

## WAR BY ANY NAME

A Book Review by  
KALEV SEPP

### Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo

by Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon  
Washington: Brookings Institute Press, 2000.

343 pp. \$24.95  
[ISBN: 0-8157-1696-6]

### Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond

by Michael Ignatieff  
New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000.

246 pp. \$23.00  
[ISBN: 0-8050-6490-7]

Two books on the Kosovo conflict—one intended for diplomats and military professionals and the other for “citizens of modern democracies”—offer us some valuable lessons. *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* by Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon is a crisp, reasoned critique of political and military actions in the Balkans during 1998–99. Notably, they consider key issues of concern to joint commanders and planners alike, including coercive diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, and casualty avoidance. *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* by Michael Ignatieff is the third in a series of books in which the author criticizes “the way Western governments have used military power to protect human rights since the end of the Cold War.” Although Ignatieff applies knowledge of ethnic conflict and nationalism to the same operational issues, he consciously offers “no policy prescriptions for politicians, and no advice for generals.” He only sets out to explain “the emerging morality governing . . . the new technology of war,” a theme that he examined in an earlier work entitled *The Warrior's Honor*.

The thesis advanced by Daalder and O'Hanlon is reflected in the title of their book. NATO made serious mistakes during the crisis preceding the conflict, and was actually losing to Serbia in the initial campaign—but then changed its overall approach and won the war convincingly. The structure of their argument is both straightforward and clear, from the introductory first chapter (which serves as an



Kosovar Albanians celebrate arrival of marines.

2 • Marine Division (Craig J. Shell)

executive summary), through the historical background, escalation, and entry into war between Serbia and NATO, and initial Allied failure and subsequent victory. The analysis found in the final chapter is followed by excellent appendices (a chronology, key documents, and “Military Issues in Operation Allied Force”) and enhanced by detailed and readable charts. These alone make the book a valuable reference work.

The idea that coercive diplomacy can be effected using airpower alone receives little support in *Winning Ugly*. According to Colin Powell, the exclusive use of aerial bombardment is a hope-to-win rather than a sure-to-win method. Although the authors determine that the “air campaign was the most fundamental factor” in the defeat of Serbia, they also credit Russian diplomatic pressure on Slobodan Milosevic, NATO unity, and development of “a credible threat of a ground invasion.” The United States has a well-deserved reputation for liberating conquered territory from occupying armies—and when a land offensive seemed imminent, the serbs folded.

The Japanese thought they could send a signal with air strikes on purely military targets at Pearl Harbor that would drive America from Asia. In 1999, “The basic idea of using bombing as an element of coercive diplomacy was pushed . . . by the State Department, with strong support from NATO . . . [which] expected air strikes to last only a few days.” The consequences of Allied miscalculation were fortunately recoverable,

largely because Milosevic escalated ethnic cleansing in Kosovo after the bombing campaign began.

The body-bag syndrome—tied to both quick-war and no-ground-force assumptions—has never been substantiated and remains unproven by Kosovo. As Andrew Erdmann pointed out in *Orbis* (Summer 1999), it is not a contradiction that the United States prefers no military casualties but will accept them in a worthy cause. The administration never adequately explained the national interest and humanitarian crisis in Yugoslavia to the American people or to Congress. Ethical issues aside, the real problem with pilots bombing with impunity from high altitude was that it was ineffective. Powell assailed the implication that military leaders were fearful of losses in an op-ed published in *The Wall Street Journal* (September 14, 2000): “The no-casualty approach is not a military strategy. It is a political strategy used when a political judgment is made that the American people will not support the loss of their GIs for the goals being pursued.”

Daalder and O'Hanlon feel that the ongoing debate over appropriate conditions for military interventions, and their objectives, is muddled because “the Powell doctrine is often confused with the Weinberger doctrine.” Determining vital national interests is less important in decisions on the use of force than the necessity to ensure such force is swift and decisive when used; and the view expressed by Powell was validated in the case of Kosovo.

Lieutenant Colonel Kalev Sepp, USA (Ret.),  
taught history at the U.S. Military Academy.

Any intervention for humanitarian reasons will raise seeming contradictions for campaign planners. As the crisis escalated in Kosovo, the desire to act quickly and decisively was countered by the need to build consensus within an unsure NATO and also with a contrary Russia. Milosevic had to be pressured to end his violent purge without unduly encouraging Kosovar Albanian separatists (since Kosovo's autonomy but not full independence was the agreed diplomatic objective). What is more, Milosevic was assumed by Western diplomats to be essential in the resolution of the larger Balkans crisis, so there would have to be limits in efforts to coerce him. Similar conundrums exist in Colombia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, East Timor, the Congo, and other places currently beset by civil wars and hundreds of thousands of refugees.

In the tradition of avid Wilsonian internationalism, *Virtual War* is an account of the Kosovo conflict that advocates "the necessity of war in defense of human rights" while criticizing the West for its lack of commitment to that principle. The book is a collection of six essays (three of which have appeared in *The New Yorker*) depicting several prominent actors. It is also an analysis intended to help average citizens "understand military power much better than we usually do."

These character studies are illuminating contributions to the history of the crisis. The actors include Richard Holbrooke, principal American official in the Balkans; Robert Skidelsky, a Britain who advocates human rights enforcement as the sole justification for foreign military intervention; Louise Arbour, a Québécoise magistrate who indicted Milosevic for war crimes; and Aleksa Djilas, the Harvard-educated Serb and son of the famous anti-Stalinist dissenter. The officer who directed the NATO aerial bombardment, General Wesley Clark, is the *virtual* commander of a *virtual* war. The book's description of painstaking targeting process followed by Clark exposes the strictures of the air campaign—"to wage a war that was clean yet lethal, just yet effective, moral yet ruthless."

The author's critique of the conduct of virtual war is not as coherent as his earlier analyses. For example, Ignatieff asserts that "the Kosovo campaign obtained its objectives" without citing any of them, but variously states that the conflict ended as an "incomplete victory," mere "military technical agreement," "debacle," and "virtual" victory. His notions of the "Colin Powell" and

"Air Force" doctrines, as a basis for his arguments, are unlike any of the official versions, and he seems to accept the discredited zero-casualty war premise as a policy standard. He does not question why the Serbs are cast as the enemy in the Balkans, or if bombing was unavoidable; and he defines war itself only in passing as "an uncertain gamble."

According to Ignatieff, much of the case for the viability of military intervention in human rights crises rests on the presumed technologically-driven revolution in military affairs (RMA). But some leading analysts, including Michael O'Hanlon, Colin Gray, and Paul Van Riper, dispute the existence of a definitive RMA. Van Riper challenges the idea that cell phones and laptops have transformed war into something utterly new, requiring the replacement of established concepts and terminology with Toeffleresque buzzwords. Williamson Murray has warned that the fascination with such an RMA "represents . . . a return to the McNamara paradigm" that promised a quick, cheap victory in Vietnam using efficiencies gained from technology.

Moreover, Ignatieff retails the fallacy that the Army failed to embrace RMA, and thus could not move quickly to the Balkans—forgetting that an infantry corps (50,000 soldiers) was ready to begin deploying from the United States in a matter of hours, and that a "heavy industrial" armored corps, with logistical support, was stationed in Europe. Railways could carry lead Army units to the Serbian border within a day, narrow tunnels notwithstanding. It is unlikely that any neglected technology could have restrained or accelerated such a movement.

*Virtual War* introduces readers to the dialogue that Ignatieff and his circle have on evolving concepts of human rights and universal values. But the book falls short in its announced purpose of explaining the present and future character of force and statecraft either in theory or application. It is likewise unconvincing in proffering virtual war as a new phenomenon or even a new designation for an age-old concept—limited war.

While Daalder and O'Hanlon may equivocate ("Could war in Kosovo have been prevented? . . . maybe.") and miss a historical point (the first NATO combat action was Operation Deliberate Force in 1995), their conclusions should be further debated. Nonetheless, *Winning Ugly* is good reading for joint commanders and planners who advise policymakers and execute their decisions to use force in wars of intervention. **JFQ**

## THE FIGHT FOR PEACE

A Book Review by

GEOFFREY D.W. WAWRO

### After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars

by G. John Ikenberry

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001

320 pp. \$55.00

[ISBN: 0-691-0509-2]

In terms of national interests, this book has appeared at just the right moment. Using three case studies, John Ikenberry persuasively shows that the defense of a great power is best assured not by coercion or triumphalism, but by a shrewd, patient policy of a postwar order acceptable to winners, losers, and those states in between. *After Victory* laudably reduces theory to a minimum, and within that limitation, not a word is wasted. The author takes on the realists, assailing what is regarded as a false dichotomy between anarchic foreign relations (the strong dominating the weak) and domestic politics (which often as not result in the strong being blocked or attrited by coalitions of weaker parties and interest groups).

International and domestic politics are essentially the same according to Ikenberry. In order to lead victorious states must accede to restraining pacts to reassure losers, entice fence-sitters, and bind the hegemon—such as Great Britain in 1815 and the United States in both 1945 and 1990—to a larger cooperative system with constitutional characteristics. Though he overrates British power in 1815, he convincingly proves that Britain did well to offer France generous terms and prolong the Quadruple Alliance—which won the Napoleonic Wars—as a peace-regulating congress system into the 1820s. Deft diplomacy by Castlereagh secured the peace by drawing the middle powers, Austria and Prussia, into the system with generous grants of territory, conceded France its ancient frontiers, and took pains to reward and restrain Russia, Britain's chief rival at the time.

World War II ended on a note of comparable complexity. Germany, like

Geoffrey D.W. Wawro is professor of strategic studies at the Naval War College.

France in 1815, was broken and beaten; the United States, like Britain 130 years before, confronted Russia across Central and Western Europe. There the similarities ended: no concert diplomacy existed between the ideologically-minded Americans and Soviets. With the Cold War in full swing, there would be no Congress of Vienna or Paris Peace Conference to tie up the loose ends. And yet America had to somehow resolve them. In a review by the Department of State in 1948, George Kennan pointed out the vulnerability to Soviet adventurism: "We have about 50 percent of the world's wealth but only 6.3 percent of its population." The United States needed to secure markets and raw materials from around the globe. Geopolitics was enjoying a renaissance: "if the rimlands of Europe or Asia became dominated by one or several hostile powers, the security implications for the U.S. would be catastrophic." Washington came up with a two-pronged solution: contain the Soviet Union and achieve economic peace with the rest of the world. President Roosevelt had hoped that a unified, rebuilt Europe would pool its resources against Soviet aggression, but Britain and France had little enthusiasm for European union. Britain wanted America to act as a counterweight to Germany or Russia, but lacked the resources and political will to develop European military power that would further strain the Commonwealth. Paris shared the concerns expressed by London but also wanted U.S. troops and aircraft in Europe to relieve its forces for colonial service. In this way, NATO was born, and Americans became committed to European bases. Ikenberry clearly spells out the issues: U.S. forces were a necessary component

of the new Europe, part of that a complex system needed to make and preserve the peace.

Until the Korean War, the world economy concerned Washington as much as Moscow's designs. Looking back on the 1920s and 1930s, America attributed the Great Depression and rise of fascism to the autarkic, protectionist policies pursued by many advanced industrial states. From the U.S. perspective, an open, international economic order was a prerequisite for future stability. Yet that was precisely what France and Britain did not want. Worn down by World War II, they sought revival through trade with their colonies. John Maynard Keynes actually alluded to Washington's "lunatic proposals" for a free trading system. American leaders set patiently to work again, forging compromises that would establish the United Nations, Bretton Woods, Group of Seven, and rapid integration of Japan into the global economy. These were strategies designed to broaden American power without alarming the world. Bound by these "restraining pacts" and institutions, the United States could exercise power without seeming omnipotent.

Constructing an international system like that conceived by Truman or Castlereagh is never easy, as the failed peace of 1919 amply demonstrates. President Wilson's conceit was his attempt to reinvent the world. Where other statesmen worked with the imperfect tools inherited after a war to achieve a functioning settlement, Wilson assumed that the Bolshevik revolution and collapse of the German and Austro-Hungarian empires augured a new age of liberalism

and social democracy that would make old-fashioned appeals to national or strategic interest obsolete. In this context, the League of Nations was not so much idealistic as fatuous. He ignored protests from the French, British, and Congress, failing to establish an international consensus for postwar revival. Another issue was the relatively small number of American casualties, only one tenth of French or British losses. To the Europeans, the United States had not suffered enough to lead the peace effort.

Wilson had failed to grasp what Ikenberry calls "the problem of power." The Great War led to new asymmetries of power—a rich America and a shattered Europe—that bred fear and suspicion. U.S. advantages—in population, agriculture, manufacturing, raw material, and capital—were only magnified by World War I. For America to lead, it needed to engage wholeheartedly in European integration and reconstruction. Instead Wilson bypassed European statesmen and appealed directly to the masses on two trips to Europe in 1918–19. He was mobbed by newsmen, trade unionists, and the left. "I can fancy the generation of Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, and the Adamses looking on with enraptured amazement that the American spirit should have made such conquest of the world," the President stated in 1919. Quite the contrary: the end of the war caused a shift to the right in Britain and France which wanted to squeeze Germany until the "pips squeaked." The end-run by Wilson—his appeal to the "organized opinion of mankind"—alienated both Clemenceau and Lloyd George, who were essential allies.

*After Victory* concludes with a caution. The end of the Soviet Union left the United States at the pinnacle of power, tempting America to intervene when and where it likes while shucking off "institutional encumbrances" that the author views positively. Such encumbrances will be familiar: landmine and environmental accords, the international criminal court, and U.N. Secretary Generals (such as Boutros-Ghali). There is obviously a liberal bias in this last section of the book; there are reasonable objections to many of Ikenberry's points. But his argument is consistent: he would like the United States to return to the spirit which prevailed in the wake of World War II and renounce "hyperpower." Events over the next several years are likely to write the last chapter of this book. **JFQ**

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## MACARTHUR'S AIR WAR

A Book Review by

THOMAS E. GRIFFITH, JR.

### Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific

by Eric M. Bergerud

Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000.

752 pp. \$20.00

[ISBN: 0-8133-3869-7]

**B**iak, Buna, and Port Moresby are all place names that lack the emotional impact of Anzio, Normandy, or the Bulge. Although the harsh conditions of the South Pacific during World War II affected thousands of soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen, the conduct of the war in that theater remains unknown to most American readers and unexamined by many historians. *Fire in the Sky* is the second book by Eric Bergerud in a planned three-part series intended to fill this gap. A first volume, *Touched With Fire*, analyzed ground warfare in the same theater while the third will be focused on the conduct of naval operations.

*Fire in the Sky* examines how the air war in the South Pacific unfolded from early 1942 to early 1944. Inspired in part by a lack of attention to this aspect of World War II, Bergerud focuses on this specific period for various reasons. He argues that those who cite overwhelming firepower as an explanation for the American victory all too often ignore the rough parity of opposing forces during these years. This symmetry explains the uncertainty which confronted the participants and how they viewed their efforts. Perhaps more importantly, this period provides a glimpse into how the Japanese lost the ability to fight effectively in the air, a weakness that would lead to their defeat. In addition, the relatively small size of the units involved offered an opportunity to better grasp the complexity of modern warfare by examining actions more closely than is possible in the case of the European theater.

The author tackles the subject topically rather than chronologically, an approach which can be tough for those

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Colonel Thomas E. Griffith, Jr., USAF, is the author of *MacArthur's Airman: General George C. Kenny and the War in the Southwest Pacific*.



Douglas Dauntless dive bomber over Wake Island, 1943.

U.S. Navy

unfamiliar with the course of the war. He first considers the three-dimensional battlefield of the air war. Bergerud looks at the environmental factors that influenced air combat as well as more down to earth matters such as the size of the area, terrain, climate, and the impact of tropical diseases. This section weaves an overview of the war, from the buildup and attack by the Japanese through 1944 when the majority of American units moved out of the South Pacific.

Next the author discusses armament, interwar aviation development, and preparation for war. In-depth profiles of both sides provide analyses of the most widely used aircraft which dissect their strengths and weaknesses as well as their employment in combat.

Finally, Bergerud offers details on aerial combat from a perspective of the warriors involved, based on interviews with participants. He also considers tactics and formations, highlighting differences between the real air war and romantic wartime descriptions and newsreel footage.

*Fire in the Sky* presents a close-up view of the air war as seen by those who flew missions, serviced the planes, and worked at hundreds of other tasks to mount combat sorties. In addition to these rich accounts, this book focuses on the complex nature of airpower and how both scientific and technological contributions combine with doctrine, training, supplies, and morale.

Bergerud provides little coverage of the challenges faced by air commanders. He focuses instead on the average pilot and airman on the ground. Nor are there new interpretations of the war. Bergerud rather presents casual asides that are not fully developed or supported by research. For instance, he states that: "The weather facing men in the South Pacific was not extremely severe when compared with many other theaters" and "It would be rare for a U.S. aircraft to suffer fatal structural failure because of a storm, but no doubt it happened." These claims are not borne out by the facts. In the Southwest Pacific it was accidents, mostly caused by the weather, that accounted for almost as many losses as those attributed to Japanese, and U.S. commanders directed aviators to avoid flying through thunderstorms because of the possibility of structural damage.

The author does not examine how airpower complemented ground and naval forces even though the Southwest Pacific provided the best laboratory of jointness. Land, sea, and air forces fought together daily. Bergerud relates the symbiotic relationship of various forces, but foregoes any analyses of joint warfighting. Although his concentration on land, sea, and air operations does fill a gap in the history of World War II, perhaps a fourth volume by Bergerud on joint warfare would address a conspicuous void in the literature on the conflict.

JFQ

## MILITARY HISTORY RECONSIDERED

A Book Review by

HOLGER H. HERWIG

### Was ist Militärgeschichte?

edited by

Thomas Kühne and Benjamin Ziemann  
Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2000.  
359 pp. DM 78.00  
[ISBN 3-506-74475-5]

Some one hundred historians, notably Germans who were born after World War II, met at the University of Bochum in late 1998 under the auspices of the Working Group for Military History to take stock of their profession. Buoyed by the increasing number of dissertations on military history submitted to German universities and the establishment of the first chair in military history at Potsdam, these academics reviewed the past, analyzed the present, and finally commented on the future of military history. Although the published proceedings of this seminal event—*Was ist Militärgeschichte?*—remain inaccessible to those who do not read German, their significance for students of military history is obvious.

One of the contributors to this volume, Stig Förster (Bern), recalled that it was Clausewitz who first rescued military history from the “drums and bugles” genre of his own day and that not only politics but also the social, economic, and technological face of war had received attention from Otto Hintze, Max Weber, and Hans Delbrück. In turn, this resulted in the war-and-society military history in the Anglo-Saxon world in the 1950s—led by Sir Michael Howard, Geoffrey Best, Brian Bond, et al. In part, this development was the impetus for the establishment of the Military History Research Center at Freiburg in 1957 (since removed to its putative roots at Potsdam), replete with its own journal and publication series. Like similar institutions in the United States and elsewhere, it was conceived as a civilian-military partnership, but it is deemed a failure by one of its erstwhile members, Wolfram Wette, because of the dominance of officers and the emergence of entrenched bureaucratic inertia.

Holger H. Herwig is Canada Research Chair in Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary.

Part of the problem is that the German account of the two world wars had been dominated by military commanders turned historians. When it came to writing the official history of the Great War (14 volumes, 1925–55), for example, Delbrück was quickly marginalized and the tone was set by officers. “The old army conducted the war,” crowed General Karl von Borries of the Historical Commission, who was entrusted with producing the series, “and therefore [the work] must also be written by the members of the old army.” Following World War II, argues Wilhelm Deist (Freiburg), General Franz Halder, a former chief of staff, and Field Marshal Georg von Küchler used ties to Basil Liddell Hart to head off critical assessments of either the *Wehrmacht* or Third Reich. Küchler recommended the sanitized official history, *Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918*, as a model and demanded that there be “no criticism on leadership decisions.” For efforts to retard historical investigation, Halder received the U.S. Civilian Service Award in 1961. It is no wonder then that Gerd Krumeich (Düsseldorf), paraphrasing Georges Clemenceau, warned the conference that military history was too important to be left to the military.

Still change was afoot. In 1967 when the Military History Research Center was founded, Rainer Wohlfeil, its leading historian, addressed the nature of military history in the inaugural issue *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*. Defining military history as an inquiry into “the armed forces of a state . . . as an instrument of politics . . . concerned with the problem of leadership in peace and war,” he pleaded that it be recognized as a “subdiscipline” of general history. Indeed, much of the speculation in the volume under review takes up that plea. What should be the relationship of military history to history overall? Roger Chickering (Georgetown) contends that military history must be *histoire globale* and *histoire des mentalités*—total war of the 20<sup>th</sup> century requires nothing less than total history. Somewhat less formidably, Anne Lipp (Tübingen) states that military history is also cultural history; that the symbolic and heroic nature of wars and warriors awaits theoretical conception. And Christa Hämmerle (Vienna) calls on scholars to end the “asymmetry” of male-female polarity and to “demilitarize” and reinvent military history as gender history. More traditionally, Jost Dülffer (Cologne) tells us that after all war is a political act. Marcus Funk (Berlin) pleads for more sociological

analysis of the military system. Stefanie van de Kerkhof (Cologne) argues for attention to the “sinews of war” while Stefan Kaufmann (Freiburg) implores historians to finally come to grips with the revolution in military affairs.





In unquestionably the most powerful section of the book, Bernd Wegner (Hamburg), ably seconded by Dennis Showalter (Colorado College), demands that operational history not continue to be abandoned to military buffs, memoirists, and former soldiers. It still is not taught in Germany at civilian or even *Bundeswehr* universities. It is not to be found in library catalogues. And internet search engines instruct one to look up “opera history”—this in a country that more than others put operations front and center. Academic political correctness decries the study of operations as superfluous and even morally offensive. But Wegner asks how the world would have looked if the Battle of the Marne in 1914 had come out differently—or the *Sichelschnitt* of 1940 in France had collapsed—or if Moscow had fallen in 1941. For all the flood tide of books on the Nazi era, why is there so little on Hitler as warlord? And why in general surveys is there so little (often only 20 percent) on the war, the alpha and omega of the Nazism? “War,” as John Keegan has argued, echoing Clausewitz, “ultimately is all about fighting.”

So what is the status of *Militärgeschichte* in Germany today? It has slowly nudged open the gates of academe. It has organized a working group which includes the editors of this volume. It is back on publishers’ lists. It will even find formal recognition as a subdiscipline of general history, as Wohlfeil demanded in 1967. But I suggest that it will, as suggested by Chickering and Ute Frevert (Bielefeld), become fully integrated into a general history of society—a new cultural or total history. For that to occur it must overcome many bastions of bias and power. A new history that elegantly combines military operations with political, social, economic, technological, cultural, psychological, and gender history, would tax its most ardent apostles. Perhaps Wegner and others will succeed in convincing the *Bundeswehr* to drop its insistence on using the term *defense history* (*Wehrgeschichte*) and to embrace the term *military history* (*Militärgeschichte*). But that may be too much to ask of an institution that transferred its Military History Research Office to Potsdam after 1990—while the Federal Military Archive remained 800 kilometers to the south at Freiburg.

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