



Letters...

Rewrapping Joint Packages

To the Editor—The British once thought that an adequate presence in the Falkland Islands could be provided by residual marine detachments, the occasional visit of a nuclear submarine or surface combatant, and long-range military overflights. Argentina's invasion caused Whitehall to regret its decision to reduce forward based assets. Some recent articles on the Adaptive Joint Force Package (AJFP) concept ignore the lessons of the Falklands. The article by Admiral P.D. Miller in the inaugural issue of *JFQ* (Summer 93), for instance, minimized the negative implications of this concept without indicating what the terms *presence* and *deterrence* actually mean.

AJFP is not a panacea for doing the same with less. Forward presence means deploying credible assets where they can be best used in a crisis. They serve simply through their existence to deter would-be aggressors. No one has yet determined the point at which *credibility* stretched to *incredulity*. Some aggressors are only deterred by what they can see. To claim that bombers in Louisiana provide the same level of deterrence as forward deployed carriers and amphibious ready groups with embarked Marines looming on the horizon tests the imagination. Yet the proponents of the AJFP concept continue to argue that this is possible.

Fiscal austerity obviously requires warfighting CINCs to take advantage of all the forces at hand. However, cobbling together disparate companies, squadrons, and detachments as the tip of the American spear is a recipe for disaster. It is worth recalling the problems encountered by joint forces at Koh Tang Island in 1975 and Desert One in 1980.

Other AJFP advocates insist that single-service force packages can be *adapted* by selecting capabilities to meet specific requirements. One CINC may require a carrier while another needs a tailored amphibious group supported by missile-firing ships and submarines. But it is a rare CINC who would accept a less capable deterrent force. The problem is one of definition. What AJFP can replicate the capabilities of carriers and amphibious forces? Can Atlantic Command convince a CINC that AJFP capabilities meet his requirements? Despite similar past experiments we have yet to determine the appropriate joint

force mix that replicates proven capabilities formerly provided by carriers and amphibious forces alone.

The value of AJFP is in cost-saving synergism and the expanded range of capabilities put at a CINC's disposal. Fragmenting capabilities by requiring joint forces to compete for scarce space aboard sea-based assets or substituting less capable assets does not provide the appropriate force or take advantage of the true capabilities of naval forces.

One need only remember the dilemma faced by the Royal Marines in the Falklands to grasp the real importance of forces and equipment designed to operate in consonance. When they wanted to use amphibious assault capabilities on *HMS Hermes*, the British marines found that the decks, normally crowded with helicopters, had been commandeered for a fleet air-to-air defense mission instead of amphibious assault. The Royal Marines were not properly utilized and the Sea Harriers launched from *HMS Hermes* were not overly effective in stopping the Argentinean air force.

AJFP remains a *good* idea. Once we determine what levels of joint force replicate carriers and amphibious forces, it will be a *great* idea. It is dangerous to experiment with the requirements of warfighting CINCs prior to reaching a consensus on what sort of AJFP is an adequate substitute for traditional forces. While AJFPs are a consequence of fiscal constraints, we must avoid being lulled into a false sense of security. It is better to model and simulate AJFP ideals before going to sea. We do not want to find ourselves in a situation similar to that which the British confronted off the Falkland Islands when they needed a carrier and had to make do with something else.

—Maj C.P. Neimeyer, USMC
Plans Division
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

Joint Acculturation

To the Editor—I read Bernard Trainor's article on service culture and the Gulf War (see Out of Joint, *JFQ*, Winter 93–94), and while it is an excellent piece, I'm compelled to offer a few further details on things which he neglected to mention.

While most participants will admit that, as Trainor indicated, not everything associated with jointness went perfectly in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, some things were a cause for pride. The Marines did a splendid job in reaching Kuwait City, assisted by the magnificent performance of the Army's Tiger Brigade. Moreover, the Army

provided vast logistical support to the Marines as well as the other services (the amount of ammunition alone would stagger the average reader of *JFQ*). Members of every service put aside parochial views and did what was best for the Nation and the coalition—and their deeds speak louder than words.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act is not a panacea, but it provided for much better coordination among the services in the Gulf War than in previous conflicts. No member of the Armed Forces should have to pay with his or her blood for the ego of their leaders. I hope and pray that we fix the problems identified in the numerous after-action reports on Desert Shield/Desert Storm. In my opinion true jointness will not occur until leaders put parochialism aside and do what is best for our soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and ultimately the Nation.

—LTG C.A.H. Waller, USA (Ret.)

The writer served as Deputy CINCCENT during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

To the Editor—Bernard Trainor's essay entitled "Jointness, Service Culture, and the Gulf War" (*JFQ*, Winter 93–94) offers a good analysis of jointness in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. However, he makes two assumptions that are incorrect and detract from his thesis.

The first is his discussion of the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC). Here he attributes to Air Force biases the centralized control of air power and attacks against only targets that planners believed critical to the overall campaign, citing the unhappiness of both the Army and Marines with targeting. The CINC determined targets for the strategic air campaign from JFACC input and reviewed JFACC planning, particularly where no agreement existed among component commanders. For example, he allocated sorties to soften up the Iraqi Republican Guard against the advice of his Air Component Commander. It is important not to interpret dissatisfaction with the decisions of a CINC as a lack of jointness when the issue really reflects joint control of air assets.

Second, Trainor compares the NATO heritage of VII Corps with the greater flexibility of the Marines. He incorrectly attributes the *delay* of VII

JFQ welcomes your

letters and comments. Write or

FAX your correspondence to

(202) 475-1012 /

DSN 335-1012.

THE ABCs OF JPME

There is a lot of misunderstanding about joint education. Part of it involves confusion over five interrelated terms, namely, *joint matters*, *Joint Professional Military Education* (JPME), the *Program of Joint Education* (PJE), the *Process for Accreditation of Joint Education* (PAJE), and *Professional Military Education* (PME). Another area of misunderstanding concerns educational requirements for promotion or designation as a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO). A third area centers on the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) for education as opposed to those of the service chiefs. The following is an attempt to clarify these areas of misunderstanding.

The Terminology

The terms mentioned above—namely, joint matters, JPME, PJE, PAJE, and PME—are defined in Chairman's Memorandum (CM) 1618-93, "Military Education Policy Document" (MEPD), which was issued on March 23, 1993. Together with the services, defense agencies, and CINC's, CJCS used the law and the intent of Congress to define these terms.

Joint matters relate to the integrated employment of active and Reserve component land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces, national security strategy, national military strategy, strategic and contingency planning, command of combat operations under unified commands, and joint force development. The term *joint matters* is fundamental because of the emphasis put on it by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. Title 10, chapter 38, of the act ("Joint Officer Management") makes several specific references to joint matters. It is important because an individual must be educationally qualified in joint matters to become a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO).

Joint Professional Military Education is focused on the integrated employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces. It refers to PME taught in a joint environment, by a joint faculty, to a joint student body, and from a joint perspective. Normally when the term *joint* is used with PME it refers to equal representation from all services. The three JPME institutions are constituent colleges of the National Defense University (NDU): the National War College (NWC), the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), and the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC). These colleges are supervised by CJCS through the President, NDU, and are fully joint in mission and orientation. A joint college, school, or course is used by two or more services and has a joint faculty. Both the Joint Military Intelligence College and the Defense Systems Management College are examples of joint colleges, but they are not JPME institutions. JPME colleges teach joint matters as part of their overall curricula and approach PME from a joint as opposed to a service perspective. Only JPME institutions offer phase II of the Program for Joint Education (PJE) because of the congressionally mandated requirement regarding the mix of students and faculty and the joint focus of their curricula which develops the joint attitudes and values required in phase II.

The *Program for Joint Education* prescribes the joint curricula, student-faculty mixes and ratios, seminar service mixes, standards, and learning objectives for all PME at both intermediate and senior levels designed to qualify officers for JSO designation. The NWC and ICAF curricula encompass both phases of PJE. Other institutions as approved by CJCS conduct PJE phase I and AFSC conducts PJE phase II. Officers must complete both phases of PJE to meet the educational requirements for JSO qualification. Phase I is incorporated into curricula both at intermediate and senior service colleges and in other appropriate educational programs which meet PJE criteria and are accredited by CJCS. Phase II complements phase I,

Corps to meticulous planning and deliberate synchronization required by NATO procedures. The rapid advance into Kuwait took advantage of the Marines' superior offensive capability. Further out on the arc, VII Corps had to travel a greater distance and wait for support units to catch up. The logistical problems are documented, including the limited ability of support units to operate at night. In retrospect any operation can be improved, but in this instance it is incorrect to fault the inflexibility of NATO procedures or lack of jointness.

—Gen James P. McCarthy, USAF (Ret.)
Olin Professor of National Security
Department of Political Science
U.S. Air Force Academy

To the Editor—Both "Jointness, Service Culture, and the Gulf War" by Bernard Trainor and "The Single Manager for Air in Vietnam" by Willard Webb (*JFQ*, Winter 93-94) highlight lessons learned—and relearned—on managing air assets, from World War II to Vietnam and the Gulf War. While acting as Battle Group O-5 JFACC representative in Dhahran during the final days of Desert Storm, I helped establish the first JFACC structure on *USS Lincoln* and participated in the JFACC doctrine working group. The perspectives provided by both Trainor and Webb would have been valuable in my daily interaction with the other services. I applaud *JFQ* for making this information and analysis on joint operations available.

—CAPT C.R. Rondestvedt, USN
Commanding Officer
Service Schools Command

To the Editor—I'm not surprised that some readers have quibbled over my essay on jointness and service culture (*JFQ*, Winter 93-94). It is a complex issue that defies digested treatment. The thrust of my piece was not that jointness failed in the Gulf, but rather that service culture was a driving influence. The lesson is that culture should not be suppressed or jointness abandoned, rather that jointness must harness the vitality of service culture.

I would suggest that critics suspend final judgment until they read my forthcoming book, *The Generals' War*, when it is published later this year. The points contained in my essay are fully addressed there and evidence supporting my thesis will, I trust, convince objective readers.

—LtGen Bernard Trainor, USMC (Ret.)
Director, National Security Program
John F. Kennedy School of
Government
Harvard University