

# The Greater Middle East

U.S. Marine Corps (J. R. Tricoche)

# The Five Pillars of Peace in the Central Region

By J. H. BINFORD PEAY III

On October 6, 1994, reports poured into the command center at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) that two Iraqi Republican Guard divisions were moving by both rail and heavy equipment transporters southward from their garrisons near Baghdad to assembly areas south of the Euphrates. Eight divisions threatened Kuwait with lead brigades located only fifteen miles from the border. Bellicose rhetoric, the massive scale and tempo of mobilization and deployment, uploaded ammunition, the high state of air defense readiness, and other indicators all pointed to a possible repetition of the 1990 invasion. While unable to predict Saddam Hussein's intentions, American analysts concluded that Iraq would be capable of attacking Kuwait with five divisions in seven days.

Viewing a renewed Iraqi threat to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as unacceptable, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to immediately act in order to deter and, if necessary, block an Iraqi offensive. CENTCOM at once modified on-the-shelf operational plans and orchestrated the deployment of units from all services in what became known as Operation Vigilant Warrior. Postured to prevent Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the command built both on the combat power of U.S. forward deployed and coalition forces and on American prepositioned equipment ashore and afloat to emplace a defensive force.

On October 10, as the first U.S.-based aircraft began landing at airfields

in the Persian Gulf and lead companies of the 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division began moving to tactical assembly areas, Iraq announced the withdrawal of reinforcing Republican Guard divisions thus defusing the situation. This recent demonstration of coalition resolve convinced Iraqi leaders that the risk of confrontation was too high. To emphasize the American commitment to support regional security and to ensure that Saddam Hussein did not reverse his decision to withdraw, CENTCOM continued the flow of forces to the Persian Gulf. By the end of October, the aircraft carrier *USS George Washington*, 2,000 marines aboard the *USS Tripoli* amphibious ready group, four Aegis cruisers, reinforcing Air Force squadrons with 275 aircraft, nearly a battalion-equivalent of special operations forces, and two brigades of the 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division joined the composite wing of JTF Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA) and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command operating within the region. Another 700 aircraft and 60,000 troops of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne and 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Divisions, and III Corps headquarters awaited deployment orders. This impressive display of power projection achieved in days what had taken weeks during Desert Shield.

The success of Vigilant Warrior as well as other operations—United Shield in Somalia, Southern Watch in the skies of southern Iraq, and maritime intercept operations in the Arabian Gulf—illustrates the depth of our understanding of the often paradoxical dynamics of the region. A vast geographic area of 19 nations, it extends

from the Horn of Africa and Egypt through Jordan and the Gulf states to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Though these nations share common cultural and religious traits, they are singularly and collectively unique.

CENTCOM operational accomplishments also reflect flexibility, versatility, and readiness to undertake a complex mission: promoting regional interests, ensuring an uninterrupted supply of resources, helping friendly states provide their own defense and contribute to collective security, and deterring attempts by regional states to achieve geopolitical gains by threat or use of force. To accomplish this mission, the command pursues a theater strategy that deals with the challenges of today while preparing for those of the next century.

## The Region Today

Maintaining regional stability and security in the Persian Gulf is integral to the political and economic well-being of the international community. Some 65 percent of the world's proven oil reserves are located in this region which supplies the United States 22 percent of its requirements, Western Europe 43 percent, and Japan 68 percent—with some experts suggesting these numbers will increase by 10 percent over the next decade. What is more, much of this oil must transit the Strait of Hormuz, Bab El Mandeb, and Suez Canal, all choke points dominated by regional states. Oil supports a vibrant economic relationship between the United States and the Middle East in areas such as military equipment, construction services, and consumer goods. In 1993, for example, U.S. exports to the region were nearly \$20 billion while imports totalled about \$21 billion. While low oil prices have

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U.S. Air Force (Dave Nolan)

**E-3 AWACS during Bright Star '94.**

forced local states to reduce major purchases, the Middle East continues to be an important commercial market, offering significant long-term economic benefits.<sup>1</sup>

These factors account for America's vital interests in the region: maintaining a free flow of oil at stable and

**the CENTCOM area of responsibility is situated astride several fault lines**


reasonable prices, ensuring freedom of navigation and access to markets, assuring the safety of U.S. citizens and property, and promoting the security of friendly states while helping to build a comprehensive peace. Other concerns include promoting respect for fundamental rights and democratization, providing humanitarian assistance, countering illegal trade in drugs, fostering economic development, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and defeating terrorism.

Safeguarding these vital and enduring interests is a herculean undertaking. In terms of both conflict and culture the CENTCOM area of responsi-

bility is situated astride several fault lines. It is the birthplace of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as well as home to 427 million people who make up 17 ethnic groups, 420 tribal groups, and six major languages with hundreds of dialects. This diversity—combined with border disputes, competition for resources, radical political and religious movements, economic strains, and exploding populations—breeds internal and external conflicts.

This situation is exacerbated by Iraq and Iran, the gravest regional threats to peace and stability. Both seek hegemony in the Gulf and have traditions of intimidating their weaker neighbors.

Though it lost more than half of its conventional military capability in the Gulf War, Iraq still has the largest army in the region. That fact, along with Saddam's defiance of post-war U.N. resolutions, alarms neighboring states. Since the war Iraq has rebuilt much of its conventional military industrial infrastructure, and the October 1994 troop movements that precipitated Vigilant Warrior established Iraqi capabilities to mobilize and move large numbers of forces quickly to threaten



**Kuwaitis on firing line for Vigilant Warrior.**

U.S. Air Force (Tracy Hall/Leahy)

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. All this indicates that lifting U.N. sanctions will certainly lead to Iraqi rearmament.<sup>2</sup>

Fifteen years after its revolution Iran is competing with Iraq for domination of the Persian Gulf while simultaneously seeking to lead the Islamic world. Its vast oil reserves, many engineers and technicians, and large population permit it to overcome internal unrest and economic malaise to satisfy its ambitions. This is evident in extensive weapons development and the procurement of submarines, attack aircraft, and anti-ship missiles. With these resources Tehran has underwritten political and Islamic extremists worldwide, militarized the disputed islands in the Strait of Hormuz, and tried to torpedo the Middle East peace process. Uncompromising devotion to such policies indicates that Iran will remain a threat to its neighbors for the foreseeable future.

Tensions based on Iraqi and Iranian belligerence, combined with other sources of conflict and extremist movements, are inflamed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Some nations in the CENTCOM

region, such as Iraq and Iran, are hard at work attempting to steal, buy, produce, and fabricate ballistic and cruise missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The difficulty of their quest is eased by the willingness of nations such as North Korea and China to sell advanced weaponry to anyone with hard cash. The situation is made more worrisome by the ease with which older systems can be improved through purchases of off-the-

### our long-term goals are best achieved by emphasizing cooperative relationships and coalitions

shelf technology. Such advances in weaponry and the nature of regional threats pose an ominous challenge for the United States. As potential foes continue to procure sophisticated systems and harden and conceal command and control, launch, research and development, and storage sites, the Armed Forces will have increasing difficulty finding and striking them.

#### Theater Strategy

Designing a strategy that protects American interests in this vital region is a daunting task. Innovative ways must be found to conduct operations over lines of communications that stretch more than 7,000 miles from the United States. Conversely, the distance from Iraq to Kuwait City and its surrounding oil fields is about the same as that from Washington to Richmond. Planning must compensate for the dearth of formal agreements and alliances with local states. Associated policies and operations must reflect a sensitivity to regional cultures. U.S. forces must be able to defeat adversaries ranging from insurgents to modernized land, sea, and air forces while remaining versatile enough to respond to terrorists, drug traffickers, environmental disasters, epidemics, and famine. Finally, they must be able to do it in a rugged terrain and harsh climate.

Thrust into a more prominent role after World War II, the United States viewed the region through the

lens of the Cold War. Policies were pursued with the aim of denying the Soviet Union access. In this spirit, America relied upon the "twin pillars" of Saudi Arabia and Iran to promote regional peace and stability until the late 1970s. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and collapse of the Shah of Iran's regime in 1979 disrupted this strategy and raised questions about U.S. ability to secure access to Persian Gulf oil and meet commitments to friendly Arab states and Israel. In response, President Carter proclaimed in January 1980 that any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the region would be regarded as an assault on our vital interests. To add weight to that statement, he established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) in March 1980.

Standing up RDJTF amounted to conceding failure in solving the knotty strategic dilemmas of the previous three decades. RDJTF had to contend with many of the same difficulties that had earlier plagued Strike Command and Readiness Command: long lines of communications, lack of forward-based assets, limited access to states of the region, a poor understanding of local cultures and regimes, insufficient forces, inadequate funding, and overlapping command responsibilities.

It was in this context that the Reagan administration established CENTCOM in 1983. The command matured over time under the leadership of Generals Kingston, Crist, Schwarzkopf, and Hoar. Operational plans, security assistance, and exercises reflected a sophisticated appreciation of regional challenges. In a succession of operations that culminated in Desert Storm, the command hammered out agreements with regional states, formed ties with local leaders, learned to oversee joint and multinational operations, and capitalized on superior American military professionalism and weaponry.<sup>3</sup> In the aftermath of the Gulf War and collapse of the Soviet Union, CENTCOM strengthened the U.S. strategic position by improving access to the region, enhancing military-to-military contacts, building local forces, upgrading security assistance and exercises, and

deriving full benefit from a limited forward presence. This was the blueprint for a new theater strategy.

CENTCOM is building on these experiences and moving into the next century with a clear strategic vision:

*...to be a flexible and versatile command—trained, positioned, and ready to defend the Nation's vital interests, promote peace and stability, deter conflict, and conduct operations spanning the conflict continuum; and prepared to wage unrelenting, simultaneous joint and combined operations to achieve decisive victory in war.*

In the spirit of this vision, CENTCOM pursues a multifaceted strategy to address mutual security concerns of the United States and its regional partners. This strategy is oriented toward promoting peace and stability, deterring conflict, limiting the intensity of conflict should deterrence fail, and providing mechanisms to prevail in combat operations when required. It is a flexible strategy that applies to each subregion, capitalizes on personal relationships forged with local friends over a half century, and builds on the success of Desert Storm. While the command retains the capability to act unilaterally, our long-term goals are best achieved by emphasizing cooperative relationships and coalitions that are prerequisites for deploying and employing forces in the Gulf.

CENTCOM forges partnerships and coalitions through a long-term, flexible, three-tiered approach to deter aggression and fight if deterrence fails. The first tier, national self-defense, calls for each nation to bear primary responsibility for its protection. During heightened regional tension or hostility, friendly states would form the second tier, collective defense. This is best exemplified by the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in forming a multinational force known as Peninsula Shield. Finally, on the third tier, the United States and other extra-regional allies would join in meeting a threat to the region. This approach and associated initiatives offer another benefit by strengthening links between the United States and regional militaries, relationships that promote peace and stability.

Seabees coming ashore in Egypt.



U.S. Army (Michael Halgren)



U.S. Air Force (Blaze Lipowski)

Arriving in the Gulf, October 1994.

## Five Pillars of Peace

The above fundamentals underpin the five pillars of the CENTCOM theater strategy: power projection, forward presence, combined exercises, security assistance, and readiness to fight. The first pillar includes activities and qualities of the Armed Forces that support rapid projection of extra-regional forces and their combat positioning. Deploying and equipping these forces depends on strategic airlift and sealift and the availability of en route basing worldwide. It also relies on the prepositioning of equipment and supplies on ships. This includes 12 vessels carrying an Army brigade set of equipment, 15 comprising Marine Corps maritime prepositioning squadrons, three with Air Force supplies and ammunition, and five containing Army port opening equipment. Through these resources and more planned, the command can reduce the time-distance hurdles.

The second pillar, forward presence, is the most visible indication of U.S. commitment. With few permanently assigned forces and as the only

theater warfighting headquarters that is not located in its area of responsibility, the command must rely on forward presence to deter conflict, enhance

access, and support the transition from peace to war. At the same time, it is balanced around land, sea, air, and special operations forces to limit the U.S. footprint while simultaneously positioning potent combat power forward.

With a limited footprint and significant lethality, naval forces are well suited to meet competing operational requirements. Under U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and Fifth Fleet, the naval component includes, on a recurring basis, a carrier battle group, an amphibious ready group, and cruise missile-equipped surface ships and submarines. In addition to supporting recent operations in Somalia and Kuwait, CENTCOM naval forces continue to conduct maritime intercept operations pursuant to U.N. sanctions against Iraq with nearly 23,000 challenges and over 12,000 boardings since August 1990.

The compact but lethal 4404 Provisional Air Wing conducting Operation Southern Watch under the command of JTF-SWA complements naval forces. Reconnaissance, attack, and support aircraft of the wing provide constant surveillance of southern Iraq

and are prepared to counter Iraqi aggression. Since JTF-SWA inception in August 1992, its aircraft have flown 60,000 sorties, 47,000 over Iraq alone. As seen in Vigilant Warrior, the JTF command and control apparatus is capable of orchestrating both land based and naval attack aircraft—a significant improvement over the situation in August 1990.

Forward deployed Patriot batteries and SOF detachments constitute the ground dimension of forward presence. Though more limited in scope than forward positioned naval and air forces, these units contribute to deterrence by strengthening CENTCOM capabilities. Patriot missiles, for example, could counter an enemy with ballistic missiles by safeguarding key facilities. Similarly, SOF personnel improve the combat skills of regional militaries, enhance coalition interoperability, and reduce the risk of fratricide during combat.

Another aspect of forward presence is the prepositioning of equipment ashore, a strategic linchpin that complements strategic lift and prepositioned equipment afloat to further reduce time-distance challenges and related risks to early deploying forces. In crisis, prepositioning facilitates sustainment of theater forces and rapid introduction of mechanized ground forces. Accordingly, the command maintains hundreds of Army, Navy, and Air Force vehicles and thousands of tons of

*(continued on page 38)*

# U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

**MISSION:** The primary mission of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is to prevent military coercion of friendly states and deter attempts by hostile regional states to achieve gains by a threat or use of force; and to help friendly states to provide for their own security and contribute to the collective defense. The command also puts military capability behind national commitments to the region by preserving and protecting access to the oil supplies of the Persian Gulf. The CENTCOM

area of responsibility includes 19 countries located in southwest Asia and Africa.

**BACKGROUND:** CENTCOM was activated on January 1, 1983. It met the requirement for a major theater command to serve U.S. interests in Southwest Asia and Persian/Arabian Gulf region. Tension in the area began to



American and Jordanian aircraft during Infinite Acclaim.



55th Signal Company (Casey T. Smith)



U.S. Navy (Jim Grant)

heighten in the late 1960s and early 1970s following Great Britain's withdrawal from east of Suez. The Iran revolution of 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979–80 changed the balance of power which clearly addressed the need for a counter-balancing force to maintain regional stability.

**COMPONENT COMMANDS:** U.S. Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT); U.S. Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF); U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT); U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Central Command (MARFORCENT); and Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT).

JFQ



U.S. Navy (Rhonda Bailey)



U.S. Army (David M. Rarifo)



Countries assigned to the CENTCOM area of responsibility.



U.S. Air Force (David Craft)

Perimeter guard at Patriot missile site.

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equipment and supplies throughout the region. A main feature is a prepositioned heavy brigade set of equipment in Kuwait. At the same time, efforts are progressing on placing a second brigade set with division support equipment in another Gulf state as well as on exploring the possibility of positioning a third on the ground elsewhere in the region. With a heavy division set of equipment positioned ashore, CENTCOM would enjoy improved operational flexibility to deal with a full range of threats and to correspondingly strengthen the deterrent effect of forward presence.

Combined exercises enrich the other pillars of the theater strategy by serving as vehicles for power projection, promoting forward presence, honing combat skills, broadening access, fostering military-to-military rela-

### security assistance offers another avenue for satisfying legitimate self-defense needs

tionships, and stimulating development of coalition warfighting procedures. CENTCOM is on track in generating a combined warfighting capability comprised of 14 regional states by 2001. In FY95, for example, the command conducted a total of 85 land, sea, air, and special operations exercises. While many were relatively small or component-oriented, a growing number are both joint and multinational. This trend will expand as part of an effort to increase joint activities while improving readiness among regional partners in the long term. Frequent exercises in Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan focus on improving the warfighting capabilities of friendly nations and ensuring continued access in the region. The sophistication of these exercises will grow to include other nations, which will enlarge a second set of command post and field training exercises that focus on boosting coalition warfare. They include Bright Star, a field exercise in Egypt; Intrinsic Action, a joint multinational training ex-

ercise in Kuwait; and Ultimate Resolve, a command post exercise in the Gulf.

Closely associated with combined exercises is security assistance, a pillar which offers another avenue for satisfying legitimate self-defense needs of regional friends. It is comprised of four major elements: foreign military sales, foreign military funding, mobile training and technical assistance teams, and international military education and training (IMET).

Foreign military sales in the region account for a large proportion of America's worldwide total—46 percent for FY90–FY94 and 36 percent in FY95, with sales reaching \$2.76 billion. Most Gulf states prefer U.S. hardware and have negotiated for major systems to include F–15 and F–16 fighters, Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, Patriot missiles, and Apache helicopters. These sales offer tangible benefits to American industry and are an effective

means of upgrading regional military capabilities and boosting interoperability among U.S. and local forces. Similarly, foreign military funding helps poorer countries meet their legitimate self-defense needs through grants and transfers of excess defense articles.

Modern weapons alone do not produce reliable and combat ready forces. Comprehensive training is needed to mold skilled, highly motivated soldiers and competent leaders. To this end, the United States relies on the 1,000 to 1,500 personnel who make up mobile training and technical assistance teams. The benefits of these teams go beyond improving regional militaries and include buttressing forward-deployed forces, improving access, and cementing relations. Finally, IMET funds enable regional civilian and military personnel to study at American educational institutions. The introduction of U.S. doctrine and training to foreign leaders, as well as their personal contact with American military and civilian personnel, strengthens long-term relationships. What is more, instruction on topics

such as human rights and civilian control of the military advances responsible defense management and democratization in their nations.

Together these elements of security assistance reinforce forward presence and combined exercises to accentuate access, strengthen military-to-military contact, encourage leaders to respect human rights, and over time support greater democratization. Also, security assistance is pivotal in coalition building by promoting all three tiers of the U.S. regional defense program.

The fifth and final pillar, readiness to fight, is oriented toward producing operational plans to support the national military strategy and ensuring that the battle staffs of CENTCOM headquarters and service components possess the equipment, procedures, and skills to deploy rapidly in a crisis and conduct high tempo joint and multinational operations. These goals are achieved with the other four pillars and by routine wargaming of operational plans and frequent conferences among joint, component, and service staffs. The command maintains a high level of readiness through a series of rigorous exercises. In addition to exercises in the region, the command conducts or participates in three others in the United States: Internal Look, conducted biennially, involves all components; Roving Sands is a theater missile defense command post and field training exercise; and Blue Flag is an air operations command post exercise. Collectively, the exercises enhance the proficiency of battle staffs in the full range of combat functions.

The flexibility, versatility, and readiness of CENTCOM were tested most recently during United Shield in January–February 1995. To withdraw the remaining U.N. peacekeepers and their equipment from Somalia, a U.S.-led combined JTF took charge of 21 American and allied ships, 75 aircraft, and 7,700 personnel in and around the area. The operation was fraught with danger. Although Somali clan leaders assured the United Nations that they would not hinder a withdrawal, questions lingered about their sincerity and ability to control their warrior factions. The command was determined to avoid bloody street fighting and

sought to minimize the risk to non-combatants. It thus tailored its military footprint ashore, adhered to well defined and rehearsed rules of engagement, and provided security for the last U.N. forces to board ships at Mogadishu on March 3.

Through the five pillars outlined above, CENTCOM is establishing peacetime relationships and infrastruc-

ture needed in a crisis and war. The functions embedded in these pillars reinforce the foundation of a theater strategy—military-to-military relations and regional access—that is essential to either deter conflict or to fight and win decisively in the Central Region.

## **nations deter by convincing potential adversaries that the risks of using force are unacceptable**

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### **Ingredients for Decisive Victory**

Detering conflict and preparing to fight are a continuum. Nations do not deter aggression by rattling empty scabbards or mouthing thinly disguised bluffs but rather by convincing potential adversaries that the risks of using force are unacceptable. This is achieved by designing, fielding, and exercising premier joint and combined forces, having the will to use them, and communicating that resolve to adversaries. While the U.S. military must be sufficiently versatile to deal with a full range of threats, it must focus on winning a high intensity war. The units, leaders, and individuals that can do this will also possess the skill and flexibility to handle other missions.

Efforts undertaken in accordance with the CENTCOM theater strategy reflect these precepts and characteristics. If called upon, the command expects forces to rapidly mobilize, deploy, link up with prepositioned weapons and supplies, and fight on arrival. In time of heightened tensions and crisis in the region, forces and supplies will be dispersed to minimize their vulnerability to enemy strikes; camouflage and deception will deny an enemy precise locations of key facilities and troop formations; forces will employ protective clothing, antidotes, and immunizations

to minimize risks of chemical and biological agents; and the command will be prepared to form joint and combined task forces capable of conducting joint and combined operations.

Before and after hostilities commence, CENTCOM will exploit all sources of intelligence continuously to survey a potential enemy; to detect, track, and gain early warning of the

use of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction; and to assess battle damage. As our first forces arrive in theater, they will emplace a multi-layered missile defense founded on newly fielded lower- and upper-tier systems based on land and sea to safeguard critical facilities and friendly forces from ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

Should hostilities commence, U.S. forces and their allies could expect heightened lethality, extended ranges, and increased volume and precision from munitions to produce greater dispersion of fighting formations. In such circumstances, CENTCOM would use imaginative and innovative forms of maneuver, battle command, intelligence, fire support, and sustainment—on the ground, at sea, and in the air and space—cashing in on the complementary capabilities of all services, with systems linked electronically to both detect an enemy at extended ranges and achieve unprecedented operational synergism. Then vital enemy centers would be pounded by bombers, fighters, naval surface fire support, cruise missiles, Army tactical missile systems, attack helicopters, and special operations capabilities. As an enemy weakened under operational fires throughout the depth of the battlefield, the command would mount a fast-paced ground offensive. The cascading, continuous beating unleashed by these attacks would fix enemy forces in place, blind them, demoralize them, strip them of sustainment, deny them air and artillery support, paralyze their decisionmaking, and ultimately collapse their military formations and will to fight.

While this scenario reflects the modern American way of warfighting, U.S. forces cannot escape the fog and friction of war despite their most valiant efforts. Access to regional states might be complicated by the operational situation or political considerations. Attack aircraft might miss their targets. Carriers might be out of position in the first few days. Sand storms might delay air and ground units. Missile defenses might not be leak proof. Logistic shortfalls might slow down operations. In the final analysis, triumph in war will hinge as it always has on the skill, discipline, courage, and sacrifice of American servicemen and women. The CENTCOM theater strategy is designed to ensure that they possess the greatest possible resources and flexibility to succeed.

As the command looks to the future, it takes pride in its success in securing vital national interests in the Central Region and in its progress in realizing long-term goals. Time and again our people have delivered first-rate results, conducting combat operations, enforcing U.N. resolutions, delivering humanitarian relief, participating in combined exercises, establishing close relations with regional friends, negotiating basing agreements and host nation support, and creating processes and organizations needed to carry out the theater strategy in both peace and war.

Our mission and vision are clear. Success requires CENTCOM to be flexible and versatile. To meet challenges to our national interests, we are pursuing a five-pillar theater strategy to signal friends and foes alike that America is resolute in securing regional peace and stability now and into the next century. **JFQ**

### **NOTES**

<sup>1</sup> Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, *United States Security Strategy for the Middle East* (Washington: Government Printing Office, May 1995), p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16.

<sup>3</sup> Robert H. Scales, *Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 41, 360–84.