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# Joint Doctrine: The Way Ahead

By JOSEPH J. REDDEN

**P**assage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was viewed by some critics as “forced jointness.” But the decade since its enactment in 1986 has seen us successfully engage a major regional threat with coalition allies, conduct operations around the world previously regarded as uncharacteristic for conventional military units, start to foster jointness as second nature in the officers and NCOs of every service, and take interdependence to the point where the Navy will provide key electronic warfare support for all services. This has been enabled by developing a firm doctrinal foundation, a requirements-based training system, and the emergence of a joint vision as a bridge to the future.

The joint doctrine development process is often maligned as slow and unresponsive to user needs. Unfortunately, there is some validity to that

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## EDITOR'S Note

Significant progress has been made in developing joint doctrine publications. The process has been shortened from four years to 23 months. Both capstone and keystone pubs have undergone major revision. The Joint Electronic Library has been expanded and made available over the World Wide Web. However, contentious issues remain in certain areas which must be resolved at service chief or CINC level. Moreover, the best hope for continued progress in joint warfighting lies in training and *Joint Vision 2010*. Yet questions have been posed about this vision—some still outstanding—with unabashed critics alleging that *JV 2010* amounts to nothing more than a string of bumper stickers.

charge. In the haste to get joint doctrine to the field, the initial publications were little more than reworked service doctrine between purple covers. They were created out of need, but many were redundant or should have been published as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). As Chairman, General Powell started a concerted effort to make doctrine more joint and more accessible to users. He also sought to improve the horizontal and vertical consistency of joint publications. General Shalikashvili continued these initiatives and has mandated that the publications should be more readable and distributed more quickly.

As a result, the process of developing doctrinal pubs was reduced from 48 to 23 months, in large part due to writing groups. While the lead agent approach to joint doctrine has not changed, agents are encouraged to host writing groups comprised of representatives of the services, CINCs, and joint staff directorates to draft a document that is as *purple* as possible, reducing coordination time. The new publication format has been widely accepted, and the extensive use of photos has opened new vistas for readers. To ensure that pubs get into the hands of users quickly distribution is made to the field and fleet based on lists developed by the services and CINCs.

Capstone pubs (1 and 0-2) and keystone pubs (2-0, 3-0, 4-0, et al.) have undergone major revision. Some 84 of the projected 104 joint pubs were slated for completion by the end of 1996. The Joint Electronic Library has been expanded and is available on the World Wide Web, allowing greater access to joint doctrine, selected service doctrine pubs, terminology, and futures databases. Another significant step in the process has been inclusion of the Coast Guard as a full participant.

### Seamless Training

While progress has been made in many areas, there are some contentious issues that have lingered for years which must be resolved. Two examples are Joint Pub 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats*, and Joint Pub 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support*. Both have gone through numerous drafts and working groups without major progress. Deployed forces will always find a way to make things work, but parochial interests in the system have precluded the development of joint doctrinal guidance. Without resolving these issues at service chief and CINC level, advances in joint training and the evolution of *Joint Vision 2010* may offer the best avenues for progress.

Our disposition of forces has proven costly, not least to OPTEMPO. We must ensure the readiness of forces while supporting regional engagement strategies identified as vital by combatant commanders. Progress has been made with the development of the joint training system and the emergence of U.S. Atlantic Command as joint force integrator, but there are challenges to ensuring a seamless joint training environment.

Prior to 1989 joint exercises were event-driven. Planning conferences were often opened with questions to determine what the components wanted to do, who was available to play, and what resources could be committed to the exercise. Success was based more on the number of personnel involved than on meeting jointly-agreed training goals. The line between command post and field training exercises was blurred if not indistinguishable, and deployed forces were regularly used as training aids for staffs.

The Chairman transformed joint training policy into a requirements based program in 1989. Combatant commanders were directed to articulate joint training requirements in joint mission essential task lists (JMETLs). This effort takes time and people. Those who have made the investment are seeing the benefits; those who have not continue to question the validity of the system. Stating mission requirements in terms of the capability to accomplish specific tasks under relevant conditions to meet defined standards provides a clear training roadmap. The vehicle to execute that is the joint training system (JTS).

One result of the Chairman's joint training review in 1992 was the need for a formal joint training system which was created in 1993-95, with a transition plan calling for full implementation by 1998. JTS is comprised of four phases: establishing training requirements based on JMETL, developing joint training plans to meet requirements, executing supporting events (from academic instruction to joint exercises), and assessing the effectiveness of events to meet these requirements. JTS and JMETL are flexible enough to accommodate CINC specific requirements while supporting the commonality essential to effective joint operations.

Our recent exercise experience has emphasized the need to be proactive with our friends and allies to meet requirements of multinational operations. We must mature together rather

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than pursuing divergent courses that may seriously degrade future coalition operations. We have seen increased interest in joint training technologies and methods by our friends and allies. There has been a shift from traditional large scale field exercises that focused on the tactical level to exercises focused on the ability of joint or multinational

staffs to coordinate, synchronize, and integrate field forces. Potential JTF commanders are being educated, trained, and exercised to develop integrated land/sea/air operations that apply "the right force, at the right place, at the right time." Quite clearly, well trained joint staffs are as critical to operations as well trained forces provided by the services. Evolving training technology will continue to support specific service requirements. The flexibility it provides will also support training for a range of potential operations that will face CINCs in the future. We have made great progress in doctrine and training systems and technology to support them. However we still must determine what joint capabilities will be needed for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### A New Window

In 1984 the chiefs of staff of the Army and Air Force issued a memo entitled "U.S. Army-U.S. Air Force Joint Force Development Process." This visionary document offered a framework for moving toward true jointness—not a popular concept prior to Goldwater-Nichols. Also known as the "Wickham-Gabriel 31 Initiatives," it presented a clear vision of the future but never realized its potential because of opposition from within the services and DOD. Ten years after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, we have *JV 2010*, which provides a new window of opportunity.

*JV 2010* contains concepts for conducting warfare in the future. Because of the emphasis placed on this document by our military leadership, it has attracted a wide readership and attention. Many now espouse its ideas and nearly every document published in the last few months has been linked to it. A commonly asked question about the vision is how it will help achieve full spectrum dominance within the battlespace of the future, across the entire range of operations. And how will progress be measured and how will quality control be exercised over various interpretations of the vision's concepts?

If *JV 2010* remains just an idea, it may well go the way of many other "good ideas" and die a slow death

from misuse and ambiguity. That is why when *JV 2010* appeared an implementation process was initiated by the Joint Staff. This effort has also been evolving at the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC). It has four distinct phases:

- publishing the vision and articulating it as strategic guidance
- further refining and defining the concepts
- assessing the progress being made in achieving the vision
- integrating lessons from the assessment phase into DOD systems to institute change.

The initial phase of publishing the vision and articulating it as strategic guidance was highly effective. One indicator of that success is the frequent use of the vision in both joint and service literature issued by the defense establishment. While this phase is vital in establishing operational concepts for the 21<sup>st</sup> century and laying a basis for the assessment phase, it is also dangerous if left to stand alone. *JV 2010* unfortunately has been reduced to a bumper sticker in some quarters. It is an idea that everyone appears to support but that few really understand. It was this requirement to define the vision's concepts that led to the second phase, conceptualization.

Concept definition has been underway at JWFC for many months. It has involved a group of senior active and retired officers from all four services with a wide breadth of experience. Its goal is to develop a document which will put meat to the bones of the original vision document. The first draft of this publication, *The Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO)*, was completed in August 1996 with copies disseminated to the CINCs, services, and Joint Staff the next month. In addition to the JWFC personnel involved in developing the document, the draft underwent extensive revisions in late 1996 and early 1997 by working groups which involved all services, representatives of the CINCs, and the Joint Staff. The preliminary coordinating draft *CFJO* was published in March 1997. This document must never be viewed as the "gospel" for future operations. It was designed as a living, breathing concept. Obviously a small group such as the one at JWFC cannot

predict future warfare with total accuracy. Moreover, the concepts of *CFJO* were evaluated during a series of senior level seminars at JWFC in autumn 1996. Continued refinement will occur throughout the life cycle of the vision as new ideas and insights emerge.

### Adjusting Course

The most frequent question about the vision is how one will know if we have achieved the capabilities to im-

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plement it in the battlespace of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Phases three and four respond to this question. Phase three, assessment, is a process that will both measure movement towards the vision and enable us to adjust our course. This assessment will involve the services, CINCs, Joint Staff, and all members of the Armed Forces. A small staff at JWFC has primary coordination responsibility for the assessment effort. They will provide a common joint assessment methodology, strategy, and measures of merit for use by the joint community in the evaluation of concepts, technology, operational art, procedures, and future capabilities required to achieve *JV 2010*. Determining what to assess and developing and conducting the exercises, seminars, and events to serve as the test bed for assessments will involve the entire joint community. JWFC will facilitate the process; the services, CINCs, Joint Staff, and others will be the executors of the assessments.

One example of this process is the effort by the Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Directorate (J-6), Joint Staff, to develop a series of exercises to determine the what and how of information superiority. Working with that directorate and affected joint activities, JWFC will collect lessons from these exercises for senior level review. The lessons will then be presented to a general/flag officer working group at the Pentagon which

will determine the utility of their ideas, make recommendations to the service operations deputies, and forward approved ideas to the appropriate agencies or systems for action. Responses could include action by the Joint Staff on issues such as joint doctrine or by the deputy operations deputies/operations Oversight Council on ideas which will involve changes in equipment or organizations. This entire process will be under the oversight of the Joint Chiefs. Once an idea is determined to have utility by the appropriate oversight group, the integration process will begin. Integration will utilize the existing acquisition, budgeting, doctrine, and planning systems. The desired output of the implementation process is the ability to achieve full spectrum dominance on the future battlefield (the accompanying figures depict this process).

Because *JV 2010* is more than a concept, it has great promise for developing unity of effort and instituting changes needed for warfighting in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This process involves all DOD components, does not promote parochial interests, maintains the vitality of each service, strives for joint and unified action, and allows for course corrections under the program described above.

*JV 2010* is more than rhetoric. It is the tool that will help us achieve what was envisioned by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It will allow DOD to develop the right force for the next century while involving the entire defense establishment in the process. Coupled with progress in joint doctrine and training, it will enable us to meet the challenges of an uncertain world. **JFQ**