

Letters . . .

JUST-IN-TIME TRAINING

To the Editor—In “Developing Joint Education for the Total Force” (*JFQ*, Spring 00), John Driscoll points to an area that has long been ignored. He reminds us that the Reserve components are increasingly involved in joint missions and that this is a critical element of the new contract between the Nation and Reservists.

But there are other joint educational initiatives that complement those addressed by Driscoll. Since 1997 the Center for Civil Military Relations (CCMR) at the Naval Postgraduate School has included members of the Army National Guard in its international master’s degree program. These students have daily contact with peers from Partnership for Peace countries. In addition, part of the curriculum earns credit for Phase I under the Program for Joint Education. Consistent with difficulties which Driscoll cites, the National Guard has funded development of a distance learning program that has the advantages of bonding with their international counterparts while reducing time spent in residence. This program is being expanded to include students from the Air National Guard beginning January 2001.

This program has led to a new venture in which CCMR will teach pre-deployment, joint, and combined peace operations to total force units rotating to Bosnia. A week-long seminar will offer critical information, including interagency data for the extraordinary challenges facing NATO. Based on this experience, CCMR plans to expand training for both individuals and units deploying to other peace operations missions. These programs directly support the shaping component of national military strategy. They are low cost, high return, and just-in-time education and training. They will make a cost-effective complement to the efforts discussed by Driscoll.

—LTC Jonathan Czarnecki, ARNG
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ON DOCTRINE

To the Editor—When General Colin Powell approved the establishment of *Joint Force Quarterly* in 1992, he intended that the journal would inspire debate on joint matters. Thanks to Ronald Dietz for helping to stimulate such a dialogue on two subjects (see Letters, *JFQ*, Spring 00).

The first is *strategic attack*, defined by Joint Pub 1 as the “direct attack of enemy centers of gravity by air, missile, special operations, and other deep-ranging capabilities” to finesse the fact that all properly conceived campaigns contribute to

achieving strategic aims. This debate is nearly eighty years old, but as Dietz clearly indicates, it is as pertinent as ever. He states that strategic attack is “far more nuanced than the imprecise bludgeoning implied in [my article, “The Plight of Joint Doctrine after Kosovo” in *JFQ*, Summer 99]. Advanced technology offers unprecedented capability to strike centers of gravity in urban areas with less concern over excessive collateral damage. . . .” Dietz confuses capabilities with utility. Yet he begs the central question just as joint doctrine does: what precisely constitutes strategic centers of gravity that new sensor and shooter systems can strike with such deadly “one bomb for one target” precision? What effects can we predict from striking them?

In the Persian Gulf and Kosovo conflicts, strategic C² targets included leadership bunkers, bridges carrying fiber optic cable networks, monuments and buildings that were national symbols, power grids, and other targets that sustained enemy C⁴I but were also deemed important to morale. Other targets included WMD sites, ground and air forces, and critical industrial facilities. In Desert Storm practically all such targets identified by intelligence sources were struck, often repeatedly, with more sorties than envisioned in the original Instant Thunder concept. Their combined effects failed to win the war and often fell short of the desired effect; for example, the capability of Iraq to control strategic attacks with Scud missiles continued by primitive means (mainly motorcycle couriers).

On the other hand, the synergistic effects of strategic air, missile, and special operations attacks against Iraq were powerful. Though neither the Iraqi leadership nor the Iraqi people were cowed into surrender, or even giving up Kuwait without the ground assault, the ability of Saddam and his generals to understand the situation and control their forces (especially once operations accelerated under coalition ground attack) was seriously degraded. These impacts were crucial to the campaign’s rapid success.

Despite a decade of continued advances in the ability of the Armed Forces to accurately see and strike precisely, Kosovo seemed like déjà vu all over again. There were attacks on the Serbian leadership, bunkers, air assets, industrial sites, and

power grids—but none of them won the war. Just how much they contributed to success is a matter for debate. But once again a dictator resisted direct assaults on his psyche and leadership capacity.

This doesn’t denigrate the extraordinary accomplishments of airmen in the Kosovo conflict, but it does emphasize the need for debate over assumptions that underpin strategic attack doctrine, which infers that attacking enemy will—leaders, population, or both—and the capability of enemy leaders to control their forces and infrastructure—will win wars. This strategy has always seemed possible in theory as well as enticing. But no matter how accurate the weapons, or how crushing and terrifying their effects on civilian populations and infrastructure, popular will is more resistant and enemy leaders more impervious than supposed. The loss of military and industrial assets has a significant impact but on a delayed basis. In fact, the effects of strategic attacks appear somewhat akin to naval blockades—potentially powerful but slow to take effect.

Another outcome of strategic attacks is their link to the other options available to joint force commanders. Experience is clear: strategic attacks in combination with other tools of warfare have been indispensable in every American victory since World War II.

Thus “necessary but not sufficient” best assesses war-winning potential in attacks directed against strategic centers of gravity—not because of the tactical impact of attacking forces but rather the nature of target sets. That this fact disappoints those searching for a silver bullet is understandable, but dangerous if a nation is looking for cheap and easy military options to solve difficult issues.

Another question raised by Dietz involves the impact of casualties on the employment of the military. In asserting that I impugned the contribution of airmen and the “courage of all warriors” he misses a point that troubles many officers—making judgments based on surveys and anecdotal data. The issue is not the courage of soldiers, sailors, marines, or airmen. It is the moral courage of political leaders in the face of changing standards on the use of force. Media frenzies dramatize each casualty to an extent that senior officers are increasingly gun-shy on recommending options that may

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lead to the loss of life. This has nothing to do with airmen who understand joint doctrine and the potential consequences of an exaggerated aversion to casualties in applying that doctrine. In fact, air-power doctrine was the source of concepts that link maneuver and interdiction, concepts indicating the enormous advantages of applying both capabilities synergistically.

No military leader wants to lose lives, and certainly no more than needed to accomplish the mission. But today they must face certain realities: smaller families, erosion of patriotism, the role of the media, and restrictions imposed under international law. Moreover, were cruise missiles the only tactical means of striking Osama bin Laden or the best weapon available in the joint tool box? Did decisionmakers rule out manned aircraft or special

operations capabilities? Must ground forces in the Balkans operate under force protection measures that inhibit the mission?

I do not claim to have definitive answers to these concerns, but I trust that readers of *JFQ* will join in a debate on matters that reside disturbingly close to the heart of the joint doctrine.

—COL Peter F. Herry, USA (Ret.)
Paris, France

MUTUAL FEARS

To the Editor—In his article “Nuclear Proliferation on the Indian Subcontinent” (*JFQ*, Spring 00), Kenneth Totty argues that domestic policies and a drive for regional hegemony have pushed India to

acquire nuclear weapons and that Pakistan is unlikely to forego a nuclear capability as long as India has one. But I would disagree with his claim that Indian foreign policy is nonaligned and that tensions in South Asia exist because Pakistan is obsessed with its powerful neighbor, India. He states that the average Pakistani thinks India wants to destroy his nation and make it a province, even though annexing territory with millions of Muslims would be against India’s interests.

Are Pakistan’s fears rational? Looking at its relationship with India since independence can be instructive. At partition in 1947, a large fraction of the Indian Army opted to join Pakistan, and the British asked India to provide it with a fair share of arms and ammunition. However, Indian leaders

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blocked the shipment of most of this equipment, and some openly spoke of the need to annul partition. This created a grave sense of insecurity and drove the Pakistanis into alliances with the United States. In later years, India sent its forces into the princely state of Hyderabad, whose ruler did not want to join the federation, and annexed it. This was contrary to the principles India had used to justify accession when Kashmir's Hindu ruler wanted to join the federation while the Muslim population was not given the right to self-determination.

In the wake of India's border war with China in 1962, the United States and Britain rushed large quantities of sophisticated military supplies to New Delhi. Washington asked Islamabad not to use this opportunity to take any action in Kashmir, and Pakistan complied. India used the new equipment to form six mountain divisions to defend itself against a Chinese invasion that Pakistan argued was infeasible to conduct across the Himalayas and inconsistent with Chinese objectives. Several mountain divisions later saw action against Pakistan, and now are deployed in Kashmir to fight insurgents. In an act of hostility, India exploited Pakistan's difficulties in its eastern province in 1971 to dismember the country. Many senior officers in the Indian military wanted to destroy the Pakistani military on the western borders but were prevented by American pressure.

India's strong ties to the former Soviet Union turned its nonalignment policy into a slogan. New Delhi signed a 30-year treaty with Moscow in 1971 and recently renewed it with Russia for another 30 years. India has recently entered into a \$3 billion military agreement with Russia for the joint production and marketing of sophisticated military hardware, including T-90 main battle tanks and SU-30

MKI long-range fighters. Its air force has hundreds of MiG-21 and MiG-27 fighters manufactured under Soviet license. Russia is also providing the aircraft carrier *Admiral Gorshkov* cost free because India is buying MiG-29s to base on it. India is also considering the acquisition and production of nuclear submarines from Russia.

Pakistan is painfully aware that the Indian Strike Corps, equipped with Russian weapons, remains poised to cut Pakistani in two. Prithvi surface-to-surface missiles, deployed with units on the Punjab border, can wreak havoc on Pakistani forces farther north. Nor can Pakistan ignore the political signal contained in the location of India's nuclear weapons test site at Pokhran, less than 100 miles from the border. Thus it is not surprising that Pakistanis live in fear of India.

Unfortunately, nuclear weapons have not improved the security of either Pakistan or India, since both countries live in mortal fear of each other. The greatest threat to many countries can come from an exaggerated sense of insecurity that causes beligerent responses.

Both India and Pakistan would be better off by reducing military expenditures and diverting resources to human development. Spending a billion dollars on an *Agosta*-class submarine or \$40 million on a SU-30 fighter makes it difficult to reduce poverty and illiteracy, bigger threats to long-term security on a subcontinent prone to ethnic, sectarian, religious, and ideological violence.

—Ahmed Faruqi
Danville, California

READY FOR WHAT?

To the Editor—News accounts of unready Army divisions, recruiting shortfalls, and officer retention rates portray a military that is seriously overstretched by a strategy that posits two nearly simultaneous major theater wars (MTWs). Signs of a return to the so-called hollow force—combined with a new administration and another Quadrennial Defense Review—make it expedient to examine strategic assumptions. In "Rethinking Two War Strategies" (*JFQ*, Spring 2000), Michael O'Hanlon makes a good start at it, but he doesn't go far enough in his appreciation of the new world disorder.

O'Hanlon is generally correct in stating that "the notion of two Desert Storms has outlived its usefulness" and inhibits innovation needed for the future. His argument has high-level support. General Wesley Clark, USA, stated "the two-war concept was never a strategy for the employment of forces . . . it was only designed to retain the force structure we already had." Another flag officer depicted the two-MTW construct as "a bayonet thrust into the wall to preserve a force structure that was in free fall." Even during the Cold War, the Nation could not have dealt with an invasion of Western Europe and an attack across the 38th parallel in Korea; fighting two major wars at once was never a reasonable planning standard for a democracy in peacetime.

While providing a sound discussion of the reduced threat to U.S. forces in the Middle East and Korea and a valid rationale for reducing time, effort, and money invested in organizing, training, and equipping troops for such contingencies, O'Hanlon misses the mark in assessing changes that have vastly increased demands for operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Missions variously known as military operations other than war (MOOTW), stability operations, and peace support operations strain forces today and promise to inexorably erode capabilities unless the force structure is reconfigured to better meet the demands of a strategy of engagement and enlargement.

The Army, as the proponent for MOOTW doctrine, conducts "sustained military operations on land to secure the Nation's interests at home and abroad." The Navy and the Air Force will also face changes as the Armed Forces move to a "Desert Storm plus Desert Shield plus Bosnia plus Kosovo plus another peacekeeping mission" force needed to implement national security strategy.

Although O'Hanlon suggests reconfiguring the Army to the extent of "adding a division for a major peace operation," he doesn't go far enough. One peacekeeping division will not suffice to meet even current demands, and requirements are likely to increase. The *three-for-one rule* must be applied to all peace support operations. Maintaining one



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brigade in Bosnia ties up a full division as one brigade is deployed, another trains to replace it, and a third stands down and prepares for future operations. The brigade in Kosovo similarly occupies a full division. There is no sign that either mission will end soon nor that the United States will relinquish its commitment to peace and stability elsewhere in the world. A commitment to peace operations, like conventional war, requires boots on the ground for an extended time.

We should specialize ground forces, creating a heavy corps as a strategic reserve that trains exclusively for high-intensity conflict; a middleweight corps optimized for peace-enforcement like the interim brigades under development at Fort Lewis; and a light corps for strategic deployment, urban warfare, and peacekeeping. Each would fight outnumbered and win—but have specialized doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and mindset for its assigned roles.

One option is pulling America back from its position as the indispensable nation. But the next administration is unlikely to diminish our role in the world. It behooves us to begin making the difficult transition from a Cold War force justified by an outmoded two-war strategy toward the kinds of forces the Nation will need to increase democracy and preserve security.

—MAJ John A. Nagl, USA
U.S. Army Command and General
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To the Editor—“Rethinking Two War Strategies” by Michael O’Hanlon is an informative piece on planning around a two-major-theater-war (MTW) strategy based on North Korea and Iraq. The author proposes an alternative to that construct with a Desert Storm plus Desert Shield plus Bosnia plan. But he omits several key issues. First, as a globally engaged superpower, the United States must be capable of being in two places at once or risk being relegated to the status of a regional power. In switching to any smaller strategy one must visualize the consequences. The Nation will remain a global power for the foreseeable future. But if it does not retain the ability of a superpower with strong budgets and adequate forces, reduced capabilities could subject the Nation to higher risks. And it should be noted that the two-war posture is not a strategy but rather a force planning metric.

A one-MTW plus one-lesser included MTW plus smaller-scale contingency posture is not so undemanding after first glance. Any smaller capability than two-MTWs is not a pat formula for even modest personnel reductions. O’Hanlon declares that a new strategy “would permit a force posture more conducive to executing the types of missions that have recently strained the military.” This assertion is flawed because civilian and military leaders

do not build a force posture to execute specific missions but rather to support U.S. national objectives. Engagement and enlargement and shape, respond, and prepare are our current respective national security and military strategies, not fighting a war in the Persian Gulf and another conflict on the Korean peninsula.

It is operating tempo, aging equipment, and inadequate endstrength—and not a two-MTW construct—that are causing wear on the Armed Forces. It is shortsighted to presume that a strategy focused more on smaller-scale contingencies is a recipe for a reduced endstrength. If the military is strained under current force structure by enforcing no-fly zones and conducting peace operations, a change to a less-than-two-MTW strategy may in fact exacerbate operating tempo, personnel tempo, and the aging equipment problems these tasks bring about. Attempting to save money by planning for the arguably smaller and cheaper wars of today will only exacerbate long-term risks. Forces can and should be sized around current contingencies as well as those envisioned for the future.

O’Hanlon may be correct in saying that something must be sacrificed, assuming the unlikely case that the defense budget will be increased to sustain the current force structure and planned modernization. But under his proposal missions that have caused strains will not go away and neither will the need to modernize and transform, particularly for the Army. It is not surprising that since the last Quadrennial Defense Review, strains on land, sea, and air forces have grown as requirements increased. The Nation will remain globally engaged based on its values of democracy and free trade. Thus its military must have the capability to respond to any conflict, from major theater wars to humanitarian assistance. General Shinseki’s vision for transforming the Army ensures this capability. Transformation is more than new equipment, it is a process that includes training, doctrine, and leadership development.

“The alternative is attempting to prevail in simultaneous worst-case scenarios in the Persian Gulf and Korea,” according to O’Hanlon, “at the expense of readiness, research, and preparing for the future.” It defies rational thought to presume the Armed Forces are prepared if they are unable to perform core warfighting missions. A force that is ready to fight two nearly simultaneous wars is by definition ready to patrol streets in Kosovo or Bosnia, while the opposite can hardly be said.

The next QDR will be more than a document or strategy alternative; it is a critical process whose outcome will be vital to transforming the Army. Regardless of which strategy is proposed, land forces

will remain indispensable. The two-MTW posture may remain useful to hedge against uncertain threats and probable conflicts. If done correctly, the QDR process can identify the range of missions the Armed Forces are likely to confront. The focus should not be on predicting major theater wars of the future or savings that can be made in endstrength, but on maintaining the role of the United States as the only superpower under any force construct.

—LTG Theodore G. Stroup, Jr., USA (Ret.)
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To the Editor—Your recent article by Michael O’Hanlon resurrected many ideas that have been under discussion at the U.S. Army War College. The author is accurate in pointing out that the possibility of two major theater wars (MTWs) still exists. Preparing for one war is an invitation to having something nasty arise elsewhere, and the United States is the only power able to stabilize through deterrence by virtue of its massive power. The larger problem, as he argues under “Something Has to Give,” is that even a two-MTW force sizing matrix is not adequate for existing or projected requirements. In that respect, the DS-DS-+Bosnia formula has merit but still does not do what is needed.

In one sense, the real issue is readiness to do many things and the artificiality of attempting to maintain everyone at C-1 all the time. The hard cold fact is that the Army is an expeditionary force—as defined by Joint Pub 1 if nothing else. Given that, the real requirement is to accept it as fact and adapt to the requirements that flow from it. Real expeditionary forces operate on long wave cycles compared to present operations. This requires a very different infrastructure management system and institutional flexibility that will be difficult to adopt.

The Marine Corps and Navy have operated as expeditionary forces for a long time. Their entire organizations are focused on a cycle that creates, trains, deploys, employs, and recovers. This system hits Army War College students in the face every March during the Strategic Crisis Exercise as student regional CINCs holler for more carriers, then gradually learn that some of them are in the service life extension program and will not be available for months! This is not another case of *USS Yorktown* returning from the Coral Sea and going through super-accelerated refit for Midway. This five-phase system would be new to the Army but would allow it to tackle present and future obligations with less strain on the force and better use of available resources.

O’Hanlon’s DS-DS-+Bosnia formula will, by his calculations, net a 5–10 percent reduction in active forces and he argues that allies should be added into any equation. The difficulty is that the United States will not always operate with allies. It

is just as likely that the Armed Forces may be operating with coalition partners with which they have little in common. As an expeditionary force, the Army might require more people, who can be afforded, but only if Congress and the American public are convinced that the increase is connected to a serious reconfiguration that will provide a significantly better cost-benefit ratio.

Adopting an expeditionary mentality and infrastructure to support it would allow the force to always have units ready for major war or various contingencies. Some would be trained for one and some for another. Overexpansion will certainly be needed in low-density/high-demand units, but the

fact is that most current missions—even those resembling police actions—can't be executed by military police units without tactical combat savvy and tanks, artillery, and air support—in other words, unless they are combat units. Thus creating unique mission units is not a productive use of assets. The basic elements of all missions continue to rest on disciplined, combat-trained forces. The British experience in Northern Ireland provides evidence that combat units can perform such tasks and recover without damage once the purposes of retraining are understood.

A 200,000-strong expeditionary force suggested by O'Hanlon is reasonable given current and

projected capabilities to move it strategically. Other assets would be needed to rapidly augment this force if necessary. Though many imponderables remain, the proposition that rapid response is important goes back at least to Instant Ready Force, which General Douglas MacArthur originated as Chief of Staff of the Army in the 1930s. If we could get a high-lethality brigade on the ground in any region within 96 hours, it could go a long way toward reducing the need for 500,000 troops in six months. The calculus is problematic and situation-dependent, but the argument seems sound.

—COL Douglas V. Johnson, USA (Ret.)
U.S. Army War College

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