A Common PERSPECTIVE

US Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center
Doctrine Division's Newsletter

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Refining Joint Doctrine



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Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System

FROM THE EDITORS

With this issue (Volume 10, Number 2), we complete ten years of publishing *A Common Perspective (ACP)* in paper form. Thanks to all who have contributed over the years. *ACP* also is available in electronic form online at *http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine*, where you can find the last fourteen (14) issues. Further, you may now apply for an electronic subscription by following the procedures outlined on page 14.

As transformation impacts both the military and the joint doctrine community, we felt it was appropriate to publish an issue that addresses current trends in consolidation, revision, and updating of joint doctrine. Our cover, for example, depicts the old hierarchy being "moulded" by the transformation of our military – into a more manageable tool for our warfighters. The impact of transformation on joint doctrine, among other things, includes the consolidation of joint publications (JPs) (an effort to reduce redundancy), the near-paperless transition of JPs (we now have 13 JPs that have not been produced in paper), and the transition to the Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System (JDEIS). See the update on JDEIS on page 26.

We also want to provide a newsletter that will spur debates and lead to changes in joint doctrine. Some of the articles reflect the opinions of the authors or their Services and are not reflected in joint doctrine, but cover issues that you'll find useful (and interesting). We have two diverse feature articles this month: Rick Rowlett's "DOTMLPF - Focusing Future Change," and "Homeland Security in an Era of Risk " by Rich Rinaldo. Rick's article explores what the future might bring, while Rich illustrates what some inside the Army are considering regarding homeland security and the likely impact on joint doctrine in the near future.

It is envisioned that joint doctrine will continue to become more responsive to the needs of the warfighter. Consolidating our current joint publications and the introduction and evolution of JDEIS will lead us in that direction. The goal is to create truly interactive doctrine that will evolve as ideas are tested and proven.

Many thanks to those who have contributed to this issue. Your contributions serve to better inform the joint doctrine community and further the understanding of current issues. We encourage you to contact us with your suggestions and articles so that this newsletter will continue to be used and improved.

MAJ Michelle Burkhart, USA
Executive Editor

Josiah McSpedden & Bob Hubner
Managing Editors

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MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDER, USJFCOM JWFC

By MajGen Gordon C. Nash, USMC

Since the last edition of *A Common Perspective*, USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center, home of the joint force trainer, has spent many months evaluating core responsibilities in the context of **our newly defined focus on the development and transformation of joint capable forces**. In an effort to center the command on joint force training and training support, the JWFC has undergone a transition and realignment. This realignment will maximize our resources in support of the "training transformation" mission. It's a change from a functional organization to a mission-based organization. It improves our command focus and creates an operational and strategic focus to ensure organizational relevance with the structure and architecture to accommodate new and evolving missions. Further, this realignment ensures that joint training is at the very heart of what we do. Since joint doctrine is the basis for joint training and the backbone of all joint operations, the Joint Doctrine and Joint Center for Lessons Learned Division has been realigned with our new Capabilities Group. See the organization chart below.

Joint doctrine development is a critical aspect of joint force transformation and joint capable forces. The experience of joint doctrine development as a part of what is now the joint force trainer community has been a challenging one, especially in terms of keeping the joint doctrine responsibility properly resourced. With the transformation of USJFCOM to include a tighter integration of fielded force experience (lessons learned), the futures piece through experimentation, and the addition of multinational and interagency capabilities; we are truly in transformation.



Joint doctrine is much bigger than just how it relates to training. The personnel assigned to Doctrine Division are fully integrated with the concepts, experimentation, and training personnel to ensure that joint doctrine is on the cutting edge. Concepts conceived and experimented with by the J9 are vetted with current doctrine at the core. During exercises, experiments, and staff actions; our doctrinaires analyze the new concept and determine the feasibility of adding valid concepts into joint doctrine. One can imagine the cycle as a wheel or a circle—new concepts are devised using approved joint doctrine as a starting point, they evolve into new ideas, are tested during experiments and exercises, and ultimately mature as new joint doctrine.

Recent articles and working groups by participants in the global war on terrorism have underscored the validity of joint doctrine and the importance of reading and applying it. Implementing new concepts into joint doctrine in a timely manner and getting revised joint doctrine to the warfighters is a constant challenge that our new Capabilities Group and the joint doctrine development community as a whole are working to enhance.

USJFCOM JWFC DOCTRINE AND JOINT CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED DIVISION UPDATES

By COL George Bilafer, USA, USJFCOM JWFC, Chief, Doctrine and JCLL Division

We appreciate all that the warfighters are doing for our country and the global war on terrorism. They have stated repeatedly that doctrine is the basis for their efforts. As doctrinaires, we must continue to be mindful of their crucial contributions and the impact of our efforts on theirs.

ASSESSMENT BRANCH

Over the last six months, the assessment branch has undergone a couple of significant changes. One of the changes involves the continuous rotation of personnel, including the loss of two key long-term personnel who will be sorely missed. However, the assessment branch also welcomed LCDR Debbie Courtney as the new branch chief.

The other major change affecting the assessment branch is the Joint Publication Consolidation Plan. Based on the proposed consolidation plan, the JWFC will soon begin implementing a new assessment schedule. The schedule will consider the impact of both publications normally scheduled for assessment and specific publications scheduled for consolidation. The assessment branch will endeavor to continue averaging approximately two assessment requests for feedback per month, although some assessments will cover multiple publications due to their impending consolidation. Once the joint staff approves the schedule, it will be posted on the Joint Electronic Library.

I want to thank you for your assistance in providing accurate and important feedback for the doctrine assessment process. I also ask that you continue to provide that feedback, as we work to provide the warfighter the most accurate and current doctrine available. Questions should be sent to LCDR Debbie Courtney, *courtney@jwfc.jfcom.mil*, DSN 668-6109, or Mr. Bob Brodel, GS-13, *brodel@jwfc.jfcom.mil*, DSN 668-6186.

DEVELOPMENT BRANCH

The JWFC Development Branch has undergone major changes since the last edition of *A Common Perspective*. With a new branch chief, new action officers, and most importantly, the re-establishment of action officer publication assignments, the branch is working to provide joint doctrine support to warfighters as our nation continues the global war on terrorism and transforms our military into a more lethal and effective force. The Development Branch is responsible for assisting in the development and revision of all 114 joint publications from initiation, to program directive (PD) approval, to draft(s) development, and finally to approval. By combining the subject matter expertise of our military staff with the experience of our government service personnel and contractors in the Doctrine Support Group, we can provide assistance and direction to lead agents and joint doctrine developers during the entire development process.

We also are "leaning forward" in our efforts to ensure that doctrine remains relevant by working closely with the concept development and experimentation efforts. While it is imperative that joint doctrine reflects validated and proven principles for the employment of joint forces, joint doctrine cannot be viewed as an impediment to change. By embracing new ideas, while ensuring that they undergo rigorous analysis and validation (through experimentation and exercise), the Development Branch can ensure that the warfighter has the best joint doctrinal tools available to accomplish their missions. This requires a "holistic" approach to viewing doctrine and its relationship to concept development, as illustrated on the next page. As concepts emerge from warfighter needs or innovation, they are processed through each ring until they are institutionalized as joint doctrine. The figure also depicts the frequency of change; the concepts and issues at the outer edge will change and adapt much more frequently than the capstone and keystone joint doctrine that forms the core of our warfighting principles.

By constantly exploring new ideas and vetting them through analysis and study, we will be able to adapt our joint doctrine as these ideas mature. It is important to remember that many of the "fundamental principles" that form the core of joint doctrine today were truly the revolutionary concepts of the past. Amphibious operations, the emergence of airpower, and even joint operations all had their beginnings as concepts. As the joint community examines such things as "effects-based operations" and "collaborative information environments," the Development Branch is poised to ensure the end results of these concepts find their way into joint doctrine.

If you need any assistance with the development of joint doctrine or just have a question on how the process works please don't hesitate to contact the branch chief, Maj Ward V. Quinn, USMC, at DSN 668-6108 or e-mail: *quinnwv@jwfc.jfcom.mil* or any of the Doctrine Division POCs listed on page 20.



JOINT CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED (JCLL) BRANCH

Ever since the JCLL first stood up five years ago, it has been reliant on commands to submit after action reports in order to populate the database and perform a low-level analysis. During the past six months, however, the JCLL has found itself transforming from a passive focus of capturing joint observations, lessons, and issues to taking an active approach to data collection and analysis.

Active data collection began in March 2002 when a Joint Doctrine/JCLL team visited Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and observed detainee operations. The trip report can be found on the classified JCLL Web site at *http://www.jwfc.jfcom.smil.mil/jcll/*.

During the week of 22 September 2002, JCLL visited USCENTCOM HQ in Tampa, FL. The 26-person collection team included analysts and subject matter experts from US Joint Forces Command J2, J4, J6, J9, and Joint Warfighting Center (JCLL, Joint Doctrine, and Joint Targeting School). A representative from the Air Force Task Force-Enduring Look, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and the Air Land Sea Applications Center joined the team. Although the report writing and analysis is still taking place, potential issues are being identified which will be factored back into the joint training program, joint doctrine, and joint experimentation.

Concurrent with writing and finalizing the USCENTCOM visit, JCLL is preparing for another collection team visit to 10th Mountain Division--the joint force land component (forward) in Afghanistan until recently. Other future visits include the joint force air component (9th Air Force), joint force maritime component (5th Fleet), and Joint Task Force-180 (XVIIIth Airborne Corps).

If you have any questions about JCLL's active collection, please contact Mr. Mike Barker, GS-13, Lessons Learned Branch Chief at DSN 668-7270 or e-mail: *barker@jwfc.jfcom.mil*.

DOTMLPF:
FOCUSING FUTURE CHANGE

By Rick Rowlett, Cornerstone Industry Inc., USJFCOM JWFC, Doctrine Support Group

The recently completed DOD-directed Exercise MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002 (MC 02) is serving as a point of departure for our senior leaders to consider pursuit of new capabilities based on the results of the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (JCDE) Program. MC 02 was a joint, computer-assisted field exercise with embedded joint and Service experimentation. It focused on the value of effects-based operations as employed by a JTF headquarters built around the US Army's III Corps staff, with critical Service augmentation. The JTF was enabled by a core standing joint force headquarters and other capabilities that facilitated planning and collaboration among all players. The event helped USJFCOM assess a number of experimentation hypotheses associated with *Rapid Decisive Operations* and several other concepts under development. The results of MC 02 and many other experimentation events conducted during the past three years have led USJFCOM to recommend actions in the functional areas of **D**octrine, **O**rganizations, **T**raining, **M**ateriel, **L**eadership and education, **P**ersonnel, and **F**acilities (DOTMLPF). This article summarizes the first impressions of MC 02 results, discusses the DOTMLPF change process, and describes actions the joint doctrine community must take as we consider the near-term impact on joint doctrine.

Joint Vision 2010 introduced the DOTMLPF construct in 1996. Adapted from an Army model, DOTMLPF now serves to provide a holistic view of changes the joint community can make and capabilities we can pursue in these key functional areas. Conveniently, there are long-standing functional processes associated with these areas. For example, JP 1-01 (5 Jul 00) describes the Joint Doctrine Development System, while CJCSI 3500.01B (31 Dec 99) prescribes CJCS policy for planning and conducting joint training. CJCSI 3170.01B (15 Apr 01) describes the Requirements Generation System. This system links directly with DOD's Acquisition Management System, the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, and the *Joint Vision* implementation process to consider potential materiel solutions to the warfighter's projected mission needs. And a new CJCSI 3180.01 (1 Sep 02) describes the Joint Requirements Oversight Council's (JROC) overarching role and the joint community's responsibilities in processing DOTMLPF change recommendations. Also, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has appointed Joint Staff Functional Process Owners who review DOTMLPF recommendations and advise the JROC as part of the *Joint Vision* implementation process.

Joint Staff Functional Process Owners

Doctrine	J7
Organization	J8
Training	J7
Materiel	J8
Leadership & Education	J7
Personnel	J1
Facilities	J4

ASSESSING THE CONCEPTS

Initial assessment indicates that many concepts and capabilities examined in MC 02 and previous events hold great promise for the future joint force. Comprehensive detailed analysis and synthesis is ongoing in USJFCOM. First impressions from MC 02 suggest that three concepts have significant potential to make a near-term impact on joint operations.

Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). Mandated by the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and Quadrennial Defense Review, the SECDEF's requirement is to field an SJFHQ in each geographic combatant command in FY 05. This is not a fully staffed headquarters per se, but rather a standing joint command and control element—largely focused on planning—that a combatant commander can employ in different ways when a contingency arises. The SJFHQ can be the core around which a JTF is formed, it can augment a Service component headquarters designated as the JTF HQ, or it can supplement a combatant commander's staff if a JTF is not formed for the operation. MC 02 demonstrated that this capability could significantly improve the combatant command's readiness by speeding the process of establishing a JTF and by providing the JFC core expertise in the critical functional areas of planning, knowledge management, and operations. DPG 03-08 directs the Military Departments to "work with USJFCOM on joint experimentation to generate fast deploying command and control structures that exploit reach back to distributed non-deploying centers of excellence." USJFCOM has formed a prototype SJFHQ located in the JWFC and will continue to experiment with it to refine the concept and organization.

Collaborative Information Environment (CIE). The experimental CIE was built as a coherently joint, experimental C4I system that linked the MC 02 knowledge and decision centers such as a combatant command headquarters, JTF headquarters, components, and other agencies. If fielded, this system will use high-speed bandwidth connectivity and electronic collaboration tools to facilitate rapid and expansive information sharing among member organizations. The CIE will use the Global Information Grid (GIG) as its information and dissemination backbone. Information brought into this environment through GIG-enabled applications will be available to everyone in the environment, thus allowing the JFC to collaborate with components and supporting organizations wherever they are located. CIE will contribute to achieving *decision superiority* by helping the JFC share information, reduce planning times, and operate inside the adversary's decision cycle. This is an important capability enhancement for the SJFHQ.

Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). Interim JIACGs have been established in some geographic commands since March 2002 to address a persistent shortfall in synchronizing military operations with civilian agency efforts. In MC 02, the experimental JIACG examined civilian agency participation in secure, real-time collaboration on operational and tactical requirements for the military operation. In addition to the Department of Defense; agencies represented in the MC 02 JIACG included the Departments of State, Transportation, Energy, Commerce, and Justice; and the US Agency for International Development. The JIACG played a key advisory and planning role in coercive diplomacy, condition setting, access dominance, and post-hostilities transition during the event.

While the SJFHQ, CIE, and JIACG were "clear winners" according to MC 02 participants, other concepts discussed below also received favorable reviews.

The **Dynamic Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR)** concept includes an overarching philosophy that encompasses a network-centric approach to the management of ISR aligned to effects based operations (EBO). JISR provides a persistent, real-time visualization and status of all national, combatant command, and component ISR assets. JISR synchronizes strategic, operational, and tactical ISR collection strategies giving the warfighter the agility and flexibility to dynamically task, position, and collaboratively manage all ISR assets within the battlespace as operations dictate. Dynamic JISR will be a key enabler to the SJFHQ's accomplishment of EBO.

The **blue intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) database** concept provides for a single-source reference and data repository on all US and Allied ISR assets and capabilities, including sensor parametric data for current and future assets. The Blue ISR Database will be the primary reference for collection managers and ISR asset managers for the effective planning, employment, and synchronization of ISR assets within the SJFHQ.

Operational net assessment (ONA) is a continuous, collaborative process that builds a common, coherent knowledge base. The ONA concept intends to promote a common understanding of ourselves, the adversary, how the adversary views us, and the prospective operational environment. When mature, its system-of-systems analysis will include not only a potential adversary's warfighting system, but also the political, economic, cultural, diplomatic, informational, and other systems that give the adversary's warfighting system its capability and relevance. A combatant commander can use ONA to shape and monitor the theater engagement program and plan for contingency operations. USJFCOM developed an extensive ONA that underpinned the MC 02 joint force effects-based planning effort.

The **effects-based operations** concept advocates a new way of thinking about military operations and provides a process for obtaining desired strategic outcomes through the very precise application of all national capabilities. From an effects-based planning perspective, EBO is linked closely to ONA.

ACTING ON USJFCOM'S RECOMMENDED CHANGES

USJFCOM recently has finalized a number of DOTMLPF Change Recommendation packages for various concepts, including those summarized in the previous section, IAW CJCSI 3180.01. This article focuses on these "concept-based" DOTMLPF packages, since they will stimulate most doctrine-related changes. USJFCOM has also developed a number of "initiative-based" DOTMLPF packages not covered here. The approved process calls for each package to be staffed with combatant commands, Services, the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Defense agencies on the JROC's Joint C4I Program Assessment Tool (JCPAT). DOD components use JCPAT to submit documents, post comments during flag-level reviews, and track the current status of documents.

The typical review period for documents on JCPAT is 30 days from posting, unless additional time is warranted by the complexity of the change recommendation or if critical comments require further analysis. DOTMLPF change recommendation packages for SJFHQ and CIE were placed on JCPAT for flag-level review on 16 September; JISR, ONA, and JIACG packages were targeted for staffing in October. Once USJFCOM resolves any issues that result from initial staffing, the Joint Staff J8 will schedule DOTMLPF package briefings in sequence for the Joint Requirements Panel, Joint Requirements Board, and JROC. The JROC will decide on issues within

(Continued on next page)

the council's authority and forward other recommendations to CJCS for decision.

The DOTMLPF packages mentioned above recommend a number of specific actions for JROC decision. In the materiel area, for example, USJFCOM requested a substantial FY 03 funding increase to support the required hardware and software capabilities critical to the SJFHQ prototype. This recommendation is connected closely to the CIE DOTMLPF package, since advanced collaborative capabilities are essential to effective SJFHQ operations. The CIE package also recommends development of a joint mission needs statement to standardize and govern future CIE capability development and fielding across Department of Defense. The JISR package recommends a joint capstone requirements document that would address development, integration, and interoperability of all ISR/information gathering systems at the operational level. Several DOTMLPF packages also recommend initiatives in the training, leadership/ education, and organization areas.

Although it was a significant event (the largest field experiment ever conducted), MC 02 is only one stop along the experimentation highway. Concept development and refinement will continue, as will various experimentation events to explore new ideas and capabilities. New concepts will emerge and others will fall aside. We can expect to see many more DOTMLPF change recommendation packages as this process clarifies ideas and validates capabilities.

SO, WHAT IS THE IMPACT ON JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT?

From a joint doctrine perspective, some concepts are mature enough and associated experimentation results conclusive enough that we can expect an impact on joint doctrine in the near term (next five years). For example, the JIACG will be mentioned in the revision first draft of JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, currently under a scheduled revision. Since the Secretary of Defense has directed fielding of an SJFHQ in each geographic combatant command in FY 05, we should consider the impact now, while key pubs are in the revision process. Many adjustments to doctrine should occur during routine revision of publications, unless JROC DOTMLPF decisions require an accelerated change to a specific JP or a new "fast-track" publication.

However, final decisions on the joint publication consolidation initiative will affect how we migrate validated concept ideas into joint doctrine. The consolidation schedule likely will cause some recently published JPs to be revised well ahead of the traditional schedule. This will create an earlier opportunity to consider the impact of validated concepts on the content of those publications. Other JPs could be postponed in the revision schedule. While each DOTMLPF package has the potential to affect a large number of JPs, the accompanying table highlights some key publications for each package.

USJFCOM J7/JWFC participated with USJFCOM J8, J9, and other staff organizations in the effort to develop the DOTMLPF packages described earlier. Although not identical, the doctrine recommendations are generally consistent across the packages. They call for the following:

- Analyze the impact of each concept and associated experimentation results on joint doctrine publications and on the publication and revision schedule.
- Develop a document that addresses doctrinal issues resulting from this analysis. This document will propose an implementation plan for incorporating relevant changes into joint doctrine based on results known to date.
- Provide an information briefing on issues and proposed implementation plan to the May 03 Joint Doctrine Working Party.
- As future concept development and experiments occur, analyze the impact on joint doctrine.
- Revise joint doctrine publications IAW decisions based on the above analysis.

KEY JOINT PUBLICAITONS LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED

DOTMLPF Package	***Joint Publications***
SJFHQ	5-00.2
CIE	5-0, 6-0
JIACG	3-08
ONA	2-01, 3-08, 5-0
JISR	3-55, 3-60
EBO	3-0, 3-07, 5-0

While these tasks are under the oversight of the Joint Staff J-7 as the joint doctrine functional process owner, the JWFC Doctrine Division will assist with the analysis, develop the draft implementation plan for staffing, and provide the May 03 JDWP briefing. Long-term implementation, of course, will involve the entire joint doctrine community. **Effective migration of validated concept ideas into joint doctrine will require closely coordinated teamwork between both concept and doctrine subject matter experts.** The end result should be value-added changes to the solid base of joint doctrine that currently underpins joint operations.

HOMELAND SECURITY IN AN ERA OF RISK

By Mr. Richard Rinaldo, Senior Military Analyst, IIT Research Institute

Wanna Bet? A new Web site solicits and offers wagers on various prospects. Here's one: "By 2020, bioterror or bioerror will lead to one million casualties in a single event." The site includes a reassuring analysis that it is unlikely for such a biological event to occur.[1] But why take a chance? We don't want to gamble. Instead, we want to prevent, protect against, or prepare for such an event.

In fact, if there is any lesson in 9-11, it should be that it was hardly a true test of what may be needed. As cataclysmic as it might have been for the national psyche, as taxing its consequences for the response, and whatever lessons may emerge to benefit us, it remains a minor disaster compared to what can be conceived.[2]

Although some events may now be considered "low probability," there is a realization that it would be "better to be scared by the improbable possibility than to be unprepared for the catastrophic reality," as Representative Christopher Shays of Connecticut put it in a hearing on bioterrorism in July 2001.[3] Shays' comments are consistent with a lesson learned (possibly a lesson lost) from Pearl Harbor, i.e., "Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation for any eventuality."[4]

Moreover, our adversaries have proven that they are fanatics who are imaginative, persevering, patient, ingenious, and dedicated. They will study and exploit every possible way to harm us. The changing nature of terrorism among international or domestic groups or individuals is at play.

Some of today's "terrorists" look not so much to instill terror in order to influence public opinion to change a system, but instead seek an apocalyptic destruction of an evil enemy who is viewed as the antithesis of their way of life, religion, or goals. They may seek revenge, retaliation, or destruction for its own sake in colossal acts of spite, hate, rage, and hostility. Many of the people labeled as today's "terrorists" may not even be "terrorists" in the strictest sense of the term. They do not seek to create terror. Instead they look upon themselves as being soldiers using terrorist-type tactics to destroy an enemy.[5]

Especially ominous are cooperative endeavors between adversaries who employ terrorism, insurgency, and crime to pursue their objectives. The competence of each in illicit enterprise feeds a synergy, which will improve and expand their capabilities. This will complicate efforts to defeat them singularly and in detail. The dedication of fearless fanatics complicates these threats, as does the possibility of state-sponsorship; availability of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives (CBRNE) or weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and sanctuary in stateless, underdeveloped regions of the world.

The *National Strategy for Homeland Security*[6] also describes several important characteristics of terrorism. Among these are the following:

- Terrorists will pick **targets based on their symbolic value and weaknesses** they find in our defenses and preparations.
- Terrorists may use a **wide array of possible ways and means** to attack the US, from CBRNE/WMD, including cyber attack, to conventional means. They also may use our own assets against us.
- Terrorists rely on a network of agents, making it **difficult to identify a single 'center of gravity.'**
- As part of an asymmetric approach to war, **surprise is key to terrorist actions**. The ability of terrorists to infiltrate and move freely hampers detection and promotes surprise.
- Terrorists exploit vulnerabilities, **choosing the time, place, and method** of attack.

But if our enemies are formidable and go to school on us, we are doing likewise on them. Americans are figuring out how to confront these threats.[7] The Armed Forces, especially the Army,[8] must also continue to support civil authorities for a myriad of other significant dangers and hazards. Thus, homeland security has two parts, homeland defense and civil support.

Natural disasters such as tornadoes and tsunamis, hurricanes, floods, drought, wildfires, and human and animal epidemics, as well as man-made or man-related disasters such as transportation and industrial accidents, may call for military support within the homeland. Similarly, existing laws permit postal augmentation, certain types of support to law enforcement not involving terrorists, and military assistance to civil disturbances. Conventional attacks on the homeland are also a possibility and, as a minimum, the US military must remain prepared to continue to perform its conventional warfighting roles and functions. Each of these threats, hazards, and conditions may have some or all of the following characteristics:

- Bewilderment as a consequences of the presence of CBRNE/WMD.
- Misinformation and disinformation.

(Continued on next page)

- Panic, fear, and possible chaos, although research indicates that these would occur only in limited circumstances.[9]

- Tenuous public security and law and order.

- Significant, or in some cases, even catastrophic environmental and infrastructure damage to human services, civil administration, communications and information, transportation and distribution, energy, commerce, and industrial facilities.

- Threats of disease or epidemic as a secondary effect.

- Presence of displaced, homeless, and disoriented populace, possibly riotous or undisciplined, in some limited circumstances.[10]

- Stress disorders, depression, disillusionment, and other psychological trauma among the victim population or assisting organizations.

- Presence and involvement of numerous agencies from all jurisdictions and the private voluntary or nongovernmental sector

The implications of such an environment include a wider spectrum of operations, increased unpredictability, and a more complex range of operating conditions. They dictate new ways to think and operate and present a force design and training dilemma across the full range of conflict. Given the importance of centers of gravity to military operations in the past and indeed, in recently conceived operational concepts, another challenge will be to develop entirely new ways to confront terrorism, ways perhaps not yet envisioned or detailed.

Leaders will require an unparalleled degree of situational understanding and planning for a wide range of tasks. They must be ready, for example, to use its high-density organizations for such manpower intensive tasks as infrastructure protection. They must also be ready to use low-density organizations, such as medical or behavioral health teams that deal with stress, for events that create unusual consequences . They must also be able to generate additional resources for all these functions.

The Army provides unique capabilities for homeland security in all these circumstances. It can rapidly move large forces to the affected location using organic or US Transportation Command assets. On arrival, Army units have a functional chain of command, reliable communications, and well-trained and equipped forces that can operate and sustain themselves in an austere environment with organic assets. When required, an Army force can deploy in support of or be assigned to a geographic combatant commander. The Army's Reserve Component (RC) forces have special qualities, capabilities, and geographic dispersion to conduct operations. The long-term relationships of Army RC forces with state and local officials are especially valuable for homeland security.

The challenges are not entirely new for the Army. Support of civil authorities is, for example, a core competency listed in FM 1, *The Army*.[11] The Army is also lead agent for developing, in concert with the DOD community, JP 3-26, *Joint Doctrine For Homeland Security*.

Both prior to and since 9-11, the Army has conducted wargames, which explored its role in homeland security, now and in the future. The 2002 Army Transformation Wargame, for example, integrated homeland scenarios into the overall global conflict and derived numerous insights. One such insight was that a clever adversary would probably try to prevent the US from responding overseas by attacking its force projection platforms within the US. Another key insight was the competition for combat support and combat service support assets between homeland security and overseas activities. One conclusion was that forces supporting homeland security might need to rely more on commercial assets.

Lessons learned from Operation NOBLE EAGLE have also provided conceptual insights. These indicate that intelligence and information fusion present a significant seam in our military's ability to provide responsive support to the homeland. In the future, interagency, state, and local and military entities must continue to develop processes and procedures, within legal parameters, to enhance their ability to maintain situational understanding. Together they must also improve coordination and communication, from the establishment of liaison officers to the development and procurement of interoperable systems and sensors. Additional lessons learned from this operation and others include:

- Avoidance of "mission creep." The goal should be deliberate, approved, appropriate, and validated mission changes in an environment of emergent activities, situations, and organizational participation.

- The need for relevant information and good information management in terms of sources, conduits, and analysis.

- The importance of transitions, to include measures of effectiveness, for example, in returning to non-military operations.

- The need for common definitions of key terms, such as "coordination" between diverse players in a fluid environment.

- The need and value of virtual reach for knowledge and expertise.

- The importance of military bearing, appearance, and conduct when operating among US publics.

The study of history and lessons learned from recent exercises also underscore many enduring principles for homeland security. These include:

- **The global security paradox**. The military must think globally in order to effectively conduct operations at home. This is an aspect of the principles of war of the Offensive and Maneuver.

- **The importance of teamwork**. Operations in the homeland will include both homeland defense and support of civil authorities. Operations will be joint, interagency, and multijurisdictional. Our preparation must correlate with those purposes. This is an aspect of the principle of war of the Objective and will involve unity of effort as discussed in the principle of war of Unity of Command.

- **The impacts and urgency of threats, attacks, significant disasters, and catastrophes in the homeland.** These types of events may exceed the capability of civil authorities to respond. The military must be able to provide surge capability in such circumstances. The military must also be able to quickly defend the homeland, especially against air and missile threats. This is an aspect of the principle of war of the Objective, and relates to the principles of Mass, Security, Maneuver, and the Offensive.

- **The synergism of support and warfighting capabilities.** The military's responsiveness, command and control (C2) capabilities, organization, and resources needed to fight wars make it capable of a wide range of operations. Warfighting and homeland security enhancements should be synergistic. This is an aspect of the principle of war of Economy of Force.

The *National Strategy for Homeland Security* will also be key to the military. It seeks to leverage the Nation's unique strengths in the areas of law, science and technology, information sharing and systems, and international cooperation. The military must also examine and develop its capabilities in these areas. It must participate in reviewing statutes and regulations relating to quarantine and Posse Comitatus.[12] Its Army must ensure a capability to support, and if necessary, lead a joint force when conducting homeland security operations.[13] It must improve its information superiority, intelligence, and seamless C2 with other federal, state, and local entities. It must design, in partnership with industry and the research and development community, better life support systems for Service members. It must continue to participate in international programs that facilitate overseas deployments and nonproliferation activities.

A focus on key functions discussed in the *National Strategy* will also be important:

- **Prevention** of an adversary from attacking the homeland. The military's ability to decisively defeat an adversary quickly may deter outright aggression. If deterrence fails, a joint force may rapidly respond to preclude an adversary from continuing their mission. Finally, joint forces may preemptively destroy adversaries before they are able to attack the homeland. Preemption may also include offensive information operations.

- **Protection** against attacks on the homeland. This includes homeland defense measures to detect, interdict, and defeat threats, preferably before they reach the homeland. Air and Missile Defense, Sovereignty Protection, and Critical Infrastructure and Key Asset Protection are aspects of homeland defense.

- **Response** to support civil authorities. Upon request, the military may provide support to save lives, prevent property damage, and reduce suffering until civil authorities are able to restore control. Such operations place a premium on military surge capabilities in order to mitigate effects.

A construct of how to approach homeland security geographically could come, in part, from the pre-World War II "Rainbow" series of plans. These plans changed the defense concept from a continental approach where the enemy was met as the ocean's edge to a hemispheric approach that would add to the existing defense by engaging and defeating an enemy outside the Nation's immediate borders. In conflict, The Army, as part of a joint force, may be called upon to defeat an adversary in the homeland while simultaneously conducting operations to defeat the source of the threat outside our borders. The Army's roles in the latter case may include: deterrence, preemption, threat reduction, security of aerial and seaports of debarkation, counterproliferation, missile defense, interdiction, interception, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), support to counterdrug operations, and other joint, interagency operations.

The Army's role in response to crises in the homeland may include: joint, interagency, and multi jurisdictional operations, homeland defense , support to law enforcement, disaster relief, response to civil disturbance, support to counterdrug operations, force protection of deploying forces, infrastructure assurance, and other civil support. As charged in various plans, statutes, and directives, the Army will help defend the industrial base, provide engineering and transportation support, treat and evacuate casualties, manage the consequences of WMD/ CBRNE, and support and reinforce civil authorities.

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

Figure 1. The Current Paradigm of Response

To conduct these operations the Army must maintain and improve its responsiveness, deployability, agility, versatility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability. These characteristics will drive key parameters of force design. The Army must design units capable of being tailored to homeland security roles. These units must be modular, function-based, and capable of a wide span of control. In order to keep pace with a rapidly changing situation, systems must be designed to accept capabilities that meet new thresholds. In civil support, responding soldiers and commanders and their staffs must act decisively to save lives, protect property and reduce suffering as they provide the surge capability to struggling civil agencies. This must be done while almost always in a support rather than lead role during these operations.

Perhaps the most significant challenge to the Nation in homeland security will be in support of consequence management for a significant domestic catastrophe. The current paradigm is one of a tiered response, a deliberate and time-consuming build up of assets, to help victims and communities (Figure 1). As the process unfolds, responses and casualties, mount. The possible magnitude of future catastrophic events argues for a different approach. In this we may borrow from the methods of terrorists and swarm to meet the challenge (Figure 2).

Such operations will place a premium on responsiveness, the quality of time, distance, and sustained momentum of its forces. As part of this national effort, the Army must be able to respond to events and incidents in as near to real-time as possible in order to use all its competencies and resources to achieve the most positive impact on the situation. The Army also must be able to deploy quickly. The exact timing of deployment has not been set and may differ by type of unit to be deployed. In either case, timing should be such to significantly help prevent, protect against, or reduce casualties and damage to property or infrastructure. Such a qualitative level of deployability has not been required or displayed in the past, since local and state authorities, as first responders, have been able to accomplish much in the initial stages of an incident. However, the threat of CBRNE/ WMD complicates present day circumstances and may require simultaneous and coherent, near-real time deployments of the full scope of national capabilities.



Figure 2. What may be needed

The Army will not confront this challenge alone. Recent futures work in "Joint Operational Warfighting (JOW) Thoughts on the Operational Art of Future Joint Warfighting," supports the notion of "combinational capability, the ability of the joint force to bring disparate capabilities together in time and space to plan, rehearse, execute, and sustain operations repeatedly." This capability "calls for task *optimizing* to create short-duration joint teams designed specifically for a mission. These task optimized forces come together through comprehensive connectivity—perhaps never even meeting face to face—and rapidly plan, rehearse, and execute, after which they may immediately recombine with other joint organizations."[14] It is also consistent with the Army's view on responsiveness, deployability, versatility, and agility.

To be able to conduct homeland security operations Army-required capabilities might include:

- **Interagency coordination, integration, and communication**. Includes a collaborative information environment[15] and joint interagency coordination groups tailored to "Homeland Operations."

- **Advanced consequence management**. Timely support to help mitigate the loss of life property, and human suffering.

- **Integrated Air and Missile Defense.** Participation in an integrated, joint force that will detect and destroy enemy cruise and ballistic missile systems. Space and Missile Defense Systems must be thoroughly integrated, both vertically and horizontally, to provide a single, layered missile defense system. Missile defense C2 systems must be able to share time critical, common, unambiguous, and continuous information. When required, Army Air and Missile Defense units will provide point defense of designated high value assets to deter and, if necessary, destroy all enemy air and missile threats.

- **Sensors, Sensor Fusion, and Networking.** An ISR architecture that ensures unity of purpose for all sensors. Human and technical, manned and unmanned, terrestrial and space-based capabilities will be needed to sense the operational environment and detect, identify and track threats. Advanced sensor capabilities integrated vertically and horizontally from strategic to tactical level and sensor networking will provide holistic situational awareness.

- **Survivability and force protection**. A holistic integration of organizational, materiel, and procedural solutions to meet the challenge of protecting soldiers, units, and information and equipment in all terrain and environments.

- **Intelligence and information fusion**. Within the legal framework, systems in place to allow the transfer of intelligence and information between civil and military authorities. Advanced collection, processing, analysis, management and sharing of information.

- **Engineering**. Responding units integrate organic and additional engineer assets into function based organizations supporting relief operations.

- **Logistics coordination and distribution, and medical responses**. Capable of supporting not only the Army but also federal, state and local responders and possibly joint forces in accordance with existing directives and agreements. Coordination of priorities will be critical.

- **Civil augmentation resources**. Rapidly deployable resources and trained soldiers to provide a temporary surge capability to civil authorities when they have exhausted their assets.

- **Security**. Historically, the Army has provided security force augmentation to civil authorities during civil disturbances; special events, such as Olympic event disasters, and during times when mission loads far exceed the capacity of civilian law enforcement agencies, such as airport security augmentation.

- **Mobile, deployable units**. To ensure timely availability of forces, they must be highly mobile and deployable to locations throughout the world including the homeland.

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- **Common relevant operational picture (CROP)**. As a presentation of timely, fused, accurate, assured, and relevant information, the CROP must be tailored to meet the requirements of forces involved in homeland security.[16]

- **Information operations**. These will be important in the war against terrorism because of the stories that terrorists create and transmit. These are a well spring of their motivations and a pivot point of their strengths and weaknesses.[17]

The common and dominant theme of our Nation's leadership today is that securing our homeland is a major priority. The Army, as a member of the joint team, leveraging its warfighting and other core competencies, will support that priority by proactively securing the homeland in the prevention of and protection against attacks. The Army will also be ready to support the mitigation of the consequences of these attacks, when necessary. The Army's approach to homeland security should also address its continuing role in support of civil authorities during times of crisis and natural or accidental disasters, which forms a base of experience, competence, and development for improvement of that effort.

ENDNOTES

[1] *Longbets.org* discussion by John Smart.

[2] For example, the US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment report, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks," 1993, Fig. 2-2, noted that 100 kilograms of anthrax spores released from an airplane on a clear, calm night in Washington, D.C., could kill 1 to 3 million people.

[3] Rep. Christopher Shays, Statement House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations Hearing on Combating Terrorism: Federal Response to a Biological Weapons Attack, July 23, 2001.

[4] *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack* Pursuant to S.Con.Res. 27, 79th Congress, Lesson 18.

[5] See, for example, Ralph Peters, *Beyond Terror*, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002), John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, (editors), Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, (Santa Clara, CA: Rand, 2001) and Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini and Brian Michael Jenkins, Countering the New Terrorism, (Santa Clara, CA: Rand, 1999).

[6] *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, Office of Homeland Security, (The White House, July 2002).

[7] Numerous examples abound. See *www.whitehouse.gov/homeland*.

[8] The Secretary of the Army has been the DOD executive agent for military support to civil authorities for some time.

[9] See E. L. Quarantelli, Disaster *Related Social Behavior: Summary Of 50 Years Of Research Findings*, (Newark, DL: Disaster Research Center University of Delaware, 2000).

[10] Ibid.

[11] FM 1, *The Army*, (Wash., DC: Department of the Army, 14 June 2001. 22.

[12] See Chris Quillen, "Posse Comitatus and Nuclear Terrorism," *Parameters*, Spring 2000.

[13] The Army is lead agent for development of JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations.*

[14] *Joint Operational Warfighting (JOW): Thoughts on the Operational Art of Future Joint Warfighting*, (Suffolk: VA, US Joint Forces Command, Draft, 15 August 2002), 37.

[15] Joint Warfighting Center Pam 1, *Pamphlet for Future Joint Operations* (Suffolk: VA, US Joint Forces Command, 1 March 2002), 9.

[16] Ibid.

[17] See Peters, *Beyond Terror*.

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WHICH CINC?

Per guidance from the Secretary of Defense, the term "commander in chief" may only be used when referring to the President of the United States. In-command titles for those formerly using "CINC" will be changed to "Commander."

EFFECTS ASSESSMENT
THE JOINT DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS

By David B. Collins, Senior Military Analyst, USJFCOM Joint Experimentation

The purpose of this article is to address the doctrinal implications of employing the effects-based operations (EBO) effects assessment (EA) process in support of US joint military operations. By way of background, EA is a key enabler of EBO. As such, it is the joint force commander's (JFC's) primary mechanism to receive information on the attainment of mission objectives and/or their associated desired effects; the EBO implications of executed actions; and the assessment regarding the occurrence and operational implications of undesired effects.

The two preceding sentences encompass a wide range of operational issues that are either not: 1) currently contained, or 2) substantively developed within US joint doctrine. It is clearly beyond the scope of this article to address all of these issues in depth. What follows are a few of the key issues along with some of their primary doctrinal considerations. These points are offered for illustrative purposes as an intended catalyst for further professional discussion regarding the future doctrinal evolution of the EA concept.

Such issues **involve the formulation of operational planning and execution based on the attainment of desired effects rather than on tasks**. The use of a task-centric approach to mission planning and execution is thoroughly embedded within US joint doctrine. However, the shift from task- to effects-centric operations is more than an issue of semantics. US joint doctrine contains a number of references to assessing effects as part of the combat assessment (CA) process. However, the doctrinal depth necessary to support the modification of the CA process to meet EBO EA requirements is not developed well enough to support a clear understanding of EA in an EBO environment. While similar in many ways to the CA process, EA differs in several important ways. Joint doctrine defines combat assessment as:

> *"The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. CA is composed of three major components: a) battle damage assessment [BDA]; b) munitions effects assessment [MEA] and c) reattack recommendations."*

Based on the above definition, it is clear that the scope of EA is broader than CA. EA encompasses not only the direct assessment of first order effects derived from the tradition elements of CA (BDA, MEA and reattack recommendations), but also includes the analysis of the "ripple effect" within the adversary's political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information (or PMESII) systems generated by friendly force actions. This predictive analysis and thorough understanding of these "ripples" or the "cause-and-effect" intent of these actions significantly impacts the JFC's intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) planning. Such analysis of intended effects enable the pre-positioning of ISR assets to observe the occurrence of such desired effects as they are generated by a combination of execute actions. The breadth of EA also incorporates inputs not only from those employed to support CA, but also supporting organizations across the full range of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic or DIME).

While there are distinct and significant differences between CA (as it is currently described within joint doctrine), and the concept for EA, the two are not incompatible. The overarching, EA-relevant statement within joint doctrine comes from JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, which states, "*At the JFC level, the combat assessment effort should be a joint program, supported at all levels, designed to determine if the required effects on the adversary envisioned in the campaign plan are being achieved by the joint force components to meet the JFC's overall concept*." The essence of this statement is on target with the EA concept. Also, it is important to note the doctrinal emphasis on determination of effects and the assessment of the results in terms of meeting the JFC's overall concept. While both of these points clearly bridge to the EBO EA concept, there is little doctrinal substance to describe the processes and procedures employed to accomplish this objective. Some EA-relevant specificity is provided in the doctrinal statement that CA is intended to: "*determine what physical and/or psychological attrition the adversary has suffered; what effect the efforts have had on the adversary's plans and capabilities; and what, if any, changes or additional efforts need to take place to meet the objectives of the current major operations or phase of the campaign. CA requires constant information flows from all sources and should support all sections of the JFC staff and components*." This quote from joint doctrine contains several additional key aspects of the EA concept. First, EA analysis deals in both tangible and intangible issues as expressed in the reference to "physical and/or psychological" attrition.

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The reference to adversary plans and capabilities is addressed in the EA concept as well. EA analysis includes understanding the "cause and effect" relationship between the first and second points; that is, what has been done to the adversary and how that has effected his plans/intentions. The final phrase addresses the aspect of identifying changes of additional efforts that are required to meet phase or campaign objectives. This aspect of the EA concept forms the "so what" of EA analysis.

In some cases, the Exercise MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE (MC) 02 EA process was able to advantage existing doctrine other than that associated with CA to explore other conceptual process and procedural requirements. For example, the EBO framework used in EA started with the traditional approach (as shown in Figure 1) by analyzing the mission and developing mission-based objectives. However, the next step represented a significant departure from joint doctrine. Rather than identifying specified and implied tasks, the MC 02 approach called for the development of "desired effects" and the identification of "key nodes" within the adversary's macro systems (political, military, economic, information, and infrastructure systems) which could be targeted to achieve each of the JTF's desired effects. This conceptual deviation from doctrine was the entry point for JTF-level EA. The JTF's desired effects provided the focus for all JTF EA activities. The effects assessment cell (EAC) used the desired effects as the macro-level of a hierarchal structure to develop the JTF's EA products (see Figure 1).

The EA products developed during MC 02 provided an assessment of the JTF's status in achieving its desired effects. The assessment "picture" painted by these products was largely historical in nature. What predictive aspect of EA that did exist was provided through analysis of the current EBO situation to forecast attainment of the JTF's desired effects in terms of the commander's decision points and other planning considerations. Future EA operations should seek to build on the historical perspective in a manner that shifts the intuitive aspect of EA products as much as possible into the predictive arena. While of value for MC 02 in terms of validating the basic concepts of EA, the EAC assessments of JTF desired effects were historical in nature. There was no mechanism or capability to effectively translate or extrapolate either the current or cumulative historical



Figure 1. MC 02 EA Concept Overview

assessment in terms of predictive assessments based on adversary activities. Even the most rudimentary doctrinal underpinnings were not available to assist the JTF staff in understanding either: 1) the significance of predictive assessments in terms of either rapid decisive operations (RDO) or EBO; or 2) the complexities of cross-staff interactions necessary to fuse relevant information from various staff functional areas into a synthesized, knowledge-rich predictive assessment tailored to empower the joint task force commander's operational decision-making on major effects tasking order (ETO) related issues. The overall shortfall in the EAC's inability to produce effective predictive assessments was in large part due to the absence of EBO assessment tools designed to empower the JTF staff on this issue. **Doctrinal support to establish the intent, nature, form, content, or associated methodologies to meet the predictive assessment requirements of EBO EA are currently not contained in joint doctrine. Likewise, the doctrinal baseline to facilitate the development of a predictive assessment-capable tool does not exist**.

One of the core aspects of effectively visualizing the knowledge provided through EA analysis rests on the manner in which it is displayed. This issue is a major EA conceptual development challenge. Visualization of EA relevant information, its role in the EA analytical process, and the methodology by which the results of EA analysis are depicted are all issues at the heart of understanding the potential utility of EA and the realization of this potential in future US joint military operations.

For the purposes of MC 02, this visualization was done in a three tier manner, similar to that described for BDA in current joint doctrine. "*It [BDA] takes a three-phased approach to proceed from the micro-level of the damage or effect inflicted on a specific target, to ultimately arriving at macro-level conclusion regarding the functional outcomes in the target system.*" Another doctrinal aspect borrowed from BDA doctrine was the establishment of a "*baseline set of target system damage criteria and measure of effectiveness (MOE). . . . These criteria and measures are invaluable to maintaining a standard measure of targeting effectiveness. They help drive the conduct of military operations against target systems in a more effective, systematic fashion. . . . achieving results at a greatly reduced effort, risk and cost.*" Development of the matrices used to display the EA status for JTF desired effects involved JTF staff interactions not currently addressed in US joint military doctrine. An EA tool designed to display EBO desired effects issues such as intensity, vector, location, time, interrelationships, etc., is necessary in order to transition the intuitive aspects of EA from the historical to the predictive realm. This is a significant aspect of intelligence support to the EA process. The MOE indicators are the ISR observable elements of the MOE. ISR collection results against the MOE indicators paint the picture for each respective MOE. The use of MOE in the EA process provides one of the key linkages between EA and the intelligence process. The development of MOE "indicators" by the staff intelligence analysts provides the EA "target list" input against which friendly force ISR assets are tasked.

There is a perception that EA is conducted primarily by a number of staff representatives whose full-time focus is conducting EA. In fact this is neither accurate nor desirable. The true value-added of EA is the process through which it leverages subject matter expertise in a highly dynamic manner from across the JTF staff. EA is specifically designed to tap into the cumulative knowledge of JTF staff members (and other sources) to enable rapid, tailored analysis of situational events in terms of the JTF's desired effects to produce EA knowledge for the JFC.

A related, but even larger issue is the absence of a clearly identified joint doctrinal framework, where EA is designed to "nest." As a result, cross-staff process interactions to enable effective EA are confused at best. A joint publication to address the cross-functional processes and procedures associated with EA (such as that provided in the form of JP 3-56.1, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*) would be extremely helpful in identifying the EA doctrinal construct that is threaded throughout the various staff and functional areas.

In summary, there are numerous joint doctrinal implications for the inclusion of EBO EA within the US joint operations. Addressing the select issues identified within this article will unveil other doctrinal issues as well, as a variety of other issues across the full range of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) requirements.

Mr. David Collins is a senior military analyst with IIT Research Institute.

JOINT PUBLICATION CONSOLIDATION PLAN

By Mr. Dean Seitz, Doctrine Support Group, USJFCOM JWFC

Over 12 years ago, there were just 64 joint publications (JPs) in the joint doctrine hierarchy. Over the next several years, this number expanded to 204 JPs. Included as JPs in this hierarchy were all 33 of the individual Joint Reporting Structure publications and 57 communications publications, which addressed US message text formatting, the worldwide military command and control system, and manuals for employing different communications systems. Once these JPs were converted to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directives, the hierarchy was stabilized at 100-114 JPs.

Since then, there have been a few cancellations (e.g., JPs 3-09.2, *JTTP for Ground Radar Beacon Operations (J-BEACON), and* 4-01.1, *Airlift Support to Joint Operations).* Further, a few JPs have been expanded to incorporate the data from deleted JPs and those scheduled for deletion (e.g., JP 3-17, *JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations*). However, with 114 JPs in various phases of completion or revision, today's action officers can find themselves with multiple monthly taskings on different JPs that have suspenses to assessment agents, lead agents, and Joint Staff (JS) doctrine sponsors.

During 2001, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the JS J-7 to explore reducing the number of joint publications by 50 percent as a goal to help eliminate redundancies and inconsistencies. Consequently, the Joint Staff J-7 and USJFCOM JWFC Doctrine Division, as well as Service and combatant command coordinating review authorities, developed a plan to reduce the number of JPs. The result was a JS J-7 strawman plan to consolidate numerous publications (e.g., JPs 3-01, *Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats;* 3-01.2, *Joint Doctrine for Offensive Operations for Countering Air and Missile Threats*; and JP 3-01.3, *Joint Doctrine for Defensive Operations for Countering Air and Missile Threats*). This plan also proposed deleting a number of JPs from the hierarchy (e.g., JP 4-01.1) and re-designating or converting other JPs to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directives or multi-Service tactics, techniques, procedures (MTTP).

In July 2002, a two-day consolidation plan joint working group (CPJWG) was held, where the joint doctrine development community voting members discussed different consolidation approaches and voted on their merit. Some recommendations required very little discussion and received a unanimous vote to consolidate (e.g., JPs 3-10, *Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations,* and 3-10.1, *JTTP for Base Defense*. Other recommendations only received majority votes to combine specific publications (e.g., JPs 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations;* 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations;* and 3-32, *Doctrine for Command and Control of Joint Maritime Operations*.) Still other recommendations were met with a vote not to consolidate, but after further discussion, the CPJWG developed alternate recommendations. For example, the CPJWG voted to not consolidate JPs 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*; 3-02.1, *Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations*; 3-02.2, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation*; and 3-18, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*; but keep JPs 3-02 and 3-18 as stand-alone publications and convert JPs 3-02.1 and 3-02.2 to multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Following the CPJWG, JS J-7 staffed the recommendations with the joint doctrine development community and prepared the final coordination results of the Joint Doctrine Publication Consolidation Plan. From the final coordination results, USJFCOM JWFC developed two different implementation plans to show when the consolidation of JPs should be initiated and also recommended the lead agent. Both options started with those consolidations that were unanimous, such as combining JPs 3-10 and 3-10.1; and combining JPs 6-0, *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems Support to Joint Operations*, and 6-02, *Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems*. The draft implementation plans ensure there are no more than two consolidations starting in any given month beginning in November 2002 and continuing through December 2004. This workload will allow the development process to remain in concert with the normal joint doctrine development timeline and still accomplish all the consolidations within the next five to six years. More will be announced when consolidation implementation planning has been finalized.

JOINT PUBLICATION STATUS

APPROVED/ CANCELED SINCE 1 MAY 2002

PUB#	TITLE
2-01.2	Joint Doctrine and TTP for Counterintelligence Support to Operations
3-06	Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations
3-14	Joint Doctrine for Space Operations
3-17	Joint Doctrine and JTTP for Air Mobility Operations
4-01.1	JTTP for Airlift Support to Joint Operations
4-08	Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations

SCHEDULED FOR APPROVAL OVER THE NEXT 6 MONTHS

PUB#	TITLE
1-04	JTTP for Legal Support to Military Operations
2-01.1[FT]	JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting
3-01.2	Joint Doctrine for Offensive Operations for Countering Air and Missile Threats
3-01.3	Joint Doctrine for Defensive Operations for Countering Air and Missile Threats
3-05.2	JTTP for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning
3-09.3	JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)
3-30	Command and Control for Joint Operations
3-40	Joint Doctrine for Counterproliferation Operations
3-57.1	Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs
3-61	Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations
4-01 Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System
4-03	Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine
4-05	Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning

IN ASSESSMENT OVER NEXT SIX MONTHS[P]

PUB#	TITLE
0-2	Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations
3-02	Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
3-04.1	JTTP for Shipboard Helicopter Operations
3-07.6	JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
3-18	Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations,
4-02	Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations
4-05.1*	JTTP for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup
4-07	JTTP for Common-User Logistics During Joint Operations

IN REVISION OVER THE NEXT 6 MONTHS

PUB#	TITLE
1-05 Rev1	Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations
2-01 Rev1	Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations
3-02.1	Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations
3-02.2 Rev 1	Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation
3-03 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations
3-05	Doctrine for Joint Special Operations
3-07 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
3-07.1 Rev1	JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
3-07.2 Rev1	JTTP for Antiterrorism
3-07.4 Rev1	Joint Counterdrug Operations
3-07.5 Rev1	JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
3-08 Rev 1	Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations (Vol I & II)
3-09 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Fire Support
3-10 Rev1[C]	Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations
3-10.1 Rev1[C]	JTTP for Base Defense
3-12 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations
3-12.1 Rev1	Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data
3-13 Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for Information Operations
3-13.1 Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)
3-50.2 Rev1[C]	Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue
3-50.21 Rev1[C]	JTTP for Combat Search and Rescue
3-50.3 Rev1[C]	Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery
3-52 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
3-53 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations
3-54 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Operations Security
3-55 Rev1	Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Support for Joint Operations
3-58 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Military Deception
4-01.2 Rev1	JTTP for Sealift Support to Joint Operations
4-01.6 Rev1	JTTP for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS)
4-01.7 Rev1	JTTP for Use of Intermodal Containers in Joint Operations
4-02.1 Rev1	JTTP for Health Service Logistics Support in Joint Operations
4-02.2 Rev1	JTTP for Patient Movement in Joint Operations
4-06 Rev1	JTTP for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations
5-0 Rev1	Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
6-0 Rev1[C]	Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations
6-02 Rev1[C]	Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/ Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems

* Denotes formal assessment, others are preliminary ** Denotes early revision [FT] Denotes "fast track" [C] Denotes in-series consolidation
[P] Pending JP consolidation plan implementation

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

DOCTRINE ORGANIZATION UPDATES

JOINT STAFF, J-7, JOINT DOCTRINE, EDUCATION, AND TRAINING DIVISION (JDETD), JOINT DOCTRINE BRANCH (JDB)

By CAPT Bruce Russell, USN, Division Chief

Personnel Turnover. JDB said farewell to LT Keith Lanzer, who was assigned to JDB for six months as an intern from the Navy Washington DC Area Intern Program. He is now assigned to the Navy staff. LT Lanzer was a terrific asset to the JDB and we wish him all the best in his future endeavors. JDB recently welcomed CDR deGozzaldi's replacement CDR Bonita Russell. CDR Russell is a Fleet Support officer who is reporting to her second tour on the Joint Staff (JS). Her previous assignment was executive officer of Naval Support Activity Washington at the Washington Navy Yard. Also new to JDB is Mr. Michael Vanderbogart, a contractor for Cornerstone Industries Inc. (CII), who replaces Mr. Harry Simmeth as the primary point of contact for all allied joint doctrine and multinational operations publications. Mr. Simmeth has assumed program management responsibilities for the Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System (JDEIS) and other duties with CII.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

Approved in the last six months: JPs 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations*; 3-14, *Joint Doctrine for Space Operations*; 3-17, *Joint Doctrine and JTTP for Air Mobility Operations*; 4-01.3, *JTTP for Movement Control*; and 4-01.5, *JTTP for Transportation Terminal Operations.* Congratulations to all for the hard work and effort required for success of the approval and dissemination processes.

Scheduled for approval in the next six months: JPs 1-04, *JTTP for Legal Support to Military Operations*; 2-01.1, *JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting*; 3-09.3, *JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)*; 3-30, *Doctrine for Command and Control of Joint Air Operations*; 3-40 *Joint Doctrine for Counterproliferation Operations*; 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*, 4-01, *Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System*; 4-03, *Bulk Petroleum*; 4-05, *Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning*, and 4-08, *Logistic Support of Multinational Operations*.

High interest publications in development: JPs 2-01.1, *JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting*; and 3-07.7, *Civil Support*, 3-26, *Homeland Security*, and 3-41, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Consequence Management*.

UPCOMING CONFERENCES

The 30th Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP) is scheduled for 13-15 November 2002 at USJFCOM JWFC in Suffolk, VA. The 31st JDWP is scheduled for 5-8 May 2003.

The 3d JDEIS Configuration Management Working Group (CMWG) is scheduled to meet on 12 November 2002 at USJFCOM JWFC in Suffolk, VA. The agenda includes an update on program status; and a review requirements, program milestones, and capabilities. The last CMWG, held on 7 May 2002, discussed the requirements, functions, format, and implementation plan for JDEIS.

MULTINATIONAL CONFERENCES

To support interoperability-related doctrine issues, JDB representatives attended the following multinational meetings during the past year:

- The 2002 Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group (AJODWG), and meetings of the subordinate Doctrine, Terminology, Harmonization, and Hierarchy Management Panels;
- Canada—US Military Cooperation Committee (CANUS MCC);
- Quadripartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference (QCJWC); and
- Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC).

2002 AJODWG

The 8th meeting of the AJODWG took place at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 2-5 September 2002. Within the NATO Standardization Agency, the AJODWG provides standardized allied joint doctrine at the operational level for use by the Alliance, the associated Partnership for Peace, and coalitions with NATO. A topic of particular concern this year was defense against terrorism. It was agreed that civil and national primacies were central in responding to a terrorist threat. For many nations, institutions other than the military typically take the lead. Though NATO may be requested to assist with national operations, this remains a sensitive issue. The AJODWG concluded that current operational doctrine is adequate pending further policy guidance.

(Organization updates continued on next page)

The AJODWG decided to merge the Hierarchy and Harmonization Committees to form the H2 Committee. The H2 Committee recognized the need for a hierarchy of allied terminology glossaries, and turned the action over to the Terminology Committee. The allied joint doctrine hierarchy was revised with a number of publications being moved from level II to level III in the hierarchy—level III publications are not required to undergo joint staffing. Change proposals to harmonize AJP-01B, *Allied Joint Doctrine*, and AJP-03, *Allied Joint Operations*, were reviewed and approved. The AJODWG meeting also approved continued development of a hierarchy of NATO glossaries. The glossary hierarchy will complement the hierarchy of allied joint publications.

The AJODWG also endorsed close coordination with the Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Cell (JALLC) to identify allied doctrinal voids. Further, the need for an allied symbology publication was considered. There was consensus on the need for it in support of operational doctrine. The US custodian of STANAG 2019, *Military Symbols for Land Based Systems*, has volunteered to assist in the project.

In addition, an associated custodial meeting for AJP-3.4, *Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO)*, and related NA5CRO business was held on 28 and 29 August 2002. The Custodial Working Group unanimously approved a draft to be circulated in December 2002 as study draft 3, followed by a ratification draft in June 2003. The next scheduled AJODWG meeting dates are 1-5 September 2003.

ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE AND TERMINOLOGY

The United States has ratified one additional AJP since the last JDWP, AJP-9, *Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)*. AJP-01B and AJP-3 were recently ratified by all nations and will be promulgated soon. Further, AJP-3.7, *Psychological Operations*, was promulgated. JS J-7 also staffed for US comment AJP-3.4, *Non-article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO)*, AJP-3.11, *Meteorological/Oceanographic Support to Allied Joint Operations*, and AJP 3.1, *Joint Maritime Operations*, along with a number of AJPs in the joint air operations series. AJP-4, *Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine*, was updated and recently staffed for US ratification. Additionally, the US was designated as the custodian for an AJP on noncombatant evacuation operations.

NEW FEATURES

The JS-authored *Allied Joint Doctrine Staffing Guide* was agreed to by the joint doctrine development community and is on the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) under a new "Multinational" button under "Global Resources." This new JEL feature will also include the NATO Glossary. Future expansion will include selected Internet-releasable NATO publications and other multinational materials.

JDEIS UPDATE

By Mr. Harry Simmeth, Cornerstone Industry Inc.

The Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System (JDEIS) is the follow-on system to the Joint Electronic Library (JEL). JDEIS consists of two parts: the "user function" consisting of the basic JDEIS Web site and database(s), and the "doctrine developer function" designed to enhance development and staffing of joint doctrine.

- **The JDEIS "user function" is envisioned as a multimedia information system containing a core database of joint doctrine, that incorporates the Universal Joint Task List and DOD Dictionary. JDEIS will be rapidly accessible by the entire military community from the Internet, Internet with PKI, NIPRNET and SIPRNET. The core joint doctrine database coupled with various new search techniques will revolutionize the ability of the warfighter to rapidly access concise and accurate doctrinal concepts, terms, and guidance while linkages to complementary databases will enhance the tools available to educators, doctrine developers, and others interested in a more detailed search of approved doctrine and related materials.**

- **The JDEIS "doctrine developer function" will improve the joint doctrine development process by providing a largely automated doctrine staffing capability.**

A completely revamped JDEIS "user function" Web site will reach initial operational capability in the Fall of 2002. The site will feature revolutionary joint doctrine search capabilities and extensive linkages to related sites and material. Extensive user evaluation and feedback will be sought to improve the site. The JDEIS "doctrine developer" site recently began development. An alpha-test capability is projected in less than a year. When fully operational, these two complementary parts of JDEIS promise quantum leaps in our ability to develop, promulgate, present, and use joint doctrine.

JOINT AND ARMY DOCTRINE DIRECTORATE (JADD), HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (HQ, TRADOC)

By COL Mark E. Warner, USA Director

Doctrine–Training Development Integrated Process Team (IPT). TRADOC established a Doctrine-Training Development IPT in June 2002. The IPT is co-chaired by the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Doctrine, Operations, and Training; and consists of 17 primary members and 25 coordinating members. Key IPT objectives are to develop a technology-enabled doctrine/ training development system, establish better linkages between doctrine and training, more fully integrate key training personnel into the development process, maintain "jointness," and provide feedback on related organizational and resource issues. The IPT identified the need to separate enduring doctrine from TTP with separate development processes for each. The IPT also is in the process of assessing related technology-based initiatives to include the doctrine taxonomy initiative (DTI) and automated collaborative tools. Finally, the IPT also will focus on changing policy and procedures to ensure that we properly integrate our instructors, OCs and key operational units into the doctrine-training development process. Ultimately, the IPT will culminate in a concept-doctrine-training development system that produces concept-driven, doctrine-based, relevant, integrated, focused, standards-based, timely, user-friendly, products to support the Army.

Doctrine Taxonomy Initiative. The Intelligence Center and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is executing a proof of principle to demonstrate the potential of an *object-based publication* approach to doctrine. This initiative decomposes doctrine, select mission training plans (MTPs) and lessons learned into low level, stand-alone pieces of information that are assigned to a specific proponent. This technique is referred to as "chunking." Chunks are then tagged or classified for easy retrieval based on established relationships. The classification scheme used to tag the chunks is called a "taxonomy." Once the chunks are tagged according to the taxonomy, they become objects. Object-based doctrinal publications provide the soldier with combined arms and other doctrine that is tailored for their specific needs. Soldiers can then store this information in their "battlebook" for later use. Additionally, objects can also be reassembled as field manuals (FM). A proof of principle test for the DTI is scheduled to be executed beginning in the 1st Quarter of FY 03. The test plan is under development and will be completed in late FY 02. The major goals of the test are to provide an evaluation of risks, costs and benefits to the Army leadership on the implementation and use of an object-based doctrinal publication system and validate the Army's tactical taxonomy in support of knowledge management. This proof of principle will use the Stryker Brigade Combat Team final draft FMs along with selected MTPs and lessons learned as base test material. The test will measure responsiveness and accuracy to soldier queries, taxonomy completeness, and level of effort required by doctrine developers to tag doctrinal materials.

TRADOC Installation Commander's Force Protection Handbook (FPHB). The publication was developed to explain the important aspects of FP, serve as a quick reference information source for TRADOC installation commanders and their staffs, operationalize the antiterrorism tasks, and consolidate key FP guidelines that are detailed in numerous references. The FPHB provides a user friendly, pocket size FP reference and procedural guide for implementing an installation FP program. It emphasizes the importance of building partnerships with the local community and other government entities. It provides tools to improve FP planning and execution. It focuses on the existing tactical tools to improve intelligence collection, reduce vulnerabilities and improve response capability. Bottom line: The FPHB provides an additional tool for commanders to deter, defend, and respond to FP threats. It was approved, published and distributed in July 2002. The FPHB is available online at *http://doctrine.army.mil/*.

Semi-Annual Army Doctrine Conference (SAADC) was held from 19 to 20 June 2002 in Hampton, VA. It provided a venue for updates and exchange of information on doctrine literature, the doctrine development process, and to conduct breakout meetings, for example, on the Doctrine - Training Development IPT. The Fall 2002 SAADC is scheduled for 29 and 30 October 2002 in Hampton, VA, and tentatively will include updates from JADD and other doctrine organizations. Additionally, our Joint Doctrine section, along with representatives from the Army G3, will facilitate an Army Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP) with selected invitees to develop an Army position on issues that will be discussed during the Joint Staff's 30th JDWP in mid-November 2002.

TRADOC Regulation (TR) 25-36, *The TRADOC Doctrinal Literature Program (TDLP)*, dated 5 April 2000, is under revision to capture new/changes in Army doctrine management and development. The final draft is being staffed for TRADOC Chief of Staff approval. The revised regulation will supercede TR 25-35 and TP 25-34, both dated 24 January 1992. It describes TRADOC's roles and responsibilities to manage, establish requirements, develop, and review doctrine to support Army, multi-Service, joint, and multinational operations. It applies to TRADOC and non-TRADOC agencies that have an

(Organization updates continued on next page)

established memorandum of agreement with HQ TRADOC.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS STATUS

JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations* addresses command relationships and considerations, and procedures and options for conducting joint land operations under a functional component commander. Second draft staffing is complete.

KEY ARMY PUBLICATIONS STATUS

FM 1-02 (formerly FM 101-5-1), *Operational Terms and Graphics*: The US Army Combined Arms Command/ Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CAC/CADD), has staffed the final draft and expects to publish the approved version in December 2002. It provides guidance for Army and Marine Corps commanders and staffs from company through corps in the use of land-based warfighting symbology.

FM 2-0 (formerly FM 34-1), *Intelligence Operations*: The US Army Intelligence Center, began development of FM 2-0 during the 2d Qtr, FY 02, with completion projected for the 3d Qtr, FY 03. It will describe how the intelligence system plans, directs, collects, processes, produces, and disseminates intelligence on the threat and environment across the range of Army operations outlined in FM 3-0, *Operations*.

FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*. CAC/CADD has reviewed, edited, and applied comments from the Doctrine Review and Approval Group (DRAG) version. FM 3-07 is Tier 1 doctrine (conceptual, not detailed) that amplifies Chapters 9 and 10 in FM 3-0. It also updates and consolidates FM 90-29, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*; FM 100-19, *Domestic Support Operations*; FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*; and FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*. Final approval and publication is estimated early in the 1st Qtr, FY 03.

FM 3-07.2, *Force Protection*, is a new FM from CAC/CADD. The initial draft is on hold pending resolution of the conflicting definitions of force protection—the definition used in FM 3-07.2 (as defined in FM 3-0; JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*; and JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*) is in conflict with the definition promulgated in AR 525-13. This issue should be resolved within the next quarter. FM 3-07.2 focuses on Army battalion through corps level units at bases and provides a general framework for operational force protection. FM 3-07.2's initial draft is scheduled for release in the 1st Qtr, FY 03; the final draft in the 3d Qtr, FY 03; the approved final draft in the 1st Qtr, FY 04; and publication during the 2d Qtr, FY 04.

FM 3-13 (formerly 100-6), *Information Operations (IO)*. CAC/CADD is planning a DRAG for early in the 1st Qtr, FY 03, and final publication later that quarter. FM 3-13 is the Army's overarching IO publication that builds on the foundation in FM 3-0's Chapter 11, "Information Superiority," and facilitates its transition to the information age.

FM 3-55 (formerly 100-55), *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations*. The initial draft will be released for staffing during the 2d Qtr, CY 03. This revision expands the scope to include intelligence and surveillance operations to balance the existing discussion on reconnaissance. This expansion will closely align it with FM 3-0 and JP 3-55, *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations*. FM 3-55 will describe the ISR system, how ISR capabilities are synchronized and coordinated to facilitate targeting and a common operational picture, and planning and executing ISR operations.

FM 3-91 (formerly 71-100), *Division Operations*. CAC/CADD's final draft is projected for staffing during the 4th Qtr, FY 02/1st Qtr, FY 03. FM 3-91 builds on the doctrine in FM 3-0, establishes warfighting as the Army's primary focus, and recognizes the ability to dominate any situation in military operations other than war. Its primary focus is the tactical level, however, it also discusses operational-level fundamentals for division participation in joint operations.

FM 3-92 (formerly 100-15), *Corps Operations*. CAC/CADD is the proponent. The program directive was approved in May 2002 and the initial draft should be released for staffing in the 1st Qtr, FY 03.

FM 3-93, *Larger Unit Operations* (formerly 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*), proponency shifted from the Army War College (now the technical review authority) to CAC/CADD in October 2001. The final draft is being prepared for release in the 1st Qtr, FY 03. FM 3-93 is the Army's overarching operational-level doctrine and is closely linked to FM 3-0 and JP 3-0. Its scope has been expanded to include discussions currently found in FM 3-100.16, *Army Operational Support*, and those on land component operations. FM 3-93 also will clarify the roles of Army forces (ARFOR), incorporate ARFOR lessons learned from recent operations in Kuwait, Bosnia, and Kosovo; and be embedded with FM 3-0 principles.

FM 3.100-21 (formerly 100-21), *Contractors on the Battlefield (COB)* defines the types of contractors and describes their relationship to the military chain of command. The primary audience is Army commanders and staff at all echelons involved in COB planning, deployment, management, and providing government furnished support and force protection to (and from)

contractor personnel. It has been revised to provide more TTP and incorporates lessons learned from recent military operations. FM 3-100.21 is awaiting CG, TRADOC approval.

FM 4-0 (formerly FM 100-10), *Combat Service Support*. Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) Combat Developments for Combat Service Support (CDC-CSS) is preparing the DRAG version for final approval and publication in the 1st Qtr, FY 03. FM 4-0 is keystone doctrine that links directly to FM 3-0 and serves as the primary source for CSS doctrine. It is intended to bridge the gap between subordinate Army and Joint and multinational logistic doctrine. It is written primarily for the legacy force, but also supports the transition to the objective force.

FM 5-0 (formerly FM 101-5), *Army Planning and Orders Production*. CAC/CADD is reviewing the final draft comments. The DRAG edition will be released in the 1st Qtr, FY 03 and final publication in the 2d Qtr, FY 03. FM 5-0 is a significant revision of the old *Staff Organization and Operations* manual and provides guidance for planning and orders production used by commanders from company through corps—the staff pieces were moved to FM 6-0, *Command and Control*. What remains is the military decision making process, and operations orders and plans. Further, troop leading procedures and problem solving techniques have been added. It also includes a start on transitional TTP for digitization and automated processes in digitized units. FM 5-0 will be distributed soon after FM 6-0 is approved so the field will understand where the contents of old FM 101-5 can be found.

FM 6-0 (formerly FM 100-34), *Command and Control* is a keystone manual that replaces FM 101-5. CAC/CADD conducted the DRAG video teleconference for its approval in April 2002. Approval was placed on hold pending resolution of the issue regarding the creation of a special staff section for IO. That issue was resolved by adding the IO special staff function under the G3. FM 6-0 will be published in late Fall 2002..

FM 7-0 (formerly FM 25-100), *Training the Force*. TRADOC DCST is incorporating information from CG TRADOC and the Army Training and Leadership Development Conference and finalizing data for approval. Publication is scheduled in the 1st Qtr, FY 03.

FM 7-15, *Army Universal Task List* (AUTL). CADD is staffing the DRAG version and approval is expected in the 1st Qtr, FY 03, with distribution in the 2d Qtr, FY 03. FM 7-15 serves as the catalog for Army collective tasks and assists doctrine and training developers with achieving standardization and reducing ambiguity.

KEY NATO PUBLICATIONS STATUS

AJP-3.2, *Land Operations*. A newly formed Doctrine Panel will convene in November 2002 to: 1) scope the requirement for doctrine to support "graduated readiness forces" and their assigned forces; 2) link the joint operational level described in AJP-3, *Operations*, with the land tactical level described in ATP-3.2; and 3) agree to the scope of land doctrine to support the land component commander, his headquarters, and assigned forces. The Doctrine Panel will review the existing and developing doctrine and procedures to include the Bi-SC GOP; ARRC TACSOPs; AJP-3.2.1, *Land Command and Control*; as well as national land component command doctrine.

STANAG 2199, *Command and Control of Land Forces*. The custodian is revising the 2d Study Draft, and pending approval of the Doctrine Panel meeting in November 2002, will release the Ratification Draft on 1 December 2002.

AJP-3.3.1, *Counter Air and Missile Defense*. A custodial meeting was convened at HQ NATO from 25 to 28 June 2002. The list of consolidated comments and proposed revisions to existing NATO definitions for counter air, active air defense, and centralized control; and developed definitions for passive air defense, defensive counter air, favorable air situation, airspace control means, decentralized execution, and combat identification were reviewed and adjudicated. The Terminology Committee is currently staffing these proposals through the French- and English-speaking nations. During November 2002, the 3d Study Draft is due out for review; on 28 February 2003, comments by nations/commands are due to the custodian; and on 31 March 2003, collated comments are due to the nations/commands in preparation for the custodial meeting in April 2003. The way ahead will be addressed at the 26th Air Operations Working Group (AOWG) also scheduled during April 2003.

AJP-3.3.4, *Supporting Air Operations*. During the Custodial Meeting in June 2002, a list of consolidated comments was reviewed and adjudicated. During October 2002, the 3d study draft was circulated to the nations/commands for review; on 31 January 2003, comments by the nations/commands are due; and on 31 March 2003 the custodian will send collated comments to the nations/commands in preparation for the custodial meeting in April 2003 and prior to the 26th AOWG. If there are no critical issues after the AOWG, the custodian will prepare the draft for ratification and forward it to the Air Board.

AJP-3.3.5, *Airspace Control in Crisis and War*. During the June 2002 custodial meeting, the list of consolidated comments was reviewed and adjudicated. On 30 September 2002, the 2d Study Draft was circulated to the nations/commands for review; on 31 December

(Organization updates continued on next page)

2002, the nations/commands submit comments to the custodian; and on 31 March 2003, the custodian sends collated comments to the nations/commands in preparation for a custodial meeting prior to the 26th AOWG in April 2003. Assuming no critical issues remain, the custodian will prepare and forward the draft to the Air Board for ratification.

STANAG 3797, *Minimum Qualifications for Forward Air Controllers*. During the 3 July 2002 custodial meeting, the members reviewed the collated 4th Study Draft comments. They agreed to remove all references to laser operators and initiate a new Study 7176, *FAC-Related Equipment And Procedures*. The Netherlands and United Kingdom delegates offered to be co-custodians of the study and the subsequent STANAG, and to host a custodial meeting in the Autumn of 2002. On 16 August 2002, the custodian sent the ratification draft to the Air Board for distribution; on 1 November 2002, a custodial meeting will be convened; during January 2003, STANAG 7176 will be circulated and the results reported at the 26th AOWG in April 2003.

ATP-27(C) (AJP-3.3.2), *Air Interdiction and Close Air Support (CAS)*; and ATP-63 (AJP-3.3.2.1) *Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support Operations*. Both publications are directly tied to STANAG 3797. The members of the 24th AOWG agreed that these ATPs would not be changed until STANAG 3797 is ratified. They discussed and agreed to review CAS per current operations to improve and broaden CAS doctrine and address the complex environment of coalition operations. During November 2002, the custodian will convene a meeting in Germany to provide the basis for the development of AJP-3.3.2; on 31 March 2003, the results of the custodial meeting will be circulated for discussion at the 26th AOWG. All nations agreed to participate in the custodial meeting.

HEADQUARTERS, AIR FORCE DOCTRINE CENTER (HQ, AFDC/DJ)

By Lt Col John P. Klatt, USAF

AFDC/DJ bids farewell to Maj Dale Bruner and wishes him good luck. Fortunately, we also welcomed two new members—Lt Col Marc Okyen (C-130 Nav) arrived from the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, AL, and Maj Kathleen Stancik (Intel) from NATO's Interim Deployable Combined Air Operations Center in Ramstein, GE. Kathleen is assuming Maj Bruner's responsibilities.

The following paragraphs reflect the October 2002 status of joint publications for which the USAF is either the lead agent or primary review authority:

- **JPs 3-01.1, *Aerospace Defense of North America*, and 3-02.2, *Joint Doctrine for Offensive Operations for Countering Air and Missile Threats***, are on hold pending resolution of the joint doctrine consolidation plan.

- **JP 3-03, *Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations***, is due for revision. Areas of interest raised in its formal assessment were the interdiction definition, lessons learned from recent operations, interdiction operations other than air interdiction, information operations, and targeting. Expect the first draft of the revision program directive or a joint working group in the Winter of 2002.

- **JP 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations***, is in final coordination. Comments are due to Joint Staff doctrine sponsor by 29 November 2002.

- The second draft of **JP 3-52, *Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone***, is scheduled for release during this printing.

- **JP 3-55, *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations***, recently completed comment resolution on the third review. There currently is no date set for a joint working group. Maj Stancik will assume responsibilities associated with its development.

Approved Air Force Doctrine Documents are available on our Internet Web site at *https://www.doctrine.af.mil*, and on the SIPRNET at *http://www.doctrine.af.smil.mil*.

MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND (MCCDC), DOCTRINE DIVISION, JOINT BRANCH

By Maj Tim Flanagan, USMC

The Marine Corps is in various stages of developing/revising four of the five joint publications for which we are the lead agent.

The revised JP 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations*, was signed by the Joint Staff on 16 September 2002 and is available on the world-wide-web in the Joint Electronic Library.

We submitted the adjudicated second draft of JP 3-02.1, *Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations*, to the Joint Staff J7 during August 2002. The Final Coordination draft should be released by Joint Staff J7

sometime in October 2002 and will then be available for review. The second Joint Working Group announcement message should be released during mid-November 2002.

The revision process for JP 3-07.5, *JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)* is underway. The responses to the Request For Feedback message were submitted to the JWFC in late July 2002. In October, the formal assessment was submitted to the Joint Staff J7 and the Program Directive will follow.

The adjudicated first draft of JP 3-02.2, *JTTP for Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation*, was submitted to the Joint Staff J7 during October 2002. The Second draft should be released by Joint Staff J7 sometime in November 2002 and will then be available for review. The publication's revised Program Directive changed the title to include debarkation, as well as changing the scope from joint doctrine to JTTP.

We hosted a Joint Working Group in July 2002 to adjudicate all of the critical and major comments from the second draft of JP 3-09.3, *JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)*. The Final Coordination draft was released during September 2002. Final Coordination comments are due to the J-3 sponsor late November 2002.

THE "NEW" UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND (USSTRATCOM)

By Maj Dennis "Mike" Howry, USAF

On 1 October 2002, history was made as the Unified Command Plan established a "new" combatant command, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). As the "new" USSTRATCOM stands up, global threats mandate a cohesive, integrated approach to our nation's defense. Our adversaries are operating worldwide without boundaries to develop missile technology and acquire weapons of mass destruction. Rising from the unification of US Space Command and the "old" USSTRATCOM, the "new" USSTRATCOM provides the President improved responsiveness and better command and control over strategic missions by placing them under a single combatant commander. The "new" USSTRATCOM construct will improve our ability to warn, deter, and defend against nuclear and non-nuclear attack through a space and information capabilities focus.

While USSTRATCOM assumes the previously assigned responsibilities of the "old" USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM, other mission areas have emerged. Areas such as DOD information operations (IO), missile defense, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and global strike are under study and consideration for assignment to a combatant command. If USSTRATCOM is assigned the responsibility for these missions, we foresee the reexamination of several joint doctrine publications.

For example, the proposed JP 3-70, *Strategic Attack*, directly relates to the global strike mission which addresses the capability to plan for rapid, limited-duration strikes to deliver extended-range precision kinetic (nuclear and conventional) and non-kinetic (space and elements of IO) effects. Other mission areas such as DOD IO, missile defense, and C4ISR may also generate doctrinal revisions. Strategic IO focuses on integrating and coordinating operations which crosses geographic areas of responsibility and involves core IO capabilities. Therefore, it may influence modifications to JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*. Similarly, global missile defense responsibilities may generate changes to publications like JP 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats*. C4ISR responsibilities may impact JP 3-55, *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations* and "above the line" JP 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support for Joint Operations* and JP 6-0, *Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations*.

From nuclear and space operations perspective, USSTRATCOM remains the lead agent for JP 3-12, *Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations*, and assumes lead agent responsibilities for JP 3-14, *Joint Doctrine for Space Operations*. JP 3-12 is in its first draft after incorporating results from the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Draft JP 3-12 now articulates the new NPR strategy for US defense planning, which is no longer limited to specific countries or small numbers of contingencies. Instead, the new strategy broadens the strategic perspective through a capabilities-based approach that focuses more on how an adversary might fight than who the adversary might be and where a war might occur. Additionally, the NPR defined, and JP 3-12 now conveys, a new Triad of strategic offensive and defensive capabilities that include nuclear and non-nuclear strike capabilities, active and passive defenses, and a robust research, development, and industrial infrastructure to develop, build, and maintain offensive forces and defensive systems. Lastly, while we do not envision the stand up of the "new" USSTRATCOM to generate immediate changes to either 3-12 or 3-14, we certainly anticipate future doctrinal revisions as new missions emerge.

29TH JOINT DOCTRINE WORKING PARTY

To review the minutes of the May 2002 JDWP and past JDWPs, navigate to:

www.dtic.mil/doctrine/working_party.htm.

(Organization updates continued on next page)

AIR LAND SEA APPLICATION (ALSA) CENTER

By Col Ken Murphy, USAF, Director

ALSA continues to fulfill its mission of meeting the needs of the joint warfighter. Recently, ALSA filled an important gap when it completed "J-Fire," a pocket-sized publication that addresses requests for joint fire support. During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, it was recognized that the new weapons and methods being used created a need for different procedures to control calls for fire and to help reduce the possibilities of friendly fire incidents. J-Fire is ALSA's answer and it should be reaching our troops in the field very soon. A new publication that is on our front burner is *Air Defense of the United States (ADUS)*. This "fast track" publication will provide guidance and information for successful joint/interagency homeland air defense. *ADUS* will serve as a single-source quick reference to facilitate decision-making, planning, and execution of homeland air defense operations at all levels, primarily focused on the tactical-level warfighter. It will also seek to clarify the relationship between the various command and control nodes, organizations, and agencies involved in homeland air defense operations.

ALSA is currently in the midst of a bottom-up review of our organization that is yielding innovative ideas that will speed our multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) development, improve its quality, and streamline our organization. Our ongoing review has already identified the need to provide an "urgency-tailored" approach to producing MTTPs as well as to conduct studies, and develop contingency operations procedures. Advances in technology, coupled with an increased need to respond quickly to the warfighter, have dictated that ALSA abandon its "one-size-fits-all" process for all projects. We have developed three MTTP production processes so our response to an interoperability problem can be tailored to the warfighter's specific needs. ALSA now has a streamlined, 12-month start-to-finish standard process to fill the essential needs of joint warfighter. Additionally, we now have a six-month

CURRENT ALSA PUBLICATIONS

TITLE--DATE	POC
AMCI: *Army and Marine Corps Integration in Joint Operations*—NOV 01	Team F
ARM-J: *Antiradiation Missile Employment in a Joint Environment* (SECRET)—Jul 02	Team A
AVIATION URBAN OPERATIONS: *Multiservice Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations*--APR 01	Team E
BMO: *Bomber Maritime Operations* (SECRET)--JUN 00	Team E
BREVITY: *Multi-Service Brevity Codes*—FEB 02	Team F
EOD: *Multi-Service Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a Joint Environment*--MAR 01	Team B
ICAC2: *Multi-Service Procedures for Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control*--JUN 00	Team D
JAAT: *Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Attack Team Operations*--JUN 98	Team A
JAOC/AAMDC Coordination: *MTTP for Joint Air Operations Center(JAOC) and Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) Coordination*--JAN 01	Team D
JATC: *Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Traffic Control*--JAN 99	Team F
J-FIRE: *MTTP for Joint Application of Firepower*—SEP 02	Team A
JIADS: *Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Integrated Air Defense System* (Distribution Restricted)--JUN 01	Team D
J-SEAD: *MTTP for the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses* (SECRET)--SEP 00	Team A
J-STARS: *MTTP for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System* (SECRET)--JUL 97	Team D
JTF IM: *Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Task Force Information Management*--APR 99	Team G
JTF LIAISON HANDBOOK: *MTTP for Joint Task Force (JTF) Liaison Operations*--AUG 98	Team B
JTMTD: *Joint Theater Missile Target Development*--OCT 99	Team D
NBC DEFENSE OF FIXED SITES: *MTTP for NBC Defense of Theater Fixed Sites, Ports, and Airfields*--SEP 00	Team E
NLW: *MTTP for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons*--OCT 98	Team C
RECCE-J: *Multi-Service Procedures for Requesting Reconnaissance Information in a Joint Environment*--JUN 96	Team G
REPROGRAMMING: *Handbook for Reprogramming of Electronic Warfare and Target Sensing Systems* (Distribution Restricted)--APR 98	Team G
RM: *MTTP for Risk Management*--FEB 01	Team C
SURVIVAL, EVASION, AND RECOVERY: *Multi-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery*--JUN 99	Team B
TADIL-J: *Introduction to Tactical Digital Information Link J and Quick Reference Guide*--JUN 00	Team C
TAGS: *Multi-Service Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System*--JUL 98	Team D
TACTICAL RADIOS: *Multiservice Communications Procedures for Tactical Radios in a Joint Environment*—JUN 02	Team C
TMD IPB: *Multi-Service Procedures for Theater Missile Defense and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*—MAR 02	Team G
UXO: *Multi-Service Procedures for Unexploded Explosive Ordnance Operations*--AUG 01	Team B
E-mail = *alsa#@langley.af.mil* -- NOTE: Replace # with team letter (e.g., for Team A use "a")	

"Fast Track" process for priority needs and a 30-day "Urgent Pub" process for critical needs.

Another initiative that has emerged from our bottom-up-review is the ALSA Outreach Program. While staying connected to the tactical customer has always been a priority of ALSA, we now will send ALSA action officers to visit combat units, schools, and other tactical level organizations to increase awareness of ALSA, uncover interoperability problems that might be addressed by MTTP, and gather feedback on current publications.

As always, ALSA is meeting the warfighter's immediate needs. Additional information on ALSA, its mission, and its products can be found at *http://www.dtic.mil/alsa/*.

REVISIONS AND NEW PROJECTS

TITLE	EST PUB DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION AND STATUS
J-FIRE (Revision): ***MTTP for Joint Application of Firepower***	Sep 02	A: FM 3-09.32 M: MCRP 3-16.8B N: NWP 3-09.2 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2..6	This revision is a pocket-size guide of procedures for calls for fire, CAS, and naval gunfire. **Current Status:** The signature draft is out for command approval. **POC: Team A** alsaa@langley.af.mil
JSTARS (Revision): ***MTTP for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System***	Nov 02	A: FM 2-00.1 M: MCRP 2-1E N: NWP 3-55.13 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.2	This revision provides procedures for the employment of the J-STARS system in dedicated support to Corps commanders and other ground commanders. The revision will be unclassified. **Current Status**: Preparing signature draft **POC: Team D** alsad@langley.af.mil
JTF IM (Revision): *Multiservice Procedures for Joint Task Force Information Management*	Jun 03	A: FM 6-02.85 (FM 101-4) M: MCRP 3-40.2A (MCRP 6-23A) N: NWP 3-13.1.16 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.22	This publication describes how to manage, control, and protect information in a JTF headquarters conducting continuous operations. **Current status:** 2nd JWG scheduled for 22-25 Oct 02 **POC: Team G** alsag@langley.af.mil
JTF LNO INTEGRATION (Revision): ***MTTP for Joint Task Force Liaison Officer Integration***	Jan 03	A: FM 5-01.12 (FM 90-41) M: MCRP 5-1B N: NTTP 5-02 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.21	This revision defines liaison functions and responsibilities associated with standing up a JTF. **Current Status:** Preparing signature draft. **POC: Team B** alsab@langley.af.mil
JTMTD (Revision): *Multiservice Procedures Joint Theater Missile Target Development*	Jul 03	A: FM 3-01.51 (FM 90-43) M: MCRP 3-43.3A N: NWP 3-01.13 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.24	This publication establishes common framework for Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines responsible for IPB sensor employment, collection management, current and future operations, target development, and force application against an adversary's theater missile forces. **Current Status:** First draft out to SMEs **POC: Team D** alsad@langley.af.mil
NLW (Revision): ***MTTP for Tactical Nonlethal Weapons***	Nov 02	A: FM 90-40 M: MCRP 3-15.8 N: NWP 3-07.31 CG:USCGPub 3-07.31 AF: N/A	This revision describes tactical nonlethal weapons and addresses their employment in operational environments. **Current Status:** Preparing signature draft. **POC: Team C** alsac@langley.af.mil
PEACE OPERATIONS: ***MTTP for Peace Operations***	Jan 03	A: 3-07.31 M: TBD N: TBD AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.40	This publication provides the tactical level guidance to the warfighter for conducting peace operations. **Current Status**: The final coordination draft is in staffing. **POC: Team E** alsae@langley.af.mil
Reprogramming: ***MTTP for reprogramming of Electronic Warfare and Target Sensing***	Nov 02	A: FM 3-51.1 (FM 43-72) M: MCRP 3-40.5B N: NTTP 3-13.1.15 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.7	This MTTP supports the JTF staff in the planning, coordinating, and executing of reprogramming of electronic warfare and target sensing systems as part of joint force command and control warfare operations. **Current Status**: Preparing signature draft **POC: Team G** alsag@langley.af.mil
SURVIVAl (Revision): MTTP for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery	Mar 03	A: FM 3-50.3 (FM 21-76-1) M: MCRP 3-02H N: NWP 3-50.3 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.26	This publication provides a weather-proof, pocket-sized, quick reference guide of basic survival information to assist Service members in a survival situation regardless of geographic location. **Current status**: Final coordination draft out for staffing. **POC: Team B** alsab@langley.af.mil
TAGS (Revision): ***MTTP for Theater Air Ground System***	Jan 03	A: FM 3-52.2 M: MCRP 3-25F N: NWP 3-56.2 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.17	This revision describes the concept, systems, and procedures for joint and component air-ground operations. **Current Status**: Preparing signature draft **POC: Team D** alsad@langley.af.mil
E-mail = *alsa#@langley.af.mil* -- NOTE: Replace # with team letter (e.g., for Team A use "a")			

(Organization updates continued on next page)

REVISIONS AND NEW PROJECTS (CONT)			
TITLE	**EST PUB DATE**	**PUB #**	**DESCRIPTION AND STATUS**
ADUS: *MTTP for AIR DEFENSE of the United States* **(SECRET)**	TBD	A: TBD M: TBD N: TBD AF: TBD	This MTTP supports planners, warfighters, and interagency personnel participating in air defense of the US by providing general information for planning, coordination, and execution in homeland air defense missions. Pub is primarily focused at the tactical level. Includes Operation NOBLE EAGLE lessons learned. **Current Status:** Program approval package submitted to Services. **POC: Team F** alsaf@langley.af.mil
COMBAT CAMERA: ***MTTP for Joint Combat Camera Operations***	Apr 03	A: FM 3-55.12 M: MCRP 3-33.7A N: TBD AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.41	This publication will fill the void that exists regarding combat camera doctrine, and assist JTF commanders in structuring and employing combat camera assets as an effective operational planning tool. **Current Status:** The final coordination draft is in world wide review. **POC: Team G** alsag@langley.af.mil
HF-ALE ***High Frequency-Automatic Link Establishment Radios***	Jul 03	A: FM 6-02.74 M: MCRP 3-40.5B N: TBD AF: TBD	This MTTP would consolidate that expertise and standardize HF-ALE radio operations across the Services. **Current Status:** Program approval package submitted to Services **POC: Team C** alsac@langley.af.mil
IDM ***(Improved Data Modem)***	Nov 02	A: FM 6-02.76 M: MCRP 3-25G N: TBD AF: TBD	This publication provides digital connectivity to a variety of attack and reconnaissance aircraft; facilitates exchange of near-real-time targeting data and improves tactical situational awareness by providing a concise picture of the multi-dimensional battlefield. **Current Status:** Preparing signature draft **POC: Team C** alsac@langley.af.mil
IFF: ***MTTP for Mk XII IFF Mode 4 Security Issues in a Joint Integrated Air Defense System*** **(SECRET)**	Nov 02	A: FM 3-01.61 M: MCRP 3-25.11 N: NTTP 3-01.6 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.39	The publication will educate the warfighter to security issues associated with using the Mark XII IFF Mode 4 Combat Identification System in a joint integrated air defense environment. It will capture TTP used today by the warfighter that can address those security issues. **Current Status**: Preparing signature draft **POC: Team A** alsaa@langley.af.mil
JAOC / AAMDC (Revision): MTTP *for Joint Air Operations Center and Army Air and Missile Defense Command Coordination*	Aug 03	A: FM 3-01.20 M: MCRP 3-25.4A N: NTTP 3-01.6 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.30	This revision will address coordination requirements between the joint air operations center and the Area Air and Missile Defense Command. It will assist the JFC, Joint Force Air Component Commander, and their principal staff in developing a coherent approach to preparation and execution of combat operations. **Current Status:** JWG #1 scheduled for 29 Oct – 1 Nov 02 **POC: Team D** alsad@langley.af.mil
JATC (Revision): *Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Traffic Control*	Jun 03	A: FM 3-52.3 (FM 100-104) M: MCRP 3-25A N: NWP 3-56.3 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.23	This revision is a ready reference source for guidance on air traffic control (ATC) responsibilities, procedures, and employment in a joint environment. Details Service relationships for initial, follow-on, and sustained ATC operations within the theater or AOR. Outlines processes for synchronizing and integrating forces and specialized ATC equipment. **Current status**: First Draft out to SMEs **POC: Team F** alsaf@lanfley.af.mil

NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND (NWDC)

Fleet Battle Experiment Juliet (FBE-J) was conducted as part of Exercise MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002 (MC 02). FBE-J investigated joint command, control, and force projection from the sea; while simultaneously gaining and assuring access within a joint operating area. One of the primary Navy initiatives during the experiment was to test an experimental maritime planning process to support development of draft JP 3-32, *Command and Control of Joint Maritime Operations*. The experiment incorporated live, virtual, and constructive elements of all the Services and joint special operations forces in a federated, simulation environment. Commander, Second Fleet was the joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) with Commander, Third Fleet and Commander, Carrier Group Three staffs as the core JFMCC staff.

The experimental maritime planning process used a maritime tasking order (MTO) to provide maritime integration into the joint force. NWDC developed the experimental maritime planning process based on the mature joint targeting and planning cycle. The process as implemented for this experiment was focused on MTO production vice a concurrent deliberate planning process.

The JFMCC produced 18 MTOs which included air, surface, and subsurface missions. The average MTO consisted of approximately 320 missions—half were tactical air and half were surface ship; submarine;

helicopter; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions employing 2007 capabilities. The MTO was integrated with the air tasking order (ATO). These merged databases were then promulgated creating a "joint" tasking order" containing all air and maritime missions. The process increased joint force visibility into maritime operations and tasking.

The integrated MTO-ATO required synchronization between the JFMCC and the joint force air component commander staffs throughout the entire planning process. Utilization of advanced collaborative tools (information workspace, share point portal server, voice over Internet protocol, video teleconferencing) facilitated this synchronization to support development of campaign strategy, target selection, force allocation, and dynamic execution.

MC 02/FBE-J spirals and field experiments provided a valuable opportunity to develop joint doctrine using field validated results. The experiment results will support further development of doctrine to clearly define the planning and execution responsibilities of the JFMCC and subordinate staffs. Draft JP 3-32 will benefit from the experiment results. NWDC's mission to co-evolve concepts, technology, and doctrine through aggressive Service and joint experimentation programs was fulfilled through this effort.

KEY INTERNET/SIPRNET SITES

CJCS Joint Doctrine:
- NIPRNET: *http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine*
- SIPRNET: http//nmcc20a.nmcc.smil.mil/ dj9j7ead/doctrine
- DOCNET: *http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ tointer.htm*

Presidential Directives and Executive Orders: *http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/direct.htm*
DOD Directives: *http://www.defenselink.mil/*
Joint Chiefs of Staff: *http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/*
USJFCOM JWFC: *http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil/*
JWFC Research Library: *http://elib1.jwfc.js.mil*
Joint Center for Lessons Learned Database:
SIPRNET: *http://www.jcll.jwfc.jfcom.smil.mil*
Army Training and Doctrine Digital Library: *http://155.217.58.58/atdls.htm*
TRADOC: *http://www-tradoc.army.mil/*
Navy Warfare Development Command: *http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/*
Air Force Doctrine Center: *http://www.hqafdc.maxwell.af.mil/Main.asp*
MCCDC, Doctrine Division: *http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil/*
USEUCOM Publications: *http://www.eucom.milpublications/index.htm*
Air Land Sea Application Center:
- NIPRNET: *http://www.dtic.mil/alsa*
- SIPRNET: *http://wwwacc.langley.af.smil.mil/alsa*

COMMON JOINT TASK FORCE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE

Early in October, USJFCOM J7 Doctrine Division released an author's first draft of the *Common Joint Task Force Standard Operating Procedure* (*JTFHQ SOP*) for review by the USJFCOM Directorates and Staff. The *Common JTFHQ SOP* was largely developed from the *USPACOM JTF SOP*, incorporating items from several other geographic combatant commands' JTF SOPs. The intent of the SOP is to develop a common set of procedures that a component headquarters can use when they are tasked to form and execute operations as a JTF. It will assist the rapid integration of subordinate units that are assigned to the JTF.

The results of this internal staffing were incorporated into a final author's first draft of the *Common JTFHQ SOP* and forwarded to the field for additional staffing on 1 November 2002. Unlike joint doctrine publications, the *Common JTFHQ SOP* was sent directly from USJFCOM to the other geographic combatant commands for their input. Concurrently, USJFCOM sent this publication to likely users for review (i.e., all US Army Corps Headquarters, Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters, numbered Naval Fleets, and numbered Air Forces).

The field comments are due back to USJFCOM Doctrine Division on 16 December 2002. We will subsequently review the comments and determine whether a working group is necessary to adjudicate critical and major comments. If necessary, the working group will convene at the Joint Warfighting Center in Suffolk, VA, from 14-16 January 03 (proposed date). The *Common JTFHQ SOP* will be completed in February 2003 and a technical review will be conducted in March 2003, with the final product delivered to the Joint Staff for worldwide release on 31 March 2003.

Future versions of the document will be Web-based. Our goal is to have an HTML version for worldwide release in March 03. Until USJFCOM JWFC Doctrine Division is successful in creating a hypertext markup language (HTML) version, all versions will be produced in MS Word on a CD-ROM and mailed to recipients. We believe that the *Common JTFHQ SOP* will assist a commander in the field with establishing a JTF for any type of operation. We welcome any comments that you may have that will help make this product more complete and useful.

POCs are (primary) LTC Thomas Graves, Deputy Chief, Doctrine Division (gravest@jwfc.jfcom.mil), DSN 668-6101, Comm (757) 686-6101; (alternate), Mr. Jon Gangloff, JW2103, DSN 668-6127, Comm (757) 686-6127; and (backup), MAJ Michelle Burkhart, JW114, DSN 668-6066, Comm (757)-686-6066.

THE UNITED KINGDOM'S FUTURE DOCTRINE STRUCTURE

FOCUSING ON THE COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDER

By Lt Col Jonathan Campbell, UK Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, MOD Shrivenham

> *"The Commander must decide how he will fight the battle before it begins. He must then decide how he will use the military effort at his disposal to force the battle to swing the way he wishes it to go; he must make the enemy dance to his tune from the beginning, and never vice versa."*
>
> **Field Marshall Viscount Montgomery**

You are a British commander with the potential to be selected for an upcoming combined and joint operation. Your background will have been in the maritime, land, or air environments; but you may also have served in several joint posts, including the UK's Joint Staff College and the Permanent Joint Headquarters; and you would certainly have experience of one or more combined operations as a component commander.

You watch an unfolding world situation with the dawning realisation you are the one best placed to lead this operation. There is no scope for failure—particularly in understanding your unique role. Your experience will help of course but this time things are different. You will command other components, even other nations. You need to know what they can do for the overall effort, but also, as importantly, what they will expect from you. Secondly, you have to produce the recipe for success but now at the operational level. When and how should you act in this complex environment?

Currently, our United Kingdom (UK) commanders have adequate doctrine available to them, but it is really focussed on what their staff has to do. We have evolved into a position where the high level philosophy is well articulated and understood (and lives in the publication *British Defence Doctrine*, which sits at the very top of our doctrine hierarchy). However, below that, the enduring principles are laid out elsewhere, and it is certainly true that for the commander they have become obscured. It is a situation that means, apart from his individual intuition, throughout his appointment the commander has no clear bespoke guidance. We believe this is a significant gap that, in the modern security context, is unacceptable.

A small team at the UK's Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC) intends to put this right. This organisation sits within the policy area of the UK's Ministry of Defence, but are physically located in the heart of the Oxfordshire countryside, England. We intend to produce the guidance that is so clearly lacking in the form of a joint doctrine publication, which will sit as the sole document in the second tier of our joint doctrine hierarchy.

Although early days in the project's life, some key drivers are shaping our work. We know that we must satisfy the following criteria:

- We must provide guidance, based on successful commanders' previous experience, and not produce a conditioning mechanism!

- Our publication must be multinational from the outset. We feel we have lots of useful experience, but we want to draw on the experiences of the US and other allies, in order to place the UK's efforts in its proper context.

- Size does matter. We believe that in this case the most useful doctrine must be concise and to the point. We must produce something in the most comfortable format for a high level commander.

The Joint Doctrine Publication will be in two parts, broken down as illustrated below:

- **Part One—The Operational Context** explains the strategic security environment within which deployed joint operations take place to ensure the commander understands this high level activity in terms of both decision making and operational direction. The main components are the strategic security environment, levels of war, strategic decision-making—political and military interaction.

- **Part Two—The Joint Force** considers the commander's force and what it does with the direction the commander received. The main sections are the characteristics of the operational level, the nature of joint operations, and building



Figure 1. The Basic Elements of Joint Operations

and fighting the force. The commander must understand the overarching concepts and enduring themes of deployed joint operations and the pivotal role the commander plays in achieving success.

Some of our early conclusions are as follows:

- The nature of the operating environment has changed—completely. Previously, different types of operation were delineated in space and time, but we now have different operations going on in the same joint operating area. For example, take Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, juxtaposed with a major peace support operation in Kabul under the International Security and Assistance Force.

- We must reinforce the critical role the commander plays in 'energising' the circuits of his organisation.

- We must hone our planning processes and decision making to the point where we can make operational leaps. This is more difficult with a newly formed or multinational organisation—until they get used to working with each other, but this luxury might not be available.

- We need to focus our efforts on the outcome of the decision making process; the best course of action, a plan that will win. We think Figure 1 illustrates the stages of this process:

Because our project will have a fundamental effect on the rest of the UK's doctrine hierarchy, significant tidying up will be needed with some of the other hierarchy capstone documents. We very much value the opinion and experience of the US joint community and so the Assistant Director Doctrine of the UK's Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, Colonel Colin Boag, will explain our work more fully at the 30th Joint Doctrine Working Party at Suffolk, VA, from 13-15 November 2002.

WORDS DO MATTER

By LTC Thomas C. Graves, USA, Deputy Chief, Doctrine and Joint Center for Lessons Learned Division, Joint Warfighting Center

"Yes, TACON means that a subordinate commander can change the mission of the unit TACON to him." Many of the students disagreed with these words, spoken by their instructor at the Joint Forces Staff College. The consensus of the students within the classroom was that the role of TACON did not allow a subordinate commander to change the mission of the unit given to him under the command authority of Tactical Control. Words do matter and having recently been appointed as a "doctrinaire," I recalled this discussion and so proceeded to take an informal poll of the office to see what the consensus was among my fellow doctrinaires. The results of our discussion only served to reemphasize to me the importance of clearly defined doctrinal definitions and concepts to the joint force.

We began by looking at the definition of TACON and comparing it with the definition of OPCON. As stated in JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, TACON is defined as "command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned." That begged the question of who assigns the mission. A comparison of OPCON showed that OPCON specifies "authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions *assigned to the command* (emphasis added)."

Our next step was to consult Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. The UNAAF goes on to further define the command relationships. For OPCON, it specifies that the commander with operational control has the authority to "employ forces within the command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command." It further goes on to state that OPCON includes the authority to "plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the action of subordinate forces." TACON, as described in the UNAAF, provides the authority to "give direction for military operations" and "control designated forces." TACON provides the authority for "controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets."

The fundamental question of whether a subordinate commander can assign or change the mission of the unit in a TACON relationship remained unanswered. Reviewing these definitions only led to more questions. We spent some time attempting to define what "give direction" and "controlling and directing" meant in the definition of TACON, vice "employ" and "plan for, direct, control, and coordinate" in the definition of OPCON. We continued to debate the meaning of the two words for another half hour until we decided that we were not going to solve the question and tabled the discussion for a later time. It reminded me of a similar discussion as the Chief of Plans for an ARFOR assigned to a JTF formed from a US Marine Corps element. At that time, the discussion was a little more heated with more than just good "academic debate" at stake. Specifically, the issue concerned an Army military police unit assigned TACON to the MARFOR for use in the Joint Rear Area, and what the MARFOR could do with that unit within that command relationship. Because neither party could agree what the doctrinal definition of TACON allowed, the issue was resolved by consensus and compromise – precisely what we don't want to have happen when we write authoritative doctrine.

As doctrinaires, one of our primary functions is to take the ambiguity out of doctrine and provide clear authoritative guidance to the warfighter. Words do matter and if the words we write can be misinterpreted, they will be misinterpreted, sometimes to the detriment of the entire joint force. Misinterpretations can lead to rather heated discussions and arguments between good people simply trying to do their best for the joint force. However, much worse than a simple argument, if the definition is not clear for a doctrinal term, one commander may think that another commander is talking about the same thing, when in fact the two are talking past each other. The results of this can be horrendous. For this reason, as you go to rewrite or revise or define a doctrinal position, matter, or definition, choose your words wisely. There is no predicting what effect a simple word or two can have on a future joint operation. Words do matter.

TERMINOLOGY CURRENCY

Users of JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, should note that printed versions quickly become dated and they should go online to get the most current information. Navigate to:

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf

THE LAST WORD

By Mr. Tom Barrows, USJFCOM JWFC, Doctrine Support Group, Cornerstone Industry Inc.

> *"The Service isn't what it used to be—and never was."*
>
> **Service saying**
> **Dictionary of Military and**
> ***Naval Quotations*, 1966**

I normally have great disdain for statements of the obvious, but just in case there are a few folks out there who haven't gotten the word; the world has entered an era of great change. Those of us who serve in or otherwise support the Armed Forces of the United States already are well embarked on that journey. Transformation, and all the term entails, has become an overarching consideration in all aspects of US military life. I haven't seen or been able to locate a specific definition for transformation, and the end state for transformation of US military forces seems to vary widely among different audiences. In a prepared statement for the Senate Armed Forces Committee Hearing on Military Transformation on 9 April of this year, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said ". . . transformation is about changing the military culture into one that encourages, in Secretary Rumsfeld words, "innovation and intelligent risk taking."" If you are interested in understanding the overarching DOD policy for military transformation, I highly recommend you read the entire text of Mr. Wolfowitz's statement. It is available on the web at *http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020409-depsecdef2.html*.

Transformation issues in the joint doctrine and training arenas already are providing a plethora of terminology challenges. Emerging joint operational concepts and the results of joint and Service experimentation are being staffed in the joint doctrine community as potential changes to approved and emerging joint doctrine through DOTMLPF (**D**octrine, **O**rganization, **T**raining, **M**ateriel, **L**eadership and Education, **P**ersonnel, **F**acilities) packages. There are lots of new ideas for doing joint business in these packages, and several have a great deal of merit. We must continue to review these packages with an eye toward maintaining terminology consistency. Many concept developers and experimentation gurus seem to have the notion that totally new terminology is required to develop new operational concepts or conduct joint or Service experiments. In my view, nothing could be further from the truth. By using approved joint terminology to the greatest extent possible, concept developers and experimentation gurus would provide the joint and Service warfighters with a better means to understand the concepts and analyze the experimentation results, thereby gaining a deeper appreciation for the potential "value added." In our reviews of these concepts and experimentation results, we should provide specific terminology recommendations to use the already approved terms and definitions or propose line-out/line-in changes to the already approved terms and definitions. In the case of completely new terms and definitions, we should insist that these terms and definitions be used consistently in the emerging concepts and experimentation results and be nominated for inclusion in JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.*

I'll close with an observation that appeared on a wall in the USJFCOM J9 (Joint Experimentation Directorate) working spaces recently: *Everybody wants transformation, but nobody wants to change.*

As always, keep your powder dry and be especially careful out there.

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