

# A Word from the Chairman



DOD (Helene Sittke)

Since I last addressed *Joint Vision 2010* in the pages of *JFQ*, it has stimulated a good deal of discussion and healthy debate. I'm particularly heartened by the spirited professional dialog that is helping to create a better understanding of both joint and service capabilities. The JFQ Forum in this issue, which is focused on joint doctrine, enlarges that debate and provides an opportunity to reexamine the basic precepts and the implementation of *JV 2010*.

I would like to offer a perspective on some points that have emerged from this discussion. First, the key operational concepts in *JV 2010* are not limited to mid- or high-intensity conflict. They apply across the full range of military operations, from peace operations to warfare at the highest level of intensity. Full spectrum

dominance—from the high to low end—is essential for us to remain the dominant fighting force in the world. Second, no combatant command or

individual service should perceive itself in terms of a single operational concept. The concepts in *JV 2010* require synergism based on efforts by all services. Third, technological advancements are vital to the operational concepts, but they share center stage with our dedicated and quality people.

### Full Spectrum Dominance

When the development of *JV 2010* began two years ago, we focused our attention on the premise that technological innovations could dramatically alter the conduct of war. That point was voiced in many sources, including the *Joint Strategy Review (JSR)* in 1994. I have just approved and released the classified 1996 version of that review. *JSR 96*, which provides an updated analysis of the trends which are likely to shape our future strategic environment, posits that until 2010 the Nation will continue to confront a range of threats—from terrorists to rogue states with weapons of mass destruction to potent regional powers. Beyond 2010, we may even face peer

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competitors or new global powers. Overall, the future environment will be at least as challenging as today's; and it still will be as important to prevent and deter conflict as to be ready to fight and win wars.

*JV 2010* complements the latest *JSR*. While that review describes the likely environment of the future, *JV 2010* presents key operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics. These four concepts will enable joint forces to accomplish any mission that arises in the strategic environment. They are also applicable across the spectrum of operations described in *JSR 96*.

Bosnia illustrates these emerging concepts and how capabilities designed for one strategic need can be adapted for another. We deployed a force that was prepared to execute high intensity wartime tasks. And it is our conventional combat power that became, and remains today, the backbone of peacekeeping efforts. The Implementation Force controlled the situation and battlespace with dispersed units which is a good example of the emerging concept of dominant maneuver.

Empowered by information superiority, this force was positioned in a manner that enabled it to respond rapidly to crises anywhere in the area of operations. A robust intelligence system, with the Predator and the joint surveillance target attack radar system, ensured that operational and tactical commanders received high levels of shared situational awareness and early warning.

Similarly, precision engagement was evident in Bosnia. Commanders were able to employ the right force to achieve the required effect. Whether threatening to use high technology weapons or employ non-lethal capabilities with military police, civil affairs, and psychological operations units, the desired effect was achieved: the opposing factions were convinced to end the violence or risk decisive defeat.

Overall in Bosnia, unified joint forces achieved full spectrum dominance by massing effects from widely dispersed elements of all services. Furthermore, despite the fact that our forces were originally trained and equipped to conduct large scale combat operations, their skilled leaders and highly trained men and women displayed great agility by rapidly adjusting training, organization, and tactics to meet the demands of the situation. They performed magnificently, showing clearly that the key concepts found in *JV 2010* are applicable at the lower end of the operational spectrum.



U.S. Marine Corps (E. J. Young)

Training for cold weather survival.

Our tremendous success in Bosnia is in large part a result of our agility, a product of quality people, superb leadership, and tough mission-oriented training. By taking further advantage of emerging technologies, especially information technologies, we will greatly enhance our agility, simultaneously improving our ability to fight as a coherent joint force and rapidly adapting our capabilities for use across the full spectrum of operations.

In large measure our success in Bosnia also can be attributed to close cooperation with our international partners. More than ever, we must

service doctrine did not always address the full complexity of joint operations

continue to place a high priority on functioning as a member of a coalition force. As Bosnia proved, future crises will be best countered by responses from all nations

with a stake in the outcome. The effectiveness of any future combined force will be a direct reflection of the seamless integration of its various national components.

As our understanding of full spectrum dominance has been clarified, we have also gained insight into the nature of force development in a rapidly changing world. We cannot have a force

oriented on a single threat or level of operational intensity. Force structure must be capabilities-based, focused on achieving the overarching operational concepts in *JV 2010*.

### Services, CINCs, and Operational Concepts

The key operational concepts are the province of every service. Our joint forces must achieve them together by empowering people and managing change wisely. *JV 2010* builds on the core competencies, institutional values, and cultures of the services, recognizing that each service has unique capabilities for which there are no substitutes. It links services as elements of a unified joint team through the shared situational awareness and common communications of information superiority as well as collective operational concepts. By achieving that, commanders will be able to employ forces as envisioned in *JV 2010*.

The evolution of joint doctrine in recent years illustrates the need to integrate service efforts to produce viable joint capabilities. In the past, joint doctrine built on service doctrine. It integrated existing doctrine to meet specific joint warfighting requirements. However, service doctrine did not always address the full complexity

of joint operations, and it left the services and unified commands to develop ad hoc solutions where gaps in doctrine occurred.

In recent years we have made superb progress in providing warfighters with improved joint doctrine. That has been accomplished only with hard work and close coordination by the services, CINCs, and Joint Staff. With *JV 2010*, we have spelled out the basic capabilities required by the Armed Forces of the future, providing the conceptual template for developing joint doctrine. At the same time, *JV 2010* will allow the services to intensify their focus on contributing to joint doctrine.

Over the coming months, the services, CINCs, defense agencies, etc., working in concert with the Joint Warfighting Center, will continue to refine the *Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO)*. This important document amplifies the four operational concepts and will provide the initial basis for various assessment activities. It is the logical next step in transforming key *JV 2010* ideas into actual joint capabilities.

*CFJO* is the first *JV 2010* implementation concept document and the means by which the services, CINCs, and Joint Staff can debate and assess joint capabilities across the full spectrum of operations. The effective implementation of *JV 2010* depends on an understanding that its concepts apply to all services as well as how the individual services operate as a joint team.

#### Advanced Technology and People

*JV 2010* emphasizes the critical importance of information superiority and other technological innovations which offer the potential to give us an advantage in gathering, exploiting, and protecting information. Wise adaptation of technology will enable us to derive the most combat power from available manpower, offsetting a potential enemy's advantages in mass, proximity, niche technologies, or weapons of mass destruction.

However, our commitment to advanced warfighting is not a substitute for quality people or a technical remedy for future military challenges. The scope and intensity of future operations will place tremendous demands on every servicemember, from decisionmakers at the highest levels to the young soldier, sailor, marine, or airman who is at the tip of the Nation's spear. The human element will remain the most critical ingredient of our operational success.

It is not a question of people *or* technology, but rather a question of how the strengths of both are integrated to give us the best possible military capability. As the implementation of *JV 2010* moves forward, we must remain mindful of how technology can be leveraged to improve training and education—things that make good people better. *JV 2010* aptly describes the vital role of people:

*We cannot expect risk-free, push-button style operations in the future. Military operations will continue to demand extraordinary dedication and sacrifice under the most adverse conditions. Some military operations will require close combat on the ground, at sea, or in the air. The courage and heart of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines will remain the foundation of all that our Armed Forces must do.*

On balance, *Joint Vision 2010* is not so much a document as a living body of ideas about joint warfare. It represents a deliberate, iterative process of evolutionary change that will help the services and unified commands march into the future together.

In the world of 2010, we must achieve an effective integration of service core competencies to accomplish a wide range of missions. By bringing us together as a joint team, *JV 2010* will help do just that. Today and into the future, our Armed Forces must remain “persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of conflict.”

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff