

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE OPERATIONAL CONTEXT OF JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS

*The commander charged with making decisions needs to understand the operational and strategic implications of a tactical struggle in an urban area.*


Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)

MCWP 3-35.3, April 1998

#### A. Overview

Joint operations in an urban area are three-dimensional in nature, encompassing military activity in, above, beneath, and/or around urban areas, and are conducted during war or MOOTW. **The JFC may have to conduct a variety of operations in urban areas to support overall campaign objectives.** During the formulation of the campaign plan, the JFC should consider whether the political-military control of either all or part of a particular urban area supports national and/or theater strategic objectives. If it is concluded that national and/or theater strategic objectives necessitate the military control of an urban area, the JFC should determine what degree of control is required over the urban area to successfully execute the campaign plan.

## Urban Operations in Context



*Urban combat is a subset of all possible urban operations which are a subset of all military operations*

Figure II-1. Urban Operations in Context

In the past, the criterion for victory during combat operations in an urban area was the defeat of the enemy; during urban MOOTW, it was the successful completion of the assigned military task. Today, there are additional criteria for victory and/or mission success in an urban area. Foremost among these is the heightened emphasis on keeping collateral damage to the urban area's civilian populace and infrastructure to an absolute minimum. In order to meet some of these new challenges when operating in an urban environment, the JFC may need to employ innovative capabilities, such as non-lethal weapons and/or precision guided munitions, to reduce the probability of fatalities, permanent injuries, and/or physical destruction.

Another criterion important in JUO that the JFC must consider is the health and safety of the joint force. The prevalence of disease and poor sanitation conditions in many of the developing world's urban areas could serve as an additional constraint on the employment of joint forces in a particular urban area. The JFC may need to provide special water purification systems, medical supplies, housekeeping materials, and hygiene procedures to ensure adequate living accommodations for a joint force operating in an urban environment.

## B. The Urban Area in War

When other elements of national power are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained military operations to achieve national objectives or to protect national interests. In the event of war, including warfare in or around urban areas, US military strategy calls for decisive operations aimed at defeating the enemy, attaining key political-military objectives, and minimizing casualties to US and allied forces and noncombatants.

For example, urban areas figured prominently in the planning and conduct of the Gulf War. The liberation of Kuwait City was one of US Central Command's (CENTCOM) key theater military objectives. Forty-five targets were struck in Baghdad as part of coalition air operations directed at Iraqi political military leadership and command and control. As well, Iraqi Scud attacks against Riyadh, Tel Aviv, and Haifa required the coalition to deploy *Patriot* missile systems to defend those urban areas and conduct a vigorous counter-Scud air campaign. Finally, the Iraqi capture of the undefended, evacuated border town of Khafji compelled the coalition to expel Iraqi forces from that urban area in fierce ground combat while destroying Iraqi reinforcements from the air.

### The Principles of War<sup>1</sup>

The additional considerations of joint operations in urban areas do not negate the **principles of war**—objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. They are the foundation of US military doctrine, and the JFC should understand how the principles of war relate to JUO:

- The **objective** of an urban operation should be clear from the beginning, and it should directly contribute to the national strategic objective, as defined by the National Command Authorities (NCA) and to the theater strategic objectives as defined by the appropriate combatant commander. Urban areas have been key objectives in recent major US military operations. For example, the urban areas of Port-au-Prince and Cap-Hatien were the decisive points during

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the US intervention in Haiti. Gaining control of the country meant first gaining control of these key urban areas and critical facilities in them, such as the Presidential Palace, the International Airport, police and military headquarters, and key communications centers.

- **Offensive** action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective. The importance of offensive action in urban areas is underscored by the need to retain the initiative while maintaining freedom of action. The Israeli offensive that resulted in the expulsion of Jordanian forces from the urban area of Jerusalem in 1967 highlights the value of carefully planned and focused offensive actions in an urban area.
- The purpose of **mass** is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the desired place and time to achieve decisive results. Massing effects in urban combat, rather than concentrating forces, may enable even numerically inferior joint forces to achieve decisive results. For example, US forces employed massing effects during combat operations to liberate Kuwait City in 1991. Long-range artillery and bombers targeting strategic points in and around Kuwait City, along with the threat of an amphibious attack, were used to concentrate combat power without having to send ground troops into the urban area.
- **Economy of force** is the measured allocation of available combat power needed to successfully execute distinct tasks in an urban area. In Operation JUST CAUSE, the US intervention in Panama, US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) had an obvious advantage in the amount of force it could bring to bear, but it ensured economy of force by selecting to strike critical centers of gravity, the vast majority of which were in dense urban terrain. US commanders followed sound doctrine to ensure that appropriate force was applied against these decisive points. In addition, CA forces were used as a force multiplier

to create synergy among NGOs, the host nation, and US government agencies.

- The challenge of **maneuver** in a JUO is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the application of military force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and protects friendly forces. Surface maneuver in many urban areas will be slow and difficult. For example, the surprise attack by the North Vietnamese on Hue during the Tet Offensive (1968) involved house-to-house combat and lasted for a month. The North Vietnamese lost 45,000 men, over half of the strength they committed. The JFC should account for the increased risks of maneuver in an urban area when planning and executing JUO.
- **Unity of command**, regardless of the environment, means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in JUO in pursuit of a common purpose. The absence of unity of command is cited as one of the critical weaknesses of US forces that operated in the urban area of Mogadishu during US joint force and multinational operations in Somalia in 1993.
- **Security** in urban warfare results from measures taken by commanders to protect their forces. In urban operations, this principle may also apply to security of noncombatants. Noncombatants may be involved in rioting, harassing, attacking, and/or looting. At times, sectors of the population may direct violence against US forces. In such circumstances, non-lethal weapons may provide commanders with an ability to influence the situation favorably and reduce the risk of noncombatant casualties and collateral damage. Effective security requires prudent risk management, rather than over-cautiousness, and can enhance freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. For example, the rapid deployment by strategic airlift of theater-based SOF to Monrovia, Liberia during Operation ASSURED RESPONSE in 1996, and their augmentation by a theater-based Army airborne infantry company, guaranteed the

security of the US Embassy, US citizens, and the joint force during the ensuing NEO.

- **Surprise** can help the commander shift the balance of combat power during JUO in the hopes of achieving success well beyond the effort expended. The JFC will need to be familiar with the three-dimensional characteristics of the urban area, and units should use these characteristics to their advantage. For instance, helicopters may use buildings for concealment and ground forces may use buildings and underground passageways to move to unexpected attack positions. Forces within an urban area which are essentially non-mobile, such as headquarters and logistics staging areas, can use landline communications to avoid many of the traditional signatures which intelligence systems can track. On the other hand, the JFC should be aware that an adversary may be more familiar with the urban area and be able to better hide observers and report on opposing troop movements. For example, during the battle for Grozny, Chechen forces were well acquainted with all access routes into and within the urban area and used small, highly mobile units to ambush and trap Russian troops.
- **Simplicity** contributes to successful JUO through clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders that minimize misunderstanding and confusion. For example, the British operational strategy during prolonged operations since 1969 in the urban area of Belfast has maintained simplicity by focusing on three objectives—attrition, deterrence, and reassurance—throughout the campaign.

### **The Levels of War<sup>2</sup>**

Modern warfare on open terrain—the preferred form of combat for modern military forces—is a complex and challenging undertaking, requiring tremendous resources, training, and organization. Further, warfare in, above, and/or around a major urban area, with its high population density and wide range of urban construction and supporting infrastructure, might negate the traditional

strengths enjoyed by modern military forces on open terrain. Therefore, before committing forces to operations in an urban area, the JFC should consider the relative importance of that urban area to specific campaign objectives as well as determine how particular operations in the urban area, if undertaken, would relate to the three **levels of war**.

The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels of war, in general, are: **strategic**, **operational**, and **tactical**. They apply to war, MOOTW, and to all joint or single-service operations conducted in, above, and/or around an urban area. Levels of command, size of units, types of equipment, and types of forces are not associated with a particular level. Actions can be defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives.

Ideally, the JFC chooses the time and place for combat operations. The levels of war construct helps commanders plan operations, allocate resources, assign tasks, and maintain the appropriate perspective on urban operations with regard to operational and strategic objectives. The JFC's ability to do this is largely a function of the abilities of the joint force to maintain the initiative and shape events. Advances in technology, information, and media reporting, along with the compression of time-space relationships, contribute to the growing interrelationships between the levels of war. Commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut across the three levels and change the course of an operation. In essence, tactical actions may have strategic consequences.

### *The Strategic Level*

The strategic level is the level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance and then develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. The combatant commander is usually associated with this level of war at the theater strategic level. At the strategic level of war, the JFC should ask: **What is the desired national or multinational strategic**

### **end state and how does the political-military control of an urban area contribute to that desired end state?**

#### *The Operational Level*

At the operational level, campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or operational areas. A campaign plan is a series of related military operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. It requires the synchronization and integration of air, land, sea, space, information, and special operations forces to attain national and multinational strategic objectives. The campaign plan must identify the enemy's strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance for defeating them. The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives.

The focus at this level is on operational art—the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Success in combat requires mastery of the ability to wage a decisive campaign that takes advantage of US strengths and capitalizes on the enemy's weaknesses. Operational art translates the JFC's strategy into operational design, and ultimately tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war. The decision to conduct urban combat is generally made at the strategic or operational level of war.

Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. It provides a framework to assist commanders in prioritizing their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations. Operational art helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before seeking combat, thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements with relative attrition as the only measure of success or failure. Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint and multinational cooperation.

At the operational level, the JFC should ask: **What operational objectives must be achieved in urban areas to support the overall campaign plan that is required to achieve strategic objectives? What activities and events, and sequencing of these events, are needed to achieve operational objectives? What resources and application of resources are required to bring about and sustain these activities and events? What degree of political and/or military control of the urban area is necessary, if it is necessary at all?** History has shown that some urban battles were required to achieve strategic objectives. The decision to accept or reject battle in an urban area is one of many operational considerations faced by the JFC during the planning and conduct of a joint campaign.

### Urban Operations: Levels of War

#### Strategic Level



What is the desired strategic end state? Does the political/military control of an urban area contribute to that desired end state?

#### Operational Level



Does the political/military control of an urban area support the campaign plan? Is it required to achieve strategic objectives? If yes, what degree of control is required?

#### Tactical Level



What military operations are needed to achieve control of an urban area at the degree required (if control is required) to support the campaign plan?

*The decision to conduct high-intensity urban warfare is generally made at the operational or strategic level*

Figure II-2. Urban Operations: Levels of War

### *The Tactical Level*

At the tactical level of war, the JFC must decide how to employ units in order to meet mission objectives. Decisions at the tactical level include determining the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to achieve these mission objectives. Combat engagements are normally short in duration and fought between small forces, such as individual aircraft in air-to-air combat, and can include a wide variety of actions between opposing forces in the air, on and under the sea, or on land. A battle consists of a set of related engagements. Battles typically last longer, involve larger forces such as fleets, armies, and air forces, and could affect the course of a campaign. At the tactical level, the JFC should ask: **What units and tactics are needed to achieve control of an urban area at the degree required (if control is required) to support the campaign plan?**

### **Operational Effects on Urban Areas During War**

When developing strategic plans and appropriate tactics, the JFC should recognize that there are a number of different operational effects on urban areas that might be an integral part of the campaign plan. These include, but are not limited to, **isolating, retaining, containing, denying, and reducing** an urban area. Military history offers numerous examples of these types of effects on urban areas.

- **Isolating** an urban area involves employing joint forces in a manner that isolates or cuts off an enemy force inside an urban area from other enemy forces or allies. US Marines and US Army paratroopers of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division did this in Operation POWERPACK, the US armed intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965–1966. During the course of Operation POWERPACK, US troops established a line of communication (LOC) in Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic’s war-torn capital, which split rebel forces and prevented them from mounting an insurgency in the Dominican countryside. This ultimately prevented the rebels from taking over the country through military aggression.

- **Retaining** an urban area is a defensive action in which the fundamental objective is to prevent an urban area from falling under the political and/or military control of an adversary. The struggle of the Soviets to prevent the capture of the urban area of Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) by the Germans during World War II is one of the most famous examples of this type of urban campaign. This type of operation can also occur during MOOTW, an example being NATO's efforts to prevent Bosnian Serb forces from exerting military control over the urban area of Sarajevo.
- **Containing** an urban area describes those actions taken by joint forces to prevent an adversary's forces inside an urban area from breaking out. In 1989, US forces in Panama took control of the airport, seaports, and key Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) strongholds within and around Panama City in order to contain the PDF and prevent the arrival of reinforcements.
- **Denying** an urban area is a defensive action taken outside the boundaries of an urban area in an effort to prevent approaching enemy forces from gaining control of the urban area. The combination of lengthening German supply lines, the early onset of winter, and Soviet defensive efforts were all elements of the successful denial of Moscow to German forces in 1941.
- **Reducing** an urban area is an essentially offensive action intended to eliminate an adversary's hold over all or part of an urban area. Following the Allied landings at Normandy during the Second World War, the US Army's first broad experience with urban combat occurred during the capture of Brest. Brest's port facilities were considered essential to supporting further Allied operations in France. The campaign to reduce Brest started on 21 August 1944, and its German defenders held out until the end of September. Another example would be Russian military operations to regain control of key sections of the urban area of Grozny from Chechen rebels in 1995 and again in 1999–2000.

### C. The Urban Area in MOOTW<sup>3</sup>

The United States acts to meet various challenges, protect national interests, and achieve strategic aims in a variety of ways depending upon the nature of the strategic and operational environment. MOOTW focus on deterring war and promoting peace. Such operations include: arms control, combating terrorism, consequence management, DoD support to counterdrug operations, enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations, enforcing exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities (MSCA), nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency, NEOs, peace operations, protection of shipping, recovery operations, show of force operations, strikes and raids, and support to insurgency. MOOTW are typically joint in nature and may involve forward-presence forces, units deployed from another theater or the continental United States (CONUS), and/or a combination of both. By definition, they do not necessarily involve combat, but military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and respond to changing situations.

#### Basic Principles

MOOTW principles are an extension of warfighting doctrine. There are six principles that must be considered in order to achieve the desired objectives of MOOTW, and all are applicable to MOOTW in urban areas. Application of these principles helps ensure success and minimizes losses by focusing on aspects of MOOTW that deserve careful consideration. They are as follows:

- The JFC should direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable **objective**. In order to understand the principle of objective, the JFC must appreciate what constitutes mission success. The JFC should be aware of changes in the urban environment and/or political atmosphere that might necessitate a change in military objectives. An objective could be the physical object of an action taken, such as the seizure of a building, or something less concrete, such as limiting excessive US casualties

incurred during a given operation in order to prevent the abandonment of the mission.

- **Unity of effort** in every operation ensures that all forces are directed to a common purpose. In a JUO, unity of effort can be complicated by a variety of international, foreign, and domestic military and non-military participants, the lack of definitive command arrangements among them, and varying views of the objective. The JFC must strive to achieve consensus between all pertinent actors and establish procedures for liaison and coordination to ensure unity of effort.
- **Security** is essential and requires denying hostile factions the opportunity to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage. The JFC must enhance freedom of action in a JUO by reducing the vulnerability of military forces, civilians, and/or participating agencies to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Furthermore, the JFC should avoid complacency and be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation. The JFC should require all personnel to stay alert even in a non-hostile operation and be ready to transition to combat should circumstances change.
- **Restraint** in JUO helps prevent collateral damage by balancing the need for security, the conduct of operations, and political objectives. Due to the presence of the media and international attention that JUO often receive, excessive use of force can potentially damage the legitimacy of an operation. In addition, the JFC may be required to maintain the viability of the urban area. For example, excessive collateral damage to the urban infrastructure could potentially result in a refugee crisis or urban migration. Restraint is best achieved when rules of engagement (ROE) address all anticipated situations and are consistently reviewed and revised as necessary. Due to the political sensitivities involved in MOOTW, ROE are often more restrictive than in wartime. ROE are a measure of restraint.

- **Perseverance** allows for a measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. The JFC should assess possible responses to a crisis in terms of each option's impact on the achievement of long-term political and military objectives. In a JUO, this may involve political, diplomatic, economic, and informational measures to supplement military efforts. The JFC should keep in mind that in MOOTW, the military may not be the primary player and strategic gains may only be accomplished over the long-term. For example, Operation PROVIDE PROMISE (1992-1996) consisted of an airlift/drop of humanitarian relief supplies into Sarajevo and other key urban areas throughout Bosnia. The airlift began on 3 July 1992 and was an on-going, four-year effort to protect the urban area of Sarajevo and maintain an air bridge into Bosnia to deliver humanitarian assistance.
- **Legitimacy** is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or correctness of a set of actions. If an operation is perceived as legitimate, there is a strong impulse to support the action. Conversely, if an operation is not perceived as legitimate, the actions may not be supported and may be actively resisted. Legitimacy is frequently a decisive element in JUO due to the impact that urban operations may have on the noncombatant population residing in the operational area. The reporting (positive or negative) of the local and international media may also affect the perceived legitimacy of the operation.

### **Types of MOOTW in Urban Areas**

The types of urban operations are extensive and represent the wide range of MOOTW in which US forces may be involved. Some operations in urban areas may be conducted for only one purpose. Disaster relief operations, for example, are peacetime military operations with a humanitarian purpose. A NEO, such as Operation ASSURED RESPONSE, the joint NEO in Monrovia, Liberia in 1996, is another example of a military operation conducted in an urban area for a

single purpose. Military operations in urban areas also can have multiple purposes, such as operations in Somalia in 1992 and 1995 (Operations PROVIDE RELIEF, RESTORE HOPE, and UNOSOM II) which combined humanitarian assistance efforts with peace enforcement operations. JP 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War,” includes the following as types of MOOTW:

- **Arms control.** Normally associated with supporting international agreements controlling nuclear weapon systems, arms control also can include efforts to control and/or collect conventional weapons during a peace operation, such as the one US joint forces were involved in during operations in Mogadishu in 1993.
- **Combatting terrorism.**<sup>4</sup> This includes anti-terrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism). As the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 attests, joint forces will need to take effective measures to combat terrorism during JUO.
- **DOD support to counterdrug operations.**<sup>5</sup> In counterdrug operations, joint forces support federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in their efforts to disrupt the transfer of illegal drugs into the United States. For example, USSOUTHCOM, while not the lead player, supports counterdrug operations in Peru. The command’s roles include detection and monitoring; sharing intelligence; providing logistics support, communications, and planning assistance; and training and equipping host nation counterdrug forces. Many of these support activities are based in or coordinated from urban areas, such as the ground-based radar facility in Iquitos that USSOUTHCOM established to help detect drug traffickers.
- **Enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations.** These are operations that employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of

certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. While not normally associated with urban areas, the conduct of this type of MOOTW could require the extensive and dedicated surveillance of an urban port area. For example, during the course of more than three years, both NATO and WEU effectively enforced both economic sanctions and an arms embargo during Operation SHARP GUARD. Maritime forces, under Combined Task Force 440, prevented all unauthorized shipping from entering the territorial waters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and all arms from entering the former Yugoslavia.

- **Enforcing exclusion zones.** An exclusion zone is established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specified activities in a given geographic area. Exclusion zones can be established in the air (no-fly zones), sea (maritime), and/or on land and can include parts of or all of a designated urban area. For example, US air forces were critical to enforcing the no-fly exclusion zone over Bosnia, specifically the airspace over numerous urban areas in that nation.
- **Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight.** These operations are conducted to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate sea or air routes. For example, during the Berlin Airlift in 1948–1949, US and Allied forces continued to conduct airdrops of food and supplies in order to sustain democratic West Berlin despite Soviet attempts to blockade the urban area.
- **Humanitarian assistance.**<sup>6</sup> These operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or endemic conditions such as human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the United States. US joint forces have been integrally involved with delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance in numerous urban areas, particularly during operations in Mogadishu and in urban areas throughout Bosnia.

- **MSCA.** These operations provide temporary support to domestic civil authorities when permitted by law and are normally taken when an emergency overtaxes the capabilities of civil authorities. US military assistance during the riots in Los Angeles in 1992 would be an example of this type of MOOTW.
- **Nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency.** Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than humanitarian assistance) rendered to a nation by US forces. US military forces provided critical support for the counterinsurgency in 1989 in key urban areas across El Salvador during the “final offensive” of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. Ongoing US operations in Colombia are another example.
- **Noncombatant evacuation operations.**<sup>7</sup> These operations relocate threatened noncombatants from a foreign country. Examples of NEOs conducted in urban areas in the post-Cold War era include: Operation URGENT FURY in Salines, Grenada, in 1983; Operation EASTERN EXIT in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1991; Operation ASSURED RESPONSE in Monrovia, Liberia, in 1996; and Operation SILVER WAKE in Tirana, Albania, in 1997.
- **Peace operations.**<sup>8</sup> Peace operations are military operations designed to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement and are categorized as peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations. Though the US military provided humanitarian assistance throughout the famine-ravaged country of Somalia, the urban area of Mogadishu became the focus of a major peace enforcement operation that required joint forces to operate in a challenging urban environment.
- **Protection of shipping.** US forces provide protection of US flag vessels, US citizens, and their property against unlawful interference (violence) in and over international waters. Protection of shipping operations that could be conducted in urban areas include harbor

defense, port security, countermine operations, and environmental defense. During the Persian Gulf War, the threat of Iraqi mines affected almost all naval operations. After Operation DESERT STORM began, the principal mission of mine countermeasures was to clear a path to the Kuwaiti coast for naval gunfire support and a possible amphibious landing. The dense minefields left US forces vulnerable to missile, artillery, and small boat attacks from fortified beaches and ports along the Kuwaiti coast and prevented the free movement of ships up and down the coast.

- **Recovery operations.** Recovery operations are conducted to locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel or human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. Operations in Mogadishu demonstrate that recovery and possible combat search and rescue (CSAR) in an urban environment are more complex than in other environments. During urban operations, the time necessary to get rescue assets in position leaves personnel at risk. There may be few available landing zones in an urban area, and rescue teams may have to fight their way to the site—negotiating unfamiliar urban streets, enemy fire, and noncombatants blocking recovery efforts.
- **Show of force operations.** These are operations designed to demonstrate US resolve. They involve increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that if allowed to continue might be detrimental to US interests. UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, September 1994–March 1995, and VIGILANT WARRIOR in Kuwait, October–November 1994, are examples of show of force operations.
- **Strikes and raids.** Strikes are offensive operations intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective for political purposes. Strikes may be used to uphold international law or to prevent nations or groups from launching their own offensive actions. A raid is usually a small-scale operation involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy

installations. For example, operations in Panama City in 1989 show the effectiveness of strikes and raids in an urban environment.

- **Support to insurgency.** An insurgency is an organized movement designed to overthrow a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. US support to the Mujahadin resistance in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion is an example.

### **General Planning Considerations for MOOTW in Urban Areas**

JFCs and their staffs prepare plans for MOOTW in urban areas in a manner similar to planning for MOOTW in other environments and for war. The mission analysis and command estimate are vital to MOOTW in urban areas. Of particular importance in the planning process is the development of a clear definition, understanding, and appreciation for all potential threats. Command and control during MOOTW in urban areas is overseen by the JFC and subordinate commanders and should remain flexible in order to meet specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort. Commanders should plan to have the right mix of forces available to quickly transition to combat operations in urban areas or to evacuate the urban area.

Intelligence and information gathering needs to be multi-disciplined and utilize fused intelligence from all sources within the military. This should include space-based intelligence, HUMINT, counterintelligence, mapping, charting, and geodesy. Intelligence collection in urban MOOTW requires a focused understanding of the political, cultural, and economic factors that might affect the operation. The JFC must understand the values by which people define themselves in order to establish a perception of legitimacy and assure that actions intended to be coercive do in fact have the intended effect. Effective information gathering will facilitate information operations, psychological operations, and counterintelligence operations.

Coordination with NGOs, PVOs, and interagency operations within the urban area allows the JFC to gain greater understanding of the situation and the urban society involved. One method to facilitate information exchange and build unity of effort is to establish a civil-military operations center (CMOC) to

coordinate civilian and military actions.<sup>9</sup> CA teams may establish the core of the CMOOC, provide assessment of the civil infrastructure in the urban area, assist in the operation of temporary shelters, and serve as a liaison between the military and the city government and various other groups. In coordination with the CMOOC, PSYOP may provide a planned, systematic process of conveying messages to and influencing selected target groups within the urban area. The JFC also may use public affairs, including media reporting, to influence the public opinion that may ultimately be a principal factor in the success or failure of the urban operation.

MOOTW in urban areas present unique challenges. For example, they are more likely to involve legal issues. Furthermore, a logistics element, such as a water purification company, may precede other military forces or may be the only force deployed for MOOTW in an urban area. Medical operations may also support MOOTW in an urban area to protect US personnel and enhance mission capability. JUO involving MOOTW may require Reserve Component (RC) units and individuals not found in the active armed forces, especially during post operational activity. Post operational activities in an urban area following a MOOTW may include: transitioning to civil authorities, marking and clearing mines and booby traps, eliminating financial obligations, and executing deployment activities, among others.

In addition, issues such as curfew, evacuation, forced labor, civilian resistance groups, and protection or uses of property should be considered by the JFC. The JFC should be prepared to answer the following types of questions. For example, can the commander impose and enforce a curfew for the urban area? How does the JFC get the word out to the civilian populace? Does the joint force have to provide medical support? How do they handle looting, protests, demonstrations? Do they establish a prison? If the government is defunct, what currency does the commander use? How is it established? How does the JFC deal with existing government officials?

The JFC should anticipate operational challenges and always be prepared for direct or indirect opposition to the spectrum of operations that may have to be conducted in urban areas. The ability of the JFC to employ innovative tactics and

capabilities, such as non-lethal weapons, in these conditions, may provide operational flexibility in accomplishing tasks.

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<sup>1</sup> JP 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> JP 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”

<sup>4</sup> JP 3-07.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism; Commander’s Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness.”

<sup>5</sup> JP 3-07.4, “Joint Counterdrug Operations.”

<sup>6</sup> JP 3-07.6, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.”

<sup>7</sup> JP 3-07.5, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.”

<sup>8</sup> JP 3-07.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations” and “Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations.”

<sup>9</sup> A doctrinal layout of a CMOC organization can be found in the “Handbook for CMOC Operations.”

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