

Extract from:

A DOCTRINAL STATEMENT OF SELECTED JOINT OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

by

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NOTE: This document is not intended to stand by itself, but to provide agreed upon concepts concerning the issues discussed herein for use in developing affected joint pubs. See the preface.

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PREFACE

Pursuant to the accompanying memorandum of transmittal by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this paper serves as guidance to the lead agents of the various joint publications whose development requires agreement on the selected concepts presented (including Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," 3-03, "Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations," 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support"). In the case of Joint Pub 3-0, it should be noted that this paper does not address all aspects of full dimensional operations in the depth or breadth required in the keystone joint operations pub. Specifically, the developers of Pub 3-0 should incorporate balanced, appropriate, keystone publication-level guidance and material on the following topics:

- joint strategic nuclear campaign operations.
- operations in the maritime and littoral environments.
- operations under various battle environments, including nonlinear operations.
- various operations short of war (bearing in mind that these operations are extensively treated in Joint Pub 3-07 and other related pubs).

FOUNDATIONS

As with all activities of the US Armed Forces, joint operations are conducted to support political objectives. The two are inseparable. Throughout all facets of an operation, Joint Force Commanders must keep in mind the overarching political purpose for military action and be aware of the use of the other instruments of national power (economic, political/diplomatic, and informational) that national security strategy integrates with military operations.

Joint Force Commanders (that is, the Combatant Commanders and subunified or joint task force commanders if established) and their vision of operations are central to joint warfighting. Successful Joint Force Commanders are familiar with the capabilities and limitations of component forces, and integrate and synchronize operations in such a manner as to apply force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. "Effectively integrated joint forces expose no weak points or seams to enemy action, while they rapidly and efficiently find and attack enemy weak points."

Specifically, Joint Force Commanders must be prepared to employ air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in both symmetrical and asymmetrical operations. Joint Force Commanders not only attack the enemy's physical capabilities, but also the enemy's morale and will. Joint Pub 1 calls this multidimensional concept "Full Dimensional Operations." In such operations, it is difficult to view the contributions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in isolation. Each is critical to the success of the joint force, and each has certain unique capabilities that cannot be duplicated by other types of forces. Given the appropriate circumstances, any dimension of combat power can be dominant and even decisive in certain aspects of an operation or phase of a campaign, and each force can support or be supported by other forces. Over time, the contributions of these various forces vary with the strategic, operational, and tactical circumstances.

The many complex and sometimes contentious issues involved in joint warfighting are found across the three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. There are no distinct boundaries between the levels of war, and they are not associated with any particular level of command, size of unit, piece of equipment, or type of force or component. National assets such as intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered principally in a strategic context, have become an important adjunct to tactical operations. Actions are defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. The levels of war continue to be useful concepts in understanding the art of warfare.

Joint Pub 1 provides the framework for joint teamwork, including an introduction to the historical perspective of the

joint operations of the US Armed Forces since Yorktown. The fundamentals of joint warfare and the supporting capabilities described in Joint Pub 1 are referenced repeatedly in this paper.

THE JOINT CAMPAIGN

1. Overarching Operational Concept

The overarching operational concept in Joint Pub 1 is that Joint Force Commanders synchronize the action of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives through integrated, joint campaigns and major operations. The goal is to increase the total effectiveness of the joint force, not necessarily to involve all forces or to involve all forces equally. As Joint Pub 1 states, "Campaigns represent the art of linking battles and engagements in an operational design . . . oriented on the enemy's strategic and operational centers of gravity . . . They serve as the unifying focus for our conduct of warfare . . . Campaigns of the U.S. Armed Forces are joint." Campaigns reflect the nature of the operation directed by the NCA (e.g., strategic nuclear, peacekeeping, and conventional operations among others); this paper focuses on conventional operations.

The joint force conducts campaigns and major operations. Functional and Service components of the joint force conduct subordinate and supporting operations, not independent campaigns.

2. Planning and Operational Art

Planning for employment of joint teams begins with articulating and understanding the purpose of the operation and the commander's intent (the commander's vision of how the operation will be conducted). Joint Force Commanders receive direction and guidance from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the responsible CINC. If a Joint Force Commander is subordinate to a CINC, the CINC refines the direction and guidance for the Joint Force Commander charged with the campaign or operation. The responsible Joint Force Commander then translates this guidance into clearly defined, attainable, and measurable objectives. The statement of what constitutes military success becomes the target at which full dimensional operations are directed.

Joint Force Commanders issue mission-type orders to all components and define command relationships to facilitate the conduct of missions consistent with their concept of the campaign. Missions are assigned to subordinate commanders, not staff officers or coordination authorities. With receipt of the mission goes the authority to conduct operations in accordance with the Joint Force Commander's intent and concept of the operation. To achieve additional leverage, Joint Force Commanders flexibly employ joint force command relationships, including COCOM, OPCON, TACON, and supporting and supported relationships within the joint force, to enable and enhance

operations in particular dimensions. For instance, when land forces conduct SEAD operations to disrupt or destroy enemy air defense systems, air operations are enhanced. When air forces conduct reconnaissance in areas of interest to naval forces, naval operations are enhanced. There are many variations of this principle, but in each case, one dimension of combat power is employed to enable or enhance another. One of the Joint Force Commander's major challenges and opportunities for innovation lies in the requirement to synchronize air, land, and sea action. This requirement is discussed extensively below.

The means of joint warfighting are those unique or complementary capabilities brought to the joint team by the Service and special operations components, as well as those capabilities provided by the supporting combatant commands, Military Departments, Defense agencies, and the national agencies and departments outside the Department of Defense. In many cases Joint Force Commanders will find that their forces are part of an alliance effort or that they must work within a multinational environment. The Joint Force Commander's task is to integrate the available capabilities and synchronize their application to achieve the assigned objective. The combinations are heavily influenced by Joint Force Commander experience and expertise in the practice of the joint operational art.

Operational art is practiced not only by Joint Force Commanders but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders. Joint operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces but also the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose.

Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions:

- (1) What military condition(s) must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal?
- (2) What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition?
- (3) How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions?
- (4) What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?

Joint campaigns, especially in multinational efforts, must be kept simple and focused on clearly defined objectives. The more complex the campaign or the more actors involved, the more time and effort it takes to plan and coordinate the joint campaign. Whenever possible Joint Force Commanders at all levels should plan far enough in advance to allow subordinates sufficient time to react to guidance and conduct their own planning and rehearsals.

Joint Force Commanders consider the strategic environment during the estimate and planning process in order to determine potential constraints. These constraints often limit the Joint Force Commander's freedom of action dictating the timing and form of the campaign. Constraints can also include the availability and capability of forces, ability to deploy and sustain those forces, rules of engagement and the Laws of War, participation and objectives of other players such as the United Nations alliances or ad hoc coalitions, and even the national desire to win quickly.

Planning for campaigns and major operations is a continuous process. Prior to initiation of combat operations, commanders focus on future operations. During operations, commanders must direct their attention to both current and future operations. This is a complex and frequently frustrating process. Planning for future operations includes estimating the probable outcome of current operations, which then serve as the starting point for future operations. Thus, current and future operations are not distinct; the outcome of current operations will shape future operations.

Joint campaigns and major operations span a wide variety of situations, from quick-hitting limited objective operations to major campaigns and wars. Planning (and indeed doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures) should accommodate this variety of potential scenarios and should provide Joint Force Commanders a flexible range of capabilities and options from which to plan, organize, and execute their missions.

3. Phasing

Phasing assists commanders to think through the entire operation and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, and time. The primary benefit of phasing is that it assists commanders in accomplishing major objectives that cannot be completed all at once by planning manageable subordinate operations to gain progressive advantages, and so accomplishing the major objectives as quickly and affordably as possible. Campaign phasing should consider such aspects as pre-hostilities (including predeployment activities), lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow through, and post-hostilities (including redeployment).

Actions during a pre-hostilities phase seek to set the terms for battle and enhance friendly and limit enemy freedom of action. The friendly force should not seek battle until it has set the terms or established the conditions for battle in its favor and should avoid being rushed into battle before such conditions are established, if possible. During predeployment activities, Joint Force Commanders tailor forces for deployment. The command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and logistics requirements of the force must be developed during the predeployment phase in order to

support Joint Force Commander concepts of operations. When in-place forces are not sufficient and/or are not appropriate for the envisioned operation, early determination of the forces required and the order in which they are needed, based on the Joint Force Commander concept of operations, will assist in identifying the time required to deploy the force. Sealift and airlift capabilities are critical to Joint Force Commander concepts.

A lodgment phase allows the movement and buildup of a decisive combat force in the joint area. In operations during peacetime, deployment will normally include movements to host-nation air or seaports. In operations conducted during hostilities short of war or during war, initial deployment may require forcible entry followed by the occupation and expansion of lodgment areas.

A decisive combat and stabilization phase initially focuses on the rapid buildup of joint force capabilities. The appropriate sequencing of forces into the joint area can contribute greatly to the stabilization of the situation. Further, deployment of forces may serve as a deterrent to hostilities, but if deterrence fails, deployment will permit Joint Force Commanders to build up full dimensional capabilities rapidly to conduct decisive action as early as possible. Such decisive action focuses on winning; that is, achieving the objectives defined by the NCA and Joint Force Commander that may include control of enemy territory and population, and destruction of the enemy's ability and will to continue.

During a follow-through phase, Joint Force Commanders synchronize joint force activities to bring the operation to a successful conclusion. Follow-through includes those actions that ensure the political objectives are achieved and sustained. Part of this phase may be to ensure that the threat (military and/or political) is not able to resurrect itself. In essence, such a phase focuses on ensuring that the results achieved endure. In peacetime military operations, joint forces may conduct operations in support of other governmental agencies. During hostilities, Joint Force Commanders continuously assess the impact of current operations on conflict termination objectives. The outcome of military operations should not conflict with the long-term solution to the crisis.

During the post-hostilities/redeployment phase, Joint Force Commanders transfer control of the situation to another authority and redeploy their forces. They should identify post-crisis and post-conflict requirements as early as possible to accomplish these missions best and simultaneously redeploy assets no longer needed to resolve the contingency.

Phasing may be sequential or concurrent and may overlap. The point where one phase stops and another begins is often difficult to define in absolute terms.

4. Other Aspects

Joint forces, often operating as part of a larger multinational operation and always in concert with other national agencies, conduct operations emphasizing lethality, tempo, and depth. Normally, Joint Force Commanders seek to employ decisive force to defeat an enemy quickly with minimum casualties. However, strategic, operational, logistic, or political factors may dictate that those forces required to fight or sustain the fight must be deployed over time into the operational area. Counterintelligence can be critical to the protection of the forces in rear areas and during the deployment of forces into the operational areas. Tailored intelligence and logistic support will often come from the CONUS base or from other theaters as directed by the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff.

The role that intelligence (including counterintelligence) plays in full dimensional operations cannot be overstated. Intelligence provides insights concerning exploitable opportunities to defeat the enemy and helps Joint Force Commanders clearly define the desired end state and when that end state has been achieved. As operations progress, timely, responsive, and accurate intelligence aids the joint force in measuring progress and focusing on the desired end state, which itself may evolve over the course of the operation. "Exploiting the information differential," as called for in Joint Pub 1, occurs throughout the joint force as fused and tailored intelligence helps synchronize multiple efforts and contributes to the success of the joint team. Exploiting the information differential can be a key to avoiding unnecessary and expensive operations, in terms of lives and national resources.

CONSIDERATIONS BEFORE COMBAT

Actions Joint Force Commanders are able to take prior to the initiation of hostilities can assist in determining the shape and character of future operations. Most inclusive is "preparing the theater," which involves intelligence and counter-intelligence operations to understand clearly the capabilities, intentions, and possible actions of potential opponents, as well as the geography, weather demographics, and culture of the operational area. Additionally, the infrastructure required to deploy and support combat operations must be identified and emplaced as appropriate. In many cases, these actions enhance bonds between future coalition partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, and strengthen future multinational military operations.

Preparing the theater also includes organizing and, where possible, training forces to conduct operations throughout the theater. When it is not possible to train forces in the theater of employment, as with CONUS-based forces with multiple taskings, maximum use should be made of regularly established

and ad hoc exercise opportunities. Joint task forces and components that are likely to be employed in theater operations should be exercised regularly during peacetime. Staffs should be identified and trained for planning and controlling joint operations. Joint Force Commanders and the composition of their staffs should reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure those responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. The training focus for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives should be the combatant commander's Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL).

Special operations prior to conflict provide powerful operational leverage. Among their potential contributions, special operations forces can be employed to gather critical information, undermine a potential opponent's will or capacity to wage war, or enhance the capabilities of multinational forces. Special operations forces can gain access and influence in foreign nations where the presence of conventional US forces is unacceptable or inappropriate. They can also ameliorate the underlying conditions that are provoking a conflict in an effort to preclude open hostilities from occurring.

Joint Force Commanders must protect their forces and their freedom of action. This dictates that Joint Force Commanders be aware of and participate as appropriate in regional political and diplomatic activities. Joint Force Commanders, in concert with US Ambassadors, may spend as much time on regional political and diplomatic efforts as on direct preparation of their forces for combat.

Joint Force Commanders also strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary. The intent is to strip away as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible, while limiting the enemy's potential for horizontal or vertical escalation.

Forces, sometimes limited to forward presence forces, can be positioned within operational reach of enemy centers of gravity to achieve decisive force at the appropriate location. At other times mobilization and strategic deployment systems can be called up to begin the movement of reinforcing forces from CONUS or other theaters to redress any unfavorable balance of forces and to achieve decisive force at the appropriate location. Such actions send strong signals of intent to a potential opponent.

Throughout all pre-battle operations, Joint Force Commanders continue to exploit the advantages that control of space provides. Intelligence and communications systems are maneuvered or activated as necessary to provide Joint Force Commanders with an accurate and timely appraisal of the situation at hand, as well as the ability to respond rapidly to events and directives from the CINC or from higher authority.

ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPTS

The manner in which Joint Force Commanders organize their forces directly affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint force operations.

The first principle in joint force organization is that Joint Force Commanders organize forces to accomplish the mission based on their vision and concept of the operation. Unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution are key considerations. Joint Force Commanders may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces.

Organization of joint forces must also take into account interoperability with multinational forces. Complex or unclear command relationships and organizations can be counterproductive to developing synergy among multinational forces. Simplicity and clarity of expression are critical.

Unity of effort in the joint force is enhanced through the application of the flexible range of command relationships identified in Joint Pub 0-2 (COCOM, OPCON, TACON, and support). Joint force command relationships are an array of options the Joint Force Commander can use to adapt the organization of assigned forces to situational requirements and arrange component operations in time, space, and purpose.

Establishing supported and supporting relationships between components is one such useful option to accomplish needed tasks. For example, some naval operations, when conducted to enable or enhance air and land operations, can dramatically increase the successes achieved by the supported forces. This concept applies equally to all dimensions of the joint force. As defined in Joint Pub 0-2, "Unless limited by the establishing directive, the commander of the supported force will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation of targets or objectives, timing, and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency . . . The supported commander should consider the accepted tactical practices of the Service of the supporting force. Normally, the supporting commander will be permitted to prescribe the tactics, methods, communications, and procedures to be employed by elements of the supporting force . . . The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported force and take such action to fulfill them as is within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks."

All joint forces include Service components. Administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through the Service components. The Joint Force Commander may also conduct operations through the Service component commanders. This

relationship is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service components. An example is when most of the required functions in a particular dimension are unique to a single Service. (NOTE: No further discussion is provided within this paper for how to conduct operations under Service componentcy since there are far fewer joint issues associated with this option; however, this topic will be expanded in Joint Pub 3-0.)

Functional componentcy can be appropriate when forces from two or more Services must operate in the same dimension or medium. A Joint Force Land Component Commander is one example. Functional component staffs must be joint and require advanced planning for efficient operations. Joint Staff billets for needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets should be identified. Such individuals should be used when joint staffs are formed for exercises and actual operations.

Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional components with operational responsibilities. Joint forces organized with Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force components will still have special operations forces organized as a functional component, for example; and Joint Force Commanders will normally designate a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), whose authority and responsibilities are defined by the establishing Joint Force Commander based on the Joint Force Commander's estimate of the situation.

The Joint Force Commander has full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. Joint Force Commanders should allow Service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of the Joint Force Commander, while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the Service organizations.

Joint Areas

To assist in the coordination and deconfliction of joint action, Joint Force Commanders define operational areas or joint areas. The Unified Command Plan defines various geographical areas of responsibility each under the control of a unified commander. In time of war, the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or CINCs may elect to further define a theater of war which is or may become directly involved in the conduct of the war. CINCs may further define a theater of operations or that area required to conduct or support combat operations. CINCs may elect to serve as the Joint Force Commander in the theater of operations, or they may use subordinate unified commands or joint task forces for that purpose, allowing CINCs to remain focused on the overall theater. CINCs may have multiple theaters of operation within their theaters of war. In that case, the focus may be more on

providing theater strategic guidance and direction to subordinate forces and less on the actual employment of joint forces. CINCs or subunified commanders may also assign operating areas known as Joint Operations Areas (JOAs) to JTFs. JOAs are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area. JOAs are also appropriate when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters.

JOINT FORCE CONTROL AND COORDINATING MEASURES

"The full dimensional joint campaign is in major respects 'non-linear.' That is, the dominant effects of air, sea, space, and special operations may be felt more or less independently of the front line of ground troops. The impact of these operations on land battles, interacting with the modern dynamics of land combat itself, helps obtain the required fluidity, breadth, and depth of operations."

It is vital that command and control of joint operations preserves this fluidity and flexibility stressed in Joint Pub 1. As one example, effective, "seamless" command and control of joint air operations is critical in assuring the proper execution of air-related functions vital to Joint Force Commander objectives, including theater counterair, area air defense, air interdiction (executed with assigned theater air assets), and direct attack of enemy strategic centers of gravity (specific targets of which may appear anywhere in the joint force area).

Joint Force Commanders also employ various maneuver and movement control and fire support coordinating measures to facilitate effective joint operations. These include boundaries, phase lines, objectives, coordinating altitudes to deconflict air operations, air defense areas, amphibious objective areas, submarine operating patrol areas, and minefields. Boundaries define areas to facilitate coordination and deconfliction of operations. In land and sea warfare, a boundary is a line by which areas between adjacent units or formations are defined. A naval boundary may be designated for seas adjacent to the area of land conflict to enhance coordination and execution of naval operations.

The Joint Force Commander may define lateral, rear, and forward boundaries that are sized, shaped, and positioned to enable land or naval forces to accomplish their mission while protecting deployed forces. Organic and supporting systems may include long-range strike assets, special operations assets, and theater air sorties. Joint fire support coordination measures (discussed below) and the procedures associated with those measures assist in the command and control of such forces. Theater air sorties are not constrained by land boundaries, *per se*; however, since the airspace above surface areas is used by all components of the joint force, Joint Force Commanders promulgate airspace control measures to deconflict the necessary

multiple uses required (see Joint Pub 3-52). Within their boundaries, land and amphibious commanders employ permissive and restrictive fire support coordination measures to enhance the expeditious attack of targets; to protect forces, populations, critical pieces of infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance; and to set the stage for future operations. Commanders position and adjust those fire support coordination measures consistent with the operational situation and in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders.

CONSIDERATIONS AT OUTSET OF COMBAT

1. General

When required to employ force, Joint Force Commanders seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time and with minimal casualties. Joint Force Commanders arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. Engagements with the enemy may be thought of as symmetrical, if our force and the enemy force are similar (land versus land, etc.) or asymmetrical, if forces are dissimilar (air versus sea, sea versus land, etc.). As Joint Pub 1 indicates, Joint Force Commanders are uniquely situated to seize opportunities for asymmetrical action and must be especially alert to exploit the tremendous potential combat power of such actions.

2. Outset of Combat

As combat operations commence, Joint Force Commanders exploit full dimensional leverage to shock, demoralize, and disrupt opponents immediately. Joint Force Commanders seek decisive advantage quickly, prior to close combat if possible.

Joint Force Commanders must sequence, enable, and protect the arrival of forces to achieve early decisive advantage. This may necessitate forcible entry operations at the onset. An example of enabling and protecting the arrival of forces is the seizure and defense of lodgment areas by naval forces which would then serve as initial entry points for the continuous and uninterrupted flow of additional forces and materiel into theater. In this capacity, naval forces can complement the capabilities of land-based forces. Joint Pub 1 cites another example: "In the same way, land operations can provide or protect critical bases for air, land, sea, and space operations and enable these operations to be supported and extended throughout the theater."

Joint Force Commanders will normally seek to secure air and maritime superiority early in the conduct of joint operations. Air and maritime superiority enable and enhance joint operations

in all dimensions. While air and maritime superiority are not ends in themselves, history contains examples where control of the sea and/or the air has been a pivotal wartime factor. The Navy component is normally the supported commander for sea control operations and the JFACC is normally the supported commander for counterair operations.

Superiority battles are not limited to the air and maritime environments. Joint Force Commanders seek to achieve superiority immediately in C4I--space control is a necessary precursor to this superiority. They seek to lay open the enemy's intentions, capabilities, and actions to observation and assessment, while simultaneously depriving the enemy of similar information about the friendly force and deceiving the enemy as to the veracity of the information obtained about the friendly force. Joint Force Commanders seek to increase their "situational awareness" through sensor fusion and complementary intelligence efforts, while enhancing the capabilities to command and control the joint force. Another example of seeking early superiority prior to close combat is the land component commanders may seek to first achieve counterbattery or indirect fire superiority, thereby enhancing protection of their forces.

Also as part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against enemy centers of gravity deep in enemy territory. Where possible, specific operations may be conducted to attack directly strategic centers of gravity by air, missile, special operations, and other deep-ranging capabilities. When air operations constitute the bulk of the capability needed to directly attack enemy strategic centers of gravity or to conduct air superiority operations, Joint Force Commanders will normally task JFACCs, as a supported commander, to conduct such operations. Joint Force Commanders oversee these operations as necessary, just as they do for all joint force operations.

Special operations enhance the power and scope of full dimensional operations and tend to be asymmetrical in its application. Innovative special operations can directly and indirectly attack enemy centers of gravity that may be difficult to reach by conventional action. Special operations forces frequently require support by other forces but can support other forces, in operations such as intelligence gathering, target acquisition and designation, and interdiction. Their capabilities are vast, but they must be employed judiciously so as to not negate their effectiveness. Special operations forces are not a substitute for conventional forces.

Deception, psychological, and civil affairs operations are separate yet related synergistically. Deception operations are an integral element of all joint operations. Planning for deception operations is top-down, in the sense that subordinate deception plans support the higher level plan. Deception is focused on causing opponents to act in a desired manner, not simply to be misled in their thinking. During the formulation

of the commander's concept, particular attention is placed on defining how the enemy should act at critical points in the battle. Those desired enemy actions then become the goal of deception operations.

Deception operations depend on intelligence operations to identify appropriate deception targets, to assist in developing a credible story, to identify and orient on appropriate receivers (the "readers" of the story), and to assess the effectiveness of the deception effort.

Deception operations are not "free" but are a powerful tool in full dimensional operations. Forces and resources must be committed to the deception effort to make it believable, possibly to the short-term detriment of some aspects of the campaign. Operational security for deception operations may dictate that only a select group of senior commanders and staff officers in the joint force be knowledgeable of which actions are purely deceptive in nature. This can cause confusion within the force and must be closely monitored by Joint Force Commanders and their staffs. (See Joint Pub 1, page 30.)

For maximum leverage, Joint Force Commanders must also be integrated and synchronized psychological operations with other dimensions of joint force operations. There must be a single unifying strategic and operational PSYOP concept across the joint force, which is in turn supported by actions of the subordinate components and supporting forces.

MANEUVER

The concept for maneuver, both naval and land, is articulated in the Joint Force Commander's concept of the operation and includes timing, sequencing, and method and location of entry into the joint area.

The principal purpose of maneuver is to gain positional advantage relative to enemy centers of gravity in order to control or destroy those centers of gravity. The focus of both land and naval maneuver is to render the enemy incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and physical cohesion (their ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole) rather than to destroy them physically through attrition. This condition may be achieved by attacking enemy forces and controlling territory, populations, key waters, and LOCs (in all dimensions). Land and naval maneuver (which includes the action of air assets organic to the surface force) is required to control population, territory, and key waters. Types of joint force maneuvers include forcible entry, sustained action at sea and from the sea, and sustained action on land.

1. Forcible Entry

Forcible entry is seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. Forcible entry capabilities give

the Joint Force Commander unique opportunities for altering the nature of the situation. Forcible entry operations can strike directly at enemy centers of gravity and can open new avenues for military operations. Forcible entry can horizontally escalate the operation, exceeding the enemy's capability to respond. In many situations, forcible entry is the only method for gaining access into the area of operations or for introducing decisive forces into the region.

Forcible entry may include airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations or any combination thereof. Forcible entry is normally complex and risky. These operations require detailed intelligence and unity of effort. Forces are tailored for the mission and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and employment. Forcible entry forces must be prepared to fight immediately upon arrival and require enhanced C4I capabilities to move with forward elements. Operational security and deception are critical to successful forcible entry. Forcible entry relies on speed and surprise and is almost always employed in coordination with special operations. Forcible entry usually requires considerable support from offshore gunfire and/or aviation assets. Follow-on forces must be prepared to expand the operation, accomplish the mission, and sustain the effort. The sustainment requirements and challenges for forcible entry operations can be formidable but must not be allowed to become such an overriding concern that the forcible entry operation itself is jeopardized.

Forcible entry has been conducted throughout the history of the US Armed Forces. Forcible entry is usually a complex operation and must therefore be kept as simple as possible in concept. Schemes of maneuver and coordination between forces must be clearly understood by all participants. When airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations are combined, unity of effort is vital. Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry.

2. Surface Maneuver

Service doctrine amply describes land and naval maneuver and is not repeated here. Joint Force Commanders and their staffs and components should be familiar with this doctrine (as noted in Joint Pub 1, page 30).

INTERDICTION

Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys the enemy's surface or subsurface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. Interdiction capable forces include fighter or attack aircraft and bombers; ships and submarines; conventional airborne, air assault, or other ground maneuver forces; special operations forces; surface-to-surface, subsurface-to-surface, and air-to-surface missiles, rockets, munitions, and mines; artillery and naval gunfire; attack helicopters; electronic warfare systems;

antisatellite weapons; and space-based satellite systems or sensors. Interdiction is a powerful tool for the Joint Force Commander. The JFACC is the supported commander for the Joint Force Commander's overall air interdiction efforts.

SYNCHRONIZING MANEUVER AND INTERDICTION

Synchronizing interdiction and maneuver (both land and sea) provides one of the most dynamic concepts available to the joint force. Interdiction and maneuver should not be considered separate operations against a common enemy, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve the Joint Force Commander's campaign objectives. Potential responses to synchronized maneuver and interdiction can create an agonizing dilemma for the enemy. If the enemy attempts to counter the maneuver, enemy forces can be exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction; if the enemy employs measures to reduce such interdiction losses, enemy forces may not be able to counter the maneuver. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational level.

Interdiction is not limited to any particular region of the joint battle but generally is conducted forward of or at a distance from friendly forces. Interdiction may be planned to create advantages at any level from tactical to strategic with corresponding impacts on the enemy and the speed with which interdiction affects front-line enemy forces. Interdiction deep in the enemy's rear will have broad theater strategic or operational effects but normally a delayed effect on land and naval combat and will thus be of direct concern to the joint force commander. Interdiction closer to land and naval combat will be of more immediate operational and tactical concern to maneuver forces. Thus, Joint Force Commanders vary the emphasis upon interdiction operations and surface maneuvers depending on the strategic and operational situation confronting them. Joint Force Commanders may choose to employ interdiction as a principal means to achieve the intended objective (with other components supporting the component leading the interdiction effort). Where maneuver is part of the Joint Force Commander's concept, the Joint Force Commanders may synchronize that maneuver and interdiction. For the joint force campaign level, Joint Force Commanders synchronize maneuver and interdiction to present the enemy with the dilemma discussed in the preceding paragraph. Indeed, Joint Force Commanders may employ a scheme of maneuver that enhances interdiction operations or vice versa. For instance, actual or threatened maneuver can force an enemy to respond by attempting rapid maneuver or resupply. These reactions can provide excellent and vulnerable targets for interdiction. Moreover, all commanders should consider how their capabilities and operations can complement interdiction in achieving campaign objectives. These operations may include actions such as deception operations, withdrawals, lateral repositioning, and flanking movements that are likely to cause the enemy to maneuver large surface forces in such a manner as

to make them better targets for interdiction. Likewise, interdiction operations must be planned to conform to the Joint Force Commander's scheme of maneuver during the campaign. The Joint Force Commander must properly integrate maneuver and interdiction operations to place the enemy in the operational dilemma of either defending from disadvantageous positions or exposing forces to interdiction strikes during attempted repositioning.

Land and naval commanders are directly concerned with those enemy forces and capabilities that can affect their near-term operations. Accordingly, that part of interdiction with a near-term effect on land and naval maneuver normally supports that maneuver to enable the land or naval commander to achieve the Joint Force Commander's objectives. In fact, successful operations may depend on successful interdiction operations, for instance, to isolate the battle and weaken the enemy force before battle is fully joined.

As a guiding principle, Joint Force Commanders should exploit the flexibility inherent in joint force command relationships, joint targeting procedures, and other techniques to resolve the issues that can arise from the relationship between interdiction and maneuver. When maneuver is employed, Joint Force Commanders must carefully balance doctrinal imperatives that may be in tension, including the needs of the maneuver and the undesirability of fragmenting theater air assets.

Joint Force Commanders have a flexible range of techniques to assist in implementing this principle in a variety of situations. The Joint Force Commander's objectives, intent, and priorities, reflected in mission assignments and coordinating arrangements, enable subordinates to exploit fully the military potential of their forces while minimizing the friction generated by competing requirements. Effective targeting procedures in the joint force also alleviate such friction.

The Joint Force Commander is responsible for the conduct of theater operations. To facilitate these operations, the Joint Force Commander may establish operational boundaries within the theater for the conduct of all operations. Within the joint force theater of operation, all missions must contribute to the accomplishment of the overall objective. Synchronization of efforts within land or naval operational boundaries is of particular importance.

The size, shape, and positioning of the land or naval force boundaries will be established by the Joint Force Commander, based on the Joint Force Commander's concept of operations and the land or naval force commander's requirement for depth to maneuver rapidly and to fight at extended ranges. Within this boundary the land or naval operational force commander will be designated the supported commander and will be responsible for

the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction through target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations.

When appropriate, a Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) will be designated by the land or amphibious force commander and coordinated with the JFACC and other supporting elements. It is a permissive fire support coordination measure used to expedite fires. Short of the FSCL, all fires will be controlled by the land or amphibious force commander, who has the responsibility to execute and integrate all ground fire support operations (employing air, sea, and ground forces).

Joint Force Commanders will pay particular attention to, and give priority to, activities impinging on and supporting the maneuver of all forces. In addition to normal target nomination procedures, the Joint Force Commander will establish procedures through which the land or naval force commander can specifically identify those interdiction targets they are unable to strike with organic assets within their boundaries which could affect planned or ongoing maneuver. These targets may be identified individually or by category, specified geographically, and/or tied to desired effects and time periods. The purpose of these procedures is to afford added visibility to, and allow the Joint Force Commander to give priority to, targets directly affecting planned maneuver by land or naval forces.

Interdiction target priorities within the land or naval force boundaries will be considered along with theater-wide interdiction priorities by the Joint Force Commander and reflected in the apportionment decision. The JFACC will use these priorities to plan and execute the theater-wide interdiction effort.

The boundaries may require relatively frequent adjustment based on the actual and projected rate of maneuver and the operational environment. The supported commander should articulate clearly the vision of maneuver operations to those commanders that will apply interdiction forces within the boundaries to attack the designated interdiction targets or objectives. In particular, supported commanders should provide supporting commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of their operations. They should clearly state how they envision interdiction enabling or enhancing maneuvers and what they want to accomplish with interdiction (as well as those actions they want to avoid, such as the destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain munitions in a specific area). Upon understanding what the supported commanders want to accomplish and what they want to avoid, interdiction-capable commanders can normally plan and execute their operations with only that coordination required with supported commanders. Joint force operations in maritime areas often require a higher degree of coordination among commanders because of the highly specialized nature of some naval operations, such as submarine and mine warfare. This type of coordination will require that the interdiction-capable

commander maintain communication with the naval commander. As in all operations, lack of close coordination among commanders in naval operating areas can result in fratricide and failed missions, especially those areas adjacent to naval forces.

Interdiction-capable commanders require command and control systems able to take advantage of real and near-real time intelligence. Such intelligence is particularly useful in dealing with targets of near or immediate effect on surface forces or whose location was not previously known with sufficient accuracy.

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION LINE

Land force commanders will normally establish a fire support coordination line (FSCL) to protect friendly forces and operations short of the FSCL and to enable subordinate forces and other components to act with minimal coordination in the area beyond the FSCL. The location of the FSCL is based on estimates of the situation and concepts of the operation. Location of enemy forces, anticipated rates of movement, and tempo of the operation are considered in the commander's estimate of the situation, as well as other factors deemed appropriate. The location and movement of the FSCL are determined in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders.

The FSCL is a line established by the appropriate land force commanders to ensure coordination of fires not under their control but which may affect current tactical operations. The FSCL is used to coordinate fires of air, ground, or sea weapon systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features, if possible. The establishment of the FSCL must be coordinated with the appropriate air commanders and other supporting elements. Supporting elements may attack targets forward of the FSCL provided the attack will not produce adverse surface effects on, or to the rear of, the line. Both the land force commander and joint force special operations commander should be informed (by air tasking order, for example) of attacks beyond the FSCL (especially if the ordnance used has delayed effects). Attacks against ground targets behind this line must be coordinated with the appropriate land force commander to reduce the possibility of friendly casualties. If a land force desires to shoot or maneuver beyond its lateral boundaries, it must first coordinate with the appropriate commander. (It should be noted that the FSCL is a term oriented to air-ground operations. There is no similar term used at sea.)

The FSCL allows the land force and supporting forces to attack expeditiously targets of opportunity beyond the FSCL. Forces attacking targets beyond the FSCL must inform all other affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid friendly casualties. In exceptional

circumstances, the inability to do so will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL; however, failure to coordinate this type of attack increases the risk of friendly casualties and could waste limited resources through duplicative attack.

The FSCL is normally positioned closer to the forward line own troops in the defense than in the offense; however, the exact positioning is situationally dependent. The decision on where to place or even whether to use an FSCL requires careful consideration. All those involved in the decision must understand that the FSCL is a permissive fire control measure used to expedite fires. Its greatest utility is in facilitating the attack of time-sensitive targets of opportunity while reducing the possibility of friendly casualties.

A change of FSCL location must be transmitted in timely fashion to higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting headquarters to ensure the proper coordination of fires is employed by all controlling agencies.

Interdiction can occur both short of and beyond the FSCL. However, short of the FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations must be controlled by the appropriate land force commander.

APPORTIONMENT

The DOD Dictionary defines apportionment as "The determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time."

Apportionment assists Joint Force Commanders to ensure the weight of the theater air effort is consistent with campaign phases and objectives. Joint Force Commanders normally apportion air efforts by priority or percentage of effort into geographic areas, against assigned mission-type orders, and/or by categories significant for the campaign; these categories can include strategic attack, interdiction, counterair, maritime support, and close air support. Joint Force Commanders may elect to apportion the interdiction effort into geographic areas. Following Joint Force Commander apportionment decisions, JFACCs allocate apportioned air sorties to the functions, areas, and/or missions they support.

JOINT PRECISION INTERDICTION

Joint Force Commanders have at their disposal a wide range of joint operational tactics, techniques, and procedures to influence the conduct of actions. As another example, Joint Force Commander's may elect to use the technique of Joint Precision Interdiction (JPI), which orients on establishing an advantageous mobility differential over a hostile force. This advantage permits the judicious use of resources for decisive

engagements at the time and place a Joint Force Commander chooses. The major aspects of JPI (locating the enemy deep, blinding enemy sensors, adversely affecting enemy mobility, and preparing the enemy for closure and attack by friendly forces) seek to protect the Joint Force Commander's freedom of maneuver while attacking the hostile mobility-producing potential. Doctrinal principles for planning and executing interdiction operations and appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures, including those associated with JPI, will be discussed in Joint Pub 3-03, "Joint Interdiction Operations."

TARGETING

According to the DOD Dictionary, targeting is "the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities."

Targeting is performed at all levels by forces capable of delivering fires or attacking targets with both lethal and nonlethal disruptive and destructive means. Targeting is complicated by the requirement to deconflict duplicative targeting by different forces or different echelons within the same force and to synchronize the attack of those targets with other dimensions of the joint force.

Targeting occurs at all levels of command within a joint force.

a. Campaign Planning. At the highest level, Joint Force Commanders establish broad planning objectives and guidance for interdiction of enemy forces as an integral part of joint campaigns and major operations. With the advice of subordinate commanders, Joint Force Commanders set priorities, provide targeting guidance, and determine the weight of effort to be provided to various operations. Subordinate commanders recommend to Joint Force Commanders how to use their combat power more effectively to achieve the objective. Weight of effort for any aspect of joint targeting, for instance, may be expressed:

- (1) In terms of percentage of total available resources.
- (2) By assigning priorities for resources used with respect to the other aspects of the theater campaign or operation.
- (3) As otherwise determined by the Joint Force Commander.

Joint Force Commanders may task an organization within their staffs to accomplish these broad targeting oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander. Typically, Joint Force Commanders organize Joint Targeting Coordination Boards (JTCBs). If

the Joint Force Commander so designates, a JTCCB may be an integrating center for this effort or a Joint Force Commander-level review mechanism. In either case, it needs to be a joint activity, comprised of representatives from the staff, all components, and, if required, their subordinate units. The JTCCB reviews target information, develops target guidance and priorities, and may prepare and refine joint target lists (see Joint Pub 5-00.2). The JTCCB should also maintain a complete list for areas beyond the FSCL of restricted targets and areas where special operations forces are operating to avoid endangering current or future operations. In multinational operations, the JTCCB may be subordinate to a Combined Targeting Coordination Board, with Joint Force Commanders or their agents representing the joint force on the combined board. In any case, this broad targeting planning is a joint process reflecting Joint Force Commander guidance and objectives and involving all applicable subordinate commands.

b. Execution Planning. Joint Force Commanders will normally delegate the authority to conduct execution planning, coordination, and deconfliction associated with targeting and will ensure that this process is also a joint effort involving applicable subordinate commands.

(1) Whoever is designated this responsibility must possess a sufficient command and control infrastructure, adequate facilities, and ready availability of joint planning expertise. Should such an agency be charged with joint functional command responsibilities, a joint targeting mechanism is also needed to facilitate this process at this level.

(2) In any event, all components are heavily involved in targeting and should establish procedures and mechanisms to manage the targeting function.

The targeting process is cyclical. It begins with guidance and priorities issued by Joint Force Commanders, and continues with identification of requirements by components, the prioritization of these requirements, the acquisition of targets or target sets, the attack of targets by components, the assessment of the effects of those missions by both components and Joint Force Commanders, and continuing guidance from Joint Force Commanders on future fires or attack of targets.

As noted above, targeting mechanisms should exist at multiple levels. The NCA or headquarters senior to Joint Force Commanders may provide guidance, priorities, and targeting support to Joint Force Commanders. Joint force components identify requirements, nominate targets that are outside their boundaries or exceed the capabilities of organic and supporting assets (based on Joint Force Commander's apportionment and subapportionment decisions), and conduct execution planning.

BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

Component commanders should recommend to the JTCB priorities for the battle damage assessment (BDA) efforts and/or areas for which they have responsibility. The BDA effort should be a joint program designed to determine if the required target effects are being achieved for each of the components, consistent with the Joint Force Commander's overall concept. The Joint Force Commander apportions joint force reconnaissance assets to support the BDA intelligence effort that exceeds the organic capabilities of the component forces. The component commanders identify their requirements and coordinate them with the joint force J-3 or designated representative; e.g., JTCB.

Joint Force Commanders should establish a dynamic system to conduct BDA operations across the operational area. They normally establish a single point of contact for assessment of BDA at the joint force level. This is normally the joint force J-3, assisted by the joint force J-2.

CONCLUSIONS

In summary, much of the success of the joint force hinges on the Joint Force Commander's capability to integrate the capabilities of the joint team and synchronize their full dimensional efforts.

Success in joint operations does not begin in battle, but rather prior to conflict when joint forces conduct those actions necessary to prepare theaters for military operations and set the terms and conditions for combat. Peacetime training exercises and operational planning assists to prepare forces for combat, including developing and fostering initiative in leaders.

The synchronization of surface maneuver and interdiction operations to create a dilemma for the enemy is important to success of the joint force in combat. Forces must be tasked and command relationships established to enable flexible and responsive operations. Operations are conducted at a tempo that exceeds the enemy's ability to respond in a coordinated fashion.

Operating with multinational forces requires that plans and organizations be kept simple and that instructions be issued as far in advance as possible.

When Joint Force Commanders fully understand the capabilities of subordinate forces and the strategic and operational environment in which they conduct operations, and organize joint forces for flexible and responsive combat, powerful operational leverage can be achieved in all dimensions of combat operations.