

JOINTNESS IN DEFENCE OF THE REALM

A Review Essay by

JEREMY R. STOCKER

Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01, *British Defence Doctrine*

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Britain remains America's strongest and closest ally today. Increasing U.S. interest in the Asia-Pacific region and greater, if often reluctant, British involvement in Europe have not altered that strategic reality. Although no one can pretend that it is a relationship of equals, cooperation on intelligence, nuclear, and maritime issues is close. Many post-Cold War problems facing the U.S. military are echoed in Britain, though with a somewhat different geographic and cultural emphasis as well as a wide disparity of scale. Downsizing and jointness dominate British defense policy much as they do that of the United States.


In Britain, adjustment to the loss of empire and world power status brought about a defense policy closely focused on the security of Western Europe through NATO and the so-called "special relationship" with the United States. For the latter half of the Cold War, Conservative and Labor governments rested defense policy on four pillars: defense of the United Kingdom, a contribution to the defense of Western Europe (especially Germany), the security of the eastern Atlantic, and a separate nuclear deterrent based on the Polaris system. Residual out-of-area commitments (such as Hong Kong and the Falklands) and wider interests were covered by forces earmarked primarily for NATO. Defense spending as a proportion of GDP, though much lower than in the United States, remained consistently higher than in nearly any other European NATO nation.

Post-Cold War

Events since 1989 have brought a significant shift in British defense and security policies and in the forces intended

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to implement them. The late Conservative government introduced "front line first" that sought to maintain operational strengths as high as a falling defense budget allows, but at the expense of much support and training infrastructure. The drive for operational efficiency was given added impetus by the Defence Costs Study that has, among other measures, introduced commercial practices, devolved budgeting, and agency status to many support activities within the defense establishment. The defense budget has fallen steadily in recent years, representing about 2.8 percent of GDP today, down from nearly double that figure a decade ago. Military personnel have been reduced from nearly 300,000 to 214,000—half in the Army, the rest divided among the Royal Navy, Marines,



Ministry of Defence

and Air Force. Peacetime force commitments to the NATO Central Front in Germany have been significantly scaled down and will eventually include withdrawal of all fixed-wing aircraft to the United Kingdom.

British defense policy now has a much more explicit world-wide emphasis than at any time during the last thirty years. Power projection and expeditionary warfare are back in vogue, having been taboo terms for many years. Force reductions have not hit the marines or airborne forces, and the Royal Navy's modest carrier force has not been affected by the cuts in the frigate/destroyer and submarine fleets. The Royal Air Force

has enhanced and modernized air transport and tanker fleets. New amphibious ships, plans for larger replacement carriers and aircraft, and the purchase of Tomahawk missiles all demonstrate the new focus of defense planning.

NATO, however, remains the central focus of Britain's security. Changes as a result of the end of the Cold War have profoundly affected contributions to the Alliance. The commander and over 60 percent of the headquarters personnel of the new Allied Rapid Reaction Corps are British. Altogether, some 55,000 troops are assigned to this corps, principally 1 Armoured Division based in Germany and 3 Division (mechanized) in the United Kingdom. Danish, Dutch, and Italian units also come under those divisions when assigned. Britain also contributes 24 Airmobile Brigade to Multinational Division (Central).

Force Structure

These changes have led to the development of a regular force structure worth noting (see the accompanying figure). The reserve force of 60,000 personnel provide the Army with a further 70 regiments and battalions, and relatively few individuals supplement the regular Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, many of them specialists. Recent legislation updated the status of the reserves and gave the services greater flexibility in the call up of selected reservists in peacetime. Reserve personnel have recently been deployed operationally, notably in the former Yugoslavia and the Falklands.

By comparison, the division of tasks and assets among the British services is somewhat different from the U.S. military. Maritime patrol aircraft and support helicopters are, for purely historical reasons, flown by the Royal Air Force. In an era of increasing jointness this ought to be progressively less important, although it does impose a joint problem where (conceptually at least) none need exist. The disruption from any change of ownership of such assets probably outweighs likely gains. Britain does not have a coast guard, and management and control of offshore assets and responsibilities is a good deal less tidy than in the United States. Most patrol vessels (what the U.S. Coast Guard calls cutters) are operated by the Royal Navy, search and rescue helicopters by the Royal Air Force, and other assets by various government departments, civilian contractors, and even a charitable organization (the Royal National Lifeboat Institution). All (not just

British Armed Forces

Army

- 41 infantry battalions
- 11 armored and armored reconnaissance regiments (900 tanks)
- 16 artillery regiments (530 guns plus MLRS)
- 10 engineer regiments
- 5 army air corps regiments (280 helicopters)
- 12 signals regiments
 - 1 special air service (SAS) regiment
 - 1 NATO corps headquarters
 - 2 divisional headquarters
- 20 brigade headquarters

Royal Navy and Royal Marines

- 4 ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) with Trident D5
- 12 nuclear attack submarines (SSN)
- 3 V/STOL light aircraft carriers (CVSG)
- 10 amphibious and sealift ships (LPH/LPD/LSL/roll-on, roll-off)
- 35 escorts (DDG/FFG)
- 18 mine countermeasures vessels (MCMV), increasing to 25
- 19 fleet air arm squadrons (170 aircraft: Sea Harriers and helicopters)
 - 1 marine commando brigade
 - 5 special boat squadrons (SBS) plus afloat support, survey, and patrol vessels

Royal Air Force

- 18 attack and reconnaissance squadrons (Tornado/Jaguar/Harrier)
- 7 air defense squadrons (Tornado)
- 4 maritime patrol squadrons (Nimrod)
- 2 airborne early warning squadrons (E3D Sentry)
- 9 transport and tanker squadrons (Tristar/Hercules/VC10)
- 13 helicopter squadrons (Chinook/Sea King/Puma/Wessex) plus training, support, and surface to air missile (Rapier) units

some, as in the United States) afloat support ships and some amphibious ships, are civilian-manned, although hydrographic survey work is undertaken by the Royal Navy itself.

Doctrine

One growth area in British defense is doctrine. Traditionally a concept associated mainly with the Army, all three services have recently produced new or updated doctrine publications, followed now by the appearance of Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01, *British Defence Doctrine*. The introduction to JWP 0-01 explains the nature of doctrine and its place in the conduct of our business.

Doctrine is “that which is taught.” It “is informative, whereas policy is essentially prescriptive.” What is more it results from hard-won experience. Doctrine “is enduring” but “not unchanging.” It underlies everything we do, from formulating policy and plans to executing tasks. It is, if you like, the philosophy of British defense. The publication attempts to bring together strategic and operational concepts common to all aspects using military force, introducing previously unfamiliar terms and ideas to each service. *British Defence Doctrine* inevitably has something of the feel of a basic text. That points to the roles of such a book: part of an officer’s essential military education, a means to influence public, political, and academic opinion, and a medium for exercising influence abroad.

The second chapter of this joint publication examines the nature of war and armed conflict and reminds us that warfare is the essence of the profession of arms, but also that it is necessarily both a political act and a limited one. What we do is for political reasons and must be limited by political requirements, frustrating though that can be for the military mind. Moving to a description of strategy, JWP 0-01 discusses ends, ways, and means. These are essentially *what* is to be done, *how* it is to be done, and *what* instruments are to be employed. The political character of strategy is again stressed, particularly where international consensus and legality are essential. There are also short definitions of information warfare (IW) and command and control warfare (C²W), but it is not altogether clear just what the difference is. Large portions of the respective definitions could be exchanged with no appreciable change in meaning. Although both subjects are very much part of warfare in the 1990s, no one in Britain seems to have firmly established what IW is that C²W is not already. There is a short section on the politico-legal implications of targeting policy which, it is interesting to note, is to be retained on “the strategic level.”

A chapter on security and defense ponders the relationship between these levels of activity. Security is concerned with territorial integrity and pursuit of legitimate interests at home and abroad whereas “defence policy supports security policy.” It determines strategy and force planning and both protects and promotes security interests.

JWP 0-01 moves on to cover military capabilities by discussing the types of operations that the services may be required to perform. They include combat, deterrence, support to diplomacy, home

defense, military aid to the civil authorities, noncombatant evacuations, humanitarian aid, arms control monitoring, and public and ceremonial duties. To mount this range of tasks, different categories of forces are used. Permanently committed forces are dedicated to their tasks on a day-to-day basis, such as nuclear deterrence. National contingency forces are tasked to meet challenges to national interests or to international peace and stability. Finally, there are forces for general war, a “regeneration and reconstitution” capability “within the warning time likely to be available.” This must be of particular concern since “front line first” emphasizes the maintenance of forces in being at the expense of support infrastructure, which is precisely what is needed to “regenerate.”

British policy features three defense roles in lieu of the four pillars of the late Cold War era:

- role one—ensure the protection and security of the United Kingdom and dependent territories even when there is no major external threat
- role two—insure against a major external threat to the United Kingdom and our allies
- role three—contribute to promoting the wider security interests of the United Kingdom through the maintenance of international peace and stability.

Each of these roles is broken into specific military tasks such as MT 1.7, the provision of military aid to the civil community; MT 2.4, air immediate reaction forces; and MT 3.7, the provision of a military contribution to operations under international auspices.

The seven mission types on which British forces may be employed in implementing these defense roles and tasks as outlined in the latest annual *Statement on the Defence Estimates* include:

- military aid to the civil authorities in the United Kingdom (such as Northern Ireland)
- internal and external security of dependent territories or overseas possessions (such as the Falklands)
- contributions to new NATO and Western European Union (WEU) missions (such as Bosnia)
- other military assistance and limited operations to support British interests and international order and humanitarian principles (such as Angola)
- a serious conflict (but not an attack on NATO) which could adversely affect European security, British interests elsewhere, or international security (such as the Gulf War)
- a limited regional conflict involving a NATO ally who calls for assistance under article 5 of the Washington Treaty
- general war—a large scale attack against NATO.

Gurkhas making house call at Camp Lejeune, CJTF '96.



U.S. Marine Corps (C. D. Clark)

Still under development, apparently with some difficulty, is JWP 0-10, *United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint and Combined Operations*, which will cover operational as opposed to strategic doctrine. On the tactical level, Britain has a good deal of joint doctrine and abundant procedures. In air defense, for example, the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force have worked closely together for many years, to some extent as a result of the demise of parts of naval air defenses when large conventional strike carriers were phased out in the 1960s and 1970s. Royal Navy anti-air warfare destroyers and Sea Harrier-equipped light carriers are fully integrated into the United Kingdom Air Defense Region using NATO coordinated air-sea procedures developed and proven in Britain.

Joint rules of engagement have replaced the separate service rules of a few years ago. Aircraft procurement, maintenance, and training are increasingly coordinated among the services, with Royal Air Force fast jets (Harrier GR7s) operating today from a carrier (*HMS Illustrious*) in the Far East, alongside Royal Navy Sea Harrier F/A2s.

Joint Developments

The services have become increasingly coordinated and in some ways integrated over the last thirty years or so, a process that has accelerated in recent years for much the same reasons as in the United States. Separate government ministries (War Office, Admiralty, and Air Ministry) were abolished in the

1960s in favor of a single Ministry of Defence (the DOD level in American terms). The purple Central Staff has been progressively strengthened at the expense of service staffs, and the services lost their ministers in the early 1980s (who were equivalent to pre-1947 cabinet-level Secretaries of War and Navy in the United States), though the three service chiefs and their modest staffs have been retained to address service-unique matters. The Chief of the Defence Staff (a post equal to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), is now principal military advisor to the government.

Britain does not have a system equivalent to the unified command plan in the United States because of its more modest force structure and regional commitments. In peacetime, each service has three commands to deal broadly with operations, materiel, and personnel. Control of operational forces, however, is almost totally joint. Prior to last year joint operations were run by whichever service headquarters was most appropriate. Recovery of the Falkland Islands, known as Operation Corporate, was controlled from Fleet Headquarters at Northwood, while Britain's contribution to Desert Shield/Desert Storm (alias Operation Granby) was conducted from Royal Air Force Strike Command Headquarters at High Wycombe. Such ad hoc arrangements were ended in April 1996 with the establishment of Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) at Northwood in the

northwestern suburbs of London, which stands alongside the existing national and NATO maritime headquarters. PJHQ will predict, plan, and conduct joint (and contributions to combined joint) operations, using forces provided by the individual services. Moreover, PJHQ is responsible for developing joint warfare doctrine, procedures, operational standards, training, and exercises. To an extent, it may be seen as a single British equivalent of several unified commands under the U.S. system.

The principal tool of PJHQ is the newly-formed Joint Rapid Deployment Force (JRDF) that will fulfil a range of missions, mounted nationally or as a contribution to NATO, WEU, coalition, or U.N. operations. While no units are permanently assigned to JRDF, its core is 3 Commando Brigade of the Royal Marines and 5 Airborne Brigade from the Army, which incidentally were the principal land force elements in the Falklands campaign of 1982. Other assets will be drawn from the national contingency forces of all three services as required (such as a carrier task group or an armored division). Royal Navy amphibious lift (of broadly brigade-size capability) and the Royal Air Force's air transport fleet (mainly C-130s) are integral to the JRDF concept. Both PJHQ and JRDF were exercised last year during Purple Star in North Carolina.

This year also sees the demise of the individual service staff colleges, with the formation of the Joint Services Command and Staff College. Initially in temporary accommodation on the site of the old Royal Air Force Staff College at Bracknell to the west of London, it will eventually have a permanent home at Shrivenham in western England.

Technological Horizon

The RMA debate in America is being followed with considerable interest on the other side of the Atlantic. In general two themes dominate British and European views on RMA. The first is a somewhat skeptical view on the true impact and importance of new technologies in fundamentally altering the nature of war. European strategic and military cultures tend to be less technologically-focused and consequently give less weight to the significance of technology. On the other hand, there is increasing concern that if Britain is to continue to operate in the major league but cannot afford to develop or acquire new systems, it must at least do enough to maintain compatibility and connectivity with the U.S. military. Britain is probably better placed to

do this than many other U.S. allies which have even more modest defense resources and force structures.

On the related issue of defense cooperation, Britain continues to be torn between being the junior partner in transatlantic projects such as the joint strike fighter, and having a stronger but still minority role in European projects such as transport/tanker aircraft and the British-French-Italian Project Horizon for anti-air warfare ships. While there are increasing political imperatives to joining European defense projects, the military and financial advantages of working with the United States remain considerable. Needless to say, Britain remains deeply suspicious of any European defense and security identity (ESDI) if it threatens to undermine NATO primacy.

It would be wrong to pretend that the British defense establishment is all one might wish. Resource constraints in recent years have been severe, and while the new Labor government has criticized aspects of the last administration's defense policy, including an overstretch of forces, it seems unwilling to do much about it. There will not be additional money for defense, and a further budget squeeze is quite possible. Labor promised a comprehensive defense and security review in its first six months, but broad support for the major tenets of the last government's approach has been expressed. These include maintenance of the nuclear deterrent, active involvement in U.N. and other peace operations, and an intervention/expeditionary warfare capability.

The British military has faced much change and turmoil in recent years, and consolidation is needed and promised. Some overdue rationalization of the defense establishment has certainly taken place, but there are concerns about some aspects of sustainability and regeneration capability. Interservice cooperation is greater and more effective than at any time in the past, although interservice rivalries can still be strong and active competition for scarce resources has certainly not gone away. Greater emphasis on jointness has not come at the expense of combined operations, and Britain's interaction with its NATO allies is undiminished.

JWP 0-01 elucidates the warfighting doctrine of the "other" half of the Anglo-American special relationship against a background of change in the defense establishments of both countries. As joint doctrine, this new publication should strike a familiar cord within the U.S. Armed Forces. 

JOINT TRAINING FOR MOOTW

A Book Review by

SHAWN C. WHETSTONE

The Battle for Hunger Hill: The 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment at the Joint Readiness Training Center

by Daniel P. Bolger

Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1997.

363 pp. \$24.95

[ISBN 0-89141-453-3]

Actions placed under the nebulous rubric of military operations other than war (MOOTW) make up a rapidly growing share of missions conducted by the Armed Forces. U.S. intervention forces often find themselves in situations that intermix political and military objectives, combatants and civilians. How do soldiers prepare for these exigencies? *The Battle for Hunger Hill* provides an insight into the demands of MOOTW and their effects on the men and women who must conduct them. Drawing on the experience of leading an air assault infantry battalion through two rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Lieutenant Colonel Daniel P. Bolger, USA (currently an operations officer with the 101st Airborne Division) derives lessons on the nature of leadership and tactics required under such conditions.

Located at Fort Polk, Louisiana, JRTC is peopled with villagers, hunters, farmers, reporters, relief workers, and guerrillas who create a scene increasingly familiar to the U.S. military. This is the fictitious island of Aragon which is comprised of three countries: pro-American Cortina, neutral Victoria, and Marxist Atlantica. Conventional Atlantican government forces and guerrillas of the Cortinian Liberation Front provide the opposing forces. American intervention involves all services including close air support by the Air Force and naval gunfire which is targeted by Marine liaison teams.

It is into this setting that Bolger leads members of 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment in September 1994. The unit fights as an element of 3^d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. The book opens by reviewing the history, organization, and tac-

tics of the combatants to set the stage for the looming action. It recounts both successes and failures impartially through the eyes of the author who indulges in no self-praise and offers no excuses.

By its very nature training cannot fully replicate the experience of life-and-death situations under live fire. However, units often become totally immersed in this exercise with the fear of failure providing some of the same edge. So too, the narrative often sweeps the reader along and assumes the intensity of combat history. Reality is not forgotten as the compromises necessary in a training environment are dealt with at appropriate times.

The title of the book is derived from the unit's first rotation. While actively seeking supply points one company discovered a large camp tentatively identified as the main guerrilla supply base. But the cache was actually an elaborate decoy to lure his unwary troops. Mortar fire began raining on the site. The guerrillas decimated the surprised company and severely hampered battalion efforts to recover their comrades. The location, named Hunger Hill by the unit, represented a situation that its soldiers did not want to repeat. It became a rallying cry for changes that were implemented as a result of lessons learned. In this and other battles during the rotation one senses the frustration of a conventional force fighting an elusive unconventional enemy.

Foremost among the lessons was a realization that often gets lost amidst other concerns and activities: the primary tasks for infantry are to control ground or kill the enemy. The latter became the unit's guiding principle and default mission.

Leaders implementing lessons from such an experience often do not have the opportunity to observe the fruits of their labors. Current personnel rotation policies and training center schedules rarely allow commanders to take their units through two rotations. However, Bolger and the 1/327 Infantry had that chance. Approximately nine months after their first rotation, the unit went back to JRTC to test new ideas and exact revenge on the Cortinian Liberation Front.

The second rotation featured different scenarios and missions. But the guerrillas remained and were ready to tangle with U.S. forces. From the start the battalion showed it had learned its lessons. Almost every organizational and tactical change improved their combat effectiveness. The reader detects confidence and

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a sense of accomplishment in turning the table on the guerrillas. More importantly, the second rotation both strengthens and gives credence to the book's observations.

The author's knowledge of military history offers unique insights which merge theory and praxis. He reviews the role of doctrine, personnel policies, the decisionmaking process, command and control, staff work, and fratricide. He does not claim to have solved the dilemmas that face commanders in MOOTW. Rather, his experiences demonstrate that neat school book solutions do not always fit messy real world situations. While that appears obvious, the day-to-day demands of commanding a unit often obscure that simple lesson.

The United States prefers utilizing firepower in dangerous situations rather than placing its soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen directly in harm's way. JTFs can strike fear into the hearts of a would-be opponent. When it was able, 1/327 Infantry employed available air support and naval gunfire to devastating effect. But MOOTW will often involve enemies who are not as vulnerable to high tech. Such operations require troops who can handle complex problems, defuse violence, and fight unconventional forces while minimizing collateral damage as well as casualties. Resulting expectations and pressures can be tremendous. The Armed Forces must have experience to execute missions to the standards demanded by their leaders and the public. Just as the National Training Center proved its worth in the Persian Gulf War, JRTC is demonstrating its value in interventions by the Armed Forces in places like Panama, Somalia, and Haiti. The training is realistic and allows for mistakes to be made in acquiring the skills to execute increasingly complex missions. In relating his insights on gaining expertise in this regard, Bolger has written a book that both entertains and educates. For those who haven't been there or can't go, *The Battle for Hunger Hill* provides a taste of what it is like. **JFQ**

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RIDING THE TOFFLER WAVE

A Book Review by
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Creating a New Civilization: The Politics of the Third Wave

by Alvin and Heidi Toffler
Atlanta: Turner Publishing, 1995.
112 pp. \$14.95
[ISBN 1-57036-224-6]

When one thinks of futurists who have depicted new vistas and written lively accounts of social and technological progress, the Tofflers—Alvin and Heidi—immediately come to mind. Their influence on the military is a tribute not only to iconoclasm but to the resolve of today's professionals in keeping abreast of technological revolutions in other sectors.

Just as the Nation as a whole cannot afford to take its eye off technological competition, the military comprehends the peril of becoming first among equals, much less second. The emphasis in professional military education is a persuasive indication of this thinking. Paul Kennedy's advice appears to have been taken to heart by both business and military elites: we do not wish to confront a decline in the economic realm lest it reduces our capacity to remain a superpower. The Tofflers began admonishing us along those lines years ago when they suggested a blueprint for avoiding "future shocks"—the disorientation caused by super change that the post-World War II period visited on the industrial sector.

Before examining *Creating a New Civilization: The Politics of the Third Wave*, it is helpful to review the earlier work by the Tofflers for two reasons. First, almost all their writing—notably *The Third Wave*, *Future Shock*, and *War and Anti-War*—has been studied by our military leaders. One of the major arguments in *The Third Wave* that impressed them was the idea that each wave of change brings with it a new kind of civilization. "Today we are in the process of inventing a third wave civilization with its own economy, its own family form, media, and politics." The military in the 1980s applied Tofflers' thesis to their profession. The

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third wave, they concluded, was also in the process of transforming war.

An obsession with lessons learned, especially from the Vietnam experience, also influenced the military in the early 1980s. Demoralization stemming from that war played a part in forward thinking among our best military minds. Thus the appearance of *The Third Wave* in 1980 served to assure many senior officers that they were on the right track about a technological revolution that would make the world a global village (not just metaphorically as was the case prior to the 1980s).

The second reason for reviewing the body of work by the Tofflers is that *Creating a New Civilization* summarizes their earlier books and advances a number of arguments initiated there. Still, those who have not read the other books may not be totally unfamiliar with the arguments in *Creating a New Civilization*, which though a short read at 112 pages is rich in content.

The theme of accelerated change found in *Future Shock* was developed in *The Third Wave*. The term *third wave*, according to the authors, "is not just a matter of technology and economics. It involves morality, culture, and ideas as well as institutions and political structure. It implies, in short, a true transformation in human affairs." The third wave is about the information revolution. Today, dictatorships and remaining Stalinist states—Cuba, North Korea, and to a lesser extent the People's Republic of China and Vietnam—are under tremendous pressure from within. The choices are stark: either change or be swept aside. The information revolution is no less challenging to democracies. Ruling elites can no longer govern on the basis of a "father knows best" approach, especially since arguments over social problems are becoming numerous and convoluted. A public glutted with information is increasingly impatient with its leaders.

War and Anti-War advanced an idiosyncratic proposition: "The way we make war reflects the way we make wealth—and the way we make anti-war must reflect the way we make war." In *Creating a New Civilization*, the Tofflers developed a "coherent approach" and a "new framework for change." The explosion of information is among other considerations revolutionizing markets and the nature of employment worldwide. While one may get nostalgic over the victory of capitalism and think glibly about the "end of history," we must be concerned with the potentially deleterious effects of

growing competition among nations. Already we have been witnessing an increase in the formation of trading blocks. Where will this trend lead?

The Tofflers touch on this issue in discussing the move from a "bisected" to a "trisected" world. In the latter, the first wave sector supplies agriculture and mineral resources. Cheap labor and mass produced goods come from the second wave sector, while dominance by the third wave sector is "based on the new ways in which it creates and exploits knowledge." They unequivocally state that the "globally competitive race will be won by the countries that complete their third wave transformation with the least amount of domestic dislocation and unrest." This prognosis does not bode well for the rest of the world.

The authors also predict that "historic change from a bisected to a trisected world could well trigger the deepest power struggles on the planet as each country positions itself in the emerging three-tiered power structure." So how should we manage the race among second wave countries to join the ranks of the third wave? Is there any way of ameliorating the effects of the competition? The authors do not say. My hunch is that they would opt for social Darwinism.

An engaging problem raised in the book is "conflict between the second and the third wave groupings" in the United States. Who will "shape the new civilization rapidly rising to replace it?" The way this conflict will be resolved in America is significant. However, it is equally important to apply this question to domestic scraps between different generations of leaders in European and Asian nations. Erstwhile members of the former Warsaw Pact are likely to experience similar conflicts in a decade or two as they rebuild institutions on the pattern of the Western democracies. But the countries of the Balkan region, most of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Caucasus region, Middle East, Africa, and South America will have to wait several decades to answer this important question. It is safe to speculate that although a new generation of leaders in many countries has grown up in the second wave, its thinking might be colored by an exposure to the third wave era in the age of electronic communications. This generation is bound to respond quite differently to social changes than did its immediate predecessor.

In the 1990s and beyond both rulers and ruled will probably behave unlike

their forefathers of the second wave. Will this be a change for the better? Some developments are not promising. The rise of ethno-nationalism in Europe, Asia, and Africa; religious extremism in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa; weakened governments in some Third World countries (states belonging to the first or second wave) suggesting to some the end of the nation-state—these are examples of what we will witness with the revolutionary changes of the third wave.

The remainder of the analysis is focused on U.S. political battles of the 1990s. They label opponents of the North America Free Trade Agreement—paragons such as consumer advocate Ralph Nader and columnist and perennial political candidate Pat Buchanan—as second wave figures while Vice President Al Gore has "one toe wet in the third wave." The bureaucracy and civil service are derided as second wave entities that are "largely unreformed, unreengineered, unreinvented." The last phrase refers to efforts by Mr. Gore to "reinvent" (read: fix or make efficient) government.

The 1996 election had its share of "wave-related" rhetoric like Clinton's harping on designs to build a bridge to the next century, portraying his candidacy as part of the third wave. At the same time, in a not-too-veiled reference to his opponent, Clinton questioned the "age of his ideas," implying that the Dole campaign was characterized by "second wave ideas."

Second wave elites are struggling "to retain or reinstate an unsustainable past because they gained wealth and power from applying second wave principles, and the shift to a new way of life challenges that wealth and power." Moreover, both political parties "reflect second wave." But the brunt of criticism is borne by the Democrats whose core constituencies—labor unions, the civil service, etc.—make it unable to follow its most forward-thinking leaders.

According to the Tofflers, third wave constituencies encompass "industries based on mind work rather than muscle work," which includes data-enriched services such as finance, software, communications, entertainment, medicine, and education. The authors believe these sectors will agree on "liberation from all the old second wave rules, regulations, taxes, and laws laid in place to serve the smokestack barons and bureaucrats of the past." Third wave activist citizens, politicians, and policymakers will assess proposals for change based on the following:

- Does it resemble a factory (symbol of the second wave)?

- Does it *massify* society (an apparent reference to mass production and assembly lines, mass education, masses, and mass media, all symbolizing the second wave)?

- Does it promote vertical organizations (second wave) or *virtual* organizations (third wave structures that parcel out services and stay slim)?

- Does it empower the home? Demassification will enable many people to work at home using computers, facsimiles, and other third wave technologies.

In their conclusion the authors offer some principles of third wave government. The first wave was characterized by "minority power" and the second operated on the basis of majority rule since it "almost always meant a fairer break for the poor." In countries undergoing the third wave revolution, the poor are no longer in the majority, according to Tofflers. "In a good many countries, they—like everyone else—have become a minority." Consequently, majority rule is not only inadequate as a legitimate principle in societies moving into the third wave; it is no longer necessarily humanizing or democratic. On this point perhaps they are so focused on the future they ignore current realities. Recent reports indicate that the level of poverty in the United States has increased. Thus it is hard to imagine that the poor will become a minority any time soon. The record of other industrialized countries cannot be that much better. The Tofflers also recommend the modernization of the entire American system "so as to strengthen the role of the diverse minorities. . . ."

Their second proposal is "semi-direct democracy," a mix of direct and indirect democracy. Thirdly, to break the decision logjam they propose dividing and reallocating decisions by "sharing them more widely and switching the site of decisionmaking as the problems themselves require." Interestingly, the Republican "Contract with America" considered such suggestions. By devolving Federal power to state governments and emphasizing the role of the private sector in many issues, the Republican majority in the 104th Congress activated the "semi-direct democracy" and attempted to avoid decision logjam. However, whether these attempts will bring about qualitative changes or accelerate America's progress as a third wave society has yet to be seen.

The "super struggle" between efforts to preserve second wave societies and efforts to create third wave ones is unlikely

to end soon. As the Tofflers see it, "creation of new political structures for a third wave civilization will not come in a single climactic upheaval but as a consequence of a thousand innovations and collisions at many levels in many places over a period of decades." The fact that the thrust of *Creating a New Civilization* deals with political, social, and technological change suggests that the United States will remain in the vanguard of the third wave. If indeed technological innovations substantially determine the future of this civilization, then America will be in the forefront. But the Tofflers argue that the third wave involves more than technology and economics. "It involves morality, culture, and ideas as well as institutions and political structure." But this definition compels us to search for this civilization around the world.

One reason for the increased number of conflicts in the post-Cold War world is the level of strife involving first or second wave states. Weakened nations in Africa underscore the inability of some societies to pull themselves out of the

first wave and into the third with only a brief transition in the second. Little attention is paid to the regional security implications of such a conversion.

At least some interest is being shown in countries that are scrambling to pull themselves out of the second and into the third wave. We have witnessed shock waves created by such endeavors in Russia, where the government is struggling to maintain its influence after undergoing a radical shift from control of an empire to confronting the multifaceted challenges of the information age. Other CIS states are bound to undergo cataclysmic changes in their efforts to emulate the industrial democracies of the third wave, especially the United States, Japan, and Germany. The impact of such changes on European security will be considerable.

In the Middle East, the transition from the first or second to the third wave is complicated by Islam. Some analysts treat the role of Islam in a superficial and

misinformed way by casting it as an obstacle to modernization. Because a transition from the first to the third wave era promises to modernize societies, one can apply this negative argument and take the position that Islam would oppose such changes. In reality all Muslim countries in the 1990s are coming to grips with how to modernize without Westernizing. Put differently, these societies are caught between adopting the technological but not the cultural aspects of the second and third waves.

The ultimate influence of the Tofflers' work on the profession of arms and of the third wave on the future of war cannot be known. But one has only to note the petulant title of the preface to this slim volume ("A Citizen's Guide to the Twenty-First Century") and its author (Newt Gingrich) to appreciate that its potential audience is legion. **JFQ**

Joint Force Quarterly

READERSHIP SURVEY

A questionnaire was enclosed in issue 13 (Autumn 1996) to solicit relevant information from *JFQ* readers. Results of that survey are abstracted below. (For purposes of comparison, data collected from the only previous survey which was conducted in 1994 is displayed in parentheses.)

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