




A Common PERSPECTIVE

US Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center
Doctrine Division's Newsletter

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PERSONNEL RECOVERY



FROM THE EDITOR


This issue introduces Jim Tritten, the new Executive Editor of *A Common Perspective*. Jim has been at US Joint Forces Command since February 1996 in a training capacity and has now returned to his doctrine roots. Jim was at the Naval Doctrine Command from 1993-1996 and taught doctrine at the Naval Postgraduate School from 1986-1993. He is the author of *A Doctrine Reader* published by the Naval War College Press as well as numerous articles on naval doctrine, military strategy, and a variety of other related subjects. For those of you who have been told that Navies don't do doctrine, Jim will be happy to show you copies of US Navy doctrine from the 1920s-1940s as well as his historical research documenting Navy doctrine since at least the year 1270.

This issue begins our newsletter's transition to a paperless form. The Chairman mandated a transition to paperless joint doctrine last year and most Service doctrine organizations have already started down this path. Our plan for *A Common Perspective* is to start by including longer versions of articles, endnotes, and accompanying diagrams, etc., on the *A Common Perspective* Web page (start at <http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil/dodnato/jw100/>, next click on "Registered Users" (password required), then click on "A Common Perspective"). The reader of the paper version will be referred to the Web for the expanded text or other amplifying information such as PowerPoint® slides. We plan to expand this effort over time with additional articles posted on the Web page that are not found in the paper version. Eventually, we hope to maintain a current Web page where contributors will be able to see their work "published" more quickly than the existing process allows. A number of professional military and civilian journals now do this with book reviews and other review articles. If the shift to postings on the Web appears to be successful, we will consider elimination of the paper version or perhaps shift it to publication of articles that are judged to have won an award of merit. If you have any good ideas on this, please send them to us.


The JWFC Doctrine Division recently completed an analysis of the overall implications from the shift to paperless joint doctrine. The analysis suggests that there are a number of systemic, exercise/training, and technical issues that beg solutions. For example, we changed the format of joint doctrine years ago to make it more appealing to the reader. As we go paperless, if the new method of reading is via hand-held device, then it is unlikely to be accompanied by graphics, as we now know them.

The issues associated with the shift to paperless joint doctrine ought to be addressed in a transition plan that identifies the stakeholders, surfaces issues, outlines feasible courses of action, and involves all of you. We seek your opinions and desire to use this newsletter as a forum for discussion for this and other doctrinal issues. A doctrine process that does not include discussion and a healthy debate of controversial issues is a doctrine process that is just going through the motions and not reaching its full potential.

We look forward to receipt of your ideas, articles, reviews, etc., and enjoying you in a great debate.



Dr. James Tritten
Executive Editor



Josiah McSpedden & Bob Hubner
Managing Editors

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MESSAGE FROM THE ACTING COMMANDER, USJFCOM JWFC

By Brig Gen James B. Smith, USAF

I would like to share my thoughts with you on the important role that joint doctrine plays in our Armed Forces. US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Warfighting Center's (JWFC's) role contains two major components: the "keeper of the flame" and concepts development. Consequently, USJFCOM JWFC has been entrusted with a number of key responsibilities associated with training and doctrine. USJFCOM serves as the Chairman's lead agent for joint training. We act as an advocate for the concept of joint training—using a joint training system that is intended to ensure training is consistent with approved joint doctrine. USJFCOM also is a center of excellence for strategic and operational level jointness and the senior comprehensive center of excellence for joint operational art.

An integral part of the "keeper of the flame" is USJFCOM JWFC's role as the integrating center for joint doctrine projects and issues. Joint doctrine establishes the fundamentals of joint operations and the guidance on how best to employ national military power to achieve strategic ends. It provides the common terms, concepts, and perspective, which fundamentally shape the way the Armed Forces of the United States plan and execute joint operations. USJFCOM JWFC facilitates the conceptualization, development, and revision of joint doctrine by analyzing all proposed/approved joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) publications for content and applicability. We review all drafts and proposed joint publications for compliance with joint doctrine, policy, and other joint guidance; and for horizontal and vertical consistency with other emerging and approved joint doctrine. USJFCOM JWFC also reviews emerging joint and multinational doctrine and TTP to ensure horizontal and vertical consistency with approved joint publications. USJFCOM JWFC normally is assigned



the responsibility to act as the Chairman's assessment agent for joint publications and evaluation agent for test publications. We also conduct research and studies on designated doctrinal issues and *A Common Perspective* is used to report on the results of such efforts.

The second major role we play at USJFCOM JWFC is that of concepts development. MG Scott Wallace wrote about that role in the previous issue of *A Common Perspective*. USJFCOM JWFC reviews and coordinates concepts for employment of emerging technology and capabilities. These concepts may become the basis for future joint doctrine or JTTP for employment of the emerging technology and capabilities. The partnership between concepts or future doctrine and approved joint doctrine is an area that we are still exploring as we develop our *Command Transformation Strategy*.

A Common Perspective plays a significant role in the debates over new policy, concepts, and proposals that may prompt changes to joint doctrine. For example, this issue's feature article (page 6) focuses on the implications of the new DOD personnel recovery policy. Your contributions to this newsletter are important to the joint community. I encourage you to contact our editors with your suggestions and articles so that *A Common Perspective* will continue to be used as a vehicle for the refinement of joint doctrine.



USJFCOM JWFC DOC-DIV UPDATES

**By Lt Col Nathan Toth, USAF, USJFCOM
JWFC, Chief, Doctrine Division**

The Doctrine Division recently welcomed several new members. **LCDR Dan Fuhrman** came across Tidewater from NAS Oceana. Dan will be our lead for key publications such as JP 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*, and JP 3-70, *Joint Doctrine for Strategic Attack*. **Dr. Jim Tritten** transferred from another USJFCOM division—he has a strong background in naval doctrine and will be working with the Navy on JP 3-32, *Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations*. He also has been tasked to start development of a doctrine outreach program for academia (and others) to help broaden the community of experts that studies joint warfare. **LTC George Bilafer**, an aviator with special operations experience, will be working, among others, JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*. **Mr. Bob Brodel**, whom many will remember as a previous Doctrine Division chief, has rejoined the team to help work homeland security/defense (HLS/D) doctrine initiatives. Finally, because old doctrinaires never die, they just go to USJFCOM JWFC, **Mr. Steve Senkovich** is the latest addition to the team. "Senk" will be responsible for coordinating USJFCOM reviews of joint doctrine and will assist in the review of Allied Joint Publications.

Like many organizations, Doctrine Division was directly impacted by recent events. Roughly fifty percent of the division has been assigned additional tasks related to HLS/D. Please see page 18 for the status of JWFC action officers ("+" indicates performing other duties). Further, we are reviewing the available and emerging joint doctrine related to HLS/D to outline a flexible doctrine development/revision game plan that can be responsive to emerging DOD policies and organizations.

Since the last issue of *A Common Perspective*, we have witnessed considerable progress in the approval of some key joint publications. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, was signed in July 2001. USJFCOM and JWFC helped craft language used to resolve the "halt phase" issue in JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, ensuring a successful Tank process—JP 3-0 was approved in September 2001. Including approval of JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, in November 2000; the three capstone/keystone publications that most influence the entire joint doctrine hierarchy have been promulgated within the past year.

The Joint Staff and USJFCOM JWFC also were instrumental in resolving contentious issues on JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*, eliminating the need for Tank sessions. Additionally, JP 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, was signed in September 2001.

The JWFC continues to explore the role of joint doctrine in Transformation. More specifically, we are examining if adjustments to the joint doctrine development system are needed to facilitate Transformation. JP 1 states that joint doctrine serves as an "engine of change." That is, doctrine is a method to implement change, and provides the conceptual basis to assess and revise doctrine and concepts for the future. However, the devil is in the details, and there is little concrete guidance on how to actually carry out the JP 1 mandate. From the macro view, this may require nothing more than a better process to integrate the Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan with the joint doctrine development system. But, we need to look at both the process and the hierarchy for ways to be more responsive. Process changes coupled with technology improvements, such as the Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System, could begin to make doctrine a true engine of change. USJFCOM JWFC will continue to engage on this vital piece and share ideas with the joint community through *A Common Perspective*, Joint Doctrine Working Parties (JDWPs), and other forums.

ASSESSMENT BRANCH

It has been one year since the October 2000 JDWP voted, and the Joint Staff J7 (JS J7) approved, the change in the maintenance of joint publications. One of the major changes in the system eliminates the mid-term or first formal assessment. USJFCOM JWFC now conducts an informal "preliminary" assessment and makes a recommendation to the JS J7 as to whether an early formal assessment is needed or to wait until just prior to the five-year normal revision period to conduct the formal assessment. The second major change allows USJFCOM JWFC, with concurrence from the lead agent (LA), to write the revision first draft (RFD). Additionally, USJFCOM JWFC and the LA will co-chair joint working groups to resolve critical and major assessment issues and develop the revision program directive (PD) for further staffing by the JS J7. Change 1 to JP 1-01, *Joint Doctrine Development System*, was approved on 29 June 2001 and reflects these changes. These changes have reduced the amount of time spent on responding to formal assessments and staffing PDs, and provided the LA with the option of preparing the RFD or allowing the USJFCOM JWFC, under the guidance of the LA, to prepare the RFD. Comments to the RFD will then be sent back to the LA for preparation of the revision second draft.

In the last six months, the following joint publications received a preliminary assessment and were recommended

for a **scheduled five-year revision**: JP 1-06, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Financial Management During Joint Operations*; JP 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*; JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*; and JP 3-33, *Joint Force Capabilities*.

USJFCOMJWFC Doctrine Division recently prepared the JP 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*, RFD for worldwide review. Additionally, we are in the process of preparing the RFD for 13 other joint publications: JP 3-02.2, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation*; JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*; JP 3-07.1, *Joint, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*; JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*; JP 3-50, *Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery*; JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*; JP 3-54, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Security*, JP 3-58, *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception*; JP 4-01.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to Joint Operations*; JP 4-01.6, *Joint, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore (JLOTS)*; JP 4-01.7, *Joint, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Use of Intermodal Containers in Joint Operations*; JP 4-02.2, *Joint, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Patient Movement in Joint Operations*; and JP 4-06, *Joint, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations*. The LA is preparing the RFD for six publications: JP 3-01.1, *Aerospace Defense of North America*; JP 3-12, *Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations*; JP 3-12.1, *Joint, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning*; JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*; JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*; and JP 6-02, *Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems*.

The following joint publications are scheduled, as indicated, for preliminary assessments:

- **October 2001**: JPs 3-51, *Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare* and 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support to Joint Operations*
- **November 2001**: JP 2-01.3, *Joint, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*
- **December 2001**: JPs 3-34, *Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations* and 4-01.8, *Joint, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration*
- **January 2002**: JP 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments*

- **February 2002**: JP 4-01.4, *Joint, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution*

The following publications will undergo a scheduled final assessment:

- **October 2001**: JP 3-54, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Security*
- **November 2001**: JP 3-03, *Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations*
- **April 2002**: JP 3-07.5, *Joint, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*

We appreciate everyone's efforts in accepting positive change and in making the assessment and revision processes more efficient and responsive to the joint warfighter. Your input is always welcome. Questions and comments should be directed to Lt Col Nathan Toth, USAF, at DSN 668-6101 or e-mail: tothn@jwfc.jfcom.mil.

DEVELOPMENT BRANCH

Ten publications were approved in the past six months as well as Change #1 to JP 1-01, *Joint Doctrine Development System*. The others include the *Joint Doctrine Primer*; JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*; JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*; JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*; JP 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*; JP 3-07.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*; JP 3-18, *Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations*; JP 4-02, *Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations*; JP 4-04, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support*; and JP 4-07, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common-User Logistics in Joint Operations*. Due to recent events numerous publication milestones have been slipped. Currently there are 13 joint publications (eight under development/five in revision) that, without further delays, are scheduled for approval in the next six months. See the list on page 17.

If you are looking for further information on the development of a particular joint publication, go online to <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine> and click on the "Joint Publication Status" button. That Web page should provide you the information you want. Otherwise, questions or comments should be directed to LTC Keith Greene, USA, Chief, Joint Publication Development Branch, at DSN 668-6102 or e-mail: greenek@jwfc.jfcom.mil.



PERSONNEL RECOVERY:

Getting Down to the Who, Where, and What

By Maj Fred "VC" Van Cleave, USAF, HQ Air Force Doctrine Center, Chief, Joint Special Operations and Personnel Recovery Branch

"Personnel recovery continues to be an issue of the highest national priority. Our service men and women, our allies and coalition partners, must believe that if they become isolated we will do everything in our power to ensure they return with honor."

**Robert L. Jones,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs**

INTRODUCTION

Words mean things—a popular adage that should ring true with our military lingo, but often doesn't. Sometimes words and phrases are used loosely, taken out of context, and key definitions themselves may be riddled with redundancies or infer unintended constraints. The latest Department of Defense (DOD) definition of personnel recovery (PR) seems to have become a casualty to this—crying out for a rescue all its own. Although better than the current DOD dictionary definition, this one contains redundancies, is too long, and conflicts with PR policy in a few key areas.¹ This isn't to suggest there hasn't been a lot of great work put forth to develop a definition. Simply put, when too many of even the finest chefs cosset the same omelet, you'll still end up with scrambled eggs.

Through an examination of some common misconceptions about PR and a review of some existing DOD terms, this article will propose a better definition of PR for our revised PR joint doctrine. Specifically, this article uses PR policy as a springboard to answer:

- Who *specifically* is PR conducted for?
- Where—in what *operational environments* is PR conducted?
- What are the *specific methods and activities* of PR?
- What is a more *clear, concise, and accurate definition* of PR?

DOD Directive 2310.2, *Personnel Recovery*, defines PR as: "*The aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to recover captured, detained, evading, isolated or missing personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas. Personnel recovery*

*may occur through military action, action by non-governmental organizations, other U.S. Government-approved action, and diplomatic initiatives, or through any combination of these options. Although personnel recovery may occur during non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), NEO is not a subset of personnel recovery."*² As presented below, perhaps the latest and greatest—isn't that great.

THE WHO—PERSONNEL RECOVERY IS NOT FOR JUST "ANYONE"

In analyzing the "who" aspects of PR, it's important to understand the meaning of the word "personnel." A common misnomer is that PR applies to the recovery of "anyone," to include those who have no affiliation with a US-sponsored activity. Within DOD, personnel is defined as "*those individuals required in either a military or civilian capacity to accomplish the assigned mission*"³ Webster supports our military lingo by relegating the term to a collective body of persons employed by or active in an organization.⁴ Therefore, while military and civilian individuals on an assigned mission are people, not all people are "personnel." Isn't this really a parsing of words? Yes, it certainly is—and an understanding of this one word clears up a lot of confusion over whom PR is for. To misunderstand the meaning of personnel could result in misapplication of the general principles of written PR policy. In consonance with the definition of personnel, DODD 2310.2 states: "*Preserving the lives and well-being of U.S. military, DOD civilian and contract service employees placed in danger of being isolated, beleaguered, detained, captured or having to evade while participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity or mission is one of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense.*"⁵

"It is DOD policy to implement timely and effective procedures to enhance personnel recovery operations, to determine accurately the status of those who are unaccounted for, . . ."⁶ Exceptions to the "personnel" stipulation are very limited. For example, published PR policy provides that PR measures may be initiated for allied or coalition personnel,⁷ and also that the span of persons for whom PR may apply can be expanded by the National Command Authorities (NCA).⁸ Specifically included with these possible exceptions are support to other governments, agencies, and organizations.⁹

PR policy also makes combatant commanders responsible for planning and executing PR operations within their areas of responsibility and directs them to include PR as an *integral part of all operational planning and training*.¹⁰ Further, each military Department and US Special Operations Command are to ensure that PR capabilities (facilities, equipment, training, personnel, etc.) are developed, programmed, and budgeted to accommodate the PR requirements of the Services and the combatant commands.¹¹ To this end, it's clear that PR is a high-priority within DOD, and a robust PR capability is required to be integrated into all of our operations.

What about those persons who by definition, are not personnel or are not members of organizations given special exception by the NCA? The answer is simple: those persons are outside the scope of PR policy. This doesn't mean we don't sometimes use DOD PR assets to save the lives of those who aren't "personnel"—it just means when it's done, it's not PR. A prominent and often confused example is "civil search and rescue" (SAR). DOD policy acknowledges that our capabilities inherent to PR can be used to support the civil SAR system, with some necessary constraints: *"The Department of Defense shall support Civil Search and Rescue efforts on a strict not-to-interfere basis with primary military duties, roles, and missions in accordance with applicable national directives, plans, guidelines, policy, and agreements."*¹²

The 1999 National Search and Rescue Plan is one such (interagency) agreement that captures DOD's support to civil SAR very well, clearly acknowledging when this activity may be supported: *"Department of Defense (DOD) components have facilities and other resources that are used to support their own operations. These resources may be used for civil search and rescue needs on a not-to-interfere basis with military missions. . . . Civil SAR does not include operations such as . . . military operations, such as combat SAR or other types of recovery by military operations to remove military or civilian personnel from harm's way."*¹⁴

A noble principle of civil SAR is that it is used to assist any person in distress, without regard to nationality, status, or circumstances.¹⁵ This makes the scope of persons for whom civil SAR is done much broader than for PR—and to misinterpret that *DOD support to civil SAR* is PR only opens the door to confusion. Whether DOD PR resources are used for civil SAR as part of theater engagement, are directed to rescue "non-personnel" for humanitarian reasons (e.g., disaster response), or by virtue of being on-scene and able to render assistance to comply with various legal conventions, these capabilities are provided as a coordinated interagency plug-in to support civil authorities—none of them are PR.

Unlike US joint military and multinational operations, civil SAR's domain is a civil system, carried out using its own terminology, standards, and procedures developed and managed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and International Maritime Organization (IMO).¹⁶ Consequently, DOD has little to no control over these, and in numerous instances they are homonymic and incompatible with the established PR lexicon that is consistent with DOD military operations as a whole. Therefore, understanding the distinction between PR and civil SAR and their interagency relationship is important, not only to avoid confusion of who PR is for and its high priority per DOD policy, but also to avoid a "mixed bag" of terminology and procedures.

PR is not even for *all* personnel. That is, for a PR effort to be effected, personnel must be isolated or have a specific "missing status"—they must be missing

involuntarily. The DOD dictionary borrows from the United States Code (USC) in defining "missing" as: *"A casualty status for which the United States Code provides statutory guidance concerning missing members of the Military Services. Excluded are personnel who are in an absent without leave, deserter, or dropped-from-rolls status."*¹⁷ The definition goes on to explain various categories of "missing," to include *beleaguered, besieged, captured, detained, interned, and missing in action*.¹⁸ Each status has its own definition published in the DOD dictionary. Within the PR definition are the words, "captured, detained, evading, isolated or missing." Since "captured" and "detained" included in the current PR definition are already inherent with "missing," they do not need to be listed separately in that definition. There is also some redundancy by use of both "evading" and "isolated." The DOD dictionary defines isolated personnel as *"military or civilian personnel separated from their unit or organization in an environment requiring them to survive, evade, or escape while awaiting rescue or recovery."*¹⁹ Given that evasion is inherent to being isolated, the word "evading" is also not necessary. It may be more useful to shorten language in the PR definition from *"captured, detained, evading, isolated or missing"* to simply, *"isolated or missing"*—without any loss to the original meaning.

Also misunderstood at times is what "missing person" means. Quite different from the civil context used by law enforcement authorities and other government agencies, DOD defines a "missing person" to include a:

- *"Member of the Armed Forces on active duty or Reserve component performing official duties that is in a missing status."*²⁰
- *"Civilian employee of the DOD or DOD contractor that serves in direct support of, or accompanies, the Armed Forces in the field under orders and who is in a missing status."*²¹

Clearly, the above description is narrower than the range of persons who would be rescued via the civil SAR system. It also remains consistent to the very important word, "personnel."

The reality of the "who" aspects of PR is that it is a high priority for DOD, necessarily conducted for a much narrower scope of persons than is civil SAR. As a general rule, if we're not recovering personnel, we're not doing personnel recovery. Further, PR efforts are undertaken for those who are *isolated or missing*, each of which have distinct, clearly defined meanings.

THE WHERE—PERSONNEL RECOVERY IS DONE IN ANY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The PR definition refers to the recovery of personnel *"from uncertain or hostile environments and denied"*
(Continued on next page)

areas." This verbiage conflicts with the *text* of DOD policy and is unrealistically constraining in that the type of environment where personnel are isolated or missing may be unknown. PR should be defined in a manner where it is clear that PR efforts will be initiated for *personnel*, as necessary, before they depart *on an assigned mission or participate in a US-sponsored activity*—regardless of the type of environment in which they are operating.

An operational environment is defined as "*a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander.*"²² Some examples of operational environments include:

- **Hostile:** Hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct.²³
- **Uncertain:** Host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area.²⁴
- **Permissive:** Host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.²⁵

Each of the above has clear DOD military connotations for the employment of forces. It's worth mentioning here that uncertain environments can contain the innocuous characteristics of permissive environments, but may quickly deteriorate into hostile environments. In addition to hostile and uncertain environments, the current definition of PR includes "denied areas," defined as "*an area under enemy or unfriendly control in which friendly forces cannot expect to operate successfully within existing operational constraints and force capabilities.*"²⁶ This definition suggests that in order for PR efforts to be successful, it may be necessary to remove constraints, alter force capabilities by using supplemental or different forces, or even alter the environment itself.

Conspicuously absent from the PR definition are "permissive" environments, the most common environment in which our military forces operate. For example, permissive environments are: often traversed by friendly forces on their way to and from objective areas; they are operated within by forces integrated with or providing support to those who are operating in non-permissive environments; or our forces operate entirely within permissive environments to accomplish US objectives. All of these forces are "accomplishing their assigned missions," all are "personnel," and "preserving the lives and well-being" of all of them is a "high priority" of DOD.²⁷

The exclusion of "permissive" environments from the DOD definition of PR has perhaps led to a common misunderstanding that "SAR" conducted by DOD forces

for their personnel is synonymous with "civil SAR." However, the two are unmistakably different if their contexts are understood. Civil SAR is done for "property" as well as for "persons" in actual or potential distress;²⁸ in the civil SAR system; "search" and "rescue" are separate processes based on international conventions ("SAR" is simply a collective term in the civil SAR system); neither civil SAR nor SAR are defined in the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual or National SAR Plan;²⁹ and civil SAR is not a defined mission or activity for DOD military forces. Although military forces of some foreign governments do indeed conduct civil SAR as one of their missions due to their governmental and support structure, even multinational doctrine distinguishes between civil SAR and SAR. For example Allied Joint Publication-3.3, *Joint Air and Space Operations Doctrine*, states: "*According to the provisions of the ICAO and IMO, SAR is a national responsibility that is often delegated to its Armed Forces for peacetime operations. . . . Military SAR assets may be used to assist host nation civil authorities when the task does not interfere with military requirements.*"³⁰ Conversely, SAR exists within DOD's military framework—specifically for personnel, and has long been defined as: "*The use of aircraft, surface craft (land or water), submarines, specialized rescue teams, and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea.*"³¹

DOD military forces who recover an overboard sailor or an airman who's bailed out of an aircraft over friendly territory—are by all intents and purposes in the text of PR policy, conducting PR. These forces have specific procedures integrated with their other military operations to get their personnel back, and they do it anywhere operations are conducted, to include permissive environments. DOD's PR policy also provides that a specific type of operational environment (or hostile action) is not a qualifier: "*The scope of persons for whom the United States will undertake Personnel Recovery is not limited to situations involving hostile action or circumstances suggestive of hostile action.*"³² *Personnel Recovery measures may be initiated for personnel (U.S., allied, or coalition) who become unaccounted for as a result of training exercises, operations other than war wherein hostile action is not involved and operational environments not involving hostile action.*"³³

To be consistent with PR policy and the reality of how our forces are employed, PR should not be defined using operational environments as a qualifier—it gets back to who is being recovered (personnel). Therefore, the PR definition should be modified to reflect that PR is done in "any operational environment" in which "personnel" are "isolated or missing" (See Figure 1). Once the joint community becomes more comfortable that PR can occur "anywhere" in the physical battlespace, the phraseology about operational environments will not be necessary in the definition at all.

THE WHAT—PERSONNEL RECOVERY METHODS AND ACTIVITIES

Although the operational environment should not be a determinant of whether a specific effort is or is not PR, it should be the principle determinant of the PR "method" used. In *preserving the lives and well-being* of personnel wherever they operate, our forces have long used SAR, combat search and rescue (CSAR), special operations (SO), and elements outside DOD for recovery.³⁴ All of the above are deeply entrenched, our allies and we understand them, and they work. As we put PR under this microscope called the "joint doctrine development process," we should adhere to an unwritten, less majestic doctrinal principle: *"If it ain't broke, don't fix it."* What may be needed however, is some "tweaking" of terms to neatly frame the methods in such a manner they clearly explain the military "aggregation of efforts" for PR. Further, our US joint doctrine should be packaged in a way that will be palatable to our allies and easily integrated into multinational doctrine.

As recently as the Vietnam War, "SAR" was the term used to describe both SAR and CSAR.³⁵ Based on the environment, our forces knew that sometimes SAR involved combat—and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that accompany it. Today, CSAR is defined as "a

specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war."³⁶ Unfortunately, this definition is nebulous in that "task," "rescue forces" and "distressed" are not very clean terms. In reality, any number of tasks may be carried out at all levels for a CSAR to be successful, and forces who are not specifically dedicated to conduct CSAR may find themselves doing it anyway by virtue of their capability and availability.³⁷ Additionally, "isolated or missing" would be more descriptive words to use than "distressed," as personnel can be extremely distressed for various reasons—but not necessarily in need of a PR effort.

Current joint doctrine includes both SAR and CSAR under the PR "umbrella" and correctly acknowledges, "CSAR is one of the more complex methods of PR."³⁸ Both are specifically for personnel, and both are defined DOD/NATO military missions that will often use the same assets and same command and control framework—with the differences being the environment, which will in turn drive the TTP used.³⁹ Additionally, given an uncertain environment gone hostile, a SAR will roil up into becoming a CSAR quite quickly. This suggests the importance for SAR and CSAR terminology and procedures to remain closely aligned, with rules of engagement that support an instant transition from one to the other as necessary.⁴⁰

The "WHERE" for Personnel Recovery




Figure 1. The "Where" for Personnel Recovery

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There are often questions raised over the operational context for special operations forces (SOF) conducting PR. Generally, when SOF conduct PR is it a SO or is it a CSAR? SOF organize, train, and equip to conduct SO, and recovery (of personnel and materiel) is a subset of the SO direct action (principle) mission, while CSAR is a collateral activity SOF can do given their inherent capabilities.⁴¹ Just as the environment determines whether PR is conducted as a SAR or a CSAR, it will also play largely in the decision of whether SOF conducts a PR as a SO or as a CSAR—or whether SOF are the appropriate forces to conduct the mission at all.⁴² CSAR TTP are designed for hostile environments and can be *planned* for use as necessary when operations are conducted in uncertain environments. On the other hand, by definition, a PR done in an environment requiring the *unconventional* capabilities SOF provide will be a SO.⁴³

In order to align the terminology and make it easier to prescribe a particular PR method, each one should be defined in descriptive terms according to *what* is being done and *where* it is done. Some suggested new definitions for SAR, CSAR, and a SO recovery (of personnel) are offered:

- **Search and Rescue**—A personnel recovery method consisting of efforts to recover isolated or missing personnel from a permissive environment. Also called **SAR**. See also **personnel recovery; personnel; operational environment; recovery; isolated personnel; missing; combat search and rescue**.
- **Combat Search and Rescue**—A personnel recovery method consisting of efforts (excluding unconventional assisted recovery) to recover isolated or missing personnel from a hostile or uncertain environment. Also called **CSAR**. See also **personnel recovery; personnel; operational environment; recovery; isolated personnel; missing; search and rescue; special operations; unconventional assisted recovery**.
- **Special Operations Recovery (Personnel)**—A personnel recovery method consisting of a special operation direct action, using unconventional military means to recover isolated or missing personnel from hostile environments, and denied and politically sensitive areas. See also **special operations; recovery; personnel; isolated personnel; missing; operational environment; denied area; personnel recovery; recovery operations; search and rescue; combat search and rescue; unconventional assisted recovery**.

There is a lot more to the "aggregation of efforts" for PR than the methods used by forces doing recovery. For example, isolated or missing personnel are responsible for the individual PR "activities" of survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE)—where each one is necessary depending on the circumstances. Further, it is a responsibility of commanders—specified in policy, to ensure

their high-risk-of-capture personnel are trained on the Code of Conduct and receive appropriate SERE training.⁴⁴ Being knowledgeable of and applying SERE TTP properly not only assists recovery forces, but may also result in an "unassisted recovery."⁴⁵ While SERE do not need to be included within the actual definition of PR, an important principle to include in discussing "aggregation of efforts" within our joint doctrine is that no matter how well the PR methods are executed, the isolated or missing personnel themselves must uphold their side of "PR equation" or the PR process may fail.

Three more ambiguous parts of the PR definition should be briefly addressed (see definition in the introduction of this article).

- *Aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts*. The word "diplomatic" would be better to use than "political," as diplomatic refers to *atactful international negotiation* that is not necessarily tied to government officials or those representing a government.⁴⁶ Next, using "sum" versus "aggregation" is a more clear and concise way to say the same thing. Also, "Civil" efforts (relating to citizens, or a non-military, non-ecclesiastic community)⁴⁷ is rather obscure. The text of joint doctrine should fully explain that these civil efforts might contribute to or result in personnel recovery. These can consist of interagency efforts (e.g., the civil SAR system), concerned citizens of a general populace lending a hand, or in more nonconventional ways. Similarly, included in joint doctrine should be a detailed explanation of the interaction between DOD components themselves (military and non-military) and the non-DOD interfaces that would comprise the civil, diplomatic, and non-DOD military (e.g., US Coast Guard operating under the DOT and multinational forces) efforts (see Figures 2 and 3).
- *"Personnel recovery may occur through military action, action by non-governmental organizations, other U.S. Government-approved action, and diplomatic initiatives, or through any combination of these options."* This language is unnecessary as it is already covered by "aggregation [sum] of all efforts."
- *Although personnel recovery may occur during non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), NEO is not a subset of personnel recovery.*⁴⁸ This verbiage is also unnecessary. PR is not a lot of things, but all of those aren't listed in the definition, nor should they be. There should be no confusion over the difference between PR and NEO. For example, as with civil SAR, NEO is not limited to personnel—and certainly NEO is not for *isolated or missing personnel*. Additionally, although civil SAR can include evacuation efforts, it has previously been presented why civil SAR should not be confused with PR. Nonetheless, it should clearly state in bold print in the text of joint doctrine that NEO is not a subset of PR.

CONCLUSIONS—A BETTER DEFINITION OF PERSONNEL RECOVERY IS NEEDED

PR is done for *personnel*. It's simple to understand this key point if we merely understand what "personnel" means. A robust PR capability must, by direction, be integrated into all of our military operations. Accordingly, policy and practice infer the reality that PR can occur in any operational environment and the PR definition should reflect this. The methods and activities our forces have successfully used for years are still viable and should remain in our joint lexicon, particularly since our joint doctrine will form the US position to multinational doctrine—where these terms and doctrinal principles also reside. However, the definitions of the PR methods should be refined to align them with PR policy and other well-established DOD definitions. DOD's PR policy seems to be in good shape—the apparent problem is with how it is reflected by the latest definition of PR. A suggested new definition is as follows:

Personnel Recovery--The sum of diplomatic, military, and civil efforts to effect the recovery of isolated or missing personnel in any operational environment. Also called **PR**. See also **personnel**; **operational environment**; **denied area**; **recovery**; **isolated personnel**; **missing**; **search and rescue**; **combat search and rescue**; **recovery operations**; **special operations**.

Words do mean things—but we must also understand what they mean. References to other existing key terms, as shown, clarify exactly who PR is for, where it's done, and what it entails. A tough task ahead will be to capture their meaning accurately, and bolster them with clear principles for the employment of joint forces in the text of new JP 3-50, *Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery*. As our joint community develops that doctrine, we should recognize that it's not necessary to "reinvent the wheel" when straightening out the spokes will give us a smoother ride.

ENDNOTES

(Abbreviated, see [ACP Web page](#) for complete version)

- 1 JP 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Apr 2001).
- 2 DODD 2310.2, *Personnel Recovery* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 22 Dec 2000).
- 3 JP 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Apr 2001), 325.
- 4 *Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary* (Boston, Ma: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1988), 877.
- 5 DODD 2310.2, *Personnel Recovery* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 22 Dec 2000), 3.
- 6 DODI 2310.5, *Accounting for Missing Persons* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 31 Jan 2000), 4.
- 7 Ibid, 17.
- 8 Ibid, 24.




Figure 2. DOD Personnel Recovery Efforts

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


Figure 3. Multinational Force (MNF) Personnel Recovery Efforts (Military)

- 9 DODD 2310.2, *Personnel Recovery* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 22 Dec 2000), 3.
- 10 DODD 2310.2, *Personnel Recovery* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 22 Dec 2000), 12-13.
- 11 Ibid, 10.
- 12 Ibid, 3.
- 13 *National Search and Rescue Plan, 1999* (Washington DC: National Search and Rescue Committee), 3.
- 14 Ibid, 9.
- 15 *United States National Search and Rescue Supplement to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual* (Washington DC: National Search and Rescue Committee, May 2000), 7-7, 7-8, B-2.
- 16 Ibid, 7-7.
- 17 JP 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Apr 2001), 275-275.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 JP 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Apr 2001), 218.
- 20 DODI 2310.5, *Accounting for Missing Persons* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 31 Jan 2000), 12.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 JP 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Apr 2001), 310-311.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Ibid, 121.
- 27 Author's note: Each of "personnel," "isolated personnel," and DOD policy regarding PR as a high priority have all been previously cited.
- 28 *United States National Search and Rescue Supplement to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual* (Washington DC: National Search and Rescue Committee, May 2000), xxiii.
- 29 Ibid, 7-8.
- 30 Author's note: None of these principles conflict with "immediate response" concepts as defined in the DODD 3025-series to respond to major disasters or attacks. It is also important to note when an emergency is declared, civil SAR or similar humanitarian activities may become the principle mission.
- 31 JP 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Apr 2001), 378.
- 32 DODI 2310.5, *Accounting for Missing Persons* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 31 Jan 2000), 11.
- 33 Ibid. 17.
- 34 DODI 2310.6, *Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery in the Department of Defense* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 13 Oct 2000), 2.
- 35 Darrel D. Whitcomb, *The Rescue of Bat 21* (Annapolis, MD; Naval Institute Press, 1998).
- 36 JP 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Apr 2001), 77.
- 37 JP 3-50.21, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combat Search and Rescue* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 23 Mar 1998), II-12.
- 38 Ibid, I-1. Author's note: Although DODD 2310.2, published 22 Dec 00, no longer includes PR as an "umbrella" term that encompasses SAR and CSAR in the definition itself, this should not be taken to mean that "SAR" and "CSAR" no longer exist as viable methods of PR.

(Continued on page 32)

JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY SUPPORT PRODUCT

By Mr. Rich Sellards, USJFCOM Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, J2

Personnel Recovery (PR) is described in DOD Directive 2310.2 as the new umbrella term for operations focused on the task of recovering captured, missing, or isolated personnel from danger. It is the sum of military, civil, and political efforts to obtain the release or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas whether they are captured, missing, or isolated. This includes US, allied, coalition, friendly military, and paramilitary personnel; or others designated by the National Command Authorities. PR may occur through military action, action by nongovernmental organizations, other US Government-approved action and/or diplomatic initiatives.

USJFCOM intends to standardize and improve intelligence support to PR by implementing and managing a collaborative production environment to produce the Joint Personnel Recovery Support Product (JPRSP). The JPRSP will provide operational planners with a digital Web-based planning product of intelligence data to facilitate PR mission planning. The JPRSP will also provide tailored, region specific, information to potential evaders to assist in creating an individual evasion plan of action.

The JPRSP process will rely on the collaborative effort of the USJFCOM Joint Forces Intelligence Center, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), combatant commands, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and other Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program (DODIPP) agencies. Much of what will make up the JPRSP is currently produced throughout the intelligence community in accordance with established DODIPP policies and procedures. By establishing a PR collaborative community and utilizing the most current collaborative tools, the JPRSP will merge existing data into a "one stop shopping" source for intelligence support to PR.

The Department of Defense Reform Initiative Directive #29 directed all "joint" PR related activities be realigned under the command authority of the Commander in Chief, US Joint Forces Command (USCINCFJCOM). This realignment occurred on 1 October 1999 when all PR executive agent responsibilities (except policy) were delegated to USCINCFJCOM. Simultaneously, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) was transferred to

USACOM (now USJFCOM) to leverage USJFCOM's synergy as DOD's joint trainer, integrator, force provider, and experimentation lead on combat search and rescue; evasion and recovery (E&R); operational prisoner of war/missing in action matters; unconventional and nonconventional assisted recovery; and Code of Conduct training. JPRA was formed by consolidating the Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Agency and the Combat Search and Rescue Agency. USCINCFJCOM then tasked the JPRA as its office of primary responsibility for all PR issues. As such, JPRA maintains an oversight and quality control capacity over the JPRSP process.

The PR mission requires broader and more complete all-source intelligence analysis and production than has been tasked or produced to date. Current intelligence products are not standardized and organized ineffectively, are not universally accessible to customers. Electronic "documents" can be reorganized, reused, and pushed or pulled as needed by a variety of users and producers.

E&R intelligence production is undergoing a profound evolution in product format, presentation, design, and functional production responsibilities. Intelligence support to the PR community in the past has been provided in the form of selected area for evasion area intelligence descriptions, designated areas for recovery, E&R studies, regional and country studies, SERE contingency guides, newsletters, bulletins, etc.. These products will be replaced, or consolidated, into a single new collaboratively produced package to support PR—the JPRSP, DIA, USJFCOM, and JPRA are the cooperating lead organizations in this process. The product will be organized in a county or region-wide modular format allowing the customer to "drill-down" into the data. The JPRSP is intended to meet the needs of multiple users (PR planners, intelligence analysts/briefers, operators, aircrew members, rescue forces, potential evaders, etc.).

In summary, USJFCOM via the JPRSP, will standardize the process and format of intelligence support to PR. The JPRSP will take advantage of the intelligence community's expertise by creating a collaborative community among DODIPP agencies. It will provide region-specific data in a digital, Web-based format to enable operational planners and potential evaders to more efficiently conduct PR mission planning. The prototype JPRSP is available on SIPRNET at: <http://www.jfic.jfcom.smil.mil/Products/Exped/COLOMBIA/JPRSP/>. Contact Mr. Rich Sellards, JPRA J2, at DSN 654-2207 or commercial (703)856-2207.



EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS: *The Heart of Rapid Decisive Operations*

**By Mr. Gene Myers, USJFCOM J9, Engagement
Division**

We must anticipate that future adversaries will learn from the past and confront us in very different ways. Thus, we must be willing to change as well or risk having forces ill-suited to protect our security twenty years in the future. Only one thing is certain: the greatest danger lies in an unwillingness or an inability to change our security posture in time to meet the challenges of this century.

An article in the April 2001 edition of *A Common Perspective* by CAPT D. Prothero and Mr. Mike Dziubinski outlined the core concept of USJFCOM's experimental program, Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO). This new initiative intends to follow the December 1997 *Report of the National Defense Panel* (NDP) prescription for changes in the conduct of military operations. In a nutshell, the Prothero and Dziubinski article identified the need to enhance our ability to break the adversary's willingness to fight as the essence of RDO. Only if that fails, or if the military component is deemed to be crucial to adversary leadership survival, would the US military plan to revert to defeating the opponent's ability to fight. In that context, CAPT Prothero and Mr. Dziubinski argued that, "The laws of physics, geography, national will, budget, and politics combine to create insurmountable obstacles" to the application of "overwhelming mass" needed to conduct attrition-based warfare "unless the national interests at stake are so compelling that all bets are off."

THE NEW REALITY

The world has changed, and so has the manner in which nations operate in it. Through time immemorial, nations have relied on mechanized or labor-intensive means of accomplishing tasks and producing wealth. Advanced nations are rapidly evolving from this reliance and producing even greater wealth by emphasizing technology and information, skill and knowledge, over strength and sweat. The same is true in the military dimension. Traditional brute force attrition strategies have relied on the brawn, blood, and suffering of a nation's soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen—often on a massive scale. The juggernaut of 20th century war also resulted in agony and dislocation for the millions of unfortunate civilians who happened to be in the path of its arbitrary

destruction. In the 21st century we may finally have the tools to alter this ancient form of brutality. Achieving national goals through military means will no longer unavoidably result in wholesale and wanton destruction such as that witnessed during the two world wars of the 20th century. The focus of military planning will be to preclude the historic carnage of armed conflict and, when force is necessary, to utilize more humane ways of forcefully attaining national objectives.

Fortunately, since the demise of our old Soviet nemesis, such potentially brutal vital interest/national survival contests are unlikely, at least for the foreseeable future. But other less capable but still dangerous adversaries await a chance to test US mettle. In keeping with this new, less certain reality, national guidance recognizes the requirement to prevail in contingencies that are less than all out warfare and do not incur inordinate cost in lives, treasure, and collateral damage.

As the central concept for current joint force experimentation, RDO provides a process for obtaining the desired strategic outcome against an adversary through the precise application of all national capabilities—economic, political, and informational, as well as military. It is based on understanding the adversary as a complex adaptive system and identifying the key nodes and links in that system that would most likely result in achieving the joint force commander-selected effects. Essentially, RDO focuses on what adversary leaders most value, then takes that away.

RDO proposes a new operational paradigm to deal with dangerous situations as rapidly and decisively as possible using the US military's dominant asymmetrical advantages in knowledge, training, speed, and precision. It eschews (but does not ignore) Napoleonic-era dictates for massed, combined arms force-on-force engagements in favor of a less traumatic approach that relies on achieving specific, often very precise effects across an adversary's entire national diplomatic, information, military, and economic spectrum.

THE BEATING HEART

Effects-based operations (EBO) is the beating heart of RDO and the USJFCOM agenda of transformational joint force experiments. EBO provides a process for obtaining the desired strategic outcome from an adversary through the precise application of all national capabilities. It is based on two things: (1) understanding the adversary as a complex adaptive system and (2) identifying the key nodes and links in that system (such as political leadership, national command and control capability, or key military forces and capabilities) where the effects are to be concentrated. It also aims to achieve effects that cannot always be attained with weapons—political, economic, social.

EBO are emphasized in RDO as a preferred option to attrition warfare. Optimally, the object is to rapidly compel adversary leaders to comply with allied demands rather than to punish the nation with death and destruction or the loss of large numbers of its uniformed sons and daughters. This ability to compel is achieved by determining the elements of an enemy's national power that have the greatest effect on the will of enemy leaders to resist our will and by directing maximum effort against those elements.

EBO are not really new. Good leaders, whether military or civilian, have often thought in terms of what effects they desire to attain the ultimate goal—the politico-military objective. This requires that every tactical action be linked to strategic and operational objectives through the effects they attain. In the case of EBO, this means achieving effects against a wide variety of targets, including geopolitical support, economic, communications, or the fielded military forces themselves. In 21st century conflict, selection of effects is based on their contributions toward achieving the desired objective while minimizing the undesirable or unintended effects such as collateral damage or civilian casualties.

A continuously updated understanding of the adversary as a complex adaptive system will allow us to more precisely coordinate the application of the full range of our national capabilities. Designating the effects that will be imposed is based first on the theater combatant commander's assessment of the National Command Authorities-assigned politico-military objectives and the adversary as a system of multifaceted military, economic, and political components. Based on these assessments, the joint force commander passes the effects-based tasking order (ETO) on to the various component commanders along with his intent for the campaign and applicable rules of engagement. The effects required by the ETO are most often expressed in terms of mission, commander's intent and desired effect, leaving the details of execution to the designated component commander or subordinate who is best able to determine appropriate action.

PARALLEL EFFECTS

The secret to rapid EBO is the ability of national political, military, economic, and information elements to achieve multiple parallel effects across the entire theater of operations simultaneously and to achieve them faster than the enemy can react. Until the last decade of the 20th century, military objectives were achieved almost independently from the other elements of national power and were achieved by massing overwhelming force and attacking targets in sequence. This is no longer the case. In the last 20 years, we have seen the rapid advance of technologies that can literally transform the way we achieve effects against belligerent opponents.

Advances in communications and computer systems now facilitate true collaborative planning to permit parallel action among all participants—Department of State, law enforcement, privately sponsored nongovernmental organizations, and others; as well as the Department of Defense, regional military commanders, and allied governments. Each will have effects on the campaign that have not been well coordinated until now.

High precision "smart" weapons with extended range and computer-based collaborative planning capabilities have allowed our forces to attack the enemy where and when it most counts. For instance, targets or objectives that required massive combined arms formations to destroy or capture during World War II, now can be destroyed or neutralized by just one or two aircraft. Today, assigning forces and weapons, even at extended range, to multiple targets often is done in minutes rather than hours or days. The same advances in precision weapons, communications, and computers also have allowed us to conduct highly effective operations; while limiting unintended casualties on all sides and reducing the massive amount of collateral damage so common to the wars of the 20th century.

While improvements can still be made, especially in joint interoperability, advanced intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities, along with the ability to rapidly disseminate it to all concerned parties, now can provide us an order of magnitude improvement in our knowledge of the opponent from just ten years ago. This knowledge is key to achieving desired effects. The more you know about your adversary the better you can do things that will have a lasting effect on him.

Developing commanders that can think in terms of "effects" rather than pure linear combat outcomes such as comparative casualties or battle-line movement will lead to more effective decision making in an RDO environment. New information technologies allow for faster and more comprehensive collaboration that potentially can significantly reduce current crisis action timelines.

EBO AND TRANSFORMATION

Much ink has been devoted to prognostications on plans to transform the nation's military. Most of the visible debates have centered on the physical tools of military operations—the ships, planes, tanks, and communications systems that conduct the operations—which ones and how much they cost. But they frequently ignore the other side of the coin—the strategic underpinnings. The one central truth that tends to be missed in these deliberations is that buying new weapons without first considering the operational concepts and national strategies under which they will be used is putting the cart before the horse.

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Despite the many gloomy reviews of Pentagon procurement decisions frequenting the national press, initial joint forces experiments hold much potential for delivering on the promise of a strategically and doctrinally transformed military. In this context, USJFCOM has been assigned the responsibility of experimenting with the operational concepts, like RDO and EBO, that will eventually form the doctrinal underpinnings of what defense experts for some time have been calling the "revolution in military affairs."

It should also be understood that it is from just such experiments that many 21st century doctrinal concepts will be derived. The basis of doctrine is not only experience from the real-life trials and errors of military operations, but also from the exercises and experiments that we conduct to develop and refine how our defense establishment does its business. In that light, doctrine and concept development are two sides of the same coin, and real transformation is not complete until both sides are thoroughly addressed.

CIVIL SEARCH AND RESCUE DOCTRINE ANALYSIS

By Mr. Terry Patterson, USJFCOM JWFC, Doctrine Support Group (OC, Incorporated)

The October 1998 Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP) voted to remove JPs 3-50, *National Search and Rescue Manual Vol I: National Search And Rescue System*, and 3-50.1, *National Search and Rescue Manual Vol II: Planning Handbook*, from the JP 3-50 series and recommended renumbering them as JP 3-49 (Vol I & II) to establish the separation of "civil search and rescue (SAR)" publications from combat SAR (now personnel recovery) publications. In March 2000, the Coast Guard began revision of JP 3-49, now called *Joint Doctrine for Civil Search and Rescue*.

The revision first draft of JP 3-49 was published on 29 September 2000. Numerous critical and major comments on the first draft questioned the need for the publication, usefulness of the content, lack of a definition for "civil SAR," and lack of adherence to the program directive. Consequently, a joint working group (JWG) was held in April 2001. The JWG recommended that JP 3-49 be cancelled because of the anticipated promulgation of DOD Instruction 2310.7, *Department of Defense Support to Civil Search and Rescue*. The consensus of the working group was that the DOD directive eliminated the need for publishing a separate joint doctrinal publication for civil SAR. The Coast Guard later recommended (to JS J7/JDET) postponing the development of JP 3-49 and tasking the USJFCOM JWFC to conduct a front-end analysis for civil SAR doctrinal requirements and hierarchical placement. JS J7/JDET agreed and assigned the study to the USJFCOM JWFC.

USJFCOM JWFC's study methodology included a review and database search in the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) of approved and draft joint publications, as well as other DOD and CJCS instructions/manuals/notices, for all existing guidance and information on civil SAR. The Internet was also searched for relevant data on civil SAR. Several thousand websites were revealed, both governmental and nongovernmental, concerning civil SAR. This provided background information on the operation of civil SAR in governmental and civilian environments and the extensive civil SAR structure already in existence. Information searches on the SIPRNET and the Joint After Action Review System

databases were conducted. Operational inputs dating back to Operation JUST CAUSE (1989) were reviewed. Informal telephone interviews also were conducted with Coast Guard and Air Force subject matter experts on various aspects and issues concerning civil SAR

Based on this research, USJFCOM JWFC discovered:

- There exists an extensive quantity of information and guidance on SAR, both official and otherwise.
- CJCS Notices 3306 and 3307, which canceled old JPs 3-50 and 3-50.1, state that the existing *United States National Search and Rescue Plan—1999*, the *International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual*, and the *United States National Search and Rescue Supplement to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual* supercede those two JPs.
- The USAF and USCG use the *United States National Search and Rescue Supplement to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual* on a daily basis in their rescue coordination centers. The USCG SAR school also uses this publication as a instructional text.
- No Service chief or combatant commander has identified a need for joint civil SAR guidance.

Therefore, recent JP 3-49 history and the above findings prompted USJFCOM JWFC to conclude a separate joint publication addressing civil SAR is not needed, but some explanation of civil SAR in a joint publication(s) is appropriate. USJFCOM JWFC recommended the joint doctrine development community discontinue development of JP 3-49 and add "civil SAR" information to JP 3-50 *Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery* (under development), and/or JP 3-07.7 *Joint Doctrine for Civil Support*. USJFCOM JWFC also developed proposed guidance on military support to civil SAR, which can be viewed/downloaded at <http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil/dodnato/jw100/>, click on "Registered Users" (password required), then click on "A Common Perspective," then "Proposed Civil SAR Guidance."

JOINT PUBLICATION STATUS

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PUB#	TITLE
—Rev2	Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer
0-2Rev2	Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
1-01Rev2Ch1	Joint Doctrine Development System
1-02	DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
3-0Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Operations
3-02Rev1 ^{FT}	Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
3-07.6	JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
3-18	Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations
4-02Rev1**	Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations
4-04Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support
4-07	JTTP for Common-User Logistics During Joint Operations

IN REVISION OVER THE NEXT
6 MONTHS

PUB#	TITLE
1-05Rev1**	Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations
2-01Rev1	Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations
3-01.1Rev1	Aerospace Defense of North America
3-02.2Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation
3-05	Doctrine for Joint Special Operations
3-07Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
3-07.1Rev1	JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
3-08Rev1	Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations (Vol I & II)
3-09.3Rev1	JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)
3-10Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations
3-10.1Rev1	JTTP for Base Defense
3-12Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations
3-12.1Rev1	Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data
3-13Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for Information Operations
3-13.1Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)
3-50.2Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue
3-50.21Rev1**	JTTP for Combat Search and Rescue
3-50.3Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery
3-52Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
3-53Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations
3-58Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Military Deception
3-55Rev1	Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Support for Joint Operations
3-56.1Rev1	Command and Control for Joint Air Operations
3-58Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Military Deception
3-61Rev1	Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations
4-01.2Rev1	JTTP for Sealift Support to Joint Operations
4-01.7Rev1	JTTP for Use of Intermodal Containers in Joint Operations
4-02.2Rev1	JTTP for Patient Movement in Joint Operations
4-03Rev1	Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine
4-05Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning
4-06Rev1	JTTP for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations
5-0Rev1	Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
6-0Rev1	Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations
6-02Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems

* Denotes final assessment, all others are preliminary assessments

PUB#	TITLE
1-04	JTTP for Legal Support to Military Operations
2-01.1	JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting
2-01.2Rev1	Joint Doctrine and TTP for Counterintelligence Support to Operations
3-05.1	JTTP for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations
3-06	Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations
3-14	Joint Doctrine for Space Operations
3-17Rev1**	Joint Doctrine and JTTP for Air Mobility Operations
3-60	Joint Doctrine for Targeting
4-01Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System
4-01.3Rev1**	JTTP for Movement Control
4-01.5Rev1	JTTP for Terminal Operations
4-09	Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution
5-00.1	Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning

UNDER ASSESSMENT

PUB#	TITLE
2-0	Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations
3-01.1*	Aerospace Defense of North America
3-16	Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations
3-51	Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare
3-54*	Joint Doctrine for Operations Security
4-0	Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations
4-01.7* Rev1	JTTP for Use of Intermodal Containers in Joint Operations
4-02.2*	JTTP for Patient Movement in Joint Operations

WITHIN 10 MONTH ASSESSMENT
WINDOW

PUB#	TITLE
1	Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
2-01.3	JTTP for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
3-03*	Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations
3-04.1*	JTTP for Shipboard Helicopter Operations
3-07.5*	JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
3-11	Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments
3-34	Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations
3-57	Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations
4-01.4	JTTP for Joint Theater Distribution
4-01.8	JTTP for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
4-02.1*	JTTP for Health Service Logistics Support in Joint Operations

UNDER EVALUATION

PUB#	TITLE
4-08	Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations

** Denotes early revision

^{FT} Denotes "fast track"

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
● Joint Publication 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support, has been approved.

JOINT DOCTRINE HIERARCHY

KEYSTONE PUBLIS

JTTP & DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS

TEUSBS



LEGEND
27 September 2001
115 Joint Doctrine Pubs

- Joint Pubs that have completed development or revision } **92 APPROVED**
- Joint Pubs under revision
- Joint Pubs under development } **23 Under Development**
- Joint Pubs to be developed
- Joint Pubs to be deleted pending development or revision of superceding publications (9)

DOCTRINE ORGANIZATION UPDATES

JOINT STAFF, J7, JOINT DOCTRINE, EDUCATION, AND TRAINING DIVISION (JDETD), JOINT DOCTRINE BRANCH

By CAPT Bruce Russell, USN, Division Chief

JDETD is moving to a new location near the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. Stay tuned! The Doctrine Branch said "farewell" to CDR Ed Lemley, who was assigned to us for six months. We welcomed USN CAPT Jay DeLoach's return to J7 with a six-month tour. Last year he was assigned to the Education Branch and worked Reserve Component joint professional military education initiatives. This tour he will be responsible for updates to several joint publications, the Joint Doctrine Master Plan, and other special projects. We also welcomed Lt Col Gail Colvin, USAF, who came to us as a graduate of the Air War College. She will be managing most of the logistics and communications publications.

Publications of Interest. Eleven joint publications have been approved since the last newsletter (see page 17). Congratulations to all for the hard work and effort required for the success of the approval and dissemination processes. Three publications of high interest are expected to be approved this Fall. Both JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*, and JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, are planned for approval by November 2001. JP 3-14, *Joint Doctrine for Space Operations*, is in the planner-level meeting process—we anticipate approval by December 2001. The September 2001 version of the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) is in production and will be distributed soon. The JEL is available through the Internet and on CD-ROM. It contains over 10,000 digital files, including all joint doctrine publications, CJCS instructions and manuals, key Service publications, and a host of other reference documents. The JEL Web site (www.dtic.mil/doctrine) is among the most popular and often-used joint sites in DOD, with over six million visitors per year.

Paperless Joint Publications. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendation to stop printing joint publications, except for capstone and keystone publications, in the current 6x9 paper format. Beginning in October 2001 all below-the-line publications will be distributed in electronic format only via the JEL on the Internet and CD-ROM. Individual publications can still be downloaded and printed from the JEL. To improve readability the online format will be modified to eliminate

scrolling. JS J7/JDETD, Joint Doctrine Branch and the Joint Staff Information Management Division will maintain a small inventory of capstone, keystone, and select reference publications. USJFCOM JWFC will maintain an inventory of all joint publications, until below-the-line publication supplies are exhausted, as part of the dial-a-pub program. (See page 33.)

The new **joint doctrine developmental policy** described in JP 1-01, *Joint Doctrine Development System Change 1*, dated 29 June 2001, has proven successful. An Operations Deputy Tank session recently resolved contentious issues in JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. The publication's milestones were passed slightly, but it was approved in September 2001. The Tank process has been the impetus to resolve contentious issues. Several publications, stalled for years, have had contentious issues resolved at planner level meetings. The Tank process slows development by one to four months, but ultimately milestones are reset and development is continued without years of delay.

The first **Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System (JDEIS) Configuration Management Working Group** is scheduled to meet on 30 October 2001. Their goal is to finalize the *JDEIS Program Management Plan* and to refine JDEIS requirements for both the doctrine user and developer functions.

The new **Chairman's Joint Doctrine Web page** is here! In addition to a facelift, it provides access to the JEL and is linked to joint education and training Web sites. The new Web page is designed to enable faster access to JEL links and related sites. The SIPRNET JEL can be accessed at the new URL: <http://nmcc20a.nmcc.smil.mil/dj9j7ead/doctrine>. The unclassified URL remains the same (www.dtic.mil/doctrine). As with any new system, there may be some growing pains. Please contact JS J7/JDETD at DSN 223-2884 or COMM (703) 693-2884 with questions or concerns. We appreciate and value your feedback.

Allied Joint Doctrine. The development and staffing of NATO allied joint doctrine has become a significant "growth area" for JDETD and the US joint doctrine development community. Since the Spring 2001 Joint Doctrine Working Party, JDETD has completed ten actions concerning ratification of NATO Allied Joint Publications (AJPs). These actions resulted in US ratification of: AJPs 01B *Allied Joint Doctrine*; 03, *Allied Joint Operations*; 2.2, *Counterintelligence & Security*; 2.5, *Handling Captured Personnel, Equipment & Documents*; 3.4.1, *Peace Support Operations*; 3.6, *Electronic Warfare*; 4.4, *Movement & Transportation*; 4.5, *Host Nation Support*; 4.6, *Multinational Joint Logistic Center*; and 4.10, *Medical Support Doctrine*. Currently being staffed are AJPs 2.1, *Intelligence Procedures*; 3.3, *Air & Space Operations*; and 3.7, *Psychological Operations*. AJPs at other stages of
(Organization updates continued on next page)

coordination include 3.4, *Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*; 3.1, *Joint Maritime Operations*; 3.7, *CJFACC Doctrine*; 3.11, *Meteorological & Oceanographic Support*; and 9, *Civil-Military Operations*. JDETD also developed a standardized *Staffing Guide* for allied joint doctrine actions during this period. The *Staffing Guide* completed preliminary coordination with very few critical comments and will be circulated for final coordination before the end of 2001. It explains the allied joint doctrine process, and codifies/clarifies US procedures and responsibilities developed over the last 18 months. It also links the US portion of allied joint doctrine development to processes described in JP 1-01, and provides policy governing participation in multinational standardization activities.

The **English- and French-speaking Nations (ESN/FSN) Panel and the NATO Terminology Conference Plenary Meeting** were held concurrently from 18-22 June 2001 at NATO Headquarters. US Delegates were: Mr. Gary Bounds, Army; Mr. Jim Gabor, Navy; Mrs. Reta Parson, Air Force; Ms. Ann Keays, Marine Corps; and Mr. Nick Fleischmann, JS J7, head of delegation. In addition to policy matters, agreement was reached on 77 proposals. NATO agreed terminology will be included in AAP-6, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French)*. It was agreed to defer a series of proposals for peace support operations terms to the Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group in September 2002. Following their action, peace support operation terms will be addressed by the French-Speaking Nations Conference in late October 2001.

The 7th annual **Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group (AJODWG)** was held at NATO Headquarters from 3-7 September 2001. The US delegation, led by CAPT Bruce Russell from JDETD, included other delegates from JS J7, the Services, USJFCOM, and USEUCOM. Prior to the AJODWG, a custodial meeting took place from 29-31 August 2001 for AJP-3.4, *Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*. After debate, it was decided the US should continue its development—the custodian (USJFCOM) will issue a 2nd draft in December 2001. AJODWG highlights included the following: the 2nd ratification draft of AJP-01(B), *Allied Joint Doctrine*, the NATO doctrine capstone publication, will be published in October 2001, as will the 2nd ratification draft of AJP-3, *Joint Operations Doctrine*. Following ratification, they will remain unchanged for two years, barring significant policy changes. The next AJODWG Meeting is scheduled for 2-6 September 2002.

The 28th **Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP)** scheduled for 29-31 October 2001 was cancelled. Agenda items will be accomplished via separate taskers. The 29th JDWP is scheduled for 6-8 May 2002 at USJFCOM JWFC.

JOINT AND ARMY DOCTRINE DIRECTORATE (JADD), HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (HQ, TRADOC)

By COL Mark E. Warner, USA, Director

We recently had a substantial turnover of personnel within JADD and DCSDOC overall. BG(P) Michael Vane has replaced BG(P) Hank Stratman as TRADOC DCSDOC as of September 2001. DCSDOC has also filled the ADCSDOC position that was made vacant due to the passing of Mr. Lou Napoleon. We are proud to welcome Mr. Mike Starry to the DCSDOC family. New arrivals in JADD include; LTC Jim Nichol (Policy Team), LTC Jim Nordahl (Homeland Security Team), LTC Jim Purvis (Joint Team), and Mr. Charles Maurer (Logistics Team).

Semiannual Army Doctrine Conference. The Spring 2000 Semiannual Army Doctrine Conference (SAADC) scheduled for 9-10 May 2001 was cancelled due to various resource challenges. The next SAADC will be held 14-15 November 2001 in Hampton, VA. The focus of the conference will be a review of Five Year Master Plan execution—how we are using it, how can we improve it, and our plan to move forward. There also will be updates from selected DCSDOC directorates and other doctrine agencies on various topics from recently published doctrine to evolving "objective force" doctrine.

TRADOC Regulation 25-36, *The TRADOC Doctrinal Literature Program (TDLP)*. The current regulation, dated 5 April 2000, is under revision to capture new changes in doctrine policy (i.e., management, development). The coordinating draft has been staffed with all affected doctrine agencies and comments are being adjudicated. The revised regulation will supercede TR 25-35 and TP 25-34, both dated 24 January 1992. The regulation establishes policy in managing Army doctrine. It describes TRADOC's roles and responsibilities to manage, establish requirements, develop, and review doctrine to support Army, multi-Service, joint, and multinational operations. It applies to TRADOC and non-TRADOC agencies that have an established memorandum of agreement with HQ TRADOC.

KEY JOINT PUBLICATIONS STATUS

JP 3-07.7, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations (now Joint Doctrine For Civil Support)*. The May 2001 Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP) voted to rename JP 3-07.7 from *JTTP for Domestic Support Operations* to *Joint Doctrine For Civil Support*,

send it back to the Army (as the lead agent (LA)) for rewrite, and reset the milestones. On 12 June 2001, a working group; attended by action officers from Joint Staff (JS) J7, USJFCOM JWFC, and the Army; met and established a plan for completing the publication and resetting the milestones. USJFCOM JWFC, with assistance from the LA, agreed to redraft JP 3-07.7 by adjudicating the critical and major comments from the last version of JP 3-07.7 and producing a new "author's draft," which is scheduled for release on 31 Oct 01.

JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*. The program directive (PD) was approved during March 2001. It assigns the Army as the LA, the Marine Corps as the technical review authority (TRA), and the JS J3 as the doctrine sponsor. This publication addresses command relationships and considerations, procedures and options for conducting joint land operations under a functional component commander. The first draft is scheduled for release on 19 November 2001.

JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning (formerly Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Campaign Planning)*. JADD assumed responsibility for development of this publication from the Army War College after 3d draft coordination. USCENCOM planners provided significant input on the organization and scope during development. It has completed the final coordination phase and comments are undergoing adjudication. Discussions between the Army staff and Joint Staff indicate that JP 5-00.1 and JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, may be consolidated (to eliminate some perceived redundancy) during JP 5-0's revision.

KEY ARMY PUBLICATIONS STATUS

FM 1 (formerly FM 100-1), *The Army*, was approved on 14 June 2001. FM 1 is the Army's capstone field manual that establishes key linkages between our national strategy and the Army's operational doctrine found in FM 3-0, *Operations*. It defines who we are, what we do, how we do it, and the road ahead.

FM 3-0 (formerly FM 100-5), *Operations*, was approved on 14 June 2001. FM 3-0 is the Army's keystone field manual that defines how the Army conducts full spectrum operations. It provides a link between FM 1 and joint doctrine to all other Army doctrine. It also provides the priority focus on warfighting, while recognizing that warfighting capabilities underscore Army credibility and effectiveness in military operations other than war. Additionally, this updated doctrine supports our current force, as well as our transformation efforts through 2006. It properly nests Army operations within unified, joint, multinational, and interagency actions. It contains an expanded discussion on force projection and strategic responsiveness, and focuses on the key planning and execution aspects of a strategically responsive force. An

awareness briefing is available on the doctrine Web site at www.doctrine.army.mil.

FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, was originally published in December 1990. The proponent, US Army Combined Arms Command (CAC)/Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD), is reviewing and editing comments received from the staffing of the final draft. Promulgation is projected for the 2nd Quarter of 2002. FM 3-07 is keystone doctrine that amplifies Chapters 9 and 10 in FM 3-0. FM 3-07 is conceptual, aiming at broad understanding more than at operational details. It also updates and consolidates FM 90-29, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*; FM 100-19, *Domestic Support Operations*; FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*; and FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*.

FM 3-13 (formerly 100-6), *Information Operations*, was originally published in August 1996. The proponent, CAC/CADD, is currently editing the Doctrine Review and Approval Group (DRAG) version and planning a DRAG video teleconference before the end of the year. Promulgation is projected during the 2nd Quarter of 2002. FM 3-13 is the Army's overarching publication on information operations and builds upon the foundation laid in Chapter 11, "Information Superiority," in FM 3-0. FM 3-13 explains the fundamentals of information operations for the Army and facilitates its transition to the information age.

FM 3-90 (formerly 100-40), *Tactics*, was approved on 4 July 2001. FM 3-90 links to FM 3-0 and provides additional guidance regarding what Army units do, and their tactics and techniques as they conduct the offensive and defensive portions of full spectrum operations. It introduces the basic concepts and control measures associated with tactics.

FM 3-93 (formerly 100-7), *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*. The proponent, US Army War College (USAWC), is currently reviewing comments received on the second coordinating draft. FM 3-93 is the Army's overarching operational-level doctrine and is closely linked to the newly revised Army and joint keystone doctrine found in FM 3-0 and JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, respectively. The scope of FM 3-93 has been expanded to include discussions currently found in FM 3-100.16 (formerly 100-16), *Army Operational Support* (e.g., joint force land component operations). In October 2001, proponenty for this manual will transfer to CAC. At that time, the role of USAWC will change from author to technical review authority. The revised version will clarify the roles of Army Forces (ARFOR); incorporate ARFOR lessons learned from recent operations in Kuwait, Bosnia, and Kosovo; and will be imbedded with updated doctrinal principles as outlined in recently-released FM 3-0.

FM 3-91 (formally 71-100), *Division Operations*. CAC/CADD is the proponent for FM 3-91. CADD (*Organization updates continued on next page*)

staffed the initial draft in October 2000 and received comments in February 2001. The final draft is projected for staffing during the 1st Quarter of 2002. FM 3-91 is built upon the doctrinal principals addressed in FM 3.0. It establishes warfighting as the Army's primary focus and recognizes the importance of being able to dominate any situation in military operations other than war. FM 3-91 primarily is written for the tactical level, however, it also discusses operational level fundamentals for Army Division participation in joint operations.

FM 3-92 (formerly 100-15), *Corps Operations*. CAC/CADD is the proponent. Work on this manual is currently on hold pending results of the Corps Design Analysis.

FM 3-100.21 (formerly 100-21), *Contractors on the Battlefield (COB)*. This manual, originally approved in March 2000, addresses the use of contractors as an added resource for the commander to consider and use when planning support for an operation. It defines the role of contractors and describes their relationship to the military chain of command. FM 3-100.21 is intended for commanders and their staffs at all echelons involved in planning, management and use of contractors; however, during the final staffing process, it was determined that more detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) on COB was still needed. DCSDOC approved the rewrite of FM 3-100.21 in January 2001. The first draft, written under contract by MPRI, was published in April 2001 and staffed internally. Comments received from the staffing of the second draft are currently being reviewed and the final draft is expected to be staffed during the 1st or 2nd Quarter of 2002.

FM 4-0 (formerly FM 100-10), *Combat Service Support*, is the Army's capstone combat service support (CSS) manual. FM 4-0 was developed in sync with the recently published FM 3-0 and builds on chapter 12 of that manual. FM 4-0 is currently undergoing final editing in preparation for approval and subsequent publication in October 2001. It supports the Army's "CSS Transformation" initiative. It discusses current and future CSS enablers that will provide commanders better situational awareness through better visibility of materiel flow and distribution. The manual introduces and discusses the new concept of "CSS reach"—the operational positioning and efficient/effective use of available combat service support assets and capabilities from the industrial base to the soldier in the field in support of full spectrum operations. The goal of CSS reach is to reduce the CSS footprint in the area of operations (AO) to more quickly build, generate, and sustain combat power; and establish links to exploit all available sources of support. The manual also discusses the use of intermediate staging bases (ISBs)—a secure base usually established within the theater of operations nearby, but not in, the AO. While not a requirement, an ISB may provide a secure, high throughput facility when circumstances warrant. FM 4-0 codifies lessons learned from joint and multinational operations and uses some vignettes to highlight those

events. Finally, it discusses each of the CSS functions and provides doctrinal references to other manuals for more detail.

FM 5-0 (formerly 101-5), *Army Planning and Orders Production*. The proponent, CAC/CADD, is currently reviewing comments received on the initial draft. FM 5-0 describes doctrine for planning and orders production used by commanders from company through Corps. It supports FMs 3-0 and 6-0, *Command and Control* (DRAG edition). FM 5-0 is a significant revision of FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*. CADD has moved the staff pieces to FM 6-0. What remains in FM 5-0 is the military decision making process, and operations orders and plans. Troop leading procedures and problem-solving techniques have been added. FM 5-0 also includes a start on transitional TTPs regarding digitization and automated processes for digitized units. FM 5-0 will be distributed soon after FM 6-0 so there is no significant gap with respect to the availability of updated guidance on the subjects in FM 101-5.

FM 6-0 (formerly 100-34), *Command and Control*. The proponent, CAC/CADD, is currently reviewing comments on the DRAG edition and projects publishing the approved manual during the 1st Quarter of FY 02. FM 6-0 is the keystone command and control manual that will dovetail very closely with related material found in FM 3-0.

FM 7-15, *Army Universal Task List (AUTL)*. The proponent, CAC/CADD, is reviewing comments from the final draft. Each Service must publish its own tactical task list to supplement the Universal Joint Task List. FM 7-15 describes the structure and content of the AUTL and its relationship to Army tactical missions. It provides a common reference for Army tactical tasks performed by units and staffs at Corps level and below. It lists tasks and definitions, and provides reference codes to identify tactical missions and tasks. It does not include tasks performed by Army forces as part of joint and multinational forces at the operational and strategic levels.

HEADQUARTERS, AIR FORCE DOCTRINE CENTER (HQ, AFDC/DJ)

By Lt Col John P. Klatt, USAF, HQ AFDC/DJ

We recently welcomed Maj John "Stiffy" Sellers from Maxwell AFB, AL, where he graduated from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS), and Lt Col Mike McDaniel from the Joint Staff—he will work our special operations actions. Maj Matt "Filter" Fenton left to spend a year in Saudi Arabia as will Maj Fred "VC" VanCleave. We wish them good luck and a safe return home! We also will lose Maj Ken Smith in November. Ken worked many of the JP 0-2, command relationships, and JP 3-30 issues. Lastly, our Deputy, Lt Col Craig McLane, has left to work for OSD. He was replaced by Lt Col Ray Clark. Best of luck to them also!

This issue will not have an update of DJ actions. Numerous events and personnel losses prevented timely information gathering. I will give a complete update in the next issue. If you would like to ask about specific publications, contact me at DSN 574-8085. For information concerning Air Force doctrine documents (AFDDs), call DSN 493-7442. There are a total of 29 approved AFDDs. Four more are in the final stages of initial development. All of these documents (along with other approved AFDDs) are available on our Web site at <https://www.doctrine.af.mil> (and SIPRNET <http://www.doctrine.af.smil.mil>). You can also access this site through the Air Force Web site.

NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND (NWDC)

By Jim Gabor

Questions often arise concerning the access and the availability of US Navy and allied doctrine and/or lessons learned products. Therefore, the following information is provided on several NWDC CD-ROM products, as described in NTTP 1-01 (Revision B), *The Navy Warfare Library*. These CD-ROM products provide users with rapid access and robust search capabilities of approved doctrine publications and lessons learned.

The Navy Warfare Library (NWL) is a compilation of doctrinal, tactical, and reference publications designed to meet the needs of the Navy warfighter. The library includes publications from within the Navy doctrine hierarchy and applicable allied/multi-Service/multinational publications. NTTP 1-01 (Revision B) defines the organization and procedures governing naval doctrine publications (NDPs), naval warfare publications (NWP), Navy tactics, techniques and procedures (NTTPs), Navy tactical reference publications (NTRPs), fleet exercise publications (FXPs), and tactical memoranda (TACMEMOs). It defines relationships among commands and programs involved in tactics development, assigns responsibilities for developing and maintaining tactical and doctrinal publications, and contains guidance for maintaining the NWL.

NWPs, NTTPs, NTRPs, FXPs, and multinational manuals are distributed tri-annually on the Navy Warfare Electronic Library (NWEL) and via the NWDC SIPRNET (navigate to <http://www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil>, then select "Doctrine Discussion Group"). Unclassified CDs in this series are provided to all Navy or other DOD commands holding any portion of the NWL. Distribution of classified CDs is limited to those Navy or other DOD commands currently on distribution for one or more classified NWPs/NTTPs/NTRPs/FXPs with adequate classified material storage facilities for SECRET and below.

Allied publications, classified as NATO Confidential and below, are distributed biannually on the Allied Publication Electronic Library (APEL). Unclassified

NATO publications are also distributed via the NWDC SIPRNET. Unclassified CDs in this series are provided to all Navy or other DOD commands holding any portion of the NWL. Distribution of NATO Classified CDs is limited to those commands meeting prescribed security requirements.

The Navy Lessons Learned Database (NLLDB) is contained on the Navy Lessons Learned (NLL) CD-ROM set. Both classified (up to SECRET) and unclassified CDs are available. The NLL CD-ROM set is distributed quarterly. The NLLDB is also available for review on the NWDC SIPRNET Web site. The NLLDB on the SIPRNET is updated weekly. Both media provide for full text search and retrieval. The Navy Instructional Input Program, which provides for the creation and submission of lessons learned, is also available for download.

Direct all requests concerning the NWEL, APEL, or NLL CD-ROM distribution to:

COMMANDER
NAVYWARFAREDEVELOPMENTCOMMAND(CODEN57)
686CUSHINGROAD
NEWPORT,RI02841-1207
DSN948-6412or1168
Comm(401)841-6412or1168
E-mail: fleetpubs@nwc.navy.mil.

MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND (MCCDC), DOCTRINE DIVISION, JOINT BRANCH

By Lt Col Pat Redmon, USMC

The US Marine Corps is presently monitoring the progress of several publications of joint interest.

- JP 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, was signed in September 2001, which will lead the way for refinement of JPs 3-02.1, *Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations*, and 3-02.2, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation*.
- The *Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) Handbook* was signed and we are working closely with the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command in the development of JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*.

The US Marine Corps also is in various stages of developing/revising four of the five joint publications for which we are the lead agent.

(Organization updates continued on next page)

- The final coordination version of JP 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations*, will be released for worldwide review during October 2001.
- We will begin work on the first draft of JP 3-02.1, *Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations* during October 2001. Expect its release for comments during February 2001.
- A joint working group for JP 3-02.2, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation*, is scheduled for 22 October 2001 to discuss the adjudication of comments from its assessment and to prepare the revised program directive.
- The revision first draft of JP 3-09.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)*, was posted on the Joint Electronic Library for worldwide review. Comments were due during September 2001.

AIR LAND SEA APPLICATION (ALSA) CENTER

By COL Mark Zodda, USA, Director

The ALSA Center remains very busy. We recently completed the major task of clearing the backlog of projects in our editing queue. We continue to conduct research on potential new products and assess the relevance of existing publications for possible revisions. ALSA approaches new projects from the Services' perspectives, looking for friction points or gaps in how Service components operate in a joint environment. Our overall goal is to enhance the warfighters' ability to operate together.

The following matrixes list our current publications and new projects. Major Barbara Romano, USAF, our new Webmaster, has been working hard to keep our Web site

CURRENT ALSA PUBLICATIONS	
TITLE--DATE	POC
AMCI: <i>Army and Marine Corps Integration in Joint Operations</i> --MAY 96	Team C
ARM-J: <i>Antiradiation Missile Employment in a Joint Environment (Distribution Restricted)</i> --JUN 95	Team A
AVIATION URBAN OPERATIONS: <i>Multiservice Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations</i> --APR 01	Team B
BMO: <i>Bomber Maritime Operations (SECRET)</i> --JUN 00	Team E
BREVITY CODES: <i>Multiservice Operational Brevity Codes</i> --APR 97	Team F
EOD: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a Joint Environment</i> --MAR 01	Team D
ICAC2: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control</i> --JUN 00	Team D
*JAAT: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Attack Team Operations</i> --JUN 98	Team F
JAOC/AAMDC Coordination: <i>MTTP for Joint Air Operations Center(JAOC) and Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) Coordination</i> --JAN 01	Team F
JATC: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Traffic Control</i> --JAN 99	Team D
J-FIRE: <i>MTTP for Joint Application of Firepower</i> --NOV 97	Team E
JIADS: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Integrated Air Defense System (Distribution Restricted)</i> --JUN 01	Team E
*J-PROWLER: <i>MTTP for EA-6B Employment in a Joint Environment (SECRET)</i> --JUL 97	Team A
J-SEAD: <i>MTTP for the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SECRET)</i> --SEP 00	Team A
J-STARS: <i>MTTP for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (SECRET)</i> --JUL 97	Team G
JTF IM: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Task Force Information Management</i> --APR 99	Team B
*JTF LIAISON HANDBOOK: <i>MTTP for Joint Task Force (JTF) Liaison Operations</i> --AUG 98	Team E
JTMTD: <i>Joint Theater Missile Target Development</i> --OCT 99	Team F
NBC DEFENSE OF FIXED SITES: <i>MTTP for NBC Defense of Theater Fixed Sites, Ports, and Airfields</i> --AUG 00	Team E
*NLW: <i>MTTP for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons</i> --OCT 98	Team C
RECCE-J: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Requesting Reconnaissance Information in a Joint Environment</i> --JUN 96	Team E
*REPROGRAMMING: <i>Handbook for Reprogramming of Electronic Warfare and Target Sensing Systems (Distribution Restricted)</i> --APR 98	Team G
RM: <i>MTTP for Risk Management</i> --FEB 01	Team C
SURVIVAL, EVASION, AND RECOVERY: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery</i> --JUN 99	Team B
TADIL-J: <i>Introduction to Tactical Digital Information Link J and Quick Reference Guide</i> --JUN 00	Team G
*TAGS: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System</i> --JUL 98	Team D
TALK II: <i>Multiservice Communications Procedures for the Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS)</i> --MAY 96	Team B
*TARGETING: <i>The Joint Targeting Process and Procedures for Targeting Time-Critical Targets</i> --JUL 97	Team B
TMD IPB: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Theater Missile Defense and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace</i> --NOV 01	Team G
UXO: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Unexploded Explosive Ordnance Operations</i> --AUG 01	Team D
* Three-year assessment, ALSA, through combatant commands and Services, recommends to retain, revise, or rescind.	

NEW PROJECTS			
TITLE	EST PUB DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION AND STATUS
AMCI (Revision): Army and Marine Corps Integration in Joint Operations	Oct 01	A: FM 3-97.31 M: MCRP 3-3.8 N: N/A AF: N/A	Describes the capabilities and limitations of selected Army and Marine Corps organizations and provides TTP for the integrated employment of these units in joint operations. Signature draft is being prepared. POC: Team C
ARM-J (Revision): Antiradiation Missile Employment in a Joint Environment	Sep 01	A: FM 2-00.2 M: MCRP 3-22.1 N: NTTP 3-01.41 AF: AFTTP (I) 3-2.11	This revision of the Jun 95 manual will provide multi-Service procedures for antiradiation missile employment in a joint or multinational environment, with an emphasis on fratricide prevention. The scope will expand to include SECRET information. The first draft is out for comment. POC: Team A
BREVITY (Revision): Multi-Service Air-Air, Air-Surface, Surface-Air Brevity Codes	Oct 01	A: FM 3-97.18 M: MCRP 3-25B N: NWP 6-02.1 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.5	This publication will remain a pocket-size dictionary of joint use brevity codes to augment JP 1-02, <i>DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms</i> , and to expedite joint and coalition communications during combat. Signature draft is being staffed. POC: Team F
IDM (Improved Data Modem)	Mar 02	A: Pending M: Pending N: Pending AF: Pending	The scope of this publication is still being defined. Continuing to assess Service requirements. The program statement has been forwarded to JDDs for signature. POC: Team E
JSTARS: MTTP for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (SECRET)	Mar 02	A: FM 2-00.1 M: MCRP 2-2B N: NWP 3-55.13 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.2	Adding the information in this publication to JP 3-55 was disapproved. ALSA will proceed with a revision. The first joint working group is being scheduled. POC: Team G
NLW (Revision): Tactical Nonlethal Weapons	Sep 02	A: pending M: pending N: pending AF: pending	Program statement is being drafted. POC: Team C
TACTICAL RADIO (Revision of TALK-II-SINGARS)	Dec 01	A: FM 6-02.72 M: MCRP 6-2.2.2 N: NWP 3-13.1 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.18	This MTTP will describe and discuss current voice and tactical radios systems used in common between the Services. It will incorporate current updates and changes to SINGARS through the Advanced System Improvement Plan (ASIP), the Internet Controller (INC), and Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS). This will include analog as well as digital operations (interoperability) in a joint environment. The final coordination draft has been sent out for comment. POC: Team B
Team A: MAJ Mark Caruso & Maj Mark Delong		Team E: CDR Jim Woodard & Lt Col Paul Moscarelli	
Team B: LTC Lou Schurott & Lt Col Steve Jenkins		Team F: Lt Col Mark Brown & LTC Kevin Kirmse	
Team C: LTC Joe Patykula & Maj Billy Lucas		Team G: LTC Roger Smith & Maj "Soup" Campbell	
Team D: MAJ Vic Losch & Maj Barbara Romano			

(www.dtic.mil/alsa) updated to ensure warfighters have access to our publications and the most up-to-date information on ongoing projects.

ALSA publications are not found in the joint doctrine hierarchy, but instead can be found in the publication hierarchy of each Service. We aim to provide amplification of Service and joint publications (e.g., *J-FIRE: MTTP for Joint Application of Firepower*), provide interim procedural solutions (e.g., *IDM: MTTP for the Improved Data Modem*), document Service-to-Service agreements (e.g., *AMCI: Army and Marine Corps Integration in Joint Operations*), serve as a single source reference (e.g., *TAGS: Multi-Service Procedures for Theater Air-Ground System*), or provide commonality (e.g., *BREVITY CODES: Multi-Service Operational Brevity Codes*). You can expect ALSA's CY 2002 output to include five revisions and four to five new projects.

Our Joint Action Steering Committee has three new members. Army BG(P) Vane replaced BG Stratman, Marine Corps BrigGen (S) Glueck replaced MajGen Goodman, and Air Force Maj Gen McGhee replaced Maj Gen Smith. ALSA recently welcomed a new Deputy Director, Col (S) Ken Murphy, USAF, as well as three new action officers: LTC Roger Smith, USA, replaced LTC Elisabeth Bilyeu; Lt Col Paul Moscarelli, USAF, replaced Lt Col R. G. McManus; and MAJ Vic Losch, USA, replaced LTC Rick Starkey.



27TH JOINT DOCTRINE WORKING PARTY

To review the minutes of the May 2001 JDWP and past JDWPs, navigate to:

www.dtic.mil/doctrine/working_party.htm

SPACE DOCTRINE—A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Lt Col Nathan Toth, USAF, USJFCOM JWFC, Chief, Doctrine Division

The uniqueness of space and military space operations might lead one to the assumption that space doctrine developed by the joint community, Services, and alliances (with space capabilities, such as NATO) would be similar in content. That is, the principles, attributes, tenets, operational missions, and basic doctrine itself would provide consistent guidance to joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs for planning and conducting joint and combined operations. This article will briefly compare and contrast some of the key doctrinal publications available on space. In so doing, it will illustrate a lack of consistency in space doctrine, from which we might conclude that real consensus on space doctrine has yet to be achieved.

	ATTRIBUTES	TENETS	COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
JP 3-14 (FC)	No	No	Yes (C2)
AFDD 2-2	Yes	No	Yes (Command)
AFDD 2-2 (Revision Draft)	Yes (Characteristics)	Yes	Yes
AJP-3.3 (Ratification Draft)	Yes	No	Minimal

Figure 1. Overview

Figure 1 provides an overview for the ensuing discussion. It depicts key characteristics of the publications under consideration in this article—JP 3-14, *Joint Doctrine for Space Operations* (Final Coordination [FC]), dated 13 Apr 01; AFDD 2-2, *Space Operations*, dated 23 Aug 98; and Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.3, *Joint Air and Space Operations Doctrine (Ratification Draft – Change 1)*. Two notes at this point. First, there has never been any approved joint space doctrine—JP 3-14 has been in development for 11 years under the current program directive. Second, AFDD 2-2 is undergoing an extensive revision; therefore, references to the July 2001 revision draft are made below to highlight some new directions taken by the USAF. Further, the draft continues to undergo major changes, so care must be taken not to infer a final USAF position in many areas.

While a number of doctrinal elements could be considered, Figure 1 depicts three that are often used in joint doctrine to define mission areas and organizations. Later in the discussion we also will consider space missions/functions. One immediate observation is the lack of discussion in JP 3-14 on attributes. Joint doctrine does, however, provide some operational considerations for planners that will be considered below with the attributes in AFDD 2-2 and AJP-3.3. The other significant disconnect within the publications is the near total absence of guidance in AJP-3.3 on command

and control of space forces. The implication is that JFCs must turn to joint and Service doctrine when conducting multinational operations, but they will find significant inconsistencies within that guidance.

- **Attributes—characteristics or qualities of a thing.** Both AFDD 2-2 and AJP-3.3 provide examples generally consistent with this definition (see Figure 2). JP 3-14's operational considerations for joint space planners include "global access," which is similar to "global coverage" in the other publications. AFDD 2-2 and AJP-3.3 provide virtually the same descriptions for "global coverage" and "flexibility." At that point they diverge—AJP-3.3 takes more of a "high ground" approach in "perspective" and a critical force enabler theme in "synergistic effects." Overall, there is a distinct lack of consistency regarding attributes and a relative void in joint doctrine on the subject. AFDD 2-2 (Revision Draft) uses the term "**characteristics—distinguishing traits, features, or qualities**" rather than "attributes." It

states characteristics "further enhance traditional warfighting operations." The definitions of attributes and characteristics are sufficiently similar to allow us to substitute the new AFDD 2-2 characteristics

for attributes. The result is more commonality between AFDD 2-2 and AJP-3.3 than there is between AFDD 2-2 and joint doctrine.

- **Tenets—principles, doctrine, or beliefs held as truths.** AFDD 2-2 (Revision Draft) also introduces tenets, or more accurately, how space fits into the tenets of aerospace power. It is the only one of the four that provides tenets; which include centralized control and decentralized execution; **flexibility** and versatility; **synergistic effects**; **persistence**; concentration; and priority. The bolded items indicate some correlation to the various considerations, attributes, or characteristics discussed above.

- **Command Relationships.** Command is one of the key areas in joint doctrine that a JFC turns to for guidance. There is a difference in approach between JP 3-14 and AFDD 2-2 (see Figure 3). In roughly two pages, JP 3-14 summarizes combatant command (command authority) (COCOM), operational control (OPCON), and tactical control (TACON) considerations for space forces; makes a distinction between global and theater command and control (C2); and introduces the concept of a theater "joint force space operations authority (since deleted)."

JP 3-14 (FC) (Operational Considerations)	AFDD 2-2 (Attributes)	AFDD 2-2 (Revision Draft) (Characteristics)	AJP-3.3 Ratification Draft) (Attributes)
Global Access	Global Coverage	Global Presence	Global Coverage
Persistence	Flexibility	Flexibility	Flexibility
Relatively Predictable Orbits	Economy	Perspective	Perspective
	Effectiveness	Precision	Synergistic Effects
	Robustness		

Figure 2. Attributes and Characteristics

Essentially, there is little commonality in the framework provided by JP 3-14 and AFDD 2-2, and considerable (but not total) commonality between

AFDD 2-2 uses roughly three paragraphs that broadly address unity of command, Service component assets, and other assets such as national systems.

The majority of AFDD 2-2 discussions on theater operations are in the final chapter, "Space Power for the Theater Campaign." It contains an overarching discussion on space operations integration, theater planning, peacetime planning, and crisis/wartime space operations. AFDD 2-2 (Revision Draft) has a new Chapter Two, "Command and Control of Space Operations," with 10 pages of discussion on global and theater space forces, but it remains to be seen if the approved version of this document retains much, if any, of the current language. As noted in Figure 3, AJP-3.3 is almost silent on command relationships, simply noting that JFCs may delegate responsibilities for coordinating and requesting space support to a suitably experienced force component commander (often the air component).

Finally, with the exception of AJP-3.3, all publications address to some degree the "support" command relationship described in JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Support is a command authority and is central (and not always well understood) to the overall discussion of command relationships, particularly between combatant commanders. JP 3-14 could benefit by providing expanded discussions and additional specifics on support relationships to further clarify the distinction between space "integration" (supported combatant commander) and "employment" (supporting combatant commander). This would help frame all other discussions on command relationships and put OPCON/TACON considerations into better perspective.

Space Missions/Functions. One final area for comparison is space missions and functional areas. Figure 4 provides a broad overview of the framework in each publication.

Examining the function of "space control" or "counterspace" illustrates the most significant inconsistencies between joint, Service, and allied doctrine.

AFDD 2-2 and AJP-3.3. While all three publications start with space control, AFDD 2-2 and AJP-3.3 quickly move into the concept of counterspace operations and its offensive/defensive aspects. AFDD 2-2 (Revision Draft) drops discussion of space control altogether and starts to distance itself from AJP-3.3 when, for example, it establishes "spacelift" as a separate function vice its previous categorization as an element of space support. Note that AJP-3.3 does not have a space support functional area, but instead places both spacelift and satellite operations within the space control functional area. JP 3-14 retains spacelift as an element of space support.

Surveillance is a major element of space control in JP 3-14. By comparison, AFDD 2-2 and AJP-3.3 list it as a contributing capability. AFDD 2-2 (Revision Draft) addresses surveillance in two ways: (1) space situation awareness as a foundation for counterspace and other space functions, to include traditional space surveillance; and (2) "Surveillance" as one of the USAF functions (e.g., Space Surveillance Network). Similarly, AFDD 2-2 (Revision Draft) elevates (not depicted in Figure 4) intelligence and reconnaissance as separate elements (not the common intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) construct), and lists navigation and timing as USAF functions, instead of being subsets of space functions. JP 3-14 is the only publication to include the "I" in "ISR" in the force enhancement function.

Consistency and consensus go hand in hand. Consistency in doctrine is mandated in three directives. JP 1-01, *Joint Doctrine Development System*, states, "Service doctrine must be consistent with approved joint doctrine and JTTP." JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, is somewhat stronger, stating "Joint doctrine takes precedence over individual Service doctrines, which must be consistent

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS		
JP 3-14 (FC)	AFDD 2-2	AJP-3.3
Command Relationships (COCOM/OPCON/TACON)	Unity of Command (Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution)	JFC may elect to delegate responsibilities
Global C2	Service Component Assets	
Theater C2	Assets not Assigned to a Service Component	

Figure 3. Command Relationships

(Continued on next page)

with joint doctrine." However, it then states that when participating in multinational operations, "US commanders should follow multinational doctrine and procedures that have been ratified by the United States." In turn, CJCSI 2700.01, *International Military Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States and its Allies and Other Friendly Nations*, dated 30 January 1995, states that the lead Service or agency will ensure "approved joint doctrine (or JTTP) are used to develop US national positions. Service doctrine must be consistent with approved joint doctrine and will also serve as the national position when uni-Service issues are involved in multinational doctrine."¹

Space operations, supported by USSPACECOM and its three Service components, are considered joint operations, albeit with the preponderance of capabilities in one Service. While the lack of joint space doctrine is not sufficient in and of itself to default to Service doctrine in developing multinational doctrine, the reality is that our NATO partners are emulating USAF space doctrine, to a degree.

OBSERVATIONS/IMPLICATIONS

- Ratification of AJP-3.3 may require a "ratify with reservation" statement by the US for Chapter 6, "Space Operations," due to inconsistencies with Service doctrine and the lack of approved joint space doctrine, despite the fact that much of AJP-3.3 is based on Service doctrine.
- AFDD 2-2 will be inconsistent with joint doctrine if JP 3-14 is published using the current space function construct depicted in Figure 4, and the command relationships outlined in Figure 3.
- The potential inconsistencies between USAF and joint space doctrine are likely to endure, because there is no enforcement mechanism in place to require change by the Services when Service doctrine is inconsistent with joint doctrine.
- JP 3-14.1, *JTTP for Space Control*, a new publication approved for development by the October 2000 Joint Doctrine Working Party, may suffer the

SPACE MISSIONS/FUNCTIONS			
JP 3-14 (FC)	AFDD 2-2	AFDD 2-2 (Revision Draft)	AJP-3.3 (Ratification Draft)
Space Control	Space Control	Counterspace	Space Control
Negation Deceive Disrupt Deny Degrade Destroy	Counterspace Offensive Counterspace Deception Disruption Denial Degradation Destruction	Offensive Counterspace Deception Disruption Denial Degradation Destruction	Counterspace Offensive Counterspace Deception Disruption Denial Degradation/Destruction
Protection Active Passive	Defensive Counterspace Active Passive	Defensive Counterspace Active Defense Passive Defense	Defensive Counterspace Active Defence Passive Defence
Surveillance	Contributing Capabilities Surveillance and Reconnaissance of Space		Contributing Capabilities Surveillance and Reconnaissance of Space
Prevention	Ballistic Missile Warning		Space Environment Ops Satellite Operations Spacelift Operations
Force Enhancement ISR	Enhancing Operations Reconnaissance Surveillance	Spacelift	Force Enhancement Surveillance & Reconnaissance of Terrestrial Environment
Environ. Monitoring Communications Positioning/Negation Warning	Environmental Sensing Communications Navigation Ballistic Missile Warning		Environmental Sensing Communications Navigation and Positioning Ballistic Missile Warning
Space Support	Supporting Space Forces		
Spacelift Satellite Operations	Spacelift Satellite Operations		
Force Application	Application of Force		

Figure 4. Space Missions/Functions

same fate as JP 3-14. It could languish until commonality in the space functional area framework is attained, robust joint space control/counterspace capabilities are fielded, and command relationships become consistent in joint and Service doctrine.

FINAL THOUGHTS

The Persian Gulf War has been touted as the first space war. Space operations have been successfully conducted for years, with USSPACECOM leading joint space operations, without any approved joint doctrine. This suggests that supported (primarily geographic) combatant commanders have organized to integrate supporting space capabilities on the basis of regional requirements and war plan assumptions. It also suggests that the employment of space forces (determining the forces, tactics, methods, procedures), that is the primary responsibility of the supporting combatant commander (through Service components), is articulated and understood within the military space community. That understanding is reached via USSPACECOM and Service component concepts of operation, plans, operating procedures, etc., as well as core Service doctrine and tactics manuals. Part of the dilemma for USSPACECOM is defining and reaching a target audience for space doctrine with capabilities that are national and strategic assets, when the province of joint doctrine/JTTP is the operational/tactical level. Adding to the dilemma is a lack of truly robust space combat capability at any level of warfare. Ultimately, the lack of consistency in joint and Service doctrine reflects an absence of common space warfare principles. Consensus on those principles, matched to extant combat capabilities and the right target audiences, could mark the real transition of space warfighting concepts to space warfighting doctrine.

¹ The May 2001 draft revision of the CJCSI states the lead agent will ensure "... approved joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures are used to develop national positions. Service doctrine must be consistent with approved joint doctrine and will serve as the national position only when single-Service issues are involved in multinational doctrine and when no applicable approved joint doctrine exists."



JOINT PUBLICATION USER FEEDBACK

Everyone has the opportunity to make recommendations to improve JPs. Each JP solicits user comments. Comments received by the joint community will be included in the final publication assessment prepared by the USJFCOM JWFC to help make joint doctrine the best warfighting guidance available. Contact any of our officers through the e-mail, phone, or fax numbers provided on page 18.

COMBATANT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS MASTER TRAINING GUIDE

*By Mr. Chris Marple, USJFCOM JWFC,
Doctrine Support Group (OC, Incorporated)*

There is a new master training guide (MTG) available on the Web. The *Combatant Command Headquarters Master Training Guide (CC HQ MTG)* was developed for permanently assigned officers and augmentees to a combatant command headquarters staff. It provides techniques for performing critical tasks related to war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). MTGs are available for staff officers assigned to a joint task force, joint psychological operations task force, joint special operations task force, joint civil-military operations task force, and the joint force air component command. The *CC HQ MTG* and the *Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide (JTF HQ MTG)—Revision-A* are at the Joint Staff for worldwide staffing and approval.

The *Joint Training Manual (JTM)* states that all MTGs must use CJCSM 3500.04B, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)*, as the common task language. The *UJTL* describes WHAT tasks must be performed and MTGs identify task steps, linked to the *UJTL*, that suggest ways the task may be performed. It also identifies joint doctrine and other source documents as well as the conditions in which the task may be performed. The *JTM* provides the framework for standardizing MTGs to assure consistency and continuity among the family of MTGs.

Within the family of MTGs, the *CC HQ MTG* and the *JTF HQ MTG* possess remarkable similarities. In fact, the *UJTL*-based *JTF HQ MTG* was a credible and useful model for *CC HQ MTG* development. There are some differences. The *JTF HQ MTG*, focused at the operational level, is a paper-based product; while the *CC HQ MTG*, focused at the strategic theater level, is Web-based. The Web-based approach offers the unique capability to showcase the most current and approved joint doctrine. Crisis action planning (CAP) was used as the backbone of the *CC HQ MTG*, binding task performance at the strategic theater and the operational levels of war. The manner and make-up of the combatant command staff evolves as it transitions from peace to war or MOOTW. The *JTF* life-cycle progresses in stages through standing-up the headquarters, developing plans and orders, deployment, employment, transition, and redeployment. Despite some differences in construct, both MTGs are joined at the hip via their connection to CAP and the *UJTL*.

You may access the Web version of the *CC HQ MTG* at <http://elib1.jwfc.js.mil/main/cincmtg>. The product has limited access and the distribution includes only US Government and military personnel and agencies so you need to use your command's username and password for the JWFC research library. You also may access it on the
(Continued on next page)

SIPRNET at <http://www.jwfc.jfcom.smil.mil/MTG>. The Web version is a dynamic, evolving MTG based on the most current doctrine. The Web site also contains a primer for those less adventurous who desire a discussion on how to use the MTG site.

The Web site has several options on how to find specific task steps for critical war and MOOTW tasks. On the left side of the screen, you will see two sections of four buttons. The top section contains the four entry methods for finding Joint Mission Essential Task information. The first button divides the UJTL task steps by CAP phase, the second button by staff section, the third by UJTL task, and the fourth allows you to perform a search for specific task step information.

When using the CAP phase button you will be able to find all UJTL task steps in a specific CAP phase. The staff positions are based on a "generic" combatant command from joint doctrine. The specific staff section tasks are further divided by CAP phase. UJTL tasks are divided by functional area and then by CAP phase. The search button allows the user to type in a specific task query and the result will provide all task steps that relate to the request.

The second section of four buttons provides the user with supplemental information. The first button is for a listing of selected theater boards that may be stood up, the second button is for job aids, the third button provides all the current MTGs in PDF format, and the fourth button is a link to the Joint Electronic Library. The theater boards are divided by functional area. There are two types of job aids;

(Continued from page 12)

- 39 Author's note: Returning to some principles and definitions discussed earlier, combatant commanders are required to have a PR capability for all operations, to include those conducted in uncertain environments. Those assets assigned to conduct a SAR are often the same assets that when necessary, can conduct CSAR if the uncertain environment deteriorates into a hostile environment. This reinforces the point that SAR and civil SAR are not synonymous, and that SAR is indeed clearly under the PR umbrella. Therefore, SAR is a critical PR capability commanders must have to recover their personnel per their responsibilities.
- 40 JP 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Apr 2001), 371.
- 41 JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 Apr 1998), II-4.
- 42 Ibid, II-12.
- 43 Ibid, GL-10.
- 44 DODD 2310.2, *Personnel Recovery* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 22 Dec 2000), 12-13.
- 45 JP 3-50.3, *Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 6 Sep 96), III-4.
- 46 Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary (Boston, Ma: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1988), 380, 910.
- 47 Ibid, 266. See definition of "civil."
- 48 JP 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Apr 2001), 295.

Computer Based Training (CBT) and PowerPoint® note slides that further enhance learning related to selected task steps. The CBT job aids require Shockwave® and Shockwave Flash® to view the modules.

During the development of the *CC HQ MTG*, we learned that it has the potential to impact other aspects of operations and training. For example, it can be used to train newly arrived non-commissioned officers in their crisis management responsibilities. It can be used as an aid for defining and reviewing the combatant commander's Joint Mission Essential Task List. Lastly, it has proven useful in all aspects of joint exercise planning and execution from the development of training objectives in the Concept Development Conference to shaping the after-action review in the post-exercise phase.



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TERMINOLOGY CURRENCY

Users of JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, should note that printed versions quickly become dated and they should go online to get the most current information. Navigate to: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf

TERMINOLOGY

By Mr. Tom Barrows, USJFCOM JWFC, Doctrine Support Group

"War means fighting . . . The business of the soldier is to fight . . . to find the enemy and strike him; to invade his country, and do him all possible damage in the shortest possible time."

Stonewall Jackson, 1824-1863

Around the time of this quote, General Jackson had the luxury of focusing only on the immediate tasks at hand—pursuing and closing with and destroying the enemy. Oh, I am sure he had the usual logistics, intelligence, and communications problems, but at least he was fighting on terrain and in an environment familiar to him. He did not have to concern himself with multinational partners, international treaties, or the myriad other tasks and responsibilities confronting today's generals. He certainly did not have to worry about personnel recovery as we are coming to know it today.

As I review the seemingly endless litany of concepts and terminology emerging under the rubric of "personnel recovery" in the joint and Service arenas, I am concerned about our ability to develop coherent joint doctrine and JTTP that will allow for the speedy recovery of US personnel who become "lost" during military operations. The plethora of emerging terminology is extremely daunting to me personally, and I have several years of experience in working these issues and developing joint doctrine and JTTP. I can only imagine the confusion and dismay felt by the warfighters who must wade through this terminology morass and provide meaningful operational inputs. It appears to me that some policy makers at the higher levels within the Department of Defense have not reached consensus on what components comprise the concept of "personnel recovery."

As is the military fashion, we will sally forth shortly in an attempt to come to grips with the personnel recovery issues and develop joint doctrine and/or JTTP based upon incomplete or ambiguous guidance from higher authority. In the end, I believe we will develop good joint doctrine and/or JTTP for personnel recovery, but I predict it will be a "painful" ordeal for those directly involved, i.e., the joint doctrine development community. Mixing what was combat search and rescue or CSAR with emerging concepts such as "civil option for personnel recovery," "military option for personnel recovery," and "political personnel recovery option" will be no small task. Factor in military support to civil search and rescue and you have the potential for very spirited (if not downright volatile) joint

discussions and working groups. Hopefully, we will manage to keep "finger pointing" and "name calling" to a minimum, but I wouldn't guarantee complete decorum at all times.

As we move more and more toward a "paperless" environment, horizontal and vertical alignment of terminology should become easier. However, we will need to be extremely watchful to guard against the spurious modification of terms and definitions—the electronic age makes it too easy to do this. Keep your powder dry and be careful out there.



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