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United Nations Peacekeeping: *Ends versus Means*

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A liaison officer coordinating air support for U.S. and Canadian troops in Somalia.

Summary

The end of the Cold War has seen the United Nations assume a more active role in resolving regional conflicts. In the last four years alone U.N. forces have mounted over a dozen military operations, more than in the previous four decades. Many of today's operations are greater in scope and complexity than in the past, and their nature is changing from *peacekeeping* to *peace-enforcing*. As a result the Secretary-General recommends expanding U.N. military capabilities. While Washington officially pledged support for a stronger and more forceful United Nations, the resources to achieve that objective are not available. The most immediate requirement is for a command and control structure for properly employing multinational forces. Moreover, there is a view that divergent U.N. and U.S. military cultures could inhibit American participation in future peacekeeping missions under U.N. control. Even if our military contributions to future combined operations are small, such missions will continue to pose a significant challenge to the way the U.S. Armed Forces currently plan and train for coalition warfare.

The United Nations has become a significant factor for the United States in developing a coherent strategic focus to guide its foreign policy during the balance of the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization has been succeeded by a widening array of conflict situations and crises which are beyond the ability of any single nation to resolve. Thus the United Nations is now the primary vehicle for conflict resolution, with the Security Council—under its senior executive agent, the Secretary-General—searching for allies to share the burden of promoting peace. The United States has pledged support for “a more robust, more muscular” United Nations.¹ The issue as yet unresolved is the nature and the extent of the American support that is required and, perhaps crucially, whether divergent U.S. and U.N. military cultures will be impediments to developing common doctrine and command and control arrangements for mounting joint and combined operations in the future as part of a multinational force.

Background

The inability of the U.N. Security Council to play an effective role in maintaining peace and security after the start of the Cold War led the United Nations to turn to peacekeeping in default. This was a “golden age” for the organization during which it avoided superpower rivalry and influence by relying mainly on smaller nations for military contributions to peacekeeping operations. The conduct of such missions evolved over four decades although the word *peacekeeping* does not appear in the U.N. Charter. In the initial phase international observer missions were established to monitor cease-fires (1948–56). This was followed by the introduction of the first modern peacekeeping force, the U.N. Emergency Force in Egypt (1956), to separate the military forces of Egypt and Israel. Then, in 1960, a multinational force was sent to the former Belgian Congo to perform an internal pacification role. The unsettled state of East-West relations inhibited instituting peacekeeping initiatives between 1967 and 1973. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war resulted in the deployment of a peacekeeping

or buffer force to the Sinai and an observer group to the Golan Heights. Later, in 1978, another U.N. buffer force was established in southern Lebanon.

The general mission of U.N. field operations was clearly defined: to supervise demarcation lines or cease-fire agreements, separate military forces upon agreement of the warring parties, and (in limited cases) foster an environment in which the population could return to normal pursuits. Missions were organized only with the consent of the contending parties (including agreement on the national origin of participating military units). For their part U.N. units were expected to avoid the appearance of partiality, carry light (nonthreatening) weaponry, and restrict the use of force to the maximum extent possible. In brief, these military units were expected to serve as an instrument of U.N. diplomacy, be militarily nonprovocative, and withdraw if the host nation so indicated.

The end of the Cold War produced an even more challenging international security environment characterized by the unleashing of divisive forces once held in check by superpower rivalry and by the transformation of international politics from bipolar to multilateral relations. This led to a dramatic increase in pressure for international organizations to engage in preventive diplomacy to resolve conflicts at an incipient stage or to forcibly intervene when conflict threatens peace and security. Complicating this expanded mandate is the eruption of intrastate conflicts that, in turn, displace populations and create humanitarian concerns. Such conflicts also may cause breakdowns in governmental authority or, *in extremis*, lead to harsh repression of restive ethnic minorities, including refusal to permit the distribution of emergency foodstuffs and medical supplies.

The impact of these developments on U.N. operations is immense. In terms of demand the organization launched 13 peacekeeping operations since 1988–89, roughly equal to all the missions conducted in the previous four decades. The scale and scope of current operations have necessitated deploying over 54,000 military personnel—more than half the strength of the forces that make up the U.N. membership’s existing military establishments—at an estimated \$3 billion for 1992. Second, these operations

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exceed the traditional bounds of peacekeeping and include:

- ▼ supporting victims of war, including provision of safe havens;
- ▼ supervising transfers of power and establishing effective institutions of government;
- ▼ organizing and monitoring elections;
- ▼ creating secure environments to ensure the safe delivery of relief supplies.

Peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance have become inextricably linked—as seen in Somalia—and now require the integration of military and humanitarian planning to meet contingencies.²

An added burden not yet fully addressed by the U.N. membership relates to responsibility for reestablishing security and order in failed states, particularly when human rights violations are blatant and regional stability is threatened. The demise of viable governing institutions in Liberia, Somalia, and Haiti provide striking examples. Many Third World governments—most notably the members of the Group of 77 which today numbers over 120 countries—resent what they believe are threats to their national sovereignty. China, one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, has expressed reservations about Western intervention under U.N. auspices in situations where humanitarian considerations dictate action without the approval of the host governments. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali favors the humanitarian position. In his June 1992 report to the Security Council, *An Agenda for Peace*, the Secretary-General observed that “the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty . . . has passed; its theory was never matched by reality” and then urged “a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.”³



DOD photo by Perry Heimer

Norwegian U.N. peacekeeping forces break down pallets of American rations (MREs) being unloaded from a U.S. Air Force C-141 in Zagreb, Croatia.

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Defining Roles and Missions

Rising demands for the United Nations to play the part of global crisis manager have generated a plethora of proposals to enhance the organization’s military capabilities. This development was foreshadowed in a post-Desert Storm observation by then Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar that the war, while “made legitimate by the Security Council, was not a U.N. victory” because victory could be claimed only if hostilities were “controlled and directed” from the United Nations. Boutros-Ghali pursued this issue by recommending that:

- ▼ the Security Council assume more peacekeeping burdens rather than authorizing member states to take action on its behalf;
- ▼ agreements be made as foreseen in article 43 of the Charter for member states to make military forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Security Council;
- ▼ the Security Council guarantee the permanent availability of such peacekeeping forces (and negotiate with member states—assisted by the hitherto moribund Military Staff Committee—to create such forces);
- ▼ peace-enforcement forces be on-call and more heavily armed than peacekeeping units, be made up of volunteers, and be extensively trained within their national commands;
- ▼ peacekeeping and peace-enforcement forces be placed under the command of the Secretary-General.⁴

The distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement reposes in chapters VI and VII of the Charter whose framers saw the United Nations as an organization required to offer assurances of comprehensive collective security. To meet that need two functions were regarded as imperative: the procedures for the “pacific settlement of disputes” found in chapter VI (*peacekeeping*) and the ability to counter “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression” in chapter VII (*peace-enforcement*). In the so-called golden age of the United Nations most disputes and conflict situations were dealt with through chapter VI procedures. Chapter VII was invoked to redress the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the Korean “police action” is generally considered to be an example of a chapter VII enforcement action. The challenge to the U.N. leadership today is bridging the gap militarily when addressing threats to international order and stability that fall between the

chapters (sometimes called *chapter VI and 1/2 requirements*). The accompanying table seeks to avoid semantical confusion over these terms by providing generally acceptable definitions.

U.N. Terminology

peacemaking—generally means using mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or diplomatic initiatives to peacefully resolve a conflict

peacekeeping—traditionally involves using military personnel as monitors/observers under restricted rules of engagement once a cease-fire has been negotiated

peace-enforcing—using military force to complete a cessation of hostilities or to terminate acts of aggression by a member state

peace-building—rebuilding institutions and infrastructure within a country to create conditions conducive to peace, as used by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in his *An Agenda for Peace*

protective engagement—using military measures, essentially defensive, to provide safe havens or a secure environment for humanitarian operations (such actions tend to fall between chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter)

The recommendations found in *An Agenda for Peace* present the U.S. military with major questions regarding roles and missions in future multilateral peacekeeping actions. For example, in what kind of situations should the United States become involved in peacekeeping? In the event of a decision to participate in peacekeeping operations, what doctrine exists to instruct and inform forces? Under what circumstances should members of the Armed Forces be directly commanded by officers outside our national chain of command? Should peacekeeping be integrated as a subset of traditional missions and capabilities? Where should the budgetary authority for peace-

keeping be lodged: in defense appropriations or the Foreign Assistance Act? Should the United States support strengthening U.N. planning and operational capabilities? Should the United States seek to energize the U.N. Military Staff Committee? If so, with what mandate and whose participation?

While not fully endorsing Boutros-Ghali's proposals, President Bush, in an address to the U.N. General Assembly on September 21, 1992, recommended that the Security Council consider them on an urgent basis. In outlining his position the President indicated the United States will:

- ▼ support efforts to strengthen the ability of the United Nations to prevent, contain, and resolve conflict;

- ▼ support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Western European Union (WEU), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and other competent regional organizations to develop peacekeeping capabilities—enhanced U.N. capabilities being a “necessary complement to these regional efforts”;

- ▼ member states, however, must retain the final decision on the use of troops they make available for peacekeeping operations;

- ▼ train its forces for “the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian relief” which will be coordinated with the United Nations;

- ▼ inform the United Nations on the availability of its unique military resource capabilities and encourage other nations to provide information on logistics, equipment, and training which can be made available to enhance readiness and interoperability;

- ▼ “promote multilateral peacekeeping . . . training exercises, simulations, and leadership development,” and make facilities available for such purposes.

President Clinton associated himself with the Bush position during his inaugural address by stating: “When our vital interests are challenged or the will or conscience of the international community are defied, we will act—with peaceful diplomacy wherever possible, with force when necessary.”⁵ Left unanswered are questions about the means of establishing a body of knowledge on joint and combined peacekeeping within the U.N. Security Council and its principal executive agent, the Secretary-General and his Secretariat.

Basic Points of Divergence

The United Nations is the world's primary legitimizing agent in matters of peacekeeping. Resolutions by the Security Council provide the framework for diplomatic initiatives (or preventive diplomacy), humanitarian intervention, and military action within the framework of chapter VII. Clearly U.S. and U.N. interests in maintaining international peace and security appear inextricably linked, but their respective histories, bureaucratic culture, and decisionmaking procedures suggest otherwise. Indeed, unless the obstacles are satisfactorily negotiated in the near future, they seem to be on a collision course due to misunderstanding. As Ambassador James Goodby has observed: “Collective security military operations require constant exchanges of views among the governments trying to deal with complex situations.”⁶ Moreover, the effectiveness of collective security operations will be

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- Established before 1988
- Fielded since 1988



United Nations photo

Note: The term troops in the lexicon of U.N. peacekeeping refers to infantry, logistics, engineering, aviation, medical, movement control, naval, and staff personnel. A total of 448 Americans—341 troops and 107 observers—were serving in 5 of the 13 on-going United Nations peacekeeping operations listed here on March 31, 1993.

Source: Strength figures courtesy of the Office of the Military Advisor, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, U.N. Headquarters.

ONUSAL 1991—United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador—established in 1991 to supervise a cease-fire between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN guerrillas, monitor human rights, and establish a police force (strength: 286 civilian police, 7 troops, and 94 military observers).

MINURSO 1991—United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara—established in 1991 to supervise a cease-fire and a referendum to determine independence or integration into Morocco (strength: 110 troops and 224 military observers, including 30 American observers).

UNIPROFOR 1992—United Nations Protection Force—established in 1992 to foster security in three protected areas of Croatia in order to facilitate a peace settlement (strength: 621 civilian police, 22,534 troops, and 394 military observers, including 339 American troops).

U.N. personnel in Somalia have been using advanced communications equipment.




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Unloading a Navy cargo ship under the watchful eyes of U.N. troops.



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United Nations Security Council meeting.

Marines in Mogadishu counter warring factions during Operation Restore Hope.



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UNFICYP 1964—United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus—established in 1964 to supervise a cease-fire and administer a buffer zone between opposing forces (strength: 39 civilian police and 1,492 troops).

UNTSO 1948—United Nations Truce Supervision Organization—established in 1948 to help mediate and observe the truce in Palestine; today supports UNDOF and UNIFIL, and supervises observer teams which are located in Beirut, southern Lebanon, Sinai, Jordan, Israel, and Syria (strength: 239 military observers, *including 17 Americans*).

UNIFIL 1978—United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon—established in 1978 to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces and assist the Lebanon in restoring security (strength: 5,216 troops).

UNDOF 1974—United Nations Disengagement Observer Force—established in 1974 to supervise a cease-fire between Israel and Syria (strength: 1,121 troops).

UNIKOM 1991—United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission—established in 1991 after the recapture of Kuwait to deter Iraqi border violations and observe potentially hostile action (strength: 71 troops and 247 military observers, *including 14 American observers*).

UNMOGIP 1949—United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan—established in 1949 to supervise a cease-fire in Jammu and Kashmir (strength: 38 military observers).

UNTAC 1992—United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia—established in 1992 to assist in the areas of human rights, elections, public administration, law enforcement, refugees, health and welfare, and demobilization and disarmament with a U.N. force that includes observers from the United States and 21 other nations (strength: 3,578 civilian police; 15,023 troops; and 488 military observers; *including 2 troops and 46 observers from the United States*).

UNAVEM II 1991—United Nations Angola Verification Mission II—established in 1991 to verify a cease-fire between the Angolan government and UNITA and monitor the Angolan police (strength: 75 military observers and 30 civilian police).

UNUMOZ 1992—United Nations Operation in Mozambique—established in 1992 to monitor a cease-fire and protect delivery of relief aid (strength: 1,082 troops and 153 military observers).

UNOSOM 1992—United Nations Operation in Somalia—established in 1992 to monitor a cease-fire and protect the delivery of food and humanitarian aid (strength: 893 troops).



A U.S. Air Force crew placing the emblem of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees on their cargo plane.

U.N. forces load an Air Force C-130 in Djibouti for the flight to Somalia.



Pakistani troops in "blue helmets" deploying to Somalia in 1992.

DOD photo by Mary Lyrichard

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determined by the mandate of the Charter, political will, available resources, and perceived legitimacy. Recent U.S.-U.N. interaction reveals that neither a commonality of views nor coordinated action exists across the full range of peacekeeping operations. In consequence we are also far removed from establishing a joint perspective on the essentials for a full-bore collective security system under the auspices of the United Nations.

The approach of U.N. Headquarters to the challenges of the post-Cold War era appears to be coherent and reasonably well balanced. Indeed, few member states could object to the general precepts and guidelines set forth in *An Agenda for Peace*, the report of the Secretary-General. It is sensible on the whole, but the devil is in the details. In particular Boutros-Ghali and the Secretariat have yet to come fully to terms with several vexing problems which, if not resolved, would inhibit U.S. military support for peacekeeping (in the broadest sense) operations. Salient among them are issues involving organization, doctrine, command and control, logistics, and rules of engagement.

Shape and Functions of the Military Secretariat. The U.N. Headquarters system is still not up to expanded peacekeeping requirements of increased complexity and scope. Hitherto the Secretariat has met emerging requirements with ad hoc approaches, not infrequently failing to meet challenges on a timely, cost-effective basis. The pattern has been jerrybuilt and does not meet the need for clearly defined mandates covering field personnel, concepts of operations, logistical plans, and multi-year resource requirement planning. The U.N. leadership must establish a single chain of command linking the political (crisis-prevention) side of its operations with the management and logistical-support side. Concomitantly, the Secretariat's military staff should be enlarged substantially, with special components established for crisis early warning, plans and operations, logistics and communications—none of which exist at present.

Fashioning a Doctrinal Foundation. Traditionally peacekeeping worked well, and casualties were kept down because peacekeepers were accepted as neutrals whose stated purpose was to assist in muting conflicts and mediating between the conflicted parties. Chapter VI 1/2 and peace enforcement

operations require more heavily armed forces and different operational doctrine. Within the framework of traditional peacekeeping operations successes came in the form of ceasefires and negotiated settlements of disputes, whereas the circumstances in both Bosnia and Somalia are more ambiguous. The danger in the latter cases arises from breakdowns in Security Council consensus, disagreements among lead countries providing troops and the Headquarters Secretariat, and muddled or mismatched aims among the major actors involved in organizing field operations.

Divided Responsibilities in the Field. A separate civilian chain of command is the bane of all military field commanders. Under traditional U.N. practice the field unit's commander is subordinate to a Special Representative who reports directly to Headquarters and has a predilection to emphasize nonmilitary subjects. A separate chain also includes the Chief Administrative Officer of the mission who reports directly to the field Department of Administration and Management at U.N. Headquarters. He has the potential to influence military operations adversely since he has decisionmaking authority over budgetary and logistical matters. Tension between military field commanders and their civilian counterparts will inevitably crystallize since the decisions taken at Headquarters in New York are not predicated exclusively on political-military considerations. Consensus in New York involves decision by committee, diplomatic negotiations, and desiderata not necessarily relevant to the actual state of affairs in the field. These factors frequently override the practical requirements of military field commanders.

Logistical Mixes and Matches. The standard guidelines for national units assigned to peacekeeping emphasize that troops should arrive fully equipped and prepared to conduct field operations over several months without requiring U.N. resupply. Several nations—notably the Nordics, Canadians, and Irish—who have a lengthy history of training and preparation for such operations are readily prepared to meet this imperative. However, some Third World contributors, anxious to participate, must look to the United Nations for matériel support prior to unit arrival. The result has been a mix of equipment, poor interoperability, and

escalating funding requirements (given limited U.S. pre-stockage). These problems are compounded by civilian requirements that tend to piggyback on those of the military. Although standardization is beyond the capability of the existing U.N. system, the major powers might wish to consider creating set-aside stocks (in areas such as communications, transportation, and engineering) in excess of their national needs that can be placed at the disposal of the United Nations. The objective would be to ensure interoperability of equipment under conditions where severe security threats confront U.N. forces.

Realistic Rules of Engagement. Communal conflict has altered the nature of peacekeeping assignments conducted under U.N. auspices. Operations conducted today involve police support, civil administration, civic action, and humanitarian relief, all of which necessitate military support. In intrastate warfare traditional rules of engagement may not suffice. In certain situations U.N. forces deployed to protect the distribution of relief supplies could well become hostages or victims resulting in heavy casualties. As witnessed in Somalia, the initial U.N. contingent inserted at Mogadishu airport in mid-1992 became hostage to the clan chieftains and local thugs—yet U.N. Headquarters refused to alter the rules of engagement. The U.N. forces in Bosnia operate under similar constraints, occasionally with tragic consequences. Flexibility for field commanders would be desirable, but the bureaucratic culture in New York constrains greater delegation or freedom of action to field commanders regardless of how perilous the situation.

Given these constraints some observers conclude that U.S. forces are ill-suited to conduct general peacekeeping operations—short of Korea-like chapter VII threats to the peace—for several reasons. The nature of U.N. coalition roles and missions are at variance with American military character, doctrine, traditions, and the concepts of both decisive force and victory. For example, a recent U.S. statement on “Joint Operational Concepts” establishes doctrine which is antithetical to U.N. Headquarters concepts and guidelines.⁷ Issued under the signature of General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it sets forth clear guidelines for joint operations of the U.S. Armed

Forces, including the need to “shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents.” The emphasis is placed on integrating and synchronizing operations to ensure total and complete application of military force. And, to ensure success, commanders are admonished that “there are few distinct boundaries between the levels of war.” They must “set the terms for battle” so that “the threat is not able to resurrect itself.”⁸ To establish control over the adversary’s “center of gravity,” they are enjoined to emphasize lethality, tempo, decisiveness, and operational depth in plan-

U.N. forces deployed to protect relief supplies could well become hostages or victims

ning to shock, demoralize, and disrupt opponents and thereby gain decisive advantage early. Such thinking is far removed from the doctrine, rules of engagement, and operating procedures currently imbued in the bureaucracy of U.N. Headquarters.

The Command and Control Dilemma

For over forty years the United States has taken the lead in applying chapter VII military sanctions under U.N. authorization. Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990–91 constituted only the second such American initiative, one which provided a U.N. license for the use of force without restricting the manner in which the U.S.-led coalition was to “secure Iraq’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its forces from Kuwait.” While required to provide periodic reports to U.N. Headquarters, the coalition was allowed unfettered planning and operational freedom to use “all necessary means” essential for success. The coalition fully met its mandate although at some cost. As Ambassador Pickering has observed: “Broadly licensing a few countries to use force in the Council’s name enables detractors to argue that the action is the project of a few governments unrepresentative of the world community.”⁹ Within the precincts of the United Nations, a number of member states want assurances that in future peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations complete command and control will repose with U.N. Headquarters rather than with a designated lead country. Clearly, Boutros-Ghali’s June 1992 report was intended to satisfy this desire.

The primary dilemma for members that want centrality of U.N. control over future undertakings is the lack of a Headquarters organization to operate beyond existing ad hoc arrangements. Indeed, the *ad hoc* approach is resulting in system overload since additional military expertise is not available for peacekeeping management. To date, efforts to increase the professionalism and strengthen the Headquarters staff have been to no avail, and U.N. members themselves disagree on the size and use of military advisory staff.

Recently, several member nations have recommended that the Military Staff Committee be revived to provide military expertise to the Security Council and Secretary-General. Both the U.S. and several West European governments have greeted this proposal with reserve. Moreover, the traditional troop-contributing countries have not favored the proposal for fear they will be excluded from decisionmaking processes if the Military Staff Committee remains dominated by the Security Council “permanent five” as it is at present.

Whatever the final decision taken by the membership, it would be prudent to assume that the Security Council will be loathe in the future to accord full delegation of command and control to the United States as in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Full consideration will have to be given in due course to the role of the Military Staff Committee. Article 46 of the Charter calls for the Security Council to develop plans for applying force with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee; article 47 details the Committee’s terms of reference including advice to the Council on readiness, planning and general matters of command, and strategic direction of forces. There are some significant traps to be addressed in this context as Ambassador Pickering has noted:

No state whose troops are engaged in hostilities is likely to allow their direction by a group to which it does not belong or whose members have necessarily also contributed troops. [There] . . . is also the need to ensure that committed troops are not subject to life-threatening surprises by change in the political parameters governing their use, or by a breach in security or by other factors arising from activities which might be implied by the words “strategic direction.” Thirdly, unless the reference to strategic command is

*interpreted in some static sense, the technology of modern warfare probably makes it obsolete: it requires flexible, decentralized decisionmaking and instantaneous communication—neither is well suited to decision by U.N. committee.*¹⁰

In cases of chapter VII peace-enforcement where the United States is the coalition leader with full operational control, the regional unified commander will either be the overall commander or establish a Joint Task Force. Such operations, however, have been and will remain exceptions. More frequently, individual U.S. observers or small-sized units will be integrated into U.N. peacekeeping commands (with U.N. logistical support) and the role of the U.S. unified commander may be more circumscribed. In the past the United States has assigned military observers to a number of peacekeeping missions but not large military units.¹¹ The experience of Operation Desert Storm in terms of chapter VII operations is that until multinational forces are deployed to one place and command and control is established, they will lack cohesion and effectiveness. On the other hand, when a substantial force is deployed with international agreement, U.S. command and control may be neither required nor warranted depending on the size of the force contributed. Experience in the NATO integrated military command and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai after the conclusion of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty should have established the fact that American troops can operate under a multinational command unencumbered by military or political constraints. Although the MFO is only one step away from a U.N. command, there is an apparent reluctance to place U.S. forces under foreign command.

Today, military planners have a most challenging assignment. Not only must they identify future adversaries but also surmise who will be our friends and coalition partners. If we confront a capable adversary—with or without direct U.N. involvement—any arrangement will require unity of command and control. Either a fragmented or multiple chain of command, predicated on loose coordination among national units, would be self-defeating because operational decisions must not be cobbled together by committees once conflict breaks out. Hence, the basic challenge for U.S. strategic plan-

ners involves interoperability in ad hoc coalitions that comprise forces with little or no history of operating together. Such arrangements are likely to resemble international versions of a sheriff's posse. But operational effectiveness can be directly enhanced and in-theater preconflict training minimized by periodic command-post exercises (CPXs) for potential coalition leaders and using the concept of lead-nation responsibility for certain equipment and functional support areas such as command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I). This concept, suggested by President Bush in his speech to the General Assembly, will undoubtedly contribute to shaping the debate in the coming months. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ "In Somalia, Now It's the U.N.'s Turn," *The New York Times*, February 1, 1993, p. 18.

² Ambassador Chan Heng Chee, "The U.N.: From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking?" Adelphi Paper no. 265 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991), pp. 30–40.

³ Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," *Foreign Policy*, no. 89 (Winter 1992/1993), pp. 3–20.

⁴ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, a report to the United Nations Security Council (New York: United Nations, June 17, 1992).

⁵ David Newson, "Use of Force to Settle Global Disputes Has Its Limits," *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 27, 1993, p. 19.

⁶ James E. Goodby (with Daniel O'Connor), "Collective Security after the Cold War" (Washington: United States Institute for Peace, March 1993).

⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "A Doctrinal Statement of Joint Operational Concepts," November 23, 1992.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁹ Thomas R. Pickering, "The U.N. Contribution to Future International Security" in *The Security Roles of the United Nations*, edited by William H. Lewis (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1993).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹¹ U.S. military units participating in peacekeeping operations are under the operational control of the peacekeeping commander. However, the U.S. commander retains operational command over his subordinates and all attached units.