




A Common PERSPECTIVE

Joint Warfighting Center's Newsletter

September 1995

Volume 3, No. 2



"Information Age 'tools,' to include speed and precision, are increasingly a part of the battlefield. Only the best soldiers, leaders, staffs and organizations, who understand the importance of speed and precision in information processing and applications, will be able to be fully successful in this kind of environment."

William W. Hartzog, General, US Army



MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDER, JWFC



Maj Gen Joseph J. Redden, USAF

It's been a busy six months since we last published A Common Perspective. As an organization, the Joint Warfighting Center has occupied our permanent facilities here at Fort Monroe, VA. In the world of joint doctrine, the 15th Semiannual Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP) took place at USSPACECOM and we hosted an "Out-of-Cycle" JDWP here at Fort Monroe. An overview of both are provided in this issue. Preparations are well underway for the next regularly scheduled session in October.

As we continue to find our Armed Forces thrust in to nontraditional roles, it is imperative that we continue to develop, teach and use doctrine that is understood across the Services. More and more we find ourselves working side by side with foreign nations to meet common peacekeeping and humanitarian goals. Not an easy challenge! At the same time, we must maintain the warfighting skills that have helped forge our Armed Forces into the deterrent force that it is today. The efforts put forward by the "doctrinaires" of the joint community are critical to continuing to improve our ability to meet the needs and requirements of our Nation.

In this issue, there are several articles that provide information useful in the training arena. If you subscribe to the theory that doctrine must be clear and useful, then the next step is ingraining this doctrine into our training so that it becomes the basis for our operational as well as strategic processes and actions. The Universal Joint Task List, Joint Mission Essential Task Lists and the Joint Model After-Action Review System are key components in an effective joint training program. The cornerstone for this program is doctrine. We encourage you to provide your comments and insights as to the effectiveness of these tools and our training programs.

We all join our editor, CDR Dan Tansey in soliciting your input for future editions of this periodical. We intend to stimulate thought and encourage debate--your inputs are the key to making it happen.

FROM THE EDITOR

WELCOME!

We just moved into the refurbished schoolhouse during the second week of August. We spent quite a bit of our first week here doing the "Hurricane Felix shuffle."

There has been such a big turnover in the key players in joint doctrine development in the past few months, we are providing an update of the Service headquarters and combatant command points of contact in this edition. We will combine it with the joint and Service doctrine organization data and update it every issue. This issue also contains summaries of two Joint Doctrine Working Parties (JDWPs): the semiannual one in April and the special session in July. Because of the "Out-of-Cycle" JDWP, we did not hold a Joint Doctrine Organization Roundtable in the last six months. Two JDWP summaries subsumed our normal article on combatant command initiatives.

Our next edition of A Common Perspective should be published in February 96. We continue to solicit articles and commentaries regarding joint doctrine, especially articles covering joint operations/issues of a historical nature. The historical theme for the next issue will be Operation ICEBERG (Okinawa) and we intend to focus on "command and control." We desire all submissions to be 1500 words or less--we will consider longer ones. Please submit them double-spaced, Microsoft Word or WordPerfect preferred format on a 3.5- or 5.25-inch disc, via the JEL, or via E-mail for ease in handling. We need your inputs by 12 January 1996.

We intend for A Common Perspective to continue to provide you a valuable forum for joint doctrinal information and initiatives. We hope you will provide us your opinion on joint doctrinal issues or joint initiatives in your command. Please pass this newsletter to anyone you think may be interested. If you didn't get a copy directly, fill out the subscription form and send it or fax it to us. We have limited numbers of back issues available, if you need any. Send your articles, letters, and commentaries to:

A COMMON PERSPECTIVE
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or place it in the on-line JEL in the "NEWSLETTER" conference; or send it via E-mail at "tanseyd@jwfc.army.mil"; or call:

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We look forward to hearing from you,

Dan Tansey, CDR, USN,
Executive Editor

Frank Moen,
Managing Editor

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IN THIS ISSUE

Article	Page	Article	Page
JWFC-DOC	4	Using UJTL as a Joint Exercise Assessment Tool	18
15th Semiannual Joint Doctrine Working Party--A Snapshot	6	JFACC and Staff Training Program	20
Out-of-Cycle JDWP 18-19 July 95	8	Joint Model After-Action Review System	21
Issues in Joint Exercises and Operations	10	GPS Navigation and Map Accuracy	24
Quadripartite 95	10	Operational Joint Targeting Procedures	26
Service Initiative--International Doctrine Conference	11	Commentaries:	
Joint Pub Status	13	Just What Is Joint Doctrine Anyway?	27
Joint Doctrine POCs	14	Joint Pub 3-0	29
Joint Doctrine Hierarchy (Graphic)	16	Joint Electronic Library (JEL)	29
Information Warfare	17	Terminology	30

JWFC-DOC

By CAPT Ernie Rogers, USN, Chief, JWFC-DOC

Greetings from our new headquarters in Building 96 at Fort Monroe. If all goes well, the 24-25 October 1995 Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP) will be held in our newly renovated conference room. It was great to see "old timers" at the July "Out-of-Cycle" JDWP, but it was especially nice welcoming the new members to the joint doctrine development community. Key new doctrine developers are: COL Jack Colley (Chief, JDD, J-7), CAPT Don Auten (HQ Navy), Lt Col (Col select) Bob Awtrey (HQ Air Force), CAPT Greg Greetis (JSOFI), MAJ Bucky Howle (PACOM), CAPT Lee Duckworth (NDC), COL Bob Hammerle (TRADOC), and Col Brian Jones (ALSA).

The July session provided consensus on some very good changes to Joint Pub 1-01 and the consolidation of several pubs. We look forward to voting on the changes at the October JDWP.

As we complete the production phase of the Joint Doctrine Development Master Plan and enter the improvement and revision phase, COL Colley and I have plans to change the focus of JDWPs. We feel they should address important operational issues and place less emphasis on the doctrine development process. Our plans are to seek out senior leaders with current experience in the field to address the JDWP on the utility of the doctrine we develop. This will be an exciting change and "our toes might get stepped on" in the interest of making joint doctrine more user responsive.

I look forward to seeing everyone in October and giving you the grand tour of our permanent facilities. The Chairman, JCS, has been invited to come and "kickoff" the JDWP.

PUB DEVELOPMENT BRANCH

CJCS has approved a new joint publications hierarchy which creates two levels of publications. The upper level consists of the capstone, keystone, and selected other key doctrinal pubs which will be signed by the Chairman. The second--or lower--level will include those joint publications that deal with specific mission area doctrine or JTTP. These publications will be signed by the Director of the Joint Staff. A graphic of this hierarchy can be found on page 16.

Joint working groups will become an integral part of the publication development process. The lead agent or

primary review authority (LA/PRA) will sponsor the working group, and JWFC will assist by providing the joint perspective from the outset and insuring the drafts are developed in accordance with the program directive. Working groups will be held to help develop the first and second drafts and at other times if agreed to after the second draft's comments are consolidated.

JWFC-DOC is currently revising two publications. Joint Pub 1-01, "Joint Publications System," is scheduled to have the first draft of change 2 out for comment by the last week in October 95. The preliminary coordination (PC) version of Joint Pub 5-00.2, "Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures," is scheduled for distribution by 1 October 1995.

The first draft of Joint Pub 1-0, "Joint Doctrine for Personnel and Administration Support to Joint Operations," has been distributed by the LA for review and comment.

Joint Pub 2-03, "JTTP for Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC & G) Support to Joint Operations," was sent out for first draft review and comments in late August.

The development of Joint Pub 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations," has proved to be very successful thus far. Due to the diligent work by everyone involved, but especially the PRA (Naval Doctrine Command), we have been able to go directly from the first draft to the PC stage in the development cycle.

TRADOC recently completed a three day joint working group at Fort Monroe, VA, regarding Joint Pub 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support." The third draft is expected out in early October 95.

PUB ASSESSMENT BRANCH

JWFC-DOC is in the various stages of conducting several formal assessments (see page 13). Inputs for these assessments are obtained from the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff, as well as from JWFC observations/interviews conducted during exercises and real-world operations. Recommendations vary with each pub, but generally, three statements can be made: (1) most of the pubs need terminology, information, or weapon system updates, (2) suggestions for additional material have been made for most of the pubs, and (3) with one exception, no one has proposed an urgent change (by the definition in Joint Pub 1-01) or earlier-than-scheduled revision.

The one exception calling for an urgent change is Joint Pub 3-15, "Barriers, Obstacles, and Mines." The pub currently does not contain any information on unexploded ordnance and its impact on operations after hostilities. This was highlighted by 25 military members being

killed during operations in Southwest Asia by unexploded ordnance and mines.

Several recommendations for pub consolidations have already been made:

- 3-02 (amphibious ops) and 3-02.2 (amphibious embarkation)
- 3-09 Series (joint fire support, lasers, beacons, and CAS)
- 3-10 (rear area ops) and 3-10.1 (base defense)
- 3-50 Series (evasion and recovery)
- 3-55 (RSTA) into 2-0 Series (intelligence) and 3-05 Series (special operations)

Note: The 3-02/3-02.2 and 3-50 Series consolidations were already approved by the April 95 JDWP.

As a result of the "Out-of-Cycle" JDWP in July, the policy for pub assessments will more than likely be changed in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-01. This, coupled with the pub reformatting plan leaves the schedule for the remainder of the publication assessments in a state of flux. Comments and concerns regarding joint publications are welcome and encouraged any time. So, if you have any inputs, please pass them to the joint doctrine POC at your combatant command, appropriate Service agency or send them to Col McLaughlin at JWFC-DOC.

FUTURE CONCEPTS BRANCH

The JWFC-DOC Future Concepts Branch is established and actively engaged. The first draft of a white paper best described as a future joint operational warfighting concept to complement "Joint Vision 2010" has been completed and forwarded to J-7, Joint Staff, for review. Upon approval it will be circulated to combatant commanders and Services for review and comment. Our belief is that it can serve as a tool to develop Service future warfighting concepts within the framework of a joint environment. Our ultimate goal is to expand the white paper into a fully staffed concept paper that provides a vector for Service "future concepts" and for future joint publications.

We are also creating a "futures database" in the Joint Electronic Library (JEL). Data collection, cataloging, scanning and editing is ongoing. Material collected to date includes Service white papers, concept papers, scholarly research pieces, articles, briefs, and testimony. These will be made available to on-line subscribers for rapid full text search and retrieval. We estimate it will be completed by March 1996. Organizations wishing to submit material for inclusion into the database should send it to the Futures Concept Branch at JWFC-DOC. Paper copies are accepted, but electronic copies are preferred. Points of

contact for the Future Concepts Branch are Lt Col Ed Felker, CDR Phil Logan, Mr. Phil Comstock, and Mr. Rick Rowlett

PERSONNEL UPDATE

JWFC-DOC and other joint brethren bid farewell to recently promoted Col Mike Lehnert who has been selected to command Marine Wing Support Group 27 at MCAS Cherry Point. His trademark dynamic management skills and stalwart determination were the impetus for many successful joint projects during his tenure. The Peace Operations Handbook and Future Concepts projects have been built upon a solid foundation that he provided. We welcome his replacement, LtCol Howard Schick, who has just completed a tour with the 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton as the commander of an assault amphibian battalion. He will take over Col Lehnert's joint pub responsibilities; CDR Phil Logan will move over to the Futures Branch to fill that void. Rick Rowlett, the former Chief of TRADOC's Joint Doctrine Directorate, has joined OC, Inc's team in the Futures Branch.



E-MAIL


JWFC-DOC personnel can now be reached on E-mail via Internet using the address (NAME)@jwfc.army.mil with the following user names:

Doctrine Division

CAPT Rogers	rogersj
Col McLaughlin	mclaughd
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LtCol Schick	schickh
Lt Col Felker	felkere
LTC Childress	childres
Lt Col Glover	glovere
CDR Hibbert	hibbertr
LTC Seitz	seitzd

Doctrine Support Group

Mr. Moen	moenf
Mr. Barrows	barrowst
Mr. Wasson	wassong
Mr. Gangloff	gangloff
Mr. Erickson	ericksod
Mr. Rowlett	rowletttr
Mr. Comstock	comstock
Mr. McGrath	mcrathc



By LTC John Dinnell, USA, JWFC-DOC

The Director J-7, Joint Staff, sponsored the 15th Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP), hosted by USSPACECOM, 4-5 April at the US Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs. The Services, combatant commands, and the Joint Staff directorates were represented by their joint doctrine points of contact. BG Conner (USSPACECOM Director of Plans (J-5)) provided welcoming remarks to the group.

COL Tackaberry (Chief, JDD, J-7, Joint Staff) presented a status brief on doctrine projects to include the revised hierarchy, the professional desk set library ("banker's box") and the status of consolidating, revising and reformatting of previously approved joint pubs.

LTC Fredericks (J-33, Joint Staff) presented a proposal to combine command and control warfare (C2W) and information warfare (IW) into Joint Pub 3-13, "Joint Doctrine for C2W Operations." The members agreed that the development of a C2W pub should continue without delay and agreement was reached to include a chapter in Joint Pub 3-13 establishing the linkage of C2W to the IW architecture. An IW information brief will be presented by J-33, Joint Staff, at the next JDWP.

VADM Frost (Deputy USSPACECOM) discussed his views on joint doctrine and current space issues. He emphasized the importance of joint doctrine and said it was receiving front office attention. The main points of his remarks included:

- How much should be covered by doctrine? Having too much can obscure or trivialize what is really important. Combatant commanders are, and should be, involved but only for high level doctrinal issues.

- Joint doctrine works at the seams between the Services--Service doctrine will still be important.
- Doctrine should be based on real lessons learned in the field. We need joint doctrine, and it is being generated, but there must be good communications between the people developing joint doctrine in the field (in actual operations and joint exercises) and the people writing the joint doctrine.
- Should space be considered an area of responsibility (AOR) like other geographic AORs? Although it lacks geographic features, it is a unique "place" and only one combatant commander really conducts operations there. It is a question that affects command relationships and will be addressed at some point in the future.
- There is a lack of understanding by operators in the field about the details of space support to operations. Terrestrial warfighters need more training on space forces--perhaps joint doctrine can help with this education in a manner similar to the concept behind Joint Pub 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations," which educates on coordination with nongovernmental organizations.
- What is the doctrine covering information warfare? This concept crosses every Service and every dimension of warfare. We are interested because it often uses space systems or space technology. We need doctrine to help organize for these operations but, like all other doctrine, this area must be based on lessons learned in the field.

Maj Gen Redden (Commander, JWFC) provided an update on the role of the Joint Warfighting Center. He emphasized that JWFC *assists* CJCS, combatant commanders, and Chiefs of the Services in their preparation for joint and multinational operations in the conceptualization, development, and assessment of current and future joint doctrine and in the accomplishment of joint and multinational training and exercises.

PROJECT PROPOSALS

The following proposals were briefed with agreement for subsequent action:

- USEUCOM presented four new joint doctrine proposals: combat stress, deployment support programs, chaplain logistics, and chaplain support in multinational and United Nations operations. The members voted unanimously against developing separate publications, however, these topics would be considered for inclusion in the development of Joint Pub 1-0, "Doctrine for

Personnel and Administrative Support to Joint Operations," Joint Pub 3-16, "Doctrine for Multinational Operations," and any other appropriate pubs.

- JWFC-DOC proposed consolidating Joint Pubs 3-02 (amphibious operations) and 3-02.1 (landing force operations). The HQ, USMC representative stressed the need for landing force operations doctrine. The decision was reached to transfer doctrine from Joint Pub 3-02.1 into Joint Pub 3-02, making Joint Pub 3-02.1 a JTTP, consider eliminating the technical information found in NWP 22-2 (supporting arms) and 22-3 (ship-to-shore movement), and eliminating the redundancies between the two joint pubs. In conjunction with this, Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) recommended canceling Joint Pub 3-18, "Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations," citing redundancy with approved and developing doctrine. It was decided Joint Pub 3-18 will be staffed as scheduled, during time which the community can comment on whether it should be retained or if enough redundancies exist to incorporate it into other joint pubs.
- Naval Special Warfare Command briefed justification to continue development of Joint Pub 3-06, "Doctrine for Joint Riverine Operations." The members unanimously accepted the recommendation to staff a program directive (PD) and proceed with the project.
- USACOM proposed to retitle and change the focus for Joint Pub 3-01.6, "Joint Air Defense Operations/ Joint Engagement Zone (JADO/JEZ)," to fully include fighter engagement/missile engagement zone (FEZ/MEZ) procedures. The JDWP unanimously agreed to change the title to "Joint Air Defense Operations" and fully incorporate MEZ, FEZ, and JEZ procedures into the pub.
- The Special Operations Division, J-3, Joint Staff, briefed a proposal to consolidate the Joint Pub 3-50 series (SAR/CSAR). This calls for developing a new Joint Pub 3-50 that describes overarching doctrine for personnel recovery. Current Joint Pubs 3-50 and 3-50.1 (National SAR manual, volumes 1 and 2) would be restructured as Joint Pub 3-50.1, volumes 1 and 2. Joint Pubs 3-50.2 (CSAR) and 3-50.21 (JTTP for CSAR) would be consolidated. Joint Pub 3-50.3, (evasion and recovery) would remain unchanged. The proposal was accepted unanimously.

INFORMATION BRIEFINGS

JWFC-DOC presented a briefing on the Joint Doctrine Assessment Process. Suggested improvements will be

considered in a forthcoming change to Joint Pub 1-01, "Joint Publication System."

JWFC-DOC briefed an assessment of the joint targeting coordination board (JTCCB) as a follow-up from the previous working party. It included an overview of the doctrine available in existing pubs, shortfalls addressed in JULLS and exercise comments, and the fact that two distinct positions exist within the joint community.

JWFC-DOC presented an overview of the "Joint Doctrine Futures Project" that included a plan of action and intended outcome.

The Joint Special Operations Forces Institute (JSOFI) provided a brief emphasizing their efforts in facilitating access to special operations commands within the theaters to improve operational input at the joint level to the joint doctrine process. A progress report was provided on change 1 to Joint Pub 3-05, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations."

USTRANSCOM provided an information brief on the "Defense Transportation System 2010."

DOD presented an in-depth look at the support combat camera can provide to the joint force commander. This concept brief found support for inclusion of combat camera support in joint doctrine, particularly Joint Pub 5-00.2, "JTF Planning Guidance and Procedures," which is currently undergoing a change.



Joint Doctrine Division (JDD), J-7, Joint Staff Personnel Changes

The personnel changes at JDD have resulted in a new boss and a smaller division. In April 95, COL Kief Tackaberry, USA, departed the Joint Staff and is now Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Army. COL Tackaberry served in J-7/JDD for almost three years and left an indelible mark on joint warfighting with his contributions to the joint doctrine community. His replacement is COL Jackie Colley, USA, who is a tanker by profession and most recently served as the Chief of Staff, First Cavalry Division, at Fort Hood, Texas.

April was also the departure month for newly promoted Col Steve Brown, strategic airlifter and would-be definer of war. Col Brown has returned to flying C-130s and is an operations group commander in Yakota, Japan.

OUT-OF-CYCLE JDWP 18-19 JULY 1995

By CDR Bob Hibbert, USN, JWFC-DOC

The Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) was host to an "Out-of-Cycle" Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP) 18-19 July at Fort Monroe. The purpose of this special session was to (1) table recommendations to improve the joint doctrine development process and (2) look at candidate joint pubs for consolidation. Consensus gained regarding joint doctrine process issues will form the basis of an upcoming change to Joint Pub 1-01, "Joint Publication System," which will be staffed with the joint doctrine developers this fall.

Maj Gen Redden (Commander, JWFC) provided welcoming remarks and stressed the need to continually improve Joint Pub 1-01 and solicited the support and participation of all JDWP representatives. In a later briefing, Maj Gen Redden provided an overview of JWFC's role and emphasized the word "assist" in the mission statement. He indicated the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) Report may expand the role of JWFC and discussed the need for increased support to the warfighting combatant commanders. Maj Gen Redden also suggested that the joint doctrine development process is not broken; it just needs to be modified, to include JWFC becoming more deeply involved during the first and second draft phases. He concluded noting that some joint exercises will be particularly useful for assessment of approved and emerging joint doctrine.

CAPT Rogers (Chief, JWFC-DOC) provided a brief history of the joint doctrine development process and declared that joint doctrine is entering a new phase. Sixty of the approximately one hundred joint pubs are now published, and most of the remaining ones should be approved in the next year. We need to refocus our efforts from initial pub development to looking at ways to continually enhance existing doctrine, improve the doctrine development and distribution processes, and look at candidate joint pubs for consolidation.

COL Colley (Chief, JDD, J-7, Joint Staff) provided comments from the Joint Staff perspective. He emphasized the need to make the joint doctrine development process more efficient and effective. Additionally, he spoke of the need to examine the quality of the product (joint pubs) being produced and the need to "get the word out" to units in the field. COL Colley also stressed the need to come to closure on several doctrine issues that have been festering for some time; he cited Joint Pub 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support," as an example.

Col Dailey (Deputy Chief, JDD) provided an overview of the current joint doctrine development process. He indicated the Chairman is closely involved, to include personal review and approval of capstone, keystone, and selected other pubs. Col Dailey emphasized the increased role of JWFC in the development process, particularly in the draft phase where JWFC will provide assistance and help facilitate publication development working groups. He also emphasized JDD's objective to get joint pubs in the users' hands within six weeks of approval. He provided an update on the status of current joint doctrinal issues--counterair operations (Joint Pub 3-01), interdiction (Joint Pub 3-03), fire support (Joint Pub 3-09), and information warfare (Joint Pub 3-13)--and indicated part of the problem is that these pubs (and others) weren't initially written using joint working groups and hence have some significant issues to resolve. This results in extended staffing times for preliminary and final coordination versions.

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES

JWFC-DOC personnel briefed initiatives to improve the various phases of the joint doctrine development process. After a day and a half of lively presentations, discussion, and debate, JDWP voting members reached consensus on several issues and put several other issues on the agenda for the next regular session in October 95. The following is a synopsis of the proposed change to Joint Pub 1-01, which will be provided to the joint doctrine developers for staffing in October.

- Improve the project proposal by providing a more detailed "background" and "scope."
- Enhance the program directive (PD) to include a more detailed "scope" section and the addition of a "chapter outline" section.
- Establish "PD development groups" to draft PDs for staffing.
- Establish mandatory "project development working groups" to assist in writing the first draft of all joint pubs. A second working group would review the consolidation of the first draft comments and resolve issues before staffing of a second draft. The working groups would additionally ensure the following:
 - The pub is developed in accordance with the PD.
 - The pub is developed with a joint perspective throughout.
 - And, the doctrinal guidance is consistent with other pubs.

- Additional working groups would be established, if necessary, to resolve issues that arise later in the development process. Because each pub may have a different audience, pub working groups will recommend to the Service and combatant command coordinating review authorities (CRAs) an appropriate final distribution list for when the pub is approved.

An overview of the formal and informal assessment process was presented. Formal assessments are currently conducted 18 months after pub approval. JWFC proposed that the need for a particular pub to be assessed should be decided by JDWP members at the semiannual meetings. To further improve the assessment process, pubs to be assessed should be made an exercise objective at combatant command joint exercises.

The current joint pub change/revision process was briefed. Members agreed that Joint Pub 1-01 should clearly articulate the differences between a substantive change to a pub, a pub revision, and rewrite as a result of a scope change. The staffing procedures would be different for each.

OC Inc, the contractor supporting both JDD and JWFC-DOC, provided an overview of the joint pub reformatting process. Improvements in the new format include the addition of an executive summary and incorporation of more graphics, vignettes, quotes, and pictures. Joint pubs approved under the old format should all be reformatted by February 96. Joint pubs still under development normally will be reformatted at the preliminary coordination (PC) phase.

The new joint pub distribution system was briefed. To help improve distribution, Service and combatant command CRAs will develop a recommended distribution list for each individual pub during preliminary coordination. A consolidated list is forwarded to JWFC, who provides it to the printer, who in turn prints, packages, addresses, and mails pubs directly to the users. Commands not receiving necessary pubs need to contact their appropriate Service or combatant command CRA. The bottom line is to expeditiously get the pubs into the hands of the people who need them.

PROPOSED JOINT PUB CONSOLIDATIONS

After discussion it was agreed that the below listed consolidations would be voted on at the October 95 JDWP:

- Joint Pubs 3-10 (rear area ops) and 3-10.1 (base defense).
- Joint Pubs 3-12 (nuclear ops) and 3-12.1 (theater nucs) Joint Pubs 3-12.2 (nuclear weapons effects) and 3-12.3 (notional effects); being considered for

conversion to CJCS Instructions.

- Joint Pubs 3-50.2 (CSAR doctrine) and 3-50.21 (JTTP for CSAR).
- Joint Pub 3-55 (RSTA) into Joint Pub 2-0 Series (intelligence) and Joint Pub 3-05 Series (special operations); tabled pending resolution of "targeting" issues.
- Joint Pubs 3-59 (meteorological & oceanographic support doctrine) and 3-59.1 (met & ocean support JTTP).
- Joint Pubs 4-02 (health service support doctrine), 4-02.1 (HSS JTTP), and 4-02.2 (patient evac JTTP).
- Joint Pub 5-03 Series (JOPES) will become CJCS Instructions. A new Joint Pub 5-03 containing JOPES doctrine will be developed.

INFORMATION BRIEFINGS

OC Inc provided an overview of planned Joint Electronic Library (JEL) improvements. Research is ongoing to create a more "user-friendly" environment for both the on-line and CD-ROM versions of JEL. JEL CD-ROMs will be produced and distributed on a semiannual basis in the future. The distribution will be improved in the same manner as that of hard copy joint pubs. The next 1995 edition of the JEL CD-ROM will include updated user software called "Acrobat," which promises to significantly ease its use.

The Army's proposal for a "Common-User Logistics" pub was presented. Examples of logistics items to be covered by this pub would be subsistence, water, conventional ammo, etc. The project will go through the full project proposal phase process and be voted on at the next JDWP.

JWFC presented the proposal for a "Joint Functional Responsibilities and Capabilities" pub. The proposed pub is envisioned to consolidate various Service pubs and detail the responsibilities and capabilities they bring to joint operations. It would supplement and expand on doctrinal guidance provided in existing joint pubs.

[Editor's Note: Further guidance has been provided and JWFC will initiate the project.]

NEXT SEMIANNUAL JDWP

The 16th semiannual JDWP will be held 24-25 October 1995 and hosted by JWFC in the new headquarters building at Fort Monroe.





By CDR Rich Jaskot, USN, EAD, J-7, Joint Staff, Evaluation Branch Chief

The Joint Staff Directorate for Operational Plans and Interoperability, Evaluation and Analysis Division (EAD, J-7), provides the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, with an independent assessment of joint preparedness by observing CINC-sponsored joint exercises and joint task force (JTF) operations. The focus of the independent assessments is to identify and document joint issues across the combatant commands, combat support agencies, and Services with an emphasis on lessons learned. To achieve that end, a team of subject matter experts from the Joint Staff, led by EAD, J-7, normally observe one joint exercise per combatant command each year and visit as many of the operational JTFs as can be scheduled and funded. The visits to JTFs form the basis of the Joint Staff JTF Review Program and are a part of the J-7 responsibility to assist combatant commanders in their recurring JTF oversight.

Specific joint issues--such as, command and control relationships, combat ID, JFACC, and JLOTS--which continue to surface--are forwarded to the appropriate Joint Staff Directorate for assistance in fixing the problem or are submitted for possible inclusion as part of CJCS's Commended Training Issues (CTI). The issues that recur most frequently are associated with the use of and familiarity with joint doctrine and publications, and the incorporation of previous lessons learned.

If you have joint interoperability questions, the Joint Warfighting Center is a great place for information, but another source is available on the Joint Staff. Give us a call in the Evaluation and Analysis Division at DSN 225-6292, and if we cannot help you we can head you in the right direction within J-7.

QUADRIPARTITE 95

By CAPT Ernie Rogers, USN, Chief, JWFC-DOC

The annual Quadripartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference (QCJWC), hosted by Canada, was held 11-15 June 1995 with delegates from Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and United States in attendance. QCJWC is designed as a vehicle for the member nations to exchange information on issues that are primarily related to joint and combined/multinational doctrine.

The Australian delegation's brief on development of campaign planning doctrine led to a discussion of the potential need for national level doctrine over and above joint doctrine. The UK delegation reported that they are developing a higher level military strategic doctrine. The Australian delegation recognized the need for national-level doctrine as a future step for them but they are presently focused at the operational level. After much discussion, consensus was reached that there is potential use for national-level doctrine.

The UK briefed the standup of their Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), which is in progress and will be completed next year. PJHQ will subsume many of the Ministry of Defense and single-service operational responsibilities. Tied in with PJHQ is the demise of the Joint Warfare Center in Poole. Doctrine will be the responsibility of the J-7 shop at PJHQ with some of the actual work being done at the Maritime Warfare Center at HMS DRYAD.

Canada presented an update on their joint doctrine and announced that their capstone publication, CFP(J)5, is now in distribution. The single-service nature of the Canadian Forces (CF) mandate that all environmental (Navy, Army, and Air Force) doctrine must be consistent with joint principles designed for CF. CF are fully unified at the strategic/national level and the void that existed at the operational level is now addressed in the new CFP and will be in subsequent documents.

The annual meeting was adjourned with the agreement that the next meeting will be hosted by the United States in 1996.



SERVICE INITIATIVE

INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE CONFERENCE

*By MAJ Tracy Herbert, USA, TRADOC, Army
Doctrine Directorate*

The Commanding General (CG), US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) hosted the first International Doctrine Conference (IDC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 24-28 July 1995. Participants included 39 foreign delegates representing 19 armies, as well as 10 distinguished US military observers from unified command staffs and the Joint Staff. The conference achieved an unusual level of frank and meaningful discussions of important multinational doctrinal issues and clarified areas for further work.

GEN Dennis Reimer, Chief of Staff of the Army, opened the conference with remarks which underscored the role and importance of doctrine as the foundation for multinational operations. GEN William Hartzog, CG, TRADOC, emphasized that the world is entering the 21st century as a family of nations that is more intertwined and interconnected than ever before. He emphasized that doctrinal flexibility is the base on which successful military operations will rest.

The presentations and discussions that occurred over the 5-day period were rich and varied, covering the full range of military operations, from warfighting to humanitarian assistance. The conference, which focused on the corps level to provide organizational context, moved to relate issues: force structuring, terminology, and operations other than war (OOTW). Many of the delegates expressed reservations about the term OOTW, feeling that it will cause the United States to view operations of this nature as a separate and lower priority issue than more conventional military operations. By conference end, however, the delegates were reassured of US preparedness to operate across the full range of operations.

Practically all of the armies represented had participated in, or were currently participating in, a

multinational operation. This common background and experience produced robust debate on the mechanics and doctrinal challenges associated with multinational operations. Technical discussions ranged from rules of engagement in peace support operations to multinational logistics; i.e., multinational logistics plus national requirements, special diets, repair parts interoperability, and so forth.

Discussions of the role of doctrine in harmonizing operations among allies was also a major subject of the conference. Other examples of the myriad areas covered are:

- National and cultural views on ideas versus dogma.
- Consensus or compatibility-based doctrinal formulation.
- Differences in terminology.
- The increased need of allies to coordinate efforts to capitalize on national strengths as a means of leveraging against ever-diminishing resources.

Delegates, provided an overview of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, "Force XXI Operations," expressed concern that the United States may be moving so far in front in terms of technology, leader development, and complexity that multinational partners will have increasing difficulty in harmonizing their operations with the US. While no conclusions were reached on doctrinal compatibility in multinational operations--nor was this an anticipated outcome--consensus emerged that harmonizing national doctrines rather than seeking consensus or even compatibility is the way to proceed. Sensitive to this compatibility/harmonization issue as we build Force XXI, we will embed characteristics of joint and multinational connectivity in TRADOC's work.

The IDC succeeded in accomplishing its stated goals of improving links between senior doctrinal experts and evaluating the utility and benefits of conducting future doctrinal conferences. The level of interest from the international military community indicates the IDC was a timely and relevant initiative. It greatly enhanced professional and personal ties among many who attended and was acknowledged as the model for future possibilities in this vital area.

(Continued on next page)

The issues that emerged and the conference results will continue to be pursued during already scheduled bilateral and multilateral staff talks and meetings.

GEN Helge Hansen, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe, superbly captured the essence of the work of the conference in his keynote address. He noted that achieving understanding across the range of the participants' military services is an imperative that must be achieved, regardless of the considerable difficulties. Future operations--multinational in scope--in which all have a part to play, will require lean and clean military command and control structures functioning with harmonized doctrine. Harmonization, however, should not be accomplished through the creation of more bureaucracies, such as standing committees or working groups. Rather, senior leaders should come together in fora such as the IDC, to focus on obtaining solutions to real-world problems.

There was general agreement that the trust and confidence which are essential for effective multinational operations, take time to develop and can't be taken for granted. In that regard, concrete steps like the IDC, which improve understanding and appreciation for cultural and other operational differences, are essential.

Countries represented at the conference:

Australia	Italy
Belgium	Japan
Brazil	Korea
Canada	The Netherlands
Chile	New Zealand
Denmark	Norway
France	Spain
Germany	Turkey
Greece	United Kingdom
Israel	United States



QUOTEABLE QUOTE

"If delivered quickly and accurately, information can create conditions for decisive victory...The trick in all of this is to make the friendly view match ground truth, then deny that clear picture to the enemy."

Gordon R. Sullivan, GEN, USA (Ret)

JOINT PUB UPDATE


JOINT PUBS APPROVED AND DISTRIBUTED IN THE NEW FORMAT:

- "Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer," 25 MAY 95
- Joint Pub 1-01.1, "Compendium of Joint Doctrine Publications," 25 APR 95
- Joint Pub 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States," 10 JAN 95
- Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)," 24 FEB 95
- Joint Pub 2-0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations," 5 MAY 95
- Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," 1 FEB 95
- Joint Pub 3-56.1, "Command and Control for Joint Air Operations," 14 NOV 94
- Joint Pub 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations," 27 JAN 95
- Joint Pub 5-0, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations," 13 APR 95
- Joint Pub 6-0, "Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations," 30 MAY 95

OTHER JOINT PUBS APPROVED IN NEW FORMAT SINCE JANUARY 95:

- Joint Pub 3-01.4, "JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense," 25 JUL 95
- Joint Pub 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War," 16 JUN 95 *
- Joint Pub 3-11, "Joint Doctrine for NBC Defense," 10 JUL 95 *
- Joint Pub 3-12.2, "Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data (S)," 28 FEB 95
- Joint Pub 3-12.3, "Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data (Notional)," 20 MAR 95
- Joint Pub 3-17, "JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations," 18 JUL 95 *
- Joint Pub 3-52, "Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone," 22 JUL 95 *
- Joint Pub 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs," 21 JUN 95 *
- Joint Pub 4-02, "Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations," 26 APR 95 *
- Joint Pub 4-03, "Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine," 25 JUL 95 *
- Joint Pub 4-04, "Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support," 24 FEB 95
- Joint Pub 4-05, "Mobilization," 22 JUN 95 *

* (At contractors for printing and distribution.)




JOINT PUB STATUS



SCHEDULED FOR APPROVAL OVER THE NEXT 12 MONTHS

PUB#	TITLE	PUB#	TITLE
1-01	Joint Publications System	3-56	Command & Control Doctrine for Joint Operations
1-07	Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations	4-01	Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System
3-05, Ch1	Doctrine for Joint Special Operations	4-01.1	JTTP for Airlift Support to Joint Operations
3-07.5	JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations	4-01.2	JTTP for Sealift Support to Joint Operations
3-08	Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations	4-01.7	JTTP for Use of Intermodal Containers in Joint Operations
3-09	Doctrine for Joint Fire Support	4-02.1	JTTP for Health Logistics Support in Joint Operations
3-09.3	JTTP for Close Air Support	4-02.2	JTTP for Patient Evacuation in Joint Operations
3-13	Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare	4-06	JTTP for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations
3-14	Joint Doctrine and JTTP for Space Operations	5-00.1	Doctrine for Joint Campaign Planning
3-18	Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations	5-03.11	JOPES Vol I (Planning & Execution) (Secret Supp)
3-18.1	Joint Doctrine for Airborne & Air Assault Operations	6-02	Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical C4 Systems
3-50.3	Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery		
3-51, Ch1	Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations		



FY 95 JOINT PUB ASSESSMENTS

PUB#	TITLE
1-05	Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations
3-02	Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
3-02.2	Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation
3-04.1	JTTP for Shipboard Helicopter Operations
3-07.2	JTTP for Antiterrorism
3-09.1	Joint Laser Designation Procedures
3-09.2	JTTP for Radar Beacon Operations
3-10	Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations
3-10.1	JTTP for Base Defense
3-12	Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations
3-15	Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, & Mine Warfare
3-50	National Search and Rescue Manual Vol I
3-50.1	National Search and Rescue Manual Vol II
3-53	Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations
3-55	Doctrine for RSTA Support for Joint Operations
4-01.5	JTTP for Water Terminal Operations

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
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JOINT DOCTRINE HIERARCHY

As of 1 September 1995

Joint Warfare
1

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0-2



LEGEND

- Approved pubs
- Pubs under development
- Pubs being revised
- Pubs to be developed

D O C T R I N E S U P P O R T I N G D O C T R I N E & J T T P

Joint C4 Systems Support
6-0

Joint Plans
5-0

Joint Logistics
4-0

Joint Operations
3-0

Joint Force Employment

Joint Force Protection

Joint Operations Other Than War

Joint Personnel & Administration

Joint Intelligence Support

Joint C4 Systems Support
TAC C4 Systems
6-02 *

Joint Planning
Campaign Planning 5-00.1
JTF Planning 5-00.2
JOPEs 5-03.1
Execution Planning 5-03.11
Plan Formats & Guidance 5-03.2
Plan Formats & Guide/s-Sup 5-03.21
Planning ADP Support 5-03.3

Joint Transportation & Logistic Support
Defense Trans System 4-01 *
Mobilization Planning 4-05
Airlift Support 4-01.1
Sealift Support Ops 4-01.2
Movement Control 4-01.3
Water Terminal Ops 4-01.5
JLOTS 4-01.6
Containers 4-01.7
Health Support 4-02
Health Logistics 4-02.1
Patient Evacuation 4-02.2
Petroleum 4-03
Engineer Support 4-04
Mortuary Affairs 4-06

Joint Combat Support
PSYOP 3-53
OPSEC 3-54
RSTA 3-55
UAV 3-55.1
Civil Affairs 3-57
Deception Opns 3-58
Meteorologic Oceanograph 3-59
Meteorologic JTOP 3-59.1
C2W 3-13 *
JTFP for Airlift Ops 3-17
SAR 3-50
SAR VOL II 3-50.1
CSAR 3-50.2
CSAR JTFP 3-50.21
E & R 3-50.3
EW 3-51 *
Airspace Control 3-52
Radar Beacon 3-09.2
Close Air Support 3-09.3
Nuclear Ops 3-12
Nuc Wpn Emp VOL I 3-12.1
Nuc Wpn Emp VOL II 3-12.2
Nuc Wpn Emp VOL III 3-12.3
Space Operations 3-14
Forcible Entry Ops 3-18
Airborne & Air Assault 3-18.1
C2 Doctrine 3-56 *
C2 for Joint Air Ops 3-56.1
Amphib Ops 3-02
Landing Force Ops 3-02.1
Amphibious Embarkation 3-02.2
Interdiction 3-03
JMO (Air) 3-04
Shipboard Helo Ops 3-04.1
Joint Special Operations 3-05
Special Ops Procedures 3-05.3
Special Ops Tgting & Msn Ping 3-05.5
Riverine Ops 3-06
Fire Support 3-09
JLASER 3-09.1
Countering Air & Missile Threats 3-01 *
Aerospace Def of N. America 3-01.1 *
J-SEAD 3-01.4
Theater Missile Defense 3-01.5
Joint Air Defense Ops 3-01.6
Rear Area 3-10
Base Defense 3-10.1
NBC Defense 3-11
Barriers & Mines 3-15
Foreign Internal Def 3-07.1
Antiterrorism 3-07.2
Peacekeeping Operations 3-07.3
Counter-Drug Opns 3-07.4
JTTP for NEO 3-07.5
Humanitarian Assistance 3-07.6
Domestic Support Ops 3-07.7

Joint Intelligence Support
Joint Intel Supt to Ops 2-01
Intel Supt to Targeting 2-01.1
CI Support 2-01.2
National Intel Supt to JT Ops 2-02
Mapping, Charting & Geodesy 2-03

Joint Reporting System 1-03
Religious Support 1-05
Public Affairs 1-07

Reference Publications
Joint Pub System 1-01
Compendium 1-01.1
JEL User's Guide 1-01.2
Dictionary 1-02

INFORMATION WARFARE

A VIEW OF THE FUTURE

By Lt Col Ed Felker, USAF, JWFC-DOC

Increasingly lethal weapon systems, combined with information technology, present formidable challenges for future warfighting. By enhancing awareness with better data processing and improved organizational concepts and structure, the Armed Forces of the US can achieve dominant battlespace knowledge. The technologies provide a fused, real-time representation of the battlespace--an ability to order, respond, and coordinate horizontally and vertically in prosecuting the battlespace mission. Battlespace awareness, combined with high-speed, advanced command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and extremely accurate, survivable, and lethal precision strike, implies that a synergistic whole is created that can be greater than the sum of its parts.

This idea has been described by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Owens, as the "System of Systems" to show how these technological advancements in information, precision force, and C4I may have altered the nature, context, and conduct of warfare. Improvements in sensors, operational concepts, and organizational structures make it possible to achieve real-time, all weather, continuous surveillance over large geographical areas. Our capacity to track, in near-real-time, the location and status of forces is greatly increasing. New technologies allow us to focus on knowledge-based warfighting --who knows what, when, where, and why. It forms the basis for information warfare (IW).

IW represents a new entry in the range of military operations spanning economic, political, social, and military forms of war. Economic war targets the production of goods and services. Political war targets leadership and institutions of a government. IW, on the other hand, targets information, communications, and the command and control (C2) systems that use the information. It means disrupting or destroying the information systems an adversary relies on to "know itself": who it is, where it is, what it can do when, why it is fighting, and which threats to counter first.

The emergence of "information-based" societies provide enormous potential to conduct military operations with and against the information that empowers and sustains them. When any society "delegates decision making to the microchip," they open opportunities within any center of gravity where the rapid manipulation of large quantities of information is critical. IW is more than electronic or C2 warfare. It portends a war-winning strategy in an entirely new battlespace. In future wars, a commander's first task may be to quickly gain and maintain information dominance and advantage, with the goal of getting inside the opponent's decision loop to mislead or deceive them. This idea is not new; however, improvements in the technology provide a potential capability never before enjoyed.

At the national level, IW and dominant battlespace knowledge can be viewed as a new form of warfare. In the strategic sense the key issue is how to attack the enemy's systems while protecting our own. As the international information infrastructure grows and becomes more sophisticated, it extends beyond the control of any single entity, nation, or military. The systems become so interreliant, they challenge the control of all users. With the multiplicity of access into information networks, many actors have the technical capability to disrupt the flow of information. At the operational level a key issue is the vulnerability of C4I--our own and the enemy's.

The major enablers for IW are systems integration and the architecture for flowing and processing information within the systems. IW presents a different landscape for the response the US might take against an adversary acting in a potentially hostile way against our information systems. One clear implication for the future is that any serious attack will include an attempt to degrade our information systems. As information systems become more capable and sophisticated, they also become more difficult to protect from attack or exploitation. An enemy maximizes their capabilities, and disrupts our operations significantly, by simply denying us information. At the same time, our use of IW is a combat multiplier. It can be the catalyst for success in the "pre-armed conflict" stage of warfare. Its application can be a dominate feature of future warfare.

IW implies some institutional redesign of the military. Moving to networked structures may

(Continued on next page)

require some decentralization of command and control, which may meet resistance in light of the view that new technology would provide greater central control of military operations. Additionally, new technology provides greater insight into the "big picture" that enhances "managing complexity." IW implies developing new doctrine about what kind of forces are needed, where and how to deploy them, and what and how to maximize precision strike against the adversary. How and where to position what kinds of sensors and related computer systems, networks, and databases, etc., may become as important as decisions for deployment of traditional forces. The view of the landscape will rely heavily on robust space-based systems.

In addition to employing information against C2, IW has relevance against a variety of other targets to include strategic attack, interdiction, and close air support. For commanders, this implies they recognize information can be controlled, exploited, enhanced, and protected. While preparing to capitalize on our information "attack" capabilities, we need to prepare for niche competitors who will attempt to use these same type of capabilities against us.

The US is an information-dependent nation. The political disruption caused by activities against our economic and political information systems would be catastrophic. For the future then, the key to leap-ahead dominance is our ability to develop high-tech distributed systems and the organizational hierarchy they evolve.

But it is not just technology. Decisiveness becomes a function of how best to apply information warfare, precision strike, and dominating maneuver. Long-range precision strike blinds and immobilizes the enemy, holds them at a distance, and destroys critical time-urgent targets. Information warfare then denies the enemy critical knowledge of both their own and our forces. It turns their "fog of war" into a "wall of ignorance." Dominating maneuver deploys the right forces, at the right time and place, to cause the enemy's psychological collapse and complete capitulation. The task for us today is to develop the details and concepts of how to conduct joint operations against all categories of future competitors.



QUOTEABLE QUOTE

"Global dominance will be achieved by those that most clearly understand the role of information and the power of knowledge that flows from it."

David B. Jeremiah, ADM, USN (Ret)

USING THE UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST (UJTL) AS A JOINT EXERCISE ASSESSMENT TOOL

By Mr. Mike Chesney, JWFC-Exercise Analysis Branch

*"Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."
SUN TZU, "The Art of War"*

BACKGROUND--WHO'S ON FIRST?

Who dreamt this thing up? No, who's on first. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) dreamt it up...at least its predecessor, TRADOC PAM 11-9, "Blueprint of the Battlefield." By the way, for those of you who go back far enough, the Abbott and Costello "Who's on First" routine was a great attempt at standardization. The premise was to standardize names of baseball players with their field positions on a fictitious team so that the fans had an easy means of assessing who was doing what. OK...what's on second. Enough of that.

The original Blueprint was designed for use in combat development studies. It applied to studies and analyses of battles and engagements, campaigns and major operations, and strategic plans and objectives. Because it also provided standardized definitions for battlefield functions, it was also used to assist in the development of doctrine and training. It represented those functions performed by the Army at all echelons and was intended to apply across the range of military operations at the three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. Its potential applications were to assist in doctrinal development, training analysis, test and evaluation, readiness assessment, and OPLAN/CONPLAN development.

The Blueprint was a good first step in providing a common structure of functions performed not only by the Army, but also joint and combined forces. It used the hierarchical structure similar to that found in the present UJTL and gave the joint community its first start at establishing a common language and standard definitions. However, it did not address conditions, measures, or standards. These factors --necessary tools for exercise analysis, assessment, and feedback to the joint training program--are currently being worked for inclusion in future versions of UJTL.

SON OF BLUEPRINT: UJTL

Somebody up there on the Joint Staff must have liked the Blueprint because, like the Phoenix bird of old, it resurrected itself from the ashes and gave life as UJTL. Approved in October 93, its purpose was to provide a common language for use by combatant commanders and Services in defining joint training requirements. It was to be an integral part of the Joint Exercise Management Package (JEMP) software and intended to assist in refinement of combatant commander's Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL). It did not attempt to address how to accomplish or who would accomplish the tasks (joint, supporting, or enabling) described in UJTL.

UJTL (VERSION 2.1)

The current version (2.1) of UJTL--at least as we go to press--as published on 15 May 1995. Its specific purpose is to: "Provide a standardized tool for describing requirements, planning, conducting, and assessing joint and multinational training." So now we have both the tool and guidance for assessing joint exercises. Lets use it.

This version of UJTL ups the ante. Not only is there a more comprehensive listing of joint tasks, but it also includes sections on conditions and standards which relate to the joint tasks. Measures (a parameter of a standard) are still under development and are to be included in Version 3.0. The hierarchical listing of tasks remains and the necessary common language and reference system has been refined.

TASKS, CONDITIONS, AND STANDARDS

Tasks, conditions, and standards from UJTL provide the "right stuff" for an analyst to use when conducting a ground truth assessment of an organization's level of training proficiency on mission essential tasks. Taken a step further, they become key tools of the trade used to measure demonstrated ability--during a joint exercise for example--to accomplish specified training objectives (the desired outcome of a training activity). Let's look at the tools of the trade with a focus on the operational level of war. At this level, which is often the focal point for a joint force commander (JFC), the major tasks are grouped as follows:

- Conduct Operational Movement & Maneuver.
- Employ Operational Firepower.
- Provide Operational Protection.
- Exercise Operational Command and Control.
- Develop Operational Intelligence.
- Provide Operational Support.

Each of these major tasks is further defined by a hierarchy of subordinate tasks, usually two levels down from the major tasks. A key to successful exercise assessment is linking the training objectives to the applicable task or tasks and using that methodology as the basis for exercise design. That's a starting point. The task is the discrete event or action that enables a JFC to accomplish a given mission or function. With a task identified, we then can consider linked conditions.

Conditions are variables of the environment that affect the performance of tasks. They are organized by: physical, military, and civil environment. A separate document, "Conditions for Joint Tasks," has been prepared that contains a complete listing of conditions applicable to all tasks in UJTL. It is currently under revision and, when completed, will mirror the revised UJTL. Then standards are established. Standards determine the minimum acceptable proficiency required in the performance of a task. A standard consists of two parameters: a measure (provides the basis for describing varying levels of task performance) and a criterion (defines acceptable levels of performance).

WHO DOES WHAT?

Don't start that again! It's a JFC's call to determine their JMET and exercise training objectives. That's not the exercise analysts' business. But what the analyst does need are those tasks, conditions, and standards that the commander determines to be pertinent to the training objectives. That puts us all on the same playing field.

JWFC is duty bound to use UJTL as an assessment tool. It not only gives us all a common denominator to conduct exercise assessment and analysis from; but also provides us with a means to review current joint doctrine, derive major issues that should be brought to the table, and, over time, allows us to identify emerging trends--good or bad--that evolve from joint exercises.



ATTILA THE HUN "SELECTED THOUGHTS"

"The consequence for not adequately training your Huns is their failure to accomplish that which is expected of them."

Wess Roberts, Ph.D.

JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER (JFACC) & STAFF TRAINING PROGRAM

By LtCol Mike Strain, USMC, JWFC-TNG

Within its charter, the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) is tasked to provide support in the development, planning, and execution of joint training programs, to include the design of joint training syllabi based on approved joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP). As part of this requirement, JWFC is developing a JFACC and Staff Training Program.

Its purpose is to provide JFACCs, potential JFACCs, members of a joint air operations center (JAOC), and members of a joint task force (JTF) staff the information and training they need to effectively conduct joint air operations. This program will provide the joint force commander (JFC) a resource to assist them in planning, conducting, and assessing joint training for JFACC and both staffs. This is a keystone program for future joint training programs development.

The training program is being developed under the following guidelines:

- It must be based on CJCS approved joint doctrine and JTTP.
- It must incorporate guidance found in applicable CJCS Instructions to include CJCSI 3500.01, "Joint Training Policy"; CJCSI 3500.02, "Joint Training Master Plan"; and CJCSI 3500.03, "Joint Training Manual."
- Program elements will include as a minimum linkage to the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), staff procedures for accomplishing the tasks, recommended prerequisites and bounds of the applicable training audience, and assessment.

Within the constraints of joint doctrine, JWFC is developing the training program to complement existing JFACC courses.

JWFC envisions a three-level training program: one level for JFACCs or potential JFACCs, one level

for personnel assigned to a JAOC, and a level designed to provide basic information for potential augmentees and other JTF staff members who interact with JFACC/JAOC during JTF operations.

JWFC published a plan of action and milestones (POA&M) on 4 February 1995 for the development of the training program, and envisioned the completion and approval of the program to occur by 17 May 1996. Currently, the JWFC development team is on track. Actions to date have included research of existing JFACC-related courses, a thorough task analysis of UJTL to determine applicable tasks for JFACC and staff, and drafting of the program outlines.

During August 95, detailed outlines for the training program were forwarded to the combatant commanders and the Services for review and comments. JWFC is actively seeking inputs into the training program during the development phase to ensure it meets the needs of the combatant commanders and the Services.

The final product will be a complete training program designed to provide combatant commanders and the Services with a common training base that can be used for initial or continuing training. The design of the program will facilitate the integration of theater concept of operations (CONOPS) to provide the training audience theater-specific standard operating procedures (SOPs). Once the program is published and distributed, a regularly scheduled review process will be implemented to ensure the information in the program remains accurate and up-to-date.

This program is breaking new ground in joint training development and implementation. It will provide a useful tool for a JFC to ensure forces are adequately and properly trained for the complex multipolar environment that currently exists. The development team at JWFC is working to ensure the best possible program is developed. If you have any questions, comments, or recommendations, feel free to give us a call at DSN 680-6410 or Commercial (804)726-6410.



MURPHY'S LAWS OF COMBAT OPERATIONS # 4

"If it's stupid and it works, it ain't stupid."

JOINT MODEL AFTER-ACTION REVIEW SYSTEM

A TRAINING ANALYSIS AND FEEDBACK PROCESS

By LTC Joe Barto, USA, JWFC-TNG, Mr. Skip Driggs & Mr. Steve Poniatowski, JWFC-EAB

JWFC's Joint Model After-Action Review System (JMAARS) supports the commander's after-action review (AAR) with the information to enhance future training decisions and combat readiness.

Commanders at all levels are inherently responsible to assess their organization's ability to accomplish warfighting tasks and develop training programs geared toward sustaining strengths and improving weaknesses. An AAR is the commander's tool to assess the training level of specific training objectives within the context of training events. JWFC has developed JMAARS to support commanders by providing a *system* to process, collate, and analyze information related to training objectives and produces a high-impact Facilitated After-Action Review (FAAR) and formal training objective assessment.

JMAARS is a doctrinally-based training-enhancement system. Using the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) as the "what" and doctrine as the "how to," JMAARS uses common tasks and prescribed methods as a common terminology in its assessment of training events. Its embedded processes (planning, preparation, execution, and postexercise) make up the analytical system designed to provide commanders direct feedback on the accomplishment of their joint mission essential tasks (JMETs). This system produces a review of the training events allowing the training audience, through a facilitated professional discussion, to discover for themselves what happened during training *and why*. JMAARS focuses that FAAR on the training objectives and their linkage to JMETs. The FAAR is the most visible product of JMAARS because, as it is conducted, key decisions may be made by the supported commander effecting training, doctrine, organization, leadership, material, and ultimately warfighting capabilities and plans. However, the FAAR is not the only JMAARS product. JMAARS also produces a detailed written assessment of all training objectives in a commander's exercise reference book (ERB) which may be used to assist the commander in the development of future joint training plans and his postexercise report. Only one ERB is published. It is delivered directly to the supported commander within 30 days of exercise termination.

JWFC supports JMAARS by providing experienced subject matter experts (SMEs) in UJTL. These SMEs function as JMAARS planners during exercise planning and UJTL analysts during exercise execution. JWFC JMAARS personnel are also augmented during each exercise by uniformed observers serving as SMEs in their military specialties. The commander's AAR Team is led by an exercise facilitator (selected by the supported commander) and supported by the JMAARS chief analyst who is expert in the AAR process and JMAARS support.

JMAARS METHODOLOGY

JWFC support to JMAARS is comprehensive. The planning and execution of an exercise calls for a close relationship between exercise planners and JWFC JMAARS personnel to ensure the supported commander's training objectives for the exercise are achieved. During each of the four stages of JMAARS support, systematic research and planning tailor the overall process to the uniqueness of the supported exercise. As figure 1 on page 22 indicates, the research and planning are done to bring analysts to a complete understanding of current doctrine, the supported commander's operating procedures, and the exercise training objectives. The "document crosswalks" result in an informed analysis invaluable to improving the supported command's war plans, SOPs, and warfighting capabilities.

With each exercise, JMAARS is tailored toward the supported commander's JMETs stated as training objectives and focuses directly on desired training outcome.

PLANNING

During the initial planning phases of each exercise, JWFC JMAARS personnel, under the direction of JWFC Operations Division, consult with the supported commander's staff to determine the scope of JWFC involvement. This involvement could range from large-scale computer-assisted exercises to training seminars for senior staffs. Once the scope of involvement is determined, personnel, equipment, and support requirements are determined and analysts' internal training development begins. The planning stage is completed when the JMAARS Concept of Operations is submitted to the exercise director.

PREPARATION

During preparation, detailed research of doctrinal publications is performed to establish a baseline for interoperable relationships for joint/multinational forces. The supported commander's operating plans and procedures are also reviewed, allowing JWFC JMAARS

(Continued on next page)




Figure 1. The initial, mid, and final planning conferences are shown to provide an approximate timing for completion of those products/services connected with them. When possible, a JWFC representative will attend the conferences with those products.

personnel to understand the methodology by which the supported commander envisions operational execution. From this, a draft collection management plan (CMP) is written to identify critical information points related to the training objectives. Further doctrinal reviews are performed and the CMP is broadened to provide the exercise observers with guidelines for informed observations which are the foundation of JMAARS execution. Additionally, the CMP will identify simulation data pertinent to each training area. The CMP is then reviewed and approved by the supported commander's staff to guarantee the JMAARS Team is focused on the commander's intended training objectives. Once approved, the CMP is the basis for conducting exercise observer training. This stage is completed when the CMP is published.

EXECUTION

This phase begins with observer training. This training allows JWFC JMAARS analysts to relay to observers information learned during their extensive pre-exercise analysis. Training also includes the use of a local area network built by JMAARS technicians to allow analysts to receive near-real-time observations during exercise execution and perform timely analysis. As

systemic issues surface, the chief analyst assists the FAAR facilitator to ensure potential topics to be presented during the FAAR are relevant to the commander's desires. The highlight of this phase is a FAAR with the training audience, its higher headquarters, and the supporting commanders. The objective of the FAAR is to allow the training audience to discover for themselves what happened during training and why. This process enhances learning and promotes effective problem-solving.

Critical to the success of a FAAR is the accuracy of data used to reconstruct the training events. Often, issues discussed during the FAAR will result in decisions on future training plans and direct follow-up action for the commander's evaluation (joint after-action report (JAAR), remedial action program (RAP), etc.). Data is collected, processed, and analyzed to ensure its relevance and accuracy.

Analysts' information sources are primarily twofold: observer reports and simulation data. Analysis is done in concert with senior exercise controllers and the exercise facilitator ensuring FAAR discussion issues are based on operations and not "game" anomalies. The results of the analysis are factual operational issues directly effecting the supported commander's operational capabilities.




Figure 2.

During the actual FAAR, each issue is presented as it occurred with supporting collated data. The training audience determines if the battle outcome was acceptable and if not, why not. The discussion that follows normally has direct impact on future training activities and supporting staff action. Figure 2 depicts the general conduct of the FAAR.

POSTEXERCISE

Upon completion of an exercise, JWFC JMAARS personnel complete a postexercise report for the supported commander's internal use. The ERB (figure 3) is a comprehensive document consisting of several sections which capture the entire training event in detail. The ERB is normally delivered to the commander within 30 days of training completion. The supported commander may use this document in the development of their JAAR, Joint Universal Lessons Learned (JULLS), or to research and investigate other pertinent issues. The ERB will also promulgate to the supported commander any FAAR-related lessons learned for review and possible inclusion in their JAAR.

MORE INFO ABOUT JWFC'S JMAARS SUPPORT OF THE AAR

The value of training cannot be known without feedback on its accomplishment. JMAARS provides that feedback--timely, thoroughly, and accurately.

The after-action review process is not new and is currently being used by several organizations supporting commander's training programs both at home and overseas. JWFC at Fort Monroe, Virginia, has the charter to assist and support commanders in the execution of their training programs. Providing a robust training feedback system is just one of those support services.




Figure 3.

GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) NAVIGATION AND MAP ACCURACY

CHECK YOUR DATUM!!!

By CPT Michelle Joerin Holtery, USA, Defense Mapping School, DMSWJ

Increased demand for positional accuracy for military applications launched the handheld GPS receiver to instantaneous success during Operation DESERT STORM. For the first time, soldiers in war could rapidly obtain an accurate geographic position at the touch of a button, regardless of weather and terrain. The small, lightweight GPS receiver (SLGR) used in DESERT STORM is a standard positioning service receiver capable of achieving coordinates accurate to within 40 meters. This immensely valuable technology was an instantaneous hit with ground forces operating in the relatively featureless Saudi desert. Many deployed soldiers rushed their personal orders to civilian mail order vendors, even as the conflict in the desert unfolded.

Despite the popularity of GPS, the increased use of GPS in conjunction with maps and charts can create a lack of confidence in the adequacy of both GPS and the map, and may result in significant positional inaccuracy. GPS users often have only a vague understanding of the positional accuracy of the GPS receiver and map accuracy. Failure to understand how these two key navigational tools compare can lead a soldier to distrust the map, their GPS, and lose confidence in their ability to navigate.

By Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) specifications, standard topographic line maps at 1:50,000 scale must be accurate to 50 meters. In comparison, the newest military version of GPS receiver, the precise, lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR) is a precise positioning service receiver capable of achieving a horizontal fix accurate to within 8 meters (figure 1). This difference in expected accuracy leads to a great deal of confusion. A soldier holding a map and a PLGR may find that their GPS coordinates do not match the map. This may be attributed to differences in accuracy, or may be evidence of a datum mismatch, an even more significant problem.

Ninety percent Circular Map Accuracy Standards (90% CMAS) is the way DMA defines map accuracy. This number means that nine times out of ten, the coordinates of a well-defined point, such as a road intersection, will fall within 1 millimeter of where it should be depicted on the map. At 1:50,000 scale, that 1 millimeter radius of positional error is equal to 50 meters on the ground. At

System Horizontal Accuracy	
PLGR	14.6 meters (CEP)
SLGR	72.9 meters (CEP)
1:50,000 map	50 meters (90% CMAS)
1:100,000 map	100 meters (90% CMAS)
1:250,000 map	250 meters (90% CMAS)

Figure 1. Relative Horizontal Accuracies

1:250,000 scale, it equates to 250 meters on the ground. By comparison, the accuracy figures for GPS receivers is given in circular error probable (CEP), which means that five times out of ten, the coordinates will fall inside the radius given in the table. If desired, you can convert CEP to 90% CMAS by multiplying the numbers given in the CEP column by 1.8227.

THE DATUM ISSUE

Maps are created using a geodetic reference system known as a datum. Horizontal datum information can be found on most maps in very small print in the center of the lower margin. Like small print on legal contracts, this datum information can cause problems if the map user doesn't read it carefully! Over the past three hundred years or so, map makers have created a thousand different reference systems, and each is slightly different from the others. Coordinates based on one datum are not the same as coordinates based on another datum. Maps used to support military missions are often "local datum" maps; local datum map coordinates may differ dramatically from coordinates derived from maps based on global datum. Datum error, positional displacement created by plotting coordinates defined in one datum (such as from a GPS receiver) onto a map produced using a second datum, may be responsible for inadvertent positional errors that may reach 800 meters, in extreme cases!

In a recent briefing by DMA to the Chief of Staff of the Army, the importance of map datum was a major item of concern and discussion. The potential for datum error to play a role in friendly fire accidents and mission failure due to positional inaccuracy has increased with the advent of GPS and "fire-on-coordinate" weapons systems. In the past, systems developers were not greatly concerned with datum error, because older systems did not require highly accurate geographic positions. Newer systems with improved accuracy, and the availability of a better datum raise new concerns. Over the years, DMA has developed more accurate world geodetic systems to meet more stringent DOD requirements. The most accurate model is the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS 84) which is accurate to better than one meter.

DOD adopted WGS 84 as the standard datum for all US forces. DMA, however, estimates that it will take many years to convert existing map stocks and source material to the new global datum. As a result, DMA still stocks and produces maps on datums other than WGS 84. Foreign map services, including those of our allies, still produce maps on datums other than WGS 84. The US military frequently uses foreign-made maps when deploying to support a crisis. Initial forces deploying to Somalia used maps on the Afgooye datum; in Haiti soldiers and sailors switched to a local version of North American Datum 1927. Most maps immediately available for ground soldiers deployed to Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina were produced on the European Datum.

INCOMPATIBILITY

Coordinates derived from different datums are completely incompatible. Each datum is based on a specific mathematical model, and the center of the coordinate system shifts from one datum to the next. The assumptions of the size and shape of the Earth also differ, which means coordinates for the same point can vary significantly, as can the distances from point to point. PLGR automatically defaults to WGS 84, although a trained user can select 1 of 49 available datums or select one of two user-defined datums. Like PLGR, many current and developing weapons systems have been designed to default to WGS 84 coordinates. Older systems may have different defaults, or may not allow transformation to or from WGS 84! When confronted by datum mismatch, the GPS user must reset their receiver to match the datum used by the map.

Most installation maps in use today at US training facilities are not WGS 84, but a local datum known as the North American Datum 1927 (NAD 27). Over the next five years, DMA plans to create new training maps for major CONUS installations that will be WGS 84. This transition will likely be difficult, as many operations orders, range control documents, and map overlays have been created from NAD 27 coordinates. Two options exist to assist map users in transforming coordinates from one datum to another. Software available from DMA can transform coordinates to WGS 84 from any of 207 local datums, or from WGS 84 to the local datum. MADTRAN software, on a 3.5-inch diskette, and the MUSE CD-ROM package can be ordered from DMA through standard unit map channels.

MISSION CHECKLIST

Mission planners should include datum information prominently in the operations order, and executors must make sure that datum information is passed along with coordinates. Even the most expensive GPS receiver is highly susceptible to inadvertent datum error. Users must

be aware of the potential for positional error, so check your datum! Common concerns include:

- Is datum information in the operations order?
- Are all users aware of mission datum selected and implications?
- Is appropriate datum selection made on all GPS receivers?
- Is datum transformation software loaded and rehearsed?
- Are all sources of coordinates double-checked for source accuracy?
- Are senior and subordinate elements using same datum?

FREE EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

DMA addresses these and other concerns in their resident and mobile training courses. Instructors from the Defense Mapping School will travel to your location at no expense to you to cover the basics of mapping, charting, and geodesy as they apply to the warfighter. The target audience consists of commanders; staffs; plans and operations, intelligence, and support personnel; air crews; and targeting personnel at all levels. Topics presented include MC&G Fundamentals, GPS, DMA Products and Services, and Digital Applications. These topics can be tailored to meet the requester's specific needs, and can be presented in half-day to two full day format. Inclusive resident training is also offered once per quarter at DMS. All requests should be submitted through the appropriate command or Service headquarters. For further information, contact the Defense Mapping School, Department of Geophysics, (703) 805-3206 or DSN 655-3206.

[Editor's note: The "common datum" issue has been documented recently in a number of joint exercises. The October 94 JDWP voted to develop Joint Pub 2-03, "JTTP for Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC & G) Support to Joint Operations." Its scope includes providing guidance concerning "common datum" and "MC&G standards." The first draft was sent out for review and comment in late August 95.]



QUOTEABLE QUOTE

"Doctrine must be powerful: it must cause the [military] to fight better; generate powerful action is the deepest, the teleological, purpose of doctrine."

Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., CAPT USN (Ret)

OPERATIONAL JOINT TARGETING PROCEDURES

By Maj Phil Ruhlman, USAF, ALSA Center

Joint task forces (JTFs) require operational joint targeting procedures to effectively execute their assigned mission. These procedures ensure:

- Compliance with joint force commander (JFC) guidance.
- Common targeting perspectives.
- Synchronization and deconfliction.
- Coordination and integration.
- Fratricide avoidance.
- Minimization of duplication of effort.
- Expeditious combat assessment.

Current joint doctrine does not adequately address these procedures. Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," outlines fundamental cornerstones to operational joint targeting, but lacks the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) required to conduct it. Joint Pub 3-56.1, "Command and Control for Joint Air Operations," also addresses targeting, albeit only from the perspective of the joint force air component commander (JFACC). Other joint pubs discuss targeting limited to specific mission areas. Examples are Joint Pub 3-55, "Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Support for Joint Operations (RSTA)," and Joint Pub 3-05.5, "Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures."

Joint doctrine currently under development attempts to address these issues. Joint Pub 2-01.1, "JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting (3rd draft)," discusses how intelligence functions support targeting. Joint Pub 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support (2nd draft)," discusses critical issues such as the joint targeting process and the role of a joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) with regard to joint fire support. However, neither of these publications specifically deals with the subject of overall operational joint targeting.

In December 94, the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center was tasked by their Joint Actions Steering Committee (JASC) to begin development of a multi-Service TTP on "targeting." Specifically, this TTP

addresses the joint targeting process and specific methods to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict JTF attacks against time-sensitive targets. ALSA recently completed its second joint working group on the project, resulting in a second draft, which will be sent out for worldwide staffing and comment in September 95. Over 45 joint, combatant command, Service, and other major command representatives participated in this project.

ALSA's TTP will only be an interim fix. What is still lacking is a joint pub on operational joint targeting. Members at the recent joint working group for Joint Pub 3-09 unanimously agreed on the need for an overarching "targeting" pub. However, this overarching pub has yet to be initiated. Issues such as the role of the JTCB, use of a joint force fires coordinator (JFFC), or placement of a fire support coordination line (FSCL) are still quite contentious. A joint pub could iron out these issues and enhance the warfighter's ability to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict joint targeting operations.



NEXT ISSUE FOCUS



OPERATION ICEBERG

COMMAND & CONTROL

"JOINT C4I SYSTEMS" ACADEMIC GROUP

The "Joint C4I Systems" Academic Group at the Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California is looking for speakers for its weekly seminars. The seminars are held each Thursday at 3 PM and are attended by 50 to 70 students from all Services. If you can help, please contact Dr. Orin E. Marvel at (408) 656-3446 or: opainc@nps.navy.mil.

COMMENTARIES

JUST WHAT IS JOINT DOCTRINE ANYWAY?

By R. B. Anderson, LTC, USA (Ret)

America's Armed Forces consists of organizations of people and equipment. Many feel that the "interoperability" of these organizations is the weak link in the US military chain and Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act to "help" the Department of Defense overcome inter-Service problems. One of the Pentagon's responses to Goldwater-Nichols is the development of joint doctrine manuals. These publications are developed through Service consensus and some say, as a result, the documents are too "watered down" to have much utility. An Army officer began his review of a new manual by saying, "It looks like joint doctrine--it doesn't say anything."

Just what is joint doctrine anyway? If you've read some of the draft manuals that have been widely circulated, you might wonder what isn't joint doctrine? The "flag ship" publication, Joint Pub 1, "Joint warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States," contains civics, philosophy, history, and political policy. The essential "keystone" doctrine, Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," is also a "statement of facts" and has been criticized for lacking interoperability guidance. Can textbooks serve as doctrine? Some officers believe they can and think that anything more definitive might restrict joint commanders or the Services. Others believe, "If it ain't applicable, it ain't doctrine." They want doctrine to help them conduct inter-Service operations.

Like many of the joint manuals, the definition of joint doctrine was developed through consensus and is vague enough to permit all points of view. According to Joint Pub 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," "joint doctrine" is "fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in the coordinated action toward a common objective." The problem word is "principles." Principles may mean philosophic considerations to one serviceman and may mean "how to" guidelines to another. In his article, "The Humpty Dumpty approach to Doctrine Development," Professor John Gates warns about confusing definitions and refers to Lewis Carroll's "Through the Looking Glass." Humpty Dumpty told Alice that a word "means just what I choose it to mean--neither more or less."

If US military officers insist on taking a similar approach, then they should also prepare themselves for the great fall that is likely to follow.

"...if doctrine is to guide officers in the accomplishment of their mission, doctrinal terms and concepts should not only be clear, but also be tasked orientated."

The foremost unresolved joint doctrinal issue is: *What do we want joint doctrine to do?* If it is to get Congress off our backs, we succeeded. If it is to provide operation prescriptions for combat, we failed.

Questions for thought:

- 1 Do we really need joint doctrine?
- 2 What's its function?
- 3 Should doctrine be textbooks or guidebooks (or something else)?
- 4 How could the meaning of joint doctrine be clearer?
- 5 Just what is joint doctrine anyway?

ANDERSON ANSWERS

Question 1. *Do we really need joint doctrine?*

We need joint doctrine to "guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in the coordinated action toward a common objective" because otherwise the Services develop singular procedures and cannot operate in concert. Doctrine gives military forces the power of unity. It enables air, land, and sea forces to "gang-tackle" operational objectives; tactical plays are run from doctrinal formations. The synergistic power of a joint doctrine breakthrough called the Blitzkrieg was easily worth 50 divisions in the years 1939-42. In eight weeks of 1940, it enabled the Germans to defeat the superior (numerical and technological) combined might of the world's foremost forces, the British and French Empires, and the separate forces of Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

Question 2. *What is joint doctrine's function?*

In any field of endeavor, doctrine is the fundamental principles that guide the actions of an organization. Historians credit Calvin's doctrine of predestination for creating a lifestyle of hard work. For many years, the Monroe Doctrine guided American actions in the Western

(Continued on next page)

Hemisphere. General George Patton preached and practiced the doctrine of "hold 'em by the nose, then kick 'em in the tail." The Soviet doctrine of massed artillery gives them tremendous physical and psychological destructive power. The US doctrine of "pin point" firepower gives Army and Marine units more responsive support.

Application of the doctrinal principles above has practical consequences. Marshall Ferdinand Foch believed doctrine is the "...practical application...of a certain number of principles...which...must logically vary according to circumstances while always tending towards the...objective goal." Marshall Foch offered this example of doctrinal application:

"A wild fowl flies up in the front of a sportsman; if it goes from right to left, he fires in front and to the left; if from left to right, he fires in front and to the right; if it comes toward him, he fires high; if away from him, he fires low. In each of the cases, he applies in a variable way the fixed principle: to get three points [his eye, the sight, and the quarry] upon one straight line...at the moment the shot takes place."

Marshall Foch's concept of doctrine provides an answer to those who say that practical doctrine might be quickly outdated by technological advances. In Foch's example, the doctrine remains constant no matter whether the hunter used a bow, a shotgun, or a rocket. Likewise, the defensive doctrine of "engage at maximum effective range" has not influenced the technology of the defenders.

Question 3. *Should doctrine be textbooks or guidebooks?*

What separates doctrine from textbook facts is that doctrinal principles have guiding, practical applications. Doctrine is written (or I believe should be written) to fulfill a need. The purpose of doctrine is to help somebody fight or support the fight. That somebody is the doctrine consumer--the warfighter. A doctrinal publication should be considered a product; a product produced and marketed to satisfy a consumer need.

Question 4. *How could the meaning of joint doctrine be clearer?*

It can be made clearer by stressing practical application. If doctrine doesn't have utility, what good is it to warfighters?

It can also be made clearer by removing an unresolved issue that has muddied the joint doctrinal waters. Joint Pub 1-01, "Joint Publication System," states that there are two levels of joint doctrine: joint doctrine ("fundamental principles that guide") and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures ("the actions and methods which implement

joint doctrine"). Unfortunately, Joint Pub 1-01 does not provide a demarcation between joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) nor does it differentiate between tactics, techniques, and procedures. Since joint doctrine and JTTP can coexist in the same doctrinal manual, the need for clarification may be academic. Nonetheless the Marine Corps has wrestled with these definitions and concluded "doctrine helps us see the structure of the battlefield clearly so we can determine what needs to be done. The supporting tactics, techniques and procedures give us way to accomplish what needs to be done." A joint doctrine writer, that I know, has a simpler means of differentiation, "joint doctrine is 'what' and JTTP is 'how'."

Joint Pub 3-05, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations," makes these distinctions between tactics, techniques, and procedures: "tactics refer to the employment of forces in battle...techniques...refer to the basic methods of using people and equipment to carry out a tactical task...procedures...are used to standardize...critical or recurring activities."




Figure 1.

Figure 1 provides a view that I saw presented by the Marine Corps. This clearly depicts the relationship of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures and the level of detail to be provided by each .

Question 5. *Just what is joint doctrine anyway?*

I see it as:

*"Fundamental principles that, **when practically applied**, guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in the coordinated action toward a common objective."*



JOINT PUB 3-0

By Kathleen Brady, CDR, USN (Ret)

I was offered the opportunity to read the new Joint Pub 3-0 by a former colleague at Special Operations Command. I am a recent retiree from the Navy and did doctrine "stuff" at USSOCOM for almost four years. I could not resist the opportunity to take a look at the new and improved Joint Pub 3-0. (Against my better judgement!)

I have three comments. Joint Pub 3-0 reads well, has a slick appeal, and I believe, reflects the way the forces are doing business--it should be a best seller. I'm glad we now have "multinational" formally defined--rather than just a buzzword. And to my surprise, "CA" now means "combat assessment" in addition to "civil affairs." Further to my surprise is that USSOCOM allowed that to happen.

Just wanted to say "well done!"



JOINT PUB USER FEEDBACK

Each joint pub contains a request for user comments. Everyone has the opportunity to make recommendations to improve joint pubs. Comments received by the community will be included in the final pub assessment report prepared by JWFC. All are strongly encouraged to use this means to help make joint doctrine the best warfighting guidance available.

JOINT ELECTRONIC LIBRARY (JEL)

By Chuck McGrath, JEL SYSOP, Doctrine Support Group

Much has happened in the realm of the JEL and more changes are on the horizon.

The JEL is now connected to Internet and can be accessed by opening a telnet connection to IP address 150.184.22.41. In addition, you "web browsers" will be happy to note that efforts are being taken to provide worldwide web access later this year. Efforts are underway to upgrade the network communication lines coming into Fort Monroe and to allow use of a plain text name versus IP address for the JEL.

On-line JEL databases are being expanded and new ones added. The newest databases are "Futures" and "The Joint Training Course Catalog."

Coming soon is a classified JEL--accessible via STU-III. Classified databases are being developed and a request for certification has been initiated. More information will be provided in the next issue, via bulletins on the JEL, and other means. Once operational, the classified JEL will contain all joint publications, the JULLS database, other classified references for research, and all databases from the unclassified system.

A major change is being made to the CD-ROM. Current plans call for the next disc to contain windows-based software and all the approved unclassified joint publications. The look and feel of the pubs on the screen will be the same as those distributed in the new improved book-style format. Everything including graphics and photos will appear in color on the screen in the same place as the printed version. Documents can be searched, read, printed, and data may be selected and copied to other windows applications using standard "copy and paste." Completion of the new disc is scheduled for late November 95.



TERMINOLOGY

By Tom Barrows, JWFC, Doctrine Support Group

"There is far too much paper in circulation in the [British] Army, and no one can read even half of it intelligently."

Montgomery of Alamein, *"Memoirs,"* 1985

Reformatting of joint publications is reducing pages and pages of old style publications to a glossy, illustrated, succinct style, more easily understood by the intended readership. This new style demands a continuing effort to reduce the use of nonstandard terminology. Writers of new and revised joint doctrinal publications must make even more effort to employ only approved terminology in their works. Any deviation from, or modification to, approved terminology should be thoroughly justified with supporting rationale. It is only this type of effort that will allow us to finally come to grips with the remaining terminology issues.

Reformatting and attendant staffing of the CAPSTONE and KEYSTONE joint publications have produced one new approved and seven modified terms for Joint Pub 1-02 (DOD dictionary). The new term is "tactical command, control, communications, and computer system(s)" from Joint Pub 6-0 (C4 systems support). The modified terms are "transient forces" from Joint Pub 0-2 (UNAAF); "fire support coordination line" from Joint Pub 3-0 (joint operations); "host-nation support" from Joint Pub 4-0 (joint logistics); "joint operation planning," "joint operation planning process," and "supported commander" from Joint Pub 5-0 (joint planning); and "command, control, communications, and computer systems" from Joint Pub 6-0. The new and modified definitions for these and all other DOD-approved terms may be found in the database "TERMSAPP" in the on-line Joint Electronic Library.

A number of interesting and colorful terms remain alive and well in the approved single or developing publication categories. Among these are "fetch," "spurious solutions," "bird affirm," "joker," "privity," "Seashed," "hopset," "taboo frequencies," and my long-time favorite "pointee-talkee." On the good news front, "pointee-talkee" was very recently approved for DOD-wide use and inclusion in Joint

Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-50.3 (evasion and recovery). With the reformatted promulgation of Joint Pub 3-50.3, "pointee-talkee" will take its proud and rightful place with other approved terms in the DOD Dictionary.

Let's hope other single publication and developing terms move quickly through the process and become approved terms for everyday use. This is the quickest and most productive way for us to clean up the terminology battlespace. Charge!!! ??



QUOTEABLE QUOTE

"Information Warfare is about defiance and disenfranchisement in both modern and Third World societies. From the inner cities of Cyberspace come fringe-element hackers with nothing to lose. Some will band together to form Cyberspace gangs. Cyberspace's organized crime. They recognize the economic benefit of waging Information Warfare."

Win Schwartau

WANTED



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