

A Word from the Chairman



The Chairman and Secretary of Defense teleconference with GEN George W. Casey, USA, Commander, Multi-National Force–Iraq, about the success of Iraqi elections

DOD (Helene C. Stikkel)


Looking back on my first 6 months as Chairman, I am impressed with the ability of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coastguardsmen, who confront challenges such as counterinsurgency and nationbuilding operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, earthquake relief in Pakistan, and hurricane relief in our own Gulf States. Though seemingly disparate, these operations share an important characteristic: they all require the coordinated efforts of a wide range of

interagency, coalition, and nongovernmental partners to succeed.

My predecessor, General Richard Myers, coined the term *integrated operations* to emphasize that the military must act in concert with a wide variety of actors to attain national objectives. Indeed, we must seek out new partners—governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, allies, industry, and the private sector—to defeat modern transnational threats. I wholeheartedly endorse this approach. As I stated in my

guidance to the Joint Staff (published in *JFQ*, issue 40, 1st quarter 2006), we must marshal the enablers of organizational agility, collaboration, and outreach if the Nation is to win the war on terror.

Although the opening examples come from recent contingencies, integrated operations are not new. Counterdrug operations in Latin America provide a more mature look at integrated operations in that they enjoy the strength of established relationships and standing organizations, such as the Joint



Royal Netherlands sailors arriving in Biloxi, Mississippi, to support Hurricane Katrina relief

Combat Camera Group, Pacific (Michael B. Waters)

relief operations in late 2005, economic and infrastructure recovery considerations clearly dominated the effort. In fact, most national-level concerns fell squarely on other agencies with portfolios such as health, housing, transportation, energy, and the environment. Beyond disaster relief operations, diplomatic, informational, and economic considerations often determine success in preconflict and postconflict operations abroad.

Second, mission requirements often dictate the need for diverse skill sets and authorities. The Intelligence Community offers an excellent example of this point. The Central Intelligence Agency, for example, provides intelligence collection and all-source intelligence analysis (centered on human intelligence), while the National Security Agency was chartered to supply primarily technical intelligence collection (signals intelligence). The Services also employ intelligence assets specifically tailored to their operational needs and missions.

Finally, other groups—even those outside the formal Intelligence Community—may enjoy expertise and relationships that impart valuable information. Each of these diverse partners reveals a piece of the larger intelligence puzzle. In Iraq, we have brought them together to enhance the intelligence picture from the tactical to the strategic level.

Similarly, the success of JIATF-S flows from an ability to harness the agency with the right expertise and authority to accomplish a particular aspect of the larger counterdrug mission. For example, the law-enforcement components of JIATF-S retain greater authority to conduct search and seizure operations, unlike the supporting military components. Providing the right authorities and leveraging the agency or organization with the appropriate authority also played a key role in hurricane relief efforts in the fall of 2005, in postconflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the war on terror.

Third, integrated operations allow the United States to leverage a wider array of resources and expertise in supporting national goals and objectives. For example, our Dutch partners sent an “un-watering” team to assist the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers with the removal of floodwaters from the New Orleans area in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Thanks to the geography of its native Netherlands, this team provided unmatched expertise and specialized equipment to the effort. Other partners helped

Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S). This task force formally links diverse interests from the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and other Federal agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. Furthermore, JIATF-S works with regional partner countries on a day-to-day basis. These habitual relationships and shared experiences facilitate a comprehensive approach to containing the illicit drug problem and integrating all the instruments of national power and a variety of partners to help achieve national objectives. We should look for ways to use this

benchmark to guide our efforts in prosecuting the war on terror and in other operations.

Cultivating and leveraging broader partnerships are crucial for several reasons. First, we recognize that the nonmilitary aspects of an operation may define the ultimate success or failure of a national effort. We have long recognized the importance of integrating the instruments of power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (and more recently financial, infrastructure, and law enforcement). While providing more than 70,000 Active and Reserve Component troops and immense resources from all the Services in support of Hurricane Katrina

President Bush talks about the war on terror with members of his national security team



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reduce the load on already stressed resources; during Katrina recovery operations, the Republic of Singapore Air Force flew more than 80 sorties, transporting more than 800 personnel and moving 540 tons of material. These cases represent two of the countless examples of international support in the wake of Katrina.

Perhaps the most striking example of leveraging resources comes from Iraq. We collaborated closely with industry in our punch-counterpunch fight to limit the effectiveness of improvised explosive devices, helping to save lives by bringing cutting-edge technology to the field quickly. In all these cases, external expertise and resources positively affected outcomes.

Over the last 20 years, the Armed Forces met the challenge of establishing a joint perspective and building joint warfighting organizations. In many ways, we now face a similar challenge as we seek to integrate better a wider community of partners in our

operations. Because integrated operations promise greater effectiveness than disjointed efforts by individual agencies, we must look for ways to formalize these relationships and response procedures in the national security structure. Organizations such as JIATF-S represent the first step in this process, but more must be done. We should explore cross-agency planning guidance, much like our own Unified Command Plan and Contingency Planning Guidance, which provides the framework for interdepartmental planning and execution. Habitual relationships in education, training, and exercises should also follow. As you read the *JFQ* Forum articles, consider the questions they raise and the implications for our organizations and operating procedures as we seek to achieve unity of effort in future operations.

This issue also provides an opportunity to recognize the National War College on the occasion of its 60th anniversary. Established in October 1945, the college filled an impor-

tant role in capturing the operational and strategic lessons of World War II, providing for the postwar joint education of our Armed Forces. Today, that mission remains essentially unchanged: to prepare future leaders of the Defense Department, State Department, and other civilian agencies for high-level policy, command, and staff responsibilities by conducting a senior-level course of study in national security strategy and national security policy.

As a National War College graduate and former President of the Marine Corps University, I firmly believe the professional military education system serves as an important source of strength for the Armed Forces. I am encouraged by efforts to expand interagency and multinational participation and dialogue in our schools, and I encourage you to seek out these nonmilitary and coalition participants and engage them in the classroom or in the field during exercises or contingency operations. These partners

bring a wealth of experience and unique insights that often challenge our conventional wisdom and lead to new and innovative approaches to the operational and strategic problems we face daily. *To the faculty and staff of the National War College, thank you! Your service remains key to our successes in the war on terror and in meeting the future tests in this demanding security environment. Your expertise and instruction are unparalleled and your results proven.*


Joint Force Quarterly provides a powerful venue to explore the mission, roles,

and organization of our forces to meet the challenges of a dynamic security environment. I encourage you to read the articles, think about them, question them, and build on them. Debate these ideas within your organizations and with other security professionals, regardless of uniform or agency. Your insights, as well as lessons identified in the field, will help shape departmental and even broader national initiatives to strengthen integrated operations and enhance the ability of all partners to contribute fully to the achievement of national objectives.

Again, my thanks to you, military professionals and interagency partners; it is through your efforts that we will prevail in this long war while simultaneously shaping tomorrow's force. **JFQ**

PETER PACE

General, United States Marine Corps
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff



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
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