanding by subordinates, before and during the operation, is vital to success.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

MISSION TYPE ORDER

1. Order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. JP 1-02

Joint force commanders issue prioritized mission type orders to subordinate commanders and define command relationships to facilitate mission accomplishment consistent with their concept of operations. Missions are assigned to subordinate commanders, not staff officers

or coordination authorities. With receipt of the mission goes the authority and responsibility to conduct operations in accordance with the superior commander's intent and concept of operations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

MOBILITY

A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. JP 1-02

The joint campaign seeks to secure air and maritime superiority and space control. These are important for the effective projection of power. Furthermore, air and maritime superiority, and the enhanced support to terrestrial forces assured by space control, allow the joint force commander freedom of action to exploit the power of the joint force. For instance, air and maritime superiority are prerequisites to attaining a mobility differential over the enemy: first and foremost by protecting friendly mobility from the enemy and second by enabling joint interdiction to degrade the enemy's mobility.

Transportation enables the joint campaign to begin and continue. The projection of power relies upon the mobility inherent in air, naval, and land forces, supported by the defense transportation system. Transportation at the strategic and operational levels of war is a complex operation. It can best be served by a single, sound deployment concept that reflects en route and theater constraints and undergoes minimum rapid changes (which may create unforeseen, cascading effects). Experience has shown that the cooperation of all supporting combatant commands and Services is required to ensure the efficient coordination and execution of a major deployment. Furthermore, transportation requires control of the necessary lines of communications. Without secure air, sea, space, and land lines of communications we cannot reliably move forces and materiel, reinforce forward-deployed forces, or sustain the campaign.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

MOBILIZATION

The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. See also industrial mobilization.

2. The process by which the armed forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve Components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the armed forces includes but is not limited to the following categories:

- a. selective mobilization — Expansion of the active armed forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve Component units, individual ready reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack.
- b. partial mobilization — Expansion of the active armed forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000 for not more than 24 consecutive months) to mobilize Ready Reserve Component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.
- c. full mobilization — Expansion of the active armed forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve Component units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. Reserve personnel can be placed on active duty for the duration of the emergency plus six months.
- d. total mobilization — Expansion of the active armed forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel, beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

JP 1-02

Mobilization is the process of preparing for war or other emergencies by assembling and organizing personnel and materiel for active duty military forces, activating the Reserve component including federalizing the National Guard, extending terms of service, surging and mobilizing the industrial base, and bringing the Armed Forces of the United States to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. There are two processes implied in this definition.

- The Military Mobilization Process by which the nation's armed forces are brought to an increased state of readiness.
- The National Mobilization Process of mobilizing the national economy to meet non-defense needs and sustain the armed forces in war or military operations other than war.


From a national perspective, the importance of a responsive mobilization capability to our national security is implicit in the President's National Security Strategy and its derivative military strategy. The national process of graduated response (GR) provides the framework for achieving the desired mobilization capability and is a model for coordinating resources and plans for military and national mobilization. GR is the process by which the US responds to early ambiguous or explicit warning of an emerging national security emergency. It includes

preplanned measures in the areas of force readiness, industrial base preparedness, operational requirements, and sustainability. From a joint operations perspective, mobilization is a function of the joint command and control process, which together with the Department of Defense (DOD) Total Force Policy provides the basis for joint military mobilization planning and execution. This information examines the relationship between mobilization and national security from both perspectives. It concludes with a definition of demobilization, an essential first step toward maintaining national security after a crisis or war.

Military forces fulfill their role in maintaining our national security by preparing for and, if necessary, conducting joint operations across the range of military operations. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System defines the functions, planning systems, and information management tools for accomplishing these tasks. Joint operation functions are arrayed in the figure below.

One complete cycle is shown. It is meant to depict an era of relative peace interrupted by a crisis and war requiring the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. It shows the major steps in the deliberate planning process that produced the operation plan used as the basis for crisis response. It also depicts a gradual return to a peacetime environment secured by the return to the pre-crisis force structure. The mobilization and demobilization functions have been emphasized to place them in perspective with the other joint operation functions.

The mobilization function includes activation of the Reserve component (RC) and surging and expanding the industrial base. Lessons learned from the war in the Persian Gulf and the emergence of a new national military strategy at the end of the Cold War have led US military planners to a broader understanding of the scope of activities that should be included under the umbrella of the term, mobilization. Planners have also acquired an awareness of the importance of mobilization planning for contingencies requiring less than full mobilization.



MOVEMENT CONTROL

Because the most visible mobilization activity is activating members of the RC serving in units or in individual manpower pools, there has been a tendency to focus planning on manpower issues. Mobilization, however, involves much more than expanding and filling the military force with people. The force must be equipped, trained, and sustained over time if it is to achieve and maintain its designed capability. These activities require the support of the DOD civilian work force and contractor support. They also require increased resources in the areas of materiel, transportation, facilities, industrial production, training base capacity, health service support, command and control communications, and host-nation support. Extraordinary actions may be required to ensure continued compliance with, or temporary waivers of, environmental protection laws. Funding and legal authorities are also required to enable mobilization activities. Mobilization, therefore, must include determining and satisfying demands for these resources to support the total force during deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment.

Mobilization planning complements and supports joint operation planning conducted by the combatant commanders. It is accomplished primarily by the Military Services, United States Special Operations Command, and their major subordinate commands based on guidance received from the Secretary of Defense. It requires development of supporting plans by the Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Mapping Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Selective Service System, Department of Labor, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Transportation, Department of Energy, Office of Personnel Management, and other Federal agencies. Just as the Military Services mobilize their reserve organizations and individuals to augment military capability, supporting Federal agencies must oversee mobilization of the support base required to sustain the mobilized force. The Joint Staff supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his role as principal military advisor to the National Command Authorities; facilitates resolution of conflicts for scarce resources among the Services, combatant commanders, and Defense agencies; provides input for resolution of claims for resources between the military and civil sectors in wartime; and oversees mobilization planning.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

MOVEMENT CONTROL

The planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. 2. An organization responsible for the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. Also called movement control center. JP 1-02

Movement Control. Movement control is the planning, routing, scheduling, and controlling of common-user assets, and maintaining of in-transit visibility to assist commanders and operations staffs in force tracking. It also includes reception and onward movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies over lines of communications in accordance with command directives and responsibilities. Movement control is a system involving the coordination and integration of movement information and programs spanning all levels of operations.

Movement control coordinates transportation resources to enhance combat effectiveness and meet the priorities of the supported combatant commander. Efficient transportation in a

theater involves establishing effective organization and control procedures. It also involves movement and resource management.

The geographic combatant commander has a wide range of options for performing movement control. These options include directing subordinate joint force commander and Service components to perform their own movement control or creating a fully integrated joint organization. Regardless, the geographic combatant commander should task organize the movement control functions commensurate with the mission, size, and geography of the operational area.

Normally, the geographic combatant commander delegates operational control (OPCON) of the various parts of the transportation system to the most-capable-Service components and monitors the entire operation and retains the authority to set priorities and apportion resources. To exercise this authority, he establishes a Joint Transportation Board, a Joint Movement Center, or both. In addition, he may assign the responsibility to a staff element, normally the command's senior logistic staff officer.

In relation to movement control, effective resource management requires the establishment and maintenance of a flow of resources through the transportation system that permits efficient utilization of user and transportation resources and capabilities. Maximum throughput at all transportation route segments, ports, and nodes, along with timely deliveries, are key measures of success in this effort. For the mode, terminal, and facility operator functions, resource management pertains to the efficient employment of personnel, materiel, and facilities.

Principles of Movement Control. Five movement control principles shown in the figure below form the foundation for management of all transportation operations.


Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution. The Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command and the geographic combatant commander control movement planning and resource allocation. Using the most-capable-Service concept, the geographic combatant commander usually delegates OPCON of movements to the Service component that has the required assets or capabilities to fulfill the mission. This delegation of authority achieves two objectives: it satisfies requirements at the lowest level possible, and it frees the geographic combatant commander to focus on theater-wide critical issues.

Fluid and Flexible Movements. The transportation system must provide an uninterrupted flow of supplies. It must also be flexible enough to change with mission modifications. The key to successful execution is the ability to regulate and manage the transportation system.

Regulated Movements. Movement control authorities must regulate moves to prevent terminal congestion and scheduling conflicts between Service components. Proper management of transportation assets and the transportation network is critical. Advances in technology have increased both the capability and requirement to regulate movements. Highly mobile forces, longer distances, increased consumption rates, and shared lines of communications are a few of the new challenges.

Maximized Use of Carrying Capacity. Transportation is a limited asset. As such, planners must understand when to use a specific mode of transport and when to maximize the use of each mode's unique capabilities. This does not mean simply loading each mode to its capacity. It means the simultaneous, synergistic use of all transportation resources that best meet the combatant commander's requirements. However, some situations may not allow adherence to this principle. The geographic combatant commander may decide to hold certain transportation modes in reserve. The following considerations apply:

- The expeditious movement of cargo to meet the combatant commander's requirements may be more important than maximizing carrying capacity.
- Terminal congestion may preclude the use of a given mode.



- Delays during off-loading cause a lost transport capability.
- Stress keeping transport modes loaded and moving.

Forward Support. Forward-oriented transportation support is a combat multiplier; it allows the commander to concentrate all his forces on the enemy.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-01.3 JTTP for Movement Control

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance.

JP 1-02

“Almost every time military forces have deployed from the United States it has been as a member of – most often to lead – coalition operations.”

General Robert W. RisCassi, USA: “Principles for Coalition Warfare”, Joint Force Quarterly: Summer 1993

General. US military operations are often conducted with the armed forces of other nations in pursuit of common objectives. Multinational operations, both those that include combat and those that do not, are conducted within the structure of an alliance or coalition.

An alliance is a result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is one example. These alliance operations are technically combined operations, though in common usage combined is often used as synonym for all multinational operations.

A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action, for instance, the coalition that defeated Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in the Gulf War, 1990-1991.

Joint operations as part of an alliance or coalition require close cooperation among all forces and can serve to mass strengths, reduce vulnerabilities, and provide legitimacy. Effectively planned and executed multinational operations should, in addition to achieving common objectives, facilitate unity of effort without diminishing freedom of action and preserve unit integrity and uninterrupted support.

Each multinational operation is unique, and key considerations involved in planning and conducting multinational operations vary with the international situation and perspectives, motives, and values of the organization's members. Whereas alliance members typically have common national political and economic systems, coalitions often bring together nations of diverse cultures for a limited period of time. As long as the coalition members perceive their membership and participation as advancing their individual national interests, the coalition can remain intact. At the point that national objectives or priorities diverge, the coalition breaks down.

The Armed Forces of the United States should be prepared to operate within the framework of an alliance or coalition under other-than-US leadership. Following, contributing, and supporting are important roles in multinational operations — often as important as leading. However, US forces will often be the predominant and most capable force within an alliance or coalition and can be expected to play a central leadership role, albeit one founded on mutual respect. Stakes are high, requiring the military leaders of member nations to emphasize common objectives as well as mutual support and respect.

Considerations for Multinational Operations. Considerations are shown in the figure below.

National Goals. No two nations share exactly the same reasons for entering a coalition or alliance. To some degree, participation within an alliance or coalition requires the subordination of national autonomy by member nations. The glue that binds the multinational force is agreement, however tenuous, on common goals and objectives. However, different national goals, often unstated, cause each nation to measure progress in its own way. Each nation, therefore, can produce differing perceptions of progress. Joint force commanders (JFCs) should strive to understand each nation's goals and how those goals can affect conflict termination and the desired end state. Maintaining cohesion and unity of effort requires understanding and adjusting to the perceptions and needs of member nations.

Unity of Effort. Motivations of member nations may differ, but multinational objectives should be attainable, clearly defined by the commander or leadership structure of the multinational force, and supported by each member nation. Commanders of multinational forces should carefully consider the types of missions assigned to member forces. Capabilities will often differ substantially between national forces, but sensitivity to and consideration of national honor, pride, and prestige will often be as important to final success as the contributions and capabilities of the national forces themselves. Small decisions, such as which national

CONSIDERATIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

NATIONAL GOALS

Reach agreement on common goals and objectives to bind multinational forces.

UNITY OF EFFORT

Multinational objectives must be supported by each member nation.

DOCTRINE, TRAINING, EQUIPMENT

Improve other national forces through training, assistance, and sharing of resources.

CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

Employ linguistics and area experts to assist with cultural and language challenges.

MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES

Support forces of member nations with national assets or through the coalition.

NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS

Have direct and immediate communications capability to respective leaderships.

forces are involved in the main effort or perhaps play the lead role at the start of an offensive, can have major consequences in multinational operations.

Coordinated policy, particularly on such matters as alliance or coalition commanders' authority over national logistics (including infrastructure) and theater intelligence, is required. Coordinated planning for rules of engagement (ROE), fratricide prevention, deception, electronic warfare, communications, special weapons, source and employment of reserves, and timing of operations is essential for unity of effort. Actions to improve interoperability and the ability to share information need to be addressed early (as early as the development of military systems for formal alliances). Nations should exchange qualified liaison officers at the earliest opportunity to ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort.

Planning is often complicated by participation of all members. Multinational force commanders and staffs should seek to involve all member nations in the decision making process, consistent with the terms established at the founding of the alliance or coalition. Member recommendations should be sought continuously by multinational force commanders, but especially during development of courses of action (COAs) and ROE, assignment of missions to national forces, and establishment of priorities of effort.

JFCs should establish a working rapport with leaders of other national forces. A personal, direct relationship can often overcome many of the difficulties associated with multinational operations. Respect, trust, and the ability to compromise are essential to building and maintaining a strong team.

Doctrine, Training, and Equipment. Doctrines, operational competence as a result of training and experience, and types and quality of equipment can vary substantially among the military forces of member nations. When the situation permits, JFCs seek opportunities to improve the contributions of other national forces through training assistance and sharing of resources

consistent with US and alliance or coalition terms of reference, such as the loan of American equipment (for example, radios, vehicles, or weapons).

JFCs implement measures to assess the capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of member forces to facilitate matching missions with capabilities. Where member forces have unique or special capabilities, they should be appropriately exploited. Joint and multinational exercises are key components of joint training and doctrine refinement. Types of exercises include command post exercises and field training exercises. Simulation can complement most exercises. Distributed simulation is a means to enhance training between remotely separated forces.

Cultural Differences. Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity — the result of language, values, religious systems, and economic and social outlooks. Even seemingly minor differences, such as dietary restrictions, can have great impact. Commanders should strive to accommodate religious holidays, prayer calls, and other unique cultural traditions important to allies and coalition members, consistent with the situation.

Language differences often present the most immediate challenge. Specifying an official coalition language can be a sensitive issue. US forces cannot assume that the predominant language will automatically be English. Information loss during translation can be high, and misunderstandings and miscommunications can have disastrous effects. To assist with cultural and language challenges, JFCs employ linguists and area experts, often available within or through the Service components or from other US agencies. In some instances, members of Service forces may be especially familiar with the operational area, its cultures, and languages as a result of previous assignments or heritage.

Management of Resources. Forces of member nations must be supported either by national assets or through the coalition. Resource contributions will vary between members. Some may contribute logistically, while others contribute military forces. Some may be able to do both. Commanders of multinational forces should seek to ensure that member forces are appropriately supplied and that contributions of member nations are consistent with national capabilities and the terms established at the formation of the alliance and/or coalition. Frequently, JFCs will rely on national political leadership and representatives from such



A US aircrew member coordinates loading procedures with UN loading crews through an Ethiopian translator during Operation SUPPORT HOPE.

agencies as the Department of State to effect such coordination with the leadership of member nations.

National Communications. JFCs should anticipate that some forces from alliance or coalition member nations will have direct and near immediate communications capability from the operational area to their respective national political leadership. This communications capability can facilitate coordination of issues, but it can also be a source of frustration as leaderships external to the operational area may be issuing guidance directly to their deployed national forces.

JFCs should have a responsive and reliable link to appropriate US agencies and political leadership. Where senior JFCs are in the chain of command between the deployed JFC and the National Command Authorities, provisions should be made for bypassing intermediate points in the chain of command for exceptional and emergency situations. The conditions and supporting communications systems for such bypassing should be established by the appropriate military and political leadership early.

Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations.

Rules of Engagement. JFCs should give early attention to developing ROE that are appropriate to the situation and can be employed by all member forces. This task is often difficult, requiring the participation and cooperation of senior political and military representatives from member nations. Complete consensus or standardization of ROE may not be achievable because of individual national values and operational employment concepts. However, JFCs should strive to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailored by member forces to their particular situation.

In many cases, commanders of deployed member forces may lack the authority to speak on behalf of their nation in the ROE development process. This lack of authority may require considerable support from coalition political leadership both within and outside the operational area to coordinate and implement appropriate ROE.

The Media. Though not directly related to the conduct of operations, JFCs seek to facilitate the activities of national and international press organizations, consistent with requirements for operations security. This task is complicated in a multinational situation where press corps from each member nation may have their own standards and requirements. JFCs cannot hope to impose control over such efforts and, instead, should seek to work closely with leaders of member forces and their national press elements to develop an open and collegial environment. Simple ground rules should be established by the senior political and military representatives of the alliance or coalition at the earliest possible moment to avoid incidents that could jeopardize the operation or detract from coalition cohesion.

Local Law Enforcement. US forces will often not have the authority or capability to enforce local laws in the operational area. JFCs should seek clear guidance from the alliance or coalition political leadership during the planning phase of multinational operations. Where local law enforcement organizations are present and capable, JFCs establish systems and procedures to optimize the contributions of indigent law enforcement personnel in facilitating operations and protecting lives and property in the operational area. Where local law enforcement systems and organizations are not available, JFCs should consider deploying appropriate US forces early in the deployment flow as well as exploiting the capabilities of other member nations.


Command and Control (C2). Successful multinational operations can center on achieving unity of effort from the outset. Participating nations need to provide the multinational force commander sufficient authority over their national forces to achieve this unity. In turn, multinational force commanders and staffs exercise their authority to unify the efforts of the

multinational force toward common objectives. Such authority, however, is seldom absolute. Consensus and compromise are important aspects of decision making in multinational organizations.

Alliances typically have developed C2 structures, systems, and procedures. Alliance forces typically mirror their alliance composition, with the predominant nation providing the alliance force commander. Staffs are integrated, and subordinate commands are often led by senior representatives from member nations. Doctrine, standardization agreements, and a certain political harmony characterize alliances. The figure below provides an example of a command structure within an alliance.

Coalitions are typically formed on short notice and can include forces not accustomed to working together. Establishing command relationships and operating procedures within the multinational force is often challenging. It involves complex issues that require a willingness to compromise in order to best achieve the common objectives. National pride and prestige can limit options for organization of the coalition command, as many nations prefer to not subordinate their forces to those of other nations. Though many C2 structures can be employed, coalitions are most often characterized by one of two basic structures: parallel command or lead nation command.

Parallel command exists when nations retain control of their deployed forces. If a nation within the coalition elects to exercise autonomous control of its force, a parallel command structure exists. Such structures can be organized with the following:



- Nations aligned in a common effort, each retaining national control.
- Nations aligned in a common effort, some retaining national control, with others permitting control of their forces by a central authority or another member force.
- Parallel command is the simplest to establish and often the organization of choice. Coalition forces control operations through existing national chains of command. Coalition decisions are made through a coordinated effort of the political and senior military leadership of member nations and forces. It is common for other command structures to emerge as coalitions mature, but the parallel model is often the starting point. The figure below depicts the command relationships developed and employed by coalition forces for Operation DESERT STORM. These relationships represented a parallel command structure, with coordination facilitated by the Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center (C3IC). The C3IC was specifically established to facilitate exchange of intelligence and operational information, ensure coordination of operations among coalition forces, and provide a forum where routine issues could be resolved informally and collegially among staff officers.

In a lead nation command arrangement, the nation providing the preponderance of forces and resources typically provides the commander of the coalition force. The lead nation can retain its organic C2 structure, employing other national forces as subordinate formations. More commonly, the lead nation command is characterized by some integration of staffs. The composition of staffs is determined by the coalition leadership.

Lead nation and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a coalition. This combination occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces, such as the command arrangement employed by the Gulf War coalition. Western national forces were aligned under US leadership, while Arabic national forces were aligned under Saudi leadership.


Regardless of the command structure, coalitions require significant coordination and liaison. Differences in language, equipment, capabilities, doctrine, and procedures are some of the interoperability challenges that mandate close cooperation. Coordination and liaison are important considerations in alliances as well. Robust liaison is critical to developing and maintaining unity of effort in coalition operations. Liaison exchange should occur between senior and subordinate commands and between lateral or like forces, such as between national special operations forces units or naval forces.

Commanders and liaison teams require reliable communications, appropriate to the operational area and the coalition's concept of operations. JFCs often deploy robust liaison teams with sufficient communications equipment to permit instantaneous communication between national force commanders. This communication is especially important during the early stages of coalition formation and planning. JFCs should appropriately prioritize their liaison requirements during deployment into the operational area to facilitate communications as soon as possible.

Liaison officers between multinational forces should be operationally proficient, innovative, and tenacious, but at the same time diplomatic and sensitive to the multinational forces with whom they are detailed. They should have the authority to speak for their JFCs or national force commanders.

Plans in multinational operations should be kept simple and focused on clearly defined objectives. The more complex the operation or the more players involved, the more time and effort it takes to plan and coordinate the operation. Plans should be issued far enough in advance to allow sufficient time for member forces to conduct their own planning and rehearsals. Some alliance or coalition member forces may not have the planning and execution

COALITION COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR OPERATION DESERT STORM



The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf conflict provides an example of a parallel command structure within which coalition capabilities were unified toward a common goal. Coalition leaders demonstrated flexibility and innovation in devising and working within this ad hoc structure.

*Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center

dexterity and flexibility characteristic of US forces. Accordingly, JFCs should ensure that the tempo of planning and execution does not exceed the capabilities of national forces. Effective liaison and reliable communications can facilitate subordinate planning and execution.

To the extent possible, procedures should be standardized within the multinational force, especially if mistakes can result in failed missions or fratricide. Procedures such as control of attacking aircraft, maneuver control and fire support coordinating measures, and requests for supporting fires should be standardized. Where this is not possible, liaison teams should be tasked to facilitate coordination and deconflict operations. JFCs should fully exploit all capabilities available to them to coordinate operations, including Marine air/naval gunfire liaison companies and/or teams and Air Force tactical air control parties.

Commanders may elect to organize the operational area that supports the command's organization. For example, when a parallel command structure is employed, there are advantages to assigning areas of operation to national forces. This assignment permits relative autonomy of operations and can significantly deconflict operations. This technique was successfully employed by JTF Bravo during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, where American, British, French, and Spanish forces operated in an area approximately 170 by 70 kilometers in size.



Operation SUPPORT HOPE Joint Task Force (JTF) officers explain airlift control element operations at Entebbe airport to the President of Uganda. A JTF, assembled in Entebbe, coordinated Ugandan support to the United Nations humanitarian relief effort to Rwanda.

Intelligence. The collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence can be a major challenge. Alliance or coalition members normally operate separate intelligence systems in support of their own policy and military forces. These national systems may vary widely in sophistication and focus. Members may not have capabilities similar to the US to collect and process intelligence. Nonetheless, each nation's contributions and capabilities should be appropriately incorporated and exploited. JFCs should rapidly establish a system that optimizes each nation's contributions and provides member forces a common intelligence picture, tailored to their requirements and consistent with disclosure policies of member nations.

JFCs need to determine what intelligence may be shared with the forces of other nations early in the planning process. The limits of intelligence sharing and the procedures for doing so need to be determined during initial coordination and negotiation between senior political and military representatives from member nations.

The National Disclosure Policy provides initial guidance. It promulgates national policy and procedures in the form of specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definitions of terms, release arrangements, and other guidance. It also establishes interagency mechanisms and procedures for the effective implementation of the policy. In the absence of sufficient guidance, JFCs should share only that information that is mission essential, affects lower-level operations, and is perishable.

Logistics. Multinational logistics is a major challenge. Potential problem areas, as shown in the figure below, include differences in logistic doctrine; stockage levels; logistic mobility; interoperability; infrastructure; competition between Services and alliance and/or coalition

CONSIDERATIONS IN MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS

Potential Problem Areas Include...

- **Difference in Logistic Doctrine**
- **Stockage Levels**
- **Logistic Mobility**
- **Interoperability**
- **Infrastructure**
- **Competition between Service, Alliances, and/or coalition members for common support**
- **National Resource Limitations**

members for common support; and national resource limitations. Nonetheless, JFCs need to coordinate the use of facilities such as highways, rail lines, ports, and airfields in a manner that supports mission accomplishment. The notion that logistics is primarily a national responsibility cannot supplant detailed logistic planning in the operational area. JFCs typically form multinational logistic staff sections early to facilitate logistic coordination and support multinational operations.

Standardization of logistic systems and procedures can ease the logistic challenges. Interoperability of equipment, especially in adjacent or subordinate multinational units, is desirable and is considered by operational planners during concept development. Significant logistic operations include acquisition and distribution of food stuffs, fuels, ammunition, and spare parts; transportation; field services; and health service support.

Contracting for various types of support, especially labor, facilities, common supplies, and transportation, is a significant aspect of many military operations. Procurement of materiel and services in the joint force's operational area is done either through contracting on the open market or when the host nation offers support through specific government agencies. The host nation may also restrict the joint force's contracting ability as it manages essential services for the host population. Requirements for materiel and services should be consolidated and validated as operationally required by the JFC's staff. A determination of appropriate source for meeting the requirements should then be conducted (for example, supply system, host-nation support, or contracting). If contracting is deemed appropriate, JFCs should ensure that sufficient, qualified contracting officers are available from the outset to leverage the

capabilities available within the operational area. When required, contracting officers should be paired with linguists and should be prepared to operate in currencies or commodities other than US dollars.

Nations hosting US joint forces may offer logistic support or limit the ability of the joint force to contract support only through host-government agencies. JFCs can consider centralizing host-nation support functions so that requirements are both identified and supported, consistent with mission accomplishment. Nations might agree to have certain common supplies and support provided by member nations to other alliance or coalition forces. Nations might also agree on whether a multinational commander will have the authority to conclude host-nation support arrangements on behalf of participating nations.

If some level of force integration is necessary to conduct operations, planners should determine where the integration of units and headquarters needs to occur. Such decisions affect the deployment priorities and schedules for personnel and equipment. If integration is to occur at an intermediate staging base or port of debarkation, its impact on those bases or ports can be significant and needs to be addressed and accounted for by base and/or port commanders and staffs.

Protection. Protection measures that apply to joint operations are appropriate also for multinational situations. JFCs consider, for example, air defense, defensive counterair, reconnaissance and surveillance, and security measures for the multinational force. These considerations extend to nuclear, biological, and chemical warning and decontamination.

Avoidance of fratricide, especially between member forces, is important because of its potential negative impact on alliance or coalition unity and trust between member forces. JFCs should carefully assess the risks of fratricide between member forces involved in COAs being considered and actively seek to minimize the fratricide potential through a combination of operational and technological solutions and expedients.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES

The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. JP 1-02

The National Command Authorities (NCA), consisting of the President and the Secretary of Defense, or their authorized alternates, exercise authority over the armed forces through the combatant commanders for those forces assigned to the combatant commands and through the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chiefs of the Services for those forces not assigned to the combatant commands.

The ultimate authority for national defense rests with the President. The President is assisted by the National Security Council (NSC), which is the principal forum for the development of national security policy. The Secretary of Defense is the principal adviser to the President for all matters relating to the Department of Defense and is a member of the NSC. The President and the Secretary of Defense (or their duly authorized alternates or successors) are the NCA, and they alone are vested with the lawful authority to direct the Armed Forces of the United States in the execution of military action, including the movement of forces or the initiation of operations. In peacetime, the Secretary of Defense issues policy guidance for joint operation planning and reviews joint operation plans with the assistance of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In crisis and war, the Secretary plays a pivotal role in crisis action planning and execution. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the NCA.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

The telecommunications system that results from the technical and operational integration of the separate telecommunications systems of the several executive branch departments and agencies having a significant telecommunications capability. Also called NCS. JP 1-02

The National Communications System (NCS) is an interagency group that coordinates the telecommunications assets of 23 Federal departments and agencies to ensure compatibility and interoperability during emergencies without compromising day-to-day operations. The NCS consists of the telecommunications assets of the entities represented on the NCS Committee of Principals and an administrative structure consisting of the Executive Agent, the NCS Committee of Principals, and the Manager. NCS Committee of Principals consists of representatives from those Federal departments, agencies, or entities designated by the President that lease or own telecommunications facilities or services of significance to national security or emergency preparedness. The NCS includes, to the extent permitted by law, other Executive entities that bear policy, regulatory, or enforcement responsibilities of importance to national security or emergency preparedness telecommunications capabilities.

and survivable system. This capability requires that the command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4) systems within WWMCCS be configured and operated for effective support of the NMCS as well as their specific missions. Systems must be compatible and interoperable. C4 systems must provide direct connection or real time relay wherever necessary. Data and message text formats must be standard. All details of system configuration and operation must be as efficient as possible in terms of both effectiveness and use of resources.

An enduring command structure with survivable C4 systems is both required and fundamental to NMCS continuity of operations. The NMCS includes four primary nodes — the National Military Command Center (Site R), United States Strategic Command Center, United States Space Command Center, the National Airborne Operations Center, and such other command centers as may be designated by the Secretary of Defense. Support of the NMCS will be the priority function of all primary and alternate command centers.

These centers must be linked by reliable C4 systems, supported by warning and intelligence systems, and continuously staffed and ready for use. Special capabilities must be provided for communication with strategic offensive and defensive forces and for other forces that may be required for quick reaction in crises. In this case, the communications will be designated and operated to ensure minimum elapsed time for the transmission of orders to the operating units of these forces. The NMCS also includes C4 systems connecting its centers with primary and alternate command centers of the headquarters of the combatant commands; service Headquarters of the Military Departments; other designated commands and Department of Defense (DOD) agencies that provide support through the WWMCCS; major or key intelligence direction, analysis, and indication and warning centers; and other functional activities; e.g., counterdrug.



C4 Systems extend the joint warriors' ability to exchange information across vast distances.

Effective coordination and liaison must be established and maintained with those activities of the US Government outside the DOD that have functions associated with the NMCS; e.g., the White House Situation Room, Department of State Operations Center, Central Intelligence Agency Operations Center, the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications, United Nations Military Mission, US Coast Guard Operations Center, Federal Aviation Administration Executive Communications Control Center, and such other agencies, activities, or centers as may be designated.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

Appropriate military information will be provided to these associated systems through the NMCS, using timely, secure, and reliable communications systems. Conversely, political, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic information input to the NMCS will be provided by these same systems. In addition, the NMCS should provide communications to support representatives of the White House and other Government activities that may use the NMCS in a politico-military situation concerning strategic direction of US military forces.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide for lateral coordination with US Government activities external to the DOD to ensure necessary interchange of data to and from the NMCS.

Related Terms

global command and control system

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
Systems Support to Joint Operations

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war. JP 1-02

National military strategy (NMS) is derived from the national security strategy. NMS attempts to promote peace, deter aggression, and, failing that, fight and win. But in the larger context, defeating an enemy military force is rarely sufficient, in and of itself, to ensure a long-term solution to a crisis. The NMS and defense policy provide strategic guidance for the employment of military forces. The NMS provides advice of the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as to the recommended NMS and fiscally constrained force structure required to attain the national security objectives. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides guidance for planning purposes to the combatant commanders and the Chiefs of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. This guidance capitalizes on US strengths and permits it to exploit the weaknesses of those who may threaten our national interests. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the National Command Authorities.

Related Terms

national security strategy; strategy; theater strategy

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

NATIONAL SECURITY

A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations, or b. a favorable foreign relations position, or c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. JP 1-02

Pursuant to the constitutional requirement of the Federal Government to “provide for the common defense,” the executive and legislative branches of the Federal Government share responsibility and authority for ensuring national security. Based on the constitutional foundation of checks and balances and civilian control of the military, Congress legislates an overall framework for national security and allocates resources to meet changing defense requirements as identified by the executive branch. Within the executive branch, Federal agencies operate within this overall framework and the resources allocated to provide for the Nation’s present and future security. Using available resources and statutory authorities, the President exercises his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief to direct the deployment and employment of the Nation’s Armed Forces.

Defense of the national security rests first on the concept of deterrence. By demonstrating national resolve and maintaining the ability to deal successfully with threats to the national interests, we deter those who would use military power against us. Readiness and military professionalism lessen the risk of our having to fight at all. If deterrence fails, then our single objective is winning the nation’s wars. When we fight, we fight to win.

We also have a long history of military support for national goals short of war, ranging from general military service to the nation (such as surveying railroads and waterways in the 19th century) to a wide range of actions abroad in support of foreign policy. In all military operations other than war, our purpose again is to promote the national security and protect our national interests.

Related Terms

national military strategy; national security strategy

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Force of the United States
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM

The National Security Council (NSC) system is the principal forum for deliberation of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision. The NSC system provides the framework for establishing national strategy and policy objectives. The NSC develops policy options, considers implications, coordinates operational problems that require inter-departmental consideration, develops recommendations for the President, and monitors policy implementation. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff discharges a substantial part of his statutory responsibilities as the principal military adviser to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense through the institutional channels of the NSC. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regularly attends NSC meetings and presents his views and those of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. The NSC prepares national security guidance that, with Presidential approval, implements national security policy. These policy decisions provide the basis for military planning and programming.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called national strategy or grand strategy. JP 1-02

We achieve unity of effort first at the national level. The President, assisted by the National Security Council, develops national security strategy (otherwise known as national or grand strategy), employing the political/diplomatic, economic, informational, and military powers of the nation to secure national policy aims and objectives. In support of this national security strategy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, advises the President and Secretary of Defense (the National Command Authorities) concerning the application of military power. The resulting national military strategy provides strategic focus for US military activity. Strategy involves understanding the desired policy goals for a projected operation; that is, what should be the desired state of affairs when the conflict is terminated. The clear articulation of aims and objectives and the resulting strategic focus are fundamental prerequisites for unity of effort.

National security strategy is the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. It encompasses national defense, foreign relations, and economic relations and assistance; and aims, among other objectives, at providing a favorable foreign relations position, and a defense posture capable of defeating hostile action.

As the national leadership generates national objectives and a national security strategy to pursue them, the leadership will also devise — or modify — the military instrument of national power as a component of national security strategy. This strategy takes the form of objectives for the development of broad military capabilities, their worldwide posture, and their functional and geographic orientation. In the event of armed conflict, this strategy will take the form of military objectives for the establishment of military conditions essential to support national security objectives and terminate the conflict on terms favorable to US interests. These objectives need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives.

Related Terms

national military strategy; strategy; theater strategy

Source Joint Publications

JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

NATIONAL STRATEGIC DIRECTION

National security strategy and national military strategy, shaped by and oriented on national security policies, provide strategic direction for combatant commanders. Combatant commanders, in turn, provide guidance and direction through their combatant command strategies and plans for the employment of military forces, in conjunction with interagency and multinational forces, in the conduct of military operations. These strategies integrate national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military concepts (ways), and

national resources and military forces and supplies (means). The figure below illustrates national strategic direction.

The National Command Authorities, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct the national effort that supports combatant and subordinate commanders to ensure the following:

- Military objectives are defined, understood, and achievable.
- Active Service forces are ready for combat and Reserve component forces are appropriately mobilized and readied to join active forces.
- Intelligence systems and efforts focus on the operational area, including opposing nations and their armed forces.
- Strategic direction is current and timely.
- Defense and other governmental agencies support the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) employment of forces.
- The continental US base and other combatant commands are ready to provide needed support.
- Allies and coalition partners are available when appropriate.
- Forces and supplies deploy into the operational area in a timely manner to support the JFC’s concept of operations.



“Our military forces are one team — in the game to win regardless of who carries the ball. This is no time for “Fancy Dans” who won’t hit the line with all they have on every play, unless they can call the signals. Each player on this team — whether he shines in the spotlight of the backfield or eats dirt in the line — must be an all-American.”

**General Omar N. Bradley, USA:
Statement to the House Armed Services Committee,
19 Oct 1949**

Related Terms

national security strategy, national military strategy

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

NATION ASSISTANCE

Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations.

JP 1-02

General. Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than humanitarian assistance (HA)) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the US and that nation. Nation assistance operations support a host nation (HN) by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. Nation assistance programs often include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), and humanitarian and civic assistance as shown in the figure below. All nation assistance actions are integrated through the US Ambassador’s Country Plan.

Security Assistance. Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the US provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Some examples of US security assistance programs are Foreign Military sales, Foreign Military Financing Program, International Military Education and Training Program, Economic Support Fund, and commercial sales licensed under the Arms Export Control Act.

Foreign Internal Defense. FID programs encompass the total political, economic, informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency. US military support to FID should focus on assisting HN personnel to anticipate, preclude, and counter these threats. FID supports HN internal defense and development (IDAD) programs. US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused on helping another nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow the government. US FID programs may address other threats to an HN’s internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism.

NATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

A group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

The total political, economic, informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency.

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE

Provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises. Must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefits to the local populace.

“The severity of human suffering in Somalia caused commanders to try to alleviate the situation on their own. Units were deployed to the field to provide security for the humanitarian relief agency convoys of food. Upon seeing the appalling conditions, and realizing they were not tasked to give food or provide direct support to the population, local commanders took it upon themselves to try to arrange for or speed up relief supplies. While well-intended, this activity diverted the commanders’ attention from their primary mission.”

Center for Army Lessons Learned
Newsletter, 93-8

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. Humanitarian and civic assistance programs are provided under title 10 US Code section 401. This assistance is provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises, and must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. In contrast to emergency relief conducted under HA operations, humanitarian and civic assistance programs generally encompass planned activities in the following categories:

- Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country;
- Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems;
- Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and,
- Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07

Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

NAVAL COASTAL WARFARE

Coastal sea control, harbor defense, and port security, executed both in coastal areas outside the United States in support of national policy and in the United States as part of this Nation's defense. Also called NCW. JP 1-02

Naval coastal warfare (NCW) forces plan and conduct operations to ensure strategic mobility and provide a safe haven for US and multinational forces in NCW areas, during time of war or other contingency situations, in support of the joint force commander's (JFC's) concept of operations. NCW is the responsibility of the JFC. This responsibility is exercised through the Navy component commander (NCC), who will normally assign a naval coastal warfare commander (NCWC) for an appropriate NCW area. The NCWC plans and conducts NCW operations within a defined geographic area, normally designated as the NCW area. NCW encompasses coastal sea control, harbor defense, and port security. NCW operations include but are not limited to intelligence gathering; reconnaissance and surveillance; interdiction; security and safety; and supporting operations. These operations may be done independently or in support of other operations.


The NCWC may assign subarea operational commanders as needed for coastal sea control and harbor defense in order to conduct these operations. Supporting functions such as mine countermeasures or search and rescue may be assigned to the NCWC. The conceptual organization is illustrated in the figure below.

Geographic combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders have the responsibility for NCW within their respective area of responsibility/joint operations area. This responsibility is exercised through the NCC. The NCC tasks the NCWC to conduct NCW operations. The NCC will assign supporting forces to the NCWC as required and available. The NCWC may request Coast Guard support before the transfer of the Coast Guard as a Service to the Navy.

The NCWC conducts NCW operations within a designated NCW area. The NCWC may identify one or more coastal sea control commanders (CSCCs), harbor defense commanders, and supporting function commanders, as appropriate.

The NCWC conducts liaison with Service component forces ashore via the joint rear area coordinator or the joint rear area commander, if designated, during joint operations. Close coordination is essential. CSCCs and harbor defense commanders establish corresponding relationships with Service component forces ashore to coordinate security operations.

The NCWC is subject to all agreements between the US and host nation (HN) governments. Close liaison between the NCWC and appropriate HN agencies is necessary in order to operate within that country's territorial waters and to coordinate support from local, civil, and military authorities.



Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-10

Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations

NBC-CAPABLE NATION

The threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) occurs across the range of military operations. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)-capable nations, including developing nations, may use these weapons to achieve political or military objectives. WMD may be used in isolation or as an adjunct to conventional combat power. If used, they pose the problem to US forces of creating an asymmetrical battlefield.

The number of nations capable of developing and possessing WMD is steadily increasing. Developing nations are receiving these weapons or means to develop them through technological transfer, overt or covert direct transfer, or support to belligerent groups or governments. The potential for their use can range from blackmail or acts of terrorism during

NETWORK

peace to escalation during conflict or war. An NBC-capable nation is defined as one that has the capability to produce or acquire and employ one or more types of WMD to achieve political and military objectives. Inherent in this capability are varying degrees of abilities to conduct research and development, improve technology, stockpile, and effectively prosecute a war in an NBC environment.

Related Terms

nuclear, biological, and chemical defense operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-11 Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense

NETWORK

The missions of the US military have changed dramatically in the last decades of the twentieth century. The current and future operating environment of joint forces will be increasingly characterized by rapid change. Technological improvements in mobility, directed energy weapons, and sensors will continue to reduce factors of time and space, and demand faster tempos of operation across vast areas. Increasing global population, rapidly expanding world economic markets, and unprecedented advances in information systems technology will continue to perpetuate a global explosion of military and commercial information networks. These ever increasing networks are rapidly creating a global sphere (or infosphere) of information. The infosphere refers to the rapidly growing global network of military and commercial command, control, communications, and computers systems and networks linking information data bases and fusion centers that are accessible to the warrior anywhere, anytime, in the performance of any mission. The infosphere provides a worldwide, automated information exchange that supports joint forces, which is secure and transparent to the warrior. This emerging capability is highly flexible to support the rapid task organization and power projection. Information technology and the existence and growth of a global infosphere have irreversibly impacted the fundamental approach to warfare of massing effects rather than forces. This has not only propelled joint forces into the age of information, but also into information-based warfare with precision-guided weapon systems that detect and engage targets based on the electronic transfer of data. Joint forces must quickly adapt to this increasingly complex and highly uncertain operating environment.

Related Terms

information grid

Source Joint Publications

JP 6-0 Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
Systems Support to Joint Operations

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

Operations conducted to relocate threatened noncombatants from locations in a foreign country. These operations normally involve United States citizens whose lives are in danger, and may also include selected foreign nationals. Also called NEO. JP 1-02

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) normally relocate threatened noncombatants from a foreign country. Although principally conducted to evacuate US citizens, NEOs may



Selected Haitian noncombatants board a US C-130 bound for safe haven camps in Panama during Operation ABLE MANNER.

also include selective evacuation of citizens from the host nation as well as citizens from other countries.

NEO methods and timing are significantly influenced by diplomatic considerations. Under ideal circumstances there may be little or no opposition; however, commanders should anticipate opposition and plan the operation like any combat operation.

NEOs are similar to a raid in that the operation involves swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of objectives, and ends with a planned withdrawal. It differs from a raid in that force used is normally limited to that required to protect the evacuees and the evacuation force. Forces penetrating foreign territory to conduct a NEO should be kept to the minimum consistent with mission accomplishment and the security of the force and the extraction and protection of evacuees.

Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, the Department of State (DOS) is responsible for the protection and evacuation of American citizens abroad and for guarding their property. This order also directs the Department of Defense to advise and assist the DOS in preparing and implementing plans for the evacuation of US citizens. The US Ambassador, or Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, is responsible for the preparation of Emergency Action Plans that address the military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign country. The conduct of military operations to assist implementation of Emergency Action Plans is the responsibility of the geographic combatant commander.

Evacuation operations are characterized by uncertainty. Evacuation operations may be directed without warning because of sudden changes in a country's government, reoriented political or military relationship with the US, a sudden hostile threat to US citizens from elements within or external to a foreign country, or in response to a natural disaster.

Examples of NEO are EASTERN EXIT, conducted in 1991, when US and foreign national personnel were evacuated from Somalia, and QUICK LIFT, also conducted in 1991, when personnel were evacuated from Zaire.

Operation EASTERN EXIT

On 1 January 1991, the US Ambassador to Somalia requested military assistance to evacuate the Embassy. Americans and other foreign nationals had sought shelter in the Embassy compound that day as the reign of Somali dictator Siad Barre disintegrated into a confused battle for control of Mogadishu.

The next day, Operation EASTERN EXIT was initiated. Despite the priorities of the Gulf War, special operations forces helicopters were put on alert, Air Force C-130 transport aircraft were deployed to Kenya, and two Navy amphibious ships with elements of a Marine expeditionary brigade embarked were sent south from the North Arabian Sea toward Somalia. Initial plans called for evacuation of the endangered Americans through Mogadishu's international airport, utilizing Air Force aircraft staged in Kenya. The situation in Mogadishu rapidly worsened and aircraft, even those of the US Air Force, could not land safely at the airport. It seemed unlikely in any case that those sheltered at the Embassy could travel safely through the embattled city to the airport.

By 4 January, it had become apparent that the Embassy's only hope lay with the two ships still steaming south at flank speed. At 0247, two CH-53E helicopters with Marines and Navy SEALs departed the USS Guam for the 466-mile flight to Mogadishu. After two in-flight refuelings from KC-130 aircraft, the helicopters arrived over the Embassy at dawn. About 100 armed Somali stood with ladders by one wall. As the CH-53Es flew into the compound, the Somali scattered. Shortly after the helicopters touched down, a special operations AC-130 gunship arrived overhead to provide fire support, if needed. The CH-53Es unloaded the security force, embarked 61 evacuees, and took off for the 350-mile return flight.

The ships continued to steam at full speed toward Somalia throughout the day. The final evacuation of the Embassy started at midnight, after the ships had arrived off the coast. The remaining 220 evacuees and the security force were extracted during the night.

EASTERN EXIT, which resulted in the rescue of 281 people — from 30 different countries — from a bloody civil war, was the result of the synergistic employment of widely dispersed joint forces that rapidly planned and conducted a NEO in the midst of the Gulf War.

Related Terms

military operations other than war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07

Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called NGO. JP 1-02

General. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are frequently on scene before US forces and are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed. NGOs are independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused, primary relief providers.

These organizations play an important role in providing support to host nations. In fact, NGOs provide assistance to over 250 million people annually. Their worldwide contributions total between \$9 and \$10 billion each year — more than any single nation or international body (such as the United Nations (UN)). Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Though differences may exist between military forces and civilian agencies, short-term objectives are frequently very similar. Discovering this common ground is essential to unity of effort. In the final analysis, activities and capabilities of NGOs must be factored into the commander’s assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected course of action.

The Role of NGOs. NGOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. The professionalism, capability, equipment and other resources, and expertise vary greatly from one NGO to another. NGOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. The connectivity between NGOs and the Department of Defense is currently ad hoc, with no specific statutory linkage. But while their focus remains grassroots and their connections informal, NGOs are major players at the interagency table. The sheer number of lives they affect and resources they provide enables the NGO community to wield a great deal of power within the interagency community. In fact, individual organizations are often tapped by the UN and US government agencies to carry out specific relief functions.

Military and Private Organization Relations. The extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various nations make private organizations valuable sources of information about local and regional governments and civilian attitudes toward the operation. While some organizations will seek the protection afforded by armed forces or the use of military aircraft to move relief supplies to overseas destinations, others may avoid a close affiliation with military forces, preferring autonomous operations. Their rationale may be fear of compromising their position with the local populace or suspicion that military forces intend to take control of, influence, or even prevent their operations. Combatant command staff planners should consult these organizations, along with the host country government (if sovereign), to identify local issues and concerns that should be reflected in the proposed public affairs guidance.

“For all our experience and compassion, we in the relief and development business do not have the capacity to deal with such large-scale catastrophes without help. Help from the military is not something we should begin to take for granted or rely upon in all cases. But there are extraordinary circumstances that call for responses – manpower, equipment, expertise, transport and communication capacity – that only the military can deploy”

Philip Johnston, President & CEO, CARE

“We must recognize that the Department of Defense contribution to interagency operations is often more that of enabler (versus decisive force, a function we are institutionally more comfortable with). For example, in Rwanda, the military served as an enabling force which allowed the NGOs and PVOs to execute their function of humanitarian relief. A key component to our success in Rwanda was the fact that we consciously stayed in the background and withdrew our forces as soon as the enabling function was complete.”

**General George A. Joulwan, USA Commander in Chief,
US European Command**

Military Support of NGOs. The National Command Authorities may determine that it is in the national interest to task US military forces with missions that bring them into close contact with (if not support of) NGOs. In such circumstances, it is mutually beneficial to closely coordinate the activities of all participants. A climate of cooperation between NGOs, and the military forces should be the goal. Taskings to support NGOs are normally for a short-term purpose due to extraordinary events. In most situations, logistics, communications, and security are those capabilities most needed by the NGOs. It is, however, crucial to remember that in such missions the role of the armed forces should be to enable — not perform — NGO tasks. As later described, US military assistance has frequently proven to be the critical difference that enabled success of an operation. Military commanders and other decision makers should also understand that mutually beneficial arrangements between the armed forces and NGOs and may be critical to the success of the campaign or operation plan.

Related Terms

private voluntary organizations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-08

Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL (NBC) DEFENSE OPERATIONS

General. A capability to defend against nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attack and to survive and sustain combat operations in an NBC environment requires intelligence forewarning and highly trained, properly equipped forces throughout the theater of operations. US forces must be prepared to conduct operations in an NBC environment with minimal degradation. At the theater operational level, NBC defense involves protection for forces and the means to remove or cope with operationally significant hazards, conceal intentions in the area of responsibility, and provide adequate health service support to preserve the fighting capability of the forces. Physical and mental demands of military operations can have profound effects on the performance of individual Service members and units. This is particularly true

when the stress of combat is intensified by heat, continuous operations, and NBC protective clothing worn as part of a unit's mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP).

NBC defense for the theater requires cognizance of the principles of NBC defense — avoidance, protection, and decontamination — coupled with a proactive theater-level program of intelligence, psychological operations, deception, and obscurity. If the enemy uses NBC weapons, an effective NBC defense program gives our forces an advantage in operational tempo. This advantage causes the enemy to cease NBC warfare or continue the conflict on less favorable terms. Nuclear weapons cause casualties through blast, heat, and radiation effects. Biological and chemical weapons cause serious injury or death and restrict the use of terrain or equipment. NBC weapons also degrade force effectiveness by causing military personnel to don cumbersome protective clothing and equipment. To counter these effects, NBC defense, as shown in the figure below, adheres to the three principles: avoidance, protection, and decontamination.

Avoidance. Passive and active measures used in avoiding NBC attack are keys to NBC defense. Passive measures include training, camouflage and concealment (including the use of smoke and obscurants), hardened positions, and dispersion. Active avoidance includes contamination detection, marking, alarms, warning, reporting, and control measures.

Protection. This principle consists of hardening of positions, protecting personnel, assuming MOPP, physical defense measures, and reacting to attack.

Hardening. Overhead cover, bunkered positions, armored-like sections of ships, or tanks are examples. This measure pertains primarily to nuclear weapons in the NBC defense context.

Protecting Personnel. Ordinary clothing can provide some protection against the thermal effects of a nuclear detonation, but more sophisticated protection is required against biological and chemical weapons. These measures may include medical prophylaxis (pre-treatments) protective masks or protective ensemble, antidote, or other medical treatments.

PRINCIPLES OF NBC DEFENSE

AVOIDANCE

Passive and active measures used in avoiding NBC attack are keys to NBC defense

PROTECTION

This principle consists of: hardening of positions, protecting personnel, assuming mission oriented protective posture, physical defense measures, and reacting to attack

DECONTAMINATION

Decontamination stops the erosion of combat power and reduces possibility of additional casualties from inadvertent exposure or failure of protection

NUCLEAR RADIATION

Nuclear. Other measures to protect personnel from nuclear effects include implementing passive measures, warning others, locating and identifying burst location, and limiting exposure.

Biological and Chemical. Other biological and chemical measures include providing individual and collective protection measures or relocation of personnel to toxic-free areas.

Mission-Oriented Protective Posture. When considering the use of MOPP, the commander should balance protection with degradation of the forces' ability to perform their mission. Normally, the joint force commander will leave the decision of MOPP level to the component commander, who usually will decentralize the decision to the various area commanders or captains of their vessels.

Physical Defense Measures. The optimum conditions for the enemy to employ biological aerosols or chemical attacks exist in the late evening or early morning. When threat conditions exist, it is recommended that during the hours of darkness as many personnel as possible remain inside any available fixed or improvised collective protective shelters or wear their protective masks.

Decontamination. Decontamination stops the erosion of combat power and reduces the possibility of additional casualties from inadvertent exposure or failure of protection. The extent of and time required for decontamination depends on the tactical situation, mission, degree of contamination, and other alternatives to decontamination, such as deferring the use of the equipment. Forces should ordinarily decontaminate only that materiel needed for completion of the mission. Depending on agent type and weather conditions, decontamination may not be required because of natural weathering effects (temperature, wind, and sunlight). Non-mission essential equipment would have the decontamination deferred, or natural weathering could be used.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-11 Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense

NUCLEAR RADIATION

Particulate and electromagnetic radiation emitted from atomic nuclei in various nuclear processes. The important nuclear radiations, from the weapon standpoint, are alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons. All nuclear radiations are ionizing radiations, but the reverse is not true; X-rays for example, are included among ionizing radiations, but they are not nuclear radiations since they do not originate from atomic nuclei. JP 1-02

Effects of a nuclear detonation are primarily in three areas: thermal radiation, blast, and nuclear radiation. Corollary effects, such as electromagnetic pulse, can break down electronics system protection, disrupt communications, and have significant psychological impacts on friendly forces.

The most wide-spread and longest lasting weapon effect comes from the emission of radioactive products. These appear in two forms: initial and residual radiation. Initial radiation, which is emitted during the first minute after detonation, produces deadly gamma rays and neutrons. Residual radiation is most prevalent in ground bursts where the detonation heaves

up land, buildings, and other materials that are later dispersed as radioactive fallout. In the case of an air burst, residual radioactive emissions are extremely limited.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-11 Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense

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OBJECTIVE

The physical object of the action taken, e.g., a definite tactical feature, the seizure and/or holding of which is essential to the commander's plan. JP 1-02

Planning for employment of joint teams begins with articulating and understanding the objective, purpose of the operations, and commander's intent (the commander's vision of the end state to be achieved). Commanders of combatant commands (CINCs) and joint force commanders (JFCs) reporting directly to the National Command Authorities (NCA) receive guidance and direction from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CINCs refine the guidance and direction for subordinate JFCs. Subordinate JFCs then translate this guidance and theater strategy into clearly defined and attainable objectives. JFCs then conduct campaigns and operations to accomplish these objectives. The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

The objective of combat operations is the destruction of the enemy armed forces' capabilities and will to fight. The objective of an operation other than war might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. Avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective.

Related Terms

principles of war; target

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

OBJECTIVITY

For intelligence to be objective, it should be unbiased, undistorted, and free from political or other constraints. The methodology, product, and use of intelligence must not be directed or manipulated to conform to a desired result, preconceptions of a situation or an adversary, institutional position, predetermined objective, operation, or method of operations. Intelligence concerning a situation is one of the factors in determining policy, but policy must not determine the intelligence.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

OFFENSIVE

The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war. Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize or re seize the initiative. An offensive spirit must therefore be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications


JP 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

OPERATIONAL AREA

Organization of an Operational Area. To assist in the coordination and deconfliction of joint action, joint force commanders (JFCs) may define operational areas or joint areas. The size of these areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations. For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, geographic combatant commanders can employ the following operational areas (illustrated in the figure below).

Joint Operations Area (JOA). A JOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area. JOAs are also appropriate when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters.



Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA). A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities, for use by a joint special operations component or joint special operations task force for the conduct of special operations. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area.

Joint Rear Area (JRA). The JRA facilitates the protection and operation of bases, installations, and forces that support combat operations. JRAs are not necessarily contiguous with areas actively engaged in combat. JRAs may include intermediate support bases and other support facilities intermixed with combat elements. The JRA is particularly useful in nonlinear combat situations.

Amphibious Objective Area. The amphibious objective area includes the objectives to be secured by an amphibious task force. It needs to be large enough for necessary sea, air, land, and special operations. Refer to Joint Pub 3-02, “Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations,” for further information and guidance.

Area of Operations (AO). JFCs may define AOs for land and naval forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Component commanders with AOs typically designate subordinate AOs within which their subordinate forces operate. These commanders employ the full range of joint and Service doctrinal control measures and graphics to delineate responsibilities, deconflict operations, and promote unity of effort.

Area of Interest (AI). JFCs at all levels can designate AIs to monitor enemy activities outside the operations area. An AI is usually larger in size than the operational area and encompasses areas from which the enemy can act to affect current or future friendly operations.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

OPERATIONAL ART

The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war. JP 1-02

The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art — the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. (See figure below.) Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and should influence the enemy disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. It provides a framework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations. Operational art helps commanders



understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure.

Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint and multinational cooperation. Operational art is practiced not only by joint force commanders but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders. Joint operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces but also at the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. Joint operational art, in particular, focuses on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces.

Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions:

- What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)
- What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)
- How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
- What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?

Related Terms

operational level of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. JP 1-02

Operational Control (OPCON) is the command authority which may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and can be delegated or transferred.

OPCON is inherent in combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. It should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. It does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. These elements of COCOM must be specifically delegated by the combatant commander. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and geographic joint operations areas of subordinate joint force commanders. Commanders of subordinate commands and joint task forces will normally be given OPCON of assigned or attached forces by the superior commander.

OPCON is the authority to exercise the following:

- Exercise or delegate OPCON and tactical control, establish support relationships among subordinates, and designate coordinating authorities.
- Give direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training.
- Prescribe the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

- Organize commands and forces within the command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- Employ forces within the command, as necessary, to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- Assign command functions to subordinate commanders.
- Plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the action of subordinate forces.
- Establish plans, policies, priorities, and overall requirements for the intelligence activities of the command.
- Conduct joint training and joint training exercises required to achieve effective employment of the forces of the command, in accordance with joint doctrine established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and establish training policies for joint operations required to accomplish the mission. This authority also applies to forces attached for purposes of joint exercises and training.
- Suspend from duty and recommend reassignment of any officer assigned to the command.
- Assign responsibilities to subordinate commanders for certain routine operational matters that require coordination of effort of two or more commanders.
- Establish an adequate system of control for local defense and delineate such areas of operation for subordinate commanders as deemed desirable.
- Delineate functional responsibilities and geographic areas of operation of subordinate commanders.

The Secretary of Defense may specify adjustments to accommodate authorities beyond OPCON in an establishing directive when forces are transferred between combatant commanders. Adjustments will be coordinated with the participating combatant commanders.

Related Terms

combatant command; combatant command (command authority); tactical control

Source Joint Publications

JP 0-2

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. JP 1-02

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Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. It provides a framework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations. Operational art helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure.

Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint and multinational cooperation. Operational art is practiced not only by joint force commanders but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders. Joint operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces but also at the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. Joint operational art, in particular, focuses on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces.

Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions:

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- What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)
- How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
- What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?

Related Terms

operational art; strategic level of war; tactical level of war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

OPERATIONAL REACH

“Sound logistics forms the foundation for the development of strategic flexibility and mobility. If such flexibility is to be exercised and exploited, military command must have adequate control of its logistic support.”

Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles: Logistics in the National Defense (1959)

On the first page of “On War,” Clausewitz likens war to a duel. In joint operational art, effective symmetrical attack (fully supported by all components of the joint force) and asymmetrical attack constitute the dueler’s sword; the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to protect each other is the dueler’s shield; and, in its broadest sense, basing is the dueler’s footing, affecting the reach of the sword and the strength and resiliency of the shield. Basing, whether from overseas locations, sea-based platforms, or continental US, directly affects operational reach.

Operational reach is the distance over which military power can be concentrated and employed decisively. Reach is influenced by the geography surrounding and separating the opponents. It is extended by locating forces, reserves, bases, and logistics forward, by increasing the range of weapon systems, and by improving transportation availability and the effectiveness of lines of communications and throughput. Nevertheless, for any given operation, there is a finite range beyond which the joint force cannot prudently operate or maintain effective operations. (See figure below.)



Thus, basing in the broadest sense is an indispensable foundation of joint operational art, directly affecting the combat power that the joint force is capable of generating by affecting such critical factors as sortie and resupply rates. In particular, the arrangement and successive positioning of advanced bases (often in austere, rapidly emplaced configurations) underwrites the progressive ability of the joint force to shield its components from enemy action and deliver symmetric and asymmetric blows with increasing power and ferocity. Basing is often directly affected by political and diplomatic considerations and as such can become a critical junction where strategic, operational, and tactical considerations interact. US force basing options span the spectrum from permanently basing forces in mature, strategically important theaters to temporary sea-basing during crisis response in littoral areas of instability. Bases (including the flexible and responsive capability of sea-basing) are typically selected to be within operational reach of the opponent, where sufficient infrastructure is in place or can be fabricated to support the operational and sustaining requirements of deployed forces, and where they can be assured of some degree of security from enemy attacks. Basing thus plays a vital role in determining the operational approach, which may be conceived of in terms of lines of operations.

Lines of operations define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. A force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point and when it is therefore closer to separate enemy forces than the latter are to one another. Interior lines benefit a weaker force by allowing it to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than the enemy. A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemy. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger or more mobile force, but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile opponent.

In modern war, lines of operation attain a three-dimensional aspect and pertain to more than just maneuver. Joint force commanders (JFCs) use them to focus combat power effects toward a desired end. JFCs apply combat power throughout the three dimensions of space

and over time in a logical design that integrates the capabilities of the joint force to converge on and defeat enemy centers of gravity.

Operational reach also depends on the ability to phase reserves and materiel forward. Finally, it must include the operating ranges and endurance of combat forces and sustainment. The combatant commander (CINC) may seek to extend operational reach (with associated increase in risk) by deploying forces ahead of supporting combat service support forces. The logistician must then creatively use available assets to provide the minimum level of sustainment to the deployed forces. Operational reach may be improved by establishing advanced bases or depots and by improving the security and efficiency of the lines of communications.

Operational reach is a relative value. It may be improved by denying one or several components of the enemy's operational reach. The essence of a campaign plan is to accomplish the assigned national strategic objectives with logistics providing the extension of the CINC's strategic and operational reach into the enemy's depths while denying operational reach to the enemy.

As CINCs move forces forward, they must gain control of command, control, communications, and computer systems centers, transportation nodes, and prospective base areas. These centers and areas become physical objectives for the combat forces to seize, control, and pass to the logistic system as it moves forward to exploit new gains. The resulting forward momentum of the logistic system results in an extension of the operational reach and endurance of the combat forces.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations
JP 4-0	Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

OPERATION ORDER

A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called OPORD.

JP 1-02

Operation orders are prepared under joint procedures in prescribed formats during crisis action planning. They are in the form of a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders to effect the coordinated execution of an operation.

Related Terms

campaign plan; operation plan

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0	Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
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OPERATION PLAN

Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operation Plan, for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published with or without a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file. a. OPLAN — An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC's Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. Also called OPLAN. b. CONPLAN — An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC's Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. Also called CONPLAN. c. CONPLAN with TPFDD — A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. JP 1-02

An operation plan (OPLAN) is a complete and detailed operation plan containing a full description of the concept of operations and all required annexes with associated appendixes. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, deployment sequence, and resources required to execute the plan and provides closure estimates for their movement into the theater. An OPLAN can be used as the basis of a campaign plan (if required) and then developed into an operation order. OPLANs are normally prepared under the following conditions:

- The contingency has a compelling national interest, a specific threat, is critical to national security, and requires detailed prior planning.
- The nature (large scale) of the contingency requires detailed prior planning for complex issues.
- Detailed planning will contribute to deterrence by demonstrating readiness and resolve.
- Detailed planning is required to support multinational planning. OPLANs facilitate the transition to war and, through the development of supporting plans, establish the feasibility of the plan's concept of operations.
- Detailed planning is necessary to determine force and sustainment requirements, determine available resources to fill identified requirements, and validate shortfalls.

Related Terms

operation order; time-phased force and deployment data

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0

Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

OPERATION PLAN IN CONCEPT FORMAT

An operation plan (OPLAN) in concept format (CONPLAN) is an operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN, campaign plan, or operation order. A CONPLAN contains the commander of a combatant command's (CINC's) Strategic Concept, Annexes A-D and K, and other annexes and appendixes either required by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) or deemed necessary by the CINC to complete planning. CONPLANS are generally developed to meet common type missions that may develop rapidly and require implementation of like action but under markedly different circumstances; e.g., noncombatant evacuation operations. Unless specified in the JSCP, detailed support requirements are not calculated and time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) files are not prepared.

A CONPLAN with TPFDD is a CONPLAN that requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. Detailed planning may be required to support a contingency of compelling interest and critical to national security but is not likely to occur in the near term. These conditions require planning associated with the warfighting/employment aspects of the plan for a clear understanding of the CINC's concept of operations. Phasing, centers of gravity, and commander's intent enhance a clear understanding of what forces are required and when they have to be deployed (e.g., TPFDD) in order to achieve the national objective. A CONPLAN with TPFDD may also be required where the primary purpose is force movement planning in support of alliances. In this case campaign planning principles should be considered and incorporated to the maximum extent possible. Recognizing, however, that the level of detail contained in these plans is dependent upon similarly detailed alliance planning that these CONPLANS support, a campaign orientation may not be possible in all cases.

Related Terms

campaign plan; operation plan

Source Joint Publications


JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

OPERATIONS SECURITY

A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. JP 1-02

Operations security (OPSEC) is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to accomplish objectives shown in the figure and text below:

- identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems;
- determine indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries;



- select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.

OPSEC's most important characteristic is that it is a process. OPSEC is not a collection of specific rules and instructions that can be applied to every operation. It is a methodology that can be applied to any operation or activity for the purpose of denying critical information to an adversary.

Unlike security programs that seek to protect classified information, OPSEC is concerned with identifying, controlling, and protecting the generally unclassified evidence that is associated with sensitive operations and activities. OPSEC and security programs must be closely coordinated to ensure that all aspects of sensitive operations are protected.

OPSEC acknowledges that commanders must be prepared to assume some degree of risk when choosing whether or not to execute OPSEC measures. OPSEC measures will, in most cases, entail the expenditure of resources. In choosing to execute particular OPSEC measures, commanders must decide that the assumed gain in secrecy outweighs the costs in resources. If commanders decide not to execute certain measures because the costs outweigh the gain, then they are assuming risks. The OPSEC process requires that decision makers directly address how much risk they are willing to assume.

"The general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack."

Sun Tzu

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-54

Joint Doctrine for Operations Security

PARALLEL CHAINS OF COMMAND

In amphibious operations, a parallel system of command, responding to the interrelationship of Navy, landing force, Air Force, and other major forces assigned, wherein corresponding commanders are established at each subordinate level of all components to facilitate coordinated planning for, and execution of, the amphibious operation. JP 1-02

The interrelationship of naval and landing force (LF) tasks during the planning for and execution of the amphibious operation requires the establishment of parallel chains of command and corresponding commanders at all levels of the amphibious task force organization. The following fundamental considerations govern the application of such a system of parallel command:

- The commander, amphibious task force (CATF), a Navy officer, is responsible for the operation and, except during the planning phase, exercises that degree of authority over the entire force as necessary to ensure success of the operation.
- The commander, landing force (CLF) is either an Army or Marine Corps officer who has operational command of the LF (which may include aviation units).
- The CATF and CLF are on a corresponding level of command with regard to their respective components.

Parallel chains of command between the naval force, LF, and, in some cases, Air Force elements of an amphibious task force create special requirements for consultation. No significant decision contemplated by a commander in one chain of command that affects the plans, disposition, or intentions of a corresponding commander in another chain of command will be made without consultation with the commander concerned.

All necessary orders from one commander affecting personnel under command of a corresponding commander at a parallel level of command are, insofar as possible, issued through the appropriate counterpart commander. The foregoing will not affect the paramount authority of a commander of a ship or aircraft over persons embarked therein concerning matters affecting safety and good order of his ship or aircraft or authority of a senior officer present to act in an emergency.

Related Terms

amphibious operation

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations

PARALLEL COMMAND


Parallel command exists when nations retain control of their deployed forces. If a nation within the coalition elects to exercise autonomous control of its force, a parallel command structure exists. Such structures can be organized with: Nations aligned in a common effort, each retaining national control; and Nations aligned in a common effort, some retaining national control, with others permitting control of their forces by a central authority or another member force.

Parallel command is the simplest to establish and often the organization of choice. Coalition forces control operations through existing national chains of command. Coalition decisions

PATIENT EVACUATION

are made through a coordinated effort of the political and senior military leadership of member nations and forces. It is common for other command structures to emerge as coalitions mature, but the parallel model is often the starting point. The figure below depicts the command relationships developed and employed by coalition forces for Operation DESERT STORM.

These relationships represented a parallel command structure, with coordination facilitated by the Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center (C3IC). The C3IC was specifically established to facilitate exchange of intelligence and operational information, ensure coordination of operations among coalition forces, and provide a forum where routine issues could be resolved informally and collegially among staff officers.



Related Terms

lead nation command

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

PATIENT EVACUATION

Patient evacuation in the combat zone or from Echelon I to Echelon II, from Echelon II to Echelon III, and within Echelon III is normally the responsibility of the component commands and is coordinated by a Theater Patient Movements Requirements Center. These movements can be by surface (land or water), rotary-wing aircraft, or tactical aeromedical aircraft.

Dedicated patient evacuation for Navy hospital ships is provided by Army air ambulance assets. Tactical aeromedical evacuation from the combat zone (Echelon III) to the communications zone (Echelon IV) is normally a responsibility of the supporting Air Force component. Patient evacuation from the theater is the responsibility of US Commander in Chief, Transportation Command, who is responsible for establishing, operating, training, and maintaining the common-user aeromedical evacuation system worldwide. This mission is executed by the Air Mobility Command.

Vietnam: From the Field to the Hospital

Field evacuation and hospitalization of wounded in Vietnam was different from any previously carried out in any war. In addition it varied both in time and place within Vietnam. It was characterized by the absence of front lines and the traditional chain of evacuation. In general, the wounded Soldier was apt to receive his wounds while with a small group or unit isolated deep in roadless jungle, and the wounds were more apt to be multiple over all parts of the body than in any previous war. First aid and emergency medical treatment given on the site by company aid men, however, differed little from previous times. Resuscitative equipment and procedures included pressure dressings, tourniquets, and airways. Morphine was available but seldom used, as pain was not usually a problem at this point and aid men were aware of the depressant effects of morphine. In all likelihood, the patient would be evacuated within a relatively few minutes by helicopter, either a medical ambulance craft or a tactical one. The facilities available for resuscitation aboard the helicopter varied depending on whether it was a medical ("dust-off") helicopter or a combat helicopter. IV fluid, usually Ringer's Lactate solution, was often available, and trained medical technicians and emergency equipment were also present on dust-off helicopters.

The destinations of the helicopters varied. In some areas patients were taken to aid stations or medical companies. More often the helicopter flew the patients directly to a surgical hospital where they could receive definitive care. Blood and electrolyte solutions were often available at aid stations and medical and clearing companies, as was some surgical capability. Complete surgical facilities, including anesthetists, were available at clearing companies, but definitive surgery was usually not done here. At times battalion surgeons flew forward to a site of combat, bringing blood and other supplies which were given on the spot.

Hospitals fulfilled much the same function for combat wounded, whether they were surgical hospitals, field hospitals, or evacuation hospitals. By and large they were all "semipermanent," usually buildings set on a concrete floor, air-conditioned and with all utilities and other equipment of a first-rate hospital in the continental United States.

Resuscitation of a Vietnam war casualty was an extremely rapid and sophisticated procedure. The patient would often be brought to the hospital directly from the battlefield by medical evacuation helicopter, frequently in less than an hour. Usually he received emergency treatment on the battlefield, to include control of hemorrhage, wound dressing, respiratory control, and often the starting of intravenous fluid. At the hospital, he was immediately

taken to the resuscitation area where he was surrounded by a large team of highly trained physicians, nurses, and technicians.

The results of this prompt and efficient treatment may perhaps be best illustrated by comparing them with similar statistics from previous wars. In Vietnam, 46,000 of 346,000 or 13 percent, of all wounded American Soldiers died. If 22 percent had died, as was true in Korea, there would have been 77,840 deaths, 31,840 more than actually occurred. In World War II, 28 percent of all wounded American Soldiers died. If the medical treatment of Vietnam had been available during World War II, 117,748 Soldiers would have been saved.

Source: Hardaway, Robert M., M.D.,
Care of the Wounded in Vietnam,
Sunflower University Press, 1988

Timely patient evacuation plays an important role in the design of the treatment sequence from front to rear. When the echelons of health service support become more sophisticated, the means of patient evacuation also become more sophisticated. Patient evacuation involves route planning, movement control, and the locating of evacuation facilities. The evacuation of patients in a theater will primarily be by aircraft when air transportation is available, feasible, and the patient's condition permits. The joint force surgeon (JFS) must plan the means for treatment, logistics support, and movement of joint force patients that exceed the capability of individual medical treatment facilities (MTFs), just as the individual MTFs and medical units must have established internal operating procedures for these unforeseen surges in patient flow. The JFS must develop and exercise these plans for interorganizational support within the joint force, as well as those medical resources that will come from higher echelons or adjacent forces.



Health service plans must consider the evacuation of patients and casualties who cannot be returned to duty in the combat zone (Echelons I-III) to more capable hospitals in the communication zone or CONUS.

Related Terms**Source Joint Publications**JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

PEACE BUILDING

Post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. JP 1-02

Peace building consists of post-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Military support to peace building may include, for example, units rebuilding roads, reestablishing or creating government entities, or the training of defense forces.

Related Terms

peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace operations

Source Joint PublicationsJP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

Peace enforcement operations (PEO) are the application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PEO missions include intervention operations, as well as operations to restore order, enforce sanctions, forcibly separate belligerents, and establish and supervise exclusion zones for the purpose of establishing an environment for truce or ceasefire. Unlike peacekeeping operations, such operations do not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict. Examples of PEO



Joint forces support Peace Enforcement Operations to compel compliance with measures designed to establish an environment for truce or ceasefire.

PEACEKEEPING

are Operation POWER PACK conducted in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the secondary effort in Somalia (UNITAF), 1992-1993.

Related Terms

peace operations; peacekeeping operations

Source Joint Publications


JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

PEACEKEEPING

Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. JP 1-02

US doctrine has defined peacekeeping as “Military or para-military operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.”

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, codified in title 22, US Code, authorizes the President to furnish assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and other programs to further US national security interests. (See figure below.)



PKOs take place following diplomatic negotiation and agreement among the belligerents, the sponsoring organization, and potential force contributing nations concerning which nations will provide peacekeeping forces as well as the size and type of forces each will contribute. These operations are conducted in accordance with agreements among the parties to the conflict. Peacekeeping efforts often involve ambiguous situations requiring the peacekeeping force to deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming a participant.

The United Nations (UN) has been the most frequent sponsor of international PKOs. However, regional organizations such as the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Arab League have also acted to prevent, halt, or contain conflict in their respective regions. Similarly, some nations have negotiated multilateral agreements to create peacekeeping missions independent of any permanent international forum. Although there have been instances of other types of operations — such as the loose coalition of national units known as the Multinational Force in Beirut — these operations have usually taken place with the tacit approval of a regional organization or the UN. In some cases, unilateral interventions, such as Indian forces in Sri Lanka, have been termed “peacekeeping,” but fall outside the use of the term as defined by US doctrine.

Modern peacekeeping efforts evolved after World War II with the establishment of the UN. Although the UN Charter did not address peacekeeping, the UN gradually developed peacekeeping doctrine. The term “peacekeeping force” was used in 1956 when the UN established the UN Emergency Force to supervise the disengagement of forces after the invasion of Egypt, in the Suez War, by Great Britain, France, and Israel.

The US has supported numerous UN and non-UN-sponsored peacekeeping efforts with logistical support, financial support, observers, and forces. The US is one of a few nations capable of providing the intertheater airlift and sealift necessary to deploy peacekeeping forces around the world.

Related Terms

peace building; peace enforcement; peacemaking; peace operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07.3 JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Peacekeeping operations (PKO) are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. An example of PKO is the US commitment to the Multinational Force Observers in the Sinai since 1982.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

PEACEMAKING

The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to it.

JP 1-02

PEACE OPERATIONS

Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to conflict. Military activities that support peacemaking include military-to-military relations and security assistance.

Related Terms

peace building; peace enforcement; peace operations; peacekeeping

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

PEACE OPERATIONS

A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. JP 1-02

Peace operations (PO) are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement and categorized as peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations. PO are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict. Additional types of military operations other than war (e.g., humanitarian assistance and noncombatant evacuation operation) may complement peace operations. Military PO are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict.

Related Terms

peace building; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

PERSEVERANCE

Perseverance requires the preparation for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some military operations other than war may require years to achieve the desired results. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. It is important to assess possible responses to a crisis in terms of each option's impact on the achievement of the long-term political objective. This assessment does not preclude decisive military action, but frames that action within the larger context of strategic aims. Often, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is a requirement for success. This will often involve political, diplomatic, economic, and informational measures to supplement military efforts.

Related Terms

military operations other than war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

PHASE DURATION

Phase duration is a useful tool for determining the allocation of resources. Phase duration is the joint force commander's projection of how long a specific phase of an operation is

expected to last. Two examples of phase duration: the air operation will last a certain number of days (time oriented); or the air operation will last until a certain percentage of enemy ground threat is destroyed (objective oriented). Threat distribution and phase duration help identify where the weight of the campaign will fall during various phases to prevent unnecessary duplication of support to different components.

Related Terms

threat distribution

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-0

Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

PHASES

The arrangement of major operations relates directly to the commander's decision on phasing. A phase represents a period during which a large portion of the forces are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities (deployment, for example). A transition to another phase — such as a shift from deployment to defensive operations — indicates a shift in emphasis. World War II's Operation OVERLORD contained six phases: buildup, rehearsals, embarkation, assault, buildup, and breakout.

Phasing may be sequential or concurrent. Phases may overlap. The point where one phase stops and another begins is often difficult to define in absolute terms. During planning, commanders establish conditions for transitioning from one phase to another. The commander adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the enemy or to react to unforeseen situations.

Phasing assists commanders to think through the entire operation and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, and time. The primary benefit of phasing is that it assists commanders in achieving major objectives, which cannot be attained all at once, by planning manageable subordinate operations to gain progressive advantages, and so achieving the major objectives as quickly and affordably as possible. Campaign phasing should consider aspects such as prehostilities (including predeployment activities), lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and posthostilities (including redeployment).

Actions during a prehostilities phase may be for deterrence or to seek to set the terms for battle and enhance friendly and limit enemy freedom of action. The friendly force should not seek battle until it has set the terms or established the conditions for battle in its favor and should avoid being rushed into battle before such conditions are established, if possible. During predeployment activities, joint force commanders (JFCs) tailor forces for deployment. The command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence and logistic requirements of the force must be developed during the predeployment phase in order to support JFC concepts of operations. When in-place forces are not sufficient and/or are not appropriate for the envisioned operation, early determination of the forces required and the order in which they are needed, based on the JFC's concept of operations, assists in identifying the time required to deploy the force. Sealift and airlift capabilities are critical to JFC concepts.

A lodgment phase allows the movement and buildup of a decisive combat force in the operational area. In operations during peacetime, deployment will normally include movements to host-nation air or sea ports. In operations conducted before and during combat, initial deployment may require forcible entry, followed by the occupation and expansion of lodgment areas.

A decisive combat and stabilization phase initially focuses on the rapid buildup of joint force capabilities. The appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational area can contribute

greatly to the stabilization of the situation. Further, deployment of forces may serve as a deterrent to hostilities, but if deterrence fails, deployment will permit JFCs to build up full dimensional capabilities rapidly to conduct decisive action as early as possible. Such decisive action focuses on winning, that is, achieving the objectives defined by the National Command Authorities and JFC, and may include control of enemy territory and population and destruction of the enemy's ability and will to continue.



Quick and decisive deployment of fighter forces may stabilize the situation and obviate actual hostilities.

During a follow-through phase, JFCs synchronize joint force activities to bring the operation to a successful conclusion. Follow-through includes those actions that ensure the political objectives are achieved and sustained. Part of this phase may be to ensure the threat (military and/or political) is not able to resurrect itself. In essence, such a phase focuses on ensuring that the results achieved endure. During this phase, joint forces may conduct operations in support of other governmental agencies. JFCs continuously assess the impact of current operations during hostilities on the termination objectives. The outcome of military operations should not conflict with the long-term solution to the crisis.

During the posthostilities and redeployment phase, JFCs may retain responsibility for operations or they may transfer control of the situation to another authority and redeploy their forces. JFCs should identify posthostilities requirements as early as possible to best accomplish these missions and simultaneously redeploy assets no longer needed to resolve the crisis.

Logistics is crucial to phasing. Joint force planners consider establishing logistic bases, opening and maintaining lines of communications, establishing intermediate logistic bases to support new phases, and defining priorities for services and support. Logistics, then, is key to arranging the operations of campaigns and should be planned and executed as a joint responsibility.

Changes in phases at any level can represent a period of vulnerability for the force. At this point, missions and task organizations often change. The careful planning of branches and sequels can reduce the risk associated with transition between phases.

The Gulf War, 1990-1991

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Much of the rest of the world, including most other Arab nations, united in condemnation of that action. On 7 August, the operation known as DESERT SHIELD began. Its principal objectives were to deter further aggression and to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The United Nations Security Council passed a series of resolutions calling for Iraq to leave Kuwait, finally authorizing “all necessary means,” including the use of force, to force Iraq to comply with UN resolutions.

The United States led in establishing a political and military coalition to force Iraq from Kuwait and restore stability to the region. The military campaign to accomplish these ends took the form, in retrospect, of a series of major operations. These operations employed the entire capability of the international military coalition and included operations in war and operations other than war throughout.

The campaign — which included Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and the subsequent period of postconflict operations — can be viewed in the following major phases:

- DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP (to include crisis action planning, mobilization, deployment, and deterrence).
- DEFENSE (with deployment and force buildup continuing).
- OFFENSE.
- POSTWAR OPERATIONS (to include redeployment).

Deployment and Force Buildup. While diplomats attempted to resolve the crisis without combat, the coalition’s military forces conducted rapid planning, mobilization, and the largest strategic deployment since World War II. One of the earliest military actions was a maritime interdiction of the shipping of items of military potential to Iraq.

The initial entry of air and land forces into the theater was unopposed. The Commander in Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT), balanced the arrival of these forces to provide an early, viable deterrent capability and the logistic capability needed to receive, further deploy, and sustain the rapidly growing force. Planning, mobilization, and deployment continued throughout this phase.

Defense. While even the earliest arriving forces were in a defensive posture, a viable defense was possible only after the buildup of sufficient coalition air, land, and maritime combat capability. Mobilization and deployment of forces continued. Operations security (OPSEC) measures, operational military deceptions, and operational psychological operations were used to influence Iraqi dispositions, expectations, and combat effectiveness and thus degrade their abilities to resist USCINCCENT’s selected COA before engaging enemy forces. This phase ended on 17 January 1991, when Operation DESERT STORM began.

Offense. Operation DESERT STORM began with a major airpower effort — from both land and sea — against strategic targets; Iraqi air, land, and naval

PLANNED REQUESTS

forces; logistic infrastructure; and C2. Land and special operations forces supported this air effort by targeting forward-based Iraqi air defense and radar capability. The objectives of this phase were to gain supremacy in the air, significantly degrade Iraqi C2, deny information to enemy commanders, destroy enemy forces and infrastructure, and deny freedom of movement. This successful air operation would establish the conditions for the attack by coalition land forces.

While airpower attacked Iraqi forces throughout their depth, land forces repositioned from deceptive locations to attack positions using extensive OPSEC measures and simulations to deny knowledge of movements to the enemy. Two Army corps moved a great distance in an extremely short time to positions from which they could attack the more vulnerable western flanks of Iraqi forces. US amphibious forces threatened to attack from eastern seaward approaches, drawing Iraqi attention and defensive effort in that direction.

On 24 February, land forces attacked into Iraq and rapidly closed on Iraqi flanks. Under a massive and continuous air component operation, coalition land forces closed with the Republican Guard. Iraqis surrendered in large numbers. To the extent that it could, the Iraqi military retreated. Within 100 hours of the start of the land force attack, the coalition achieved its strategic objectives and a ceasefire was ordered.

Postwar Operations. Coalition forces consolidated their gains and enforced conditions of the ceasefire. The coalition sought to prevent the Iraqi military from taking retribution against its own dissident populace. Task Force Freedom began operations to rebuild Kuwait City.

The end of major combat operations did not bring an end to conflict. The coalition conducted peace enforcement operations, humanitarian relief, security operations, extensive weapons and ordnance disposal, and humanitarian assistance. On 5 April, for example, President Bush announced the beginning of a relief operation in the area of northern Iraq. By 7 April, US aircraft from Europe were dropping relief supplies over the Iraqi border. Several thousand Service personnel who had participated in Operation DESERT STORM eventually redeployed to Turkey and northern Iraq in this joint and multinational relief operation.

This postwar phase also included the major operations associated with the redeployment and demobilization of forces.

Related Terms

operational art

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

PLANNED REQUESTS

When air movement requirements are known or projected in advance, they are handled as planned requests through normal logistic channels. Channel missions and most special assignment airlift missions result from planned requests. In all cases, the joint military

command should task planned requests within the operational lead time established by the Air Force component commander. Lead time is the time required to source, task, and generate actual missions in support of a specific requirement. Lead time varies, depending on the scale of the request, available forces, and the theater air planning process.

Related Terms

immediate requests

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-17 JTTP for Theater Airlift Support

PLANNING AND DIRECTION

Planning and direction involve establishing the command relationships between all intelligence elements within the joint force and identifying, prioritizing, and validating intelligence and intelligence system requirements. This step also includes preparing a collection plan, determining essential elements of information, issuing requests for information collection and production, and continuously monitoring the availability of collected data.

Collection planning is normally conducted through the Collection Requirements Management (CRM) process. CRM registers, validates, and prioritizes collection, exploitation, and dissemination requirements to meet the information needs of joint and component force commanders. Through the development of a comprehensive collection plan or strategy, CRM tasks requirements to appropriate organic, attached, and supporting external organizations and agencies. (See figure below.) CRM also monitors the overall satisfaction of these requirements and assesses the effectiveness of the collection strategy to satisfy the original and evolving intelligence needs.

Planning and direction also includes identifying: intelligence personnel augmentation requirements to the Manpower and Personnel Directorate, key logistical requirements to the Logistics Directorate, lift and transportation requirements in the time-phased force and deployment list to the Plans Directorate, and communications requirements for intelligence operations to the Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate. This step also includes establishing and coordinating intelligence dissemination procedures

TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

ORGANIC

Intelligence assets or capabilities permanently assigned to a particular command.

ATTACHED

Separate units or assets attached to the joint force to support a particular operation or phase of operation.

SUPPORTING

Adjacent or other area of responsibility (AOR)/joint operations area (JOA), theater, other combatant command, or national intelligence assets providing intelligence support to the joint force commander from outside his AOR/JOA.

PLANNING ORDER

and systems with subordinate, lateral, and higher intelligence organizations and commands, and identifying national-level support requirements.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

PLANNING ORDER

1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate execution planning. The planning order will normally follow a commander's estimate and a planning order will normally take the place of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff alert order. National Command Authorities approval of a selected course of action is not required before issuing a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning order. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning before the directing authority approves a military course of action. JP 1-02

The PLANNING ORDER is a message from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the supported commander and other members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community. The primary purpose of the PLANNING ORDER is to direct that execution planning activities begin before formal selection of a course of action (COA) by the National Command Authorities (NCA). Used in this manner, the PLANNING ORDER saves time by allowing the planning activities described in Phase V of crisis action planning to begin pending a decision by the NCA. The PLANNING ORDER is designed to allow the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff additional flexibility in directing military activities taken in response to a crisis. In extremely time-sensitive situations, the PLANNING ORDER may be used in lieu of a WARNING ORDER. When used in this manner, the PLANNING ORDER will describe a specific COA; direct execution planning activities; and provide the combat force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information normally provided in a WARNING ORDER. The PLANNING ORDER will normally not be used to direct the deployment of forces or to increase force readiness. If force deployment is directed, the PLANNING ORDER will require approval of the Secretary of Defense.

Related Terms

alert order; execute order; warning order

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-03.1 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)

PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM

The planning, programming, and budgeting system, (PPBS) is another major national-level system related to the joint operation planning and execution process. The Department of Defense (DOD) military strategy formulation and resource management system develops and integrates defense policy, military strategy, Service programs, and the DOD budget. This system's ultimate objective is the acquisition and allocation of resources to meet the warfighting needs of the combatant commanders. The PPBS applies Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) derived national military strategy and recommended forces, and translates

them into budgetary requirements to be presented to Congress. The PPBS encompasses three phases.

Planning. The planning phase of the PPBS articulates the national policy, military strategy, and the force requirements to support the national defense. In response to guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense regarding projected budget levels and national security objectives, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, uses the JSPS to develop national military objectives, strategy, recommended forces, options, assessments, and evaluation of risk for the President's consideration. Following review by the Secretary of Defense, the President considers the recommendations of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and makes his strategy and option decisions, which are then incorporated in the development of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG is developed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in close coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders, the Services, and others. The final DPG is reviewed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the Services, the combatant commanders, and other members of the Defense Planning Resources Board (DPRB) before being forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and publication. The DPG is the link between planning and programming as it articulates national defense strategy and appropriate force structure requirements, together with programming guidance sufficient to accomplish national security objectives to the Military Departments, the Defense agencies, and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) for the development of their Program Objective Memorandums (POMs).

Programming. The programming phase of the PPBS focuses on the development of POMs and the integration of those POMs into a coherent defense program to support the warfighting requirements of the combatant commanders. With the exception of USSOCOM's special operations-unique requirements, the combatant commanders provide their requirements to the Services through their Service components and identify their highest priority needs to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by means of the Integrated Priority List. The Military Departments, Defense agencies, and USSOCOM develop their POMs based on the combatant command requirements and strategic concepts and guidance contained in the DPG. The POMs express the Services' total requirements and include assessments of risk, as well as descriptions of how well the POMs support the requirements of the combatant commanders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assesses the overall balance and adequacy of the composite POM force and support levels in view of approved strategy and the requirements of the combatant commanders and documents his assessment in the Chairman's Program Assessment. In a coordinated effort, program issues are identified by the combatant commanders and DPRB members and are resolved by the DPRB. The results are promulgated in the Secretary's Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). The PDM is the link between programming and budgeting.

Budgeting. The final phase of the PPBS is budgeting. Once the PDMs are received, budget estimates are prepared by each of the Military Departments, the Defense agencies, and USSOCOM and submitted to the Secretary of Defense. The Defense budget is reviewed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget to ensure that it is consistent with fiscal guidance. Changes to the budget are documented in Program Budget Decisions (PBDs). During this final phase of budgeting, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the Services, and the combatant commanders assess the impact of PBDs on warfighting capabilities. Their concerns are presented to the Secretary of Defense. Final changes are incorporated with previous PBDs to establish the DOD portion of the President's budget, which is submitted to Congress for funding. When the President

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

signs the congressional appropriations act into law, the Services, Defense agencies, and USSOCOM execute the budget to procure forces and capabilities.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). All military operations are driven by political considerations. However, MOOTW are more sensitive to such considerations due to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities. In MOOTW, political considerations permeate all levels and the military may not be the primary player. As a result, these operations normally have more restrictive rules of engagement than in war. As in war, the goal is to achieve national objectives as quickly as possible and conclude military operations on terms favorable to the US and its allies. However, the purposes of conducting MOOTW may be multiple, with the relative importance or hierarchy of such purposes changing or unclear; for example, to deter potential aggressors, protect national interests, support the United Nations or other regional organizations, satisfy treaty obligations, support civil authorities, or provide humanitarian assistance.

Political Considerations. There are two general means for obtaining objectives by force. The first seeks domination or overthrow of the opponent's military strength and political policy — an imposed settlement. The second seeks concession through coordinated military and negotiating actions. War is an instrument of policy. Negotiating power in armed conflict springs from two sources: military success and military potential. Military success provides military, geographic, political, psychological, or economic advantage and the quid pro quo for negotiations. Military potential establishes the threat of further advantage accruing to the possessor, which forces the opposing nation to consider a negotiated conclusion. Negotiating an advantageous conclusion to conflict requires time and power and the demonstrated will to use both. In addition to imposed and negotiated termination, there is an armistice or truce, which is a negotiated intermission in hostilities, not a peace. In effect, it is a device to buy time pending negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of hostilities. A nation needs to consider the advantages accruing to a truce and the prospects for its supervision.

Even when pursuing an imposed termination, the government requires some means of communication with the opponent(s). Declarations of intentions, requirements, and minor concessions may speed conflict termination, as the enemy considers the advantages of early termination versus extended resistance in the light of fading leverage.

The issue of conflict termination centers on national will and freedom of action. Once the opponent's strategic aim shifts from maintaining or extending gains to reducing losses, the possibilities for negotiating an advantageous termination improve. Military, economic, diplomatic, and informational effort need to be coordinated toward causing that shift and, once made, toward exploiting it. Conflict termination should be considered from the outset of planning and should be refined as the conflict moves toward advantageous termination.

Related Term

military operations other than war

Source Joint Publication

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN MOOTW

Political objectives drive military operations other than war (MOOTW) at every level from strategic to tactical. A distinguishing characteristic of MOOTW is the degree to which political objectives influence operations and tactics. Two important factors about political primacy stand out. First, all military personnel should understand the political objectives and the potential impact of inappropriate actions. Having an understanding of the political objective helps avoid actions which may have adverse political effects. It is not uncommon in some MOOTW, for example peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions which have significant political implications. Secondly, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious. However, commanders should strive, through continuing mission analysis, to detect subtle changes which, over time, may lead to disconnects between political objectives and military operations. Failure to recognize changes in political objectives early may lead to ineffective or counter-productive military operations.

The political objectives which military objectives are based on may not specifically address the desired military end state. Joint force commanders (JFCs) should, therefore, translate their political guidance into appropriate military objectives through a rigorous and continuous mission and threat analysis. JFCs should carefully explain to political authorities the implications of political decisions on capabilities and risk to military forces. Care should be taken to avoid misunderstandings stemming from a lack of common terminology.

Change to initial military objectives may occur because political and military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation, or it may occur because the situation itself changes. JFCs should be aware of shifts in the political objectives, or in the situation itself, that necessitate a change in the military objective. These changes may be very subtle, yet they still require adjustment of the military objectives. If this adjustment is not made, the military objectives may no longer support the political objectives, legitimacy may be undermined, and force security may be compromised.

Related Terms

military operations other than war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

POSSE COMITATUS ACT

Prohibits search, seizure, or arrest powers to US military personnel. Amended in 1981 under Public Law 97-86 to permit increased Department of Defense support of drug interdiction and other law enforcement activities. (Title 18, "Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus" - United States Code, Section 1385) JP 1-02

Limitations on military forces in providing support to civil authorities include, among others, the Posse Comitatus Act, Title 18, US Code Section 1385 — Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus. This Act prohibits the use of federal military forces to enforce or otherwise execute laws unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress. Statutory exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act which allow active duty military members

PREHOSTILITIES

to respond to civil disturbances are included under Title 10 Sections 331 to 333: Request from a State (331), Enforcement of Federal Law (332), and Protection of Civil Rights (333). Additional important exceptions to Posse Comitatus are found in Title 10 Sections 371-380.

Related Terms

military support to civil authorities

Joint Source Publications

JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

PREHOSTILITIES

Actions during a prehostilities phase may be for deterrence or to seek to set the terms for battle and enhance friendly and limit enemy freedom of action. The friendly force should not seek battle until it has set the terms or established the conditions for battle in its favor and should avoid being rushed into battle before such conditions are established, if possible. During predeployment activities, joint force commanders (JFCs) tailor forces for deployment. The command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence and logistic requirements of the force must be developed during the predeployment phase in order to support JFC concepts of operations. When in-place forces are not sufficient and/or are not appropriate for the envisioned operation, early determination of the forces required and the order in which they are needed, based on the JFC's concept of operations, assists in identifying the time required to deploy the force. Sealift and airlift capabilities are critical to JFC concepts.

Related Terms

phases

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

PREPARING THE THEATER

General. Actions joint force commanders (JFCs) are able to take before the initiation of hostilities can assist in determining the shape and character of future operations. Most inclusive is preparing the theater, which involves intelligence and counterintelligence operations to understand clearly the capabilities, intentions, and possible actions of potential opponents, as well as the geography, weather, demographics, and culture(s) of the operational area. Additionally, the infrastructure required to deploy and support combat operations must be identified and emplaced as appropriate. In many cases, these actions enhance bonds between future coalition partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, and strengthen future multinational military operations. (See figure below.)

Preparing the Theater.

Intelligence. At the advent of a crisis or other indication of potential military action, JFCs examine available intelligence estimates. As part of the intelligence preparation of the battlespace process, JFCs then focus intelligence efforts to refine estimates of enemy capabilities, dispositions, intentions, and probable actions within the context of the current situation. They look for specific indications and warning of imminent enemy activity that may require an immediate response or an acceleration of friendly decision cycles.

JFCs direct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition operations by elements of the joint force to further develop the situation and gain information critical to decision making. In some cases, such information can be gained by passive or unobtrusive means. In other cases, elements of the joint force may have to fight to gain the information desired. Armed

CONSIDERATIONS BEFORE COMBAT

Joint Force Commander's actions include...

- Preparing the Theater
- Isolating the Enemy
- Movement to Attain Operational Reach
- Special Operations
- Protection of Forces and their Freedom of Action
- Control of Space
- Constant Assessment of Physical Environment

reconnaissance operations conducted by manned systems have the potential to fight for information as well as process the information on site, providing commanders with real time intelligence. Special operations forces can be employed for special reconnaissance or other human intelligence operations.

JFCs use a broad range of supporting capabilities to develop a current intelligence picture. These supporting capabilities include national intelligence and combat support agencies which are coordinated in support of the JFC by the National Military Joint Intelligence Center. Intelligence Directorates should integrate these supporting capabilities with the efforts of the joint intelligence center. Liaison personnel from the various agencies provide access to the entire range of capabilities resident in their agencies and can focus those capabilities on the JFC's intelligence requirements. Intelligence operations serve to reduce uncertainty.

Organizing and Training Forces. Preparing the theater also includes organizing and, where possible, training forces to conduct operations throughout the theater. When it is not possible to train forces in the theater of employment, as with continental US-based forces with multiple taskings, maximum use should be made of regularly scheduled and ad hoc exercise opportunities. Joint task forces and components that are likely to be employed in theater operations should be exercised regularly during peacetime. Staffs should be identified and trained for planning and controlling joint operations. JFCs and the composition of their staffs should reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure those responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. The training focus for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives should be the combatant commander's joint mission essential task list.

Maintaining Theater Access. JFCs establish and maintain access (including exercises, basing, transit, and overflight rights) to operational areas in which they are likely to operate. In part, this effort is national or multinational, involving maintenance of intertheater (between theaters) air and sea lines of communications (LOCs). Supporting combatant commanders

PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED RESERVE CALLUP AUTHORITY

can greatly enhance this effort. Either at the outset or as operations progress, JFCs establish and secure intratheater (within the theater) LOCs through the application of appropriate joint force.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED RESERVE CALLUP AUTHORITY

Provision of a public law (US Code, title 10 (DOD), section 12304) that provides the President a means to activate, without a declaration of national emergency, not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for not more than 270 days to meet the support requirements of any operational mission. Members called under this provision may not be used for disaster relief or to suppress insurrection. This authority has particular utility when used in circumstances in which the escalatory national or international signals of partial or full mobilization would be undesirable. Forces available under this authority can provide a tailored, limited-scope, deterrent, or operational response, or may be used as a precursor to any subsequent mobilization. Also called PSRC. JP 1-02

Manpower mobilization options provide great flexibility to the National Command Authorities for responding to a crisis. Response levels are tied to the legal authorities available before a Presidential declaration of national emergency or a congressional declaration of national emergency or war. Before a declaration of national emergency, the Secretaries of the Military Departments can call for Reserve component (RC) volunteers who have needed skills and activate them for short periods of time. RC volunteers were used effectively during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. Volunteer Reservists and recalled retirees were used in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in the Persian Gulf.

Presidential Selective Reserve Callup authority makes up to 200,000 Selected Reservists available for up to 270 days (10 USC 12304). It was also used effectively in the Persian Gulf and during recent operations in Haiti. This authority can be used to send a strong signal of US resolve to friends and foes alike and can serve as a prelude to mobilization.

Related Terms

mobilization

Source Joint Publications

JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. JP 1-02

Preventive diplomacy consists of diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. Military support to diplomacy may, for example, take the form of a preventive deployment. An example is Operation ABLE SENTRY, where US

Forces deployed in 1993 to Macedonia in support of the United Nations effort to limit the fighting in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.

Related Terms

peace operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07

Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

Preventive medicine personnel must be included early in joint health service support planning. They conduct preliminary investigations for endemic diseases, arthropod and rodent infestations, and water quality. Specific preventive medicine procedures are generally the responsibility of the component commands. However, the geographic combatant commander may exercise directive authority and change component responsibilities based on operational or geographic considerations.

In a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environment, preventive medicine services will be in great demand. There is a possibility that many deaths would occur if an effective biological agent attack occurred. Demands for military medical support to both military and civilian populations will probably be intense. Preventive medicine personnel must assist the commander in determining the health hazards associated with nuclear fallout and biological contamination, such as safe food and water sources, and in determining when to use prophylaxis, immunization, and other preventive measures associated with NBC warfare. Preventive medicine personnel must be aware of the NBC threat in the theater and continually update the informational data base on diseases, potential disease vectors, and the susceptibility of troops to these diseases. In NBC conditions, diseases known to exist in the area may be manifested but not transmitted to our forces. The appearance of a disease or vector not known to exist in the theater is an indication that biological warfare agents are being introduced into the area. Following an effective NBC attack, the application of general preventive medicine principles will be important.

Related Terms

health service support

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-11

Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense

JP 4-02

Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations

PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE

Basic Principles of Intelligence. (See figure below.)

Joint Force Commander (JFC) is Responsible for Intelligence Support to Operations.

The JFC determines the strategic and operational objectives for the theater of operations. The Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff (J-2) determines the intelligence requirements and direction of the intelligence effort in support of the JFC's objectives. The intelligence effort is critical to the mission. Its nature, orientation, and scope depend on the commander's decision on the relative importance of intelligence in accomplishing the mission. The J-2 should refine the concept of intelligence operations to reflect changes in the commander's mission, estimate of the situation, and objectives. JFCs, with their J-2s, must ensure that intelligence objectives are correct, adequately stated, understood, synchronized, prioritized, and translated into actions that will provide the intelligence needed to accomplish the mission.

CENTRAL PRINCIPLE OF INTELLIGENCE

KNOW THE ADVERSARY

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE

JOINT FORCE COMMANDER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

SYNCHRONIZE INTELLIGENCE WITH OPERATIONS

USE THE SAME APPROACH FOR SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR AND WAR

J-2 SHOULD PARTICIPATE FROM THE OUTSET

ENSURE UNITY OF INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

RECOGNIZE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION

PRIORITIZE COMPONENT INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

ATTRIBUTES OF INTELLIGENCE QUALITY

TIMELINESS

OBJECTIVITY

USABILITY

READINESS

COMPLETENESS

ACCURACY

RELEVANCE

Intelligence actions must be synchronized with other warfare disciplines to ensure integrated and responsive support throughout all phases of the operation. Acquiring intelligence is the responsibility of the commander.

Synchronize Intelligence With Operations. The commander should require, and the J-2 should ensure, that all intelligence activities, assets, and disciplines are applied in time, space, and purpose to support optimally the JFC's operation plan. This synchronization process occurs across the range of military operations to provide timely, objective, tailored, complete, accurate, and relevant intelligence to achieve assigned operational objectives. This integration of intelligence and operations ensures the totality of effort against the adversary's centers of gravity. The product of effective synchronization is maximum use of every resource, including intelligence assets, where and when it will make the greatest contribution to success.

Use the Same Approach for Operations Other Than War and War. Military intelligence systems should be single structures for warfighting support and be able to provide intelligence support for any military operation throughout the range of military operations. Warfighting intelligence structures of resources, methodologies, and products should be established, viable, exercised, and operational in peacetime to be available in any type of conflict and for any form of operation. Although it is recognized that intelligence organizations, particularly Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) and joint intelligence support elements (JISEs), will expand according to need, the concept of dual peacetime and wartime structures does not support the principle of “readiness” for all potential operations. Dual intelligence structures for peace and war require difficult and time-consuming transitions in critical situations.

The J-2 Should Participate From the Outset. The J-2 should participate in decision and planning processes from the initial point when operations are contemplated or directed. Effective intelligence support requires a two-way flow of essential information. The J-2 should be collocated with the JFC and function as a full member of the staff to provide the commander with the best possible view of the situation and adversary and to identify, develop, and disseminate the intelligence needed to support operations. The J-2 should apprise the JFC whether adequate intelligence can be made available for the campaigns, operations, and courses of action being considered.

Ensure Unity of Intelligence Effort. For a particular area of interest, there should be unity of intelligence effort to ensure complete, accurate, and current intelligence to develop the best possible understanding of the adversary and the situation, and to reduce unnecessary redundancy and duplication.

JFCs have the responsibility and authority to determine, direct, and coordinate all mission-related collection and analysis through centralized or apportioned collection and production management efforts. When liaison personnel are provided by national intelligence and/or combat support agencies, the J-2 should integrate their efforts with the JIC/JISE. These liaison personnel are normally organized into a national intelligence support team (NIST) and support the JFC as an integral part of the J-2 organization. Access to intelligence capabilities to support mission responsibilities must be without regard to organization or command configurations. This approach allows the commander and J-2 to orchestrate pertinent intelligence activities to meet joint force intelligence requirements.

The JFC should have assured access to all necessary national and theater intelligence capabilities. If higher priority or competing tasks preclude optimum support to the JFC, that commander and the senior commander assigning the mission must be informed so they may make timely and alternative provision for intelligence or assess the effects of gaps in intelligence to the operation.

Subordinate commanders employ organic intelligence capabilities to support their assigned missions. At the same time, those capabilities must be available to assist the joint effort under the J-2's concept of synchronizing all forces' intelligence requirements. The J-2 must establish a flexible and tailored architecture of procedures, organizations, and equipment focused on the joint commander's needs. This intelligence system of systems complements and reinforces the organic capabilities at each echelon and, when necessary, provides direct support to subordinate commanders whose organic capabilities cannot be brought to bear.

The keys to unity of intelligence effort for joint operations are ensured access to any needed mission-related intelligence capability and coordination of all intelligence efforts in or about the area of interest. Cooperation of intelligence organizations is important, but it is not a substitute for a unified and coordinated effort.

The JFC should ensure that the subordinate commands assist each other in collecting and evaluating intelligence needed to the maximum extent compatible with the requirements of their respective commands and the joint force. This includes sharing intelligence sources, collection assets and operations, collection management, data bases, intelligence analysis, production, and communications. This principle of sharing also applies to other forces and to intelligence organizations that support the joint force. Sharing is an affirmative responsibility of commands and organizations that have the ability to support joint operations. Sharing and mutual support are essential to integrating all resources and capabilities into a unified system that will best fulfill the prioritized intelligence needs for joint operations. The JFC will establish the command relationships for all assigned forces, including intelligence assets. Normally, components having organic intelligence staffs and forces will remain the assets of that component commander. If the JFC wants organic intelligence assets of a component to support other units, the JFC will usually assign that intelligence support mission to the component commander. Separate intelligence units and organizations assigned to the joint force will receive one of the four standard support missions from the JFC. Support relationships are shown in the figure below.

Recognize Counterintelligence (CI) as a Source of Information. CI is a discipline that is separate and distinct from foreign intelligence and supports military commanders, operational



planners, and the traditional intelligence disciplines. CI supports military operations and planning during peacetime operations and at all levels of operations other than war and war. The type and methods of CI support differ at various organizational levels within the Department of Defense (DOD). CI develops information on the threat posed to plans, strategies, resources, programs, operations, and systems by foreign intelligence services and intelligence collection by foreign groups, including terrorists and drug traffickers. CI is responsible for the identification, neutralization, and/or exploitation of this threat. CI also determines the ability and willingness of host-nation forces to protect DOD resources and personnel. CI consists of four functions: operations, investigations, collection, and analysis. As such, CI plays a significant force protection role as well as conducting functions complementing intelligence such as analysis and collection.

Prioritize Component Intelligence Requirements. The joint force J-2 should carefully manage the flow of intelligence to the joint warfighter. Critical, time-sensitive component request for information should be expeditiously answered at the lowest command level possible.

Related Terms

intelligence


Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0

Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

PRINCIPLES OF LOGISTICS

General. The principles of logistics (see figure below) complement the principles of war. These principles and considerations serve as a guide to commanders and their staffs for planning and conducting logistic support for joint operations.



Responsiveness. Responsiveness is the right support in the right place at the right time. Among the logistic principles, responsiveness is the keystone; all else becomes irrelevant if the logistic system cannot support the concept of operations of the supported commander.

Simplicity. Simplicity is avoidance of complexity and often fosters efficiency in both the planning and execution of national and theater logistic operations. Mission-type orders and standardized procedures contribute to simplicity. Establishment of priorities and preallocation of supplies and services by the supported unit can simplify logistic support operations.

Flexibility. Flexibility is the ability to adapt logistic structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and concepts of operation. Logistic plans and operations must be flexible to achieve both responsiveness and economy. The commander must retain positive command and control over subordinate organizations to maintain flexibility. The principle of flexibility also includes the concepts of alternative planning, anticipation, reserve assets, redundancy, forward support of phased logistics, and centralized control with decentralized operations.

Economy. Economy is the provision of support at the least cost. At some level and to some degree, resources are always limited. When prioritizing and allocating resources, the commander must continuously consider economy.

Attainability. Attainability (or adequacy) is the ability to provide the minimum essential supplies and services required to begin combat operations. The commander's logistic staff develops the concept of logistic support, completes the logistic estimate, and initiates resource identification based on supported commander's requirements, priorities, and apportionment. An operation should not begin until minimum essential levels of support are on hand.

Sustainability. Sustainability is a measure of the ability to maintain logistic support to all users throughout the theater for the duration of the operation. Sustainability focuses the supporting commander's attention on long-term objectives and capabilities of the supported forces. Long-term support is the greatest challenge for the logistician, who must not only attain the minimum essential materiel levels to initiate combat operations (readiness) but must also sustain those operations.

Survivability. Survivability is the capacity of the organization to prevail in the face of potential destruction. Examples of military objectives selected for their effect on logistics and subsequent theater operational capability include industrial centers, airfields, seaports, railheads, supply points and depots, lines of communications, shipping, rail and road bridges, and intersections. Logistic units and installations are also high-value targets that must be safeguarded by both active and passive measures. Active measures must include a plan for ground defense of logistic installations with provisions for reinforcement and fire support. Passive measures include dispersion, physical protection of personnel and equipment, deception, and limiting the size and capabilities of an installation to what is essential for the mission. Although the physical environment will most often only degrade logistic capabilities rather than destroy them, it must be considered when planning. Survivability may dictate dispersion and decentralization at the expense of economy. The allocation of reserves, development of alternatives, and phasing of logistic support contribute to survivability. These concepts are related to logistic indicators.

Related Terms

logistics

Source Joint Publications


JP 4-0

Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

PRINCIPLES OF NBC DEFENSE

General. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense for the theater requires cognizance of the principles of NBC defense — avoidance, protection, and decontamination — coupled with a proactive theater-level program of intelligence, psychological operations, deception, and obscurity. (See figure below.) Theater-level intelligence assets gather information on the state of the area of responsibility and enemy capabilities and intentions. Psychological operations support deterrent measures and, in the event of the failure of deterrence, enhance reactive measures as a force multiplier. Deception at the theater level supports large-scale maneuvers. Obscurity increases survivability of large-scale operations and port and airfield operations.

Avoidance. Passive and active measures used in avoiding NBC attack are keys to NBC defense. Passive measures include training, camouflage and concealment (including the use of smoke and obscurants), hardened positions, and dispersion. Active avoidance includes contamination detection, marking, alarms, warning, reporting, and control measures.



Protection. This principle consists of hardening of positions, protecting personnel, assuming mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP), physical defense measures, and reacting to attack.

Hardening. Overhead cover, bunkered positions, armored-like sections of ships, or tanks are examples. This measure pertains primarily to nuclear weapons in the NBC defense context.

Protecting Personnel. Ordinary clothing can provide some protection against the thermal effects of a nuclear detonation, but more sophisticated protection is required against biological and chemical weapons. These measures may include medical prophylaxis (pre-treatments) protective masks or protective ensemble, antidote, or other medical treatments. Other measures to protect personnel from nuclear effects include implementing passive measures, warning others, locating and identifying burst location, and limiting exposure.

Other biological and chemical measures include providing individual and collective protection measures or relocation of personnel to toxic-free areas.

Mission-Oriented Protective Posture. When considering the use of MOPP, the commander should balance protection with degradation of the forces' ability to perform their mission. Normally, the joint force commander will leave the decision of MOPP level to the component commander, who usually will decentralize the decision to the various area commanders or captains of their vessels.

Physical Defense Measures. The optimum conditions for the enemy to employ biological aerosols or chemical attacks exist in the late evening or early morning. When threat conditions exist, it is recommended that during the hours of darkness as many personnel as possible remain inside any available fixed or improvised collective protective shelters or wear their protective masks.

After an Attack. Following an attack, personnel should take immediate action to reduce the impact of the attack and restore the fighting power to continue the mission. Different procedures would be prescribed for nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks.

Decontamination. Decontamination stops the erosion of combat power and reduces the possibility of additional casualties from inadvertent exposure or failure of protection. The extent of and time required for decontamination depends on the tactical situation, mission, degree of contamination, and other alternatives to decontamination, such as deferring the use of the equipment. Forces should ordinarily decontaminate only that materiel needed for completion of the mission. Depending on agent type and weather conditions, decontamination may not be required because of natural weathering effects (temperature, wind, and sunlight). Non-mission essential equipment would have the decontamination deferred, or natural weathering could be used.

Related Terms


NBC defensive operations

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-11 Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Principles of War. The principles of war represent the best efforts of military thinkers to identify those aspects of warfare that are universally true and relevant. The principles of war currently adopted by the Armed Forces of the United States are objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. (See figure below.) The principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of US military doctrine.



Objective. The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The objective of combat operations is the destruction of the enemy armed forces' capabilities and will to fight. The objective of an operation other than war might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. Avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective.

Offensive. The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war. Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize or re seize the initiative. An offensive spirit must therefore be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations.

Mass. The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the place and time to achieve decisive results. To achieve mass is to synchronize appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass must often be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can

enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

Economy of Force. The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.

Maneuver. The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver — or threaten delivery of — the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy.

Unity of Command. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective. Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. In multinational and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort — coordination through cooperation and common interests — is an essential complement to unity of command.

Security. The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine will enhance security. Risk is inherent in military operations. Application of this principle includes prudent risk management, not undue caution. Protecting the force increases friendly combat power and preserves freedom of action.

Surprise. The purpose of surprise is to strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which it is unprepared. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in decision making, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; operations security; and variations in tactics and methods of operation.

Simplicity. The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to success in combined operations.

Related Terms

Joint Source Publications

JP 1	Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations

PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

General. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, private voluntary organizations (PVOs) are frequently on scene before US forces and are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed. PVOs are independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused, primary relief providers. These organizations play an important role in providing support to host nations. In fact, PVOs provide assistance to over 250 million people annually. Their worldwide contributions total between \$9 and \$10 billion each year — more than any single nation or international body (such as the United Nations (UN)). Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Though differences may exist between military forces and civilian agencies, short-term objectives are frequently very similar. Discovering this common ground is essential to unity of effort. In the final analysis, activities and capabilities of PVOs must be factored into the commander's assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected course of action.

The Role of PVOs. PVOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. The professionalism, capability, equipment and other resources, and expertise vary greatly from one PVO to another. PVOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. The connectivity between PVOs and the Department of Defense is currently ad hoc, with no specific statutory linkage. But while their focus remains grassroots and their connections informal, PVOs are major players at the interagency table. The sheer number of lives they affect and resources they provide enables the PVO community to wield a great deal of power within the interagency community. In fact, individual organizations are often tapped by the UN and US Government agencies to carry out specific relief functions.

Military and Private Organization Relations. The extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various nations make private organizations valuable sources of information about local and regional governments and civilian attitudes toward the operation. While some organizations will seek the protection afforded by armed forces or the use of military aircraft to move relief supplies to overseas destinations, others may avoid a close affiliation with military forces, preferring autonomous operations. Their rationale may be fear of compromising their position with the local populace or suspicion that military forces intend to take control of, influence, or even prevent their operations. Combatant command staff planners should consult these organizations, along with the host country government (if sovereign), to identify local issues and concerns that should be reflected in the proposed public affairs guidance.

“For all our experience and compassion, we in the relief and development business do not have the capacity to deal with such large-scale catastrophes without help. Help from the military is not something we should begin to take for granted or rely upon in all cases. But there are extraordinary circumstances that call for responses – manpower, equipment, expertise, transport and communication capacity – that only the military can deploy”

Philip Johnston, President & CEO, CARE

PRODUCTION (INTELLIGENCE CYCLE)

"We must recognize that the Department of Defense contribution to interagency operations is often more that of enabler (versus decisive force, a function we are institutionally more comfortable with). For example, in Rwanda, the military served as an enabling force which allowed the NGOs and PVOs to execute their function of humanitarian relief. A key component to our success in Rwanda was the fact that we consciously stayed in the background and withdrew our forces as soon as the enabling function was complete."

**General George A. Joulwan, USA Commander in Chief,
US European Command**

Military Support of PVOs. The National Command Authorities may determine that it is in the national interest to task US military forces with missions that bring them into close contact with (if not support of) PVOs. In such circumstances, it is mutually beneficial to closely coordinate the activities of all participants. A climate of cooperation between PVOs, and the military forces should be the goal. Taskings to support PVOs are normally for a short-term purpose due to extraordinary events. In most situations, logistics, communications, and security are those capabilities most needed by the PVOs. It is, however, crucial to remember that in such missions the role of the armed forces should be to enable — not perform — PVO tasks. As later described, US military assistance has frequently proven to be the critical difference that enabled success of an operation. Military commanders and other decision makers should also understand that mutually beneficial arrangements between the armed forces and PVOs may be critical to the success of the campaign or operation plan.

Related Terms

nongovernmental organization

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-08

Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I

PRODUCTION (INTELLIGENCE CYCLE)

intelligence cycle

The steps by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. There are five steps in the cycle: a. planning and direction — Determination of intelligence requirements, preparation of a collection plan, issuance of orders and requests to information collection agencies, and a continuous check on the productivity of collection agencies. b. collection — Acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing and/or production elements. c. processing — Conversion of collected information into a form suitable to the production of intelligence. d. production — Conversion of information into intelligence through the integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of all source data and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or anticipated user requirements. e. dissemination — Conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form. JP 1-02

Production. Intelligence production is the integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of information from single or multiple sources into finished intelligence for known or anticipated military and related national security consumer requirements. A term associated with production is "intelligence application." Intelligence application is the direct

extraction and tailoring of information from an existing foundation of intelligence and near real time reporting. It is focused on and meets specific requirements, normally on demand.

Production Guidelines. (See figure below.)

Focus on the Purpose and Use of Intelligence. To better understand the exact needs of the consumer and the best way of answering the requirements, the producer needs to know who will use the intelligence at what level(s) of command, the user's mission, the general intelligence requirements and responsibilities, and purpose of the intelligence products.

Objectivity. Producers must be objective, unbiased, and avoid any tendency toward preconceived ideas. When conflicting information exists, efforts should be made to resolve the difference. If time or resources are inadequate to provide unambiguous intelligence, the joint force commander (JFC) should be made aware of the ambiguity or uncertainty. Commanders need all available pertinent intelligence, including conflicting or contradicting information and opinion.

Provide Integrated Products. Intelligence analysts at joint intelligence centers and other fusion centers should use information available from multiple sources, integrate it, and provide the decision maker with a clear picture.

Coordinate Production Among Echelons. Intelligence production should be coordinated from national through tactical levels. These production activities should be directed and coordinated by the Intelligence Directorate (J-2) so they are mutually supporting and nonduplicative.

- Intelligence production for joint operations is accomplished by units and organizations at every echelon. It includes Service-unique products at the component commands and operating forces.
- Intelligence produced at higher echelons is derived from both collection assets organic to that echelon or higher and a refinement and compilation of intelligence received from subordinate units and external organizations. Subordinate units, in turn, use the intelligence products sent to them by the senior command to determine or adjust their mission and/or strategy.

Production Responsibilities. Higher echelons are responsible for ensuring subordinates are provided any required intelligence exceeding the subordinate's organic production capability. Toward this end, higher echelon commanders and J-2s should identify organizations able to contribute, and take necessary actions to provide JFCs with required intelligence products and services.

Production Management. Production management is a critical element in ensuring effective and efficient military intelligence production in support of joint operations. Within

PRODUCTION GUIDELINES

- FOCUS ON THE PURPOSE AND USE OF INTELLIGENCE
- OBJECTIVITY
- PROVIDE INTEGRATED PRODUCTS
- COORDINATE PRODUCTION AMONG ECHELONS

PROTECTION

each production agency, production managers receive, review, validate, prioritize, and coordinate production requirements to determine the producer and schedule, the task, and editing requirements for intelligence products. Automated data processing (ADP) on-line updates are controlled by the production manager. Strict controls should be applied to changing information in ADP systems that can be accessed by other organizations. There must be a designated approving authority for such changes. Routinely, only one organization will have the authority to change a specific item (e.g., a data field in a record in an official data base).

Related Terms

intelligence cycle

Source Joint Publications

JP 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

PROTECTION

Protection. Joint force commanders (JFCs) must protect their forces and their freedom of action. This protection dictates that JFCs be aware of and participate as appropriate in regional political and diplomatic activities. JFCs, in concert with US ambassadors, may spend as much time on regional political and diplomatic efforts as on direct preparation of their forces for combat. JFCs strive to conserve the fighting potential of the joint force.

Protection from the Enemy's Firepower and Maneuver. JFCs counter the enemy's firepower and maneuver by making personnel, systems, and units difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. They protect their force from enemy maneuver and firepower, including the effects of weapons of mass destruction. Air and maritime superiority operations; air defense; and protection of airports and seaports, lines of communications, and friendly force lodgment all contribute to force protection. Operations security and military deception are key elements of protection.

Health, Welfare, Morale, and Maintenance. JFCs keep personnel healthy and maintain their fighting spirit. This protection includes guarding equipment and supplies from loss or damage. JFCs ensure systems are in place for adequate medical care, quick return of minor casualties to duty, and preventive medicine.

Safety. JFCs make safety an integral part of all joint training and operations. Sustained, high-tempo operations put personnel at risk. Command interest, discipline, and training lessen those risks. Safety in training, planning, and operations is crucial to successful combat operations and the preservation of combat power.

Prevention of Fratricide. JFCs make every effort to reduce the potential for fratricide — the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly fire. The destructive power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of modern combat, increase the potential for fratricide. Commanders must be aware of those situations that increase the risk of fratricide and institute appropriate preventative measures. The primary mechanisms for limiting fratricide are command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among component commands, rehearsals, and enhanced situational awareness. Commanders should seek to minimize the potential for fratricide while not limiting boldness and audacity in combat.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

PROTECTION OF SHIPPING

The use of proportionate force by United States warships, military aircraft, and other forces, when necessary for the protection of United States flag vessels and aircraft, United States citizens (whether embarked in United States or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence. This protection may be extended (consistent with international law) to foreign flag vessels, aircraft, and persons. JP 1-02

When necessary, US forces provide protection of US flag vessels, US citizens (whether embarked in US or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence in and over international waters. With the consent of the flag state this protection may be extended to foreign flag vessels under international law. Protection of shipping includes coastal sea control, harbor defense, port security, countermine operations, and environmental defense, in addition to operations on the high seas. It requires the coordinated employment of surface, air, space, and subsurface units, sensors, and weapons, as well as a command structure both ashore and afloat, and a logistics base.

Protection of shipping is accomplished by a combination of operations. Area operations, either land-based or sea-based, are designed to prevent a hostile force from obtaining a tactical position from which to attack friendly or allied shipping. This includes ocean surveillance systems that provide data for threat location and strike operations against offending bases or facilities. Threats not neutralized by area operations must be deterred or addressed by escort operations. Generally, escorts are associated with convoys, although individual ships or a temporary grouping of ships may be escorted for a specific purpose. Mine countermeasures operations are integral to successful protection of shipping and are an essential element of escort operations. An example of protection of shipping is Operation EARNEST WILL, the reflagging of Kuwaiti ships in 1987. Environmental defense operations provide for coordinated Coast Guard/Department of Defense response to major pollution incidents both at home and overseas. These incidents have the potential for grave damage to natural resources, the economy, and military operations.

Related Terms

military operations other than war

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-07

Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. JP 1-02

General. Psychological operations (PSYOP) are operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and

individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. PSYOP are a vital part of the broad range of US political, military, economic, and informational activities. When properly employed, PSYOP can lower the morale and reduce the efficiency of enemy forces and could create dissidence and disaffection within their ranks.

Military PSYOP. PSYOP are an integral part of military operations and, as such, are an inherent responsibility of all military commanders. PSYOP have been used throughout history to influence foreign groups and leaders. Modern PSYOP are enhanced by the expansion of mass communication capabilities. Nations may multiply the effects of their military capabilities by communicating directly to their intended targets promises or threats of force or retaliation, conditions of surrender, safe passage for deserters, invitations to sabotage, support to resistance groups, and other messages. The effectiveness of this communication depends on the perception of the communicator's credibility and capability to carry out promises or threatened actions. It is important not to confuse psychological impact with PSYOP. Actions such as shows-of-force or limited strikes may have a psychological impact, but they are not PSYOP unless the primary purpose is to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, or behavior of the targeted audience. Categories of Military PSYOP are shown in the figure below.

The employment of any element of national power, particularly the military element, has always had a psychological dimension. Foreign perceptions of US military capabilities are fundamental to strategic deterrence. The effectiveness of deterrence, power projection, and other strategic concepts hinges on US ability to influence the perceptions of others. Military PSYOP constitute a systematic process of conveying messages to selected foreign groups to promote particular themes that result in desired foreign attitudes and behaviors that can augment the national effort. PSYOP are used to establish and reinforce foreign perceptions of US military, political, and economic power and resolve.

CATEGORIES OF MILITARY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)

Strategic PSYOP -

International information activities conducted by US Government agencies to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in favor of US goals and objectives. These programs are conducted predominantly outside the military arena but can utilize Department of Defense assets and be supported by military PSYOP. Military PSYOP with potential strategic impact must be coordinated with national efforts.

Operational PSYOP -

Conducted prior to, during war or conflict, and at the conclusion of open hostilities in a defined geographic area to promote the effectiveness of the area commander's campaigns and strategies.

Tactical PSYOP -

Conducted in the area assigned a tactical commander during conflict and war to support the tactical mission against opposing forces.

Consolidated PSYOP -

Conducted in foreign areas that are inhabited by an enemy or potentially hostile populace and occupied by US forces, or in which US forces are based, to produce behaviors by the foreign populace that support US objectives in the area.

Related Terms

Source Joint Publications

JP 3-53

Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations

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