

RETHINKING ASIAN ALLIANCES

A Review Essay by

PATRICK M. CRONIN

Alliances usually are marked by formal treaties whereby signatories pledge to defend each other against external threats. But many Cold War alliances were so dominated by U.S. power, especially military power, that reciprocity was supplanted because of asymmetrical contributions. Today America has five treaty partners in Asia and the Pacific: Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. In the past these allies helped form a *cordon sanitaire* against the spread of communism. The demise of the Soviet Union has forced the United States to review its security arrangements in Asia as well as other regions. But the old alliances must be recast not scrapped. As policymakers look for ways to rebuild valuable security frameworks they should return to the original intent of their architects—to men like Dean Acheson—and emphasize the critical role of alliance structures to the economic well-being of America.

Alliance Formation

When American leaders appraised the world in 1945 an astonishing number underscored the need for a robust Asian order. Close teamwork with Australia and New Zealand ensured that those two nations would emerge as the southern anchor in the postwar era. Similarly, in Southeast Asia, where Filipinos fought side-by-side with Americans at Bataan, on Corregidor, and in other battles, Manila figured large as a subregional mainstay of postwar security. It is ironic, however, that because of its wartime potential,

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Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia

by Ronald L. McGlothlen
New York: W.W. Norton, 1993.
320 pp. \$27.95.
[ISBN 0-393-03520-4]

Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea, 1950–1953

by D. Clayton James with
Anne Sharp Wells
New York: The Free Press, 1993.
282 pp. \$24.95.
[ISBN 0-02-916001-4]

The U.S.-South Korean Alliance: Time for a Change

edited by Doug Bandow and
Ted Galen Carpenter
New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction
Publishers, 1992. 217 pp. \$19.95.
[ISBN 0-56000-583-1]

Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines

by H.W. Brands
New York: Oxford University Press,
1992. 384 pp. \$27.95.
[ISBN 0-19-507104-2]

The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures

by Joseph Keddell, Jr.
New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993.
230 pp. \$47.50.
[ISBN 1-56324-129-3]

U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945–1990

by Roger Buckley
New York: Cambridge University Press,
1992. 225 pp. \$49.95.
[ISBN 0-521-35141-3]

A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances After the Cold War

by Ted Galen Carpenter
Washington: CATO Institute, 1992.
238 pp. \$12.95.
[ISBN 0-932790-95-X]

East Asia and the Pacific: Challenges for U.S. Policy

by Robert G. Sutter,
with a contribution by Larry Niksch.
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1992. 182 pp. \$37.50.
[ISBN 0-8133-1370-8]

Japan—a vanquished foe—became the linchpin for long-range reconstruction of the Asian-Pacific region, a fact that gnawed at the Philippines and other allies.

America lost no time in cultivating Japan. In *Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia*, Ronald McGlothlen recounts how statesmen laid the foundations for U.S. interests in the wake of World War II. Above all, they rehabilitated Japan as a bulwark from which, in Acheson's words, the United States could "control every wave in the Pacific Ocean." Similarly, John Davies wrote: "The central American objective [is] a stable Japan, integrated into the Pacific economy, friendly to the United States and . . . a ready and dependable ally of the United States." But it was Acheson, as Under Secretary and later Secretary of State, who was the "extraordinary chief architect" of a postwar U.S.-centered order. Dean Acheson—working with perspicacious analysts like Paul Nitze, Dean Rusk, and George Kennan—foresaw reconstructing Japan as the "workshop of Asia" whose trade with Korea, Taiwan, China, and Southeast Asia would be the engine for powering regional economic recovery. Writes McGlothlen: "From the early 1930s through the end of World War II, Japan aggressively pursued economic ascendancy in the Far East under the guise of creating a 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.' In the postwar years, Acheson sought a surprisingly similar ascendancy for Japan, but one in which Japan exchanged its failed militarism for American tutelage, protection, and domination."

Acheson leaned heavily on the analysis of Nitze, who was then Deputy Director of the State Department Office of International Trade. Although Kennan and others in Foggy Bottom argued for a Europe-first strategy, Acheson and Nitze believed that Japan and the rest of Asia needed to be included in a recovery program akin to the Marshall Plan. Nitze noted that the region's percentage of global trade had been virtually halved (from 15 to 8 percent) in the span of several years, and

Japanese exports had sunk to a measly 4.3 percent of prewar levels.

McGlothlen's portrayal of Acheson as a prescient geoeconomist is somewhat hyperbolic. Nonetheless, he assembles a compelling case that Acheson saw the need to reconstruct an Asian economic system that featured Japan at its apex. With more than \$16 billion in annual exports, Acheson figured in mid-1947, America's future hinged on foreign trade, which in turn required rebuilding the economies of both Europe and Asia. Accordingly, Acheson steadily worked to craft a beneficent assistance plan for Japan, slacken restrictions on industry, foil any stringent reparations settlement (which countries like the Philippines coveted), negotiate a comprehensive peace treaty, and reconstruct Japan's trading network. In each endeavor he finally triumphed and, partly as a result, modern Japan sprang from the ashes of the Pacific war like a phoenix.

To a significant degree Acheson was responsible for the commitment to Korea, if only because he saw it as indispensable to Japan's recovery. He reversed a policy of withdrawing troops from Korea and overcame military resistance to a long-term alliance with Seoul. In 1947, as Under Secretary of State, Acheson successfully set in motion a policy aimed at underwriting the Korean economy. Unfortunately, the commitment in Korea was feeble, and it deteriorated after Acheson's departure from the scene in mid-1947. At that time, in response to a Soviet *demarche* demanding a withdrawal of foreign troops, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to estimate the impact of extracting all Americans from the Korean peninsula. Reaching a conclusion that anticipated that of Doug Bandow and Ted Galen Carpenter in *The U.S.-South Korean Alliance: Time for a Change*, the Joint Chiefs led by General Dwight Eisenhower provided an unequivocal response: "The United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops based in Korea."

In fairness to the Joint Chiefs, President Truman had cut the defense budget 85 percent (from \$81.6 to \$13.1 billion). Naturally, removing the two divisions stationed in Korea was seen as a step toward matching ends and means. As McGlothlen indicates, retrenchment was supported by the father of containment, George Kennan, who noted that the time had come to "cut our losses and get out of there as gracefully as possible." The policy, codified in NSC 8 of April 1948, specifically precluded direct U.S. intervention in Korea. In determining America's *vital* interests the military consistently excluded Korea, instead relying on MacArthur's island perimeter—across the Pacific from the Philippines through the Ryukyu Archipelago and Japan to the Aleutians.

NSC 8 did not long survive Acheson's return as Secretary of State in 1949. But while he quickly implemented a policy that again committed the United States to the economic rehabilitation of Korea, troop withdrawals lunged ahead with calamitous results. Few doubted that the North Korean army of 125,000 was a lethal threat to the lightly armed South Korean force half its size. Indeed, McGlothlen maintains that in February 1949 some CIA analysts predicted North Korea would pounce across the 38th parallel just as soon as America's retreat was complete. When the Army Chief of Staff, General Omar Bradley, queried his staff about possible contingency plans, they replied that a U.N. "police action" would be the only feasible option. Alas, the notion of a U.S.-led "police action" was dismissed by the JCS as totally impractical. Hence, when the last troops left Korea in June 1949, the United States had neither established a sufficient South Korean army nor developed contingency plans to deal with the real possibility of a North Korean invasion. Given this attitude it is astounding that just months later American troops were dying in the defense of an ally "of little strategic interest." The impact of the Department of State on military strategy and policy toward Korea, as well as the resolution to defend South

Korea, is lucidly communicated by D. Clayton James in *Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea, 1950-1953*.

As threat perceptions grew more alarming, the United States needed an eastern mooring to check communist expansion. In marking the anniversary of Japan's surrender in 1946, MacArthur noted that Japan could be "a powerful bulwark for peace or a dangerous springboard for war." Balance-of-power considerations reigned supreme. In the 1950s President Eisenhower repeatedly told the NSC to go gently on Japan, because "even a nation of America's preeminence would be highly vulnerable without allies in Europe and Asia." John Foster Dulles, then arranging a peace accord in the Pacific, warned that it would be "extremely unpleasant" if Japan was dominated by the Kremlin: "[Should Japan] become a captive Soviet country, that would involve a major shift in the present power position in the world today." Echoing this zero-sum mentality Vice President Richard Nixon gave a clear indication in 1953 of why close relations with Japan were necessary, "if Japan falls under communist domination," he reasoned, "all of Asia falls."

America's role in the Korean War, and thus in the postwar U.S.-Korean alliance, was one consequence of the belief that military defeat anywhere could undermine the Free World's struggle. Consider the words of General Matthew Ridgway speaking to the Eighth Army in the dark hours of January 1951 about the purpose of the war: "The real issues are whether the power of Western civilization . . . shall defy and defeat communism." This East-West contest became the foremost reason for formalizing security arrangements with the Philippines and Thailand. As superpower rivalry grew more intense and Washington became more obsessed with Munich—that aggression must not be appeased—a scramble for allies known as "pactomania" erupted during the 1950s.

This was the larger context of the alliance structure in Asia, in which the Philippines played a significant part. Strategically the archipelago was a vital link in the island chain that constituted America's line of defense against communism. The long relationship between the United States and the Philippines is well chronicled by H.W. Brands in *Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines*. From Commodore Dewey's victory over the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay and the subsequent annexation of the Philippines to the closing of the Subic Bay naval base last year, America has alternately treated the Philippines as a special partner or a colony. In its association with the Philippines, the American failure to match global security concerns with more localized responsibilities provides lessons for future alliances with smaller partners.

Because the main objective was to align states against the Soviet bloc, U.S. officials tended to disregard corrupt, autocratic regimes in Manila. As a consequence, argues Brands, Washington let the Philippines be governed by a cabal of "privileged collaborators." He opines that a more value-based foreign policy might have impelled changes on the Filipino ruling classes. Power, not ideology, was the criterion of greatest import for security planners. In November 1950 Truman approved an NSC paper defining policy toward the Philippines. Written against the backdrop of Mao's victory in China, the conflict in Korea, and France's deepening predicament in Indochina, the paper dubbed the Philippines an essential part of the island chain encircling communism in the Far East. Thus, by 1951, the basic structure of the U.S. alliance system in Asia had been born.

Growth and Adaptation

Brands pulls few punches in recounting the volatility of Philippine relations in the 1960s as President Lyndon Johnson escalated involvement in Vietnam. With Saigon under siege, Johnson pressured allies, among them Manila, to show solidarity with the Free World in the

IN TAKING THE UNITED STATES into the Korean conflict . . . [President] Truman . . . attempted to salvage the American role as a world policeman by having its intervention by force sanctioned by the United Nations. The military element, though predominantly American, was to appear to be a truly international force and to represent a large segment of global opinion regarding the particular crisis. Actually, the U.N. guise at the high-command level was so thin in 1950 that [General] MacArthur used the same officers to head the principal sections—for example, intelligence, operations, and personnel—in the headquarters of both the United Nations Command and the United States Far East Command. He was under strict orders to issue his periodic reports to the U.N. Security Council through the JCS, which freely edited and censored them; and he was to have no direct communication with the Security Council whatsoever.

Four decades later the United States would turn to a variant of this scheme again, acting as policeman in the Iraq-Kuwait affair and providing a large majority of the combat forces of the coalition whose mission was to enforce a dozen U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq's aggression. In 1950 and again in 1991 the United States would undertake a military task enjoying U.N. sanction and claiming to have world opinion largely behind its use of force. During and after the Korean War some thoughtful observers questioned whether the compromises, complications, and resources drain involved in trying to maintain the roles of the global policeman and the international command were realistic and successful in furthering American strategic interests.

—From *Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea, 1950–1953*
by D. Clayton James with
Anne Sharp Wells

fight against communism. But when Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal tried to dispatch a token force to Vietnam, he was bitterly opposed by the then senate president, Ferdinand Marcos. Some months later President Marcos made an ostentatious state visit to the White House where he persuaded Johnson to extend \$80 million in aid for sending a 2,000-man Philippine unit to Vietnam. The more the United States thought they needed a show of alliance solidarity, the more allies took advantage of American largesse. After all, quips a sardonic Brands, that is "what allies are for."

Turning to another aspect of alliance management, the books under review demonstrate that domestic or bureaucratic considerations can affect alliances. For instance, Buckley analyzes the rift between the Departments of State and Defense over how to incorporate a peaceful Japan into the U.S.-engineered postwar world. Due to the occupation, the military tended to have an advantage over diplomats when it came to Japan. As Ambassador Edwin Reischauer noted in 1960 when he left the banks of the Charles for Tokyo, "To many Japanese, an American general or admiral seemed much more a genuine American than a Harvard professor." Thus, even before policymakers had been forced to take the Japanese defense industry out of mothballs because of the Korean War (\$4 million in munitions were purchased from a former enemy), U.S. forces were quietly molding the embryonic Japanese security forces. In effect, the Armed Forces were forging a special relationship with their fledgling counterparts, more modestly but not unlike the British-Japanese alliance of naval secretariats some five decades earlier. While the results of this military influence on Japan proved to be salubrious, the early years of U.S.-Japan relations aptly demonstrate how different agencies within the same government can pursue and implement alliance policies quite autonomous of one another.

Managing alliances also centers on operationalizing military cooperation, that is, planning and conducting combined operations. Notwithstanding some limited successes, Joseph Keddell in *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures* explains why Japan has been so reluctant to undertake a greater role in regional and global security. Throughout the Cold War, Japanese defense policy was principally designed to manage conflicting American and Japanese domestic political pressures; the United States tried to measure the international military balance while Japan saw things through the prism of mutual security. This proved dispiriting to Japanese who sought a defense role for their country, but in the 1950s Prime Minister Shigeuro Yoshida deliberately subordinated Japan to the alliance to concentrate on economic expansion.

Although Japan took steps toward a larger defense role in the 1980s under Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, it was the Gulf War that finally jarred Japan out of postwar insularity. Tokyo belatedly contributed \$13 billion to coalition coffers, but questions lingered about whether Japan was pulling its fair share within the alliance and international community. Only after the Gulf War did the Diet pass the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations bill which authorized the creation of a 2,000-person civilian and military organization. This unit could, under specific conditions, serve in noncombat roles in U.N. missions. Shortly thereafter the first ground forces deployed overseas to the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Cambodia. While the peacekeeping bill and the Cambodian deployment represent a watershed in Japan's postwar military posture, they are modest, sharply-circumscribed events. Keddell elucidates why these incremental steps were almost predetermined by Japan's postwar political system, given its built-in, multi-layered conservatism.

Whether Japan's defense posture of the future will change radically is doubtful. In *U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945-1990*, Roger Buckley

states that we may never know the actual strength of the alliance unless a conflict leads to the ultimate decision that befalls allies: "... [the] alliance has not yet been called upon during its history to confront the ultimate justification of any international pact—solidarity in the council chamber and on the battlefield."

The future of the U.S.-Japan alliance is a matter of some speculation. The past, however, provides a grounding for forecasters and policymakers alike. In particular, understanding why Japan remained a military midget while becoming an economic giant goes far toward appreciating the impact of domestic politics on alliance management and on this bilateral alliance in particular.

Termination or Transformation?

In *A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances After the Cold War*, Ted Galen Carpenter argues vehemently for disengagement or, more euphemistically, for "selected engagement." Asian alliances, as well as others like NATO, are anachronistic. What Washington must do, Carpenter contends, is stand up and declare strategic independence from these vestiges of the Cold War. He faults President Bush's New World Order in which U.S. forces undergird global stability as woolly-minded conservatism: it only perpetuates an outmoded alliance structure at excessive cost. Carpenter calculates that even a vastly scaled-back NATO commitment of 100,000 troops will cost at least \$90 billion a year, and 98,000 or so troops afloat and ashore in the Asia-Pacific region will cost another \$40 billion. This presumably means that every dollar spent only redounds to the advantage of others, not to the United States. Furthermore, Carpenter prefers surgical responses to commitments that are just as Manichean as those proposed during the Cold War, for instance, when Eisenhower dubbed the Japanese "indestructible partners" (read "permanent allies").

Ignoring the more dyspeptic criticisms of current alliances, Carpenter seems to be on surer footing

when reassessing U.S. interests. After all, American (and, undoubtedly, allied) military analysts should be haunted by the vacillation toward Korea in the early postwar period and the Philippines at various times during this century.

As the United States is pressured to assume a greater role in peace-enforcement missions, Carpenter's guiding rules merit deliberation. First, we must define vital security interests more narrowly than during the Cold War. Unimpressed by the lessons of Korea, Carpenter asserts that vital national interests should have direct, immediate, and substantial consequences. Second, in formalizing alliances decisionmakers should have greater latitude to avoid commitments with imprecise, long-term obligations that can limit American options when significant interests are at stake or that lead to entanglement in irrelevant conflicts. Third, the United States should resist pursuing ambitious international *milieu* goals like stability which are unattainable at acceptable cost or risk. Though desirable, in the final analysis such goals are not essential to American security.

What is striking about these books, however, is not the picture of irredeemable decay, but rather the impressive resiliency of American alliances in overcoming adversity. The essential glue that held the alliances together was a willingness and ability to lead on the part of the United States. The leadership question is accentuated by the recent quest of the Clinton administration and others throughout the Asia-Pacific region to establish a multilateral mechanism for security dialogue and cooperation. Just as we need to be cognizant of our own limitations, so too must we be aware of the limitations of multilateralism in Asia. For instance, it is doubtful that the United States can use its bilateral ties as building blocks for a nascent Pacific defense community. Theoretically alliances may provide a bridge for regional institution building; practically speaking, military alliances tend to be inferior instruments for integration. Economic means seem to carry more weight throughout the region. But

given the difficulties nowadays in separating economic and military security, the United States has wisely stepped up support for multilateral approaches in the Asia-Pacific region—not only through participation in both the Association of Southeast Nations and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, but also by helping to establish a pan-Pacific security debate.

There also is a fundamental incompatibility between alliances and collective security. That is why the current move toward Asian multilateralism should not strive for collective security but simply cooperative security—or basically, confidence building. For the foreseeable future, a mere forum for security dialogue cannot replace an alliance. Among other things, in the event of war, an infant multilateral organization would face the traditional problem of leadership.

Today, economics is the engine of international politics. Alliances support stability in order to allow economic progress to continue to bring more nations of Asia into the industrialized (if not necessarily democratic) world. Economic concerns were central in the postwar years; they remain of paramount concern in contemporary Asia. And just as Acheson recognized a half century ago, Japan remains at the heart of regional economic prosperity. This could easily lead one to embrace the conclusion offered by Robert Sutter in *East Asia and the Pacific: Challenges for U.S. Policy*, that our interests argue for maintaining traditional ties with Japan and other nations in Asia and the Pacific region whose interests coincide with those of America.

U.S. alliances in the Pacific are being reexamined in light of the end of the Cold War. The critical question is whether the typhoon-like winds of the post-Cold War world will completely rip apart the U.S. military umbrella which, although tattered, still stands over several Asian allies. Conversely, will Washington feel compelled to identify a new enemy such as China around which to recast old alliances and

forge new commitments to Singapore and other nations of the region? Or will the United States perhaps agree on a more positive cooperative security agenda than the traditional threat-based concept and thus seek the prospect of a meaningful multilateral security community? While the books reviewed offer some conflicting answers to these questions, they will equip the reader to better appreciate the significance of Asian-Pacific security issues. **JFQ**

CHIEFS FROM ACROSS THE ESTUARY

A Book Review by
WALTER S. POOLE

The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff
by William Jackson and Lord Bramall
London, New York: Brassey's (U.K.),
1992. 508 pp. \$29.95.
[ISBN 0-08-040370-0]

You may take the most gallant sailor, the most intrepid airman, and the most audacious soldier, put them at a table together—and what do you get? The sum of their fears!

Winston Churchill's words still have a ring of truth about them despite decades of effort in London and Washington to foster crisp but truly joint decisionmaking. In *The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff* the British side of that effort is well presented. The authors of this work have unique qualifications: General Sir William Jackson was Assistant Chief of General Staff and Quartermaster General before becoming a reputable military historian, and Field Marshal Lord Bramall served as both Chief of General Staff and Chief

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of Defence Staff. It is a tribute to the authors, particularly Bramall, that they do not flinch from pointing out short-comings in the system they helped shape and some of those under whom they served.

In Britain, as *The Chiefs* makes clear, military reforms often occur in response to failure. The Committee of Imperial Defence was established in 1904 after embarrassing reverses during the Boer War. The Chiefs of Staff (COS) Committee was formed in 1923 in response to the nearly disastrous clash of what the authors call "political dictatorship versus professional judgment" in World War I. One chief was selected to double as the chairman of the committee, but without a separate supporting staff. The COS worked so well that no serious reorganization was attempted for almost twenty years. The rise of the Chief of Defence Staff to pre-eminence took place gradually, through changes launched by Admiral Louis Mountbatten in the 1960's, and continued during the 1980's under two Secretaries of State for Defence, John Nott and Michael Haseltine.

It is illuminating to compare the post-1945 evolution of the British COS with that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in this country. The United States acquired a Secretary of Defense in 1947, whose staff and authority expanded enormously over the following two decades, and a JCS Chairman in 1949, whose influence soon outgrew formal limitations imposed by law on the post. During the same period in Britain, the Minister of Defence had a tiny staff and imprecise, non-executive coordinating functions that did not impinge upon the powers and responsibilities of the chiefs or service ministries. It was not until 1957 that Marshal of the RAF Sir William Dickson became Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as well as Chairman of the COS Committee. Yet, with only a small briefing staff of his own, Dickson was really a toothless tiger.

Although a Defence Ministry was created in 1964, management remained decentralized in the services. The army, naval, and air staffs remained separate but were brought

The Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting in 1943. The British officers (from left to right): Rear Admiral W.R. Peterson, RN; Field Marshal Sir John Dill; Brigadier Vivian Dykes; Lieutenant General G.N. MacReady; and Air Marshal D.C.S. Evill, RAF. The American officers (from right to left): Admiral Ernest J. King, USN; Admiral William D. Leahy, USN; Brigadier General J.R. Deane, USA; General George C. Marshall, USA; and Lieutenant General J.T. McNearney, USA.

together in joint committees—an approach attempted by the United States in World War II and judged inadequate. Admiral Mountbatten was the first CDS to outshine the service chiefs, and he did so by exploiting his close ties with the political establishment and by resorting to devious, even deceitful methods. Bramall was on Mountbatten's staff and writes bluntly about his chief's foibles: "I was staying at Windsor last weekend," he would say benignly at the start of a chiefs' meeting, "and she said how glad she was that we were going to do so and so. . . ." The fact that the particular subject was of such complexity or triviality that the Queen could not be expected to have an opinion or interest in it, destroyed the story's credibility, but that seemed to concern him very little." Unlike the situation within the U.S. Armed Forces, where the Navy usually opposed centralization while the Army and the Air Force advocated it, Mountbatten found no allies among the service chiefs for a more centralized system of control. Even adding a Director of Plans to the CDS's staff provoked intense opposition. Mountbatten's successor as CDS, an Army officer, moved back toward a consensus and corporate approach to decisionmaking.

In the 1980's, however, major reforms in both the United States and the United Kingdom moved their respective defense establishments in precisely the same direction. John Nott pushed through changes making the CDS alone the principal military advisor to the government as well as making central operational and military policy staffs responsible to him. Michael Haseltine later stripped the services



U.S. Naval Historical Center

of their vice chiefs, reduced executive staffs, and shifted management responsibility to the commanders in chief (CINCs) in the field. Similarly, the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the principal military advisor to the President and directed that the Joint Staff respond to the Chairman alone, not the corporate JCS. Jackson and Bramall contrast the way in which the corporate COS waged the Falklands War of 1982 with how the CDS alone made decisions during the Gulf War ten years later, leaving the chiefs to supervise deployments and logistic support. Within the Pentagon, in the wake of Goldwater-Nichols, the Chairman, General Colin Powell, was performing in exactly the same manner, first acting and then calling the service chiefs into his office to explain what he had done.

Britain in some respects has gone farther than the United States in trimming the sails of the services. One wonders, for example, if we could follow their lead by dispensing with vice chiefs. Originally, the American chiefs were supposed to concentrate on joint issues and their vice chiefs on internal service matters. Now that the chiefs have largely lost their joint functions, are the vice chiefs really necessary?

But Jackson and Bramall see danger in the new dispensation: "At the heart of the matter lay the degradation of specialist Land, Sea, and Air advice in the formulation of Defence policy and decisionmaking." In 1982, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Henry Leach, was the only chief on hand when Prime Minister Thatcher received her first briefing on the impending Argentine invasion of the Falklands. Leach's judgment that the Navy could respond, the authors recount, gave her the courage to act. Yet, under the post-Haseltine organization, the First Sea Lord could not have dealt directly with and advised the Prime Minister. This seems like a plausible argument, but we must bear in mind that specialist advice is not always sound, as illustrated by U.S. military history. During the winter of 1970-71 a major incursion into Laos, aimed at cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail, was under consideration. The Chairman, Admiral Thomas Moorer, naturally did not feel qualified to render judgment and queried the Army Chief of Staff, General William Westmoreland, who was a former commander in Vietnam as well as other senior Army officers. Their opinion was that the South Vietnamese Army had improved sufficiently to carry out the operation. So Admiral Moorer recommended to the civilian leadership that the operation should

proceed. Thus Lam Son 719 was launched, and the specialists were proven wrong all too quickly.

One may be skeptical, too, of Jackson and Bramall's claim that "five minds are invariably better than one" in assessing risks and options. True enough if the five minds speak with a single, clear voice. But frequently the pre-1986 Joint Chiefs of Staff did not; their five minds gave rise to either a split recommendation or a compromise which played to the lowest common denominator. What you got, to paraphrase Churchill, was the sum of their parochialism.

Jackson and Bramall also warn against "policy being hijacked by bureaucrats who might be influenced more by political and economic factors than by the best available professional judgment" and provide two classic examples as evidence. First, the Treasury kept such a tight rein on military spending during the 1920's and much of the 1930's that Britain was woefully unprepared to fight Germany. Second, John Nott would have emasculated the Royal Navy's surface fleet except for the fact that the Argentine junta acted before the worst cutbacks took place. This is not to make a brief for Neville Chamberlain, who as Chancellor of the Exchequer and Prime Minister insisted on strict economies until the *Anschluss* in March 1938. But, as the authors acknowledge, Chamberlain was reacting to wider trends: the pacifism grown out of the bloodshed of World War I, overstretched Imperial responsibilities, and an economy that lacked the vigor of the Victorian era. John Nott also was taking account of trends that had reduced Britain to barely a middle-sized power. For logical reasons, political and economic factors can override "the best available professional judgment." No one has ever devised a safeguard against bad forecasting. President Harry Truman, who has become a folk hero in recent years, rejected JCS warnings and pursued an economic program that left the Army unprepared for the war that broke out in Korea.

The Chiefs is drawn entirely from published works, supplemented by the authors' wealth of experience. Within these limits they have produced an eminently sound and readable book. But there are instances where they betray what appears to be an insular bias. Admiral William Leahy was not the first Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff; appointed as Chief of Staff to President Franklin Roosevelt in 1942, his main function was liaison between the White House and the JCS. During 1944, Hitler did not reinforce the Italian front by drawing many first-class divisions from France and Russia. Apparently echoes of the wartime Anglo-American debate over the merits of a Mediterranean strategy have not completely died down. There is no conclusive evidence, at least in American minds, that the Italian campaign contributed decisively to the success of Overlord. As to the 1956 Suez crisis, it is wrong to say that the threat of Soviet intervention "frightened Washington more than it did London." Both Eisenhower and Dulles condemned the Anglo-French invasion for reasons of principle, not fear. Finally, the notion of a NATO multilateral nuclear force did not die because Bonn went *cold* on the idea. It was Prime Minister Harold Wilson who played the role of executioner because he had a razor-thin majority in the House of Commons and some Germanophobic Laborites were ready to join the Tories on the issue and bring down his government. But these are minor points of clarification in an otherwise well researched book.

The Chiefs makes worthwhile reading for anyone interested in the higher realms of defense organization. Unfortunately there is no comparable volume that tells the story of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this side of the estuary. JFQ

RUSSIA'S MILITARY PAST

A Book Review by
BRIAN R. SULLIVAN

Strategy and Power in Russia,
1600-1914

by William C. Fuller, Jr.

New York: The Free Press, 1992.

557 pp. \$35.00.

[ISBN 0-02-910977-9]

The past can often provide the best guidelines for an uncertain future. With the collapse of Soviet power, those who are curious about future Russian strategy would do well to read *Strategy and Power in Russia* by William C. Fuller, Jr., who is a specialist on Russian military history and a professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College. In this absorbing book, Fuller applies the analytical method developed at Newport which uses historical case studies to critique approaches to Russian strategy. *Strategy and Power in Russia* provides brilliant explanations of how the tsars employed force to achieve political goals from the early 16th century up to the eve of World War I.

Although Fuller has produced neither a military history of imperial Russia nor a study of its military theory, there is much to learn about both from this well-written book. It is an expertly-led tour across three centuries of war and military policy from which a clear pattern emerges. In sum, effective Russian strategies applied native genius and indigenous resources to strategic challenges, while attempts to adopt purely Western methods usually failed.

The book begins its account in a period when the extinction of the ruling dynasty had left Russia without national leadership, plunging the country into civil war and anarchy.

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Its neighbors stripped huge territories from the carcass of what seemed to be a dying land. When the Romanovs seized the throne, they bought peace at home by acknowledging these foreign conquests in order to consolidate their power. But the Romanovs planned to win back the lost lands and then expand their realm.

However, subsequent Russian campaigns to recapture Smolensk from the Poles in 1632–33 and seize the Crimea in 1687–89 failed. Despite investing vast resources and importing foreign military experts and technology, tsarist armies were repulsed with huge losses. After Peter the Great came to power in 1689–90 he did have some success against the Turks. But when a small Swedish force shattered his army at Narva in 1700 Peter realized the need for a new approach to war. He did not adopt Western methods. Instead, as Fuller shows, he did the opposite: in desperation, he studied the peculiarities of Russian society and adapted them to the situation.

Peter took advantage of his defenseless serfs by squeezing them for taxes, as well as for manual labor and military service. He dragooned serfs to create naval shipbuilding and weapons industries, build canals and

roads for military transportation, and construct a network of frontier fortifications. Every spring, more serfs were drafted to replace the tens of thousands lost the previous year in battle, and through disease, exposure, and exhaustion. The serf-soldiers that survived their years of service formed an autonomous military society rigidly obedient to imperial command. Given the size of the population and the tsar's sacred authority, Russian conditions were amenable to a system that spent untold lives and caused enormous human suffering.

Of equal importance, Peter insisted that strategic and operational issues be debated openly and that proposals be reached collectively in councils of war with his generals. The tsar made the ultimate decisions himself but his discussions of military affairs served as extraordinary seminars on war for Russian commanders, provided for the widest possible play of imagination, created a broad range of options, and prevented the stagnation of dogmatic thinking.

National backwardness and native genius produced an army of considerable, albeit hardly overwhelming, power. Peter employed this military force carefully, not aiming

to achieve the impossible goal of total overthrow of the Swedes but at acquiring territory along the Baltic of strategic or economic value. He was prepared to endure operational defeat, retreating into the vast interior to gain strategic superiority by use of Russian geography, in order to draw the Swedish King Charles XII after him. Only when the enemy was severely debilitated by several months of campaigning did Peter offer battle, winning the crucial victory at Poltava in June 1709.

Peter still had to batter the Swedes for twelve more years. After shifting the fighting north to the Baltic, the Tsar built a navy and learned to conduct combined operations. The Russian fleet smashed the Swedes at Cape Hangö in 1714. Thereafter, the Russians launched major amphibious raids that culminated in landings between 1719 and 1721 in Sweden. These punitive expeditions ravished the Swedish economy and finally forced the Swedes to cede the Baltic coastline Peter had fought the war to acquire. Along the way, Fuller argues, Peter the Great haphazardly created what can be called the Russian way of war.

In the seventy years following Peter's death in 1725, his successors,

WORLD WAR II REMEMBERED



THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF WORLD WAR II is being commemorated in various ways, including publication by the services of historical monographs and pamphlets on the European and Pacific theaters.

The Naval Historical Center will republish a series of "Combat Narratives" of campaigns which were originally printed during World War II by the Office of Naval Intelligence. The first volume in this series has

appeared and six others are slated to come out in the next few months.

The Aleutians Campaign, June 1942–August 1943. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993. 140 pp. [ISBN 0-16-041801-1]

The Marine Corps Historical Center is publishing the "Marines in World War II Commemorative Series" which thus far includes the following titles:

Opening Moves: Marines Gear Up for War. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991. 24 pp. [PCN 190 003115 00]

Infamous Day: Marines at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941. Robert J. Cressman and J. Michael Wenger, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1992. 31 pp. [PCN 190 003116 00]

First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1992. 52 pp. [PCN 190 003117 00]

Outpost in the North Atlantic: Marines in the Defense of Iceland. James A. Donovan, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1992. 32 pp. [PCN 190 003118 00]

A Magnificent Fight: Marines in the Battle for Wake Island. Robert J. Cressman, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1992. 37 pp. [PCN 190 003119 00]

See the previous issue of *JFQ* (Summer 1993) for a selection of titles on World War II published by both the Army and the Air Force.

especially Catherine the Great, formalized this improvised military system to conquer huge new provinces in the course of nine major wars. The Russian army even defeated Frederick the Great, only to surrender its gains on the orders of the mentally unbalanced Peter III. The history of Europe from 1689 to 1815 is often described as a struggle for supremacy between England and France. But Fuller makes clear that such a perspective is a purely Western interpretation. In fact, it was really France and Russia that were dueling for continental dominance.

Napoleon seemed to decide the contest when he entered Moscow in 1812. Within three months, however, the Russians under Alexander I drove out the French, employing basically the same methods that had brought Peter victory over the Swedes a century earlier. (In detailing this victory, Fuller offers an engrossing description of the 1812 campaign.) At the time of Napoleon's downfall, the Russian empire had reached its apogee. Russian armies marched into Paris, a feat which Stalin later grumbled even his victorious Red Army of 1945 was unable to match.

The second half of Fuller's book is devoted to the rapid decline of Russian strength after 1815. The tsars of the 19th century clung to the system created by Peter—victory over Napoleon had given it an invincible aura—but they demolished the real pillars of Russian strength. To the already conquered peoples of East Europe, later tsars added the tribes of the Caucasus and Central Asia. If the Russians had been victors in the wars of 1853–56, 1877–78, and 1904–05, they would have also annexed millions of Turks, Kurds, Manchurians, and Koreans. As it was, the monarchy was transformed into a restive empire of rebellious nations. Policing so many non-Russian lands pinned down tsarist armies on garrison duty or in frequent counterinsurgency campaigns. By the mid-19th century maintaining the empire taxed Russian military capacity to the limit.

Even worse, the tsars discarded the strategic planning system that had served them so well. Debate

gave way to autocratic decisions at the center and competitive, uncoordinated expansion on the borders by semi-independent provincial military governors. Territory was grabbed for hollow reasons of prestige, with little thought to its strategic value or the geopolitical consequences. Such pointless greed led to Russian military disasters during the empire's last century.

The defeats which Russia suffered also were the result of other weaknesses. Technological backwardness, combined with the rapid developments of Western military and naval technology after 1815, presented the tsars and their armies with an apparently insoluble contradiction. The imperial system was based on war and expansion but, from the mid-19th century on, it could only acquire territory of value by fighting enemies of superior strength. Defeat in the Crimean War sent a tremendous shock wave throughout the Russian imperial system and directly led to the abolition of serfdom and a policy of modernization. But the force unleashed by reform disrupted the entire system; for example, a law abolishing the military enslavement of serfs injected politically discontented conscripts into the main institution which had supported the monarchy. Meanwhile, Russian expansion continued, even though it led to new military disasters. Paradoxically, a fear of revealing weakness created a psychological imperative to project the appearance of irresistible strength. But instead, Russian attempts at territorial aggrandizement in East Asia led to defeat in the Russo-Japanese War.

Growing Russian fear of Germany and Austria-Hungary, prompted by rivalry for influence over the Balkans, led Tsar Alexander III to form an alliance with France in the 1890s. It had become painfully evident to Russian officials that the empire was too weak to defend itself. Yet they retained a system that forced expansion. Even the French alliance actually increased Russian weakness by placing additional strategic demands on the Russian

army. And yet, Fuller argues, the empire's collapse in 1917 was not inevitable, although to have avoided it would have required a long period of peace, entailing painful concessions to Russia's enemies. This Nicholas II and his officials were unwilling to do and thus they marched to catastrophe in the summer of 1914 rather than back down during the Serbian crisis.

Fuller's analysis of imperial Russia's military strategy suggests parallels with the communist era. One can see Stalin as compressing the accomplishments of Peter the Great and mistakes of the later tsars into a 25-year period, first creating a powerful military machine, then using it to expand the Soviet empire beyond Russian ability to control it. The Soviet technological decline in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by defeat in Afghanistan and revolt of the subject peoples, adds weight to the appearance of history repeating itself.

Whether or not such analogies are accurate, the history of Russian military strategy does raise serious questions about the future. How far will Russians go to regain those territories lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union? Will they limit their ambitions to Russian-inhabited lands or seek to reincorporate potentially rebellious regions? Indications are that Russians will establish volunteer forces. But will this mean emulating tsars and communists by creating aggressive, ideologically committed legions or establishing a military devoted to Western ideas of constitutional order and territorial defense? How will the Russian government overcome technological backwardness? Will Russia remain strategically isolated or seek allies?

Strategy and Power in Russia does not answer all of these questions. But it does provide a historical perspective for making educated guesses about the future. Despite present difficulties, the Russian people remain by far the largest national group in Europe and possess great reserves of human strength and genius. When those resources are once again harnessed to an effective strategy, Russia will regain the status of a great military power

JFO

A NOTE TO READERS AND CONTRIBUTORS

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
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KUDOS

As the inaugural issue of *Joint Force Quarterly* came off the presses on June 25, 1993 (right), it marked the beginning of the end of a period of gestation that stretched from a concept briefing presented to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on November 4, 1992, to the publication date of July 2, 1993. While getting there may not have been half the fun, launching a journal has been rewarding. The satisfaction that the editors experienced on receiving the first copies of *JFQ* was likewise shared by others outside the precincts of Fort McNair who helped to turn a concept into a reality. Among them are members of the Government Printing Office and Gateway Press.

The editors wish to acknowledge the outstanding contribution of William Rawley, Typography and Design Division, Government Printing Office, who designed and laid out the first issue. Thanks also go to



JFQ (Jim Peters)

David Haddock and Frederick Uhlick, both of the Government Printing Office, and to William Fante, of Gateway Press in Louisville, Kentucky, for their invaluable advice and support in publishing the inaugural issue. **JFQ**

MISCELLANEA

The F-5E pictured alongside the Air Force F-16C on page 22 of issue 1 (Summer 1993) is Jordanian, not Saudi Arabian as indicated in the caption. Thanks to Colonel Bander Al Saud, Royal Saudi Air Force, for pointing out the error.

The caption on page 28 of issue 1 should have read "A GBU-27 prototype laser guided bomb being dropped from an F-117 stealth fighter"—a correction provided by Capt J.D. Ramsey, USAF.

The Marine Corps aircraft shown launching a missile in the photo on page 35 of issue 1 is an F-4, not an A-4.

The JCS medal depicted on the back cover of issue 1 was presented by General Earle G. Wheeler, USA (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), to General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe), in May 1968. (Medal loaned by Special Collections, National Defense University Library.) **JFQ**

items of commentary on articles published in previous issues are invited. Copies of supporting material (such as charts, maps, and photos) should be submitted with manuscripts citing the full source and indicating applicable copyright information if known. To facilitate the editorial review of your contribution, please provide two copies of the manuscript together with a 150-word summary. Place all personal or biographical data on a separate sheet of paper and avoid identifying yourself in the body of the manuscript. You may follow any accepted style guide in preparing the manuscript, but endnotes rather than footnotes should be used; both the manuscript and the endnotes should be typed in double-space with one-inch margins.

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The back cover photo shows the JCS identification badge worn by General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, (courtesy of Special Collections, National Defense University Library).

DOD

An M-1 Abrams tank during a night training exercise.

