This is the Third Edition of the Sustainment Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper, written by the Deployable Training Division (DTD) of the Joint Staff J7 (JS J7), and published by the JS J7.

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**Scope:** This paper focuses on defining sustainment and the roles and responsibilities of key players in the planning and execution of sustainment functions at the theater-strategic and operational levels. This includes developing a concept of support at the operational level to set the foundation for integration of the various sustainment functions. This paper also introduces the sustainment sub-functions and offers insights and best practices for achieving sustainment goals.

**Terminology and Acronyms:** Numerous military acronyms and organizational names are used freely in the paper. They are defined in the glossary, but not throughout the body of the paper to improve readability based on the high level of experience and knowledge of the intended audience.

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**POC:** Mr. Mike Findlay - Email: js.dsc.j7.mbx.joint-training@mail.mil  
Deployable Training Division, Deputy Director Joint Staff J7, Joint Training  
116 Lake View Parkway  
Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

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PREFACE

The JS J7 supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the joint warfighter through joint force development to advance the operational effectiveness of the current and future joint force. The DTD gains insights on operational matters through regular contact and dialogue with combatant command (CCMD) and operational-level commanders and staffs as they plan, prepare for, and conduct operations and exercises. The DTD observes and compares staff processes among the various joint force headquarters (HQs), drafts “insights and best practices,” refines them through senior flag officer feedback, and then shares them with the joint lessons learned and joint doctrine communities.

This paper addresses integration of sustainment functions to enable mission accomplishment while retaining agility and adaptability to respond to the uncertainties in the future environment. This has been observed as a key challenge faced by some combatant commanders (CCDRs) and joint task force (JTF) commanders.

This paper might prove to be particularly useful for CCMD- and JTF-level operational planning team (OPT) members or members of a sustainment team who are developing or executing their command’s concept of support. This paper addresses sustainment functions from the perspective of offering insights and best practices as a potential means to address challenges.

Several active and retired senior flag officers have provided invaluable insights and recommendations during development of this paper. These senior flag officers’ continuing support helps keep our observations and insights at the theater-strategic and operational levels, and ensures that these "Insights and Best Practices" papers retain focus on the primacy of the commander, commander’s guidance, intent and decision making.

This paper adds to the existing body of work that may be found on the sites noted on the inside front cover. All of the papers are unclassified for broad accessibility. Several are cross-referenced in this paper and the J7 team encourages broad dissemination and reading.

Please pass on your comments to DTD’s POC, Mr. Mike Findlay so that we can improve this paper. We would like to capture your thoughts and potential non-materiel solutions as you think, plan and work your way through the challenges. Email address: js.csc.j7.mbx.joint-training@mail.mil.

WILLIAM M. JURNEY
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Director, Joint Training
Joint Staff J7
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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. This focus paper shares emerging joint sustainment insights and best practices across the range of military operations. This includes warfighting, support to foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions in the continental United States (CONUS). The paper addresses joint HQ activities at the theater-strategic (i.e., CCMD) and operational (e.g., JTF and other joint force commander (JFC)) levels in the areas of logistics, engineering, health services (HS), and personnel support. Sustainment is one of six warfighting functions common to joint operations and includes the provision of logistics and personnel services to maintain and prolong operations through mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Sustainment encompasses all of the core logistics capabilities (including supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, HS, logistics services, engineering, and operational contract support [OCS]) along with personnel support services that include human resources, financial management, and religious ministry.

This paper is based on observed insights and best practices, and is consistent with the 2015 National Military Strategy (NMS) as it pertains to the concepts of global agility and globally integrated operations. Future joint forces are unlikely to operate within an established theater with mature support networks. Joint force entry and sustainment may likely be contested in an anti-access, aerial denial (A2AD) environment. Access to global chokepoints, en route infrastructure, force protection, and cyber vulnerabilities are all concerns. Reduced forward presence will necessitate flexible positioning of forces, prioritized prepositioned stocks, and rapid expeditionary capability. Joint Force 2020 is envisioned to be more rapidly deployable and employable, pervasively interoperable, and sustained via globally synchronized operations.

Key Challenges:
- Anticipating requirements in an uncertain, complex and rapidly changing operating environment.
- Leveraging Global Providers that are part of the Joint Logistic Enterprise (JLEnt) to ensure rapid and precise response for the JFC.
- Integrate sustainment capabilities to support joint force requirements.

Key Insights:
- The involvement of the commander and the staff’s ability to anticipate requirements and leverage available capabilities are crucial to both setting theater conditions and for successful long-term force sustainment.
- Availability of limited global resources and time-distance requirements can become factors early in a conflict or crisis. Coordination for and prioritization of critical resources are key methods by which the higher headquarters (HHQ) can help set conditions for success.
- Sustainment actions (to include medical “soft power,” and health diplomacy) should be included in the theater campaign plan (TCP) objectives and the commander’s communication synchronization narrative.
- Force accountability supports the commander’s concept of operation and is essential to make informed decisions concerning force allocation and capabilities.
2.0 SUSTAINMENT DEFINED. Sustainment is more than logistics. It encompasses all of the core logistics capabilities (including supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, HS, engineering, logistics services, and OCS) and also includes personnel support services (including human resources, financial management, and religious ministry). The joint logistics capabilities on the left side of the diagram along with the personnel support capabilities on the right side of the diagram are an integral part of sustainment and vital for supporting TCPs.

The responsibility for these capabilities is usually spread across multiple directorates (e.g., J1, J4, J7, J8, surgeon, and chaplain), making the integration of capabilities more challenging. The joint HQ surgeon and engineer staffs may be organized under the J4 (Logistics Directorate) or each may be autonomous as a special staff directorate. Responsibility for personnel support is typically spread across the staff to include the J1, J8, and chaplain. Each functional area provides a unique view of supporting operations; success entails effective synchronization of these capabilities to support the mission.

3.0 ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS.

3.1 National Strategic Providers. Our Nation’s ability to project military power depends on our ability to sustain a joint force through the sharing of Department of Defense (DOD), interagency, and other national resources. Just as it is important to understand the linkage between national strategy and defense strategy, it is equally important to understand force structure and resourcing, and translate those linkages from the theater-strategic to the operational level.

Within the DOD, resource responsibility begins with the Title 10, United States Code (USC) authority of the Services and includes Combat Support Agencies like the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and commercial industrial partners. These global providers manage end-to-end processes that provide capabilities and support to the JFC.

The essence of joint sustainment is the ability to integrate all of these strategic capabilities and resources at the operational level to satisfy tactical-level requirements in order to achieve national objectives. This means setting conditions for subordinate success and setting priorities at the operational level.
3.2 The Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt). Globally integrated operations require coordination and partnering across multiple global logistics providers, both military and civilian. The sustainment and logistics demands in complex emergencies require an “enterprise” approach as they often transcend the ability of a single nation, government, or organization to address alone.¹

There are multiple stakeholders, both military and civilian, that comprise the JLEnt, a multi-tiered matrix of key global logistics providers working cooperatively to achieve a common purpose without jeopardizing their own mission and goals.

Understanding the players and their authorities, goals and limitations as well as their willingness to help in an operation are imperative to establishing effective situational awareness. This situational awareness can enable sustainment planners to identify potential support opportunities as well as potential resource conflicts. In FHA or DSCA missions, interagency and multinational partners may play key or lead roles. When participating in a supporting role, communicating the capabilities the Joint Force can deliver will be a key challenge for the JFC.

**Insights:**

- Understand the authorities, goals, and limitations (such as national caveats) of JLEnt partners early in the planning process. This may expand capabilities or restrict them.
- Capitalize on and leverage other stakeholders’ capabilities and resources.
- Other organizations may play a key role in providing logistics support during both Phase 0 (Shaping) and FHA missions as well as in relief and reconstruction operations. Be prepared to provide support to other U.S. Government (USG) agencies, intergovernmental organizations [IGOs], nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], and private volunteer organizations (PVO).
- Establish relationships and build trust among JLEnt partners before a crisis. Once a crisis occurs, involve JLEnt partners early in the planning process.

4.0 DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT OF SUPPORT. Setting conditions at the operational level begins by integrating all of the sustainment capabilities into a synchronized concept of support. The concept of support is a planning product developed to support the concept of operations (CONOPS) for each operations plan (OPLAN).

¹ For more information on the Joint Logistics Enterprise Concept, see *Operation of the Logistics Enterprise in Complex Emergencies*, July 2012.
Each CCDR has a theater support concept that contains existing provisions to help set conditions in the theater for subordinate organizations’ success. The overarching theater support concept should include factors based on the formal Logistics Supportability Analyses and Transportation Feasibility Analyses developed for each concept plan (CONPLAN). Subordinate commanders should nest their concepts of support within the CCDR’s theater support concept. Components and subordinates should work with the CCMD staff early to leverage and capitalize on existing theater resources and capabilities. Joint forces strive to gain efficiencies and minimize the organic footprint by leveraging host and partner nation support and other National Support Element (NSE) capabilities. Where possible, staffs should leverage Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs) for the limited exchange of goods and services between forces, maximize OCS integration, and consider area support or sea basing options. As always, strategies such as these are not implemented at the expense of effective support to the force or detriment to the long-term objectives of the theater security cooperation (TSC) plan.

Insights:
- Nest the subordinate concept of support with the CCDR’s theater support concept.
- Integrate and synchronize JLEnt capabilities in support of joint force requirements. Use OCS to minimize the joint force’s organic footprint and, where feasible, supplement/replace military support capabilities. Capitalize on the knowledge and experience of the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) planners resident on the CCMD staff as well as DLA’s deployable JCASO team.

5.0 LOGISTICS

5.1 Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL). CCDRs can exercise directive authority for logistics, or DAFL, as part of Combatant Command (COCOM) authority. DAFL provides a CCDR with the authority to organize logistics resources within the theater according to operational needs. DAFL includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures necessary to ensure: effective execution of OPLANs; effectiveness and economy of operation; and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and functions overlapping among Service component commands. However, DAFL does not alleviate Service responsibility for logistics support, discourage coordination by consultation and agreement, disrupt effective procedures, or prevent efficient use of facilities or organizations. Unless otherwise directed by the SecDef, the Military Departments and Services continue to have responsibility for logistics support of their forces assigned or attached to joint commands.
The CCDR may delegate DAFL for common support capabilities to a subordinate JFC as required to accomplish the assigned mission. However, when delegated to a subordinate commander, the CCDR formally delineates this delegated authority by function and scope to the subordinate JFC.

5.2 Global Considerations. There are a variety of important global logistics considerations that often require cross-CCMD coordination and JS action. Availability of limited resources, combined with the associated time-distance requirements, is a common challenge. Prioritization and coordination of critical resources and focus on gaining access are two key methods by which the HHQ helps set the conditions for the joint force.

Four critical consideration areas include:
- Strategic lift and tanker support
- Global critical munitions (e.g., integrated air defense, ballistic missile defense, and global strike)
- Access, basing, and overflight
- War Reserve Materiel (WRM) and prepositioned stocks

Insights:
- Access requirements for basing and overflight (transit and en route infrastructure) may extend beyond a given area of responsibility (AOR) and involve coordination with other CCMDs and the JS, and appropriate engagement with interagency, multinational and coalition partners.
- Understand the implications of simultaneous execution of OPLANs and how competing requirements will impact the mission and the associated risks.

Best Practices:
- Articulate critical resources required to support OPLAN(s) along with the impacts, risk assessment, and mitigation strategies based on anticipated global logistical sustainment constraints.
- Engage in cross-CCMD and JS coordination early (pre-crisis) to request adjudication of limited resources. The JS can convene a Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB) to adjudicate competing requirements between CCMDs.2
- Engage JS J4 and USTRANSCOM early should events require a joint transportation board (JTB) to prioritize and allocate strategic lift or tanker support.

5.3 Theater Logistics Considerations. At the theater level, coordination across components and with subordinates is crucial to set the theater and to ensure long-term sustainment of the force.

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2 For policy and procedure guidance on the JMPAB process, see CJCSI 4110.01E, Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation.
Subordinates and components work with the CCMD staff to assess capabilities, limitations, and resources early in the planning process.

Insights:
- During operations, assess and tailor the logistics posture to support the broader mission.
- Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) planning is critical to balancing and prioritizing combat forces and combat service support forces.
- Scale sustainment capabilities across the phases of an operation.

Best Practices:
- Recognize and tailor logistics posture activities to send coherent messages (and not unknowingly send an escalatory message through an aggressive logistics posture).
- Sequence critical enablers such as theater opening and force protection capabilities appropriately in the force flow.
- Utilize the joint logistics coordination board (JLCB) to provide theater logistics guidance, and coordinate and set logistics priorities. Include other internal and external staff as well as the JLEnt partners in planning.

6.0 ENGINEERING. Engineers facilitate the freedom of action necessary for the JFC to meet mission objectives. This is accomplished by: enhancing strategic and operational maneuver, providing infrastructure for force projection, and enhancing quality of life. Engineers also provide support to sustainment operations, develop operational intelligence, construct protective fortifications, and help set conditions for an operation to transition to civil authorities. Engineer functions include combat engineering, general engineering, and geospatial engineering. Integration of the engineer functions and directing their efforts through a logical organizational structure and coherent command and control (C2) relationships are keys to achieving unity of effort.

Responsibilities for engineer functions may be spread across the staff to include the J3, J4, or special staff. When deciding where to place the Engineer or engineering staff function oversight in the joint force staff, there are four general options to consider based on the focus of engineer efforts.

- When focused on maneuver support, the engineering staff function may be placed under the J3. This is observed in most U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps commands.
- When directed towards facilities and basing, the best choice may be to place the engineering staff function under the J4. This is the organizational construct observed in most CCMD staffs.
- When the engineer effort cuts across several staff sections, the best option may be to designate the engineering staff function as a separate staff section, normally the J7 or simply the Joint Engineer (JENG) as seen in coalition HQs in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- When the engineer effort is a significant focus or a key element of the joint operation, and there are a significant number of theater engineer requirements which can only be accomplished with high-demand engineer assets, consider establishing a separate engineer command known as a Joint Force Engineer Command (JFEC) that reports directly to the JFC and whose commander may be dual-hatted as the joint force’s staff engineer. This option provides maximum flexibility in synchronizing diverse engineer
operations but will require geographic CCMD (GCC) approval based on the command relationship the JFC has with the other Service forces.

Insights:
- The omission of engineer considerations in any phase of an operation may adversely impact the entire plan.
- In stability operations and TSC activities, engineers are a valuable capability the JFC can use to achieve civil-military objectives.

Best Practices:
- Use a joint civil-military engineer board (JCMEB) to facilitate unity of effort among JLEnt partners in the joint operations area (JOA).
- Integrate the JCMEB into campaign assessments and nonlethal integration processes to allocate resources to achieve operational objectives.
- Leverage engineering efforts (e.g., humanitarian construction projects) to support TSC efforts and effectively deliver themes and messages that support the commander’s communication strategy.

6.1 Basing and Infrastructure. The joint HQ Engineer and staff play a critical role in sustainment operations through development, closure, and transition of basing and infrastructure. In base support operations, the joint HQ Engineer establishes policy for base development, construction standards, real estate actions, operation and maintenance, and closure of facilities. The Engineer recommends to the commander the overall facility utilization policy for the AOR and reconciles discrepancies with the military Service components or CCMD staff. Environmental planning and policy formulation are important to consider early in the operational planning process. Key tasks include developing policy in accordance with U.S. and host nation (HN) laws and agreements, providing advice on applicable laws and regulations, mitigating actions for mishaps, and coordinating for completion of all environmental baseline surveys (EBSs). Neglecting early environmental planning can result in impacts to force protection issues (health and safety) and the disposal of real estate or the closure of operating bases. These functions normally require specialized skill sets not usually available on the engineer staff. Some Service military engineers may have the experience required, but civilians who reside in the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, U.S. Army Environmental Command, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), and the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence (AFCEE) may be called on to support environmental requirements of the engineer staff.

Insight:
- Consider infrastructure and basing requirements in the early stages of campaign development, particularly for new construction or extensive renovations.

Best Practices:
- Incorporate basing and infrastructure considerations in the JFC’s concept of support.
- Incorporate environmental planning factors in the planning phase to reduce later challenges in disposal of real estate or the closure of operating bases.
Understand and apply the appropriate basing standards to achieve the mission. Contingency basing using predesigned modules (Force Provider and Harvest Falcon) maximizes operational flexibility and support efficiency. Contingency construction and MILCON provide more enduring solutions but require long lead time for planning, funding, and construction.

7.0 HEALTH SERVICES. HS supports the operational mission by fostering, protecting, sustaining, and restoring the health of the joint force. Responsibility for HS is under the staff purview of the Joint Force Surgeon. Inclusion of HS requirements into operational planning is vitally important to support operations. A clear picture of the medical footprint (to include all medical capabilities, equipment, airlift/medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) support, personnel and specialties available in the operational area as well as availability of multinational and HN facilities and services) enhances operational planning efforts and ensures responsive support to the JFC. The Joint Forces Surgeon and staff develop the HS plan based on mission requirements, the medical capabilities of the joint force, and the operational situation. The HS plan should account for DOD, interagency, state and local agency, NGO, and partner or HN medical capabilities.

7.1 Patient Movement / Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC). Timely patient movement through CASEVAC, MEDEVAC, and Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) is a critical capability in military operations. CASEVAC is the movement of casualties using opportune lift capabilities. MEDEVAC is patient movement using pre-designated aircraft, and watercraft temporarily equipped and staffed with medical attendants for en route care. The U.S. Army is the only Service that has dedicated air MEDEVAC assets. AE is the Air Force system providing time-sensitive en route care to regulated patients to and between medical treatment facilities.

Per JP 4-02, the Joint Force Surgeon will either establish a joint patient movement requirements center (JPMRC) or direct liaison with the theater patient movement requirements center (TPMRC) and Service patient movement components. The JPMRC coordinates closely with the TPMRC for patient movement to theater-controlled beds outside the JOA. The JFC can also establish a patient evacuation coordination center (PECC) to perform integrated patient movement into and out of the JOA and to control MEDEVAC within the JOA. The primary difference between the PECC and the JPMRC is that the PECC controls JTF commander OPCON MEDEVAC assets for urgent MEDEVAC, intra-theater evacuation, and coordinates with the TPMRC for inter-theater evacuation.

- Effective PECCs have the following:
  - The communications systems to quickly and reliably receive 9-Line MEDEVAC requests.
- Direct communications and liaison with Task Force Aviation or the unit to which MEDEVAC aircraft are assigned. This allows the PECC to coordinate launch authority.
- Direct communications and liaison with Task Force Medical or the elements that provide Role II/III HS to the JTF. This allows the PECC to direct casualties to the correct medical treatment facility.
- Communications with the TPMRC via transportation command regulating and command and control evacuation system (TRAC2ES) to submit patient movement requests for inter-theater evacuation.

- The multiple roles of the PECC suggest the following staffing considerations:
  - Staff for 24-hour operations and locate on the joint operations center (JOC) floor.
  - Designate a PECC OIC and NCOIC.
  - TF Aviation Liaison Officer (LNO)/NCO to coordinate for launch authority of urgent MEDEVAC and intra-theater evacuation.
  - Patient Administration Officer/NCO to request inter-theater evacuation with TPMRC.
  - TF Medical Liaison Officer/NCO to coordinate the exact medical treatment facility that will receive urgent MEDEVAC requests and intra-theater evacuations.
  - A medical provider to ensure that all MEDEVAC requests are medically sound.

7.2 Health Diplomacy and ‘Soft Power.’ HS can be leveraged especially during Phase 0 shaping operations in support of broader TSC efforts. Coined “health diplomacy,” this ‘soft power’ connotes medical capabilities that can be used in humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) efforts to help shape the future environment, build partner nation capacity, promote stability in key regions, and assist in preventing future conflict or violence. Health diplomacy can also be leveraged to mitigate future A2AD challenges by improving access to HNs through HCA efforts. These efforts should also be coordinated with interagency and multinational partners as part of a broader strategy to achieve national and strategic objectives. JFC’s must avoid creating a non-sustainable change in HN health care that creates dependency on our shaping efforts to deliver essential health care.

During an FHA operation, medical support may become the priority of effort for the JFC. Other governmental and nongovernmental medical providers may support the relief operations, often competing with the JFC for access and resources. JFC’s medical efforts expand the operational reach within the JOA. They also incorporate the appropriate strategic messages and themes during the initial phases of the operation to prepare the local population and other providers for the eventual departure of military forces.

Insights:
- Health diplomacy is most effective when coordinated with other mission partners.
• Recognize the potential impact providing medical care may have upon local and/or national medical infrastructure.
• HS may be a line of operation or effort (LOO/LOE) during an FHA or DSCA mission.

Best Practices:
• Establish a medical synchronization board, with representation from key JLEnt partners, to ensure vertical and horizontal communications across staffs and provide a venue to allow for deconfliction of efforts and dissemination of information.
• Clearly define medical rules of engagement (MRoE) and HS transition criteria; leveraging international and nongovernmental organizations’ expertise for medical transitions.
• Leverage health diplomacy efforts to support TSC efforts and effectively deliver themes and messages that support the commander’s communication strategy.
• Incorporate HS into the campaign assessment and nonlethal integration process to better direct resources to achieve operational objectives.

8.0 PERSONNEL SUPPORT. Human resources, financial management, and religious affairs are functional areas within joint personnel support. These functions are executed, respectively, by the J1 and J8 directorates, and HQ chaplain as a staff agency lead. The focus of this section is narrow in scope and covers three critical activities executed under the purview of the J1: joint Manning document (JMD), personnel accountability, and casualty reporting.

8.1 Joint Manning Document. Once a mission is delineated via a SecDef order, the unit tasked to form the core of the JTF HQ must identify its personnel requirements. One of the keys to effectively transition a Service component organization from its routine Title 10-related missions to that of a JTF HQ is the creation of a JMD that defines the JTF HQ’s overall manpower requirements needed to complete its mission. These requirements are captured in a JMD to ensure adequate manning levels and the proper mix of skilled military and civilian personnel. The JMD is the tool to identify core staff, and to request joint individual augmentation (JIA) if necessary. The JMD billets can be filled using multiple sourcing options to include existing staff personnel, Service units, and other DOD entities. With proper coordination, it is possible to leverage coalition, other government agencies, and contractors to fill capability gaps. A formalized, structured JMD working group (JMDWG), within the boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups (B2C2WGs) construct, is the prescribed venue for JMD development. It is used to confirm/validate JMD positions by skill, grade, and component. The draft JMD is submitted to the establishing commander (usually the CCDR) for validation and approval. The CCMD J1 will attempt to fill any remaining vacancies in JMD billets from within the CCMD prior to requesting JS J1 for JIA support. The JMD is not a static document. Once approved and sourced, the JMD can be utilized as a tool to track by-name arrivals and departures for each position; determine/refine current and future manning requirements; and submit requests to HHQ for changes based on approved additions, deletions, and modifications identified by the JMDWG.

Insights:
• JMD development and management is an iterative process that warrants constant command attention.
• JMDs should be capabilities-based to allow the staff to effectively meet operational requirements.
• JMD constructs must accurately reflect the actual needs of the commander; inflated requirements call into question the veracity of the entire document.
• An evolving mission mandates an adaptive manning construct.
• LNO/interagency partners, internal and external to the organization, are a critical component of a staff. Provide the most qualified personnel as liaisons to external organizations.

Best Practices:
• The JMDWG is most effective when chaired by the chief of staff (COS). Identify the J1 and J3 as JMDWG co-chairs.
• Engage the staff to identify required capabilities during JMD development to establish a credible/supportable document.
• Engage the Service components early and frequently during the JMD validation process to improve fill rates.
• Include theater Service component manpower representatives in the JMDWG.
• Establish an iterative process through the JMDWG, ensuring the staff remains tailored and capable to adapt to evolving mission phases, branches and sequels.

8.2 Personnel Accountability. The J1 has primary staff responsibility for personnel accountability (and strength reporting). Accountability begins with arrival in the theater. Accurate accountability enables leaders at all echelons to support the commander’s overall concept of operations. Timely reporting allows the commander to make optimal force allocation and employment decisions.

Joint strength reporting for the JFC is accomplished by combining daily Service component strength reports into the joint personnel status and casualty report (JPERSTAT). JPERSTAT is the prescribed method used to satisfy the commander’s information needs and to authenticate the number of Total Force personnel physically present in a geographic CCDR’s AOR. The JPERSTAT is divided into three sections: Personnel Strength, Casualty, and the Narrative. The personnel strength number includes all U.S. forces physically present within a CCDR’s AOR; the Casualty Section is a report of all categories of personnel identified in the Personnel Strength Section who have become casualties since the last JPERSTAT report; and, the Narrative section is used to amplify data, raise personnel issues, and explain changes or discrepancies. The completed JPERSTAT will be classified consistent with the classification of the operation or as directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the authoritative CCDR.
As mentioned previously, accountability begins immediately upon arrival in theater. A mechanism to account for personnel arrivals (to include civilians and U.S. contractors) is through establishment of a joint personnel reception center (JPRC) which is a key component of joint reception, staging, onward movement and integration (JRSOI) activities. One of the primary uses of the JPRC is as a central entry point for in-processing. It should be established as early as possible in an operation. In addition to accountability, the JPRC is an excellent venue to provide mass briefings regarding rules of engagement, cultural concerns, and General Orders, and information regarding billeting, training, and onward movement. Additionally, the JPRC is used to out-process personnel upon their departure from the theater or the operational area.

As the number of contractors on the battlefield increases, accurately accounting for these contractors (both U.S. and foreign national) presents a significant challenge. Processing these personnel in and out of the AOR through the JPRC, or other personnel center designated by the CCDR, can alleviate this issue. The synchronized predeployment and operational tracker (SPOT) is the sole federal government database for tracking and accountability of contractor personnel; its use is mandatory. SPOT delivers a standardized and collaborative method for the management, tracking, and visibility of contractor personnel.

Insights:
- Personnel accountability (to include JRSOI) should be included in a JFC’s concept of operations.
- Forces tasked with personnel accountability must be identified early and properly sequenced in the force flow to allow immediate reception activities.
- Accurate accountability of contractors can impact planning and sustainment of the force.

Best Practices:
- Establish reporting instructions that identify mandatory entry points (ideally at a JPRC) as well as theater-specific personnel requirements (medical records, orders, etc.).
- Identify staff responsibility for the oversight and monitoring of SPOT (JP 4-10 states that the J1 is responsible for contractor accountability); know the SPOT use requirements and system functionality.

8.3 Casualty Reporting. Per JP 1-0, “Casualty reporting requirements are based on CCDR guidance to make the chain of command aware of status of forces and events under their purview. Casualty operations are a Title 10, USC responsibility of the respective Services (components). “Service casualty procedures remain relatively consistent across the range of military operations.” The system for casualty reporting by the DOD is the defense casualty information processing system (DCIPS). The lowest level unit with DCIPS capability will create the casualty report. Timely and accurate reporting is critical since reporting facilitates time-sensitive family notification. Typically, the Services perform the next of kin notification and the J1 maintains accountability.

Insight:
- Properly maintaining accurate personnel accountability facilitates timely casualty reporting.
- Plan for redundant casualty reporting capabilities.

Best Practices:
- Link casualty reporting to significant events for commander update briefs.
• Ensure the most current casualty information is presented at all commander update forums (regardless of established reporting criteria).
• Reconcile casualty numbers between the J1, J3, and the Joint Force Surgeon’s office to eliminate confusion.

9.0 SUPPORTING THE COMMANDER’S DECISION MAKING PROCESS.

9.1 The Sustainment Team Concept. Fostering a Sustainment team mindset on the staff promotes planning and coordination across the staff sections responsible for Sustainment (e.g., J1, J4, J8, Surgeon, and Chaplain).

Organization of sustainment functions at the CCMD level varies. Although the Engineer and Surgeon staff may be consolidated in the J4, they are frequently organized as a special staff section or in a different J-code.

The Sustainment team concept is employed through deliberate internal staff synchronization meetings between the various directorates. Whether formal or informal, there are clear benefits in a Sustainment team approach. Benefits include:

• Better synchronization and coordination of overlapping Sustainment functions.
• Provides consistent cross-functional inputs supporting operational planning and execution.
• Facilitates information sharing while minimizing stovepiped efforts.
• Development of a comprehensive picture of Sustainment issues.

The Sustainment team concept is more a philosophy than a hard and fast set of business rules. Sustainment team organization should be tailored to best support each mission. The key takeaway is that staff sections routinely coordinate (sometimes virtually), at both the senior leader and action officer level, to address Sustainment issues to support the mission.

Insights:

• Operating as a Sustainment team can promote comprehensive planning and concept of support development.
• During a contingency, a Sustainment team approach can help synchronize cross-functional/directorate requirements such as personnel rotation, JRSOI, resourcing, mortuary affairs, casualty tracking and patient evacuation, transportation and lift, and key leader engagement (KLE) requirements.

Best Practices:

• Include representatives from the J1, J8, Engineer and Surgeon’s staff in the Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC) to facilitate daily coordination of sustainment efforts.
• Include the J1, J8, Engineer, Surgeon, and Chaplain in the JLCB and leverage this decision board to facilitate senior-level synchronization of sustainment efforts.

• Provide effective visualization of the Sustainment picture through the use of a dedicated portal, electronic dashboard, or an integrated Common Operational Picture (COP) that can be used for situational awareness.

9.2 Visualizing the Sustainment Picture. A critical aspect of informing the commander’s decision cycle is the ability to help the commander and the staff visualize the sustainment picture through the use of electronic visualization tools. Visualization can be provided via a variety of information technology tools such as SharePoint portals, electronic dashboards, or a more sophisticated portal or web-based COP. A Logistics COP (LOGCOP) can contain integrated mapping and overlay features as well as an electronic library and can be used for both the staff’s situational awareness as well as to brief the commander.

Insights:
• Emphasis should be on achieving a fully collaborative information sharing (vertically and horizontally) environment.
• JLEnt partners will not always be able to share information since they often communicate on different systems (e.g., a non-DOD network).
• Global Combat Support System – Joint (GCSS-J) is the current joint system of record for LOGCOP. GCSS-J provides a global picture for logistics operations allowing for better cross-CCMD synchronization of logistics.

Best Practices:
• When possible, avoid creating separate functional COPs in the same command. Integrate the Sustainment picture with the operational COP.
• When possible, incorporate information feeds from the system(s) of record.
• Create backup plans in the event of cyber degradation.

9.3 Informing the Commander’s Decision Cycle. Synchronizing and integrating Sustainment staff efforts are not only important to ensure unity of effort and economy of staff, but ultimately, to better inform the commander’s decision cycle. The Sustainment team must provide advice and recommendations to the commander concerning prioritization and allocation of support in the theater. This demands that the Sustainment team have a clear understanding of the commander’s intent and CONOPS and is able to anticipate the basic mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment requirements of the plan. The Sustainment team best supports the commander’s decision making process through integration in the command’s battle rhythm across all three event horizons—current operations (CUOPs), future
operations (FUOPs), and future plans (FUPLANs). The Sustainment team must be able to synchronize the joint logistics integrating tasks (i.e., Plan, Execute, Control, and Assess) with the commander’s decision cycle activities (i.e., Design and Plan, Direct, Monitor, and Assess). Sustainment planners and functional subject matter experts (SMEs) must stay engaged as plans and planning products are developed and refined.

As plans transition to orders, the JLOC and joint deployment and distribution operations center (JDDOC) are the fusion centers for logistics execution efforts on the staff and must stay closely connected to the JOC and other external operations centers such as a TPMRC. The sustainment staff sections will establish functional B2C2WGs and represent sustainment equities in other command B2C2WGs. The primary logistics board for overall theater logistics synchronization is the JLCB. Other supporting boards include the theater-joint transportation board (T-JTB) for theater lift prioritization and allocation, the JCMEB for civil-military construction projects and resources, and the joint requirements review board (JRRB) or combatant commander logistics procurement support board (CLPSB) for theater contract support coordination. The Sustainment staff should also have a presence in the JOC and participate in other command B2C2WGs—providing staff estimates and supportability analyses throughout the planning process. At a minimum, the Sustainment staff should actively participate in the following B2C2WGs: targeting, interagency, assessments, KLE, as well as OPTs or joint planning groups (JPGs).

As campaign and operational assessment informs future design and planning, the Sustainment team must be integrated into the command’s assessment process. In order to monitor the progress or effectiveness of plans in execution, sustainment planners and functional SMEs must identify expected outcomes from the concept of support that will be used to assess progress.

**Insights:**

- Synchronize sustainment staff efforts across all three event horizons (CUOPs, FUOPs, and FUPLANs) to inform the commander’s decision cycle.
- Sustainment support, particularly when operating in remote or austere locations, often requires significant lead time. Including the Sustainment team up front and early in the design and planning phase enables them to anticipate requirements and help set conditions for mission success.

**Best Practices:**

- Include a J3 representative in the T-JTB and the JLCB to ensure operational priorities are communicated and understood by the Sustainment team.
- Include the correct sustainment SME(s) in appropriate command B2C2WGs (e.g., Joint Targeting Working Group/Board, Interagency Working Group, KLE Working Group, Joint Effects or Assessments Working Group/Board, etc.) to ensure staff products and analysis incorporate sustainment considerations from the beginning.
- Establish Directorate Critical Information Requirements (DCIRs) to prioritize staff efforts supporting sustainment decision making.
- Develop measures of effectiveness (MOEs) in coordination with the J3/5, components, and subordinates and participate in the assessment process to ensure support adaptation based on assessment of LOOs/LOEs.
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Glossary
Abbreviations and Acronyms

A2AD – Anti-access, area denial
ACSA – Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
AFCAP – Air Force Contract Augmentation Program
AFCEE – Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment
AOR – Area of Responsibility
B2C2WGs – Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells and Working Groups
CASEVAC – Casualty evacuation
CCDR – Combatant Commander
CCJO – Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
CCMD – Combatant Command
CJCS – Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CLPSB – Combatant Commander Logistics Procurement Support Board
COCOM – Combatant Command Authority
CONOPs – Concept of Operations
CONPLAN – Concept Plan
COP – Common Operational Picture
COS – Chief of Staff
CUOPS – Current Operations
CREST - Contingency Real Estate Teams
DAFL – Directive Authority for Logistics
DCG-S – Deputy Commanding General for Support
DCIPS – Defense Casualty Information Processing System
DCIR – Director’s Critical Information Requirement
DCMA – Defense Contract Management Agency
DLA – Defense Logistics Agency
DOD – Department of Defense
DOS – Department of State
DSCA – Defense Support to Civil Authorities
DTD – Deployable Training Division
EA – Executive Agency
EBS – Environmental Baseline Survey
e-JMAPS – Electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel System
FHA – Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
FUOPS – Future Operations
FUPLANS – Future Plans
GCC – Geographic combatant commander
GPMRC – Global Patient Movement Requirements Center
HCA – Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
HHQ – Higher headquarters
HS – Health Service
IFAK – Improvised First Aid Kit
IGO – Intergovernmental Organization
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force
ISSA – Inter-Service Support Agreement
J1 – Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a Joint Staff
J3 – Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff
J4 – Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff
J8 – Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate of a Joint Staff
JCASO – Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office
JCMEB – Joint Civil-Military Engineer Board
JDDOC – Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center
JDEIS – Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System
JECC – Joint Enabling Capabilities Command
JENG – Joint Engineer
JFC – Joint Force Commander
JFEC - Joint Force Engineer Command
JFS – Joint Force Surgeon
JFUB – Joint Facilities Utilization Board
JIA – Joint Individual Augmentee
JLCB – Joint Logistics Coordination Board
JLEnt – Joint Logistics Enterprise
JLLIS – Joint Lessons Learned Information System
JLOC – Joint Logistics Operations Center
JMD – Joint Manning Document
JMPAB – Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board
JOA – Joint Operations Area
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation/Word</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>JPERSTAT</td>
<td>Joint Personnel Status and Casualty Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPMRC</td>
<td>Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRC</td>
<td>Joint Reception Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRSOI</td>
<td>Joint Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLE</td>
<td>Key Leader Engagement</td>
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<td>LNO</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>LOE</td>
<td>Line of Effort</td>
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<td>LOGCAP</td>
<td>Army Logistic Civil Augmentation Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOGCOP</td>
<td>Logistics Common Operational Picture</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOO</td>
<td>Line of Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>Medical evacuation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILCON</td>
<td>Military Construction</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Measure of Effectiveness</td>
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<td>NAVFAC</td>
<td>Naval Facilities Engineer Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMCB</td>
<td>Naval Mobile Construction Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>Operational Contract Support</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operations Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PECC</td>
<td>Patient Evacuation Coordination Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRIMEBEEF</td>
<td>U.S. Air Force Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>PVO</td>
<td>Private Volunteer Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-A-T-E</td>
<td>Refine, Adapt, Terminate, Execute</td>
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<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Surgeon</td>
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<tr>
<td>SITREP</td>
<td>Situation report</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPOT</td>
<td>Synchronized Pre-Deployment Operational Tracker</td>
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<tr>
<td>T-JTB</td>
<td>Theater-Joint Transportation Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPMRC</td>
<td>Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRAC2ES</td>
<td>Transportation command regulating and command and control evacuation system</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSC</td>
<td>Theater Security Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ULN</td>
<td>Unit Line Number</td>
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<tr>
<td>USACE</td>
<td>U.S. Army Corps of Engineers</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Strategic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Transportation Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>WRM</td>
<td>War Reserve Materiel</td>
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