

Letters . . .

OVERSEAS PRESENCE

To the Editor—In an article that appeared in the Summer 1995 issue of *JFQ*, David Yost stated that to address the question of U.S. overseas presence, we must go back to first principles. Yost's principles turn out to be pillars of liberal internationalist theory. Peace is indivisible and threats to the world order are everywhere threats to our security. In other words, occasional alligators of discontent, extremism, and aggression can be best defeated by draining the swamp.

But a potent argument can be made that his principles vanished with the Cold War. After all, it is astonishing to learn that the demise of the Soviet Union as a clear and present danger has apparently changed nothing vis-à-vis national security. In one of the most unthreatening periods in our Nation's history we are being encouraged to wage a costly and expansive crusade through a strategy of engagement.

Yost's first principles rest on two assumptions of the Cold War that are questionable today. The first is that resources are unlimited and provide infinite means to shape international security. This takes little account of the debt crisis, a falling share of world GNP, and rich democratic, free-market states across Europe and Asia. The second is that our allies and clients will acquiesce in our actions overseas. After all, who wouldn't want to follow our lead? Exceptionalism is key to Wilsonian internationalism, but as Abba Eban observed: "The truth is that nobody outside of America has ever taken the theory of American exceptionalism very seriously."

The arrogance of liberal internationalism does not start at the water's edge; it also applies to Americans in an attempt to factor them out of the foreign policy equation. Yost rightly points out that polls reveal a mood of prudence and caution that reflects dire in-your-face troubles at home and lack of a tangible threat abroad. Like a committed internationalist, however, he brushes aside these things by refusing to factor constraints into his prescription for engagement. Leading the world may ennoble foreign policy elites, but those who must bear the cost of that still have to deal with the more mundane problems of domestic renewal. Given the propensity of U.S. foreign policy adventures to lose public support and collapse at the first sign of double-digit casualties, the tolerance of the Nation should command greater attention from policy elites instead of getting short shrift as parochial or irrelevant. Public willingness to make sacrifices is an accurate barometer of the varying importance of U.S. interests.

The coupling of Yost's two assumptions leads to a means-ends gap that undermines America's credibility overseas. Resources are finite, and it is not unpatriotic to say so. We must abandon the paradigm that every crisis is a zero sum game. U.S. security requires taking a selective look at military responses and preserving our assets for crises that merit attention because they threaten national interests. Engagement and leadership are means to an end, not ends in themselves, and when taken in Yost's context as policy guidance they could lead to squandering valuable resources in places such as Somalia and Bosnia. In an age of shrinking budgets and crippling debt, we can take important stands on security issues without becoming the one and only world policeman.

To his credit, Yost does not pretend, as others do, that the myriad threats of a fragmenting, multipolar world actually threaten America in the same way as the Soviets did. Instead, his most compelling rationale for engagement lies in supervising our allies who apparently cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons or the strategic capabilities of force projection. So we maintain the arsenal of democracy to keep our major trading partners out of the security business—which enables them to profit enormously from our neurotic largesse—while we struggle on in the superpower role. As Ronald Steel has written, "They concentrate on productivity, market penetration, wealth, and innovation: the kind of power that matters most in today's world. In this competition we are—with our chronic deficits, weak currency, massive borrowing, and immense debt—a very strange kind of superpower."

Can we only be secure by ensuring, at great cost, that the rest of the world is secure first? Perhaps, as some suggest, this is an overreaction to having responded late for two world wars in this century. Internationalism holds that there will be other wars unless America remains "at the center of international security management efforts." This smacks of self-fulfilling prophecy and, more cynically, of a rationale for an establishment grown rich on global gendarmerie.

The underlying question suggested by Yost's first principles is whether the end of the Cold War engendered new first principles. These might dictate that peace is divisible, that wars can and always will occur, and that many will not threaten our interests. They would need to be addressed, but not always by a significant military campaign. New principles would maintain that conflicts are best solved from the inside-out: at local or regional levels. Such solutions are sustainable, and achieving them would allow the Nation to keep its powder dry for conflicts that really threaten the global balance of power and vital interests.

Basing an analysis on a theory which we do not have the resources or will to support saps the pertinence of the argument. Nobody is suggesting that we turn our backs on the rest of the world. It is a matter of intellectual approach, and defense analysts must free themselves from Cold War clichés. In the past we could not afford to question if we should be there. But today the question has to be asked, even if it is continually rejected by some on its own merits.

—John Hillen
Defense Policy Analyst
The Heritage Foundation

JOINT PSYOP

To the Editor—An error introduced into the published version of my article on "PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC" in your last issue (*JFQ*, Summer 1995) requires clarification. Command and control for psychological operations (PSYOP) forces differs from that for other special operations forces (SOF). The broad range and tactical levels, with the requirement to be fully integrated with interagency activities (both overt and covert), as well as with conventional forces, command and control warfare operations, and information warfare, mandate that PSYOP command and control structures and relationships be separate and distinct from those of other SOF. While PSYOP fully supports the activities of other SOF, its primary emphasis is to bolster the theater CINC's overall campaign and conventional forces. Thus its focus is broader than just the activities of JFSOCC or JSOTF, and its C² must allow for direct access to JFCs and full integration at all levels.

A theater SOC or JFSOCC does not normally exercise command and control over PSYOP forces other than those specifically attached to JSOTF to support other operations. Rather, day-to-day peacetime responsibility for PSYOP planning and supervision rests with J-3s, assisted by J-3 PSYOP officers and forward liaison teams from the active component PSYOP group. In a crisis, contingency, or war, CINCs will form Joint Force PSYOP Component Commands (JFPOCCs) as functional component commands (similar to ground, naval, air, and special operations component commands) to plan, coordinate, and execute theater PSYOP. CINCs designate the senior PSYOP commander as JFPOCC commander who will form a Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF) to execute PSYOP. Some forces may be assigned or attached to component commands (GCC or SOCC) as the mission dictates, but JPOTF retains overall responsibility for executing PSYOP in theater.

—COL Jeffrey B. Jones, USA
Joint Staff (J-38)

A JOINT NCO?

To the Editor—Military training and leadership depend heavily on non-commissioned officers. Yet the Chairman, unlike service chiefs and most CINCs, lacks the counsel of a senior NCO. This seems odd since senior NCOs perform three distinct functions to support the chain of command. First, they assist in decisionmaking and enforcing standards during execution. Goldwater-Nichols served as the impetus for thinking about what it means to fight jointly. Participation by NCOs in joint decisions and execution should be consistent up and down the chain. Second, NCOs direct and monitor training that, while not usually joint at the individual and small unit levels, definitely affects joint exercises. Their experience could enhance efforts by CJCS to develop meaningful and challenging training. Third, they enhance communication by explaining policy to enlisted men and women and glean feedback on morale, welfare, quality of life, and training. This function is no less important from a joint perspective.

A senior NCO seems appropriate given the Chairman's role as communicator. Title 10 lists four CJCS functions performed for CINCs: confer with and obtain information on requirements, evaluate and integrate such information, advise and make recommendations on the requirements of combatant commands, and communicate those requirements to other DOD elements.

National military strategy cites five force building foundations including quality people and states that retaining good people involves not only matters of pay and benefits, but ensuring that "our operating tempo and planned deployments are kept within reasonable bounds." These words speak to the heart of what NCOs do: they enlighten the leadership by paying attention. Indeed, paying attention means to listen, question, monitor, reassure, ensure (the NCO way of enforcing), and report back to the boss. These communications basics are key to the success of joint exercises and operations.

Soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen should be able to look to the NCO chain and see that it continues to the top of the Armed Forces. They should know that CJCS gets advice and counsel from one of their own. Enlisted personnel should hear the latest joint policies and decisions from an NCO. These are more matters of substance than symbolism; they are real elements of both joint and service culture, considerations that the military must address for mission success.

A senior enlisted advisor to the Chairman could uniquely benefit the entire enlisted force by reducing friction at the seams of joint training and operations. Unlike his opposite numbers in the services, he would only focus on issues relevant to jointness. When an interservice conflict that affected

the enlisted force arose, he could help senior advisors at unified commands find common solutions. This would be valuable for every command. In ad hoc organizations such as JTFs he could establish an acceptable set of standards.

Since nearly 80 percent of the Armed Forces are enlisted, it seems fitting that they have one of their own at the top of the joint team.

—SGM William P. Traeger, USA
Senior Enlisted Advisor
Joint Special Operations Forces
Institute

HUBRIS . . . FROM THE SEA

To the Editor—When General Merrill McPeak, former Air Force Chief of Staff, stated that his service was willing to give up major missions to the Army and naval air arms except for long-range and strategic bombing, he basically admitted that the Nation does not need an Air Force. Then why not simply expand the other services to assume the missions of the Air Force? After all, the Air Force was a

creature of the Cold War, which is over now. As outlined by McPeak, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps would continue present missions, even though he envisioned mission expansions for each service. The Navy could assume long-range bombing, which he suggested is the only true remaining Air Force mission. The Navy has the power to control the air over ocean and coastal areas and consequently can strike anywhere. All three main branches of the operational Navy have long-range strike potential already.

Submarines clearly possess that potential as the Navy's strategic arm. This most viable leg of the nuclear triad continues to deploy submarine-launched nuclear missiles. Strategic Command is already headed by a naval officer. It would be a relatively small step to turn it over to the Navy. Furthermore, because strategic (nuclear) forces have a much smaller profile than in the Cold War, perhaps it is time to do away with B-1Bs and B-52s and their outdated strategic strike capability. The rationale for a nuclear triad has passed away as should the triad itself. All long-range strategic bombing

RMA Essay Contest

WINNERS

The winners of the first annual *Joint Force Quarterly* Essay Contest on the Revolution in Military Affairs sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation, Inc., are as follows:

FIRST PRIZE

"War in the Information Age"

by ENSIGN THOMAS G. MAHNKEN, USNR

SECOND PRIZE

"Acoustic Technology on the Twenty-First Century Battlefield"

by LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARVIN G. METCALE, ARNG

THIRD PRIZE

"Joint Warfare and the Ultimate High Ground: Implications of U.S. Military Dependence on Space"

by MAJOR JEFFREY L. CATON, USAF

Prizes of \$2,000, \$1,000, and \$500 will be presented to the first, second, and third place winners, respectively. An additional prize of \$500 will be awarded to the first place winner, ENS Mahnken, for submitting the best essay by a contestant in the rank of major/lieutenant commander or below. Winners also will receive a selection of books on various aspects of military affairs and innovation. The prize winning essays and other contributions on the revolution in military affairs will appear in the next issue of the journal (Winter 1995-96).

JFQ

should belong to the most secure of the strategic forces, the Navy submarine service.

Tomahawk cruise missiles give surface vessels a long-range strike capability. They proved their worth in Desert Storm and since. The Navy currently has plans for more Tomahawk capable ships and more capable missiles. This offers the ability, without allies, to strike anywhere within a thousand miles of any coast, that is, in every politically important region of the world.

Most important to long-range and strategic bombing is naval air. Navy and Marine aircraft did the same job as Air Force planes during Desert Storm. One problem—a lack of coordination in long-range strike war—can be solved if the Air Force is phased out and the Navy is given all long-range bombing missions. But not only is the Navy able to fill much of the long-range and strategic bombing mission; for fifty years it has been built around the strength of airpower projection, so much so that today 48 percent of naval officers are flyers.

Eliminating the Air Force would simplify the military establishment and cut the size of the defense budget. Instead of three military departments there would be two. The redundancy of the Air Force—in transport, nuclear weapons, tactical air, long-range strike, et al.—could be scraped while that small portion of its capabilities that is not a duplication could be given to the Army and Navy.

The Navy is built around airpower projection. The recurring strategic question “where are the carriers?” which has been asked by virtually all post-war Presidents recognizes this fact. Since the Navy has become the Nation’s on-call air arm, why not eliminate the Air Force and give part of its sole remaining mission to the Navy?

—LT S. Pratt Hokanson, USN
History Department
U.S. Naval Academy

CORRIGENDA

In the article entitled “Atlantic Command’s Joint Training Program” by Clarence Todd Morgan which appeared in issue 8 (Summer 1995), the following particulars shown here in italics stand as corrections: (1) all combatant CINCs have full authority and responsibility *under Title 10, U.S.C., chapter 6, section 164*, to conduct joint training; (2) *the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)* provides detailed training guidance to CINCs; and (3) *J-71 coordinates JTP scheduling, monitors participation of ACOM forces in CJCS-directed NATO and bilateral exercises, and documents and reports or corrects deficiencies in exercises and operations.* **JFQ**

A Note to Readers and Contributors

DISTRIBUTION: *JFQ* is distributed to the field and fleet through service channels. Military personnel and organizations interested in receiving the journal on a regular basis should make their requirements known through appropriate service, unified command, or agency channels. Corrections in shipping instructions for service distribution should be directed to the appropriate activity listed below.

■ **ARMY**—Contact the installation Publications Control Officer or write to the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896 (reference Misc. Publication 71–1).

■ **NAVY**—Contact the Navy Inventory Control Point, Customer Service List Maintenance (Code 3343.09), 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19111–5098; requests may be sent by FAX to: (215) 697–5914 (include SNDL, UIC, and full address).

■ **MARINE CORPS**—Contact the Marine Corps Logistics Base Atlantic, Warehouse 1221, Section 5, Albany, Georgia 31704.

■ **AIR FORCE**—Contact the base Publishing Distribution Office to establish requirement at the Air Force Distribution Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896 (indicate issue number requested which should be preceded by the prefix “N–#”).

■ **COAST GUARD**—Contact U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, ATTN: Defense Operations Division, 2100 2nd Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20593–0001.

In addition, bulk distribution is made to defense agencies, the Joint Staff, unified commands, service colleges, and other activities. Changes in these shipments should be communicated to the Editor at the address below.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: *JFQ* is available by subscription from the Government Printing Office (see the order blank in this issue). To order for one year, cite: *Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ)* on the order and mail with a check for \$21.00 (\$26.25 foreign) or provide a VISA or MasterCard account number with expiration date to the Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15220–7954, or FAX the order to: (202) 512–2233. Individual copies may be purchased at GPO bookstores for \$7.50 each.

CONTRIBUTIONS: *JFQ* welcomes submissions from members of the Armed Forces as well as from defense analysts and academic specialists from both this country and abroad, including foreign military officers and civilians. There is no required length for articles, but contributions of 3,000 to 5,000 words are appropriate. Other submissions, however, to include letters to the editor, items of commentary, and brief essays are invited. Reproductions of supporting material (such as maps and photos) should be submitted with manuscripts; do *not* send originals.

Manuscripts are reviewed by the Editorial Board, a process which takes two to three months. To facilitate review, provide three copies of the manuscript together with a 150-word summary. Place personal or biographical data on a separate sheet of paper and do not identify the author (or authors) in the body of the text. Follow any accepted style guide in preparing the manuscript, but endnotes rather than footnotes should be used. Bibliographies should not be included. Both the manuscript and endnotes should be typed in double-space with one-inch margins.

JFQ reserves the right to edit contributions to meet space limitations and conform to the journal’s style and format. Proofs of articles accepted for publication are not normally sent to authors for review.

If possible submit the manuscript on a disk together with the typescript version. While 3.5- and 5.25-inch disks in various formats can be processed, WordPerfect is preferred (disks will be returned if requested). Further information on the submission of contributions is available by calling (202) 475–1013 / DSN 335–1013, FAX: (202) 475–1012 / DSN 335–1012, or writing:

Editor
Joint Force Quarterly
ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ
Washington, D.C. 20319–6000

JFQ