

Letters . . .

INDO-PAKI DIALECTIC

To the Editor—On the fate of Kashmir, what "history shows" as Rahul Pandit would have it in his response to my article, "Nuclear Proliferation on the Indian Subcontinent" (*JFQ*, Spring 2000), is that the facts are not compelling for either side. Although I can understand why Dr. Pandit as a Kashmiri takes the matter of blame to heart, the U.N. resolution of 1948 warrants attention.

The truce agreement declares, "Pakistan will use its best endeavor to secure the withdrawal from the state of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the state for the purpose of fighting" (Part II, A, 2). It also states, "when the commission shall have notified . . . India that the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals referred to in Part II, A, 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by . . . India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the state of Jammu and Kashmir . . . India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that state in stages to be agreed upon with the commission" (Part II, B, 1).

That Pakistan acted dishonorably in fulfilling its obligations under the truce can hardly be disputed. But, if Pakistan is to be believed, the hostilities that required the truce were a grassroots uprising by tribesmen, which included Muslims who lived in Kashmir, against abuses of a foreign power in an independent principality. Pakistan did not abide by the terms of the truce, ostensibly because it feared that Indian troops in Kashmir would fill the vacuum of power.

India was to withdraw in stages in consultation with the commission and not, as Dr. Pandit says, only after Pakistani forces departed. U.N. observers on the scene to monitor the truce could not convince either party to budge. Troops on both sides began digging in, and the cease fire line, which had also been the skirmish line, soon metamorphosed into what is the line of control today.

Kashmiri accession, which India cites to lay claim to the state, is also subject to argument. Pakistan charges that the provincial ruler never acceded while India claims that he did. Regardless of how historians read this event, the ruler cannot be rebuked if he promised to accede in exchange for protection. He was about to lose Kashmir and perhaps even his life. A dispassionate observer might well consider an agreement made under such duress unenforceable.

There is one aspect of this issue that is not subject to argument. An instrument of accession

does not exist. This is significant because the accessions of more than 500 princely states to India during the transition of British power were formalized with written documents.

If the clarification Dr. Pandit seeks is acknowledgment that Pakistan is worthy of blame for lack of progress in establishing a U.N. plebiscite, it is found in my article, which explicitly states that the issue is whether Kashmiris will be able to decide their own future. This is an outcome that continues to be blocked by militants on both sides of the line of control.

—CDR Kenneth R. Totty, USNR
U.S. European Command

SOLDIERS AND MARINES

To the Editor—I found it surprising to read in "Rethinking Army-Marine Corps Roles in Power Projection" by Brian Dunn (*JFQ*, Autumn 00) that "only 10 Army and 3 Marine Corps divisions span the globe to deal with various small contingencies." The Army has a total of 18 divisions and another two divisional headquarters that oversee separate brigades. These numbers do not include the independent cavalry regiments and separate brigades. The argument that only active forces are ready and available for deployment ignores the multiple deployments made by Reserve components in Desert Storm and over the last decade. Army National Guard divisions have deployed to Bosnia and will soon take over the mission completely. Similarly many units are deploying with minimal training. I know of a call up when soldiers were given two weeks notice before mobilization and deployed within 30 days. The era of the stay-at-home National Guard is over.

Dunn also errs in his comparison of Army and Marine divisions. They are simply not the same. Marine divisions are the ground component of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and significantly larger than those of the Army. In fact, active MAGTFs are mini combined arms corps with separate ground, air, and support components.

Finally, one point Dunn does not address is the allocation of peacekeeping chores. Why is it that an Army with 18 divisions provides a division to Korea, brigades to Kosovo and Bosnia, and a battalion to the Sinai while the Marine Corps with four MAGTFs has no such commitments? The Army also provides several ready brigades. As that service continues to draw down, it is time to rethink roles and missions and get the Marines into peace operations.

—CPT Eric P. Michael, ARNG
Commonwealth of Virginia

To the Editor—In a recent article "Rethinking Army-Marine Corps Roles in Power Projection," Brian Dunn makes the case for the two services to revisit their traditional missions and to create a more complementary relationship. He advocates that the Marines "must abandon amphibious warfare as a core capability and embrace an expeditionary role based on urban warfare and air mobility to complement the role of the Army to fight heavy forces." On one hand, if Dunn is suggesting that turning from a traditional forcible amphibious entry capability (opposed landings like Iwo Jima and Okinawa), I tend to agree. On the other, if he is challenging the naval character and concept of operational maneuver from the sea, he is mistaking the objectives of transformation. The Marine Corps is in fact embracing the expeditionary role, as Dunn proposes, and part of that expeditionary role is a forward deployed capability—consistently with Marine expeditionary units, occasionally as Marine expeditionary brigades, and with the potential for Marine expeditionary forces. Forward deployment means being deployed aboard ships, and the Marine Corps will still use that medium to launch operational forces in new assault amphibious vehicles, the current inventory of transport helicopters, and ultimately the Osprey. At the same time Marine forces will be equipped with sea-based air support from Harriers, Cobra gunships, and naval fixed-wing fighter/attack aircraft.

Dunn also incorrectly states that "only two [MEUs] are routinely forward deployed." The Marine Corps routinely has three MEUs forward deployed in the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, and Pacific. I dispute that MEUs offer "additional combat power, but not much." In most developing nations where America is arguably most likely to fight, I would venture that a Marine light armored reconnaissance company—with two 81mm vehicle mounted mortars, two mounted TOW missile launchers, eight 25mm machine guns, nineteen 7.62 pintle and coaxial-mounted machine guns (not to mention small arms)—does in fact add substantial combat power.

—Maj Patrick J. Carroll, USMC
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

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Welcomes your letters and comments.

FAX your correspondence to (202) 685-4219/
DSN 325-4219 or send it on the Internet
to JFQ1@ndu.edu