

## JOINT TASK FORCES: A BIBLIOGRAPHY

Compiled by

Gail Nicula and John R. Ballard

Joint task forces (JTFs) have been the response of choice for most contingencies since the Vietnam conflict. Nonetheless the organization and functioning of JTF staffs are among the least understood areas of operational warfighting. JTFs form the crucial link in the operational planning and execution continuum, connecting strategic objectives of the National Command Authorities as well as theater campaign plans of CINCs to the execution of mission-essential tasks at the sharp end of the bayonet. This bibliography introduces members of the Armed Forces, particularly Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs), to sources on the requirements for JTF staffs.

By their nature, JTF staffs deal with emerging crises. Time is always short, plans are often inadequate or nonexistent, and forces are usually just being alerted for deployment. The major demand is properly utilizing JTF personnel in the face of time constraints, insufficient information, and overall uncertainty. At a basic level, each officer has to arrive at JTF headquarters ready to work and able to immediately confront a crisis as the organization adapts to new members. This underscores the importance of being able to call on the expertise and tools required to do the job.

JSOs should not fail to understand JTFs nor be prepared to function on that level. JTF staffs remain the most common response not only to combat but to a plethora of crises currently lumped under the rubric Operations Other Than War. Responding to such diverse issues re-



M1A1s boarding LCUs at Camp Lejeune for Agile Provider '94.

U.S. Marine Corps (Paxler)

quires a much broader range of information than found in individual service doctrine.

JTF staffs exist because single-service assets are rarely able to address crises effectively. Multi-service efforts automatically create problems of confused terminology and lack of familiarity with service-specific procedures and equipment. The reader will note that many of the sources listed below highlight command and control, which is the primary task of JTF staffs. Having access to the right information is crucial. This bibliography is annotated to assist readers in identifying source material to aid them in accomplishing tasks on the JTF level.

### BOOKS

- Mark Adkin. *Urgent Fury*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989. Outlines the formation and crisis action planning for JTF 120; details an operation that most clearly highlights the difficulty of forming a JTF on short notice.
- C. Kenneth Allard. *Command, Control, and the Common Defense*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. Provides a comprehensive history of U.S. military command structure and calls for the services "to develop and refine a truly unified body of joint military doctrine."
- James A. Blackwell, Jr., and Barry M. Blechman, editors. *Making Defense Reform Work*. Washington: Brassey's, 1990. Contains background information on defense reform including essays on planning military operations and the role of joint institutions in defense resources.

- Daniel P. Bolger. *Americans at War, 1975-1986: An Era of Violent Peace*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1988. Analyzes military operations from the *Mayaguez* incident and Gulf of Sidra air engagement to the Grenada invasion and *Achille Lauro* crisis.
- Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker. *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama*. New York: Lexington Books, 1991. Describes problems of timing, rules of engagement, public affairs, post-conflict resolution, and the integration of joint forces.
- Richard A. Gabriel. *Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1985. Reviews the Sontay raid, *Mayaguez* incident, Iran rescue mission, Marine compound bombing in Beirut, and Grenada operation in stinging terms.
- Maxwell O. Johnson. *The Military as an Instrument of U.S. Policy in Southwest Asia: The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 1979-1982*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Considers various issues including the Carter Doctrine, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and Gulf Cooperation Council.
- David A. Quinlan. *The Role of the Marine Corps in Rapid Deployment Forces*. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1983. Underscores the advantages of Marine Corps task organization in rapid deployment operations.
- Jeffrey Record. *The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S. Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf*. Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1981. Argues that the Rapid Deployment Force was both flawed and hastily put together

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from existing units and that it suffered from inadequate strategic and tactical mobility as well as forcible-entry capability.

U.S. Joint Task Force One. *Bombs at Bikini: The Official Report of Operation Crossroads, Joint Task Force One*. New York: William H. Wise and Son, 1947. Looks at a JTF created by JCS with representation from land, sea, and air forces to conduct tests in 1946 on the effects of atomic bombs on naval vessels.

U.S. Joint Task Force Two. *Report on Low Altitude Test 4.4: Target Acquisition Tactical Air Reconnaissance*. Sandia Base, N.M.: n.p., 1968. Examines a JTF organized to conduct tests to obtain data on low altitude air offensive and defensive weapons systems operations.

## MONOGRAPHS AND UNPUBLISHED THESES

Stephen E. Anno and William E. Einspahr. *Command and Control and Communications Lessons Learned: Iranian Rescue, Falklands Conflict, Grenada Invasion, Libya Raid*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air War College, 1988. [DTIC AD A202 091] Makes a case for unity, simplicity, and autonomy; covers communications architecture and planning.

Lance A. Bentros. *Coping with Uncertainty: The Joint Task Force and Multi-service Military Operations*. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991. [DTIC AD A240 414] Finds that doctrine recognizes the need for JTFs but service parochialism often frustrates joint commanders.

Wayne W. Boy. *Joint Task Force Bravo: A Model for Forward Presence*. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1992. [DTIC AD A250 546] Describes the evolution of JTF-Bravo as an example of transitioning from forward deployment to forward presence in the wake of declining resources.

James D. Chambers, Patrick J. Evans, and Karl H. Johnson. *Command and Control in Low Intensity Conflict: Adequacy of Current Military Arrangements and Joint Doctrine*.

Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1986. [DTIC AD B102 872] Includes a consideration of the need for JTFs in low-intensity conflict operations.

Antonio M. Cogliandro and Frank R. Prautzsch. *Identification and Assessment of Joint Exercise Command, Control, and Communications (C<sup>3</sup>) Failures*. Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, 1986. [DTIC AD B101 624] Assesses joint planning and training, the dilemma of command, and joint communications control.

John C. Coleman. *Tumbling "Component Walls" in Contingency Operations: A Trumpet's Blare for Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters*. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991. [DTIC AD A243 329] Examines the CINC's need for a standing JTF headquarters to provide command and control for contingency operations involving forced entry et al.

Michael P. Currie. *Operational Lessons of Urgent Fury*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1988. [DTIC AD B123 621] Discusses experience with JTF operations during Operation Urgent Fury and urges a dedicated effort to conduct routine joint training.

Gary W. Deulley. *Joint Organization: Where Do We Go after Goldwater-Nichols?* Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air War College, 1989. [DTIC AD A217 256] Advocates increasing joint exposure for all officers through education and exercises.

Michael Finn. *Does Copernicus Wear Purple Robes?* Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1991. [DTIC AD B157 999] Explores Navy Copernicus architecture for C<sup>4</sup>I and concerns over the horizontal linkages for command at sea, especially for the naval components of JTFs.

James W. Fondren, Jr. *Joint Task Force Operations in the Persian Gulf*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air War College, 1989. [DTIC AD A217 341] Reviews operations to protect eleven U.S.-flagged Kuwaiti tankers from attack by Iran.

Jeremiah F. Garretson. *Confronting Challenges to Jointness: Initiatives for Joint Command and Control*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1993. [DTIC AD A266 909] Analyzes operational requirements using "C<sup>4</sup>I for The Warrior" as a point of departure and concludes that JTFs are the logical benefactors of such support.

Daniel J. Gilbert. *Joint Task Force Command, Control, and Communications: Have We Improved?* Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1989. [DTIC AD A215 795]

USS Kitty Hawk underway off the Virginia Capes.



U.S. Navy (Callagher)

- Examines whether commanders are better able to exercise command and control over JTFs today than in the past and whether previously identified C<sup>3</sup> problems have been fixed.
- Robert G. Gorrie. *Joint Battle Staff Training*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1991. [DTIC AD A236 279] Validates the need for trained command and joint battle staff teams to lead multi-service joint task forces.
- Nicholas P. Grant. *Joint Task Force Staffs: Seeking a Mark on the Wall*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1993. [DTIC AD A266 560] Describes how EUCOM, PACOM, and the Joint Staff prepare JTF staffs for contingency operations.
- Brent J. Griffin. *The Joint Intelligence Center Pacific: A Case Study in Modern Joint Intelligence Operations* (U). Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, 1992. [DTIC AD C959 978L] Discusses the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific and its initial performance in support of PACOM forces and JTF intelligence support capabilities.
- Michael E. Haith. *CINC-ronization (Synchronization): The Critical Tenet in Future Operational Art*. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990. [DTIC AD A234 163] Examines critical synchronization issues confronting CINCs and JTF commanders in conducting joint and combined operations.
- James R. Helmly. *Future U.S. Military Strategy: The Need for a Standing Joint Task Force*. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1991. [DTIC AD A237 692] Points out that, based upon historical experience, contingency forces in the future should be organized into a standing JTF.
- Michael L. Henchen. *Establishment of a Permanent Joint Task Force Headquarters: An Analysis of Sourcing a Command and Control Structure Capable of Executing Forced Entry Contingency Operations*. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993. [DTIC AD A272 885] Emphasizes that members of a JTF staff must work together on a continuing basis to be effective in contingency or other operations.
- Marc R. Hildenbrand. *Standing Joint Task Forces: A Way to Enhance America's Warfighting Capabilities?* Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992. [DTIC AD A256 594] Provides an analysis of whether force allocation procedures or standing JTFs better serve warfighting needs.
- Ernest E. Hugh. *Joint Task Force Bravo: Wave of the Future or Legacy of a Discredited Past?* Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, 1991. [DTIC AD B161 802] Argues that a revamped JTF-Bravo in Honduras which emphasized civic action could serve as a model for future U.S. involvement in Latin America.
- Jared A. Kline. *Joint Communications in Support of Joint Task Force South during Operation Just Cause*. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991. [DTIC AD A241 732] Analyzes tactical and strategic communications used in invading Panama and provides a detailed account of communications support provided to a JTF engaged in contingency operations.
- Richard W. Kokko. *Joint Operations Involving Marine Amphibious Forces and Army Airborne Forces*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1988. [DTIC AD B122 715] Provides case studies of the Dominican Republic and Grenada to demonstrate that sequencing force deployment is driven by the enemy situation, mission, terrain, and the need for surprise.
- Robert D. Lewis. *Combined Joint Task Force Provide Comfort: What Are We Trying to Do? What Is the Way Ahead?* Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1992. [DTIC AD A249 846] Identifies national policies which JTFs appear to support and discusses operations that the JTF "should be prepared to undertake."
- Thomas C. Loper. *A Candidate Functional Architecture Design for the Detection and Monitoring Process of a Counterdrug Joint Task Force*. Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, 1993. [DTIC AD A272 515] Considers the design of JTFs using a systems engineering approach of top down decomposition which establishes a format for baseline requirements.
- Jerry W. McElwee. *Principles for Organization of Joint and Combined Staffs*. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1986. [DTIC AD A167 675] Describes the role of the military staff and summarizes the major organizational principles of Marshall, MacArthur, and Eisenhower during World War II as well as those of current leaders.
- Gary E. Morgan. *Joint Logistics Doctrine—Yes or No?* Washington: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1988. [DTIC AD B133 959] Uses after-action reports from Urgent Fury and Ahaus Tara III to examine improvements in logistics planning for JTF operations.
- Donald L. Morris. *A Multinational Amphibious Task Force for NATO* (U). Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1980. [DTIC AD C025 202] Examines the feasibility of establishing a standing combined amphibious task force for Europe's northern flank.
- H.M. Murdock. *Doctrine for Combined Airborne and Amphibious Operations*. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991. [DTIC AD A258 499] Looks at the complexity of integrating airborne and amphibious operations in a joint and combined environment through a series of historical examples.
- Thomas P. Odom. *Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964–1965*. Leavenworth paper no. 14. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 1988. Reviews joint and combined operations in central Africa and concludes that, inter alia, too many bosses and ineffective communications created major limitations.

Andrew Petruska. *Operation Sharp Edge: The Evacuation of Liberia—A Prototype for Future Joint Littoral Operations*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1994. [DTIC AD B174 463] Traces events involving the evacuation of noncombatants from Liberia during Operation Sharp Edge.

John C. Race, Jr. *Grenada: Command and Control Lessons Learned in Operation Urgent Fury* (U). Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1987. [DTIC AD C042 294] Discusses operational security, planning, communications, maneuver boundaries, designation of a ground force commander, fire support coordination, and airspace management.

William S. Ramshaw. *Operation Just Cause Command and Control: A Case Study*. Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, 1991. [DTIC AD B159 072] Gives straightforward account of the operational planning and C<sup>2</sup> organization.

David M. Rodriguez. *Task Force Synchronization: What Is Essential?* Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1989. [DTIC AD A210 929] Stresses the importance of time and space factors to the maneuverability of JTFs to synchronize offensive operations.

B.A. Ross. *The Joint Task Force Headquarters in Contingency Operations*. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993. [DTIC AD A274 327] Takes stock of JTF headquarters in contingency operations by reviewing the foundations of C<sup>2</sup> functions, selected historical examples of crisis response operations, and current doctrine.

William A. Saunders. *Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures: A Critical Review*. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Army War College, 1992. [DTIC AD A250 545] Claims that this publication does a good job of addressing doctrinal and procedural voids in past JTF operations but fails to discuss functional command organizations.



F-117 stealth fighters.

Combat Camera Imagery (Marvin Lynchard)

Adam B. Siegel and Scott M. Fabbri. *Overview of Selected Joint Task Forces, 1960-1993*. Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, September 1993. Compares contingency versus standing JTFs including Power Pack (Dominican Republic), JTF-LEO (Congo), and Bold Face (Mexico).

A.G. Smart. *Military Support to Domestic Disaster Relief: Doctrine for Operating in the Wake of the Enemy?* Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993. [DTIC AD A274 105] Analyzes disaster relief provided after Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and finds that this type of operation, while not understood, will grow in importance.

Michael N. Smith. *Putting the Commander in Control: The Light Cavalry Regiment's Utility to the Joint Commander*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1993. [DTIC AD A264 458] Concludes that an Army light armored cavalry regiment is the best capability available to the JTF commander for gaining and maintaining positive C<sup>2</sup> in contingency operations.

John E. Sterling. *The Corps Staff in the JTF Role*. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992. [DTIC AD A255 147] Assesses the experiences of XVIII Airborne Corps as a JTF

headquarters in the Dominican Republic, Exercise Golden Pheasant, and Operation Just Cause.

George Stewart, Scott M. Fabbri, and Adam B. Siegel. *JTF Operations Since 1983*. Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, July 1994. [CRM 94-42] Incorporates information from the JULLS database and unit histories in a functionally organized guide to JTF issues.


Stephen M. Townsend. *Command and Control Architecture for Joint Task Forces* (U). Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, 1991. [DTIC AD C958 855L] Examines the combat environment, decisionmaking, and information requirements to determine the best methods of organizing a JTF.

## ARTICLES

S.L. Arnold and David T. Stahl, "A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War," *Parameters*, vol. 23, no. 4 (Winter 1993-94), pp. 4-26. Examines lessons learned from Operations Andrew Relief and Restore Hope with emphasis on boundaries between the strategic and operational levels of activity.

Timothy D. Bloechl, "Operation Just Cause: An Application of Operational Art?" *Low-Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*, vol. 2, no. 3 (Winter 1993), pp. 546-77. Summarizes the events in Panama immediately prior to Just Cause, then compares operation planning and execution with doctrine.

- George Bush, "Remarks at the Aspen Institute Symposium in Aspen, Colorado, August 2, 1990," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 26, no. 31 (August 6, 1990), pp. 1190-94. Identifies the basic and far-reaching change in defense policy and includes a rationale for increasing the emphasis and reliance on JTFs.
- Robert D. Chelberg et al., "EUCOM—At the Center of the Vortex," *Field Artillery* (October 1993), pp. 12-16. Notes that the EUCOM approach to burgeoning crises is to develop an expeditionary mindset and increase training for potential JTF staff officers.
- "Civil Disturbance Rules of Engagement: Joint Task Force Los Angeles," *Army Lawyer* (September 1992), pp. 30-32. Presents rules of engagement for a JTF composed of almost 10,000 California National Guardsmen, 1,500 marines, and over 1,700 soldiers.
- John H. Cushman, "Fight as a Team," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 119, no. 1 (January 1993), pp. 58-62. Suggests that commanders should ignore the roles and missions debate and exercise hands-on control over assigned forces to accomplish the mission, regardless of service doctrine, in order to fight as a team.
- , "Joint Command and Control," *Military Review*, vol. 70, no. 7 (July 1990), pp. 25-34. Uses a theoretical command structure to show C<sup>2</sup> deficiencies stemming from a legacy of service compartmentalization even among unified commands.
- , "Joint, Jointer, Jointest," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 118, no. 5 (May 1992), pp. 78-85. Describes JTF Provide Comfort, which was formed in April 1991 to bring humanitarian relief to Kurds fleeing Iraqi forces as one of the most joint and combined missions assembled to date.
- , "The New USACOM: Providing the Punch," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 120, no. 5 (May 1994), pp. 96-99. Discusses the responsibilities of ACOM for training JTF staffs and orchestrating joint force packages for employment.
- William E. DePuy, "For the Joint Specialist: Five Steep Hills to Climb," *Parameters*, vol. 19, no. 3 (September 1989), pp. 2-12. Underscores the pitfalls of Goldwater-Nichols in advising NCA, honing operational art, generating joint requirements, controlling collateral operations, and synchronizing cross-service support on the tactical level.
- Thomas A. Fabyanic, "Conceptual Planning and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 7, no. 3 (Spring 1981), pp. 343-65. Explores the purpose of the RDJTF, deployment and employment concepts, and risks inherent in such a force.
- Henry G. Franke, "Ocean Venture '93: An Overview," *Field Artillery* (October 1993), pp. 17-19. Provides an overview of JTF formation and employment, command relationships, et al., with emphasis on coordinating among echelons.
- Jack Grace, "MAGTF CE Congruent to JTF HQ," *Amphibious Warfare Review* (Summer/Fall 1993), pp. 42-43 and passim. Advances the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) command element as a model for improving jointness and interoperability.
- Gilbert S. Harper, "Logistics in Grenada: Supporting No-Plan Wars," *Parameters*, vol. 20, no. 2 (June 1990), pp. 50-63. Looks at the role of logistics requirements for operational success of JTFs.
- Robert Holzer, "Adapting Missile Defense," *Navy Times* (March 28, 1994), p. 32. Reviews ACOM plans for JTF 95 to test new technologies.
- Jonathan M. House, "Joint Operational Problems in the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Parameters*, vol. 21, no. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 92-102. Contains valuable insights into the politico-military aspects of joint operations and the dangers of operating without a JTF based on plans for military operations against Cuba in 1962.
- Thomas M. Johnson and Raymond T. Barrett, "The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 106, no. 11 (November 1980), pp. 95-98. Outlines the rationale for forming the RDJTF as a response to the increased Soviet capability to project power overseas and subsequent improvements in lift generated by its formation.
- Robert B. Killebrew, "Force Projection in Short Wars," *Military Review*, vol. 71, no. 3 (March 1991), pp. 28-37. Focuses on the importance of time management and public opinion in joint operations and highlights the importance of forcible entry as a joint capability.
- Donald Kropp, "Task Force Communications: The Special Operations Paradigm," *Special Warfare* (May 1993), pp. 30-32. Draws attention to the fact that SOF must have a powerful roll-on/roll-off communications capability which is deployed with the warfighters.
- Victor H. Krulak, "The Rapid Deployment Force: Criteria and Imperatives," *Strategic Review*, vol. 8, no. 2 (Spring 1980), pp. 39-43. Spells out four vital criteria for success that remain valid today: readiness, prepositioning, adequate tactical and logistic support, and effective decisionmaking.
- Thomas C. Linn, "The Cutting Edge of Unified Actions," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 3 (Winter 93-94), pp. 34-39. States that, since the integrity of units which do the fighting must be preserved, the force is more joint and combined at the top than at the bottom.
- James P. McCarthy, "Commanding Joint and Coalition Operations," *Naval War College Review*, vol. 46, no. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 9-21. Addresses the pitfalls of joint operations including communications during planning, changes in mission, not using the best forces, the impact of politics, the power of CNN, anticipating problems, and momentum in modern warfighting.
- John J. Meyer, III, "JTF Communications: The Way Ahead," *Military Review*, vol. 73, no. 3 (March 1993), pp. 85-87. Argues that commercial communication systems must and can be made available to JTF commanders and suggests that the Defense Information Systems Agency take the lead in guiding investment in commercial capabilities.



Training in Egyptian desert during Bright Star '94.

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Paul D. Miller, "The Military after Next: Shaping U.S. Armed Forces for the Next Century," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 120, no. 2 (February 1994), pp. 41-44. Treats the capabilities derived from adaptive joint force packaging and JTFs, and the new mission of U.S. Atlantic Command.

Allan L. Mink, "JTF Planning Cell: Initial Response to the Yugoslavia Crisis," *Military Review*, vol. 74, no. 3 (March 1994), pp. 68-70. Examines the creation of the Yugoslavia Joint Planning Cell by EUCOM in 1992 to bridge the gap between crisis planning and full JTF operations.

John F. Otis, Jr., "Joint Task Force Operations," *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 71, no. 1 (January 1987), pp. 24-26. Provides a primer on dividing responsibility and requirements for a Marine Corps component commander within a JTF.

Jerry A. Roberts, "Ocean Venture '93 and the Joint Targeting Coordination Board," *Field Artillery* (October 1993), pp. 20-21. Details the functioning of the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB), breaks down the steps in the joint targeting process, and offers a useful JTCB agenda for JTF joint fires personnel.

John G. Roos, "Joint Task Forces: Mix 'n Match Solutions to Crisis Response," *Armed Forces Journal International* (January 1993), pp. 33-39. Observes that the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact has turned a token commitment to jointness into serious considerations of the contributions of core service capabilities to joint planning.

Alan N. Sabrosky and William J. Olson, "USCENTCOM Reconsidered: A Case for Reform," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 10, no. 3 (September 1987), pp. 310-30. Summarizes the history of strike forces, REDCOM, and RDJTF, and analyzes CENTCOM prior to its success in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Jeffrey E Stambaugh, "JFACC: Key to Organizing Your Air Assets for Victory," *Parameters*, vol. 24, no. 2

(Summer 1994), pp. 98-110. Discusses differing service perspectives on the Joint Force Air Component Commander fairly and demonstrates the solid reasoning behind assigning the JFACC command responsibilities.

Gordon R. Sullivan, "Hurricane Andrew: An After-Action Report," *Army*, vol. 43, no. 1 (January 1993), pp. 16-22. Describes the relief effort under JTF Andrew to ameliorate the devastation caused by the hurricane which struck southern Florida in August 1992.

John E. Valliere, "Disaster at Desert One: Catalyst for Change," *Parameters*, vol. 22, no. 3 (Autumn 1992), pp. 69-82. Analyzes the 1980 hostage rescue mission (Eagle Claw) in Iran to include planning, operational sequence, and command and control by JTF 1-79.

Dianne Yancey, "Joint Task Force Bravo," *Military Police* (June 1993), pp. 12-14. Outlines the missions (nation building, training, and contingency planning) of the 1,200-person joint Army-Air Force JTF headquartered at Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras.

Lawrence A. Yates, "Joint Task Force Panama: Just Cause—Before and After," *Military Review*, vol. 71, no. 10 (October 1991), pp. 58-71. Takes a look at the JTF activated by SOUTHCOM in 1988 to coordinate security operations, engage in contingency planning, and manage the tactical aspects of the crisis in Panama. **JFQ**

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## OPERATION DOWNFALL

A Book Review by  
H.P. Willmott

The Invasion of Japan:  
Alternative to the Bomb

by John Ray Skates  
Columbia: University of  
South Carolina Press, 1994.  
276 pp. \$27.95  
[ISBN 0-87249-972-3]

Since 1945 conventional wisdom has held that the atomic bomb spared the United States the daunting task of invading the Japanese home islands. This wisdom has been consistently lurid in its portrayal of the nature of the resistance and the casualties that would have been incurred in Operation Downfall. One has always been skeptical of conventional wisdom. How projected Allied casualties tallied with the order of battle has eluded this writer, and one always questioned an implied Japanese effectiveness far beyond that of a better equipped *Wehrmacht* in France during 1944.

In *The Invasion of Japan* John Ray Skates squares the circles: the conventional wisdom is fraudulent. Drawing largely upon primary sources and having walked battlefields that were not, Skates provides the lie to orthodox "truths." Set down in this account is the hopelessness of the Japanese high command's position as it faced dilemmas that confounded their German opposite numbers in dealing with the western theater in 1944: whether to defend Kyushu and thus exhaust the reserves needed for the Kanto Plain or retain forces for Honshu and thereby compromise what little hope there was of denying southern Kyushu to the enemy; whether to deploy on the beaches where Ameri-

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can firepower would be greatest or hold forces inland in the certainty that they would never get into battle; how to reconcile the need to disperse airpower in order to preserve it but concentrate it forward for attack purposes in the face of overwhelming U.S. air superiority; and how to plan for the defense of the Kanto Plain with static infantry against a mobile, armored enemy.

Moreover, Skates provides correctives to common mythology in three critical areas. First, for all its numbers the Imperial Army was hopelessly unready to resist invasion: the cohorts raised in 1945 were untrained and wretchedly equipped and the few good divisions were compromised for want of established lines of supply within the home islands. Second, while there was talk of "arming the people" for a last-ditch defense next to nothing had been put in hand by summer 1945: Tokyo, rather than wanting a people's war, sought to evacuate civilians from threatened areas lest they

hamper operations. Third, correctly deducing where landings would take place was of small account given Japan's inability to cover all beaches adequately.

With these matters known to the American high command, the unfortunate aspect of this book is that it will be invoked to question the decision to use the bomb in August 1945. Thus it is important to remember that it took two bombs, not one, to bring Japan to defeat, and only because the Emperor made decisions that were above and beyond the Supreme War Council. More relevantly, one wonders whether the course of events would have been better served by Operation Downfall than ruin from the air. Defeat in operations on home soil disposes of national alibis. *The Invasion of Japan* poses a number of questions long overdue.

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## A NOTE TO READERS AND CONTRIBUTORS

**DISTRIBUTION:** *JFQ* is published four times each year for officers of the Armed Forces. One copy is distributed for every two officers on active duty assigned to joint billets and one copy for every four majors/lieutenant commanders and lieutenant colonels/commanders across all the services.

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### CORRIGENDA

The article on "Joint Doctrine: New Pubs, Old Controversies," in number 5 (Summer 1994), was submitted by Colonel Michael Luers, USAF, who is on the faculty of the U.S. Army War College. Our sincere apologies for misspelling his name.

The list of honors awarded in the 1994 CJCS Strategy Essay Competition which appeared in issue number 5 misidentified the institutional affiliation of one contestant. The co-winning essay by Colonel Gerard A. St. Amand, USA ("Schizophrenic Sanctioning: A Failed U.S. Policy Toward China"), was an entry of the National War College.

—The Editor  
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*The true speed of war is . . . the unremitting energy which wastes no time.*

—Alfred Thomas Mahan