



A Common PERSPECTIVE

USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center
Doctrine Division's Newsletter

October 1999

Volume 7, No. 2

Peace Operations

Obtain consent...

Maintain impartiality...



Apply force...



FROM THE EDITOR

Greetings from the USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC)! I am pleased to be serving as editor and committed to ensuring we provide accurate, educational, and thought-provoking news, articles, and information. Upon my arrival here from Korea, I was pleasantly surprised to learn that the joint doctrine development community has provided the warfighters with over 85 approved publications, with several interesting new projects underway. Most importantly, we are continually refining approved joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) to articulate recent advances in warfighting and military operations other than war.

Despite the overall grand success of joint doctrine development, progress is often slow. Just four publications were approved since our last newsletter. USJFCOM JWFC and the Joint Staff are both conducting formal reviews of what we call "languishing pubs." The results will be briefed to the Joint Doctrine Working Party in October 1999. The objective is to provide senior leadership visibility to the problem and make recommendations on critical publications that need immediate attention. The summer turnover throughout the joint doctrine development community has been completed and the next six months should produce a marked acceleration in JP development.

Over recent years, we have seen a proliferation of World Wide Web Home Pages from the various doctrine-related organizations. On page 33, we have provided a guide to 20 key sites commonly used in JP development. Many are referenced in the included articles, but we thought you would appreciate a consolidated listing as we do for the joint doctrine points of contact (POCs). Remember, our co-managing editor, Mr. Bob Hubner, periodically updates the POC listings on pages 20 and 21 by providing an Acrobat (PDF) file on the A Common Perspective portion of our Internet site starting at <http://www.jtasc.acom.mil/>. Check it out if you are unable to get connected using the phone numbers and e-mails listed in this issue.

We originally intended to focus this issue on logistic support to joint operations. However, recent operations in Kosovo and now in East Timor have highlighted peace operations. Consequently, this issue is primarily devoted to addressing peace operations and associated activities such as urban operations (see page 14). We also thought you would be interested in the issues surrounding directive authority for logistics discussed on page 16. Our next issue will focus on consequence management as it relates to weapons of mass destruction. Consequence management is addressed in JP 3-11, "Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments" (First Draft), dated 28 May 1999, and other joint and multi-Service publications. We need your support! Send us an article by 15 February 2000 on consequence management or other related topics. Along that vein, I would like to thank Mr. Richard Rinaldo and the Armed Forces Staff College for being such dependable regular contributors. We hope others will get the fever!

I am looking forward to serving as the editor—it certainly will be a challenge different than controlling aircraft and managing tactical data links in Korea. I ask that you continue to support the development of joint doctrine and JTTP by reading and participating in our newsletter.

Nathan Toth, Lt Col, USAF
Executive Editor

Josiah McSpedden & Bob Hubner
Managing Editors

A Common Perspective is published under the provisions of DOD Instruction 5120.4. This newsletter is an authorized publication for members of the Department of Defense. The articles, letters, and opinions expressed or implied within are not to be construed as official positions of, or endorsed by, the US Government, the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, or the USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center.

IN THIS ISSUE

Article	Page	Article	Page
Message from the Commander, USJFCOM JWFC	3	Doctrine Organization Updates:	
USJFCOM JWFC DOC-DIV Updates	4	Joint Staff, J-7, Joint Doctrine Division (JDD)	23
Peace Operations: Perceptions	6	TRADOC, Joint and Army Doctrine Directorate	25
Small Wars, Faux Wars, and Peace Operations:		Air Force Doctrine Center (AFDC)	28
Sources of Friction	10	Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)	29
The Marine Corps Tackles Urban Operations	14	MCCDC, Doctrine Division, Joint Branch	30
Understanding and Clarifying Directive Authority		Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center	30
for Logistics	16	Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC)	33
Joint Publication Status	19	23rd Semiannual Joint Doctrine Working Party	34
Joint Doctrine Points of Contact	20	Terminology	37
Joint Doctrine Hierarchy (Graphic)	22	Joint Publications Distribution	38
		Subscriber Request Form	39



MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDER, USJFCOM JWFC

By MG William S. Wallace, USA

Since assuming command of the USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) this Summer, I continue to be impressed with the wide range of initiatives, products, and services that we provide to warfighters. Not least of those is this publication, intended to provide operators, planners, and doctrine experts a forum to share ideas and concerns on joint operations. Your contributions to A Common Perspective (ACP) are important to the joint community. I encourage you to contact our editors with your suggestions and articles.

The focus of this issue is peace operations. Recent events in Kosovo, East Timor, and other lands since Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM illustrate the impact this expanding role has had on the joint community.

- The first article by Mr. Richard Rinaldo (page 6), a frequent contributor to our newsletter, provides a very useful guide to the structure and sources of information for peace operations. The available materials are extensive, and he has categorized sources in the broad areas of lessons learned, situation and mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command and signal (note the parallels to an operations order format).
- Mr. Stephen Cimbala's article (page 10) discusses some of the friction inherent in organizing our forces for what he calls nonwar operations. It is an excellent introduction to the problems inherent to warriors trained for combat, but expected to perform a wide range of "nonwar" missions.
- In an important adjunct to peace operations, Maj John Scanlan outlines how the Marine Corps has approached the concept of urban operations (page 14). Urban operations can pose special problems during peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

The 24th Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP) will be held 19-20 October 1999. This semiannual forum of representatives from the combatant commands and Services continues to be an excellent vehicle for making decisions on the structure and content of joint doctrine



publications. One significant agenda topic will be a review of joint doctrine publications that have been in development or revision for extended periods. Our collective intent with the Joint Staff J-7 team is to identify the languishing publications and determine how to bring them to closure. I should add that the assessment process for joint doctrine continues to be very effective and recommendations from joint users have spurred many needed changes to joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. The results of the 23rd JDWP held in April 1999 are summarized on page 34.

Among the many areas of concern in an uncertain world is the issue of how military and civilian authorities might deal with the consequences of the intentional or unintentional release of weapons of mass destruction. Consequence management has applications for both overseas and CONUS, and its direct link to the emerging concepts of homeland defense (see our April 1999 ACP) is one of the new areas we are focusing on in joint doctrine. The Joint Staff, and the US Army as lead agent, are accelerating the revision of JP 3-11, "Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments" (First Draft), which addresses consequence management. Consequence management will be the theme for the April 2000 ACP.

Finally, we continue to consolidate USJFCOM JWFC activities at the Joint Training, Analysis and Simulations Center in Suffolk, VA. The Doctrine Division, currently at Fort Monroe, VA, will move to the Suffolk facility in the near future. This will enhance the synergy inherent to our combined responsibilities in joint experimentation, joint training, and major exercise participation; all key to the development of joint doctrine.



USJFCOM JWFC DOC-DIV UPDATES

*By Col Bob Brodel, USAF, USJFCOM JWFC,
Chief, Doctrine Division*

The joint doctrine development community was very busy despite approval of only four joint publications over the past six months (see list on page 19). Forty-seven of 111 joint publications (42%) are either in development or under revision, along with six to eight under assessment at any given time. Nevertheless, some publications are languishing in the development process, prompting us to request we all put more emphasis on moving them through the process. Among the slow movers are four that require our focused attention:

- JP 3-01, "Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats," has been in final coordination for two years and four months. There is disagreement on the use of supported and supporting command relationships within a component commanders area of operations. It has been through several tank sessions and is currently at the Director of the Joint Staff level for resolution.
- JP 3-02, "Doctrine for Joint Amphibious Operations," is two years past its revision date. It is stalled because of conflict over a proposed Commander, Amphibious Task Force/Commander, Landing Force command relationship. This has delayed the development of JP 3-02.1, "Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations," and revision of JP 3-02.2, "Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation." An author's draft is under lead agent review.
- JP 3-16, "Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations," has been in development for five years. Comments on the second final coordination version produced 20 critical comments. We are forming a working group in October 1999 to resolve critical comments.
- JP 3-18, "Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations," has been in development just over six years. The preliminary coordination version was restaffed for comments in April 1998 after incorporating portions of former JP 3-18.1, "Joint Doctrine for Airborne and Air Assault Operations."

We must be persistent and resolve the issues in these publications, so we can turn our full attention to other publications in development or under revision. Some key publications under revision are JPs 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Force of the United States;" 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF);" and 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations." The second draft of JP 3-0 will be sent out for worldwide review prior to the end of 1999 and the program directives for JPs 1 and 0-2 are in development. Regarding JP 0-2, we reported in the last issue that the USACOM (now

USJFCOM) JWFC completed a joint command and control (C2) doctrine study, which concluded that most C2 subject areas derived by the joint working group are covered in joint doctrine and recommended not developing a new publication, but instead revising and strengthening JP 0-2. That recommendation was approved by the April 1999 Joint Doctrine Working Party. This means we must pay particularly close attention to the development of a workable program directive (PD) for the revision of JP 0-2. A working group met in late September 1999 to discuss the PD.

Publication printing and distribution also is a priority. Since May 1996, over 466,000 hard copy joint publications and over 93,000 Joint Electronic Library CD-ROMs have been distributed to the joint community. Be sure to review pages 37 and 38 of this newsletter for the latest information on how to get copies of joint publications.

Our involvement with NATO issues and doctrine continues. It is particularly notable that USJFCOM JWFC has been assigned the lead in developing AJP-3.4, "Military Operations Other Than War." The 1st study draft was released in late June 1999 and comments are due on 30 October 1999. We recently participated in the Allied Joint Operational Doctrine Working Group and the associated custodial meetings for AJP-3.4; AJP-3, "Allied Joint Operations;" and AJP-3.4.1, "Peace Support Operations." We will be attending the custodial meetings for AJP-3.4 and AJP-3.4.1 in Hamburg, Germany during December 1999.

I wish to recognize our new arrivals and say farewell to those who have departed. LTC Rich Cardillo, USA, arrived in July 1999 from the Army War College. Rich's military background includes numerous assignments with the artillery, which he claims is "King of the Battlefield." LTC Steve Senkovich switched from Chief of our Assessment Branch to Chief of the USJFCOM Doctrine Branch, which is part of the Doctrine Division. He was replaced by LTC Ralph R. "Rick" Steinke; a former commander of the 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery (Multiple Launch Rocket System/Army Tactical Missile System) in Germany from 1996-1998. Rick arrived from a Senior Service College Fellowship by way of Tirane, Albania, where he served as the future plans/targeting officer-in-charge, Deep Operations Coordination Center, Task Force HAWK. Lt Col Nate Toth, a weapons controller, arrived from a tour in Korea and replaced Lt Col Kitty Bryan, who left for an air control billet in Alaska. Our latest arrival is MAJ Frank Miller, an air defender, also arriving from a tour in Korea. Check the joint doctrine POC listings on page 20 for our new arrivals' phone numbers and e-mails.

Finally, we are anticipating a move to the Joint Training, Analysis and Simulations Center in Suffolk, VA, within the next six months. Give us a call before sending us anything. See the lower insert on page 15 for our new address information.

DEVELOPMENT BRANCH

There has been a great deal of work accomplished on the development and revision side of the house. The key advances were:

- Formation of an JFCOM-staff working group to review the draft program directive for JP 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States." One of the subsequent recommendations was the USJFCOM offer to take the lead in writing the proposed chapter on future concepts.
- JP 1-01, "Joint Doctrine Publication System," has completed preliminary coordination (PC). All comments have been received and the final coordination (FC) version will be released as soon as Unified Command Plan 99 gains final approval.
- JP 3-09.1, "JTTP for Laser Designation Operations," a revision of the 1991 version, was approved on 28 May 1999.
- JP 3-35, "Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations," was approved on 7 September 1999.
- JPs 2-01.3, "JTTP for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace" (PC), and 3-55, "Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Support to Joint Operations" (PC), were both released on 9 July 1999.
- JP 3-51, "Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare" (FC), was released on 14 September 1999.

JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations" (First Draft (FD)), was released for worldwide review and comment during March 1999. The USJFCOM JWFC will host a Working Group on 26 October 1999 to work the issues associated with the resulting comments. Other draft publications recently released include JPs 3-05.1, "JTTP for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations" (Second Draft (SD)), on 31 August 1999; 3-11, "Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments" (FD), on 28 May 1999; and 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations (CMO)" (SD), on 30 July 1999.

It has been a productive six months. Thanks for all the hard work! Questions should be directed to CDR Dave Bentz, USN, Chief, Joint Publication Development Branch at DSN 680-6449 or e-mail: bentzd@jwfc.acom.mil.

ASSESSMENT BRANCH

As noted in the previous issue, new assessment procedures have been implemented to ensure that lead agents have the most current information available for revising publications. First, assessments are continuous and begin at publication approval. Further, these procedures include the potential for two formal assessments for each joint publication. Approximately two years after publication, our interim assessment will be completed. This assessment will recommend either an accelerated or normal revision. If a normal revision is recommended, the report becomes an interim report and Doctrine Division will continue to collect and analyze comments and data through the end of the assessment period. If an accelerated revision is recommended,

the assessment report will be a final report and forwarded to the Joint Staff J-7 for action. Since April 1999, we have completed seven assessment reports. The results are:

- Early revisions for JPs 1-05, "Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations;" 3-54, "Joint Doctrine for Operations Security;" 3-61, "Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations;" and 4-01, "Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System."
- Normal revisions for JPs 3-07.4, "Joint Counterdrug Operations;" 3-07.5, "JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations;" and 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations."

Six joint publications are undergoing formal assessments; JPs 3-04.1, "JTTP for Shipboard Helicopter Operations;" 3-07.2, "JTTP for Antiterrorism;" 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support;" 3-10, "Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations;" 3-56.1, "Command and Control for Joint Air Operations;" and 4-02.1, "JTTP for Health Service Logistic Support in Joint Operations."

A request for feedback (RFF) message is an assessment tool used to solicit recommendations for publication improvement. RFF messages will be released as follows:

- October 1999: JP 3-50.21, "JTTP for Combat Search and Rescue."
- November 1999: JP 3-05, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations."
- December 1999: JPs 4-05, "Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning," and 6-0, "Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Support to Joint Operations."
- January 2000: JPs 3-52, "Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone," and 4-03, "Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine."
- February 2000: JP 3-01.4, "JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Defenses (J-SEAD)."
- March 2000: JP 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations."

To date, the USJFCOM JWFC Doctrine Division has completed 60 assessments. Joint publication assessment status can be checked by accessing the USJFCOM JWFC Home Page at <http://www.jtasc.acom.mil>. Click on "Limited Access," followed by "Joint Doctrine" and "Joint Pub Assessment." See page 18 for registration procedures.

Questions, comments, or suggestions regarding joint publication assessments should be directed to LTC Rick Steinker, USA, Chief, Joint Publication Assessment Branch at DSN 680-6406 or e-mail: steinker@jwfc.acom.mil.



PEACE OPERATIONS: Perceptions

By *Mr. Richard J. Rinaldo*

The purpose of this article is to identify sources for accessing the enormous body of information available to military peace operations practitioners and to outline some broad, selective perceptions about peace operations in a structured manner. Peace operations encompass peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. This article addresses those and other related operations and activities, such as peace building and foreign humanitarian assistance.

US AND MULTINATIONAL DOCTRINE

Available peace operations doctrine is bountiful. Recently published JP 3-07.3, "JTTP for Peace Operations," addresses most aspects of these operations. It includes an appendix of historical examples as well as a robust listing of references containing lessons learned, along with a glossary of US, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and United Nations (UN) terms. The second edition of the USJFCOM JWFC's "Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations," dated 16 June 1997, accompanied by a CD-ROM of selected policy; joint, Service, and allied doctrine; training literature; lessons learned; books; papers; and more is also an excellent resource. The Army's FM 100-23, "Peace Operations," currently under revision, is another excellent resource. NATO's AJP-3.4.1, "Peace Support Operations" (Draft), dated December 1998, is still under development.

JP 3-07.3 discusses US and multinational doctrine development and terminology. The US, NATO, and others differ on terminology and labels for the types of peace operations, but not about essentials. The conferences, doctrine, military exchanges, lessons learned, policy, academic study, and literature of the last decade have driven a convergence of approaches to peace operations. Much of this convergence validates **the key variables of peace operations as consent, impartiality, and the use of force.**¹

LESSONS LEARNED

The USJFCOM JWFC's Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) collects, processes, analyzes, distributes, and archives lessons learned, issues, and key observations from operations, training events, and other sources to enhance the combat effectiveness and interoperability of joint forces. The lessons learned are linked to the CJCSM 3500.04A, "Universal Joint Task List Version 3.0," (UJTL). JCLL also manages the Joint After Action Reporting System (JAARS) database—a work in progress that should support joint training, exercises, and operations as the

database links with the UJTL mature. The database is available on the Secret Internet Protocol Routing Network (SIPRNET) at <http://www.jcll.jwfc.acom.smil.mil>. The JCLL also publishes The Joint Center for Lessons Learned Bulletin, available at <http://www.secure.jwfc.acom.mil/protected/jcll>, an unclassified but password protected Internet site. It includes discussions of CJCS-commended training issues, lessons learned about specific UJTL tasks, and "golden nuggets" of significant JAARS entries. The Winter 1997 edition included discussions of force protection, interagency operations, rules of engagement (ROE), and noncombatant evacuation operations—all, to some degree, related to peace operations.

The US Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) collects and analyzes data from a variety of current and historical sources, including Army operations and training events, and produces lessons for military commanders, staff, and students. CALL disseminates these lessons and other related research materials via a variety of print and electronic media, including an Internet site at <http://call.army.mil>. Its Home Page also includes joint and Service doctrine, State Department and Central Intelligence Agency country overviews, and the comprehensive Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) Home Page. The CALL database has over 1.5 million pages of operations orders and after-action reviews, to include initial impressions reports, normally for official use only. CALL also publishes special editions focused on a specific operation; News From the Front, which include short articles that discuss solutions to specific problems; and longer newsletters, which provide TTP for units. CALL products on the Internet are both unrestricted and restricted with the latter requiring a password. A recent FMSO addition to the site is Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) Active in the Kosovo Region: A Primer that contains links to doctrine, pertinent documents, and other Internet sites.

The Marine Corps Research Center at Quantico includes a comprehensive collection of library, research, and archival material. It focuses on linking scholarly research and professional military education with operational lessons learned to stimulate the development of successful concepts, doctrine, and TTP. Plans are to place the archive online at <http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/MCRCweb/archive.html>. The Marine Corps Lesson Learned System is available on CD ROM and online to military users at <http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/www/library/2mccls.htm>.

The UN has produced numerous materials for member states and organizations available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko>. Examples include General Guidelines for Peace-keeping Operations (1995), The United Nations Civilian Police Handbook (1996), and the United Nations Military Observers Handbook (1995). Since 1989, UN peacekeeping operations have become increasingly complex and multifaceted. Learning from these diverse experiences became one of the main objectives of its Department of Peacekeeping Operations, leading to the creation of a Lessons Learned Unit in 1995. Its products include lessons

learned from Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda, as well as a broader publication, Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons From Recent Experience. Topics include mandates and means, planning, coordination, intelligence and information analysis, military security, training of local police and human rights monitoring, logistics, finance and budget, personnel and training, medical and health, demining, humanitarian relief in a peacekeeping environment, public information, relations with local population, and demobilization. Other interesting UN document are The United Nations Stress Management Booklet (1st Draft, 1995) and the recent publication of a bulletin to set out "fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law."²

The US Army Peacekeeping Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA, is another excellent resource for information and lessons learned about peace operations. Its Internet site at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usacsl/org/pkinew_pki.htm includes numerous, relevant links. Additionally, to stay abreast of ongoing developments about peace operations and related missions, the Center for Defense Information maintains a biweekly citation list at <http://www.cdi.org/issues/pkcite>. The Canadian Army Lessons Learned Center at www.allc.com and The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre offer further information. The Pearson Centre maintains an extensive library database and links to valuable sites, such as the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers at <http://www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca/library.htm>. Finally the US Institute for Peace maintains an Internet site at <http://www.usip.org> with a wealth of information and links.

Among the most useful collection of lessons learned are those of General Anthony Zinni, USMC. Despite the caveat that each situation is unique, these lessons in their original form should be on any list of required reading for peace operations practitioners.³ The following is an abbreviated interpretation of some of the lessons:

- Early involvement, planning, and identification and participation of all of players will contribute to success. If possible make a thorough predeployment assessment. Know the culture and players. Coordinate with everybody and establish mechanisms where various viewpoints may be expressed.
- Planning should include thorough mission analysis, determination of end states, centers of gravity, commander's intent, measures of effectiveness, exit strategy, cost, and time factors. Keep the mission focused, avoiding mission creep, but allow for mission shift (a conscious evolution that responds to the changing situation). Align military tasks with political objectives.
- Decentralize execution and centralize planning. Start or restart key institutions early, maintain momentum. Do not make enemies, but if you do, do not treat them

gently. Avoid mind-sets. Encourage innovation and nontraditional approaches. Be aware of personalities—the right people in the right place.

- Be careful whom you empower with resources, positions, and control.
- Seek unity of effort/command and create the fewest possible seams.
- Centralize information management. Decide on your image and stay focused on it. Seek political, cultural, and military compatibility among multinational entities. Assure senior commander and staff education and training for nontraditional roles such as negotiating, interagency operations etc. Assure troop understanding and awareness of these roles.

Interestingly, one could easily adapt the above bullets into an acronym recognizable to most military professionals—SMEAC or situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command and signal.

SITUATION AND MISSION

Situation and mission are inextricably intertwined, each affecting the other. US doctrine and numerous lessons learned recognize the uniqueness of each situation in peace operations and related humanitarian assistance efforts and stress continuous situational assessment. Meanwhile some lessons highlight the "ad-hocery" or "pick-up-games" inherent in many recent operations.⁴ Such concern is expected in light of the continuing quest to eliminate as much uncertainty as possible in military operations.⁵ Similarly there has been some concern about "mission creep," and other mission changes, especially when they surprise publics and their legislative representatives. JP 3-07.3 provides guidelines for these circumstances in Chapter I, "Primer for Peace Operations."

Such conditions, often volatile, not only require continuous assessment of the actual local situation in terms of political, military, social, economic, and informational factors; but also an understanding of the situational context—the overarching political-military environment, akin to a grand strategic view.⁶ They require translation into specific military constraints and restraints at the operational and tactical level, adequate command and control of the military forces involved, and unity of effort in interagency operations. They also require planning for uncertainty and continuous political-military coordination. Spare parts, additional officers, and modular organizations suited to tailored tasks also may be required.⁷

An important aspect of planning is the need for military planners to avoid strict use of warfighting templates in peace operations, but instead to adapt these templates to the situation.⁸ Nimble, agile, flexible organizations will continually anticipate events, acquire relevant information, analyze it quickly, and adapt to new circumstances. New tools are
(Continued on next page)

available to assist military planners as they articulate and synchronize military planning with other essential aspects of achieving success. The "Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations" further explains the coordinating mechanisms and planning tools outlined in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations," and articulates how they should be applied. The handbook discusses PDD 56 to include a copy of the unclassified White Paper (where the term complex contingencies is described), the interagency process, coordinating mechanisms, and planning and assessment tools. It also provides a generic political-military implementation plan, an example synchronization matrix, lessons to be learned for interagency management of complex contingency operations, and an operators guide for the US Interagency Complex Contingency Operations Planning Decision Support System.

Military force may be used during peace operations to coerce parties to the conflict or for other legitimate purposes. However, US doctrine is clear that ultimate success in peace operations is settlement, not military victory. Patience and perseverance, a principle of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), will be necessary. US doctrine is also clear that military efforts alone are not the panacea in peace operations. They must be part of a larger and concurrent political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, and informational effort involving numerous agencies. The importance of combining these efforts effectively in furthering success of the mission is another one of the major lessons learned from our involvement in peace operations.

EXECUTION

The importance of airpower as a means of coercion to achieve specific political goals has been amply demonstrated. It also is addressed in JP 3-07.3 and elsewhere.⁹ However, our experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, or the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia demonstrate that there is no substitute for "boots on the ground" when it comes to preventing conflict, getting it under control, or ameliorating its effects. US capabilities in civil affairs, psychological operations, combat and civil engineering, and military police are used to influence the peaceful outcome to any conflict. In Bosnia, for example, most of the assets for the Implementation Force (IFOR) Civil Military Cooperation program came from US Army civil affairs units. The US Army was also predominant in conducting the IFOR information campaign.

Technology is an adjunct to situational control. It helps to "create time and space, and thereby opportunities for alternative courses of action."¹⁰ Nonlethal technology is a tool that has potential applicability in peace operations.¹¹ This technology will also enhance the ability to apply restraint, a principle of MOOTW. Additionally, telemedicine is a technology success story that enhances medical force protection.¹²

Information Operations foster legitimacy, another principle of MOOTW. JP 3-07.3 addresses the subject and

many recent experiences have been captured in other literature.¹³ A Navy study highlights that "Information operations allow the operational commander to persuade, intimidate, confuse, or cajole the opponent into accepting the strategic objectives, ideally without the use of force."¹⁴ Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been used in Bosnia, offering NATO forces unprecedented up-to-the-minute intelligence and the capability to take the high ground in information operations. They were used to show the former warring factions that they could not lie about where their forces or equipment were located. The Predator UAV also was used in Bosnia for video support during the elections in Mostar—permitting surveillance of the city without risking deployment of small patrols.

Rules of Engagement (ROE) help to create legitimacy and foster restraint, while assuring the inviolable right of self-defense. In January 1996, an AK 47 was fired at a US unit in Bosnia. The troops elected not to follow that part of the ROE allowing return fire against an individual who fires against you. Instead the unit chose to emphasize another part that prescribed minimum force to defend yourself. In this case that meant take cover. The attacker turned out to be an elderly, drunken civilian, whose apologetic neighbors took him under control. Flexible ROE can contribute to the legitimacy and restraint without being a drawback to security and force protection.¹⁵

Force protection is an imperative in all operations, including peace operations, where the risk associated with warfighting is even less acceptable. Impartiality—treating all parties even handedly, while adhering to and enforcing mandated aspects of the mission—may serve as a force protection multiplier.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

The US military has no peer in its capability to achieve military victory in conventional operations. As a corollary, it has the capability to coerce parties to a conflict toward agreement and compliance with the settlement terms. JP 3-07.3 also is clear that ultimate settlement is a product of the will of the parties involved. Coercion may be necessary, but not sufficient to bring about desired political aims. Military interface and involvement in posthostility activities, conflict termination, and transitions has become a repeated aspect of recent operations in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. These activities, many of which are called peace building in joint doctrine, have become increasingly important in supporting efforts to achieve ultimate success. Such activities rely more on administrative and logistical professionalism and interagency coordination than they do on classic warfighting skills.

Despite robust joint doctrine,¹⁶ with each operation new lessons, literature, and techniques emerge to enhance the professionalism required to accomplish peace building and related missions.¹⁷ Moreover, the need for flexibility in applying what was learned to new circumstances is evident from the recent operations in Kosovo.¹⁸ Assistance to

humanitarian demining, arms control, public security and policing, election assistance, treatment of inhabitants, demobilization, handling claims, funding, contracts, property and personnel issues, and a host of other administrative matters have and will continue to arise in these operations. Military support and participation will continue to require professional military education, tailored dissemination of lessons learned, and doctrine and TTP development.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

Interagency coordination and multinational operations place a premium on adequate command, control, and communications arrangements to foster unity of effort, another principle of MOOTW. Joint doctrine provides guidance, and other literature and lessons learned will be helpful to commanders and staffs involved.¹⁹ The "Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations," mentioned earlier, also should be helpful.

Bottom line. The US military has a robust doctrine and lessons learned community to support meeting the challenge of peace operations. The experience and expertise of our allies, academia, industry, and numerous governmental and nongovernmental institutions also strengthen our capabilities. Military practitioners cannot afford to ignore these resources.

[Rich Rinaldo is a part-time senior coordinator at the USJFCOM JWFC's Exercise Analysis Branch (Cubic Applications, Incorporated). He is both a retired Army officer and military analyst formerly with the Joint and Army Doctrine Directorate, HQ TRADOC. He may be reached at peaceops@att.net.]

•••••
ENDNOTES

¹ Compare JP 3-07.3 with NATO's Draft AJP-3.4.1 and Pamela L. Reed, J. Matthew Vaccaro, William J. Durch, Handbook on United Nations Peace Operations, (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, April 1995).

² "Annan Sets Rules For U.N. Forces In Combat" Washington Times August 11, 1999: 13.

³ "Twenty Lessons Learned for Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations," Center for Naval Analysis Conference, and "Military Support to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies From Practice to Policy," 26 October 1995, available at <http://www.cna.org/conference/95past.html>.

⁴ US Army Peacekeeping Institute, Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review Conference Report 19-23 May 1996.

⁵ Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the Wars 47-80.

⁶ Carnegie Commission on Deadly Conflict, David Hamburg and Cyrus Vance, Co-chairs, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report 1997 Chapter 1.

⁷ LTG Daniel Schroeder, "Lessons of Rwanda," Armed Forces Journal International (December 1994): 33.

⁸ Perceptions (1998), USJFCOM JWFC Exercise Analysis Branch. Examples of adaptability may be found in John W. Jandrow, "Threat Parameters for Operations Other Than War," Parameters, (Spring 1995): 55.

⁹ John A. Tirpak, "Lessons Learned And Re-Learned," Air Force Magazine (August 1999): 3.

¹⁰ Operations Other Than War: The Technological Dimension, (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1997)

¹¹ John M. Collins, Nonlethal Weapons and Operations: Potential Applications and Practical Limitations, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 14 September 1995).

¹² Clifton Berry Jr., "Military Telemedicine Extends Its Reach," Army (March 1997): 18.

¹³ Warren P. Stroebel, Push Me, Pull Me: The News Media, Peace Operations, and US Foreign Policy, (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1998). LTG H. Hugh Shelton, USA and LTC Timothy D. Vane, USA, "Winning the Information War in Haiti," Military Review (Nov-Dec 1995).

¹⁴ E. D. McGrady and Karen Smith, Haiti and the Future of Warfare (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1997) 3.

¹⁵ David Fastabend, "The Categorization of Conflict," Parameters (Summer 1997): 75.

¹⁶ JP 3-07.1, "JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense," JP 3-07.6, "JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance" (Preliminary Coordination), JP 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations (CMO)" (Revision Second Draft), JP 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations," and the JP 4-0 Series.

¹⁷ COL Alexander W. Waiczak, USA, "Conflict Termination—Transitioning from Warrior to Constable: A Primer," (US Army War College Study Project, 15 April 1992). After The War is Over: What Comes Next? (Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development, 1997). R. B. Oakley, M. J. Dziedic, and E. M. Goldberg, Eds., Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998) the concluding chapter, which includes lessons learned.

¹⁸ "Kosovo—The Task Force Commander's Viewpoint," Army (September 1999): 35.

¹⁹ Dr. Davis S. Alberts and Dr. Richard Hayes, Command Arrangements for Peace Operations, (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, May 1995). Dr. Margaret Daly Hayes, RADM Gary F. Wheatley, Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti-A Case Study, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996).



SMALL WARS, FAUX WARS, AND PEACE OPERATIONS: Sources of Friction

*By Professor Stephen J. Cimbala, Penn State,
Deleware County Campus*

INTRODUCTION

The use of American or other military forces for peace operations or military operations other than war (MOOTW) has become a staple of the post-Cold War world. In peace and other nonwar operations, however necessary they are thought to be, military instruments are being used for a purpose other than victory in combat against professional armed forces. Yet, while tasked by policy makers to support or to create peace; US, NATO, or allied forces may require the capabilities and attitudes of warriors for self defense. In addition to this Janus-like requirement for peace-like warrior making, US forces are often less than clearly instructed by policy makers whether they are engaged in small wars, faux wars, or exclusively noncombat operations. Finally, public sensitivity to casualties, ubiquitous media coverage of military setbacks, and legalistic scorekeeping add to the ambience within which nonwar military operations can easily crash and burn.

DEFINING THE PROBLEM

Military planners and scholars have been frustrated by the lack of a conceptual framework for understanding how the internal wars of the post-Cold War era are different from the revolutionary wars of the Cold War. Donald M. Snow outlines some of the important ways in which contemporary internal wars differ from traditional insurgencies.¹ First, traditional insurgencies are fought with the object of capturing control over the political system; for many of the new internal wars, this object is absent, or secondary. For example, criminal organizations and narco-terrorists prefer a weak state, not a strong one, and are comparatively indifferent to who rules so long as they can escape effective control. Second, contemporary internal wars are often marked by lack of restraint, compared to Cold War insurgencies. Insurgent tactics emphasize winning over the "hearts and minds" of a politically ambivalent population. Internal wars of the 1990s, for example in Bosnia and Rwanda, were marked by "ethnic cleansing" and other massacres with no apparent object other than killing itself.

A third apparent difference between Cold War insurgencies and post-Cold War internal wars is, according

to Snow and others, is that many internal wars are concentrated in the economically least developed states or in politically failed states. Failed states are those in which the government has suffered a terminal loss of legitimacy and effectiveness. Loss of legitimacy means that the state is no longer regarded as authoritative and entitled to rightful rule. Lack of effectiveness in a failed state is often apparent in the shift of control to local centers of real power and resistance: warlords, clans, criminal syndicates, ethno-national rebels, and others from a list difficult to exhaust.² Although a weak or failing state may give the appearance of sovereignty and strength, its durability rests solely on context. As the weak state increases its level of context seeking, in vain, to substitute for lost legitimacy and effectiveness, resistance to context also increases. Eventually the state fails of its own apparent incompetence as even its coercive powers dissolve or are overthrown by its enemies.³

It may be useful to distinguish between small wars and faux wars. **Small wars** are military conflicts in which at least one side employs irregular forces and unconventional methods of battle. Often this side is something other than a politically accountable state authority.⁴ **Faux wars** refer to those nonwar military deployments, or threats of intervention, that are intended to accomplish some political purpose other than victory in battle, but which may require a capability for military combat as well as noncombatant missions. I prefer the term faux wars because it emphasizes the two sided demands placed upon military operators in these situations—simultaneously, they are diplomats or politicians as well as warriors. Therefore, these nonwar missions, however honorable in intent: (1), force military commanders into political, cultural, and social contexts over which they have partial and often inadequate control relative to their assigned mission; and (2), within those contexts, may require that commanders and forces be forced to play an undesirable, unaccustomed, or unpopular political part. From 1991 to 1994, US forces in Somalia found themselves in the first situation. From 1956-1958, French paratroops in Algeria ended up in the second situation. Today, the outcome of NATO and Russian peace operators in Yugoslavia (Kosovo) remains to be seen.

ORGANIZING THE US MILITARY FOR NONWAR OPERATIONS

The US Department of Defense recognizes that its responsibilities now include preparedness for so-called unconventional conflicts, including revolutionary and counterrevolutionary warfare, terrorism, antidrug operations, and peace operations. In part, this recognition has found its way into manuals and other publications giving the accepted version of military doctrine and practice. For example, specific kinds of MOOTW included in a recent version of Army doctrine were: (1), support to domestic civil authorities; (2), humanitarian assistance and

disaster relief; (3), security assistance; (4), noncombatant evacuation operations; (5), arms-control monitoring and verification; (6), nation assistance; (7), support to counterdrug operations; (8), combating terrorism; (9), peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations; (10), show of force; (11), support for insurgency or counterinsurgency; (12), attacks and raids.⁵

Current US joint doctrine assumes that most peace operations will take place as part of "complex contingencies." A complex contingency operation is one that responds to a complex emergency. The United Nations defines a complex emergency as:

A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate (or) capacity of any single agency and/or the on-going United Nations country programme.⁶

Experts on complex emergencies emphasize that complex emergencies must be distinguished from natural disasters. According to Mark Duffield, "So-called complex emergencies are essentially political in nature: they are protracted political

crises resulting from sectarian or predatory indigenous responses to socioeconomic stress and marginalisation. Unlike natural disasters, complex emergencies have a singular ability to erode or destroy the cultural, civil, political, and economic integrity of established societies."⁷

According to the USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center's "Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations," complex contingencies have the following characteristics:

- Increased use of asymmetrical means by belligerents.
- Dominance of political objectives.
- Presence and involvement of nongovernmental, private, voluntary, and international organizations, media, and other civilians in the military operations area; impacting military activities.
- Usually take place in a failed state, which also implies undisciplined factions, absence of law and order, numerous parties to the conflict, large scale violations of human rights, risks of armed opposition to peace forces, and other problems.⁸

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS			
	Military Operations	General US Goals	Representative Examples
COMBAT	War	Fight & Win	Large Scale Combat Operations Attack / Defend / Blockade
	NONCOMBAT	Military Operations Other Than War	Deter War & Resolve Conflict
Promote Peace & Support US Civil Authorities			Freedom of Navigation Counterdrug Humanitarian Assistance Protection of Shipping US Civil Support

Figure 1. Range of Military Operations

(Continued on next page)

MOOTW constitute an elastic category. As such, they invite controversy about the boundary line between "war" and "other than war." When, for example, does US support for counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations spill over from nonwar into defacto involvement in a war? The object of insurgents is to blur the line between peace and war until they are ready to wage open, conventional warfare to their advantage. This is not merely a problem of terminology. Confusion about whether the US is actually at war invites inconsistency between policy objectives and military operations. A working solution to the boundary problem is shown in Figure 1 on the previous page, extracted from JP 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War."

THE ENVIRONMENT FOR NONWAR OPERATIONS

Greater sensitivity to casualties may be a feature of "post-heroic" warfare, according to some military theorists and historians.⁹ Other experts feel that the US policy process, on account of cultural traditions or media saturation, is exceptionally vulnerable to the political impact of casualties. One French commander of UN forces in Bosnia reportedly stated, "Desert Storm left one awful legacy. It imposed the idea that you must be able to fight the wars of the future without suffering losses. The idea of zero-kill as an outcome has been imposed on American generals. But there is no such thing as a clean or risk-free war. You condemn yourself to inactivity if you set that standard."¹⁰ The conclusion of the air-dominant campaign against the former Yugoslavia in 1999 without a single US or allied air fighter killed in action will further solidify a public and media expectation of zero friction in modern warfare. The unwillingness of the US and NATO even to threaten a ground offensive into Kosovo, despite the deterrent effect this threat might have posed to Serbian President Milosevic, reflects a heightened sensitivity to the fear of casualties in framing military options.

On the other hand, the sensitivity of Americans to using armed force should not be overstated. The majority of Americans, immediately after the deaths of 18 US Army Rangers in October 1993 in Somalia, were in favor of sending reinforcements to capture Somali warlord Aideed.¹¹ US public sensitivity to combat casualties has a direct relationship to at least two other variables: (1), public perceptions about the significance of the conflict; and, (2), the expectation that US political and military objectives will be accomplished in a timely manner and at an acceptable cost. Of course, the US political leadership plays an important role, especially the President, in mobilizing or failing to establish public support for military intervention. The irony is that the President may have a harder sell for nonwar operations in which significant casualties are possible than for traditional wars, since public understanding of the latter is apt to be more intuitive.

Unconventional warfare, including covert operations of various sorts, by its very nature demands actions that do not televise well. It may require that US policy makers get in bed with disreputable characters among the leaders of other state or non-state actors. The US government may be required to disown its prior authorship of operations gone afoul of the original intent or to conceal the role of allies.¹² Leaders may have to evade reporters or Congress while an operation is in the planning or hopeful stages to avoid compromising security. All of these possible requirements for the successful conduct of covert operations sit poorly with the mind sets of many, not only in the US Congress and media, but also in the US intelligence bureaucracy.

US military intelligence, including that pertinent to unconventional warfare and special operations, is steeped in a legalistic paradigm as is its civilian counterpart. The jurisprudential paradigm for deciding how and whether to engage in unconventional warfare is an understandable temptation.¹³ Any officer or policymaker who lived through the 1970s investigations of US intelligence or the 1980s Iran-Contra flap has developed forgivable protective instincts and a necessary reflex for a backside-covering paper trail. Unfortunately, those behaviors and legalisms that are self protective in courtrooms or Congressional hearings are not necessarily those that are strategically useful in a timely manner. Peace operations and other MOOTW will not escape the constraints of US legalism and formalism in policy making. This means, in all likelihood, that a successful endgame for US participation in peace operations will require the drawing of a clear line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement and staying clear of the nether-world between the two conditions.

There is worse. MOOTW can quickly and inadvertently become warlike. Outside interveners in civil wars need a clear statement of mission and some reasonable expectations about the endgame. One Rand study published in 1996 concluded that, with respect to US and Russian use of armed forces since the end of the Cold War, intervention decisions have been made in both countries from time to time for no more profound reason than the absence of any better ideas. Both the United States and Russia are configured toward unstructured and often shortsighted policy planning, with a tendency to commit forces without clearly articulated aims. In particular, ad hoc and impromptu assessments of "what is at stake" often decide what ultimately gets placed on the US intervention calendar.¹⁴

CONCLUSIONS

Military peace operations embody at least two potential contradictions that have the potential to create enormous friction in decision making and where the rubber hits the road. First, persons trained primarily as warriors, tasked to kill their enemies in combat, must now accept being

employed for conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance. Second, conventional militaries that are suited for conflict against other state-armed and trained forces must now deal with non-state entities in failing or failed states; transnational or local criminal organizations; rebellious clans; and ethnic, religious or linguistic separatists and irredentists. Politics, with a lower case "p," is apt to dominate military operations. Carrying out these adjustments in attitudes and operations is difficult enough within a single state's armed forces; the difficulties increase for multi-state peace and stability operations.



ENDNOTES

¹ Donald M. Snow, Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts 144-146.

² K. J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War 119-122.

³ I. William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority 1-11. See also Holsti, 116-117.

⁴ Charles E. Calwell, Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers cited in Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy 276.

⁵ Daniel J. Kaufman, "The Army," Chapter 2 in Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr., America's Armed Forces: A Handbook of Current and Future Capabilities 49-50.

⁶ Bradd C. Hayes and Jeffrey I. Sands, Doing Windows: Non-Traditional Military Responses to Complex Emergencies 2.

⁷ Mark Duffield, "Complex Emergencies and the Crisis of Developmentalism," IDS Bulletin: 38.

⁸ Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations iii.

⁹ Edward Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," Foreign Affairs (May-June 1995): 109-122. See also John Keegan, The Mask of Command Chapter 3 and 311-351.

¹⁰ General Philippe Morillon quoted in Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age 14.

¹¹ I am grateful to Professor Peter Viggo Jakobsen for calling this point to my attention. He bears no responsibility for arguments here.

¹² Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence 158-180.

¹³ The temptation is for scholars as well as for soldiers, with the result that there is little written about the strategic character of special operations, covert action or other unconventional means. A useful corrective appears in Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy 163-188.

¹⁴ Jeremy R. Azrael, Benjamin S. Lambeth, Emil A. Payin, and Arkady A. Popov, "Russian and American Intervention Policy in Comparative Perspective," Chapter. 12 in Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin, eds., US and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force 6, CF-129-CRES via Netscape. Pagination varies with downloading software and printer.

[The author gratefully acknowledges the cooperation of many from USSOCOM at MacDill AFB in Tampa, FL, along with LtCol Pete Vercruyse and Mr. Bob Hubner from the USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center at Ft. Monroe, VA, in providing information and background pertinent to this paper. They are not responsible for any arguments or opinions in this article.]



USJFCOM JWFC ELECTRONIC RESEARCH LIBRARIES

Using your Internet browser, go to the USJFCOM JWFC Home Page at <http://www.jtasc.acom.mil/>, then click in the left-hand column on "Limited Access." If access is denied, see page 19 for access control information. Once at the current-day Home Page, click on "Electronic Libraries" in the left-hand column. You will then be presented with a menu of read-only full-text search and retrieval libraries as follows:

- **Peace Operations Research Library** - Contains policy, doctrine, and other guidance, articles, books, lessons learned, and training literature; along with a special legal section.
- **Joint Experimentation Research Library** - Contains policy and other guidance, articles, books, and other literature. It addresses the *Joint Vision 2010* period and beyond.
- **Joint Policy and Doctrine Library** - Contains DOD and joint policy, joint doctrine, and JTTP.
- **Consequence Management Library** - Includes both DOD and interagency policy, doctrine, guidance, and others papers related to consequence management operations.

Each library is password-protected. To obtain access, submit your request to mcgrathc@jwfc.acom.mil.

THE MARINE CORPS TACKLES URBAN OPERATIONS

*By Major John Scanlan, USMC, Marine Corps
Combat Development Command, Doctrine
Division, Joint Branch*

INTRODUCTION

The topic of homeland defense is not comfortably addressed among planners and officials in Washington. While the term sparks visions of complex satellite warning systems, supersonic missile intercepts, and other "Star Wars" technology; recent world events imply that future homeland defense may involve a totally different type of warfare—urban operations. This armed conflict may not be as technically advanced as "Star Wars", but is arguably more complex.

Why does the Marine Corps think urban operations will dominate future global headlines? To begin with, world population predictions indicate 85% of all people will live in an urban environment by the year 2025. Further, the current National Security Strategy of peace enforcement through global engagement will require a credible United States presence near urban centers. Furthermore, future adversaries may seek to attack the United States in an asymmetrical manner, such as employing terrorists or weapons of mass destruction in our homeland's urban centers. In anticipation of these situations, the Marine Corps has placed itself on the cutting edge of urban operations.

The Marine Corps developed the term "urban operations" as a more precise label than the old term "military operations in urban terrain (MOUT)." Whereas MOUT creates the image of a warfare environment that focuses on the tactical level of war and its associated tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), urban operations recognizes that infrastructure and noncombatants overlaid on natural terrain make urban warfare much more than just an environment like mountains or desert.

Urban operations will span the entire range of military operations. The Marine Corps' vision includes conducting humanitarian assistance missions, peacekeeping, and full scale combat (the "three block war")—all by the same unit, on the same day, and in the same city. The warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare applies to urban operations, regardless of the level of operations. Forces will pit their strength against the enemy's weaknesses, using tempo as a

weapon to shatter his cohesion, organization, command, and psychological balance. They will maneuver in time and space, simultaneously leveraging the peculiarities of urban operations, to achieve decisive superiority. Gone are the days of attrition style warfare where units doggedly slugged their way from building to building.

DOCTRINE

Because each Service possesses unique and applicable capabilities, urban operations will require a joint effort. However, joint doctrine on urban operations does not exist. In April 1998, the Marine Corps finally published Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-35.3, "Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain." This publication was the crucial first step in Service doctrine, paving the way for future joint doctrine. During the 14-15 October 1998 Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP), LTC Frank Abbot, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, presented a decision brief on a proposal to develop "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations in Urban Terrain." His final recommendation to the JDWP was to produce a stand alone joint publication that integrates current Service efforts, defines terminology, and provides a single, authoritative source of doctrine for urban operations. After a spirited debate, the JDWP members voted to develop JP 3-06, "Joint Urban Operations." In November, 1998, the Marine Corps was designated as the lead agent and the US Army as the technical review authority. These decisions mean the Marine Corps will develop, coordinate, and maintain JP 3-06 and the US Army will provide specialized, technical, or administrative expertise during the publication's development process. Moreover, JP 3-06 will be developed through a genuine team effort among all of the Services and combatant commands.

On 15 December 1998, USJFCOM JWFC hosted a JP 3-06 Program Directive Development Group. The scope and outline of the publication were developed. After the Joint Staff publishes the program directive, it will take approximately 5 to 7 months before the first draft is distributed.

EXPERIMENTING

Another Marine Corps effort in urban operations is the Urban Warrior Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE). Urban Warrior represents the culmination of over 2 years of planning and development by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) in Quantico, VA. During 1997, Urban Warrior Phase I, sponsored by Marine Forces Atlantic, was conducted at Camp Lejeune, NC. Urban Warrior Phase II was conducted in early 1999 by Navy and Marine Corps commands from southern California. To provide this AWE with a realistic urban littoral environment, an actual city was needed. Thanks to the gracious support of numerous civil authorities and

individual citizens in the Bay area, Urban Warrior Phase II occurred in and around Oakland, CA. The US Navy's Third Fleet, allied forces from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, and urban agencies participated in the AWE.

The TTPs tested in Urban Warrior were derived from a concept paper entitled "Future Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain," approved by the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, in October 1997. It outlined seven operational capabilities for urban operations: command and control, mobility/counter mobility, measured firepower, survivability, adaptability, awareness, and sustainability. Each capability requires further refinement for successful urban operations. Lessons learned from Urban Warrior Phase II will be incorporated into future operations.

Urban Warrior Phase II was also the initial phase of exercise KERNEL BLITZ 99, under the overall guidance of the Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Command. The MCWL conducted the AWE through the special purpose Marine air-ground task force experimental (SPMAGTF [X]). The SPMAGTF (X) consisted of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (Reinforced) serving as its ground combat element, the Third Marine Aircraft Wing forward as its aviation combat element, and elements of the First Force Service Support Group as the combat service support element. After being equipped with advanced technologies and trained in experimental TTP, the SPMAGTF (X) embarked on amphibious shipping and entered the San Francisco Bay area. The SPMAGTF (X) command element remained in its experimental command operations center aboard the USS Coronado to test sea-based command and control (C2). The centerpiece of the experimental C2 systems developed for Urban Warrior Phase II is the Integrated Marine Multi-agent Command and Control System (IMMACCS), a comprehensive suite of automated decision support tools. An innovative aspect of IMMACCS is the cutting-edge, multi-agent software programs that interact with real-time information to provide the commander and his staff with useful knowledge about the battlespace. A linchpin of the Marine Corps' process to obtain this knowledge is the accurate projection of the common tactical picture (CTP) to all participants throughout the C2 architecture of each experiment. Developing technologies associated with the CTP will improve the combat leader's situational awareness and enable him to make decisions faster than the enemy.

The goal of the Marine Corps in urban operations is to create a capable and prepared joint force for the 21st Century. The results of Urban Warrior Phase II and publication of JP 3-06 will help achieve this goal.



Newsletter Inputs and Subscription Information

Please pass this newsletter to anyone you think may be interested. If you didn't get a copy directly, and would like to receive one, fill out the subscriber request form (page 39) and either mail or fax it to us. We have a limited number of back issues, but you also can download them from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine> or view and download them from <https://www.secure.jwfc.acom.mil/protected/doctrine/cpindex.html>. We hope you will enjoy A Common Perspective and take the time to provide us some feedback.

Our next edition will be published in April 2000. We continue to solicit articles and commentaries regarding joint doctrine/operations. Submissions should be 1500 words or less—we will consider longer articles as possible features. Please submit articles or letters on disk or via e-mail for ease in handling. We need your submissions by 15 February 2000.

Send your articles, letters, or commentaries to:

A COMMON PERSPECTIVE
ATTN: LT COL NATHAN TOTH
USJFCOM JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER
380 FENWICK ROAD BLDG 96
FORT MONROE VA 23651-1064 *

or via e-mail to "tothn@jwfc.acom.mil" or call:

DSN 680-6555 *
FAX 680-6555 *
COMM (757) 726-XXXX *

* We are moving. See the insert below for our pending address/phone # changes.

THE USJFCOM JWFC DOCTRINE DIVISION AND DOCTRINE SUPPORT GROUP IS MOVING

Within the next six months, we will move to the Joint Training, Analysis and Simulations Center in Suffolk, VA. Our new address will be:

Commander, Joint Warfighting Center
Doctrine Division
116 Lakeview Parkway, Ste 100
Suffolk, VA 23435-26XX

Our e-mail addresses will remain the same, but check the "Current POC List" file in the A Common Perspective section of the USJFCOM JWFC Internet site at <http://www.jtasc.acom.mil/> for changes to our phone numbers.

UNDERSTANDING AND CLARIFYING DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY FOR LOGISTICS

By Major Joel Berry, USMC, Logistics Support Operations and Training Officer, USJFCOM J4; Major Blaise Martinick, USAF, Bomber Employment Officer, USSTRATCOM, J-31; and Major Charles Young, USA, Logistics Support Operations Officer, USJFCOM J4.

Disclaimer: The original version of this paper was written to satisfy requirements of the Armed Forces Staff College "Joint Perspectives" course. The contents of this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of AFSC, its Commandant, or Staff.

A combatant commander's directive authority for logistics is clearly defined in joint doctrine as an inherent element of combatant command (COCOM). This definition, however, focuses on a single unified commander's **assigned forces**, and does not adequately address the needs of the entire joint warfighting community. In actual application, most combatant/joint force commanders conduct operations with forces **attached** from other supporting combatant commanders. In these cases, directive authority for logistics over these forces remains with the supporting combatant commander and does not extend to the supported commander. Therefore, directive authority for logistics for supported combatant commanders is not completely effective and is not well understood throughout the joint community. Solutions to problems with directive authority for logistics are needed in order to increase the overall effectiveness and efficiency of logistic support to US forces. While joint logistics can be an extremely complex topic, as can many of the details within directive authority for logistics, the overarching problems with directive authority for logistics are actually quite basic. Likewise, many of the potential solutions to directive authority for logistics are basic. Before the more technical details of directive authority for logistics can be remedied, the basic issues must be resolved.

JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)," and JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," both define combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) as the authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands by Title 10, US Code (USC), section 164, or as directed by the President in the Unified Command Plan (UCP). It is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces that permit them to accomplish assigned missions. This authority encompasses organizing and employing forces, assigning

tasks, designating objectives, and authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, including logistics.¹ JP 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations," further specifies directive authority for logistics as a combatant commander's authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures necessary to ensure the effective execution of approved operational plans. It includes measures necessary for the effectiveness and economy of operations, and the prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities or logistic functions among the Service component commands, giving the combatant commander the unique ability to shift necessary materiel and resources within a theater as they see fit.²

It is a contemporary reality that when a combatant commander conducts a contingency operation, it will be primarily with forces other than assigned forces. Since forces are normally "attached" rather than "reassigned," the supported combatant commander will not have directive authority for logistics over the majority of the forces conducting operations. It is the supporting combatant commanders, those who are not conducting the operation, who retain the directive authority.³ Current joint doctrine stipulates that directive authority for logistics, like COCOM, cannot be transferred or delegated from one combatant commander to another.⁴ So, in most cases, the wrong combatant commander seemingly has directive authority for logistics. This is the first and most fundamental problem with directive authority for logistics pertinent to real-world applications.

Attaching forces from a supporting combatant commander to a supported combatant commander is characterized by a degree of control. Operational control (OPCON) is the most common command relationship associated with attachment of forces. That is, forces under COCOM of one combatant commander (supporting) are allocated to another combatant commander (supported), under an OPCON relationship. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize and employ forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. It does not, however, in and of itself include authoritative direction for logistics.⁵ The directive authority for logistics for those forces remains with the supporting combatant commander, who retains COCOM. Because that is true, a combatant commander may provide forces to another combatant commander with authority over operational matters, but not authority over logistical matters. Unless a combatant commander is operating exclusively with assigned forces, they are limited to redistributing logistical resources among Service components, and only with their concurrence. This dichotomy between operational authority and logistical authority is the second essential problem with directive authority for logistics pertinent to real-world applications.

The reason for the disparity between operational authority and logistic authority is clearly dollars. Each of the Services is responsible under Title 10, USC, to organize,

train, and equip its forces to respond to unified commanders' taskings. More precisely, the Service Chiefs spend a large percentage of their dwindling budgets to train and sustain their forces to meet the needs of the combatant commanders to which they are assigned in the UCP. So, perhaps justifiably, the Service Chiefs are concerned over the financial backlash of another unified commander (read non-UCP assigned) exercising directive authority for logistics. They are concerned about losing control of their precious financial resources. They have a point. Nevertheless, the Nation's military does not exist to maintain a balanced checkbook. It exists to fight wars, or conduct military operations other than war (MOOTW). In any case, combatant commanders, not the Service Chiefs, are at the business end of military operations. If directive authority for logistics means messy finances and if it wreaks havoc on the Services' spending plans, so be it. Warfighting combatant commanders who prudently exercise directive authority for logistics while conducting contingency operations can save DOD millions, even if the savings do not always benefit every military branch.

Financial matters notwithstanding, logistical support is vital to the success of any operation at home or abroad. Therefore, the supported combatant commander's directive authority over logistical matters is a critical factor in the execution and sustainment of the operation. This raises the question of whether a supported combatant commander with limited forces assigned under the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) can fully optimize capabilities within the current scope of directive authority for logistics. During MOOTW, particularly where the Secretary of Defense has not directed the reassignment of forces, the supported combatant commander is clearly limited in his execution of directive authority for logistics. Nonetheless, the supported combatant commander, like any commander, is responsible for efficient use of resources in the execution of a mission and the reduction or elimination of overlapping logistic functions. Thus, the supported combatant commander has a responsibility for logistic efficiency, but lacks the authority to exercise directive authority for logistics to accomplish it. The supported combatant commander must go to the various Service components and "request" the reallocation of logistic resources between Services. This is a cumbersome process, at best, and does not lend itself to efficient mission accomplishment or resource optimization.

Logistic lessons learned from the Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM are often cited as the first illustrative examples of the exercise of directive authority for logistics since Title 10 refined combatant commander authority in 1988. A form of directive authority for logistics was exercised in the tasking of common support and redistribution of resources. Although this was effective use of logistical control, it was an after-the-fact effort, and led to an incorrect assumption that directive authority for logistics was available over all forces in theater. Detailed logistical support planning in advance of the operation at the component level was not executed and, thus, logistic resources were suboptimized. There was either a lack of

full understanding about directive authority for logistics or a failure to completely exercise it.

Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) presented a MOOTW situation. The supported combatant commander operated a limited logistic structure and, as such, had a similar problem to that presented in the Gulf War regarding the exercise of directive authority for logistics during planning/coordination at the component level. It was expected that the Service components would functionally perform their "executive agent" roles. Subsequently, the most significant lessons learned were not related to the exercise of directive authority for logistics, but rather to an absence of it. MOOTW require efficient logistics simply due to significant constraints on funding, transportation assets, and personnel. Therefore, logically, the ability to exercise directive authority for logistics would be a key factor in the success or failure of this type of operation.

The recent disaster relief operation in Central America in response to Hurricane Mitch is a vivid example of how logistic authority is financially driven. It also is an example of how directive authority for logistics is misunderstood. In this case the supported combatant commander relied heavily on supporting combatant commanders for forces. Additional forces for disaster relief operations, specifically Naval Construction Battalion (SEABEES) support from USACOM (now USJFCOM) were required. This requirement was within the scope of normal support relationships; however, a misuse or misunderstanding of directive authority for logistics occurred when the USACOM (now USJFCOM) SEABEES were directed to deploy with approximately \$1 million worth of construction material. Supporting combatant commanders provide forces. "Forces" equates to units, their organic equipment, and basic supply loads; not supplies over and above this level. Perhaps this example illustrates the incorrect belief that COCOM and directive authority for logistic transfers from the supporting combatant commander to the supported combatant commander along with the allocated forces.

There are a number of potential solutions to the problems with directive authority for logistics. First, intervention at higher levels could change existing guidance to allow supported combatant commanders to exercise directive authority for logistics over forces attached OPCON. The UCP divides the globe among the geographical combatant commanders, and the "Forces for Unified Commands" and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) assign forces, but none address directive authority for logistics—perhaps they should. JP 0-2 addresses the subject—perhaps the guidance should be modified. It is clear that most combatant commanders rely on forces not assigned to execute OPLANs and other operations. Why not give the combatant commanders the logistic authority they might very well need up front so that they do not have to negotiate for it during crisis action planning, or worse, during execution? Giving supported combatant commanders directive authority for logistics over attached forces up front, for anticipated operations,

(Continued on next page)

would not reduce the supporting combatant commanders' authority for day-to-day operations, but it would surely help the supported combatant commanders during a crisis or major operation. A change in UCP/"Forces for"/JSCP/JP 0-2 guidance would be an authoritative fix for the directive authority for logistics dilemma.

However, if this solution is too bold, directive authority for logistics could be established on an as-required basis. That is, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), speaking for the National Command Authorities, could address directive authority for logistics in warning, alert, planning, execute, or deployment orders. Rather than providing forces attached, as has nearly always been the case in post-World War II operations, the forces could be temporarily reassigned, with appropriate limitations corresponding to the end of the operation. Combatant commanders exercise COCOM over assigned forces and COCOM includes directive authority for logistics, hence the issue could be resolved for that instance.

Beyond the seemingly easy remedies using the UCP or a CJCS order, supported combatant commanders have some means at their disposal for exercising directive authority for logistics to support attached forces. All combatant commanders have assigned Service component headquarters and, regardless of the nature of command relationships over all other forces, the combatant commander could direct logistic action through these staffs. Surprisingly, few combatant commanders seem to exercise this option.

Directive authority for logistics remains an ongoing issue for every operation. It is open interpretation by the joint community, and can be very difficult to implement. Therefore, the joint community must address this basic command and control issue to clarify the associated guidance and provide supported combatant commanders with the authority necessary for efficient logistic management.

●●●●●●●●●●
ENDNOTES

¹ Department of Defense, JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)," (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), III-3 to III-9.

² Department of Defense, JP 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations," (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), I-1 to I-8.

³ Department of Defense, JP 5-0, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations," (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), I-13 to I-19.

⁴ Department of Defense, JP 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations," (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), I-1 to I-8.

⁵ Department of Defense, JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), II-5 to II-7.



USJFCOM JWFC INTERNET SITE SECURITY CHANGES

On 12 June 1999, the USJFCOM JWFC implemented new access control procedures that affected the "Limited Access" area of our Home Page (<http://www.jtasc.acom.mil/>). The implementation affected three groups; previous ".mil users" who were able to access the site automatically, users who previously accessed the site with a login/password, and users who previously accessed the site using bookmarks. Unlike the old version of "Limited Access," the user may be presented with a page that contains a registration form.

- Those using a computer connected to the USJFCOM network (acom.mil users) will have automatic access to the "Limited Access" page.
- Those using a computer not connected to the USJFCOM network will have to register with the new system whether they possess an old account or not. After clicking on "Limited Access", the registration page appears—complete the registration form. If you do not have a USJFCOM POC, then include a DOD POC. There is an entry on this form for your old account login and password, if applicable, to expedite processing of your new account. A login/password will be e-mailed back to you, upon adjudication with your POC. Upon receipt of the login/password, access the site and click on "Limited Access." The registration page appears. This page has a link towards the top entitled "Press HERE to access the Limited Access Web Site if you already have an account." Click on this link. Login using your new account information.
- Those who previously bookmarked specific areas of the JWFC unclassified Home Page will find those public and limited access area bookmarks may no longer work—edit them accordingly. This includes bookmarks to the Document Management System. This situation will not affect Joint Digital Library bookmarks.

The USJFCOM JWFC WWW site is encrypted with a standard 40-bit Internet encryption key. A 128-bit key provides additional protection to some parts of the "Limited Access" area, which is a feature available on US versions of commercial Internet browsers.

If you have any questions concerning access to the USJFCOM JWFC WWW site, our POC is Mr. Mark Willmann at 686-7993 or e-mail: webmaster@jwfc.acom.mil.

JOINT PUBLICATION STATUS

SCHEDULED FOR APPROVAL OVER THE NEXT 6 MONTHS

PUB#	TITLE	PUB#	TITLE
1-01,Rev2	Joint Doctrine Publication System	3-33	Joint Force Capabilities
1-06	JTTP for Financial Management During Joint Operations	3-51 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare
2-0 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations	3-55 Rev1	Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Support for Joint Operations (RSTA)
2-01.1	JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting	4-0 Rev1	Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations
3-01	Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats	4-01.4	JTTP for Joint Theater Distribution
3-07.6	JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance	4-01.8	JTTP for Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
3-07.7	JTTP for Domestic Support Operations		
3-16	Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations		

IN REVISION OVER THE NEXT 6 MONTHS

PUB#	TITLE
1 Rev1	Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
0-2 Rev2	Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
1-05 Rev1**	Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations
2-01.2 Rev1	Joint Doctrine and JTTP for Counterintelligence Support to Operations
3-0 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Operations
3-02 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
3-11 Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for Operating in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment
3-13.1 Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)
3-17 Rev1**	Joint Doctrine and JTTP for Air Mobility Operations
3-49 Rev1	National Search and Rescue Manual
3-54 Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for Operations Security
3-55.1 Rev1	JTTP for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
3-57 Rev1**	Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations (CMO)
3-61 Rev1**	Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations
4-01 Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System
4-01.3 Rev1**	JTTP for Movement Control
4-01.5 Rev1	JTTP for Terminal Operations
4-02 Rev1**	Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations
4-04 Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support
5-0 Rev1	Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

APPROVED SINCE MARCH 31, 1999

PUB#	TITLE
1-01.1 Rev1	Compendium of Joint Publications
2-03	JTTP for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations
3-09.1 Rev1	JTTP for Laser Target Designation Operations
3-35	Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations

UNDER ASSESSMENT

PUB#	TITLE
3-04.1	JTTP for Shipboard Helicopter Operations
3-07.2	JTTP for Antiterrorism
3-09	Doctrine for Joint Fire Support
3-10*	Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations
3-10.1*	JTTP for Base Defense
3-56.1*	Command and Control for Joint Air Operations
4-02.1	JTTP for Health Service Logistics Support in Joint Operations

WITHIN 12 MONTH ASSESSMENT WINDOW

PUB#	TITLE	PUB#	TITLE
1-0	Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations	3-50.21	JTTP for Combat Search and Rescue
2-02	National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations	3-52*	Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
3-01.4*	JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Defenses (J-SEAD)	4-01.6	JTTP for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS)
3-05	Doctrine for Joint Special Operations	4-03*	Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine
3-07.3	JTTP for Peace Operations	4-05*	Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning
3-09.3*	JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)	4-05.1	JTTP for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup
3-12*	Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations	5-00.2	Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures
3-12.1*	Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations	6-0*	Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations
3-13	Joint Doctrine for Information Operations		
3-15	Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare		
3-50.2*	Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue		

* Denotes final assessment, all others are interim assessments

** Denotes earlier than normal revision

Joint Staff, J-7, JDD
7000 Joint Staff Pentagon
Washington, DC 20318-7000

	username	number
COL R. Smith	(smithre)	5-0873
Lt Col D. Snodgrass	(snodgrde)	*4-6494
LCDR S. deGozzaldi	(degozsd)	7-1046
CDR F. Midgette	(midgetfm)	*4-6493
MAJR. Fox	(foxrw)	*4-6492
Lt Col S. Smith	(smithsa)	*4-6469
Mr. N. Fleischmann*	(fleiscnt)	*4-6663
Mr. H. Simmeth	(simmethg)	*4-6493
FAX		7-6322

DSN 22X-XXXX/Com(703)69X/61X-XXX
E-mail (username)@js.pentagon.mil
*COM# preceded by 61(all others are preceded by 69)

**USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center
Doctrine Division**

380 Fenwick Road Bldg 96
Fort Monroe, VA 23651-1064

	username	number
Col R. Brodel	(brodelr)	6404
LTC K. Greene	(greenek)	6557
LTC R. Cardillo	(cardillo)	6427
LTC R. Steinke	(steinker)	6409
CDR D. Bentz	(bentzd)	6449
Lt Col M. Artese	(artesem)	6407
Lt Col N. Toth	(tothn)	6555
Lt Col P. Verduyze	(verduyze)	6550
MAJ W. Braley	(braleyw)	6639
MAJ F. Miller	(millerf)	6865
Maj R. Schuttz	(schuttzr)	6115
Ms. T. Sheets	(sheets)	6554
Ms. D. Austin	(austind)	727-4388
FAX		6552

DOCTRINE SUPPORT GROUP

Mr. F. Moen	(moenf)	6520
Mr. T. Barrows*	(barrowst)	6521
Mr. G. Wasson	(wassong)	6522
Mr. J. Gangloff	(gangloff)	6523
Mr. D. Erickson	(ericksod)	6524
Mr. C. McGrath	(mcgrathc)	6525
Mr. D. Rolston	(rolstond)	6539
Mr. C. Bellis	(bellisc)	6666
Mr. J. McSpedden	(mcspeddn)	6665
Mr. D. Fitzgerald	(fitzgera)	6113
Mr. B. Hubner	(hubnerr)	6111
Mr. D. Seitz	(seitzd)	6112
Mr. T. Patterson	(patterso)	6538
Mr. J. Millner	(millnerj)	6138
FAX		6433

DSN 680-XXXX/Com (757)726-XXXX
E-mail (username)@jwfc.acom.mil

**US Transportation Command
USTRANSCOM (TCJ5-SR)**

508 Scott Drive Room 120
Scott AFB, IL 62225-5357

	username	number
CAPT L. Bernstein	(lou.bernstein)	6840
LTC J. Chen	(james.chen)	8077
Mr. K. Collins	(kenneth.collins)	8077
Ms. J. Bien	(jollynn.bien)	3826
FAX		7957

DSN 576-XXXX/
Com (618) 256-XXXX

E-mail (username)@hq.transcom.mil

JOINT DOCTRINE POINTS OF CONTACT

**Chief of Naval Operations
Warfare Policy and Doctrine
Branch (N512)**

2000 Navy Pentagon
Washington, DC 20350-2000

	username	number
CAPT J. MacKercher	(mackercher.john)	9381
CDR J. Lewis-Cooper	(lewis-cooper.jennifer)	9262
CDR B. Mueller	(mueller.bob)	4832
CDR A. LaBeouf	(labeouf.alan)	9273
LCDRA. Rander	(rander.andrew)	4832
LTC C. Bonat	(bonat.christian)	9273
Ms. J. Brooks	(brooks.janet)	9381
Ms. Johnson (NTSA)		948-1070
FAX		3599

DSN 225-XXXX/Com (703) 695-XXXX
Unclass. E-mail (username)@hq.navy.mil

**HQ US Marine Corps
Strategy and Plans Division
(Code PLN-13) Rm 5D616 Pentagon
Washington, DC 20380-1775**

	username	number
Maj J. Raney	(raneyjr)	4221
FAX		1420

DSN 224-XXXX/Com (703) 614-XXXX
E-mail (username)@hqmc.usmc.mil

**US Joint Forces Command
USJFCOM (JW140)**

116 Lakeview Pkwy Suite 100
Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

	username	number
LTC S. Senkovich	(senkovic)	7292
Mr. M. Smith	(smithm)	7254
Mr. M. Barker	(barker)	7270
FAX		7253/7056

DSN 668-XXXX/
Com (757) 686-XXXX
E-mail (username)@jwfc.acom.mil

**Commandant (G-OPD)
US Coast Guard Headquarters**

2100 Second Street SW
Washington, DC 20593-0001

	username	number
CAPT K. Coddington	(kcoddington)	1502
Mr. D. White	(dlwhite)	0610
CWO4 M. Hart	(mhart)	0583
FAX		4278

Com (202) 267-XXXX
E-mail (username)@comdt.uscg.mil

**USSouthern Command
USSOUTHCOM (SCJ5-PS)**

3511 NW 91st Avenue
Miami, FL 33172-1217

	username	number
CDR D. Singleton	(singletd)	1511
Lt Col J. Dudley	(dudleyj)	1513
E-mail w/attachments	(uscj5ps)	
STUIII		1511/12
FAX		1854

DSN 567-XXXX/Com (305) 437-XXXX
SIPRNET: (username)@hq.southcom.smil.mil

**USSpace Command
USSPACECOM (SPJ5X)**

250 S. Peterson Blvd Suite 116
Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3130

	username	number
LTC O. Doss	(olin.doss) ¹	5927
Lt Col R. Macleod	(macleodr) ²	2635
FAX		2615

DSN 692-XXXX/Com (719) 554-XXXX
¹E-mail (username)@peterson.af.mil
²E-mail (username)@usspacecom.af.mil

**US Strategic Command
USSTRATCOM (J512)**

901 SAC Blvd Suite 2F26
Offutt AFB, NE 68113-6500

	username	number
LCDR J. Brown	(brownje)	0560 ¹
Ms. D. Kassube	(kassubed)	4093 ²
FAX		1035 ¹

¹DSN 271-XXXX/Com (402) 294-XXXX
²DSN 272-XXXX/Com (402) 232-XXXX
E-mail (username)@stratcom.af.mil
SIPRNET
brownje@stratnets.stratcom.smil.mil

HQDA, ODCSOPS (DAMO-SSP)

400 Army Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-0400

	username	number
COL S. Loving	(lovinsm)	4-8241
Mr. Gary Bounds*	(bounds)	7-6949
LTC J. Bonsell	(bonseja)	3-6315
LTC A. Alcover	(alcovra)	4-5371
Mr. M. Goracke	(goracml)	4-7224
SFC(P) M. Rush	(rushmah)	5-6314
FAX		4-8623

DSN 22X-XXXX/
Com (703) 69X/614-XXXX
E-mail (username)@hqda.army.mil

**USEuropean Command
USEUCOM (EC J5-S)**

Unit 30400 Box 1000 APO AE 09128

	username	number
Lt Col J. Lee	(leej)	7445
Maj J. Sprecht	(spechtj)	8500
LCDR J. Bohler	(bohlerj)	8500
SSgt J. Malone	(malonejm)	5600
FAX		7218

DSN 430-XXXX/

Com 049-711-680-XXXX

E-mail (username)@eucom.mil

SIPRNET (username)@eucom.smil.mil

**US Central Command
USCENTCOM (CCJ5-O)**

7115 South Boundary Blvd
MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5101

	username	number
Lt Col J. Sturch	(sturchjp)	6668
FAX		5917

DSN 968-XXXX/Com (813) 828-XXXX

SIPRNET: (username)@centcom.smil.mil

HQ US Air Force Doctrine Center

155 North Twining Street

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6112

	username	number
Col T. Bowermeister	(thomas.bowermeister)	5421
FAX		7654

DSN 493-XXXX/Com (334) 953-XXXX

E-mail (username)@doctrine.af.mil

<http://www.doctrine.af.mil>

AFDC Det 1, Langley

216 Sweeney Blvd Suite 109

Langley AFB, VA 23665-2722

	username	number
Col R. Hinger	(robert.hinger)	8091
Lt Col M. Moss	(marc.moss)	8091
Lt Col N. Mack	(nanetta.mack)	4703
Lt Col C. Sutherland	(charles.sutherland)	8085
Lt Col (S) M. Schmidt	(marcel.schmidt)	2757
Maj M. DeVorss	(martin.devorss)	8093
Maj M. Fenton	(matthew.fenton)	8095
Maj S. Rife	(shawn.rife)	2756
Maj K. Smith	(kenneth.smith)	2758
Maj J. Coats	(james.coats)	8094
Maj F. VanCleave	(frederick.vancleave)	5806
TSgt V. Smith	(vernon.smith)	8083
Mr. W. Williamson	(wayne.williamson)	8088
Mrs. Waggener	(beatrice.waggener)	4657
Ms K. Stoufer	(kim.stoufer)	8103
FAX		8096

DSN 574-XXXX/Com (757) 764-XXXX

E-mail (username)@langley.af.mil

HQ AFDC/DL

1480 Air Force Pentagon

Washington, DC 20330-1480

	username	number
Lt Col D. Kenerley	(david.kenerley)	3-7943
Maj D. Davis	(donnie.davis)	7-0677
Ms. R. Parsons*	(rita.parsons)	3-7932
FAX		4-7461

DSN 22X-XXXX

Com (703) 697/693-XXXX

E-mail (username)@pentagon.af.mil

**USSpecial Operations Command
Attn: SOOP-TJ-D**

7701 Tampa Point Blvd.

MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323

	username	number
CDRL. Geisinger	(geislnl)	7548
LTC A. Krezeczowski	(krezeca)	3114
Maj D. Pannell	(pannel)	9832
Mr. J. Brush	(brushj)	5075
YN1 L. Brooks	(brooksl)	9832
FAX		9805

DSN 299-XXXX

Com (813) 828-XXXX

E-mail (username)@socom.mil

USSOCOM (J6SD)

7701 Tampa Point Blvd.

MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323

	username	number
Ms. M. Gibson	(gibsong)	3965
FAX		3749

DSN 968-XXXX

E-mail (username)@socom.mil

**US Pacific Command
HQ USCINCPAC (J38)**

Box 64013

Camp H. M. Smith, HI 96861-4013

	username	number
Lt Col T. Gerke	(tagerke0)	8269
FAX		8280

DSN 477-XXXX/Com (808) 477-XXXX

E-mail (username)@hq.pacom.mil

HQ TRADOC

DCSDOC, JADD (ATDO-A)

Ingalls Road Bldg 133, Rm 7

Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000

	username	number
COL B. Williams	(williamsb)	3153
LTC F. Abbott	(abbottf)	3892
LTC R. Watkins	(watkinsd)	4134
LTC C. Maurer	(maurerc1)	2888
LTC W. Orthner	(orthnerw)	4225
LTC M. Goodwin	(goodwinm)	3560
LTC S. Ham	(hams)	3444
LTC G. May	(mayga)	3439
MAJ T. Martinell	(martinet)	2234
Mr. R. Wightman	(wightmar)	3089
Mr. S. Wales	(wales)	4316
Mr. L. Washington	(washingl)	3454
Mr. L. Heystek	(heystekl)	4489
Ms. B. Brown	(brownb2)	3451
Mrs. P. Boone	(boonep)	3951
Ms. B. Nealon	(nealonb)	3087
FAX		680- or (757) 728-5859

DSN 680-XXXX/Com (757) 727-XXXX

E-mail (username)@monroe.army.mil

<http://147.248.133.36/doc1>

MCCDC

Joint Doctrine Branch

3300 Russell Road

3rd Floor Suite 318A

Quantico, VA 22134-5021

	username	number
Lt Col M. Triplett	(tripletmh)	2871
Maj J. Scanlan	(scanlanjm)	3609
Lt Col C. Haselden	(haseldence)	3608
Ms. A. Keays*	(keaysa)	6227
FAX		2917

DSN 278-XXXX/Com (703) 784-XXXX

E-mail (username)@mccdc.usmc.mil

**Navy Warfare
Development Command**

Sims Hall

686 Cushing Road

Newport, RI 02841-1207

	username	number
CAPT R. Nestlerode	(nestlerr)	4201
CAPT R. Miller	(millerrj)	4204
CAPT S. Morris	(morriss)	3485
CDRR. Kapcio	(kapcior)	1144
CDR J. Stamos	(stamosj)	7063
Lt Col J. Alexander	(alexanderj)	1167
Lt Col M. Bulawka	(bulawkam)	1164
Mr. R. Wilhelm	(wilhelmr)	1131
Mr. J. Gabor	(gaborj)	1126
FAX		7816

DSN 948-XXXX/Com (401) 841-XXXX

E-mail (username)@nwc.navy.mil

**Navy Warfare
Development Command
Norfolk Detachment**

1530 Gilbert Street Ste 2128

Norfolk, VA 23511-2723

	username	number
CDR T. Tucker	(tuckert)	2782
FAX		0570

DSN 262-XXXX/Com (757) 322-XXXX

E-mail (username)@nwdc-nor.navy.mil

**Air Land Sea
Application (ALSA) Center**

114 Andrews St

Langley, AFB VA 23665-2785

	username	number
Col E. Modica	(edward.modica)	0960
CDR J. Woodard	(jim.woodard)	0967
LTC D. Zoellers	(william.zoellers)	0962
LTC E. Bilyeu	(elisabeth.bilyeu)	0905
LTC L. Fowler	(lawrence.fowler)	0853
LTC W. Deneff	(wayne.deneff)	0854
LTC K. Kirmse	(kevin.kirmse)	0963
Lt Col J. Callaway	(james.callaway)	0851
Lt Col M. Brown	(mark.brown)	0964
Lt Col M. Vehr	(mary.vehr)	0966
Lt Col L. McDonald	(louis.mcdonald)	0903
MAJ R. Starkey	(richard.starkey)	0965
Maj R. McManus	(ronald.mcmanus)	0968
Maj S. Jenkins	(stev.jenkins)	0961
Maj R. Campbell	(robert.campbell)	0906
Mrs. D. Haba	(diane.haba)	0908
Mrs. T. Houston	(tracy.houston)	0849
FAX		0089

DSN 575-XXXX/Com (757) 225-XXXX

E-mail (username)@langley.af.mil

LEGEND

* Terminologist



JP Distribution



Members of the
Joint Doctrine
Working Party (JDWP)




Other Service
& Multi-Service Organizations

E-Mail addresses appear as (username)

JOINT DOCTRINE HIERARCHY

"As of 24 September 1999"

Future Concepts of Joint Warfare



DOCTRINE ORGANIZATION UPDATES

JOINT STAFF, J-7, JOINT DOCTRINE DIVISION (JDD)

By COL Robert Smith, USA, Division Chief

JOINT DOCTRINE NEWS

Personnel Turnover. Colonel Steve Schook departed for Fort McPherson, GA. His conceptual originality and ability to relate transformation to universal military principles brought a fresh perspective to doctrine and *Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010)* activities. His replacement, Colonel Robert (Rob) Smith, a West Point graduate, was the Executive Officer to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and formerly the Commander, 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Tim Malone, JDD's most experienced action officer, left in May 1999 to assume duties as the Deputy Operations Group Commander at Seymour Johnson AFB, NC. He is flying F-15Es and was recently promoted to Colonel. Tim's replacement is Lt Col Dave Snodgrass (B-52/B-1 background), who arrived in June 1999 after spending last year at the National War College. CDR Bryon Ing departed in July 1999 and reported to the Commandant (G-AWP), U.S. Coast Guard staff. Bryon was replaced by CDR Fred Midgette, who came from a tour with the Coast Guard Cutter *Harriet Lane (WMEC 903)*, homeported in Portsmouth, VA. CDR Ruth Mohr departed in June 1999 to a position with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Her replacement is LCDR Sally deGozzaldi (SH-2F and H-46D helicopters background), who arrived from Helicopter Combat Support Squadron Five in Guam. Also new is Mr. Harry Simmeth, a recently retired Army Colonel from the Joint Staff (JS) J-5 with experience as the Opposing Forces Commander at the National Training Center Fort Irwin, CA. He is working US-French interoperability and space operations as well as other multinational issues.

Publications of Interest. Since our last update, the following publications have been approved:

- JP 2-03, "JTTP for Global Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations," 31 March 1999;
- JP 1-01.1, "Compendium of Joint Publications," 23 April 1999;

- JP 3-09.1, "JTTP for Laser Designation Operations," 28 May 1999; and
- JP 3-35, "Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations," 7 September 1999.

Three publications made significant progress recently.

- The JP 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States," revision began in August 1999 with a Program Directive Working Group (PDWG). Development will be guided by Service Operations Deputies and Director JS agreement.
- The JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)," PDWG met in September 1999 to begin a major revision, which includes the incorporation of overarching Command and Control guidance.
- The revision first draft of JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," was released on 30 March 1999. A working group met in September 1999 to consider recommended changes.

Joint Publications Printing Status. Three publications are in the print queue, JPs 1-01.1, 3-09.1, and 3-35. The following publications are in final coordination and will be next in the print queue:

- JP 1-06, "JTTP for Financial Management During Joint Operations,"
- JP 2-0, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,"
- JP 2-01.1, "JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting," and the classified appendix,
- JP 3-01, "Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats,"
- JP 3-16, "Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations," and
- JP 3-33, "Joint Force Capabilities," with CD-ROM

Electronic Distribution. Doctrine and related material are now available on both the Internet and SIPRNET. Recent highlights include:

- Three electronic means of pushing information—AUTODIN message, unclassified Internet e-mail, and SIPRNET e-mail. LCDR deGozzaldi maintains the "JDD Distribution" e-mail container, so please coordinate changes with her at DSN 227-1046 or (703) 697-1046.

(Continued on next page)

- Password controlled access to draft publications and Doctrine Networked Education and Training (DOCNET). **Note: The passwords for DOCNET and draft joint publications must change every 90 days.** An Internet e-mail will announce the password change and a SIPRNET e-mail will provide the new passwords. For those personnel without access to SIPRNET, call LCDR deGozzaldi at DSN 227-1046 or (703) 697-1046 to receive the new password.
- Availability of UNCLASSIFIED Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directives (176 of the 179 CJCSIs/CJCSMs/CJCSNs).

Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System (JDEIS). JDEIS, an interactive database of doctrine, was successfully briefed to the Chairman and the USSOUTHCOM, USCENTCOM, and USEUCOM combatant commanders. It is fully funded and expected to be available on the Internet by 2002.

DOCNET. The first seven modules of DOCNET, an Internet-based education and training package, are complete and available at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/tointer.htm>. It is Chairman approved and funded starting in FY 2000.

Joint Doctrine Interactive Practical Application (JDIPA). JDIPA is an intelligent interactive CD-ROM based product, similar in appearance to a wargame, to test users on their joint doctrine knowledge. It conducts a "virtual" joint operation employing doctrinal principles learned from DOCNET. It is Chairman approved and fully funded.

Allied Joint Doctrine (NATO)

AJP-01(A), "Allied Joint Doctrine," is in its final review and was addressed at the September 1999 Allied Joint Operations Doctrine (AJOD) Working Group. The second draft of AJP-3, "Allied Joint Operations," is complete and a review will occur at the AJOD. The first draft review of AJP-3.4, "Military Operations Other Than War" was completed in June 1999 and it is approaching completion of the second draft. The second draft of AJP-3.4.1, "Peace Support Operations," was completed in July 1999 and is quickly approaching its next review.

To support interoperability and doctrine issues, a JDD representative attended the following multinational talks:

- US-French Combined Operations and Space Support Interoperability,
- Six-Nation Council on Coalition Interoperability,
- Canada-US Military Cooperation Committee, and

- 1999 English/French Speaking Nations (ESN/FSN) Panel and NATO Terminology Conference.

The 1999 ESN/FSN Panel and NATO Terminology Conference Meeting were held concurrently from 14-18 June 1999 to expedite decision making for the NATO Terminology Standardization Programme. The five ESN/FSN nations (Belgium, Canada, France, United Kingdom, and the United States) constituted the ESN/FSN Panel to finalize agreements in French and English. JS J-7 and Service terminologists represented the United States. All attending nations functioned collectively as the "NATO Terminology Conference Meeting" to address issues above the ESN/FSN level. NATO Headquarters; Allied Command, Atlantic; and Allied Command, Europe participated as nonvoting members for both events.

Of the 38 terminology issues from the Panel-NATO agenda, 26 became "NATO Agreed" and 12 were deferred for study. Items of policy and procedure included the revised NATO Standardization Agreement for AAP-6, "NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French);" enhanced use of the Internet by NATO; and complete declassification of AAP-6 and AAP-15, "Glossary of Abbreviations Used in NATO Documents." The agreements accorded with US positions and reflected the impact of US joint doctrine on allied joint doctrine. When promulgated, "NATO Agreed" terminology will be staffed by Service and DOD terminologists for acceptance and subsequent inclusion in JP 1-02, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms."

JOINT VISION BRANCH NEWS

Organizational Changes. Despite a massive turnover, the Branch was left with an experienced Branch Chief and a host of talent. COL Del Turner moved on to Chief of Joint Force Integration for USJFCOM's Washington Liaison Office. CAPT John R. Warnecke became JV Branch Chief—his branch experience was key to the minimal disruption experienced during the summer. LtCol Tim (BT) Hanifen, a Marine aviator coming from the National War College, replaced Col Tom Tyrell, who became the Executive Officer to the Deputy J-7. Lt Col "Doc" Colvin moved to the Joint Military Education Division within J-7 and was replaced by LTC James E. Harris, also coming from the National War College. Jim's light infantry background includes tours as a battalion commander and a West Point instructor. Mr. Tom Glover, a civilian contractor with TRW is aboard performing the doctrine, organization, training and education, material, leadership, and people study. Unfortunately, Capt Bill "Spanky" Spangenthal, our intrepid intern, proved irreplaceable.

Joint Vision Integration Cell (JVIC). The JVIC will provide the Chairman and senior department leadership with a one-stop update and decision support capability on *JV2010* implementation and operation. It is being developed in conjunction with the USJFCOM Battle Lab Coordination Cell concept. JCS contracted support from Nonlinear Dynamics Incorporated. The \$99K contract focuses on concept refinement, developing an information architecture, and producing technology and communications strategies. Office of the Secretary of Defense and JS senior leaders were briefed and embraced the JVIC approach. JS J-7 continues to brief others to gain widespread support and funding. Commercial and governmental JVIC equivalents have been explored at the Federal Aviation Administration integration centers, Electronic Data Systems, and the Ballistic Missile Defense Office. Lack of resources continues to be the main barrier to implementing JVIC—its first POM funding appears in FY 02.

Transformation. As required by the "Defense Planning Guidance," the JV branch continues research on the revolution in business affairs as a means to ensure US dominance in the revolution in military affairs. Accordingly, we became familiar with "Complexity Theory" and its application to business processes. We will be gathering further data about its applicability to "Network Centric Warfare."

JV 2010 Multi-Media. We added current briefings to the *JV 2010* Home Page at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/JV2010>. The briefings are grouped into smaller sections for faster downloading. These briefings are rotated frequently to provide updates.

Questions or Comments? Please e-mail us at JV2010@js.pentagon.mil.

JOINT AND ARMY DOCTRINE DIRECTORATE (JADD), HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (HQ, TRADOC)

By COL Bristol Williams, USA, Director

JADD writes and reviews doctrine in accordance with JP 1-01, "Joint Publication System Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program," and the TRADOC Doctrinal Literature Program. JADD continues to serve as the chair and host for the Semi-Annual Army Doctrine Conference and as TRADOC's executive agent for interface with the combatant commands, Air Land Sea Application (ALSA)

Center, and the other Service doctrine centers and commands. JADD's Director is COL Bristol Williams. He can be reached at DSN 680-3951 or e-mail: williamsb@monroe.army.mil.

The Army Doctrine Hierarchy. TRADOC has developed a doctrine hierarchy that provides a structure for development and promulgation of doctrinal publications. It organizes the content to be comprehensive without being redundant and aligns publications with the needs of the target audience. Thus, it serves managers and doctrine developers, as well as users. The current version of the Army Doctrine Hierarchy can be found on the World Wide Web at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/dcsdoc/doctrine>. The hierarchy is maintained in Powerpoint format for printing. The doctrine hierarchy will be reviewed in TRADOC Regulation 25-36 later this year and is included in final draft of that document. The hierarchy consists of three tiers of doctrinal publications, as shown in Figure 1 below, and described in the following paragraphs.




Figure 1. Army Doctrine Hierarchy

- **Tier One – Army.** This tier contains capstone, keystone, joint related, Army interest, and some combined arms field manuals. With hundreds of field manuals in the publication system, the Army Tier allows soldiers to view those field manuals that offer a broad perspective on Army operations. This tier is closely related and organized very similar to the joint doctrine hierarchy to facilitate the use of both Army and joint doctrine by all Army personnel. The Army tier contains the following types of field manuals.
 - **Capstone.** FM 100-1, "The Army," is the Army's capstone, or highest level, doctrinal
(Continued on next page)

publication. Capstone publications provide a linkage between Army doctrine and National security and military strategies.

- **Keystone.** FM 100-5, "Operations," is part of the Army's keystone, or next highest level of doctrinal publications. It establishes the foundation for Army doctrine and describes general guidelines, regardless of the type of operations or the echelon.
- **Joint Related.** All Army doctrine that has a directly related joint publication is included. These publications are specially tagged to reflect their joint linkage and the joint publication number is included as a reference. For example, FM 100-5 is not only a keystone publication, but it is joint related and includes a reference to JP 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."
- **Army Interest.** The intent of this category is to capture doctrine that would be of interest to the Army as a whole. Most 100-series manuals that cover general operations would fall into this category. Other doctrine in each functional area is included as appropriate. The rules for this category are flexible and doctrine is added or removed, as appropriate.
- **Combined Arms.** Field manuals included in this category describe the doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures required for combined arms operations. They focus on synchronizing and coordinating varied capabilities to successfully execute assigned offensive, defensive, stability, and support missions throughout the range of military operations.
- **Tier Two – Proponent.** The second level tier is designed to capture the bulk of proponent level field manuals that would not qualify for the Army Tier or the lower Reference Tier. The tier is designed to capture most branch-proponency field manuals. The Proponent tier will often include the proponent's principle publication along with other field manuals covering functions, units, and the employment of its soldiers and systems.
- **Tier Three – Reference.** The third tier is used to group those field manuals containing information that could apply to any soldier or unit depending on assignment or generic information that seldom changes. This tier is also grouped by proponent with other appropriate groupings. Because fundamental tasks, such as providing first aid or operating communications equipment, apply to all soldiers, they should be described in reference publications available to all soldiers.

Doctrine Study 00/01. The TRADOC Commander tasked the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine (DCSDOC) in June 1999 to conduct a doctrine study to set the priorities and doctrinal focus for FYs 00 and 01. JADD has been assigned the lead in conducting the study. It is primarily based upon five issues: (1) proponent procedures for writing doctrine, (2) the effectiveness and timeliness of the development process, (3) the process for gathering and integrating lessons learned into our doctrine, (4) the integration of joint, multinational, and Army doctrine, and (5) the relevance of doctrine being produced to soldiers in the field. The final study report to the Commanding General is expected to be delivered by late September 1999. Our POC is LTC Steve Wallace at DSN 680-2778 or e-mail: wallaces@monroe.army.mil.

Digital Doctrine. As the Army's integration center for all Force XXI doctrine, JADD is currently tracking 156 digital publications for DIVISION CAPSTONE EXERCISE (DCX) 2001 and in the process of refining JOINT CONTINGENCY FORCE ARMY WARFIGHTING EXPERIMENT (JCF AWE) 2000 doctrinal publications. In addition, we have started to prepare for the CORPS ARMY WARFIGHTING EXPERIMENT (CAWE) scheduled for 2002. The purpose of this effort is to insure Force XXI units have the most up to date digital publications when and where they need them.

The Doctrine Developer's Course (DDC) is a component of the Army Doctrine (AD) XXI initiative. The course provides officers and noncommissioned officers who are newly assigned to doctrine positions with the basic knowledge to effectively and efficiently develop, write, staff, and publish Army doctrine. Participants receive hands on training with the Automated Systems Approach to Training Doctrine Module, the Army Doctrine and Training Digital Library, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned Virtual Research Library. The DDC helps doctrine proponents maximize use of their limited doctrine related resources. The course mitigates these resource shortfalls by providing doctrine writers with "how to" guidance, thereby reducing the ramp-up time for newcomers. Future plans indicate the DDC will be exportable via CD ROM and offered in distance learning facilities and/or the Internet. Classroom sessions are conducted semiannually. The DDC sessions are scheduled for 5-8 October 1999 and 21-24 March 2000. Our POC is LTC Walter H. Orthner at DSN 680-4225 or e-mail: orthnerw@monroe.army.mil.

Homeland Defense. JADD is the office of primary responsibility for examining the implications regarding Army doctrine and related developments in homeland defense. JADD has produced a White Paper, "Supporting Homeland Defense," for Headquarters, Department of the Army and is working with the Maneuver Support

Center at Fort Leonard Wood, MO. This Center will become the Army's Center of Excellence for homeland defense on 1 October 1999. The emphasis is on monitoring consequence management actions, a component of homeland defense, and one that is of special interest in the Department of Defense. Our POC is Mr. Larry Heystek at DSN 680-4489 or e-mail: heystekl@monroe.army.mil. Our alternate POC is MAJ Ted Martinell at DSN 680-2234 or e-mail: martinet@monroe.army.mil.

NATO Doctrine Program. Participation in NATO Military Agency for Standardization (MAS) Army Board working groups in TRADOC is divided among the various schools and centers. The current US Head of Delegation to the NATO Land Forces Tactical Doctrine and Operational Procedures Working Party (TOP WG) is COL Clinton J. Ancker III, Director, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD), USA Command and General Staff College. COL Ancker is also standing chairman for the Quadripartite Working Group for Doctrine, Command and Staff Procedures. CADD is tasked to research, write, coordinate, and integrate Army combined arms doctrine. CADD participates in joint and multinational doctrine development to further Army doctrine efforts. CADD is the custodian for NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs) 2019/APP-6A, "Military Symbols for Land Based Systems," and 2014, "Operations Orders, Warning Orders, and Administrative/Logistics Orders;" is chairman of the APP-6A Study Panel; and is the US member of the APP-9, "Compendium of Land Forces Message Study Panel." Combined Arms Support Command NATO responsibilities include membership on the logistic doctrine, transportation, and maintenance working parties. DCSDOC (JADD) duties include coordinating the TRADOC position on all pertinent NATO doctrine with Air Force and Marine Corps doctrine centers. JADD represents the Army in the Amphibious and Air Operations Working Parties, and is responsible for coordination of the Army position on STANAGs maintained by these groups. DCSDOC (IAPD) coordinates Army positions for all ratification documents. The DCSDOC (JADD) POC is LTC May at DSN 680-3439 or e-mail: mayga@monroe.army.mil. The DCSDOC (IAPD) POC is Richard Wilson at DSN 680-3453 or e-mail: wilsonr2@monroe.army.mil.

KEY PUBLICATIONS/PROJECTS UPDATES

FM 100-5, "Operations." The 1993 version of FM 100-5 is under revision. The revision debate centers on ideas contained in a series of concept papers. These papers frame key operational questions and issues, discuss alternative approaches, and recommend future paths for our operational doctrine. Interested parties can request

access to these papers by visiting <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/operations/index.htm>. Preparation of the next draft will begin as the review of concept papers nears completion during the Fall of 1999. The Army plans to publish and distribute the manual electronically by October 2000 and in hard copy by February 2001. Other key Army manuals will be developed in parallel to include FM 100-1, "The Army," an outline of the Army's fundamental purpose, roles, responsibilities, and functions; FM 100-7, "Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations," a guide for US Army forces functioning at the operational level of war in concert with joint, multinational, and interagency organizations; FM 100-20, "Stability Actions and Support Actions," a description of the Army's operations other than war doctrine; and FM 100-40, "Tactics," the Army's manual for offensive and defensive operations. The HQ TRADOC POC is LTC Abbott at DSN 680-3892 or e-mail: abbottf@monroe.army.mil.

FM 100-XX, "Contractors on the Battlefield," addresses the use of contractors as an added resource for the commander to consider when planning support for an operation. Its purpose is to define the role of contractors, describe their relationship to the joint force commander and the Army Service component commander, and to present their mission of augmenting operations and weapons systems support. This manual is intended for commanders and their staffs at all echelons, program managers/program executive officers, and soldiers involved in the planning, management and use of contractors in a theater of operation. It is also a guide for Army contracting professionals and contractors to understand how contractors will be managed and supported by the military forces they assist. The manual is being written under contract by MPRI and is in its final stages of development. Publication is anticipated during the 1st Quarter FY 00. Our POC is Mr. Wightman at DSN 680-3089 or e-mail: wightmar@monroe.army.mil.

JP 4-07, "JTTP for Common User Logistics During Joint Operations" will standardize guidance across logistic functional areas and provide a single source publication for conducting common user logistics operations within a theater and by a joint task force. The Army is the lead agent. The first draft was placed on the JEL during April 1998. The second draft should be out for staffing by 1 October 1999. Our POC is LTC Maurer at DSN 680-2888 or e-mail: maurercl@monroe.army.mil.

JP 5-00.1, "JTTP for Campaign Planning," (Preliminary Coordination) is currently undergoing revision by the Army War College to clarify introductory principles, more closely integrate the elements of design with the campaign model, and expand the discussion of subordinate campaign planning. Our POC is LTC Ham at DSN 680-3444 or e-mail: hams@monroe.army.mil.

(Continued on next page)

HEADQUARTERS, AIR FORCE DOCTRINE CENTER (HQ, AFDC)

By Lt Col Marc Moss, USAF, AFDC Det 1

Personnel. HQ AFDC Detachment 1 has several new faces. Maj Ken Smith (Airborne Warning and Control System and Ground Theater Air Control System experience/command) has arrived and taken on the command and control issues formerly handled by Lt Col Kate Nelson. Maj Matt "Filter" Fenton, an F-15C instructor pilot, has arrived and taken on the counterair issues formerly covered by Lt Col Brad Seipel. Lt Col "The Chuck" Sutherland is in the last days of a 90-day deployment to Prince Sultan AB, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as the wing operations center shift chief. On 3 December 1999, Lt Col Nan-Etta "Nano" Mack will retire from active duty, taking with her a significant portion of logistic war-planning and doctrine expertise. Our best wishes will go with her.

The following paragraphs provide updates on some of our recent efforts, both in the joint community and from HQ AFDC at Maxwell AFB, AL.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS UPDATE

JP 3-17, "Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Mobility Operations," is undergoing a complete revision, as indicated by the title change. The United States has found itself in a new security environment and JP 3-17 must address this new environment. The US military rapidly responds to and supports operations ranging from humanitarian relief to war—this rapid response is by air. JP 3-17 will provide air mobility doctrine for now and the future. The revision will combine three joint publications—approved JP 3-17, "JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations;" JP 4-01.1, "JTTP for Airlift Support to Joint Operations," and portions of JP 3-18.1, "JTTP for Airborne and Air Assault Operations." Additionally, the revision will pioneer doctrine and TTP for air refueling and air mobility support. USTRANSCOM is the lead agent (LA) and the USAF is the primary review authority (PRA). The first draft was posted on the Joint Doctrine Home Page (<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine>) for review in May 1999. Comments on that draft are being analyzed. Maj Coats is our POC at DSN 574-8094 or e-mail: james.coats@langley.af.mil.

JP 3-50 Series. The 6-8 October 1998 DOD Personnel Recovery (PR) Conference hosted by the Defense Prisoner of War and Missing Personnel Office (DPWMPO) surfaced an issue, discussed below in two parts, regarding joint combat search and rescue (CSAR) and evasion and recovery doctrine.

- Current CSAR doctrine calls for the Services to perform their own CSAR, which is inconsistent with other joint warfighting doctrine. **[Editor's Note: This conclusion refers to JP 3-50.2, page I-1, subparagraph 1a, 1st sentence. The USACOM (now USJFCOM) JWFC assessment report on JP 3-50.2 of 11 February 1998 recognized that sentence needed revision. We recommended the lead agent change it to acknowledge that the Services and USSOCOM train and equip forces for CSAR, not perform CSAR. Nevertheless, JP 3-50.2 does correctly establish that the component commanders, when tasked, provide support to joint CSAR operations (those that have exceeded the capabilities of the component commanders in their own operations and require the efforts of two or more components of the joint force to accomplish the operation). In this respect, CSAR doctrine is consistent with other joint doctrine.]**
- It is the combatant commander's responsibility to recover personnel placed at risk in the area of responsibility and to identify requirements for recovery assets—functional components must ensure their parent Services provide those assets. **[Editor's Note: Joint doctrine supports the former (JP 3-50.2, page I-1, subparagraph 2a) and it stands to reason the latter would follow, since functional components are derived from Service components or forces.]**

The conference recommended revising the JP 3-50-series to bring CSAR responsibilities in line with approved joint doctrine. The Joint Combat Rescue Agency (JCRA) (soon to be realigned under USJFCOM as the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency); as the PRA for JPs 3-50.2, "Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue," and 3-50.21, "JTTP for Combat Search and Rescue;" submitted a proposal to the October 1998 Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP) to renumber, retitle, and realign the JP 3-50 series publications during their NORMAL revision cycle. The JDWP approved JCRA's proposal. The USAF, as the LA for these publications, recognizes the need for change, but revisions will be made in conjunction with the established revision/review cycle.

JP 3-55.1, "JTTP for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)." The Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center coordinated distribution of the first and second drafts for worldwide review and comment. The USAF, as the LA, has forwarded the resultant revision to the Joint Staff for preliminary/final coordination and approval. Expect posting of the preliminary coordination version in the Joint Electronic Library on the Joint Doctrine Home Page later this Fall.

JP 3-60, "Doctrine for Joint Targeting." Worldwide review and comment on the second draft, dated 15 April 1999, is complete. A working group that included the technical review authorities (TRAs) (Joint Targeting School, ALSA Center, and Joint Staff J-2T) was held in July 1999. This working group validated the need to submit a proposal to the 24th JDWP to remove the requirement for JTTP on time-sensitive targets from JP 3-60 and develop a separate JTTP-level publication proposed as JP 3-60.1, "JTTP for Time-Sensitive Targeting (TST)." HQ AFDC/DJ is incorporating coordinating review authority and TRA inputs and comments in JP 3-60. A preliminary coordination version of JP 3-60 is being developed and will be delivered to Joint Staff J-7/JDD shortly after the JDWP.

AIR FORCE PUBLICATIONS UPDATE

Air Force doctrine development is proceeding rapidly. Since April 1999, six Air Force Doctrine Documents (AFDDs), listed below, have been approved.

- AFDD 1-2, "Air Force Terms."
- AFDD 2-6, "Air Mobility Operations."
- AFDD 2-1.4, "Countersea Operations."
- AFDD 2-6.2, "Air Refueling Operations."
- AFDD 2-5.2, "Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)."
- AFDD 2-5.3, "Psychological Operations (PSYOP)."

This brings the total to 21 approved AFDDs, three of which are being revised. Seven AFDDs are in the final coordination phase—all are projected to be presented to their approval authorities before 1 October 1999. Three AFDDs are out for comment resolution and two are in draft coordination or development. Related future events include the Fall 1999 Air Force Doctrine Working Group, scheduled for 15-16 September 1999 and the Four-Star Doctrine Summit scheduled for 15-16 December 1999.

AIR MOBILITY ARTICLE

Due to space limitations, we were unable to include an excellent AFDC article ("JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AIR MOBILITY OPERATIONS: Now, and for the Future") by Maj James T. Coats about the impact of today's and tomorrow's security environment on air mobility. We apologize, however, that article is available from the USJFCOM JWFC Internet site at <http://www.jtasc.com>. Click, in sequence, on Limited Access, JWFC Newsletters & Bulletins, A Common Perspective, and the article's title.

NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND (NWDC)

By CDR John Stamos, USN

"In everything we do, we must ask ourselves: does this directly advance preparation for war? Our Fleet today is over-organized, over-educated, over-theorized, over-instructed, over-administrated, over-complicated, and over-whelmed with red tape, correspondence, paperwork and books!"

I believe the Fleet can be handled far more effectively and practically than is the case today if the number of tactical books used by the Department is limited to four. Any commander may indoctrinate his command in any way he chooses, except by complicated books and pamphlets on tactical procedures.

If war comes, this Fleet must fight 'as is.' You must fight at sea and not on paper. Victories are won by practical results. Practical results are obtained by application at sea of our studies, theories, and analyses on shore.

You will get licked with your nose in the wrong book and your pocket full of red tape and fine forms unless you lock your library in the safe, stand up, and face a practical sea situation in a practical seamanlike way, using your own brains and making your own decisions."

Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves

The new Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet, gave the above speech to his officers as he launched his fleet reform initiative. The date was July 11, 1934.

The NWDC is adapting ADM Reeves' thoughts and modifying them for the 21st Century. The Maritime Battle Center is taking ideas harnessed by the Concept Department, and exploring them in the caldron of current fleet operations with their successful Fleet Battle Experiment (FBE) process. Once a concept is matured into a realistic tactic, technique, or procedure (TTP) and shows promise through the FBE process; the Doctrine Department transforms it into concise, standardized TTP that can be easily and quickly understood by the fleet. If the results of an FBE indicate that other aspects, such as training or programs, require a rudder change, the NWDC Operations Department is positioned to help the Navy accomplish it.

NWDC has begun a number of initiatives to transfer the new knowledge gained through the FBE process to the fleet operators. Current fleet operators require a more efficient way to absorb the ever-growing repositories of internal knowledge; such as naval warfare publications (NWP), joint publications, and published "lessons
(Continued on next page)

learned;" as well as the created new knowledge. One such initiative is a limited objective experiment (LOE) that exclusively addresses knowledge management. The Maritime Battle Center is in the initial stages of planning this experiment for the February 2000 timeframe. NWDC has also reenergized the Navy Lessons Learned System to more effectively "market" this valuable knowledge database to the fleet user. A new CD-ROM search engine and a more aggressive process for exposure are some of the recent initiatives. The NWP's are one year into a planned two-year conversion process to transfer all Navy doctrine and TTP into an all-digital format.

The Doctrine Department has built up significant steam and is close to all-ahead, full. Seventy-five percent of Doctrine Department billets are now filled, including officers from all five Services. The Department is fully integrated into all aspects of the NWDC innovation process from Wargames to FBEs. Doctrine Department's ongoing challenge is to become the Navy's knowledge transfer agent and let the fleet do what it does best, operate forward from the Sea.

MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND (MCCDC), DOCTRINE DIVISION, JOINT BRANCH

By Lt Col M. Triplett, USMC, Director

The US Marine Corps is monitoring the progress of several joint publications. Foremost on this list is JP 3-01, "Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats." A three-star level Pentagon Tank session on 21 July 1999 resolved the first of two contentious issues to the satisfaction of the Marine Corps. A summary of the outcomes is provided as follows:

- Issue #1 was about joint force air component commander (JFACC) assignments. The Marine Corps concurred with the following text: "The responsibilities of the JFACC, AADC [area air defense commander], and ACA [airspace control authority] are interrelated and are normally assigned to one individual, but they may be assigned to two or more individuals when the situation dictates. Based on the situation, if the joint force commander decides not to assign the JFACC, AADC, or ACA as one individual, then close coordination between all three positions is essential."
- Issue #2, concerning who is the supported commander in a particular land or naval area of operations (AO), was not satisfactorily resolved in the Tank. The Marine Corps desires the following text: "With concurrence of the land or naval force commanders, the JFACC has the latitude to plan

and execute JFC-prioritized counterair operations and attack targets within land and naval AOs. The JFACC must coordinate counterair operations to avoid adverse effects and fratricide."

As the lead agent for JP 3-09.3, "JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)," the Marine Corps is leaning forward in the foxhole. Accordingly, the second annual Joint CAS Symposium will be held in November 1999 at Langley AFB, VA. This symposium series originated in August 1998, where a well-attended meeting of representatives from each of the Services and combatant commands discussed methods to improve joint CAS doctrine, as well as JTTP. Furthermore, the symposium evaluated the potential of emerging technologies in avionics, ordnance, target marking devices, and other CAS-enhancing items. Similar discussions will take place in November 1999, in addition to the formation of a CAS Executive Steering Committee.

The Marine Corps also is the lead agent for JP 3-06, "Joint Urban Operations." The first draft is being written to meet a late Autumn 1999 release for worldwide staffing.

Obviously, there also is significant Marine Corps interest in JP 3-02, "Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations." Here, the Marine Corps desires to shift the traditional command relationships between the commander, amphibious task force (CATF) and commander, landing force (CLF) to a support relationship.

Lastly, the Marine Corps is monitoring the results of request-for-feedback messages associated with two key publications as follows:

- JP 3-56.1, "Command and Control for Joint Air Operations," contains some of the same contentious language concerning JFACC assignments yet to be resolved in the JP 3-01 debate.
- JP 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support," contains contentious CATF/CLF text being debated in JP 3-02. Further, the Marine Corps seeks the addition of a paragraph that describes the Marine tactical air command center, and text which clarifies the fact that Marine air-ground task forces smaller than a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) use the fire support coordination center to do the same functions as the MEF's force fires coordination center.

AIR LAND SEA APPLICATION (ALSA) CENTER

By Col Ed Modica, USAF, Director

We remain busy here at the ALSA Center. Our primary effort over the last six months has been to clear the backlog of ongoing projects, however we continue to

conduct research on potential new products and assess our existing publications for possible revision. You can expect ALSA's CY 2000 output to include three to five revisions and a similar number of new projects.

Next year will also mark a milestone in the history of ALSA—our 25th anniversary. ALSA was founded in 1975 as ALFA (Air Land Force Applications), an Army/Air Force institution. The current four-Service organization evolved from ALFA and continues its tradition of responsiveness in our primary mission: meeting the immediate needs of the warfighter. We plan to celebrate our history this year. As these plans become firm we will post additional information on our Internet Home Page at: <http://www.dtic.mil/alsa>.

DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS STATUS

"Aviation MOUT – Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) for Aviation Operations on Urban Terrain" will address the preparation and execution of tactical fixed- and rotary-wing aviation urban operations. It provides a source of reference material to aviation and ground personnel in planning and coordinating tactical aviation urban operations, and promotes an understanding of the complexities of urban terrain. This publication is designed for use at the tactical level and incorporates lessons learned, information from real world and training operations, and TTP from various sources applicable to the urban environment. **Current Status:** The second draft was released on 27 May 1999. The final coordination version is projected to be released for worldwide review in August 1999. Contact LTC Zoellers at DSN 575-0962 or e-mail: william.zoellers@langley.af.mil, or Maj Jenkins at DSN 575-0961 or e-mail: mark.jenkins@langley.af.mil.

"BMO – MTTP for Bomber-Maritime Operations" (SECRET) discusses the integration of USAF bombers (B-52, B-1, B-2) with naval maritime forces. It delineates bomber capabilities/limitations, "arms" bomber strike mission participants with a comprehensive knowledge of naval maritime procedures, discusses planning procedures, and highlights key tactical considerations for weapon system integration. The MTTP will better educate our joint forces, contribute to more efficient utilization of bomber assets, and enhance joint strike operations. **Current Status:** BMO is approved and at the editor in preparation for printing and release, which is projected to occur during the 1st Quarter of FY 00. Contact CDR Woodard at DSN 575-0967 or e-mail: jim.woodard@langley.af.mil, or Maj McManus at DSN 575-0968 or e-mail: ronald.mcmanus@langley.af.mil.

"EOD-J – Multiservice Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a Joint Environment" will provide procedures to assist EOD units in planning, coordinating,

and integrating explosive ordnance disposal operations in a joint environment. The MTTP will provide working relationships for command and control; and address equipment, maintenance, supply lines, communications, and manning for EOD operations in a joint environment. In addition, the manual will address standardized reporting and intelligence procedures, joint training standards, and automated information sharing/management. **Current Status:** The second draft is available for review. Publication is projected for the 3rd Quarter of FY 00. Contact Lt Col Vehr at DSN 575-0966 or e-mail: mary.vehr@langley.af.mil, or MAJ Starkey at DSN 575-0965 or e-mail: richard.starkey@langley.af.mil.

"ICAC2 - MTTP for Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control" will facilitate coordination, integration, and regulation of combat airspace during exercises, contingencies, and other operations where more than one Service must share the airspace for operational use. It will outline the importance of an integrated airspace control function on the battlefield and describe the organization responsible for airspace control in joint operations. It will define procedures for planning, implementing, executing, and deconflicting airspace, including addressing specific airspace control issues for specialized missions. It also will outline the information, interfaces, and communications supporting the integrated airspace control function. **Current Status:** The signature draft was released during July 1999 and is awaiting command approval. Publication is projected during the 1st Quarter of FY 00. Contact Lt Col Vehr at DSN 575-0966 or e-mail: mary.vehr@langley.af.mil, or MAJ Starkey at DSN 575-0965 or e-mail: richard.starkey@langley.af.mil.

"JAOC/AAMDC - MTTP for Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC)/Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) Coordination" discusses methods used to coordinate AAMDC operations for the Army forces (ARFOR) with the JAOC for the joint force air component command (JFACC)/area air defense commander (AADC)/airspace control authority (ACA). It defines command and control between the AAMDC and the JAOC and it will include the role of the battlefield coordination detachment as the principal liaison element between the ARFOR and the JFACC. It will address JAOC/AAMDC coordination and integration procedures in five areas: intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB); passive and active defense; attack operations; and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence. This MTTP will specifically address integration between the AAMDC and an Air Force-established JAOC; some of the principles, relationships, and processes described may apply in other circumstances, such as when the USN or USMC component provides the JFACC/AADC/ACA. This publication will provide readers with a common frame of reference for establishing effective working relationships. **Current Status:** The
(Continued on next page)

signature draft was released in June 1999 and is awaiting command approval. Publication is projected during the 1st Quarter FY 00. Contact MAJ Starkey at DSN 575-0965 or e-mail: richard.starkey@langley.af.mil, or Lt Col Vehr at DSN 575-0966 or e-mail: mary.vehr@langley.af.mil.

"JIADS – MTPP for Joint Integrated Air Defense Systems" will provide a single, consolidated reference addressing existing Service air defense systems, their capabilities, connectivity and processes, as well as describing concepts for the relationships and use of information within Service data and planning networks. It will enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of organizations participating in theater air and missile defense. **Current Status:** The final coordination draft was released for worldwide review in June 1999—comments are due by September 1999. Publication is projected during the 3rd Quarter FY 00. Contact LtCol McDonald at DSN 575-0903 or e-mail: louis.mcdonald@langley.af.mil, or LTC Deneff at DSN 575-0854 or e-mail: wayne.deneff@langley.af.mil.

JP 3-55.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures For Unmanned Aerial Vehicles," originated during the 16-17 April 1996 Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP), which identified the requirement to revise Joint Pub 3-55.1 prior to reformatting. It will provide overarching doctrinal guidance and JTTP on joint UAV employment, as well as providing principles for the planning and execution of such operations. **Current Status:** The preliminary coordination draft was forwarded to the lead agent (Air Force) in June 1999. Contact LTC Fowler at DSN 575-0853 or e-mail: lawrence.fowler@langley.af.mil, or LtCol J. E. Callaway at DSN 575-0851 or e-mail: james.callaway@langley.af.mil.

"JTMTD – MTPP for Joint Theater Missile Target Development" addresses joint theater missile (TM) target development in early entry and mature theater operations. It focuses on providing a common understanding of the TM target system and information on the component elements involved in attack operations target development. It will focus on integration of the IPB methodology as it applies to TMs, collection management, and target development to include sensor employment considerations to support those operations. It is intended to help joint task force (JTF) and subordinate component commanders and their staffs develop a cohesive approach to the processes necessary to conduct offensive operations against TM forces. **Current Status:** JTMTD is approved, edited, and has been forwarded to the printer. Electronic copies are available at www.dtic.mil/alsa. Contact Lt Col Brown at DSN 575-0964 or e-mail: mark.brown@langley.af.mil, or LTC Kirmse at DSN 575-0963 or e-mail: kevin.kirmse@langley.af.mil.

"NBC Defense of Fixed Sites, Ports, and Airfields – Multiservice Procedures for Nuclear,

Biological, and Chemical Defense of Fixed Sites, Ports, and Airfields." In August 1996 the US Army Chemical School, serving as lead agent at the direction of the Joint Service Integration Group (JSIG) for NBC Defense, initiated development of this publication. Service review of the coordinating draft confirmed that it did not meet the needs of all Services. Consequently, the JSIG asked ALSA to complete development. **Current Status:** The final coordination version was released for worldwide review in May 1999—comments were due by August 1999. This draft is available at: <http://www.mcclellan.army.mil/usacmls/doctrine/docindex.htm>. The user name and password are cued so that a user can receive the needed information within two working days. Publication is projected during the 2nd Quarter FY 00. Contact CDR Woodard at DSN 575-0967 or e-mail: jim.woodard@langley.af.mil, or Maj McManus at DSN 575-0968 or e-mail: ronald.mcmanus@langley.af.mil.

"RM – Multiservice Procedures for Risk Management" will provide common and integrated risk management methods/tools for planners and operators in a joint environment. **Current Status:** The first Joint Working Group (JWG) was held from 2-5 August 1999. The second JWG is scheduled for 2-5 November 1999. Contact LTC Fowler at DSN 575-0853 or e-mail: lawrence.fowler@langley.af.mil, or LtCol Callaway at DSN 575-0851 or e-mail: james.callaway@langley.af.mil.

"SEAD -MTPP for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses" provides the JTF and subordinate component commanders, their staffs, and SEAD operators with a single, consolidated reference that discusses the employment of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and electronic and destructive attack weapons systems to destroy/disrupt/degrade the enemy's air defenses. It documents TTP for SEAD-related ISR systems, electronic and destructive attack aircraft, fires, and other assets at the SECRET level. **Current Status:** It is approved and in the queue for final editing and release. Publication is projected for the 1st Quarter FY 00. Contact Lt Col McDonald at DSN 575-0903 or e-mail: louis.mcdonald@langley.af.mil, or LTC Deneff at DSN 575-0854 or e-mail: wayne.deneff@langley.af.mil.

"Survival, Evasion, and Recovery – MTPP for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery" is a consolidated quick reference guide for basic survival, evasion, and recovery information. This publication will be printed on light brown, weatherproof stock and be pocket-sized for portability. The guide includes basic survival information on sustenance (food and water), personal protection, emergency medical, personal hygiene, movement techniques, navigation, evading the enemy, signaling, recovery operations, and induced conditions (nuclear, biological, and chemical). **Current Status:** It is approved, edited, and has been forwarded to the printer. An

electronic copy is available at www.dtic.mil/alsa. Contact LTC Zoellers at DSN 575-0962 or e-mail: william.zoellers@langley.af.mil, or Maj Jenkins at DSN 575-0961 or e-mail: mark.jenkins@langley.af.mil.

"TADIL-J- Introduction to TADIL-J and Quick Reference Guide" provides the warfighter and JTF planners and staff with unclassified guidance for TADIL-J planning and operations. It can be used to gain an understanding of TADIL-J operations and its role in the multi-TADIL world. This publication also will serve as a central locator for TADIL-J references, manuals, and points of contact to increase the warfighter's knowledge, which in turn maximize combat effectiveness. **Current Status:** TADIL-J is approved and in the queue for final editing. Publication is anticipated during the 1st Quarter of FY 00. Contact LTC Bilyeu at DSN 575-0905 or e-mail: elisabeth.bilyeu@langley.af.mil, or Maj Campbell at DSN 575-0906 or e-mail: robert.campbell@langley.af.mil.

JOINT INFORMATION OPERATIONS CENTER (JIOC)

As of 1 October 1999, the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center became the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) under USSPACECOM. Maj Gen John F. Miller Jr., USJFCOM Chief of Staff, signed the JIOC's Charter on 9 August 1999. The new charter and name change expands the Center's mission from focusing on C2W to full spectrum IO support. The transition from USJFCOM to USSPACECOM is connected to USSPACECOM's assumption of new IO responsibilities. USSPACECOM plans to reissue the JIOC's Charter as an instruction. Although the JIOC has a new charter and a new boss, its focus will continue to be on support to the joint warfighter. Both CINCUSPACECOM, General Richard B. Meyers, USAF, and the JIOC's Commander, Maj Gen John R. Baker, USAF, have emphasized that JIOC customers will be able to depend on the same timely, professional support that was the JC2WC's trademark.

Regarding joint doctrine, the JIOC will continue to support the Joint Staff (JS) through USSPACECOM by assisting in the development of joint IO doctrine and related documents. The JIOC serves as the primary review authority for JPs 3-51, "Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare," and 3-13.1, "Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)." Both publications are in active revision. The revision of JP 3-51 is in the final coordination stage. It is recommended that JP 3-13.1 be revised as joint tactics, techniques, and procedures to support the IO doctrine in JP 3-13. The JIOC recently submitted a draft program directive to USJFCOM JWFC and the JS for review and staffing. Further, the JIOC recently submitted a defensive IO Tab to the Operations Annex (Annex C) for the next version of Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES)

guidance and assisted the JS in drafting a computer network attack Tab for the IO Appendix in JOPES.

In other areas, JIOC operations support personnel were extensively involved in recent operations in Kosovo and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. The JIOC's new lessons learned branch is working closely with the USJFCOM JWFC, Joint Center for Lessons Learned, and other organizations to gather and compile valid IO lessons learned from that conflict.

Our joint doctrine POC is Mr. Dave Holmes at DSN 969-4697 or e-mail: holmes@jc2wc.osis.gov.



KEY WORLD WIDE WEB SITES

CJCS Joint Doctrine:

- NIPRNET: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine>
- SIPRNET: <http://nmcc20a.nmcc.smil.mil/users/dj9j7ead/doctrine/index.htm>
- DOCNET: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/tointer.htm>

Presidential Directives and Executive Orders: <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/direct.htm>

DOD Directives: <http://www.defenselink.mil/>

Joint Chiefs of Staff: <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/>

USJFCOM JWFC: <http://www.jtasc.acom.mil/>

Joint Center for Lessons Learned Database:

- NIPRNET: <http://www.secure.jwfc.acom.mil/protected/jc11>
- SIPRNET: <http://www.jc11.jwfc.acom.smil.mil>

Army Training and Doctrine Digital Library: <http://155.217.58.58/atdls.htm>

TRADOC: <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/>

Center for Army Lessons Learned: <http://call.army.mil/>

Naval Warfare Development Command: <http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/>

Navy Online: <http://www.ncts.navy.mil/nol/>

Navy Directives: <http://ned.nebt.daps.mil/>

Air Force Doctrine Center: <http://www.hqafdc.maxwell.af.mil/Main.asp>

MCCDC, Doctrine Division: <http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil/>

Marine Corps Lessons Learned: http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/www_library/2mccls.htm

USEUCOM Publications: <http://www.eucom.mil/publications/index.htm>

Air Land Sea Application Center: <http://www.dtic.mil/alsa>



Brig Gen Morehouse, Deputy Commander USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC), welcomed all attendees. He provided a brief overview of USACOM's upcoming transition to US Joint Forces Command and highlighted several recent and future joint exercises involving USJFCOM. COL Schook, Chief, Joint Doctrine Division (JDD), Joint Staff (JS) J-7, and the JDWP chairman; provided a brief overview of the ongoing transformation within the military, as well as certain JS roles. He emphasized that doctrine will be one of the key players affecting any change to the way we do business in the near term.

Lt Col Malone from the JS J-7/JDD provided a joint doctrine update. He indicated work on JP 3-56, "Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations," has been discontinued, publications on total distribution and military operations in urban terrain are being developed, the JP 3-50 series is being realigned and consolidated, and publications in active development/revision include JPs 1 (revision), 1-01 (revision), 3-01 (revision), 2-0 (revision), 3-0 (revision), 3-14 (development), and 3-16 (development). He noted the Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System (JDEIS); a comprehensive, relational database of doctrine under development; will be made available on CD-ROM and the WWW, and that Doctrine Networked Education and Training (DOCNET) is available on the WWW—six of 30 modules are complete. DOCNET allows personnel who do not attend joint professional military education (JPME) institutions to receive JPME-type instruction. He outlined the Joint Doctrine Operations Laboratory (JDOL) (initial operating capability during June 2002), which will be a net-based interactive application of doctrine that allows multiplayer participation in combatant commander-driven scenarios. Lt Col Malone closed by emphasizing early planner level visibility on JPs under development is necessary. Mr. Gary Bounds of HQDA asked whether JPs will coexist with the JDEIS and was informed they would run parallel for the introduction and development period. He also asked who resolves doctrinal inconsistencies for inclusion in DOCNET modules and was informed that JS J7/JDD does. Col Brodel, Chief, USJFCOM JWFC,

Doctrine Division; requested a concept paper for JDEIS be developed and staffed with the field to address proponent concerns. Col Hinger of the AFDC indicated there should be more interaction with the Services' PME in the early stages of JDOL development. Lt Col Malone indicated some early coordination with the Services via the Military Education Coordinating Committee has taken place and will continue. Col Chilstrom of USPACOM expressed concern with the slow development of JPs 3-07.6, 3-07.7, and 5-00.1. CDR Ing of JS J7/JDD explained that a policy decision involving the definition of consequence management is delaying JPs 3-07.6 and 3-07.7, and MAJ Roy Fox of JS J7/JDD stated that JP 5-00.1 was returned to the lead agent (LA) for further work. Mr. Bounds stated that more emphasis on keeping the combatant commands informed of the contentious issues is needed. Lt Col Malone indicated the JS J7/JDD will consider providing additional updates to joint doctrine issues and JP development events on the WWW.

LTC Senkovich of the USJFCOM JWFC provided a JP assessments update. He indicated that 53 assessment reports have been released with six in progress. Open assessment reports include JPs 3-07.4, "Joint Counterdrug Operations," 3-07.5, "JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations," 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations," 3-54, "Joint Doctrine for Operations Security," 3-61, "Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations," and 4-01, "Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System." LTC Senkovich noted that assessment data is available on the USJFCOM JWFC Home Page and that assessment reports are now categorized by the revision recommendation—interim reports for normal revisions and final reports for immediate revisions.

CDR Geisinger of USSOCOM provided a decision briefing to retain and redesignate JP 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs," as JP 3-57.1, "Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs." He explained that the ongoing conversion of JP 3-57 to "Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations (CMO)" will not provide adequate guidance for conducting the approximately 16 functions comprising civil affairs (CA) activities. The proposed JP 3-57.1 would highlight Services' active and reserve component capabilities, provide information on USSOCOM's CA role, and present a succinct outline of legal and regulatory CA policies. **MAJ Braley provided the USJFCOM JWFC front-end analysis (FEA) that concurred with the proposal. The JDWP voted unanimously to approve the new project as JP 3-57.1.**

CDR Geisinger of USSOCOM also provided a decision brief to retain and redesignate JP 3-05.5, "Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning," as JP 3-05.2, "JTTP for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning." He explained that the original plan to consolidate portions of JP 3-05.5 into JP 3-60, "Doctrine for Joint Targeting," and JP 3-05.1, "JTTP for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations," will be inadequate. JP 3-05.5 remains an important source of JTTP

concerning the integration of joint special operations targeting and mission planning into conventional joint operations, coordination and deconfliction with other joint force elements, improving consistency from theater to theater, and providing a common guide for both deliberate and crisis action planning. **MAJ Braley of the USJFCOM JWFC provided a FEA that concurred with the proposal. The JDWP voted unanimously to approve the new project as JP 3-05.2.**

Maj Smiley from the JS J-3 provided a decision brief on the disposition of JP 3-56, "Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations." As an introduction, Maj Miller of the USJFCOM JWFC provided the historical perspective, background, and analysis; which indicated there is no need for a new, separate C2 publication—JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)" should be revised to include expansion and strengthening of C2 doctrine. Maj Smiley then recommended cancellation of JP 3-56's program directive (PD), cessation of associated doctrine development, and revision of JP 0-2 to reflect overarching C2 doctrine; noting the Joint Battle Center had reached the same conclusion. He provided a proposed four-part structure for JP 0-2 with development/coordination of a PD during April/May 1999 and the revision commencing in June 1999. **Col Brodel asked if anyone was still interested in pursuing the development of JFLCC and JFMCC guidance—the members expressed no immediate interest.** COL Hinger explained that the Air Force likes JP 0-2 as is. He indicated a working group (WG) should write the JP 0-2 revision PD and stated that if this effort becomes too controversial and delays or dilutes JP 0-2, the USAF may have to come back and recommend a separate JP. Col Brodel suggested a CD-ROM like the one USJFCOM JWFC produced with the C2 doctrine study may be appropriate for field use. **The JDWP voted unanimously to cancel all further work on JP 3-56. The JDWP voted 14-1 (USEUCOM opposed) to expand the C2 guidance in JP 0-2 during its revision.**

Lt Col Sutherland of the AFDC provided an information briefing on designation of the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) as a joint publication. He reasoned that: (1) The UJTL makes doctrinal statements throughout the document, (2) It has not gone through the formal doctrine review process, and (3) Joint training should be conducted using approved joint doctrine. He emphasized that including the UJTL in the JP process would provide alignment of training with joint doctrine. Mr. Bounds noted previous efforts to align the UJTL with joint doctrine have failed. COL Schook indicated that alignment will not enable future concepts to be included in UJTL revisions and will not bring about changes to employment of joint forces.

Lt Col Weresyanski of HQ USAF (Air and Space Operations) provided an information briefing involving the US Air Force's evolution to an expeditionary aerospace force (EAF). She noted the Cold War USAF focused on containment; but the 21st Century USAF must

focus on engagement with two-thirds less forward basing. The USAF must evolve in a way that meets national needs, ensures joint effectiveness, leverages USAF strengths, and uses the total force. Lt Col Weresyanski indicated today's USAF organizational structure will evolve to 10 aerospace expeditionary forces (AEFs) and will comprise active, guard, and reserve forces. Only needed capabilities are deployed with the remainder of the force on-call. Deployed and on-call capabilities consist of both team and individual taskings. A rotational cycle will allow for an AEF planned "life cycle" and will enhance overall USAF efficiency by providing a "total force" organization, integration of trained and ready forces, enhancement of deliberate and crisis planning, and "allowing commanders to command." The EAF for the 21st Century provides: (1) Increased USAF combat capability to the combatant commanders, (2) A force management tool, and (3) TEMPO relief.

CAPT Thompson of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Test and Evaluation Office, provided an information briefing on the Joint Shipboard Helicopter Integration Process (JSHIP) Program. He explained that JSHIP's purpose was to provide a methodology to integrate DOD rotorcraft aboard US Navy ships and to increase interoperability of joint Service forces in the "at-sea environment." He indicated current joint shipboard helicopter operations lack standardized tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that restrict joint force commanders' options during contingencies. For example, waivers are routinely required. The JSHIP principal issues are compatibility, procedures, and training and its focus is to develop the processes required to integrate any ship/helicopter pair through a minimum number of dedicated at-sea tests. He stated there are 12 dedicated tests—primarily compatibility issues, and three non-dedicated tests—primarily procedures/training issues. Ultimately, JSHIP will provide recommended TTPs and data and legacy products to the Services for acquisition/operations/testing. He indicated input would be provided for the revision of JP 3-04.1, "JTTP for Shipboard Helicopter Operations."

LTC Kelsey of USJFCOM J4 provided an information briefing on predeployment, port of embarkation (POE), and port of debarkation (POD) activities. LTC Kelsey discussed, among other items, joint deployment process ownership (JDPO), the relationship between strategic maneuver and global sustainment, USJFCOM J-4 JDPO functional tasks, and the collaborative relationship between USJFCOM and the USTRANSCOM-sponsored Joint Deployment Training Center. He explained how USJFCOM deployment process improvement initiatives and a collaborative filtering process have enabled an effective and efficient deployment process. He noted three pieces remain missing to the overall joint deployment and redeployment guidance provided in JP 3-35, "Joint Deployment and Redeployment;" predeployment activities, movement to and activities at the POE, and movement to the POD.

(Continued on next page)

Mr. Rinaldo of TRADOC provided an information briefing on support of homeland defense. He noted several JPs, FM 100-19, "Domestic Support Operations", and CJCS Handbook 5260, "Commander's Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness," provide some guidance that could be used in homeland defense. He then provided an overview of ongoing US Army homeland defense efforts that include sponsorship of studies, designation of response task forces, medical readiness efforts, and concept and doctrine development. Specifically, an Army Center of Excellence for Homeland Defense has been established at Fort Leonard Wood, MO and the Army-After-Next Wargame 99 will include some homeland defense play. He indicated a DOD-wide definition; consolidation of doctrine in an overarching publication, possibly a handbook; along with some revision of the UJTL is needed.

COL Schook of the JS J7/JDD provided an information briefing on the revision status of JP 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States." He revealed that revised JP 1 will address the integration of military capabilities with other elements of national power, serve as a conceptual foundation for joint doctrine, provide better linkage to the contemporary security environment, link to shape/respond/prepare now—macro employment of joint forces post Cold War, and provide a bridge to future security requirements—stretch doctrine. He indicated that a white paper will be developed and vetted with the combatant commanders and a joint writing team will be used. He noted the OJCS will serve and the LA and the JSDS is the J-7. Approval of revised JP 1 is planned for September 2000. Col Schook indicated the main difference between this effort and others is the formation of a joint writing team. He also indicated several ongoing interagency efforts could be leveraged.

CDR Bougard of USJFCOM JWFC provided an information briefing concerning JP 1-01 procedures for the submission of proposals. He noted the JP 1-01 revision (PC version) requires proposals be submitted four months prior to the next JDWP and must include a detailed justification and an explicit scope, along with a draft PD. Col Hinger of the AFDC indicated we could improve the JP 1-01 process by adhering to the timelines and indicated the Air Force believes we should use automatic suspenses to get the appropriate level of attention to contentious issues—we need to put more discipline in the process. Col Hinger also indicated the planners do not want to get involved earlier in the process. Lt Col Malone restated the need to get O-6 level attention sooner (although not necessarily Service planners). COL Schook explained that timing and higher-level interest also play a role in the tank decision process—normally, every attempt to reach consensus is explored before going to the tank. Mr. Bounds of the USA indicated that "people in the building" are satisfied with the system, and generals do not want to push doctrine problems with potential programmatic implications to Tank sessions—making the process more restrictive is the wrong thing to do.

Group Captain Graham McMellin, RAF (Ret), and Group Captain Alan Vincent, RAF, provided a briefing on the development of United Kingdom (UK) and Allied Joint doctrine. They discussed developments in UK joint warfare, UK joint doctrine, and Allied joint doctrine, as well as the primary role of the Permanent Joint Headquarters. Current UK joint doctrine projects include intelligence; logistics; common item support; joint planning; joint operations; and nuclear, biological, and chemical defense. The briefing concluded with an overview of the Allied Joint Publications Development Plan. Mr. Bounds indicated that centralized focus for the US oversight of the allied joint publications is needed. COL Schook indicated the JS J7/JDD is investigating a process to provide this oversight, to include coalition and bilateral doctrine projects.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Col Hinger of the AFDC suggested dividing JP 1-02 into sections and reviewing them as opposed to the whole document at one time. Mr. Bounds of the USA and Mr. Fleischmann from the JS J-7 indicated there was a plan to break JP 1-02 into categories for WG addressal. Mr. Bounds added that contentious changes to terms should be staffed with the JPs that nominated them. Col Brodel suggested creation of a joint doctrine dictionary exclusively for joint doctrine terms, and a reference manual for other DOD terms. COL Schook directed all to stick with the present plan and the new suspense (2 June 1999).

Col Brodel indicated there should be more reporting of progress regarding JP development, to include reports of why JPs have fallen behind in the development/revision cycle. CDR Ing indicated most JPs are behind schedule while staffing the PC and FC versions—some LAs are turning in unsuitable drafts and the lack of early O-6 or above visibility creates opportunities for delays. Col Hinger indicated there should be more information provided at future JDWPs concerning the status of JP development problems, which Lt Col Malone promised. COL Schook solicited inputs concerning those JPs being delayed that have an impact on the operations of those Services/combatant commands. The USJFCOM JWFC reported JPs 3-14, 3-18, 3-55 and the Air Force reported JP 3-01. Col Brodel suggested that perhaps the JDWP should prioritize ongoing development/revision efforts. COL Schook indicated that JPs development efforts are being prioritized at JS J7/JDD based on issues and issue resolution.

COL Schook thanked the participants and the USJFCOM JWFC for their support in hosting a successful conference. The next JDWP will be held from 19-20 October 1999 at the USJFCOM JWFC on Fort Monroe, VA.



TERMINOLOGY

By Mr. Tom Barrows, USJFCOM JWFC, Doctrine Support Group

"The units participating in peace [support] operations could have easier going if all were using the 'peacekeeping' words in the same way. Today, different defense forces are using the very same expression with different meanings. If we are going to create a real joint and combined force for peace [support] operations, we need to solve the terminology problem."

**LtCol Alf Gorsjo, Swedish Army
Swedish Armed Forces International Centre, 1996**

The concept or idea of US military forces conducting peace operations is not new. As President Harry S. Truman noted ". . . we should expect to participate in a broad range of deterrent, conflict prevention, and peacetime activities. Further, our history, strategy, and recent experience suggest that we will usually work in concert with our friends and allies in almost all operations."

President Truman certainly was correct in his vision. US forces are embroiled in peace operations around the world with more "opportunities" popping up daily. Military analysts appearing on national news broadcasts regularly advise us that these (peace operations) are the wave of the future and the most likely employment of US military forces over the next several decades. The development of an expanding series of joint publications dealing with military operations other than war (in which is included JP 3-07.3, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations") would seem to support this notion.

With the expansion of joint doctrine for peace operations come certain responsibilities to be precise in our terminology. As noted by LtCol Gorsjo, there are several different meanings for the same terms being used in the international arena. It is my observation that we have similar problems in the joint doctrine community. We should all remember that within US parlance "peace operations" is "a broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace."

Unfortunately, the terminology picture becomes fuzzy beyond this point. For example, there are different US, NATO, and UN definitions for "peacekeeping." While all three definitions point to implementing a peace agreement, the UN definition also makes provisions for "ensuring the safe delivery of humanitarian relief." Within US parlance, we use the term "foreign humanitarian assistance" to denote such operations. Another example occurs with the term "peace enforcement," which also has separate US, UN, and NATO definitions. Again, all three definitions seem to point to the application of necessary military force to compel or coerce compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. There are enough differences in these definitions to provide considerable

confusion to commanders trying to develop a cohesive "peace enforcement" strategy in the multinational arena.

In the four plus years since LtCol Gorsjo's observation, the international doctrine/terminology community has made no evident progress in resolving the "terminology problem" he outlines. Fortunately, on-scene commanders and their subordinates assigned to multinational forces to conduct peace operations have been able to make accommodating arrangements and local agreements concerning terminology. We can only hope that continuing efforts to standardize international peace operations terminology will prevail and such standardization will be accomplished. Until then, we must attempt to arm ourselves with what works in each particular circumstance or situation. Hang in there—we who seek to standardize will prevail in the long run.



USJFCOM JWFC JOINT PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTION

The USJFCOM JWFC maintains a small inventory of JPs. As of 1 October 1999, the inventory included over 27,000 copies of 56 different color JPs plus approximately 500 black and white copies of 14 older approved JPs. The purpose of this small USJFCOM JWFC inventory and the inventories maintained by the Services is to be able to field printed JPs on short notice to those commands who require and request them. It took nearly three years to place these 56 color publications in our inventory and will take another two years to fill in some of the vacant shelf space with new and/or revised color JPs.

To keep the inventory "not too big" and "not too small," USJFCOM JWFC works closely with the Joint Staff, J-7/JDD to track the approval process and make orderly distribution. The printed copies will always lag the electronic versions, which now can be found in two locations: (1) the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) on CD-ROM and (2) the JEL on the World Wide Web at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine>. The JEL on CD-ROM comes out approximately twice a year and contains all approved JPs as well as training modules and selected papers and Service publications.

USJFCOM JWFC "Dial-a-Pub" POCs

- CDR Dave Bentz, USN, Doctrine Division, DSN 680-6449, Comm (757)726-6449, FAX extension 6552, or e-mail bentzd@jwfc.acom.mil.
- Mr. Gary C. Wasson, Doctrine Support Group, DSN 680-6522, Comm (757)726-6522, FAX extension 6540, or e-mail wassong@jwfc.acom.mil.
- Mr. Dennis Fitzgerald, Doctrine Support Group, DSN 680-6113, Comm (757)726-6113, FAX extension 6540, or e-mail fitzgera@jwfc.acom.mil.

If contacting the USJFCOM JWFC, please provide the following information via FAX, letter, or e-mail:

**Requester's name, rank, Service
Phone numbers (DSN, Comm, FAX)
e-mail address
Full US post office mailing address
Pub number(s) and quantities**

JOINT PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTION

PART 1: PUSH

- At approximately one month prior to the approval date for a new or revised JP, an e-mail is sent from the USJFCOM JWFC to the Services and combatant commands POCs. It provides the JP distribution status report and additional distribution requirements.
- The Services, combatant commands, and the Joint Staff then gather user addresses and JP quantities, and provide distribution lists to the USJFCOM JWFC.
- The USJFCOM JWFC consolidates all lists, coordinates fiscal accounting, and provides the print copy and label mailing information to the printer.
- The printer mails the JPs. Publications are only mailed to the addresses consolidated by the USJFCOM JWFC.
- To get a label, identify your requirements to one of the 15 primary POCs: (1) Joint Staff, (2) USJFCOM JWFC, (3) USSOUTHCOM, (4) USEUCOM, (5) USPACOM, (6) USSPACECOM, (7) USSTRATCOM, (8) USCENTCOM, (9) USSOCOM, (10) USTRANSCOM, (11) US Navy (NWDC), (12) US Army (DAMO-SSP), (13) US Air Force (AFDC/DJ), (14) US Marine Corps (MCCDC), and (15) US Coast Guard (HQ).

PART 2: PULL

- If you don't have the JP you need or not enough copies, contact the military Service publication center assigned administrative support responsibility or look in the appendix section of the joint pub for the following addresses:

US Army AG Publication Center SL
ATTN: Joint Publications
1655 Woodson Rd.
St. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force Publications Distribution Center
2800 Eastern Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21220-2896

CO, Navy Aviation Supply Office
Distribution Division (Code 03443)
5801 Tabor Avenue
Philadelphia, PA 1920-5000

Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD)
2100 2nd Street, SW
Washington, DC 20593-0001

Marine Corps Logistics Base
Albany, GA 31704-5000

- If the Service publication center is unable to provide a JP, contact the Service or combatant command distribution POC for further information. These POCs are identified on pages 20 and 21 with a & symbol next to their name.
- If neither the Service publication center nor the distribution POC can help, the USJFCOM JWFC maintains a small stockage which is intended to be responsive to emergent requirements and may assist with this problem. "Dial-a-pub" POCs are listed on page 37.
- Contractor requests for JPs, including the JEL CD-ROM, only will be honored if submitted through their DOD sponsor.
- Private individuals will be referred to the Government Printing Office (GPO) order and inquiry service: (202) 512-1800 which has a list of publications for sale. Not all joint pubs are printed by GPO, but they do stock the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) CD-ROM at a cost of approximately \$14.00.

JEL

- The JEL CD-ROM is distributed like any JP as described above.
- The JEL on the World Wide Web can be found at "<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine>" using your browser. It is updated routinely and contains all approved JPs which may be electronically downloaded (pdf format) for local distribution or read with Acrobat Reader (also available for download).

SUBSCRIBER REQUEST FORM

ATTENTION LINE: _____

GROUP/DEPT./DIVISION NAME : _____

COMMAND: _____

DELIVERY ADDRESS: _____

CITY, STATE: _____

ZIP CODE (+ FOUR): _____

POC: _____ PHONE #: _____

E-MAIL: _____

INVOLVED IN JOINT DOCTRINE: _____ NO. COPIES DESIRED: _____

HOW DID YOU GET THIS NEWSLETTER? _____

WHICH ARTICLE(S) DID YOU FIND MOST USEFUL? _____

WHICH ARTICLE(S) DID YOU FIND LEAST USEFUL? _____

WHAT WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE IN FUTURE EDITIONS? _____

OTHER COMMENTS: _____

FAX TO: DSN 680-6552 OR COMM 757-726-6552

cut along line
OCTOBER99

FOLDUPHERE

FOLDBACKHERE

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

USJFCOM JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER
ATTN A COMMON PERSPECTIVE
380 FENWICK ROAD BUILDING 96
FORT MONROE VA 23651-1064

