

Doctrine

GAME PLAN

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, is the keystone volume in the joint operations series. It “provides guidance to joint force commanders and their subordinates for the direction, planning, execution, and support of campaigns and operations—in war and in military operations other than war (MOOTW).” The current version (dated September 2001) replaces the edition issued in 1995 and features revised joint operations concepts.

Some revisions in the publication appear to have been driven by change in the strategic and operational environments as well as technological advances. Chapter I, “The Strategic Concept,” has sections on information systems and theater engagement planning and an expanded description of military operations which include nonmilitary organizations. Chapter II, “Fundamentals of Joint Operations,” contains considerations of both asymmetric environments and joint urban operations as well as a broader look at C³ISR issues. Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations,” augments key planning factors to include a commander’s critical information requirements, concept of fires, countering air and missile threats, space operations, force protection, and the environment. One of the noteworthy aspects of this chapter is that it takes the phases from the previous edition, reduces them from five to four, retitles them, and revises their descriptions. Chapter IV, “Joint Operations in War,” adds sections on dimensional superiority, information superiority, joint strategic attack, and sustainment.

Other revisions are more subtle and substantive, particularly those related to the operational art in chapter III. For example, doctrine defines center of gravity in terms that include sources of power rather than locations, and acknowledges that “COGs also may exist at the operational level.” And the concept of decisive points is expanded to include specific key events and systems.

Unfortunately, one amendment is missing. Joint Pub 3-0 still includes a parenthetical note to the effect that “functional component commands are component commands of a joint force and do not constitute a ‘joint force’ with the authorities and responsibilities of a joint force as described in this document, even when composed of forces from two or

more military departments.” There is much to mull in that passage which, starting with the phrase “the authorities and responsibilities of a joint force.” What does that mean? Where are they succinctly stated?

These are not the only unanswered questions. The definition of center of gravity represents the third revision in three editions (1993, 1995, and 2001). Readers may ask why the change was made without explanation. Another example comes from a section in chapter II on “Organization of the Operational Area.” The 1995 edition stated “subordinate unified commanders are typically assigned theaters of operations.” That phrase, which links subunified commanders to theaters of operations, is omitted from the 2001 edition (associating JTF commanders with joint operations areas). Why has joint doctrine failed to link a theater with a particular commander?

However linkages are quite apparent between Joint Pub 3-0 and other joint references. For example, the pub includes a chart on command relationship identical to one found in Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*. In addition, chapter V of Joint Pub 3-0 lists those types of military operations other than war that more closely correspond to, and actually expand on, those outlined in Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (June 16, 1995). But at least one doctrinal disconnect appears. In discussing multinational command and control, Joint Pub 3-0 outlines the purpose of a “coalition, coordination, communications, and integration center (C³IC)” depicting it in relation to Desert Storm (figure VI-3). Joint Pub 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations* (April 5, 2000), uses the same chart bearing the acronym F²C² (friendly forces coordination council). C³IC is not described or depicted in Joint Pub 3-16.

An assessment of Joint Pub 3-0 would be incomplete without acknowledging that most of the joint concepts advanced in 1995 survive in this new edition with the same format, organization, and much of the content. Compared to the previous edition, it is twenty pages longer and contains more illustrations. Much of the narrative is cross-referenced to publications that have appeared in the period since 1995. Moreover, some of the language has changed to accommodate the concepts in joint vision statements such as full spectrum dominance and information superiority.

The general compatibility of the 1995 and 2001 editions of Joint Pub 3-0 seem to confirm that the joint and service communities have grown comfortable with the principles and ideas found in *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Future editions may call for minor adjustment in the descriptions of joint concepts. Nevertheless, any changes in doctrine, whether blatant or subtle, should not go unnoticed. Subsequent revisions of existing publications would better serve its users by offering brief accounts of salient changes, perhaps in the executive summary. Such a device would herald those key changes that warrant careful consideration. **JFQ**

ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE

Developing Allied joint doctrine has turned into a growth industry for the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Division (J-7), Joint Staff, and doctrine community at large.

Thus far the United States has ratified 16 allied joint publications (AJPs)—15 within the last year. As a requisite number of nations ratify this doctrine, promulgated copies will be issued. These publications include: AJP-01(A), *Allied Joint Doctrine*; AJP-2.2, *Counter Intelligence and Security Procedures*; AJP-2.5, *Handling of Captured Personnel, Equipment, and Documents*; AJP-3.3, *Joint Air and Space Operations Doctrine*; AJP-3.4.1, *Peace Support Operations*; AJP-3.6, *Allied Joint Electronic Warfare Doctrine*; AJP-4, *Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine*; AJP-4.4, *Movement and Transportation*; AJP-4.5, *Allied Joint Host Nation Support Doctrine and Procedures*; AJP-4.6, *Multinational Joint Logistic Center Doctrine*; and AJP-4.10, *Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine*. AJP-01(B), *Allied Joint Doctrine*, and AJP-03, *Allied Joint Operations*, will be promulgated soon.

Moreover, the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Division has developed a staffing guide for Allied joint doctrine actions which explains the doctrine process and codifies U.S. procedures and responsibilities. The guide also links the U.S. portion of Allied joint doctrine development to processes described in Joint Pub 1-01 and provides policy governing participation in multinational standardization activities. **JFQ**

PULPLESS PUBS

The Chairman has approved a recommendation to end the production of joint publications in paper format, except for capstone and keystone titles. With this change, all below-the-line pubs will only be available electronically via the Joint Electronic Library on the Internet or CD-ROM.

Users can download and print current pubs from the Joint Electronic Library. To improve readability online versions have been modified to eliminate scrolling. Moreover, the Joint Staff has a stock of capstone, keystone, and selected reference volumes on hand. And the Joint Warfighting Center will retain an inventory of printed doctrinal pubs until below-the-line supplies are exhausted as part of the dial-a-pub program. **JFQ**

Lessons Learned

A BETTER WAY

The Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL), which serves as the DOD executive agent for the joint lessons learned program (JLLP), enables the resolution of joint issues and shares knowledge on a range of joint matters. Through this process observations submitted by one unified command and then surfaced by others can be identified as joint warfighting issues. The center synthesizes observations into a single view of issues, trends, and knowledge. Furthermore, through integrated analysis with the joint experimentation process, JCLL recommends near-term changes in doctrine, training, leadership, education, matériel, personnel, organization, facilities, and capabilities.

The purpose of a joint lessons learned program is twofold. First and foremost, it exists to identify issues of joint warfighting significance, which are eventually forwarded to an appropriate resolution process. The program captures observations from organizations with diverse operations to develop issues which, when submitted to the resolution process, address existing deficiencies.

One challenge in establishing a common structure is defining terms, which must be simple and intelligible for all users. Beginning at the point of entry, information gathered during an event, regardless of type, is known as an observation, namely, a circumstance observed and documented, based on the level of expertise of an observer. It is nothing

more than a data point as seen through the eyes of an observer; it is not raw data. An observation captured by an observer experienced in a particular area should be considered accordingly.

Analysis is conducted once observations on an event are collected. It involves examining, organizing, and evaluating information as well as identifying component parts, relationships, and trends to establish facts for subsequent use. The level of analysis is determined by the organization conducting the review based on its available resources and can simply take the form of a review to vet aggregated observations or a much more detailed examination such as that conducted by JCLL. A finding is called a lesson, and may be an issue to be resolved or knowledge to be shared.

The determination of a potential joint warfighting issue as a result of analysis is the primary purpose of JLLP. Issues are worked on each level of the process. On the organizational level, this can include updating a standing operating procedure or operations plan. On the JCLL level, it can involve analysis of observations from participating organizations to determine potential issues and trends requiring mediation by the Joint Staff, for example, under the Chairman's Remedial Action Program. Issues are considered only after they are incorporated

in planning, doctrine, tactics, and training, enabling a task to be accomplished to standards.

The program has four major components—the user, inputs, process, and outputs—which shape the collection, analysis, and distribution of observations. Regardless of the type or level of an operation (training or contingency), no part is ever omitted. In a typical operation, for example, the joint task force or user collects and records the observations (inputs) from assigned commands, organizations, and staffs. At the end of an operation, or in given period of an ongoing operation, inputs are processed, analyzed, and eventually distributed to the next level, for example, the office of primary responsibility at a unified command. On each level that office has the responsibility for processing observations to ensure accuracy and completeness, conducting a level of analysis, and distributing the final report to the next higher level to meet established suspenses.

Contact the center at jcll@jwfc.jfcom.mil or <http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil/dodnato/jcll/>; write to U.S. Joint Forces Command, ATTN: JW 4000, 116 Lakeview Parkway, Suffolk, Virginia 23435-2697; or call (757) 686-7270/DSN 668-7270 or Fax (757) 686-6057/DSN 668-7270. **JFQ**



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