



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

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16 May 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
Commandant of the Marine Corps
President, National Defense University

Subject: 2011 Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs)

I approve the enclosed 2011 JPME SAE list based on the Military Education Coordination Council's recommendation. Where appropriate, please incorporate these SAEs into JPME curricula.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M. G. Mullen", is positioned above the printed name.

M. G. MULLEN
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Enclosure

Copy to:
Military Education Coordination
Council

ENCLOSURE

2011

JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (JPME) SPECIAL AREAS OF EMPHASIS (SAEs)

#	SAE Topic	Submitting Agency	Description
1.	Building Partnership Capacity (BPC)	Joint Staff/J-5	<p>BPC is a preventative strategy to build the capacity of foreign partners to counter terrorism and promote regional stability. BPC includes Department of Defense (DOD) activities that support USG plans to train, equip, and operate with foreign militaries. These activities include providing humanitarian aid and leveraging international organizations and agreements in support of USG plans. BPC incorporates crosscutting enablers such as cultural understanding and awareness commensurate with social science research and analysis. It includes improving DOD communication mechanisms in domestic public affairs and influencing potential adversaries and non-state actors. Initial guidance is provided in <i>Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)</i> as contained in the Campaign Strategy planning construct and in the <i>Guidance for Development of the Force</i>. Additionally, the <i>2008 National Defense Strategy</i> emphasizes the need to work by, with, and through partners in achieving strategic success.</p> <p>JPME curricula should provide students with an understanding of the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">a. Indirect approaches to use of military power.b. Existing mechanisms for conduct of civilian/military operations in Phase 0 operations.c. Contributions of other USG agencies in conduct of preventative strategies.d. Integration of security cooperation activities into campaign planning.e. Approaches to achieving cultural and sociological understanding of areas of interest.f. Messaging to domestic and foreign partners through non-traditional media.

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2.	Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)	Joint Staff/J-5 DDICP	<p>The concept of CVE is integral to the USG and military strategy for counterterrorism (CT) efforts. CVE erodes the appeal of extremist ideology to susceptible populations, the enemy’s strategic center of gravity. All military members should have an understanding of the principal framework of USG CT strategy, including CVE. JPME curricula should challenge students to investigate the five elements of the DOD’s role in CVE (security, information operations, humanitarian support, military-to-military contacts, and conduct of operations) and provide students with an awareness of the culture, customs, language, and philosophy of the enemy. In addition, students should be familiar with current national directives and policies for U.S. CT strategy. This will allow future leaders to more effectively counter the extremist ideology driving terrorists and providing cover for them to operate within their society.</p> <p><u>Security.</u> The U.S. Armed Forces and indigenous forces provide security as a critical condition for countering extremist ideologies. A secure environment prevents a culture of violence from emerging that feeds the radicalization process. Security is also a precondition for the success of humanitarian assistance and the counter-ideology efforts of other government agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.</p> <p><u>Information Operations.</u> The DOD can support efforts, consistent with its limited authorities, to facilitate introspection within Muslim society that may lead to a rejection of violent extremism. It can also support countering the radicalization message of extremist groups. These operations are coordinated with other departments and agencies, principally the Department of State (DOS), where authorized, and as a component of the DOD contribution to public diplomacy and strategic communications.</p>

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			<p><u>Humanitarian Assistance.</u> The considerable capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces to alleviate suffering in times of hardship may provide opportunities to influence the way people perceive their situation and environment and how they perceive the USG. These efforts are often key to demonstrating goodwill abroad, reinforcing support for local governments, and mitigating problems that extremists exploit to gain support for their cause. These operations are coordinated with other departments and agencies, principally the DOS, and are conducted by the DOD pursuant to limited authorities and funds.</p> <p><u>Military-to-Military Contacts.</u> The military’s extensive footprint and access to foreign military leaders can influence the way they think about CVE and the actions they take to counter extremists and promote non-violence. The contacts include: International Military Education and Training, Offices of Military Cooperation and other train-and-equip efforts, foreign participation in regional centers, combined training activities and exercises, and senior military contacts.</p> <p><u>Conduct of Operations.</u> The way we conduct operations – choosing whether, when, where, and how – can affect ideological support for terrorism. Knowledge of the indigenous population’s cultural and religious sensitivities and understanding how extremists portray the U.S. military’s actions as attacking the indigenous population should inform the way the U.S. military operates. Where effects can be achieved by means other than direct U.S. military actions, the USG may seek to do so. Where U.S. military involvement is necessary, military planners should build efforts into the operation to reduce potential negative effects. At the same time we must, by our military actions, convey the sense that our power cannot be defeated and that, under the right circumstances, we are willing to use it. This will require careful balancing. The conduct of military</p>

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			<p>operations should avoid undercutting the credibility and legitimacy of indigenous authorities opposed to the extremists while defeating the extremist's ability to spread their ideology.</p> <p>JPME curricula should provide students with an understanding of the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. History and basic elements of militant Islamic ideology. b. Cultural features of the population the enemy seeks to radicalize. c. Social and political environments in which the ideology breeds. d. Effects of all instruments of national power on CVE. <p><u>National Implementation Plan (NIP)</u>. Combating the terrorist threat requires a “whole of government approach” involving all aspects of national power. The NIP reflects the strategic aims of USG CT efforts and provides a framework for aligning USG CT activities. This strategy has four pillars: (1) protect and defend the homeland, (2) attack terrorist capabilities, (3) counter violent extremism, and (4) prevent terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. These pillars represent the main thrust of our strategy and the interplay of immediate and future threats. Each pillar has several strategic objectives leveraged against enemy resources. In effect, this translates the strategic guidance into a form that is practical for use by Combatant Commanders for their campaign planning. The crosscutting enablers of expanding foreign partnerships and partner capacity, institutionalizing counterterrorism strategy, robust information sharing, and focused and deliberate counterterrorism intelligence span the pillars and are critical to obtaining our ultimate strategic goal.</p>

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3.	Strategic Communication (SC)	Joint Staff/J-5	<p>The accepted joint definition of SC is “focused USG processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.” It is one of six primary initiatives in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which stresses that SC is essential in counterinsurgency, CT, and stability operations, where population and stakeholder beliefs and perceptions are crucial to our success. The QDR further emphasizes that effective SC requires close collaboration across interagency lines at all stages, across multiple lines of operation. Chief among these lines of operation are policy implementation, force employment, information operations, public affairs, civil affairs, and public diplomacy and engagement. DOD must work particularly closely with DOS to support their core role in communicating with foreign governments and international publics. Together, the effects of these activities support national objectives.</p> <p>Despite this emphasis in both the 2006 and 2010 QDRs, along with prominent focus in the GEF and General McChrystal’s assessment for success in Afghanistan, much work remains before we can effectively employ the process of SC throughout the DOD. There are multiple studies – the most prominent of which was the <i>SC Joint Integrating Concept Capabilities Based Assessment</i> – which, along with DOD reports to Congress on SC, will inform students on the significance of gaps in SC, to include policy/doctrine, organizational, and shortfalls in supporting capabilities such as public affairs, information operations, and defense support to public diplomacy.</p>

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			<p>JPME should emphasize the QDR goal for the DOD to develop a culture that recognizes the value of communication and integrates communications considerations into policy development, operational planning, execution, and assessment to advance national interests.</p>
4.	Operational Contract Support (OCS)	OSD(AT&L)	<p><u>Description.</u> The ability to plan, manage, and integrate contracted efforts that provide essential capabilities across the deployed operational spectrum is integral to mission success. Career-level-appropriate OCS training and education for non-acquisition professionals requires increased attention throughout the professional military education (PME) community.</p> <p><u>Background.</u> The DOD does not possess the organic capability to accomplish all of its assigned missions. Contractors provide mission-essential capabilities to DOD organizations at all levels.</p> <p>All senior leaders, in CONUS and in deployed or contingency settings, require a fundamental understanding of OCS (including basic contracting procedures); the ability to plan and integrate contract support with other military and interagency capabilities; and the ability to account for and manage contractors as an integrated part of the total force.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Given the increased reliance upon contractors to support mission accomplishment, a greater emphasis on tailored training/education in OCS at the intermediate-level college (ILC) and senior-level college (SLC) levels is appropriate. b. ILCs will address basic OCS planning, including requirements definition; basics in contract principles governing contracting organizations and responsibilities; contract award and administration; ethical considerations in dealing with contractors; and integration of contracting organizations and contractors into all levels of operational

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			<p>planning and training. ILCs will specifically address contractor roles and contract administration, at the tactical and operational levels, and in contingency and deployed settings.</p> <p>c. SLCs will address the strategic impact of contracted capability in the execution of national security missions, and the effective and efficient use of contracts and contractor personnel at the operational and strategic levels. SLCs will address the proper integration of contracted capabilities into contingency and operational planning, training, and the execution of operational plans to achieve strategic objectives at the theater and JTF levels, as well as interagency integration of contractors and contracted capability into theater operations. SLCs will address risk of reliance on non-organic contracted capability. They will also reach back to the CONUS industrial base; multi-national and interagency contract operations; and legal, ethical, and cultural issues relating to use of contractors in the operational environment. Additionally, SLCs will address the role of the contracted force as a component of the total force and its implications for DOD core competencies and overall force structure.</p> <p>JP 4-10 defines OCS as the ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contract support and management of contractor personnel providing support to the joint force in a designated operational area.</p> <p>a. Contract Support Integration is the ability to synchronize and integrate contract support being executed in a designated operational area in support of the joint force.</p>

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			<p>b. Contractor Management is the ability to manage and maintain visibility of associated contractor personnel providing support to the joint force in a designated operational area.</p>
5.	Psychological Health Awareness	Joint Staff/Warrior and Survivor Care Task Force (WSCTF)	<p>OEF and OIF veterans have presented significant psychological health challenges as a result of their combat experiences. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and mild Traumatic Brain Injury (mTBI) have become known as the “hidden injuries of war” and are not yet fully understood by either combat leaders or the medical community. The scope of the challenge facing the joint force has only recently been acknowledged in a statistically significant manner. An April 2008 report published by the RAND Corporation estimates that as many as 300,000 Service members suffer from PTSD or mTBI as a result of OEF and OIF. Additionally, a recent Mental Health Advisory Team visit to the USCENTCOM area of responsibility noted that nearly 18 percent of active duty personnel in theater reported psychological health symptoms consistent with anxiety and depression. Many Service members endure PTSD and mTBI simultaneously, and these conditions are frequently coupled with anxiety, depression, and substance abuse.</p> <p>Engaged and educated leaders clearly mitigate the long-term psychological effects of combat and improve the overall fitness of Service members. Techniques to prevent psychological distress, rapid identification of psychological challenges, and early treatment regimens enable the vast majority of Service members to remain on active duty. Effective leaders are also key to eliminating the cultural stigma associated with psychological illness, and leaders of the joint force must enable Service members to seek help when needed. Educated leaders will improve the overall health of the joint force and allow Service members to continue their service in an honorable manner.</p>

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			<p>The JPME curricula should provide students with:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. An appreciation of psychological health as an integral component of total fitness. b. An understanding of the prevalence of psychological health challenges facing the joint force. c. Familiarity with techniques that can help reduce the psychological impact of combat on Service members. d. The knowledge required to identify the signs and symptoms of psychological distress. e. An understanding of the co-morbidity of PTSD, mTBI, anxiety, depression, and substance abuse. f. The skills necessary to effectively reduce the stigma associated with psychological illness within the joint force.
6.	Security Force Assistance (SFA)	USSOCOM	<p>The Military Departments and many DOD components have long engaged in a range of activities to enhance the capabilities of partner nations by providing training, advice, and assistance to foreign security forces. SFA is a key component of our defense strategy against both traditional and, increasingly, irregular threats. SFA is defined as DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.</p> <p>SFA activities must directly increase the capacity and/or capability of a foreign security force and/or their supporting institutions. The term “directly” is context specific and serves to emphasize that the clear and express intent of an SFA activity is the improvement of the capacity and/or capability of a foreign security force and/or its supporting institutions. SFA shall encompass DOD efforts to support the professionalization and the sustainable development of the capacity and capability of the foreign security forces and supporting institutions of host countries, as well as international</p>

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			<p>and regional security organizations. SFA contributes to DOD’s role in USG security sector reform initiatives. SFA is a subset of DOD’s overall security cooperation initiatives. Other security cooperation activities, such as bilateral meetings or civil affairs activities dedicated to the non-security sector, provide valuable engagement opportunities between the United States and its partners, but fall outside the scope of SFA. Security assistance programs are critical tools to fund and enable SFA activities, which contribute to a host country’s defense. The portion of SFA oriented toward supporting a host country’s efforts to counter threats from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency is a subset of foreign internal defense.</p> <p>JPME curricula should provide students with an understanding of the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. How SFA spans the range of military operations from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and contingency operations and, if necessary, major operations and campaigns. b. That joint forces can conduct SFA unilaterally when necessary; however, when conducted within unified action, joint forces collaborate closely with interagency and multinational partners. c. How SFA directly supports the “Operational Capacity and Capability Building” and “Defense/Security Sector Reform” security cooperation focus areas in the GEF. d. Where SFA fits within the lexicon of terms that describe assistance to foreign security forces, including building partnerships, building the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions (BPC), security assistance, security cooperation, and foreign internal defense.

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7.	Senior Leader and Strike Advisor Education (formerly Joint Targeting)	USJFCOM in conjunction with Joint Staff and all combatant commands	<p>Over the past few years, several key DOD leaders have expressed concern over the functional health of joint targeting. In April 2008, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the formation of a “Joint Staff J-2/J-3 co-led targeting Cross Functional Work Group (CFWG) to assess the current state of targeting, identify key challenges, and develop recommendations to optimally align targeting capabilities, processes, and functions across the DOD.” The study identified major gaps/shortfalls in three of the six joint targeting cycle steps: Step 2 - Target Development and Prioritization; Step 3 - Capabilities Analysis; and Step 6 - Assessment.</p> <p>As a result of the CFWG findings, the Vice Chairman issued a planning order in September 2008, directing USJFCOM to construct courses of action to “address the challenges identified in the CFWG study with an end state of an effective targeting capability within the DOD that leverages and fully integrates existing organizations and capabilities.” In response to the tasking, USJFCOM, with assistance from USSTRATCOM, formed a Targeting Operational Planning Team (OPT), conducted analysis of the challenges identified in the Joint Targeting CFWG Report, and interviewed over 160 subject matter experts from combatant commands, Services, and agencies. The Targeting OPT focused their efforts on identifying the root causes contributing to the gaps and shortfalls identified in the CFWG report (beyond the key planning restraint of addressing the lack of personnel). Following their interviews and analysis, and in collaboration with combatant command stakeholders, the Targeting OPT defined the military problem as deficiencies in the management of the DOD targeting enterprise; the availability and placement of sufficiently trained targeting personnel; and targeting automation systems interoperability. In addition, the management of targeting support</p>

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			<p>prevents the efficient execution of the joint targeting cycle as necessary to meet joint force commander requirements.</p> <p>Studies and empirical evidence are pointing to the fact that we are not adequately preparing the joint force to efficiently and effectively execute this critical warfighting function. Improvements in joint targeting are required to achieve our strategic, operational, and tactical objectives as described in our operational validated doctrine.</p> <p>A key part of the availability and placement of trained personnel is the requirement to educate officers during all phases of their PME, from company grade through general officer, on the importance of targeting. We need staff officers who can write coherent end states and actionable commander's objectives. We need to ensure a basic understanding across the force of how targets are developed while ensuring those doing the targeting development work are experts at their tasks using standard interoperable systems and encompassing data. We need to instill the understanding that we consider non-kinetic capabilities just as we do kinetic capabilities when making force assignment decisions. As a guiding principle, we need to provide the right education at the right time in the right job in our development of the force, from E-1 to O-10.</p> <p>Additionally, the Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Committee, a JROC-chartered body, listed "Senior Leader and Strike Advisor Education" as the number two prioritized joint issue for resolution in the <i>Joint Fire Support 2010 Action Plan</i>. Within the issue description, comprehensive understanding of targeting and associated variables that affect strike approval was included as the key objective.</p>

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			<p>The JPME curricula should provide students with:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. The ability to clearly articulate commander’s objectives into targeting guidance. b. The ability to write coherent end states and actionable commander’s objectives. c. A basic understanding across the force of how targets are developed in accordance with doctrinal guidance. d. An understanding across the force of strike approval authority, limits, delegation, and legal basis (preferably through case studies). e. An understanding of the rules of engagement (ROE), their basis in operational law, and their tie-in to collateral damage estimates (below). f. An understanding of collateral damage estimation and the various methods to derive estimates, as well as the legal basis of its application. g. The methods for positive identification and pattern of life analysis as the basis for determining strike approvals, as well as the ability to articulate these methods into action. h. An understanding of the effects of civilian casualties and the importance of alternative actions on overall objectives. i. An understanding across the force of how to effectively execute the assessment process. <p><u>JPME Objectives by Level</u></p> <p><u>ILE</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Understand Service targeting process. b. Understand joint targeting process (JP 3-60, “Joint Targeting”). c. Basic understanding across the force of how targets are developed.

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			<p>d. Comprehend and articulate commander's intent and objectives.</p> <p>e. Demonstrate ability to write coherent end states and actionable objectives.</p> <p>f. Understand strike approval authority, limits, delegation, and legal basis (case studies/table-tops).</p> <p>g. Understand ROE, basis in operational law, and ties to collateral damage estimation.</p> <p>h. Understand collateral damage estimate methodology and methods to derive collateral damage estimation (legal basis).</p> <p>i. Understand positive identification and pattern of life analysis for recommending strikes.</p> <p>j. Understand impacts of civilian casualties and importance of alternative actions on overall objectives.</p> <p>k. Demonstrate ability to effectively execute targeting emphasizing assessment process across the force (strategic/theater/operational/tactical level).</p> <p><u>SLE</u></p> <p>a. Apply the joint targeting process in tabletop exercises and through case study analysis.</p> <p>b. Analyze combat scenarios requiring the potential application of joint fires.</p> <p>c. Synthesize ROE, doctrine, environmental factors, and the impact of potential civilian casualties.</p> <p>d. Evaluate recommendations and risks for and alternatives to the application of joint fires.</p> <p><u>Joint Forces Staff College.</u> Apply a joint overlay to reinforce the comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation skills developed in JPME Phase I and other lifelong career education regarding joint fires and targeting.</p>

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8.	Reserve Component (RC) Attributes	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD(RA))	<p>The RC is indispensable in support of national security requirements in both peace and war. We must continue to use the RC both wisely and effectively. The DOD, combatant commands, and the Services are moving forward to shape the seamlessly integrated total force envisioned in the QDR. There is now a solid basis for making RC integration a high priority in achieving maximum total force development. As a result, our JPME curricula within joint and Service schools must educate our future leaders on the unique aspects and capabilities that the RC brings to the “joint team” and the overall total force.</p> <p>Critical aspects for military officers and senior non-commissioned officers to understand concerning the RC are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. How do RC forces and capabilities support joint operational efficiencies? Based on this, what RC roles and missions provide optimal operational efficiency to the joint force? b. Homeland Defense <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) What is the best distribution of forces between federal and state (Titles 10 and 32)? Under what authorities can military forces provide support? (2) What are the C2 relationships (Titles 10 and 32) relative to the RC? What are the unique considerations of support to governors or other civilian authorities or agencies, to include “dual status” C2? c. How does the RC support (with an emphasis on CS and CSS capabilities) the buildup of joint forces in an operational and strategic construct? <p>Joint integration of forces is not normally realized at the tactical level. The integration of RC forces and capabilities is at all levels (strategic, tactical, and institutional), and therefore has joint implications. In the prosecution of Overseas Contingency</p>

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			<p>Operations since 9/11, RC and AC integration of all Services became a critical element of sustained operational success. It is essential that we achieve further AC/RC integration and enhanced understanding among all components through our training and management institutions in order to achieve maximum total force capability. This integration and understanding must start within our JPME institutions. To facilitate enhanced understanding of RC capabilities and employment, additional RC information must be deliberately incorporated into JPME core curricula at every opportunity.</p> <p>Judicious use of the RC is essential to our success in the evolving global strategic environment. As we continue to utilize the National Guard and Reserves as both an operational and a strategic force, it is critical that all members of our total force understand the missions, organization, employment, and unique considerations of all components, including the RC. Our future military leadership must help shape the organizational construct for effective use of the RC across a wide range of roles and missions. Leaders at all levels must understand the unique skill sets, mindsets, and opportunities that the RC brings to the “joint fight.”</p> <p>At a minimum, JPME curricula should provide students with an understanding of the following RC institutional and mission-related aspects:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Homeland Defense and Civil Support</u>. JPME curricula should address the roles and missions of our National Guard and Reserve Forces in defense support to civil authorities and homeland defense. Students should understand the unique skills and competencies the National Guard and Reserves bring to the joint team; statutory considerations under Titles

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			<p>10, 14, and 32 of the United States Code; and the evolution and role of USNORTHCOM.</p> <p>b. <u>Command and Control</u>. Understand the roles and missions in support of the Combatant Commanders and the dimensions of command and control at state and federal levels, and the considerations for employing the National Guard and Reserves across the full spectrum of conflict.</p> <p>c. <u>Strategic Force Planning and Readiness</u>. Address the unique need for understanding for the RC in force planning in support of the joint force. Strategic use of the RC in roles and missions in support of Combatant Commander requirements across the spectrum of conflict. Critical aspects of access to the RC in support of national requirements, and the use of mobilization and other authorities necessary to provide that access to the RC.</p> <p>d. <u>Force Management</u>. Understand the capabilities of the RC, to include constraints, limitations, and Title 10 and 32 authorities for use of the RC. JPME structure and overview that explains RC assignment and education opportunities.</p> <p><u>Background/Justification</u></p> <p>The justification and importance of including RC integration into JPME (all Services) is substantiated by both operational and strategic necessity, and is codified in recent strategic documents such as the 2010 QDR:</p> <p>a. The 2010 QDR notes on page 53: “Achieving the defense strategy’s objectives requires vibrant National Guard and Reserves that are seamlessly integrated into the broader All-Volunteer Force. Prevailing in today’s wars requires a Reserve Component that can serve in an operational capacity – available,</p>

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			<p>trained, and equipped for predictable routine deployment. Preventing and deterring conflict will likely necessitate the continued use of some elements of the Reserve Component – especially those that possess high-demand skill sets – in an operational capacity well into the future” and “effective use of the Reserve Component also helps preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force by increasing its capacity and expanding the range of capabilities it provides.”</p> <p>b. From the Chairman’s Assessment of the 2010 QDR: “...it is important that we consider the proper balance of maintaining the operational capabilities and strategic depth of the Reserve Component as an integrated force to meet requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. Access to the Reserve Component remains a critical lever for meeting global operational demands without substantially increasing the size of the active force.”</p> <p>The RC – both National Guard and Reserves – is no longer a force of last resort. The RC is now an indispensable part of the Nation’s 21st century operational force. Select characteristics that describe the “new” National Guard and Reserves are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. They will be organized for a planned, rotational accessibility so that RC forces can routinely become a part of the operational force, as needed. Some members of the RC will remain assigned, by choice, as a strategic reserve, and available to serve only in case of national emergencies. b. The men and women who comprise the AC and RC will move seamlessly between full-time and part-time service, supported by laws, policies, and systems that enable them to adjust the amount and type of their service to their particular lives and situations.

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			<p>The National Guard and Reserves are an “indispensable force of choice.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. As a “just-in-time” force, the RC allows us to expand the size of the AC with a cost-effective force. By continuing to use RC personnel periodically, the Nation preserves its readiness and continues to benefit from their substantive training and experience. b. Combatant Commanders want “assured access” to RC forces for a diverse range of missions. RC forces are well suited for engagement and theater security missions, as they provide civilian competencies, military capabilities, and the ability to form long-term relationships in host nations. Success in post-conflict reconstruction missions are also enhanced by the use of the civilian-acquired skills found in National Guard and Reserve units. c. The National Guard’s hometown basing and deep connections to state and local governments distinguish it as an optimal force to serve as the military “first responders” to provide DOD support after a natural or man-made catastrophe, or when the Nation suffers an attack on the homeland. <p>Changes such as those described above are reflections of a changing military and national culture. Many of those leading the Armed Forces today readily admit that in their formative years, they were not trained or educated about the RC. Today’s emerging leaders have served in combat with the National Guard and Reserves, and their views of the RC are shaped by shared experiences and integration in theater. In the same way that leaders at various levels of experience are trained and educated about supporting elements of national power, future leaders must also achieve an understanding that the RC of the Armed Forces</p>

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			<p>represent an indispensable element of the total force. Our future military professionals must know how to employ all elements of the joint force, to include the RC. No longer should our senior leaders have to say that they “don’t know much about the Reserves.” Skillful employment of the total force, to include a thorough understanding of what the RC can contribute to the “joint fight” and the “joint team,” will be a true measure of the 21st century military leader.</p> <p>Note: OASD(RA) is pursuing the establishment of RC chairs at each of the resident JPME I and II institutions to assist in the integration of RC material into JPME curricula. Fulfillment of this SAE is tied to such establishment. For Service institutions, ideally the RC chair positions will be filled by members from other than the host Service of that institution.</p>
9.	U.S. Economy and National Security	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)	<p>The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that the United States has an enduring interest in “[a] strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity” (p.7). “We cannot grow our economy in the long term unless we put the United States back on a sustainable path” (p.34).</p> <p>The current national debate on the U.S. national debt and annual deficit spending foreshadows a constrained budget environment for the DOD. The complexity of this debate is compounded by a DOD that, after 10 years of war fought on supplemental appropriations, must return to a constrained budget devoid of supplemental appropriations for its needs, to include retrofitting or replacing legacy systems that have been expended in operations. DOD faces critical choices in a time of constrained and declining resources. Accordingly, JPME curricula should provide students with an understanding of the following:</p>

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			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. How the U.S. economy shapes and influences the U.S. NSS and how the economy has a direct impact on the Nation's ability to influence other nations, generate forces, acquire needed materiel and services, project power, and respond to crises, both man-made and natural. b. How the DOD budget fits within the overall federal budget formulation process, to include the impact and interrelationship between discretionary and non-discretionary federal spending and the impact that DOD appropriations, annual deficits, and long-term federal debt have on the national economy. c. How international economic events and activities impact U.S. national security, to include: how global financial markets and trade affect the U.S. economy and economic conditions worldwide; how the loss or ability to expand natural resource access, capital, technology, and manufactured products affects regional and global economic stability; and the impact of trade disputes and conflict. d. How DOD historically has responded to domestic economic downturns. How DOD establishes priorities to maintain the military capability necessary to meet current and future threats in a constrained budgetary environment for the foreseeable future. What are the current major issues facing the DOD regarding how to balance current and future force structure, research and development, production, and equipment recapitalization after 10 years of war in a constrained fiscal environment.