



A Common PERSPECTIVE

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Fueling the Engine of Change



FROM THE EDITORS

The April 2002 issue of *A Common Perspective* will continue our transition to a paperless format. **We are now offering electronic distribution of this newsletter via an e-mail attachment. To subscribe, follow the instructions in the insert on page 26.** We also are considering publishing *A Common Perspective* as an online journal. There are some online journals that are doctrinal in nature. Take a peek at the *Canadian Military Journal* at <http://www.journal.dnd.ca/> or the *Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* at <http://armyapp.dnd.ca/lfds/choose.asp>. The latter sometimes does not work well if you are browsing from a computer behind a firewall. If any of you know of a good online journal, please let us know. Currently, we post an electronic version of this newsletter on the Chairman's Joint Doctrine Web Site at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine> and on the "A Common Perspective" Web page reached via USJFCOM JWFC's Web site at <http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil>. The latter site also contains longer versions of various articles or supplemental information that didn't fit in the paper version. For example, you can view a [PowerPoint briefing on the overall shift to paperless doctrine](#).


The 29th Joint Doctrine Working Party will meet 8-9 May 2002 after missing the previous meeting due to the events of September 11, 2001. Among other items, this JDWP will consider proposals for a new joint doctrine master plan that recommends improvements to the joint doctrine development process; reducing the number of joint publications through consolidation, conversion to another publication types (e.g., handbook), or deletion;

redefining the terms "military doctrine" and "joint doctrine"; and creating a course of instruction for joint doctrine development. JDWP decisions regarding these important issues will require our collective best efforts.

This newsletter plays a significant role in the debates over new policy, concepts, and proposals, etc., that may prompt changes to joint doctrine. For example, this issue features articles that address deriving doctrine from concepts ([page 6](#)), functional componency ([page 10](#)), an analytical framework for doctrine writers ([page 13](#)), changing the crisis action planning process ([page 17](#)), operational net assessments ([page 34](#)), combatant commander's command and control options ([page 37](#)), and British defence doctrine ([page 39](#)). Your contributions to this newsletter are important to the joint community. We encourage you to contact us with your suggestions and articles so that *A Common Perspective* will continue to be used as a vehicle for the betterment of joint warfighting.



Dr. James Tritten
Executive Editor



Josiah McSpedden & Bob Hubner
Managing Editors

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MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDER, USJFCOM JWFC

By BrigGen Gordon C. Nash, USMC

Although not always in the limelight and sometimes hidden away, the Doctrine Division continues to provide the punch and power of a heavyweight fighter. Its impact on doctrine and current and future operations has been immeasurable and will be felt even more in the future.

A key USJFCOM mission is to lead the Department of Defense's "Transformation" efforts. Joint doctrine has a major role in accomplishing transformation. As JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, states, "**Joint doctrine— an "engine of change"** — serves as an important method for implementing change as forces train and build effective joint teams . . . The continuous application of joint doctrine in training and leader development also encourages development of new and innovative capabilities – including joint tactics, techniques, and procedures – that improve upon extant capabilities."

Joint doctrine can have its highest payoff in support of transformation through its ability to influence, among many items, concept development; other military doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and military education and training. Joint doctrine forms the baseline from which concept developers should knowingly depart— not a constraint. After development, sufficient experimentation, and review; a validated concept, which sprang from approved joint doctrine, should be quickly incorporated as new approved joint doctrine. Once incorporated, the new joint doctrine will prompt changes to other doctrine and TTP and have a cascading affect on US military education, training, organization, policy, plans, and programming. As an illustration, initial military education and training are done in conformance with military doctrine because it is the basis for understanding what our military is expected to do. When good military doctrine is internalized by the training and education afforded to individual soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen,



transformation is ready for actual execution on the battlefield. Further, military education and training using joint doctrine is key to the establishment of a joint culture. A familiar example of doctrine engineering military change is the adoption of the joint force air component commander (JFACC) organization into joint doctrine. JFACC became an expected element in a joint force commander's organization and other joint doctrine was modified accordingly. Ultimately, Service programs were adjusted to support this expectation (e.g., Army battlefield coordination detachment).

For joint doctrine to be an "["engine of change"](#)" those involved with it must be proactive and leaning forward— without falling over. There is a delicate balancing act in rapidly fielding joint doctrine based upon newly validated concepts and extant capabilities. To capture and efficiently apply this significant transforming force, the new Transformation Branch in Doctrine Division is exploring the relationships between concepts, experimentation, and doctrine with a view toward recommending a "concepts to doctrine process." Further, USJFCOM will continue to participate in bringing new joint doctrine into the schoolhouses, exercises, and actual operations so it will not merely be books on shelves. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said it best during his January 2002 speech at the National Defense University: "All the high-tech weapons in the world will not transform US Armed Forces unless we also transform the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise, and the way we fight."



USJFCOM JWFC DOC-DIV UPDATES

By **CAPT John Evanoff, USN, USJFCOM JWFC, Chief, Doctrine Division**

As the US military boldly marches into the 21st century, a debate is beginning. Learned men have recently said that "Doctrine is dead and concepts are the way ahead for change." Can it be; is JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, wrong in stating that doctrine is an "engine for change"; or is the truth somewhere in between? Although concepts may well be an "engine of transformation," in my view, doctrine remains an "engine of change" since we train to doctrine and doctrine sets the standards. Concepts could be described as unproven doctrine, and those concepts that survive the scrutiny of learned professionals and are proven through exercises and operations become doctrine and are recorded and codified as what we believe is the best way to fight. There is nothing to prohibit a commander from trying a concept in an exercise or operation when the situation warrants, however, it is always prudent to use concepts in which one has confidence, which essentially is doctrine. The danger with concepts replacing doctrine is they are like opinions. They need to be tested and proven before they graduate to prime time.

There is no doubt that concepts, along with lessons learned, are two key contributors to revitalizing the life blood of joint doctrine. For this reason, USJFCOM JWFC has reorganized its Joint Center for Lessons Learned under the Doctrine Division (JW100) and added a Transformation Branch to JW100. These changes are timely given the Department of Defense's focus on Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and transformation of the military. For example, we recently sent a JW100 team to US Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to observe detainee operations conducted by Joint Task Force (JTF)-160. Initial research indicated that there was very little information available to assist a JTF in preparing for detainee operations. The observations and other data collected will be analyzed to determine if there is sufficient material to develop a product (e.g., handbook, lessons-learned database, or pamphlet) for use by future JTF commanders and their staffs in conducting these types of operations. Further, in our efforts to support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in substantiating joint doctrine as an "engine of change," the Transformation Branch is exploring the relationships between concepts, experimentation, and doctrine with a view toward recommending a "concepts to doctrine process." If successful, the results of their work will be published in a future JWFC Pamphlet.

TRANSFORMATION BRANCH

The JW100 Transformation Branch was established to pursue doctrine-related initiatives that help achieve USCINCFCOM's transformation objectives. These initiatives are intended to institutionalize interaction with the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (JCDE) program and Joint Interoperability and Integration (JI&I) process; facilitate the development of joint doctrine from concepts; stimulate the discussion of emerging joint doctrine issues; and promote the use of joint doctrine. Examples of our transformation-related projects include:

- Reviewing USJFCOM J9 and JI&I group concepts and other relevant documents and advising both of key doctrine issues that relate to joint experimentation. The branch recently completed a special study on doctrine as an "engine of change."
- Developing a "process" pamphlet to JWFC Pam 1 to institutionalize interaction with JCDE and JI&I.
- Preparing a JTF HQ standing operating procedure.
- Participating in the recertification of joint professional military education (JPME) institutions through professional accreditation of joint education visits and with lead development agents on the certification of joint training courseware.
- Participating in initiatives such as the Joint Doctrine Master Plan (JDMP) revision and Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System implementation.
- Conducting an outreach program to improve the awareness of joint doctrine through JPME institutions and professional publications.

JWFC Pam 1, *Pamphlet for Future Joint Operations (PFJO)*, is an early product associated with these initiatives. Signed on 1 March, the PFJO and supporting work will facilitate changes to joint doctrine based on the good ideas and results that emerge from the JCDE and JI&I programs and associated transformation efforts. The PFJO discusses the relationship between concepts and doctrine, provides an overview of the current rapid decisive operations (RDO) integrating concept, and highlights the RDO-related experimentation objectives for the upcoming Exercise MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002. Our emphasis over the next few months will be on determining a process and organization of supporting documents that will capture, compare, assess, and integrate key ideas that could improve joint doctrine in the near-term. The Transformation Branch Chief is Dr. Jim Tritten, GS-14, at DSN 686-7236 or e-mail: tritten@jwfc.jfcom.mil.

ASSESSMENTS/TRAINING BRANCH

It has been a busy six months for assessments since publication of the last ACP. The events of 11 September 2001 brought about changes and adjustments in many

areas, including publications assessment. Mr. Bob Brodel is now the branch chief for the Assessment Branch that also will be making or improving inroads to JWFC training processes and the Joint Center for Lessons Learned. These efforts will further enhance an already mature assessment process and provide a better foundation for publication revisions.

In the last six months, the following joint publications received assessments and were recommended for a **scheduled revision**: JPs 2-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*; 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*; 3-34, *Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations*; 3-51, *Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare*; 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*; 4-01.4, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution*; and 4-01.8, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration*.

Ongoing assessments include JPs 3-03, *Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations*; 3-07.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism*; and 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments*.

The following joint publications are scheduled, as indicated, for preliminary (P) or formal (F) assessments:

- **April 2002**: JP 3-07.5, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations* (F).
- **May 2002**: JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (P) and JP 4-02.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Logistics Support in Joint Operations* (F).
- **July 2002**: JP 3-01, *Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats* (Tentative F).
- **August 2002**: JP 3-04.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Shipboard Helicopter Operations* (F) and JP 3-57, *Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations* (P).
- **September 2002**: JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations* (F).
- **October 2002**: JP 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support* (F).
- **November 2002**: JP 4-07, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common User Logistics During Joint Operations* (P).

We appreciate everyone's efforts in making the assessment and revision processes more efficient and responsive. Your input is always welcome. Questions and comments should be directed to Mr. Bob Brodel, GS-13, at DSN 668-6186 or e-mail: brodel@jwfc.jfcom.mil; or Mr. Jon Gangloff, CII, at DSN 668-6127 or e-mail: gangloff@jwfc.jfcom.mil.

DEVELOPMENT BRANCH

We recently prepared the **revision first drafts (RFDs)** of JPs 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, and 3-58, *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception*, for worldwide review. Additionally, we are in the process of preparing the RFD for 12 other joint publications: JPs 1-05, *Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations*; 3-02.2, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation*; 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*; 3-07.1, *Joint, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*; 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*; 3-50, *Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery*; 3-54, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Security*, 4-01.2, *Joint, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to Joint Operations*; 4-01.6, *Joint, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore (JLOTS)*; 4-01.7, *Joint, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Use of Intermodal Containers in Joint Operations*; 4-02.2, *Joint, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Patient Movement in Joint Operations*; and 4-06, *Joint, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations*.

The Development Branch also refines and consolidates joint publication review inputs from USJFCOM's components and staff for forwarding to the LA/Joint Staff doctrine sponsor. Additionally, we recently converted JP 1-01, *Joint Doctrine Development System*, to CJCSI format and inserted several changes recommended from the new JDMP. The branch chief is Mr. Steve Senkovich, GS-13, at DSN 668-7254 or e-mail: senkovich@jwfc.jfcom.mil.

JOINT CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED BRANCH

Our primary task is to collect and analyze joint after action reports from exercises, operations, and experimentation to identify and disseminate positive and negative trends, issues, and lessons to improve joint force capabilities through doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facilities enablers. To accomplish this task, we collect and process joint after action reviews; conduct analysis; produce special reports; maintain a lessons learned database and help desk; host the Worldwide Lessons Learned Conference and Configuration Management Board; support the Joint Staff Remedial Action Program, joint training, real-world operations, and joint doctrine development; identify software requirements, and develop system improvements. We also produce a *Joint Center for Lessons Learned Quarterly Bulletin* that addresses current lessons-learned trends. Visit our Home Page at <http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil/dodnato/jcll/> and click on "Registered Users" to view a copy or subscribe electronically. The branch chief is Mr. Mike Barker, GS-12, at DSN 668-7270 or e-mail: barker@jwfc.jfcom.mil.



CONCEPTS TO FUTURE DOCTRINE

By *Gene Myers, HQ USJFCOM, Concept Development*

"Doctrine and concept development are two sides of the same coin. And real transformation is not complete until both sides are thoroughly addressed."

Gene Myers
Effects-based Operations

Contrary to the traditional American love affair with the "silver bullet," good ideas are not confined to the world of science and technology. It is often stated that martial innovation stems from technological advance—from the long bow and the stirrup to the machine gun and the tank to stealth aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles. While the joint force's driving concept *Joint Vision 2020* clearly acknowledges the role of technology in such advances, it also states that technology is not the sole driver of change within the armed forces. That document places an even greater importance on the "development of doctrine, organizations, training, and education, leaders and people...."¹ It is no coincidence that doctrine is placed at the head of this list since doctrine is the authoritative statement of the best way to do the business of the military profession. It drives the other elements, education and training.

It can be argued that operational concepts represent the future of military doctrine. Somebody's bright idea about a better way to do things, properly developed, tested, sponsored, and presented, can eventually become part of the driving paradigms of a nation's military might. **This discussion addresses the notion of concepts as future doctrine**—the idea that what are now new concepts stand a good chance of having sufficient impact to require doctrinal revision in the near term.

CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE

Do we understand the difference between doctrine and concepts? There are several notions captured in various definitional works. For example, joint force publications see doctrine as, "fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Military Departments in coordinated action toward a common objective."² Air Force Service doctrine says that, "air and space doctrine is an accumulation of knowledge gained primarily from the study and analysis of experience, which may include actual combat or contingency operations as well as equipment tests or exercises. As such, doctrine

reflects what has usually worked best."³ The general thrust of such descriptive efforts seems to be an emphasis on historical context—what has worked in the past.

Concepts, by contrast, might be seen as the birthplace of doctrine. They forward the ideas that may eventually become part of our doctrinal construct. One respected author on the subject said that concepts are "...a statement, in broad outline, which provides a common basis for future development of tactical doctrine."⁴ Said another way, concepts are "future doctrine."⁵ In a soon to be published paper, Dr. James Tritten of USJFCOM JWFC, Doctrine Division, put the intellectual cap on the relationship of concepts and doctrine. "Doctrine forms the baseline from which concept developers should knowingly depart."⁶

SOME CONCEPTS FOR CHANGE

In its promising war fighting conceptual framework, Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO), USJFCOM is attempting to capture the emerging trends in the "American way of war" and to present new constructs for military operations in the 21st century. Figure 1, on the next page, briefly summarizes how the nature of military operations is changing to meet 21st century needs.⁷

These emerging trends have already fostered some changes in the way we view military operations, and will result in far more in the next few years. But, as of this writing, most have no conceptual foundation in the volumes of joint doctrine—there is very little doctrinal description of their effects on how we achieve national goals. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff draft *Dominant Maneuver Operational Concept* paper states, "Decisive victories are less about technology than about the perception of technology and how it is employed."⁸ This is where concept development as a formal process comes to play. What are some of the likely near-term requirements for doctrinal revision? USJFCOM and the Joint Staff have some ideas. Below are a few of them in brief outline.⁹

EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS (EBO)

Since man first carried a grudge we have most often viewed conflict with a desire to do great harm. We have historically approached organized conflict from a destruction or attrition perspective, with measures of success such as battle line movement, numbers of casualties, or targets destroyed. The EBO approach is more subtle. It shifts emphasis more to precisely defined activities, both lethal and non-lethal, that would affect an adversary leader's will to oppose us across the diplomatic-information-military-economic spectrum. "What I'm looking for are the pressure points where I can actually destroy the coherence of the military, economic, social and political systems an adversary needs to wage war," said Colonel




Figure 1. Shifting Along a Sliding Scale

Chuck Bradbury, commander of USJFCOM's experimental standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ).¹⁰

The effects-based philosophy sees the adversary as a complex system of systems with key nodes and vulnerabilities. It focuses on obtaining a desired strategic outcome or "effect" on the adversary, through the application of the full range of military and non-military capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels with an eye to the adversary's critical nodes. The need for true EBO was highlighted in the Air Force's 2000 report on Operation ALLIED FORCE against Serbia and is echoed in that Service's doctrine as well as virtually all of the emerging joint operational concepts.¹¹

Effects are achieved at multiple levels by far more actors than the military component.¹² The secret to rapid EBO is the ability of national politico-military-economic elements to achieve multiple parallel effects across the entire theater of operations simultaneously and to achieve them faster than an adversary can react. The need to plan for achieving specific effects rather than attriting the

adversary's military forces is just now beginning to emerge in joint doctrine publications such as JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, but far more remains to be done, including expanding the concept to include effects across all the of elements of national power.

THE INTERAGENCY CAMPAIGN

The military has most often viewed its campaigns through an exclusively military lens, but the lessons of the past 15 years show that continuous integration in times of peace and crisis of all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, and economic) with the military campaign can achieve significant synergistic effects on the adversary. We have seen that objectives can be achieved in many ways. Some examples: if you strangle an adversary's sources of income—his money—you cripple him; if you can manipulate his information flow you make him deaf, dumb, and blind; and frying the computer brain that controls a drawbridge over which an armored column must pass at least temporarily accomplishes the same objective as destroying the bridge.

(Continued on next page)

"In many instances the ability to go after an adversary's alliances, their money, and their international support will accomplish as much as physically destroying tanks, power plants, or air defenses. We must be prepared to do each or both. For all intents and purposes there will no longer be purely military campaigns, even though the level of violence we may visit is negotiable."¹³

Achieving a true interagency perspective on international conflict will require doctrinal emphasis on managing the regionally focused interagency process at the combatant command level. To do this, USJFCOM is proposing an interagency coordinating element be placed at each geographic combatant command headquarters with representatives from US government departments and agencies such as State, Treasury, Justice, USAID, CIA, and NSA with the goal of establishing regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners.

An experimental verdict on this concept will likely be rapid, and a requisite doctrinal update could quickly follow. But successful application requires that we think differently. We will need to accept simultaneous collaborative vice sequential planning processes. Command relationships (who's in charge of the planning) also will need to be developed to adapt to the new interagency environment. Further, we will need to solve manning issues. Virtual Web-based membership is an option.

STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has directed that all geographic combatant commanders establish a SJFHQ by 2005. Traditionally, such organizations are not "stood up" until a crisis or impending operation demands specific mission-oriented leadership. The SJFHQ would provide a small core of permanent operational experts that, using advances in communications and collaborative planning tools, would afford the combatant commander a continuous planning capability that could be augmented as the situation dictates. A permanent SJFHQ would, per the USJFCOM RDO White Paper, provide "the ability to rapidly form, deploy, and employ the joint force early in a contingency."

This "is critical as the President and Secretary of Defense attempt to influence or deter an adversary before combat operations begin. Habitual relationships, including peacetime training, between the SJC2E [USJFCOM's experimental version of the SJFHQ] and designated components and agencies [including the interagency group discussed above] will facilitate efficient planning and rapid execution."¹⁴

As the graphic on the next page illustrates, a major advantage of the SJFHQ is speed of organization and operation. Traditional procedures have called for the task-specific headquarters to be deployed once a crisis has begun or a real need is identified by political/senior military

authorities. In that case, a commander must be identified and a staff assigned to manage the operation, and very often the staff personnel are untrained in joint task force procedures. By contrast, a fully trained standing headquarters of 50 to 60 people located at the geographic combatant commander's headquarters can begin much of the planning immediately—while it is being augmented as needed by the evolving situation.¹⁵

A SJFHQ also would lift the burden of joint task force command from the shoulders of the air, land, sea, and special operations component commanders and their staffs. Such command is very often assigned to an existing Service component command. This requires that they divide their time between component and joint force operations and spend considerable time in organizing and training augmentees and other component liaison officers. There is a potential near-term doctrinal enhancement available here. Appropriate publications should recommend a truly joint force headquarters be the commander's first choice over a Service-based construct.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Not all change centers on incorporating new experimental concepts. For example, previously sacrosanct doctrinal constructs such as the principles of war first proposed at the close of the Napoleonic era are now undergoing an unprecedented review to both better align them with the lessons of recent military operations and to integrate some new operational concepts.¹⁶ A particularly relevant example is the principle of mass, which has traditionally referred to achieving superior numbers and/or firepower at the point of contact with opposing forces. In the past this typically required placing significant numbers of people and weapons within range of hostile fire in the hope of overwhelming the adversary. Today, improvements in the realms of speed, range, precision, communications networking and collaborative planning at all levels are fostering a new view where the goal is achieving *massed effects* on the adversary without having to mass forces. Fast moving forces wielding high precision weapons in a pervasive knowledge environment can achieve their intended effects without having to face an adversary in a traditional force-on-force contest.

THE TECHNOLOGICAL ENABLERS OF CHANGE

It is these and many other advances that form the technological backbone of the new concepts rising from the fires on innovation and that are beginning to have considerable impact on how the US military does its business. But technology, by itself, does not make doctrine. We must develop and test the guiding principles that would leverage these advances.

All of the joint concepts now under development stress the need for an ability to deliver rapid, precise




Figure 2. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters

actions on a global scale and across the entire range of military operations.¹⁷ Advances in technology—precision in navigation and weapons delivery; lighter, more mobile systems; rapid, accurate targeting processes—are providing the tools to do this and have provided alternatives to achieving objectives beyond ravaging huge swaths of territory. Precision weapons with near zero targeting error have vastly improved our ability to achieve requisite levels of damage while placing fewer of our people in harm's way. At the same time, overall collateral damage levels have been reduced and fewer noncombatants have had to face the virtually unlimited destruction so characteristic of mid 20th century warfare.

Recent systems and procedural innovations have enabled rapid collaborative (vice sequential) decision making by improving intelligence quality and making high value information available to senior commanders as well as to tactical elements. Sensor-to-shooter targeting, where items of interest—such as a group of terrorists in an isolated area—are identified and directly passed to attack-capable forces, was clearly demonstrated during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan.

TRANSFORMING CONCEPTS TO DOCTRINE

The rapidly developing concepts discussed here—EBO, the interagency campaign, and SJFHQ—are but three examples of many new operational national security

concepts that are being developed across the diplomatic, information, and economic, as well as military elements of national power. But it can be argued that the level of interest and the time and energy spent on their development, test, and actual initial use in the field make them ideal candidates for near-term doctrinal review.¹⁸

Concepts are developed to solve pressing national needs. They are validated through test and experimentation, at times even in the cauldron of conflict. The emerging principles are then submitted to joint and Service doctrine development authorities for review and acceptance in the body of doctrine. Even concepts in development for use many years in the future may render near-term doctrinal refinements. USJFCOM pamphlet, *Bridging the Gap Between Concepts and Doctrine*, clearly makes this point when it states, "Even a concept focused on 2015 and based on materiel capabilities not yet available can contain process and organizational constructs that could improve today's operations."¹⁹

If we are truly serious about transforming our military structure to meet 21st century challenges, the doctrine that guides how we achieve our military objectives must also change—and, in fact, must be a leading element in that transformation. New doctrine serves as the intellectual engine of change. In that role it manages the incorporation of the advances proven in concept development and testing into the training and education of military leaders and serves as a major component of the strategies that assure national security.

(Endnotes continued on page 36)

FUNCTIONAL LAND COMPONENTS: JUMPING THE "WALL"

By Richard J. Rinaldo and LTC Kenneth L. Bowman

The most important consideration in US joint military operations is command and control, even more so because of Service components. Retired Army LTG John Cushman said that, "... each component... comes to the unified command with a culture and ethos of its own forming an invisible but very real 'wall' which resists placing its units under another 'component.'" Cushman finds this phenomenon "not reprehensible," since "intangibles of esprit and unit bonding within these walls add tangible strength in battle."¹ Service specialization on land, air, sea, and space or in special operations brings unique competencies to the joint world. Others view the outward manifestation of such specialization, in component commanders within a joint force, as an "obstacle to synergy," "a drag on the joint fuselage," and "the weak links in the joint chain."²

Whatever the merits of those views, the doctrine community has studied and captured some of the lessons of history and exercises³ for factors that the joint force commander (JFC) must take into account in organizing Service forces to fight as part of a joint command. Some of these appear in JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, while others are in JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*. For example, JP 0-2 includes the following guidelines for the JFC concerning functional component commands: "The JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct operations. Functional component commands can be appropriate when forces from two or more Military Departments must operate in the same dimension or medium or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission."⁴ Additionally, "JFCs may decide to establish a functional component command to integrate planning; reduce their span of control; and/or significantly improve combat efficiency, information flow, unity of effort, weapon systems management, component interaction, control over the scheme of maneuver."⁵ No doubt further lessons will emerge from ongoing transformation efforts, such as Exercise MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 02. The exercise will experiment with a functional land component as part of its evaluation of the Rapid Decisive Operations concept used in a small-scale contingency. Meanwhile joint doctrine is under development for functional component commands.⁶ Additionally, at the tactics, techniques, and procedure level, the Air Force published a *Joint Force Air Component Commander Primer*, the Navy is currently producing the *Joint Force*

Maritime Component Commander Handbook, while the Army and Marine Corps recently published the *Joint Force Land Component Commander Handbook*. Army Forces Central Command has detailed standing operating procedures for its coalition and joint functional component staff.⁷ This command exercises frequently as a functional land component.

One of the several ways to organize joint forces to jump Cushman's "wall" and promote joint synergy for seamless operations is the joint force land component command, a type of functional component command with a joint force land component commander (JFLCC) designated by the JFC. Joint doctrine defines the JFLCC as "the commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander."⁸ The functional land component is an organizational option with historical precedent, though it has at times been honored more for its absence than its use.

During the Gulf War, for example, General Schwarzkopf may have had Clausewitz's notion of friction in mind⁹ when he decided to retain command of the land component, at least in part, to avoid creating another layer of headquarters and staff. The idea here is that an additional part in the overall machine can complicate its functioning. Also, according to one study, "the terrain objectives of the ground campaign... did not lend themselves to a single concentrated force," since they were spread over vast distances.¹⁰ More significantly, Schwarzkopf avoided placing Saudi land forces under US control, or US land forces under Saudi control, in deference to national sensibilities. Some critics believe that General Schwarzkopf hampered himself with numerous responsibilities and weakened unity of effort, by retaining command of the land component.¹¹

The Service "wall" concerning command and control is no more evident than in the US Army's official study of command and control during the Vietnam Conflict, which claims to provide a model for future conflicts of this nature. This model proposes that component headquarters "should exercise both command and operational control of the forces of their respective U.S. services...."¹² This study also notes General Westmoreland's proposal that the commander of the Mobile Riverine Force, a joint task force, be an assistant division commander of the 9th Division, the Army element of the force. Admiral Sharp, the commander in chief of the Pacific Command, along with the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, opposed the proposal. Army and Navy units would remain under Service command.

The command and control arrangements in Vietnam worked, to a large degree, due to the energy and professionalism of commanders involved. But notwithstanding other important considerations, the reluctance of Services to place their units under the command of another Service component was clearly evident.

World War II proved that overcoming such reluctance was possible. While this war was to see creation of land component commanders in the European and Pacific theaters, these command and control arrangements had to confront both Service and multinational challenges. General Eisenhower said that, "Alliances in the past have often done no more than to name the common foe, and "unity of command" has been a pious aspiration thinly disguising the national jealousies, ambitions and recriminations of high ranking officers, unwilling to subordinate themselves or their forces to a command of different nationality or different Service."¹³ Given such understandings, however, General Eisenhower in the European theater and Admiral's Nimitz and Spruance in the Pacific, fashioned functional land component commanders during World War II. Simultaneously surmounting and leveraging various aspects of Service and national cultures, ethos, bonding, and specialization; these commands united, fought together, and triumphed, driven by acknowledgement of the primacy of key considerations and factors in their forming.

The mission is key among such factors and may require that the unique capabilities and functions of more than one Service be directed toward closely related land objectives where unity of effort is a primary concern. Land forces are competing for limited joint force assets. The JFLCC contributes to the prioritization and control of joint force assets, as the situation requires. In the case of Operation TORCH in North Africa in 1943, it was not different Services as much as different national forces that were converging on Tunis from different directions, thus requiring unity of effort. Eisenhower, as Commander in Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force, established the first modern example of an allied JFLCC in appointing a British general to command both US and British land forces, while he also placed all air and naval elements under respective commanders. This arrangement also allowed him to deal with numerous political-military and alliance challenges that existed in March 1943. In addition, it is another example of terrain as a consideration for organizing large forces.

When the scope of operations is large, and where the area of operations is geographically concentrated, as was the case in Operation OVERLORD—the allied invasion of Europe in 1944, **functional component commands may be the right way to organize.** In this instance Eisenhower also chose to organize functional component commands.

A functional land component command may also be established anytime that the land forces of two Services are employed. It is normally established for

major theater operations where multiple Army corps or Marine Expeditionary Forces are employed. In the Pacific during World War II, a clear example of this was the US-only JFLCC in Operation ICEBERG, the invasion of Okinawa. Planners found that a single Service would be unable to invade and take the island of Okinawa. A joint Army-Marine Corps force would do so, under the command of Army LTG Simon Buckner, whose Tenth Army had the resources to command and control the operation. Buckner's command would include an Army corps and a Marine amphibious corps. He also formed a joint staff of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps officers. Operations in Lebanon in 1958 and the Dominican Republic in 1965 are further examples of forces of both Services under a single commander. The troops available for these operations appeared to be a factor in the choice of a functional land component.

Time may also be a factor in establishing a functional land component. The duration of operations must be long enough to warrant the establishment of a single land force commander and worth the costs in terms of lead-time; personnel and staff training; command, control, communications, and computer systems architecture, and the impact on flexibility. As noted earlier, General Schwarzkopf weighed some of this in retaining command of the US land components in the Persian Gulf, despite the fact that a functional land component command may have enhanced the detailed planning, coordination, and execution of operations required by his headquarters. Also, the multiple complex tasks confronting him may have exceeded his span of control. A JFLCC allows resolution of joint issues at the functional component level. The JFC has other responsibilities that may require greater focus. Among these may be multinational operations, where the inherent political and national sensitivities, like those that Eisenhower faced in Europe and North Africa during World War II, will arise. During operations in Kosovo in 1999, time was also a factor in regard to what some analysts have called the "short war syndrome." Accordingly, "neither a combined nor a joint force land component commander was established for the NATO Operation ALLIED FORCE, nor its associated US operation."¹⁴

With the decision to form a functional land component also comes the need to decide how much of a jump over the Service "wall" may be needed. When, for example, only the Army and Marine Corps provide forces for the command, there are two basic options for forming the JFLCC's headquarters.

One option is to form the functional land component headquarters as a separate entity from either Service component. This option provides the JFLCC the requisite command and control resources to focus on operations without the direct responsibilities associated with logistic and administrative support. The JFLCC will then have a separate Army and Marine force commander and headquarters responsible for the command and control of

(Continued on next page)

their respective Services. Within the JFLCC's headquarters, the billets of deputy commander/chief of staff and key members of the staff (J-1 through J-6) should be fully integrated with Army and Marine Corps representation.

Another option is to designate either the Army or Marine Service component commander as the JFLCC. The JFLCC's headquarters then must continue to perform Service component functions. This option also requires the other Service to be fully integrated across all staff sections. The Service component commander designated as the JFLCC provides the core elements of the staff to assist in planning, coordinating, and executing land operations. While this option requires fewer personnel, it has the potential to badly burden the JFLCC's staff during the performance of their dual roles. It may be advantageous for the Service component commander to delegate as many of the Service component related duties as practical to a subordinate Service force headquarters.

Once duly organized the JFLCC's overall responsibilities and roles are to organize, plan, and direct execution of land operations based upon the JFC's concept of operations and designation of command relationships. The later may run the full gamut of such relationships, from support relationships with other components, to operational or tactical control of units or capabilities provided, to other types of authority. The following is an expansion of responsibilities of the JFLCC as listed in Figure III-4 of JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*. They include, but are not limited to:

- Advising the JFC on the proper employment of all assigned and attached forces.
- Developing a land operation plan or operation order that supports the operational objectives of the JFC and optimizes the operations of task-organized land forces.
- Coordinating the planning and execution of land operations with the other component, JTF commanders, and other supporting agencies.
- Evaluating the results of land operations to include the effectiveness of interdiction operations.
- Synchronizing and integrating movement and maneuver, firepower, close air support, and interdiction in support of the land operations.
- Supporting the JFACC for counterair operations, strategic attack, theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance, and theater- and/or joint operational area-wide interdiction effort.
- Providing the deputy area air defense commander for defensive counterair operations approved by the JFC.

- Supporting the JFCs information operations.
- Establishing standing operating procedures and other directives based on the JFC's guidance.

The JFLCC and staff also perform, or contribute to, a number of tasks that are critical for successfully conducting land operations. These tasks apply in varying degrees across the range of military operations including those involving multinational forces. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 3500.04B, *Universal Joint Task List* provides further details.

- **Movement and Maneuver.** The JFLCC is responsible for land component operational movement and maneuver and for making recommendations to the JFC on the employment and support of land forces.
- **Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR).** The JFLCC states operational requirements to ensure optimum ISR support to operations; identify, define, and nominate ISR objectives; avoid surprise; assist friendly deception efforts; and evaluate the effects of operations.
- **Firepower.** The JFLCC is responsible for the planning and employment of operational firepower in terms of shaping the land forces' future battlefield.
- **Logistics and Personnel Support.** Generally, each Service is responsible for the logistics support of its own forces. The JFLCC would make recommendations concerning the distribution of materiel and services commensurate with priorities developed for land force operations.
- **Command and Control.** The JFLCC has significant responsibility for operational command and control as the single focal point for integrated and synchronized land force operations.
- **Force Protection.** The JFLCC significantly influences the JFC force protection plans and priorities—particularly land component operations. The JFLCC is responsible to the JFC for all land force protection operations.

Clearly, the functional land component command will be a busy one, since it is unlikely that it will exist in an operation where land force activities are not highly visible and critical to success. At the same time the command will be a joint one and must be designed to achieve the purpose of leveraging the capabilities of more than one Service. To do so it must effectively jump the Service "wall." On the other side of that "wall" lies synergy, interdependence, interoperability, and ultimately, victory on land.

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Endnotes

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2. C. P. Ankersen, "Component Commands: Seams, Not Synergy." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 1998, p. 118.
3. Exercise Unified Endeavor (UE) 96-2, for example, included a Joint Forces Land Component Commander. See also *Joint Forces Land Component Commander ALSA Study*, April 1997 and *Joint Command and Control Doctrine Study*, Joint Warfighting Center, 1 February 1999.
4. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, p. V-4.
5. Ibid. p. V-18.
6. JP 3-30, *Command and Control of Joint Air Operations* is under development with the Air Force as lead agent, while the Army is lead agent for JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*. The Navy will develop joint doctrine for maritime operations.
7. USARCENT Coalition/Joint Forces Land Component Command SOP (C/JFLCC), 1 Aug 2000 and USARCENT/USMARCENT/DJFLCC SOP, 15 Oct 1997, both available at <http://www.arcent.army.mil.smil.mil>. See also MAJ. Aaron Jarvis and Mr. Bill Rice, "Joint Forces Land Component Command: the ARCENT Experience." *Training Techniques, 4th Quarter FY 01*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 15 May 2001.
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AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DOCTRINE WRITERS

**By CAPT Jay DeLoach, USNR, JS J7, JDB;
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As Dudley Knox eloquently demonstrated in his seminal work in 1915, "Military doctrine are beliefs or teachings which have been reasoned from principles, that is, they flow from principles as a source." Knox further clarified that military doctrine are derived from "an exhaustive study of history and war, as well as of the material, political, and other conditions which confront their country. From the results of this study is evolved the conceptions of war as it should in its opinion be best conducted." Thus, formulating military doctrine requires an intensive intellectual effort based on an analytical framework that is steeped in the historical conceptions of war and military operations other than war. It requires a deep understanding of our national security strategy; national military strategy; force capabilities; and joint, interagency, and multinational operations.

A well-conceived, clearly-articulated body of doctrine would provide a degree of mutual understanding from which our commanders can derive a sound course of action during the stresses of military operations. It also will instill confidence throughout our armed forces. If we in the doctrine development community are not carefully studying and capturing the essence of operations in our military doctrine, then we will be prone to repeat history with the unnecessary spilling of the blood of our sons and daughters in the military. Without an extensive study of history, then we forsake the rich inventory of lessons learned throughout the ages—many of these lessons are still applicable today. We also must look into the future for possible changes.

I. B. Holley (1979) explained that the search for doctrine becomes a matter of discovering the best way to arrive at sound generalizations about operations. In his article *The Doctrinal Process: Some Suggested Steps*, Holley perceptively questioned the quality of the work being conducted by doctrine organizations:

"There are many organizations addressing doctrinal problems, but how many of them have perfected adequate procedures to ensure that the doctrines produced represent only the most refined distillates from experience? Has any one of the organizations involved yet produced a document, a manual, a regulation, a standing operating procedure which describes in comprehensive fashion the actual processes by which doctrine is developed and assessed?"

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Important Attributes	Skill Areas	Education Courses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Field Experience • Interest in Doctrine Writing • Advanced Military Education • Research Skills 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General Intellectual Skills (analysis, critical thinking) • Project and Time Management • Library and Bibliographic Research • Historical Analysis • Computer Skills • Technical Writing • Team Writing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • English • History • Philosophy and Logic • Management • Military Science • Behavioral Science

Table 1. High Payoff Skills for Doctrine Writers

One can find statements indicating which organizations are responsible but very little guidance on how the flow of information is secured and how the analysis is to be conducted."

So where are we today? Is the joint doctrine development community devoting the necessary intellectual capital required to conduct the exhaustive historical research, inquisitive and creative analysis, and deep critical thinking on how best to fight in the present and the future. Richard Paul (2000) offers a good definition of critical thinking worth noting here: "Critical thinking is the intellectually disciplined process of actively and skillfully conceptualizing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief and action." **Today, we have accepted a joint doctrine development process that may be more bureaucratic than we care to admit. There is a need for a reinvestment in the intellectual capital with a team capable of critical thinking necessary for conceptualizing and formulating military doctrine.** Doctrine developers need to take heed of Holley's sage advice (1979) that:

"Doctrine is derived by means of the intellectual process of generalization. This means one studies the evidence in a variety of cases, which is to say, experience which has been recorded. These instances are subjected to analysis, and, where necessary, further experiments or trials may be carried out....The soundness of a generalization derived by such means is attested solely by the weight of the evidence, not by the rank or position of the individual who puts his authenticating imprimatur on the finished product."

Dedicated doctrinaires like Knox, Holley and Dennis Drew (1995), to name a few, have over the decades articulated the need for a more robust method of developing military doctrine. These authors have only lightly touched on the harder question—how does one actually research, and then analyze the vast amount of information and experiences to formulate clear, meaningful military doctrine? Military doctrine development is not a simple academic exercise. It requires the right type of person(s) with the skills, education, and attributes of a historical researcher, legal investigator, public policy analyst, and

warfighter combined. According to the now-superseded TRADOC Pamphlet 25-34 *Desk Guide to Doctrine Writing*, "doctrine writers face a formidable task of understanding the history, assessing the current state of knowledge, and seeking consensus solutions on doctrinal issues....[it] depends on writers who question, probe, and discover the basis for doctrine's authority." What are the attributes of a good doctrine developer? Again, TRADOC Pamphlet 25-34 provided a superb listing of attributes, skill areas, and education courses for a doctrine developer/writer noted in the Table 1.

As you can see, it takes a team effort of critical thinkers with warrior backgrounds (both new and battle-hardened) to perform the painstaking work needed to craft good military doctrine. Individuals with these qualifications to develop doctrine are hard to find. Given that, **an analytical framework for doctrine writers is provided on the next two pages to help in the process of conceptualizing and formulating military doctrine.** The lines of inquiry in this framework were derived from the works of Holley (1979, 1995, 1997), Drew (1995), Murray and Millet (1988), Andre (1996), Harper-Marinick (2001), and the now superseded TRADOC Pamphlet 25-34. They were then tailored and augmented with other questions by seasoned joint doctrine developers. The perspective afforded and the mental discipline imposed simply by asking such questions should not only enrich the doctrine development process but also enhance the chances of developing effective doctrine.

This framework should not be viewed as a prescriptive set of questions, but a helpful guide for doctrine researchers, thinkers, writers, and managers. It should be a living document such that other good critical thinking questions can be added to help simulate the minds of others during the doctrine development process. The challenge to the joint doctrine development community is to take the lines of inquiry in this framework, modify as you see fit, and then institutionalize as part of a directive or handbook so that we have a basis to train and educate the doctrine developers of the future.

"Our doctrine represents the apex of our thinking about the best ways to [fight]...it deserves our best intellectual efforts and our utmost attention (Drew 1995)."

(See references on page 36)

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DOCTRINE WRITERS

Has the doctrine team cast its net wide enough to capture the pertinent sources of information for developing doctrine?

Have the advances in technology been taken into account that may temper or perhaps obviate the "lessons" of the past?

Have the following potentially relevant sources of information been considered?

- National Security Presidential Directives/Presidential Decision Directives
- Presidential or Secretary of Defense Guidance (e.g., UCP, SECDEF Memo, Nuclear Posture Review, etc.)
- Executive Orders
- DOD instructions, manuals, and regulations
- CJCS directives
- Approved and emerging joint doctrine
- US Service and multi-Service doctrine
- Multinational doctrine
- US joint lessons learned
- Service and multi-Service lessons learned
- Real-world joint operations after-action reports
- Service and multi-Service exercise reports
- Joint exercise after-action reports
- Ongoing real-world joint operations to attend/observe
- Official/unofficial Joint Staff and joint command histories
- Books – biographies, autobiographies, memoirs, and monographs bearing on joint operations
- Research papers from military education institutions
- Feedback from joint doctrine users
- Interviews with experienced commanders of joint operations and joint support organizations

What steps should be taken to prepare interviewers to elicit objective evidence?

Are the interviewers sensitive to the danger of asking, wittingly or unwittingly, leading questions that elicit answers desired, that is, answers that conform to their presuppositions?

What ongoing relevant multinational, joint, Service, and/or multi-Service exercises should be attended/observed?

Have ongoing study groups/seminars at joint and/or Service colleges/universities been sought or considered in the subject area to research and formulate doctrinal concepts?

What international, joint, multi-Service, and Service military periodicals are available?

What joint, Service, and/or multi-Service subject matter experts are available?

Are there any relevant joint and/or Service concepts under development?

Are there any ongoing or recently completed relevant joint and/or Service experiments?

Have the experiences and lessons learned of foreign militaries been comprehensively studied?

What are the underlying assumptions for the current doctrine? For each one, is it still valid in the current and near-term future environment?

Given that all thinkers and writers are subtly influenced by their assumptions, what steps should doctrine writers take to ensure that their assumptions are valid?

Should doctrine writers reach outside their organizations to invite critical evaluations of their assumptions to avoid parochial bias?

Has the historical research looked at "what happened" as well as weighed the previous interpretations of "why" and "how" as well as the significance of "what happened?"

Are the terms that describe the doctrinal subject defined and commonly understood?

What are the fundamental principles of doctrine for this particular subject?

How does the international security environment, US interests, and threats to those interests affect the national strategic situation? How must doctrine change to conform to the new reality?

Are the core military competencies adequate to achieve the national military objectives?

What characteristics of the operational environment envisioned for this doctrinal subject need to be discussed in the publication?

How do the values of joint warfare (integrity, competence, physical courage, moral courage, teamwork) relate to this doctrine subject?

How do the principles of war (objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity) and/or principles of military operations other than war (objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy) relate to this doctrine subject?

How do the fundamentals of joint warfare (unity of effort; concentration; seizing and maintaining the initiative; agility; extending operations; maintaining freedom of action; sustainment; clarity of expression; and knowledge) relate to this doctrine subject?

How will this doctrine enhance unity of effort at the strategic level (coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, with nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and among nations in any alliance or coalition)?

(Continued on next page)

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DOCTRINE WRITERS (CONT.)

How will the military instrument be integrated with the other instruments of national power in this doctrinal area?

What roles do the enduring concepts of strategic agility, overseas presence, power projection, decisive force, forcible entry, timeliness, and survivability play?

What roles do the enduring enablers of people; technology; information superiority; global command and control; air, land, sea, and space control; strategic mobility; sustainment; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; assured access to the battlespace; national will; and force protection play?

Which elements of joint operational art (synergy; simultaneity and depth; anticipation; balance; leverage; timing and tempo; operational reach and approach, forces and functions; arrangement of operations; centers of gravity; culmination; and termination) need to be considered in this doctrinal area?

What types of operational areas (e.g., joint operations area, area of operations, joint special operations area, amphibious objective area) will be required for the operations in question?

What are the duties and responsibilities of the commanders and staff involved?

Are there any special types of organizational structures (e.g., special purpose joint task force, coordination centers, etc.) required in this subject area?

What types of joint command and control arrangement options should be considered? (Organization along Service and functional component lines should be covered.)

What types of command authorities are most appropriate for this doctrinal area? What are the recommended organizational options for airspace control, air defense, and joint air operations?

What are the responsibilities of the supported and supporting commanders involved in these operations?

Will the operational environment of this doctrine create any new or unique personnel requirements?

What types of individual, unit, and joint training will be required for the forces participating in this operational environment?

What role does joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (defining the total battlespace environment; describing the battlespace's effects; evaluating the adversary; and determining and describing adversary potential courses of action) play in this doctrinal area?

What unique or different types of intelligence support may be required?

How will joint targeting be conducted in this operational arena?

Does this doctrinal subject give rise to different legal considerations (e.g., more restrictive rules of engagement)?

What are the relevant considerations if this type of operation is conducted in a multinational environment?

What are the relevant considerations if this type of operation is conducted in an interagency environment with other government agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations?

What, if any, are the information operations implications/considerations for this doctrine?

Will the scope of these contemplated operations be large enough to warrant a campaign plan?

What unique planning considerations are required for this doctrine subject?

How will planning be conducted for this doctrine subject under deliberate and crisis action procedures?

What are the logistic support considerations for this doctrine subject?

What types of command, control, communications, and computer support will be required in this doctrinal area?

What steps should the doctrine team take to test the validity of its formulations of doctrine?

- Should some outside critics be drawn from the other military Services or even foreign Services?
- What actual field testing should be undertaken in peacetime via maneuvers, exercises, and the like?
- Should doctrine writers solicit high-command support for more far-reaching testing of key doctrinal formulations?
- Has vetting the doctrinal formulations before a workshop or symposium been considered?
- Have the doctrinal formulations been informally submitted to a network of subject matter experts or academicians for their exchange of ideas, references, and comments?

CRITICAL THINKING CRITERIA

Clarity. Could you state ... in your own words? Could you elaborate on? Could you give a current or historical example of ...? Could you illustrate....with a picture or diagram?

Accuracy. How could we find out if that is true? How can we verify or test that? Are the underlying assumptions still valid?

Relevance. How does that relate to the problem? How does that bear on the issue or question?

Depth. What are some of the complexities of the question or issue? How does your answer address the complexities in the question?

Breadth. Is there another way to look at this question? Do we need to consider another point of view or perspective?

Logic. Does this really make sense? Does follow from the evidence? How?

DOCTRINE FOR PLANNING JOINT OPERATIONS: Supporting Change

By Mr. Jens A. Jensen, Assistant Deputy for
Crisis Operations, USCINCPAC (J30-0PT)

WHY CHANGE?

The current processes in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) were defined in the mid-1970s. They were originally designed in the Cold War era. Crisis action planning and execution (CAP&E) was extrapolated from the deliberate process. However, the process remained essentially the same and it was expected that planners would work in a time constrained and undefined shortened process.

Importantly, the database and computer support was designed to support the deliberate planning process. As a result, the process and its supporting automated data processing (ADP) has remained slow and ponderous, able to support deliberate planning but ill suited to CAP&E. As currently outlined in JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, steps in the process could be adjusted as necessary to meet milestones. In the 1970s and 1980s the focus of most staff efforts was on global war plans and major theater contingencies (e.g., Korea). However, as the post Cold War era continues to evolve, we find ourselves in small conflicts, peace operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and other such military operations. We operate in coalitions not only with other militaries, but other agencies and nongovernmental agencies. Our existing command and control (C2) ADP support is not up to the tasks at hand. Our military planning processes need to adjust to current circumstances. We need streamlined processes and the ADP necessary to give agility to our planning.

How do we do CAP&E today? I submit that it is largely done using PowerPoint and Word. Processes have been put into place that provide situation awareness. This is achieved by gathering, analyzing, assessing, and disseminating intelligence and information. This is an ongoing, daily activity throughout the Department of Defense. Secondly, crisis planners, based on assessment, prepare crisis or contingencies plans. The planners may or may not be able to take advantage of deliberate plans in whole or part. If a plan is executed, then it is managed through to mission success. Figure 1 represents what is the observed command or-CAP&E cycle.




Figure 1. Crisis Action Planning and Execution Cycle

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM were the first large-scale tests of JOPES. Many lessons were learned in planning for the deployment and employment of a large force. We continue to relearn these same lessons because our training remains inadequate and our ADP does not support the workflow and processes that are actually being employed. Opportunities to further test JOPES have continued to occur. However, observations continue to be made that the current CAP&E process is too slow, labor intensive, and reactive. There are three principal reasons for this:

- The joint planning and execution community (JPEC) lack tools to cope with the current environment. The focus has shifted from deliberate to crisis planning in an uncertain, unstable post-Cold War world. The process should be designed as a crisis management system, not a deliberate planning management system.
- JOPES automation, developed to support deliberate planning, is not agile enough to support CAP—not agile and not extensive enough to support the complete planning process.
- No matter what is done to modernize JOPES automation, there will be no significant improvement in its capability to support crisis response unless we change the CAP process to gain more timely access to accurate planning data.

We need a concurrent, distributed, joint (combined) planning and execution system that provides a modern, properly engineered process that supports decision makers in their ability to make timely, correct decisions. The process is changing with or without changes in doctrine. The recent war in Afghanistan is only loosely following the current six-phased approach to CAP&E. Where is the OPORD?

(Continued on next page)

Where is the campaign plan? They appear to be laid out in a series of PowerPoint slide presentations. From that we get requests for forces and deployment orders.

Now is the time to change the basic doctrine. From those changes JOPES must change, which will drive changes in ADP support. We need a comprehensive, coordinated change that integrates combatant commands, Services, and agencies with processes and systems that provide for rapid exchange of information and presentation of decisionable data/information.

CONTEXT

Table 1 summarizes the current six-phased crisis planning cycle. It is essential that we modify this cycle. First, it doesn't represent the steps employed in most military operations today. Second, nonessential tasks are laid out that should be eliminated to speed up the overall process. Third, the threats and reactions times required today require a different perspective. Fourth, the ADP support required to support military operations today, differs from the expectations and capabilities of the past.

Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Phase IV	Phase V	Phase VI
Situation Development	Crisis Assessment	Course of Action Development	Course of Action Selection	Execution Planning	Execution
EVENT					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Event occurs with possible national security implications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CINC's Report/Assessment received 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CJCS publishes Warning Order 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CJCS Presents refined COAs to NCA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CINC receives Alert Order or Planning Order 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NCA decide to execute OPORD
ACTION					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitor world situation Recognize problem Submit CINC's assessment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase awareness Increase reporting JCS assess situation JCS advise on possible military action NCA-CJCS evaluation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop COAs Evaluate COAs Create, modify JOPES database CINC assigns tasks to subordinates by evaluation request message USTRANSCOM prepares deployment estimates JCS review Commander's Estimate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CJCS gives military advice to NCA CJCS may publish Planning Order to begin execution planning before formal selection of COA by NCA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adjust JOPES Database Identify movement requirements Identify and assign tasks to units Convert COA into OPORDs Resolve shortfalls and limitations Begin SORTS reporting JCS monitor OPORD development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CJCS publishes Execute Order by authority & direction of SECDEF CINC executes OPORD JOPES database maintained JPEC reports execution status
OUTCOME					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assess that event may have national implications Report the event to NCA/CJCS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NCA/CJCS decide to develop military COA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CINC publishes Commander's Estimate with recommended COA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NCA select COA CJCS publishes COA selection by NCA in Alert Order 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CINC publishes OPORD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Crisis resolved

Table 1: Summary of Existing Time-Sensitive Planning Phases




Figure 2. Expanded Proposed Process Steps

DISCUSSION

Process reengineering is the act of identifying functions and relationships in the JOPES process that can be streamlined, optimized and automated at all echelons of command. The current processes need to be broken down, reorganized, and streamlined with a view toward optimizing the overall process. With this in mind, **the major phases of crisis planning are reduced to three: maintain situational awareness, plan, and execute.** This takes us back to Figure 1 which lays out the Command Process Cycle with the addition of analyzing the effect of execution then moving into "replanning" to begin the cycle again. Multiple cycles can be in various stages either within a single geographic theater or worldwide.

Figure 2 above drills down one layer from the major three phase steps. Maintenance of situation awareness is a daily, ongoing activity throughout all three phases. Contingency and crisis planning may occur, and execution may occur less often. In this model, we are always in crisis planning if you assume that you are always in Phase I: Maintain Situational Awareness.

Table 2 on the following page reflects a modification of Table I and illustrates the three phase process.

- **Phase I: Maintain Situation Awareness.** This is an ongoing activity. Commander's critical information requirements (priority intelligence requirements, friendly force information requirements, and essential elements of friendly information) drive collection, sensor tasking, processing priorities, analysis, interpretation, assessment, and dissemination of data and information. When an event occurs, efforts become focused; however, a weather eye must be maintained for other events. Maintenance of situation awareness is continuous and continues throughout phase II and III.
- **Phase II: Planning.** This phase may begin as a what if drill and may result from an event. Planners execute their military decision-making process. Options are developed, explored, evaluated, and selected. Orders are prepared and disseminated as required to support planning. If a plan is being executed, replanning occurs based on analysis of outcomes and changes in the situation.
- **Phase III: Execution.** This phase begins with an EXORD. The plan is executed while assessing the results. Once the mission is complete, forces are reconstituted.

(Continued on next page)

Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
Maintain Situation Awareness	Planning	Execution
EVENT		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Event occurs with possible national security implications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CINCs continue to update and provide assessment with OPREP-3PCA CINC receives Alert Order or Planning Order 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NCA decide to execute OPORD
ACTION		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recognize problem OPREP-3 Reports Submit CINC's Assessment (OPREP-3PCA) Refocus resources to improve situation awareness CJCS gives military advice to NCA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase awareness Increase reporting Create, modify JOPES database CINC assigns tasks to subordinates USTRANSCOM supports CINC with deployment estimates Force providers source Identify movement requirements Identify and assign tasks to units Convert COA into OPORDs Resolve shortfalls and limitations Begin SORTS reporting JCS monitor OPORD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CJCS publishes Execution Order by authority & direction of SECDEF CINC executes OPORD JOPES database maintained JPEC reports execution status
OUTCOME		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assess that event may have national implications NCA/CJCS/CINC decide to develop military option CJCS publishes NCA decision in Alert Order 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CJCS publishes NCA decision in Alert Order CINC publishes OPORD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Crisis resolved

Table 2: Summary of Revised Time-Sensitive Planning Phases

SUMMARY

This short paper proposed a revision to CAP&E. Working groups (e.g., JOPES UAG, GCCS FPWG) have recognized the need to change. Now is the time to change doctrine and begin the process that will change JOPES and drive revised requirements for ADP support. Our current system does not support the way we are doing operation planning and execution. It is time to eliminate steps that are routinely skipped over and re-engineer our processes accordingly. If we do this, we stand a better chance of getting a C2 system that supports the JPEC. Implied is a continuous cycle of planning and replanning including branches and sequels as a crisis evolves.



JOINT PUBLICATION USER FEEDBACK

Everyone has the opportunity to make recommendations to improve JPs. Each JP solicits user comments. Comments received by the joint community will be included in the publication's formal assessment prepared by USJFCOM JWFC to help make joint doctrine the best warfighting guidance available. Submit JP changes or recommendations by e-mail to doctrine@jwfc.jfcom.mil.

TERMINOLOGY CURRENCY

Users of JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, should note that printed versions quickly become dated and they should go online to get the most current information. Navigate to: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf

JOINT PUBLICATION STATUS

APPROVED/ **CANCELED** SINCE NOVEMBER 1, 2001

PUB#	TITLE
3-05.1	JTTP for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations
3-05.3	Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures
3-49	Joint Doctrine for civil Search and Rescue (FD)
3-60	Joint Doctrine for Targeting
4-01.3 Rev1**	JTTP for Movement Control
4-01.5 Rev1	JTTP for Transportation Terminal Operations
4-09	Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution
5-00.1	Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning

SCHEDULED FOR APPROVAL OVER THE NEXT 6 MONTHS

PUB#	TITLE
1-04	JTTP for Legal Support to Military Operations
2-01.1 ^{FT}	JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting
2-01.2 Rev1	Joint Doctrine and TTP for Counterintelligence Support to Operations
3-01.2	Joint Doctrine for Offensive Operations for Countering Air and Missile Threats
3-01.3	Joint Doctrine for Defensive Operations for Countering Air and Missile Threats
3-05.2	JTTP for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning
3-06	Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations
3-14	Joint Doctrine for Space Operations
3-17 Rev1**	Joint Doctrine and JTTP for Air Mobility Operations
3-57.1	Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs
4-01 Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System
4-08	Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations

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PUB#	TITLE
1	Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States
3-04.1*	JTTP for Shipboard Helicopter Operations
3-07.4*	Joint Counterdrug Operations
3-07.5*	JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
3-09*	Doctrine for Joint Fire Support
3-57	Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations
4-02.1*	JTTP for Health Service Logistics Support in Joint Operations
4-07	JTTP for Common-User Logistics During Joint Operations

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1-05 Rev1	Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations
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3-03 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations
3-05	Doctrine for Joint Special Operations
3-07 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
3-07.1 Rev1	JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
3-07.2 Rev1	JTTP for Antiterrorism
3-08 Rev 1	Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations (Vol I & II)
3-09.3 Rev1	JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)
3-10 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations
3-10.1 Rev1	JTTP for Base Defense
3-12 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations
3-12.1 Rev1	Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data
3-13 Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for Information Operations
3-13.1 Rev1**	Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)
3-50.2 Rev1 ^c	Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue
3-50.21 Rev1 ^c	JTTP for Combat Search and Rescue
3-50.3 Rev1 ^c	Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery
3-52 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
3-53 Rev1	Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations
3-54 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Operations Security
3-55 Rev1	Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Support for Joint Operations
3-56.1 Rev1	Command and Control for Joint Air Operations
3-58 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Military Deception
3-61 Rev1	Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations
4-01.2 Rev1	JTTP for Sealift Support to Joint Operations
4-01.6 Rev1	JTTP for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS)
4-01.7 Rev1	JTTP for Use of Intermodal Containers in Joint Operations
4-02.2 Rev1	JTTP for Patient Movement in Joint Operations
4-03 Rev1	Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine
4-05 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning
4-06 Rev1	JTTP for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations
5-0 Rev1	Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
6-0 Rev1	Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations
6-02 Rev1	Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems

* Denotes formal assessment, others are preliminary ** Denotes early revision ^{FT} Denotes "fast track" ^c Denotes consolidation as JP 3-50

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
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JOINT DOCTRINE HIERARCHY

"As of 24 April 2002"



LEGEND

114 Publications

- Approved pubs
- # Approved pubs being changed/revision
- Pubs under development
- Pubs to be developed
- # Pubs to be deleted pending development or revision of supporting pubs

DOCTRINE ORGANIZATION UPDATES

JOINT STAFF, J7, JOINT DOCTRINE, EDUCATION, AND TRAINING DIVISION (JDETD), JOINT DOCTRINE BRANCH

By *CAPT Bruce Russell, USN, Division Chief*

Personnel Turnover. The Joint Doctrine Branch will be saying farewell to CAPT Jay DeLoach in May 2002 and CDR Sally deGozzaldi in June 2002. CAPT DeLoach will depart after a six-month tour, returning to his post on the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. CDR deGozzaldi will be leaving after a three-year tour, to serve as the Executive Officer and eventually the Commanding Officer of Helicopter Training Squadron Eight (HELTRARON 8), based in Milton, FL. Sally and Jay truly will be missed and their outstanding contributions are greatly appreciated. We recently welcomed LT Keith Lanzer, who is assigned to the Joint Doctrine Branch for six months as an intern from the Navy Washington, DC, Area Intern Program. LT Lanzer's background is in submarine warfare. He will help manage publication maintenance and Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System (JDEIS) development.

PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

The six publications approved in the last six months are listed on page 21. Congratulations to all for the hard work and effort required for successful approval and dissemination. Publications expected to be approved by October 2002 also are listed on page 21.

There are five high interest publications in development or revision—JPs 2-01.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Targeting*; 3-07.7, *Doctrine for Civil Support*; 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*; 3-26, *Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security*; and 3-41, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Consequence Management*.

UPCOMING CONFERENCES

The **29th Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP)** is scheduled for 8-9 May 2002 at USJFCOM JWFC.

The **2nd JDEIS Configuration Management Working Group (CMWG)** is scheduled to meet on 7 May

2002 at USJFCOM JWFC in Suffolk, VA. The goal is to solicit input on the requirements, functions, format, and implementation plan for JDEIS. The last CMWG, held 30 October 2001, provided specific inputs and recommendations to guide further JDEIS progress for both user and developer functions.

The **8th annual Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group (AJODWG)** is scheduled for 2-6 September 2002, at NATO HQ in Brussels, Belgium.

ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE AND TERMINOLOGY

The United States has ratified 16 Allied Joint Publications (AJPs)—15 within the last year. As sufficient numbers of other nations ratify these AJPs, promulgation copies will be made available. Promulgated AJPs include: AJPs-01(A), *Allied Joint Doctrine*; 2.2, *Counter Intelligence and Security Procedures*; 2.5, *Handling of Captured Personnel, Equipment, and Documents*; 3.3, *Joint Air and Space Operations Doctrine*; 3.4.1, *Peace Support Operations*; 3.6, *Allied Joint Electronic Warfare Doctrine*; 4, *Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine*; 4.4, *Movement and Transportation*; 4.5, *Allied Joint Host Nation Support Doctrine and Procedures*; 4.6, *Multinational Joint Logistic Center Doctrine*; and 4.10, *Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine*. AJP-01(B) and AJP-3 will be promulgated soon.

To support interoperability-related doctrine issues, Joint Doctrine Branch representatives attended the following multinational meetings during the past year:

- The Allied Joint Operations Doctrine AJODWG, and meetings of the subordinate Doctrine Harmonization and Hierarchy Management Panels;
- Canada - US Military Cooperation Committee (CANUS MCC);
- Quadripartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference (QCJWC); and
- Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC).

As part of Joint Doctrine Branch support for the six-nation MIC, Mr. Harry Simmeth wrote and internationally coordinated a White Paper entitled, *The Lead Nation Concept in Multinational Coalition Operations*. The United Kingdom reports that it used this paper to help plan its recent Lead Nation role for the Afghanistan international peacekeeping force, and found that it considerably shortened planning time. The paper can be found on the MIC Web site, and will soon be retitled, *MIC Coalition Building Guide*.

NATO English Speaking Nations (ESN) Terminology Conference. The annual NATO ESN
(*Organization updates continued on next page*)

Conference took place 18-22 March 2002, hosted by the UK in Blunsdon, near Swindon. Chaired by the NATO Terminology Coordinator, the ESN Conference is hosted every third year, on an alternating basis, by three nations: the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The ESN Conference is part of the annual series of NATO terminology conferences under the NATO Standardization Agency. The purpose of the series is standardized civil and military terminology in both English and French for use throughout NATO, plus the required plans, policy and procedure for implementation. These conferences are a principal feature of the NATO Standardization Programme. Delegates to the Conference included representatives from NATO Headquarters and the two strategic commands of NATO, in addition to delegates from Canada, the UK, the Netherlands, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Turkey and the United States. The meeting reached decisions on 95 terminology issues and approved, in modified form, a proposed US revision of the Conference terms of reference. The Terminology Coordinator briefed the Conference on the ongoing study of the NATO Terminology Standardization Programme. The majority of issues raised will be addressed at subsequent meetings in June at NATO HQ, in order to finalize NATO agreement. "NATO Agreed" terminology is incorporated in the AAP-6, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French)*. Where applicable, it will be considered for possible use within DOD, and subsequent inclusion in JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

ELECTRONIC DISTRIBUTION of A COMMON PERSPECTIVE

This newsletter is now available through electronic subscription and distribution to approved subscribers. If you wish to receive *A Common Perspective* via e-mail, register your subscription using the following procedures:

- Navigate to <http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil/dodnato/jw100/>. **If you are not a "registered user," request an account using the link at the bottom of the page. Once registration is confirmed, return to the above Web page and continue.**
- Click on "Registered Users." The "JW100 Joint Doctrine" Home Page will appear. Click on the link for "A Common Perspective," then click on the link for "Electronic Subscription," and fill out and submit the subscription form.

You will be notified via e-mail when your subscription registration has been approved. The next edition of *A Common Perspective* will be distributed to you in Acrobat's PDF format attached to an e-mail.

JOINT AND ARMY DOCTRINE DIRECTORATE (JADD), HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (HQ, TRADOC)

By COL Mark E. Warner, USA, Director

Homeland Security (HLS) Directorate. HQ, TRADOC has recently created a HLS Directorate under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine to serve as the proponent for HLS matters within the command. The mission of this directorate is to serve as the Commanding General's primary organization for the integration of HLS doctrine, training, leadership, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS) into the Army. Strategically focused, the Directorate will maintain situational awareness with the Department of the Army, joint, and interagency communities, while providing consistent guidance and direction for the efforts of the proponent schools. The HLS Directorate is currently located in Building 11 on Fort Monroe, VA, and is divided into three branches: Current Operations, Future Operations, and DTLOMS Integration. Current Operations Branch will focus on near-term initiatives, doctrine and training products, and the development of policies and directives. Future Operations Branch will develop the concept for HLS as well as focus on Army Transformation. The DTLOMS Integration Branch will assist the other two branches by ensuring that initiatives are staffed and coordinated throughout the Deputy Chiefs of Staff. The organization will be tri-component, consisting of a mix of approximately 14 Active Component, USA Reserve, National Guard, contractor, and civil servant personnel. The Director of this organization will eventually be a National Guard Colonel (due to arrive in June 2002). This structure will promote synergy within the Army for HLS.

Strategic Plans Directorate. HQ, TRADOC has also established a Strategic Plans Directorate under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine. Its mission is to work both Army Strategic Campaign Plan and TRADOC Strategic Campaign Plan issues. The directorate will also support TRADOC's Transformation Roadmap efforts to synchronize them with the six Quadrennial Review Lines of Operations.

TRADOC Installation Commander's Force Protection Handbook (FP HB). The FP HB was developed to explain the important aspects of FP, serve as a FP quick reference information source for TRADOC installation commanders and their staffs, operationalize the antiterrorism tasks, and consolidate key FP guidelines that are detailed in numerous references. The FP HB provides a user-friendly, pocket-size reference and procedural guide for implementing an installation FP

program. It emphasizes the importance of building partnerships with the local community and other government entities. It provides tools to improve FP planning and execution. It focuses on the existing tactical tools to improve intelligence collection, reduce vulnerabilities and improve response capability. Bottom line: The FP HB provides an additional tool for commanders to deter, defend, and respond to FP threats. It is expected to be approved and published in the 3rd Qtr of FY 03.

Semi-Annual Army Doctrine Conference (SAADC). The Fall 2001 SAADC was held 14-15 November 2001 in Hampton, VA. The conference provided a venue to review the Five Year Master Plan execution, as well as an opportunity to exchange and disseminate information on doctrine literature and the doctrine development process to various members of the Army doctrine community. The next SAADC is scheduled for 19-20 June 2002 in Hampton, VA, and tentatively scheduled to include updates from the HQ, TRADOC doctrine staff and TRADOC proponent schools; as well as breakout groups to address and make recommendations on various doctrinal issues. Registration information can be found on the Army Doctrine Web site at doctrine.army.mil.

TRADOC Regulation 25-36, *The TRADOC Doctrinal Literature Program (TDLP)*. The 5 April 2000 version is under revision to capture new and changed doctrine policy (i.e., management and development). The regulation establishes policy in managing Army doctrine and describes TRADOC's roles and responsibilities to manage, establish requirements, develop, and review doctrine to support Army, multi-Service, joint, and multinational operations. It applies to TRADOC and non-TRADOC agencies that have an established memorandum of agreement with HQ, TRADOC. The coordinating draft has been staffed with pertinent doctrine agencies and their comments are being adjudicated. The revised regulation will supersede TR 25-35 and TP 25-34, both dated 24 January 1992.

KEY JOINT PUBLICATIONS STATUS

JP 3-07.7, *Doctrine for Civil Support*. During May 2001, the JDWP voted to rename JP 3-07.7, from *JTTP for Domestic Support Operations* to *Doctrine for Civil Support*, send it back to the Army for rewrite, and reset the milestones. On 12 June 2001, a working group (of action officers from JS J7, USJFCOM, and USA) established a plan of action and milestones. USJFCOM, with assistance from the Army, agreed to redraft JP 3-07.7 by adjudicating the critical and major comments from the last version and produce a new writer's draft. The first draft was staffed for comment in December 2001. The final coordination (FC) draft is scheduled for release in June 2002.

JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*. The first draft has been staffed worldwide for comment. A joint working group was conducted in April 2002 to consolidate comments and resolve issues prior to releasing the second draft for worldwide staffing in June 2002. It addresses command relationships, organization and planning considerations, procedures, and options for conducting joint land operations under a functional component commander.

JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, was approved on 25 January 2002.

KEY ARMY PUBLICATIONS STATUS

FM 1-0 (formerly FM 12-6), *Personnel*. FM 12-6 was approved in 1994. The proponent, US Army Adjutant General School, has delayed staffing the revision due to resource constraints. When published, FM 1-0 will outline how the personnel units and staff ensure responsive, flexible personnel support for commanders and soldiers. It will define objectives and standards for integrating continuous personnel support into Army and joint operations. It also will outline those conditions and missions personnel units and staff must anticipate.

FM 1-02 (formerly FM 101-5-1), *Operational Terms and Graphics*. FM 101-5-1 was approved in September 1997. The proponent, US Army Combined Arms Command (CAC)/Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD), will publish the revision in the June/July 2002 timeframe. FM 1-02 sets forth doctrine for the Army and Marines in the use of land-based warfighting symbology. It is designed for commanders and staffs from company through corps.

FM 2-0 (formerly FM 34-1), *Intelligence Operations*. FM 34-1 was published in September 1994. The proponent, US Army Intelligence Center, began development of FM 2-0 during the 2d Qtr FY 02 with completion projected for the 3d Qtr FY 03. When published, FM 2-0 will provide the fundamental principles, missions, roles, responsibilities, and processes of Army intelligence operations. It will describe how the Army plans, directs, collects, processes, produces, and disseminates intelligence on the threat and environment across the range of Army operations outlined in FM 3-0, *Operations*.

FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, was originally published in December 1990. The proponent, US Army CAC/CADD, has reviewed and edited comments from the final draft, posted the Doctrine Review and Approval Group (DRAG) version on their Web site, and requested a mid-April 2002 suspense for staffing. Promulgation is estimated late in the 3d Qtr 2002. FM 3-07 is keystone doctrine that amplifies chapters 9 and
(*Organization updates continued on next page*)

10 in FM 3-0, *Operations*. FM 3-07 is conceptual, aiming more at broad understanding than at any operational details. It also updates and consolidates FMs 90-29, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*; 100-19, *Domestic Support Operations*; 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*; and 100-23, *Peace Operations*.

FM 3-07.2 (New), Force Protection. The proponent, US ARMY CAC/CADD, released the initial draft in March 2002 and plans to publish the DRAG version in the 4th Qtr FY 02. Release of the DRAG version may be delayed pending the release of the initial draft of the new *Force Protection Army Regulation* being prepared by the Army G3. Promulgation of FM 3-07.2 is anticipated in the 1st Qtr FY 03. FM 3-07.2 will focus on Army units at the company through corps level and provide a general framework outlining Army force protection doctrine at the tactical and operational level. Additionally, FM 3-07.2 will emphasize actions commanders will take to protect their forces against more varied threats in a tactical environment.

FM 3-13 (formerly 100-6), Information Operations, was originally published in August 1996. The proponent, US Army CAC/CADD, is planning a DRAG video teleconference following the approval of FM 6-0, *Command and Control*, and subsequently publishing FM 3-13 early in the 3d Qtr 2002. FM 3-13 is the Army's overarching publication for information operations (IO) and builds on the foundation laid in Chapter 11, "Information Superiority," of FM 3-0. FM 3-13 explains the fundamentals of IO for the Army and facilitates the transition of the US Army to the Information Age.

FM 3-91 (formerly 71-100), Division Operations. US Army CAC/CADD is the proponent, who staffed the initial draft in October 2000 and received comments in February 2001. The final draft is projected for staffing during the 3rd Qtr 2002. FM 3-91 is built on the doctrinal principles addressed in FM 3-0. It establishes warfighting as the Army's primary focus and recognizes the importance of being able to dominate any situation in military operations other than war. This manual's primary focus is the tactical level, however, FM 3-91 discusses operational level fundamentals for division participation in joint operations.

FM 3-92 (formerly 100-15), Corps Operations. US ARMY CAC/CADD is the proponent. The program directive is pending approval and staffing of the initial draft is projected in the 4th Qtr FY 02.

FM 3-93 (formerly 100-7) Strategic Army. Proponency moved from the US Army War College to US Army CAC/CADD in October 2001. The US Army War College will have technical review authority. CADD released the final draft March 2002. FM 3-93 is the Army's overarching operational-level doctrine and is closely linked to the newly revised Army and joint keystone

doctrine found in FM 3-0, *Operations*, and JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. The scope of FM 3-93 has been expanded to include discussion currently found in FM 3-100.16, *Army Operational Support*, and to include discussions on joint land operations. FM 3-93 also will clarify the roles of Army Forces (ARFOR); incorporate ARFOR lessons learned in recent operations in Kuwait, Bosnia, and Kosovo; and will be updated per the doctrine outlined in FM 3-0.

FM 3-100.21 (formerly 100-21), Contractors on the Battlefield (COB), defines the types of contractors and describes their relationship to the military chain of command. The primary audience is Army commanders and staffs at all echelons involved in COB planning, deployment, management, and support. It also provides a significant COB-related force protection discussion. Due to the high interest in COB-related operations, it is being rewritten to provide more detailed TTP-like doctrine and to incorporate lessons learned from recent military operations. FM 3-100.21 approval is expected before this printing contingent on resolution of the few remaining issues. NOTE: JADD is discussing with the Joint Staff possible development of a stand-alone "JTTP for COB" similar in scope to FM 3-100.21.

FM 4-0 (formerly FM 100-10), Combat Service Support, was originally published in October 1995. The proponent, US Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM)/Combat Developments for Combat Service Support (CDC-CSS), is preparing the DRAG version for final approval and publication in the 3d Qtr FY 02. FM 4-0 is keystone doctrine that links directly to FM 3-0, *Operations*; and collaborates information found in FM 1, *The Army*, and FM 3-93, *Strategic Army*. FM 4-0 serves as the Army's capstone CSS doctrine and bridges the gap between Army, Joint, and multinational doctrine. The manual provides the basis for subordinate CSS DTLOMS development in support of Army of Excellence forces, Transitioning Force XXI organizations, and the Army's Transformation initiatives for a more agile and responsive force.

FM 5-0 (formerly 101-5), Army Planning and Orders Production. The proponent, US Army CAC/CADD, released the final draft in April 02. The DRAG version is scheduled for publication during September 2002. It describes planning and orders production used by commanders from company through corps. FM 5-0 is a significant revision of the *Staff Organization and Operations* manual. CADD has moved the staff pieces to FM 6-0. What remains in FM 5-0 is the Military Decision Making Process, and operations orders and plans. Troop leading procedures and problem solving techniques were added. This rewrite also includes a start on transitional TTPs on digitization and automated processes for digitized units. FM 5-0 will be distributed soon after FM 6-0 so the field will understand where the contents of the current FM 101-5 package can be found.

FM 6-0 (formerly 100-34), *Command and Control*. The proponent, US Army CAC/CADD, is preparing to publish the approved manual as of this printing. FM 6-0 is the C2 keystone manual that will dovetail with the C2 discussion found in FM 3-0.

FM 7-0 (formerly 25-100), *Training the Force*. The proponent, TRADOC DCST, has incorporated comments from the review of the final draft and is preparing for a GOSC in the 3d Qtr FY 02 and subsequent Chief of Staff of the Army release during the 4th Qtr FY 02.

FM 7-15, *Army Universal Task List (AUTL)*. The proponent, US Army CAC/CADD, has released the final draft. Each military Service must publish its own tactical task list to supplement the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). FM 7-15 describes the structure and content of the AUTL and its relationship to Army tactical missions. It provides a common reference for Army tactical tasks performed by units and staffs at corps level and below. It lists tasks and definitions, and provides reference codes to identify tactical missions and tasks. It does not include tasks performed by Army forces as part of joint and multinational forces at the operational and strategic levels.

HEADQUARTERS, AIR FORCE DOCTRINE CENTER (HQ, AFDC/DJ)

By Lt Col John P. Klatt, USAF, HQ AFDC/DJ

HQ AFDC/DJ bids farewell to Maj Ken Smith who left us for a JSTARS assignment at Warner-Robbins AFB, GA. We wish him good luck. We also bid farewell and best wishes to Col Craig McLain, who has moved up to Washington, DC, and is currently assigned to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. With his absence, Lt Col Ray Clark has assumed duties as Deputy Commander for Det 1, AFDC, and Mr. Wayne Williamson assumes the position of Deputy Director for AFDC/DJ. We welcomed one new member to our organization in October 2001. Lt Col Mike McDaniel arrived from the Pentagon where he served in the Joint Staff J-3, Special Operations Division (J3/SOD). He is assuming the actions that were assigned to Maj Fred "VC" Van Cleave, specifically, special operations doctrine.

The following paragraphs reflect the latest status of joint publications since October 2001 for which the Air Force is either the lead agent or primary review authority:

- **JP 3-55, *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Target Acquisition (TA)*.** AFDC/DJ hosted a revision second draft joint working group (JWG) from 21-22 February 2002. The JWG determined that JP 3-55 should proceed to a revision third draft (RTD) before final coordination (FC). Joint Staff

J7/JDETD will release a preliminary RTD in late March 2002 and AFDC/DJ will host a writer's WG from 22-26 April 2002 to refine it before releasing it for worldwide review and comment. AFDC/CC requested and JS J7 approved adjustment of the remaining milestones accordingly.

- **JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*.** AFDC/DJ played a leading role in resolving contentious issues clearing the way for approval in January 2002.

Thirty-two of the 34 Air Force Doctrine Documents (AFDDs) are approved. AFDDs 1-3, *Air Force Leadership*, and 2-4.5, *Legal Support for Air and Space Operations*, are in development. Twelve AFDDs are in revision. All AFDDs (along with other approved doctrine publications) are available on our Web site at <https://www.doctrine.af.mil> (and SIPRNET <http://www.doctrine.af.smil.mil>).

NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND (NWDC)

By Mr. Mike Bulawka

Future Concepts, Experimentation, and Doctrine: The Navy's Approach

"... our challenge is to boldly describe our vision and aggressively adapt new organizations, command structures, tactics, and forces that can respond rapidly, prevent future surprises, and adapt to the new world environment ..."

**Gordon R. England
Secretary of the Navy**

One of NWDC's missions is to "coevolve concepts, technology and doctrine/TTP through an aggressive Service and joint experimentation program." The next few paragraphs will briefly describe how the command is organizing to meet this challenge, the Doctrine Department's role, and a successful Navy model for the development of TTP that might serve as a model for a "joint process."

Policies and procedures, guidance, and lessons learned that describe the process(es) used to validate conceptual warfighting philosophies are almost nonexistent within the joint community and very limited within each separate Service. While JP 1-01, *Joint Doctrine Development System*, tells us that, "prior to fielding of new or enhanced military capabilities, the validated principles and fundamentals for employing such capabilities should be reviewed and prepared for potential incorporation in emerging or approved joint doctrine and JTTP concurrent with the actual fielding of these capabilities," it does not explain how this should be done. Thus, that responsibility falls to each separate Service, and within the Navy a large portion of that responsibility lies with the (NWDC).

(Organization updates continued on next page)

NWDC has established five Warfare Innovation Development Teams (WIDTs) manned by subject matter experts from its Maritime Battle Center, Concepts, Operations and Implementation, and Doctrine Departments, as well as other organizations when required. Each WIDT is responsible for taking "innovative ideas for warfighting from the conceptual stage through the validation phase, and continually identifying new and revised doctrine that will support future capabilities before they are delivered to the Fleet." Focus areas for the WIDTs are: 1) information and knowledge advantage, 2) assured access, 3) effects based operations, 4) forward sea-based forces, and 5) homeland security/force protection. Each WIDT has at least one Doctrine Department representative who, in addition to bringing his or her professional experience and expertise to the WIDT, assists the team in understanding what the most current doctrine and TTP is, what draft doctrine is being staffed and who is responsible for its development, and the importance of terminology—a common language that assists commanders and their staffs in operating "from the same page."

A "doctrine lead" also is assigned to each Fleet Battle Experiment to assist in the development of each experiment's supporting data collection and analysis plan. The "doctrine lead" also coordinates with the Navy Centers of Excellence (COE) and primary review authorities (PRAs) to obtain any additional subject matter expertise that may be required to collect data or participate in the analysis and finally, funnels experiment results to the COEs, PRAs, and the Fleet for validation and incorporation into the doctrine/TTP development process.

While the command is still in the process of developing an SOP that captures this process, the Navy already has a tested, accepted, and successful program that provides numerous lesson learned and a solid basis for adaptation—the Tactical Development and Evaluation (TAC D&E) Program. Per NTTP 1-01, The TAC D&E Program should be used when introducing new weapons system capabilities, modifying an existing system, or to support the development of an innovative tactical application of a current system. TACMEMOs are one of the programs products. These TACMEMOs allow operational commanders and warfare COEs to approve and publish new TTP for use by subordinate forces and for validation and review by operating forces, either in exercises or in operations. They are issued for a specific period of time that will allow validation of their substance, normally 24 months. Validated tactics from these TACMEMOs are then incorporated into NWPs, NTTPs, or NTRPs.

To keep doctrine relevant we must ensure our "development process" incorporates the benefits of Service and joint experimentation, which includes the structured seminars, modeling and simulation exercises, and wargaming efforts that are used to refine the initiatives. This is the new paradigm that has been used for joint forces maritime component commander doctrine development in conjunction with MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002. NWDC has

tied command and control experimentation to doctrine development. Seminars, workflow modeling, workshops, and wargames have been use to refine the draft joint doctrine. Some of the most valuable commentary has come from joint and other Service experiment planners and participants. Joint experimentation provides a unique opportunity to jump start joint doctrine development using field validated results. This paradigm speaks to an article in the April 2001 issue of *A Common Perspective*. The following quote is taken from page 6 of the newsletter.

"The joint doctrine development process is focused almost exclusively on existing capabilities, and while it is responsive to change, it is not an effective agent of change, particularly change associated with transformation. JP 1 . . . states that joint doctrine serves as "an engine of change"."

Joint doctrine, like Service doctrine, must lead the target if it is to be an "engine of change." Codification of present day consensual collaboration will be joint doctrine's future unless it aligns with joint experimentation. As the joint force looks to integrate and transform, joint doctrine, along with joint experimentation, has an opportunity to lead vice follow.

Additional information on the TAC D&E Program and Fleet Battle Experiments can be found on the NWDC SIPRNET Web site at www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil.

MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND (MCCDC), DOCTRINE DIVISION, JOINT BRANCH

By LtCol Pat Redmon, USMC

The Marine Corps, as lead agent, is in various stages of developing/revising four of our five joint publications.

- The final coordination (FC) draft of JP 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations*, was released for worldwide review during February 2002 and is on track for a late July 2002 signature. The Joint Staff (JS) doctrine sponsor, JS J8, will adjudicate all FC comments during May 2002.
- We submitted the first draft of JP 3-02.1, *JTTP for Landing Force Operations*, to the JS J7 during February 2002 and will begin to adjudicate all comments during late May 2002. We plan to host a joint working group (JWG) sometime in late June 2002--look for a mid-May announcement message.
- The first draft of JP 3-02.2, *JTTP for Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation*, is on track for a June 2002 release. The publication's revised program

directive changed the title to include debarkation, as well as changing the scope from joint doctrine to JTTP.

- We hosted a JWG during January 2002 to adjudicate the more than 1400 comments received on the first draft of JP 3-09.3, *JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS)*. The second draft was released during April 2002. We are hoping to get more input from those directly involved in CAS while deployed to Afghanistan. We are planning another JWG from 16-18 July 2002 to adjudicate all comments from the second draft.

The Marine Corps also is closely monitoring the revision/development of the JP 3-30 series publications that address functional component commanders (i.e., JPs 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*; 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*; and 3-32, *Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations*). As the technical review authority for both JPs 3-31 and 3-32, the Marine Corps has been heavily involved in the development of these publications and is seeking input from all commands on the associated command and control issues. JP 3-30 has just completed a second draft review and by press time for this newsletter, the second draft of JP 3-31 should be released. The first draft release of JP 3-32 is scheduled for May 2002 and we are anticipating input from those commands involved in recent joint force maritime component commander operations in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE (AWC)

By LTC Karl C. Thoma, Joint/Army Concepts and Doctrine Officer, (717)245-3398

AWC has a Joint and Army Concepts and Doctrine Directorate responsible for ensuring that doctrine is appropriately fused within the curriculum. Our primary focus is at the strategic national and theater levels since our students work through an initial term designed to build knowledge in the areas of strategic leadership, national security policy and strategy, joint processes and landpower development, implementing national military strategy, and campaign planning. That knowledge is then applied through regional strategic appraisals and a Strategic Crisis Exercise.

The Strategic Crisis Exercise is conducted within the framework of crisis action planning and execution as outlined in joint and CJCS publications. Students lead and role play elements of the National Security Council, National Economic Council, the Departments of State and Defense, in addition to the military roles that include the geographic combatant commanders, the Joint Staff, the Service Chiefs, the Service staffs, and the supporting combatant commanders. In this multiple-crisis scenario exercise, students participate in the interagency process, develop Presidential Decision Directives, promulgate

strategic guidance, allocate forces, distribute strategic lift, execute campaign plans, and negotiate conditions of conflict termination. Joint doctrine provides the foundation for planning and execution in each phase of the exercise.

Professor Mike Morin is the Director and our longtime resident expert on joint doctrine and campaign planning. To assist him, LTC Karl C. Thoma has replaced LTC Curtis Cheeseman. Karl comes to the college from 8th Army Korea where he served as the Director of Replacement Operations at 8th PERSCOM. He has previously worked concepts and doctrine at the Adjutant General School. Ms. Gwen Kochert provides the necessary administrative support to complete the team.

This small office has the tremendous advantage of being able to tap senior-level subject matter experts who serve on the staff and faculty. Over the past year we have provided comments and input on 73 joint publications, 13 field manuals, 13 allied joint publications, 3 ALSA and other Service publications, and 5 concept papers. AWC has provided major input to the revisions of JPs 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*; 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*; 3-08, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations*; and FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*, and other similar manuals that impact the strategic level or have significant planner-level implications. This shop works hard to ensure that our curriculum remains doctrinally based while simultaneously assisting the Department of the Army staff in the ongoing joint doctrine review and development process.

AIR LAND SEA APPLICATION (ALSA) CENTER

By COL Mark Zodda, USA, Director

We continue to be very busy conducting research on potential new products and assessing our existing publications for possible revision. ALSA's CY 2002 output remains on track to include seven revisions and three new projects. For those of you who are not familiar with what ALSA does for the joint and multi-Service community, our mission is to responsively and rapidly develop multi-Service concepts and tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) across the entire scope of military operations. ALSA develops and publishes selected publications, studies, and periodicals that coordinate Service doctrine and complement efforts of government, joint, unified, and Service staff; and provide solutions that cross Service lines to meet the **immediate** needs of operating forces. Within this framework, our publications do the following:

- Provide a bridge between joint and Service doctrine (e.g., *Explosive Ordnance Disposal*)
- Capture multi-Service solutions to joint operations problems (e.g., *Joint Air Operations Center and* *(Organization updates continued on next page)*)

the Army Air and Missile Defense Command Coordination)

- Establish a foundation for joint doctrine (e.g., *Humanitarian Assistance*)
- Provide a blueprint (80%) to the field when Services can't agree on doctrine (100%) (e.g., *Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control*)
- Provide a single-source reference guide (e.g., *Theater Air Ground Systems*)
- Standardize operating procedures between the Services (e.g., *Brevity, J-Fire*)

We have a number of upcoming personnel changes. First, we are losing two of our long-time civilian members. Ms. Shirley Ferguson, our editor, who sets and maintains the ALSA standard for our publications and Air Land Sea Bulletin (ALSB), will be retiring from the Department of

the Air Force. Ms. Tracy Houston, our Budget Analyst, who also does all of the other critical jobs like briefing preparation that no one else wants to do, will be transferring to a budget position with the 1st Fighter Wing on Langley AFB, VA. We also have three action officer who will be departing. LTC Kevin Kirmse, USA; Lt Col Steve Jenkins, USAF; and Lt Col(S) Bob Campbell are all scheduled for a permanent change of station this Summer. They will be replaced by Maj Jennifer Spears, Maj Kyle Taylor, and another individual, yet to be named, in the July – August timeframe.

The following is a list of current (as of March 2002) publications, publications under revision, and new projects. For the most up-to-date information, go to our Web site at www.dtic.mil/alsa. Major Barbara Romano has done excellent work updating our site to insure that you, the warfighters, have access to our publications, drafts, and up-to-date information on ongoing projects. We are currently in the process of making sure the Joint Electronic Library has been updated to include all ALSA publications.

CURRENT ALSA PUBLICATIONS	
TITLE--DATE	POC
AMCI: <i>Army and Marine Corps Integration in Joint Operations</i> --NOV 01	Team C
ARM-J: <i>Antiradiation Missile Employment in a Joint Environment (Distribution Restricted)</i> --JUN 95	Team A
AVIATION URBAN OPERATIONS: <i>Multiservice Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations</i> --APR 01	Team B
BMO: <i>Bomber Maritime Operations (SECRET)</i> --JUN 00	Team E
BREVITY: <i>Multi-Service Brevity Codes</i> --FEB 02	Team F
EOD: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a Joint Environment</i> --MAR 01	Team D
ICAC2: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control</i> --JUN 00	Team D
JAAT: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Attack Team Operations</i> --JUN 98	Team F
JAOC/AAMDC Coordination: <i>MTTP for Joint Air Operations Center(JAOC) and Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) Coordination</i> --JAN 01	Team F
JATC: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Traffic Control</i> --JAN 99	Team D
J-FIRE: <i>MTTP for Joint Application of Firepower</i> --NOV 97	Team F
JIADS: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Integrated Air Defense System (Distribution Restricted)</i> --JUN 01	Team E
J-SEAD: <i>MTTP for the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SECRET)</i> --SEP 00	Team A
J-STARS: <i>MTTP for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (SECRET)</i> --JUL 97	Team G
JTF IM: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Task Force Information Management</i> --APR 99	Team A
JTF LIAISON HANDBOOK: <i>MTTP for Joint Task Force (JTF) Liaison Operations</i> --AUG 98	Team E
JTMTD: <i>Joint Theater Missile Target Development</i> --OCT 99	Team G
NBC DEFENSE OF FIXED SITES: <i>MTTP for NBC Defense of Theater Fixed Sites, Ports, and Airfields</i> --SEP 00	Team E
NLW: <i>MTTP for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons</i> --OCT 98	Team C
RECCE-J: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Requesting Reconnaissance Information in a Joint Environment</i> --JUN 96	Team E
REPROGRAMMING: <i>Handbook for Reprogramming of Electronic Warfare and Target Sensing Systems (Distribution Restricted)</i> --APR 98	Team G
RM: <i>MTTP for Risk Management</i> --FEB 01	Team C
SURVIVAL, EVASION, AND RECOVERY: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery</i> --JUN 99	Team B
TADIL-J: <i>Introduction to Tactical Digital Information Link J and Quick Reference Guide</i> --JUN 00	Team G
TAGS: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System</i> --JUL 98	Team D
TALK II: <i>Multiservice Communications Procedures for the Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS)</i> --MAY 96	Team B
TARGETING: <i>The Joint Targeting Process and Procedures for Targeting Time-Critical Targets</i> --JUL 97	Team F
TMD IPB: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Theater Missile Defense and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace</i> --JAN 01	Team G
UXO: <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Unexploded Explosive Ordnance Operations</i> --AUG 01	Team D
E-mail = alsa#@langley.af.mil -- NOTE: Replace # with team letter (e.g., for Team A use "a")	

REVISIONS AND NEW PROJECTS

TITLE	EST PUB DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION AND STATUS
ARM-J (Revision): Antiradiation Missile Employment in a Joint Environment	Apr 02	A: FM 3-51.2 M: MCRP 5-58 N: NTTP 3-01.41 AF: AFTTP (I) 3-2.11	This revision of the Jun 95 manual will provide multi-Service procedures for antiradiation missile employment in a joint or multinational environment, with an emphasis on fratricide prevention. The signature draft is in staffing. (Distribution Restricted). POC: Team A
COMBAT CAMERA: MTTP for Joint Combat Camera Operations	Apr 03	A: TBD M: TBD N: TBD AF: TBD	This publication will fill the void that exists regarding combat camera doctrine, and assist JTF commanders in structuring and employing combat camera assets as an effective operational planning tool. The program statement is being staffed. POC: Team D
IDM (Improved Data Modem)	Nov 02	A: TBD M: TBD N: TBD AF: TBD	This publication provides digital connectivity to a variety of attack and reconnaissance aircraft; facilitates exchange of near-real-time targeting data and improves tactical situational awareness by providing a concise picture of the multi-dimensional battlefield. The 2d draft is in production. POC: Team E
IFF: MTTP for Combat Identification in a Joint Integrated Air Defense System (SECRET)	Nov 02	A: TBD M: TBD N: TBD AF: TBD	The publication will educate the warfighter to security issues associated with using the Mark XII IFF Mode 4 Combat Identification System in a joint integrated air defense environment. It will capture TTP used today by the warfighter that can address those security issues. The 2d draft is in production. POC: Team A
J-FIRE (Revision): MTTP for Joint Application of Firepower	Jun 02	A: FM 3-09.32 M: MCRP 3-16.8B N: NWP 3-09.2 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2..6	This revision is a pocket-size guide of procedures for calls for fire, CAS, and naval gunfire. The signature draft is in production. POC: Team F
JSTARS (Revision): MTTP for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System	Nov 02	A: FM 2-00.1 M: MCRP 2-11B N: NWP 3-55.13 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.2	This revision provides procedures for the employment of the J-STARS system in dedicated support to Corps commanders and other ground commanders. The revision will be unclassified. The 2d draft is in staffing. POC: Team G
JTF LIAISON HANDBOOK (Revision): MTTP for Joint Task Force Liaison Operations	Nov 02	A: FM 90-41 M: MCRP 5-1.A N: NTTP 5-02 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.21	This revision defines liaison functions and responsibilities associated with standing up a JTF. The program statement is in staffing. POC: Team E
NLW (Revision): MTTP for Tactical Nonlethal Weapons	Dec 02	A: FM 90-40 M: MCRP 3-15.8 N: NWP 3-07.31 CG:USCGPub 3-07.31 AF: N/A	This revision describes tactical nonlethal weapons and addresses their employment in operational environments. The final coordination draft is in production. POC: Team C
PEACE OPERATIONS: MTTP for Peace Operations	Jan 03	A: 3-07.XX M: TBD N: TBD AF: TBD	This publication provides the tactical level guidance to the warfighter for conducting peace operations. The 1st draft is in staffing. POC: Team B.
Reprogramming: MTTP for reprogramming of Electronic Warfare and Target Sensing	Sep 02	A: FM 2-00.4 M: MCRP 3-36.1B N: NTTP 3-13.1.15 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.7	This MTTP supports the JTF staff in the planning, coordinating, and executing of reprogramming of electronic warfare and target sensing systems as part of joint force command and control warfare operations. The final coordination draft is in production. POC: Team G
TACTICAL RADIO (Revision of TALK-II- SINGGARS)	Mar 02	A: FM 6-02.72 M: MCRP 3-25.2 N: NTTP 3-13.1 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.18	This is a revision to the Multi-Service Communications Procedures for the Single-channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINGGARS). It will include system improvements to SINGGARS as well as position reporting systems such as the enhanced position location reporting system (EPLRS), position location reporting system (PLRS), and situational awareness data link (SADL). POC: Team B
TAGS (Revision): MTTP for Theater Air Ground System	Jan 03	A: FM 3-52.2 M: MCWP 3-25.2 N: NWP 3-56.2 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.17	This revision describes the concept, systems, and procedures for joint and component air-ground operations. The 1st draft is in staffing. POC: Team D

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OPERATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT: *Planning for EBO*

By Gene Myers, HQ USJFCOM, Concept Development

Effects based operations (EBO)—achieving effects on those who make crucial decisions rather than just pounding away at the enemy's politico-military targets—is the beating heart of USJFCOM's rapid decisive operations (RDO) concept. For RDO, joint force commanders employ all available national capabilities in the right balance to quickly achieve strategic and operational effects. It is the command's aim to use RDO as the basis for its joint force experiments that test the methods and means to transform US military might to better operate in the uncertain world of the 21st century. As a RDO guiding principle, EBO provide a process for obtaining a defined set of desired strategic outcomes on an adversary through the precise application of all national capabilities—diplomatic, information, economic, and military.

EBO is based on two things: 1) understanding the adversary as a complex adaptive system of many supporting systems and 2) identifying the key nodes and links in that system (such as political leadership, important economic components, national command and control capability, or key military forces and capabilities) where the effects are to be concentrated. It also aims to achieve effects that cannot always be attained with military force—political, economic, and social. As the torrent of media reports have pointed out in recent weeks, it is this approach, officially described as an experimental concept that is being applied today in America's war on terrorism. Intense political and economic activity at the highest levels along with selective deployments of diverse military capabilities from all the Services indicate a serious attempt at a truly coherent, multifaceted offensive—not a traditional Napoleonic era combined arms campaign, but a deliberately-paced operation to simultaneously have a broad range of effects on the terrorist network and its supporters.

Conducting true EBO requires detailed planning involving a wide cross section of military, political, economic, and information expertise. **Optimally, the object is to rapidly compel adversary leaders to comply with allied demands rather than to punish the nation with death and destruction or the loss of large numbers of its uniformed sons and daughters.** We need to remember that in 21st century conflict we will not be fighting nations, but networks—be that a terrorist network of operatives, supporters, and suppliers or an advanced national political, economic, cultural, military network.

NEEDED: GOOD INFORMATION

EBO requires a great deal of very good information about the adversary, much of which is not provided by traditional military intelligence—his military capabilities, cultural character, economic strength and vulnerabilities, leadership personality and popular support, access to information technologies, and much more. USJFCOM feels that the primary means for collecting, synthesizing, and delivering such detailed knowledge about an adversary, ourselves, and actions that are most likely to create the effects we want is the operational net assessment (ONA). It is an experimental operational support tool that hopefully will provide the kind of across-the-board assessments of an adversary that are so badly needed in modern conflict if we wish to win big and fast while risking as little as we can consistent with objectives.

While the enemy is being scrutinized, an equally important analysis of our own capabilities and intentions is taking place. This analysis begins with an understanding of overarching national foreign policy objectives and how they will likely manifest themselves in a confrontation with a particular adversary. Models and simulations then are used to predict a range of possible outcomes if/when the adversary's critical nodes or vulnerabilities are exploited by the various elements of national and coalition power. The modeling process also helps predict second and third order effects, unintended outcomes, and evaluates the effectiveness of simultaneous application of multiple means. If, for example, we were to choose to create debilitating effects on an adversary's financial system in order to reduce their warfighting potential, we would first need as thorough an understanding as possible of the complete set of effects. In addition to the effect on the adversary's will to resist our objectives, others could include effects on the adversary's military component, on the complex interlocking international financial network, and on the political perceptions of the international community and our own governmental elements such as the Department of Commerce.

Traditionally, crisis planning and strategy execution has been the purview of a rapidly assembled ad hoc collection of military personnel, many without specific training in the tasks they will perform and with, at best, perfunctory knowledge of non-military agency needs and concerns. ONA presents an alternative. It has the potential to foster the kind of comprehensive understanding needed to act swiftly and aggressively by providing a permanent planning mechanism within each geographic combatant commander's headquarters. Its purpose is to impose military, government, and nongovernmental agency collaboration in the planning process as an alternative to relying on impromptu arrangements to handle each crisis.

Planning for a true EBO should begin well before current-day crisis action planning; it should anticipate, not react. Waiting until an adversary commits an overt hostile

act by today's standards precludes many proportional operational-level responses that improve the ability to resolve a conflict early or deter it altogether. This type of planning requires that a geographic combatant commander continually prioritizes and refines regions and issues of concern within his assigned area of responsibility. These priorities focus the efforts of the task oriented joint force headquarters to direct and refine the theater ONA. The objective is to provide a common understanding of ourselves and the adversary among all participants and then link this to the desired effects. One of ONA's main benefits is continuous interagency communication and collaboration itself—collaboration on the issues of vital national political and economic concern as well as on the needs of the geographic combatant commander.

AVOIDING POLITICO-MILITARY MISUNDERSTANDING

As evidenced by DELIBERATE FORCE in 1995 and ALLIED FORCE in 1999, this ongoing collaboration is vitally important. **Recent campaigns have missed attaining the kinds of effects-based outcomes they could have due to systemic failures in politico-military communications.** During these conflicts, issues of political importance such as alliance cohesion and casualty and collateral damage avoidance should have been better understood by military leaders. By the same token, the legitimate demands of conducting rapid and comprehensive military EBO should have been better understood by political leaders. This comprehensive mutual understanding cannot be achieved under the stress and rigor of crisis operations. Collaborative planning should not begin in the face of an enemy. Mutual understanding and a collaborative mentality must be developed over time through continuous association. ONA is intended to provide a primary tool for this.

In an ONA environment, the combatant commander would be supported by a political-military planner and an interagency operational support element, notionally titled the "J-X" Directorate, located in the headquarters. This staff agency would inform the commander of actions and decisions of the interagency community and coordinate politico-military activities and objectives on a daily basis—not just in times of crisis or conflict. The J-X staff would conduct political-military coordination with the full combatant command headquarters staff and develop habitual communication links that ease development of the interagency strategic guidance and political-military plans required by ONA.

Once we understand the adversary's political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information systems and their relationships, we can make judgments on a full range of potential friendly actions. Analysis includes key links and nodes within these systems and proposes methods that will influence, neutralize, or destroy them to achieve

a desired effect or outcome. This is a continuous process that provides a high level of situational understanding well in advance of any military action. It may determine that some targets are not appropriate to purely military means and require employment of other means (e.g., economic, informational, or political actions) in conjunction with military means.

We know that the basic information technologies needed to collect, integrate, analyze, and provide the massive amounts of information for a comprehensive ONA exist today. We now need to harness and adapt them to this specific need. USJFCOM is experimenting with many of these technologies and related techniques with the goal of having a robust ONA system available to military commanders in the near-term.

PARALLEL OPERATIONS—CHANGING HOW WE THINK

But developing an ONA will require more than adapting hardware and software to these purposes. We need to change the way we think. We are used to planning for and conducting operations in a calculated sequential manner—a joint force buildup followed by a combined arms offensive to fight through the layers of enemy defense one at a time in route to the ultimate objective. To achieve EBO in an RDO environment we need to act fast-faster than the adversary can react. We need to keep them off balance. To do this we must plan for and conduct our operations in parallel with forces tailored to achieve specific effects not to overwhelm geographic objectives. We have to use the collaborative tools modern technology provides to allow each planner to instantly see the information and products other planners see and produce. We need to plan for cumulative effects from multiple sources that can cascade upon enemy leaders and paralyze their decision-making processes. They cannot be allowed the time to adjust to our actions and work around our effects. We must understand that we can now conduct military and non-military operations using a wide variety of tools at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war—*simultaneously*. This is the secret of EBO and the ONA process that supports it.

Grover E. (Gene) Myers is senior military analyst for General Dynamics working primarily with USJFCOM's Joint Experimentation program. His previous assignment was as a senior analyst for the US Air Force sponsored report on Operation ALLIED FORCE, the 1999 campaign against Serbia. He is a retired Air Force officer and combat pilot and the author of two books and numerous published articles on politico-military affairs, military doctrine, arms control, and nuclear policy. He is also a former senior fellow at the Air Force Education Foundation's Eaker Institute for Aerospace Concepts.



(Continued from page 9)

Endnotes

- ¹ "Joint Vision 2020: America's Military—Preparing for Tomorrow," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 2000, pages 57-76.
- ² JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
- ³ Air Force doctrine Document (AFDD)-1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, September 1997, page 1.
- ⁴ Major General I. B. Holley, Jr., US Air Force (ret.), "Concepts, Doctrine, Principles: Are You Sure You Understand these Terms," *Air University Review*, July-August 1984, pages 90-93.
- ⁵ "The RDO concept is the USJFCOM experimentation vehicle for transformation and achieving *Joint Vision 2020* (JV2020). This concept provides a construct for future joint operations and a framework for USJFCOM experimentation to develop recommendations for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, people, and facilities (DOTMLPF), as well as policy implications." U.S. Joint Forces Command, *A Concept for Rapid Decisive Operations*, final Draft, October 25, 2001, Page 17.
- ⁶ Dr. James John Tritten, "Can Joint Doctrine be an engine of Change," page 6.
- ⁷ This graphic was extracted from *A Concept for Rapid Decisive Operations*, Page 17.
- ⁸ The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Draft *Dominant Maneuver Operational Concept*, 1 October 2001, page 9.
- ⁹ See *A Concept for Rapid Decisive Operations*. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Operational Framework (JOF) effort also includes many similar discussions.
- ¹⁰ Dale Eisman, "Experiment in Norfolk could change pace of war," *The Virginian-Pilot*, February 24, 2002.
- ¹¹ Headquarters United States Air Force Initial Report, *The Air War over Serbia: Aerospace Power in Operation Allied Force*, April 2000, page 41.
- ¹² USJFCOM J9 Concepts Department, *Effects-based Operations*, White Paper Version 1.0, 18 October 2001 outlines that command's approach to the EBO concept. Other efforts such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff JOF study and *Dominant Operational Maneuver* concept paper echo much the same themes on EBO. Also see Gene Myers, "Effects-based Operations: The Heart of Rapid Decisive Operations," *A Common Perspective*, October 2001, pages 14-16.
- ¹³ Gene Myers, "Bombs and Bullets, Words and Cash: The Interagency Campaign" scheduled to appear in the March issue of *Armed Forces Journal International*.
- ¹⁴ *A Concept for Rapid Decisive Operations*, page 30. Additionally, the draft Joint Chiefs of Staff Precision engagement paper says, "The JTF and subordinate battle staffs should be standing organizations with habitual training relationships." U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Precision Engagement Operational Concept* (11 December 2001) page 6.

¹⁵ The SJFHQ graphic was obtained from a USJFCOM briefing, "Concepts for Transformation: Joint Operational Framework Conference, 11-13 December 2001.

¹⁶ The Joint Chiefs of Staff sponsored study effort on a new JOF has launched a serious investigation into the changing nature of US military operations including possible revision of the principles of war.

¹⁷ For example, the RDO paper states, "Legacy warfighting concepts, and to some extent the forces created to support them, are in many ways ill suited to deal with this new security environment. We can no longer plan on months or even weeks to deploy massive theater forces into a region rich in unthreatened infrastructure, while delaying offensive action until favorable force ratios have been achieved. Instead, we must plan to engage in the first hours of a crisis with those capabilities that can be brought to bear quickly, informed by intimate knowledge of the adversary and focused on those objectives most likely to produce the desired effects." *Rapid Decisive Operations*, page 5.

¹⁸ The USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet for *Future Joint Operations: Bridging the Gap Between Concepts and Doctrine*, 1 March 2002, emphasizes taking advantage of new conceptual ideas as soon as is possible.

¹⁹ Ibid, page 18.



(Continued from page 14)

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ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND & CONTROL OPTIONS FOR COMBATANT COMMANDERS

*By Mr. Chuck Bellis, USJFCOM JWFC,
Doctrine Support Group (Cornerstone Industry
Inc.)*

Joint doctrine provides a geographic combatant commander with six options for conducting operations within an assigned area of responsibility (AOR). The commander can employ subordinate unified commands; joint task forces (JTFs), functional components; Service components; single-Service forces; or specific operational forces. Additionally, combatant commanders retain the option to directly control military operations. All combatant commanders have the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations.

- **Subordinate Unified Command.** Combatant commanders may establish subordinate unified commands, when authorized, to **conduct operations on a continuing basis**. Subordinate unified commands may be established on a **geographical area or functional basis**. US Forces, Korea and Special Operations Command, US European Command are examples of geographic and functional subordinate unified commands, respectively.
- **Joint Task Force.** A JTF may be established on a **geographical area or functional basis** when the mission has a specific **limited objective** and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. JTF operations normally are operational in nature, conducted to achieve operational-level objectives. Examples for which JTFs traditionally are employed include most military operations other than war (e.g., peace operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, combating terrorism), especially when the capabilities of several Services may be required and there is a distinct possibility of at least limited combat operations or significant force protection considerations. A JTF is dissolved when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required.
- **Functional Component Commands.** Functional component commands may be appropriate when forces from two or more Military Departments

must operate in the **same dimension or medium** or there is a need to accomplish a **distinct aspect of the assigned mission**. Functional components enable combatant commanders to leverage the similar capabilities of assigned Service forces and provide a synergy of effects. In some instances, functional components may somewhat complicate command and control and logistics planning and execution. A recent example of functional competency at the combatant command level is the establishment of a combined force air component commander for operations in Afghanistan. Functional component commanders have authority over forces or military capability made available to them as delegated by the establishing combatant commander. The combatant commander designates the forces and/or military capabilities that will be made available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command relationship(s) the functional component commander will exercise.

- **Service Component Commands.** Designating Service component commanders may be appropriate when **stability**, continuity, economy, ease of **long-range planning**, and the **scope of operations** dictate organizational integrity of Service forces for conducting operations. Service components often provide fewer command and control and logistics problems but may not possess all the organic capabilities required to quickly accomplish all assigned mission objectives.
- **Single-Service Forces.** Single-Service forces are normally assigned to a Service component and generally conduct a **specific function**, such as electronic warfare, within the AOR. Other examples include noncombatant evacuation operations in a permissive or uncertain operational environment or foreign humanitarian assistance operations in response to a natural disaster.
- **Specific Operational Forces.** Specific operational forces may be designated when, because of the **mission** assigned and the **urgency** of the situation, they must remain immediately responsive to the combatant commander. This option may be used, for example, for an in-extremis hostage rescue operation.
- **Combatant Commander Direct Control.** As a commander with combatant command (command authority), the geographic combatant commander has the option to **exercise or delegate operational control** of assigned or attached forces. When retaining operational control, combatant commanders may establish **support** relationships within the command to enhance unity of effort for given

(Continued on next page)

operational tasks, emphasize or clarify priorities, provide a subordinate with an additional capability, or combine the effects of similar assets. Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established between subordinate commanders when one organization should **aid, protect, complement, or sustain** another force. The combatant commander will promulgate an establishing directive that specifies the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken.

and control preferences, and logistics considerations. Long-term missions lend themselves to establishing subordinate unified commands. Shorter-term operations, or operations uniquely involving only land, sea, air, or special operations forces, may be accomplished through JTFs, functional components, Service components, single-Service forces, or specific operational forces. Throughout, combatant commanders retain the option to directly control military operations within their assigned AORs.

SUMMARY

As noted in the many examples above, the decision as to which command and control option is best suited for an operational situation contains many variables, such as the duration and magnitude of the operation as well as the geographical area, operational environment, command

For further information on command and control options, please see JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF), 10 July 2001, JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 10 September 2001, and JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, 13 January 1999.



NEW TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETING HANDBOOK NOW AVAILABLE

By Major Michael J. Riggleman, USAF, Joint Warfighters Joint Test and Evaluation

The USJFCOM JWFC and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Warfighters (JWF) Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E), have cooperated to develop a handbook based on JWF's four-year study of time-sensitive targeting (TST). The *Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting*, 22 March 2002, provides the field with a supplement to current or pending joint/Service doctrine. The JWFC/JWF partnership to co-produce this handbook was formed to help ensure that the findings and recommendations from JWF's study will not be lost when JWF's charter expires in June 2002.

This new publication is intended to complement continuing doctrinal works, such as JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*, by filling in some of the details that are currently not specified in other publications. The material contained in the new handbook is consistent with approved joint fire support and targeting doctrine, and considers combatant command targeting guidance, as well as Service and multi-Service fire support and targeting TTP. Its content is applicable to the full range of joint military operations at all levels of war. The major focus is on the joint task force (JTF) commander, component commanders, and their staffs.

JWF conducted research by observing and collecting detailed data on TST procedures from numerous joint exercises in several theaters. These exercises included US Forces Korea's ULCHIFOCUS LENS; US Air Force's BLUE FLAG; US Central Command's INTERNAL LOOK; and several US Navy fleet battle experiments. One of the major findings was that current joint and Service doctrine, and other guidance on TSTs, is either scattered among multiple publications or, in some cases is nonexistent. Additionally, the associated terminology is often widely duplicative, confusing, or inconsistent.

The new handbook is a **non-authoritative** collection of considerations and methods for TST operations that includes a variety of options rather than attempting to present a single "best method" or consensus. The handbook is designed as a tool to assist joint force commanders and their staffs in rapid target engagement by summarizing TST concepts, terminology, and procedures from several joint, combatant command, and Service documents into a single-source document. Its **non-authoritative** status is one of the major strengths of the handbook; enabling it to cover several issues that were not resolved during the development of JP 3-60. For example, the handbook has an appendix that discusses the difference between the terms *time-sensitive target* (defined in joint doctrine), and *time-critical target* (undefined doctrinally, but widely used in the field).

To highlight the coordination required between the joint force components to successfully engage this target set, the handbook concentrates on those TSTs that require cooperation and/or coordination by two or more components. Examples of joint TSTs include those targets where one component fires into or through another component's area of operations, or when the effects of attacking a TST could cause fratricide or other collateral effects on another component's mission.

The handbook also presents a method to overcome computer database information sharing limitations, adaptable to minimum bandwidth and multinational restrictive environments. User guides, checklists, and systems information are also included that allow the handbook to be used as a comprehensive reference and training aid for standing and ad hoc JTF and component operations centers. Lastly, useful collaborative tools, checklists, and successful examples from the different combatant commands and JTFs have been included.

The *Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting* can be downloaded from the Joint Electronic Library at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/other_publications.htm or from the USJFCOM JWFC Web site at <http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil> (password required).

BRITISH DEFENCE DOCTRINE

*By Lt Cdr Jeremy Stocker, Royal Naval Reserve,
Research Associate, Royal United Services
Institute for Defence Studies*

The second edition of JWP 0-01, *British Defence Doctrine* (BDD), was published in October 2001. It has been completely rewritten and is barely a third the size of its predecessor, which came out in 1996. The new version of *BDD* has been produced by the new Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, one of many new Joint institutions created by the 1998 Strategic Defence Review undertaken by the then-new Labour Government.

The new edition is at pains, in a way that the first edition was not, to draw the vital distinction between Doctrine and Policy. The former ought to be (largely) unchanging, whilst the latter must respond to both changing circumstances and government direction. Doctrine is about the fundamental principles which should guide military action. *BDD* in particular purports to be about the British Approach to Military Operations, acting as higher-level guidance for those devising and implementing doctrine across all elements of UK military capability, and at all levels of war.

In just 44 pages of text, one would not expect much detail. A balance between concise explanation of overarching principles and vague generalities is always difficult to achieve. A feature of *BDD* is the frequent raising of issues, for a detailed discussion of which one has to look elsewhere—often in the now-superseded First Edition. Almost entirely absent is historical illustration, which as Britain's military approach is strongly driven by practical experience, is a shame.

Part I of *BDD* introduces the nature of doctrine and its purpose, and contains a (possibly too-) brief discussion of the Strategic Environment—political, economic, military, physical, scientific and technical, social and cultural, legal, ethical and moral. Within that environment, Grand Strategy is pursued by a mix of diplomatic, economic and military instruments.

The bulk of *BDD* is contained in Part II which deals with a distinctive British Approach to Military Operations. The long-standing Principles of War are set out; Selection and Maintenance of the Aim, Maintenance of Morale, Offensive Action, Security, Surprise, Concentration of Force, Economy of Effort, Flexibility, Co-operation and Sustainability.

There is also a discussion of the Warfighting Ethos. The UK sets great store by the continuing readiness and willingness to actually fight of its Armed Forces, not least because this enhances the ability of the Forces to do lower-level tasks such as Peace Support Operations. You will find no echo in UK forces of an often-expressed view in the American military that US forces should do warfighting and leave lesser tasks to others. Nor, conversely, is there the approach of some other countries, which increasingly configure their forces for gendarmerie-type tasks with little emphasis on actually killing people. Britain's Armed Forces exist to do whatever the elected government requires them to do.

The Manoeuvrist Approach was originally an Army concept but is now applied across all the Forces. This is not simply about mobility, though that is important, but about 'momentum and tempo' leading to 'shock and surprise'. The OODA Loop (Observation - Orientation - Decision - Action) plays a key role in this approach. The Manoeuvrist Approach needs a health warning attached, however. It entails "shattering the enemy's overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than his material..." Many enemies' will to fight proves remarkably resilient and physical destruction often *is* required. This point crops up again under Coercion which sometimes reads like Strategic Bombing re-discovered.

Another Army-derived concept is Mission Command, a slightly more sophisticated way of describing the principles of delegation. *BDD* also pays attention to the Joint, Integrated and Multinational nature of operations, which of course has its own dynamics. Doing it with others, of necessity, comes more naturally to a force structure a fraction the size of US Forces.

A chapter on Fighting Power deals with the Conceptual, Moral and Physical components. It also contains the interesting observation that while the Navy and Air Force have their own higher-level doctrines (BR 1806 and AP 3000 respectively), the British Army's needs are met by *BDD* itself. This perhaps reflects the land-origin of several *BDD* concepts and that the Army has historically been more doctrine-driven than the other Services. A truly Joint approach, however, would surely dictate that either all Services express their own doctrinal visions, or none do.

In a chapter on Warfare and the Utility of Fighting Power the relationship between Deterrence and Coercion is discussed at some length. One seeks to persuade others not to do something, the other to persuade them to do something. Both fit neatly with the Manoeuvrist approach outlined earlier, focussing on the enemy's will rather than material. However, this applies more to deterrence by punishment than it does to deterrence by denial, a distinction that unfortunately UK doctrine does not recognize. *BDD* does, however, try to move away from the Cold War

(Continued on next page)

association between strategic deterrence and nuclear forces, observing that *all* the UK's armed forces constitute Britain's 'Strategic Deterrent'.

A distinction is made between 'essential' and 'vital' national interests, the nuance of which will be lost on many readers. Also contentious is the establishment of 'political independence' as an essential national interest, being somewhat at variance with Britain's increasing integration with the institutions of the European Union.

The Broader Utility of Fighting Power is about the UK Armed Forces' non-warfighting roles. A useful concept introduced here is the Spectrum of Tension, representing a variety of conditions in between the extremes of war and peace - not that either of those are any longer absolutes. What the US Forces call Operations Other Than War (OOTW) include Conflict Prevention, Order Enforcement and Confrontation Management. Impartiality, Consent, Restraint, Capability, Credibility and Civil-Military Co-operation are all vital facets of operations along the spectrum of tension. There are also useful if brief discussions of the dynamics of humanitarian aid and crisis management.

A key difference between the British and American Forces is the extent to which they can be, and are, used domestically. Britain does not have the constitutional bars to the employment at home of elements of the Armed Forces. Long-standing antiterrorist operations in Northern Ireland are but one example of Military Aid to the Civil Power, in which the civil authority remains paramount throughout. Coast Guard-type functions such as fishery protection and drug interdiction are other examples of the employment of the Forces at home. An unarmed equivalent is Military Assistance to Government Departments, in the maintenance of essential services in the event of natural disaster or industrial disputes—both thankfully rare events in Britain.

A final chapter on the Philosophy of Command deals with Ends, Ways and Means, and the Attributes of Command. Under the latter the point is well made that, contrary to many popular perceptions, Service discipline is not rigidly hierarchical and contains considerable scope for personal initiative and responsibility.

This reviewer would have liked to see more discussion of what has been termed 'The British Way in Warfare', and especially its expeditionary nature. The role of technology also merits examination, even noting that British forces are less technology-driven than their American counterparts, and, perhaps, having a greater emphasis on tactical rather than technical training.

The second edition of *BDD* is more limited in scope than the first, and hence is a much slimmer volume. Tightly focussed on higher-level fundamentals, it does not provide

the broader view of Britain's defence vision that the first edition did. Nonetheless, it is an authoritative statement of doctrine from which all else should take its cue. It would benefit from a fuller treatment of many of the important facets of UK defence doctrine and there are a few notable omissions altogether. It is, however, an important starting-point.



29TH JOINT DOCTRINE WORKING PARTY

To review the minutes of the May 2002 JDWP and past JDWPs, navigate to:

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TERMINOLOGY

By Mr. Tom Barrows, USJFCOM JWFC, Doctrine Support Group, Cornerstone Industry Inc.

"We had Generals who were Admirals and Admirals who wanted to be Generals. Generals acting as Admirals were bad enough, but it was the Admirals who wanted to be Generals who imperiled victory among the coral islands."

Holland M. Smith, Coral and Brass, 1949

Just as Major General Holland M. Smith received more guidance and direction about how to fight his forces than he felt he needed, so today do some Service component commanders in a joint force occasionally receive such guidance. Today's joint force commanders have institutional and formalized options not available in Major General Smith's era—functional componency. For the most part, functional components seem to be a very viable option for certain scenarios. There are those among us who, given the option or chance to do so, would always organize a joint force along functional lines, regardless of scenario. It should be remembered, however, that the doctrinal issues concerning functional componency were recently revisited during the revision of JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Once again, the joint doctrine development community, which includes as a minimum the joint warfighters at the combatant command level, reaffirmed the notion of functional components as an option when organizing a joint force. I believe the key word in the preceding sentence is "option." A review of the approved definitions of these joint force component commanders indicates a requirement for "requisite command and control capabilities." Personally, I can't envision many scenarios where we won't have a joint force air component, but forming effective joint force land and maritime components (and the requisite staffs) in an era of shrinking resources will be a challenge for those joint force commanders so inclined.

As a related matter, recent developments in the joint concept and experimentation arena have raised the issue of functional componency as the "norm" when forming a joint force. This concept is not ready for "prime time," but it does highlight the fact that more and more joint concepts will be carefully analyzed for their potential to replace or modify approved or emerging joint doctrine. There are many terminology issues arising from the joint concept and experimentation arena, and these terminology issues often provide the greatest challenge to meaningful analysis of the concepts and experiments. I understand a joint concept developer's desire to demonstrate new ideas and

"think outside the box," but the development of new terminology just for the sake of new terminology probably needs close scrutiny by all concerned. Concepts that use approved and universally understood joint terminology to the greatest extent possible probably have a better chance of gaining acceptance in the "real world," mainly because the people conducting joint training and joint exercises can more easily visualize their utility and application.

As always, keep your powder dry and be careful out there.



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