

Organization

OSD AND THE JOINT STAFF

A report issued in May 1997 on reorganizing the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) contained a number of findings bearing on the relationship between OSD and the Joint Staff. The report, *The Office of the Secretary of Defense: Creating a New Organization for a New Era*, which was prepared by Hicks and Associates, has been provided to Congress. Its recommendations on OSD organization call for creating a position of assistant secretary for intelligence and realigning the functions of a new assistant secretary for command, control, and communications beneath the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. Among its notable recommendations is that the primary role of OSD is "to lead, not to do." Moreover, the report indicates that:

- *OSD is a staff and advisory component, not an operating component*
- *tasks and activities involving resource and program management should be assigned to operating components*
- *assignment of resource and program management responsibilities within OSD should be regarded as a last and temporary resort.*

The following particulars on OSD and the Joint Staff are based on the report's executive summary.

Centralization of authority within OSD and strengthening joint structures are perhaps the most significant trends in defense organization since 1947. Both trends share the common objective of improving unity of effort and reducing the relative autonomy of the military departments. Today there are two key staffs in the higher headquarters of the defense establishment. And while OSD and its subordinate elements are under pressure to reduce in size, some joint structures are being encouraged to expand.

The need to better define roles, functions, and relations between OSD and the Joint Staff is an urgent issue to be considered by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman. Specifically, how can the two staffs work together more effectively without compromising their respective roles, how can management processes be coordinated for greater efficiency, and how can the potential for unnecessary duplication be reduced?

Despite existing positive working relationships between senior civilian officials and military officers the institutional links between OSD and the Joint Staff are not well defined. The governing directive is outdated and most officials are unable to define their relationships in other than personal terms. Significant concern also was voiced over the roles of OSD and the Joint Staff in areas such as resource allocation, operational and contingency planning, and requirements and acquisition. In sum, this lack of definition denies DOD the benefits of synergy between its two chief staffs.

Several causes are identified for this problem. First, the role of the Joint Staff appears to be better defined after passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, though it is still evolving; in contrast, the OSD role is less so. Moreover, some remnants of older patterns of behavior on the part of Joint Staff remain (such as the desire to work through military disagreements behind closed doors) and some civilian officials cling to outmoded concepts that erect barriers between civilian and military activities. Basic tensions embedded in civil-military relations also are present.

This report is only intended to initiate an analysis that would be necessary to compare the organizational capabilities of each staff, their respective management processes, and their subordinate elements. Such an analysis is required to inform decisions on areas of duplication, personnel requirements, opportunities for closer coordination, and the goals for organizational reform. Given the sequential attention paid to joint structures in the mid-1980s, and the closer attention to OSD in the late 1990s, the report points out that a more holistic and coordinated development of civilian and military staff capabilities in the future would constitute a significant breakthrough.

The definition of the desired OSD/ Joint Staff relationship can only be initiated by dialogue among the Secretary and Deputy Secretary and the Chairman and Vice Chairman. The potential for dialogue is not to solve a major problem but rather to clarify relations between OSD and the Joint Staff in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era. The objectives of this process are to attain at a new sense of the OSD role as well as to promote greater unity of effort and maximum efficiency.

Top civilian and military leaders should start that dialogue on the key principles which govern OSD/Joint Staff relations, identify objectives for cooperation, and pursue opportunities for greater

efficiency. Among the potential principles mentioned are the following:

- Both staffs work for the Secretary of Defense—OSD forms his civilian staff while the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs, and the Joint Staff comprise his military staff.
- Related management processes should be mutually reinforcing and, where possible, integrated into a single headquarters process.
- Activities subordinate to each staff should be mutually supporting and, where possible, consolidated.

To address the above issues, the report proposes that the Secretary and Chairman establish a working group to develop detailed recommendations and update relevant directives. Finally, the report indicates that the effort to implement its recommendations on reorganization would require "a sustained commitment of two to three years." JFQ

Lessons Learned

JOINT CENTER

The Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) has been expanded to include an operational branch at Fort Monroe. To make the joint universal lessons learned system (JULLS) more friendly to its users, the center has begun the transfer of the master JULLS database from the Joint Staff to the Joint Warfighting Center. This move was highlighted by publication of the first *Joint Center for Lessons Learned Bulletin*. It included articles on the JULLS database and its relationship to CJCS commended training issues and the universal joint task list (UJTL) operational level tasks. The bulletin also had a "Golden Nuggets" section with significant JULLS submitted during 1995. The next issue is scheduled to be published in autumn 1997.

JCLL has been working with the combatant commanders to execute a quality review of the current JULLS database to refine existing information and archive outdated and irrelevant JULLS. The JULLS database will be limited to a compilation of lessons learned submitted after August 1, 1990, plus 373 lessons from Just Cause (Panama 1989-90). The initial step in this project was to send the existing JULLS database to the CINCs responsible for their submission in order to determine which lessons should be archived. JULLS returned by CINCs will be put in the master database after being

linked to UJTL and categorized as doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership development, or personnel in nature. These links are an innovative approach to administering the database and were outlined by the Joint Staff in February 1997.

The key objectives of this effort are:

- Archive lessons learned which are no longer relevant to future operations or have already been incorporated. These selected JULLS will no longer be distributed to CINCs but will be placed in a separate database for researchers seeking historic information.

- Link all remaining lessons learned with UJTL using JULLS software to help military planners review lessons in the context of a given mission task.

- Remedial action project lessons will not be archived, but rather maintained in the active database until resolved within this program.

After refining the database it will be made available via SIPRNET. Research on the most efficient software with which to interface the database remains underway. The system is slated to be ready by the second quarter of 1998.

Plans for the JCLL master database include using the system as a repository and reference source for the results of the current *Joint Vision 2010* assessment. This will assist in synthesizing assessment results and facilitate *JV 2010* coordinating authorities, the services, and CINCs in their assessment/experimentation efforts.

Anyone interested in the history and organization of the Joint Warfighting Center is invited to visit its home page on the Internet which also serves as an excellent search engine with hypertext links to all lessons learned databases and points of contact (jcll@jwfc.js.mil).

For copies of the bulletin or details on the Joint Center for Lessons Learned, contact CDR Pat Clark, USN, at (757) 726-6158 / DSN 680-6158. JFQ

History

THE JOINT BOOKSHELF

Two new monographs have been released by the Joint History Office. *Operation Urgent Fury* by Ronald H. Cole is an account of planning for and execution of operations on Grenada in 1983. It focuses on the involvement of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs, and Joint Staff in planning and directing such operations. It also discusses the combat operations incident to the evacuation of noncombatants after the October 12, 1983 coup that removed the Grenadian leader, Maurice Bishop, and deals with events up

to the termination of operations on November 2. This monograph, based on research in Joint Staff files and interviews, contains an index and maps.

The other volume, which was written by Robert T. Cossaboom of Air Mobility Command, is entitled *The Joint Contact Team: Contacts with Former Soviet Republics and Warsaw Pact Nations, 1992-1994*. It describes the assistance provided by the Armed Forces to states in

central and east Europe after the collapse of communist regimes. The monograph details the activities of the Joint Contact Team Program which was created for this mission by U.S. European Command.

Both titles are available by writing to: Director for Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Room 1B707, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-9999. JFQ

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
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