

## APPENDIX A: REFERENCES

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## APPENDIX B

### Example Rules of Engagement

#### UNOSOM II ROE

**Taken from *US Army Operations in Support of Somalia: Lessons Learned***

NOTHING IN THESE ROE LIMITS YOUR RIGHT TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE ACTION TO DEFEND YOURSELF AND YOUR UNIT.

2. Use all necessary force, including deadly force;
  - a. To defend yourself, other UN personnel, or persons and areas under your protection against the use of force or clear evidence of intent to use force.
  - b. To confiscate and demilitarize crew-served weapons.
  - c. To disarm and demilitarize individuals in areas under UNOSOM control.
3. Always use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat.
4. If the tactical situation permits, give a challenge before using deadly force. Challenge by:
  - a. Shouting in English, "UN, stop or I'll fire."
  - b. Shouting in Somali, "UN, KA HANAGA JOOGA AMA WAA GUBAN," or
  - c. Firing warning shots in the air.
5. Unattended weapons, such as booby traps, mines, and trip guns, are prohibited.

6. Detain individuals who interfere with your mission, who use or clearly threaten deadly force, or who commit criminal acts under UNOSOM control. Evacuate detainees to a designated location for turnover to military police. Treat all detainees humanely.
7. Do not seize civilian property without your commander's authorization.
8. Treat all persons with dignity and respect.
9. Organized, armed militia, technicals and other crew-served weapons are considered a threat to UNOSOM forces and may be engaged without provocation.

## APPENDIX C

### Media Survival Guide

“Generally, it is in the institution’s best interest to deal honestly and in a timely manner with the media. If you do not play, you surrender to your critics who will be eagerly at hand.

Understand the media’s obsession with speed and, through daily contact, keep working to win the battle of the first media perception.

Leaders must learn to take time to articulate their positions to the media. They must use short, simple language that the media will use and the public will understand.

Use the media to inform the public proactively, not just to react to critics.

Understand that the news is almost always skewed toward the side of those willing to talk to the media, and against those who say “No Comment.”

Remember that CNN will correct the television record, while other networks rarely will do that because of time constraints.

Realize that there are reporters who do want to be accurate and have balanced stories. Too often editors or television producers get in the way and interject the political or budget spin on an otherwise positive story about our people. Getting reporters out to the fleet, field, or factory floor is a beginning.

Play the media game. Understand there are times for a low profile, but more often, a media opportunity to tell your story should not be lost

because of fear. We need to tell people, through the media, what we are about.

Do not be thin-skinned. We will not win every media engagement, but we must continue to communicate to our people and to the public.”

Rear Admiral Brent Baker,

USN (RET)

Taken from *JTF Commander's Handbook  
for Peace Operations, VIII-6*

# GLOSSARY

## PART I - ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<b>AC</b>	Active Component
<b>BDA</b>	battle damage assessment
<b>C2</b>	command and control
<b>C2W</b>	command and control warfare
<b>C4ISR</b>	command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
<b>CA</b>	civil affairs
<b>CENTCOM</b>	US Central Command
<b>CI</b>	counterintelligence
<b>CIA</b>	Central Intelligence Agency
<b>CINC</b>	commander in chief of a combatant command
<b>CIT</b>	combat intelligence team
<b>CJTF</b>	commander, joint task force
<b>CMO</b>	civil-military operations
<b>CMOC</b>	civil-military operations center
<b>CONUS</b>	continental United States
<b>CSS</b>	combat service support
<b>DIA</b>	Defense Intelligence Agency
<b>DoD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>ESG</b>	Executive Steering Group

<b>EW</b>	electronic warfare
<b>FID</b>	foreign internal defense
<b>FM</b>	field manual
<b>FRY</b>	Former Republic of Yugoslavia
<b>GPS</b>	global positioning system
<b>HA</b>	humanitarian assistance
<b>HACC</b>	humanitarian assistance coordination center
<b>HAST</b>	humanitarian assistance survey team
<b>HUMINT</b>	human intelligence
<b>IADS</b>	integrated air defense system
<b>IDF</b>	Israeli Defense Forces
<b>IFOR</b>	International Forces
<b>IMINT</b>	imagery intelligence
<b>IO</b>	international organization, information operation
<b>IRA</b>	Irish Republican Army
<b>ISR</b>	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
<b>J-2</b>	Intelligence Directorate of the Joint Staff
<b>J-3</b>	Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff
<b>J-4</b>	Logistics Directorate of the Joint Staff
<b>J-6</b>	Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Systems Directorate of the Joint Staff
<b>JCSE</b>	Joint Communications Support Element
<b>JFC</b>	joint force commander
<b>JIC</b>	Joint Intelligence Center
<b>JISE</b>	joint intelligence support element

<b>JOA</b>	joint operations area
<b>JSTARS</b>	Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
<b>JTF</b>	joint task force
<b>JUO</b>	joint urban operations
<b>LOC</b>	lines of communications
<b>LOGCAP</b>	logistics civilian augmentation program
<b>LZ</b>	landing zone
<b>MAGTF</b>	Marine air-ground task force
<b>MASINT</b>	measurement and signature intelligence
<b>MCWP</b>	Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
<b>MEU</b>	Marine Expeditionary Unit
<b>MIST</b>	military information support team
<b>MLRS</b>	Multiple-Launch Rocket System
<b>MNF</b>	multinational force
<b>MOOTW</b>	military operations other than war
<b>MSCA</b>	military support to civil authorities
<b>MTW</b>	major theater war
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NBC</b>	nuclear, biological, and chemical
<b>NCA</b>	National Command Authorities
<b>NDP</b>	Naval Doctrinal Publication
<b>NEO</b>	noncombatant evacuation operation
<b>NGO</b>	nongovernmental organization
<b>NIST</b>	National Intelligence Support Team

<b>NMJIC</b>	National Military Joint Intelligence Center
<b>NSA</b>	National Security Agency
<b>OFDA</b>	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
<b>OPLAN</b>	operations plan
<b>OPORD</b>	operations order
<b>OPSEC</b>	operations security
<b>OSINT</b>	open source intelligence
<b>PA</b>	public affairs
<b>PDF</b>	Panamanian Defense Force
<b>PIRA</b>	Provisional Irish Republican Army
<b>PKO</b>	peacekeeping operations
<b>POLAD</b>	political advisor
<b>PSYOP</b>	psychological operations
<b>PVO</b>	private voluntary organization
<b>QRF</b>	Quick Response Force
<b>RC</b>	Reserve Component
<b>ROE</b>	rules of engagement
<b>RPG</b>	rocket propelled grenade
<b>RUC</b>	Royal Ulster Constabulary
<b>SAS</b>	Special Air Service
<b>SEAL</b>	sea-air-land team
<b>SIGINT</b>	signals intelligence
<b>SJA</b>	Staff Judge Advocate
<b>SOF</b>	special operations forces

<b>SROE</b>	standing rules of engagement
<b>TECHINT</b>	technical intelligence
<b>TTP</b>	tactics, techniques, procedures
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNITAF</b>	Unified Task Force
<b>UNMIH</b>	United Nations Mission in Haiti
<b>UNOSOM</b>	United Nations Operation in Somalia
<b>UNPROFOR</b>	UN protection force
<b>USACAPOC</b>	United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
<b>USAID</b>	US Agency for International Development
<b>USG</b>	United States Government
<b>USSOCOM</b>	US Special Operations Command
<b>USSOUTHCOM</b>	US Southern Command
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>VTC</b>	video teleconferencing
<b>WMD</b>	weapons of mass destruction

## PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

**antiterrorism.** Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. (JP 1-02).

**arms control.** A concept that connotes: (1) any plan, arrangement, or process resting on explicit or implicit international agreement, governing any aspect of the following: the numbers, types and performance characteristics of weapons systems (including the command and control, logistics support arrangements, and any related intelligence-gathering mechanism); and the numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment, or employment of the Armed Forces retained by the parties (it encompasses disarmament); and (2) on some occasions, those measures taken for the purpose of reducing instability in the military environment. (JP 1-02).

**campaign.** A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02).

**campaign plan.** A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to achieve strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 1-02).

**campaign planning.** The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the National Command Authorities select the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. (JP 1-02).

**centers of gravity.** Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (JP 1-02).

**civil affairs.** Designated Active Component or Reserve Component civil affairs forces organized, equipped, and trained to carry out missions that specifically include the conduct or support of civil affairs activities (Upon approval of revised JP 3-57, *Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, this term and its definition will replace the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02).

**civil affairs activities.** Activities performed or supported by civil affairs forces that (1) embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities and populations in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, which enhance conduct of civil-military operations (Upon approval of revised JP 3-57, *Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02).

**civil-military operations.** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil-military operations may include activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. (Upon approval of revised JP 3-57, *Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, this term and its definition will replace the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02).

**civil-military operations center.** An *ad hoc* organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also called **CMOC**. (JP 1-02).

**coalition force.** A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. (JP 1-02).

**combatant command** (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by Title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called **COCOM**. (JP 1-02).

**combatant commander.** A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02).

**combat camera.** Visual information documentation covering air, sea, and ground actions of the Armed Forces of the United States in combat or combat support operations and in related peacetime training activities such as exercises, war games, and operations. (JP 1-02).

**command and control.** The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.  
Also called **C2**. (JP 1-02).

**command and control warfare.** The integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare is an application of information operations in military operations. Also called **C2W**. C2W is both offensive and defensive: (1) C2-attack. Prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading, or destroying the adversary C2 system. (2) C2-protect. Maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system. (JP 1-02).

**command relationships.** The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the authority of commanders in the chain of command. (JP 1-02).

**contingency.** An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. (JP 1-02).

**counterdrug.** Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. (JP 1-02).

**counterterrorism.** Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. (JP 1-02).

**Country Team.** The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission, and comprised of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02).

**critical node.** An element, position, or communications entity whose disruption or destruction immediately degrades the ability of a force to command, control, or effectively conduct combat operations. (JP 1-02).

**economy of force theater.** Theater in which risk is accepted to allow a concentration of sufficient force in the theater of focus. (JP 1-02).

**electronic warfare.** Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called **EW**. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support.

- a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons

to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability.

Also called EA. EA includes: (1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and (2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams).

- b. **electronic protection.** That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability.
- c. **electronic warfare support.** That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition.

Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing.

Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence, both communications intelligence and electronics intelligence. (JP 1-02).

**exclusion zone.** A zone established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specified activities in a specific geographic area. The purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of sanctions, or use or threat of force. (JP 1-02).

**force protection.** Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all

locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (JP 1-02).

**host nation.** A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 1-02).

**host-nation support.** Civil and/or military assistance rendered within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 1-02).

**human intelligence.** A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called **HUMINT**. (JP 1-02).

**humanitarian assistance.** Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (JP 1-02).

**imagery intelligence.** Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors, such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Also called **IMINT**. (JP 1-02).

**information operations.** Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called **IO**. See also defensive information

operations; information; information system; offensive information operations; operation. (JP 1-02).

**intelligence.** (1) The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. (2) Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (JP 1-02).

**interagency coordination.** Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations. (JP 1-02).

**interoperability.** (1) The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. (DOD) (2) The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. (JP 1-02).

**joint intelligence center.** The intelligence center of the joint force headquarters. The joint intelligence center is responsible for providing and producing the intelligence required to support the joint force commander and staff, components, task forces and elements, and the national intelligence community. Also called **JIC**. (JP 1-02).

**joint intelligence support element.** A subordinate joint force forms a joint intelligence support element as the focus for intelligence support for joint operations, providing the joint force commander, joint staff, and components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation. Also called **JISE**. (JP 1-02).

**joint force.** A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02).

**joint force commander.** A general term applied to a combatant commander, sub-unified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called **JFC**. (JP 1-02).

**joint operations.** A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (JP 1-02).

**joint urban operations.** All joint operations planned and conducted across the range of military operations on or against objectives on a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where man-made construction and the density of noncombatants are the dominant features. (JP 3-0).

**logistics.** The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: (1) design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; (2) movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; (3) acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and (4) acquisition or furnishing of services. (JP 1-02).

**maneuver.** Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02).

**mass.** The concentration of combat power. (JP 1-02).

**measurement and signature intelligence.** Scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydro-magnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the target. The detected feature may be either reflected or emitted. Also called **MASINT**. (JP 1-02).

**military deception.** Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision-makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. There are five categories of military deception. (1) Strategic military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of senior military commanders to result in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator’s strategic military objectives, policies, and operations. (2) Operational military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned and conducted in a theater of war to support campaigns and major operations. (3) Tactical military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of tactical commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted to support battles and engagements. (4) Service military deception—Military deception planned and executed by the Services that pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems. (5) Military deception in support of operations security (OPSEC)—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the prevention of the inadvertent compromise

of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions.

Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities. (JP 1-02).

**military operations other than war.** Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called **MOOTW**. (JP 1-02).

**multinational operations.** A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02).

**National Command Authorities.** The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called **NCA**. (JP 1-02).

**National Intelligence Support Team.** A nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from either Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or any combination of these agencies. Also called **NIST**. (JP 1-02).

**noncombatant evacuation operations.** Operations directed by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Also called **NEO**. (JP 1-02).

**nongovernmental organizations.** Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called **NGOs**. (JP 1-02).

**non-lethal weapons.** Weapons that are designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or material while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. (DoD Directive 3000.3).

**open source intelligence.** Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public. Also called **OSINT**. (JP 1-02).

**operational art.** The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities of all levels of war. (JP 1-02).

**operational level of war.** The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (JP 1-02).

**operations security.** A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: (1) Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. (2) Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. (3) Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called **OPSEC**. (JP 1-02).

**peace operations.** The umbrella term encompassing peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and any other military, paramilitary, or non-military action taken in support of a diplomatic peacemaking process. (JP 1-02).

**private voluntary organizations.** Private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. Private voluntary organizations are normally United States-based. “Private voluntary organization” is often used synonymously with the term “nongovernmental organizations.” Also called **PVOs**. (JP 1-02).

**psychological operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **PSYOP**. (JP 1-02).

**public affairs.** Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called **PA**. (JP 1-02).

**reconnaissance.** A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (JP 1-02).

**rules of engagement.** Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called **ROE**. (JP 1-02).

**safe area.** A designated area in hostile territory that offers the evader or escapee a reasonable chance of avoiding capture and of surviving until that person can be evacuated. (JP 1-02).

**signals intelligence.** (1) A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. (2) Intelligence derived from communications, electronics, and foreign instrumentation signals. Also called **SIGINT**. (JP 1-02).

**strategic level of war.** The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02).

**strategy.** The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. (JP 1-02).

**strike.** An attack that is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective. (JP 1-02).

**support.** (1) The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. (2) A unit which helps another unit in battle. Aviation, artillery, or naval gunfire may be used as a support for infantry. (3) A part of any unit held back at the beginning of an attack as a reserve. (4) An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02).

**surveillance.** The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 1-02).

**tactical level of war.** The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (JP 1-02).

**technical intelligence.** Intelligence derived from exploitation of foreign materiel, produced for strategic, operational, and tactical level commanders. Technical intelligence begins when an individual service member finds something new on the battlefield and takes the proper steps to report it. The item is then exploited at succeeding higher levels until a countermeasure is produced to neutralize the adversary's technical advantage. Also called **TECHINT**. (JP 1-02).

**theater strategy.** The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater. (JP 1-02).

**weapons of mass destruction.** In arms control usage, weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02).

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