Extract from:

FUNDAMENTALS OF FORCE PLANNING

VOL. 1: CONCEPTS

Edited by

The Force Planning Faculty
Naval War College

Dr. Richmond M. Lloyd-Course Coordinator
Dr. Henry C. Bartlett
CDR Donald J. Denny, USN
Dr. G. Paul Holman, Jr.
CAPT John M. Kirby, USNR
CAPT Tom Lawler, USN
Dr. Mackubin T. Owens, Jr.
Dr. Kenneth E. Freeman
LTC Edward F. Smith, Jr., USA

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS
NEWPORT, R.I.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Naval War College, the Department of Defense, or any particular Service thereof, or any other Government Agency or private organization.

Portions of this book are copyrighted and may not be reprinted reproduced, or extracted without specific permission of the copyright proprietors.

Naval War College Press
Newport, RI
1990

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Fundamentals of force planning / edited by the Force Planning Faculty, Naval War College; Richmond M. Lloyd... [et al.].
p. cm.
Includes index.
1. Military planning--United States. 2. United States--Armed Forces. 3. United States--Military policy. I. Lloyd, Richmond M. II. Naval War College (U.S.). Force Planning Faculty.
U153.F86 1990 90-6458
355'.033573--dc20 CIP

FUNDAMENTALS OF FORCE PLANNING
VOL. 1: CONCEPTS

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments vii

Chapter 1: Framework for Force Planning
A. Introductory Essay-Framework for Force Planning--Richmond M. Lloyd . . . . . .
B. Foundations of National Security
1. Grand National Strategy--COL Dennis M. Drew, USAF and Dr. Donald M. Snow . . . . . .
2. Force Planning for the Post-Cold War World: What Can We Learn From Geopolitics?--Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman, Jr . . . . . .
3. America's New Course--William G. Hyland . . . . . .
4. Coping with Victory--John Lewis Gaddis . . . . . .
5. Excerpts from the National Security Strategy of the United States--George Bush . . . . . .
6. Excerpts from "Assessing the Military Threats of the 1990s"--Sam Nunn . . . . . .
C. Defense Planning Concepts
1. Force Planning for the 1990s--Richmond M. Lloyd . . . .
2. Strategic Concepts for the 1980s: Part 1--COL William O. Staudenmaier, USA . . . . . .
3. Defense Planning Steps--John M. Collins . . . . . .
4. Planning U.S. Forces: The Shape of the Problem--Caspar W. Weinberger . . . . . .
5. Dominant Force Planning Cases: Maxwell Taylor for Today's Strategic Thinkers--Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman, Jr . . . . . .

Chapter 2: Emerging Threats
A. Introductory Essay-Assessing the Threat--G. Paul Holman, Jr . . . . . .
B. The Soviet Threat
1. Gorbachev the Economist--Marshall I. Goldman . . . . .
2. Gorbachev's Strategy and Western Security: Illusions Versus Reality--William E. Odom . . . . . .
3. The Military Meaning of the New Soviet Doctrine--Jeffrey W. Legro . . . . . .
4. The Emerging Soviet Vision of European Security--Phillip A. Petersen . . . . . .
5. Soviet Change in a Changing World--RADM Ronald J. Kurth, USN . . . . . .

C. Regional Threats
1. Starting from Scratch, But With a Vision in Mind--
Zbigniew Brzezinski . . . . . .
2. The Middle East: Out of Step with History
Mark A. Heller . . . . . .
3. Command of the Seas: Asian Naval Expansion
Contains Potential for Conflict--
Tai Ming Cheung . . . . . .
4. New Directions in Chinese Strategy--
Jean V. DuBois . . . . . .
5. The United States Should Reorder Its Priorities in
East Asia--Donald E. Nuechterlein . . . . . .
6. The Democratic Prospect in Latin America--
Mark Falcoff . . . . . .
7. In Africa, Independence Is Far Cry From Freedom--
George B.N. Ayittey . . . . . .
8. Low-intensity Conflict: Future Challenges and
Lessons from the Reagan Years--
Richard H. Shultz, Jr . . . . . .
9. Excerpts from The Coming Explosion of Silent
Weapons--CDR Stephen Rose, USN . . . . . .
10. The Transnational Drug Trade and Regional
Security--Michael J. Dziedzic . . . . . .
11. Excerpts from Global Spin--Craig Lambert . . . . . .
12. 1990 Joint Military Net Assessment: Executive
Summary--Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . . . .

Chapter 3: Force Planning Approaches
A. Introductory Essay--Force Planning--Henry C. Bartlett . . .
B. U.S. Defense Strategy
1. Strategy as a Guide to Force Planning--
Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman, Jr . . . . . .
2. Excerpts from a Statement of Secretary of Defense--
Dick Cheney in Connection with the FY 1991
Budget for the Department of Defense--
Dick Cheney . . . . . .
3. Excerpts from a Statement of General Colin L. Powell,
USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on
Dramatic Change and Enduring Realities--
GEN Colin L. Powell, USA . . . . . .
4. The Need for Strategy in the New Postwar Era--
John McCain . . . . . .
5. Excerpts from a Speech about Revising United States
Military Strategy and Forces--Sam Nunn . . . . . .

C. Force Planning Methodologies
1. Approaches to Force Planning--Henry C. Bartlett . . . .
2. Excerpts from A Primer on Force Planning--
Robert P. Haffa, Jr . . . . . .
3. Defense Investment Strategy--William J. Perry. . . . .
4. A Plan to Cut Military Spending in Half--
William W. Kaufmann . . . . . .
5. Budgetary and Military Effects of the Strategic
Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty--
Congressional Budget Office . . . . . .
6. Budgetary and Military Effects of a Treaty
Limiting Conventional Forces In Europe
Congressional Budget Office . . . . . .
7. Meeting New National Security Needs: Options
for the U.S. Military Forces in the 1990s--
Congressional Budget Office . . . . . .
8. Force Planning in an Era of Uncertainty--
Mackubin Thomas Owens . . . . . .

Force Planning Faculty . . . . . .

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Acknowledgments

This book, the first volume in a new series, is published in support of the Force Planning curriculum within the National Security Decision Making Department of the Naval War College. We intend to publish two more volumes in the series, Vol. 2, Defense Planning Cases and Vol. 3, Resources for Defense. They will provide a set of case studies dealing with the complex and dynamic area of joint force planning.

This is a time of rapid change in the force planner's world. Old threats have new faces, and the nature of future threats is largely uncertain. Therefore, a national debate over defense budgets and force composition is quite appropriate. We have drawn together in this volume a wide range of articles which provide the foundations, the enduring concepts, the methods of risk assessment, and the planning concepts to guide us through these tumultuous times. We convey our appreciation to the authors and copyright holders of the articles collected here for their permission to republish their works and expose their ideas to a new audience.

We thank our students for their extensive support. They have provided ideas, insights, and critical scrutiny of our efforts, drawing upon their widely varied experiences to help enlighten us in dealing with a multitude of complex issues.

This book could not have been completed without the tireless support of many people on the faculty and staff of the Naval War College. We wish to express to them our deepest thanks.

First, it is within the challenging and rigorous academic atmosphere promoted by Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth, President of the Naval War College, that the seeds of this undertaking were nurtured. Admiral Kurth and a long line of previous presidents have fostered the scholarly environment that makes such efforts possible. Captain Clyde Van Arsdall, Deputy to the President and Chief of Staff, ensured the financial support necessary to produce these volumes. Through her initiatives, Captain Elizabeth G. Wylie, Dean of Academics, greatly expanded opportunities for faculty research and publications. As Chairman of the National Security Decision Making Department, Dr. William E. Turcotte has provided immeasurable support. His emphasis on curriculum development, teaching excellence, and scholarly endeavor has fostered a superbly supportive climate for teaching and research. His Academic Assistant, Commander Kevin P. Kelley, attended to the many administrative details of the department, providing us the time to devote to publication of this book.

A new member of the Force Planning Faculty, Professor Timothy I. Somes, deserves special mention for his diligence in reading the manuscript, providing useful advice, and assisting greatly in the book's final production.

We owe our thanks to Captain Joseph P. Marnane, Dean of Administration, who ensured that the personnel and administrative support of his highly professional departments were available to us while still meeting other, equally pressing requirements.

Lu Cabeceiras, Director of the Publications and Printing Department, smoothly integrated a wide range of conflicting demands while coordinating her division's significant contributions from typing to final printing. Carole Boiani, Head of the Publications Division, supervised the extremely large volume of word processing and typesetting, and kindly accommodated our numerous changes. Gina Vieira also assisted in supervising these functions and led the word processing with Diane Cote, Barbara Roderick and Allison Sylvia. Special thanks go to Justina Victorino, who led the phototypesetting effort and made significant suggestions to improve format. Her task was very difficult, because we drew upon many different works. Vicky Florendo greatly assisted in phototypesetting. Jackie Cayer must receive truly warm thanks. As Head of the Copyright and Editorial Division, she obtained the copyright authorizations and did the extensive layout and pasteup. Her many suggestions greatly improved the final product. She was efficiently assisted by Penny Souza, Carolyn Gregory and Jennifer Correia.

We are especially grateful to Ian C. Oliver, Director of the Graphic Arts and Photography Department. As he has done in all of our previous efforts, he worked with us patiently to coordinate cover design and reproduction of the many figures. His creative suggestions constantly enhanced the quality of the work. Special thanks must also go to John L. Ramos for his cover design, to Jim Deffet for photo reductions, and to Bob Hobbs for illustrations.

We also wish to express our gratitude to all who have deepened our understanding of the enduring concepts and current issues that force planners must confront. Our strategic perspective, our teaching philosophy, and our analytical abilities have profited from intensive exchanges with our colleagues at the Naval War College and several other educational institutions. They have sharpened our insights, broadened our horizons, and shaped our thoughts in assimilating the wide range of academic specialties relevant to national security decision making.

Finally, we warmly thank our families. Through the long and trying process of distilling our ideas and those of myriad other scholars into this volume, they have lent their unfailing support and sustenance.

Chapter 1: Framework for Force Planning
A: Introductory Essay

* * *

Framework for Force Planning

Richmond M. Lloyd

Introduction

There has been a great deal of movement over the last twenty years in the defense posture of the United States. We have gone from an under-funded "hollow" force in the 1970s, to a renewed determination to rebuild U.S. and allied total strength in the 1980s. Now, as we enter the 1990s, we anticipate another fundamental readjustment. We directly challenged the "center of gravity" of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies by our strategy of rebuilding first, and then bargaining from strength. We made economic sacrifices to provide more resources for defense, and we maintained the cohesiveness of our alliances. We long understood the inherent weaknesses of a command economic system, but few of us in the West fully appreciated the ultimate effects of the pressures we applied by our response to the Soviet military buildup. Thus, we were surprised by a remarkable series of events: the retreat from Afghanistan; Gorbachev's urgent moves toward economic and political reforms; unilateral arms cuts; the return to the bargaining table in earnest; the fall of the Berlin Wall as the decade ended; and the rapid rejection of the communist system in Eastern Europe. We should be very positive today concerning the totality of Western security. But much remains to be done. Because of these dramatic changes, we must now comprehensively review our national and alliance objectives and the economic, political and military elements of our national security strategy. {1}

The nation is once again debating the appropriate level of resources it should dedicate to defense, and rightfully so. It is imperative that we properly plan our forces to ensure that we consummate our gains, lessen our risks in the future, and prepare ourselves well for the opportunities and challenges of the twenty-first century. Choosing the right military forces for the future involves consideration of many important factors. But above all, it requires that we have a clear sense of what we want to achieve as a nation and how we plan to get there. This collection of readings is intended to assist you in developing a framework for force planning and applying it to the central issues now facing our nation.

If we want to do force planning well, we must have a comprehensive methodology which helps us to identify the many relevant factors and then consider relationships among them. The nation's interests and objectives are the ends that the nation wishes to achieve. The elements of national power, including its economic, political and military capabilities, are the means available. The nation's strategy provides a plan of action on

how these means will be used to achieve the nation's objectives in the face of the threat. The military capabilities required to support the military component of the strategy are determined, and alternative force choices are evaluated. Since the nation rarely has overwhelming means or a perfect strategy, it is important that we assess overall risks before our final choices are made.

Much has been written about the political, bureaucratic and organizational factors that also strongly influence final force choices. Such factors can cause final results to deviate drastically from those intended. While such factors clearly have importance, and too often can dominate the decision making environment, they are not the focus of study here. The desire here is to develop a rational framework for force planning. In essence, it is to develop a standard for comparing alternative force choices. The focus is thus on the substance of national security issues.

This collection also does not explore the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System used by the Department of Defense to select forces and provide for their necessary support. Nor does it explain the weapons acquisition process used to procure and field the weapons selected. Again, the focus is on the concepts and issues that should be considered within these processes. The intent is to assist you in asking the right questions and seeking the best answers through a deeper understanding of force planning principles.

Major Factors

Force planning can begin by considering the nation's fundamental interests, that is the basic wants and needs of the nation. President Bush in his National Security Strategy of the United States for 1990 summarizes our national interests as:

> The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people .....
>
> A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and abroad....
>
> A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions.... [and]
>
> Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations. {2}

While statements on national interests can be too general and abstract at times, from these interests flow the more specific national objectives of the country. The President includes the following national

security objectives, among others, in his report:

The United States seeks, whenever possible in concert with its allies to:

- o deter any aggression that could threaten its security and, should deterrence fail, repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and allies;

- o deal effectively with threats to the security of the United States and its citizens and interests short of armed conflict, including the threat of international terrorism;

- o improve strategic stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, moderating our strategic deterrent, developing technologies for strategic defense, and strengthening our conventional capabilities;

- o encourage greater recognition of the principles of human rights, market incentives, and free elections in the Soviet Union while fostering restraint in Soviet military spending and discouraging Soviet adventurism;

- o prevent the transfer of militarily critical technologies and resources to hostile countries or groups, especially the spread of weapons of mass destruction and associated high-technology means of delivery; and

- o reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. {3}

A fundamental U.S. policy objective for the last forty years has been containment, that is "to prevent the domination of the Eurasian landmass by the Soviet Union, or any other hostile power or coalition of powers." {4} Now that we have the opportunity to think "beyond containment," our national security objectives will evolve in sometimes subtle, but most important ways. For example, while the Reagan Administration's objectives slowly shifted toward "encourag(ing) liberalizing tendencies within the Soviet Union and its client states," {5} prospects for success were considered extremely low and very distant. Now President Bush can officially seek "market incentives, and free elections in the Soviet Union." {6}

Our defense strategy must be developed in the complete context of both foreign and domestic policies. It must realistically take into account all the means available to the nation including economic, political, military, technological, and informational to ensure our policy objectives are achieved in the face of the threat. Admiral Watkins, former Chief of Naval Operations, offers us a fundamental standard for strategy and force choices:

> We, of course, prepare to pursue these interests using a wide range of political, economic and military tools; and our ability to defend national interests and security objectives against military threats is the standard against which the nation's strategy and defense posture are measured...{7}

The threat posed by Soviet military capabilities has been the primary stimulus for the United States to rebuild its military strength. Throughout the 1970s, the Soviet Union continuously expanded the real resources it applied to its military, especially in terms of investment in force structure and research and development. After the Vietnam War, defense spending by the United States declined both in terms of real dollar expenditures and the percentage of the gross national product applied to defense. However, during the Carter Administration, a series of events slowly changed the nation's perception of the threat and thus its willingness to reinvest in national security. The continuous nuclear buildup by the Soviet Union, growing disenchantment with detente and the arms control process, the fall of the Shah of Iran, the second oil crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iranian hostage crisis all contributed to this change in public mood. While threat assessments usually place greatest emphasis on a threat's capabilities, it is quite clear that the nation also became very concerned with Soviet intentions, in particular, its objectives and overall strategy to achieve them. Of course, the Soviet Union was not without its own considerable vulnerabilities, which must be considered, and the circumstances of the time further complicated our threat assessments, which they always do.

Paul Nitze, writing in Foreign Affairs in 1980, probably best summarized a growing consensus concerning Soviet objectives. He described Soviet strategic objectives as a desire to: (1) politically separate NATO from the United States; (2) increase their influence and control in the Middle East and Persian Gulf; (3) encircle and neutralize China; (4) stimulate trouble for the United States in the Western Hemisphere; (5) be prepared to deal successfully with direct military confrontation with the West; and (6) build an image as a responsible member of the world community. {8} Throughout the early 1980s, Soviet actions and writings continually reinforced the Western view that these were in fact Soviet objectives. The key point for the force planner was an ever increasing correlation between Soviet capabilities and our understanding of their intentions. This sparked further serious study of Soviet doctrine, Strategy and operational concepts, which greatly influenced both operational planning and force planning decisions throughout the Reagan era. Of course, since Gorbachev arrived on the scene, this has all changed. As Graham Allison has put it, the United States can no longer plan for the "unambiguous" threat. {9}

While the United States recognized the need to redress the deteriorating military balance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, resource constraints were another significant factor which limited the nation's ability to rearm quickly. The U.S. economy performed very poorly in the

1970s with slow economic growth, a decline in productivity growth, rising inflation and unemployment, and a decrease in its international competitiveness. The defense industrial base suffered not only from these trends but also from the effects of fluctuating defense budgets, program stretchouts, and a general lack of resources and serious attention due to over reliance on short-war scenarios. The Defense Industrial Base Panel of the House Armed Services Committee in its 1980 report, The Ailing Defense Industrial Base: Unready for Crisis, concluded that the defense industrial base suffered from: insufficient capacity at the sub-contractor level; skilled manpower shortages; unfavorable productivity and investment trends; increasing dependence on foreign sources; and in general, an inability to adequately surge production to meet emergency needs. {10}

During the Reagan buildup, the increased demand for military equipment and supplies obviously did much to alleviate the adverse effects of some of these industrial base trends, although not all. Most importantly, however, the Administration reconfirmed the need for realistic mobilization planning and a credible defense industrial mobilization base. It then took concrete steps to establish the necessary mobilization organizations throughout the executive branch of government. Funding to fix mobilization shortfalls, however, consistently fell short of mobilization planners' desires. Now that we are moving toward a future of reduced force levels and procurements, it is very important to rethink the proper role of industrial and manpower mobilization, to avoid a return to our earlier weaknesses. President Bush underscores this:

> The United States has never maintained active forces in peacetime for ail the possible contingencies we could face in war. We have instead relied on reserve forces and on a pool of manpower and industrial strength that we could mobilize.... [R]etaining reserve forces.... is an alternative we must thoroughly explore, especially as we better understand the amount of warning time we can expect for a major conflict.... While important progress has been made... more can be done to preserve our ability to produce... Mobilization plans will also have to reflect our changing understanding of...{11}

The development of an economic strategy to support desired defense and non-defense expenditures should consider: (1) measures to stimulate economic growth; (2) the federal share of the nation's output; (3) defense vs. non-defense shares of the federal budget; and (4) measures to ensure defense expenditures are effective and efficient. Upon taking office, the Reagan Administration emphasized reduced federal spending, a shift of funds from non-defense to defense activities, and long run measures to stimulate economic growth. In a relatively short period of time, taxes were cut and defense spending was increased, but federal spending continued to grow since reductions in non-defense programs proved hard to achieve. The result was a federal budget deficit that eventually exceeded 5% of the gross national product. It was not until after FY 1987 that the deficit was grudgingly reduced to the 2-3% level.

{12}

Concern over the deficit clearly triggered a national debate over the appropriate size and composition of the entire federal budget, and this debate began well before the recent dramatic shifts in threat assessments. Persistent federal budget deficits are viewed by many as having the potential to threaten U.S. economic growth, productivity, and ultimately the nation's international competitiveness. The nation must again review the basic elements of its economic strategy. Besides how much we want to spend on various programs, this review must consider how best to ensure future growth. It is now recognized that the so-called "peace dividend" will not be as large as originally hoped, and it will be much slower in coming. More importantly, such resources must be wisely invested now to ensure a stronger and more robust economy later in this decade. If, instead, we waste these resources by "muddling" through, we will jeopardize our future economic well-being and security. Ultimately, these fundamental decisions about our overall economic strategy will affect our final defense strategy and future force choices.

For the last twenty years, U.S. defense strategy has been defined in overall terms as flexible response. Two main principles are consistently emphasized. First, it is a deterrent strategy. Its purpose is to prevent war by having a spectrum of capability, both conventional and nuclear, to convince possible enemies about the high costs of aggression. Second, it is a defensive strategy. The United States will not launch a preemptive attack against another nation. In terms of deterrence, President Bush explains:

> Throughout the postwar period we have deterred aggression and coercion against the United States and its allies by persuading potential adversaries that the costs of aggression, either nuclear or conventional, would exceed any possible gain. "Flexible response" demands that we preserve options for direct defense, the threat of escalation, and the threat of retaliation. {13}

Former Secretary of Defense Weinberger explains the second principle of defense as follows:

> Should deterrence fail, U.S. strategy seeks the earliest termination of conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its allies, and its national security objectives. "Favorable" means that if war is forced upon us, we must win--we cannot allow aggression to benefit the aggressor. It does not mean more territory or other elements of power for the United States. {14}

Several concepts flow from these principles and significantly affect how force planners and operational planners approach their responsibilities. First, planners recognize that deterrence is enhanced when one is perceived by the threat to have both the capability and the will to respond and defeat aggression. The second concept is that the

nation must be prepared should deterrence fail, and such preparations serve to enhance deterrence. This requires planners to think beyond the beginning of hostilities through to war termination on "terms favorable to the United States, its interests and allies." This means planners must realistically assess what favorable means both in terms of what is desirable and what is achievable. It has also rejuvenated serious campaign planning that integrates all forces in a joint and combined fashion. Several supporting elements of U.S. defense strategy are collective defense, forward defense through forward presence, and flexible force projection. In addition, arms control is another means used as part of the overall grand strategy. {15}

The importance of considering the nation's allies and their interests, objectives, strategy and capabilities is reinforced by the fact that the United States has extended deterrence to them. In addition, we rely on a "coalition" strategy as opposed to a "go-it-alone" strategy. President Bush, speaking on strong alliances, states:

> Shared values and common security interests form the basis of our system of collective security. Collective defense arrangements allow us to combine our economic and military strength, thus lessening the burden on any one country. {16}

At some point the ability of our current military forces to carry out the strategy in face of the threat must be assessed. This assessment inevitably highlights specific force deficiencies. It is important that the overall risk to the nation be determined as well. Operational planners are concerned with employing today's forces against today's threat, and their insights are invaluable to the force planning process. Existing forces can severely limit the choice of objectives and strategy, and the ability of a nation to move toward a more desirable defense posture takes considerable time. This force planning reality was amply illustrated during the early stages of the Reagan buildup. Similarly, if careful planning is not done now, the nation could be left with the wrong forces to support its preferred future strategy.

Technology is another factor which can offer new opportunities to the nation as it develops its future forces. A strategy for technology is very important to ensure such opportunities are fully exploited and to guard against technological surprise. At the same time, we all recognize that pushing the frontiers of technology is expensive and inherently uncertain. In addition, poorly focused programs waste resources and ultimately limit the technological opportunities available to future force planners.

Force planning is an iterative and evolutionary process. Various force alternatives will be considered and many rejected for a variety of reasons. The strategy may also have to be modified, and of course, the level and timing of objective may also have to be reluctantly changed. The overall purpose of force planning is to ensure ends, means, strategy,

and risk are consistent with the nation's desires.

Themes

The preceding section introduced some of the factors relevant to force planning and provided current examples of how decision makers responsible for force planning have applied these concepts. Each of these areas will be developed further. The task of applying them to the significant security issues now facing the nation is the essence of the readings that follow.

Throughout this collection several themes are emphasized. The first is the development and application of a rational framework for force planning. As already illustrated, force planning entails a variety of factors which must be synthesized. Thus, this study does not approach force planning from a single discipline, but rather it attempts to bring the relevant concepts to bear on the problem of choosing forces. As decision makers take on greater responsibilities, they are frequently required to integrate multiple points of view coming from various specialties. The relevance and importance of each view will depend upon the specific circumstances being considered, and making such judgments is part of the art of force planning. A framework can help one focus on the right questions and effectively apply the most appropriate concepts In achieving solutions. While some readings provide purely conceptual material, the majority of the readings have been chosen to represent excellent case studies dealing with current force planning issues. The case method provides the opportunity to integrate the many competing factors, interrelationships, and uncertainties that always complicate force planning.

The key variables-objectives, strategy, forces, threat, and risk-are continually reinforced. A major consideration in each of the planning areas is the proper and explicit selection of objectives. Too often objectives are vague, misdirected, overly ambitious or miss opportunities. The spirit here is best represented by John Collins' law:

> If you don't know what you want to do, you can't plan how to do it. {17}

The need to rethink objectives now is extremely important given the significant changes that are occurring within the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the rest of the world.

Focusing on the relationships among objectives, strategy, and forces is also of key importance. The fundamental standard is simply:

> Do the military forces support the strategy such that national objectives are achieved, at acceptable risk, in face of the threat?

This gives rise to several recurring fundamental alternatives. The ends may be changed, the strategy may be changed, or the forces may be changed. Finally, the inevitable risk may also be modified or accepted. These relationships are stressed in the Secretary of Defense's FY 1986 Annual Report:

> America's defense effort requires a close relationship between our military strategy and the force structure we select to carry out that strategy. Our defense strategy must be anchored firmly in our national security objectives, and our force structure decisions must stem directly from this strategy if our forces are to be able to execute their required missions. Strategy and force structure therefore must be planned together, taking into account the requirements of the strategy, the military capabilities that the defense program is to provide, military doctrine, and the need for priorities that ensure our defense assets meet our most important needs. {18}

Finally, the conceptual readings and cases are deliberately drawn from a multitude of sources, including the White House, Department of Defense, Congress, other government agencies, private defense research centers, and academia. In every section, a conscious attempt has been made to provide comprehensive opposing points of view. In aggregate, this diversity allows concepts and current issues to be examined from alternative perspectives.

Overview of Text

This collection of readings is organized into three major chapters. Each chapter begins with an introductory essay, which in turn is followed by sections containing readings focused on more specific topics. The introductory essay provides an overview of the subject area, highlights key concepts and issues, briefly introduces each reading, and provides issues for further consideration.

The first chapter focuses on the need for a rational Framework for Force Planning, defines many of the concepts briefly introduced earlier in this essay, and explores their important relationships. Several cases are provided which apply these key concepts to the situation now facing the United States in the 1990's. These cases explore potential changes to U.S. national security strategy which will significantly influence U.S. force planning during this decade and establish our defense posture for the twenty-first century.

Chapter 2: Emerging Threats examines the full range of global factors that threaten American national interests. It is organized into two sections. The first addresses only the USSR, while the second considers regional situations around the world. Some of these threats are clearly military, others are distinctly non-military, but most are

notorious for their high degree of ambiguity. This is especially true of Gorbachev's Russia, where progress toward democratic government and breakthroughs in arms control must be studied in light of impressive and still modernizing military capabilities. Thus, the analysis of the Soviet threat ranges from narrowly military considerations to Moscow's prospects for economic reform and Soviet visions of the future. The authors of all these articles concur on one point: never before has it been so difficult to pontificate with confidence about Soviet intentions, capabilities, vulnerabilities and circumstances across the full spectrum of warfare.

The second section of Chapter 2 identifies a complex array of regional threats. Some reflect traditional, virtually intractable rivalries which periodically culminate in terrorism, insurgency, and war. Others are relatively new, or at least new to force planners, who must now include the proliferation of sophisticated weaponry, the war on drugs, and world economic, health, and environmental issues in their deliberations. The consistent theme of these articles is that the post-Cold War world seems likely to be unstable, well armed, and replete with threats to American and allied national interests.

Chapter 3: Force Planning Approaches includes three broad areas of force planning. The first deals with U.S. defense strategy and starts by examining the usefulness of strategy as a guide to force planning. The current U.S. defense strategy is outlined through testimony by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before Congress. This provides you with an opportunity to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses. Senators John McCain and Sam Nunn then explain how they
would revise U.S. military strategy and forces in the future. Their views provide alternatives for comparison and analysis.

The second part of the chapter examines how force planners can organize their thinking to arrive at better informed judgements about the level and mix of military forces required by the nation. Various approaches to force planning are illustrated and evaluated in terms of strengths and weaknesses.

The chapter concludes with five broad case studies dealing with strategic nuclear forces, NATO and the overall level and mix of general purpose forces. Arms control alternatives are comprehensively treated within these cases. The purpose of these cases is to integrate the concepts and approaches to force planning covered throughout the collection.

Overview of Chapter One

This first chapter begins the development of a framework for force planning. Section B covers the basic Foundations of National Security providing an initial overview of U.S. national interests, national objectives, and national security strategy, in the context of a changing

global environment, highlighting challenges and opportunities for the United States, and their implications for our national security. Section C is more methodological in nature and expands the discussion of Defense Planning Concepts, presenting several alternative frameworks for force planning for your consideration.

Drew and Snow define a basic vocabulary for the discussion of national security. They first outline a methodology for organizing one's thoughts about national interests developed by Donald Nuechterlein. Nuechterlein suggests that national interests be defined in four broad categories: (1) defense of the homeland; (2) economic well-being; (3) favorable world order; and (4) promotion of values. A specific issue or international event can affect each of these interests differently. He suggests four levels of intensity of interest to assess the importance of a specific issue to a nation. Ranging from the most to least important, the intensities are survival, vital, major and peripheral. Snow and Drew then explore the instruments of national power and develop the important concept of grand national strategy. Throughout, they provide historical examples of the difficulty of assessing national interests, defining objectives, and making wise use of the instruments of national power.

Bartlett and Holman contend that American strategists for the post-Cold War era should think in terms of three geopolitical alternatives: The Eurasian Heartland, the Eurasian Rimland, and the North American Continent. They reject the Heartland model as too wedded to the decaying Soviet threat; object to the North American orientation as defying the lessons of the twentieth century; and argue that an appropriate strategy for America would consist of supporting friends and preventing the rise of hostile power centers on the Eurasian Rimland. How helpful is a geopolitical perspective to the development of a national security strategy? What are the implications of a shift from a Heartland orientation to a Rimland orientation?

Hyland surveys the rapid changes occurring in today's global environment and explains how these changes will shape the debate over future U.S. foreign policy. He suggests that a rapidly disappearing Soviet threat, a shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world, and limits to America's resources will force fundamental choices on what we wish to achieve and bow we plan to get there. What are the most important issues for American policy makers to address now? How would you defame America's future world role? What should our foreign and domestic priorities be? Now that we successfully achieved our policy objective of containment, Gaddis asks, what do we do next? He challenges us to first think about what we want the future world to look like. This is a difficult first step before we formulate a new national strategy. To help us, he outlines several fundamental issues and his suggested strategy to deal with them. Among others, should we welcome the breakup of the Soviet Union? How do we deal with NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and a reunified Germany? Should

we
help repair the damage done by Marxism? What is your evaluation of his assessment and proposals? What other issues should we be concerned about for the future? How would you define our national security objectives and a plan to achieve them?

President Bush, in his first report on the National Security Strategy of the United States, outlines our national interests, specifies national security objectives, assesses challenges and opportunities, and then provides how he intends the United States to use its economic, political and military means to achieve its goals. How do the national interests compare to the categories outlined in Snow and Drew? What is your evaluation of the national security objectives? How would you modify and prioritize them? Do you agree with his assessment of threats and opportunities? What are the strengths and weaknesses of our national strategy? What would you propose to ensure U.S. interests are safeguarded?

Senator Nunn provides his assessment of the Soviet military threat. He argues that "the threat of a large-scale Warsaw Pact attack against Western Europe" no longer credible, and any effort to reverse this situation would give "NATO many months of warning." He suggests the Bush
Administration has been too slow in modifying its strategy, force plans and defense budgets in light of such dramatic events. What is your evaluation of his assessment? What implications does it have for our national security strategy, national military strategy, and future defense posture?

The five articles in Chapter 1.C: Defense Planning Concepts provide alternative frameworks for force planning. Lloyd expands the list of factors relevant to force planning, discusses their major relationships, and provides examples of their application. He emphasizes the importance of focusing on ends, means and risks when making both strategy and force choices. Which terms and relationships would you prefer to use? What is your preferred framework for force planning?

Staudeumeier examines the interrelated concepts of national purpose, interests, objectives and military strategy. He then discusses the fundamental elements of military planning highlighting the similarities and difference between operational and force planning. A key difference is their time horizon. What are the realities faced by both types of planners? How can these different perspectives be used to ensure both types of planning are done well?

Collins provides his framework for defense planning which organizes the many competing factors in terms of five major steps: special purposes; appraise opposition; Formulate strategy; allocate resources; and reconcile ends and means. He developed this framework to serve as his standard to assess the quality of U.S. defense planning.

Former Secretary of Defense Weinberger explains that the logic of the force planning process is essentially one of balancing means and ends, and he offers a framework identifying the most critical variables. What is your evaluation of this framework? What problems complicate the process, and how would you deal with them?

Bartlett and Holman update and apply a systematic approach to force planning developed by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor. This methodology suggests that force planners should organize their thoughts in terms of several specific defense planning cases or scenarios. They then evaluate each of these scenarios for combat in terms of the threat to American national interests, assess its probability of occurrence, estimate its potential damage, and finally weigh its priority against the other planning cases. Do you agree with their list of planning cases? If not, what cases would you add or delete? What priorities would you establish among the planning cases and how would you allocate resources to them?

Notes

1. This essay revises and updates Chapter I. A: "Introductory Essay-Framework for Force Planning" by Richmond M. Lloyd in The Force Planning Faculty, Faa of Foundation of Force Planning: Concepts and Issues, (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1986).

2. George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington: The White House, March 1990), pp. 2-3.

3. Ibid., p. 2.

4. Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington: The White House, January 1988),p. 4.

5. Ibid., p. 4.

6. Bush, p. 2.

7. Admiral James D. Watkins, "A Report by Admiral James D. Watkins, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations on the Posture of the United States Navy," cited in Department of the Navy, Fiscal Year 1984 Report to the Congress (Alexandria, Va.: February 1983), p. 15.

8. Paul H. Nitze, "Strategy in the Decade of the 1980s," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1980, Vol. 59, No. 1, p. 87.

9. Graham Allison, "National Security Strategy for the 1990s," in Edward

K. Hamilton, ed., America's Global Interests: A New Agenda (Penquin Books Canada, Ltd. and W.W. Norton Company, Inc., 1989), pp. 214 and 220-229.

10. U.S. Congress, House, Defense Industrial Base Panel of Committee on Armed Services, The Ailing Defense Industrial Base: Unready for Crisis, Committee Print (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p.11.

11. Bush, p. 27.

12. For historical data on federal revenues, outlays, and deficits see Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 1991-1995, A Report to the Senate and House Committees on the Budget - Part 1 (Washington: January 1990), pp. 122-129.

13. Bush, p. 23.

14. Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress FY 1986 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 4, 1985), p. 27.

15. Bush, pp. 23-27.

16. Ibid., p. 23.

17. John M. Collins, U.S. Defense Planning, A Critique (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), p.6.

18. Weinberger, p. 26.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 1.B.1

* * *

Grand National Strategy

Colonel Dennis M. Drew, U.S. Air Force and Dr. Donald M. Snow

The term strategy is military in derivation and the clearest applications strategy are in the military realm, but other groups and individuals have appropriated the term as part of their lexicons as well. In particular, the term is associated with the broad set of goals and policies a nation adopts toward the world (akin to the broadest definition and sense of national foreign policy).

In this adaptation, strategy also remains a process relating means to ends, but the means and ends are somewhat different. Grand national strategy is the process by which the nation's basic goals are realized in a world of conflicting goals and values. The ends of grand strategy are usually expressed in terms of national interests. The role of the strategy process is to translate those national interests into means for achieving those ends. Those means, in turn, are traditionally described in terms of the instruments of national power. They are usually categorized as the political (or diplomatic), economic, and military instruments of power.

Grand national strategy thus emerges as the process by which the appropriate instruments of power are arrayed and employed to accomplish the national interest. Thus, the building blocks of grand national strategy are the goals or national interests that are to be served and the instruments that may be used to serve those ends.

Vital National Interests

The idea of a vital national interest is unique to the sphere of international politics, and it is a term which is commonly defined by two characteristics. The first characteristic is that a vital interest is one on which the nation is unwilling to compromise. By illustration, territorial integrity is a matter on which the United states would not willingly compromise; we would not, if we have any choice in the matter, cede any part of American soil. The

---

Reprinted from Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems, by Col Dennis M. Drew and Dr. Donald M. Snow, Air
University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, pp. 27-44.

second characteristic is related--a vital interest is one over which a nation would go to war. Thus, if someone claimed a portion of American soil, not only would we refuse to compromise our claim, we would fight to guarantee our retention.

Vital interests normally do not exist within domestic society, but only within the relations (international politics) between sovereign nation-states. The international system has no peaceful mechanism to resolve matters that are vital to its members, nor does it have mechanisms to enforce community will when vital interests clash. The reason, of course, is that since nations believe that some things are so important that they cannot be compromised, they want neither the mechanisms that might reach compromising decisions nor the mechanisms to
enforce compromises. Instead, in the international realm, nations prefer to attempt to maintain maximum control over their vital interests up to and including the use of organized armed force to protect or promote those interests.

Like all other states, the United States has a variety of interests, some of which are more important than others and some of which are amenable to promotion in different manners. Donald Nuechterlein, {1} in a number of works, has provided a useful way of distinguishing between various interests. His framework is shown in figure 2.

In this depiction, "Intensity of Interest" refers to how important a given interest is to the United States, the highest level of intensity is to the left of the heavy vertical line, and the lowest is to the right. The heavy vertical line between the categories of "Vital" and "Major" indicates the point where the criteria of vital interests come into play. "Basic Interest at Stake" refers to categories of substantive interest, which are arranged in roughly descending order.

Intensity of Interest

Basic Interest at Stake	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of Homeland				
Economic Well-being				
Favorable World Order				
Promotion of Values				

Figure 2



Figure 2. National Interest Matrix.

The notion of intensity of interest is basic here, and its categories require definition. According to Nuechterlein, a survival interest exists when the physical existence of a country is in jeopardy due to attack or threat of attack. Clearly, this is the most basic interest the state has. If a state cannot survive, no other interest matters. For the United States, this means avoiding nuclear devastation by the Soviet Union, in reality the only direct threat to our survival. The strategy problem is how to avoid this circumstance.

The second level of intensity is vital interest, which Nuechterlein says are circumstances when serious harm to the nation would result unless strong measures, including the use of force, are employed to protect the interest. A dramatic (and not altogether implausible) example would be the coming to power of a Castroite government in Mexico. A more commonly employed example is the Soviet threat to America's closest allies, such as those in NATO and Northeast Asia.

Before proceeding to the other levels of intensity, note that protection of survival and vital interests is not always nor necessarily compatible and may, indeed, be contradictory. The clearest example of contradiction occurs when protecting a vital interest jeopardizes survival. For instance, defense of NATO Europe could entail the use of nuclear weapons, and nuclear exchange could escalate to a homeland exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union that would threaten the existence of both. Conversely, if the Soviets believe that the subjugation of Western Europe is vital to them, they face the same dilemma, since attaining that end would also involve the risk of a survival-threatening nuclear escalation.

The third level of interest is major interests, which are situations where a country's political, economic, or social well-being may be adversely affected but where the use of armed force is not deemed necessary to avoid adverse outcomes. The fourth level of interest is peripheral interests, which are situations where some national interest is involved but where the nation as a whole is not particularly affected by any given outcome.

The most difficult and contentious determination is between vital and major interests. Since the demarcation line Nuechterlein draws represents the distinction between what the nation should and should not defend with armed force, the location of the line can be argued to be the most basic item in the debate about national defense. Indeed, in the difficult debates about defense policy, defense spending, and the like, one can get a rather clear understanding of various viewpoints by knowing on which side of the line participants place different situations. There is little real disagreement over which interests are absolutely essential (deterring nuclear war, for example), but there are matters of honest difference between political actors about how best to achieve goals (in other words, differences over appropriate strategies). Similarly, there is general agreement on the least important, most peripheral matters.

As noted, it is the junction point between vital and major interests that is the problem and this is understandable. In these situations, interests are at stake and, by definition, various outcomes do make a difference to the United States. Policy disagreements tend to be about how much difference the various outcomes make, and thus what one should be prepared to do to protect these interests.

The situations in the Persian Gulf and Central America illustrate

this tension and difference, if in varying ways. President Jimmy Carter, in a portion of his 1980 State of the Union Address only three weeks after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, declared free transit through the Persian Gulf and access to Persian Gulf oil to be vital American interests. What became known as the Carter Doctrine declared that the United States would defend its access to the gulf with armed force if that access was threatened. As a result, American naval vessels now routinely patrol the gulf and are stationed nearby in the Arabian Sea.

But is the Persian Gulf vital to the United States? Certainly the gulf is important in that some of the oil we need passes through it, and both our economic well-being and vision of a favorable world order would be compromised by certain political outcomes in the region. But does that constitute reason enough to use US armed force in the region? What the American public thinks about the vitality of the region and thus ultimate US commitment is not entirely clear.

The Central American, and especially the Nicaraguan, situation is a similar and even more lively situation. There is general agreement that American interests in the area would be better served by a Nicaraguan government other than that of the Sandinistas (although there is no universal agreement as to who should constitute that government). The questions that divide the political spectrum are: How much of a problem do the Marxist Sandinistas create for their neighbors and for us? And hence what should we be prepared to do about the Nicaraguan situation? Few would argue that the situation is so intolerable that the United States should contemplate direct military intervention (declare the situation a clear and compelling vital interest). Rather, the debate is over whether we should give military support to the United Nicaraguan Opposition (the Contras), thereby placing the situation astride Nuechterlein's line, or not, placing the situation in the major interest category.

Because direct defense of territorial assets has not been a major US requirement since World War II, a great concern has been determining which external situations pose threats to basic US interests. In the twentieth century, the existence of a Europe not controlled by a hostile power or powers has been identified as an imperative objective. The US military instrument of power has been employed twice in combat to that end, and the quest for European security has led to the grand national strategy of containment since the 1940s. Northeast Asia Uapan and Korea) has also been considered vital to US interests since 1945. The fact that American security interests are primarily foreign adds a special character and source of contention in the formulation of US grand national strategy. With the direct (if ultimate) threat to American territory limited to the nuclear case, the primary roles assigned to American forces (the threats to which those forces must prepare to respond) are expeditionary defenses against foreign powers posing an indirect threat to the achievement of basic American goals. This fact creates an imperative for strategic and force development not required in

countries whose military forces are primarily or exclusively concerned with territorial defense (e.g., Poland has no need for a rapid deployment force), but it also causes disagreement. Expenditure and sacrifice for direct homeland defense is a far less contentious idea (although people may disagree about the levels of effort needed) than is the less immediate, more abstract notion that a situation in some distant land poses a vital threat. For instance, the necessity of American participation in the Vietnam conflict would have been much easier to "sell" if the US government had been able to argue credibly that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong would next head for San Diego harbor.

The extended, expeditionary nature of American security objectives gives rise to a more significant debate over what security objectives should be than would otherwise be the case. Isolationism (the conscious attempt to withdraw from international involvement) is a stronger impulse in American culture than in cultures more directly threatened. The degree to which American vital interests are threatened in any given geographical area is the source of considerable division within the United States because of the physical remoteness of many areas of interest. The United States is not unique in this regard. British debate over involvement in continental European affairs during the period when the English Channel effectively shielded the United Kingdom from direct territorial peril provides a parallel example.

The remoteness of many of the areas of interest to the United States makes the debate over whether interests are vital or major/peripheral more lively and affects the debate over the relative national emphasis on security and nonsecurity goals. By definition, interests deemed vital require military resources if the gap between threat and capability (risk) is to be narrowed. Providing the required resources usually comes at the expense of other demands for resources, such as those associated with social programs. If the same interests are designated as major or peripheral, the pressure to divert resources to military ends disappears because, in risk terms, assaults on major or peripheral interests represent a smaller threat.

This competition is important because of the reciprocal relationship between grand strategy objectives and the means available to carry them out. To some extent, ends must be determined by available means and risks must be borne. National objectives exceed resources available to fulfill them and thus are contentious in the sense that various people order them differently in the competition for resources. Advocacy of different objectives is always spirited and generally stated in terms of absolute need.

The post-Vietnam debate of the 1970s over defense can be seen in these terms. Part of that debate centered on what objectives should be pursued: where and in what situations is an American ability to project power necessary and proper? At the same time, a perceived erosion in defense capabilities, particularly relative to the Soviet Union, raised

questions about American ability to meet security objectives. The Reagan administration entered office committed to the proposition that then current spending levels did not provide the wherewithal to meet legitimate objectives. It secured a large military funding increase to reduce what it considered intolerable levels of risk. By the middle 1980s, the resulting buildup had arguably reduced risk considerably, but public and congressional concern about huge budget deficits and their consequences hadfuelledyet anotherdebate overrelative spendingpriorities.

The degree of external threat and public willingness to respond to differing levels of threat are additional sources of friction that affect perceptions about vital interests. The two problems are, of course, related and sequential. If people recognize a high degree of threat, their willingness to combat it is likely to be high. But, since the direct threat to basic American values is limited to the nuclear case, the credibility of other threats is ambiguous and debatable. It is one thing, for instance, to argue the need for a credible deterrent against Soviet nuclear aggression; it is quite another proposition to argue that, in the absence of some prescribed level of military vigilance, the Soviet army would occupy Hoboken. In the first case, the threat is to survival and is unambiguous and recognized. Thus, avoiding its consequences is an objective with which grand national strategy must come to grips (although people can and do argue vehemently about appropriate military strategies, tactics, and deployments necessary to achieve the objective). In the second case, there is ample room for disagreement. Few people doubt that the Soviets wish the United States less than well, but the nature and degree of their malevolence and the extent to which their animosity translates into a direct assault on core American goals are more conjectural. This ambiguity nurtures honest disagreement about American strategic posture toward the Soviet threat.

The translation of basic national interests into objectives leading to formulation of grand national strategy and factors influencing that translation can be exemplified. Since the late 1940s, American grand national strategy has been containment of communism. The core assumption of the strategy is that Soviet-dominated Communist states should not be allowed to spread beyond the boundaries established at the end of World War II because further spread would eventually pose a direct threat to the United States. Originally devised for and applied to the power balance in Europe, the basic containment formulation has been extended to encompass the Sino Soviet periphery, although the primary author of the strategy, George F. Kennan, has denied that this extension was his intent. The effect of containment is to draw a line on the map and to declare that forced change outside that line is a threat to American interests. Whether those interests at any specific place are vital (so that the United States would personally defend them) or merely major (in which case our support would be more limited) has been an ongoing source of debate.

Although there has been disagreement about the operational

implications of containment and the extent to which the United States should enforce the containment line, there has been remarkable consensus for containment in the postwar period. During the so-called cold war and into the 1960s, this support was explicit and forthright. Disillusionment with application of the strategy in Southeast Asia and perception that detente was moderating US-Soviet relations resulted in less explicit references to containment as basic strategy through the middle 1970s. Burgeoning Soviet defense expenditures and third world adventurism, however, have led to a revival of explicit support of the concept in the early 1980s.

Regardless of the nature of the acceptance of containment as the guiding principle of American grand national strategy, there has always been disagreement about the best way to achieve it (a question of what is or is not the national interest). Discussion of the means to implement containment policy moves us a step down the strategy model to the instruments of power and the strategies used to employ them. The interplay between the instruments of power helps to define what grand strategy is and is not.

Instruments of National Power

In conventional terms, the instruments are generally placed in a threefold classification. The military instrument refers to the extent to which a nation's armed forces can be employed (or have their employment threatened) to achieve national ends. The economic instrument refers to the application of a nation's material resources in achieving those ends. The diplomatic (or political) instrument refers to the ways the international political position and diplomatic skills of the nation-state can be brought to bear in pursuit of national interest. Each instrument is applied for the same purpose: to achieve outcomes that serve the national interest.

A range of employment strategies accompanies each instrument. The potential use of the military instrument, even when its application is not threatened, always lurks in the background to condition international relationships. The potential for thermonuclear confrontation, for instance, serves as a conditioner in US-Soviet relations that forces the two superpowers to treat one another more carefully than would be the case in its absence. At the same time armed forces can be employed in a variety of other ways to influence events. Some employments are relatively mild and are more symbolic than substantial, as in the movement of naval forces into waters adjacent to a local conflict to indicate support for a particular regIme. Depending on the objectives and the perceived level of threat, more active strategies include providing arms to combatants, assigning technical or combat advisers, and intervening in hostilities. The ultimate application, of course, is direct involvement in combat in support of (by definition) vital interests.

The economic instrument also takes varied forms, and the extent to which it can be employed depends greatly on the country's economic resources. In this regard, much o£the concern over declines in American national power in the 1970s and 1980s was at least implicitly a commentary on the relative strength of the US economy within the global economic system. As the world's leading industrial nation (if the European Economic Community is not treated as a unit), the United States has considerably more economic tools than most of the developing world or, for that matter, the Soviet Union, which is itself a developing country in economic terms.

The economic instrument is more explicitly amenable to the "carrot-and-stick" approach than other instruments. Hence, economic assistance or preferential trade relationships can be used as positive inducements (carrot) to produce desired behavior, and the threat of withholding aid or using quotas or tariffs to disadvantage trade can be a sanction (stick) if another country does not take desired actions. The same strategy can be applied in other economic areas, such as foreign investment policy to encourage or constrain overseas activities of American corporations, and in policies more closely associated with the military instrument, such as arms transfers.

The diplomatic/political instrument is somewhat more derivative and amorphous. Because of the US position as political leader of the Western alliance, its proposals automatically receive more attention and scrutiny than the proposals of a less powerful nation. It is not clear whether US political "clout" derives purely from that position or whether its source is American economic and military strength. What is clear is that diplomatic skill can help turn events in a nation's favor. During the nineteenth century, for instance, the influence of the comparatively weak Hapsburg monarchy in Austria-Hungary was largely the result of the diplomatic brilliance of foreign minister Count von Metternich. The ability to mediate successfully and to produce unique and mutually acceptable solutions to complex issues without application of military or economic power is the essence of the diplomatic instrument.

These instruments, of course, are not available in a vacuum. The extent to which a nation has military might, economic resources, or skilled diplomats is one source of limitation, but democratic societies have other constraints, particularly in domestic affairs. For constitutional, statutory, and political reasons, the president of the United States cannot exercise the military instrument with impunity in support of the containment strategy. Constitutional entrustment of the power to declare war to the Congress is a limit on such a prerogative, and the War Powers Act of 1973 places statutory limitations on presidential ability to employ American forces in combat in situations where war is not declared (the United States has not engaged in a declared war since World War II). Politically, the need for public support further constrains the president.

The economic instrument has similar constraints. The degree to which the US government can manipulate economic assistance is limited by the comparatively small and static size of its assistance budget. Foreign aid has been described as a budgetary element with no real domestic constituency and, as a result, it has not grown with inflation (meaning its real value has declined). In addition, manipulation of trade relationships is constrained by domestic considerations. For example, providing favorable trade terms for such items as foreign automobiles is likely to hurt domestic industries and cause internal resistance; and restrictions on trade, such as the grain embargo to the Soviet Union following its invasion of Afghanistan, are likely to result in selective domestic sacrifices deemed unfair. In the same vein, the government cannot order private US firms to invest in particular countries, nor can it completely control their activities if they do invest. The complexities in applying the economic instrument and to what ends are well illustrated by the ongoing debate over American private participation in South Africa. The poles in that debate are punishment through divestiture and participation to bring about reform through so-called constructive engagement.

Several other factors complicate the task of developing strategies for particular instruments. First, the instruments are highly interrelated and thus cannot be viewed in isolation. In modern warfare, for instance, military success or failure depends to a large degree on the national economic, technological, and industrial base and the extent to which that base can be mobilized and applied to the war effort. At the same time, military spending 15 a significant part of the American economy, and the nation's economic health depends to some degree on diplomatic skill in negotiating favorable trade agreements with foreign governments. To complete the circle, diplomatic success depends on activities that can be backed up by economic and military rewards or sanctions. In other words, treating the various instruments of power in isolation oversimplifies reality.

Second, each of the instruments of power is, in fact, a combination of multiple factors, and any one factor can be crucial in a given situation. It is difficult, for example, to identify any single index of military power that allows prediction of a clash between two reasonably equal, or even not so equal foes, because so many factors comprise military prowess. In addition to such obvious factors as the amount of manpower and firepower available to any contestant, numerous other influences may prove critical. Some of these factors are tangible, such as the length and security of supply lines; and others are more difficult to measure precisely, such as morale, leadership, strategic and tactical soundness, compatibility between physical capabilities and political objectives, and sheer luck. To a great extent, military history is a chronicle of calculation and miscalculation in comparing military instruments and their capacities to serve national ends.

Third, one may speak analytically about the individual instruments

of power and their use in various strategies, but, in application, some combination of instruments usually must be brought to bear, often in an ad hoc rather than a planned manner. This complex intertwining occurs for two related reasons. On one hand, any given situation may involve multiple objectives with political, economic, and military/security dimensions and different strategies may be necessary for the various aspects. The extent and mix of actions employing one or more instruments of power will vary depending on the situation. On the other hand, situations evolve over time; thus, an appropriate strategy at one point may be forced to yield to another strategy at a different point. The situation in the Persian Gulf illustrates the first factor and the Iranian hostage crisis is a good example of the second factor.

As already noted, President Carter deemed the guarantee of continuing access to Persian Gulf petroleum reserves vital to American security interest, a judgment accepted by the Reagan administration and reiterated by the president in 1987. Addition of the gulf area to the containment line has dictated strategies for the various instruments of power. The implications for the military instrument, particularly in light of Soviet troops being only 300 miles from the gulf in Afghanistan, have fueled the urgency for having the Rapid Deployment Force, have made necessary a permanent station for a new carrier flotilla in the Indian Ocean, and have accelerated military assistance for Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the Iranian revolution has required the United States to look for alternative political "allies" in the region. The ongoing Iran-Iraq War, and especially its extension to attacks on oil tankers entering or leaving the ports of the belligerents, has created additional requirements for naval patrols, escorts, and defense as well as air cover.

The Iranian hostage crisis illustrated both the interrelation of the various instruments and emphasis on one or another at different stages. Diplomatic activities were conducted throughout the period that American personnel were held captive, but they were muted and highly secret. initially, the economic instrument of power was applied through such actions as levying a trade embargo and freezing Iranian financial assets in the United States. When that pressure failed to secure the hostages' release, the military instrument was applied in the unsuccessful raid at Desert One in late spring 1980. Finally, diplomatic efforts heavily assisted by Algerian intermediaries secured the release, although the effects of the economic sanctions and Iranian need for money and spare parts to continue prosecuting the war with Iraq had a considerable impact.

The fourth factor that complicates strategy making for particular instruments of power is the fact that different countries are predisposed by culture, history, and circumstance to prefer greater or lesser reliance on different instruments of power. During the heyday of British power, the United Kingdom sought to rely primarily on diplomatic skill to maintain a balance of power conducive to British commercial interests on the European continent (a preference influenced by a relatively small

British population and cultural aversion to maintaining a peacetime standing army). The Soviet Union relies heavily on the military instrument partly because of its experience with foreign invaders and a weak Soviet economy that restricts its economic leverage. The United States has historically emphasized the economic instrument, reflecting a preeminent economic system and an aversion dating back to the American Revolution to maintaining a large peacetime military force.

Fifth and finally, the relative emphasis placed on different instruments of power fluctuates with time. In recent years, for instance, it has been fashionable in the United states and Western Europe to derogate military power as a means of realizing foreign policy objectives. Partly as a result of the Vietnam experience and partly as a result of the tremors created by the various oil "shocks" and skyrocketing energy costs, emphasis has shifted to something called economic interdependence. Advocates of interdependence argue that the world's nations are becoming so inextricably tied to one another through burgeoning trade in energy and mineral resources and in agricultural and industrial goods that no nation remains self-sufficient in any meaningful way. Nations must cooperate to survive since hostilities with virtually any rival risk cutoff of vital goods. Nation states are forced to cooperate from fear of the consequences of not doing so, much as fear of mutual vaporization forces some level of US-Soviet cooperation. The argument for interdependence suggests the relative rise of the economic instrument among the tools of power, and its champions optimistically suggest that once cooperative patterns become widespread, they may become the norm. Such an outcome would, of course, diminish the role of military force considerably.

There is evidence, however, of a growing awareness that interdependence has a darker, more Machiavellian side in which the military instrument plays a potentially greater role. This construct suggests that mutual dependence does not necessarily lead to cooperation because one nation can withhold or threaten to withhold vital resources to put another nation at its mercy. Under such conditions, the only way to ensure access to vital materials may be the resort to force. The "Carter Doctrine" regarding the Persian Gulf is testimony of this concern. Concerns about the future of mineral-rich southern Africa and the ability of the relatively new Soviet blue-water navy to interdict shipping lanes vital to the United States and its allies are similar indicators. In other words, the realization that interdependence is a double edged sword may lead to shifting perceptions about the relative importance of the various instruments of national power.

Summary and Conclusion

As the preceding discussion has suggested, grand national strategy making is a process of determining what interests the nation has, what priorities to place on various interests, and what national instruments

of power are available, appropriate, and acceptable for achieving individual interests and the aggregate of those interests. The process is inevitably political because it involves public policy choices about the relative interests that are at stake, their intensity, and the risks each involves. This determination is always contentious, especially in the gray areas separating interests that are vital from those of a lower level of intensity. This distinction is especially important for the military strategist because the location of the line between vital and lesser interests defines where the military will and will not ply its trade.

The number of vital interests a state has influences the reliance it places on military as opposed to other instruments of national power. At the same time, the availability of certain kinds and amounts of power may place limits on the interests that a nation can pursue. A small, developing state, for instance, cannot define its vital interests in global terms because it lacks the military means to prosecute them. At the other extreme, the United States and the Soviet Union possess such excessive military (e.g., nuclear) power that they are precluded from pursuing some interests against each other for fear that their power will be activated.

Thus, matching the instruments of power to the interests of the state is a primary task of the strategy maker. What those interests are and what instruments will exist to pursue those interests are matters of public policy choices. The choices are made in the political realm, where decisions are made about what scarce resources are allocated to what ends.

Notes

1. Donald Nuechterlein, America Over committed: United States National Interests in the 1980s (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1985).

Chapter 1.B.2

* * *

Force Planning for the Post-Cold War World: What Can We Learn from Geopolitics?

Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman

The world is changing fast, so fast that today's force planners face a high degree of ambiguity and uncertainty. The political situation is almost unrecognizable compared to the days before Gorbachev rose and the Berlin Wall fell. Economic power is being redistributed among the Western nations, while the command economies are collapsing. Even so, some physical determinants of national power have not changed. Major demographic trends are essentially the same; the key natural resources are located exactly where they used to be; and in terms of geography, the world's lanes of communications, continents, and oceans look the same as at the height of the Cold War.

We contend that it would be useful for today's force planners to reconsider the geographic factors that influence relations among nations. The legacy of Mahan, Corbett, Mackinder, and Spyknian can help us to bound our uncertainties and prepare for a wide spectrum of unpredictable events, even in these days of the Communist decline.{1} In this article, we summarize three basic geopolitical alternatives for American strategists and then assess their implications for force planners.

Is Military Power Still Useful?

Such a return to "the old time religion" of the great geopolitical questions are being asked. Above all, in this post-Cold War world, does military force still have utility as an instrument of national power?

This is not a new question. At the risk of oversimplification, there are two extreme views on this subject. The traditional view is that "international relations continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy. The classic history of Thucydides is as meaningful a guide to the behavior of states today as when it was written in the fifth century B.C." {2} If this is true, then even

---

Adaptation of Map 11 from The Geography of the Peace by Nicholas John Spykman, edited by Helen R. Nicholl, reprinted by permission of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.

in this post-Cold War era, the military instrument of national power can still be useful in furthering policy objectives.

But there has long been another view. Its adherents argue that the military instrument has no utility for furthering national goals. Peter Drucker, a widely renowned authority on management and business, has recently restated this position.

> ...arms have proven themselves counterproductive. They have become a major drain on economic performance and economic development, a major cause of Russia's economic crisis, of America's falling behind economically, and of the failure of development, especially in Latin America. . . . arms have lost their military capacity. They can win battles but can no longer decide wars. In an age of nuclear, chemical, and bacterial weapons, they can no longer defend their countries. Indeed, war can no longer be considered, in the famous words of Karl von Clausewitz, "the continuation of policy by other means." It has become the defeat of policy. {3}

Drucker's view of war represents an important element of the American political spectrum. Similar views appeared on the eve of both world wars and were deeply rooted before then. Americans have traditionally felt uneasy with the "European," "cynical," "Bismarckian," and "Machiavellian" notions of the balance of power in which the military instrument plays an important part in world affairs. Four basic themes characterize this position: an assumption that America can be isolated from world affairs (because of our early frontier experience); a belief that men of good will can solve their differences by personal encounter (as in American presidents dealing face to face with other world leaders); a conviction that lawyers, arbitrators, and international negotiators can reliably avert war (typified by public responses to arms control agreements); and a conclusion that the catastrophic nature of modern weapons makes warfare ethically unacceptable, economically harmful, and politically counter-productive.

Such themes are both tenacious and important. However, in our opinion they do not resolve the issue. In this imperfect world, the American people seem unlikely to reject the military instrument and its use when appropriate.

Recent events illustrate the continuing utility of military power. The past two presidents used the armed forces successfully in an impressive number of cases. In Panama, we assisted the people in putting their elected president into power. In the Persian Gulf, we did much more than just keep the oil flowing; we also inspired the formation of an international military effort that helped to achieve a stalemate in the Iran-Iraq conflict. In Grenada, we both prevented the taking of American hostages and ousted an externally supported Marxist-Leninist dictatorship (much to the satisfaction of the Grenadan people). In Angola,

Afghanistan, Kampuchea, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, the use of covert and surrogate military power clearly weakened Soviet proxies and favored American interests., Not only did we bolster the chances for international stability, we supported our national values by fostering democratically elected regimes.

At the highest strategic level, America's use of military power in the 1980s did more than just affect a few crisis situations. Our actions exacerbated a host of economic, political, and demographic problems in the Soviet Union, contributing directly to Gorbachev's radical attempts to reconstruct the whole nature of world Communism.

Geopolitical Models for Today's Force Planners: Heartland, Rimland or North America?

When today's force planners consider our future options, they may be wise to reconsider the accumulated wisdom of past geopolitical thinkers. All stressed the importance of geography, as well as demographics and economic potential. Certain pieces of terrain used to be more important than others. But what do those old priorities mean in this era of changing relations among nations, rapidly improving communications, and uncertain military threats? We approach this issue in terms of three overarching questions:

- Where can we do the most to promote democracy, increase trade, and prevent aggression?

- On balance, which region of the globe deserves our primary emphasis and why?

- What are the strategic implications of that choice?

The Eurasian Heartland. Sir Halford F. Mackinder, the great British geopolitical thinker, argued from 1904 through 1943 that the Western maritime coalition should stress the Eurasian Heartland, as depicted in Figure 1.{4} He predicted that Moscow's victory in World War II would make the USSR,

> ...the greatest land Power on the globe. Moreover, she will be the Power in the strategically strongest defensive position. The Heartland is the greatest natural fortress on earth. For the first time in history it is manned by a garrison sufficient both in number and quality. {5}

From this perspective, Mackinder worried that the Heartland power could dominate Eurasia and thus the world.

After World War II, American national security planners clearly operated from Mackinder's framework, seeing the Soviet Union as the Heartland power and thus the fundamental threat to U.S. national

security. The NATO alliance fulfilled Mackinder's vision. He anticipated a temporary stationing of troops on German soil, and he went on to describe the strategic essence of the NATO alliance:

> ...a bridgehead in France, a moated aerodrome in Britain, and a reserve of trained manpower, agriculture and industries in the eastern United States and Canada. {6}

Figure 1

Mackinder's View of the Heartland

Consequently, from the late 1940s through the 1980s, our overriding national security objective was the "containment" of Soviet geographic and ideological expansion. That goal directly influenced a hierarchical series of decisions, as shown in Figure 2. At the highest level (sometimes called "grand strategy"), we adopted a coalition strategy to stop or contain Soviet expansion which included political, economic, and military elements. For the military, very specific goals were set. Planners were to design a force capable of deterring both nuclear and conventional attacks by the Soviet Union against ourselves and our allies. In theory, the military strategy entailed two key concepts: forward defense with our allies and flexible response throughout the spectrum of conflict. In practice, these two concepts required that American troops be stationed far forward on and around the Eurasian continent, able to fight at all levels of conventional conflict and posing a credible threat of nuclear escalation. Because of the vast size, population, and defense economy of the Communist coalition, this orientation demanded a high degree of preparedness for the industrial base, a significant capacity for mobilization, and powerful reserve forces.

Figure 2

Heartland Matrix

LEVEL	OBJECTIVES	STRATEGY	FORCE PLANNING IMPLICATIONS
National ("Grand")	Contain USSR & its proxies	Coalition vs. USSR	Specialization of effort by country
Military	Deter attack on U.S. & allies	Forward defense	Deployed defensively around USSR Regional specialization of land forces
		Flexible response	Capability for war throughout spectrum of conflict (small wars through strategic nuclear) Threat of escalation Strategic nuclear offensive forces modernized rapidly Robust defense industrial base Powerful reserve forces

This is the traditional thinking which has guided force planning throughout the Cold War. Its logic for our deployed forces was perfectly clear until the counter-revolutions of 1989. We have not been so fortunate since then. Force planners today are being driven by a diverse collection of uncertain threats, as well as such concerns as the U.S. budget deficit, our balance of trade, and the euphoria over events in Eastern Europe. This combination of factors will probably move us further and further away from the Cold War model with its stress on the USSR and thus on the Eurasian Heartland.

The Eurasian Rimland. Nicholas Spykman, a professor at Yale University, set forth a different view of geopolitics in the 1930s. Spykman deepened Mackinder's analysis by assessing the Eurasian Rimland from a broad historical perspective.

> ...there has never really been a simple land power-sea power opposition. The historical alignment has always been in terms

> of some members of the rimland with Great Britain against some members of the rimland with Russia, or Great Britain and Russia together against a dominating rimland power. The Mackinder dictum "Who controls eastern Europe rules the Heartland; who rules the Heartland rules the World Island; and who rules the World Island rules the World" is false. If there is to be a slogan for the power politics of the Old World, it must be "Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world." {7}

Figure 3

Spykman's View of the Rimland

Furthermore, he emphasized the importance of Eurasia for America. He warned of the threat posed to the United States by hegemons, or concentrations of power, which could control Eurasia.

> ...the safety and independence of this country can be preserved only by a foreign Policy that will make it impossible for the Eurasian land mass to harbor an overwhelmingly dominant power in Europe and the Far East. {8}

How can Spyknian assist our decisions today? We would argue that his insights may surpass those of Mackinder for the modern force planner.{9} Given the improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations, what we seek today is an appropriate balance between a diminished Soviet threat and new configurations of power on the Eurasian Rimland which may or may not eventually jeopardize our national interests. This was the position of one latter-day American geopolitical strategist, Ray S. Cline, writing in the mid 1970s:

> The United States should protect the security of its people and society by maintaining an alliance system which will prevent a hostile totalitarian nation or combination of such nations from establishing political or military control over central Eurasia plus any substantial parts of the Eurasian peripheral rimlands.{10}

Orienting ourselves toward the Eurasian Rimland would reflect recent trends in international relations. Above all, it would imply less concern for the Soviet threat, but only to the extent that Soviet intentions and capabilities continue to decline. Thus we could accommodate a wide range of arms control negotiations and confidence building measures (such as cutting back on certain forward deployments that the Soviets view as threatening to their own national interests).

These goals would shape a new set of hierarchical decisions which are significantly different from the Heartland model and are shown in Figure 4. At the highest level, grand strategy would seek to preserve the global balance of power and preclude the rise of hostile hegemons in

Eurasia (rather than containment of the Soviet Union). Our fundamental military objectives would not change. We would still stress deterrence of attack and collective security. However, military strategy and force implications would.change significantly.

The exact identity of our alliance partners may change as we adjust to new developments in the global balance of power. Indeed, the very nature of our mutual commitments would probably be more fluid and unpredictable. It seems likely that we would forward deploy fewer air and land forces on the Eurasian continent during peacetime. Instead, we would shift toward some form of forward presence to ensure continued influence and access to areas of vital interest. Because of a dwindling number of foreign bases, we might rely more heavily on naval forces, and strategic mobility would be of growing importance if air and land forces were needed for a regional crisis. We should not forget the potential for new threats and rivalries, as old empires collapse and a more multipolar world takes shape.

Flexible Response would likely remain one element of American military strategy, but its force planning implications would change. Although we would retain a capability for war across the spectrum of conflict, the importance of threatening nuclear escalation would decline as a function of our assessment of the Soviet threat. This same logic would lead us to cut the strategic nuclear offensive forces more sharply than other elements of our force posture.

Strategic defensive forces will likely continue to arouse intense controversy. Some Americans will argue against deploying any form of strategic defense on the grounds that it would destabilize international relations. However, other authorities will cite the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic missile technology around the world as reasons for greater attention to homeland defense.

Because the Rimland orientation reflects declining concern for the Soviet threat, our need for a robust defense industrial base and for powerful reserves would decline. However, they would likely be reduced less sharply than the overall military budget.

Finally, arms control measures will be integrated more coherently into U.S. military strategy. Some constraints will be negotiated in bilateral or multilateral agreements, while others will be undertaken unilaterally. Such phenomena as confidence building measures, intrusive verification, and limits on the quality and quantity of weapon systems are all likely to constrain U.S. force planning decisions. (See Figure 4.)

Figure 4

Rimland Matrix

LEVEL	OBJECTIVES	STRATEGY	FORCE PLANNING IMPLICATIONS
National ("Grand")	Balance of power Preclude hostile hegemons	Alliances to foster stability	Dwindling base structure Multiplying threats
Military	Deter attack on U.S. & Allies	Forward presence ambiguously	Deployed Fewer countries have firm U.S. commitment Fewer forces stationed on Eurasian continent Greater need for strategic air and sea lift
		Flexible response	Capability for war throughout spectrum of conflict Threat of escalation declines Strategic nuclear offensive forces reduced Strategic defensive forces may be deployed Defense industrial base and reserves are reduced less sharply than overall budget
		Arms control	Confidence building measures Intrusive verification Negotiated limits on quantity and quality of weapon systems

The North American Continent. In contrast to the views of Mackinder and Spykman, there exists a very different view. Although rarely articulated today as an explicit, geopolitical alternative, a growing body of opinion within the United States clearly favors drastically greater stress upon our own home continent.

Many of the favorable trends noted above point toward a potential shift in the geographic priorities of American national security planners: the alleged end of the Cold War; the growing strength of regional powers (or groups of powers) in Europe and Asia; greater concern for environmental protection; and the global perception that military spending should be cut in order to promote economic growth.

Several negative trends in American demography reinforce this shift in the geographic emphasis of our force posture. Among the most commonly cited are the use of harmful and addictive substances; inadequate education; the aging of our population; and astronomical increases in the cost of medical care. Some pessimists would even predict the eventual fortification of American borders and rigid enforcement of coastal and air defense zones. They stress the movement of illegal drugs and persons across our borders, as well as protracted instability in Mexico and Central America. The broad effect of all these harmful trends is to constrain our economic productivity growth, creating inexorable pressure for more attention to events at home and less attention to Eurasia. See Figure 5 for a map of the North American continent.

Advocates of this shift in military priorities would argue that reorienting our focus toward the homeland would reinvigorate America. Our new vibrancy would outweigh the harm done by the shift away from a military commitment to Eurasia-both Heartland and Rimland. In spite of this reorientation, we would still have many friends and allies in Eurasia. However, shared concerns for economic, demographic, and environmental factors would largely replace armed force in maintaining favorable balances power. Furthermore, many adherents of this view would advocate massive cuts in military spending, on the grounds that a richer and financially more secure America could best promote representative government, economic growth, and political stability abroad. {11}

There is scant tradition of geopolitical thinking which concentrates on the North American continent from a full military perspective. The reverse is true, of course, in the narrow case of strategic nuclear attack on the United States, which has been studied endlessly. But few observers have examined how a shift in geopolitical emphasis away from forward defense of Eurasia and toward the continental defense of North America would affect our overall national security priorities. Figure 6 provides a hypothetical set of overall objectives, strategy, and force planning implications for this view.

Figure 5

North American Continent

Such a shift need not constitute the old isolationist stereotype of "Fortress America." In fact, we would of necessity remain engaged in the affairs of the world, although our future emphasis would be more economic and less military. We would probably be willing to deter attack on far fewer allies and friendly countries. In those rare cases where we did decide to use force outside the United States, we would employ some form of expeditionary strategy relying on stealth, speed, strategic lift, high technology, and lighter forces. The several armed services would likely undergo a protracted and bitter rivalry over the exact priority to be assigned the air, naval, and ground forces. It is our personal belief that space forces would enjoy a growing priority and might even become dominant.

Figure 6

North American Continental Matrix

LEVEL	OBJECTIVES	STRATEGY	FORCE PLANNING IMPLICATIONS
National ("Grand")	Hemispheric protection	Continental security	Defensively oriented forces
Military	Deter attack North American continent	Continental defense	Space forces could become dominant Strategic defensive forces may be broadened & emphasized (ballistic missile defense, air defense, coastal defense, and border defense) Strategic nuclear offensive forces further reduced Arms control may decline in importance Drug interdiction and border security may become major military missions
	Selectively deter attack on ALLIES	Expeditionary	Balanced active & reserve forces but smaller Focus on small wars

Threat of escalation decays

Defense against strategic nuclear attack by any country would figure prominently in a homeland defense scheme. By the same token, there would be many advocates of border security as a major military mission. Reserve forces would probably constitute a larger fraction of the total force than they do today, and industrial mobilization would be of declining importance.

Conclusion

This is a time of profound uncertainty and great decisions. A host of observers are asking what our military strategy should be. It is our view that people who criticize our lack of military vision can rarely propose alternatives which reflect the highest level of geopolitical thinking. We would suggest a return to the classic analyses of geopolitics. Whichever model we choose will carry powerful implications for force planners, as indicated in the matrices above. Although these three models may not offer a full set of geopolitical alternatives, they do provide a start and the basis for analyzing military requirements at progressively lower levels of abstraction.

The need for continued emphasis on the Eurasian Heartland in U.S. force planning seems to be waning. Many would argue that it is inappropriate for the current era. In narrowly geopolitical terms, Eurasia is declaring its independence of the Soviet Union. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan reduces the Heartland threat, as do the departure of Soviet divisions from Eastern Europe and reductions in military spending throughout the moribund Warsaw Pact. Thus the Heartland is no longer under the domination of one hegemon and can no longer pose the same threat to American national interests that it did during the Cold War.

Even so, it would be unwise to ignore the power potential of new hegemons in and around Eurasia. There are many opportunities to exploit in this continent, especially economic. A Eurasian orientation would best perpetuate the past four decades of progress in Western Europe and the Pacific Basin. Above all, we would hope for friendly relations and shared interests with Japan, the European Economic Community, India, China and other potential hegemons. We aspire to much closer relationships and favorable trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This view has recently been expressed by Colin Gray and Roger Barnett:

> ...the enduring threat to the United States is not the Soviet Union, but whatever contemporary power bids for dominant control of the assets of Eurasia. Thus, the preeminent U.S. security interest in geopolitical perspective lies neither in opposing the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, nor even in opposing Soviet totalitarianism and bureaucratic despotism, although these might sway policy choices for

> other reasons. Rather, abiding U.S. interest lies in opposing the hegemonic or territorial imperialism of any state in Eurasia. {12}

Finally, the idea of concentrating upon the North American continent will appeal to few strategists or military planners. It would defy the lessons of the entire twentieth century, which have drawn America away from its insular and frontier legacies. America has had to engage in the power struggles of Eurasia, and the Old World still needs America. In our opinion, Spykman offers the appropriate geopolitical model for today's planners. His reflections upon World War II can constitute a geopolitical epitaph for the Cold War.

> Today, we are looking forward to a new peace after the Second World War. The basic issues will remain the same because the geographic factors continue to operate. Balanced power on the Eurasian Continent is one of the objectives for which we are fighting and the establishment of such an equilibrium and its preservation will be our objective when the fight is won. It will then be to the interest of the United States to continue to collaborate with any powers seeking to prevent the consolidation of the rimland regions. {13}

You may disagree with us; you may even develop a better alternative than Spykman, Mackinder, or the North American continental focus. But depending on which one you pick, you will have to apply yourself to the discipline of its unique matrix.

Notes

1. Attempts to establish a causal relationship between geography and national power are often referred to as "geopolitics." They date at least from the 18th century and became very explicit with Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julia Corhett, Sir Halford Mackinder, and Nicholas John Spykman. Unfortunately, Mackinder's concepts appealed to a German geographer, Karl Haushofer, who has sometimes been blamed for inspiring Hitler's concept of Lebensraum. As a result, these concepts have been unpopular in academic circles for the past several decades. Of the modern strategists who found geopolitics still useful, Colin S. Gray is perhaps the best known. The Geopolitics of Super Power. (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1988). For critical insights into the history of geopolitics, see James Lee Ray, Global Politics, 4th ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), pp. 215-218.

2. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 7. As cited by Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power, p. 30.

3. Peter F. Drucker, The New Realities: In Government and Politics/In Economics and Business/In Society and World View (New York: Harper &

Row,
1989), pp. 44-45.

4. The maps in Figures 1, 3, and 5 are adapted from Nicholas John Spykman, ed. by Helen R. Nicholl, The Geography of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1944), p. 16. He contended that the most appropriate map for American strategists concerned with Eurasia is the one shown. Interestingly, the standard Soviet map for similar purposes is the same projection but viewed from Moscow.

5. Sir Halford F. Mackinder, "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace," Foreign Affairs, July 1943, p. 601.

6. Ibid., p. 604.

7. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, p. 43.

8. Ibid., pp. 58 and 60.

9. Shortly after American entry into World War II, Spykman wrote America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1942). In the introduction, he traces the historical debate over "isolation and intervention as the most desirable grand strategy for the United States." p. 3.

10. Ray S. Cline, World Power Assessment. A Calculus of Strategic Drift (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1975), p. 135.

11. Peter Drucker tends toward this view, although he does not express it in geopolitical terms. He advocates world-wide cuts in military spending, international conventions to halt terrorism, abolition of military aid, and unprecedented attention to economic productivity and competitiveness in domestic and world markets. The New Realities, passim.

12. Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett, "Geopolitics and Strategy," Global Affairs, Winter 1989, p. 21.

13. Spykman, Geography of the Peace, pp. 60-61.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 1.B.3

* * *

America's New Course

William G. Hyland

Not available at this time

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 1.B.4

* * *

Coping with Victory

John Lewis Gaddis

Not available at this time

Chapter 1.B.5

* * *

Excerpts from the National Security Strategy of the United States

George Bush

The Foundations of National Strategy: Goals and Interests

Enduring Elements of Our National Strategy. Throughout our history, our national security strategy has pursued broad, consistent goals. We have always sought to protect the safety of the nation, its citizens, and its way of life. We have also worked to advance the welfare of our people by contributing to an international environment of peace, freedom, and progress within which our democracy-and other free nations-can flourish.

These broad goals have guided American foreign and defense policy throughout the life of the Republic. They were as much the driving force behind President Jefferson's decision to send the American Navy against the Pasha of Tripoli in 1804 as they were when President Reagan directed American naval and air forces to return to that area in 1986. They animated Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, and my initiatives in support of democracy in Eastern Europe this past year.

In addition, this Nation has always felt a powerful sense of community with those other nations that shared our values. We have always believed that, although the flourishing of democracy in America did not require a completely democratic world, it could not long survive in one largely totalitarian. It is a common moral vision that holds together our alliances in Europe, East Asia, and other parts of the world-a vision shaped by the Magna Carta, our Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights, the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Helsinki Final Act. The American

---

Reprinted from National Security Strategy of the United States, March 1990, by President George Bush.

commitment to an alliance strategy, therefore, has a more enduring basis than simply the perception of a common enemy.

Another enduring element of our strategy has been a commitment to a free and open international economic system. America has championed liberal trade to enhance world prosperity as well as to reduce political friction among nations. We must never forget the vicious cycle of protectionism that helped deepen the Great Depression and indirectly fostered the Second World War. Like so many of its predecessors, my Administration is committed to working with all nations to promote the prosperity of the free market system and to reduce barriers that unfairly inhibit international commerce. In particular, it would be a tragedy of immense proportions if trade disputes weakened political ties that forty years of military threat could not undo.

Our location on the globe has also defined a consistent element of our security strategy. We have been blessed with large oceans east and west and friendly neighbors north and south. But many of our closest friends and allies and important economic and political interests are great distances from the United States. Therefore, in the modern era we have maintained the ability to project American power to help preserve the international equilibrium-globally and regionally-in support of peace and security.

In particular, for most of this century, the United States has deemed it a vital interest to prevent any hostile power or group of powers from dominating the Eurasian land mass. This interest remains. In the period since World War II, it has required a commitment to forward defense and forward military deployments, and a recognition of the lesson of the 1930s-that peace and security come only through vigilance and preparedness. This strategy was described as a strategy of containment of Soviet expansionism. Its purpose was not the division of the world into American and Soviet spheres of influence, but, on the contrary, fostering the reemergence of independent centers of power in Europe and Asia. Behind this shield, our friends built up their strength and created institutions of unity (like the European Community), and our system demonstrated its political and economic vitality. It was our conviction that in these conditions, a steadfast policy of resistance to encroachments would, over time, in George Kennan's famous words, lead to
"the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power."

This we now see. The very success of containment has created new conditions and new opportunities for a new generation of Americans. We welcome this change. Yet our basic values-and our basic geopolitical necessities-remain. As the world's most powerful democracy, we are inescapably the leader, the connecting link in a global alliance of democracies. The pivotal responsibility for ensuring the stability of the international balance remains ours, even as its requirements change in a

new era. As the world enters a period of new hope for peace, it would be foolhardy to neglect the basic conditions of security that are bringing it about.

Our Interests and Objectives in the 1990s. Our broad national interests and objectives are enduring. They can be summed up as follows:

The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

The United States seeks, whenever possible in concert with its allies, to:

o deter any aggression that could threaten its security and, should deterrence fail, repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and allies;

o deal effectively with threats to the security of the United States and its citizens and interests short of armed conflict, including the threat of international terrorism;

o improve strategic stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, modernizing our strategic deterrent, developing technologies for strategic defense, and strengthening our conventional capabilities;

o encourage greater recognition of the principles of human rights, market incentives, and free elections in the Soviet Union while fostering restraint in Soviet military spending and discouraging Soviet adventurism;

o prevent the transfer of militarily critical technologies and resources to hostile countries or groups, especially the spread of weapons of mass destruction and associated high-technology means of delivery; and

o reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.

A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and abroad. National security and economic strength are indivisible. We seek to:

o promote a strong, prosperous, and competitive U.S. economy;

o ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space; and

o promote an open and expanding international economic system with minimal distortions to trade and investment, stable currencies, and

broadly agreed and respected rules for managing and resolving economic disputes.

A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions.
We seek to:

o promote the rule of law and diplomatic solutions to regional conflicts;

o maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance;

o support aid, trade, and investment policies that promote economic development and social and political progress;

o promote the growth of free, democratic political institutions, as the surest guarantee of both human rights and economic and social progress; and

o aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking.

Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

To build and nurture such relationships, we seek to:

o strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights;

o establish a more balanced partnership with our allies and a greater sharing of global leadership and responsibilities;

o support greater economic, political, and defense integration in Western Europe and a closer relationship between the United States and the European Community;

o work with our allies in the North Atlantic Alliance and fully utilize the processes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to bring about reconciliation, security, and democracy in a Europe whole and free; and

o make international institutions more effective in promoting peace, world order, and political, economic and social progress.

Trends in the World Today: Opportunities and Uncertainties

Broadly and properly understood, our national security strategy is

shaped by the totality of the domestic and international environment-an environment that is today dramatically changing.

The Crisis in Communism. Future historians may well conclude that the most notable strategic development of the present period is the systemic crisis engulfing the Communist world. This crisis takes many forms and has many causes:

o After the Vietnam trauma of the 19705, the West's political recovery in the 1980s, including its rearmament and such successes as the INF deployment in Europe, undermined the Soviet leaders' assumptions that the global "correlation of forces" was shifting in their favor.

o While the industrial democracies surge headlong into a post-industrial era of super computers, microelectronics, and telecommunications, Communist states have been mired in stagnation, paralyzed by outmoded statist dogmas that stifle innovation and productivity. Poor economic performance, especially in contrast with the West, has discredited a system that prided itself on its mastery of economic forces. And the new Information Revolution has posed for totalitarian regimes the particular challenge that clinging to old policies of restricting information would lead to permanent technological paralysis.

o A new Soviet leadership in the mid-1980s recognized that its system was in crisis and undertook an ambitious program of reform. Abroad, this leadership sought a calmer international environment in order to concentrate on its internal crisis. This has led, for example, to a Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and Soviet diplomatic interest in compromise solutions to regional conflicts, as Moscow sought gradually (and selectively) to scale back costly overseas commitments. These commitments had been made costly by indigenous resistance-supported
by reinvigorated Western policies of engagement.

o In 1989, in parallel with the negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Soviets began unilaterally reducing their heavy military burden and their presence in Eastern Europe, while proclaiming (and thus far demonstrating) a more tolerant policy toward their East bloc neighbors' internal affairs. We have seen powerful pent-up democratic forces unleashed all across Eastern Europe that have overturned Communist dictatorships and are reversing the pattern of Soviet dominance.

We are facing a strategic transformation born of the success of our postwar policies. Yet, such fundamental political change will likely be turbulent. There may be setbacks and new sources of instability. Happy endings are never guaranteed. We can only be impressed by the uncertainties that remain as the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern

Europe, each in its own way, advance into historically uncharted waters.

The Industrial Democracies. The industrial democracies also face strategic challenges, some of them serious, but they too are largely the products of our success. These include a shifting balance of economic power and the danger that trade disputes in an era of economic change and adjustment could strain political and security ties. Such strains would be especially damaging at a moment when we need to maintain strength and unity to take best advantage of new opportunities in East-West relations which that strength and unity have helped bring about.

The growing strength and self-reliance of our allies in Western Europe and East Asia have already resulted in a greater sharing of leadership responsibility-as the European Community (EC) has shown in policies towards Eastern Europe and as Japan has shown in international economic assistance.

One of the dramatic strategic developments of the 1990s will be the new role of Japan and Germany as successful democracies and economic and political leaders. U.S. policy has long encouraged such an evolution. It will provide powerful new reasons to maintain the partnerships-the Atlantic Alliance, the EC, and the U.S.-Japan security alliance-that have fostered reconciliation, reassurance, democracy, and security in Europe and Asia in the postwar period.

The Global Economy. In a new era of technological innovation and global markets, the world economy will be more competitive than ever before. The phenomenal growth in East Asia will likely continue, and by early in the next century the combined output of Japan, the Republic of Korea, China, and Taiwan may exceed our own. Western Europe-as it progressively removes barriers to the free flow of labor, capital, and goods within the EC-will become an even stronger economic power. The Soviet Union, even with a measure of success for perestroika, will likely slip further behind the United States, Japan, and Western Europe in output. In many other areas of the world, economic expansion will not keep pace with population growth or the debt burden, further squeezing resources and fomenting unrest and instability. All these developments carry significant security implications as well as their obvious economic and social import.

The diffusion of economic power that will almost certainly continue is, in part, a reflection of a wise and successful U.S. policy aimed at promoting worldwide economic growth. Provided that the world economic system remains an open and expanding one, we ourselves will benefit from the growth of others. But American leadership will remain pivotal. A healthy American economy is essential to sustain that leadership role, as well as to foster global economic development and ease dangerous

pressures for unilateralism, regionalism, and protectionism.

Third World Conflicts. In a new era, some Third World conflicts may no longer take place against the backdrop of superpower competition. Yet many will, for a variety of reasons, continue to threaten U.S. interests. The erosion of U.S.-Soviet bipolarity could permit and in some ways encourage the growth of these challenges.

Highly destructive regional wars will remain a danger, made even greater by the expansion of the armed forces of regional powers and the proliferation of advanced weaponry. And it will be increasingly difficult to slow the spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons-along with long-range delivery systems. Instability in areas troubled by poverty, injustice, racial, religious or ethnic tension will continue, whether or not exploited by the Soviets. Religious fanaticism may continue to endanger American lives, or countries friendly to us in the Middle East, on whose energy resources the free world continues to depend. The scourge of terrorism, and of states who sponsor it, likewise remains a threat.

Trends in Weaponry. Modern battlefields are characterized by an unprecedented lethality. The greater precision, range, and destructiveness of conventional weapons now extend war across a wider geographic area, and make it much more rapid and intense. As global weapons production becomes more diffused, these weapons are increasingly available to smaller powers, narrowing the military gap between ourselves and regional states and making some Third World battlefields in many ways as demanding as those we would expect in Central Europe.

The United States has a competitive edge in most technologies relevant to advanced weaponry, but we must continue to translate this advantage into fielded weapon systems supported by appropriate tactical doctrine and operational art. New conditions require continuing innovation as we move to incorporate stealth technology, extremely accurate weapons, improved means of locating targets, and new operational concepts into our combat forces.

Illicit Drugs. Traffic in illicit drugs imposes exceptional costs on the economy of the United States, undermines our national values and institutions, and is directly responsible for the destruction and loss of many American lives. The international traffic in illicit drugs constitutes a major threat to our national security and to the security of other nations.

We will increase our efforts to reduce both the supply of and the demand for illicit drugs. Internationally, we will attack the production of such drugs, and the multinational criminal organizations which enable illicit drugs to be processed, transported, and distributed. A cornerstone of our international drug control strategy is to work with and motivate other countries to help defeat the illicit drug trade and

reduce the demand for drugs.

As we intensify our programs, we will increase our actions aimed at controlling the flow of drugs across our borders. In this area, as in others, we will make increased use of the resources and expertise provided by the Department of Defense. We recognize that military involvement in this mission has costs, and that in a world of finite resources increased effort here is at the expense of other important defense activities. We accept these trade-offs, and we will do the job.

Refugees. The dislocations of a turbulent world-famine, persecution, war, and tyranny-have swelled the wave of refugees across the planet to a total that now exceeds 14 million. Many have literally been forced from their homes by the heavy hand of tyranny.

Thousands of others have fled their homelands to escape oppression. Millions from Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Mozambique have moved simply to
stay alive. Others subsist in camps, from one generation to the next, awaiting solutions to seemingly intractable political and ethnic disputes. Beyond the deep personal tragedies these figures represent, such a vast refugee population taxes the world community's resources, denies to that community the many contributions these peoples could make in more benign circumstances, and fuels the hatreds that will ignite future conflicts.

The United States has a proud tradition, as long as our history, of welcoming refugees to our shores. We also take pride in our work with international agencies to provide assistance and relief for refugees, even as we strive politically to resolve the conflicts that provoked their flight. We have encouraged the restructuring of relief organizations to make them more effective and efficient-to make certain that scarce resources reach those who need them. This year, through our budget and the generosity of private groups, we will take in more refugees than last year. We will maintain a compassionate and generous program of resettlement in the United States and assistance for refugees worldwide.

Issues for the Future. The security environment we face in the 1990s is more hopeful, but in many ways also more uncertain than at any time in the recent past. Some of the questions before us are:

o How can we ensure continued international stability as U.S.-Soviet bipolarity gives way to global interdependence and multipolarity? What will be America's continuing leadership role-and the new roles of leadership assumed by our allies?

o What are the risks that today's positive strategic trends will be reversed, and how do we take due account of them in our long-term planning? How much risk can we prudently accept in an era of strategic

change, fiscal austerity, and great uncertainty?

o While maintaining a balance of power with the Soviet Union as an inescapable American priority, how do we adapt our forces for the continuing challenge of contingencies elsewhere in the world?

o How do we maintain the cohesion among allies and friends that remains indispensable to common security and prosperity, as the perceived threat of a common danger weakens?

o What will be the structure of the new Europe-politically, economically, and militarily-as the Eastern countries move toward democracy and Germany moves toward unification?

o If military factors loom less large in a world of a more secure East-West balance, how shall we marshall the other instruments of policy to promote our interests and objectives?

In shaping a national security strategy for the 1990s, we will need answers to these and other questions. Our preliminary assessments are reflected in the sections that follow.

Regional Challenges and Responses

Although we are a global power, our interests are not equally engaged or threatened everywhere. In the face of competing demands, budgetary stringency, and an improving East-West climate, we must review our priorities. Where our capabilities fall short of needs, we must assess the risks and employ the full panoply of our policy instruments to minimize them.

Our relationship with the Soviet Union retains a strategic priority because that country remains the only other military superpower. Even as tensions ease and military forces are reduced on both sides, maintaining the global strategic balance is inescapably an American concern; there is no substitute for our efforts.

Yet, the extraordinary changes taking place, if their promise is

fulfilled, will permit important changes in our defense posture-and a greater possibility of viewing other regions in their own right, independent of the East-West context.

The Soviet Union. Our goal is to move beyond containment, to seek the integration of the Soviet Union into the international system as a constructive partner. For the first time in the postwar period, this goal appears within reach.

The Soviet Union has taken major steps toward rapprochement with the international system, after seventy years of seeking to undermine it; 'it

has repudiated its doctrines of class warfare and military superiority and criticized major tenets of its own postwar policy. It has begun to move toward democracy. All this we can only applaud.

The United States will seek to engage the USSR in a relationship that is increasingly cooperative. Moscow will find us a willing partner in creating the conditions that will permit the Soviet Union to join, and be welcome in, a peaceful, free, and prosperous international community. We will expand contacts for mutual benefit, to promote the free flow of ideas and democratic values in the Soviet Union, and to lay a firmer foundation for a deeper relationship over the long term. Our Open Lands proposal, for example, would abolish the "closed zones" that unnecessarily impede contacts by diplomats, businessmen, tourists, students, and journalists. To support Soviet economic reform, I have proposed immediate negotiations on a U.S.-Soviet trade agreement so that pending action by the Supreme Soviet to codify emigration reform-we could grant Most Favored Nation status to the Soviet Union at the June 1990 Summit. We have offered to support observer status for the Soviet Union in the structures created by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) after the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations is completed, and I personally urged Chairman Gorbachev to use the intervening time to move more rapidly towards market practices in the Soviet economy. We are also expanding technical economic cooperation and have begun discussions on a bilateral investment treaty.

We strongly support today's dramatic process of political and economic reform, and have a significant stake in its success. Yet, U.S. policy does not and cannot depend on a particular leader or set of leaders in the USSR. We look for fundamental alterations in Soviet institutions and practices that can only be reversed at great economic and political costs. In the political sphere, democracy is the best assurance of irreversible change. In the military sphere, with agreements in place-and weapons destroyed, production lines converted, and forces demobilized-any future Soviet leadership would find it costly, time-consuming; and difficult to renew the pursuit of military supremacy and impossible to attempt without providing ample strategic warning. These must be our standards.

Even if the U.S.-Soviet relationship remains competitive, it can be made less militarized and far safer. We will seek effectively verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and others as an integral component of our security strategy.

But whatever course the Soviets take over the next decade, the Soviet Union will remain a formidable military power. The United States must continue to maintain modern defenses that strengthen deterrence and enhance security. We cannot ignore continuing Soviet efforts to modernize qualitatively even as they cut back quantitatively. As Chairman Gorbachev declared last September 21st, "While reducing expenditure for [defense] purposes, we are paying attention to the qualitative rearmament of the

Army, and in this way we are not permitting the overall level of our defense capability to be weakened in any degree." Our response thus represents prudent caution, but the Soviet leadership and people should realize that it is a caution based on uncertainty, not on hostility.

Restructuring the Soviet Union's relationship to the international community is as ambitious a task as containment was for its time. Responsibility for creating the conditions for it lies first and foremost with the Soviet Union itself. But the United States is determined, together with our allies, to challenge and test Soviet intentions and, while maintaining our guard, to work to put Soviet relations with the West on a firmer, more constructive course than had ever been thought possible in the postwar era.

Western Europe. The nations of the Atlantic Community, defined by their common values, are the founding members of a larger commonwealth of free
nations-those states that share a commitment to freedom and individual rights. Ours is an alliance rooted in a shared history and heritage. Even if the military confrontation in Europe diminishes dramatically-as is our goal-the natural partnership of democratic allies will endure, grounded in its moral and political values.

The continued strength of the Alliance and our leadership within it remain essential to peace. The Soviet Union, even if its forces were pulled back entirely within its territory, would remain by virtue of geography a major military factor in Central Europe. Security and stability in Europe will therefore continue to depend on a substantial American presence, political and military. As I have repeatedly pledged, the United States will maintain significant military forces in Europe as long as our allies desire our presence as part of a common security effort. Our nuclear power remains the ultimate deterrent of aggression, even at lower force levels.

In Europe's emerging new political environment, moreover, the Atlantic Alliance remains a natural association of free nations and the natural framework for harmonizing Western policies on both security and diplomacy. It embodies the continuing American commitment to Europe; it
also sustains the overall structure of stability that can assure the success of the democratic evolution of Central and Eastern Europe.

Yet, within this framework, the "European pillar" of the Atlantic world is being strengthened before our eyes-another dramatic development of this period. The United States categorically supports greater Western European economic and political integration, as a fulfillment of Europe's identity and destiny and as a necessary step toward a more balanced sharing of leadership and responsibility within the broader Atlantic Community. European unity and Alliance partnership do not conflict; they reinforce each other. We support the European Community's efforts to

create a single unified market by 1992. A strong European Community will ensure more efficient use of European resources for common efforts, and will also be a strategic magnet to the nations of Eastern Europe. We also support increased Western European military cooperation and coordination, within the overall framework of the Atlantic Alliance, including both bilateral efforts and those in the Western European Union. We strongly support the independent British and French nuclear deterrent forces and their continued modernization.

The unification of Germany is coming about--by peaceful means, on the basis of democracy, and in the framework of the Western relationships that have nurtured peace and freedom for four decades. This is a triumph for the West. We expect a unified Germany to remain a member of both the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Community, as all of us seek to foster the conditions for wider reconciliation in Europe.

As the European-American relationship shifts, frictions can arise. Statesmanship will be needed to ease them. The challenges that the Western democracies face in this environment, however, are challenges to wise policy, not to the nature of their system. Assuming the democracies maintain discipline in their diplomatic, defense, and economic policies, we face an extraordinary opportunity to shape events in accordance with our values and our vision of the future.

Eastern Europe. The United States and its allies are dedicated to overcoming the division of Europe. All the countries of Eastern Europe are entitled to become part of the worldwide commonwealth of free nations as, one by one, they reclaim the European cultural and political tradition that is their heritage. Overcoming this division depends on their achievement of self determination and independence. We will accept no arrangements with Moscow that would limit these rights, and we expect the soviet Union to continue to repudiate in deeds as well as in words all right and pretext to intervene in the affairs of East European states. A free and prosperous Eastern Europe is not a threat to legitimate Soviet security interests, and every day it becomes easier to envision the time when Eastern and Western states can freely associate in the same social and economic organizations.

The Cold War began with the division of Europe. It can truly end only when Europe is whole again.

We share with our allies a vision of Europe whole and free:

o We believe democratic institutions and values will be the core of the new Europe, as it is these institutions and values that today stand vindicated.

o Even as fundamental political changes are still evolving, we place high priority on moving rapidly to a level of forces lower and more stabilizing, with greater openness for military activities.

The United States intends to play a role in fostering Eastern Europe's economic development, supporting its democratic institutions, and ensuring the overall structure of stability. It has become dramatically clear that the American role is welcomed by the peoples of Eastern Europe, who-in the new Europe that is emerging-see our presence as reassuring. Naturally, our relations with East European countries will be affected by their policies on matters of concern to us, such as espionage, illicit technology transfer, terrorism, and subversion in the Third World.

In November--as an investment in our own security as well as in the freedom and well-being of the peoples of Eastern Europe--I signed into law legislation authorizing $938 million in assistance to support democracy in Poland and Hungary. In my FY 1991 budget I have proposed an additional $300 million as we begin to expand our program to encompass other new East European democracies. In addition, we have offered our best advice and expertise in support of economic reform, trade liberalization, labor market reforms, private sector development, and environmental protection. This marks a major and positive step in bipartisan foreign policy and underscores the strength of the American commitment to assist Eastern Europe's historic march toward freedom.

We will also look to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to play a greater role, since the CSCE stands for the freedom of people to choose their destiny under a rule of law with rulers who are democratically accountable. We suggested last year that we expand the CSCE human rights basket to include standards for democratic pluralism and free elections, and that we breathe new life into the economic dimension of CSCE by focusing on the practical problems of the transition from stagnant planned economies to free and competitive markets. The time is ripe for such steps.

The Western Hemisphere. The Western Hemisphere has within reach the great goal of becoming history's first entirely democratic hemisphere. The dramatic victory of the Nicaraguan opposition in the February 25th elections has given a significant boost to the underlying trend toward democracy evident in the region over the past several years. The United States has long considered that its own security is inextricably linked to the hemisphere's collective security, social peace, and economic progress. The resurgence of democracy supports these objectives, and strengthens our natural unity just as another traditional stimulus to solidarity-fear of an extra-hemispheric threat-is receding. In a new era, our hemispheric policy seeks a new spirit of mature partnership.

We must continue, however, to counter security threats. Improvement in our relations with Cuba depends upon political liberalization there and an end to its subversion of other governments and the undermining of the peace process in the region. In Nicaragua, our goal is to assist the

new government of Violeta Chamorro in its efforts to nurture democratic institutions, rebuild the economy, and scale back the Nicaraguan military. We support the Salvadoran government's military and political efforts to defeat the Communist insurgency.

Central America remains a disruptive factor in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. We hold the Soviet Union accountable for the behavior of its clients, and believe that Soviet cooperation in fostering democracy in the region is an important test of the new thinking in Soviet policy.

We will find new ways to cooperate with our two closest neighbors, Canada and Mexico. We strongly support the new democratic government in
Panama, which is also the best long-term guarantee of the security and efficient operation of the Panama Canal. We will continue to seek a transition to democracy in Haiti, promoting international efforts in support of free elections. The return to democracy in most of Latin America will put new emphasis on our efforts to support professional, apolitical militaries. We will also confront the challenge to democracy posed by the drug trade and debt problems.

East Asia and the Pacific. Our network of alliances and our forces deployed in the region have ensured the stability that has made this area's striking progress possible.

In addition to our own deterrent strength, security in the region has rested since the 1970s on an unprecedented structure of harmonious relations among the region's key states. Our alliance with Japan remains a centerpiece of our security policy and an important anchor of stability. Japan's importance is now global. Our relationship is one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world and it is in our strategic interest to preserve it.

The relationship between the United States and China, restored in the early 1970s after so many years of estrangement, has also contributed crucially to regional stability and the global balance of power. The United States strongly deplored the repression in China last June and we have imposed sanctions to demonstrate our displeasure. At the same time, we have sought to avoid a total cutoff of China's ties to the outside world. Those ties not only have strategic importance, both globally and regionally; they are crucial to China's prospects for regaining the path of economic reform and political liberalization. China's angry isolation would harm all of these prospects.

The U.S. security commitment to the Republic of Korea remains firm; we seek a reduction in tensions on the Korean peninsula and fully endorse Seoul's efforts to open a fruitful South-North dialogue. Our strong and healthy ties with our ally Australia contribute directly to regional and global stability. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) continues to play a major role in the region's security and prosperity.

In Cambodia, the United States seeks a comprehensive settlement, one which will bring the Cambodian people true peace and a government they have freely chosen.

As we have amply demonstrated, we support the Philippines' democratic institutions and its efforts to achieve prosperity, social progress, and internal security. We will negotiate with the Philippines in good faith on the status of our military facilities there. These facilities support a continued and needed American forward presence that benefits us, the Philippines, regional security, and global stability.

The Middle East and South Asia. The free world's reliance on energy supplies from this pivotal region and our strong ties with many of the region's countries continue to constitute important interests of the United States.

Soviet policies in the region show signs of moderating, but remain contradictory. The supply of advanced arms to Libya and Syria continues (as does the cultivation of Iran), though Soviet diplomacy has moved in other respects in more constructive directions.

The Middle East is a vivid example, however, of a region in which, even as East-West tensions diminish, American strategic concerns remain. Threats to our interests-including the security of Israel and moderate Arab states as well as the free flow of oil-come from a variety of sources. In the 1980s, our military engagements-in Lebanon in 1983-84, Libya in 1986, and the Persian Gulf in 1987-88-were in response to threats to U.S. interests that could not be laid at the Kremlin's door. The necessity to defend our interests will continue.

Therefore, we will maintain a naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. We will conduct periodic exercises and pursue improved host-nation support and prepositioning of equipment throughout the region. In addition, we will discourage destabilizing arms sales to regional states, especially where there is the potential for upsetting local balances of power or accelerating wasteful arms races. We are especially committed to working to curb the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and associated long-range delivery systems. We will confront and build international pressure against those states that sponsor terrorism and subversion. And we will continue to promote a peace process designed to satisfy legitimate Palestinian political rights in a manner consonant with our enduring commitment to Israel's security.

In South Asia, Pakistan and India are both friends of the United States. We applaud the return of democracy to Pakistan and the trends of economic liberalization in both countries. We will seek to maintain our special relationship with our traditional ally Pakistan, steadily improve our relations with India, and encourage Indo-Pakistani rapprochement and

a halt to nuclear proliferation. While we welcome the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Afghanistan, the massive and continuing Soviet arms supply to the illegitimate regime in Kabul reinforces the need for continued U.S. support to the Mujahiddin in their quest for self-determination for the Afghan people. We remain firmly committed to a comprehensive political settlement as the best means of achieving Afghan self-determination and regional security.

Africa. Institution-building, economic development, and regional peace are the goals of our policy in Africa. The global trends of democracy must come to Africa too. All these goals must be achieved if Africa is to play its rightful role as an important factor in the international system. Africa is a major contributor to the world supply of raw materials and minerals and a region of enormous human potential.

In the strategic dimension, the United States has pressed hard throughout the 1980s for the liquidation of all the Soviet/Cuban military interventions in Africa left over from the 1970s. The New York Accords of December, 1988, were the culmination of an eight-year U.S. effort for peace in Angola, and independence for Namibia. As a result, Cuban forces are departing Angola, and Namibia will become independent on March 21st. In the Horn of Africa, the United States has encouraged negotiated solutions to the region's conflicts.

In the economic dimension, the United States will continue to advocate reforms that eliminate wasteful and unproductive state-owned enterprises and that liberate the productive private sector and individual initiative. The United States has significantly increased the assistance it provides through our Development Fund for Africa. We continue to be the biggest donor of humanitarian aid and have helped international organizations and voluntary associations to distribute food, medicines, and other assistance.

We continue to press for a rapid and complete end to South Africa's system of apartheid. We support negotiations leading to a democratic, non-racial South Africa that would enhance long-term stability in the country and the region. We are encouraged by the progress that has been made, particularly the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of political organizations.

We look to all parties to continue to take the steps necessary to create a climate in which productive negotiations can take place.

Relating Means to Ends: Our Political Agenda

The elements of our national power-diplomatic and political, economic and military-remain formidable. Yet, the relative importance of these different instruments of policy will change in changing circumstances. Our most difficult decisions will include not only which military forces or programs to adjust, increase, reduce or eliminate, but

also which risks can be ameliorated by means other than military capability-means like negotiations, burdensharing, economic and security assistance, economic leverage, and political leadership.

In a new era, we foresee that our military power will remain an essential underpinning of the global balance, but less prominently and in different ways. We see that the more likely demands for the use of our military forces may not involve the Soviet Union and may be in the Third World, where new capabilities and approaches may be required. We see that we must look to our economic well-being as the foundation of our long-term strength. And we can see that, especially in the new international environment, political will and effective diplomacy can be what translates national power into the achievement of national objectives. While this Report necessarily describes these different elements of policy separately, national strategy must integrate them and wield them according to a coherent vision.

Alliance Relationships. Our first priority in foreign policy remains solidarity with our allies and friends. We have never been able to "go it alone", even in the early days of the Cold War when our major allies were still suffering from the devastation and exhaustion of World War II. Even to attempt to do so would alter our way of life and national institutions and would jeopardize the very values we are seeking to protect.

The rise of other centers of power in the free world is therefore welcome, consistent with America's values, and supportive of our national interests. We must ensure that free nations continue to recognize the fundamental moral, political, and security interests we have in common and protect those interests against both the residual threat of Soviet military power and the emerging threats of regional conflict and of divisive economic issues. We are prepared to share more fully with our allies and friends the responsibilities of global leadership.

Arms Control. Arms control is a means, not an end; it is an important component of a broader policy to enhance national security. We will judge arms control agreements according to several fundamental criteria:

o First, agreements must add to our security. Our objective is to reduce the incentives, even in crisis, to initiate an attack. Thus, we seek not reductions for reductions' sake, but agreements that will promote stability. We will work to reduce the capabilities most suited for offensive action or preemptive strike.

o Second, to enhance stability, we favor agreements that lead to greater predictability in the size, nature, and evolution of military forces. Predictability through openness expands the traditional focus of arms control beyond just military capabilities and addresses the fear of aggressive intent.

o Third, agreements are effective only if we can verify

compliance. As we broaden our agenda to include issues like chemical and missile proliferation, verification will become an increasingly difficult challenge, but effective verification will still be required. We want agreements that can endure.

o Finally, since the security of the United States is indivisible from that of its friends and allies, we will insist that any arms control agreements not compromise allied security.

The arms control accomplishments of the past twelve months are impressive. We have already reached a number of new agreements with the Soviet Union on:

o prevention of dangerous military activities;

o advance notification of strategic exercises;

o clarification of the rights of innocent passage in territorial seas;

o a memorandum of understanding implementing verification provisions of the INF Treaty;

o trial verification and stability measures for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START);

o reciprocal demonstrations of each side's proposed procedures for verifying reentry vehicles on ballistic missiles;

o reciprocal exhibitions of strategic bombers to aid verification; and

o demonstrations of proposed "unique identifiers" or "tags" for ballistic-missile verification.

These are but the beginning. Our arms control agenda is now broader

than ever-beyond the traditional East-West focus on nuclear weapons. We are dealing with pressing multilateral arms control issues. We are also negotiating for greater transparency and for limits on conventional arms. We will negotiate in good faith, patiently and seriously, but we will not seek agreement for agreement's sake, nor compromise the basic principles set forth above.

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). In START, our goals are not merely to reduce forces but to reduce the risk of nuclear war and create a more stable nuclear balance. Our proposals are designed to strengthen deterrence by reducing and constraining in particular those strategic nuclear forces which pose the greatest threat-namely, ballistic missiles, especially large ICBMs with multiple warheads. We propose less strict

limits on bombers and cruise missiles, which are not capable of carrying out a disarming first strike. Our goal is to resolve all substantive START issues by the June 1990 Summit.

Defense and Space. Our approach to this set of issues, as well, is to enhance strategic stability by facilitating a cooperative transition to a stable balance of offensive and defensive forces if effective defenses prove feasible. We also seek greater transparency and predictability in approaches to strategic defense, and have proposed regular exchanges of data, briefings, visits to laboratories, and observations of tests.

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The United States is firmly committed to reaching an agreement to reduce conventional armed forces in Europe to lower levels in order to enhance security and stability and to reduce the ability to launch a surprise attack or sustain large-scale offensive operations. Our goal is to complete the CFE Treaty as soon as possible this year. In my State of the Union speech, in response to rapid changes in Europe, I proposed to lower substantially the levels of U.S. and Soviet ground and air force personnel in Central and Eastern Europe-to 195,000 troops. This proposal has been accepted.

Chemical Weapons. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva continues
to work toward a global ban of chemical weapons, using as the basis for its negotiations the draft text that I personally presented for the United States in 1984. It is one of my most important goals to see an effective, truly global ban of chemical weapons-their production and possession, as well as their use. At the United Nations and at Malta, I made several suggestions and challenges to speed this negotiation to a successful conclusion, including ways that the United States and Soviet Union can set an example to spur achievement of a global ban. In this connection, we and the Soviets have agreed to work together to sign a bilateral agreement at the June 1990 Summit that would have each side destroy substantial quantities of its chemical weapons stocks. We must not only deal with those states that now possess chemical weapons, but also address the growing proliferation of these instruments of indiscriminate destruction.

Open Skies. An important step in achieving predictability through openness is the Open Skies initiative I made last May, which would allow frequent unarmed observation flights over the territory of participating states. This would institutionalize openness on a truly unprecedented scale. It would achieve greater transparency about military activities, lessen danger, and ease tension. The NATO allies agreed in December on a common approach for pursuing this initiative, and foreign ministers from NATO and the Warsaw Pact have met in Ottawa to begin negotiating an agreement.

Confidence-and Security-Building Measures. These negotiations in

Vienna are another important opportunity to enhance free world security through a variety of measures to codify openness and transparency in military operations and force structures. The recently completed seminar on military doctrine is a powerful example of bow this forum can generate valuable exchanges among high-ranking military officers and open up new avenues of understanding.

Nuclear Testing. The United States and the Soviet Union are on the verge of completing new verification protocols to the 1974 Threshold Test Ban and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties that should open the way to their ratification and entry into force. The protocols-which I expect to be signed at the June 1990 Summit-involve new, complex, and unprecedented techniques for effective verification, including direct, onsite measurement of explosive yield.

Proliferation. The spread of ever more sophisticated weaponry-including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons-and of the missiles capable of carrying them represents a growing danger to international security. This proliferation exacerbates and fuels regional tensions and complicates U.S. defense planning. It poses ever greater dangers to U.S. forces and facilities abroad, and possibly even to the United States itself.

Our comprehensive approach to this problem includes stringent controls and multilateral cooperation designed to stop the spread of these technologies and components. We will work to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. We will also use diplomacy and economic and security assistance to address the underlying causes of tension or insecurity that lead countries to seek advanced weaponry.

Naval Forces. The Soviet Union has urged that we negotiate limitations on naval forces. We have rejected this proposal for reasons grounded in the fundamental realities of the free world's strategic interests.

The economies of the United States and its major allies depend so vitally on trade, and on the security of sea lines of communication, that we have always defined a vital interest in freedom of the seas for all nations. Our Navy protects that Interest. Similarly, some of our most important security relations are with nations across the oceans. The Soviet Union, as a power on the Eurasian land mass not dependent on overseas trade, with interior lines of communication to its major allies and trading partners, has no such strategic stake. Its navy has served the purposes of coastal defense-or of denial of our ability to defend our vital interests. There is no symmetry here.

Nor is our naval power to be equated with the Soviet ground-force superiority that we are determined to reduce-a superiority that in its very nature, scope, and composition has posed an offensive threat. No

navy could pose such a threat to the Soviet Union.

The Contest of Ideas and the Nurturing of Democracy. Since the end of World War II, the United States has developed and maintained an extensive program of public information around the world-through U.S. Information Agency offices at our embassies, speakers, publications, exchange programs, cultural centers, and numerous other activities.

A special effort has been made to reach into closed societies with information about their countries, factual news of the world, and insight into American society. Primary tools for this effort are the Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Europe. Their impact has been invaluable, and has contributed significantly to the changes now taking place in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere.

The American message of democracy, respect for human rights, and the free flow of ideas is as crucial and inspiring today as it was forty-five years ago. The truth we provide remains a stimulus to openness. In the coming decade, we will have to project American values and protect American interests on issues of growing global importance, such as the battle against narcotics trafficking and the search for solutions to international environmental problems.

An American initiative begun in the 1980s-the National Endowment for Democracy-has broken new ground, mobilizing the private efforts of our political parties, labor unions, businesses, educational and other organizations in fostering the development of democratic institutions. As democratic change continues around the world-and is still denied in many places- we must ensure that the message we send and the means of delivery we use keep pace.

Economic and Security Assistance. Our foreign assistance has traditionally supported our security objectives by strengthening allies and friends, bolstering regional security, deterring conflict, and securing base rights and access.

As East-West tensions diminish, these political and economic instruments become more centrally relevant to an era of new challenges:

o A multipolar world, in which military factors may recede to the background, puts a new premium on the instrumentalities of political relations-of which foreign assistance has been one of the most cost effective and valuable.

o In a new era, nurturing democracy and stability remains a basic goal, but one now freed from its traditional Cold War context. Foreign assistance is an indispensable means toward this end.

o Economic and humanitarian goals-such as promoting market-oriented structural reforms in Eastern Europe and the developing world, or aiding

refugees and disaster victims-will also loom larger than before. This is a responsibility we need to share with international financial institutions and prosperous allies, but we need to do our part.

o As regional conflicts are resolved, United Nations peacekeeping

takes on additional tasks-and will have a claim on our support. As for those conflicts that continue to fester, security assistance can reduce the level or likelihood of a direct U.S. role in bolstering regional security.

o on problems such as drugs, the environment, terrorism, or the proliferation of high-tech weaponry, U.S. aid remains a valuable tool of policy.

These policy instruments in our International Affairs budget have always struggled for survival in the congressional budget process. Low funding and excessive earmarking and conditionality have hampered flexibility. In the 1990s, we will need to do justice to the growing needs of the emerging East European democracies without validating the fears of our Third World friends that they will be relegated to second place. A national security strategy that takes us beyond containment needs these tools more than ever.

Military Openness. In addition to the confidence-building measures discussed above, our policy seeks other ways of changing East-West military relations toward our goal of greater transparency. A prudent program of military-to-military contacts can demonstrate the capabilities of our forces while allowing us greater access to and understanding of the military establishments of potential adversaries. This can reduce worst-case planning based on limited information and reduce the likelihood of miscalculation or dangerous military incidents.

As the Soviet political system evolves, we hope that Soviet military power will increasingly be subject to detailed and searching public debate. In the long term, a Soviet military that must justify its size, mission, and resource demands to the Soviet public and legislature will find it more difficult to enhance its capabilities beyond the legitimate needs of defense. Increased contact with the armed forces of the United States and other democracies can aid this process as well as contribute to greater understanding. We will continue to pursue the kinds of contacts first agreed to by Admiral Crowe and Marshal Akhromeyev in 1988. We will also pursue similar exchanges with the armed forces of Eastern European states. In addition to their obvious contributions to transparency, such contacts will support our overall approach to Eastern Europe by helping the military officers of these states establish a professional identity independent of their roles in the Warsaw Pact.

Relating Means to Ends: Our Economic Agenda

America's national power continues to rest on the strength and

resilience of our economy. To retain a position of international leadership, we need not only skilled diplomacy and strong military forces, but also a dynamic economic base with competitive agricultural and manufacturing sectors, an innovative research establishment, solid infrastructure, secure supplies of energy, and vibrant financial and service industries.

We will pursue a strategy that integrates domestic economic policies with a market-opening trade policy, enhanced cooperation among the major industrial countries, and imaginative solutions to the problems of the Third World.

Global Imbalances. Japan and Germany continue to run substantial trade and current account surpluses; the United States has large deficits. Recent economic summits and meetings of finance ministers of the Group of
Seven (G-7) have given high priority to reducing these imbalances. For deficit countries like the United States, this requires action to reduce budget deficits and encourage private savings. The surplus countries like Germany and Japan should, for their part, pursue macro-economic policies and structural reforms to encourage non-inflationary growth. Through the G-7 and economic summits, we will strengthen coordination and ensure implementation of appropriate policies for non-inflationary growth and expanded trade.

Debt. Aggregate Third World debt is over $1 trillion, and debtor nations need some $70 billion just to meet annual interest payments. It is a tremendous burden on struggling democracies and on the ability of many friendly countries to maintain their security. Relatively slow world growth, growing inflation, rising unemployment, and the failure to implement necessary economic reforms aggravate an already difficult situation. We have advanced, in the Brady Plan, suggestions to revitalize the international debt strategy through reductions in commercial bank debt and debt service payments, as a complement to new lending. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank will provide financial support for these efforts. As an essential first step in obtaining this support, we are urging debtors to adopt medium-term economic programs-including measures to strengthen domestic savings, steps to attract foreign investment, and policies that promote the return of flight capital.

Trade. Support within the United States for free trade has weakened as a result of persistently high trade deficits. Additional concern about the competitiveness of the U.S. economy has led to increased calls for government intervention in support of key sectors. Current account and trade deficits are macroeconomic phenomena that primarily reflect domestic savings and investment. The imbalance between the U.S. saving rate and the higher U.S. investment rate is, therefore, the fundamental source of the U.S. trade deficit. The net capital inflow into the United States, which is necessary to finance the deficit, must be matched by a

corresponding increase in imports to the United States over exports to other countries. The key to reducing the deficit, therefore, is to increase domestic saving, thus closing the savings-investment gap and reducing import demand. We have proposed a comprehensive Savings and Economic Growth Act to raise household savings which will help to restore necessary balance in the trade and current accounts.

While addressing the domestic causes for the trade deficit, we must also ensure that market forces are free to operate at home and abroad, and that trade expands-rather than closing our markets. In this regard, we will work with other members of GATT to bring to a successful conclusion this year the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations now addressing issues crucial to our interests, including agricultural subsidies, services, the protection of intellectual property, trade-related investment measures, and market access. These are the trade problems of the 1990s that require solution if we are to maintain a domestic consensus in support of free and open trade.

Given the continuing strategic importance of unity among the industrial democracies, it is essential that trade disputes be resolved equitably, without tearing the fabric of vital political and security partnerships.

Technology. Our economic and military strength rests on our technological superiority, not sheer manufacturing might. The United States remains in the forefront in the development of new technologies, but American enterprises must respond more quickly in their exploitation of new technologies if they are to maintain their competitiveness in both domestic and foreign markets. The loss of advanced production capabilities in key industries could place our manufacturing base in jeopardy.

The dynamics of the technological revolution transcend national boundaries. The transfer of technology between allies and friends has benefitted the United States in both national security and economic terms. Open markets and open investment policies will best ensure that scarce resources are used efficiently and that benefits are widely shared. But the openness of the free market economy must not be exploited to threaten our security. With our partners in the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), we must continue to work to ensure that militarily sensitive technology does not flow to potential adversaries. At the same time, we must adapt the procedures and lists of COCOM controlled goods to support rapid political and economic change in
Eastern Europe. In that regard, our task is threefold: (a) streamline COCOM controls on strategic goods and technologies; (b) harmonize and tighten national licensing and enforcement procedures; and (c) encourage greater cooperation with non-COCOM developing countries. We have also initiated a comprehensive analysis of the changing strategic threat, which will be instrumental in deciding on possible further changes in the

multilateral system of strategic export controls.

Energy. Secure supplies of energy are essential to our prosperity and security. The concentration of 65 percent of the world's known oil reserves in the Persian Gulf means we must continue to ensure reliable access to competitively priced oil and a prompt, adequate response to any major oil supply disruption. We must maintain our Strategic Petroleum Reserve at a level adequate to protect our economy against a serious supply disruption. We will continue to promote energy conservation and diversification of oil and gas sources, while expanding our total supply of energy to meet the needs of a growing economy. We must intensify efforts to promote alternative sources of energy (nuclear, natural gas, coal, and renewables), and devote greater attention to reducing fossil fuel emissions in light of growing environmental concerns.

Relating Means to Ends: Our Defense Agenda

One reason for the success of America's grand strategy of containment has been its consistency. The military component of that strategy has been adjusted to changing threats and available military technology, but there too substantial continuity remains:

o Deterrence: Throughout the postwar period we have deterred aggression and coercion against the United States and its allies by persuading potential adversaries that the costs of aggression, either nuclear or conventional, would exceed any possible gain. "Flexible response" demands that we preserve options for direct defense, the threat of escalation, and the threat of retaliation.

o Strong Alliances: Shared values and common security interests form the basis of our system of collective security. Collective defense arrangements allow us to combine our economic and military strength, thus lessening the burden on any one country.

o Forward Defense: In the postwar era, the defense of these shared values and common interests has required the forward presence of significant American military forces in Europe, in Asia and the Pacific, and at sea. These forces provide the capability, with our allies, for early, direct defense against aggression and serve as a visible reminder of our commitment to the common effort.

o Force Projection: Because we have global security interests, we have maintained ready forces in the United States and the means to move them to reinforce our units forward deployed or to project power into areas where we have no permanent presence. For the threat of protracted conflict we have relied on the potential to mobilize the manpower and industrial resources of the country.

These elements have been underwritten by advanced weaponry, timely intelligence, effective and verifiable arms control, highly qualified and

trained personnel, and a system for command and control that is effective, survivable, and enduring. Together they have formed the essence of our defense policy and military strategy during the postwar era.

The rebuilding of America's military strength during the past decade was an essential underpinning to the positive change we now see in the international environment. Our challenge now is to adapt this strength to a grand strategy that looks beyond containment, and to ensure that our military power, and that of our allies and friends, is appropriate to the new and more complex opportunities and challenges before us.

Overall Priorities. From the weapons, forces, and technologies that will be available, we will have to pick carefully those that best meet our needs and support our strategy in a new period. Our approach will include the following elements:

o Deterrence of nuclear attack remains the cornerstone of U.S. national security. Regardless of improved U.S.-Soviet relations and potential arms control agreements, the Soviets' physical ability to initiate strategic nuclear warfare against the United States will persist and a crisis or political change in the Soviet Union could occur faster than we could rebuild neglected strategic forces. A START agreement will allow us to adjust how we respond to the requirements of deterrence, but tending to those requirements remains the first priority of our defense strategy.

o As we and our allies adjust our military posture, each should emphasize retaining those roles it is uniquely or better able to fulfill. For the United States, these include nuclear and space forces, advanced technologies, strategic mobility, a worldwide presence, power projection, and a secure mobilization base.

o As a country separated from many of its allies and areas of interest by vast distances, we will ensure we have those forces needed to control critical sea and air lines of communication in crisis and war.

o U.S. technological superiority has long been a powerful contributor to deterrence. To retain this edge, we will sustain our investment in research and development as an important hedge against an uncertain future.

o We remain committed to the doctrine of competitive strategies. l reaffirm the wisdom of exploiting American strengths in a systematic way, moving Soviet investment into areas that threaten us less or negating systems that threaten us most.

o Defense investment faces a dual challenge: to maintain sufficient forces to deter general war while also giving us forces that

are well suited for the more likely contingencies of the Third world. Many defense programs contribute significantly in both environments but, where necessary, we will develop the weaponry and force structure needed for the special demands of the Third World even if it means that some forces are less optimal for a conflict on the European central front.

o As we make fundamental changes in our military forces, we will preserve a capacity for reversibility. This will affect decisions on a variety of issues and may, in the short run, reduce the amount of savings we might otherwise see. But it is a prudent hedge against future uncertainty, which it is my moral and constitutional duty to provide.

Deterring Nuclear War

Strategic Offensive Forces. The Soviet Union continues to modernize its strategic forces across the board. Even as START promises to reduce numbers substantially, the qualitative competition has not ended. Decisions on strategic modernization that I have already made take advantage of the most promising technologies in each leg of our Triad to increase stability. The B-2 bomber will ensure our ability to penetrate Soviet defenses and fulfill the role the bomber force has played so successfully for forty years. The D-5 missile in Trident submarines will exploit the traditionally high survivability of this leg and add a significant ability to attack more hardened targets. In a two-phase program for our ICBM force, the deployment of the Rail Garrison System will enhance stability by removing Peacekeeper missiles from vulnerable silos and providing the mobile capability we need for the near term. In the second phase, deployment of the small ICBM road-mobile system will further strengthen stability and increase force flexibility.

While we will ensure that each leg of the Triad is as survivable as possible, the existence of all three precludes the destruction of more than one by surprise attack and guards against a technological surprise that could undermine a single leg.

Strategic Defenses. Flexible response and deterrence through the threat of retaliation have preserved the security of the United States and its allies for decades. Looking to the future, the Strategic Defense Initiative offers an opportunity to shift deterrence to a safer and more stable basis through greater reliance on strategic defenses. In a new international environment, as ballistic-missile capabilities proliferate, defense against third-country threats also becomes an increasingly important benefit.

The deterrent value of strategic defenses derives from the effect they would have on an adversary's calculations. Even an initial deployment would influence an attacker's calculation by diminishing his confidence in his ability to execute an effective attack. Initial strategic defenses would also offer the United States and its allies some

protection should deterrence fail or in the event of an accidental launch. Follow-on deployments incorporating more advanced technologies could provide progressively more capable defenses, even in the face of countermeasures.

We continue to seek with the Soviet Union a cooperative transition to deployed defenses and reductions in strategic offensive arms. Strategic defenses can protect our security against possible violations of agreements to reduce strategic offensive weapons.

The Soviets have stated that they are no longer making completion and implementation of a START treaty contingent on a Defense and Space Agreement restricting SDI. A START Treaty should stand on its own merits and we will preserve our right to conduct SDI activities consistent with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and our option to deploy SDI when it is ready. And we will use the Defense and Space Talks to explore a cooperative and stable transition to a greater reliance on stability-enhancing, cost-effective strategic defenses.

Theater Nuclear Forces. The Atlantic Alliance has consistently followed the principle of maintaining survivable and credible theater nuclear forces to ensure a robust deterrent, to execute its agreed strategy of flexible response-and to "couple" European defense to the strategic nuclear guarantee of the United States. At the same time, we have always pursued a nuclear force that is as small as is consistent with its tasks and objectives. Indeed, NATO has unilaterally reduced its theater nuclear weapons by over one-third during the past decade-over and above the entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons eliminated by the INF Treaty. As requirements change, we will continue to ensure that our posture provides survivability and credibility at the lowest possible levels. The United States believes that for the foreseeable future, even in a new environment of reduced conventional forces and changes in Eastern Europe, we will need to retain modern nuclear forces in-theater.

Command, Control and Communications. Another basic element of deterrence is the security of our command and control, enhancing the certainty of retaliation. In addition, we maintain programs to ensure the continuity of constitutional government-another way of convincing a potential attacker that any attempted "decapitating" strike against our political and military leadership will fail.

Deterring Conventional War. It is clear that the United States must retain the full range of conventional military capabilities, appropriately balanced among combat and support elements, U.S.-and forward-based forces, active and reserve components. We must also maintain properly equipped and well trained general purpose and special operations forces. Within these requirements, as we look to the future, we see our active forces being smaller, more global in their orientation, and having a degree of agility, readiness and sustainability appropriate to the demands of likely conflicts.

Forward Defense through Forward Presence. American leadership in the postwar world and our commitment to the forward defense of our interests and those of our allies have been underwritten by the forward presence of U.S. military forces. We have exerted this presence through forces permanently stationed abroad; through a network of bases, facilities, and logistics arrangements; and through the operational presence provided by periodic patrols, exercises, and visits of U.S. military units. Clearly, the mix of these elements will change as our perception of the threat changes, as technology improves the capabilities and reach of our military forces, and as allies assume greater responsibilities in our common efforts. But our forward presence will remain a critical part of our defense posture for the foreseeable future. Our overseas bases serve as an integral part of our alliances and foster cooperation against common threats. There is no better assurance of a U.S. security commitment than the presence of U.S. forces.

There are growing pressures for change in our global deployments, however. Some are caused by concerns at home over an inequitable sharing of the defense burden, and others in host, countries emanate from nationalism, anti-nuclear sentiment, environmental and social concerns and honestly divergent interests. Operational restrictions on our forces overseas are also increasing, some of which we can accommodate with new training and technologies, but others of which may eventually reduce the readiness of our deployed units.

In Europe, the overall level and specific contribution of U.S. forces are not etched in stone, but we will maintain forces in Europe-ground, sea and air, conventional and nuclear-for as long as they are needed and wanted, as I have pledged. Our forces in Europe contribute in many ways to stability and security. They are not tied exclusively to the size of the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe, but to the overall Alliance response to the needs of security. For the foreseeable future, we believe a level of 195,000 U.S. troops in Central Europe is appropriate for maintaining stability after a CFE reduction.

We also recognize that the presence of our forces creates burdens that are part of the overall sharing of effort within the Alliance. Consistent with the demands of readiness, we will work to adjust our training and other activities to ease the burden they impose.

Outside of Europe, we will maintain the ability to respond to regional crises, to support our commitments, and to pursue our security interests. Within that policy, adjustments in our overseas presence will be made. Yet-- even as the total number of U.S. forward-deployed forces is reduced--we will work to preserve a U.S. presence where needed. And, where appropriate, we will work to ensure continued access to facilities that will permit a prompt return of U.S. forces should they be required. As we negotiate for the use of overseas bases, we will also proceed from the realistic premise that no base is irreplaceable. While some are preferred more than others, each makes a limited contribution to our

strategy.

Sharing the Responsibilities of Collective Defense. The success of our postwar strategy has enabled allied and friendly nations' economies and societies to flourish. We now look to them to assume a greater share in providing for our common security. Our efforts in this regard will be integrated with our plans for future force structure, weapons modernization, and arms control. Above all, they must not be-nor be perceived to be-a cover for "burden shedding".

Our deliberations will be less about different ways to calculate defense burdens and more about increasing overall capabilities. One promising approach is a greater commitment so national specialization, an improved intra-alliance division of labor based on the comparative advantages of different allies in different defense activities. Such an approach could reduce the impact of budget constraints being felt by us all. Significant adjustments in missions and national force structures may be possible as part of major negotiated force reductions, such as those envisioned by CFE. The overall destruction of equipment and the possibility of "cascading" newer items from one Alliance member to another (while destroying older, less capable models) may give us opportunities for greater efficiencies and new forms of Alliance cooperation. These are complex issues, however, and any steps will have to be sensitive to issues of national sovereignty and based on an Alliance-wide consensus.

As a part of burdensharing, the United States will continue to ask our economically stronger allies to increase aid to other Alliance members and to friendly Third World countries. As another element of burdensharing, the United States will work with allies to broaden the regional role of our forward-deployed forces. This will help us deal with the challenge of maintaining sufficient forces for local defense and the forces for likely contingencies elsewhere-a challenge that will grow as defense resources become more constrained. In support of this objective, we will make forward-deployed forces more mobile and flexible so they can assume broader regional responsibilities in addition to deterring attack in the country in which they are located.

Forces for the Third World. Since World War II, the threat posed by the Soviet Union has dominated much of our planning for the Third World. But we have also worked to preserve peace and build democracy and we have
long identified specific interests independent of a Soviet factor. In the future, we expect that non-Soviet threats to these interests will command even greater attention.

To the degree possible, we will support allied and friendly efforts rather than introduce U.S. forces. Nonetheless, we must retain the capability to act either in concert with our allies or, if necessary, unilaterally where our vital interests are threatened.

The growing technological sophistication of Third World conflicts will place serious demands on our forces. They must be able to respond quickly, and appropriately, as the application of even small amounts of power early in a crisis usually pays significant dividends. Some actions may require considerable staying power, but there are likely to be situations where American forces will have to succeed rapidly and with a minimum of casualties. Forces will have to accommodate to the austere environment, immature basing structure, and significant ranges often encountered in the Third World. The logistics "tail" of deployed forces will also have to be kept to a minimum, as an overly large American presence could be self-defeating. These capabilities will sometimes be different from those of a force optimized for a conflict in Europe, and-as our understanding of the threat there evolves-we will make the necessary adjustments.

We will also try to involve other industrial democracies in preventing and resolving Third World conflicts. Some of our Atlantic allies have strong political, economic, cultural, and military ties with Third World countries, and Japan provides considerable sums of aid. Their role will become even more important in the future.

The Mobilization Base. The United States has never maintained active forces in peacetime adequate for all the possible contingencies we could face in war. We have instead relied on reserve forces and on a pool of manpower and industrial strength that we could mobilize to deal with emergencies beyond the capabilities of our active units.

For almost two decades, our Total Force policy has placed a significant portion of our total military power in a well-equipped, well-trained, and early-mobilizing reserve component. Various elements of that policy-the balance between active and reserve forces, the mix of units in the two components, the nature of missions given reserve forces-are likely to be adjusted as we respond to changes in the security environment. Reserve forces are generally less expensive to maintain than their active counterparts so, as we adjust force structures, retaining reserve units is one alternative for reducing costs while still hedging against uncertainties. It is an alternative we must thoroughly explore, especially as we better understand the amount of warning time we can expect for a major conflict.

A credible industrial mobilization capability contributes to deterrence and alliance solidarity by demonstrating to adversaries and friends alike that we are able to meet our commitments. While important progress has been made in recent years, more can be done to preserve our ability to produce the weapons and equipment we need. Mobilization plans will also have to reflect our changing understanding of warning for a global war and develop graduated responses that will themselves signal U.S. resolve and thus contribute to deterrence.

Chemical Warfare. Our primary goal is to achieve an effective, truly

global ban on chemical weapons as soon as possible. Until such a ban is achieved, the United States will retain a small but effective chemical weapons stockpile to deter the use of chemical weapons against us and our allies. We will also continue our initiatives to protect our forces from chemical agents that could be used against them and to minimize the impact of being forced to operate in a chemical environment.

We will never use chemical weapons first, but only in retaliation for their use against us. For as long as we retain a chemical weapons deterrent, we will ensure that it is as safe and effective as possible.

Space. The United States remains committed to the exploration and use of space for peaceful purposes and the benefit of all mankind, but international law and this commitment allow for activities to protect our national security. Our objectives for space mirror those which we have long held for the sea-to ensure free access for all in time of peace, but to be able to deny access to our enemies in time of war.

Our space activities will help deter and, if necessary, defend against enemy attack. We will maintain assured access to space and negate, if necessary, hostile space systems. We will develop, acquire, and deploy systems for communications, navigation, environmental monitoring, early warning, surveillance, and treaty verification.

We will also pursue scientific, technological, and economic benefit-including encouraging private sector investment. We will promote international cooperative activities and work with others to maintain freedom in space.

We remain dedicated to expanding human presence and activity beyond earth orbit and into the solar system. In July I committed the United States to return to the moon, this time to stay, and continue with a journey to Mars. The first step in this bold program to strengthen our position of space leadership will be completion of Space Station Freedom in the 1990s.

I chartered the National Space Council, chaired by Vice President Quayle, to develop national space policy, advise me on space matters, and ensure that policy guidance is carried out. I have also asked the Vice President, as Chairman of the Council, to assess the feasibility of international cooperation in human exploration. Equally important, I announced our commitment to use space to address critical environmental problems on earth. The new Mission to Planet Earth program, a major part of a comprehensive research effort, will use space platforms to gather the data we need to determine what changes are taking place in the global environment:

The National Space Council also provides a high-level focus for commercial space issues. Consistent with national security and safety, an expanding private sector role in space can generate economic benefits for

the nation.

Low-Intensity Conflict. Even as the threat of East-West conflict may be diminishing in a new era, lower-order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking are menacing the United States, its citizenry, and its interests in new ways.

Low-intensity conflict involves the struggle of competing principles and ideologies below the level of conventional war. Poverty and the lack of political freedoms contribute to the instability that breeds such conflict. Our response must address these underlying conditions-but we cannot accept violence against our interests, or even less against innocent civilians, as a legitimate instrument of anyone's policy. Nor can the ideals of democracy, freedom, or economic progress be nurtured except in an environment of security.

It is the primary responsibility of friendly nations to protect their own interests. Our security assistance programs are a crucial tool with which we can help them help themselves. In some cases, security assistance ought to assume the same priority as resources devoted to our own forces.

It is not possible to prevent or deter conflict at the lower end of the conflict spectrum in the same way or to the same degree as at the higher. American forces therefore must be capable of dealing effectively with the full range of threats, including insurgency and terrorism. Special Operations Forces have particular utility in this environment, but we will also pursue new and imaginative ways to apply flexible general purpose forces to these problems. We will improve the foreign language skills and cultural orientation of our armed forces and adjust our intelligence activities to better serve our needs. Units with unique capabilities in this environment will receive increased emphasis. Training and research and development will be better attuned to the needs of low-intensity conflict.

Drug Trafficking. The Department of Defense, as noted earlier, has an important role to play in our National Drug Control Strategy in coordination with the Department of State and law enforcement agencies.

The first line of defense against the illegal flow of drugs is at the source- in those countries where illicit drugs are produced and processed before being sent to the United States and other countries. Our policy is to strengthen the political will and institutional capability of host-country military, judicial, and law enforcement agencies. Training and material assistance help improve tactical intelligence and the ability to conduct airmobile and riverine operations. Security assistance also provides host countries with the resources needed to confront the insurgency threats that often are endemic to narcotics-producing regions.

A second line of defense involves the deployment of appropriate elements of the U.S. Armed Forces with the primary role of detecting and monitoring the transportation of drugs to the U.S. border. The Secretary of Defense has directed several regional commanders to support these objectives with their own programs and operations. As a high priority, our military counter-narcotics deployments will focus on the flow of drugs, especially cocaine, across the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico toward the southern border of the United States. These deployments will support U.S. law enforcement agencies in their efforts to apprehend traffickers and seize drug shipments.

Our military and foreign intelligence activities must be coordinated with our own and host-country law enforcement agencies to identify air and maritime smuggling vessels as well as the networks that facilitate and manage illicit drug trafficking. This cooperation and coordination must be extended to the operational level to ensure timely and effective interdiction.

Current efforts are already bearing fruit. Our assistance to the Colombian government has aided its courageous campaign to strike back at the drug lords and to reestablish national sovereignty and the rule of law. The cocaine industry in the Andean region has been disrupted, and sustained pressure and cooperation will erode the strength of the drug trafficking organizations. The United States is committed to such a sustained international effort.

Intelligence Programs. The extraordinary changes taking place in the world are posing an almost unprecedented challenge to our intelligence assets and programs.

The changes in East-West relations point to a more peaceful future. But--after four decades of confrontation-achieving mutual trust will be a difficult task of confidence-building and verification. A time of transition can also be a time of turbulence. It will be critical that we be well informed of events and intentions in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere.

In a new period, intelligence must also focus on new issues. Within the Communist world, for example, economic questions take on new importance. As economic forces are the impetus for many of the military and political changes taking place there, economic change can be a valuable gauge of how much real change is occurring. The extent to which Soviet leaders actually shift resources from military to civilian uses, for example, will be an important strategic indicator.

In contrast to the hopeful trends in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, there are danger signs elsewhere-as this Report has noted. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and other military technologies raises the risks of conflict and crisis. Regional conflicts continue to fester. U.S. intelligence must monitor such developments and provide

policy makers with the information needed to protect American interests.

The twin scourges of international terrorism and narcotics trafficking also pose very high-priority, but non-traditional, intelligence requirements. We will also have to adapt to a new emphasis on broader global economic and trade issues. We must be more fully aware of such subjects as foreign trade policies, economic trends, and foreign debt.

U.S. counterintelligence must be responsive to a changing hostile intelligence threat. Historically, foreign governments-and to some extent foreign businesses-have tried to obtain our secrets and technologies. Hostile intelligence efforts are not likely to decrease in the near term, and they may actually increase as barriers to contact come down.

U.S. intelligence must still be the "alarm bell" to give us early warning of new developments and new dangers even as requirements grow in
number and complexity. Our intelligence capabilities must be ready to meet new challenges, to adapt as necessary, and to support U.S. policy in the 1990s.

Planning for the Future. United States military planning in the postwar era has been dominated by the need to deter and be able to defend against overwhelming Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Europe. As this Report has described, this heretofore dominant reality is undergoing significant change, both through Soviet and other Warsaw Pact unilateral reductions and through negotiated agreements. This prospect is clearly affecting our military planning.

Such planning need not and cannot await the entry into force of arms reduction treaties. We will not act merely on the promise of change in Warsaw Pact forces, but neither will we delay developing our responses to those changes until their implementation is upon us. We will continually review important issues like the future demands of nuclear deterrence, the proper role and mix of our general purpose forces, and an improved and more effective security assistance program.

A Public Trust

o o o o

Congress and the American People. Under our Constitution, responsibility for national defense is shared between the executive and legislative branches of our federal government. The President, for example, is commander-in-chief, while Congress has the power to raise and support armies and declare war. This system of shared and separated powers is well designed to guard against abuses of power, but it works best in the demanding environment of national security affairs only if there is a spirit of cooperation between the two branches and, indeed, a strong

measure of national and bipartisan consensus on basic policy.

I am proud of the successful examples of bipartisan cooperation in the past year-on Central America, on aid to Eastern Europe, on Panama, to name a few. Yet other issues remain contentious, such as various attempts to constrict Presidential discretion and authority in fields ranging from covert actions to the excessive earmarking of assistance funds. If we are to make a successful transition to a new era, we need to work together.

We are now in an era of rapidly changing strategic conditions, new openings for peace, continuing uncertainties, and new varieties of danger. We thus face new opportunities and new problems, both of which demand of us special qualities of leadership-boldness, vision, and constancy. It is my responsibility to meet that challenge, and I am prepared to meet it in a spirit of close cooperation and consultation with Congress. I believe there is a national consensus in support of a strong foreign and defense policy--perhaps broader and deeper than at any time in 25 years. Congress and the President need, more than ever, to reflect that unity in their own
cooperation. We owe the American people no less.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 1.B.6

* * *

Excerpts from "Assessing the Military Threats of the 1990's"

Sam Nunn

Not available at this time

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 1.C.1

* * *

Force Planning for the 1990s

Richmond M. Lloyd

> The most difficult military problem to resolve is that of establishing a security system, as inexpensively as possible in time of peace, capable of transforming itself very rapidly into a powerful force in case of the danger of aggression.
>
> General Andre Beaufre {1}

Introduction

For the last forty years, the United States and its allies maintained a strong peacetime defense posture principally focused on containing the expansionist threat of the Soviet Union. With remarkable constancy of purpose, the Western alliances brought to bear the totality of their economic, political, and military power. America's demonstrated leadership in rebuilding its military strength during the last decade, enabled the West to directly challenge the inherent weaknesses of the Soviet empire. With the Warsaw Pact a fading historic relic, the challenge for the United States is to articulate a revised model of Western security that reflects the evolving international security environment and the economic realities of the future.

The United States is in the process of reassessing its national priorities and the fundamental elements of its national strategy. It is important for us to take advantage of this moment in time, but to do so well, requires quality and clarity in our force planning decisions. Lack of a clear set of objectives and a focused, robust national strategy will lead to the United States reacting to, rather than controlling, the events of the world which are in its interests. Today's force planning decisions will fundamentally influence our national strategy and force posture well into the next century. To avoid the consequences of force planning errors, it is useful to revisit the basics of force planning in their fullest dimensions. {2}

Making the best force choices in a free society is a difficult and lengthy process. The force planner must consider numerous international and domestic factors, including political, military and economic influences. The sheer number of ideas, concepts, opinions and differing points of view can be confusing, especially if you do not have a useful framework for organizing key factors. Because planning involves a prediction of the future, there is considerable uncertainty and much room for disagreement about how forces should be structured, organized, and equipped. Unfortunately, there rarely is a single right answer. Equally

valid arguments are often made for widely different choices, each depending on the objectives sought and the assumptions made about enemy intentions, technological advances, and future political and economic conditions. This tendency is exacerbated by various advocates who focus on the single factor most important to them, such as the threat or budget, without a balanced attempt at exploring the full dimensions of the problem. A framework helps the force planner to ask the right questions and to seek the best solutions through a comprehensive treatment of all the important factors.

While recognizing that organizational interests, bureaucratic behavior, and politics play significant roles in the final selection of defense forces, this article presents a rational framework for the formulation of national security requirements and the evaluation of alternative force choices. This article does not describe the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), which is the organizational process used to select future forces and update the Six Year Defense Program (SYDP). Its details change with every new administration. Nor is the weapons acquisition process reviewed which is used to procure and field the selected forces in an effective and efficient manner. Rather, the framework is intended to highlight the major factors that should be considered within these processes. This framework therefore represents a compromise between the complexity of reality and simplicity to aid in understanding. It attempts to identify the most essential elements in force planning and their dominant relationships. These elements and relationships are illustrated in Figure 1.{3}

The framework takes a top-down approach by starting with national interests and objectives and proceeds down to the detailed assessments that are made to assist decisionmakers in the selection of forces. The explanation of terms included within this framework provides a basis for common understanding and assists in sorting the essential force planning concepts from the many peripheral arguments that all too often become the center of discussion.

The purpose of presenting this framework is to provide a tool for understanding the fundamental concepts of force planning. It provides an approach for organizing your thinking as you go about the task of planning future military forces. Taken in that light, it can be: (1) a guide to developing alternative strategies and future forces; (2) an aid to evaluating the arguments of military strategists or force planners; and (3) a starting point for developing alternative approaches to structuring major force planning decisions. {4}

Figure 2

DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS



Step 3: Formulate Strategy

FIGURE 1

Scope

Force planning can be defined as the process of establishing military requirements based on an appraisal of the security needs of the nation, and selecting military forces to meet those requirements within fiscal limitations. These requirements are sometimes divided into broad defense planning cases such as strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, major conventional and contingency categories. Alternatively, one can take a regional focus aligned with that of each of the major unified commanders, who are responsible for developing plans to deal with the full spectrum of potential threats within their areas of responsibility. The individual military Services are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the forces provided to the unified commanders. Thus, Service-oriented and mission area categories are also used. In any case, the scope of military force planning is so large that it is generally treated in manageable components. But, once these have been dealt with, it is always imperative that the planner returns to view the whole. A comprehensive joint/combined perspective is necessary to ensure that Service-specific force structuring decisions are considered in a national (joint) and allied (combined) context. In an attempt to establish the general underpinnings for all force-related issues, this article sacrifices some degree of exactness in the choice of terminology and completeness in the

treatment of examples.

Throughout this paper two main themes underlie the discussion of force planning concepts: (1) the allocation of scarce resources, and (2) the relationship among ends, means and risks. There will never be enough resources to satisfy all the nation's wants. Thus, we must establish requirements, set priorities, make decisions, and allocate scarce resources to the most critical needs.

To obtain the most from our limited national resources (means), we must determine where we want to go (objectives), and how we plan to get there (strategy). The importance of these intuitively obvious ideas sometimes gets lost in the process of making detailed assessments and specific weapon system decisions. It may be necessary-to adjust our security objectives (ends) to fit within the bounds of our nation's economic, political, and military power (means). A mismatch between these two force planning elements poses some danger (risk) to our overall security interests.

For purposes of discussion, the force planning framework is divided into two sections: strategic choices and Joyce choices. Strategic choices involve the identification of national interests, national objectives, the national strategy, and a supporting national military strategy. Force choices involve an assessment of the national military strategy, available forces, and the threat, in order to identify deficiencies that result when specific fiscal constraints are applied to the acquisition of defense forces. Each of these two basic choices has a major feedback loop that is depicted by the heavy lines in Figure 1. These lines indicate the iterative nature of the force planning process. Assessments play an impOrtant role in force planning, as this is where strategic and force choices come together. Other feedback loops and other relationships between elements are evident in practice, but are omitted,for simplicity.

Strategic Choices

The basic perspectives, choices, assumptions, and constraints, that are introduced during the formulation of national interests, objectives and strategy establish the course of successive decisions. Thus, it is essential that these choices be clearly defined prior to the development of force choices. The formulation Of national strategy is perhaps the most difficult because it involves consideration of so many interrelated and complex factors. In meeting our own national objectives, national strategy should consider the interests and objectives of our allies, friends and enemies, constraints imposed upon our human, industrial and material resources, and the technology that we can reasonably expect to have available during the time period of interest. "Thinking strategically" eventually involves the balancing of ends and means. At times it may be necessary to reluctantly change the degree or timing of our national objectives when it becomes painfully obvious that we cannot support the chosen strategy with the means available. Alternatively, our

strategy may be the problem, and by working to improve it, we might easily meet our goals within our means. Lastly, we can take steps as part of our strategy to change means, sometimes viewed as constraints, which is true in the short run. But, a major responsibility of the force planner is to create the future military capability needed to ensure the nation's objectives are met with its desired strategy.

National Interests. At the highest level of abstraction, national interests are the "wellspring" from which national objectives and a grand strategy flow. National interests are the most important wants and needs of a nation. {5}

The overriding national interests are normally stated in terms of national survival and well-being. Preservation of our territorial integrity, freedom, independence, political institutions and honor are fundamental to our survival as a nation. Maintenance of the economic well-being and overall quality of life of the American people are also important national interests. Another national interest is the survival of our allies. We are a nation whose national survival is inextricably linked to that of our allies by historic, political, economic and cultural ties. President Bush in his National Security Strategy of the United States summarizes our national interests as:

> The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
>
> A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and abroad. .
>
> A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions. . . . [and]
>
> Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations. {6}

Neuchterlein suggests that national interests can be viewed in terms of four broad categories: (1) defense of the homeland; (2) economic well-being; (3) favorable world order; and (4) promotion of values. He further suggests that the intensity of the nation's interest in some issue can be scaled from high to low as: (1) survival, (2) vital, (3) major, and (4) peripheral. {7} The threat of a possible nuclear attack on the United States by the Soviet Union has always been treated as a survival interest. A vital interest means it is so important that the nation is willing to use military force to guarantee it, although force may not be necessary if other available means are more appropriate and effective.

In his 1980 State of the Union address, President Carter indicated that free world access to foreign oil was a vital interest of the United

States. Such judgments have important influences on force planning. Throughout the 1980s, a Southwest Asian focus was used, among others, to determine the level and mix of future power projection capabilities, and a major new unified command was established, the Central Command. {8} It
is important that the nation think very hard about why something is or is not vital, and periodically review such declarations. John Lehman, former Secretary of the Navy, cautions us to distinguish between long-term as opposed to short term access to oil:

> Our vital interests are first to ensure the long term access of the United States and its allies to Persian Gulf oil. Second, we must prevent Soviet domination of the gulf. . . . These are the only two vital interests that would justify America's going to war in the area. There are, of course, other very important American Interests . . . they are of a far lesser magnitude than our two vital interests. . . . The fundamental policy issue that must be addressed is the hugely expensive force structure necessary to back up the Carter Doctrine and guarantee security of the gulf {9} [emphasis added]

Force planners must explain why their plans are sound and often this requires them to reflect on which national interests are at stake, and why military force, as opposed to other means, is necessary.
National Objectives. Whereas national interests define the basic, nonnegotiable needs of a nation, national objectives "spell out what a country is trying to do." National objectives are the specific goals that a nation seeks in order to advance, support or defend its national interests. They are generally described in three broad categories-economic, security, and political-although other categories such as social, ideological, or technological are also used. {10}

Examples of political objectives articulated by President Bush are:

o strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights;

o establish a more balanced partnership with our allies and a greater sharing of global leadership and responsibilities.

Several economic objectives of the United States are:

o promote a strong, prosperous, and competitive U.S. economy;

o ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space.

Similarly, our security objectives include:

o deter any aggression that could threaten its security and,

should deterrence fail, repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and allies;

o deal effectively with threats to the security of the United States and its citizens and interests short of armed conflict, including the threat of international terrorism. {11}

These brief examples address the highest level of abstraction and provide only a starting point for the strategist. Detailed objectives must be formulated and prioritized for each region and particular situations in which U.S. interests are involved.

Our major policy objective for the last forty years has been "containment." Our success now provides us with tremendous opportunities, and of course, challenges too. But we need to take action, and this in turn requires us to reassess our fundamental goals. What is our vision for the world of the future? Gaddis, in discussing the problems of "Coping With Victory," cautions against our lapsing into the "dog-and-car syndrome," that is "dogs spend a great deal of time chasing cars but very little time thinking about what they would actually do with a car if they were ever to catch one." {12}

National Strategy. Strategy is a word that is often used but little understood. It has taken on so many meanings in different publications that it is important to set the context for its use here.
Beaufre has defined strategy as "The art of applying force so that it makes the most effective contribution toward achieving the ends set by political policy." {13} He goes on to state:

> The aim of strategy is to fulfill the objective laid down by policy, making the best use of the resources available. . . . The art of strategy consists in choosing the most suitable means from those available and so orchestrating their results that they combine to produce a psychological pressure sufficient to achieve the moral effect required. {14}

Collins states that:

> National strategy fuses all the powers of a nation, during peace as well as war, to attain national interests and objectives. Within that context, there is an overall political strategy, which addresses both international and internal issues; an economic strategy, both foreign and domestic; a national military strategy; and so on. Each component influences national security immediately or tangentially. {15}

National strategy, as used in this article, refers to the overall approach or master plan for accomplishing our national objectives through a combination of political, economic, military, diplomatic or psychological means. {16} These tools are the basic instruments of our

national power. Our strategic choices indicate how we choose to employ these instruments in the pursuit of our national objectives. These strategic choices, and the assumptions we make about them, provide guidance and establish limits on lower level decisions. The framework explicitly shows the national military strategy flowing from and in support of the national strategy. This same relationship holds for the political and economic elements of the national strategy, but such detail is omitted to allow further treatment of force planning. Thus, in the top-down force planning approach suggested by this framework, the national strategy that is initially selected sets the bounds in which successive force choice decisions are made.

National Military Strategy. The national military strategy flows from our objectives and overall national strategy. A primary U.S. security objective is "to deter any aggression" and "should deterrence fail, repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and allies." Thus, an enduring fundamental element of our national military strategy has been the concept of deterrence. Deterrence requires that any nation that might threaten us perceives that we have the capabilities and the will to defend against aggression. Similarly, the nation must be prepared to deal with the failure of deterrence, which in itself contributes to deterrence.

President Bush states the following concerning the national military strategy:

> One reason for the success of America's grand strategy of containment has been its consistency. The military component of that
>
> strategy has been adjusted to changing threats and available military technology, but there too substantial continuity remains:
>
> o Deterrence: Throughout the postwar period we have deterred aggression and coercion against the United States and its allies by persuading potential adversaries that the costs of aggression, either nuclear or conventional, would exceed any possible gain. .
>
> o Strong Alliances: Shared values and common security interests form the basis of our system of collective security. .
>
> o Forward Defense: In the postwar era, the defense of these shared values and common interests has required the forward presence of significant American military forces in Europe, in Asia and the Pacific, and at sea. .
>
> o Force Projection: Because we have global security interests, we have maintained ready forces in the United States and the means to move them to reinforce our units forward deployed or to project power . . . {17}

The significantly changed security environment of the 1990s requires that all elements of the national military strategy be reviewed. Some will remain relatively firm, such as those elements designed to deter nuclear war, especially since the Soviet Union will not likely give up its nuclear superpower status. But, other elements will change, and some dramatically. For example, NATO's strategy of forward defense at the inter-German border now is meaningless as the two Germanies reunite and the Warsaw Pact ceases to be a viable military alliance. However, the general concept of forward defense as opposed to only defense of the continental U.S. still remains an extremely important element of our national military strategy. But, the manner and degree to which "Forward Defense through Forward Presence" {18} is achieved will change.

To help in such a review, it is sometimes useful to view the elements of a strategy as fundamental choices concerning alternative courses of action. These elements or "descriptors" {19} outline how we intend to use our military means to achieve our ends. Some of these fundamental choices are: a coalition strategy vs. a go-it-alone strategy; deterrence vs. warfighting; forward deployed vs. strategic U.S. reserve; globally flexible vs. regionally tailored; and active vs. reserve. The degree to which the national military strategy shifts along these and other dimensions will greatly influence the types of forces required. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides an indication of the nature of such shifts when speaking about nuclear and conventional strategies:

> The US nuclear strategy must remain one of deterrence. . .
>
> The US Strategy of forward defense will continue to feature forward presence composed of forward-based forces and deployments. This forward presence will include fewer permanently forward-based forces and more periodic deployments. .
>
> Allies must accept greater responsibility for day-to-day deterrence and initial defense while the United States turns toward reinforcement capabilities and the contribution of unique capabilities, such as strategic deterrence . . . and forces for power projection.
>
> Likewise, US strategy will provide for rapidly executable contingency operations for responding to unpredictable regional events. {20}

Force Choices

Once overall national strategy and national military strategy are determined, it is possible to assess our ability to carry out our strategy given the availability of forces and the projected enemy threat. These assessments take various forms, from detailed analytical treatments of opposing forces to a seasoned judgment that intuitively integrates the nonquantifiable factors of war. But whatever the form, any force

assessment should somehow include the essential elements of objectives, strategy, threat, available forces, and risk. The fundamental standard is simply:

> Do the military forces support the strategy such that national objectives are achieved, at acceptable risk, in face of the threat?

Deficiencies identified by this overall assessment are often described in terms of military risks. These risks may be reduced by judicious selection from among alternative forces. Final decisions about which forces to include in the next Six Year Defense Program are conditioned by fiscal and program guidance that should be consistent with overall national objectives and strategy. These decisions may lead to an emphasis on improved readiness at the expense of weapon modernization, or on general purpose forces instead of additional strategic nuclear forces. These choices are largely governed by an assessment of the risk assumed by not investing in foregone opportunities.

The entire force choice process should be dynamic in order to adapt to changing conditions. Different force planning elements are considered in varying degrees both inside and outside the Defense Department. By design, the entire process must come together at least once a year with the preparation of the Six Year Defense Program. This, however, is not the final word, as Congress will modify choices to reflect its evaluation of the proposed strategy and forces, as well as, the public and political moods of the time. Modifications and supplemental budget changes are also requested by the Services during the year, as necessary to meet unexpected contingencies.

Each of the force choice elements is considered in more detail in the following sections.

Threat. A description of the threat is an essential element of any force planning assessment. Threat assessments can be global or regional, immediate or future, nuclear or conventional, and so on, depending on their intended use, and the planner's assumptions. At some point, however, the force planner must consider the full spectrum of conflict ranging from strategic nuclear conflict through major conventional war to regional conflicts, insurgencies, and terrorism. Hartmann suggests a useful organization of the threat description is in terms of capabilities, intentions, and circumstances. {21} Enemy vulnerabilities should be added to this list.

Capabilities refer to the physical ability of a potential enemy to impose its will on other nations. This can be measured by six factors: (1) demographic; (2) geographic; (3) economic; (4) historical-psychological-sociological; (5) organizational-administrative; and (6) military.{22} The military capability of a nation is often described by the number and quality of weapons and armed forces personnel, command and control features, deployment patterns, readiness level,

mobilization ability, etc.

Assessing the capability of military forces is extremely difficult. A simple accounting of the numbers and types of forces is not always available, and the effectiveness of forces is not easily measured. Our arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union have generated intense debate on what to count and how to verify the numbers and effectiveness of weapon systems. For example, the SALT I treaty limited strategic nuclear launchers. Both sides soon proliferated the number of warheads by placing multiple warheads with significantly improved accuracy on their missiles. Eventually, both sides' land-based missiles became increasingly vulnerable to a first strike. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty tried to solve verification problems by eliminating a whole class of weapons within specified ranges, but complete disarmament is not always feasible nor desirable. Throughout the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks, the predecessor to the recent Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks, both sides could never agree on each other's order of battle. In turn, the CFE talks have had to address such fundamental issues as: what is a main battle tank, an armored personnel carrier, and an attack helicopter? And even, when does an armored personnel carrier become a tank?

Information about an adversary's important economic and political factors is often difficult to obtain and even more difficult to interpret. Communist countries traditionally concealed or purposefully distorted basic economic data that is commonly available in Western nations. Economic and political problems were not freely reported in the censored press. Simple questions on the size of the Soviet defense budget and its relative burden on the Soviet economy have been difficult perennial issues. Such budget estimates greatly influenced the United States and her allies to increase their defense spending beginning in the late 1970s. Glasnost and perestroika have now radically changed Western views. Only a few years ago, official estimates were that the Soviet defense burden was about 15-17% of their gross national product. {23} Now many experts believe that defense consumes upwards of 30% of their GNP, mainly because there has been a radical downward revision of the total Soviet GNP. Their GNP was usually estimated to be about one-half that of the United States; now the figure is closer to one-third. {24} In fact, even the Soviets have a hard time making estimates given inadequate statistics and the lack of realistic pricing in a command economy. {25}

Intentions refer to what an enemy plans to do, such as initiating an attack. Knowledge of another's intentions is considerably more vague and uncertain than is knowledge of capabilities. Determination of intentions includes an examination of the enemy's national interests, objectives and strategy. Just as U.S. intentions are difficult to assess, so too are those of the enemy for many of the same reasons. National leaders do not articulate their intentions unambiguously, nor do they act consistently with their stated intentions. Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, the West perceived a high correlation between Soviet capabilities and

intentions. U.S. military officers studied Soviet objectives, doctrine, strategy, and operational concepts, all of which greatly influenced both operational and force planning. The Army's AirLand Battle and the Navy's Maritime Strategy were responses to Soviet capabilities, but were also greatly influenced by perceived intentions. The decade of the 1990s will be much more difficult for the force planner, who will now have to deal with a much more ambiguous threat. {26}

Even when an enemy has the capability to threaten our vital interests, and military action is the best available option, circumstances may prevent him from doing so. Soviet concern over the actions of China weighed heavily in her calculations about the wisdom of attacking NATO, and U.S. interest in furthering relations with China recognized that factor. By the late 1970s, Soviet leaders could have assessed the "correlation of forces" to be very much in their favor. The U.S. economy had performed poorly with high rates of inflation, meager growth,. and a decline in defense investment. The Soviets had significantly increased their strategic nuclear forces and their already considerable conventional superiority was further advanced both in numbers and quality. Communist insurgencies were succeeding throughout the Third World with the U.S. unwilling to act. However, who in the Kremlin would have predicted such a rapid decay of the Soviet empire. It began with a series of old leaders dying in quick succession, which inevitably led to great turmoil. More recently, the Soviet leadership has had to change its overall assessment of the "correlation of forces" as a result of the fall of the Berlin wall, the rapid rejection of the communist system in Eastern Europe, and the elimination of the Warsaw Pact as a viable alliance. These problems were further exacerbated by internal unrest and secessionist movements. Now warning time is expressed in months or years. Because of a rapid change in circumstances, the "correlation of forces" has shifted firmly in favor of the West.

One needs to be cautious, however. Circumstances can also cause a nation with little hope of defeating another nation to launch a military attack. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was motivated by Japan's need to preserve resource supplies and likely U.S. war against Germany. Certainly Japan alone could not have expected to defeat the United States.

Although selected scenarios are important tools in threat analysis they can easily be misused in planning military forces. Optimizing force to the specifics of one scenario will be painfully disappointing if the enemy selects an alternative approach that capitalize on our vulnerabilities. In the 1960s, the United States adopted a NATO scenario that assumed a 23-day warning time for planning purposes. Military planners soon treated this warning time as a rigid fact. {27} By the late 1970s, warning time was reduced to 10-14 days, with even quicker "bolt-out-of-the-blue" attacks considered distinct possibilities. During the Reagan era, the focus of Europe was expanded to a global, world-wide scenario intended to more fully recognize increased Soviet capabilities

and the linkages between theaters. It greatly influenced many force planning decisions, but especially the size and mix of strategic lift. Eventually, this scenario approach also tended to become too fixed. A year before the dramatic events of 1989, The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy recommended that: "We should emphasize a wider range of contingencies than the two extreme threats that have long dominated our alliance policy and force planning: the massive Warsaw Pact attack on Central Europe and an all-out Soviet nuclear attack. {28} Planners are reluctant to leave the certainty of their scenarios, even after times change. Multiple scenarios help somewhat to avoid some of these inherent problems of scenario-based planning.

Extreme positions should be avoided. There is a tendency to assume the worst case by giving the enemy the benefit of the doubt. Military planners tend to be conservative by consistently assigning higher effectiveness to enemy forces. Also, being intimately familiar with the shortcomings and limitations of friendly forces, they tend to undervalue these capabilities. In addition to assessing the capabilities of the enemy, vulnerabilities should also be identified. In this way opportunities to exploit enemy weaknesses are sought in the overall strategy. Offensive measures are identified to supplant reactive and defensive ones that result from a preoccupation with enemy strengths. This type of focus greatly influenced the development of the national military strategy throughout the 1980s. The Maritime Strategy, Air/Land Battle, Follow-On-Forces Attack, and Competitive Strategies {29} were manifestations of this type of thinking.

Available Forces. Another major input to the continuing assessment process is a description of the military forces that would be available to engage in future conflicts. These forces include: (1) existing forces (active and reserve) minus those that are scheduled for retirement; (2) forces programmed to become operational during the time of interest; and (3) force contributions that can be expected from our allies in specific situations.

Existing forces provide a convenient baseline to which additions and deletions are made. Given the extended life and long procurement leadtimes for many weapon systems, existing forces inevitably form a major part of the force structure far into the future. Force modernization choices are most often made "on the margin" as our force structure is not built from the ground up each year. Thus, although national security objectives and military strategy should determine our selection of forces, it is also true that existing forces largely determine today's strategy and our ability to meet today's contingencies.

Naval vessels in particular highlight these realities. Early in the Reagan buildup it was decided to increase the size of the Navy, and yet it was not until FY 1986 that the first Reagan ship was delivered. {30} The aircraft carrier George Washington joins the fleet in 1991, 8 years

after the procurement decision was made in FY 1983, and is expected to be in the fleet at least until the year 2035, and possibly longer. {31} It is interesting to reflect on what the world situation will be like in 2020, when the George Washington reaches middle age, and to imagine bow it will contribute to our security requirements then. What naval strategy will guide the use of carrier assets 30 or more years from now? Interestingly, the aircraft carrier Midway was still in operation in 1990, and home-ported in Japan, the very country it was designed to defeat 45 years earlier.

Existing operational forces have another effect on our ability to meet the threat. The cost of manning, operating and maintaining them comes at the expense of force modernization. Ownership costs are quite large, and thus, the force planner must choose between current readiness, the ability to sustain current forces in combat, modernization of forces, and changes in the overall force structure. Operational planners tend to emphasize readiness and sustainability, as they face fighting with today's existing forces. Force planners are attempting to create future forces better capable of supporting the nation's strategy and objectives, and therefore they tend to focus on modernization and force structure issues. Both perspectives are important, and the best force planner strikes a balance between operating existing forces and procuring future capability.

The expected contributions of our allies are critically important to how we allocate our limited resources. A key element of U.S. strategy is that of a coalition or collective defense. This inevitably raises the issues of the division of labor and overall burdensharing. However, these issues are something over which we have less control. Allied capabilities, intentions and circumstances must be taken into account. And we must not forget their sensitivity to specific vulnerabilities. Their national interests and objectives come first, and it is only when those interests and objectives are compatible with our own that we can include allied forces in the accomplishment of our objectives. For example, U.S. military planners have worked closely with our NATO allies in sharing tasks, such as agreements on the use of allied airlift and sealift to support U.S. reinforcement of NATO. However, there is always considerable debate on the availability of assets for other contingencies. What contributions can be expected if Western access to Persian Gulf oil is threatened again?

In counting forces, only those forces that can be expected to be brought to bear in a timely manner should be included. This is an extremely difficult task owing to uncertainty in future manpower and budget levels, allied interests, state of force readiness, deployment, and duration of the conflict. As with each step of the force planning process, assumptions must be made in order to deal with these uncertainties in making the necessary adjustments.

Assessment. Force planning assessments comprise a complex series of analyses that evaluate the capabilities of U.S. and allied forces to

support the national strategy when opposed by the expected threat. The results of these assessments are the identification of deficiencies in available forces and an indication of risks to interests inherent in current programs. These assessment exercises serve as a basis for formulating changes to the programmed forces. This appraisal process leads to the decisions that eventually reallocate funds among various Service programs within fiscal guidelines. Deficiencies are corrected by making changes in the various weapon procurement, manpower, operations and maintenance, research and development, and other supporting programs. The revised programs are then used as the basis for future force posture. {32}

In making these assessments, defense planners must consider what we want to do (objective), how we plan to do it (strategy), what we are up against (threat), and what is available to do it (forces). Both qualitative and quantitative assessments are useful in comparing opposing forces and strategies. Qualitative factors include such things as leadership, doctrine, training, morale, logistics, intelligence, technology and initiative. Quantitative factors include order of battle, firepower, mobility, survivability, accuracy, range, weapons effects and a host of other measurable quantities.

In the analysis of quantitative factors, use is made of counting, modeling and gaming. Counting the type and numbers of opposing forces has
limited use, but it is a necessary first step. Both static counts and dynamic attrition methods are used. Questions naturally arise concerning: whose forces should be counted; which of their forces should be counted; when are the forces generated; whether comparisons should be symmetrical (like forces) or asymmetrical (opposing forces); how can double counting be avoided; how are organizational aspects accounted for; how are firepower and mobility differences treated; and how are variations of strategy dealt with? Various techniques and assumptions have been developed to deal with some of these issues, each with strengths and weaknesses to which the force planner must be sensitive. {33}

Models of combat situations are used to determine the ability of military forces to carry out specific missions. The effectiveness of individual weapons and tactics is explored for situations ranging from one-on-one to many-on-many. The analytical model allows the analyst to extend the results of investigations to complex interactions among many systems. In effect, models reduce the extremely complex nature of combat to a relatively simple mathematical form. While this can significantly enhance one's understanding of the cause-effect relationships involved, it can also mask the true complexity and uncertainty that will always exist in the reality of war. The validity and reliability of models should be the force planner's key concern. Too often their results are used without full appreciation of their serious limitations. Used with caution, however, analytical models are indispensable aids to assessing military capabilities.

War gaming is a systematic method for studying military problems that introduces the human decision element into an assessment. A dictionary definition of a war game is "a simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving two or more opposing forces, conducted using rules, data and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real life situation." {34} Simulated warfare provides a means of gaining experience, identifying errors or shortcomings, discovering new ideas and opportunities to exploit, and improving skills without paying the penalties of real war. War games provide valuable insight into the capabilities and employment of planned forces.

As a part of war games, political-military simulations can establish the feasibility of various strategies and test the outcome of particular scenarios. The effectiveness of postulated strategies, campaign plans, and forces can be evaluated in this dynamic setting that incorporates the elements of maneuver, chance and human limitations.

During the 1980s, all Services intensified the use of war games in response to the need to improve plans and skills. For example, the Global War Game series held at the Naval War College, was used to explore various elements of the national military strategy. The major benefits of such endeavors derive from the human element. Bringing together diverse skills and perspectives helps test ideas, stimulate thought, and ultimately enhance plans. {35}

Of course, all forms of war games have their limitations. Each play of a game is only one of many possible sequences of events and decisions. Individuals who reject models can naively embrace game results. Caught up in the drama of the event, they may not appreciate that behind-the-scene umpires frequently use many models to assess game outcomes. The old adage, "garbage-in, garbage-out," applies when a game suffers from poor assumptions, faulty data, invalid models, and unskilled players or umpires. The fact that a game is silent on an issue does not mean it is not important; it may just mean no one played that issue. And the fact that both friendly and enemy forces are played by one side should also give pause before conclusions are drawn. Therefore, one needs to know the objectives and limits of the game, and not use its results for unintended purposes.

War games only simulate the employment of forces. In contrast, military exercises involve "the operation of actual military forces in a simulated hostile environment." Exercises can serve many purposes though usually they are intended to "train and evaluate performance." Naturally, exercises are expensive, but they also are indispensable to maintaining the skills and readiness of military forces. And, they can provide very useful insights to the force planner. {36}

Throughout the assessment process there is always the danger that the limitations of key assumptions and constraints will not be fully appreciated. Subjective judgments are made in the creation and

application of all quantitative assessments. One must not be swayed to equating the validity of the outcome with the precision of the results.

Deficiencies and Risk. Through the qualitative and quantitative assessment of objectives, strategy, forces and threat, deficiencies in our force posture are identified. Insufficient numbers of people or weapons, low combat effectiveness, inadequate logistics elements, lagging technological capabilities, or the inability to move and sustain forces may be identified. The net result of these deficiencies is that risks must be assumed until improvements can be made.

Risk can be broadly described as the difference between desired ends (national security objectives) and what can be achieved with available means (strategy and forces). To choose military forces effectively, risks must be analyzed, assessed and managed.

Risk analysis involves the identification of factors affecting the desired outcome. In particular, the likelihood of failure and the consequence of failure should be addressed if various levels of risks are to be assessed and managed.

Risk assessment should consider the overall implications of any identified deficiencies. How risks arc to be measured and described must be decided. Several alternative measures of risk include the ability to: protect national interests and achieve national security objectives; successfully deter attack on the U.S. and its allies; terminate hostilities on favorable terms; conduct simultaneous operations in multiple theaters; and successfully execute campaign plans to achieve theater strategic objectives. In each case, the meaning of "success" must be defined. Risk assessments highlight areas requiring attention in terms of further force planning actions. To minimize their effect, risks must also be managed. For crucial uncertainties, additional information may be sought to reduce them. Budgets may be raised to lower the overall risk of failure. Limited resources may be reallocated among mission areas, accepting increased risks in some areas in order to reduce the risk in others. At the highest level of planning, a nation may accept higher levels of security risks to achieve other political or social development objectives.

Alternatives and Programmed Forces. The final step in force planning is to select from alternative forces the number, type, and mix of weapon systems and platforms needed to correct deficiencies and minimize risks, keeping in mind balanced force levels and fiscal realism. This selection process occurs each year in the preparation of the Six Year Defense Program. This programmed force is fiscally constrained but hopefully fulfills the most critical aspects of the national military strategy.

The SYDP lists bow the defense budget will be allocated over the next 6 years. Although the SYDP is the end result of a long and involved PPBS process, it should not be regarded as a definitive statement of U.S.

choices of military forces for the future. The analysis and debate, both public and internal, surrounding the multitude of decisions that shape future defense forces play a significant role in force planning. Thus, force programming should be thought of in its larger context, involving the Executive Departments, Congress, the media, academia, and the American public.

Fiscal and Program Guidance. The entire force planning process can be viewed as a resource allocation problem. An early step in the PPBS is the issuance of policy, strategy, fiscal and programming guidance by the Secretary of Defense to the military Services in the form of the Defense Planning Guidance. This guidance reflects the Administration's desired priorities for the coming year.

Five different levels of resource allocation affect the amount and mix of resources applied to defense. {37} First, there is consideration of the nation's total resources and how they are to be shared between the private and public sectors. The focus of debate at this level is concerned with growth, employment, inflation, productivity, budget and trade deficits, and overall competitiveness of the economy.

The second level of resource allocation occurs between defense and nondefense programs within the federal budget. Competing economic, political and security objectives strongly influence these resource allocation decisions. Thus, defense planners must articulate well their legitimate needs to meet the nation's security objectives. Realistic appraisals must be made of the future availability of defense funds. Too often, defense plans assume budgets will rise in the future to correct current deficiencies. A declining share of the federal budget went to defense during the early 1970s because of antiwar, isolationist feelings and efforts to curb inflation. Consequently, force modernization plans were continually shifted to the later years of the SYDP. The mood of the nation shifted quickly as it entered the 1980s and firmly supported increased defense budgets to meet the Soviet threat. However, beginning in the mid-1980s, the SYDP became increasingly out of touch with the budgets Congress would approve. Now, in the 1990s, we are reassessing our national priorities in light of the changing nature of the threat and fiscal realities. The fiscal guidance given to the Department of Defense is the result of decisions made at the above two levels.

A third level of resource allocation occurs when each Service's share of the defense budget is determined. Initial shares are given in the Defense Planning Guidance. Concerns over roles and missions can surface at this time. Changing defense priorities have an important effect. Should the modernization of strategic nuclear forces be given highest priority? What of strategic defense? How much should be allocated for defense in Europe? What of the requirements for other contingencies? What are the needs for each of the unified and specified commands?

Within each Service a fourth major resource allocation must be made

among each of the appropriation accounts. Should funds be provided for manpower and for operations and maintenance to ensure current readiness? Or should funds be provided for procurement to implement force modernization or change existing force levels? How about investment in research and development to ensure future force planners have a better set of choices?

Finally, a fifth level of allocation occurs when alternative force choices are made within the procurement accounts of each Service. Should Army divisions be heavy or light? Should the Navy emphasize carriers, submarines, or amphibious lift? Should the Air Force modernize ground-based ballistic missiles or manned penetrating bombers? What should be the active/reserve force mix?

Feedback and Iteration

This description of the force planning framework considered each element in a step-by-step fashion. This is not meant to/imply that force planning is a rigid, sequential process. In reality, elements are considered in varying degrees by different groups at different times. Feedback and iteration exist at all levels. Consideration of too many feedback loops would complicate the diagram and destroy its usefulness. Thus, only three feedback loops are highlighted.

The heavy lines in the upper portion of Figure 1 emphasize the need for feedback and iteration in making strategic choices. Military, political, and economic assessments may indicate the need to revise the initial choice of national strategy in order to better satisfy the national objectives. It may also be necessary to review the national objectives to ensure that more has not been attempted than the available resources, technology and forces can accomplish.

The heavy lines in the lower portion of the framework indicate the need to reassess the ability of available forces to carry out the national military strategy after the programmed forces are added. Alternative forces can be evaluated in order to determine the most effective choice within resource limits.

Finally, assessment forms the link between strategic and force choices. Limitations or deficiencies of a military strategy may become apparent only after forces needed to carry it out are determined. Where a strategy-force mismatch exists, either the forces must be increased, the strategy revised, the objectives lowered, or the additional risks accepted.

Summary

This article presents an organized framework for choosing defense forces. As such, it is intended to serve as a useful starting point for the consideration of complex force planning issues. Political,

bureaucratic and organizational factors often obscure the important rational elements of force planning decisions. In light of the dynamic security environment of the 1990s and increasing competition for scarce resources, choosing the best defense forces is more crucial now .than ever before. Errors made now will only result in defense forces ill-suited to the nation's future needs. Precise and thorough consideration must be given to all the key elements of force planning.

Because of the complexities involved and the numerous uncertainties that make precise evaluation difficult, clear-cut choices are seldom achieved. Consequently, final decisions are often made in an atmosphere of political bargaining and organizational advocacy. It is incumbent upon those involved in national defense to use some rational approach for considering the numerous force planning elements as they make timely and informed judgments on complex force choice issues. In addition, it is essential that they clearly and concisely communicate their reasoning to the American public.

Notes

1. Andre Beaufre, Strategy for Tomorrow (New York: Crane, Russak, 1974), p. 71.

2. This article updates Richmond M. Lloyd and LTCOL Dino A. Lerenzini, US Air Force, "A Framework for Choosing Defense Forces," Naval War College Review, January/February 1981, pp. 46-58. Significant portions of the original article are used in their entirety without further citation. I

want to thank Dino Lorenzini, my colleagues at the Naval War College, and my students who have reconfirmed the importance of a framework and have provided innumerable suggestions which have been incorporated here. However, I remain solely responsible for the views expressed and any errors and omissions.

3. This diagram is an adaptation of the Force Structure Assessment Methodology given in NWP1 (Rev. A), Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy, (Washington: Dept. of the Navy, 1978). This diagram also is a minor modification of that originally appearing in the Lloyd and Lorenzini, 1981 article.

4. This framework is intended to comprehensively include the most important force planning factors. Within each broad category, many concepts, principles, ideas and methods may be used. Clearly, certain factors will be more important than others depending on the circumstances. The art of force planning is to know which factors are most relevant to the issues at hand. Quite often, alternative approaches

give greater emphasis to what is considered a key variable such as the threat, technology, or the budget. For further discussion of such alternative approaches and their strengths and weaknesses, see Chapter 3.C.1: "Approaches to Force Planning" by Henry C. Bartlett in this collection of readings. At some time, however, the force planner must review all the force planning factors in a comprehensive manner.

5. John M. Collins, Grand Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1974), pp. 1-3.

6. George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington: The White House, March 1990), pp. 2-3.

7. For a more detailed discussion of these concepts and how to apply them, see: Dr. Donald E. Nuechterlein, "National Interests and National Strategy: The Need for Priority," in Terry L. Heyns, ed., Understanding U.S. Strategy: A Reader (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1983), pp. 35-63, and Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Over committed: United States National Interests in the 1980s (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985).

8. Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1990 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., January 17, 1989), pp. 169-175.

9. John F. Lehman, Jr., Command of the Seas (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), pp. 396 and 399.

10. Collins, pp. 2-3.

11. Bush, pp. 2-3.

12. John Lewis Gaddis, "Coping With Victory," The Atlantic Monthly, May 1990, p. 49.

13. Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 22.

14. Ibid., p. 24.

15.Collins, p. 14.

16. One can expand or contract the list of means, breaking each broad category into greater detail, but the key point is that all means must be considered. At times you may wish to expand the list to underscore a desired emphasis. For example, in the 1970s the nation began to lose the "war of ideas" as it was reluctant to use fully its "informational" means. During the 1980s, resources were shifted to fight head on "propaganda" and to promote democratic principles.

17. Bush, p. 23.

18. Ibid., p. 25.

19. This concept is developed and applied in Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman, Jr., "Strategy as a Guide to Force Planning," Chapter 3.B.1 in this collection of readings.

20. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990 Joint Military Net Assessment (Washington: 1990), pp. ES-4 and ES-5. (Note: reprinted as Chapter 2.C.12 in this collection of readings; see section on "Implications for Strategy and Force Posture.").

21. Frederick H. Hartmann, The Relations of Nations, (New York: Macmillan, 1978), p. 259. See pp. 259-262 for an excellent discussion on why military officers prefer to focus on capabilities while diplomats tend to concentrate on intentions and circumstances.

22. Ibid., p. 45.

23. See for example Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense, Soviet Military Power, An Assessment of the Threat, 1988 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., April 1988), p. 32.

24. See Henry S. Rowen and Charles Wolf, Jr., editors, The Impoverished Superpower: Perestroika and the Soviet Military Burden (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1990) for an extensive collection of analyses on this issue, and Philip Merrill, "How the Soviets are Fooling Themselves," Wall Street Journal, March 30,1990, P. A15, for review and highlights of The Impoverished Superpower.

25. A Soviet social scientist, Andrei Revenko of the Institute of Economics of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences estimates per capita gross domestic product of the Soviet Union to be between 25 and 40 percent that of the United States. He feels it is most likely closer to 25%, but such estimates are risky business. See Everett Carll Ladd, "Soviet Social Scientists Gauge Their Country's Collapse," The Christian Science Monitor, 1 June 1990, p. 18.

26. Graham Allison, "National Security Strategy for the 1990s," in Edward K. Hamilton, ed., America's Global Interests: A New Agenda (Penguin Books Canada, Ltd. and W.W. Norton Company, Inc., 1989), pp. 214 and 220-229.

27. U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Dance (Washington: 1977), p. 22.

28. The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., January 1988), P. 2.

29. Competitive strategy analysis pits U.S. strengths against the

opponent's weaknesses to enhance U.S. defense posture while influencing the opponent's posture to become less of a threat. For a description of Competitive Strategies see: Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1990 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., January 17, 1989), p. 47.

30. U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Future Budget Requirements for the 600 ship Navy (Washington: September 1985), p. 14.

31. This assumes a service life of 45 years. For a discussion of typical service life assumptions for different classes of ships see: Ibid., p. 13.

32. NWP-1, p. 1-5-1.

33. These problems of counting and the strengths and weaknesses of various techniques for assessing military balances are more fully discussed in U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Assessing the NATO/ Warsaw
Pact Military Balance (Washington: 1977)

34. Alfred H. Hausrath, Venture Simulation in War, Business, and Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), p. 8.

35. For a comprehensive treatment of war gasing principles, and its history, especially at the Naval War College, see Peter P. Perla, The Art of Wargaming, A Guide for Professionals and Lobbyists (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990)

36. Perla, pp. 275 and 281. Also see pp. 273-290 for an in-depth comparison of the attributes, strengths and weaknesses of operations analysis, wargames and exercises.

37. Paul H. Nitze and Leonard Sullivan, Jr., Securing the Seas (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 319-336.

Chapter 1.C.2

* * *

Strategic Concepts for the 1990s: Part I

Colonel William O. Staudenmaier, U.S. Army

Contemporary Strategic Concepts

In theory, there are two fundamental and competing approaches to the development of a midrange military strategy and its supporting force structure. In the first, the president, with the advice of his national security advisers, allocates a certain share of the nation's budget and resources to national defense. The secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are then expected to develop and implement a strategy which will employ these resources to secure the nation's interests. This approach, which was in vogue in the years immediately following World War II, has often been called the "remainder" method because defense was allotted the money remaining after the domestic and foreign policy accounts were finalized.

The second approach, which has never been fully implemented, requires that the national goals or objectives be derived from the nation's interests. Next, a national strategy would be developed to achieve these goals. From the national strategy, a national military strategy is then created, together with the force structure needed to implement it.

In the first approach, program and budget concerns dictate the strategy and force structure. In the second, theoretically, objectives and plans are the critical factors. Although the latter method is embodied in the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System, fiscal realities supersede theoretical constructs, so programs and budgets continue to dominate objectives and strategies. However, a military strategy developed through the interests objectives-strategy approach provides a more rational guide to the shortrange decisions required by the realities of the program budget system.

Fundamental to an understanding of the current system used to develop military strategy are the interrelated concepts of national purpose, national interest, national goals or objectives, national strategy and military strategy.

Reprinted from Military Review, March 1982, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

National Purpose

The development of a military strategy must begin with a consideration of the concept of national purpose. The national purpose impacts upon the national interests and national goals that the United States seeks to achieve. Unfortunately, the national purpose is such an abstract concept that many analysts doubt that it can ever be adequately defined.

Some have described it as the expression of the enduring values in which a nation is rooted. Others have defined it as the "nonverbal" consensus of the chief values of the people of the United States or claim that it is to be found in the Preamble to the Constitution. President Dwight D. Eisenhower declared that the American purpose was the nation's need to seek peace with justice. In 1950, a National Security Council strategic assessment {1} considered that the national purpose was "to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity of the individual."

In practical terms, the values inherent in the American national purpose do affect the development of national and military strategy. Because the United States eschews aggression-a philosophy which reflects its democratic values-preemptive war is not a practicable strategic option for national planners. Thus, if in a general nuclear war context, the United States will not plan to launch a disarming first strike, the only remaining viable strategic option is deterrence based on a capability to retaliate in strength after an enemy nuclear strike has been absorbed.

The national purpose also manifests itself in other ways. It can be argued that, regardless of the exact definition of the national purpose, the character of striving to attain it has changed over the years. In the last 80 years, the United States has changed from a young nation asserting itself, striving for perfection in its society and in its relations with the rest of the world, to a more mature nation that is principally concerned with maintaining its place in a more sophisticated and complex world. The first circumstance signifies action, boldness, initiative and opportunity. The second can be characterized by the status quo, caution and reaction.

Perhaps it should not be surprising that modern US strategies are so often defensive and threat-oriented rather than offensive and opportunity centered. For the strategist, the strength of the national will is frequently a reflection of the national purpose. In a democracy, a firm, articulated public opinion can be decisive. The strategist must learn to recognize it and to anticipate it or risk the failure of his strategy. Certainly, there were options that were foreclosed to strategists during the Angolan affair because of the adverse contemporary public attitudes toward intervention.

National Interest

National strategy must be founded on national interests. A national interest may be defined as a defense, economic, political or ideological concern of importance to the United States. Although not unchanging, perceptions of national interests are relatively stable and enduring. A nation should construct a national strategy to secure its national interests.

Since it is possible for national interests to be in conflict or to compete with one another, plans to harmonize competing interests must be part of an inclusive national strategy. Other policies must furnish guidelines which will enable strategies to establish priorities among national interests. In this respect, it is possible to speak of national strategy and of national strategies in much the same way that we speak of the foreign policy of a natiOn and also of its foreign policies.

The ambiguity that naturally surrounds the concept of national interest is compounded in the pluralistic society of the United States where there is no authoritative spokesman short of the president who can articulate national interests. And, even after a national interest has been authoritatively expressed, there are varying degrees of intensity with which the United States might pursue it. The intensity depends on public opinion, on congressional support and on the priority assigned by the executive branch.

Because of this difficulty, military planners must make assumptions regarding the intensity of effort and degree of risk that the nation might be willing to take to secure its national interests. There are a number of ways that this intensity might be expressed. One way is:

Vital interest. Of such importance as to have a direct bearing on the attainment of basic US national security objectives. The United States would risk escalation to general nuclear war to protect a vital interest.

Significant interest. Of such significance that the United States would be willing to use military force to protect it, short of risking escalation to nuclear war.

Important interest. Of lesser significance than vital or significant interest, but important enough to use limited air, naval and logistic support. Ground forces would only be used in an advisory role.

Of interest. Of less importance and more indirect than important interests. The United States would probably take actions short of war, to include supporting the indigenous population, and might possibly commit military forces.

National interests may also be direct or indirect. Hypothetically, if Western Europe is a vital interest of the United States, then the Persian Gulf oil fields and sea lines of communications between the Persian Gulf and Western Europe, which the Europeans consider vital to their interests, would also be a vital interest of the United States, albeit indirectly.

Another example: If Korea is considered to be vital to the defense

of Japan and if Japan is a vital interest of the United States, it may be concluded that, for that reason, Korea is an indirect vital interest of the United States. Other interests may derive from the satisfaction of these indirect interests.

Korea is an example of a success story of a US ally that, due to US hopes for a free and stable Korean government, coupled with significant economic investments, has taken on a degree of interest to the United States quite apart from its relationship to the defense of Japan. This case illustrates the need to review periodically the basis of our stated national interest for a given country.

While the definitions of interests are helpful as an analytical tool, there are no existing objective criteria, no easy tests which would identify one nation rather than another, one event rather than another or one circumstance rather than another to be in the national interest. Rather, it is a consensus that exists among top-level governmental decisionmakers at any point in time.

National interest is a dynamic concept both in its abstract and contextual elements. In the abstract, the concept in the post-World War II world has taken on some overtones of internationalism. In some cases, national interests and international interests have become indistinguishable. For example, the national interests not only of the United States and the Soviet Union, but also of all of the nations of the world, require that general nuclear war be avoided. It is even conceivable that the concept of national "self-interest" may be a vanishing concept in a world in which increasing interdependence and technological advances in weapons and destructive power make it dangerous even for superpowers to pursue national interests with military means.

Some political scientists and futurists suggest that, in the future, transnational interests may transcend in importance national self-interest. International treaties on space and Antarctica, as well as the international concern over pollution, population and food, represent some examples of this trend. However, too much should not be made of this trend in the midterm since it seems certain that, through 1990, nations will acknowledge few obligations beyond their own national self-interest.

If the national interests of a nation represent its compelling needs, then the national objectives that the nation selects for itself

must lead to the realization of those interests.By extension the interests and objectives determine, in large measure, the strategic options of a nation. The most critical element in the development of a military strategy is the proper translation of the national political objectives into military objectives and strategic concepts. Since the end of World War II, this has been the weakest aspect of the development of strategy.

The Anglo-French invasion of the Suez Canal in 1956 is a clear illustration of the failure to translate a political objective into correct military terms. After Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, English and French political leaders were convinced that they were faced with an emergent dictator who might ultimately engulf the Middle East in flames. Mindful of the results of the failure of France and Britain to oppose forcibly Adolf Hitler's takeover of the Rhineland 20 years before, the allies were determined that this mistake should not be repeated.

The French and English, therefore, prepared a combined force for the invasion of the Suez Canal. The political objective-the unseating of Nasser-was never transmitted to the operational military commanders who naturally focused their attention on securing the Suez Canal. Had they been given the objective of deposing Nasser, they would undoubtedly have planned to take Cairo and perhaps to occupy much of Egypt.

In any event, the entire enterprise failed, resulting in the strengthening of Nasser's position both within Egypt and throughout the Arab world. Although the Suez crisis was an extremely complicated international affair, the failure to remove Nasser can be attributed to the fact that the French and English policy makers never communicated the actual political objective to their military commanders. This resulted in the selection of a military objective and strategic concept totally inconsistent with the political effect desired. {2}

National Strategy

After national objectives that are consistent with the national purpose and in harmony with the central values of the American people have been derived to achieve national interests, a national strategy may be developed. One significant indication of the future path of a nation's national strategy is its traditional pursuit of its national interests. Walter Lippmann commented on this issue when he wrote:

> ...the behavior of nations over a long period of time is the most reliable, though not the only index of their national interest. For though their interests are not eternal, they are remarkably persistent. We can most nearly judge what a nation will probably want by seeing what over a fairly long period of time it has wanted; we can most nearly predict what it will do by knowing what it has usually done.... Even when they adapt themselves to a new situation,

their new behavior is likely to be a modification rather than a transformation of their old behavior. {3}

Most modern nations have exhibited this phenomenon. For example, the central thrust of British security policy for centuries has been to provide for the security of the home islands by pursuing national security policies that would ensure that its fleet was supreme in home waters, that no hostile power should occupy the Low Countries and that no hostile power or coalition should establish hegemony over the European continent.

Since 1945, the United States has followed a policy of world leadership. Since that time, three variations of this policy have been dominant. They are the geopolitical, the nuclear and the ideological:

o Geopolitically, the strategic thinking since World War II in the United States has sought to ensure that no single power or combination of powers hostile to the interests of the United States could establish hegemony over either Western Europe or Northeast Asia. While reminiscent of the regional interest of the United Kingdom in the political viability of the Low Countries, the US interests are global, a condition which is apparently difficult to comprehend or to accept, particularly by our NATO allies.

o The strategic nuclear theme deals with the problem of deterring strategic nuclear war. While this problem has been with us for more than a generation, it is becoming more difficult to cope with as the United States has passed through successive stages of nuclear monopoly and nuclear superiority to nuclear parity and now, in the opinion of some senior military officers, to a state close to strategic nuclear inferiority.

o Containment, the ideological element of American postwar foreign policy, has evolved from the general containment of monolithic communism to the more traditional approach of selectively containing the political influence of the USSR when and where it is in the US national interest to do so. This policy is euphemistically, and perhaps optimistically, referred to as managing the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower. It was manifested in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiation and in the policy of detente. As the recent eclipse of these policies demonstrates, events color policies in different shades. And, while it is true that contemporary interests can change (we are now the allies of our World War II enemies), it is also true that traditional interests and strategies also change although much more slowly.

The term strategy, deriving from the ancient Greek strategies-the art of the general-has been obscured in a semantic fog since its revival in the 17th century. In order not to add to this confusion, it will be necessary to define somewhat precisely not only what is meant by the term

national strategy, but also to differentiate it from some allied terms such as grand strategy and national policy. To begin in reverse order, a clear differentiation between the meanings of policy and strategy has been provided by the Institute for Defense Analysis:

> Although there is often a legitimate overlap of these words,. . . the distinction between them can be retained if we keep in mind that a "policy" is essentially a pattern (of action or decision), while a "strategy" (i.e., any particular strategy, not strategy itself, as an art or science) is essentially a plan . . . . In other words, a policy is a rule governing action or decision; a strategy is a plan in accordance with which various means, including actions and decisions, are directed toward the achievement of objectives. {4}

Karl von Clausewitz properly understood this interrelationship of policy and strategy, wherein policy establishes the political framework in which strategy must operate. In Clausewitz's mind, the distinction was clear. Strategy was an instrument that was guided, shaped and controlled by political policy. So, policy really operates on two levels. First, it can designate the political objectives toward which strategy is directed, and, second, it can be taken to mean a rule which governs action.

Grand strategy and national strategy must also be differentiated. Essentially, grand strategy implies a heavier emphasis on military force than does the concept of national strategy. The following exemplifies this notion:

> ..."grand strategy" has come into use to describe the overall defense plans of a nation or coalition of nations. Since the mid-twentieth century, "national strategy" has attained wide usage, meaning the coordinated employment of the total resources of a nation to achieve its national objectives. {5}

Military Strategy

Theoretically, after a national strategy has been determined, a military strategy should be developed to help achieve the ends desired. In military strategy, to paraphrase Clausewitz, everything is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult-and that extends to its definition.

One reason that such an aura of mystery surrounds the subject is that, unlike the history of warfare, the history of strategy is fragmentary. It has been only recently that military strategy has been conceived of as anything more than the art of distributing and applying military means, such as armed forces and supplies, to fulfill the ends of policy. Today, at least three distinct, although interrelated, types of military strategy may be identified: national military strategy, coordinative military strategy and operational military strategy.

In the development of an integrated global national military strategy, the military works with individuals who are experts in dealing with the other elements of national power-political, economic, psychological and technological. National military strategy may be defined "as the art of the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives." {6} It is usually joint or combined in nature and primarily has to do with translating political objectives into military objectives and broad strategic concepts. It is also at this national level of strategic analysis that the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense interface in the conduct of crisis-management activities.

Coordinative military strategy is focused on the military problems that arise out of the separation of military strategy from the executive civilian policy function. When the head of state was both the political and military leader, unity and coherence between ends and means-between policy and strategy-was easier to achieve. The military complexity of the last half of the 20th century, when the head of state cannot effectively function as the operational military commander, has led to the growth and increased importance of the coordinative level of military strategy.

In step with the growing and multifaceted responsibilities of contemporary defense planning, the nature of and preparation for warfare have become increasingly complex. The national security process created in the aftermath of World War II shifted from its traditional concentration on war to the more ambiguous demands of Cold War.

This required that the military forces of a country be designed and maintained in readiness in peacetime against a threat that was not only global, but one that was not bounded by time. Required was a system of interlocking parts that would allow the military to suggest ways in which military force might help to achieve political objectives and to design and maintain the force structure as well. Coordinative military strategy impacts greatly on the development of force structure. Because of these force structure implications, the Department of Defense and the military departments develop coordinative military strategy although the Joint Chiefs of Staff also play an important role.

Coordinative military strategy may also be defined as that planning which links the military concepts established at the national level to the contingency plans of the unified commands. It also develops the policy and programs needed to build the force structure necessary to implement the midrange military strategy.

The function of the military establishment during peacetime, in addition to deterrence, is to prepare to fight. The problem, however, is that, since at least the early 1960s, system analysts and programmers have had a disproportionate impact on military planning because of their ability to influence budgetary decisions. This has led to an imbalance

wherein professional judgment has given way to political expediency, not only in the development of a force structure, but also in the conduct of war. Strategy planning, not programming, should be the primary determinant of the way that military forces will be used in battle.

The last level of military strategy is the more traditional and better understood concept of operational military strategy. A concept used by the French, Germans and Russians among others, it consists of one or more interrelated military campaign plans designed to achieve a stated military objective. Since operational military strategy is the generally accepted view of what is meant by the term military strategy, the literature abounds with suitable definitions. One that is both suitable and familiar derives from Clausewitz:

> ...the art of the employment of battles as a means to gam the object of war. In other words strategy forms the plan of the war, maps out the proposed course of the different campaigns which compose the war and regulates the battles to be fought in each. {7}

Clausewitz understood that the military object of war had to be subordinated to the political object. But many of the followers of Clausewitz twisted his conception to mean the very opposite of what the great man intended. Helmuth von Moltke, in particular, took the political-military interface to mean that the military should be free from political restraints in the conduct of military operations {8} --a refrain that is being heard with alarming frequency today in the post-Vietnam US military establishment. There is an obvious necessity for cohesion and coherence among the elements of the national military strategy, the coordinative military strategy and the operational military strategy. This unity or integration does not come easily. One reason is the absence of a comprehensive military theory.

Military Planning

Coordinative military strategy overlaps with national military strategy and operational military strategy in the development of the military capabilities required to achieve the objectives of the national military strategy and the operational plans to employ these capabilities. This necessarily involves two distinct types of planning: force planning and operational planning. The fact that the Department of Defense is largely responsible for force development, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff devote much effort to operational matters and that the service staffs plan in both areas, often simultaneously, has been a source of confusion for many years. The major differences between force planning and operational planning are shown in the accompanying figure.

Any operational military plan must consist of two major components: selection of the proper military objectives and the development of an effective operational concept. {9} The translation of the political objective into a proper military objective is the most critical factor in

the development of an operational plan. Conversely, the most critical action that the political leader must accomplish when directing the use of military force is to provide a clear statement of what the use of force is to achieve-the political objective.

The initial transformation of a political objective to a military objective is usually accomplished at the national military strategy level. Eventually, however, a physical objective (key terrain, enemy army, air superiority) will be developed. The military planner must not only consider the objective, he must visualize the effect that the achievement of the objective is desired to create.

During the Suez crisis, the advice of Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery was sought. Montgomery, who was at the time deputy supreme commander at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, asked about the objective of the use of military force. He was told that it was to overthrow Nasser. Montgomery said that this was not enough. He had to know what condition was desired after the objective of deposing of Nasser was achieved, for this should determine the military objective and concept of operation. Consideration of the effect desired must be accomplished before a military objective is selected. {10}

Figure 1

Differences Between Operational Planning and Force Planning

	Operational Planning	Force Planning
Perspective	Employment of military force	Development of military capabilities
Timeframe	1-2 years	3-10 years
Conceptual Basis	Military strategy	Resource allocation
Organizational Focus	Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified commands	Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, commanders in chief and the services
Scenarios Employed	Regional orientation, both those scenarios likely to occur and those taxing US capabilities	Worldwide war and specific scenarios to test forces across full spectrum
Products Produced	Contingency Plans	Input to Department of Defense programming and budgeting documents

Forces Considered	Current forces, with and without mobilization, including their deficiencies	Programmed forces and planned forces at various levels of risk
Threat Considered	Deployed enemy forces	Projected enemy forces
Treatment of Employment	Unified commander's concept of operation forms basis for deployment requirements	Broad concept of deployment considered only for major force elements

Once the proper military objective has been determined, it is attained through the development and implementation of an effective strategic concept. Successful operations are the result of a plan that considers, in addition to the development of a correct military objective, the salient factors of projecting force from positions which offer significant advantages over the enemy, of balancing the requirement for adequate forces over competing priorities and of maintaining freedom of action. The strategic concept can be evaluated for effectiveness by using three criteria: suitability, feasibility and acceptability. Each of

these factors is dependent upon the other two.

The first standard, suitability, determines whether the military objective, if achieved, will lead to the desired effect. But the objective sought must also be feasible. This requires that the resources available for the attainment of the objective be compared to the enemy's capability to prevent its attainment. Finally, if the strategic concept has met the demands of suitability and feasibility, it must yet be determined whether the operation can achieve its military objective at reasonable cost-acceptability. The influence of this factor may require the abandonment of the entire project, if, after being advised by his military commander, the political leader decides that the gains do not justify the costs. During war, this is obviously a highly subjective determination.

Each of these three factors and their subelements could be considered in much more detail. For example, in determining the suitability of the appropriate effect desired, there are two possible choices: Either the status quo may be maintained, or some change to the situation can be effected. To determine his objective, the military planner considers the salient aspects of the situation. To determine the balance of relative combat power, such nonmilitary factors as the political and economic situation must be considered along with factors more directly relevant to the military such as major combat forces, logistics and weapons systems.

Estimates for both friendly and enemy forces must also be made. The survey of the characteristics of the operational area should include such

things as terrain, climate, base infrastructure and lines of communication. Costs may be measured in casualties, dollars or in other less tangible ways such as loss of a nation's prestige, military reputation or credibility as an ally.

All of these criteria are based on the evaluation of the factors relevant to military operational planning. Each military objective and each supporting strategic objective will require a determination of the suitability of the effect desired; an examination of the feasibility of the operational plan with regard to its physical objectives, relative positions, apportionment of fighting strength and freedom of action; and, finally, of its acceptability with reference to its relative cost.

Constraints on Military Strategy

For strategists, there is, in reality, no such thing as a totally unconstrained strategy. The constraints on US strategists are severe. Some of the more important constraints ace discussed below:

Vulnerability. The vulnerability of the United States to nuclear attack has caused American strategists to avoid a military confrontation with the USSR. It is strategically significant that the USSR is also vulnerable to a US nuclear attack. Yet it is not.merely the fact that the United States is vulnerable that constrains American strategists. It is the degree of vulnerability that really matters. The very survival of the United States is at stake.

So, the two superpowers have attained a "balance of terror" that promotes the status quo where the vital interests of each are concerned and allows strategic flexibility only in peripheral areas. At the same time, due to its strategic arsenal and geostrategic location, the territory of the United States is relatively invulnerable to conventional attack, making a strategy of retrenchment tempting. In fact, to adopt any other strategy requires proof that the country or area in question is important to the United States. This proof is couched in such terms as economic interdependence, resource requirements, moral commitments and ideological opposition to communism. With the exception of Western Europe and Japan, whether or not the factors apply and to what degree, are and will continue to be subject to significant debate.

Principles. Americans have certain deeply held beliefs as to what is "right." These principles have evolved from historical, cultural and psychological roots, and they are difficult to change. As President Jimmy Carter stated in his 1980 State Of the Union message,". . . our power will never be used to initiate a threat to the security of any nation or the rights of any human being." Because Americans want to be right, many of our wars have had an ideological, if not messianic, quality to them. They have been couched in terms of "making the world safe for democracy" and "fighting communism anywhere, anytime."

These concepts make it difficult to select war-termination goals short of total victory or unconditional surrender. Americans are also a pragmatic people who attack distasteful jobs directly and who want to end them quickly so that they can get to other things. The experiences of Korea and Vietnam have caused the American public to view limited war with distaste. Therefore, the strategist must be concerned with public opinion, hopefully choosing a strategy that is not only morally "right," but also one which is in harmony with the American character and one with which the public can identify.

National will. National will is a dynamic element of national power and, for the United States, is composed of at least three subelements: public will, congressional will and presidential or executive will. Crucial to the expression, and more significantly to the formulation of national will, is the communication media. The adverse impact of the Vietnam experience on the national psyche has led to a perception of a loss of will which could very well set the stage for costly errors in foreign policy by American statesmen and foreign diplomats as well. In a democracy, a firm, articulated public opinion can be decisive. Since Americans are also concerned about their image, strategists must recognize the constraints that world opinion places on military options.

Legal. Legal constraints also affect the development and execution of military strategy. The most controversial legal constraint is the War Powers Act passed during the height of the Vietnam withdrawal period. This is an especially significant constraint in view of the development of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

This constraint will be critically sensitive to the president's relations with Congress. The Act is ambiguous enough to allow room for interpretation. With good congressional relations, the president can expect favorable interpretations. If poor relations exist, restrictive interpretations may result. So, the military strategist must be cognizant of the status of presidential-legislative relations. Other congressional acts which constrain strategy include constraints on security assistance, refusal to vote for assistance to Angola, the passage of the Nunn amendment and the end of the draft.

Geographic. Geography is a basic element of military strategy. The lack of depth in Europe is one of the factors that forces the United States and NATO to adopt a strategy of forward defense that might not otherwise be the best choice. This is particularly significant to the United States. Throughout most of this century, the United States, a maritime nation, could, like Great Britain before it, rely on having time available to mobilize its forces for war. It could also primarily rely on its naval forces for its defense.

The collapse of the Western Allies on the continent in World War II caused the United States to send a huge army to participate in the invasion and liberation of Western Europe. The emergence of the large

Soviet ground threat in the 1950s caused the United States and NATO to extend membership to the Federal Republic of Germany (GE) in exchange for
its contribution to NATO defense.

The price exacted by the GE for this exchange was a forward defense strategy at or near the Inter-German Border (IGB). This need to defend forward against the contiguous Warsaw Pact armies negated the advantage of distance and time that had enabled the United States to mobilize behind the Atlantic Ocean. Today, in a strategic sense, it is as if the Eastern territorial border of the United States were conterminous to the IGB. In this context, the friendly ocean now becomes an extremely fragile line of communication. This causes the paucity of a US merchant fleet to be a matter of great concern to US strategists considering the importance of US reinforcements to NATO strategy. If this were not enough, the linkage of NATO defense with the US strategic nuclear force has made it virtually impossible to decouple US interests from NATO interests.

In essence, then, the current forward defense of the IGB is not a "forward defense" of the Continental United States insofar as that strategy has developed. The United States has become as mobilization dependent and as strategically rigid as any continental power ever was, gratuitously, and apparently without realizing it, giving up the precious flexibility provided by the maritime nature of its geostrategic location.

Force structure and risk. Strategic concepts can be changed almost instantaneously, but it takes considerably longer to develop the forces, equipment, doctrine and training that is needed to implement a new strategy. This indicates that changes in military strategy in the coming decade, because of force structure considerations alone, will probably be marginal or incremental in nature.

There is a close and obvious relationship among the concepts of military strategy, force structure and risk. A military strategy is devised to achieve political objectives in the face of some threat. The force structure provides the capabilities needed to implement the strategy. Since only rarely are military requirements and capabilities in equilibrium, to balance the books the shortfall between the two is termed risk. When risk becomes unacceptable, and resources to increase force structure are not forthcoming, then the strategic objectives must be reassessed to bring them into terms with the reality of the strategic environment.

Since objectives are real and risk is abstract, this reassessment seldom occurs. It is this reluctance to align strategy with reality that is at the root of most military failure.

International negotiations. International negotiations, such as the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and SALT, although beneficial, constrain strategy because they limit the weapons

and the forces available to the strategists. Arms-control agreements which could have major impact on strategy include a comprehensive test ban, SALT, chemical warfare, mutual and balanced force reductions, conventional arms transfers and antisatellite convention.

Alliances. Due to the Soviet ability to maintain a large standing army, the United States has adopted an alliance strategy. The introduction of allies always leads to constraints because allies generally are asymmetrical in power and in interests both within, but especially outside of, the alliance area. Vietnam and the 1956 Suez incident are cases in point.

Of equal importance is the fact that US forces are not available for use without regard to location and prior commitment to alliances. Particularly in countering a Soviet threat outside of Central Europe, the United States would find it difficult, for political as well as military reasons, to weaken the main front (NATO) in order to use such forces in a peripheral area. At the same time, the NATO Alliance further constrains the United States by its commitment to an articulated strategy of forward defense.

Bureaucracy. In considering more indirect or creative approaches to strategy, the strategist is constrained by bureaucratic inertia. The bureaucracy is based on stability and routine and resists innovation and change. Strategic concepts are usually compromise positions-lowest common denominators-with which all agencies can agree and, because of this drive for consensus, are not very imaginative. One reason why generals are so often accused of preparing to fight the last war is the fierce bureaucratic resistance that bold changes generally encounter.

Economic. The economic resources that a nation is willing to devote to defense are major considerations in the formulation of strategies. Economists correctly tell strategists that they are competing for scarce resources. Even in the affluent United States, there is never enough to go around. Ideally, strategy would derive from interests, then resources would be allocated to implement the strategy. Nevertheless, the strategist must be a pragmatist and propose strategies that are financially obtainable. Realistically, however, the programmer commands the strategist, and the budget shapes strategy. It is axiomatic that, in each Five-Year Defense Plan, strategy and resources are always in equilibrium in the fifth year, but, in reality, the fifth year is never attained.

Summary

Any US strategist drawing up military plans must be aware of the impact that contemporary strategic concepts will have on his design. The interrelated concepts of national purpose, national interest, national objective, national strategy and military strategy establish the framework within which the strategist must operate. The emergence of

three distinct, although interrelated types of military strategy-national, coordinative and operational-reflects the complexity of the emerging strategic environment. An appreciation of the fundamental elements of military planning and the constraints acting upon the strategist is necessary to an understanding of the discussion of the strategic model presented in Part II.

Notes

1. NSC-68. United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, 14 April 1950.

2. Roy Fullick and Geoffrey Powell, Suez, The Double War, Hamish Hamilton, North Pomfret, VT, 1979, pp. 1-29.

3. Walter Lippmann, quoted in Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age, Harper and Row Publishers Inc., N.Y., 1972, p. 163.

4. Lexicon of Terms Relevant to National Security Studies on Arms and Arms Control, edited by James E. King Jr., quoted in Urs Schwarz and Laszlo Hadik, Strategic Terminology, Praeger Publishers, N.Y., 1966, p. 95.

5. Grand Strategy for the 1980s, edited by Bruce Palmer, Jr., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, DC, 1978, p. 73.

6. Henry C. Eccles, Military Power in a Free Society. Naval War College Press, Newport, RI, 1979, p. iv. Admiral Eccles attributes this definition to Herbert Rosinski.

7. Roger Ashley, A Short Guide to Clausewitz, Capricorn Books, N.Y.,

1960, p. 101.

8. Haso Holborn, "Moltke's Strategic Concepts," Military Affairs, Volume VI, Fall 1942, pp. 153-68.

9. The following discussion is based on Sound Military Decision, US Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1942.

10. Fullick and Powell, op cit., p. 185.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 1.C.3

* * *

Defense Planning Steps

John M. Collins

Defense planning, a dynamic process, takes place in a matrix, much of which is non-military (Figures 1 and 2). Comprehensive and foreign policy planning, which are complementary, proceed simultaneously through five stages in constant flux.

Step 1, which specifies purpose, takes precedence. Step 2 appraises opposition. Step 3 formulates strategy to satisfy objectives in the face of all obstacles. Step 4 allocates resources to cover requirements without intolerable risk. Step 5 reviews alternatives, if available assets are insufficient to support preferred concepts.

Step 1: Specify Purposes

Defense planners seek to protect and promote assorted interests that form the foundation for national security.

Domestic tranquility and prosperity are inseparable from the interest called common defense, which U.S. founding fathers first delineated in the Declaration of Independence, then incorporated in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution. Survival, physical security, peace, strategic stability, power, freedom of action, and freedom of the seas are among its many subdivisions.

Tributary interests (strategic and tactical, active and passive, positive and negative, immediate and deferred, regional and worldwide) supplement the intrinsic core. American interests in European political alignment and Persian Gulf petroleum are exemplary. {1}

Some interests are worth spilling blood and spending billions to safeguard. Others merit strong attention, but not a shooting war. Decision makers who hope to match ends and means in meaningful ways must
put them in perspective, with the most important on top.

Step 2: Appraise Opposition

The nature, imminence, and intensity of apparent perils determine what (if anything) should and could be done in what order of priority to safeguard

---

Reprinted by permission of Westview Press from U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique, by John M. Collins. Published, 1982, Westview

Press, Inc., Boulder, Colorado.

Figure 1

Defense Planning Matrix

Comprehensive Planning [1]

Identifies national wants/needs	Interests
Shapes supporting national purposes	Basic Goals
Determines relative importance	Priorities
Identifies impediments to accomplishment	Multiform Threats
Allocates national resources	Means
Seeks public consensus	Information

Foreign Policy Planning

Outlines roles in the world	International Aims
Identifies present/potential opponents	External Threats
Generates strategic guidelines	International Policies
Promotes partnerships	Commitments
Specifies role of military power	Tasks

Defense Planning

Determines goals	Military Aims
Determines relative importance	Priorities
Assesses opposing capabilities/intentions	Military Threats
Selects courses of action	Military Strategy
How	Concepts
Where	Theaters
When	Timing
Assigns responsibilities	Missions
Determines resource requirements	Feasibility
Forces	Tools
What kind	Types
How many	Levels
Logistics	Support
Budgets	Costs
Identifies deficiencies	Risks

All Planning

Seeks to reconcile mismatched ends	Accommodation

and means

[1] Comprehensive planning considers national security in complete context, taking foreign and domestic requirements into account concurrently.

U.S. interests from all foes, both foreign and domestic. Proper appraisals start with enemy capabilities (what opponents could do, if so inclined). Listing capabilities in isolation, however, can lead to incorrect conclusions. The Soviets, for example, massed enough ballistic missiles to atomize America many years ago, but still refrain for many reasons. Enemy intentions (what opponents are likely to do in assorted circumstances) consequently are critical. Complete assessments also consider enemy vulnerabilities and opportunities to exploit them. {2}



Figure 2. DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS

DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS

Step 3: Formulate Strategy

Experienced defense specialists recognize that the best intelligence

estimates are often fallible, and try to fashion strategies that will work if prognostications prove wrong.

Collins' Law says, "If you don't know what you want to do, you can't plan how to do it." Sound politico-military objectives therefore must delineate at the onset what must be done to achieve desired degrees of security. Domestic goals frequently conflict with needs for national defense. Attempts to balance the U.S. federal budget, reduce tax burdens, and curb inflation while pushing important social programs, for example, bump into demands for big military buildups. Priorities once again are imperative.

Concept formulation starts with policy guidelines, keeping national aims in mind. Ten possible choices at opposite poles illustrate a wide range of options:

Isolation	or	Involvement
Defensive posture	or	Offensive posture
Stress diplomacy	or	Stress military power
Stress arms control	or	Slight arms control
Status quo	or	Change
Containment	or	Rollback
Selective containment	or	Universal containment
Partnerships important	or	Partnerships immaterial
Supply supplicants	or	Police the world
Prorate burdens	or	Bear the biggest brunt

Collective security policy simply sets forth a philosophy that loosely links nations with common interests or needs. It can, and usually does, however, lead to formal or informal commitments that pledge partners to take specific actions at particular times and places. Planners must consider multiple implications in each case, since allies may hinder as well as help.

Finally, defense strategists fit operational concepts into the policy/commitment framework in ways they believe would best accomplish objectives picked to protect national interests. That process, which is both an art and a science, employs political, economic, military, social, technological, and psychological power to achieve stated purposes through diplomacy, threats, force, indirect pressures, subterfuge, and other imaginative means in many combinations. {3}

Step 4: Allocate Resources

Conceptual planning ascertains what should be done to satisfy critical security interests. Resource allocators compare resultant requirements with present and projected capabilities, in terms of forces and funds, to confirm or deny feasibility.

The planning process terminates with Step 4 only if aspirations and

assets mesh completely. Step 5 follows when they refuse to merge.

Step 5: Reconcile Ends with Means

Reconciliation is essential when unacceptable risks occupy the breach between ends and means. At least six choices, singly or in combination, are available:

- Reduce waste
- Compress or discard objectives
- Reshape strategic concepts
- Revise force requirements
- Increase resources
- Bluff

Planners must be cautious, because reducing risks can be a risky business. Reducing waste is properly top priority, but trimming "fat" can cause serious problems, if careless surgeons cut into "muscle." Telescoping objectives and tinkering with strategies is less likely to stir up political storms than requests for more resources. Critical interests, however, remain and must be covered. Overoptimizing forces for any set of concepts stifles flexibility. Bluster sometimes holds foes at bay, but habitual bluff is bound to be a loser.

Planning Steps Related to Reality

The five planning steps summarized above rarely occur in Utopian sequence. Except in times of dire emergency, U.S. leaders tend to downgrade national defense, glossing over or assuming away many potential threats. They try to walk a tightrope between excessive defense expenditures that emasculate political, economic, social, scientific, and ecological programs on one hand, and deficient defense expenditures that endanger national security on the other. Experience shows, however that success is spotty whenever planners skip steps or overstress one at the expense of others.

Notes

1. Additional discussion of U.S. security interests is contained in Collins, John M., U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities, 1960-1980, Washington, D.C., McGraw-Hill Publications, 1980, p. 17-22, 303, 343, 367.

2. Essentials of net assessment are summarized in ibid, p. 3-14. For relationships between such assessments and strategy formulation, see Kent, Sherman, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1966, 226 p.

3. For a concise review of interrelationships among national security interests, objectives, policies, commitments and concept formulation, see

Collins, John M., Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices, Annapolis, MD., U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1973, p. 1-7, 14-21.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 1.C.4

* * *

Planning U.S. Forces: The Shape of the Problem

Caspar W. Weinberger

The process by which DoD decides which military forces to buy is extraordinarily complex. Literally thousands of individuals spend millions of hours each year making calculations and judgments about the complex chain of means and ends for achieving U.S. security objectives. The complexity of this process should not obscure its basic logic. How should we decide how many divisions of troops or how many strategic nuclear forces we should have? The problem is one of matching means and ends with an eye to budget constraints. The ends are our national security objectives and foreign policy interests. The means for achieving these objectives are military forces capable of performing specific actions in particular contingencies. Thus, we should buy the requisite military forces, choosing among alternatives to purchase the capabilities vital to us at the lowest cost-or to provide the greatest capability for any given budget

The logic of defense planning should be clear. The need for military forces arises from U.S. security interests and commitments. These interests are threatened by adversaries in ways that create contingencies that U.S. forces must be able to meet. Defense policy judgments about the manner and method of U.S. responses are translated into requirements for specific forces that are designed to provide the necessary capability at the lowest cost.

It is a mistake, however, to imagine that there exists some precise numerical standard in the calculus of deterrence. Pretension to false precision in calculating the forces we need not only fuels confusion, it promotes a dangerous arrogance. The attempt to select the means that will best achieve our goals is complicated by five additional factors.
The first is inherent uncertainty about the future. The weapons we are buying today will provide the backbone of US. military forces well into the 21st century. Against which potential adversaries may these weapons be used? How strong will our enemies be? What weapons will they use?

Reprinted from Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1987 by Caspar W. Weinberger.

Identifying U.S. national security interests and commitments;

Assessing the threat to these interests;

Formulating defense policy and strategy for meeting contingencies; and

Buying cost-effective forces, weapons, and manpower to carry out our policy and strategy.

The Logic of the Process

If the future resembles the past, the assumptions our planners make about which contingencies we will face, how specific weapons will perform in wartime, and what exchange calculations can be anticipated may prove to be inaccurate. Prior to the fact, most planners' calculations showed that France would successfully resist the German attack in 1940, and that the British would lose the air battle in a month. France fell in seven weeks, and the British won The Battle of Britain. Thus, while we attempt to analyze numbers and capabilities of opposing divisions, aircraft, tanks, and antitank munitions, such calculations are only approximations-not infallible guides to our real needs. In the face of uncertainty, prudence requires that one hedge against the risk of being-wrong.

Second, if the United States' only purpose were to protect its interests by the use of force, the problem would be simpler, since weapons and numbers could be chosen with exclusive attention to defeating the enemy. In fact, we seek to achieve our objectives not by the use of force, but rather by preventing an adversary from using its forces against us. We do this by the threat of our response. Our deterrence strategy must therefore address our adversaries' perceptions and calculations. In a world in which the elements of military power are ever changing, and the mechanisms of threat and deterrence are not well understood, the United States must nonetheless attempt to choose forces that will deter its adversaries.

Third, the United States cannot solve its weapons riddle without considering the possible responses of its adversaries. Our weapons acquisition and force structure decisions also affect our opponents' decisions about their military forces-by suggesting possible technologies, by encouraging emulation, and by provoking reactions. We must recognize that our adversaries' reactions could pose problems for us that would require further responses and take this into consideration as we formulate our defense decisions. Thus arms reduction agreements that verifiably constrain Soviet armed forces can advance our interests, and

we strongly support such agreements.

Fourth, in acquiring weapons, we do not select from a fixed menu. The extraordinary pace of technology generates new weapons each decade, but their design, testing, and acquisition take from 7 to 12 years. Since new weapons can be developed by our adversaries as well (frequently must more rapidly because there is no public debate involved in their development), prudence requires that we invest across the spectrum in research and development to limit surprise. We thus regularly face the difficult problem of tradeoffs between today's capability and tomorrow's possibilities, uncertainties, risk, and costs.

Finally, the question of "how much is enough" cannot be answered independently of the first four factors, but neither can it be answered with reference to these factors alone. We recognize the inevitable tradeoffs among defense, domestic programs, and private consumption.

This outline of the problem underlines one clear conclusion: defense planning is extraordinarily complex-so complex that reasonable individuals can reach different conclusions about the right solution. There are so many variables to be weighed, and hard judgments to be made, that unanimity is unattainable. Disagreement and debate is a source of strength in our democracy. Members of the Congress, especially members of the committees most concerned with defense, should act as an informed board of directors for the nation's shareholders-reviewing DoD's plans, programs, and performance. But boards of directors reach conclusions and either authorize management to proceed, or demand presentation of new proposals for quick decision. Endless debate is not a strength. It can be a weakness that totalitarian adversaries exploit.

Chapter 1.C.5

* * *

Dominant Force Planning Cases: Maxwell Taylor for Today's Strategic Thinkers

Henry C. Bartlett and G Paul Holman

In 1979, General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, (Ret.), wrote a seminal article on military force planning. Based on his experience as a former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and later Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, he addressed the growing national consensus that, "our military strength has been allowed to decline too far in relation to that of the Soviet military establishment . . . " {1} Current assessments differ, especially in the wake of startling developments in a wide range of East-West negotiations. However, the methodology which underlay Taylor's thinking has stood the test of time for those concerned with planning U.S. military forces. The purpose of this article is threefold: to review Taylor's approach for today's strategic thinkers; to expand upon it where appropriate; and to consider the dominant force planning cases in light of current events.

Taylor's Methodology

Taylor's approach consists of three steps:

o Determine the Threat. Demonstrate the existence of clear dangers to broadly accepted national interests, in terms of specific scenarios for crisis or combat;

o Assess the Probability of Occurrence. Weigh the likelihood of each threat scenario in terms of the adversary's capabilities and intentions to execute the threat. For example:

1. Possession of adequate means;
2. Absence of excessive cost or risk;
3. Consistency of such action with past behavior;
4. No cheaper or safer way to achieve the goal.

o Estimate the Damage. Consider the potential harm to our national interests if the adversary carried out the threat. {2}

In his article, Taylor considered three threats important enough to examine as separate scenarios or force planning cases. The first was, "a surprise strategic attack by the Soviets for the primary purpose of destroying all or most of our land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as a step to eliminate or neutralize a major rival for global hegemony." The second was, "a major conventional attack on NATO by

the Soviets in the hope of destroying this hostile coalition, evicting U.S. forces from Europe and absorbing the region into the Soviet political-economic system." Taylor called his third case the trade protection mission. This broad case arose from "the dangers to the national economy resulting from its growing dependence on imports, particularly oil, and from hostile efforts to interfere with our access to their sources." {3}

Having established his force planning cases, Taylor next considered their relative probability of occurrence. He argued that a surprise nuclear attack by the Soviet Union upon our strategic nuclear forces was extremely unlikely because of the excessive risks of massive U.S. retaliation. As for the NATO case, he regarded the early defeat of NATO conventional forces as "highly probable". But the risk of escalation to nuclear war, together with the uncertain costs of seizing and occupying Europe, led him to conclude that the NATO case has only a "somewhat higher probability of occurrence" than the strategic nuclear case and "is somewhat less dangerous for U.S. interests provided strategic warfare does not ensue." He considered the third threat--"the exploitation of our growing dependence on imports" by the Soviets or other ill-wishers--as a near-certainty, which would be encountered repeated]y. {4}

As his final step, Taylor examined the potential damage to U.S. interests if his scenarios occurred. Strategic nuclear war would be a catastrophe and might jeopardize long-term national survival. A conventional attack could devastate key trading partners, consign a major portion of Eurasia to hostile hands, and alter the global balance of power. As for Taylor's third case-- exploitation of our resource dependency--conservation and substitution could minimize its impact. However, we would still face serious economic problems. {5}

Strengths and Weaknesses of Taylor's Approach

Taylor's methodology, as outlined above, has important strengths from a force planning perspective:

o Spectrum of Conflict. Taylor's thinking coincides with current depictions of the spectrum of conflict, as shown in figure 1. {6} This graphic concept portrays the full range of mission areas--from strategic nuclear attack to crisis response and peacetime presence-in terms of their estimated damage and probability of occurrence.

Figure 1

Graph showing Estimate of Damage and Probability of Occurrence

o Regional Analysis. Another strength is Taylor's use of regional analysis. He begins with defense of the American homeland (strategic nuclear war), descends the ladder of national interests to the defense of

NATO Europe, and then considers the sea lanes of communication. Force planners have traditionally thought in terms of the requirements for combat in specific geographic areas. However, that approach should be combined with the spectrum of conflict, which, if used alone, is not complete enough for investigating the full depth and range of planning cases.

o Threat Categories. Taylor distinguishes between Soviet and non Soviet threats to national interests (which the spectrum of conflict does not necessarily do). He begins with the Soviet threat (Moscow's strategic nuclear capabilities); proceeds to the Soviet bloc threat (Warsaw Pact conventional capabilities against NATO), and ends with threats that might be either Soviet or non-Soviet.

o Priority. Finally, Taylor organizes his planning cases systematically by using probability of occurrence and estimate of damage. Thus he provides a basis for setting priorities. Such priorities serve useful purposes for force planners. Which case do I think about first? Where do I apply the next available dollar? And under the current reality of constrained spending, what must I protect? {7}

Despite these strengths,, there are aspects of Taylor's approach which could be improved. It is unclear how each of his planning cases is related to our broad national strategy. Furthermore, he does not explain his omission of other important regional planning cases, such as the Pacific and Middle East. Nor does he differentiate among the several warfare environments: space, sea, air, and ground.



We propose to broaden and update Taylor's approach. We will assess a full array of force planning cases and establish appropriate priorities among them. We begin by considering the regional planning cases (including defense of the homeland against nuclear attack) followed by environmental cases (space, sea, air, and ground). Our article ends at that point. You may agree with our planning cases and priorities, or you may prefer to develop your own. You will then be ready to consider each case, in terms of the level and mix of required forces-all within the bounds of available resources, objectives, strategy and risk.

Regional Planning Cases

U.S. grand strategy, which dates from the aftermath of the Second World War, stresses the containment of Soviet power through a series of alliances around the Eurasian continent. It leads to a military strategy of forward defense, which in turn gives rise to a series of regional planning cases based upon axes of potential Soviet expansion. U.S. strategy must also accommodate a number of non-Soviet threats to our national interests.

Homeland (Strategic Nuclear)

Threat Assessment: Strategic nuclear warfare is a complex subject, which has long dominated our national security planning process. Today, Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (primarily land-based) can destroy a significant portion of U.S. nuclear retaliatory forces (ICBMs, bomber bases and key port facilities) in a surprise attack. Or they could devastate the U.S. population and industrial base. The key issue in the threat assessment is what fraction of U.S. forces would survive attack (secure at sea, in the air, or in undamaged ICBM silos) and threaten retaliation in kind. There are also many questions surrounding the potential damage inflicted by Soviet air-breathing platforms (both bombers and cruise missiles).

Probability of Occurrence: Such a conflict is most unlikely because both sides still possess a secure, survivable capability to retaliate.
Estimate of Damage: Both countries could be devastated by nuclear war. Indeed, no other threat so powerfully jeopardizes their survival in the short term.

Priority for Force Planning: In analyzing this case, we are weighing two variables against each other-one very small (probability of occurrence) and the other very large (estimate of damage). Force planners have always been cautious, stressing the estimate of damage and ranking this case as top priority. Furthermore, the constraints upon decision makers are critical. As an example, warning time for a surprise attack could be as little as 30 minutes (ICBM flight time from one continent to the other).

Therefore, this case should continue to enjoy the highest force planning priority. We do not mean that it should take all available resources, or even most of them. Nor do we mean that it would necessarily take the next available dollar-unless the risk becomes intolerable. But, when we say that this case is the number one priority, we mean that it must be considered first. The force planner must be confident in our ability to deter the worst case of a surprise, counter-force Soviet attack. Otherwise resources must be applied ahead of the other cases to minimize risk.

NATO.

Threat Assessment: NATO has a larger population than its potential enemies, a far greater economic base, and certain advantages which accrue to a defender. Moreover, many improvements have been made in the NATO position over the past few years. Even so, the Warsaw Pact still maintains more men under arms and equipment-especially main battle tanks, artillery, and chemical weapons.

Probability of Occurrence: The risk of a NATO-Soviet war is low. Even so, the NATO planning case is more susceptible to changing circumstances than the strategic nuclear case. There are more than two national players in the European case; there are harsher historical animosities among those players; and they have common borders. Taken together, this relationship holds more potential for unpredictable behavior than the U.S.-Soviet relationship in strategic nuclear matters.

Estimate of Damage: A European conventional war might result in destruction comparable to World War I and II. If such a conflict involved nuclear weapons, the damage would be unprecedented. Furthermore, such nuclear escalation might extend to the U.S. and Soviet Union. Even if the conflict were limited to Europe, and NATO prevailed, the cost to U.S. force structure and economic interests would be severe. If such a conflict resulted in a U.S. and Soviet nuclear exchange, the estimate of damage would be comparable to the strategic nuclear planning case. Furthermore, if NATO or parts of Western Europe should fall under Soviet influence or control- through political manipulation or military coercion-US. interests and the global balance of power would be seriously affected.

Priority for Force Planning. These considerations lead to the view that a Soviet conventional attack on NATO might well escalate to central nuclear war between the superpowers. Indeed, NATO's strategy of flexible response threatens such escalation to compensate for Soviet conventional superiority. This risk reduces the likelihood that such an attack will ever happen, but by the same logic, it intensifies the potential damage to NATO and the United States.

Time would not be as critical as in the strategic nuclear case. Unless Moscow initiated war with a nuclear attack, NATO would have opportunities for negotiation and force generation. Thus we argue that the NATO conventional planning case is priority number three, after the strategic nuclear case and the space case (which we address later in the article). Again, we do not mean that it should consume all or most of the resources available after those cases are settled. Nor do we mean that NATO must indefinitely enjoy the percentage of U.S. defense spending it does today.

Pacific.

Threat Assessment: Since World War II, the U.S. has fought two wars

in the Pacific to contain communist expansion. During that period, the threat varied among North Korea, Communist China and North Vietnam. Today, our regional allies command more economic and military strength than ever before. Furthermore, our former adversaries have deferred expansionism for now. China's focus is clearly on internal development; Vietnam appears to be reorienting its priorities in the same direction; and perhaps even the traditional "wild card" of North Korea will be influenced by similar thinking if current trends continue.

Probability of Occurrence: Force planners have long studied four scenarios for conflict in the Pacific. U.S.-Soviet conflict arising from events in the Pacific is least likely. There is a small but greater risk that superpower conflict in the Pacific could be caused by combat in other theaters. A Korean conflict cannot be ruled out because of Pyongyang's historic unpredictability. Highest in probability is some lesser contingency against a non-Soviet threat. Philippine insurgency is a case in point, as are territorial disputes in the South.China Sea.

Estimate of Damage: War with the Soviets in the Pacific could gravely jeopardize U.S. economic and security interests. Trade patterns could be disrupted, and America's western states might be threatened-especially our Alaskan oil reserves. If Korea, Japan, or other trading partners were attacked, the very fabric of our alliance relationships and global stability would be at risk.

A conflict between the two Koreas would immediately involve American air and ground units. Whether or not it would escalate above conventional war or beyond the Korean peninsula is hard to predict. Past history, however, suggests that Russia and China would work hard to limit the conflict. In that case, damage to U.S. national interests would be minimal.

American involvement in lesser Pacific contingencies could affect a wide range of national interests. At most, we might face the loss of key overseas bases, such as Clark Air Base and Subic Bay, or the creation of new anti American regimes. At least, we would worry about the damage to international goodwill and regional stability. (These estimates of damage for so-called "lesser contingencies" assume that we could avoid a protracted conflict similar to the Vietnam model.)

Priority for Force Planning: American national security planners have historically considered the Pacific after Western Europe. But over the past decade the growing wealth, technological sophistication, and international trade of this region have demanded growing attention for the Pacific. We now trade more vigorously with this region than ever before, and many of our first-line military systems rely heavily on subassemblies manufactured there.

From a military perspective, the potential damage to the U.S.-in our judgment-is less than in Western Europe. We base this view on both

geography and geopolitics. Our key trading partners and allies (except for Thailand) are either island nations or defensible peninsulas. Water barriers and great distances separate most of them from potential attackers. In this regard, they differ crucially from the vastly smaller confines of Western Europe, whose contiguous states lie open to traditional invasion corridors for massive land forces.

Current geopolitical realities further bolster American allies in the Pacific. The very diversity of ideologies and cultures favors a reasonably stable balance of power. No multilateral alliance links the communist nations. On the contrary, China, which was once a major cause of regional tensions, has tended to stabilize the region in recent years.

Politically, the most productive Asian nations are also becoming the most stable ones. Moreover, they are well aware of the need to defend themselves and have impressive ability to increase their military power. Japan, above all, stands out, as a candidate for greater "burden-sharing" in defense of the Pacific.

On balance, we believe chat the Pacific should still be considered after the strategic nuclear, space, and NATO planning cases. The military threats and estimates of damage to U.S. national interests seem significantly lower. But the different scenarios for the Pacific make it particularly complex, and its importance for force planners is growing.

Middle East/Southwest Asia.

Threat Assessment: Moscow enjoys the advantages of geographical proximity, common borders with key countries, and some heavily armed client states. These capabilities understandably trouble American planners, although the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan is a positive development.

Non-Soviet threats could also jeopardize U.S. interests. Terrorists from a wide array of radical groups might attack U.S. citizens, economic interests, embassies, and deployed forces. However, their primary targets are likely to remain local governments friendly to the West.

Probability of Occurrence: No other region of the world holds such potential for sparking conflict between the superpowers, even though recent events have lowered the degree of risk. Local hatreds are intense, tempers short, and wars incessant among a bewildering array of superpower clients, religious fanatics, and criminal factions. A U.S.-Soviet confrontation might result from a regional power vacuum, a regional crisis (such as another Indo Pakistani flare-up), or oil constraints (perhaps arising from Arab-Israeli hostilities).

Estimate of Damage: If the Middle East or Southwest Asia should fall under hostile control, the West might suffer reduced access to both the world's largest oil resources and key lines of communication from the

Atlantic to the Pacific. Moreover, there is a high risk that combat in this region may escalate to chemical, toxicological, or even nuclear conflict. The proliferation of ballistic missiles increases the risk of regional tensions spilling over into superpower confrontation.

However, several considerations tend to reduce our estimates of damage. Oil heads are widely dispersed, and some are separated from potential attackers by great distance and fairly defensible terrain. Alternate lines of communication do exist, and the use of special weapons may be deterred by the threat of retaliation in kind. Finally, any expansionist power is likely to generate powerful opposition from its neighbors.

Priority for Force Planning: Moscow has withdrawn its battered forces from Afghanistan, thus easing our fears of Soviet expansion. We are also reassured by the fact that oil managed to flow throughout the Iran-Iraq War. On balance, economic and political instruments of national strategy may reduce the risk of conflict.

Our capabilities for using military power in the Middle East and Southwest Asia improved over the 1980s. Even so, this region is further from the United States than any other and would consequently impose the highest logistical costs. In Taylor's terms-weighing the threat, probability of occurrence and estimate of damage-this case should be considered after the NATO and Pacific cases.

Other Regions.

Threat Assessment: Several other regions compete for the attention of force planners. Central America has been the most controversial over the past few years. Whether it will remain so prominent depends on the threat of Cuban and Soviet military forces, which are closer to the American homeland than in other planning cases. Events in South America, the Caribbean, and Africa will continue to affect American foreign policy--and may briefly dominate it. Even so, they will rarely pose a major threat to America or its major allies.

Probability of Occurrence: Could events in these regions cause a U.S.-Soviet conflict? We think not. The Soviets have been increasingly conservative about confronting the U.S. directly. Also, they would suffer severe logistical constraints when operating in these areas. Throughout these lesser planning cases, it is Soviet surrogates and non-Soviet threats which will from time to time create a high probability of conflict for U.S. forces.

Estimate of Damage: Plausible antagonists are less powerfully armed than in the previous planning cases, while American logistical capabilities for combat would be far greater. At most, we might fear serious but temporary disruptions-such as closure of the Panama Canal-or diminished access to scarce minerals.

Priority for Force Planners: Many conflict situations will continue to threaten American interests in Central America, the Caribbean, South America, and Africa. Such regional struggles for political stability will occasionally embroil U.S. forces. Moreover, to the extent that illegal drugs from these areas penetrate American borders, we can anticipate more pressure from our own public for military action.

However, there are many arguments which lead the force planner to assign a relatively low priority to these regions. In general, the military instrument of national power has proven less effective than economic and political means. Furthermore, events are notoriously unpredictable and thus create the constant risk of sub-optimization due to changing circumstances. Finally, U.S. force planners have long assumed that if they can cope with the most serious situations, they can deter or defeat "lesser included" threats. The wisdom of such an assumption is invariably debated in the aftermath of every regional crisis.

Global.

Threat Assessment: Only the Soviet Union and its key allies could pose the threat of global, conventional war with the United States. Western planners have devoted much time to examining such scenarios over the past decade.

Probability of Occurrence: Such a conflict seems almost as improbable as a strategic nuclear attack upon our homeland. However, there is a clear risk that regional conflict between the superpowers might escalate around the world.

Estimate of Damage: The harm done by a global, conventional war with the Soviet Union would, in all probability, surpass the damage suffered in World War II. If it escalated to nuclear war, the results would undoubtedly be catastrophic.

Priority for Force Planning: Analysis of this case should follow all the others-including the environmental cases below. Since it has the potential to be the "worst case" in terms of duration and logistics, it forces us to look at the global forest, as well as the regional trees. Periodically we need to assess the harshest demands upon our people, economy, and industrial base. Although hedged by impressive assumptions and huge uncertainties, the global case can help to minimize theater and service proclivities for suboptimization in force planning.

Environmental Cases

Space.

Threat Assessment: In conceptual terms, space has been an environmental medium for force planners since the first ballistic missiles achieved enough range, accuracy, and destructive capacity to

carry out strategic missions. But only in very recent years have the Soviets begun to acquire technological capabilities so serious that the space planing case warrants specific and dedicated attention. {8} As we see it, the space threat takes several distinct forms:

o Strategic attack through space by ballistic missiles.

o Space defense by the Soviets against our strategic retaliatory force.

o Denial of our use of space through:

--Attack upon our satellites (by many possible means) which are of growing importance for early warning; command, control and communications; reconnaissance; and the conduct of military operations;

--Denial of our ability to launch new platforms into space.

o Evolving technology, which may result in direct, space-to-earth attack, against our deployed forces, mobility assets (strategic airlift), or even our homeland. Such attacks could occur with less warning time than in any other force planning case.

Probability of Occurrence: War in space is directly linked, in our view, to every major scenario for U.S.-Soviet conflict. If any such scenarios occur, conflict in space would probably happen as well. Unless or until the U.S. can respond in kind to the Soviet capability for attack on space-based assets, the absence of a deterrent will increase the likelihood of this form of combat. We doubt that even the most ambitious arms control regime will alter this situation.

Estimate of Damage: Should any country gain a unilateral ability to wage war in space, or from space to earth, its position in the global balance of power would increase dramatically. At every level of combat, its own military capabilities would be enhanced at the expense of the adversary.

Priority for Force Planning: Today, we think space should be considered second, immediately after the homeland (strategic nuclear) case. Our reasons are threefold. First, space is the environment which

would provide an attacker the most direct and rapid access to our homeland. We grant that this "worst case" assessment of attack directly from space is not yet a reality. But the technological trends are very clear. Indeed, we may see a day when we would rank this force planning case ahead of the strategic nuclear, if only because the time available for decision-makers to respond to a specific threat might be less.

Secondly, open access to space for warning and intelligence gathering is now a necessary condition for deterring strategic nuclear

war. Thirdly, we cannot allow the trend of greater reliance on space-based systems to reduce our ability to deter or fight a conventional war. If we are going to rely on the force multiplier effect of space-based support, we must ensure its availability in time of conflict.

Sea.

Threat Assessment: For the first time since World War II, a rival power could seriously threaten America at sea. Historically, the maritime superiority of first England and then the Anglo-American coalition was used to counterbalance the continental strength of first Germany and then the Soviet Union. That historic balance is now challenged by the Russian bear's progress at learning to swim.

Moscow has the naval and maritime assets to disrupt global commerce along the sea lines of communications. They could also interfere with our ability to reinforce and resupply NATO, the Pacific, or Southwest Asia. Finally, their many and diverse naval assets could also be used to project Soviet power around the world.

Probability of Occurrence: We see no reason why the probability of a global war at sea against the Soviet Union would be any higher than the risk of war in the cases already discussed. In fact, we estimate that combat at sea would only begin as a result of tensions originating on land.

Estimate of Damage: The damage to national interests would be serious if we lost our traditional maritime strength. Without it, we would be unable to accomplish our missions in any of the regional planning cases which arise from the forward defense strategy.

Priority for Force Planners: Some authorities would delete the sea, air, and ground cases, contending that such environmental cases are subsumed under regional planning considerations for joint forces. We disagree, believing that the maritime case requires separate treatment because of several unique features:

o First, the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans flank the North American continent. Therefore, as in the strategic nuclear and space planning cases, the maritime case can involve direct threats to our homeland.

o Second, as a maritime nation we depend heavily on sea-borne commerce. This potential vulnerability has troubled us since our earliest days. From the War of 1812 (Barbary Pirates) to our recent adventures in the Persian Gulf, we have always required the capability to negate threats to our sea lines of communications.

o Third, control of the seas is a prerequisite for rapid and sustained reinforcement of allies on other continents. With relatively

modest assets, by modern standards, the German Navy probed this vulnerability in two world wars. It is unwise to assume that the Soviet Navy might not try to improve on German efforts. Thus, the United States cannot safely follow a strategy of forward defense in Europe or elsewhere unless we can confidently dominate the sea at times and places of our choosing.

o Fourth, on a global basis we have many allies with powerful land and air forces to support our strategy of forward deployment on and around the Eurasian continent for the primary purpose of deterring the Soviet threat. But in other parts of the world, especially at sea, and against other adversaries, we are not so fortunate. This weakness, however, is offset by the relative speed and power of U.S. naval forces which can be brought to bear for crisis management.

o Finally, maritime superiority is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for victory against a Eurasian land power. From a historical perspective, the maritime power cannot expect to defeat the land power solely by strength at sea. However, if the maritime power's "battle fleet" is defeated, it may lose the entire war.

Air and Ground.

There is no significant air threat to America beyond the strategic nuclear case. As a result, the level and mix of air-breathing systems (aside from the bomber, cruise missile, and air defense components of the strategic nuclear case) are dominated by the regional planning requirements of NATO, the Pacific, and Southwest Asia.

Much the same logic applies to ground forces today. The only country which might plausibly project land power against the Continental U.S. would be the Soviet Union (chose assault forces might have some real but highly speculative missions to perform in the event of protracted U.S.-Soviet war). Consequently, the level and mix of ground forces are likewise dominated by the regional planning cases.

This situation may be changing. Some observers already see significant threats from within our own hemisphere-whether instability in Central America or the pervasive penetration of our borders by trucks, ships and aircraft bearing illegal drugs. Even so, we suspect that air and ground forces will continue to be planned in terms of broad regional requirements, rather than separate planning cases in and of themselves.

Conclusions

Taylor's approach helps force planners to organize their thinking about total force requirements of astounding complexity, depth, and expense. Prospective force planners usually feel comfortable in dealing with their own war fighting specialties. However, all experience frustration and uncertainty when confronted by the task of integrating

total force requirements. How do the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and Air Force fit together? How does Southwest Asia relate to the Pacific, NATO, and defense of the homeland? How does strategic nuclear warfare relate to naval and low intensity conflict, if at all?

We contend that Taylor's logic can help the force planner to answer such questions. His building block approach breaks the total force planning problem into manageable bites. Individual planning cases are identified and set in priority based on probability of occurrence and estimate of damage. Each can then be analyzed in terms of objectives, strategy, level and mix of forces, and risk. In every case, there is a gap between ideal and reality; resources and commitments; or promise and delivery. But the tolerable gap is narrower at the top. We can accept less risk when dealing with the most dominant planning cases.

The cases arrayed in Figure 2 are not exhaustive. Some will argue that the air and ground cases should be explored independently. Others will contend that power projection or low intensity conflict merit separate cases.

FORCE PLANNING CASES

		THREAT SCENARIO	PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE	ESTIMATE OF DAMAGE	PRIORITY	OBJECTIVES	STRATEGY	FORCES
REGIONAL	HOMELAND (STRATEGIC NUCLEAR)							
	NATO							
	PACIFIC							
	SWA/ME							
	OTHER							
	GLOBAL							
ENVIRONMENTAL	SPACE							
	SEA							
	AIR							
	GROUND							

Figure 2. FORCE PLANNING CASES

Having read our analysis, would you differ with our set of major force planning cases? Or would you establish a different scale of priorities? How would you reason your way through national objectives and military strategy to the actual force requirements for each planning case? And finally, having considered each distinct case, how would you integrate them into a coherent and affordable U.S. military force structure?

It is for you to answer such questions. We believe that Taylor's methodology will help you to do so. Indeed, we have found that our own ideas changed significantly as we submitted ourselves to the discipline of his logic.

Notes

1. Maxwell D. Taylor, "Changing Military Priorities," AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1979, pp. 2-13.

2. An excellent discussion of national interests can be found in Drew and Snow, "Grand National Strategy," chapter 1.B.1.

3. Taylor, pp. 2 and 7.

4. Ibid., pp. 3-5.

5. Ibid.

6. The Spectrum of Conflict diagram is adapted from Figure 3 in Admiral James D. Watkins, U.S. Navy, "The Maritime Strategy", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Supplement to January, 1986, p. 8.

7. To set the right priorities for competing military options is never easy. The defense, planner's quest for "more bang for the buck" closely resembles the economic concept of profit maximization. The business person should apply his or her next investible dollar (marginal dollar) to that product or service which makes the greatest marginal contribution to profits per unit produced. However, the defense planner has no profit measure; thus the marginal dollar concept does not offer much help in setting Priorities among the planning cases (as it would for the businessman). Instead, the defense planner makes that determination in terms of probability of occurrence and estimate of damage.

Within each case, however, marginal analysis is important. Given several ways to solve a perceived military problem, the force planner would logically choose that alternative which provides the most payoff in terms of effectiveness and efficiency per dollar of input, as shown below.



WITHIN CASE ANALYSIS

8. For evidence of the growing importance of space as a planning case, compare Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the

Congress Fiscal Year 1990 with the same document for Fiscal Year 1989. In its assessment of the military balance, the 1989 document proceeds directly from the strategic balance to the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance, on pp. 25-34. The 1990 version, however, inserts an evaluation of "The Military Space Balance" at pp. 17-19.

Chapter 2: Emerging Threats
A: Introductory Essay
* * *

Assessing the Threat

G. Paul Holman, Jr.

Defining and Analyzing "The Threat"

Of all the concepts involved in the force planning process, none arouses as much confusion and controversy as "The Threat." Even within the relatively narrow confines of the Intelligence Community, it inevitably ignites conflict both within and between the agencies. All too often, the result is a murky and rising tide of contradictions between official statements and the sniping allegations of politically motivated "leakers." Significant though such controversies are, they are dwarfed by wildly differing appraisals of "The Threat" as seen by members of Congress, lobby groups (sometimes including various churches and religious groups), retired officers and ex-civil servants with an axe to grind, contract researchers (whose findings are occasionally "massaged" to suit the needs of their sponsors), the opinionated professorate of academia, and the media. {1}

This diversity of views among the so-called experts tends to discredit the Intelligence Community in the eyes of senior national decision makers. Again and again, the Intelligence Community has been asked to overcome its internal differences of opinion and to present a compromise, "consensus" appraisal of "The Threat." Such pleas run afoul of a long parade of "intelligence failures" from Pearl Harbor, through the fall of the Shah, to the bloody attacks on the U.S. Embassy and Marines in Beirut. In far too many cases, the "consensus" opinion has obscured the single agency or analyst who was in a minority but just happened to be right. As a result, the Intelligence Community has usually found a way for dissenters to express their views in some sort of footnote or alternative text. This freedom can be misused. Idealists periodically complain of the fact that careful trumpeting of the "The Threat" can favorably influence departmental budgets, while cynics proceed on the motto, "To each his own Threat."

Department of Defense publications often refer very loosely to "The Threat" as a synonym for the Soviet Armed Forces. However, it can also refer, by extension, to any ally or proxy of the U.S.S.R. In its broadest sense,

"The Threat" can denote a nonaligned but hostile country (Iran under the Mullahs comes to mind), or even a transnational phenomenon (as in, "the threat of nuclear proliferation").

Precisely what is meant by "The Threat" can be somewhat obscure, let

alone how this concept is applied to specific weapons, countries, regions, or situations. JCS Pub. 1 offers no agreed definition. One unofficial dictionary defines "Threat" as "The capabilities, intentions, and actions of actual or potential enemies to prevent or interfere with the successful fulfillment of national security interests or objectives." {2}

Uncounted generations of intelligence officers have made "The Threat Briefing" a very distinctive art form, in which capabilities weigh far more heavily than intentions. Inasmuch as only capabilities kill, this is an understandable-perhaps even a necessary-bias for the warriors and war planners of any nation. Even commanders who have never contemplated von Clausewitz instinctively understand that it is wiser to prepare for what the enemy Can do than for what he might or might not intend to do.

Unfortunately for harried planners, but fortunately for careful commanders, a third factor complicates the first two elements of threat assessment: vulnerabilities. Both people and machines sometimes fail, and the greater the scale of combat the greater the risk that sometime, somewhere, self-inflicted wounds will detract from military performance. Complete evaluations of "The Threat" must, therefore, address the weaknesses of the other side as well as its strengths.

The fourth element of threat assessment allows at least a partial resolution of the many uncertainties summarized thus far: the circumstances, situations, or "scenarios" within which combat might plausibly occur. In theory, scenarios can be endlessly varied, improved and endowed with whatever level of detail one might need to approach reality ever more closely. In fact, however, bias rears its ugly head, since incomplete, skewed, or unrealistic scenarios can vitiate any assessment and thus distort our insights into "The Threat."

Let us assume that our brightest analyst has total command of all that the Intelligence Community knows about "The Threat's" capabilities, intentions and vulnerabilities with regard to any given situation. Such information is of keen intellectual interest in and of itself, but to satisfy the force planner it must be weighed against similar data concerning our own forces in the form of a "net assessment." Thus another analyst or, more likely, an entire team of analysts must provide equally detailed information on friendly capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities with regard to the same situation.

Given whatever comparative data are at hand, we can finally undertake a "net assessment." But which kind? Rarely can we rest content with the two-dimensional view provided by mere quantitative assessments. Yet qualitative comparisons, especially at realistic levels of complexity, frequently elude our intelligence collection capabilities. (See Figure 1 for a graphic portrayal of the major types of assessment techniques.)



Figure 1. Assessment Tree

Similarly, dynamic assessments-which account for the changes likely to occur on both sides over some specified period of combat-provide better grounds for judgment than do the pre-combat, counting techniques of static comparison. Mathematical modelling, war gaming, and campaign analysis are some of the available techniques for dynamic assessment. At their best, such methods allow a more sophisticated appreciation of comparative strengths and weaknesses than we ever had in the past. At their worst, however, these techniques can be no better than the data, scenarios, and assumptions upon which they are constructed.

Even within the simpler realm of static comparisons, there are escalating levels of complexity. Symmetric or side-by-side assessment (e,g., our bombers compared to their bombers) lend themselves nicely to colorful bar graphs for impressing the public or those who control our purse strings, but the fact that such forces rarely confront each other in combat makes them too crude for much force planning. For that, we need asymmetric or head-to-head comparisons (e.g., our bombers against their air defenses and their bombers against our air defenses).

Few governments have the resources in time, money, personnel, and patience to base all their force planning decisions on the most exhaustive net assessments" of which they might theoretically be capable. Worse, ineradicable differences of opinion within any government intrude upon rationality. Congressmen, diplomats, journalists, and college professors do not entirely share the military proclivity to take capabilities more seriously than the other elements of the "net assessment" process.

As a result, non-military planners are quick to point out-and rightly so; that overemphasis on the capabilities of a real or potential antagonist would waste our money and perhaps incite or exacerbate an avoidable arms race, Frederick H. Hartmann summarizes this aspect of the assessment process quite realistically in his classic work, The Relations of Nations:

> ...bureaucratic analysis within any state of its power problem or "threat" will normally involve some disagreement. The reason is that military staffers will consider the power problem first and foremost from the standpoint of capability. They will begin with an analysis of enemy order of battle data-the "hardware" an enemy would have at his disposal if war broke out. Foreign office officials, by contrast, will begin either with intentions (which, to the military man, usually seem vague and ambiguous), or they will even more often begin by considering the total circumstances that limit the potential enemies' freedom of action (that is, what happens at his back once he is frontally involved).
>
> Thus "threat analysis" in the foreign office almost always begins in the "middle" or at the "rear" and works toward the

"front," whereas the military man's analysis begins at the "front," progresses with a very suspended judgment toward the "middle," and stops short of the "back." Military threat analysis stops short because bureaucratic tradition plus an instinctive preference make

it do so. Military men, believing that intentions can be altered faster than extra defensive military capability can be assembled, will lean, if they are prudent, toward "worst case" calculations. {3}

The Soviet Threat

The implosion of the Soviet empire under Gorbachev came as a great surprise to Russians and Americans alike. Even so, it was not the first time that our perception of the "The Soviet Threat" had changed abruptly. Some extreme examples of these shifting views would include the following:

-- "Allied Intervention" in the Russian Civil War of 1918-1921. American troops did no major fighting, but their presence testified to deep fears of Soviet goals.

-- The "Grand Alliance" of World War II, when we fought side by side with the Soviet Union against the Axis and assured ourselves that Stalin was merely a nationalist with no aspirations for global domination.

-- The early days of the "Cold War," when we rearmed to prevent Soviet expansion and again worried about Communists in our own midst.

-- The "Cuban Missile Crisis" of 1962, when we came closer to nuclear war than at any time before or since.

-- The "Detente" of the early 1970s, when we concentrated our efforts on the war in Southeast Asia, attempted to profit from Sino-Soviet rivalry, signed dozens of agreements (most notably SALT I and II) intended to improve relations with the U.S.S.R., and opened the floodgates of credit and technology transfer to the East.

-- The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which both revived American fears and exacerbated Soviet weaknesses that had been accumulating over the decades.

Just as the Intelligence Community failed to predict the invasion of Afghanistan, so it anticipated neither the rebellion of the non-Russians nor the vigor of reformists within the Soviet elite. American liberals and conservatives disagree sharply about which of our many intelligence failures have done most harm to our national interests.

In general, conservatives believe that our greatest failure was

perhaps the underestimate of Soviet determination to achieve strategic superiority. {4} Secretary of Defense McNamara predicated both our strategic doctrine and our force posture of the 1960s on the assumption that the Soviets would indefinitely tolerate strategic parity, if not some level of American strategic superiority. That belief became progressively less tenable over the 1970s. Profiting from America's post-Vietnam malaise, Brezhnev enthusiastically modernized all elements of his own armed forces and pumped huge quantities of rubles into the proxy wars of Vietnam, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Washington's passivity in the face of such provocations must have convinced the Kremlin that direct intervention in the Afghan civil war would pose little risk of reawakening America.

Liberals make a powerful retort to this line of reasoning. They contend that the Intelligence Community has long exaggerated Soviet hostility to the West and ignored clear evidence of desires for fundamental reform of the Soviet system. {5} As a result, American observers contradict each other very sharply about the impact of the "Reagan Doctrine," SDI, and rising defense budgets on the Soviet threat. Conservatives assert that Reagan stressed the Soviets so heavily that communism collapsed under the strain, thus making Gorbachev possible. Liberals reply that Reagan only exacerbated U.S.-Soviet tensions, thus preventing unprecedented breakthroughs in arms control and delaying the rise to power of the Soviet reformists. {6}

Such intelligence errors and politically charged debates could be minimized if we thought more carefully about the Russian and Soviet past. Russia is the embittered heir of a thousand years of history. As a continental power, it has always been surrounded, sometimes by dangerously powerful, but more often by enticingly weak neighbors. Westerners disagree rather fruitlessly over whether to characterize the resulting Muscovite mentality as basically offensive or basically defensive, but all can agree that the Kremlin is obsessed by the desire for extraordinarily high levels of military power. When Russia was weak, both Asiatic and European conquerors trooped ferociously across her soil. When Russia was strong, her armies more than retaliated for old injuries and expanded her sphere of direct and indirect control.

Communist ideology both transformed and reinforced the old Imperial Russian desire for the expansion of Moscow's power and influence. Just as the old Russian tsars once sanctified their imperial ambitions in terms of the Orthodox Christian religion, so the Kremlin's leaders since 1917 have legitimized themselves with the new faith of Communism. Thus each real or nominal increase in Soviet global power is officially portrayed as yet another step by the workers of the world toward their inevitable, global victory.

It is likely that careerist chameleons or mere Russian nationalists who mouth Communists slogans while thinking and acting very much like

tsarist bureaucrats, outnumber true believers in the long tarnished vision of what they still call "the bright Communist future." According to Arkady Shevchenko, a Soviet diplomat formerly assigned to the United Nations and the highest ranking Soviet defector thus far, there are no true believers at the top of the Soviet system. He contends that all members of the ruling elite have been corrupted by their material perquisites and their insulation from the concerns of the common people. Even so, he asserts that key members of the Soviet system regard their overall global policy as superior to that of the West and believe that they will ultimately triumph in their quest for global domination. {7}

Such aspirations by the old Soviet elite clash dramatically with the sordid realities of daily life in a collapsing economy. The multi-national Soviet people have not been so uncertain about their country's future since the darkest days of World War II, and still less can we outsiders predict what will happen to them. At least three extremes are possible: restoration of some new despotism by blood and terror; degeneration into a mass of squabbling nationalities and ideologies; or transformation into some hybrid of Russian Orthodoxy and Western civil society. None will come about quickly or painlessly, and all will have destabilizing consequences for other regions.

Overview of Chapter Two

The goal of this chapter is to depict the various threats to American national interests which have shaped our policy, strategy, and forces. Its readings fall into two distinct categories: those which consider the Soviet Union and those which address a wide range of regional threats. This separation testifies to a basic irony which has perplexed American force planners ever since the early 1950s. Over the past four decades, the Soviet Union has posed far and away the greatest threats to American interests. Only the Soviet Union, of all the countries which at one time or another have pursued anti-American policies, could actually have jeopardized the survival of the United States. And at every specific level of force structure- ranging from naval combatants to attack aircraft and maneuver divisions-only the Soviet Armed Forces have provided the long-term basis for determining our own military requirements.

Yet in spite of our preoccupation with the Soviet threat, at no point in the Cold War did the Soviet and American armed forces openly and directly engage each other in combat. Instead, ever since the late 1940s the two superpowers have found themselves confronting a diverse collection of regional enemies. All too often, the forces of both countries had the wrong equipment and training for the missions that they were actually given. Just as American forces in Vietnam were originally structured for defense against a Soviet attack on Central Europe, so the Soviets invaded Afghanistan with divisions designed primarily for war with NATO.

Section 2.B considers the Soviet threat from several different perspectives, not merely the external threat to the West but also the internal threats to its own stability. It begins with Goldman's analysis of Gorbachev as an economist. The Soviet leader gets high marks for his astounding changes in the political system, but he has not been able to reform the decaying, inefficient, and over-centralized economy. Goldman argues that Gorbachev's economic policies have been so misguided and contradictory as to worsen existing problems, leading him to doubt that Gorbachev will remain in power much longer.

General Odom asks some hard questions about Gorbachev's long-term goals: is he trying to transform the Soviet system or merely revitalize it? When the Soviets claim that their military doctrine is wholly defensive, should we see this as proof that the USSR has become a nonthreatening, status quo power, or should we still worry about strategic deception? Odom sees evidence for both views. He predicts a dramatic decline in Soviet force levels, but he worries that we will overreact, remove the linchpin that U.S. ground forces have provided to NATO, and find ourselves unready to face new threats that may make us nostalgic for the old Warsaw Pact.

Legro examines both optimistic and pessimistic interpretations of the "new thinking" in Soviet military doctrine. He sees a possible decline in the forward-based, standing-start threat. Even so, he stresses Soviet advantages in mobilization and reinforcement, warning that Moscow will still be able to conduct major offensive operations against NATO.

Petersen examines the political and social currents within the Soviet leadership that brought Gorbachev to power. Neither a bloody-handed despot nor a hidebound communist of the old school, the Soviet leader has a sophisticated understanding of the internal problems that threaten his country. Do you agree with Petersen that there is little the Soviet Army can do to keep the non-Russians under Moscow's control? How persuasive is the argument that America should welcome a freer, more productive, and transformed Soviet Union into a new security structure in Europe?

Admiral Kurth is not optimistic about Gorbachev's chances for success. He warns of chaos, if economic reforms do not take hold quickly. Chaos, in turn, could give rise to a new form of authoritarianism and an enormous bloodletting. Why does Kurth conclude that communism in the Soviet Union may be collapsing? To what extent would anarchy or civil war in a nuclear armed superpower affect the national interests of other countries? What counsel does Kurth offer to concerned Western strategists?

Section 2.C extends the force planner's horizon to the rest of the world, assessing a variety of Soviet proxy, non-Soviet, and even non-military threats to American national interests. Brzezinski begins with

a highly debatable assertion: that the Soviet empire is shattered beyond redemption or repair. From this perspective, the threats to the post-communist governments of Central Europe are national and territorial conflicts. Thus Brzezinski advocates a new U.S. policy aimed at ending U.S.-Soviet rivalry over the fate of Europe and creating a stable, cooperative, democratic all-European order. What are the components of this policy? Is it affordable, as well as politically feasible?

Heller sees the Middle East as a vicious competition among increasingly well armed enemies. How optimistic is he about U.S. attempts to settle regional conflicts? What are the implications of the deideologization of Soviet Policy toward this region?

Cheung examines the geo-strategic landscape of Asia. He notes the decline of superpower influence but worries about the rise of the Chinese, Indian, and Japanese navies. Why has seapower re-emerged in the defense calculations of these countries? What are the resulting threats to regional stability?

DuBois contends that China wants to be the dominant power in the Asia Pacific region and may even aspire to global power status. Do such goals--especially when evaluated in light of China's weak economic base-actually threaten the interests of America or its allies?

Indeed, how vital is East Asia compared to other claimants on U.S. resources? Neuchterlein argues that we have long overstated the importance of this region and understated the burdensharing that we should expect from friendly countries. What does he mean when he advocates an offshore strategy for East Asia?

Falcoff likes what he sees in Latin America. Never before have so many countries been ruled by elected, civilian governments. Why does he believe that the Latin countries are of declining importance to the great powers?

Ayittey takes a hard look at Africa, where political repression and economic basket cases are rampant. Why do so few black African nations allow their people to vote, choose their leaders and express themselves freely? How should the West respond to destabilizing demands for democratic reforms?

Supporting anti-Communist resistance movements, bolstering governments threatened by insurgency, and countering terrorism raise the politically divisive subject of low intensity conflict (LIC). Shultz predicts that small wars will continue to jeopardize U.S. national interests (although he notes some positive trends in Soviet, Cuban, Vietnamese, and Palestinian policies). How persuasive is his assertion that the U.S. has yet to fully understand protracted conflicts, indirect aggression and other forms of unconventional warfare?

Rose considers another unpopular topic: biochemical warfare. He believes that soft but deadly weapons are inevitably entering the arsenals of many aggressive and unstable regimes. Which of his three strategies for the U.S.- status quo, patchwork, or aggressive defense-makes the most sense to you?

Dziedzic examines an important but non-military threat (sometimes called a non-traditional security threat): the transnational drug trade. He stresses its painful impact on regional security, yet he cautions against misuse or overuse of regular military forces in fighting it. What does he see as proper roles for the military in the war on drugs?

Harvard professors have big plans for the "peace dividend," according to Lambert's article. They advocate spending trillions of dollars to help the developing world, end poverty, control population growth, cut tobacco smoking, halt the green house effect, and heal the damage to the ecosphere. Do you share the professors' confidence that the decline of military threats and the ascent of women to positions of world leadership have fundamentally altered world politics? Does the dawn of global consciousness favor trust and cooperation among the nations, as opposed to fear and conflict?

The final article in this section summarizes a net assessment from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. It identifies many positive changes and a few that are negative. Moscow has clearly lost control of the East European armed forces, and its vast advantages in the mobilization and generation of ground forces are eroding. U.S.-Soviet conflict seems less likely, but there is an increased probability that non-Soviet crises in the Third World will threaten U.S. interests. What military strengths do the Soviets still have? How does this assessment deal with regional threats, exacerbated by the proliferation of advanced weapons, debt, terrorism, insurgencies, and drug trafficking?

The JCS assessment is a powerful but complicated document. It accepts the fact that deficit reduction efforts, perceptions of a falling Soviet threat, and rising Congressional interest in burdensharing will cause demands for lower defense spending. Predictably, however, it urges caution. The Soviet Union will remain the only nation capable of inflicting vast nuclear destruction on the U.S. and its allies through the 1990s. Substantial modernization of Soviet strategic systems is still continuing, while the range and intensity of non-Soviet threats (measured in terms of their capabilities) have never been as great as they are today. The article concludes by warning against foreclosing options for hedging against new or renewed threats, but it does not say which options would be of greatest importance in hedging against which threats. Indeed, the article's omissions offer much insight into American national security dilemmas.

The ultimate fate of Moscow 's empire is unknowable, and the crumbling of world communism will have wildly different implications for

regional power struggles on every continent. Even so, it would be inadequate simply to say, "The threat is uncertainty." Such a vague formulation would be worse than useless at a time when declining defense budgets demand tough choices among competing services, programs, and regions of the world.

There is no alternative to the traditional method of identifying plausible threats to broadly accepted national interests. Our net assessments may become more generic and less specific (if only to avoid offending our partners in perestroika, as well as current friends and allies who may turn troublesome in the future). {8} Given our past errors, we would also do well to tolerate diversity among our analysts and to encourage some humility in their predictions.

Notes

1. This essay revises and updates Chapter 2.A: "Introductory Essay - Eassy Assessing the Threat" by G. Paul Holman, Jr. in The Force Planning Faculty, Foundations of Force Planning: Concepts and Issues (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1986).

2. Wolfram F. Hanrieder and Larry V. Buel, Words and Arms: A Dictionary of Security and Defense Terms with Suggested Data (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), p. 128.

3. Frederick H. Hartmann, The Relations of Nations, 5th ed. (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1978). p. 261.

4. For elaboration of this argument, see G. Paul Holman, Jr., "Offense-Defense in Soviet Strategic Force Planning," in Robert L. Pfaltxgraff, Jr., and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., eds., Defense Policy in art Era of Constrained Resources (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1989).

5. Jerry F. Hough believes that Westerners have long ignored the Soviet potential for democracy, asserting that the Russians are "returning home" to Europe. "Gorbachev's Politics," Foreign Affairs (Winter 1989/90), p. 27.

6. See Tom Gervasi, The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1986), for a detailed rebuttal of official U.S. Government estimates of Soviet capabilities.

7. Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York, NY: Knopf, 1985), p. 287.

8. The quality of unclassified threat assessments has been steadily rising. Interested readers should review the entire Soviet Military Power

series, which Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger first released in 1981. The latest version by Richard B. Cheney has added a significant subtitle: Prospects for Change (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989). Academic users of this document are optimistic that future versions will both continue to appear and will include the non-Soviet threats.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 2.B.1

* * *

Gorbachev the Economist

Marshall I. Goldman

Not available at this time

Chapter 2.B.2

* * *

Gorbachev's Strategy and Western Security: Illusions Versus Reality

William E. Odom

Not available at this time

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 2.B.3

* * *

The Military Meaning of the New Soviet Doctrine

Jeffrey W. Legro

The current ferment in Soviet military doctrine has led to uncertainty and debate over its implications. On one hand, Gorbachev's peaceful rhetoric, backed by force reductions, is competing with the Bolshoi's ballerinas for favorable Western press reviews. Public opinion - and many public officials-perceive a reduced military threat from the Soviet army. On the other hand, skeptics believe that recent doctrinal changes are compatible with a modernized, more efficient Soviet military machine. In their view, the Soviet army is definitely changing, but the threat will not. A review of the operational implications of the new Soviet security themes indicates that neither the optimist nor pessimist is wholly justified. The effect on the military situation in Europe will be mixed: some changes appear to benefit NATO's position, while others suggest new challenges. Understanding the specifics of this evolution is crucial for determining how the West should respond.

Gorbachev's new thinking in security affairs has promised radical change, but its development has thus far seen greatest elaboration at the sociopolitical level of doctrine, which addresses the nature, objectives, and initiation of war. The focus in this article, however, will be on the military technical aspect of change: how have the plans and operations of the Soviet

---

Jeffrey W. Legro is a Fellow at the RAND/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies and a Ph.D. candidate in political science at UCLA. From 1987 until early 1989, he was a Research Fellow with Harvard University's Center for Science and International Affairs. He holds a B.A. from Middlebury College with majors in economics and Russian; an M.A. from UCLA; and a certificate in Soviet culture and Russian language studies from the Pushkin Institute in Moscow. His most recent publication was the article "Soviet Crisis Decision making and the Gorbachev Reforms" in the July/August 1989 issue of Survival. The author would like to thank the Ford Foundation for financial support during the preparation of this article.

Reprinted by permission from Parameters, December 1989, pp. 80-92.

army evolved under the "new thinking"? Because doctrinal developments take time to affect military operations, this is necessarily a speculative venture. Nonetheless, high-level Soviet officials have begun to speak out publicly and they deserve a measured hearing.

The Nature of Military-Technical Change

Although much of the doctrinal reformulation under Gorbachev is linked to political posturing, several of the declaratory themes appear to have consequences at the military-technical level. Three of the most prominent, which will be addressed in turn, are defense dominance, quality over quantity, and prevention of war.

Defense Dominance. The central theme of the USSR's new security policy is that Soviet and Warsaw Pact doctrine is now defense-oriented. Soviet declaratory doctrine has always been defensive at the socio-political level, but now it is alleged that such will also hold true at the military-technical level. {1} Gorbachev and others have called for a strategy and posture that would exclude the possibility of offensive operations. While this outcome is to be the result of negotiations, the Soviets also maintain that they are unilaterally developing a defensive doctrine. A brief review of what "defense" means, the sources of military interest in it, and the nature of the changes occurring will help to illuminate the significance of this "new" orientation.

Soviet military officials have put forward different conceptions of the "defensive" doctrine. At one extreme is the view that it simply implies nonaggression; the USSR claims it will not attack anyone and therefore it has a defensive doctrine. {2} Apparent Soviet plans to fight a war through massive offensive operations aimed at deep penetration of enemy territory are brushed aside-after all, such options would be implemented only in the event that the USSR is attacked. The implication of this usage is that no substantial changes in military posture are needed. At the other extreme, the shift to defense suggests that Soviet strategy will be dominated by defensive operations and will demand only capabilities that permit the army to counterattack to regain the Warsaw Pact's own lost territory. {3} In this version, the war is fought primarily in Eastern Europe.

The middle position (which appears most authoritative) is that the new focus on defense means (1) greater attention to how defensive battles will be fought, and (2) emphasis upon defensive operations at the beginning period of war, but (3) ultimate dominance of the offense within the full range of military operations. {4} While the magnitude of the counteroffensive after the initial defensive stage is left undefined, the goal is to destroy the enemy's forces. {5} The implication of this formulation is that significant dynamic capabilities are still required and the battle will be taken to the enemy's territory.

The degree of military attention to defense cannot be completely separated from current political and economic needs, yet its roots predate Gorbachev and relate also to developments in military technology. {6} A, key source of interest in defense is the perceived threat from Western high-technology nuclear and conventional weapons which challenge the efficacy of the USSR's theater offensive. In particular, the Soviets fear that enhanced reconnaissance capabilities and high-accuracy munitions will allow NATO to disrupt the concentration of forces in the forward battle area and neutralize second-echelon forces that are moving up to the front. {7}

Also spurring attention to defense is uncertainty about how the next war will begin. More specifically, military authorities realize there is no guarantee that either the situation or political leaders will allow them to seize the initiative and implement an offensive at the start of a war, even if"purely" military factors demand such action. {8} The historical analogy used is Stalin's choice at the beginning of World War II when "the political measures that were taken to avoid war were not correctly linked with concern over maintaining the armed forces at a high state of readiness." {9} Like it or not, defensive operations may be a necessity. Finally, defensive operations remain important as a part of the overall strategic offensive plan. They would provide time to marshall forces to shift to the offense, hold ground in secondary sectors, or protect the flanks of the strategic offensive sector from counterattacks. {10}

Defense-mindedness is apparently leading to institutional and operational modifications. One of the alleged purposes of Soviet force reduction is to demonstrate that the USSR's divisions in East Europe are no longer offense oriented. Over the next two years, the number of tanks will be reduced by 40 percent in motor rifle divisions and 20 percent in tank divisions located in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Independent tank regiments in the Central Group of Forces are to be converted into motorized infantry units, cutting the number of tanks by 60 to 80 percent. In addition, assault landing and assault crossing units will be withdrawn with all their equipment. Meanwhile the number of antitank, engineering, and air defense systems is to be increased, giving the units "a clear-cut defensive structure." {11} It remains uncertain how, if at all, forces within the Soviet Union will be restructured. {12}

Aspects of the military educational system are also being brought into line with the defense emphasis. Programs at the military academies have supposedly been overhauled and manuals revised. {13} Military journals and books are pointedly giving more attention to topics related to defense. For example, a generally positive review of the book Tank Armies on the Offensive critiques it for not paying enough attention to tank forces as a defensive tool, which would have strengthened the "up-to date tone" of the study. {14} At a conference in Moscow, a Soviet analyst proudly displayed a copy of the January 1989 issue of the

restricted-circulation publication Military Thought, in which most of the articles were devoted to defense. {15} Thus it may be that attitudes and attention to defense will be strengthened by reforms in the way soldiers are taught to think, and encouraged to write, about military affairs.

Military authorities contend that defense awareness will indeed lead to operational modifications. One important area is military exercises. One article has stated that training on defensive operations will be increased to 50 percent of the time allocated, with offensive maneuvers receiving the remainder. {16} Marshall Akhromeyev asserted that the Soviet army now plans to remain on the defensive for three weeks at the beginning of a war, a revision which is supposedly reflected in the USSR's exercises. {17} In addition, all moving-target tank gunnery ranges and troop firing ranges have allegedly been reequipped in line with the demands of the defensive doctrine. {18}

Despite these claims, many reports of observers of Pact maneuvers have questioned their defensive nature. {19} Not all accounts, however, have been skeptical. Admiral William Crowe, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recounted seeing exercises and wargames that were "truly defensive" during his June 1989 visit. {20} These differing reports suggest either that the defensive shift is just starting to take hold, that Crowe was shown "Potemkin" maneuvers which do not reflect overall training, or that it is simply difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive maneuvers.

Ironically, Soviet plans for the defense appear to include concepts traditionally linked with the offense, such as preemption. Several military authors, including Marshal Akhromeyev, have noted that while the defensive orientation is being realized at the operational level, it will not be passive, but an active, aggressive defense. In the Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, however, "defense activeness" (aktivnost'oborony) includes "hitting the adversary with airstrikes and artillery fire during the time the adversary is preparing for an attack." {21} Indeed, Soviet commentaries have specifically stated that new technologies allow the defense to take the initiative and defeat an offensive before it is launched. {22} Thus, while preemption appears to have been downgraded relative to its previous prominent role in the theater offensive, Soviet writings still allow for it.

One of the most important implications of a defensive orientation is the perceived need to increase readiness. This involves both combat readiness and mobilization readiness. Combat readiness is seen as necessary because if the aggressor can make preparation covertly and has the advantage of seizing the initiative, the defender must be constantly prepared to neutralize the attack. Soviet force reductions have also heightened military interest in enhancing readiness. {23} lmproving mobilization readiness-which apparently refers to the ability to field reserves quickly-has received less attention, but the chief of the General Staff, M. A. Moiseyev, has repeatedly mentioned it along with combat readiness. {24}

A final implication of the defensive orientation is an emphasis on mobility, particularly that of strategic reserves. Mobility is supposedly needed for transferring forces rapidly to areas of enemy attack where additional troops may be required.{25} Of course, mobility is also useful for rapid offensives.

Quality Over Quantity. The notion that force generation should be guided by qualitative rather than quantitative criteria received great attention beginning in the summer of 1988 following the 19th Party Conference and has been a central principle in Yazov's and other high military officials' speeches and writings. {26} The term "quality" is no stranger to Soviet military discourse. In the early 1960s when the Soviets lagged the United States in numbers of ICBMs, they emphasized that the quality of the rockets was more important than the quantity.{27} In the first part of the 1980s, Marshal Ogarkov was an outspoken proponent of the importance of qualitative improvements in weapons. Nonetheless, the degree to which the quality theme has been emphasized since the Party Conference and the explanation for this emphasis suggest that it could be particularly important in the way the military operates in the future.

The sources of Soviet interest in military quality are tied to economic, foreign policy, and military considerations. Reductions in troops and military expenditures will allegedly free resources for socio-economic development. {28} Furthermore, these cuts contribute to the "new thinking" foreign policy campaign aimed at changing international perceptions of the Soviet threat and slowing the arms race. The Soviet Union's economic restructuring is predicated on a placid external environment. {29} The goal of the quality campaign in the military sphere (as is the case for the economy as a whole) is to switch to intensive development: try to get more out of what is being produced rather than just producing more. The past emphasis on building large numbers of weapons and maintaining a massive standing army is eschewed because it provokes an international reaction (e.g. antiSoviet coalition) and is expensive. {30}

From the military viewpoint, "quality" makes sense for several reasons. One is combat effectiveness. As Yazov has proclaimed, quantitative indicators are becoming less effective even in strictly military terms. {31} Although he does not fully explain this idea, the tenor of other military writings suggests that he is referring to the increased range and accuracy of high-technology weapons which could help numerically inferior troops defeat larger forces. {32} This, of course, would be a challenge to a Soviet strategy based in part on taking advantage of superior quantities of "lowtech" tanks and artillery to overwhelm a Western defense. {33} The stress on economical quality, alongside commentaries on the importance of new types of weapons, suggests that the Soviet Union, and especially the military, is practicing deferred gratification: economizing is accepted now so that in the longer run systems suited for the modern battlefield will be available. {34}

Gorbachev's reduction of the military forces is another factor that military personnel refer to when emphasizing quality. In fact, even before the reduction plan was announced, quality was cited as especially significant if troop levels were lowered. {35} With Gorbachev's cuts, the armed forces foresee a period of trial when quality must be sought because, despite smaller numbers, Soviet forces will be expected to fulfill the same tasks. {36}

The new focus on quality also has implications for hardware and training. In terms of hardware, officials imply that there will be a shift away from the traditional Soviet emphasis on quantity of weapons toward fewer systems with greater reliability and technological sophistication. The production plan for both arms and equipment has allegedly been cut in favor of developing weapons that cover the same missions in fewer numbers. {37} At the same time, however, it is not clear how this qualitative shift fits in with the political priority of economic stringency. Soviets reading report's of the United States' $500 million Stealth bomber undoubtedly realize that quality achieved via high technology is not necessarily cheaper. Indeed, in one article, the United States is accused of using the "competitive strategies" concept to drag the arms race from the quantitative to the qualitative plane in the hope of weakening the Soviet economy by pressuring the USSR to devote more resources to the defense sector. {38}

One of the main areas of expected opportunity in the quality campaign is military training. The Soviets hope to get the most out of available resources by improving personnel skills and combat training. Articles in the Soviet press indicate that Soviet troops are having problems operating the more sophisticated weapons. Soldiers are urged to increase their skill in using and maintaining existing arms so that capabilities can be maximized. {39} Combat training is criticized as too formal and inadequate in scope. {40} Troops are being diverted from training by other duties ranging from helping with the harvest in the fall to pandering to high-level officers during their inspections and visits. {41} The Soviets have announced that they have cut the number of large-scale exercises in order to devote more time to "qualitative" training of sub-units. {42} The army also hopes to enhance training and tactics in field exercises through laser simulation like that used by the US Army's National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, California. {43} Perhaps one reason why training is receiving so much attention is that the Soviets feel it can enhance capabilities significantly at low cost. {44}

Prevention of War. According to prominent military figures, the third important new element of Soviet military doctrine is its aim of preventing war. {45} Of course, one might question the novelty of this goal, as the argument has been made since the 1970s that the Soviet Union's military power, especially its strategic nuclear parity with the United States, has been a key factor in preventing war. Today, however, prevention is portrayed not just as a side benefit of building military power, but rather as the primary purpose of the armed forces. Such a change seems largely

limited to semantics at the socio-political level of doctrine, but may have some operational consequences.

An aspect that bridges the socio-political and military-technical levels is the explicit Soviet pledge not to initiate hostilities, including the foregoing of preemptive attacks, a calling card of the Soviet operational modus operandi.{46} It is of course questionable that such pledges would be honored if conflict threatened. For example, it is unclear whether a Soviet reaction based on a perception that the other side is preparing for war would fall under the rubric of initiating hostilities. {47} If so, such a definitional gymnastics would allow the East to strike at NATO even if the latter's actions were merely a precaution.

Perhaps spurred on by their "no first use of nuclear weapons" and "no initiation of hostilities" promises, the Soviets also aim to reduce the vulnerability of the army. The goal is not merely to limit casualties and equipment loss during the course of a conflict. The perception of vulnerability in this case results from the declared intention to absorb the first blow in a war. The problem of protecting forces when restricted to defensive maneuvers is viewed as particularly challenging. {48}

Another implication of the prevention-of-war theme is continuing attention to avoiding inadvertent use of forces with strong escalatory potential, especially nuclear weapons. The doctrine's practical implementation will be more rigorous control over tactical and strategic nuclear munitions to avoid unauthorized use. {49} Again, however, interest in this area predates Gorbachev. Then Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov noted in 1982 that preventing a nuclear war would demand tighter control to exclude unauthorized release. {50}

The Meaning of Military-Technical Change

The implications of the new doctrine can be assessed in terms of the components of its military-technical level, including (1) the nature of the military threat, (2) force structure, (3) force employment concepts and strategy, and (4) the preparation of the armed forces. {51} Let us examine each of these four elements, highlighting where appropriate the effect of the new thinking on the USSR's ability to attack NATO successfully.

Military Threat. The political leadership has stressed inadvertent war as one of the primary threats to peace, thus downgrading a calculated NATO attack and providing a doctrinal basis for reducing defense spending and seeking arms control. While the military has paid lip service to this theme, prominent officers appear to put much greater emphasis on the purposeful aggressive actions of the West as the most important challenge to Soviet security. If anything, military officials see the peril from NATO growing as new systems are modernized and Western military strategy becomes more "offensive." {52}

The results of a threat assessment that endows the West with considerable high-tech capabilities are mixed. On the one hand, it strengthens deterrence if the Soviets believe that new types of weapons endanger the viability of the their offensive. On the other hand, traditional military interests will undoubtedly try to use this threat to build an internal consensus for quickening the development of new weapon systems to negate Western advantages.

Force Structure. Gorbachev's plan to restructure forces in Europe-if carried out as announced {53}--should benefit NATO security because it decreases the likelihood of a successful Soviet short-warning attack. {54} Even so, the Soviet Union is left with considerable forces capable of conducting offensive operations against NATO after mobilization.

A potential negative implication from the Western perspective is the desire on the part of some Soviet military leaders to produce improved high-technology weapons. Of course, it is not realistic to expect zero modernization or production of new systems. The real issues thus are the types of weapons built and the quantities and rates of production. If the systems are primarily suited for offensive operations or the pace of production is rapid and the quantity large, the threat would obviously increase. The types of weapons produced would also influence which scenario is most affected. For example, if accurate long-range missiles, strike aircraft, or attack helicopters were to appear in greater numbers, the possibility of an effective short-warning attack might increase. On the other hand, if the quantity of tank transporters jumps or airlift capacity is expanded, then a mobilized attack would gain credibility. Despite the desires of Soviet professional soldiers, however, there is little in military writings to suggest that weapons development will receive resource priority. The mood conveyed is one of having to accept less in resources, at least in the short run.

Also related to force structure is the emphasis on creating highly mobile reserves for rapid maneuvers, which if realized would pose a challenge to NATO capabilities. Mobility might"be necessary to secure a lengthy frontier against a foe with superior forces whose main breakthrough sites could not be predicted. However, increasing the mobility of the USSR's strategic reserve, which has easier access to central Europe than NATO's US-based reserves, could represent a serious danger. Soviet forces would be able to move from the rear to the front and concentrate near the FEBA more rapidly, thus enhancing the possibility of a successful mobilized attack.

Employment Concepts. In the category of force employment concepts, doctrinal developments indicate both positive and negative consequences for Western security. A positive, albeit superficial, effect is the Soviet promise not to initiate hostilities nor launch preemptive attacks. If honored, these pledges would directly undercut key elements of the Soviet theater offensive: preemption of NATO's airfields, nuclear weapons, and storage sites; and seizing the initiative. Pledges such as

these would be mostly relevant to a short-warning attack, since after a mobilization they would have even less credibility. The obvious problem here is that talk is cheap. Declaratory statements can easily be retracted in the heat of the moment and could have little bearing on Soviet military actions. This is particularly true since preemptive options appear to have been subsumed under "defensive" plans.

The new emphasis on defensive operations may also have mixed implications for Soviet capabilities. The upside is that the Soviet Union is devoting more attention to the defense and is intent on developing a strategic defensive option. This means that in a crunch Soviet leaders will have other choices besides the deep-strike offensive. There is, however, a downside. Although more attention will be given to defense, offensive potential and plans (e.g. the "counteroffensive") are not disappearing. The possibility arises, then, that the USSR will improve its capabilities in combating NATO's plans (e.g. FOFA) but also maintain its deep offensive operation potential, particularly after mobilization occurs.

Preparation of Forces. Here, defensive military exercises, improved combat and mobilization readiness, and improved training come into play. One good omen is the Soviet claim that its exercises will now be defense-oriented. As noted, however, there is no evidence yet of any widespread shift and it is unclear how defense can be practiced without exercising some offense.

So far as military readiness is concerned, it is understandable why with smaller forces the Soviets feel the need for higher readiness. But the USSR's reduction of forces still leaves the East with important advantages in some major ground systems in central Europe (e.g. artillery). Even more disturbing, however, would be the improved combat readiness of Category I and II troops in the western USSR. These troops become more significant if the Soviets also improve their mobilization readiness, which-via the USSR's geographic advantage of land lines of communication-would increase the chance of a successful reinforced Warsaw Pact attack.

Finally we may note the disadvantages for NATO in the event of improved technical knowledge and training of Soviet soldiers. General Yazov's repetition of Lenin's dictum, "Better less, but better," is comforting only if the "less" is somewhat more than the troops and systems that Gorbachev has already offered to cut. However, personnel skills and training have long been an area of concern in the USSR's conscription army and it is unclear how easily they can be enhanced even with renewed efforts.

Conclusion

It is difficult to disagree with the notion that the predominant themes of the new Soviet doctrine are preferable to past rhetoric. However, when one focuses on how these general declaratory principles of

national security policy will be implemented in terms of day-to-day military operations and plans for war, the picture shows mixed results. The USSR's reduction of forces in Eastern Europe, especially their mobile firepower, would benefit Western security because it lessens Soviet capabilities for a standing-start attack. Furthermore, increased Soviet attention to the defense-in training, academic programs, and military research-is positive because it means that other options besides a quick offensive based on preemption are being actively considered. Thus, in a crisis, the East will not be backed into a corner where its security is perceived as dependent on striking massively and early.

While acknowledging the positive, the West must also confront the potentially threatening aspects of current changes. First, Soviet military officials remain interested in the capability to conduct deep offensive operations. The leaders of the Soviet army recognize the political and military need to pay attention to defensive operations, but their discussions are generally crafted in a way that continues to recognize the offensive as the dominant form of operations. It may be that the forward-based, standing start threat has decreased, yet the USSR will continue to maintain a powerful force potential on its territory. Furthermore, their declared aim is to increase the readiness and mobility of such forces. If these goals are met, the Soviet Union will retain the capabilities and plans to conduct significant offensive operations against 'NATO. This suggests that the West should respond, through arms control and/or force improvements, to Soviet mobilization and reinforcement advantages that will become increasingly important to military stability in Europe.

Notes

1. General Colonel Makhmut Gareyev, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 44 (December 1988), 31. Gareyev is a deputy chief of the General Staff and the foremost Soviet authority on military science.

2. See the remarks of General Colonel V. N. Lobov, first deputy chief of the General Staff on the TV program "Studio 9," 15 October 1988; translated in Daily Report: Soviet Union (hereinafter cited as DR:SU), Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereinafter cited as FBIS), 18 October 1988, p. 84.

3. Andrei Kokoshin and General Major V. V. Larionov, "Protivostoianie sil obshchego naznacheniia v kontekste obecpecheniia stratigicbeskoi stabil'nosti" (The Confrontation of Conventional Forces in the Context of Strategic Stability), Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia (June 1988), pp. 23-31.

4. See General Colonel M. Gareyev, "The Armed Forces in the Condition of Glasnost," Argumenty ifakty, 24-30 September 1988, pp. 4-5. Gareyev continually stresses that defensive operations will dominate the beginning of war--a phrasing that allows for offensive operations to

dominate the remainder. In one of the most extensive recent discussions of defense at the operational and tactical levels, it is still described as subordinate to the offensive. See Colonel G. Ionin, "Osnovy sovremenuogo oboronitel'nogo boia" (Foundations of Modern Defensive Battle), Voennyi vestnik, 3 (March 1988), 18-21.

5. For example, see Minister of Defense D. T. Yazov, Vzashchitesotsialisma i mira (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), pp. 30-32.

6. This was evident in the writings of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, former chief of the General Staff. See Dale Herspring, "Nikolai Ogarkov and the Scientific-Technical Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs," Comparative Strategy, 6 (No. 1, 1987), 29-60.

7. For a detailed Soviet view of the threat based upon their analysis of NATO's deep-strike concepts, see General Lieutenant I. Perov, "Agressivnaia sushchnost' novykh kontseptsii SShA i NATO" (The Aggressive Essence of the New Concepts of the USA and NATO), Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozremie (February 1988), pp. 7-17. Also see the discussion in Phillip A. Petersen and Notra Trulock III. "A New Soviet Military Doctrine: Origins and Implications," Strategic Review, 16 (Summer 1988), 17.

8. General Colonel M. A. Gareyev, M. V. Frunze-Voe"nyi teoretik (Moscow: Voenisdat, 1985), p. 242.

9. General Lieutenant of Aviation V. Serebriannikov, "Sootnoshenie politicheskikh i voennykh sredstv v zashchite sotsialisma" (Correlating the Political and Military Methods in the Defense of Socialism), Kommunist v vooruzhennykh sil, No. 18 (September 1987), 12-13.

10. Ionin, p. 20. This point is made by historical analogy in General Colonel V. N. Lobov, "Aktual'nie voprosi razvitiia Sovetskoi teorii voennoi strategii 20-kh-serediny 30-kh godov" (Actual Questions in the Development of the Soviet Theory of Military Strategy from the 1920s to the mid-1930s), Voenn-is-toricheskii zhurmal (February 1989), 43-44.

11. D.T. Yazov, "Na nachalakh realizma i balansa interesov" (Based on Principles of Realism and a Balance of Interests), Pravda, 9 February 1989, p. 4; interview with USSR Defense Minister Army General D. T. Yazov, "V interesakh obshchei bezopasnosti i mira" (In the Interests of Universal Security and Peace), Izvestiia, 27 February 1989, p. 3; M. A. Moiseyev, "Sokrashchenie voorushennykh sil i voorushenii-garantia besopastnosti dlia vsekh i dlia kashdogo" (Reduction of the Armed Forces and Armaments is the Guarantee of Security for Each and Everyone), Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn' (August 1989), 3-4.

12. Some analysts speculate that the Soviet army will shift to a corps/brigade structure. See David M. Glantz, "Force Structure: Meeting

Contemporary Requirements," Military Review, 68 (December 1988), 58-70; David Eshel, "Soviet Force Reductions: Eyewash or Reality," Defense Update, April 1989, p. 18. Of course, macro-organizational changes have been made, including the removal of the border, internal, and railway troops from the control of the armed forces and the merging of several military districts. In addition, a hot debate continues over whether the Soviet Union should shift from a conscript army to a professional or militia-style one.

13. Gareyev (December 1988), p. 32.

14. Marshal of Tank Forces O. Losik's review of I. M. Ananev's Tankovye armii v nastuplenii (Voeniadat, 1988), in Krasnaia zvezda, 8 March 1988, p. 2.

15. The titles included "Several Questions on the Preparation and Conduct of Counterstrikes in Defensive Operations," "Maneuver in defensive Operations," "Tactical Defense," and "The Problem of Raising the Survivability of the PVO Forces in Defensive Operations." At least one analyst has noted a similar trend in the non-classified Soviet military literature. See Edward Warner III, "New Thinking and Old Realities in Soviet Defense Policy," Survival, 31 January/February 1989), 25.

16. See Colonel G. Miranovich and Colonel V. Sbitarenko, "Chem sil'na oborona?" (How Is the Defense Strong?), Krasnaia zvezda, 10 December 1987, p. 2.

17. See William Odom, "Soviet Military Doctrine," Foreign Affairs, 67 (Winter 1988/1989), 130.

18. Interview with Army General B. Snetkov, commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, "V usloviakh sokrashcheniia" (In the Conditions of Cuts), Krasnaia zvezda, 23 March 1989, p.2.

19. Bernard E. Trainor, "Soviet Maneuvers: A New Strategy?" The New York Times, 4 November 1988, p. A8. Also see "The Soviets Practiced Only Attack Type Combat," Die Welt, 12-13 November 1988, p. 4, as translated in Daily Report: Western Europe, FBIS, 16 November 1988, p. 11; and Don O. Stovall, "A Participant's View of On-Site Inspections," Parameters, 19 (June 1989), 1-15.

20. Interview on "Good Morning America," 21 June 1989, as reported in DOD, Current News, 23 June 1989, p. A2; Michael Dobbs, "Joint Chiefs View
Soviet Weaponry," The Washington Post, 19 April 1989, pp. A1, A23.

21. Marshal Akhromeyev, ed., Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar' (Moscow: Voenisdat, 1986), pp. 496-97.

22. Ionin, p. 18.

23. Army General D. T. Yazov, Minister of Defense, stated on TV, "One of the main tasks of this doctrine is the prevention of war, followed by the maintenance of military readiness, repulsion of aggressive intrigues, and so forth." See "I Serve the Soviet Union" program, 29 October 1988; as translated in DR:SU, FBIS, 1 November 1988, p. 89; Army General M. Sorokin, "S tochki zreniia inspektsii" (From the Inspectorate's Point of View), Krasnaia zvezda, 6 September 1989, p. 2; Gareyev (September 1988), pp. 4-5.

24. Report on a meeting of General Colonel Moiseyev with Communist Party members of the General Staff, "S pozitsii oboronitel'noi doktriny" (From Defensive Doctrine Positions), Krasnaia zvezda, 10 February 1989, pp. 1-2; Army General Moiseyev, "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" (On Guard for Peace and Socialism), Krasnaia zvezda, 23 February 1989, p. 2.

25. See Gareyev (December 1988), p. 31. For a historical analysis emphasizing the importance of maneuver and mobility, see Lobov (February 1989), pp. 44,48.

26. The first appearance of this theme was a major article by Yazov in August 1988, "Kachestvennye parametry oboronnogo stroitel'stva" (The Qualitative Parameters of Defense Building), Krasnaia zvezda, 9 August 1988, pp. 1-2. Also see Gareyev (September 1988), pp. 4-5; General Colonel V. Lobov, first deputy of the General Staff, "Vysokoe kachestvo - glavnyi kriterii boevoi podgotovki" (High Quality- The Main Criteria of Military Training), Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil (January 1989), 12-18.

27. See Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Sources of Soviet Military Doctrine,"in Comparative Defense Policy, eds. Frank B. Horton III, Anthony C. Rogerson, Edward L. Warner III (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974), p. 203.

28. Army General D. T. Yazov, "Armiia naroda" (The Army of the People), Pravda, 23 February 1989, p. 3.

29. Yazov (9 August 1988), p. 1, explicitly says, "The acceleration of the country's socio-economic development and the revolutionary restructuring and renewal of society are pinned on peace."

30. See the speech of Foreign Minister Shevardnaze delivered at the Scientific and Practical Conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 July 1988, in Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 15 (August 1988), esp. 32-33. Also relevant are the remarks of V. Falin, head of the CPSU's International Department on the TV show "Studio 9," 15 October 1988; see note 2.

31. Yazov (9 August 1988), p. 2.

32. For example, see Ionin, p. 18.

33. For example, Soviet plans rely on being able to push fresh units into the battle when others are used up as opposed to reconstituting them as is the case with NATO. Should new weapons threaten these forces, the chances of Soviet strategy's succeeding would be reduced.

34. "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" (On Guard for Peace and Socialism), in Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie (January 1988), 3-8, notes that the CPSU's focus on boosting economic development will contribute to enhancing the military's combat power.

35. Yugoslavian newspaper interview with D. T. Yazov, "We Are Not Hawks,"
Danas, 15 November 1988, pp. 54-58; translated in DR:SU, FBIS, 22 November 1988, p. 73. Yazov says, "The process of perfecting the quality of combat techniques is accompanied by certain reductions in their total quality."

36. Report on comments by D. T. Yazov, "Po strogomu schetu" (Strict Accountability), Pravda, 22 January 1989, p. 8. Also see Lobov (January 1989), p. 13.

37. Army General V. Shabanov, Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments,
"Novye podkhody" (New Approaches), Krasnaia zvezda, 18 August 1989, p. 2;
Army General M. Moiseyev, "Sovetskaia voenuaia doktrina: realizatsiia ee oboronitel'noi napravlennosti" (Soviet Military Doctrine: Realization of its Defensive Thrust), Pravda, 13 March 1989, 5.

38. General Lieutenant V. Pavlov, "I vot teper' strategii konkurentsii"
(And Now "Competitive Strategies"), Krasnaia zvezda, 30 November 1988, p.
5.

39. See Lobov (January 1989), pp. 12-18; Moiseyev (23 February 1989), p. 12. For a specific example of concern over low technical skill levels of Soviet soldiers, see Jeanette Voas's analysis of General Lieutenant R. Akchurin, "From Technology and Armaments-The Maximum Possible," Vestnik
protivovozdushnoi oborony, 11 (November 1987), 33-36, in Soviet Defense Notes, 1 (May 1989), 6-7.

40. Army General D. Yazov, "Voennoi shkole-novoe kachestvo" (New Quality
in Military Education), Krasnaia zvezda, 27 January 1989, p. 1.

41. Lobov (January 1989), p. 15; Yazov (22 January 1989), p. 8.

42. Interview with Snetkov, 23 March 1989, p. 2.

43. Discussion with General Lieutenant V. Khazirkov, deputy chief of the Main Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces, "Vozrodit'kak iskussrvo" (To Regenerate as an Art), Krasnaia zvezda, 7 January 1989, pp. 1-2.

44. See Gareyev (September 1988), pp. 4-5; Defense Minister Yazov is quoted as saying that officer cadres' training is "one of the key sources for enhancing the armed forces' qualitative condition while incurring virtually no additional costs. Full use must be made of this source." See Yazov (27 January 1989), p.1.

45. For example, see Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, "The Doctrine of Preventing War, Defending Peace and Socialism," World Marxist Review (December 1987), 40; in Russian see Problemy n'ira i sotsializma (December 1987).

46. Gareyev (December 1988), p. 31, states, "In other words, Soviet military strategy completely rules out the possibility of launching a preemptive or preventive strike, no matter what the political circumstances."

47. For example, Ionin, p. 18, states that defense in combined arms battle can be used to "break an offensive being prepared by the enemy."

48. Gareyev (December 1988), p. 30.

49. D.T. Yazov, "Voennaia doktrina Varshavskogo dogovora-doktrina aashchity mira i sotsializma" (The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Is the Doctrine of Peace and Socialism), Pravda, 27 July 1987, p. 5. Also see Yaxov (15 November 1988), p. 74.

50. D.F. Ustinov, Otvesti ugrozu iademoi voiny (To Repel the Threat of Nuclear War) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982), p. 6.

51. These four areas are listed in Gareyev (December 1988), p. 31.

52. For example, see Moiseyev (13 March), p. 5; interview with General Lieutenant V. Achalov, Commander of the Airborne Troops, "Golubie berety"
(Blue Berets), Pravda, 3 August 1989, p. 3.

53. It is unclear how faithfully the force reduction will be implemented. One report from a US congressional group maintains that the Soviets are shifting soldiers and equipment from disbanded units to remaining forces. See Michael R. Gordon, "Congress Inspects a Soviet Pullback," The New York Times, 9 August 1989, p. A10.

54. Phillip A. Karber, "The Military Impact of the Gorbachev Reductions," Armed Forces Journal International, January 1989, pp. 54-64. Karber, part of the congressional delegation (see preceding note), has scaled back his

optimistic January estimate, concluding that Soviet units in Europe have "by no means made the transfer to a strictly defensive force," but nonetheless are still less capable than before the reductions. (See Peter Almond, "Experts Say Soviets Play Old Shell Game," Washington Times, 14
September 1989, p. 5). Some believe that even if the reduction is carried out, the Soviet short-warning threat will remain and could increase. Eshel (see note 12) makes this case.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 2.B.4

* * *

The Emerging Soviet Vision of European Security

Phillip A. Petersen

As we marvel at the speed of the collapse of the post-World War II security structure, it becomes all the more important that Western policy analysts understand that the "current of reform" responsible for stimulating these contemporary events has a history. One of those present at the creation of this "current" reminds us that "Mikhail Sergeyevich [Gorbachev] did not just drop out of the sky. There are historical, intellectual reasons that he is who he is." {1} If the West should fail to comprehend the "current of reform" that produced Gorbachev, we will most probably fail to nurture it sufficiently to firmly anchor Russia to Europe. This process of integration into European political culture will be complex since the majority of Russians believe in isolation and dislike progressive people who have strong connections with the West. Only the "de-ideologization" of European security offers any hope of breaking down the "bourgeois encirclement and penetration" imagery of the Stalinist period sufficient to facilitate the accommodation of the Russians to the self-determination of the peoples of the Soviet empire. Decolonization, in turn, will facilitate European integration of a new Russian confederation based on principles that would avoid breeding what Woodrow Wilson would call "a constantly recurring sense of injustice." The common search for a stable security constellation requires the creation of this just conclusion to the chaos unleashed in European history by the First World War.

The emerging Soviet revolutionary vision of future European security is directly related to the life and ideas of Yuri Andropov. As Raisa Gorbachev was reported to have said to Mrs. Averell Harriman, "We owe everything

---

Phillip A. Petersen is Assistant for Europe and the Soviet Union on the Policy Support Planning Staff in the Office of the U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Security Policy. Dr. Petersen wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of his deputy, Joshua B. Spero.

We owe this article to the courtesy of the author.

to him." A protege of the Finnish-born communist, Otto Kuusinen, Andropov's early career was intertwined with the Karelo-Finnish region and Russo-Finnish relations until his 1951 transfer to the Central Committee apparatus of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). During these years in Karelia, Andropov learned to speak Finnish and made an intellectual effort to understand the Finns that allowed him to demonstrate an impressive grasp of Finnish society in his 1983 meeting with Finnish President Mauno Koivisto. In 1953, Andropov was transferred to the Foreign Ministry and, after a brief time as head of the Fourth European Countries Department (responsible for Poland and Czechoslovakia), was subsequently posted to the Soviet embassy in Budapest. It is fair to assume that Andropov drew some conclusions from his experiences which could be expected to have left him, at the very least, sympathetic to views articulated by the policy "consultants" Kuusinen had assembled at the Kremlin secretariat and inherited by Andropov when he served in the secretariat from 1962 until his appointment as chief of the Committee for State Security (KGB) in 1967. Kuusinen's "consultants," names like Fedor Burlatsky, Georgi Arbatov, Alexander Bovin, and Oleg Bogomolov, would figure prominently in the glasnost and peristroika of the future struggle to free the Soviet state from "the stagnation of the Brezhnev years." {2}

"Children of the 20th Party Congress" of 1956, these young "consultants" became "the Andropov circle," initially in support of "peaceful coexistence" and "democratization," and subsequently in opposition to the full rehabilitation of Stalin. It should be noted, however, that Andropov was no liberal. According to Bogomolov, "Andropov
is being idealized now. If he had lived he probably would have changed things some, but he would not have touched the underlying structures of society. He was careful, conservative, maybe a bit like [Politburo member Yegor] Ligachev." {3} In having transferred Andropov to the KGB, both the Politburo conservatives and the young "consultants" assumed that Andropov had been effectively sidetracked from mainstream politics. The "final blow" to the "Andropov circle" came with the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. During the years that followed, according to Tatyana Zaslavskaya, one of the members of the circle, they "all led double lives, not only scholars but a few progressive-minded politicians like Gorbachev. Except for Sakharov, maybe, there was not a single one among us who could say we never made a single compromise." {4}

Possessing what Bogomolov has described as "a flexible mind," Andropov continued to gather about himself the best and the brightest for what would ultimately become a "revolution from above."They would be called to visit during his holidays in the Northern Caucasus to discuss the true situation both inside and outside the Soviet Union. Conversations during leisurely walks through the woods with the local CPSU first secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, undoubtedly became progressively more searching and candid. {5} It was probably during these discussions

that a revolutionary pragmatism was forged by the appreciation that Soviet security would increasingly be dependent upon economic power and the mounting evidence of the magnitude of Soviet economic failure. What seems to have emerged was a nonzero-sum model of security emphasizing threat-reduction, unilateral restraint, and collaboration with adversaries. Georgi Arbatov, who is described as having been "a close friend of Andropov's," {6} would ultimately describe the new strategy as one of depriving the West of its "enemy."

The communist system imposed by Stalin on Central Europe as a means of insuring Soviet security was perceived as having been a counterproductive policy choice. Andropov revealed in a 1978 speech the essence of what subsequently would emerge as a new security model for Europe: "Our position is clear, Europe must become a continent of peace and good neighborly cooperation. Here, in Karelia, we have to emphasize the significance of the Soviet Union's good-neighborly. . . cooperation with Finland. Soviet-Finnish relations today . . . represent the very kind of detente which makes for a more lasting peace. . . . " {7} Having been alerted to the rising danger to the Soviet state by the deepening Polish economic crisis and the election of a Polish pope, Andropov positioned his KGB assets for the approaching Kremlin power struggle. {8} Already by 1981 Andropov had concluded both that without change the Soviet economy would eventually come to the same fate as the Polish economy, and that Soviet-Finnish relations were on a more sound footing to withstand the rising economic crisis than were Soviet relations with its non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) allies.

Studies such as the so-called Novosibirsk Report by the sociologist Zaslavskaya made clear "that the social mechanism of economic development as it functions at present in the USSR does not ensure satisfactory results. The social type of worker formed by it fails to correspond not only to the strategic aims of a developed socialist society, but also to the technological requirements of contemporary production." {9} When this paper was presented at an April 1983 restricted seminar organized by economic departments of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the State Planning Commission, Zaslavskaya's professional affiliation was with the Institute of the Economics and Organization of Industrial Production. This institute in Akademgorodok [Academic City], near Novosibirsk, was headed by Abel Agenbegyan who, having formed his team of young economists and sociologists when he was only 33 years old, would frequently begin his evening meals with the toast "we shall outlive them." {10} By 1985, Agenbegyan would surface as Mikhail Gorbachev's economic mentor. Thus, "economic perestroika did not start on a completely fallow field." Zaslavskaya's work constituted the sociological framework for what would become perestroika and, as Agenbegyan's ideas began to crystallize, "they grew more and more radical." {11}

The revolutionary transformation of Soviet political leadership is

directly related to economic conditions so adverse as to risk party control over the country. {12} According to Bogomolov, a widening gap between the Soviet Union and the West in technological progress, labor productivity, and living standards of the population, coupled with inflation and ecological disasters, permanent shortages of many essential goods, non-competitiveness of the majority of manufactures, and a falling economic growth rate are indicative of the very depth and pressing nature of the economic crisis facing the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Faced with "no choice other than a radical change of the existing social system," Bogomolov has argued that "a form of political pluralism, appropriate for the particular conditions and historic traditions of the country, has become an indispensable pre-requisite" for successful economic recovery. This change in politics and the mechanisms of social organization is expected by Bogomolov to require "10 to 15 years and will be accompanied by an acute struggle of opinions and by conflicts between the old and new modes of action. " {13} It was already understood in the mid-1980s, however, that only cautious changes and experimentation could adequately prepare the ground for "radical" steps in the 1990s. {14}

Even before Gorbachev became Party leader, a four-volume study was drafted at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations so that he "realized we had been approaching the limits beyond which civilization could not survive." {15} Georgi Arbatov would subsequently note that during the 1970s and early 1980s "the military and its attendant industries were given a completely free hand, carte blanche . . . prepared only to give the rest of us a few alms." {16} The process of revolutionary transformation of Soviet society initiated by the decisions of the March and April 1985 Plenary Meetings of the CPSU Central Committee ultimately led, after nearly two years of discussions in the Soviet Defense Council, {17} to the adoption of a military doctrine consistent with the assessment that security would be increasingly a political task. Although Soviet military scientists do appreciate that political methods of guaranteeing security (i.e., negotiations, agreements, treaties) can have great utility, civilian critics of the military point to an excessive tendency in the past for Soviet foreign policy to rely on military force. Alexsandr Bovin, for example, has written that "the deployment of SS-20 missiles and the introduction of troops in Afghanistan were . . . typical examples of subjective decisions oriented at the use of military force in foreign policy." His conclusion was that "in both cases we clearly overestimated our possibilities and underestimated what could be called the resistance of the environment." {18} Yet the publicly expressed conservative and military anxieties over reductions in military spending continued so that Arbatov found it necessary to warn that when "looking to the future, without radical cuts in the military, we will hardly be able to avoid further lagging behind in the economy. And that would mean that soon we would not even be able to have a modern army at all." {19}

At lease since 1985, therefore, Soviet theoreticians have been

struggling with the development and implementation of a new approach to security that would reshape relations between the USSR and the rest of the world. Although the Soviets probably don't have a specific plan for an alternative security structure, there exists what may be properly called an evolving Soviet vision for the future structure of European security. Using Northern Europe as the "model," it was initially thought by the Soviets that a two tier neutral zone comprised of "west-leaning" (i.e., Sweden) states and independent states that could confidently be depended upon to defend their territorial integrity (i.e., Finland) might be established throughout the rest of Europe. Such a zone might provide the Soviets with greater confidence in the determination of Poles, Czechoslovaks, and Hungarians to defend their respective states. Essentially, it was hoped by Soviet security theorists that they might be able to "Finlandize" states they could no longer control at an acceptable cost. For the Germans it meant the possibility of eventual unification, but at the price of neutrality.

By 1989, the transformation in the character of relations between the USSR and the socialist countries of Central Europe was said to be "already underway, and we understand and accept this de facto." It is explained that "where Soviet foreign policy interests are not challenged, and an attempt is made to set up a market economy and a pluralistic system, the processes taking place in these countries can be correctly understood by the Soviet Union." {20} Arguing that Soviet diplomacy toward the states of eastern Central Europe "should undergo profound restructuring in essence, methods and style," Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze explained to the Supreme Soviet that "new alternative forces are emerging on the political arena in some of these countries for the reason that this is what the people want." {21} Lest anyone misread Soviet commitment to "the principle of noninterference," senior Soviet parliamentarians noted that the Soviet Union would explicitly respect the decisions of its allies even with regard to withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. {22} As the president of the New Hungarian Socialist Party summarized the new environment, "certainly, in Eastern Europe one cannot conduct policy that is openly anti-Soviet," but "the Soviet Union has ceased to be an ideological power; it no longer regards itself as the avantgrade of world revolution." {23}

That at least some Soviets believe "Eastern Europe is much less important as a buffer zone than it was" probably is less important than the recognition that the NSWP states have common security concerns they share with the Soviet Union. This same Soviet participant in the 1989 meeting of the International Institute for East-West Security Studies expressed the belief, for example, that "Poland has an interest in being in an alliance with a great power in a time of rapid and uncertain change." {24} Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev came to the conclusion that even with a coalition government in Poland headed by a non-Communist, the Polish interest in "the stability of the territory and state boundaries" has remained the same, to a significant degree." {25} Thus, despite the "historic" changes sweeping through the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states, Shevardnadze declared

that "all these countries remain the Soviet Union's neighbors, allies, and friends." {26}

The remarkable march of events, however, built to a crescendo that would alter the basic planning assumption about Germany's future. A mass exodus of tens of thousands of East Germans first swept Erich Honecker from power, and then began to undermine the very existence of the Democratic Republic. Once the Berlin Wall was opened, the people of East Germany began to ask for what reason should they continue to sacrifice in the face of their own leaders' corruption. The easy solution was simply seen in the streets to be unification with the "successful" Germany, and neither the communists nor the government were perceived to have either the credible arguments or the power to prevent it. If eastern Germany is not soon united with the Federal Republic, the territory will simply become depopulated. The people have been so "deformed" by the system and
have become so desperate that even with unification, an expensive colonization program will be required to repopulate the territory of eastern Germany. To even suggest that the Federal Republic overtly try to stop the 3,000 person daily exodus from East Germany risks precipitating a panic that would depopulate eastern Germany in a fortnight and, thereby, provoke a socio-economic crisis that could destabilize all of Europe.

New Thinking on the "German Question"

For Soviet civilian security theorists, Soviet rejection of all attempts to reform the system had gradually changed the NSWP states "from a safety zone into a zone of danger and instability." These theorists came to perceive opportunities for guaranteeing the interests of the national security of the Soviet Union and the further development of socialism to depend upon the following three assumptions: First, "a North Atlantic bloc . . . without West Germany, practically speaking, could not exist." Second, since it is an irreversible reality" that "the West German national economy will remain closely intertwined with the economic ties within the framework of West European integration," East Germany could become an important middleman" in "eliminating the tremendous gap that was formed during the postwar period in the economic ties between East and West Europe." Third, "a voluntary confederation of the two German states" is possible only "when the East-West confrontation in Europe begins to give way to all-European cooperation. "Thus, resolving the "German Question" became the central instrument for obtaining "the liberation of the (USSR] from the terrible burden of struggling against the coalition of all the Western Powers," preventing use of "the economic might of the Common Market for political purposes that run counter to the interests of the Soviet Union," and avoiding the conversion of "the Common Market into a closed grouping" or "zone to which the access of commodities from East Europe will be limited." {27}

Soviet specialists on Germany sought to insure that the Soviet Union

did not miss the technological development and economic growth expected from the creation of a post-December 1992 single EC market by raising the German Question for discussion. Convinced that "the United States, Britain, and France do not want reunification of Germany and hope the Soviet Union would prevent such a development," {28} senior Soviet officials apparently believed that German unification could be used to not only slow EC monetary union and political integration, but also encourage German support for Austrian, Polish, and Hungarian admission to the EC. {29} The Soviet preference on the form of German unification may be found in the proposal of a "two states-one economy" type of confederation suggested by the deputy director of Moscow's Institute of Europe. {30} Already in early 1989 mid-level Defense Ministry officials in the Federal Republic warned that, contrary to whatever their government was telling the United States, German politicians were under intense pressure from the Soviet Union on the issue of unification. {31} Unprepared to challenge the conventional wisdom that the Soviet Union would be the last to promote German unification, when the Americans also proved unwilling to place themselves "on the wrong side of German national aspirations" the Soviets found themselves on a runaway "train of German unity."

Rapid disintegration of the political structure of the German Democratic Republic threatened to dictate not only the fact, but even the form of unification. With the emigration of hundreds of thousands of young, skilled East German workers to the Federal Republic, only by employing the army in the civilian economy could the Democratic Republic postpone total collapse of its socio-economic structure. As summarized by a banner carried in a Leipzig demonstration, "If the West German mark comes, we'll stay. If the West German mark doesn't show up, we'll go join it. " {32} Conceding the impending socio-economic crisis of opposing political unification of East Germany with the Federal Republic, the East German communist party leader concluded that "this process cannot be stopped any more." {33} Thus, despite having told Bush during their December summit in Malta that political unification "gave the Soviet Union some problems that could push it too hard, too fast, could create some real tension," {34} and President Mitterrand that it would result in "a two-line announcement that a Soviet marshall has taken my place," {35} by the end of January 1990, Gorbachev would note that, when considering the issue of German political unification, "no one casts doubt upon it." {36}

Since polling data indicated that one-fourth of the population in the Democratic Republic intended to move to West Germany if living conditions fail to improve in the coming months, {37} the Federal Republic moved quickly once Soviet approval was obtained for currency and economic union of the two German states. West German Chancellor Kohl exploited this economic leverage to extract political unification by declining East Germany's appeal for 15 billion Deutsche marks (about $9 billion) in emergency aid until after free elections. Citing the Federal Republic's strong, stable currency and trade surplus of 130 billion

Deutsche marks, Kohl held out hope to East Germans for a better life but ended the long practice of allowing the communists to subsidize independence at the expense of West German taxpayers. {38} Complaining that "it is not intelligent for the Americans to leave us as the only brake on unification," a Soviet diplomat in central Europe explained that "it's not that we don't trust the Germans. But you know as well as we do that they have a tendency to go to extremes, especially if they face hard times. And certainly unification will bring hard times." {39}

To reassure both East and West, Federal Republic Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher articulated a unification formula within which a united Germany would remain within NATO, but the territory of East Germany would be maintained as a demilitarized zone so "there will not be an extension of NATO territory eastward, closer to the borders of the Soviet Union." {40} Even the "Genscher Plan," however, has been described by head of the Soviet institute of Europe, Vitaliy Zhurkin, as "not something we find appealing" and "not something we accept." {41} Although some senior Soviet officials and advisors continue to argue that "if the Western alliance sticks with its demand for a NATO membership for all Germany, then there won't be any reunification," {42} Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has suggested greater flexibility in noting that neutrality was "not the only way" that the Soviet Union could accept a unified Germany. Furthermore, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary disagree with the idea of a neutral Germany, insisting instead that keeping a unified Germany in NATO remains a better security guarantee. {43} Thus, authoritative CPSU sources are reported to have "confirmed that demilitarized neutrality for a reunited Germany was no longer the Soviet bottom line." {44}

Despite having argued over time for a dissolution of the Warsaw and North Atlantic Organizations, at least some Soviet theorists have also concluded that "the idea of neutralizing the GDR and the FRG on the basis of their "earliest possible withdrawal" from the military blocs has, on closer examination, proven to be a utopian idea." {45} Since many East Europeans lack confidence that a unified Germany would remain neutral and demilitarized for long, it is not surprising that a senior researcher from the Institute for System Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences argued at a January 1990 conference at Cambridge University that German unification should only come in the context of the Federal Republic's membership in NATO. Entangling the new Germany in Western multilateral organizations is thus perceived as a more practical solution than neutrality. It is presently assessed, for example, that "more than 90 percent of the [West German Chancellor's] decisions have to be taken within the multilateral framework of NATO, the "Common Market," the European Parliament, and other organizations. {46}

With the "Genscher Plan" being endorsed by the U.S. as consistent with what the West Europeans refer to as "the Baker Plan," {47} Gorbachev has been provided a mechanism by which both to "manage" the withdrawal of

Soviet forces from East Germany and retain "leverage" over NATO force posture in the new European strategic structure. The rush of event since the breaching of the Berlin Wall has obviously altered the urgency of changing the posture of Soviet forces stationed in the forward area as an initial step in the transition to a new security structure. In the wake of the widespread creation of coalition and non-communist governments in the NSWP states, Gorbachev and his NSWP allies are most certainly anxious to reduce the profile of these forces. With the reductions Gorbachev announced in his December 1988 speech at the United Nations, the Soviets would still have 15 divisions in East Germany, two divisions in Poland, four divisions in Czechoslovakia, and three divisions in Hungary by January 1991. Since residual forces would be sufficiently dense that many cities and villages in these states would continue to be garrisoned by Soviet forces, Gorbachev elicited the assistance of the American President in meeting his requirement to accelerate reductions of general purpose forces beyond any proposed Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement.{48}

Grumbling in the Soviet Armed Forces over the conventional force reductions announced in December 1988 made it difficult for Gorbachev to make additional troop cuts. {49} Former Chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeyev, who is now an adviser to Gorbachev at the Supreme Soviet and a member of the Supreme Soviet's Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security, said on a 9 October 1989 television broadcast that "there can be no further reductions on a unilateral basis." He said the same thing before Gorbachev's December 1988 unilateral reductions, however, and Soviet civilian theorists continue to argue that military stability is so high that additional unilateral force reduction is a valid instrument for sharply accelerating the disarmament process. {50} They note that "even after the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan and the reduction of our forces in East Europe and Mongolia we still have as many soldiers and officers abroad as the United States." {51}

Conventional force reductions have been proposed at the negotiating table in Vienna and under President George Bush's proposal for U.S. and Soviet withdrawals of stationed personnel in Central Europe. The latter, in particular, facilitated Gorbachev's overcoming General Staff resistance to additional force reductions. {52} In fact, based on a rough approximation of Soviet General Staff weighted combat potential values, the U.S. force reductions in Europe initially prepared for "budgetary reasons" (2 divisions, 9 squadrons beyond the 2 brigades, 4 squadrons already on the table in Vienna) {53} allow Gorbachev to justify a further reduction of approximately sixteen divisions. Mutual reductions to the 195,000 troops in the "central zone" proposed by Bush {54} would, therefore, leave approximately eight Soviet divisions in the forward area. Agreement on such force reductions, which could be verified under procedures established in a CFE treaty, would facilitate the "two plus four" arrangement and the Helsinki process to develop agreement on a general security structure and the development of a framework for the further reduction of forces.

As noted by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the old European security structure was "destroyed by the will of peoples no longer willing to put up with violence." Responding to conservatives in the CPSU who charge that Gorbachev's policies have "lost Eastern Europe," Shevardnadze argued that "the undermining of faith in a Socialism based on suppression and violence began in the 1940s, not in 1985." Wisely perceiving that "it is easier to change our policies than their people," {55} it is widely understood that "relations with the Soviet Union are losing their specifically socialist ('fraternal') aspect and are being wholly geared toward peaceful coexistence." With the emergence of this new historical reality, "whose future still holds much that is uncertain," {56} Shevardnadze has concluded "there are some elements [in the Genscher Plan] that deserve consideration." {57} Thus, while still arguing that "the ideal solution would be a neutral Germany," Shevardnadze understands that such a solution may not be "realistic." {58} He suggests, however, the following: "let nobody think that Moscow will remain indifferent if a united Germany joins NATO," since "we have some variants to suggest." {59}

To further address Warsaw Pact fears over the prospect of a unified Germany aligned with NATO, it has been proposed that a contingent of Soviet forces remain in eastern Germany for an undetermined "transitional" period after unification. Politburo member Alexander Yakovlev implicitly accepted this proposal by stating that "Soviet troops will not leave a reunified Germany if the military units of the Western countries remain there." {60} This possibility is also consistent with one of the variants to which Shevardnadze may have been referring since apparently for some time the reduction of Soviet forces stationed in East Germany to 50,000 was already being studied last year. {61} The idea of a continuing Soviet presence in Germany has already been endorsed by Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, and Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki has argued that "I do not think one can envisage serious consideration of the concept of a unified Germany which would not have NATO forces stationed in one part, and, I suspect, Warsaw Pact forces in another." The West German Secret Service is said to have reported that Gorbachev has accepted this solution in exchange for a sizeable reduction in the Bundeswehr. In addition, at least for the near term, the Bundeswehr would not be garrisoned in the territory of the present East Germany.{62}

As the senior Soviet politicians postured on the issue of the German role in NATO, "The Andropov circle" reappeared in the person of the old Kuusinen "consultant," Alexander Bovin. Appreciating that "the end of postwar Europe could not have failed to put the question of the unification of Germany onto a practical footing," Bovin boldly asked on Moscow Television if a united Germany will be a member of NATO or a
neutral state? In examining an neutral Germany, he then asks "will this strengthen stability in Europe?" Fearing that it would not, Bovin argues that "Germany is not Austria or Switzerland, and . . . we'd see the beginning of an endless struggle. . . . And this tug-of-war between East

and West. . . could be a constant source of suspicion and distrust, a constant source of destabilization in Europe." Turning to the option of a unified Germany in NATO, Bovin argues that such an option can be considered as a "major political defeat" by the terminology of old political thinking. Only by overcoming such,, conventional stereotypes is it possible to obtain "a victory for democracy." Bovin also argues that, although "it's hardly likely that the inclusion of the present territory of the GDR in the territory of NATO could affect our security in any degree . . . in the nuclear age," still "the West is seeking compromise" in accepting that "NATO forces should be kept out of GDR territory, or Soviet forces could remain there." Expecting "the debate will be long and difficult," he urges that "no possibility should be discounted in advance." {63}

Substituting New Structures for the Warsaw Pact

During a February 1990 exchange with the author at the North Atlantic Assembly, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev noted that "we need to reduce tensions . . . and when we reduce the threat of force, the German Question can be decided. If NATO were no longer threatening to the Soviet Union, then Germany could remain in NATO. The transformation of the alliances goes hand in hand with the unification of Germany." Consistent with such a transformation, Soviet theoreticians now recognize that it is time to transform the Warsaw Pact from a "military-political into a political military organization." {64} Even General Vladimir Lobov, chief of the Warsaw Pact joint armed forces, agrees that "as long as the Warsaw Pact and NATO have to be preserved, they should be gradually transformed from military political alliances into political-military ones." {65} In the opinion of some Soviet civilian security theoreticians, "there are common interests that justify the existence and development of WTO, chief among which are its member countries' common social and economic problems. All of them (the Soviet Union included) have fallen too far behind in their development to be accepted on an equal footing with the West in the process of the world's economic and political integration." {66} Thus, while the Warsaw Pact could continue to provide reassurance to the previous victims of German hegemony, it might also be transformed into an economic organization to provide the Soviet Union with a broad economic and political bridge to the West.

While the Soviets talk of the maintenance of both the North Atlantic and Warsaw Treaty Organizations, the latter has ceased to exist as an integrated operational command since, for all intents and purposes, the 1979 Warsaw Pact command statutes are null and void. Authorization for the employment of Polish, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian armed forces outside their respective national territory now requires approval of the respective NSWP governments, effectively negating Soviet control over these national forces through the Warsaw Pact operational command structure. {67} Furthermore, the Soviets have already agreed with both the Czechoslovaks and the Hungarians to withdrawal of all 73,500 and 49,700 Soviet troops from their respective territories by 30 June 1991.

{68} Somewhat understating the new reality, Soviet Ambassador to the January 1990 seminar on military doctrine in Vienna, Vladimir Shustov, notes that "[imagine that military questions will now be discussed on a more democratic basis, taking into account the interests of each state." {69} Other than in the context of a mutual assistance treaty directed toward deterrence of any possible future German efforts to redraw the postwar territorial frontiers, the fiction of the Warsaw Treaty Organization will most likely be maintained principally for purposes of near term symmetry.

The head of the Hungarian Institute for Foreign Relations, Peter Hardi, has noted that "opposition groups in Eastern Europe never saw NATO as the equivalent of the Warsaw Pact." {70} Thus, as the former "opposition" assumes leadership in the NSWP states, both the relationship between the Warsaw and North Atlantic Treaty Organizations, as well as relations among the signatories of the Warsaw Pact, will be adjusted to reflect the altered political reality in Eastern Europe. East Europeans argue for dissolution of the Warsaw Pact because "it has never been based on shared interests of nations" and plead for West EuroPeans to avoid legitimizing the organization by linking the two alliances either out of a desire to maintain American military presence in Europe or out of a desire to dissolve NATO as well. {71} Soviet willingness to accept such an evolution of the European security structure is suggested in Marshal Akhromeyev 's expectation that one or two of the Warsaw Pact states will "probably" leave the treaty organization. {72} Already the Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister has told the Soviets that "no doubt . . . at some point in the future membership in the Warsaw pact will cease to be of strategic interest for Hungary." {73} According to the Hungarian chief of staff, "we are already redeploying some troops away from the Western border" so as to "be prepared to defend ourselves . . . from any direction," since "we no longer have an image of the enemy formulated on an ideological basis." {74}

The nonzero-sum model of security that may be traced back to Andropov and his appreciation for the superiority of Soviet-Finnish relations over the relationship between the Soviet Union and its NSWP allies is evolving toward a vision of European security that would both overcome the division of Europe and bridge the Atlantic to maintain the European link with Canada and the United States. The idea of a "common European home" goes far beyond DeGaulle's "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals," and quickly dismisses Gorbachev's expression of concern over "an onslaught of 'mass culture' from across the Atlantic." It has developed into an inclusive concept allowing peripheral states of both the East and West to reclaim their heritage. Despite his earlier mischievous message about American culture, Gorbachev has come to appreciate that Canada and the United States are already part of an existing "common home" of European political culture running west from the Elbe to the Pacific. He hopes to eventually expand the boundaries of this "common home" to run from pacific to Pacific.

Gorbachev has also come to appreciate the contribution the North American states make to European stability. The vice rector of the diplomatic academy of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, for example, has argued that since "a certain presence of American troops-a limited presence- poses no danger" to Soviet security, and "some circles in Western Europe feel their security is greater with American troops" present in Europe, "let them have it." {75} In fact, even a substantial majority of Poles would prefer to see the American forces stationed in Europe remain at the same level or be increased because it is perceived to offset the power of Germany. {76} Thus, as Andrei Kokoshin stated during the summit at Malta, "we have no master plan, no desire to drive America out of Europe. In calling for a new Helsinki mechanism, we have chosen a framework that gives the United States and Canada legitimate roles in Europe." {77}

Beyond the desire of some Warsaw Pact security theorists to retain NATO as an instrument for the restraint of a unified Germany, the Soviets expect West European integration to dilute German political influence in Central Europe. The Soviets, French, and even the West Germans agree that burying the unified Germany within a supra-national "West European Confederation" based on several members of the European Community would resolve concerns over the maintenance of present borders. Under such a "mechanism" all "foreign" troops could be withdrawn from Central Europe as has been frequently proposed by the Soviets. This would require only that American and British forces withdraw from western Germany as residual Soviet forces withdraw from eastern Germany. The Bundeswehr would cease to exist and, at least initially, the new supra-national army could be headed by a non-German commander. The continued presence of Belgian, Dutch, and French soldiers in Germany would further reinforce Polish and Soviet confidence on the territorial question.

As noted by a former British Defense Minister, "it would not be impossible for NATO to accept that United States forces would not be deployed in a united Germany. The skill will come, however, in keeping American forces in Western Europe and in keeping a united Germany within the Western European security framework." {78} Defense Secretary Cheney has noted that such an agreement under which "the Soviets were out of Eastern Europe and the U.S. retained a modest presence in Western Europe would probably be the ideal outcome." {79} For their part, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrosky has already declared that "our final goal is to have not a single Soviet soldier abroad by the year 2000." {80} So long as Great Britain, Italy, and Portugal are willing to host limited American forces, the domestic consensus on keeping American forces in Western Europe should be possible to maintain. In fact, contrary to the statements of some American Congressional politicians, {81} almost twice as many Americans are in favor of either maintaining U.S. forces in Europe at the same level (50%) or increasing it (10%) as

are in favor of decreasing it (34%). {82}

Less formal regional groupings are also expected to facilitate economic integration while contributing to the stabilization of the larger European wide political system. The Italians, for example, are reported to be seeking to organize a regional grouping in the south to serve as "a balancing force to the German sphere of influence that many expect to emerge in the north." {83} For the other states participating in this regional grouping, membership in the EC is the goal. With eyes on membership in the EC, Austria and Hungary believe the road to Brussels runs through Rome. Furthermore, since the prosperous and westward-looking Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia are particularly attracted to the resurrection of what was once the Mitteleuropa of the Emperor Franz Josef, the less than enthusiastic Yugoslav federal government has found itself drawn into the process of economic integration and multi-party democratization to avoid disintegration of the federation. {84} Both Slovenia and Croatia have come to accept that "there can be no democratic socialism without political pluralism based on the right of political association and the competition of equal political subjects and programs." {85} Although politics initially limited the new regional grouping, "Czechoslovakia is an obvious future partner" since it too is a "successor state" of the defunct Hapsburg Empire. {86}

An additional instrument for restraining German nationalism is recognized in the resurgence of the old Austro-Hungarian ties. Anschluss could create a Germany that would stretch from the Baltic to almost the Adriatic. Such a "Greater Germany" would generate sufficient concerns to divide Europe once again. An Austria tied to a neutral Hungary by some form of economic union, however, would constitute an effective barrier to German political expansion to the south. Such a confederation would both appeal to Austrian pride as well as to Hungarian fears about becoming a "museum of the industrial revolution." As for the Soviet attitude, Fyodor Burlatsky, chairman of the human rights panel of the Supreme Soviet committee on foreign relations, has argued that "if Austria can be neutral, then why not Hungary." {87} In fact, the Hungarians have already indicated that their armed forces are to be redirected toward the preparation for resistance to "any foreign intervention or aggression." {88}

When the Soviets see centripetal forces at action in the West, they are forced to contend with growing centrifugal forces in the East. Burlatsky has observed that "there is an asymmetry between the disintegration of Eastern Europe and the growing integration of Western Europe." As a result, he fears that Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union could become "an economic appendage of the West, a supplier of raw materials." The only alternative, Burlatsky argues, is the creation of "a common market on the entire European continent." {89} The states of Western Europe, however, question whether Russia is too big, and too Asian, to fit in as a full member of the EC. Yet, as with Turkey, the

potential political cost of exclusion is simply perceived as too high. The price of associate membership the Soviets will probably have to pay, on the other hand, will likely be the independence of the Baltic republics, since the Balts are determined to regain the independence illegally taken from them and West European politicians have no flexibility with regard to supporting Baltic self-determination. In fact, for some time now Soviet officials have been saying in private that the Baltic republics might be allowed to slip away, {90} and Gorbachev assured Bush at their Malta summit that he has no intention of using force to resolve the issue. {91}

Diplomats from Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland have all indicated to the author the willingness of the Nordic Council to accept Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as members. Such action would undoubtedly be reassuring to the Russians, since it would tend to restrain the return of German political influence in the Baltic republics. Unfortunately, a critical result of such an expanded Nordic Council when combined with the resurrected "Middle Europe Group," is the isolation of Poland between its historical enemies. Despite the Poles having made an intensive effort to draw Sweden closer, the Nordic Council is unlikely to admit Poland. The possibility of including Poland, along with Germany and Russia, in a Baltic or Hansa Group is being discussed among some Swedes as an alternative. In addition, Czechoslovakian President Vaclav Havel has suggested cooperation between Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary to create a Central Europe "which does not need the protection of superpowers because it is capable of defending itself, and capable of building its own security system." {92} Since any such "formal structure" would restrain Hungarian and Czechoslovak relations with the "Middle Europe Group," however, it is unlikely that Havel's proposal will lead anywhere productive for Poland.

Whatever future security constellation is produced by the Helsinki process, it must address the failure to create a stable and just conclusion to the chaos unleashed by the First World War. Despite the great differences between liberal-capitalist and Marxist-Leninist critiques of the European security environment produced by the First World War, the two ideologies have come to critically and objectively perceive this environment as a historical experience emerging from a particular set of political and economic institutions. Resolution of these differences requires an accommodation of the Leninist revolutionary perspective on national self-determination with the avoidance of a peace that would breed what Woodrow Wilson would call "a constantly recurring sense of injustice." {93} The difficulties of achieving such an accommodation cannot be overestimated.

Managing the Transition

Obviously, the transition to a new security structure will involve a series of stages. As noted earlier, the foundation of the new structure social justice. Towards this goal, the twelve nation European Community

and the six nation European Free Trade Association (Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) began the process of forging an expanded free trade area and customs union in December 1989. {94} The economic integration of Eastern Europe, however, will be more difficult. An East European Development Bank for assisting Yugoslavia and the Warsaw Pact states will probably be the initial step in creating all-European economic integration. For the mid-term, some form of Reconstruction Finance Corporation will have to be created by the West and Japan. The West will buy in for peace and stability in Europe; the Japanese will buy in to obtain the return of its Kurile Island. {95}

The social cost of the economic adjustment necessary to integrate the Warsaw Pact states clearly worries the politicians of the East. "The real challenge is to change people's mind-set" notes Mieczyslaw Rokowski, who argues that "Poles would like to work in socialism but live in capitalism." {96} While the new non-communist politicians of the East acknowledge the need to protect society's most vulnerable during the transition to market economies, it may also be that communists like Rokowski ignore the extent of poverty already existing in the socio-economic system. The Solidarity spokesman Janusz Onyszkiewicz notes, for example, that "for 40 years we claimed we had no homelessness, no illiteracy. Now we find that the homeless are numbered in the thousands, and one out of every three Army recruits can't read." {97} Thus, despite the 31% devaluation of the zloty, scrapping of price controls while maintaining wage controls, and ending of many subsidies for goods and services, the Solidarity-led government retains the support of 80% of the Polish people. {98} This would suggest, therefore, that the public deprivation is already so great that as long as the people are convinced of the government's sincerity and integrity they will endure. The exception is in East Germany since the deprivation of the Poles and the other non-German members of the Warsaw Pact is clearly easier to contain than is that of the East Germans because the non-Germans have nowhere to escape.

The social cost of economic adjustment in the Soviet Union has the additional dimension of managing demobilization of the Soviet Ground Forces. Gorbachev is reported to have told Kohl and Genscher that the Soviet Union is in no position to absorb the hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe into a society that is losing the struggle to provide food and housing to its people. {99} "We will withdraw the troops," says the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, "but no one has yet given much thought to what this means." {100} The Soviet troops in Germany, with their families, constitute approximately 600,000 people. Some 60,000 troops withdrawn from Eastern Europe as part of Gorbachev's December 1988 unilateral force reduction are still living in tents." {101} Only 39 percent of the officers and warrant officers stationed in the 64 garrisons in Czechoslovakia, for example, have housing awaiting them in the Soviet Union. {102} As Soviet forces are

withdrawn from Czechoslovakia and Hungary the more than 35,000 officers and warrant officers and some 30,000 families "will virtually have the status of refugees, without apartments, their families without jobs, and their children-and there are nearly 19,000 of them-without schools." {103} Officers living in tents, dependents living with relatives in already over-crowded Soviet housing and children attending schools in overcrowded classrooms have only added to the tension building in the society.

Sociologist Zaslavskaya has observed that "tolerance was never one of the qualities instilled in people in our political culture. Such bourgeois notions of tolerance were uprooted and people were made to believe there was one truth and [those who are not with us are against us]." {104} The result is that there is little ability in the society to accommodate the increased tension, and aggression is the standard response. In response to this increasing tendency to violence, the ability to employ the Soviet Armed Forces to maintain the federation is rapidly evaporating in the face of what General Moiseyev calls "the growing anti-army propaganda and the inactivity and sometimes connivance on the part of party and soviet organs with the people's fronts." The Chief of the Soviet General Staff complains that this threat "is particularly clear in the context of events in Transcaucasia, the Baltic region, Moldavia [and] central Asia." General Moiseyev complains that "in the fall draft more than 6,500 people refused to serve in the Army. And this was often done with the direct support of republican and local organs of power." In addition, he notes that "there has been an increase in the number of persons of the Transcaucasian nationalities deserting from the Army. At present around 1,200 deserters are in hiding on the territory of the Transcaucasian republics." Worse yet, "some of them are used to man the detachments of combatants." {105}

The state created by the Bolsheviks some 70 years ago is disintegrating. As one Central Committee bureaucrat has explained, "the party leadership is close to collapsing at the local and district level all across the county." {106} In Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tadzhikistan the party structures have already collapsed as they did in the NSWP states because they were Russian-imposed institutions without local legitimacy. Beyond the inevitable spread of this collapse among the outlying regions, as oil and coal production falls, and feed grain runs out and meat disappears from the stores in Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and Russia, local soviets [councils] are wresting authority from the local party structures because they have greater legitimacy. The real question now becomes whether Gorbachev can obtain CPSU cooperation in facilitating
a transition to a new federation with legitimacy in the republics. If the CPSU cannot break with the past to accept a freer economic and political system, as well as accommodate the non-Russian national aspirations, Gorbachev will fail to save the USSR. {107} As Soviets have frequently noted a coup d'etat offers no alternative to restore the CPSU-led Soviet state since a successor regime would face the same types of economic and

political pressures.

The present Union of Soviet Socialist Republics contains fifteen republics and the question of national autonomy, and even succession from the union, has become the dominant political issue in many of these republics. In the outlying regions such as the Baltic republics, western Ukraine, Moldavia (with a population that is 64% Moldavian, 14% Ukranian, and 13% Russian), and the Transcaucasus the indigenous populations support Popular Front movements campaigning for national revival. Even in Byelorussia (80% Byelorussian and 12% Russian) the Popular Front is supported by about 25 percent of the population. {108} If the individual republics ultimately are provided the opportunity to decide on the "refounding" of the union as has been proposed, {109} some Russians believe they can confidently count on retaining only Byelorussia. Regions they would hope to be able to retain, however, include the Ukraine (73% Ukrainian and 21% Russian), Georgia (69% Georgian and 9% Armenian), Armenia (90% Armenian), Kazakhstan (40% Kazakh, 40% Russian, and 6% Ukrainian). The Russians might have to compromise and split the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, retaining only the eastern part of the Ukraine and the northern part of Kazakhstan where the Russian populations are concentrated. Although the Russians expect the Christians of Armenia to cling to the federation for protection from the Muslim states, demands for independence by activists in the Georgian Republic threaten to leave the Armenian Republic isolated from Soviet territory.

Although Western scholars usually include Kazakhstan among the Central Asian republics for geographic and ethnographic reasons, the Soviets include only Uzbekistan (69% Uzbek and 11% Russian), Turkmenistan (69% Turkman, 13% Russian, and 9% Uzbek), Kigizia (48% Kirgiz, 26% Russian, and 12% Uzbek), and Tadzhikistan (58% Tajik, 23% Uzbek, and 11% Russian). The first three are inhabited by people whose languages belong to the Turkish family, and the latter to the Iranian family. Azerbaijan (78% Azeri, 8% Russian, and 8% Armenian) is the western-most of the Muslim republics, separated from the others by the Caspian Sea. With the outbreak of violence over the predominantly Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani Popular Front was radicalized. Although moderates initially intended to exploit popular emotions in pursuit of political liberalization and economic reform, by January 1990 the radicals in the Popular Front were able to organize the approximately 200,000 homeless Azeris that had fled ethnic clashes in Armenia in a pogrom to drive Armenians in Azerbaijan out of the republic so as to occupy their homes. When Moscow attempted to restore order in the republic, some 27 soldiers and 120 civilians were killed in the fighting, and Russian families had to be evacuated from the republic under armed escort. One of the front's executive board members, Josif Samedogli, drew two conclusions: first, that a split between democratic moderates and national fundamentalists in the Popular Front is likely once Soviet

military forces withdraw; and second, the republic is now anti-Russian and pro- independence. Samedogli predicts that "the Azerbaijani people will never forgive . . . the people being killed in the streets. It's now completely obvious that there's nothing left for us in federation. . . As the army withdraws, we will take over." Now the talk in the Azerbaijan Republic is of reunification with the Azeris in Iran. {110}

While Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov characterized use of the Soviet Ground Forces to restore order in the face of the anti-Armenian pogrom in Azerbaijan as an attempt to smash the "power structures" established by the Popular Front, the commander of the Interior Ministry troops sought a dialogue with moderates in the organization. {111} After the long war in Afghanistan, the Russian public is reluctant to get involved in military entanglements in any of the southern republics known as "the Muslim crescent of Central Asia. Together, they are home to about 50 million Muslims." {112} The military union Shchit (Shield] held a rally in Moscow. . . to denounce the use of troops in Baku, and the Russian nationalist group Pamyat[memory] held a rally to demand the immediate withdrawal of 'our boys' from what many Russians regard as a faraway conflict having little to do with them. {113} One alternative discussed by members of the Inter-regional Group of the People's Congress was to support a union of the 7 million Soviet Azeris and the 12 million Iranian Azeris with Turkey so as to establish a secular barrier to Islamic fundamentalism from the south.

Armenians fleeing Azerbaijani violence in Baku across the Caspian Sea set off demonstrations in Tadjhikistan "in response to rumors that several thousand Armenian refugees arrived in the capital and that the authorities promised to give them comfortable flats to the detriment of the local population." {114} Although no more than 40 Armenians fleeing the pogrom in Baku were staying with relatives in Dushanbe, youths and local religious leaders exploited racial and religious prejudice to set off mass disorders and pillaging that reflects a broad-based general reassignment against "foreigners." The unrest quickly, spread to Uzbekistan and included the circulation of "leaflets demand[ing] the immediate eviction of Russians from Central Asia." {115} Already some six years ago, Nancy Lubin noted that "however unjustified their feelings may be, indigenous Central Asians have begun to hold [the Russians] responsible" for the economic slowdown and the disappearance of many basic goods, services, and job opportunities. Despite the fact that the principal cause is due to rapid indigenous population growth, Lubin warned that "it could spark deep-seated nationalist hostilities and resentments which would be difficult to contain." {116} Now the Armenian spark to a racist conflagration brings forth the only slightly suppressed fear of "a rising yellow tide" evoking ancient Russian memories of the "Tatar yoke." The Russian people, of whom was demanded great sacrifice for other Soviet and socialist peoples in the name of all-union and international solidarity by the CPSU, now feel unjustly threatened by some of those for whom they suffered deprivation. Thus, the cruelest joke of all those played on the Russian people by the CPSU is the legacy of

resentment against the old imperial thinking that sustained the Soviet Union.

The colonization or russification programs have also created an aggravated situation in the Baltic republic of Latvia (49% Latvian, 38% Russian, and 5% Byelorussian). Having encouraged Russian immigration to Latvia with promises of apartments, Latvian families may wait 15 years for a flat of their own. Now a minority in their own land, "Riga itself in now less than 30 percent Latvian." {117} Despite the catastrophic demographic situation, the Latvian Popular Front is as determined to regain political independence as are the Popular Fronts in Estonia (68% Estonian, 28% Russian, and 3% Ukranian) and Lithuania (80% Lithuanian, 9% Russian, and 8% Polish). Ultimately, the Russians will have to make the same individual decisions that citizens of other colonial empires faced, but since they were not representing a modernizing power they will find it more difficult to find a place in the Baltic states of the new Europe. The repatriation of the Russian population in the Baltic states will require outside financial assistance if this transfer is to avoid the destabilizing consequence of demands and counter-demands for compensation.

Over the course of modern European history, Russia has several times been a major political actor and, as noted by Jacob Kipp, if the Soviet Union is allowed to withdraw completely from its role as a large state actor during this contemporary "time of troubles," Russia will undoubtedly return with a vengeance once it passes through one more "veil of tears." Soviet political analysts like Bovin admit Soviet vulnerability when they explain that "Americans realize that the shifts in East Europe and the acute collisions and difficulties within the USSR weaken the positions and narrow the room to maneuver on the part of the Soviet leadership. So they do have trump cards. . . ." Yet Bovin also believes the West to be sufficiently sophisticated to make the transitioning Soviet Union into a permanent partner in constructing a new security structure in Europe founded on a sense of social justice. Thus, the United States and its allies will not deny the Russians their national aspirations because". . . the Americans consider it not in their own interest to undermine the forces advocating perestroyka and the further evolution of Soviet foreign policy within the framework of new political thinking." {118} Bovin clearly believes that Americans understand that firmly anchoring Russia to Europe is every bit as critical for decisively changing European history for the better as is tying Germany to Western Europe.

Colonel-General Dmitriy Volkogonov, Director of the Soviet Institute of Military History, told John G. Hines in March 1990 that if he were pressed to choose a historical analogy for the crisis facing the Soviet state, it would be the period 1917-1919 and the forgotten peace of Brest-Litovsk. By this agreement Russia lost 34 percent of her population, 32 percent of her agricultural land, 54 percent of her industrial

undertakings, and 89 percent of her coal mines. {119} The historical fact that the over-all pattern of Russo German relations over the past two hundred years has been one of alternating bitter estrangements and warm rapprochements may partially explain Volkogonov's argument that the United States has an obligation to play a larger security role in Europe as the Soviets become less able to play the dominant role they have since 1945.

Notes

1. Oleg Bogomolov as quoted in David Remnick, "Perestroika Nurtured At Siberian Think Tank," Washington Post, February 10, 1990, p. A18.

2. See Martin Ebon, The Andropov File, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1983, pp. 18-22; Dusko Doder, Shadows and Whispers, New York:
Random House, 1986, pp. 132-151; and Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, Inside the Kremlin, London: W. H. Allen, 1987, pp. 42-44.

3. As quoted in Remnick, "Perestroika Nurtured At Siberian Think Tank," p. A18.

4. Tatyana Zaslavskaya as quoted in Remnick, ibid.

5. Doder, Shadows and Whispers, p. 28 and p. 290.

6. Zhores A. Medvedev Andropov, New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 1983,
pp. 178-179.

7. Yuriy V. Andropov, Izbranniye rechi stat'i [Selected Speeches and Articles], Izdatel'stvo, Moskva, 1979, p.287.

8. See David Ignatius, " 'Major' KGB Defector to U.S. Breaks 10 Years of Silence," Washington Post, March 2, 1990, p. A1 and p. A18.

9. Tatyania Zaslavskaya. "The Novosibirsk Report," Survey, No. 28, January 1984, p. 106.

10. As quoted in Remnick, "Perestroika Nurtured At Siberian Think Tank," p. A1.

11. See Remnick, "Perestroika Nurtured At Siberian Think Tank," p. A1 and p. A18.

12. Ann Imse, "Soviet party could be next to fall, Gorbachev warns," Washington Times, December 11, 1989, pp. A1 and A10.

13. Oleg T. Bogomolov, "The Origins of Change in the Soviet Union," paper presented at Annual Conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oslo, Norway, 14-17 September 1989; also see R. Jeffrey Smith, "Soviet Economist Says Moscow Is Bungling Economic Reform," Washington Post, September 20, 1989, p. A31.

14. See Doder, Shadows and Whispers, p. 314.

15. Yevgeny Primakov as quoted in David Remnick, "Gorbachev's Policy: Turning a Weak Hand Into Grand Strategy," Washington Post, February 18, 1990, pp. A35 and A41.

16. As quoted in Remnick, "Gorbachev's Policy: Turning a Weak Hand Into Grand Strategy," p. A41.

17. Walter Pincus, "Soviet Pledges Military Changes," Washington Post, July 13, 1988, p. A16.

18. Aleksandr Bovin, "Perestroika i vneshnaya politika" [Restructuring and Foreign Policy], Izvestiya, June 16, 1988, p. 4.

19. As quoted in Remnick, "Gorbachev's Policy: Turning a Weak Hand Into Grand Strategy," p. A41.

20. Andranik Migranyan, "For Discussion: An Epitaph to the Brezhnev Doctrine: The USSR and Other Socialist Countries in the Context of East-West Relations," Moscow News, No. 34, 27 August-3 September, 1989, p. 6.

21. As cited in Michael Dobbs, "Moscow Condemns '79 Afghan Invasion," Washington Post, October 24, 1989, p. A22.

22. As reported in Adam Pertman, "Weighing the future of NATO," Boston Globe, October 30, 1989, p. 1; "Soviets Primakov, Shishlin Rule Out Interference," FBIS-EEU-89-208, 30 October 1989, p. 38; "Officials on Pact Future," FBIS-EEU-89-209, 31 October 1989, p. 25; and "Hungarian, Polish Roles in Warsaw Pact Viewed," FBIS-SOV-89-209, 31 October 1989, p.
19.

23. Rezso Nyers, "The Party Remains," International Herald Tribune, October 1-15, 1989, p. 4.

24. As quoted in Jim Hoagland, "Eastern Europe's Danger Zone," Washington
Post, October 24, 1989, p. A25.

25. As quoted in Bill Keller, "Gorbachev's Hope for Future: 'A Common European Home,' "New York Times, November 30, 1989, p. A20.

26. As cited in David Remnick, "Party Officials Accused of Restricting

Soviet Legislature's Radical Reformists," Washington Post, November 1, 1989, p. A36.

27. "The Concept of an All-European House and the German Question," a
speech delivered by Vyacheslav Dashichev in Berlin during April 1989 in preparation for Gorbachev's visit to the FRG.

28. "Yakovlev Says Reunification Up to Germans," FBIS-SOV-89-219, November 15, 1989, p. 24.

29. See, for example, "Official Presents German Reunification Proposals," FBIS-WEU-89-138, July 20, 1989, p.15.

30. Sergei Karaganov as quoted in Jim Hoagland, "New Alliance Roles See: Soviets Study Future of NATO, Warsaw Pact," Washington Post, December 3,
1989. p. A38.

31. For a review of some of this Russo-German back channel discussion, see Lally Weylhouth, "Germany's Urge to Merge: Behind the Tumult, the Designs of Moscow & Bonn," Washington Post, March 4, 1990, p. C1 and p.
C4.

32. "Soviets oppose NATO in a unified Germany," Washington Times, February 13, 1990, p. 9.

33. Gregor Gysi as quoted in "East Berlin Echoes Idea For 1st Time," International Herald Tribune, January 31, 1990, p. 1.

34. U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker as quoted in "Soviets warn against uniting Germany," Washington Times, December 6, 1989, p. A7.

35. See "Skubiszewski Views German Unification Issue," FBIS-EEU-89-243,
December 23, 1989, p.55.

36. As quoted in Michael Dobbs, "Gorbachev May Seek Aid of Allies," International Herald Tribune", January 31, 1990, p. 1.

37. Marc Fisher, "Kohl to Press Soviets On Speeding Unification," Washington Post, February 10, 1990, p. A20.

38. See Serge Schmemann, "German Move on Currency." International Herald
Tribune, February 14, 1990, p. 1 and p. 2.

39. As quoted in Marc Fisher, "1 Germany, Many Hurdles," Washington Post,

February 18, 1990, p. A37.

40. See, for example. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Events Forced Bush's Hand On Troop Cuts, U.S. Aids Say," International Herald Tribune", February 2, 1990, p. 1 and p. 4.

41. As quoted in Thomas L. Friedman, "A New Set of Rules In Game of Nations, " International Herald Tribune", February 14, 1990, p. 2.

42. Valentin Falin as quoted in Marc Fisher, "1 Germany, Many Hurdles," Washington Post, February 18, 1990, p. A37.

43. See Marc Fisher, "Last Obstacles are Removed, A Jubilant Bonn Proclaims," International Herald Tribune", February 15, 1990, p. 6.

44. Craig R. Whitney, "Moscow's Last Hope." New York Times, February 16,
1990, p. A8.

45. Ye. Bovkun, "The German Question: Outlines and Reality," Izvestiya, November 27, 1989, p. 3, as translated in FBIS-SOV-89-231, December 4, 1989, p. 53.

46. Ibid., pp. 53-54.

47. See, for example, "A New Europe, A New Atlanticism: Architecture For A New Era," address by Secretary of State James A. Baker III to the Berlin Press Club, Steigerburger Hotel, December 12, 1989; "Excerpts from Baker's Speech on Berlin and U.S. Role in Europe's Future," International Herald Tribune", December 13, 1989, p. A18; and Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Backing West German's Unity Plan," New York Times, February 5, 1990, p.
A14.

48. David Hughes and John Cassidy, "West plans big cuts in defense," London Sunday Times, November 19, 1989, p. 1.

49. Michael Dobbs, "Gorbachev to Press Arms Cuts at Talks," Washington Post, November 30, 1989, p. A62.

50. Andrey Piontkovskiy and Arkadiy Skorokhodov, "What is Sufficiency," APN Military Bulletin, No. 17, September 1989.

51. V. Zhurkin, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Europe Institute, as quoted in Izvestiya, November 24, 1989, Evening Edition, p.
5.

52. Patrick E. Tyler, "More Troop Cuts Possible In Eastern Europe, Cheney Says." Washington Post, November 27, 1989.

53. Patrick E. Tyler and Molly Moore, "U.S. Military in Europe Being Reshaped," Washington Post, December 17, 1989. p. A20.

54. See, for example, "On Troops and on German Unity, the Barriers Fall: Bush Hails Concessions by Soviets," International Herald Tribune, February 15, 1990, p. 1 and p. 6.

55. As quoted in Bill Keller, "In Soviet Speeches, 2 Nightmares: Europe's Ideologies, or Its Armies," New York Times, February 7, 1990, p. A12.

56. A. Bovin, "Discussion Will Be Difficult," Izvestiya February 7, 1990, p. 4, as translated in FBIS-SOV-90-026, February 7, 1990, p. 12.

57. As quoted in Peter Almond, "NATO: Neutrality for unified Germany is out of the Question," Washington Times, February 9, 1990, p. 5.

58. See Paul Lewis, "United Germany Urged to be in NATO," New York Times,
February 15, 1990, p. 18; and Martin Fletcher, "Kremlin softens view of German links with NATO," The Times, February 15, 1990, p. 8.

59. As quoted in Marc Fisher, "Moscow, Bonn Differ On Unification Pace," Washington Post, February 21, 1990, p. 16.

60. "Yakovlev on Soviet Troops in [Reunified Germany,]" FBIS-SOV-90-030,
February 13, 1990, p.36.

61. See "Academician Says Unification Distant Objective," FBIS-EEU49-247-A,
December 27, 1989, Annex, p. 6.

62. See Paul Lewis, "United Germany Urged to be in NATO," New York Times,
February 15, 1990, p. 18; "Premier Demands Role in Talks," ibid.; Stephens Broening, "West willing to allow Soviet troops in a united Germany," Baltimore Sun, February 15, 1990, p. 1; Peter Almond, "Recalling Gref Spee, NATO lures Germans," Washington Times, February 16,
1990, p. 6; and Ian Johnson, "Bonn agrees to send troops East," Baltimore Sun, February 20, 1990, p. 1.

63. See "German Role in NATO Examined," FBIS-SOV-90-043, March 5, 1990,
p. 4.

64. See, for example, "Lobov on Dissolution of Warsaw Pact," NATO, FBIS-SOV-90-041, March 1, 1990, p. 3.

65. "Reportage on Roundtable Dialogue With NATO,"

FBIS-SOV-90-034,
February 20, 1990, p. 2.

66. Bezrnkov and Kortunov, "What kind of an alliance do we need?," p. 7.

67. R. Jeffrey Smith, "An East-West First: Joint Military Talks," International Herald Tribune, January 16, 1990, p. 2.

68. See "Soviet Troops Set to Leave Hungary," Washington Post, March 11, 1990, p. A32.

69. As quoted in Alan Riding, "Soviet Military Sees Enduring but Revamped Warsaw Pact," International Herald Tribune, January 18, 1990, P. 5.

70. As quoted in Joseph Fitchett, "Unity: Politicians Face a Test," International Herald Tribune, February 13, 1990, p. 2.

71. Peter Hardi, "Scrap the Warsaw Pact," Washington Post, February 25, 1990, p. B7.

72. "Some Members May Leave Warsaw Pact-Akhromeyev," Defense Daily.
February 14, 1990, p. 245.

73. Istvan Oszi as quoted in R. Jeffrey Smith, "Military Leaders of East and West Conferring as Europe Changes," Washington Post, January 16, 1990, p. A20.

74. Lt. General Laszlo Borsits as quoted in R. Jeffrey Smith, "Warsaw Pact-Endgame: In Eastern Europe, the Military Alliance Is Dead," Washington Post, February 4, 1990, p. C2.

75. Vladimir N. Chernega, as quoted in Bill Keller, "Gorbachev's Hope for Future: 'A Common European Home,' "New York Times, November 30, 1989, p.
A20.

76. See "United Germany: They like it and they fear it," p. 49.

77. As quoted in Jim Hoagland, "New Alliance Roles Seen: Soviet Study Future of NATO, Warsaw Pact," Washington Post, December 3, 1989, p. A38.

78. David Owen, "Now the defence equation changes," London Sunday Times,
November 12, 1989, p.17.

79. As quoted in Andy Pasztor, "Cheney Says U.S. May Demand Pullout Of

All Soviet Troops From East Europe," Wall Street Journal, January 31, 1990, p. 20.

80. As quoted in Ken Adelman, "Events overtake waltz at Vienna," Washington Times, January 17, 1990, p. F-1; also see "Lobov on Dissolution of Warsaw Pact, NATO," FBIS-SOV-90-041, pp. 3-4.

81. See, for example, Molly Moore, "Bush Proposal Called 'Floor' On Force Cuts," Washington Post, February 4, 1990, p. A17.

82. See "United Germany: They like and they fear it," p. 49.

83. R. W. Apple, "The New Europe: Will It Come Apart as It Comes Together?," New York Times, November 23, 1989, p. A7.

84. "Mittleuropa tunes up once more," The Economist, November 18-24, 1989, p. 73; and Robert D. Kaplan, "Yugoslav Tremors Along Balkans' Political Fault Line," Wall Street Journal, December 11, 1989, p. A15.

85. Croation communist party leader Stanko Stojcevic as quoted in Tony Barber, "Issue of Free-Election Splits Yugoslav Republics," Washington Post, December 12, 1989, p. A39.

86. See Flora Lewis, "More Quakes for Europe," New York Times, November
15, 1989, p. A29.

87. As quoted in Bill Keller, "Gorbachev's Hope for Future: 'A Common European Home,' "New York Times, November 30, 1989, p. A20.

88. As quoted in "Europe: The Warsaw Pact Vanishing," The Economist, January 27, 1990, p. 54.

89. Ibid.

90. Peter Reddaway, "Life After Gorbachev: The Soviets' Grim Future," Washington Post, November 26, 1989, p. C2.

91. See Don Oberdorfer, "Baltic Secession: Not Just If, but When," Washington Post, February 5, 1990, p. A15.

92. As quoted in R. Jeffrey Smith, "Warsaw Pact-Endgame," p. C2.

93. For a discussion of the Wilson-Lenin confrontation on anti-imperialism see N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: Americas Response to War and Revolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.

94. Alfred H. Kingon, "The Next Step Toward One Europe," Wall Street Journal, December 19, 1989, p. A15.

95. See "Soviet deputy urges settling territorial issue," Washington Times, November 7, 1989, p. 2.

96. As quoted in "Behind the Masks of Eastern Europe," Newsweek, October 16, 1989, p. 13.

97. As quoted in Mary Battiata, "TV Talks Try to Reconcile Poles to Pains of Transition," Washington Post, October 25, 1989, p. A42.

98. See "Bye-bye, queues," The Economist, January 27, 1990, p. 48.

99. See Marc Fisher, "Moscow, Bonn Differ On Unification Pace: Shevardnadze Sees Troop Return a Problem," Washington Post, February 21,
1990, p. 16.

100. Army General M. A. Moiseyev as interviewed in Krasnaya zvezda, February 11, 1990, p. 1.

101. See Peter Almond, "Unhappy Soviet army a potential powder keg," Washington Times, January 29, 1990, p. 1.

102. Jonathan C. Randal, "Soviets Begin Pullout From Czechoslovakia," Washington Post, February 27, 1990, p. A12.

103. Army General M. A. Moiseyev as interviewed in Krasnaya zvezda, February 11, 1990, p. 1.

104. As quoted in David Remnick, "The Kremlin Knew That Hard Times Were
Ahead," International Herald Tribune", January 18, 1990, p. 2.

105. Interview with Army General M. A. Moiseyev, Krasnaya zvezda, February 11, 1990, p. 1.

106. As quoted in Craig R. Whitney, "Moscow's Last Hope," New York Times,
February 16, 1990, p. A8.

107. See Patrick E. Tyler, "Webster Sees No Revival of Soviet Threat," Washington Post, March 2, 1990, p. A1 and p. A30.

108. See Michael Dobbs, "Lithuanian Vote: Democratic Step," Washington Post, February 25, 1990, p. A1 and p. A20.

109. See "Gorbachev Advisor Proposes 'Refounding' USSR," FBIS-SOV-90-015,
January 23, 1990, p.84.

110. As quoted in Michael Dobbs, "Separatism in Azerbaijan Growing Since Crackdown," Washington Post, February 16, 1990, p. A37.

111. See Michael Dobbs, "Unrest Deepens in Baku, Kremlin Delays Meeting,"
International Herald Tribune", January 24, 1990, p. 1.

112. See "Soviet Rioting Worsens: Tadzhik Violence 'Out of Control,' A 2d Republic Hit," International Herald Tribune", February 14, 1990, p. 1.

113. Michael Dobbs, "Military Says Baku Is Calm, But No Political Solution Seen," International Herald Tribune", January 29, 1990, p. 3.

114. Interfax, Radio Moscow as quoted in Craig R. Whitney, "Tadzhiks Impose a Curfew," International Herald Tribune", February 13, 1990, p. 1.

115. Tass as quoted in "Soviet Riots Spread to Samarkand," Washington Post, February 17, 1990, p. A26.

116. Nancy Lubin, Labour & Nationality In Soviet Central Asia, London: St. Antony's/Macmillan, 1984, p.234.

117. Peter Riggs, "Rock, Roll, and Revolt," Washington Post, February 4, 1990, p. C4.

118. A. Bovin, "Discussion Will Be Difficult," Izvestiya, February 7, 1990, p. 4.

119. John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace, March 1918, London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1966, p. 269.

Chapter 2.B.5

* * *

Soviet Change in a Changing World

Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth, U.S. Navy

A standard catechism has developed on change in the Soviet Union. Early in the development of this catechism a procrustean bed was fashioned to which observations and arguments about change in the Soviet Union have been fitted selectively. Now this catechism, one that is remarkably optimistic, has gained permanence through repetition. However, it is too soon, and dangerous, to decide how the rest of the story will run. The supporters of the catechism of optimism seem to include the majority of our countrymen and Western friends. Many seem troubled by any view skeptical of the outcome of change in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, skepticism about change in the Soviet Union seems even more unacceptable because of the astonishing developments in Eastern Europe.

The specific axioms of this catechism--though thoroughly contradicted by history--really do not keep me awake at night. However, so that we can begin on common ground as I develop my argument, I offer the following tenets from its credo:

o Mr. Gorbachev leads the pursuit of peace.

o The Soviet people, even the KGB, have abandoned authoritarianism forever.

o We are on the threshold of saying farewell to arms.

o Since it is apparent that we have come to the end of the cold war, it is inevitable that democratic liberalism will everywhere be embraced.

Let me add quickly that I am not the last of the cold war warriors looking for comfort in the good ol' days. I know, as do you, that Mr. Gorbachev is committed to reform and has motivated more change in the Soviet Union in the last two years than occurred in the previous sixty.

Admiral Kurth spent 17 years in and out of the Soviet Union, including tours as Naval Attache (1975-1977) and Defense Attache (1985-1987). He is fluent in Russian and has a Ph.D. from Harvard in government (Soviet Studies).

Reprinted from Naval War College Review, Winter 1990.

We also ought to admit together that the pressure is very strong both to accept that Mr. Gorbachev is a prophet and that the farewell to arms has begun. We hear that the war now to be fought by our elected officials is not the cold war. Rather, we must fight the new wars on drugs, deficits, and environmental damage. I cannot imagine a candidate seeking election today who would publicly support investment in readiness against a Soviet threat of any kind. It simply won't play in Peoria. I saw it most of all on one bumper on the road to Maine: Three stickers: "Just say no," "Embrace your mother" (printed over a green planet Earth), and "Give peace a chance." One was missing: "Forgo an import." So, the imperatives of our country's current domestic issues as well as the lure of simplistic and repetitive analysis are pushing us away from thinking about even the possibility of undesirable consequences resulting from current events in the Soviet Union.

The problems which Gorbachev faces are enormous. The chance of failure is greater than that of success. The chance of chaos is real. And the resolution of chaos could easily become a new political form of Russian authoritarianism. That, in my judgment, has a reasonably high likelihood of being the final product of Mr. Gorbachev's search for a more economically sound Soviet Union.

Our proclivity for optimism is a natural outgrowth of America's culture. We place a positive and hopeful view on nations moving to free themselves from the bonds of totalitarianism. We support the underdog, and we make his champion more heroic and admirable than warranted by the
champion's known behavior. As a body politic, we want to limit both the number and the complexity of the issues we think about. We tire of analysis stretching our cognitive limits. Perhaps we want to avoid the sacrifice so often attending drawn out struggles between nations. Perhaps we are inclined to believe that the human race is one and that human decency will inevitably emerge. We say that all people are created equal. We conclude easily that people are the same all over the globe and that Russians are really Americans in fur hats. It is at this point-the point of ignoring the characteristics of a distinctively unique Russian culture-that we are almost precipitously embracing a uniform but unrealistic optimism. It is my thesis that we ignore, at our own risk, the characteristics of Russian culture which will come to dominate the course and outcome of perestroika just as those same characteristics presided over the building of the Russian-and then Soviet-empires.

Soviet successes in foreign relations will not make perestroika work. Mr. Gorbachev's higher public standing than that of Mr. Bush in West Germany will not make perestroika work. Neither will bold and unilateral arms control proposals. The only steps which could make perestroika work are events which take place inside Soviet borders.

The common sense of our focus on drugs, deficits and the environment

draws our attention away from the shallowness of our popular analysis of events and prospects in the Soviet Union. It is these phenomena which underlie our outraged reaction when a senior public official dares to think out loud that Gorbachev's prospects are dim.

My argument looks at perestroika against the background of Russian culture. Let me turn to an expert witness, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. You may wish to argue with me about the great author's current state of mind. What you cannot deny, however, is that the author of The First Circle, The Cancer Ward, and The Gulag Archipelago knows Russian culture. In the Spring 1980 issue of Foreign Affairs, Solzhenitsyn published an article entitled "Misconceptions About Russia Are a Threat to America." He said that one mistake is:

"...the failure to realize that communism is irredeemable, that there exist no [better] variants of communism; that it is incapable of growing kinder, that it cannot survive as an ideology without using terror, and that, consequently, to coexist with communism on the same planet is impossible. Either it will spread, cancer-like, to destroy mankind, or else mankind will have to rid itself of communism (and even then face lengthy treatment for secondary tumors)."

Gorbachev is trying to put a different face on communism. It must have a kinder, more democratic face in his judgment if it is to reenergize an apathetic people and bypass the footdragging of eighteen million bureaucrats. But if Solzhenitsyn is right, then a Gorbachev who abandons force is a Gorbachev who cannot save communism. I have not met a
Russian recently who believes that a return to the intimidation and terror of the past could happen. Thus, if Solzhenitsyn is right, and I think he is, Gorbachev is pursuing two opposing goals: the reform of the economy and the preservation of communist rule. At most he can achieve only one of these goals. His chance of achieving neither is high.

Consequently, I conclude that mankind is ridding itself of communism. But, I am arguing, in the Soviet Union communism is akin to a
cancer which after 70 years has penetrated the body of the populace. It is a cancer whose cure will be long and whose secondary tumors could be threatening to the rest of us. Later in this same article, Solzhenitsyn writes that:
the only path down from the icy cliff of totalitarianism that I could propose was the slow and smooth descent via an authoritarian system. (If an unprepared people were to jump off that cliff directly into democracy, it would be crushed to an anarchical pulp.)"

Gorbachev has tried to be careful in his moves toward economic reform, which after all, must change communism, for economics is at the ideological center of communism. But, if Solzhenitsyn is right, there can be no reform of communism, only its destruction. The death of the Soviet

state and maybe of Russia-to use Solzhenitsyn's distinction-is the threat of the descent to an anarchical pulp of which he warns. I have used the word chaos and would be willing to accept possible definitions all the way from social unrest to civil war.

Look at what we are learning from inside the Soviet Union. Soviet youth and blue collar workers do not support perestroika, for to them there is no evidence of results. To them perestroika looks like new icing on a stale cake. A young Canadian student of the USSR, John Battle, who recently returned from a four-month stay in the Soviet Union, writes that:

"...continually unfulfilled promises and the inability of the party to adapt itself to new conditions during the 1970s and early 1980s, produced a generation of young people more interested in the pursuit of sex, drugs, heavy metal and the avoidance of military education and service, than in challenging the higher authorities or forming new privately-run cooperatives. The death of idealism among Soviet youth has fostered a [drop out and turn off] attitude that shuns any type of activity even vaguely resembling politics."

Workers now go to the store only to encounter shortages they have not seen in twenty years. Professor Bill Fuller of my faculty, a Russian historian who also recently returned from a five-month visit, reports that, while he was there, there were no matches; for a time there was no cheese; sugar was rationed; and that, without Russian soap, there were lines blocks long for North Korean soap. Sergei Petrov, a Russian friend who has just immigrated, told me that last spring bologua sausage was so thin and watery that butchers would sell only the entire casing, for if they sliced it open, the contents would a!l run out.

Finally, the peasants are not happy because agrarian reform-their hope for long-term rental of land from collective farm plots-is nearly dead in the water, sabotaged by bureaucratic interests.

In the West, we tend to exaggerate the societal health produced by the sunshine of glasnost and nascent democratization. Old communist icons, the glue of Soviet socialist society, are being broken. Let me give you an example from the new Soviet film, "Solovyetskaya Vlast." This film relates the story of the most brutal political prison of all, that which may have served as the template for other Soviet concentration camps. You can read about it in the first volume of Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago. The film documents the origin of the camp in 1919, with Lenin's approval.

Glasnost is also filling in the blanks in Soviet history. Now Russians know that it was Russians who killed the Polish officers in the Katyn Forest. Now they know that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty of 1939 had secret protocols. Now they know it was an agreement which was not politically necessary. Now they know it was both illegal and immoral.

To us, the openness these revelations exemplify is good, but I have met many ordinary Russians who revere Stalin even after years of such disturbing revelations. They revere him not because he sat on a pedestal of defensible political ethics, but because he was an authoritarian figure who could make Soviet society function. Respect for that kind of authority is a major characteristic of Russian culture.

In the West we were much attracted to the scenes from the Congress of People's Deputies last spring in which elected representatives demanded an accounting from public figures. Even the KGB got a scathing dose of sunlight. But Russians who watched the Congress endlessly on their televisions were disappointed. What they saw was the weak authority, the shallow competence, and the fulsome mendacity of the party leadership. It was neither pleasant nor inspiring to witness Gorbachev turning off Andrei Sakharov's microphone, regardless of the latter's conduct, for both were men who had won support and admiration.

Glasnost, perestroika and democratization have brought some truth but they have also brought gloom and despair. Without an authoritarian system, Russians are afraid. That fear will not disappear easily or quickly. Russians know the disparate peoples who form their state, their lack of a historical development of social and political institutions like those of Western liberal democracies, and the capacity of their people for violence. They fear chaos. The prop which holds Gorbachev in power is more likely the severity of the crisis than anyone's hopes for perestroika.

We are inclined to help Gorbachev. It is in our cultural nature to want to bid farewell to arms, to put the cold war behind us and to encourage a greater Soviet reliance on market forces. We believe in bringing the Russians into the international community, whose embrace we think may serve as a catalyst for progress toward liberal democracy. I hear words about countries which trade together not having wars together. However, until the ruble is convertible, the Soviet Union cannot function effectively in the international economic market. The Soviet Union cannot convert the ruble until its domestic economy is radically reorganized. Gorbachev cannot reorganize the domestic economy until he motivates the work force. He cannot provide that motivation without a drastic expansion of consumer goods. The Soviet government cannot pay for those consumer goods until the heavy industry and military sectors are savagely reduced.

However, Gorbachev cannot cut the military so far that he risks the failure of Soviet foreign policy and vast disorder throughout the domestic empire. He cannot control the threat of public disorder without sacrificing the international goodwill upon which he counts so heavily (and that is where we come in).

Others have suggested a Marshall Plan for the Soviet Union. Even if such a program were ideologically possible in the United States, I wonder

if the capital investment possible could make a difference in the Soviet Union. Privately, Russian intellectuals are telling American friends not to try to save the Soviet Union. Their words are based on the view that our help would only prolong the agony. They believe that the Soviet Union must accept its uncertain future, the possible descent to chaos, and must purge itself of its ills: the party, communism, its leadership and all else. I find that view typical of the Russian culture: suffering builds character and earns redemption.

Just as many of those who live there, I too fear chaos in the Soviet Union. First, its resolution would most likely proceed through some new form of authoritarianism, much as Solzhenitsyn tells us. Moreover, I fear that the strength of our own political and social needs-drugs, deficits and the environment-could so distract us that we would not notice the buildup to an unacceptable level of danger inside the Soviet borders until, helplessly, we could only watch it spill outside. Anarchy and civil war inside the Soviet Union would not be events like those of 1825, 1905 or 1917-21. Should this happen, we will not watch from safely outside Russian or Soviet borders while an underdeveloped peasant country resolves its problems in some way. Now we are dealing with a country which is-or has been-a military superpower. Now the Soviet Union is a country with nuclear weapons and energy reactors like that at Chernobyl. These circumstances do not allow complete and irresponsible societal chaos without risk to external powers. If we do not involve ourselves willingly and early, pressures to do so later could approach the levels of political blackmail.

Crotchety, apparently consumed in anger and passionately dogmatic, the old man in Vermont, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, does not like us much. But he likes communists a great deal less. As a Russian Slavophile and a Christian, he vents his spleen of double strength on them. Our current measure of Solzhenitsyn may tend too much to diminish due regard for his cultural insight.

Let us conclude with Solzhenitsyn that Soviet communism cannot exist free of force and possibly terror. Let us also conclude that Gorbachev would never revert to force and terror to save communism. If we do these things, we must then conclude that communism in the Soviet Union is collapsing. Most Russians whom I know have reached this conclusion. They are unwilling to offer any additional prediction. Nevertheless, let us predict that communism will collapse either peacefully and slowly-incrementally or violently and rapidly-chaotically. Our interest lies in the success of the incremental transition, and we ought to do all possible to encourage that kind of outcome.

With incrementalism as our policy goal, can we not look at, and work toward, those steps which might help? I will conclude with one vote of support and two ideas.

I vote for the administration in its policy on arms control. The

push by the President is correct and should continue. I would press meaningful and verifiable decreases in nuclear arms everywhere and conventional arms on the central front to the lowest prudent limits.

Next, I would try to pursue constructive and imaginative ideas. Could we help with our best minds to tackle the problem of ruble convertibility? We do not have to be asked. Why not tackle the problem as best we can with our own intellectual resources?

Joint ventures which work on trade-in-kind seem dead-ended to me. Given the magnitude of the problem, natural resources appear of little use as trade options. We must seek to do better.

On to the second idea. The USSR did not come into existence by the consent of the governed. It came to its current empire by fire, terror and political treachery. Millions were sacrificed, and old hatreds are still very much alive in the Soviet Union. The problem is that history is seldom justly avenged. The clock is seldom turned back from de facto to de jure. The nationality issue in the USSR is potentially explosive. Were it to begin, there would be no turning back from a massive use of the Red Army for renewed subjugation. Once it begins, an enormous bloodletting is possible. Could we not participate by political means to help encourage incrementally more autonomy acceptable to Moscow and the republics? There may be precious little time to lead in this endeavor.

These then are my vote and my two ideas. You may have a vote and some ideas of your own. My two are bold, maybe altruistic. But, I believe now is the moment to try. It is our moment. We may not have another.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 2.C.1

* * *

Starting from Scratch, But With a Vision in Mind

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Washington--The external Soviet empire lasted 45 years. It is altered, beyond redemption or repair. The Soviet Union,suffering from a bad case of imperial fatigue, itself is struggling for survival. The internal crisis-simultaneously ethnic, economic and political-will be of long duration.

In the meantime, a new geopolitical reality in the very heart of Europe is emerging. Today, Eastern Europe is again Central Europe-which it has always been historically, culturally and philosophically. This post Communist region is threatened by chaos and instability even as it yearns for a Western European style of life and for Western-type institutional arrangements. Central Europe's economies are in a shambles. Its political systems have to be rebuilt from scratch. The threat of national and territorial conflicts overhangs the internal difficulties that every government will have to overcome on the way to the stable democracy all profess to seek.

A policy that responds creatively to all these overlapping dilemmas will have to be comprehensive geographically, ambitious politically and long term historically.

It must be capable of harnessing Western popular support and of captivating the political imagination not only of the Central Europeans but also of the many Soviet nations. It must build on the success of Western policy, not diluting but enhancing the processes of Western European integration while also seizing the moment in Central Europe to capitalize on that integration's ripple effects.

Brzezinski served as President Carter's national security adviser.

A longer version of this article appeared in The National Interest, Spring 1990.

That policy should be founded upon the grand concept of a trans-European commonwealth with the European Community at its core but embracing Central Europe and being open also to eventual association with the Soviet Union.

Such a strategic vision should include the following seven specific but interconnected and historically ambitious policy components:

Acceleration of Western European integration; enhancement of transAtlantic ties; consolidation of democratic reform in Central Europe; negotiation of a German confederation within an all-European security framework; facilitation of cross-cutting multilateral cooperation; promotion of Central European regional cooperation, and encouragement of a new Soviet confederation.

These components have to be viewed as a package, with the pursuit of one facilitating and necessary to the attainment of the others. The end result of the effort should be the emergence of a more stable, cooperative and democratic all-European order as well as the termination of the American Soviet rivalry over the fate of Europe.

Accordingly, it will be critically important to the success of the entire agenda for Western Europe's political integration to be accelerated further. Indeed, that integration must serve as the cornerstone of any eventually wider European commonwealth and as an attractive, and badly needed, example of successful multilateral cooperation for the Central Europeans and Russians. Without such integration, any attempts to promote the regional recovery of Central Europe will lack the necessary source of stability and support.

American support for European integration is consistent with the fostering of even more intimate transAtlantic ties. Firm linkage with the U.S. would make it easier and safer for the Europeans to try to foster a more genuinely cooperative relationship, beyond Central Europe, with the Soviet Union. A continued--even if significantly diminished--American military presence in Europe is, therefore, in the self-interest of Europe and America.

The promotion of stable democracy in the post-Communist countries will require a major and immediate commitment of Western resources, far beyond existing commitments. In the first half of 1989, it appeared that only Poland--the spearhead and historic catalyst for the collapse of the Soviet bloc--and Hungary would require Western assistance. It is now obvious that all Central European countries will have to be aided in the extraordinarily difficult transformation of their economic and political systems.

The level of Western capital needed to prevent the region's slide

into political and economic chaos might well range from $25 billion to $30 billion. Since this figure may appear at first glance appallingly large, it should be viewed in historical perspective.

Between 1946 and 1955, the U.S., then with a gross national product about one-third of today's, contributed a total (in 1989 dollars) of $171 billion to Western Europe's recovery. That came to an annual contribution of $17 billion. The result was a historical triumph.

The economic response to the challenge of Central Europe certainly should not be America's burden alone. Western European countries likewise have a stake in Central Europe's stability. Japan, with a G.N.P. more than half that of America's also should play a role.

The peaceful transformation of Central Europe will require a stable security context, one that is reassuring to the West and East alike. Accordingly, the West, in embracing the cause of German unification, should move forward with a comprehensive plan for a German confederation and for special security arrangements to accompany it. Indeed, German acceptance of the existing frontiers is the sine qua non of international acceptance of unification.

Moreover, for an agreed transitional period, NATO and the Warsaw Pact should retain some military contingents in the two parts of united Germany, thereby guaranteeing a secure transition to the new European order.

Members of the two political-and-military alliances should also be free to choose their economic associations through memberships in multilateral organizations. Thus, the Central European states, as they move toward market economies, should be permitted and encouraged to seek some form of association with either the European Free Trade Association or eventually the European Community-even while they remain Warsaw Pact members.

The West should also encourage the Central Europeans to develop new forms of regional cooperation among themselves. Western economic and ecological assistance could even be made conditional to some degree on the recipients' willingness to engage in multilateral cooperation.

Finally, the Soviets must be constructively encouraged to see their future in trans-European cooperation. The option of participation in the expanding European adventure should be explicitly held open to a new and genuinely pluralistic Soviet confederation in the event that Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika does lead to fundamental reformation of the Soviet Union.

A necessary concomitant to any process of creating a genuinely voluntary Soviet confederation will be the right of secession. Some parts of today's Soviet Union may choose to exercise that right. But such secession could become more tolerable to the Soviet Union if it led to new forms of association between the seceding states and the remainder of the current Soviet Union with an emerging trans-European commonwealth.

It is not too early for Europeans and Americans to start thinking about the implications of the epochal fact that the Eurasian map, as much of this century has known it, is being shaken. Given the accelerating velocity of history, we should begin charting deliberately the next phase in its trajectory.

Chapter 2.C.2

* * *

The Middle East: Out of Step With History

Mark A. Heller

Not available at this time

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 2.C.3

* * *

Command of the Seas: Asian Naval Expansion Contains Potential for Conflict

Tai Ming Cheung

Not available at this time

Chapter 2.C.4

* * *

New Directions in Chinese Strategy

Jean V. DuBois

Historically, China's armed forces have been defensive in nature and primarily concerned with threats from the north, their passive military strategy and cordon defense symbolized by the Great Wall. Under Mao Zedong, this traditional defensive strategy was adapted to contemporary Chinese conditions in a form known as "people's war".

The people's war strategy drew heavily on the ideas of Chinese traditional strategic thinkers, Marxist ideology and Mao's own peculiar view of military affairs. Its three man element - mass mobilization, luring an invader deep and protraction of the conflict - assumed that it would be used by a weaker force defending its territory against a stronger one and conducted by unskilled masses.

Accordingly, basic individual soldiering skills were usually maintained at a high level while unit or combined arms skills were poor. People's war struck an appropriate balance between China's military traditions, the state of Chinese society, the level of available technology and the existing threat. The balance could not be maintained indefinitely, but while Mao lived he managed to contain change in order to maintain the strategy.

The Second Revolution

Deng Xiaoping initiated key shifts in Chinese military strategy as part of his "second revolution". Their seeds could be seen in articles written by Deng as early as the mid-1970s and they reflected a view of the world that was decidedly different from that of Mao. Deng's views on class struggle, the role of ideology, the inevitability of a major war, the importance of technology and China's relationship with the outside world all combined to create a condition that was to change the face of China.

Deng's program of reforms, the "four modernizations", had an indirect but important impact on Chinese military strategy. In order to develop the

---

1989 Interavia SA. Reprinted with permission from International Defense Review, November 1989.

domestic economy he accorded defense the lowest priority of the four. This required a relatively peaceful international environment, which for China meant that the Soviet threat from the north had to be minimized, and in a 1985 speech Deny announced that the threat of a major war no longer existed. Deng also realized that to sustain the four modernizations China needed to open up to the outside world. Moreover, he perceived that the international structure had changed and that China must occupy its rightful position in the world.

The process of change started with the momentous Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in December 1978 and major changes in military strategy began taking shape at the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission in June 1985. This watershed event formalized the military reforms that Deng had initiated in the late 1970s and established the future direction for military strategy in the 1980s and 1990s.

Deng's reforms and strategic developments were already achieving positive results. The professionally oriented reforms in civil-military relations, organization, training, education and operations, combined with limited but effective equipment modernization, were translating into an improved military capability. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) had become a more professional force and a more effective military organization.

The mid-1980s also saw the eclipse of the older generation of revolutionary veterans who had been simultaneously the civil and the military leaders of China. A new generation of professional military leaders was assuming control of the PLA as a result of rejuvenation policies and these personnel shifts were formalized at the 13th Party Congress in October 1987.

These improvements in China's strategic defense posture did not escape the attention of Soviet strategic thinkers. Western analysts may argue about the effectiveness of Chinese military reforms, but Soviet actions strongly suggest that the Chinese achieved some measure of both strategic and conventional deterrence. In fact, much of the impetus for Soviet perestroika and glasnost was probably generated by the progress of Chinese reforms. In turn, the outward strategic manifestations of Soviet glasnost, such as Gorbachev's initiatives in Asia, the INF treaty, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the reduction of Soviet forces in Europe and Asia and the potential resolution of the thorny Cambodian issue, have enable Chinese national defense planners to be much more flexible.

Local concerns

The evolving Sino-Soviet relationship and the fluid Asian security environment have allowed Deng Xiaoping to push ahead with military reforms in a period of relative peace. At the same time, the combination

of the domestic factors discussed above and developments in the international system created a new set of conditions that allowed and even required a new military strategy.

Deng's 1985 announcement that the threat of a major war no longer existed and that China could look forward to a period of peace lasting into the early part of the 21st Century did not take long to affect military strategy and the PLA's self-concept as a professional military force.

Without a serious and immediate threat, the PLA began to lose sight of its primary purpose, while bureaucratic inertia preserved the pre-1985 strategy, tactics and force structure. Strategy continued to focus on the Soviet Union, tactics were still based on the concept of active defense and force structure remained centered on the heavy mechanized forces of the combined group armies. The PLA was in danger of becoming an army without coherent doctrine or motivation. Budget constraints and the lack of a threat made it increasingly difficult for the PLA to attract scarce resources or leadership attention. Responsible individuals in and out of the military began to question the need for such a strong and expensive force structure.

However, in the spring of 1987, tension along the Sino-Indian border resulted in a deployment of Chinese forces to the contested areas. Logistic preparations were stepped up and the level of rhetoric escalated as memories of the 1962 Sino-Indian war were resurrected. Tension along the Sino Vietnamese border also increased in 1987, but the main fireworks occurred in March 1988 in the Spratly Islands.

These events provided the impetus necessary to give content to the strategic shift that had begun in 1985. The declining threat from the north was now being replaced by a growing one from the south. Discussions of a major war scenario were being supplanted by discussions of local, limited or peripheral wars. Chinese strategic thinkers were now confronting a situation in which the most dangerous threat was the least likely and the most likely one involved a lower level of danger.

By mid-1987 there were signs that defense planners were developing a strategy to fill the void created by Deng's dismissal of the threat of a major war. The new strategy, designed to deal with the likelihood of local, limited war in the south, involved a greater emphasis on offensive capabilities. It also required more flexibility than the northern-oriented strategy since it would need to react to a wider variety of threats and environments.

The Chinese strategic formulation to deal with the local limited war threat was called "rapid response". The Chinese have never clearly enunciated the specifics of this strategy, but it does not involve protraction or mass mobilization and is not defensive in nature. Instead, it relies on quick reaction and existing forces and is basically

offensive. It envisages the employment of combined arms units in joint air, sea and land operations.

The local limited war scenario postulates a conflict on China's periphery. Such warfare would be limited in time, space and intensity and oriented toward political rather than purely military objectives. Local limited wars, starting suddenly and finishing quickly, would require active duty forces trained for a wide range of missions and climatic conditions and with a high degree of strategic mobility. To be successful, quick-reaction forces must be relatively self-contained units with substantial organic firepower.

The new strategic formulation led to an inevitable re-orientation of force structure and an emphasis on elite units such as airborne, helicopter, marine, naval aviation and mountain troops. On a larger scale, the emphasis in the future will be on naval and air forces and light, strategically deployable land forces.

Initially, as a result of the situation in the Spratly Islands, the Navy has been receiving most attention. . . . The Navy's ability to protect sea lanes and valuable oceanic resources and to project power rapidly in support of national objectives also make it the potential centerpiece of future military strategy. Whether China has a blue-water naval capability now is open to serious question, but it is less easy to doubt the blue-water mentality of Chinese strategic planners. While the PLA Navy is deficient in many blue-water areas such as submarines, aircraft carriers, naval aviation and an extended logistical capability, these areas are main targets for future acquisition and development programs.

Global Ambitions

Just as China was beginning to make progress in the implementation of the rapid response strategy, the threat from the south began to diminish. This was partly the result of a linkage between the direct Soviet threat from the north and the more indirect Soviet threat from the south. The decline in the direct threat and the warming of relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese was bound to affect China's relationships with Vietnam and India. Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing in late 1988 and the announcement of the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia
also affected the regional strategic structure.

This left the PLA without a viable and credible threat with which to justify a military strategy, consequent force structure and operational orientation. More crucially, it led civilian leaders to question the need for a large and costly military force. The PLA's ability to contend for scarce budgetary resources was becoming more and more limited and its prestige in the eyes of China's population was suffering. China now had to fall back on a rather ambiguous set of reasons for maintaining a

substantial military force. Fortunately, the strategy of rapid response and the consequent force structure and operational adjustments also responded to China's regional and global aspirations.

The new rationale, which had always existed but only became overt in 1988, was based on China's long-standing desire to be the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, China's ultimate goal may well be to ascend to global power status. Such an objective would require an 'active role in international affairs and the ability to project power. As the Chinese themselves say, "China has a major role to play to oppose hegemonism and safeguard world peace".

However, this is an objective, not a threat. And because it is an objective which is not well articulated, it will not be easy to develop a coherent military strategy to provide direction for weapons acquisition, force structure development and training policy.

Chinese strategic thinkers are aware of the change taking place in the international structure, one which Chinese sources characterize as change in the process of world history from war and revolution to peace and development. Under the new conditions, dialogue and cooperation have become a principal form of political struggle. The future state of mankind will be determined not by war, but by economic, scientific and technological development. This incipient form of comprehensive national security could well lead to a reduction in the importance of the military as an instrument of national policy. In the Chinese case, however, the strategy may be flawed by the weak economic base upon which such a structure must be built.

Some Chinese defense planners and analysts have begun to propose deterrence as a major national defense strategy. While this may be very forward-looking and may represent a new level of sophistication in national defense planning, it will create additional problems. China, historically, lacks the appropriate domestic inputs to develop a stable, long-term defense policy which a deterrent strategy requires.

Finally, a deterrent or a rapid response strategy can be both defensive and offensive in nature, even to the point of being preemptive. A Liberation Army News article of 3 April 1987 speaks of establishing a "three-dimensional strategic frontier which extends China's frontiers in space, at sea and on land". This outward movement calls for access to external battlefields and follows what Chinese strategists see as the wave of the future - that is, the impending strategic contention for the world's oceans and outer space. Given China's long-term global aspirations, more distant nations as well as neighboring states could regard the strategic frontiers concept as being offensively oriented.

Since Chinese defense planners broke free of the constraints of people's war they have not found it easy to settle on a coherent

replacement. Their difficulty stems from a lack of sophistication in national defense planning and the rapid changes in the situation they must deal with. Nevertheless, one point remains clear. The Chinese world view envisages China playing a decisive role in international affairs, and while the military strategy necessary to achieve that end has yet to be defined, it will encompass a broader, more comprehensive approach to strategic formulations in which military strategy is but a component part.

Chapter 2.C.5

* * *

The United States Should Reorder Its Priorities in East Asia

Donald E. Nuechterlein

Forty years ago President Harry Truman enunciated his famous Doctrine--with its implied promise of aid to any country that was threatened by Soviet-supported revolution. Today a number of thoughtful Americans of various political persuasions believe that the United States is overcommitted to the world in terms of our willingness to uphold all the mutual security obligations undertaken since 1947 in the name of "containing communism." Congress' unwillingness to increase defense and foreign aid budgets to pay for worldwide obligations and the President's refusal to approve significant tax increases to overcome congressional resistance to higher defense spending suggests that a reassessment of U.S. international priorities is now at hand. {1}

As the President and Congress grapple with foreign aid and defense spending priorities, one geographic area, East Asia, is visible beyond all others in terms of its previous claims to U.S. resources, and particularly the American military casualties suffered while undertaking its defense. Even though the Truman administration originally believed that no country on the Asian mainland constituted a vital U.S. interest, the United States went to war twice within 15 years to prevent Soviet and Chinese-supported communism from expanding in Korea and Southeast Asia.

Since 1950 the United States has committed itself by treaty and security agreements to defend a number of Asian states which are no longer threatened by the People's Republic of China; these include Japan and South Korea in

---

Donald Nuechterlein is a former professor of international relations at the Federal Executive Institute in Charlottesville, Virginia. He is of Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia (1965); United States National Interests in a anging World (1973); and America Overcommitted: United States National Interests in the 1980s (1985).

Reprinted by permission from the Naval War College Review, Autumn 1987, and the author with minor revisions.

Northeast Asia; and Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia in Southeast Asia. Taiwan, although officially recognized by Washington as part of China, retains a residual defense relationship with the United States. Moreover, China itself now tacitly relies on U.S. strategic power to deter its greatest antagonist, the Soviet Union. In short, while the political and military situation in East Asia has changed profoundly since President Richard Nixon made his historic visit to China in 1972, the U.S. defense posture in East Asia has changed little except for the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina in 1975.

This article argues the case for reordering U.S. national interests in East Asia in light of the significant changes that have occurred in China's leadership and foreign policy over the last decade, Japan's rise to economic superpower status and growing defense capabilities in Northeast Asia, and the Soviet Union's recent willingness to emphasize political detente with the East Asian states. The thesis here is that it is now time for the United States to return to an offshore defense strategy in the Western Pacific, a policy that prevailed from 1945 to 1950, and to encourage Japan, China, the Philippines, and Australia to take greater responsibility for improving political and security relationships and for countering pressures from hostile regional powers such as Vietnam and North Korea. The objective of U.S. policy in the coming decade should be to promote political stability and build a lasting balance of power among the major states in East Asia. To achieve this, U.S. policy makers need to have a clear vision of fundamental-vital-American interests in the region as differentiated from those that are important but not crucial. {2}

Offshore Defense Strategy: 1945-1950

U.S. national interests in East Asia since the Second World War may be divided into four clearly identifiable periods. The first runs from August 1945 until February 1950 and may be called the offshore defense posture. Following Japan's defeat and the collapse of its Asian empire, the Truman administration concluded that the United States had no enduring crucial interests at stake on the mainland of East Asia. This assessment was made even though strong political forces, particularly in the Republican Party, argued that China was of overriding importance for balance of power reasons and that Washington had a vital stake in preventing Communist forces from winning a military victory there and establishing a Marxist regime. Truman sent General George C. Marshall to China in 1946 to assess the political and military situation and then decided that U.S. forces should not be used in an attempt to save the Nationalist regime from defeat. Without an American military guarantee to support his cause, Chiang Kaishek's position on the mainland was nearly hopeless. In making this judgment, Truman implicitly decided that China was not a vital U.S. interest and that Washington could live with the consequences of a Nationalist defeat. He also decided, in 1949, to withdraw U.S. occupation forces from South Korea after Moscow removed Soviet troops from North

Korea. The Truman administration believed that Britain, France, and The Netherlands-the prewar colonial powers in Southeast Asia-should have responsibility for maintaining security in that region and did not object to the return of their forces to Malaya, Indochina, and the East Indies, respectively. After granting independence to the Philippines in July 1946, the United States continued its prewar role as protector of the islands. Washington also accepted responsibility for the security of Japan, Okinawa, and the former Japanese islands in the Pacific, which became strategic Trust Territories under a United Nations mandate. A fundamental factor influencing U.S. policy in East Asia during this period was the strongly held view in official Washington that U.S. interests in Europe far outweighed those in Asia. It simply was not prudent for the United States to undermine the efforts of Britain, France, and The Netherlands in Asia while soliciting their cooperation to rebuild postwar Europe and bring West Germany into a new political and economic arrangement.

Australia and New Zealand were also considered to be part of the U.S. postwar defense posture in the Pacific. These wartime allies had served as staging areas for the liberation of the Philippines and other Pacific islands and assisted in the defeat of the Japanese empire. Although the strategic importance of Australia has always outweighed that of New Zealand, the United States nevertheless concluded a formal defense alliance (ANZUS) with both countries following the outbreak of war in Korea.

U.S. vital security interests in East Asia between 1945 and 1950 clearly lay in the offshore chain of islands running from Japan and Okinawa in the north, to the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand in the south. American security interests in this early period did not include China, the Korean peninsula or Southeast Asia, except for the Philippines. Even though Indochina was embroiled in a colonial war against France during 1947-1950, and the Indonesians fought a similar war to oust the Dutch (and won independence in 1949), the United States provided no military aid to either colonial power. Thailand was the only independent state in Southeast Asia prior to 1941 and had allied itself with Japan during World War II. Treated as an enemy state by Britain, France, and China after the Japanese surrender, the Thai kingdom regained its sovereignty in 1946 with U.S. help. Yet this political support did not imply more than a modest U.S. interest in Thailand's security prior to 1950.

China represented a special problem for President Truman. After deciding in 1946 that the United States had no vital security interests at stake in mainland China, he was obliged to accept the Red Army's victory over the Nationalists and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Washington declined to grant diplomatic recognition to the new regime, but it also refused to provide aid to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces after they fled to Taiwan and established a rival government there. Washington adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward the policies of the new Peking regime; and although apprehension existed in

Washington in late 1949 over events in China, the new Peking regime was not yet perceived as being implacably hostile to the United States. Britain and other Commonwealth countries recognized the new Peking government.

The Truman administration's overall assessment of U.S. interests in East Asia at the start of 1950 was spelled out by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a now-famous address to the National Press Club in Washington on 12 January. Acheson defended Truman's decision not to intervene in China's civil war to save the Chiang regime, a decision that infuriated the Republican opposition in Congress and provided it with an opportunity to charge the Truman administration with being "soft on communism." Acheson later cited his reasons for making this fateful speech, which he bad cleared with President Truman: "Its purpose was to bring home what the United States Government had done to defend vital interests in the Pacific, not to speculate on what it might do in the event of various exigencies in Asia. Our defense stations beyond the western hemisphere and our island possessions were the Philippines and defeated, disarmed, and occupied Japan. These were our inescapable responsibilities. We had moved our line of defense, a line fortified and manned by our own ground, sea, and air forces, to the very edges of the Western Pacific." {3}

Acheson recalled that General Douglas MacArthur had asserted a year earlier that the U.S. defense line in Asia started in the Philippines and continued through the Ryukyus to Japan and the Aleutians. At the beginning of 1950, that view seemed to him and the President to be a prudent definition of U.S. security interests in the Western Pacific.

Expansion of U.S. Security Commitments, 1950-1965

The second period in U.S. policy began abruptly in February 1950 when Peking signed a mutual defense pact with Moscow. This precipitated a
major reevaluation of U.S. interests and policies in Asia, a process made urgent by the outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950 and China's massive intervention in November after General MacArthur moved United Nations forces to the Chinese border at the Yalu. These events shaped President Truman's view of Peking's intentions and caused U.S. policy makers to conclude that all non-Communist Asian states were highly important to the United States in the worldwide struggle with the new "Sino-Soviet bloc." Washington then concluded mutual defense Pacts with South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. It urgently negotiated a peace treaty and defense pact with Japan, and began for the first time to send military and economic assistance to French forces fighting Vietminh Communists in Indochina. It also inaugurated aid to Thailand, which faced growing insurgency along its border with Laos. Washington even provided clandestine military support to Chinese Nationalists forces based in the jungles of Burma. By the time Truman left office in January 1953, the State Department was seeking to enlist the support of all Asian countries in a broad anti-Communist security

pact.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower substantially expanded U.S. commitments in East Asia by concluding a new Southeast Asian alliance, which soon was known as SEATO. The Manila Pack, signed in September 1954, included Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, France, Britain, and the United States. It also covered the British colonial possessions of Malaya, Singapore, and North Borneo, and it authorized the supply of economic and military assistance to the new governments of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (now Kampuchea) to help them resist pressures from Communist-dominated North Vietnam. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was an outgrowth of the Manila Pack and provided its military arm for the next two decades. {4} Significantly, three new and influential Asian countries-India, Indonesia, and Burma-declined to join the Manila Pact and decided instead to form a nonaligned Afro-Asian bloc at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955.

The Manila Treaty was one result of President Eisenhower's refusal in April 1954, despite strong pressures from Paris, to send U.S. forces to Indochina to save the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu. When this strategic position fell to Vietminh forces, it precipitated a crisis in the French Government and resulted in France's withdrawal from the war. This Vietnamese victory led to' the Geneva Accords in July 1954 which provided for the independence of Laos and Cambodia and the division of Vietnam into two provisional administrations, North and South. Eisenhower's refusal to use U.S. forces to save the French position, despite the urging of his advisers, meant that he did not consider Vietnam at that time to be a crucial security interest of the United States. He decided instead to pursue a diplomatic course and sent Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to Geneva to negotiate the best political arrangement possible. The partition of Vietnam soon followed. {5} The Manila Treaty, signed 2 months later, afforded the United States a face-saving fallback position in Southeast Asia, and provided the legal framework for subsequent armed intervention in Indochina should the security situation there deteriorate further.

President John Kennedy faced such a deteriorating situation in Vietnam when he entered the White House in January 1961. He had to decide whether a non-Communist South Vietnam was of truly vital interest to the United States and, if so, what his Administration was prepared to do about defending it. After about 6 months of deliberations amid a decaying security situation in Laos as well as South Vietnam, his National Security Council concluded that South Vietnam must not succumb to North Vietnam, which was then being heavily supported by Moscow and Peking. {6} Kennedy's secret decision that the United States should not tolerate the subjugation of South Vietnam by Hanoi led to the introduction of 15,000 U.S. advisers and Special Forces into Vietnam by the summer of 1963. His

Administration made a serious effort to draw Indonesia into a security relationship with the United States, but President Sukarno decided instead to pursue an armed "confrontation" against British possessions in North Borneo and Malaya and to align Indonesia with Hanoi and Peking. Following the failure of a Communist coup in Jakarta on 1 October 1965, in which Sukarno was implicated, the Indonesian Army assumed control of the country. Thereafter, a military regime headed by General Suharto reoriented Indonesian foreign policy toward friendly relations with Washington and London and hostility to Peking and Hanoi. Nevertheless, Suharto's new government decided to continue a nonaligned foreign policy.

Massive Intervention in Southeast Asia, 1965-1972

The third period in U.S. policy began after President Lyndon Johnson's landslide election victory in November 1964. In August he had obtained the Tonkin Gulf Resolution from Congress which permitted him to use American military forces to repel Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. The resolution specifically said that Southeast Asia constituted a "vital" U.S. interest. After sustained aerial bombing of Vietcong and North Vietnamese installations failed to produce negotiations to end the Communist insurgency, President Johnson decided in July 1965 to commit large U.S. ground forces as well as air power to the struggle to save Vietnam and all of Southeast Asia from a Communist takeover. {7} Soviet and Chinese support for North Vietnam's war effort put this crisis in a category similar to the one Harry Truman had encountered 15 years earlier in Korea when he sent large U.S. forces to thwart a Communist victory there. In both cases, the President perceived that the threat was not a localized one, but rather a broad challenge by Moscow and Peking to diminish American influence throughout Asia.

By 1968 most Washington policy makers had concluded that North Vietnam could not be bombed into negotiating an end to its war in the South, and that it was too risky to invade or blockade the North. Yet President Johnson continued to hold the view, shared by Richard Nixon who succeeded him in January 1969, that helping South Vietnam to defend its independence remained a vital U.S. security interest. Most American policy makers accepted the proposition that if Vietnam succumbed to communism, the other states in Southeast Asia-Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines-would be in jeopardy. The domino theory was accepted by leaders of both the Republican and Democratic Parties, but it was not shared by large segments of the press and the public.

After becoming President in 1969, Richard Nixon enunciated the Guam Doctrine which stated that the United States would not use its ground forces in local Asian wars, but would provide a strategic shield to allied countries against threats by nuclear powers. {8} Nixon thus intimated that local wars on the Asian mainland would no longer be seen as threats to vital U.S. interests, but he reaffirmed the general nature of U.S. treaty commitments in Asia, including South Vietnam. Nixon then

sought to open diplomatic relations with China, which he believed to be the key to achieve his objective of withdrawing "with honor" U.S. combat troops from Vietnam. The first 3 years of his presidency were thus devoted to achieving a detente relationship with China (following 20 years of mutual hostility) and to the disengagement of American forces from Southeast Asia. In effect, Nixon concluded that friendly relations with China outweighed a continued U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia.

Redefining U.S. Security Interests in Asia, 1972-1986

Richard Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972 and his agreement to recognize the People's Republic as the sole government of all China inaugurated the fourth period of U.S. security involvement in East Asia and the Pacific. The Shanghai Declaration implied that Taiwan was no longer a vital U.S. concern, and Southeast Asia was downgraded in importance when all American combat forces were withdrawn from Vietnam in
1973. Washington's unwillingness to retaliate when Hanoi launched its final offensive against the South in 1975 confirmed that Vietnam was no longer a vital U.S. interest. The withdrawal of U.S. Air Force units from Thailand in 1975 and the subsequent dissolution of SEATO signalled a reduction in the U.S. commitment to Thailand, although Washington did reaffirm its treaty obligations under the Manila Pact. Britain's decision to withdraw militarily from Malaysia and Singapore in 1970 removed that area from American protection. In sum, every Southeast Asian country that had become part of the U.S.-sponsored East Asian containment effort, except the Philippines, was downgraded in priority by Washington. South Korea's status also came under scrutiny in 1977 when President Jimmy Carter tried to withdraw all U.S. ground forces. However, under heavy pressure from Japan and the Pentagon, Carter agreed to retain a combat force of about 40,000 troops in Korea.

The impetus for this shift in the U.S. perception of its security interests in Asia was the sudden turnabout in Washington's relations with the People's Republic of China. As China's relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated in the late 1960s and Peking sought to open ties with the United States, Washington was permitted to downgrade the importance of countries along China's periphery. If China was no longer hostile to Washington and Tokyo, it did not appear to be essential for the United States to maintain armed forces in Southeast Asia and perhaps not in Korea. It clearly became a U.S. interest to reduce sales of arms to Taiwan in order to encourage Peking along a new path of detente with Washington. To restrain the growing Soviet power position in Asia after 1975, particularly the Soviet air and naval presence in Vietnam, it was important for the United States to foster good relations between China and its non-Communist neighbors such as Thailand and South Korea. It was also in the interest of the United States to provide China with sufficient economic and military assistance to enable it to be an Asian counterweight to Soviet influence as well as a check on Vietnam's designs

in Southeast Asia. Washington also had an interest in encouraging China to modify its totalitarian system and move toward a free-market society and greater personal freedom for its people. Although China began experimenting with free enterprise in the mid-1980s, it has nevertheless shown little inclination to relax the tight security controls that dominate Chinese life.

Throughout the 1970s, Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter pursued detente policies with the People's Republic and gradually disengaged from the defense commitment to Taiwan, a problem that inhibited good relations between Washington and Peking. Ford and Carter also adopted a detached view of events in Laos and Cambodia when Hanoi moved to dominate their governments after its victory in Vietnam. Washington continued to provide limited military assistance to Thailand in the 1970s, but showed little inclination to become militarily involved there. Instead, U.S. policy makers sought to encourage regional solidarity through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an economic and political organization established in 1967 to foster cooperation among the countries in that region. {9}

Ronald Reagan came to the White House in 1981 determined to reduce U.S. involvement with the People's Republic of China and to strengthen U.S. security ties with Taiwan. However, this policy proved to be irreconcilable with his more important objective to counter growing Soviet influence in Asia, particularly in Vietnam. The President enunciated a modified view of U.S. interests in China while visiting Peking in 1984. He agreed to make economic and military equipment available to China to help modernize its economy and improve its defenses, and he pledged to reduce and eventually phase out arms sales to Taiwan. His Administration also reiterated the U.S. defense commitment to South Korea and has given no indication that the 40,000 U.S. troops currently stationed there will be reduced. Although Reagan deepened U.S. relations with Japan, building on his good personal relationship with Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, he had to contend with serious trade imbalances with that country and, consequently, strong protectionist pressures from Congress to curb imports. The U.S. defense relationship with Japan remains good, however, and the Japanese government has taken steps to gradually expand the size and missions of Japan's self-defense forces.

In sum, the relationship between the United States and China, enlarged over the past decade, has significantly changed Washington's perception of U.S. interests in East Asia. Expanded ties between Washington and Peking, and between Peking and Tokyo, have reduced the danger of war on the Korean peninsula and opened the potentiality that China will quietly help to initiate talks between North and South Korea to lessen tensions there. In Southeast Asia, China's role in resisting Hanoi's occupation of Kampuchea and its efforts to build good relations with Thailand and Malaysia have improved the security situation in the area.

Proposed Strategy for the 19905

In view of the changing political, economic, and security conditions that have occurred in East Asia and the Pacific over the past 20 years, U.S; security interests there should be more limited than they are at present. The United States does not have the unlimited economic and military resources to restore the preeminent world role that it enjoyed during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. If one calculates that U.S. defense and foreign aid budgets will not increase in the foreseeable future, and may decline, it follows that the United States will be obliged to adopt a less ambitious international security stance in the 1990s and that East Asia, as well as Europe and the Middle East, will see a diminution of American military power deployed there. The reductions in American military assets located outside the Western Hemisphere will be hastened if the President and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev achieve significant arms reduction agreements. In East Asia, therefore, the United States should adopt the posture of encouraging the principal states-Japan, China, and the ASEAN group in Southeast Asia-to take greater responsibility for reducing political tensions and encouraging North Korea and Vietnam to join in this effort. The United States should adopt a lower political profile in order to encourage this process.

The key factor influencing U.S. perception of its future security interests in East Asia is the Soviet Union, particularly the Soviet naval presence in the Western Pacific. Moscow's acquisition of a modern naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam was a major strategic gain for the Soviet Navy. Additionally, the Soviet Air Force has facilities in Vietnam and North Korea. During 1986 Moscow showed a special interest in the island states of the South Pacific, notably Kiribati and Vanuatu, located east of Australia. Gorbachev reiterated in a visit to Vladivostok in the summer of 1986 that the Soviet Union is an Asian and Pacific power and that it intends to play a larger political role there. The Soviet foreign minister and other ranking diplomats have visited East Asian capitals and said that Gorbachev wants to hold an East Asian conference to reduce threats to peace, including those posed by nuclear-armed ships. Gorbachev has made overtures to China's leadership to settle border disputes and other issues standing in the way of better relations.

Does the Soviet announcement of its intention to play a larger role in East Asia pose a greater threat to U.S. security interests? Some argue that an expanded Soviet role means the United States should enlarge its own military, especially naval, presence. Yet, an enlarged Soviet interest in the Western Pacific does not necessarily require a larger U.S. military presence there. The new Soviet challenge is primarily political in nature. But an enlarged Soviet naval presence does not in itself pose a greater security threat to countries of the region, and the United States should avoid responding primarily in a military fashion. Moscow is not likely, in the current political climate, to encourage land wars in Asia such as a Vietnamese attack on Thailand or a North Korean

invasion of South Korea. In each case, Moscow would have to calculate that China's vital interests might be at stake and that Peking would not tolerate Vietnam or North Korea starting a war on its doorstep. Similarly, Moscow is not likely to use its navy to undermine governments in the Pacific or Southeast Asia. However, Moscow will certainly exploit local.political conflicts for its own advantage, for example, in the Philippines, and it will take advantage of strong antinuclear sentiments prevailing in many Asian countries, including Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. But these are political challenges, and the United States should adopt sophisticated political responses in return.

If one calculates that China will remain engaged with the United States and Japan into the 1990s and that Japan will gradually expand its military capabilities and take on a larger security role in the Western Pacific, the United States should be able to return to an offshore defense strategy in East Asia without increasing the risk of a military challenge there from the Soviet Union. Washington should rely primarily on naval power to maintain -its political influence in the Pacific area and should also retain air bases in Japan and the Philippines to caution Moscow against the use of its navy and air force to intimidate East Asian countries. It should not be necessary, however, to station American ground forces in Korea or any other mainland area. Washington should continue to sell military equipment and technical assistance to friendly states such as Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and China. A significant product of an offshore defense strategy would be a sizeable reduction in U.S. ground forces stationed in the Western Pacific, including Marines based in Okinawa.

U.S. policy makers need to accept the reality that Congress and the American people are not willing to have the United States act as guardian of every East Asian country if this requires intervention with U.S. forces when regional states are subjected to pressure from hostile neighbors and local insurgencies. Specifically, North Korea and Vietnam are Asian regional threats and need to be dealt with by Asian regional powers. For example, South Korea clearly has the capability to provide a much greater defense of its own territory against North Korea. Its population is more than double that of the North, and the GNP is nearly four times larger. South Korea has well-trained armed forces numbering 600,000, many with Vietnam combat experience. It has the resources to increase this number to 1 million, if necessary, to deter another North Korean attack southward. Although the United States must be willing to respond to a direct Soviet challenge in Northeast Asia, it is unlikely Congress will again support U.S. military intervention in any Asian country that is not directly attacked by the U.S.S.R.

If one accepts the view that the United States no longer has vital interests at stake on the Asian mainland in the 1980s and 1990s, what can be done now about the 40,000 American combat troops that remain in South Korea 33 years after the Korean peace agreement was signed? The reality is that U.S. interest in Korea today is a derivative one based on the

truly vital economic and security interests the United States has in Japan's security. Unlike the situation in 1950 whereby U.S. troops were first sent to Korea, or in 1954 when a Korean peace treaty was signed, China and Japan, and China and the United States today have good working relations that are designed to contain Soviet power in Asia. China and Japan are in the process of overcoming a half-century of animosity and have developed good economic and political relations. Peking maintains diplomatic ties with the North Korean Government, and recently it has shown a willingness to conduct limited negotiations with South Korea. Given the present relationship between Japan and China, the United States should ask these two Northeast Asian powers to take on a major responsibility for keeping the peace on the Korean Peninsula while the United States confines its military presence to Japan, the Philippines, and Australia. For historical reasons it may be difficult for Japan to assume a direct security role in Korea. This should not, however, dissuade the Tokyo government from strengthening its political relationship with South Korea and working toward an accommodation between the Pyongyang and Seoul regimes. China should be encouraged to exercise its influence with North Korea to avoid armed incursions into South Korea.

The United States should announce its intention to withdraw its ground forces from South Korea in the early 1990s, leaving only a small U.S. contingent there, primarily Air Force units. Washington should make clear to North and South Korea that it will honor its commitment to help South Korea if it is attacked; but it should emphasize that its obligation in the 1990s should not entail the continued presence of U.S. ground forces on the Korean peninsula. South Korea has a large, well-disciplined and well equipped army, and it has the manpower and economic resources to increase its defenses as the United States withdraws. Japan will continue to provide air and naval surveillance in the Sea of Japan and around the Korean peninsula, and the U.S. Air Force in Japan and remaining units in Korea will be nearby in the event of an emergency.

What risks might Washington chance by withdrawing ground troops from Korea? Such action might embolden North Korea to think it could again overrun the South by force and unite the peninsula under Pyongyang 's control. It is conceivable that China would refuse to be involved in efforts to restrain North Korea if it decided to attack the South. Arresting a North Korean attack would be left to Japan and the United States and would be difficult without U.S. combat presence in Korea. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea may also embolden Moscow to increase political pressure on Japan and China. These are possibilities, but none of them is likely to occur so long as China continues a relationship with the United States and Japan and Washington maintains strong naval and air forces in the Western Pacific and Sea of Japan. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that North Korea would risk a full-scale attack on South Korea

unless it had strong backing from Moscow. Such support is not likely to be given unless the Soviet leadership is prepared to risk a far wider war with the United States.

The Philippines poses another problem for the offshore defense strategy. Here the United States faces a crucial test of its ability to assist a former colony and long-time ally to recover its political and economic health after more than a decade of dictatorship and plunder by ex-President Ferdinand Marcos. A growing Communist insurgency threatens that country, and it will require monumental efforts by the government of Corazon Aquino to prevent its descent into political chaos. In the process, the United States could lose two key military bases in the Western Pacific-Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base. These two installations are regarded by the Defense Department as crucial to the projection of U.S. power in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. They may be irreplaceable; yet, the uncertain political future of the Philippines makes it desirable that the United States not wait until the expiration of its bases agreement with the Philippines to begin building alternative military facilities in the Pacific.

Although retention of Clark Field and Subic Bay clearly is important to long-range U.S. security interests in East Asia, particularly because of their size and location, it is possible that the current Philippine Government will ask for termination of the bases agreement. Corazon Aquino campaigned on a platform of phasing out these American bases, but she may change her mind and conclude that the bases are important to her country's security as well as to the security of other Asian countries. However, it would be took risky for the United States to base strategic policy on this expectation. Washington is now considering the establishment of new bases in Guam, Tinian, and Palau to the east of the Philippines, even though the cost of construction will be great. Also, alternative bases in the Pacific will not enjoy the supply of skilled manpower available in the Philippines. An alternative bases plan should be pursued, so that the United States will not be without a realistic fallback position.

The United States also has an important historical reason for helping the Philippine people rebuild that country's democracy. This was once a showcase for how American colonial rule could foster democratic institutions in an Asian country and prepare it for independence. The martial law period imposed by President Ferdinand Marcos was an embarrassment to the U.S. Government, and the Reagan administration belatedly acknowledged this moral dimension of American policy when it decided in 1985 that new democratic leadership was needed to prevent the Philippines' decline into chaos. The dilemma for U.S. leaders is whether they can achieve both democracy and military bases.

In Southeast Asia the United States has an enduring interest in fostering economic growth and political stability, but it does not have a vital security interest in this region and should not, therefore,

contemplate reintroducing U.S. combat forces except in the case of general war. Thailand, which has a residual defense relationship with Washington stemming from the Manila Pact of 1954, poses a policy problem because of sporadic border clashes between its troops and Vietnamese forces occupying Kampuchea. Presidents Carter and Reagan reiterated the U.S. commitment to defend Thailand should it be attacked, but the means of doing so remain discretionary under the Manila Treaty. The United States should continue to give Thailand strong diplomatic support and military assistance to strengthen its defense capabilities; but Thailand should not be led to believe that U.S. combat forces will again be sent to its defense against a local threat in Southeast Asia.

Indonesia is another country that is important to the United States for political and economic reasons. It is the largest and most richly endowed land in Southeast Asia and, with Singapore and Malaysia, guards the strategic Malacca Strait between the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. However, Indonesia and Malaysia do not have treaty arrangements with the United States and there is no reason why they should be considered vital to U.S. security interests. Non-Communist Southeast Asian states associated in ASEAN are important to the United States because of their economic and political influence in Asia. Yet, these states (except for the Philippines) should not be considered vital security interests of the United States, and U.S. policy makers should resist the temptation to be drawn into military conflicts there.

In the Southwest Pacific, the principal security problem for U.S. policy is the growing antinuclear sentiment in Australia and New Zealand. In mid-1986, Washington broke its ANZUS relationship with New Zealand because it refused to allow U.S. Navy ships to make port calls unless Washington declared that they carried no nuclear weapons. The Reagan administration sought unsuccessfully to persuade the Lange government to change its position and then broke off security relationships with Wellington. This sharp U.S. response to New Zealand's policy was conditioned by Washington's concern over potential reactions in other allied countries--notably Japan and the Philippines--should the United States bow to antinuclear sentiments in one state, such as New Zealand. The ANZUS relationship, therefore, became expendable in light of the larger U.S. strategic interest in Asia. With New Zealand now out of the alliance, there is danger that antinuclear sentiment in Australia will grow and eventually affect that government's policy toward the U.S. defense relationship. Consequently, it is imperative that Washington deepen the relationship with Australia and take greater notice of Canberra's political and economic needs. This might include coproduction in certain defense procurement arrangements and other economic measures.

During the remainder of this decade, the United States will continue to be a major Pacific power and will also exercise great political influence in East Asia and the Indian Ocean area. However, the United States is no longer willing--for historical and financial reasons--to carry the East Asian security burden alone, as it did from 1950 to 1972,

and as some think it should continue to do. Washington, therefore, needs to persuade other Asian countries to share the defense responsibility. Similarly, U.S. policy makers should encourage all states in East and South Asia to work out political arrangements to protect the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean to markets in Europe as well as East Asia. This is not a role that the U.S. Government can be reasonably expected to play alone, no matter how large a naval force it deploys to that area. Reducing the level of U.S. military commitments in, and the economic resources devoted to the security of, East Asia will not occur until political leaders in Washington make a fundamental decision to return the United States to an offshore defense strategy, a shift which is now overdue.

Notes

1. The new emphasis on seeking to define national security priorities is illustrated by the White House publication, first issued in January 1987, entitled: National Security Strategy of the United States. This assessment of national interests and national security policies was required by Congress as part of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

2. As defined here, a vital national interest is one that is so important to a country's well-being that it will risk armed conflict in order to persuade another state to alter a threatening action or policy. See Donald E. Nuechterleln, "The Concept of National Interest: A Time for New Approaches," ORBIS, Spring 1979, pp. 84-85.

3. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969). pp. 356-357.

4. SEATO went out of existence after the conclusion of the Vietnam war in 1975. Pakistan had previously withdrawn, following its war with India in 1971.

5. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change 1953-1956: The White House
Years (New York: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 352-354.

6. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 546-548.

7. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: Rhinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 151-153.

8. Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset
and Dunlap, 1978), pp. 394-395.

9. ASEAN originally consisted of five countries: Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. In 1984 the new state of Brunei

in North Borneo became the sixth member.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 2.C.6

* * *

The Democratic Prospect in Latin America

Mark Falcoff

Not available at this time

Chapter 2.C.7

* * *

In Africa, Independence Is Far Cry From Freedom

George B.N. Ayittey

Not available at this time

Chapter 2.C.8

* * *

Low-intensity Conflict: Future Challenges and Lessons from the Reagan Years

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Not available at this time

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 2.C.9

* * *

Excerpts from The Coming Explosion of Silent Weapons

Commander Stephen Rose, JAGC, U.S. Navy

Twenty years ago the United States unilaterally disbanded its biological warfare program. According to the wisdom of that time, germs and toxins were crude, uncontrollable weapons of little military value. {1} In recent times, however, analysts have begun to warn that biological agents are now poised to become flexible weapons perhaps "even more dangerous" than nuclear arms. {2} What has led to this complete turnaround in analytical thinking within the span of two decades?

The answer lies in the revolution in biotechnology, especially in genetic engineering, that began during the 1970s. Recently developed techniques permit the manipulation of key biological processes with a precision and power not dreamed of 20 years ago. Gene-splicing allows the transfer of toxic features from one biological agent to another. Science can now reshuffle the genetic deck of micro-organisms to produce a theoretically unlimited number of combinations, each with its own unique blend of toxicity, hardiness, incubation period, etc. In short, it is becoming possible to synthesize biological agents to military specifications. Thus, the world lies on the threshold of a dangerous era of designer bugs as well as designer drugs.

As if this were not concern enough, two additional factors serve to amplify the impact of this revolution on the military. First, the new biochemical

---

Commander Rose was graduated with honors from Yale University and received his juris doctor degree from the University of Virginia Law School. A former naval aviator and, in 1989, a graduate of the Naval War College, Commander Rose is currently the Force Judge Advocate for Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic.

This article (under another title) received both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Naval War College's Richard G. Colbert prize essay awards.

Excerpts reprinted from Naval War College Review, Summer 1989 by permission of author.

processes are relatively cheap, easy to master, and accessible to all. This allows many more players to enter the arena of biochemical warfare, ranging from superpowers to Third World states to terrorist groups.

Second, the new technology inherently favors offense over defense. Although strengthened by a million years of evolution, the human organism remains vulnerable to biochemical assault. Several of the new supertoxins are ten thousand times more potent than nerve gases now held in military arsenals. One author estimates that "nerve gas, which has created a worldwide furor, is mere perfume compared to some agents on the drawing board." {3} Even more sobering is the emerging possibility for designing organisms which resist all known treatment and which might take years to counter. The potential scope of this problem is illustrated by the billions of dollars and years of effort already expended to discover a defense against a naturally occurring biological phenomenon--the AIDS virus. {4}

As novelists are fond of reminding us, biotechnology could conceivably unleash the equivalent of a homemade "Andromeda strain"--a pathogen so demonic that it would result in global catastrophe. In the judgment of most knowledgeable experts, however, the more realistic threat lies in gene splicing's powerful ability to recombine bits and pieces of known organisms in a nearly limitless array. As one government official described the problem, "new [biological warfare] agents can be produced in hours; antidotes may take years." {5}

The Pressures and Perils of Proliferation

A key aspect of this emerging technology is that weapons of mass destruction threaten to become commonplace. We are crossing into an era when tiny nations and terrorist groups can arm themselves with biological and chemical weapons of great destructiveness-the equivalent of the "poor man's atomic bomb."

For example, Moammar Qadhafi has long sought a nuclear capability for Libya, but thus far without apparent success. Recent reports suggest, however, that Libya is now developing both biological and chemical weapons. {6} Should his nuclear quest continue to be thwarted, it is likely that Qadhafi's long-touted "Moslem bomb" will be a biochemical weapon rather than an atomic one.

An estimated 10-20 other nations have biochemical weapons, and this number is expected to double in the coming decade. {7} While current technology permits even backward countries to achieve a quasi-nuclear status at bargain basement cost, the technological infrastructure required to develop an atomic weapon is far more complex and expensive than the effort needed to produce sophisticated biochemical weapons. The same processes used to make fertilizers and pesticides can also churn out poison gases; similarly, bulk toxins can be manufactured at a gene-splicing

facility, at modest cost, and based on techniques freely available in the scientific press. Poor, nonnuclear nations caught up in a regional arms race or believing themselves menaced by heavily armed neighbors are beginning to invest in biochemical weapons as a "cheap" but potentially nasty deterrent. {8}

In the decades ahead, it is likely that many additional nations will opt to acquire such arms. Proliferation of biochemical weapons is part of a broader cycle of global diffusion of political, economic and military power. As the international alignment continues to shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world, weapons of mass destruction will also spread. It is conceivable that by the turn of the century 35 nations will possess a stockpile of nuclear, chemical and/or biological weapons. Aside from placing many new fingers on the triggers of mass destruction, such a development would also diminish superpower freedom of action. As time passes, conclude the authors of a landmark report on Discriminate Deterrence, "[t]he arsenals of the lesser powers will make it riskier and more difficult for the superpowers to intervene in regional wars." {9} With the spread of biological and chemical weapons, even small nations will gain the capacity to mete out punishing counterstrokes to an intermeddler.

The good news is that none of the Third World countries suspected of developing biological weapons has, thus far, turned to genetic engineering to create novel organisms. {10} The not-so-good news is that at least a dozen countries are hard at work on toxins and chemicals. The bad news is that many of them, particularly in the Middle East, are actively shopping for missiles and other delivery systems to extend the reach of their new biochemical arsenals. The worse news is that the 50-year tradition of not using biochemical weapons in battle has collapsed in the past decade during a series of regional conflicts. Worst of all, the lesson demonstrated to many by Iraq's use of poison gas against Iran is that the military benefit gained by Iraq substantially outweighed any price paid in terms of international censure or economic sanctions.

Widespread use of chemical poisons in the Iran-Iraq war may have lowered the threshold for future use of biological weapons as well. This erosion of ancient taboos is being accelerated by the new biotechnology, which not only blurs the distinction between biological and chemical processes, but also provides a framework for controlled biological warfare. Thus, the proliferation of biochemical weapons gathers momentum from three trends--a search for economical deterrence, the weakening of old taboos, and the advent of a new and powerful technology ripe for exploitation. {11} In short, some countries are beginning to view biochemical weapons as both useful and, under certain circumstances, usable.

Nations of the Middle East are a case in point. The current scramble for chemical armaments in this region adds a dangerous twist to an already volatile situation. In the estimate of CIA Director William Webster,

"the spread of chemical weapons among the Arab states, principally Iraq, Libya and Syria, could seriously alter the regional balance of power." {12} This threat will intensify as countries obtain quantities of missiles capable of delivering biochemical warheads throughout the region.

Thanks to Soviet largesse, the Syrians already have a supply of 55-21 missiles capable of sending warheads into neighboring states with considerable accuracy. {13} During the Gulf War, Iraq successfully managed to modify a number of short-range Scud-B missiles, tripling their reach to nearly 600 miles. With help from Iraq, Egypt is reported to be hard at work building the Badr-2000, which will have a range comparable to the modified Scud. {14} Finally, Israel served notice with the September 1988 launching of its first satellite that it too has the technology to deliver advanced ballistic payloads. {15}

For decades Israel and its Arab neighbors have circled each other like proverbial scorpions in a bottle. As biochemical warheads continue to spread through the Middle East, this analogy becomes increasingly apt. Virtually every city in the region will be exposed to the sting of a formidable and potentially lethal attack.

In the past, Israel has enjoyed a regional monopoly over weapons of mass destruction. The one direct challenge to its presumed nuclear strangle hold--Iraq's effort to build an atomic weapon in the late 1970s--ended in the bombing of the main Iraqi research reactor in 1981. Similar preemptive strikes would be less useful to curb the spread of biochemical weapons. "If a country is serious about acquiring chemical weapons, it is hard for another country to eliminate that capability the way Israel knocked out Iraq's atomic bomb program," concludes one analyst. "These weapons can be made and stored in small sites all over a country, and you can never be sure you got them all." {16}

This is equally true for biological and toxin weapons. Like their chemical cousins, these agents can be prepared and stored in a small facility at relatively little capital investment. A batch of anthrax capable of killing millions of people, for example, can be concocted in a "room the size of a broom closet." {17}

Although the present furor over the Middle East balance of power centers on chemical agents, in time the biological side of the spectrum will be viewed as even more insidious and destabilizing. Chemical weapons, in comparison, are crude. Despite their lethal effect, chemicals require bulk application to qualify as a true weapon of mass destruction. The nerve gases in modern arsenals are, essentially, refined versions of agents developed prior to World Wars I and II. While some additional refinements can be expected, pure chemical agents are approaching the end of their evolutionary path. The menace of the future lies in biologicals-pathogens and toxins-which, thanks to the advancing power of genetic engineering, have a far richer potential for harm. If the proliferation of poison gas in the 1990s creates a decade of chemical concerns, the

largely untapped, but nearly unlimited nature of this new biotechnology will threaten to turn the next century into a diabolic era of military biology. {18}

Military Utility of Biological Weapons

To what extent do these developments, especially those arising from the revolution in biotechnology, require a shift in American military preparations? Not surprisingly, reasonable minds differ as to the strategic and tactical implications of genetic engineering. A key issue is the "usability" of biological agents.

One school of thought suggests that there may be less to the new developments in life science than meets the eye. It judges that biotechnology "will not lead to the [ideal] BW or routinize biological warfare. That would require a higher level of protection and predictability than is likely ever to be possible. Effective weapons will always pose deadly risks for their maker. And no realistic genetic transformation will yield biological weapons that are suitable for theater operations." {19} In other words, science might well make biological warfare more dangerous, but never sufficiently controllable. Thus, the very nature of bioweapons induces self-deterrence, both now and for a long time to come.

Other thinkers view the situation as more threatening. From their perspective, controllability may not be an insoluble problem. Already, "in the case of biological agents . . . it is now possible to eliminate undesirable side effects. . . [to] preserve and package agents more effectively . . . to do more and do it safely." {20} In the future, the phenomenal versatility of genetic engineering could enable an attacker to retain control over its biological agent, for example, "by designing it to . . . die off after a previously determined number of cell divisions. . . [or] by designing the organism to be bound by a narrow set of environmental factors." {21}

The mysteries of biotechnology have just begun to be probed, and at their core lie the basic secrets of life. According to many scientists, the next major exploratory step will be to map the human genome--a ten-year, $3 billion effort to determine the exact location, function and molecular structure of the 50,000 genes that human cells have in common. Human genes are the memory bank for our species--the cell's floppy disk governing all life processes at the molecular level. Precise mapping of such genetic blueprints, whether for human beings or other organisms, would greatly enhance the reach and sophistication of genetic engineering. Thus, as science marches on, the potential for controllable biological warfare will also advance and should not be discarded out of hand as a dead issue.

In practical terms, this means that all dimensions of potential biological warfare-strategic and tactical, overt and covert-must be monitored with great care.

Overt Strategic Use of Biological Weapons. The traditional scenario for germ warfare envisions an attack resulting in massive civilian casualties; devastation on a scale similar to the destructive power of nuclear weapons. Biological weapons have been viewed as inherently strategic in nature, and U.S. policy makers have assumed that a biological attack on a nuclear-armed nation could be countered with (and thus deterred by) another available weapon of mass destruction, i.e., nuclear arms. Therefore, when President Nixon dismantled our biological warfare program in 1969, he did not worry about the disappearance of a like-kind retaliatory capacity. Three years later, similar considerations led the United States to support a sweeping arms control ban on biological weapons, even though the agreement lacked any procedures for verification. At that time, overt biological warfare was correctly viewed as a clumsy, indiscriminate weapon, an all-or-nothing proposition allowing no tactical finesse or useful strategic advantage.

In part, the rationale of the Nixon era still makes sense. Nuclear deterrence continues to restrain superpower use of biological agents against another superpower. {22} In the words of a former director of a Defense Department laboratory responsible for identifying such agents: "one of the most awesome tasks I can think of [is] coming up with a definitive statement that we've been attacked with a biological weapon, knowing that that statement is probably equivalent to pushing the [nuclear] button. [The President] could always call the Kremlin and ask [What the hell did you do that for?] My guess is he wouldn't. He'd tape that message to the front end of a Minuteman missile." {23}

Embedded in this scenario are the key assumptions that use of a biological agent would be both traceable and massive enough to qualify as a strategic threat. In times past, the relatively primitive nature of biological weapons made both assumptions nearly axiomatic. The new biotechnology complicates this old equation, however, by opening up novel possibilities for tactical and covert uses of biological agents.

Overt Tactical Use of Biological Weapons. One potential use of genetic-engineering is the mass production of toxins, which are poisons made by organisms. Toxins occupy an interesting niche between biological and chemical weapons--more potent than most man-made poisons, but also more
controllable than living agents. Until now, the availability of toxins has been limited by a production bottleneck. Large numbers of creatures and expensive, laborious processes were needed to yield even small quantities of toxin. For example, using refinement techniques available during the late 1960s, the U.S. government generated only 11 grams of shellfish toxin from several tons of mussels. Biotechnology changes all this.

With gene-splicing, micro-organisms can now be converted into miniature poison factories, permitting the production of militarily significant amounts of toxins at far less cost and effort. Soviet use of

"black rain" in Afghanistan, believed to be a form of toxin causing one-breath anesthesia, illustrates the tactical potential of such agents. According to an official U.S. study, the Soviets are pursuing development of a broad spectrum of natural and synthetic toxin weapons, ranging from extraordinarily lethal agents to those which merely induce sudden panic, listlessness, or sleepiness. {24}

The obvious and chilling threat of lethal agents tends to divert our attention from problems posed by incapacitants. These nonlethal toxins could have a disproportionate impact, however, due to the natural reaction of the people who are unaffected to assist the stricken. In Douglass' estimate, incapacitants "can be militarily more effective [than lethal agents] because sick or disabled soldiers and dependents tie up scarce resources, demand the energies of those still healthy, and have a very demoralizing effect." {25} The crucial point is that toxin weapons can theoretically be tailored to create a wide variety of effects, depending on the tactical need.

Covert Use of Biological Weapons. In the 1970s, Cuba charged that the CIA was clandestinely using biological agents to try to destabilize the island. {26} Allegedly, this campaign targeted vital crops such as tobacco (blue mold) and sugar cane (cane smut), livestock (African swine fever), and also the populace itself (hemorrhagic strain of dengue fever). {27} Whatever the source, these outbreaks cost Cuba several billion dollars and 300,000 cases of debilitating disease. The Cuban charges highlight several reasons why covert biological warfare is such a potential menace--the difficulty of proof, the range of potential targets, and the substantial damage that can be inflicted by relatively cheap and easily concealed agents.

None of these problems are new. Even before the advent of genetic engineering, nations had at their disposal some nasty means for biological sabotage. Nature is a veritable cornucopia of pathogens and maladies. The biological revolution, however, expands both the size of the chessboard and the power of the pieces available for such covert operations.

As previously discussed, the potential number and potency of these biological "chess pieces" has increased dramatically due gene-splicing's capacity for reshuffling the genetic deck in a controlled way. Nature no longer sets the upper limit for either variety or virulence; and as genetic engineering increases in sophistication, so too will the subtlety and scope of covert biological weapons. If (when) a devastating new strain of wheat rust or pesticide-resistant fruit fly or AIDS-like virus pops up in America's future, will we be able to determine whether the source is a natural mutation or a genetic manipulation concocted by an adversary? Granted, these hypothetical examples seem more a product of science fiction than reality; however, judging from advances made in genetic engineering in just over a decade, science appears to be eclipsing fiction more rapidly than expected.

Quo Vadis?

As the preceding discussion suggests, a number of factors--including regional conflicts, Soviet capabilities and the revolution in biotechnology--are converging to usher in an era of soft but deadly weapons. This threat, which has grave implications for American security, is here now and will grow progressively worse. {28} What can the United States do? There are three basic approaches: status quo; patchwork; and aggressive defense.

o o o o

Status Quo. America's current biological warfare doctrine involves two tracks: a defensive posture (no stockpile of bioweapons) and deterrence (possible nuclear escalation in response to biological attack). The status quo approach would leave matters as they are. Unfortunately, recent advances in biotechnology seriously weaken both prongs of this doctrine.

As we have already seen, the traditional notion of treating military biology as a weapon of only strategic significance no longer seems to be valid. When such weapons were an instrument of relatively uncontrollable mass destruction, it may have been apropos to threaten nuclear retaliation in response to an outbreak of plague warfare. But now that the tactical possibilities of bioweapons are beginning to emerge, this deterrent linkage is not as seamless and credible as it once was.

Would we go nuclear, for example, in response to the use of "black rain" or a biological warfare campaign in Europe that sickened but did not kill the populace? Without the capacity for like-kind retaliation (as called for by U.S. chemical warfare doctrine), there is a policy/force mismatch that invites mischief and miscalculation. As former Senator John Tower wrote in 1982, when arguing the need for a robust U.S. chemical weapons capability, "the idea that we can credibly threaten to respond to a Soviet first-use of chemical weapons [during an attack on NATO] by resorting to nuclear retaliation should be as preposterous to the Soviets as it must be appalling to West Europeans." {29}

Similar pejoratives apply to the gap now opening up between American deterrence policy and the expanding world of bioweapons. Our nuclear umbrella cannot credibly deter tactical use of toxin or other limited biological agents any more than it can deter chemical strikes. As biological warfare techniques and agents continue to evolve, becoming more and more "discriminate" as well as harder to detect, the problem of finding a range of credible and proportional deterrents will also grow.

The other prong of the U.S. biological warfare posture--defense but no offense--is grounded on adherence to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which bans possession of all biological and toxin agents except for small stocks retained solely for defensive research.

Prior to the biotechnological revolution, this made some sense as a useful firebreak, because the biological agents and processes then in existence were relatively unwieldy and unreliable.

The new technologies, however, have potentially converted biological warfare from a major undertaking into a cottage industry--simple, cheap, quick, precise. Distinctions between research and production, between defense and offense, are now essentially meaningless. Counting missiles in their silos is child's play compared to tracking the thousands of facilities which could be used to produce biological warfare material.

By their very nature such facilities are quite difficult to detect using standard technical means of verification, i.e., surveillance satellites and ground monitoring stations. "Unlike high energy physics experiments or the construction and testing of weapons delivery vehicles," notes John Birkner, "new biotechnology research efforts devoted to military objectives would tend not to reveal themselves." {30} Also, advances in bioprocessing technology made during the past decade have magnified the detection problem by scaling down the size of facilities needed to produce militarily significant amounts of biological agents. A verification procedure designed to cope with these problems -- the 1972 Convention having no such provisions whatever--would have to be extraordinarily intrusive. Since the step from research to production could be quite rapid, a comprehensive inspection regime might, as one director of a research institute glumly noted, "have to inspect the lab notebooks of every [biological] lab in the country." {31}

Summing up these concerns, the DoD official then in charge of negotiations policy, Douglas Feith, told Congress in 1986 that the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention "must be recognized as critically deficient and unfixable." {32} Labeling the Convention a "false advertisement to the world," Feith went on to explain that the primary culprit was the revolution in biotechnology. "Because new technology makes possible a massive and rapid breakout, the treaty represents an insignificant impediment at best." He concluded by suggesting that this potential for a quick breakout made the notion of a biological warfare treaty fundamentally unworkable. "Its principal failing, therefore, is no longer the absence of verification provisions or lack of effective compliance mechanisms, the commonly acknowledged shortcomings, but its
inability to accomplish its purpose." Feith ended his remarks with the following pessimistic appraisal:

"It is not a pleasant task to deliver so dismal a report to the Congress. . . . But can one responsibly inflate hope for an escape from the military problems posed by the Soviet BW programs? There can be no deus ex arms control in this arena. In answer to those who crave a constructive suggestion under even the least promising circumstances, one can recommend only: Defense." {33}

Overall, then, the status quo approach rests on two flawed premises--that the biological warfare genie can be kept on a tight leash through arms control and that bioweapons can otherwise be held in check by strategic deterrence. Both prongs invite more risk than seems prudent under the circumstances.

A Patchwork Quilt. This approach seeks to contain the biochemical problem via the cumulative effect of several interlocking initiatives: economic sanctions, export controls, an augmented defensive capability, and participation in arms control negotiations.

Sanctions. During the Reagan administration, other aspects of American policy clearly took precedence over a perceived need to keep the biochemical genie bottled up. Between 1986-88, for example, when Iraq was using mustard and nerve gas to break up human-wave assaults during its touch-and-go war with Iran, the United States basically turned a blind eye to this breach of the biochemical taboo. Later, Iraq began to use similar agents to settle a long-standing feud with Kurdish rebels, and several nations called for tough trade sanctions. After some dithering, the Reagan administration came out in opposition to sanctions against Iraq, {34} and proponents eventually settled for diplomatic protests.

"The fundamental question," as John Kester sees it, "is whether . . . use [of biochemical weapons] by anyone will carry a real penalty--economic, political and perhaps military--even if enforcement injures Western economic or short-term political interests." {35} Thus far, developed nations have not been willing to stomach more than a taste of the required medicine, and during the past few years the United States has sadly been among the reluctant.

Export Controls, The U.S. track record regarding export controls is more favorable. In 1984 the Reagan administration began to clamp down on the transfer of equipment and materials directly contributing to biochemical weapon programs in other countries. In the long run, this is probably a futile effort, since many. of the items in question have dual use in paints, plastics and pharmaceuticals or are found in breweries, hospitals and pesticide plants. The unwelcome truth is that even if the United States imposes stringent export controls, too many other countries are willing to let their business firms peddle biochemical technology to a world of eager customers.

Arms Control. Under a patchwork approach, however, the time gained by these delaying maneuvers can be put to good use in trying to fashion a workable arms control regime for biochemical weapons. The expert consensus is that effective worldwide control Of biological and chemical agents is probably a chimera, but nonetheless an effort worth making. For nearly 20 years diplomats at the Geneva Disarmament Conference have been searching for an acceptable formula that would lead to a comprehensive, verifiable and global ban on chemical weapons. As with biological agents, the main stumbling block to an effective chemical warfare treaty has been

the bugbear of verification. According to William Burns, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "no country in the world has offered a system which has a reasonable chance of verification." {36}

Part of the problem is that chemical weapons can be produced by the same types of factories which turn common chemicals into fertilizers, pesticides and pharmaceuticals. Even more ominous, these plants can be switched from one production line to the other-from agents of well-being to agents of death--within a 24 to 48-hour period. Accordingly, a ban on chemical weapons would require continuous monitoring of some of the world's most basic industries. Although the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed in principle on the need for short-notice challenge inspections as part of any chemical warfare treaty, negotiations have bogged down on the inevitable issues of how, what, when and where. In addition, several major countries, primarily China and India, have not yet accepted the principle of on-site challenge inspections. {37}

A further complication is the recent Arab call for linking any ban on chemical weapons to progress in nuclear disarmament. {38} The heavy Arab investment in biochemical weaponry is intended, in part, to offset Israel's possession of nuclear arms. From the Arab perspective, a ban on chemical weapons appears to be discriminatory so long as Israel retains its weapons of mass destruction. Without Arab participation, a chemical warfare treaty would be stillborn--even if the verification quagmire could eventually be navigated.

This having been said, some kind of a chemical warfare convention will likely emerge from Geneva during the next few years. There is a growing consensus that even an imperfect ban would be preferable to the galloping proliferation now under way. As Brad Roberts puts it, "[t]he choice, practically speaking, will be between a partially disarmed world and a wildly proliferating world." {39} To wait is to court increasing danger, especially in the Middle East cauldron; to move too quickly, however, without first resolving key issues of verification and linkage, would be to indulge in an illusion of progress.

o o o o

Aggressive Defense. A more forceful approach might involve preemptive strikes to prevent biochemical attacks on the United States or its allies. The controversy surrounding Libya's chemical plant at Rabta highlights the pros and cons of such action. {40} International law does not forbid the construction of a chemical weapons facility. The 1925 Geneva Convention prohibits "use" of chemical weapons, but not their manufacture or possession. Realistically, the United States is concerned about Colonel Qadhafi's track record of extremism which makes his possession of chemical arms a threat per se.

The saber-rattling of the last days of the Reagan administration, during which Washington raised the prospect of a military strike against

the Rabta plant, appears to have had three objectives: to put Qadhafi on final notice; to seize the lead and perhaps dampen any Israeli enthusiasm for an independent strike; and to impress on our allies the urgent need for export controls and vigilance to slow down biochemical proliferation. For now, the prevailing consensus within the U.S. government seems to be that, absent actual injury to our interests or at least hard intelligence that injury is imminently threatened, there is no clear legal justification for attacking the Libyan plant. {41}

One risk, of course, is that Qadhafi might opt to produce and stockpile large quantities of "pharmaceuticals" prior to distributing or employing them. Once such weapons are dispersed, a preemptive strike loses some of its value. This is especially true if biological agents are involved. In fact, a preemptive strike on a bioweapons workshop, if it broke open secure containment facilities without exterminating the pathogens inside, could precipitate, rather than prevent, a catastrophe.

By its very nature, military preemption is a weapon with limited reload capacity. Unless a nation cares little about its international reputation, preemptive attacks are usually reserved for situations posing clear, immediate and substantial danger. The Libyan plant at Rabta-capable of producing both medicine and military weapons; legal according to international norms but perceived to be a grave threat; built with Western connivance in pursuit of short-term profits at the risk of long-range perils- this one plant symbolizes the confusion and cross-currents that exacerbate the biochemical problem. Threats of a preemptive strike may help to keep Colonel Qadhafi in check, but preemption is obviously no solution to the larger issues posed by biochemical proliferation.

o o o o

Wars Hot and Cold

Soft weapons also circumvent current military operations in another fundamental way. An essential element of warfare is the ability to determine when one has been attacked. The use of a nuclear weapon, for example, is not likely to go unnoticed. This is not necessarily true of biological weapons.

An ominous new possibility is that attacks could be mounted which mimic natural phenomena so well that the onslaught may not be recognizable for what it is. Potentially, biological agents can be converted into the ultimate stealth weapons. The dark side of biotechnology enhances the opportunities for a kind of shadow war with no formal battlefronts and no detectable invasion.

One can analogize a nation's military forces to antibodies created by society to protect against, and deal with, external threats. But what if this protective "antibody" fails to recognize an invader or pinpoint the source? Invisible attacks of this sort represent the highest level of

maneuver warfare. According to Jeremy Rivkin, "microbes are the foot-soldiers of the 21st century." {42} More precisely, they threaten to become the elite saboteurs of the coming century. To the degree that hot wars grow increasingly impractical, the surreptitious and protean nature of soft weapons will unfortunately encourage their use as an extension of war by other means. {43}

The biotechnological revolution has unfolded dangerous new possibilities for converting the basic processes of life into weaponry. Still in its infancy, this revolution is likely to be a source of continuing surprises. From the standpoint of national security, the United States must track these developments closely to minimize the chance of a decisive trump card turning up in enemy hands. To paraphase Mao's well-known maxim, future power may come from the mouth of a test-tube as well as from the barrel of a gun.

Notes

1. See Manfred Hamm, "Deterrence, Chemical Warfare, and Arms Control,"
Orbis, Spring 1985, p.157.

2. Joseph Douglass, Jr., "The Challenges of Biochemical Warfare," Global Affairs, Winter 1988, p.156.

3. Charles Piller and Keith Yamamoto, Gene Wars (New York: William Morrow, 1988), p. 113.

4. In 1987, the Soviets alleged that AIDS was created by an American biological weapon experiment gone haywire. Although no evidence has been offered to support this charge, some studies conclude that it would be possible to manipulate genes to interfere with the body's immune system. See Piller and Yamamoto, p.97.

5. Douglas Feith, "Biological Weapons & the Limits of Arms Control," The National Interest, Winter 1986/87, p. 81. Feith served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for negotiations policy from March 1984 to September 1986.

6. Michael Gordon, "Libya Says It Can Make Chemical Arms If Others Do," New York Times, 10 January 1989, p. A12. Libya is reported to have a joint biological warfare program underway with Romania. See Joseph Douglass, Jr., "Soviets Surge in Biochemical Warfare; West Remains Drugged with Apathy," Armed Forces Journal International, August 1988, p.58.

7. John Fialka, "Chemical Weapons Spread in Third World, Pose Challenge to West," Wall Street Journal, 15 September 1988, p. 1; Lee Lescaze, "Quest for Way to Block Biological Weapons Is Itself Called a Threat," Wall Street Journal, 19 September 1988, p. 1; Elisa Harris, "CBW Arms

Control: A Regime Under Attack?" Arms Control Today, September 1986, p.

9. The following nations are reported to be either members of the chemical club or on the verge: United States, Soviet Union, France, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Syria, Israel, Libya, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, China, South Africa, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Ethiopia. No nation admits to stockpiling biological weapons. Countries believed to have the capacity for developing a bioweapon on short notice include the United States, Soviet Union, Iraq, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Syria, China and Romania.

8. Modern weapons and munitions are enormously costly, and very few countries have the resources to spend large sums developing and stockpiling arms. The more expensive war stays, the fewer the nations that can pose a conventional threat. Unfortunately, biological and chemical (B/C) weapons threaten a lot of destruction at relatively little cost. In the judgment of Robert Gates, the new Deputy National Security Advisor, "the most immediate threat to world peace may well come from the proliferation of chemical and biological warfare in the Third World." David Ottaway, "Middle East Weapons Proliferate," Washington Post, 19 December 1988, p. A11.

9. Fred Ikle, Albert Wohlstetter, eds., Discriminate Deterrence: Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1988), p. 10.

10. John Cushman, "U.S. Cites Increase in Biological Arms," New York Times, 4 May 1988, p. A9.

11. A breakthrough in biology described as "the most significant technological event since the Industrial Revolution," Joseph Douglass, Jr. and Neil Livingstone, America the Vulnerable (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 3, will be difficult to ignore, either militarily or commercially. The genie of genetic engineering cannot be stuffed back into its bottle for two basic reasons. First, the logic of deterrence and counterdeterrence suggests that in a fearful world nations will tend to explore and, where practical, exploit new technology for military purposes--if only to forestall an adversary from gaming an advantage.

Second, the commercial utility of genetic engineering continues to expand. As global oil supplies dwindle, the economics of production will gradually encourage chemical and pharmaceutical industries to use biotechnological methods in key production processes. As a result, even without overt military pressure, a vast reservoir of gene-cloning expertise will build up. This commercial momentum means that "in the not-too-distant future, countries throughout the world will learn how to produce an enormous variety of large biological molecules, including toxins, on a scale that was previously inconceivable." Jonathan Tucker, "Gene Wars," Foreign Policy, Winter 1985, p. 65.

12. Ottaway, p. A4.

13. George Moffett, III, "Israel: Determined Not to be a Chemical Target," Christian Science Monitor, 13 December 1988, p. B15.

14. Ottaway, p. A4.

15. "Israeli Satellite Is [Threat] Say Arabs,"Janes Defense Weekly, 1 October 1988, p. 753.

16. Fialka, p. 1, citing an unidentified "U.S. government expert."

17. Dr. Robert Kupperman, quoted in William Rempel and Robin Wright, "How Spying, Analysis and Luck Provided Proof of Libyan Chemical Warfare Plant," The Providence Sunday Journal, 22 January 1989, p. A-8.

18. However, even if chemical weapons are just a harbinger of greater troubles to come, at present the main threat to Middle East stability appears to be chemical. With Israel holding an estimated 50-100 nuclear weapons and Arab adversaries beginning to amass a significant number of deliverable chemical and perhaps biological warheads, the region is entering a hair-trigger environment.

In essence, the Middle East is undergoing a shift from Israel's assured military superiority to a regime of reciprocal deterrence loosely equivalent to the U.S./Soviet notion of mutual assured destruction (MAD). Understandably, Israel views this turn of events with alarm and is currently mulling over whether to invest in an offensive or defensive strategy to deal with the new Arab threat.

The Middle East may simply be too volatile to permit transition to, much less maintenance of, a stable MAD equilibrium. Prime Minister Shamir and Defense Minister Rabin have already dropped strong hints that major chemical attacks against Israel would be met with a nuclear rather than chemical or conventional reply. (See Leonard Spector, "Nonproliferation After the Bomb Has Spread," Arms Control Today, December 1988, p. 10.) The proliferation of missiles and B/C weapons increases the chance of miscalculation by either side--and resurrects the possibility that Israel might take desperate retaliatory measures, such as using shaped nuclear charges to contaminate or even obliterate key oil fields upon which the wealth, and ultimately the military might, of the Arab bloc depends.

19. Piller and Yamamoto, pp. 113-114.

20. Douglass, "The Challenges of Biochemical Warfare," p. 160. See also Wohl.

21. Piller and Yamamoto, p. 98, citing Raymond Zilinskas, "Managing the International Consequences of Recombinant DNA Research," Ph.D. dissertation, Los Angeles: Univ. of Southern California, 1981.

22. An interesting feature of biological warfare is the absence of realistic options for counterforce targeting. Germs and toxins attack people (or livestock, crops, etc.), but not an enemy's retaliatory capacity, either nuclear or biological. By itself, a traceable bioweapons attack is a perilous gambit: It would serve to provoke an adversary without immediately disarming him. In a struggle between superpowers, the only practical value of a massive biological warfare capability is to provide limited insurance for the possible neutralization of one's nuclear arsenal. In other words, at the level of strategic interaction among the superpowers, overt biological warfare serves primarily as a back-up deterrent, and not as a first-strike weapon.

23. Piller and Yamamoto, p. 129, quoting David Kingsbury when he was director of the Naval Biosciences Laboratory in Oakland, California in 1984.

24. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Chemical Warfare
Review Commission, Staff Report (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1985), p. 118.

25. Douglass and Livingstone, p. 74. The Soviets are also reported to be working on quick-acting diseases, with an incubation period of a few hours, that could serve a tactical function. See Douglass, "Soviets Surge in Biochemical Warfare," p. 58; and Douglass, America The Vulnerable, p. 77.

26. Piller and Yamamoto, p. 72.

27. Military planners tend to evaluate biological agents almost exclusively in terms of their threat as antipersonnel weapons. Just as important, however, is biological warfare's potential for harming other life. For example, plants lack an immune system and are therefore especially vulnerable to biological attack. This susceptibility is magnified by the widespread use of monocultivation, i.e., the planting of genetically identical strains to boost crop yield, as an agricultural standard in Western countries. Monocultivation provides ideal targets for biological warfare.

28. Another possible source of a B/C threat inside American borders might be terrorism. Although terrorists have targeted American citizens and interests throughout the world, thus far relatively little activity has been reported within the United States. In addition, up to this time nearly all terrorist groups have relied on conventional weaponry to carry out their attacks.

Many experts believe terrorists have not yet turned to B/C weapons because potential drawbacks continue to outweigh expected benefits. (See Elliot Horwitz, "Terrorists and Chemical/Biological Weapons," Naval War College Review, May-June 1982, pp. 36-40; L. Paul Bremer, III, "High Technology Terrorism," Dept. of State Bulletin, July 1988, pp. 65-67.)

The likely gains from a B/C attack resulting in mass casualties would be spectacular visibility and perhaps short-term bargaining power; the probable disadvantages would include deep public revulsion, a high risk of alienating key support groups, and an unleashing of extremely vigorous countermeasures. As Dr. Robert Kupperman, terrorism expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington points out, government pursuit of bioterrorists would probably be relentless: "If terrorists start to use [biologicals], there is no end to which a nation would go to stop them." (Jeanne McDermott, The Killing Winds (New York: Arbor House, 1987), pp. 254-255.)

To some degree, terrorism is theater--a kind of psychodrama played out on the world stage with real victims to gain public attention for desperate causes. As Brian Jenkins sees it, "(t]errorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening, not a lot of people dead." (Augustus Norton, "Terrorists, Atoms and the Future," Naval War College Review, May-June 1979, p. 42.) Of course, this logic holds only so long as the death of a few continues to be newsworthy. Some observers worry that after a decade of being exposed to terrorism based on conventional explosives, people are becoming "desensitized." (See Harvey McGeorge, "Reversing the Trend on Terror," Defense & Foreign Affairs, April 1988, p. 16.) Accordingly, as existing techniques begin to lose their propaganda punch, the temptation for terrorists to turn to more exotic and deadly means will grow. For this school of thought, the question is not whether B/C weapons will be used by terrorists, but only when.

Whatever their stance on the psychodynamics of terrorism, analysts generally agree on at least one point: the means to construct chemical or biological weapons are now within the grasp of many nonstate groups and, as time passes, the killing potential of these means will only expand. As previously discussed, many experts rely on a benefit-burden analysis to support their conclusion that terrorists are unlikely to resort to B/C agents. Unavoidably, such an argument pivots around the notion of a "rational" terrorist. There may be some freedom fighters who are not so calculating--those who, in a spasm of retribution, might seek to destroy what they cannot realistically hope to control. A terrorist group determined to inflict mass casualties (rather than just engage in theatrics) could well turn to B/C agents. The capability exists already. It seems inevitable that the international political climate will at some point be ripe to spawn an unholy trinity of bugs, drugs and thugs.

29. John Tower, "The Politics of Chemical Deterrence," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1982, p. 36. See also Manfred Hamm, pp. 127-128. In Hamm's judgment, "NATO has long relied in practice on the threat of nuclear escalation to deter Moscow from initiating chemical combat. But a nuclear response has always lacked credibility. . . . It can be all but ruled out that NATO's political leaders would muster the courage to permit the use of nuclear weapons to retaliate against chemical attacks or to transfer this decision to their military commanders in order to make the nuclear response automatic."

30. Quoted in Jonathan Tucker, "Gene Wars," Foreign Policy, Winter

1984-85, p. 76.

31. Piller and Yamamoto, p. 175, quoting Richard Novick, director of the New York Public Health Research Institute.

32. Feith, p. 83. Feith's conclusions have been widely shared by government and private analysts. In 1986, H. Allen Holmes, an assistant secretary of state for politico-military affairs, opined that "the Convention, in our judgment, cannot be made effective through amendment or design. " (Cited in David Dickson, "Gene Splicing Dominates Review of Weapons Pact," Science, 10 October 1986, p. 143.) In 1985 the Defense Science Board on Chemical Warfare and Biological Defense concluded that "technology has made obsolete much of the distinctions and language of the BW treaty." (Dept. of Defense, Biological Defense Program, Report to the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, May 1986, chap. 1, p. 6.) For the past five years, in numerous articles and books, Joseph Douglass, Jr., has been arguing that the Biological Warfare Convention is a dangerous illusion lulling the United States to sleep. See, e.g., the Douglass sources cited in notes 2, 6, & 11 and Joseph Douglass, Jr. and H. Richard Lukens, "The Expanding Arena of Chemical-Biological Warfare," Strategic Review, Fall 1984, pp. 714. For a contrary view, that the Biological Warfare Convention is not hopelessly obsolescent and could perhaps be salvaged, see Piller and Yamamoto.

33. Feith, pp. 83-84.

34. Michael Gordon, "Senators Prepare Sanctions Laws For Supply and Use of Poison Gas," New York Times, 24 January 1989, p. A8.

35. John Kester, "Chemical Weapons, Cloudy Thinking," New York Times, 13
January 1989, p. A31.

36. Russell Watson, "The Winds of Death," Newsweek, 16 January 1989, p. 25. Other leading experts echo Burns' point. "It would be extremely difficult to detect a deliberate violation of a chemical warfare [CW] treaty--extremely difficult," observed Thomas Welch, deputy assistant to the secretary of defense for atomic energy and chemical matters. (Cited in Dan Boyle, "An End to Chemical Weapons-What are the Chances?" International Defense Review, September 1988, p. 1087.)

Brad Roberts, a CW expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, is quoted as concluding: "A realist would have to say that the prospects for a meaningful chemical disarmament regime are dim." (Russell Watson, "Letting a Genie Out of a Bottle," Newsweek, 19 September 1988, p. 31.)

37. Charles Flowerree, "Elimination of Chemical Weapons: Is Agreement In Sight?" Arms Control Today, April 1988, p. 9.

38. James Markham, "Arabs Link Curbs on Gas and A-Arms," New York

Times,
9 January 1989, p. A8.

39. See Watson. Judging from pledges made during the election campaign, President Bush is keenly interested in keeping up the momentum for a CW treaty. "If I'm elected president," he said, "if I'm remembered for anything, it would be this: a complete and total ban on chemical weapons. Their destruction, forever. That is my solemn mission." Paul Taylor, "Bush: Ban Chemical Weapons," Washington Post, 22 October 1988, p. 7.

40. Robert Tucker, "Using Force Against Libya," New York Times, 11 January 1989, p. A23.

41. David Ottaway, "U.S. Officials See Insufficient Grounds to Justify Attacking Libyan Plant Now," Washington Post, 8 January 1989, p. A24.

42. Quoted in Gary Thatcher, "Disease as an Agent of War, " Christian Science Monitor, 15 December 1988, p. B3.

43. Since 1945, nations possessing nuclear weapons have been careful not to engage in direct wars with each other. Most of the fighting has been done via proxies. But now that some of the proxy states are also beginning to acquire weapons of mass destruction, this technique might eventually become too risky as well. Twenty years from now, if current proliferation trends hold up, the world could easily have 50 nations with significant nuclear, chemical and/or biological capabilities. In such an environment, as weapons of mass destruction continue to disperse throughout the globe, hot wars will be a tricky business; and even the euphemistically named low-intensity conflicts may become carefully modulated duels with more political than military content.

To follow this speculative path one step further, if the world becomes increasingly locked up militarily, then economic competition will be ascendant, and "warfare" might shift from overt to more covert forms. What could eventually emerge as a darker side to this economic struggle is an intensified campaign of "dirty tricks"--a stream of soft weapons designed to sap an adversary's vitality: computer viruses, designer drugs, insect pests and, tapping the new potential of bioweapons, an array of enfeebling agricultural, animal and human disorders.

To the extent possible, this cool war would be waged out of the public eye and off the military mapboard. During the past 45 years, it is likely that the first salvos in such a clandestine campaign have already been launched--silently and without fanfare. The concept of social sabotage is not new. What is disturbingly new, however, is the growing potential for biological and toxin agents to serve as weapons in such a struggle.

Chapter 2.C.10

* * *

The Traditional Drug Trade and Regional Security

Michael J. Dziedzic

Not available at this time

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 2.C.11

* * *

Excerpts from Global Spin

Craig Lambert

Not available at this time

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 2.C.12

* * *

1990 Joint Military Net Assessment: Executive Summary

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Prologue

The 1990 Joint Military Net Assessment has been prepared for the Secretary of Defense by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the advice and participation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders of the unified and specified commands, and the Intelligence Community. It provides an analysis of current and projected capabilities of US forces, assisted by allies where appropriate, to deter war and, if deterrence fails, to terminate the conflict on terms favorable to the United States. This assessment makes both quantitative and qualitative comparisons of US and allied FY 1990 current forces with those of the Soviet Union and its allies, as well as comparisons of anticipated future forces through FY 1997.

The extraordinary changes in the international security environment present a unique challenge to defense planning and programming. Sweeping global change, coupled with US fiscal pressures, will strongly influence the way US military strategy is implemented and key force investment decisions are made. This assessment reflects conditions as of the end of January 1990 and assumes a defense program with an approximate 2-percent annual real decline in resources.

National Military Objectives

The national military objectives serve the national security goal of preserving the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact, while deterring war.

The national military objectives are to:

-- deter war across the spectrum of conflict and, should deterrence fail, to terminate conflict on terms most favorable to the United States and its allies and friends;

Reprinted from 1990 Joint Military Net Assessment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

-- encourage political reforms and liberalizations taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe;

-- achieve mutually balanced and effectively verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons;

-- maintain stable alliance relationships;

-- maintain global influence and freedom of action;

-- protect free commerce and access to markets;

-- stem drug flow into the United States;

-- inhibit the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and

-- preclude militarily significant technology transfer to potential adversaries.

The Strategic Environment

Since World War II, the Western democracies have prospered economically while executing a grand strategy of containment. The United States has exercised global political, economic, and military presence, including a large commitment of forward-deployed forces. This strategy has been an historic success. The Soviet Union and its allies, economically and politically isolated behind the Iron Curtain, have paid an enormous price in terms of the social and economic well-being of their people. Their leaders now appear determined to pursue fundamentally different paths in an effort to resolve multiple crises that threaten the very foundations of their society. The resulting domestic and foreign policy reforms are producing profound changes in the Warsaw Pact and associated defense relationships.

Changes of this magnitude present both opportunities and challenges to traditional US alliances. Although prospects are high for successful arms control, simultaneous fiscal pressure to reduce permanent overseas forces and cut spending may create perceptions of reduced US resolve, thus undermining confidence among allies and perhaps provoking tensions between traditional adversaries. In Europe, greater economic integration, more democratic East European political regimes, and the question of German unification will usher in a new era of alliance relationships for both East and West.

The continuing challenge of intractable conflicts in the Third World poses increasingly complex security tasks, especially given the relentless proliferation of advanced weaponry. Ballistic missiles, in particular, have introduced a new era in regional conflict, increasing

the potential for escalation and widespread destruction. Traditional regional animosities, exacerbated by the problems of debt, terrorism, insurgencies, and drug trafficking, will continue to command US attention and defense resources.

On the domestic scene, deficit reduction efforts, perceptions of a lessening Soviet threat, and increased Congressional interest in burdensharing will bring demands for decreased defense spending.

However, there is also reason for caution. The United States must recognize that the Soviet Union's restructured military will be formidable and that the Soviet Union will remain the only nation capable of unilaterally inflicting vast nuclear destruction on the United States and its allies through the 1990s. Moreover, despite their current problems, the Soviets are unlikely to weaken significantly their strategic position. Substantial modernization of Soviet strategic systems continues. The United States must remain a source of stability in the event that the positive changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union lead to greater instability.

Striking a prudent balance between optimism born of momentous change and caution driven by great uncertainty will require the most serious dialogue among policy makers in the United States, as well as with friends, allies, and former adversaries.

Implications for Strategy and Force Posture

The current dynamic environment, with its reduced prospect for conflict with the Soviet Union, has serious implications for both nuclear and conventional strategies and the forces necessary to support them.

The US nuclear strategy must remain one of deterrence, and parity must be maintained. The deterrent utility of the Triad is still valid. The United States must integrate policies and plans with programs for modernized post-Strategic Arms Reduction Talks force structures, to include appropriate command, control, communications, and intelligence.

The US strategy must continue to support the theater nuclear strategy fundamental to NATO's flexible response. The removal of intermediate-range nuclear forces under the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty dictates that the Alliance will place increasing reliance on naval and air forces. The decision on deployment of the Follow-On To LANCE to NATO will be made in 1992 in accordance with NATO's May 1989
Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament. Further, the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by regional powers is of great concern; this may eventually impact on global requirements for US nonstrategic nuclear forces.

In the area of conventional forces, the diminishing Soviet and

Warsaw Pact threat and domestic budget reductions both permit and dictate force cuts. The US strategy of forward defense will continue to feature forward presence composed of forward-based forces and deployments. This forward presence will include fewer permanently forward-based forces and more periodic deployments of ground, naval, and air forces for varying durations. Allies must accept greater responsibility for day-to-day deterrence and initial defense while the United States turns toward reinforcement capabilities and the contribution of unique capabilities, such as strategic deterrence (including nuclear deterrence) and strategically mobile naval, air, and ground forces for power projection. Likewise, US strategy will provide for rapidly executable contingency operations for responding to unpredictable regional events. This strategy must increasingly rely on allied support. US forces will need to be mobile, flexible, sustainable, technologically advanced, and able to respond rapidly and discriminately to protect and defend the wide range of US interests across the spectrum of contingencies.

Assessment

General. The most critical tasks remain the maintenance of an effective strategic nuclear deterrent, appropriate provisions for defense of the US homeland, and the strategic projection of power. Given recent events in Eastern Europe and the growing integration of the European Economic Community, Europe will continue to exert fundamental influences on US foreign and national security policies. Also of importance are the continued satisfaction of US commitments to allies and friends and the ability, if needed, to unilaterally deter threats to and defend US interests worldwide.

Strategic Nuclear Forces. The foundation for this strategy of deterrence is US strategic nuclear forces. If forces on both sides are reduced according to the plan envisioned by the United States for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, deterrence and stability can be maintained. Regardless of the outcome of negotiated arms reductions, because of residual Soviet capabilities, the United States must maintain parity and retain a ready, modern, and effective strategic nuclear Triad capable of denying Soviet goals. Investment in a ballistic missile defense system is needed as a minimum to counter the possibility of a Soviet missile attack against the United States and the potential problems caused by the proliferation of advanced missile systems among Third World nations. In any case, the risk of nuclear deterrence failing is assessed to be low and at this moment to be decreasing.

Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces. US nonstrategic nuclear forces constitute a critical element of the military strategy of flexible response. NATO continues to rely on its strategy of flexible response to deter Soviet aggression and to defend against that aggression if deterrence fails. Even in an environment of conventional parity, NATO's nuclear forces will continue to contribute to deterring conventional attack and will serve as a fundamental component of US deterrence of Soviet use of nuclear

weapons. Following completion of the destruction of intermediate-range missiles under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union (to a lesser degree) must rely more on dual-capable aircraft. Both have the capability to use cruise missiles to support their strategies and execute war plans. To maintain a credible capability, the United States must continue to modernize its nonstrategic nuclear forces and supporting command, control, communications, and intelligence. The overall nonstrategic nuclear forces balance is assessed to be improved for NATO as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty is being implemented, but the Soviets retain a significant advantage both in numbers and range of nonstrategic nuclear forces below the intermediate-range nuclear forces range. The probability that NATO would need to resort to the use of nonstrategic nuclear forces is assessed to decrease with elimination of conventional force asymmetries.

Conventional Forces. Although the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact maintain significant force advantages, unilateral force reductions and political change in Eastern Europe are eroding the Soviets' capability to conduct successful, sustained conventional operations against NATO. Additionally, their confidence in the reliability of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces, which had contributed much of the ground forces (albeit a lesser share of combat potential) in the Western Theater of Military Operations, is diminished. This concern is especially valid if the Soviets contemplate aggression against the West. Thus, the Soviets have to consider the prospect that they would have to conduct a theater offensive against NATO primarily on their own. Consequently, their capability to accomplish theater strategic objectives is significantly decreased. This said, the probability of a global conventional war with the Soviets is assessed as low.

With the possibility of further unilateral force reductions, force reductions under a conventional forces agreement, and recently postulated reductions beyond initial treaty proposals, and given the increased independence of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations, the Soviet Union will require increasingly lengthy preparation time for force generation for a major theater operation. These conditions allow prudent conventional force reductions by the United States but also call for hedges against reversal through continued modernization and improvements in reinforcement capability and industrial capacity. In the unlikely event that global conventional war were to occur and if the United States reacts in a timely fashion to Soviet attempts to recreate current force asymmetries, the potential for termination of such a conflict on terms favorable to the United States is much improved.

Non-Soviet crises will likely command greater attention of the United States. Third World debt, poverty, fragile democracies, and internecine struggles have created the conditions for continued instability around the globe. In much of the Third World, terrorism, insurgencies, and drug trafficking are becoming more destabilizing and will likewise demand the increasing attention, if not the resources, of the United

States. The United States is assessed to be capable of successfully dealing with all likely non Soviet military contingencies. However, there is an increased probability of threats to US interests as a result of these destabilizing conditions.

Force Generation and Mobilization. In the past, the Warsaw Pact has been judged capable both of generating forces more quickly and of generating more forces over time than NATO, resulting in vast ground force asymmetries. Currently, many of the Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact divisions in the Western Theater of Military Operations are maintained in a ready status, but initial trainees account for a considerable percentage of the conscript soldiers. Under the unilateral reductions already taking place, many ready and not-ready Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact divisions will be eliminated, and remaining units will be restructured in a way that will reduce their armored striking power. However, equipment and personnel from these units are being used to restructure and modernize remaining units. Because of the structure postulated to exist following unilateral reductions, and certainly under the structure remaining following an agreement on conventional forces in Europe, it will be more difficult for the Soviets to generate forces. Their future capability will be a function of readiness and the disposition of forces and equipment. Upon completion of the announced unilateral reductions, remaining Warsaw Pact motorized rifle divisions will be well suited for defensive operations, but they will be less capable of conducting large-scale attacks or counterattacks in the traditional Soviet manner.

NATO's force generation capabilities will improve relative to those of the Warsaw Pact, given continued unilateral Warsaw Pact reductions. Under the conditions of a conventional forces agreement, NATO's relative capabilities will be vastly improved if NATO exercises its full treaty rights and continues with force modernization.

Sustainability and Industrial Mobilization. Existing US supplies, prepositioned war reserves, and secondary war reserve stocks for Central Europe are assessed to be improving. US capabilities are adequate for. regional non-Soviet conflicts. The lack of alternative production facilities, the inability to surge rapidly to require wartime rates, and the increasing reliance on overseas supplies introduce a moderate risk under the conditions of a global war. Under the lower force levels envisioned by a conventional forces agreement, with the resultant reduced demand on defense investments, it will be increasingly important to maintain a warm industrial base and mobilization capability as well as a vital research and development base.

Mobility. US capabilities to meet present commitments currently are assessed to be marginal. Improvements will result from programmed prepositioning and airlift, but sealift hulls and tonnage capability will decline. Currently, strategic lift cannot deliver movement requirements on time and, consequently, the strategic lift shortfall exacerbates the

primary risk-the lack of forces-although the capability required to reinforce after a conventional forces agreement has not yet been fully formulated. In a regional conflict, the planned mobility force would be adequate to support movement of contingency forces worldwide, assuming most combinations of time, distance, and forces. However, mobility shortfalls may occur as a result of short warning, a requirement to rapidly apply overwhelming combat power, or contingencies occurring simultaneously. The future combination of less favorable basing rights, decreased forward-based forces, declining sealift assets, and an aging airlift fleet points toward increasing risk in the future.

Space. Most of the US and Soviet national objectives are adequately supported by current and projected space capabilities. Both nations rely on space systems in some key mission areas. The United States is assessed to retain some advantages in technology and on-orbit capability for military support in peacetime and crisis. The current Soviet warfighting advantage will decrease but remain significant because of the snergistic combination of their antisatellite capabilities and robust space system replacement capabilities. Given the assessment that conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States is increasingly unlikely, the risk to US space systems is considered to be decreasing.

Summary

A dramatically different security environment is emerging that is principally characterized by a diminished Soviet threat, reduced defense resources, and an increasingly complex world. These realities imply a reshaping of US security policy, strategy, force posture, and capabilities. The challenge is to reconcile enduring objectives and tasks with repostured and restructured forces without foreclosing options for hedging against new or renewed threats.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 3: Force Planning Approaches

A: Introductory Essay

* * *

Force Planning

Henry C. Bartlett

Introduction

This chapter continues to explore ways planners organize their thinking about force requirements subject to fiscal limits specified by the Executive and Congressional branches of government. It also examines national defense policy, objectives and strategy. This sets the stage for five cases which look at future force requirements. They are included to help integrate issues, concepts and force planning approaches covered in earlier sections. {1}

Annual federal government outlays for national defense ranged from approximately 5% of GNP ($134 billion) at the start of the 1980s to 5.8% ($298 billion) at the end of the decade. In between, national defense outlays reached 6.5% of GNP at the height of the decade's build-up. This compares to previous GNP peaks of 39.2% in 1944 (World War II), 14.4% in
1953 (Korea), and 9.6% in 1968 (Vietnam). The two lowest years since World War II were 3.7% in 1948 and 4.8% in 1979. {2}

From fiscal year 1985 through 1990, Congressional appropriations for the Department of Defense declined at an average rate of about 2.3% a year in purchasing power or constant dollar terms. {3} Based on current circumstances, that trend may accelerate downward during the 1990s. Such volatility in funding, as well as the uncertain nature of future threats, presents a demanding environment for U.S. force planners.

Definition of Forces

The term forces, as it is used throughout this book, means total military or warfighting capability. Debates about force issues often center on individual weapon systems such as tanks or aircraft carriers. However, readiness, sustainability, modernization and force structure are other aspects of force planning and military capability. They have been described as the four pillars of total combat capability:

> One source of public misunderstanding has been a misinterpretation of readiness and its relationship to combat capability. Although often incorrectly used as a synonym for warfighting capability, readiness--the people, training, equipment, and maintenance needed to keep our forces prepared to deploy and light--is only one of four components that, when integrated and maintained in balance, form the pillars of our total combat

capability. The other three components are sustainability--the inventories of munitions, spare parts, fuel, and other items that give our forces "staying power" for prolonged combat; modernization-the equipping of our force with more capable, technically superior weaponry and facilities; and force structure--the number and composition of air wings, battalions, and ships in the Armed Forces. {2}

In addition to the physical resources stressed above, total combat capability includes less tangible but equally important factors such as leadership, morale and doctrine. These, as we shall see, must also be considered by force planners.

Approaches to Force Planning

Conceptually, one of the first challenges facing a force planner is to decide what methodologies or organizing principles would be most helpful for arriving at sound force choice decisions. In Chapter 1 several overall frameworks were introduced which included major factors for consideration such as interests, objectives, threats, strategy, technology, allies and available forces. Those frameworks also suggest a process or sequence for evaluating key variables. They start at the broadest level of national security concerns and move downward through major planning cases to specific force choices. Such comprehensive approaches to force planning are commonly referred to as Top Down methodologies.

However, other approaches are also used in attempting to arrive at systematic and rational force choices. One such methodology concentrates on current military capability and immediate threats. Because this approach uses insights from current operations for making judgements about future force requirements, it is often referred to as a Bottom Up approach.

Scenarios provide another important way to approach force planning. Since the end of World War II the United States has assumed global security responsibilities. However, dollar resources are limited, and risks cannot be minimized in all theaters simultaneously. Scenarios provide a way of thinking through the most important or likely theaters of operation for the purpose of setting priorities in force planning. Forces required for a NATO contingency will differ from those for Southwest Asia. As an example, heavily mechanized forces designed for the European theater may be less useful in other parts of the world due to such factors as geography and the overall availability of strategic mobility assets for air or sea transportation. Thinking through specific circumstances and threat campaigns is often referred to as a Scenario approach to force planning.

Other approaches emphasize different variables. The overall Threat could be the point of focus, or Mission area analysis might dominate the

planning process as warfare areas like defense suppression and antisubmarine warfare are reviewed in relation to global or regional scenarios and threats. All the cases at the end of this chapter incorporate one or more of the approaches.

Key Variables

In the introduction to Chapter 1, several themes were presented which flow throughout the book. One concerns objectives, strategy, forces, threat and risk as key variables. Essentially, they should always be considered irrespective of the force planning approach or combination of approaches used. Also, the following questions generally apply in force planning:

1. Has the problem or opportunity been identified?

2. Are overall and supporting objectives clear?

3. Is the strategy or game plan well defined? Are there better strategies relative to existing forces or should a new concept be pursued?

4. What are the force alternatives? Are they restricted to changes in the level and mix of existing forces, or should they be driven by emerging technology or a new strategy?

5. What is the risk? Can selected means achieve desired ends?

Overview of Readings

The first section of Chapter 3 deals with U.S. defense strategy. Bartlett and Holman start with a methodological piece. The article considers the usefulness of strategy as a guide to force planning, and as such, examines another way force planners can organize their thinking about the level and mix of military capability required by the nation. The article emphasizes three points. First, if strategy is to serve as a guide, a coherent and purposeful game plan must be developed before force planning is initiated. This includes a set of key descriptors which explain the strategy. Secondly, strategy formulation requires a clear vision of the interests, policies and objectives our country intends to pursue. Thirdly, force planners must be aware of different levels of strategy. These range from national "grand" strategy down through regional game plans for posturing forces in peacetime and initiating operations in war. Does the article clarify the concept of strategy as a guide to force planning? What improvements would you make?

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney then gives an overview of U.S. military strategy in a statement before Congress. He uses descriptors such as forward defense, flexible response and security assistance. Is our peacetime national military strategy clear to you? If so, do you

think it is appropriate for the uncertain world we face? Would you change the strategy, and if so, could you make it clear enough to guide force planners in choosing an appropriate level and mix of forces?

In the next reading, General Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testifies before Congress on America's military posture. He provides a broad assessment of national interests, objectives and potential threats in a rapidly changing world. He also covers key concepts of the national military strategy and regional concepts such as economy of force in the Pacific. Does his testimony, together with that of Secretary Cheney, provide a clear sense of strategy?

Senator John McCain argues that there are two fundamental priorities for force planning in the 1990s. The first is to structure our NATO and strategic nuclear forces in relation to verifiable Soviet reductions. The second is to restructure the remainder of our forces around a maritime and power projection strategy focused on lower level contingencies in the Middle East, Latin America and other regions. For each priority, he provides specific recommendations. What is your evaluation of his force proposals and strategy? How do his recommendations compare with the strategies described by Secretary Cheney and General Powell?

In the last reading, Senator Sam Nunn addresses the U.S. Senate about U.S. defense strategy. He expresses his views about key tasks the military will have to perform in the future, essential elements that should guide a new military strategy, and specific force proposals related to the NATO planning case. Four of his essential elements include nuclear deterrence, forward deployed forces, emphasis on reinforcement, and flexible readiness. How do these descriptors agree or differ with Secretary Cheney, General Powell and Senator McCain? Can you discern a
comprehensive national military strategy from Senator Nunn's address which would help force planners in choosing U.S. military forces? Also, how radically would NATO have to revise the current flexible response strategy if Senator Nunn's proposals were adopted? Will regional strategies still be important for U.S. force planners given the change in the Soviet threat?

The second section of the chapter expands methodologies beyond strategy as a guide to force planning. It also includes five cases which incorporate issues and concepts covered in the book.

Bartlett summarizes different approaches used in force planning. Eight. of the more common ones are defined according to their primary and secondary emphases. Each is then described and examined in terms of strengths and weaknesses that can help or confound a force planner. Are the different approaches clearly developed, and which one do you think should dominate the planning process? Have you encountered others, and if so, should they be included?

Haffa continues with the theme of rational force planning. He uses the concept of three policy levels, and points out that force development is the link between declaratory and employment policy. He then covers the Department of Defense Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), and suggests why it may not lend itself to rational and systematic force planning. Finally, he addresses the relationship between force planning and systems analysis in determining the appropriate level and mix of required forces.

In the first case, Kaufman deals with the entire U.S. military force structure. He proposes a three stage reduction in capabilities tied to strategic and conventional arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Stage one is from 1990 to 1994, stage two is from 1995 to 1997, and the final period is from 1997 to 2000. What are the major changes recommended for each period, and do you agree? Has Kaufman considered all relevant factors and how important is strategy? Are different approaches or emphases to force planning woven together, or does one particular approach tend to dominate? What are the strengths and weaknesses of each proposal? Does he present a reasonable approach for reducing U.S. military forces in the coming decade?

The second case is focused on strategic nuclear weapons. The Congressional Budget Office considers three alternatives for altering the level and mix of forces after a Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaty is negotiated. Option one focuses on maximum modernization of strategic nuclear forces permitted by the treaty. The second postulates a balanced but cheaper triad of forces, and the third examines minimum modernization. In examining the case, it is important to focus on the measures of effectiveness and cost used to compare the alternatives. From a force planner's perspective, do the measures of effectiveness include the ability to execute a flexible response strategy as well as a comparison of residual warheads following a surprise first attack? Are both important measures for the decision maker, or should the focus be on measures of cost?

The third planning case examines how proposed Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations might affect U.S. army and air forces in terms of cost, level and mix of forces. It starts by examining the current balance of forces in Europe using two quantitative models. They are used throughout the study to evaluate three possible post-CFE force structures. Key issues in the case include the importance of warning and response time, the problems associated with maintaining or revising NATO's flexible response strategy, and the issue of burden sharing among NATO nations. In studying this case, it may be worth considering the factors used in the balance of force models. As an example, should qualitative inputs such as alliance cohesion, soldier morale and troop control doctrine be included in the assessment? More importantly, if the Soviet and NATO members continue unilateral force withdrawals and

reductions, will the NATO alliance be necessary to support U.S. interests in Europe?

In the fourth case, the Congressional Budget Office considers the entire U.S. military structure. Five alternatives are considered which include minimum adjustments driven by START and CFE, possible plans by the Administration to reduce active and reserve forces, large active duty reductions coupled with cadre divisions, large active duty reductions with greater use of reserves, and large reductions in both reserve and active duty forces. What are the strengths and weaknesses of each alternative, and what would you propose?

The final case presents an example of a Top Down approach to force planning. Owen starts with a broad assessment of the uncertain world we face. From there he develops his view of how U.S. military forces should be structured based on national interests, strategy and emerging threats. How do you assess his position, do you agree, and if not, what would you change?

In examining the cases, an effort should be made to integrate the issues, concepts and force planning approaches covered throughout the chapters. Ultimately, the book's purpose is to help develop critical thinking about national military strategy and future force choices.

Notes

1. This essay revises and updates Chapter 3.A: "Introductory Essay - Force Planning" by Henry C. Bartlett in The Force Planning Faculty, Foundation of Force Planning: Concepts and Issues (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1986).

2. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, FY 1990 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1989), pp. 43-51.

3. Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, January 1990 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1990), p. 69.

Chapter 3.B.1

* * *

Strategy as a Guide to Force Planning

Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman, Jr.

Is there a method to Pentagon madness? That is the question so often asked about defense planning by Congressional and journalistic critics. Between the extremes of "throwing money at the problem" and "indiscriminate cuts," is there a better approach to force planning? {1}

Many authorities believe there is. The Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy, in its January 1988 report, Discriminate Deterrence, suggests that, "Our strategy must be designed for the long term, to guide force development, weapons procurement, and arms negotiations." {2} We agree. The question unanswered by the report is, how?

The Commission is not alone in its assertion. Almost all high-level statements on national security policy explicitly or implicitly identify strategy as a guide for choosing forces. {3} The words are familiar, but our experience as classroom teachers of force planning suggests that they are hollow. It is not always clear to students how strategy can guide us toward rational force choices, even after reading our highest level strategic documents.

This article attempts to show how strategy can serve as a guide in force planning. We argue that strategies can be broken down into sets of key elements or "descriptors" that can be used as criteria for evaluating alternative force choices. We will also point out that force planners deal with progressive layers of strategies. Logically, the descriptors of lower level strategies should support those at a higher level of national security concern. If this is done, strategy provides an excellent means for indicating appropriate levels and mixes of military forces in support of national interests.

National security analysts constantly assess our nation's place in the world, often using what is termed a "top-down" approach to do this. {4} They begin with national interests and derive appropriate national security policies, objectives, and strategies to deal with threats and pursue opportunities. Force planners conduct much the same intellectual journey, but with greater stress

---

Reprinted from Naval War College Review, Autumn 1988

on the military dimension. In this article, we will use a top-down approach, beginning with a net assessment and descending through levels of strategy to the forces.

The Threat

Theoretically, our national capabilities should be evaluated in light of our actual and potential adversaries. The technical term for this analysis is net assessment, {5} or what the Soviets call the correlation of forces. The United States and Soviet Union each view the other as the primary threat to their respective national interests.

This emphasis on the Soviets is not meant to deny the existence of other threats to American national security interests. They include drugs, terrorists, regional conflicts, and countries such as Iran, which may be hostile to America, but are in no sense Soviet proxies. We will focus on the Soviet threat for three reasons: it is the only one which could physically devastate America by nuclear means; it has dominated national security decisions over the past forty years; and it allows us to trace the full logic of strategy as a guide in force planning.

National Objectives

In dealing with the Soviet threat, our range of strategic choices has been surprisingly narrow: rollback, containment, or accommodation with Soviet power. These are familiar words to the student of American foreign policy and they have practical significance for force planners. When those policy alternatives are stated as overall national objectives, the choice of one or the other should logically dispose us toward different military force structures. As an example, rollback would favor a heavily offensive orientation, while accommodation would favor a minimal defense.

National Strategy

Given the Soviet threat and a containment objective, the next decision involves strategy--the game plan for linking the instruments of national power (economic, political, military, and psychological) to the accomplishment of our political goals. Since World War II, our national strategy for handling the Soviet threat has laid great stress on our many allies. This coalition strategy for containing Soviet power is sharply different from other conceivable approaches such as a go-it-alone game plan. (This might be an isolationist, "Fortress America" strategy, or something very different: a willingness to contain the Soviets unilaterally, where necessary, while maintaining the U.S. role as the dominant maritime power-but without necessarily committing ourselves to defend any portion of the Eurasian landmass.)

This choice of a national strategy will continue to channel us

toward distinct force alternatives. As an example, our coalition strategy permits member nations to specialize in specific military missions where they have comparative advantages. For the NATO alliance, the U.S. Navy can concentrate on open ocean operations, while western Europe focuses on other required missions such as shallow water ASW and mine warfare. An alternative go-it-alone strategy would probably result in a more ambitious Navy, with strong capabilities in all mission areas, probably at the expense of our forward deployed ground and tactical air forces.

National Military Strategy

From a military perspective, we have consistently sought to deter Soviet attacks against us and our allies. This objective leads to force characteristics that are different from the intent to deliberately attack (as an example, the force structure required to achieve Hitler's vision of a greatly expanded Germany) or, more conservatively, a use of massive military power to compel rivals to do our bidding.

If our goal is to deter, we can choose from different types of deterrent strategies. Two theoretical extremes are threat of punishment and denial of an adversary's objectives. Again, whichever emphasis is chosen will tend to guide force choices in a particular direction. Two examples of deterrence by threat of punishment are the current French nuclear strategy of massive retaliation and similar U.S. thinking during the 1950s and early 1960s. The best example of deterrence by denial is current Soviet strategy, which requires large, active, and passive defensive capabilities to frustrate any potential attack.

In the nuclear arena, threat of punishment has taken the form of an offensive force structure which can devastate the enemy's homeland-even under the worst case of absorbing a surprise first strike. The key attributes of such forces must be survivability-reflected in the strategic triad of land, air, and sea-based forces-and their assured penetration of enemy defenses.

U.S. strategy has long been mixed. It originally stressed threat of punishment by retaliatory strikes against counter value targets (such as the industrial and economic infrastructure). But as technology and the Soviet threat advanced, arguments arose over the need for at least some counterforce capabilities for our offensive forces. The advocates of such capabilities contended that we could deter war most effectively by threatening what the Soviets value most (not merely their cities, but also ICBM silos, airfields, logistical centers, and division bases). If such a counterforce capability makes ultimate Soviet war aims unattractive, then logically a surprise attack would not occur in the first place.

However, elements of a strategy based upon denial of objectives never totally left American thinking and have increased notably over the past two administrations. In offensive terms, we seek forces with high accuracy. The objectives are very ambitious: denying the Soviets the

reserve forces they would require to continue the conflict; limiting the damage a second Soviet strike could inflict on the American homeland; and preventing Soviet domination of the postwar world. In defensive terms, we have had at least some continental air defenses, civil defense, and research on antiballistic missile capabilities since the 1950s. More recently, the President has directed greater emphasis on strategic ballistic missile defense research. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has subsequently grown in importance. We are approaching the point when advanced technology may further increase the defensive aspects of the denial component in our strategy.

In the conventional arena, our strategy to deter Soviet aggression has been strikingly consistent since World War II. We have chosen to defend selected parts of Eurasia by forward deployment of land, air, and sea forces on allied territory. This element of a conventional strategy is starkly different from an alternative of basing these forces at home in a central reserve. Here again, U.S. strategy has been mixed. Both of these elements logically support our national strategy of coalitions, but they have very different effects upon the resulting force structures. As an example, if a greater proportion of our reinforcements are allocated to a central reserve, we will require more ships and aircraft to provide strategic mobility for crisis response and reinforcement.

Our most familiar planning documents usually offer additional descriptors or elements of our conventional strategy. These generally include collective security, which in military terms supports the higher level coalition strategy; flexibility to handle the full range of both Soviet and non-Soviet threats; rapid reinforcement in the event of war; and security assistance to friends and surrogates, which multiplies our assets without requiring direct U.S. intervention. Such documents also include other descriptors or concepts whose content and frequency have varied. One is technological superiority (to offset Warsaw Pact numerical superiorities and husband our human resources). We also include the concept of deliberate escalation, which could occur in terms of intensity (from conventional to nuclear combat), or expanded geographical scope (for example, opening a new front). {6}

Using such descriptors does not help us to identify the specific numbers of tanks, aircraft, ships, and warheads we may require for any given circumstance or region. Nor does it formulate any "von Schlieffen plan" to aid us in future conflicts. But this approach does create a way to communicate ideas among force planners, strategists, and concerned laymen. If we distill and array such descriptors of a strategy as we have done above, they provide a coherent array of criteria for evaluating alternative force choices. Such an array will provide a general sense of direction, channeling force choices through the levels of strategy.

Regional Strategy

Next, having assembled useful arrays of force planning criteria from

the national and military levels of strategy, we shall proceed on down to the regional level. Our major regional planning case since World War II has been NATO. Consequently, we will explore the descriptors of NATO's flexible response strategy.

A key element of flexible response is forward defense against the Warsaw Pact threat at NATO borders. Its goal is to preclude any perception that territory would be surrendered either temporarily or permanently. One possible alternative could be a concept of rearward defense, which would trade space for time by maneuvering on NATO territory while preparing to counterattack. Another might be some variant of forward offense involving an immediate counteroffensive into Warsaw Pact territory. Choices at this regional level of strategy affect very broad force characteristics such as the basing structure, reliance upon reserves, deepstrike systems, and the degree of armored forces.

Forward defense at the inter-German border is currently explained in terms of a "layer cake" of NATO national corps arrayed side by side from north to south. At warning, these corps deploy forward to the border and take up planned defensive positions which, at best, have been lightly prepared. This element of the flexible response strategy, therefore, stresses speed of deployment by mechanized forces with strong antitank capabilities.

This concept of forward defense involves certain risks. Current force levels are relatively low. Consequently it is questionable whether we have adequate reserves in the NATO rear to stop a major Warsaw Pact breakthrough. This situation has intensified the old debate over the effectiveness of forward defense. Various alternatives have been proposed.

One is the concept of a cordon defense behind the West German border. Such a strategy descriptor would logically stress barrier systems and hardened fortifications. Such concepts evoke memories of the ineffective Maginot Line and stimulate West German concerns about perpetuating the division of their nation. As a result, NATO has consistently rejected such an approach.

A second possibility, which has been receiving greater attention over the past several years, is deep attack. Its two major forms are follow-on-forces attack (FOFA) and the U.S. joint doctrine of airland battle. Both variants put unprecedented stress on identifying, targeting, and striking Warsaw Pact land forces behind the front lines as they move forward from their mobilization points. FOFA is limited to deep attack by air and missile systems to reflect NATO's declared position that it is a defensive alliance and has no intention of operating on or seizing Warsaw Pact territory. Airland battle doctrine also stresses deep attacks against Warsaw Pact follow-on forces. However, it conveys an additional sense of maneuver and counteroffensive operations by land forces-perhaps across the inter-German border. Such a concept is not acceptable because of

NATO's declaratory, defensive objectives and strategy.

The force structure implications for striking deep--in both FOFA and airland battle--are much the same. Each variant requires extraordinary attention to advanced technology for command, control, communications, and intelligence; real-time identification and targeting at considerable range; all-weather delivery systems; and precision-guided munitions. They differ only in the greater requirement for ground maneuver forces under airland battle doctrine.

A third possibility, which has been extensively discussed in Western academic circles, is the concept of a defensive defense dominated by forces which could not conceivably threaten Warsaw Pact vital interests. It has taken many forms, but most would stress dense, light, and highly potent antitank forces; as opposed to main battle tanks, which the Warsaw Pact might misinterpret as threatening offensive intentions.

These alternatives (cordon, deep attack, and defensive defense) would only change the forward defense element in NATO's flexible response strategy. However, there are several other key descriptors. One is direct defense at the level and point of attack. This element of the strategy requires attention by force planners to the full geography of NATO (such as the extreme Norwegian and Turkish flanks), as well as the full spectrum of warfare. An opposite concept, such as indirect defense, would put less of a premium on the military capability to respond in place and kind to Warsaw Pact aggression.

Another key descriptor of the NATO flexible response strategy is rapid reinforcement as opposed to more deliberate, slower reinforcement. This goal of rapid reinforcement has channeled NATO forces in some very important directions. Within the space of ten days, the United States is committed to deploy, "a total of ten Army divisions (of which four, plus two armored cavalry regiments, are stationed in Europe in peacetime), 60 reinforcing tactical fighter squadrons, and one Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), plus support detachments for all of these forces." {7} To do this, planners have elected to pre-position sets of division equipment in Europe (as opposed to sending them by sealift, which a slower reinforcement concept would allow). Thus we accelerate the reinforcement of Europe by limiting our logistical burden to airlift of the soldiers.

Threat of escalation is perhaps the final key element of the strategy of flexible response. NATO seeks to deter political coercion, territorial encroachment, and war by threatening the use of nuclear weapons if conventional forces fail. This is a sharply different and vastly cheaper concept than conventional deterrence. In terms of force planning, this descriptor points to the need for a range of theater nuclear weapons. It will also pose painful questions for NATO force planners as arms control agreements take effect. As examples, how will the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty affect NATO's ability to deter conventional aggression through the threat of escalation? How would

a 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear warheads affect NATO's strategy and force structure?

Several lessons emerge from the NATO example. First is the importance of strategic clarity. Strategy cannot be a useful guide in force planning unless it can be distilled into a readily understood array of descriptors, which then become the criteria for evaluating alternative force choices. Second is the need for strategic simplicity. It is very easy for a multilateral alliance of democratic countries to talk too much and too vaguely about their strategy for achieving desired objectives. This can even be the case for strategists in general. Third is the countervailing requirement for elements of strategic ambiguity. A strategy of deterrence may require an aspect of incalculability. For example, the threat of escalation should be hedged by some deliberately vague qualifications. What we seek is sufficient clarity and simplicity to guide our own force planners, without giving potential enemies enough insight to counter our strategy and achieve their political objectives.

Schools of Strategy

Having considered national (grand), national military, and regional strategies, we next consider the choices offered by radically different perspectives arising from at least three distinct emphases in strategic thought. They are the maritime, continental, and aerospace schools. Most War College students are familiar with the concepts of Mahan, Corbett, Mackinder, and Douhet. Each of these classic theorists established an environmental theme around which strategies can be crafted and forces channeled.

Our principal rival, the Soviet Union, has a traditional preference for the continental view and constantly reasserts that victory in war requires the seizure of enemy territory after destruction of his forces. Historically, Moscow has attached less importance to both maritime and aerospace perspectives than we have. Americans have long been attracted by Douhet's stress on air power as a means of transcending the potential stagnation and cost of ground combat. The result has been a long debate over the effectiveness of using conventional air power against the enemy's heartland to achieve victory. An analogous debate has raged even longer concerning the utility of maritime tools to gain strategic leverage against a continental power.

There is the constant risk that undue emphasis on one of these environmental schools of strategy could distort force choices and thus confound our ability to deal with known and emerging threats. Some critics have made precisely that accusation against the maritime strategy set forth by the U.S. Navy in the mid-1980s. {8} For the purposes of this article, we will neither defend nor attack that strategy, but simply use it to continue our exploration of how strategy descriptors can guide force planning at a distinctly different level of strategy.

Maritime Component of the National Military Strategy

The Maritime Strategy aims to support U.S. national strategy under all scenarios ranging from peacetime presence through strategic nuclear war. Its goal is to bolster deterrence through both the threat of punishment and the actual denial of Soviet objectives by the application of U.S. naval power. Should deterrence fail, U.S. naval forces would attempt to influence the outcome of the war by controlling escalation, seizing the initiative, and taking the fight to the enemy.

These are ambitious objectives, and the blueprint by which we would achieve them may or may not contain sufficient strategic descriptors to chart the general course of U.S. naval force planning.

Official, unclassified documents present the Maritime Strategy in terms of a scenario of global, conventional war with the Soviet Union. It begins with an unfolding crisis situation, which might or might not escalate to combat. The first descriptor found therein is that our forces would deploy early. This seemingly simple element has major force planning implications such as high readiness, forward basing abroad, strategic home-base locations, and the potential need for stealth in the initial stages of the crisis.

Another element of the strategy is to deploy our naval forces well forward against the Soviet Navy. The purpose is to sink the Soviet Fleet or deny it access to the open oceans in the early stages of a war. These goals could ensure the rapid reinforcement by sea upon which our allies depend so heavily. We cannot resolve in this paper how far forward we would go; this is the rightful terrain of future campaign planners. But we can say with certainty that early, forward deployment has sharply different force planning implications than a later, more rearward orientation.

The Maritime Strategy also anticipates that U.S. naval forces would respond to Soviet aggression (probably on land) by taking the offensive. They would seize the initiative at sea, both destroying deployed Soviet forces and fighting their way toward Soviet home waters. No other descriptor of the Maritime Strategy produces a force structure so starkly different from other conceivable approaches to neutralizing the Soviet naval threat. Defensive concepts, such as barrier defenses or convoy escort, would predispose us toward different mission areas with different, far less robust capabilities.

A further element of the strategy is the sense of simultaneous operations at sea in all theaters to destroy Soviet naval forces. This could include not only ships, but also naval aircraft, bases, and sanctuaries. If such operations were conducted sequentially instead, the level of forces required might be different.

A naval force capable of early, forward, offensive, and simultAneous

operations against highly valued Soviet assets will be different in both level and mix than other, hypothetical navies built to support alternative strategies. Structuring such a force involves risk. As an example, focusing on the "worst case" of protracted, global, conventional war with the Soviet Union requires assumptions about a navy that will be used in more likely cases of crisis response and contingencies in the Third World. Above all, force planners assume, sometimes too rashly, that a force structure designed for the high-threat Soviet environment can also control less demanding scenarios.

Recent events in the Persian Gulf illustrate both the weakness and the strength of this assumption. In the short term, U.S. naval forces were embarrassingly vulnerable to the low technology of mine warfare during the early days of the crisis. Such a situation was not accidental. It reflected a conscious choice among maritime strategy descriptors, in which forward, offensive capabilities were maximized for the U.S. Navy leaving significant mine warfare capabilities with our allies.

However, as subsequent events in the Persian Gulf have unfolded, two points are worth noting. First, in non-Soviet contingencies, it is probable that there will be sufficient time and space to overcome initial shortcomings resulting from the high-threat Soviet emphasis. U.S. naval forces did adapt to the environment, and allies were forthcoming in helping with mine operations. Second, naval forces designed for such strategy descriptors as forward and offensive, relative to a high threat Soviet environment, will dominate Third World maritime battlefields when appropriate forces are brought to bear.

Implications

Observers will differ in their evaluation of U.S. strategy, force structure, and crisis responses, especially when we look to the future. The strategy descriptors which we have examined do not include every military planning case, but the same methodology can be applied to them.

SDI is an example. It may revolutionize many aspects of force planning. Above all it reflects a much stronger movement toward the strategic defensive as opposed to the offensive orientation of our current strategy. Moreover, it would put a greater premium upon nonnuclear as opposed to nuclear capabilities. To the extent that we are relying upon extremely advanced, expensive, and untested technical capabilities, we can anticipate many debates over ground-based versus space-based systems and near-term versus long-term operational capabilities. These debates will involve the most revolutionary changes in military strategy in recent years, and we can clarify them greatly by carefully defining the strategy descriptors which must guide our many and complex force choices.

Perhaps an even more difficult challenge is now posed by arms control initiatives. There is a very serious risk that drastic changes in

theater and intercontinental nuclear systems will have unforeseen impacts upon current strategy. For example, the INF treaty has major implications for many aspects of NATO force planning. As theater-range nuclear systems decline drastically in number, will NATO need to compensate by moving toward conventional deterrence? Will NATO prefer to modernize its shorter range nuclear systems, or focus upon deep strike aircraft? What will be the impact on Soviet strategy and on the overall likelihood of war?

Finally, how can we pay for these changes? There is a high probability that declining real defense budgets (since FY 1985) will continue. During such periods of retrenchment, the worst possible outcome for the U.S. Armed Forces would be indiscriminate cuts inflicted more by service "rice bowls" and Congressional "pork barrels" than by rational criteria. Cooler heads will argue against such irrational cuts, offering a wide range of wiser choices. They might argue that we should redefine our national interests, redistribute the burdens among our allies, change national objectives, or alter the national military strategy. In every case, the authors of this article contend that careful attention to existing or emerging strategy descriptors will result in a more effective mix and level of forces.

Notes

1. The term "forces," as it is used throughout this article, means total military or warfighting capability. It reflects the full level and mix of weapon systems, people. and ideas.

2. The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1988), p. 1.

3. Official statements vary in how strongly they present this assertion. Contrast Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress. Fiscal Year 1984 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1983), p. 18, with the vaguer formulation in Chart 1.A.1, Frank C. Carlucci, Annual Report to the Congress. Fiscal Year 1989 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1988), p. 17.

4. This concept of a "top-down" approach to force planning is explored in Richmond A. Lloyd and the Force Planning Faculty. Naval War College, eds., Foundations of Force Planning: Concepts and Issues (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1986). pp. 62 and 217.

5. See John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance. Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980), pp. 3-14, for perhaps the best elaboration of the essentials of net assessment.

6. Compare and contrast the interestingly different formulations in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report for FY 1988 (pp. 47-50) and FY 1989

(pp. 63-65) with The Joint Staff, United States Military Posture for FY

1989 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1988), pp. 2-4.

7. Annual Report FY 1989, p. 219.

8. For representative examples of such critics, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," International Security, Fall 1986, and the exchange of views between John M. Collins and Rear Admiral William Pendley in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March, June, and August 1986.

Chapter 3.B.2

* * *

Excerpts from a Statement of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in Connection with the FY 1991 Budget for the Department of Defense

Dick Cheney

The Changing Global Security Environment

Changes affecting U.S. security are occurring throughout the world, most profoundly in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. For four decades, the primary concern of NATO has been to deter a potential Soviet-led invasion of Western Europe. Now, instead of tanks and troops moving from East to West, the ideas and institutions of freedom are moving from West to East.

As we view what are clearly positive developments, we have a responsibility to distinguish what is done from what is only promised. The Soviet Union remains an extremely formidable military power. Recent events both in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself have decreased the risk of the Soviets launching a premeditated attack on Western Europe. But the volatility and unpredictability of the situation there has, in many ways, increased the chance of an inadvertent conflict. We cannot know for certain the future course of the current communist upheaval. As President Gorbachev himself has noted, "There are no guarantees that the positive processes [we] have begun are irreversible."

Facing the uncertainty implied by this ongoing transition, America's best stance is steadiness in its defense policies and posture in the short term. We must make our military adjustments with an eye toward genuine reductions in risks, not in anticipation of how we hope global events will evolve.

Evolving Threats to U.S. National Security.

While the threat of deliberate aggression in Europe has diminished, the dangers elsewhere are increasing. In the coming decade, U.S. forces must be prepared to cope with the following challenges:

Reprinted from Statement of the Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 1, 1990.

o The Soviet Union. While we expect Soviet forces to shrink, they have diminished only marginally so far, significant military capabilities remain. The Soviet nuclear arsenal is undergoing considerable modernization. Moreover, the Soviets still are working to enhance the overall effectiveness of all their forces. We should not expect the Soviet Union to neglect significantly the only national instrument that makes it a superpower: its substantial nuclear and conventional forces. And while events in Eastern Europe are encouraging, they have not consistently been matched by more promising Soviet actions in Asia or the Third World.

Hard realities tell us that we cannot assume that Moscow's current military restraint will continue. Because of its centralized authority, a future Kremlin could reverse its military course quickly and decisively. What would most enable the world's democracies to reduce their concern about the Soviet Union's future intentions would be its establishment of durable institutions based on freedom and respect for human rights.

o Arms proliferation to potentially hostile states. The diffusion of high technology weapons to potentially hostile nations has greatly complicated America's security picture. At least a half dozen nations are working to acquire nuclear capabilities, and a disturbing number of Third World countries are acquiring sophisticated military arsenals, including long-range missiles and chemical and biological weapons. Moreover, certain of these nations are hostile to U.S. interests and have indicated that they will attempt to assert domination over neighboring areas. As in the case of Iran during its war with Iraq, these states may be willing to expand conflicts in ways destructive of the interests of the United States and its allies. America may find itself compelled to act, as it did in the Persian Gulf, to forestall such efforts when they threaten our national interests, including the safety of our citizens.

o Anti-American regimes. As the case of Manuel Noriega proves, various Third World states may, for a variety of reasons, decide to behave in ways that force a military confrontation with the United States, despite the odds against them. Moreover, many Third World states have acquired the ability to use force far more effectively, and over a longer period of time, than could Noriega.

o Non-state threats. U.S. armed forces are called upon today, and will be in the future, to confront organizations that have proven themselves deeply hostile to American interests and values. These include drug traffickers, anti-democratic insurgents, and terrorist groups.

Adapting U.S. Defense Strategy to Global Changes

America's national security strategy should continue to opt for global involvement over isolation. America's enduring global interests require a significant ability to counter threats affecting those interests. We must maintain a forward presence in cooperation with our

allies and friends in key areas such as Europe, the Mediterranean, Asia, and the Pacific. Regardless of whether Soviet military power diminishes, many U.S. allies and interests will continue to face major threats, as in South Korea and the Persian Gulf region.

Additionally, America's global military posture and leadership promotes an international environment in which free peoples and those seeking freedom can prosper. It helps allies and friendly nations follow a course favorable to shaping a better world; supports peaceful change and resolution of international differences; fosters the free flow of goods, people, and ideas; and promotes freedom, human rights, and nonaggressive national behavior. Many nations appreciate the contribution to peaceful progress made by a visible American military presence in their part of the world. Not only does our presence deter Soviet influence, it also can dampen regional arms competition and discourage local powers from seeking to dominate their neighbors.

As we work toward negotiated arms reductions and a better world for all peoples, we should remember that the military strength of America and its allies made possible much of the positive movement we are now seeing, and it will be critical to continued progress. The promising developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union-ultimately brought about by the courage and sacrifices of people yearning to be free were fostered by the collective resolve of free nations. We contained and opposed communism so that its own political, economic, and moral bankruptcy would be felt at home and would thereby undermine its ruling regimes. Military strength will remain the ultimate safeguard for democratic nations against armed regimes hostile to our interests and values.

America should continue to anchor its strategy to the still-valid doctrines of deterrence, flexible response, forward defense, security alliances, and prudent arms reductions. Even the extraordinary events of 1989 do not mean that America should abandon this strategic foundation. Rather, our task is to analyze our strategy and forces continuously, and adjust them as necessary to meet changing threats and conditions.

The central tenet of America's global strategy is and should remain: to deter aggression against our global interests by maintaining, with our allies, a credible array of military responses, aimed at making the cost of such aggression exceed any possible gains. The great question then is: how many and what kind of forces are needed to do that? With growing uncertainty about the location and severity of our future threats, that question becomes harder to answer. Also complicating our decisions is the fact that the forces we may need in ten years have to be planned and programmed now.

Linking Strategy to Defense Budget Decisions

The changing global conditions highlighted above have extensively affected the Department's plans and programs, and they will continue to

do so. The most compelling indicator of the extent to which we are taking account of promising global developments is our revised FY 1991-95 Topline. Just a year ago, the President's five-year plan included modest real growth of 1 to 2 percent each year. Now, based on a realistic assessment of America's security threats, I believe our nation can begin to scale back defense funding somewhat without unacceptable risk to its security, if current U.S.-Soviet negotiations bear fruit as expected. The prudent and efficient pace I recommend is roughly a 2 percent per annum real decline in defense budget authority for FY 1991 through FY 1995.

This course will involve a substantial reduction in planned defense resources and continues a steady decline in defense funding that began with FY 1986. By FY 1995, the result will be a cumulative 10-year real decline of 22 percent, and DoD outlays as a percentage of our GNP and of total federal outlays will be the lowest in 50 years. As a way of comparison, our actual DoD budgets, including the request for FY 1991, will be $208 billion less than the amounts that would have been required to provide zero real growth for FY 1986 through FY 1991. When the projections through FY 1995 are included, our actual budgets will end up $515 billion below what the zero-real-growth level would have been for FY 1986-95.

The assumptions allowing this significant reduction in defense resources--and the accompanying reshaping of U.S. forces--are these:

o A continuation of the positive developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union;

o Completion of satisfactory Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) agreements; and

o No unforeseen, extended commitments for U.S. forces. As long as these conditions hold, the lower spending I am proposing can keep America's security risks acceptable. However, that requires that we adhere to a rational and coherent process for allocating our limited resources wisely. My Department is determined to do its part. DoD's senior civilian and military leaders have discussed extensively every major strategic issue affected by the extraordinary events of recent months. We are continuing to reassess our military programs within the context of our evolving defense needs.

Budget Priorities

The budget priorities outlined in this section are reflected in my FY 1991 defense request, and they indicate how I believe we should proceed in adapting our current forces to changing global prospects. Taking account of promising security developments and declining budgets, we must preserve the high quality of our forces, even if that means major reductions in our manpower and active force structure. High quality derives mostly from our military people, but it also requires that our

weapons and systems be technologically superior. To ensure such superiority, we must restrict access to critical Western technologies, emphasize military research and development, and terminate some older programs to fund more advanced systems.

Whatever systems we decide we need should be acquired as efficiently as possible. That means economical production rates, which may require the deferral or termination of some lower-priority programs. To guard against an unexpected resurgence of security threats, we also should give priority to those elements of our military posture that would be most difficult to restore, if required. For example, America's technological superiority and the high quality of our uniformed men and women would be very hard to restore, if they deteriorated.

Our budget decisions should reflect our confidence that negotiated force reductions are likely, that Soviet attack options will decrease, and that NATO's warning time for a major Soviet attack will increase. We and our Atlantic allies also should plan now to use this scaling back as an opportunity to effect a better allocation of military roles, responsibilities, and other security burdens within NATO.

Below is a further delineation of the specific budget priorities that shaped our FY 1991 defense request and are guiding our plans for FY 1992-97:

o People. We must continue to recruit and retain high-quality military and civilian professionals-emphasizing their training, quality-of-life, and career satisfaction.

o Robust nuclear forces/strategic defenses. Even with sound START and CFE agreements, we will need to develop modern and survivable nuclear forces to ensure that our deterrent has the utmost credibility. We also must vigorously pursue the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, both because of the Soviet ballistic missile threat and because of the spread of ballistic missile technologies to other countries. If anything, the new global environment makes SDI even more important. Moreover, at
the lower force levels expected under START, the adverse consequences of Soviet cheating will increase. Strategic defenses can offer us some insurance against such cheating and also help discourage it.

o Versatile, ready, deployable, sustainable conventional forces. U.S. conventional forces must be able to respond quickly to diverse contingencies worldwide, and be sustained logistically once committed. Stateside, we need versatile, multi-purpose forces, and sufficient sealift and airlift to deploy them. Overseas, our forward-deployed forces should be as mobile and flexible as possible, so they can support our regional military needs, in addition to deterring aggression where they are based.

o Continued maritime superiority. The United States is a maritime nation, heavily dependent on overseas trade and resources. We therefore need sufficient naval power to ensure our access to critical sea lines of communication, especially in time of crisis or conflict. That also enables us to project adequate military power in areas of U.S. interest, with less reliance on foreign bases or overflight rights.

o Reserve forces and mobilization. Especially with our active forces shrinking, we must continue to improve our ability to mobilize the necessary national resources to meet all possible contingencies. To this end, we must support substantial Reserve forces-including essential logistics, infrastructure, and planning-and preserve a proficient, responsive defense industrial base.

o Special operations forces. The rising threat to U.S. interests of low intensity conflict-ranging from terrorism to armed insurgencies keeps our special operations forces especially important. Their unique contributions extend from nation-building and security assistance to participation in large scale conventional operations.

Chapter 3.B.3

* * *

Excerpts from a Statement of General Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Dramatic Change and Enduring Realities

General Colin L. Powell, U.S. Army

Introduction

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on America's military posture in connection with your hearings on President Bush's defense budget.

The images of the past 13 months or so have so captured the world's attention that it is almost a platitude for me to conclude that these are the most exciting times in forty years. The Free World has persevered, held out its values for all to see, kept its strength throughout calm and tumult, and now the prospects for the future are enticing, exhilarating, and may constitute a fundamental turning point in human history.

In some ways, I compare our current situation to the immediate post-World War II period. We and our allies had settled the balance of power in the world in a manner made possible by our tremendous systemic strength. But the more complex and difficult challenge lay ahead of us--how to manage the transition to peace and the peace itself. Some people assumed that such a resounding victory as we had achieved would automatically produce peace. Today we know that no proposition could be further from reality: there is no automaticity to peace whatsoever. Peace comes, and stays, when free people are strong and ready.

Today's domestic climate is not too dissimilar from the climate created by our overwhelming World War II victory. Some people are poised to make decisions calling for the precipitous dismantlement of the very strength

---

Reprinted from Statement of General Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the House Budget Committee, 7 February 1990.

that brought the prospects for peace. We know that this year, and for the next few years, we will engage in a great struggle to determine whether we will repeat failures of the past and cause this dismantlement or, having learned our lessons, continue to maintain the needed strength to avoid putting America at risk.

Our eyes are open. Indeed, to remain blind to the change in the world would be an egregious and unpardonable mistake. The Secretary and I know the Department will get fewer funds, we know the armed forces will be decreased in number and that the Department will shrink. We know also that the risk of making these changes is acceptable, that the nation cannot afford to do otherwise. But we must not shatter the armed forces. We must not make them a shadow of strength. We must not devastate what we have invested so much of our treasure to build during the past decade.

Secretary Cheney and I began our efforts with an eye to history, current events, and with a view to the future. But not with a view to dissolving America's strength. I took my present job in the hope that I could help shape our armed forces for the future challenge, not to demobilize them precipitously and weaken our position in the world. The Soviets have not made the mistake of equating withdrawal and restructuring with disarming, and neither should we.

Military Strategy and Posture

Our military strategy is designed to safeguard and promote enduring national interests--and it is working dramatically well. Those interests are unchanged by the volcano of events in the world:

- The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation;

- The continuance of a healthy and growing economy that provides opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for our national endeavors; and

- The maintenance of vigorous alliance relationships that bolster forward defense of the United States, secure our allies, and collectively maintain peace with freedom in the world.

Basic Objectives. Two of our national defense policy's basic objectives are:

To deter military attack against the United States, its allies, and other important countries; and to ensure the defeat of such an attack should deterrence fail; and

To increase U.S. influence around the world, to further an atmosphere conducive to democratic progress, and to protect free commerce and ensure U.S. access to world markets, associated critical resources, the oceans, and Space.

These objectives remind us that America cannot choose between military security and economic security. The two are inextricably intertwined. On a smaller but similar scale, the peaceful trade and economic prosperity of a city is dependent on the vigilant presence of the local policeman as much as it is on the ebb and flow of the vitals of commerce. No city mayor would consider abolishing his police force because were he to do so, the city's peace would soon dissolve and disappear.

Military Posture. Our global military posture is designed to keep the peace. The presence and readiness of our armed forces, here and overseas, prevents small crises from becoming big ones, deters major hostilities, reassures allies, and provides for dealing with unforeseeable contingencies wherever they may arise.

We try to keep these armed forces balanced. Balanced in terms of the strategy we call upon them to implement, the possible enemies they may have to contend with, the technology we can provide them, and the dollars available to raise, maintain, provide for, and sustain them.

We try to keep them balanced also in the sense of quality people, superb training, a high state of readiness and a pride in service to the nation.

And, with all of the foregoing in mind, we try to keep them balanced in terms of how they are divided between the active and reserve components.

In the world environment of the present and the foreseeable future, a durable consensus on the amount of dollars needed to support these efforts and these forces is essential to keep risks at an acceptable level.

The Dramatically Changing World Scene

We are witnessing today the long-term success of policies we put in motion over forty years ago. Mid-term success produced a vibrant, cohesive, and dynamic Western Europe out of the utter devastation of world war. Among those nations at the forefront in that resurgent Europe was a democratic West Germany. Implacable foes became the closest of allies, marking one of the most extraordinary transformations in history.

Today, the long-term effects of that success are breathtaking to watch- from the collapse of the Berlin Wall to the potential for the ultimate democratization of Eastern Europe. The systemic crisis of our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, is the immediate catalyst for this

historic and dramatic change but we and our steadfast allies provided the chemistry to which the catalyst was applied.

Though the spellbinding changes in Europe rivet our attention, there is much more on the horizon as well. In Asia, Japan was our archenemy in December 1941 and for almost four bitter years thereafter. Today japan is an economic and democratic goliath and one of our closest allies. Again, our policies and our strategy following the devastation of World War II brought this transformation about. The bilateral security relationship between the U.S. and Japan has been a principal ingredient in the chemistry that produced the changes sweeping the globe today.

The march toward democracy and freedom seems inexorable. In Africa and Asia, in Europe and in Latin America, the principles our founding fathers brilliantly encapsulated in our two most famous documents, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution with its Bill of Rights, seem to be on the lips of a remarkable majority of the world's peoples. Our founding fathers would find no mystery in this, merely the confirmation of their fondest hopes and their firmest beliefs.

Soviet Military Power in Transition. To give credit where credit is due, a Soviet leader of considerable vision and daring has set the stage for much of this sweeping change. President Gorbachev has embarked on a difficult course to renovate and repair the Soviet system. It is a formidable task and we wish him well. But we know a part of that system he wishes to renovate and repair is the Soviet military establishment.

President Gorbachev has no intention of demobilizing the Soviet military. The four tenets of President Gorbachev's plan for his military are withdrawal, reductions, and we must not forget restructuring and modernization. The end result will not be a demobilized military but a smaller and more modern force. These Soviet intentions present the United States with both opportunities and challenges, opportunities to reposture and restructure as a longstanding threat recedes, and challenges to sustain the nation's military strength in an emerging security environment of enormous complexity.

Throughout this promising but turbulent transition from an era of singleminded pursuit of containment, to an age of proliferating threats, I, as the Commander-in-Chiefs principal military advisor, must stay focused on the continuing reality of an enormous Soviet military capability. I cannot afford to be distracted by Soviet charm or sudden openness or the present disarray in the Soviet economy, even as I hope and plan for the prospects of a genuine, irrevocable reversal in Soviet foreign policy and all the advantages that such an outcome would bring to the world.

Equally important, I must devote increasing attention to the plain and simple fact that we as a superpower have grave responsibilities in the world, and to the realization that America offers the greatest hope

to those peoples still oppressed.

And as I focus on these world realities and set about helping the Secretary of Defense to restructure the armed forces, I will not put America at risk. I never want to return to that leisurely, comfortable "From Here to Eternity" attitude of the 1930s that helped invite global conflict to an unsuspecting world.

Net Assessment

That being said, however, I cannot imagine a more challenging environment in which to set about the task of reshaping America's armed forces.

Nowhere is the challenge greater than in assessing the direction, scope, pace and momentum of the changes in Soviet military strength. On the one hand, I see convincing evidence that President Gorbachev intends to carry through his plans for unilateral cuts, for reducing the more threatening aspects of his forces and for achieving arms control breakthroughs. Conversely, it is also clear that he intends to take every opportunity to make virtue of necessity.

Thus, even as Soviet unilateral troop cuts in Eastern Europe proceed apace, much of the residual equipment is serving to modernize remaining units. While forces are being withdrawn into the Soviet Union-a process which may well accelerate in the months ahead-their long term status is unknown. And there can be no doubt that Soviet military planners will make the case for a sizeable reserve and a credible mobilization capability. Moreover, despite the promise of a START agreement in 1990, the Soviets' stable, long term strategic modernization programs have produced a daunting nuclear force posture-and will continue to do so.

These and other ambiguities make capability comparisons especially difficult. Nevertheless, as directed, the Secretary of Defense will provide Members of Congress a Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA). It is
in the final stages of approval. Here I want to emphasize several points from that assessment.

As I noted, the Soviets have for some time been shaping their strategic nuclear modernization program to be compliant with future START treaty constraints. We can expect continual upgrading of ICBMs, SSBNs, and bombers throughout the coming decade. Such upgrading will make these
systems increasingly accurate and place our forces at increasing risk. Soviet forces will also be more survivable-making ours less effective. Today, the Soviets have already deployed a significant number of their planned railbased SS-24s and their road-mobile SS-25s. As you well know, we have yet to field a mobile missile with comparable capability. By the mid to late 90s Soviet mobile systems could comprise one-half of their

total ICBM force. To continue to provide a credible deterrent, we also need mobile missiles, and systems such as the B-2 that are capable of holding at risk these Soviet mobile missiles.

The Soviets have also constructed an impressive system of strategic communications facilities and both hardened and mobile command posts. In addition, they have continued to modernize their treaty compliant Moscow ABM system consisting of radars and two classes of missiles. These improvements coupled with their robust air defense systems mean we will have to modernize our systems so they can reach potential targets with the assurance we require.

On balance, Soviet space programs are geared more toward warfighting than ours. Their systems are expected to continue to improve, but at potentially reduced rates. To complement their existing on-orbit space systems, the Soviets have the capability to place additional systems on orbit quite rapidly. Moreover, they have a credible capability to conduct ASAT operations. As you know, we are only now taking steps to realize similar capabilities. To ensure our access to space and to deny a haven in space to any enemy in time of crisis, we need the ASAT program that is under development. Although our space programs are generally oriented toward peacetime activities, initiatives are underway to improve our capabilities across a broad range of conflict. Specific improvements are being applied in the general areas of launch and satellite system performance, reconstitution and survivability, as well as in ground-based surveillance for space control.

In assessing conventional forces in Europe, we noted that Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations currently furnish 40% of the forces in the Central Region and 50% of those in the Southern Region. Thus, considering the new political orientation of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations, our judgments clearly accept a related reduction in Pact capabilities as well as a dramatic diminution in the likelihood of East-West hostilities. But, while taking into account current political upheaval, as well as Soviet unilateral reductions, we noted that considerable conventional force asymmetries remain and will for some time to come. During this process of restructuring, the Soviets have been using some of the equipment they have removed to make other units more capable and, although they have reduced tank production this year by about half, they continue to outproduce us. Production of new and more capable aircraft and ships continues at a vigorous pace. Equally important, the Soviets are producing equipment whose sophistication rivals our own.

As you know, our estimator of warning time in Europe are changing for the better and we expect further improvement as unilateral reductions are completed and as the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact continue to go their separate ways. We also look toward CFE negotiations to codify reductions, withdrawals, and verification measures and, therefore, virtually assure a wholesale change in the entire European security

picture. We are now engaged in a reassessment of warning time, planning factors, and other important variables, but significant unknowns exist. The salient question, in my view, is when will it be prudent to translate hopes, assumptions, and what appears to be an increasingly defensive military orientation, into solid planning factors. When that time arrives, I anticipate we will be able to make historic-and perhaps permanent-changes to the defense posture that has brought historic change to Europe.

In the Pacific, it is unlikely that the Soviets would initiate hostilities which threaten our interests. Much of Soviet attention will remain focused on their bilateral concerns with China. As a part of their general force reductions, the Soviets have begun to draw down land and air forces in Mongolia, throughout the Eastern TVD, and at Cam Ranh Bay. Additionally, the readiness of the Soviet Pacific Fleet will decline somewhat as older ships are retired. Similarly, their fleet out-of-area deployments will continue to decline. This said however, their naval capabilities will continue to pose a potential threat to U.S. security interests in the region.

On the Korean Peninsula, although there have been signs of a desire to talk, the dialogue thus far between Seoul and Pyongyang has done nothing to convince us that the North Koreans want to change the confrontational relationship. They continue to maintain formidable armed forces, but our assessment is that the U.S.-Republic of Korea security relationship will continue to deter aggression on the peninsula.

In other theaters we can continue to meet our requirements. I believe the recent operations in Panama ably demonstrate our capability to respond rapidly to crisis. But I am not overly optimistic about Third World developments in general. Debt, poverty, fragile democracies and internecine struggles will continue to generate both turmoil and tragedy and thus challenges to U.S. interests. In particular, drug-trafficking, insurgency and terrorism will command ever increasing attention and resources. And the chilling facts are that in today's world, the proliferation of sophisticated weapons adds a new and unknown dimension to what were already vexing security problems.

The uncertainties imbedded in these and other assessments lead me to three fundamental conclusions. First, the Soviet Union will remain a military superpower. As such, Soviet armed forces will possess vast potential regardless of the increasingly benign stated intent of the Kremlin. And that potential will remain should intentions change.

Second, and relatedly, until the profound transformation in the Soviet system is firmly rooted in democratic institutions--and it most assuredly is not at present--we would court inordinately high risks if we made irrevocable changes to the foundation of our military strength. It is still too soon to make sweeping changes to strategy, force structure and posture, and modernization. There is simply too much risk in such

precipitous change. Eastern Europe, and even the Soviet Union itself, may be changing at an incredible rate, but that is certainly no reason for NATO to do so. Instead, it is sound reason to move but to avoid haste. The Soviets are in the throes of a second revolution. Because of this, we are engaged in a hopeful but as yet uncertain transition to new international security relationships.

Third, other threats to American interests do not disappear because of a retrenched Soviet Union. The problems we are likely to confront in the rest of the world in the 1990s keep me from any inclination to pronounce the end of history.

In this period of remarkable world change and its attendant instability, it is important that we and our allies continue to provide an overarching framework of stability. Thus, the fundamentals of our national military strategy remain sound. We must continue to provide a credible strategic deterrent through a modern TRIAD, protect our interests globally, retain a highly mobile and ready force for crises and contingencies, and through all of the coming restructuring avoid foreclosing options for hedging against a new or renewed threat.

The Architecture of the Armed Forces

With this backdrop, let me tell you about some of the issues we grappled with as we began the process of reshaping the armed forces of the United States:

The Inescapable Reality of Nuclear Weapons. No matter how much the most optimistic dreamer amongst us may wish it, we cannot disinvent nuclear weapons. We can try to defend against them--in the not too distant future, perhaps decisively so--and that is why we must keep pushing our Strategic Defense Initiative. As other wise Americans have said, it is inconceivable that any sane person would want to opt for mass destruction over meaningful defense as the most desirable strategic deterrent.

Since we cannot disinvent nuclear weapons, nor for the time being offer an effective defense, it is axiomatic that we must keep our strategic deterrent modernized and ready. The only way the Soviets can destroy us in thirty minutes is with their strategic nuclear weapons. We must deter the use of those weapons. We must have a triad of air, land, and sea-based nuclear weapons that represents state-of-the-art capability so that no Soviet leader would ever contemplate using his nuclear arsenal against us.

Conventional Forces For Forward Defense. In areas critical to our interests we must be able to conduct and support forward defense. In Europe, in Japan, on the Korean Peninsula, in the Philippines, in Southwest Asia, and in Latin America U.S. forces constitute the primary deterrent to conflict in the region. Our forward-deployed forces also

constitute the leading edge of the capability to execute our military strategy should deterrence fail. Moreover, our forward-based troop and aircraft deployments and continuous naval presence in key areas demonstrate to our allies, our friends, and our adversaries that our commitment in the region is rock solid.

Our capability to reinforce these forward-deployed forces is also fundamental to deterrence and, should it fail, to warfighting. We can adjust the timetables for reinforcement based on a careful assessment of the various threats, but we must not dismantle the procedures, the mechanisms, nor the forces that reinforcement requires.

Conventional Forces for crises and Contingencies. In the first ten weeks in my job as Chairman, I received ample proof of the need for conventional forces. I helped the President and the Secretary with crises in Panama, on the border of Nicaragua and Honduras, in El Salvador, and in the Philippines. I am well aware of the leverage that military forces provide in such circumstances. Perhaps more so, I can sense the nakedness our national leaders would feel were they to lack such an instrument. We do not want to be in the situation where we watch a crisis erupt and grow and our only reaction is, finally, mobilization for the war that the crisis eventually produces.

The war plans maintained by our warfighting CINCs around the globe are not simply aimed at the Soviets. Certain plans are aimed at a particular threat to U.S. interests that might foreseeably develop in specific areas of the world. Each such plan has a complement of military forces that is intrinsic to it's successful execution. In our recent operations in Panama, the Members of Congress, our friends and our potential adversaries witnessed a dramatic example of the capability of our conventional forces to execute our plans. In this case, it became increasingly clear that to protect the interests of both the United States and Panama, we needed to act. We deployed significant conventional forces and successfully carried out the contingency operation and, at the same time, prevented a potentially larger crisis. In short, we protected American lives and restored to power the duly elected leaders of Panama.

Conventional Forces for the Drug War and for Anti-Terrorism. As you are all aware, I believe the American people want the armed forces to participate in the war on illegal drugs. I believed this when I was the Commander in Chief of Forces Command and I continue to believe it now. Impacting the flow of drugs into the U.S. is not a mission we will accomplish to the satisfaction of the American people in a brief period of time. We are in this one for the long haul. Acting always in accordance with the laws and traditions of our nation, we can make a significant contribution and we are planning to do so.

As for terrorism, we all hope that scourge goes away or at least diminishes. But we all know that for the time being it probably will continue to haunt us. While military force is only infrequently the right

answer to terrorism, under certain circumstances it can be. We do not want to lose the option to exercise it should those circumstances arise.

Strategic Mobility. I cannot speak of conventional forces in crisis management, contingencies, or counterterrorist actions without stating the requirement for the strategic means to get those forces to the scene of battle. We must have the aircraft and the ships to get our forces to the action. The less our forces are forward-deployed, the more efficient and effective these ships and aircraft must be.

Space. The importance of Space to our modern armed forces is growing daily. At present, we would be hard-pressed to retain the precision and timeliness of our ability to react to crisis or to control contingency operations, without our Space assets. We would be equally hard-pressed to accomplish necessary surveillance and verify arms control treaties and agreements without our Space assets. Space is not yet indispensable to all our military operations, but it is rapidly growing in importance.

A Global Perspective with Regional Realities

As I told General Moiseyev and my Eastern and Western European counterparts in Vienna several weeks ago, the United States has global responsibilities. We cannot afford to become myopic nor to focus on a single portion of the globe. We are a superpower and the leader of the Free World. With that position go certain realities.

Europe. Europe remains our first order of business. Despite the sweeping change there, certain realities endure. While we will reduce the number of our forces in Europe, there is nothing whatsoever on the horizon that indicates to me that we can disengage from the continent entirely.

NATO will remain an important alliance well into the future. No one in Europe views the U.S. presence there or the NATO Alliance as an anachronism. They view both our presence and the Alliance as the needed ingredients for stability and for the fulfillment of their and our political vision of a Europe whole and free. Because it is an alliance of nations with common values and aspirations, its foundation is far firmer than its military dimensions might suggest. At the same time, however, our armed forces in Europe are our commitment to stay. Our armed forces signal to the Europeans that we are in the contest for the long haul, that our endurance is sufficient to ensure a genuine peace. In short, our armed forces tell the nations of Western Europe that we are sincere when we say we are defending the United States and the Europeans by being in Europe. Successful alliances are built on shared hopes and values. They are sustained by these things too but not without military power. It is helpful to remember that a central tenet of the NATO Alliance has always been: strength without dialogue is politically untenable, but dialogue without strength is morally--and literally--indefensible.

Our destiny, now and in the future, is wrapped up in the destiny of

Europe. Essentially, that has been true since the first colonist set foot on this continent almost four centuries ago. That is an enduring reality. East Asia and the Pacific. For what is essentially an economy of force operation in the Pacific and Asia, the United States has purchased peace, prosperity, stability, and democratic progress in the region for the past 15 years. For a pair of forward-deployed Army divisions, a single numbered fleet, the equivalent of four tactical fighter wings, some Marine air-ground task forces, and a carefully constructed security assistance program, we have done all this. Japan has become the economic engine of the Pacific and much of the world. South Korea has a phenomenal economic growth rate. Thailand is prospering and with the Vietnamese out of Cambodia, will likely move ahead with amazing speed. The Philippines, with fits and starts, is still practicing democracy. The failures in the area are few and on the other side: North Korea and Vietnam. And even they show signs of waking up, signs that they are listening to, as a minimum, the call of open markets.

We cannot afford to disengage in a major way from this region of the world. We have won too much. Our friends and our allies do not want to see us disengage. They know that politics and nature abhor a vacuum and that into the power vacuum created by major U.S. disengagement from the region would flow only God knows what. They trust the United States in matters of gravest importance and they do not want us to abandon the region.

We have fought our last two major wars in the Pacific, and we had a crisis there, in the Philippines, about two months ago. To disengage in a major way, to remove all our Army, our Air Force, our Navy, and our Marines and go home, would see us coming back in the future under far less desirable circumstances; or, worse, losing the inclination to return and with that loss, forfeiting our access to the economic might supporting our superpower status. These are the enduring realities of the Asia and Pacific region.

The Middle East and Southwest Asia. We still patrol the Persian Gulf. We still provide military forces to the multi-national peacekeeping force in the Middle East. We still have security relationships with nations in the region. We still get a large amount of oil that passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and so do our allies. Iran and Iraq, without a peace treaty, still stand and eye each other warilY. They are armed to the teeth. Iraq alone has over 1,000 first-line tanks and battle-hardened tankers to man them. These are all enduring realities in this region.

We have made our work easier in this critical part of the world. Operation Earnest Will, our escort of U.S. flagged tankers in the Persian Gulf, and the associated military operations, helped create more confidence in the United States. The Gulf Cooperation Council states now have increased faith in America and have responded accordingly.

Moreover, new realities may be in the making. A more cooperative

Soviet Union, a more tractable PLO, a war-weary region, a Syria without strident Soviet support, and so on, may bring about change. But for the moment and for the near future, these are realities we hope for. Meantime, the old realities endure. Indeed, they are perhaps the oldest realities with the greatest endurance of any in the world. We simply cannot afford to ignore them. We do so at extreme peril to our own livelihoods that of our allies, and certainly that of the state of Israel.

Latin America. In our own hemisphere, I have had the most pressing crises of my first four months on the job. The conflict in El Salvador is to the Salvadorans a full-scale war and demands our daily attention. A freely elected, democratic government is threatened by communist insurgents supported by other governments. On the borders with Nicaragna, there is constant tension as Honduras and Costa Rica watch the largest Army in this hemisphere outside the U.S. go through its daily routines. And the democratically-elected government in El Salvador looks across the Gulf of Fonseca and sees this same Nicaragna sending arms to the insurgents in El Salvador. And in Panama, at the close of 1989 we found it necessary to translate our previous longstanding diplomatic and economic efforts into military force, or risk more American lives and a deteriorating situation in an area of great interest to the nation. We chose to use force and, as a result, we have put our diplomacy and our economic efforts back on track and given Panamanians solid hope for a future of freedom and democracy in their nation.

In summary, Latin America will continue to demand our attention. The rapid procession toward freedom and democracy and civilian governments is
still resisted by forces whose chief motivation in the world, communism, is dying fast. Adding to this resistance are the realities of a huge debt, a somewhat dismal economic environment, and the omnipresent greed of narco-traffickers. We cannot afford to allow this regional procession toward democracy, every bit as marvelous as the one in Eastern Europe, to succumb to these pressures.

A View to the Future

In 1985, Mr. Chairman, you and your colleagues in both houses began to tell the Department of Defense that we were going to spend less on the military. This was before Mr. Gorbachev's charm and enlightened self interest took the world by storm, and before any announcement of substantial Soviet reductions in their military forces. Since that time we have had no real growth or a real decline in every annual budget. Because of other pressing domestic demands on our national resources, that was a reasonable approach to doing business.

Now that we do have a certain reduction in the Soviet military threat, albeit a fairly small one in terms of capabilities, it is reasonable to continue that approach. It is not reasonable nor wise, nor very safe for this nation, to draw down our armed forces precipitously and I

am opposed to any such extreme approach.

When people ask me if we have a strategy for the future I tell them that we most assuredly do. It is a strategy based on the enduring realities I have described to you, on the continuing quite capable military potential of the Soviet Union, on the changed public consensus on defense spending, And on the determination that America shall not cease to be a superpower. It is a strategy that has about it nothing of the Soviets' desperation. They have created a one-dimensional superpower, a Third World nation with a First World military force. They are reexamining their alliances, sending mixed signals to their client states around the world, who are losing too, and they are retrenching in key areas so they can eventually achieve multidimensional superpower status. We, on the other hand, are seeing our postwar strategy vindicated. Our strategy must evolve to accommodate both our victory and the Soviet desire to change, no matter how that desire turns out in reality. Our strategy must not abandon the victory nor compromise its completeness.

What emerges from this evolutionary approach to changes in our defense posture is a reshaped but balanced military that can do the things that have to be done to keep America from unacceptable risk. What emerges from my analysis of the military forces needed to implement the first stage of this evolutionary approach is the President's FY 1991 budget.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 3.B.4

* * *

The Need for Strategy in the New Postwar Era

John McCain

Not available at this time

Chapter 3.B.5

* * *

Excerpts from a Speech about Revising United States Military Strategy and Forces

Sam Nunn

Not available at this time

Chapter 3.C.1

* * *

Approaches to Force Planning

Henry C. Bartlett

Force planning can be defined as "the process of establishing military requirements based on an appraisal of the security needs of the nation, and selecting military forces to meet those requirements within fiscal limitations." {1} Administratively, force planning is carried out annually as part of the Department of Defense planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS). Although this system provides structure and discipline for completing force planning tasks in the short term, it does hot provide complete insight into alternative approaches or focuses which force planners use over the longer term to help them determine the level and mix of required forces.

The purpose of this paper is to consider some of the more common approaches and their merits and limitations. Different planning focuses tend to lead to alternative solutions and choices. Prospective force planners should be aware of the various focuses in order to develop and evaluate force choice alternatives skillfully. A list of common approaches appears in the table below.

Force Planning Approaches

Approach	Primary Focus	Other Emphasis
Top Down	Objectives	Longer Term
Bottom Up	Current Capability	Shorter Term
Scenario	Circumstances	Opportunities and Vulnerabilities
Threat	Opponent Capability	Net Assessment
Mission	Mission Area Priority	Mission Area Balance
Hedging	Uncertainty	Flexibility
Technology	Technological Superiority	Technological Optimism
Fiscal	Budget	Dollar Constrained

Top Down

Objectives drive the Top Down force planning approach. The first step is to determine what the decision maker wants to accomplish. The second is to develop a strategy or game plan which specifies how the objective or

---

Reprinted from Naval War College Review, May-June 1985.

objectives will be achieved. Both the objectives and strategy are defined before force choices are made. Forces to implement the strategy are then determined. {2} The purpose of this approach is to minimize the risk associated with military threats to vital national interests.

The Top Down approach proceeds downward through several levels of objectives and strategy. At each level constraints or guidelines are applied which tend to channel and define military force choices.

At the highest level of national security decision making, broad objectives and grand strategies are developed to further or protect overall national interests such as defense of the homeland, economic well-being, a favorable world order or promotion of American values abroad. {3} As an example, a broad US national objective has been to contain Soviet ideological and geographical expansion. To achieve that objective, a coalition or collective security strategy was selected which includes political, economic and military dimensions. As a result, our military force structure and that of our allies have been influenced, and the influence is different from that exerted by alternative objectives or strategies.

At a lower level, separate objectives and strategies have been developed which support higher level decisions. Continuing with the military dimension, a US objective is to deter Soviet conventional attacks against our allies. This objective is supported by a US military strategy of forward defense using sea, air, land and space forces deployed on or near the Eurasian continent. At this level, the selection of the forward defense strategy further defined and channeled forces, and the channeling effect was different from that of an alternative strategy. To illustrate, suppose that the strategy was based on the concept of a central reserve of US general purpose forces located in the United States and postured for rapid deployment in support of allies. {4} The desired force in this case would probably include highly mobile, light units and the strategic lift to deploy them quickly overseas. The choice of such a military positioning strategy will therefore shape and define the level and mix of military forces.

At an even lower level, theater objectives and strategies will continue to shape force choices. As an example, the NATO alliance is committed to an operational strategy which includes the concept of a conventional linear defense at the inter-German border. {5} However, there are alternatives to this politically driven forward defense strategy which might decrease the risk of early Warsaw Pact breakthroughs. One is the concept of stronger and deeper forward forces backed up by armored reserves capable of countering penetrations. {6} Another is a more forward-oriented concept, emphasizing in-depth attacks against Warsaw Pact forces and counteroffensive operations. {7} Either of these alternatives, at this level of objectives and strategy, will tend to lead to different force choices.

There are several advantages to a Top Down approach. First, it helps force planners to concentrate on ends. Second, it provides a systematic way to think through force requirements startingfrom the broad or "macro" perspective. Third, the approach includes an implied time line. At the highest level, objectives and strategy tend to be longer term. At lower levels, the focus is shorter range. Understanding the implied time line helps to balance expectations about the short and long term. Fourth, the components of a clearly defined strategy can serve as useful criteria for evaluating, judging, and choosing among alternative force choices. This is particularly useful when a higher level national security objective is difficult to quantify in terms of measures of effectiveness or cost. An example is the objective of deterrence. Once a deterrent game plan is developed, force choice alternatives can be compared for efficiency and effectiveness against the more precise and measurable components of the game plan.

A final advantage is that the Top Down approach can be condensed into a relatively simple model. For any threat or opportunity, the primary variables for consideration are objectives, strategy, forces and risk. The variables can be visualized as illustrated.



Threat/Opportunity

As an example, when desired objectives exceed existing forces, force planners perceive an ends-means mismatch which results in increased risk. Often in this case, the tendency is to focus exclusively on increasing the means. However, alternative solutions may exist in the form of more clearly defined or limited objectives, a different strategy, or the explicit acceptance of the risk resulting from the objective-force mismatch. If the decision is to accept the risk, the action should be based on a careful assessment of such factors as probabilities of occurrence and estimates of damage in relation to the objective, strategy and forces. In other words, the acceptance of risk should be based on a conscious acceptance of the potential consequences.

There are certain pitfalls associated with the Top Down approach. One is a tendency to be captured by future-oriented concepts and programs at the expense of current capability. A second is to ignore constraints too long during conceptualization. Consequently, when dollar, technology or other limits are applied, the distance between desired and constrained is so great that major adjustments must be made among the ends and means being considered. A third concerns the level at which a force planner enters the Top Down framework. If a problem or opportunity is approached from the highest level down, nothing is taken for granted. This tends to stimulate creativity. However, when planning is initiated at a lower level, there is a tendency to view all higher level objectives and strategy as unchangeable and unchallengeable. Therefore, there is a tendency to ignore them, when in fact they should be reconsidered. A final pitfall concerns public awareness of the strategy. In the Top Down approach, the conceptual game plan is a key element in force choices. Since strategy will be debated openly during the budget process, a question of security may arise.

The beginning of the Kennedy administration provides a historical example of the Top Down approach following a presidential election. Given the overall objectives of containing the Soviet Union and deterring nuclear and conventional war, former Secretary of Defense McNamara worked to reshape US military strategy and supporting forces in light of emerging threats and perceived imbalances. One such imbalance concerned the ability of US and allied forces to deal with limited wars at the conventional level without resorting to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. As he commented to Congress in 1961," . . . the decision to employ tactical nuclear weapons in limited conflicts should not be forced upon us simply because we have no other means to cope with them." {8} Emerging threats included Khrushchev's reemphasis on Soviet support for wars of national liberation. {9}

The result of this Top Down approach was the acceptance of flexible response as an important concept in contrast to massive retaliation. {10} Since flexible response called for forces which could respond selectively and effectively throughout the spectrum of conflict from wars of national liberation to strategic nuclear exchange, complementary forces were planned and acquired to meet identified shortfalls. Examples included the build-up of special purpose forces such as the Army Green Berets, and the overall level of conventional forces. {11}

Bottom Up

Current military capability drives the Bottom Up approach. Consequently, it is related to operational planning, and the matrix below is provided to clarify how force and operational planning differ. {12}

The Bottom Up approach tends to emphasize current capabilities and threats, and to key off operational issues. A major advantage of the

Bottom Up approach is that it emphasizes the "real" world. Force planners are compelled to focus on how adversaries can be handled with existing forces.

Force Planning Compared to Operational Planning

Item Force	Planning	Operational Planning
Purpose	Structuring Forces	Fighting Forces
Orientation	Global/Regional	Theater/Local
Input	Future:	Existing:
	Forces	Forces
	Threats	Threats
	Objectives	Objectives
	Strategies	Strategies
	Risk	Risk
Output	Planned and Programmed Forces	Contingency War Plans
Biases	Development	Deployment
	Modernization	Employment
	Force Structure	Readiness
		Sustainability

This tends to counter a mind-set which dwells excessively on the contribution of future capability. Focusing on current forces can also lead to improved strategies and war plans which can further help to refine force requirements. On the other hand, too much emphasis on a Bottom Up approach can result in neglect of the future and compromised long term goals. Another pitfall of the Bottom Up focus is a tendency to lose sight of the "big picture." As an example, local or theater considerations may tend to dominate when an integrated global view is required.

The following quotation provides an example of this approach and involves force planning in the US Navy during the PPBS cycle. Although the Bottom Up emphasis is apparent, it is important to point out that other focuses such as Top Down and mission area analysis are molded into the process. Also, throughout the process the dominant variable is maritime strategy. {13}

> This, in a nutshell, is the first part of our homework. We get the information from the CinCs. We go through a maritime strategy analysis. Given the number of battle groups we have, given the number of airplanes We have, given the amount of sustainability, the amount of fuel we have in the water today, how would you fight a force? A lot of things come out of that, things that people outside the Navy would, perhaps, not have thought of. We go through all the analysis and we end up with the CNO's Programming and Fiscal Guidance. {14}

Scenario

The Scenario approach in force planning is situationally driven. The force planner starts with a well-defined set of circumstances at the national, theater, regional or global level. The threat is usually specified in terms of warning and mobilization time, force level, and attack plan assumptions. The force structure required is that which will achieve the military aims called for in the scenario used.

The Scenario approach has three clear strengths. The first is specific and tangible focus. If the scenario is a Warsaw Pact conventional attack against NATO, fairly precise planning can be undertaken once major assumptions are established. If simultaneous scenarios are anticipated, such as Korea and NATO, even more specific planning can result. A further advantage is that the Scenario approach encourages priorities. National interests dictate that some regions, theaters or nations are more important than others. This is particularly true in a global war context against a major adversary like the Soviet Union. A third strength is the dynamic nature of a scenario which handles time well. Events are sequential and results are cumulative. The next action in the scenario depends on the outcome of the last event, and in that way the focus tends to be more narrowly refined as events unfold.

However, there are limitations to this approach. The world rarely conforms to chosen and planned circumstances. Scenarios also tend to take on a life of their own. After all the work involved in planning, there is a natural reluctance to challenge the basic rationale of the scenario. As an example, key assumptions such as warning and mobilization times become
absolutes, and hypothesized enemy doctrine becomes a fact. Finally, scenarios tend to be threat reactive. This is natural for a defensively oriented country such as the United States, but force planners should be alert to opportunities to take the initiative.

An example of the scenario approach is included below from the Joint Chiefs of Staff military posture statement for FY 1982. During the 1970s, the growth of Soviet strategic nuclear forces suggested that serious post-attack residual force imbalances might develop in the future. The following insights influenced the US strategic modernization programs of the 1980s through scenario depiction.

> In each scenario, targeting goals for each side are assumed to be the same: first, attacking all of the opponent's ICBM silos and shelters with nuclear weapons; and then, using "moderate damage" to a specified percentage of the remainder of the opponent's target system. Perfect C3 is assumed for both sides. By assuming identical targeting goals and perfect C3, it is possible to provide a common basis for comparing the opposing arsenals over time and to obtain results that may lead to better understanding of the strategic balance. Because of the assumptions involved, the results do not

indicate absolute capabilities for either side. Rather, they are intended only to portray trends in relative US and Soviet capabilities. In reality, US targeting goals likely will differ from Soviet goals, and both may change from year to year. The target data bases used in the analysis reflect differences between US and Soviet target systems in size and vulnerability to nuclear effects. {15}

Threat

The Threat emphasis is driven by opponent capability. Net assessments of the relative balance of forces between major adversaries, such as the US and the Soviet Union, or NATO and the Warsaw Pact, are the points of departure. Such assessments tend to focus on different segments of capability such as strategic nuclear delivery systems and warheads, army divisions, tactical aircraft or submarines.

A focus on the overall balance of forces is important from several points of view. The first involves perceptions and the impact of perceived relative strength on day-to-day relations between nations. Although precise relationships are difficult to establish, and different circumstances result in different perceptions, the relative military strength between nations does impact on political leverage and available options. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 was a notable example of the influence of US nuclear and naval superiority at that time. Secondly, numbers count in warfare. Leadership, training, and morale are important; but an approximate two-to-one ratio of Warsaw Pact-to-NATO armored division equivalents at the NATO central front suggests a serious correlation of force imbalance if a conventional war were to occur. Finally, the Threat emphasis does keep the focus on the threat at both the macro level of overall balances and the micro level of individual weapon systems. Detailed knowledge of enemy capability has always been important for perceptions of balance, to prevent technological surprise, to adjust doctrine, or to exploit opportunities.

There are a number of pitfalls associated with the Threat focus. One is a tendency to array forces too simplistically in a tank-versus-tank (side-by-side) or tank-versus-antitank (head-to-head) comparison. These can be misleading in terms of overall unit or weapon system combat power. However, combat power can be approximated by various judgmental and weighting techniques to develop standardized measures for comparison, such as armored division equivalents. {16} Another is a bias towards quantitative data such as types and numbers of weapon systems. This bias may result in overlooking or underrating important qualitative factors such as experience, leadership, morale, doctrine or the need to consider more than one front. A further pitfall is to use balances as justification for force choices out of context with objectives, strategies, and scenarios.

Mission

The Mission focus is functionally driven. The force planner starts with broad categories of wartime mission activities such as strategic surveillance, strategic deterrence, force projection and sea control. These categories in turn can be broken down into subsets of more specific activities such as antisubmarine warfare or defense suppression. This approach provides a way of looking at capability across general categories of wartime activity.

This emphasis incorporates two strong points which are worth considering. It is an excellent way to assess the balance of capability across warfighting functions, either unilaterally or in relation to a specific threat. It also provides a systematic way of developing priorities for the allocation of scarce resources.

The primary drawback of the Mission focus is the possibility of disconnecting force choices from objectives and strategies. Different objectives and strategies tend to call for different mixes among functional capabilities. Consequently, functional balance or optimization should not become an end in itself. Another pitfall associated with this emphasis concerns the threat. Defined functional activities can become too threat oriented. Terms such as antisubmarine warfare reinforce this tendency.

All services, to some degree, use the Mission approach in force planning. {17} The example below shows how the Mission approach is integrated with doctrine to help in force planning.

> To develop the detailed analysis of the Army's ability to execute its wartime missions, the battlefield is viewed in terms of 13 specific mission areas. These mission areas serve as the framework for measuring the capabilities of an FY87 US Corps to fight a successful battle against a projected FY92 threat. The Army Training and Doctrine Command's Mission Area Analysis process is based on the fundamental assumption that the Army will modernize according to development and procurement schedules set forth in the Army POM. Using the Army's programmed force, the projected threat, the AirLand Battle Doctrine, each mission area proponent examInes battlefield tasks to be accomplished, assesses the capability to accomplish the tasks, and develops a list of deficiencies in the areas of doctrine, training, organization, and material systems.
>
> From this analysis, the mission area proponent develops a series of corrective actions to eliminate deficiencies. {18}

Hedging

The Hedging focus in force planning is driven by uncertainty. Overemphasis on specific adversaries, objectives, strategies or scenarios is viewed with skepticism. Even in the short term, the world is viewed as too volatile to permit tailored force structuring.

The Hedging emphasis has merit in that it explicitly deals with uncertainty in the future. History provides a number of examples of tailored forces overcome by unforeseen events. Consequently, balance and flexibility are key concepts. Modernization, force structure, research and development, readiness and sustainability are balanced to reduce the uncertainty represented by such factors as technological surprise or incorrect assumptions about the duration of hostilities. Likewise, resources are balanced across the continuum of warfare with forces to deal with a range of activity from terrorism up through strategic nuclear warfare. An effort is also made to balance forces across warfighting capabilities such as naval, air, land and space forces.

The Hedging emphasis also has merit when the results of being wrong could be catastrophic. An example is strategic nuclear warfare and the emphasis on multiple land and sea-based delivery systems to ensure their ability to survive and retaliate if required.

The major drawback of a Hedging emphasis is that it leads toward worst case and least cost-effective force choices. This tends to escalate defense expenditures. A second drawback is a tendency to be reactive instead of active. This often occurs when inadequate attention is given to systematically thinking through objectives and strategy.

In 1977 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown provided the following example of a Hedging emphasis while explaining a strategic nuclear force choice decision:

> We already rely heavily on our submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force. If we do not improve our bomber or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) forces, particularly as our ICBM silos become increasingly vulnerable to the growing number and accuracy of the Soviet ICBM force, that relative reliance will continue to grow, with SLBMs providing perhaps five out of every six penetrating weapons by 1956. We must, therefore, pay attention to the ways in which our SLBMs might be defeated. One possibility is an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) breakthrough; another is a more effective anti-ballistic missile (ABM) development followed by clandestine or rapid deployment. The possibility that such unexpected evolutions could happen in a very short time, in terms of development and massive deployment, is small. However, we cannot exclude it absolutely, and the consequences would be so serious that we cannot ignore it.
>
> In order to hedge against unexpected breakthroughs in defensive technology, we maintain three separate strategic forces:
>
> - SLBMs,
> - ICBMs, and
> - Air-breathing systems.
>
> Together they make up the Triad. {19}

Technology

The Technology emphasis is driven by technological optimism. Force planners seek high technology concepts and systems which have potential as force multipliers. Examples include the Manhattan Project of World War II and the surveillance, targeting, delivery systems and "smart" munitions being developed to support in-depth attack concepts within AirLand Battle doctrine and NATO's Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA).{20} A more recent example is the thrust toward a ballistic missile defense capability:

> In an historic speech to the American people on March 23,1983, President Reagan offered the hope of a world made safe from the threat of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. The president stated, "Our ultimate goal . . . [is] eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles,"and "our only purpose . . . is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war."
>
> Following the speech, the president directed intensive studies of the technical feasibility and policy and strategy implications of this new direction. The studies were conducted by some of the most knowledgeable scientists, engineers, and planners in the United States during the latter half of 1983.
>
> They demonstrated that, despite uncertainties, new technologies held great promise for achieving the president's goal of eliminating the threat of missiles to ourselves and our allies. They further concluded that strategic defenses, evolving towards increasing effectiveness, could protect the United States-and its allies-from the threat of nuclear war by enhancing deterrence and elimInating the military utility of nuclear attack. Moreover, increasingly effective defenses would provide a measure of insurance and protection from irrational or accidental nuclear attack.
>
> Based on these conclusions, the president established the Strategic Defense Initiative to develop those technologies which show promise for effective ballistic missile defense. In March 1984, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization was established. {21}

Advantages of the Technology approach are the emphasis on initiative, focusing on an area of comparative strength, and an open mind toward change or innovation. Two pitfalls include a tendency to pay too much for the last five percent of capability, and a trend toward fewer and more valuable aim points. Another pitfall is the problem of channeling too great a proportion of defense resources into too few specialized programs at the expense of a more balanced and flexible force structure with greater numbers.

Fiscal

The Fiscal approach to force planning is budget driven. Overall dollar constraints are established at the outset based on a criterion such as a percentage of gross national product or the Federal budget. Within the dollar limits, other planning approaches are integrated to make the most of what is available.

The primary strength of the Fiscal emphasis is that resources for defense are placed in context with the overall state of the economy and the political emphasis of the public at large. A second advantage is that additional focus is placed on efficiency and effectiveness. Since the cost-of-ownership of current forces will constrain the amount of resources remaining for research and modernization, there is considerable incentive to operate efficiently.{22}

A primary weakness of the Fiscal approach is that it may not be realistically related to the threat-particularly over the long run. Closely associated with this point is the issue of cycles. The size of the Department of Defense argues against frequent or severe changes in direction. Rapid growth cycles can be just as difficult to manage as sharp down cycles. Policies and guidance may change rapidly, but short-term shifts are difficult to implement efficiently in such a large organization. A predictable, steady and long-term growth path should be used in dealing with a steadily growing long-term adversary. A final pitfall of the Fiscal approach is the additional emphasis placed on service rivalry at the expense of the best way to handle threats or opportunities. Service rivalry is always present in the planning process, and within reasonable bounds it forms an important part of the checks and balances which characterize our representative form of government. However, when planning starts with a fiscal emphasis, the focus tends to be on the apportionment of overall resources instead of the optimal combined arms solution to common problems.

The purpose of this paper was to consider some of the more common approaches to force planning. Each was taken in isolation to provide an understanding of its respective merits and limitations. However, during an actual force planning cycle, some or all of the approaches will be used and melded together to arrive at decisions. The one that dominates will depend on circumstances such as a change of administration or a technological breakthrough.

There are three sound reasons for understanding these approaches. First, it is useful for students, practitioners and critics to recognize that there is more than one approach to force planning. Secondly, understanding the strengths, weaknesses and biases of each approach can result in better decisions. Finally, it is important to understand that different approaches tend to lead to alternative solutions.

Notes

1. Richmond M. Lloyd and Dino A. Lorenzini, " A Framework for

Choosing
Defense Forces," Naval War College Review, January/February 1981, p. 46. [1.C.1]

2. Caspar W. Weinherger, Annual Report to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1984 (Washington: US Govt. Print. Off., 1983), p. 18.

3. Donald E. Nuechterlein, "National Interests and National Strategy: Back to Basics," presented at the Ninth National Security Affairs Conference, National Defense University (Washington: 9 October 1982). [1.B.2 and 2.C.3]

4. William W. Kaufman, Planning Conventional Forces 1950-1980 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 20. [7.B.1]

5. Trevor N. Dupuy, "Strategy for Victory or Defeat,"Air Force Magazine, April 1983, p. 80.

6. Steven Canby and Ingemar Dorfer, "More Troops, Fewer Missiles," Foreign Policy, Winter 1983-84, pp. 11-13.

7. US Army Dept., Operations, FM 100-5 (Washington: 20 August 1982), pp. 1-5.

8. Robert S. McNamara, "Statement," US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1963-67 Defense Program and 1963 Defense Budget, Hearings, 19 January 1962 (Washington: US Govt. Print. Off., 1962), p. 9.

9. Ibid., pp. 7, 35.

10. John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980), p. 185.

11. Kaufman, see pp. 4-14 for an excellent assessment of this period.

12. This matrix is adapted from one presented by Colonel William O. Staudenmaier, USA, in "Strategic Concepts for the 1980s: Part I," Military Review, March 1982, p. 45. [1.C.2]

13. Rear Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, USN and Captain Ray Walsh, USN, briefing titled, "Service PPBS: A Comparative Review of Navy Programming," appearing in Center for Naval Analyses, Naval Studies Group Proceedings. Conference on The Defense Planning Programming and Budgeting
System (PPBS): Past, Present, and Future (Washington, DC: 4-6 November 1982), p. 153.

14. Ibid., p. 149.

15. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture for FY 1982 (Washington: US Govt. Print. Off., 1981). p. 26.

16. William P. Mako, U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 108.

17. Refer to Metcalf and Walsh, p. 145, for a Navy perspective. Refer to the same CNA conference report, pp. 33-53, for the Air Force approach in a presentation by Colonel James B. Donahoe, USAF, titled "Air Force Wide Mission Area Analysis: A New Tool for PPBS."

18. US Army Dept., The Army Plan Appendix: 1986-2000 (U) (Washington: December 1983), pp. 30-31.

19. Harold Brown, "What's Behind the B-1 Cruise Missile Decision," Commanders Digest. 15 September 1977, pp. 3-11.

20. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)/Allied Command Europe (ACE). ACE Output, January 1985, pp. 1-10.

21. Lieutenant General James A. Abrahamson, USAF, "The Strategic Defense Initiative," Defense, August 1984, p. 3.

22. James W. Abellera and Rolf Clark, "Forces of Habit: Budgeting for Tomorrow's Fleets," AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review, v. 3, nos. 2 and 3, 1981, p. 5.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 3.C.2

* * *

Excerpts from A Primer on Force Planning

Robert P. Haffa, Jr.

This primer seeks to foster understanding of force planning basics by focusing on the following:

The baseline force: What are current force levels? How were they reached?

The adequacy of the force: How capable are current US forces of meeting anticipated contingencies? How can we test those capabilities?

The future of the force: If deficiencies are demonstrated, on what basis should the United States plan its forces to remedy those deficiencies?

An answer to the first question calls for a description and explanation of the basis for the planning behind existing US military forces. In a time when force planning is too often thought of in relation to some percent of the gross national product, this methodology is frequently overlooked. Explaining this methodology highlights the rational methods and prudent choices used to construct the baseline force. The central thesis of this study answers the second question. A rational framework for planning military forces based on test of their adequacy-threat assessment, campaign analysis and quantitative modeling-exists and has been used effectively. A realistic conclusion addresses the third question: methods used successfully in the past should not be carelessly cast aside as the United States embarks on a major military improvement program-but reemphasized as balance is restored to the nation's budget.

Although the fundamentals of force planning are admittedly incomplete, they are all too often forgotten in analyses that stress bureaucratic outcomes of defense decision making and international perceptions of force capability. Today, far too many defense debates are cast in terms of dollars rather than in terms of objectives, missions, and forces. My purpose here is to argue that a more satisfactory method of understanding the baseline force and evaluating programs to improve it is to estimate the extent to which existing and planned forces can meet national objectives and commitments. Planned

---

Reprinted from Rational Methods, Prudent Choices: Planning U.S. Forces, by Robert P. Haffa, Jr., National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 1988.

increases or reductions in those forces must be related to their capability to meet those goals.

What Force Planning Is

Force planning is subsumed under defense policy, which in turn acts in support of United States national security policy and foreign policy. One of the best ways to distinguish between force planning and other elements of defense policy is to differentiate among policy levels. This approach is not new. Writing in Foreign Affairs in 1956, Paul Nitze distinguished between declaratory policy-statements of political objectives with intended psychological effects-and action or employment policy-concrete military objectives and plans employing current forces in support of those objectives. {1} Nitze also saw the requirement to match the two levels closely, lest declaratory policy appear hollow or employment capability inadequate. But that fit has never been perfect.

Nitze's concept has since been refined. Donald Snow and others have inserted a policy level between declaration and employment: force development and deployment. {2} Force planning is the development of forces flowing from the requirements of declaratory policy or the shortfalls in employment policy. Force development planning should, therefore, unite a declared strategy and the means to implement it. Snow also noted some important differences between the levels. Declaratory Policy is the strategy of the elected political leaders. Therefore, it is the most political level, subjected to cosmetic if not comprehensive change during election cycles. Declaratory policy is also the level at which most academic debate is focused; it is the most public decision level. Employment or action policy, on the other hand, lies in the domain of the military. It demonstrates remarkable continuity, even in the face of political change. Often it is highly compartmentalized and protected from public view; strategic nuclear employment policy is the most secret decision level.

What of force planning? A split exists in this middle kingdom of decision levels. Those with a micro-perspective on force planning tend to concentrate on weapons system acquisition. Case studies abound in documentation of the difficulties of weapons system development. The majority of these analyses ultimately explain the acquisition process as a nonrational, political-military-budgetary compromise. This, of late, has been the most maligned decision level.

But the macro-perspective on planning US military forces may be the most ignored decision level. The concern at this level is not with what individual weapons systems are procured but what military forces are required to meet specific contingencies. The units of analysis are not single M-1 tanks or F-111 aircraft but collective forces of strategic missiles, army divisions, or carrier battle groups. Judgments are required not only on the size and structure of the force, but also on the mix of force

modernization, readiness, and sustainability. Force planning must be related to declaratory and employment policy in a rational way. This study assesses the importance of such an approach to force planning.

Given these three policy levels-declaratory, force development, employment--what would a rational force planning process look like? While there is an obvious difficulty in attempting to link these levels, an ideal process can be designed. The declaratory policy should come first: incorporating objectives formulated by political leaders enjoying popular support. The employment policy should follow: utilizing existing forces to accomplish the declared strategy. Force planning is third: developing forces in support of declared policy and designing forces to overcome shortfalls in contingency war plans. Finally a budget emerges: within given constraints, supporting the planned and programmed force.

Even dilettantes of defense policy who do little more than glance at newspaper headlines will recognize that the current force planning process does not work this way. There is not a close link between declaratory and employment policy; there is, instead, a great gap. To a certain extent, this gap will always exist. The danger is that, in a strategy-force mismatch, the choices too often become stark: reduce US commitments abroad or expand defense budgets to meet all comers. When defense policy is reduced to such simplistic terms, force planning becomes programming. Programming ends with a budgetary battle in which arbitrary across-the-board cuts are made to fit fiscal guidance fashioned by committee. This emphasis on defense spending cannot be characterized as a rational way to plan US military forces.

There is another way. It has been applied and applied successfully. The baseline force in both strategic nuclear and general purpose forces derives from rational methods of contingency planning. When tested with these methods and models, much of the baseline force appears adequate. Planners may reach prudent choices by employing these rational methods when they consider improvements to documented deficiencies in the force structure. Programmers may also wish to return to these methods as they seek more modest defense growth in the late 1980s and 1990s.

What Force Planning Is Not

If the rational chain of the force planning process is continued, the result should be a budget. Since 1961, the Defense Department has constructed its budget through the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, referred to as the PPBS. Force planning is not the PPBS, and this study does not attempt to explain that system. {3} Indeed, Washington wags have suggested that the first "P" in PPBS is silent. They may be close to the truth. In theory, knowledge of the PPBS helps to understand the force planning process and its need for rational input.

The planning cycle is actually the longest of the series of events in the PPBS. Joint and service staff force planning starts as much as a

full year before the initial development of the OSD-directed Defense Guidance. Thus there is plenty of time for planning and analysis. But a major disconnect occurs within this process. The service and joint force planners submit a "planning force"--levels required to meet declared policy with reasonable assurance of success. The Defense Guidance responds with fiscal constraints to be used by the services in preparing their programs.

Consequently, the Defense Guidance ends the planning process and turns the attention of would-be defense planners to programs and budgets. The concept of moving from a minimum risk force to a constrained force can be valuable if accompanied by a rational process to consider and make explicit the political cost of increasing risk as the dollar cost declines. But there is no meaningful coordinated joint force planning process that makes trade-offs within these areas. Instead, we usually find a bureaucratic battle of service-oriented programs and across-the-board budgetary cuts, revising, as Lawrence Korb writes, the would-be rational policy of moving from declared goals to forces to funding. {4}

The actual process is too familiar. The administration decides on the size of the total federal budget and allocates some of that to defense. Further distributions apportion money required to execute the program among the services (called Total Obligational Authority, or TOA). Programming takes place based on allocation. Planning is left behind. Such an emphasis on funding focuses on "how much" and disregards the important questions of "what for, how many, and how well." Thus, once the planning cycle has been put to rest, the real business of defense takes over. The services dominate the programming cycle with their separate roles, missions, and agendas. Here decisions are made, not only on weapons programs, but on what kind and on how many forces can be acquired
based on service desires and resource limits.

In the budgetary phase, the President and the Office of Management and Budget review the programs passed on by the Secretary of Defense. Ultimately, the Congress gets several shots in what has by now become merely a fiscal exercise. First a budget resolution establishes a ceiling on expenditures. Congress then embarks on a lengthy and multi-committeed exercise to authorize and appropriate the funds. It micro-manages the remnants of the planning process.

By the time Congress has matched its target with its final budget, the planning force, or some rational version of it, has been forgotten. Although the final budget may vary considerably (higher or lower for separate line items, depending on the political and economic climate) from the President's budget, the alterations often demonstrate little consideration of those forces planned against assessments of enemy threats. Rather, these changes in expenditures are often based on constituent interests and short-term political perceptions, and often evidence a tendency to reduce the "fast money" of pay, allowances, and

operations and maintenance costs rather than to cut "big ticket" items. Thus programming, primarily, and budgeting, ultimately, rule the PPBS. Rational force planning, a realistic matching of national commitments and forces based on threat assessment and resource constraints, is unachievable in a system dominated by parochial interests. Fiscally constrained strategy does not have to be developed; it is already a reality.

Parenthetically, force planning is not simply systems analysis, although analysis is an important part of rational force planning. Systems analysis bashing is considered good sport these days, principally by agencies and individuals feeling threatened by force and budgetary analyses emanating from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. {5} These laments frequently culminate in the accusation that systems analysts are closet strategists who, given any encouragement at all, will eagerly fill the void between declaratory and employment policy. Analysts have, at times, played that role, but probably more because other actors abdicate that function than because of their own ambitions. Most analysts would agree that they should not make decisions and should not set goals or assign priorities. But analysis can assist the force planning decision process.

Analysts pursuing rational force planning as a link between declared policy objectives and their implementation will also admit to shortcomings. At times, economic graphs have been allowed to sweep over less quantitative political judgements and military expertise. Analysis has been used in pursuit of political goals as well. But analysts also will argue that their influence is less than they desire or their opponents fear. {6}

From this parenthetical discussion, a larger question emerges: what could substitute for analysis in the systemic planning of military forces? Some argue for military experience, yet force planners assert that decisions must be a judgmental blend of analysis and experience with civilian control imperative. Others argue that analysis omits important, unquantifiable variables. Yet there are indices, imperfect but important, that can weigh the training, morale, and maneuver of opposing forces over varying terrain. The most difficult issue to reconcile is that of perception. Notions of strategic superiority or conventional parity have great political appeal but little meaning to the force planner. Static measures of comparison and fuzzy ideas of how forces are perceived by allies and adversaries are poor guides to rational force planning, and likely guarantors of unlimited budgetary claims.

Planning US Military Forces. Rational force planning is an analytical process designed to link declaratory and employment policy. To that end it assesses the military balance in possible contingencies, measures force capabilities in relation to requirements, and, after cross-program evaluation, establishes broad priorities for allocating resources. The task is big. But planning is essential in determining whether the US defense effort coherently supports US goals. Without planning, the larger

process of formulating defense policy fragments into separate, uncoordinated, and irrational programs.

Notes

1. Paul H. Nitze, "Arms, Strategy and Policy," Foreign Affairs (January 1956). pp. 187-198.

2. Donald M. Snow, "Levels of Strategy and American Strategic Nuclear Policy," Air University Review, Vol. XXXV, No. 1 (November-December 1983). pp. 63-73.

3. The intellectual roots of the PPBS are developed by Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith in How Much is Enough? (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).
Arguments favoring and opposing the system are collected in An Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System (Washington: GPO,
1969). For an inside-the-building look at the Air Force process see A Primer, The Planning, Programming and Budgetary System (Washington: DCS/Programs and Resources, Department of the Air Force, January 1987).

4. Lawrence J. Korb, "Planning, Programming and Budgeting System" (mimeographed document, 1983).

5. Two recent examples are Eliot A. Cohen, "Guessing Game: A Reappraisal of Systems Analysis," in Samuel P. Huntington, ed., The Strategic Imperative (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1982), pp. 163-192, and Stephen Rosen, "Systems Analysis and the Quest for Rational Defense," The Public Interest, No. 76 (Summer 1984), pp. 3-17.

6. For an argument that the "McNamara Revolution" failed to achieve drastic improvements in DOD organizational control, see Arnold Kanter, Defense Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).

Chapter 3.C.3

* * *

Defense Investment Strategy

William J. Perry

Not available at this time

Chapter 3.C.4

* * *

A Plan to Cut Military Spending in Half

William W. Kaufmann

Not available at this time

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 3.C.5

* * *

Budgetary and Military Effects of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty

Congressional Budget Office

Introduction and Summary

This memorandum summarizes an analysis of the costs and military effects of the proposed Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaty currently being negotiated by the United States and the Soviet Union. {1} The proposed treaty would limit the total number of strategic warheads in various categories that each country could deploy. For the most part, however, the treaty would not limit production or deployment of particular weapon systems. Thus, by altering the number of older systems that are retired, the United States could accommodate the proposed START treaty while pursuing varying amounts of modernization of strategic offensive forces.

The choice of how to respond to the proposed treaty could depend not only on the treaty but also on broader policy considerations, including budgetary limitations and future trends in military relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. To illustrate the effects of a range of possible responses to the treaty, this memorandum examines three possible U.S. responses. The United States could:

- Continue maximum modernization of strategic forces;
- Seek a balanced, cheaper triad of strategic forces; or
- Pursue minimum modernization.

Key Findings. Depending on the option chosen, this memorandum finds that long-run cost savings in a typical year could range from $3 billion to as much as $12 billion. (Savings are expressed in 1990 dollars of budget authority

---

Reprinted from Budgetary and Military Effects of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty, February 1990. Published by the Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office.

and are relative to spending on analogous systems in 1990.) The savings in any particular year would depend on decisions about specific weapon systems that are not analyzed in this memorandum.

All of the options would probably maintain the rough parity in the total number of strategic warheads that exists today between the United States and the Soviet Union. But the total number of warheads would be lower, probably by about one-quarter, for the United States.

The number of U.S. warheads that would be likely to survive a Soviet nuclear attack would decrease under these options. Depending on the nature of the attack and the option, reductions could be over 35 percent compared with today's levels. Surviving warheads are important because they measure the ability of the United States to retaliate after a Soviet attack. The U.S. ability to retaliate, one hopes, would deter the Soviet Union from attacking.

While fewer warheads would survive under all of the options, the United States would still have thousands of warheads available for retaliation after an attack. Regardless of the option and even under the most stressful type of attack, at least 2,900 warheads would be likely to survive. In most cases, the number of surviving warheads would exceed the number that would have survived a Soviet attack in 1982, before the effects of the recent buildup in strategic forces.

Proposed START Treaty

The START treaty is still being negotiated. Where issues are in contention in the negotiations, this analysis assumes that the U.S. proposals are accepted. Under the overall limits that have been agreed to, each country would be allowed no more than 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads on 1,600 delivery platforms (strategic nuclear delivery vehicles). In addition, there would be various sublimits on warheads.

Moreover, some weapons that deliver warheads would not be counted, or would be counted only partially, under the treaty. For example, bombers designed to penetrate enemy airspace would count as carrying only one warhead, even though they would actually carry a number of warheads. Also, up to 72 launchers on submarines in overhaul would not be counted under the U.S. version of the START treaty. Table 1 shows the specific assumptions about the treaty that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) used in its calculations in this memorandum.

Option I: Carry Out the Treaty but Maximize Modernization

Under one approach to carrying out the START treaty, the United States could accommodate the various limits on warheads imposed by the treaty by retiring older strategic systems and by continuing to pursue a full program of modernization. This option would be consistent with the view that, if

TABLE 1. PROVISIONS OF PROPOSED START TREATY

Limits	
Total accountable warheads	6,000
Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles	1,600
Ballistic missile warheads	4,900
ICBM warheads {a}	3,300
Heavy ICBM warheads (SS-18 type)	1,540
Special Counting Rules	
Penetrating bombers count as one warhead	
Bombers carrying cruise missiles count as 10 warheads {a}	
Seventy-two submarine-based launchers in overhaul do not count {a}	

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on U.S. government sources.

NOTE: Limitations on sea-launched cruise missiles are not being considered in the START negotiations; therefore, SLCMs are not considered in this analysis.

{a} U.S. proposal apparently not yet accepted by the Soviet Union.

strategic systems are to be fewer in number, those remaining should be as modern as possible.

Under this option, the United States would buy all of the strategic systems it now plans to buy in substantial numbers. These would include 50 Rail MX missiles, 500 Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (SICBMs), 23 Trident submarines, and 132 B-2 bombers (see Table 2). To comply with the START limits, the United States would retire older strategic systems as the new systems entered the inventory. Retired systems would eventually include all of the Poseidon submarines, B-52 bombers, and Minuteman land based missiles.

Budgetary Savings. Under Option I's approach to carrying out the START treaty, average annual costs to buy and operate these systems would eventually total about $3 billion less than the costs to buy and operate analogous systems in 1990 (see Table 3). Savings include reductions in procurement costs and in direct and indirect operating costs. {2} But virtually all of the savings under this option would come from reduced operating costs associated with smaller strategic forces. Because of the aggressive program of modernization assumed under this approach, average savings for procurement would be modest.

Long-run savings could rise to a total of $4 billion a year when overhead reductions are included. (see Table A-I.) Overhead costs-which include portions of costs for activities such as headquarters, the

training establishment, and the operation of military bases--are often assumed not to vary with relatively small changes in the number of forces. Thus, they might not vary under the options in this memorandum since they mostly alter the mix of strategic forces. However, overhead costs may vary if

TABLE 2. DETAILS OF OPTIONS
(In numbers of systems)

		Alternatives with START		
	1990 Level	Maximum Modernization	Cheaper, Balanced Triad	Minimum Modernization
Planned Systems or Those Now in Production				
Rail MX	0	50	50	0
SICBM	0	500	250	0
Trident Submarine	11	23	20	17
B-2 Bombers	0	132	66	15
Systems No Longer in Production				
Silo-Based MX	50	0	0	50
Minuteman III	500	0	295	500
Minuteman II	450	0	0	0
B-1 Bombers	97	97	97	97
B-52 Bombers	186	0	0	23
Poseidon Submarines	23	0	0	0

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

reductions in strategic forces to accommodate the START limits are made along with reductions in other military forces as a result of the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) or the general lessening of military tension. In the context of large overall force reductions, the overhead reductions associated with these cuts in strategic forces might be realized. {3}

The reader should view savings for this option, and for other options in this memorandum, as long-run estimates that apply in a typical year after all older forces have been retired and new systems have taken their place, and after procurement programs have been adjusted to accommodate the new forces. While savings reflect reductions in operating and procurement

TABLE 3. LONG-RUN SAVINGS OF OPTIONS
(In billions of 1990 dollars)

	Maximum Modernization	Cheaper, Balanced Triad	Minimum Modernization
Procurement	a/	3	6
Operating			
Direct/indirect	2	5	6
Total	3	8	12

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE: Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
{a} Less than $400 million.

costs, they do not reflect the added costs of verifying the START treaty, which cannot yet be estimated with confidence.

Effects on Military Capability. This approach to the START treaty would probably maintain the rough parity in the number of strategic warheads that exists today between the United States and the Soviet Union, but at a lower level. Today, the United States and the Soviet Union have about 11,800 and 11,000 on-line warheads, respectively, or close to a one-to-one ratio. (On line warheads include all warheads in the inventory less those whose delivery vehicles are in the maintenance pipeline or in overhaul.) After all systems assumed under this option are fully in place, the United States and the Soviet Union might have about 8,900 and 7,700 on-line warheads, respectively. {4} Thus, the ratio of warheads would still be close to one to one, but the total number of U.S. warheads would be about 25 percent smaller than it is today.

Because of the uncertainty created by the START counting rules, the preceding analysis should be viewed only as a rough guide. As was noted earlier, the rules count warheads on penetrating bombers only partially and exclude all warheads on some submarines in overhaul. Therefore, the number of warheads and the resulting ratios could vary considerably if, for example, the Soviet Union decided to expand its bomber force greatly or if the United States decided to limit its bomber force. Nevertheless, neither country would be likely to implement the treaty in a manner that sacrificed the current rough numerical parity in total warheads.

The counting rules also explain why START would reduce total U.S. warheads by only about 25 percent rather than the 50 percent reduction often associated with it. The 50 percent reduction applies to warheads accountable under START, the 25 percent applies to available (on-line) warheads.

Under this approach to carrying out START, about 7,500 U.S. warheads would be likely to survive a Soviet nuclear attack that occurred after sufficient warning that U.S. forces were brought to a wartime posture. {5} This is a reduction of about 11 percent compared with the 8,400 that would survive if such an attack occurred in 1990 (see Figure 1). The number of Soviet targets may also decrease, though perhaps not in proportion to the decline in surviving U.S. warheads. Targets associated with Soviet strategic forces would decrease as the Soviet Union carries out START. But numbers of other targets, such as leadership shelters and command and control centers, have been increasing in the recent past and could continue to do so. Hence, after START, a retaliatory strike by the United States might be able to destroy a somewhat smaller proportion of Soviet targets than would such a strike today. Some analysts might argue that this would reduce U.S. ability to deter the Soviet Union from attacking.

Nevertheless, even assuming the reductions in U.S. forces under this option, the United States would have about 7,500 surviving warheads after

DISTRIBUTION OF STRATEGIC TRIAD:
CURRENT FORCES AND
ALTERNATIVES UNDER START



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Estimates for the alternatives assume that all changes in the force structure are fully effect. For some systems, this would not occur until after the year 2000.

an attack that occurred with sufficient warning to permit U.S. forces to prepare for it. This number of warheads would be substantial and would represent about 34 percent more warheads than would have survived had such an attack occurred in 1982 (see Figure 2).

In addition to changes in quantitative measures, this maximum modernization approach to carrying out the proposed START treaty would create a highly modern U.S. strategic force. The force would contain systems such as the B-2 bombers, designed to avoid Soviet radars, and SICBMs designed to disperse widely to avoid destruction during a Soviet attack.

Option II. Seek a Balanced, Cheaper Triad

In view of political changes that may make the world less threatening, as well as pressures to reduce the deficit, the United States could respond to the START treaty by seeking a balanced and cheaper triad of strategic forces. Specifically, this option would buy 50 Rail MX missiles, 250 SICBMs, 20 Trident submarines, and 66 B-2 bombers-fewer in most cases than were purchased under the maximum-modernization option. To remain at the numerical ceilings for total warheads, 295 of the older Minuteman III land based missiles and 97 B-1 bombers would be retained.

Budgetary Savings. Long-run savings would eventually amount to $8 billion compared with the costs for analogous systems in 1990. Savings reflect reductions in procurement ($3 billion) and in direct and indirect operating costs ($5 billion). Long-run savings could rise to $10 billion a year when overhead reductions are included.

Effects on Military Capability. As for capability, this option would maintain about 8,600 on-line warheads, a number likely to maintain today's rough numerical parity with the Soviet Union. Warheads likely to survive a Soviet attack with advance warning would be fewer in number under this approach than the number that would survive today (by about 22 percent) or the number that would survive under the maximum-modernization approach (by about 12 percent). The number of surviving warheads would be smaller because thin option relies more heavily on land-based missiles in fixed silos, and these weapons are likely to be destroyed during a Soviet attack.

Surviving warheads would, however, continue to match or exceed the number that would have survived in 1982 (see Figure 2). Moreover, under this option, surviving warheads would be somewhat more evenly balanced among the three legs of the strategic triad (land-based missiles, submarines, and bombers) than is the case with current forces (see Figure 1). This shift toward more balance may contribute to the deterrence of nuclear war by limiting the potential damage that could be caused by a

Soviet technological breakthrough that threatened one of the three triad legs.

DISTRIBUTION OF STRATEGIC TRIAD:
1982 AND 1990

FIGURE 2



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

Option III. Carry Out the Treaty but Minimize Modernization

Finally, the United States could respond to the proposed START treaty in a way that would be likely to maintain rough numerical parity in total warheads but would hold down costs by minimizing further modernization. Specifically, the United States might decide not to buy any new strategic systems beyond those already purchased. That would mean no Trident submarines (beyond the 17 already under contract), no rail MX missiles, no SICBMs, and no B-2 bombers (beyond the 15 already under contract). To remain at the numerical ceilings established by the proposed treaty, the United States would retain 500 of the older Minuteman III missiles, 23 older B-52H bombers, and 97 B-1 bombers.

Budgetary Savings. This approach would result in long-run average savings of about $12 billion a year compared with the 1990 level of spending. Savings would include reductions in procurement, averaging $6 billion a year, plus direct and indirect operating savings, averaging another $6 billion a year. Long-run savings could rise to $16 billion a year when overhead reductions are included.

Effects on Military Capability. The total number of available on-line warheads would be about 8,600 under this approach, which would probably maintain a rough numerical parity with the Soviet Union. But warheads likely to survive a Soviet attack would fall to the lowest level under all of the approaches outlined in this memorandum.

In the most stressful situation for U.S. forces-a Soviet attack that occurred without advance warning-surviving warheads would fall to a level 37 percent below the current level and 23 percent below the level under the maximum-modernization approach. There would be 13 percent fewer surviving warheads than would have survived after such an attack in 1982 (see Figures 1 and 2). This decrease in the expected number of surviving warheads occurs largely because the entire ICBM force would be based in silos that would be vulnerable to a Soviet attack unless launched before Soviet missiles arrived, and because the Soviets are assumed to continue improving their missiles' accuracy and reliability so that the survivability of the U.S. silo-based ICBMs would be expected to decline even further over time. However, even after such an unexpected attack, the United States would still have about 2,900 surviving warheads to use in retaliation under this option.

In the less stressful and more likely case of a Soviet attack that occurs after some warning, the United States would have 32 percent fewer surviving warheads than would survive today and 23 percent fewer than under the maximum-modernization approach. But the 5,800 surviving warheads would represent a substantial capability, about the same as the 1982 level.

Under this approach, the United States would rely on significantly

older strategic forces than in the previous options. Relying on older forces may mean accepting reduced flexibility and effectiveness in attacking certain types of Soviet targets-such as targets super-hardened against nuclear effects or well-defended targets. Older forces, particularly the bomber force, may also be less survivable in their retaliatory mission, which is not reflected in the above counts of warheads surviving a Soviet attack. Finally, at some point some older weapon systems may require life-extending modification programs, such as reskinning the wings of the B-52 bombers. Additional costs for this purpose, however, are not likely to be incurred until well beyond the year 2000.

Timing of Savings

The estimates of savings in this memorandum represent long-run estimates that would be realized in a typical future year after all the changes in forces and systems were in effect. How quickly the savings would be realized depends on which option is chosen and how rapidly the changes are made.

Under the maximum-modernization approach, for example, it might be several years before even the fairly modest cost savings would occur. Indeed, costs could actually increase for the next few years. Under this approach, expensive procurement programs that are now in their early stages would continue. Only after the new systems are purchased and enter the inventory, and older systems are retired, would operating savings gradually be realized.

In contrast, substantial savings could occur immediately under the approach that carries out START with minimum modernization. Under that option, programs requiring large expenditures over the next few years, including the B-2 bomber, would be canceled.

APPENDIX A.
LONG-RUN SAVINGS OF ALTERNATIVES WITH REDUCTIONS IN OVERHEAD

TABLE A-1. LONG-RUN SAVINGS OF ALTERNATIVES INCLUDING OVERHEAD (In billions of 1990 dollars)

	Maximum Modernization	Cheaper, Balanced Triad	Minimum Modernization
Procurement	{a}/	3	6
Operating			
Direct/indirect	2	5	6
Subtotal	3	8	12
Overhead	1	3	4
Total	4	10	16

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE:Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.

{a} Less than $400 million.

Notes

1. Details of this analysis will be contained in a forthcoming CBO Paper analyzing alternative military force structures.

2. Direct operating funds pay for the personnel and operating costs of a particular military unit or weapon system. Indirect funds pay for combat support that is not part of the unit or system, as well as for portions of the training, medical care, repair facilities, and other support needed by the unit or system.

3. For details of CBO's assumptions regarding overall force reductions and reductions in overhead costs, see forthcoming CBO Paper analyzing alternative military force structures.

4. For this calculation of Soviet warheads, and for others in this memorandum, CBO assumes that the Soviet Union responds to the START treaty by retiring older systems and continuing its ongoing modernization programs.

5. Both countries are considering options to restrict the deployment areas of mobile ICBMs. Such restrictions could reduce the expected survivability of the SICBM, particularly in a scenario in which a Soviet attack occurred without advance warning. The survivability of the SICBM could become similar to that of the Rail MX.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Chapter 3.C.6

* * *

Budgetary and Military Effects of a Treaty Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe

Congressional Budget Office

Introduction and Summary

The United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are currently negotiating a treaty with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies that would limit conventional military forces in Europe (CFE). Under NATO's proposal, this CFE treaty would establish parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the number of major weapons held by each alliance-a step that would require disproportionately large reductions in Pact weapons. For example, the Pact would have to destroy about 37,000 tanks compared with about 2,000 for NATO. The Soviet Union would have to withdraw from Europe and demobilize 325,000 troops compared with 30,000 for the United States.

These large reductions in Warsaw Pact military forces have raised the possibility of substantial reductions in U.S. military forces and in the military budget. The prospects for such a "peace dividend" have been enhanced by recent events in Eastern Europe-notably, the opening of the Berlin Wall, reduced cohesion within the Warsaw Pact, and the move toward democratic governments in several Eastern European countries.

This paper assesses the current balance of forces in Europe and how NATO's proposed CFE treaty would affect U.S. military forces and budgets. Two options that would make even larger reductions in U.S. forces are also examined. The analysis assumes that NATO's proposals are fully accepted even though negotiations are ongoing and will no doubt result in some changes. Also, because it is not clear how long it will take to reach agreement on, ratify, and carry out a CFE treaty, budgetary effects are assessed for

---

Reprinted from Budgetary and Military Effects of a Treaty Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe, January 1990. Published by the Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC.

a future period after enough time has elapsed to permit full implementation of the treaty. For the options discussed in this paper, which go beyond the reductions proposed by NATO, that period could be five years or even longer.

Finally, this paper focuses on funds allotted for the military forces directly limited by the CFE treaty-namely, the budgets of the Army and the tactical Air Force, which accounts for roughly one-third of the total Air Force budget. {1} A CFE treaty would not limit the other forces of the U.S. military naval, strategic, and marine-and so they are assumed to be outside the scope of this paper. The Army and tactical Air Force budgets together account for about 35 percent of the total 1990 budget for the Department of Defense (DoD), a proportion that readers should bear in mind when assessing the size of savings achieved. The remainder of this section summarizes CBO's key conclusions.

Effects of NATO's Proposed CFE Treaty. Today's balance of military forces in Europe heavily favors the Warsaw Pact. Based on CBO's analysis, which takes both the quantity and quality of weapons into account, the current capability of the Pact's ground forces in the central portion of Europe where most U.S. forces in Europe are stationed in peacetime-exceeds NATO's capability by 20 percent to 90 percent, depending on how long both sides have to mobilize their forces. (Ground forces are defined as Army units intended to fight primarily on land.) Throughout Europe, the capability of the Pact's tactical aircraft exceeds NATO's capability by about 20 percent. (Tactical aircraft include the fighters and bombers that would attack enemy targets in the air and on the ground using conventional munitions.)

Once NATO's proposed version of the treaty has been carried out, NATO and the Warsaw Pact would have roughly equal capability on the ground, and NATO would have a significant advantage, about 32 percent, in the capability of its tactical aircraft. These large improvements in the balance of forces should sharply reduce the risk that the Warsaw Pact could successfully invade NATO countries.

In contrast to the sharp reduction in risk, the proposed treaty would result in only a modest reduction in the U.S. military budget because few U.S. weapons and personnel would be eliminated. CBO used an
illustrative reduction that would meet the requirements of the treaty in order to estimate potential budgetary savings associated with the treaty. This potential reduction included withdrawal of two-thirds Of one Army division and 1 1/3 wings of fighter aircraft from Europe-a total of 30,000 troops (25,900 Army and 4,100 Air Force). After the treaty is fully in place and military reductions have been made, which might not occur until 1993, savings might average slightly less than $3 billion a year-about 3 percent of the budgets for the Army and tactical Air Force, and less than 1 percent of the total DoD budget. Savings

reflect reductions from the level of funding in the 1990 budget in both operating and procurement costs, but they do not reflect added costs of verification, which cannot currently be estimated with confidence.

Option I: Make Larger Reductions in U.S. Forces for NATO but Maintain Adequate Geographic Coverage. The United States could decide that the reduction in military tensions that would follow in the wake of a CFE treaty, coupled with political changes in Eastern Europe, would allow it to commit an even smaller force to NATO. Although this approach would forgo some of the reduction in military risk afforded by the treaty, it would also realize greater budgetary savings by eliminating more U.S. military forces than required by the treaty. Reductions could involve U.S. forces stationed in Europe, those based in the United States that would reinforce European forces in the event of war, or both.

The United States might, for example, eliminate about 20 percent of the current ground and tactical air capability that would support its NATO allies early in a war. This approach could involve eliminating 22/3 of the Army's 18 active divisions and 5 2/3 of the Air Force's 35 active and reserve wings. Slightly more than 143,000 personnel would be cut from the Army and the tactical portion of the Air Force.

If NATO allies matched the U.S. reductions, as seems likely, the Warsaw Pact would have more weapons than NATO. But even with this 20
percent reduction, the balance of forces would be better than today's balance. Also, NATO's remaining forces should be able to mount a forward defense of the long inter-German border without having to withdraw to better defensive positions deep within West Germany.

A reduction in forces of 20 percent from current levels would eventually result in larger budgetary savings than those offered by the treaty itself. However, these reductions might not be initiated until after the treaty had been fully carried out. Furthermore, reducing the Army and the Air Force by more than 143,000 people could take several years. In an average year after full implementation of this option, sometime in the late 1990s, savings from the 1990 budget level could amount to $12 billion. These savings represent 12 percent of the affected portion of the defense budget, and 4 percent of DoD's 1990 budget.

Option II: Make Reductions in U.S. Forces for NATO Proportional to Pact Reductions. If a CFE treaty is signed and ratified, the United States also could consider a large military reduction on the same scale as that required of the Warsaw Pact by the treaty. Such a reduction might be justified by recent political changes and by a desire to achieve large budgetary savings. The United States could, for example, reduce its ground and tactical air forces committed to NATO by about 50 percent from the current level-roughly proportional to the cuts that the treaty would require in Pact forces. Proportional cuts would involve eliminating 7 of the Army's 18 active divisions and 14 2/3 of the Air Force's active and reserve

wings. As many as 321,600 personnel would be cut from the Army and the tactical Air Force.

If the United States made such reductions, and the NATO allies made similar cuts, then the Pact could retain, even under the provisions of the CFE treaty, much of its current advantage in weapons and personnel. Thus, this approach would forgo the increased military security for NATO that would result from the treaty. Moreover, NATO might not have enough military forces to cover the inter-German border in a way that would permit a forward defense. By this measure, NATO could actually be at higher military risk than it is today.

Such a large reduction in forces, however, would eventually yield substantial budgetary savings. U.S. defense spending could eventually fall by as much as $27 billion below the 1990 level; about 26 percent of the combined Army and tactical Air Force budgets, or 9 percent of the total DoD budget for 1990. Full savings would probably not be realized until several years after 1993.

Effect of Political Changes on Conventional Forces in Europe. A large reduction in NATO forces might be deemed reasonable in view of political events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which make war in Europe seem highly unlikely. For one thing, the threat that the Warsaw Pact poses to Western Europe may seem less overwhelming because the Pact's cohesion can no longer be taken for granted. It is hard to predict what role, if any, non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members would play in an armed conflict. The easing of tensions between East and West that has resulted from the move toward democracy by Eastern European countries has also improved the climate for reductions in conventional forces that go beyond the currently proposed CFE treaty.

Large budgetary savings-on the order of those associated with Option II-could result from follow-on treaty negotiations, commonly referred to as CFE II. Although no formal proposals have been made, these negotiations could seek reductions of Pact and NATO forces to a level 50 percent below the current NATO level. In that case, NATO could enjoy a rough parity of military forces with the Warsaw Pact while still making reductions that would eventually reduce U.S. defense spending by as much as $27 billion a year from the 1990 level.

The Balance of Military Forces in Europe Today

The concentration of weapons in Europe is currently very high. Including weapons owned by both alliances, the region between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains in the Soviet Union--known as the "ATTU" region and covered by the ongoing CFE negotiations (see Figure 1)-currently contains almost 80,000 tanks, over 63,000 pieces of artillery, 19,300 combat aircraft, and more than 5 million ground troops organized into 292 divisions and 136 independent brigades. Indeed, the region has more than twice as many tanks today than in the fall of 1944 at the height of

World bar II. The majority of these weapons and ground troops belong to the Warsaw Pact, which enjoys an advantage of more than 2 to 1 over NATO in some categories (see Table 1). The Soviet Union operates most of the Warsaw Pact weapons, accounting for more than two-thirds of the Pact's weapons and troops, whereas the United States plays a much smaller relative role within NATO.

Region Covered by NATO's proposed Treaty Limiting
Conventional Forces in Europe



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, cutting conventional Forces 1: An Analysis of the Official Mandate, Statistics, and Proposals in the NATO-WTO Talks on Reducing Conventional Forces in Europe (Brookline, Mass.: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, July 1989), p. 20.

Numerical comparisons do not, however, tell the whole story. For example, the Pact's striking advantage in number of divisions can be partially explained by the fact that most Pact divisions contain fewer soldiers than NATO divisions. The Pact's numerical advantage in combat equipment may also be offset somewhat by the higher quality of NATO's weapons. In addition, some analysts believe that NATO troops are better trained, fed, and supplied and thus would be better able to fight.

Measuring Military Capability. Clearly, a method is needed to take into account both the quantity and quality of each side's weapons. Because of the inherent differences between air and ground combat forces, CBO used separate methods to analyze them.

TABLE 1. EQUIPMENT AND TROOPS POSITIONED BETWEEN THE

ATLANTIC OCEAN AND
URAL MOUNTAINS

	NATO			Warsaw Pact			
	Total	U.S.	U.S. Share (%)	Total	Soviet	Soviet Share (%)	Ratio NATO:Pact
Main Battle Tanks	22,224	6,000	27	57,300	37,000	65	1:2.6
Armored Personnel Carriers {a}	28,600	6,100	21	63,235	46,630	74	1:2.2
Artillery	17,328	2,232	13	46,270	33,000	71	1:2.7
Helicopters	2,599	700	27	3,880	2,850	73	1:1.5
Aircraft	6,700	700	10	12,592	9,234	73	1:1.9
Ground Troops (Thousands)	2,214	216	10	3,090	2,200	71	1:1.4
Divisions {b}	103	5 2/3	6	224 1/3	161 2/3	72	1:2.2

SOURCES: Congressional Budget office based on Congressional Research Service, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Negotiations: Facts and Figures (October 30, 1989); Department of Defense, CFE, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (July 1989); North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts (Brussels: NATO, November 1988);
The Analytic Sciences Corporation, Atlantic-to-the-Urals Unclassified Conventional Weapon Systems Data Base (Arlington, VA.: TASC, April 1988);
and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1989-1990 (London: IISS, Autumn 1989).

NOTE: Based primarily on NATO and U.S: assessments of alliance totals.
{a} National totals may not be consistent with alliance totals because of definitional differences between sources.

{b} Includes separate brigades and regiments. Assumes three brigades or regiments are equivalent to one division.

Ground Forces. For ground forces, CBO used a method developed by the

Army that is based on weapon effectiveness indices (WEI) and weighted unit values (WUV). {2} The WEI/WUV technique evaluates and ranks each
ground weapon of a particular type, such as an M1 tank, relative to other weapons of the same type and assigns it a score or index (WEI). Each type of weapon-such as tanks, artillery, or armored personnel carriers-then receives a weighing factor (WUV) that reflects its contribution to a combat unit's overall ability to perform its mission. For all the weapons in a combat unit, the individual indices (WEIs) are multiplied by the weighing factors (WUVs) and added up to attain a score for the unit. In this way, the ground forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact can be evaluated on a common basis, taking into account both the quantity and quality of their weapons.

To compare the combat capability of the two alliances, CBO totaled the scores of all the combat units that would fight for the Pact and compared them with the total of the scores for NATO's combat units. It then divided the Pact's total score by NATO's total score to determine a ratio of Pact capability to NATO capability. These ratios do not take into account combat attrition; rather, they represent only those forces that would be available to each side before an attack begins.

The analysis of ground forces focuses on the central region of Europe (identified in Figure 1), which is generally assumed to include the NATO countries of West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and the Pact countries of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. This region is where U.S. forces stationed in Europe are concentrated in peacetime, and where most U.S. forces would fight in the event of war. Not all of the ground forces that might be involved in a conflict in the central region are stationed there during peacetime, however. In fact, most of the forces would have to be brought in from other countries, including a large number of reinforcing units from both the continental United States and the Soviet Union. When these reinforcing units might actually arrive in the central region is a matter of some debate. This analysis used the assumptions of a study by the Department of Defense, which is one of the few detailed statements by DoD on this topic that is both unclassified and currently available. {3}

Recent press articles indicate that DoD is reevaluating the time that the Pact might need to ready its units that are not on full active status during peacetime. The mobilization rates used in this analysis assume that the least ready units would need 60 days of preparation. Units at the next highest level of readiness were assumed to be available after 15 days of preparation. Revising these times would not affect the total forces available to the Pact, but would affect the size of the advantage that the Pact would have over NATO at different points during the mobilization process. {4} Unfortunately, no unclassified details of DoD's latest estimates are available. Thus, CBO's analysis does not reflect any recent revisions of Pact mobilization rates.

This analysis also assumes that all members of each alliance would participate in a major war. Recent events in Eastern Europe cast doubt on this assumption, particularly with regard to the participation of the Soviet Union's Eastern European allies. The military significance of the forces of these countries is discussed later in this paper.

The calculations of forces available to the Warsaw Pact do not reflect recent unilateral reductions in Soviet forces. The reductions announced by President Gorbachev in December 1988 involve 5,000 tanks and six divisions and are still in the process of being realized in Soviet units in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Recent reports from Eastern Europe indicate that these reductions are being made, but not quite as expected. {5} Some equipment and personnel are being reassigned rather than eliminated from the Soviet military. When and if all of Gorbachev's announced reductions are carried out, the impact on Soviet forces available to oppose NATO will be measurable--a 10 percent to 24 percent reduction in forces available shortly after mobilization--but not large enough to offset the Pact's current advantage. Because of the uncertainty surrounding these reductions, they are not reflected in the rest of this analysis.

Based on these various assumptions, CBO's analysis suggests that the Warsaw Pact has a substantial advantage in the central region of Europe. Figure 2 shows the ratio of scores for Pact forces in the central region to those for NATO during the first 90 days after the Pact mobilizes for war. The ratio peaks at about 1.9 on the fourth day after Pact mobilization begins and before NATO can respond on a large scale. The ratio drops to about 1.2 after nine days when all of NATO'S divisions stationed in the central region during peacetime are ready for combat, and then stabilizes at a value of 1.6 or slightly higher through the seventy-fifth day after mobilization begins. Although these advantages are significant, they may not be sufficient to ensure the success of a Pact attack, especially since the WEI/WUV method describes the situation on the ground only.

Air Forces. The Warsaw Pact enjoys markedly less advantage over NATO in the air than on the ground. Indeed, under some assumptions, Warsaw Pact air forces are inferior to NATO air forces. In the region between the Atlantic Ocean and the Oral Mountains, the Pact has many more aircraft than does NATO. According to NATO's assessment, the Pact has 12,592 combat aircraft in the ATTU region compared with NATO's 6,706-an advantage of about 2 to 1.

The Pact advantage may, however, be smaller than these numbers suggest. The Pact's numerical total includes more than 4,000 trainer aircraft, which may not be fully capable of performing combat missions. The Pact total also includes about 1,800 interceptor aircraft designed primarily to defend the Soviet Union. Some analysts question whether these interceptors would play a significant role in an invasion of Western Europe. Moreover, some

Figure 2.
Current Ground Force Ratios in the European Central Region



Figure 2. Current Ground Force Ratios in the European Central Region

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense data
and William P. Mako, U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983).

NOTE: Based on data available in mid-1989. Does not reflect unilateral Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe. Warsaw Pact forces include those from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

NATO aircraft not in Europe in peacetime could be introduced into the theater during a war, including more than 1,400 additional U.S. aircraft based in the continental United States that could arrive within 10 days after NATO started to mobilize. If total numbers of aircraft are adjusted for these factors, the Pact's numerical advantage appears less formidable.

As with ground forces, these numerical tallies do not reflect the variations in quality among the many types of aircraft in each alliance. To account for differences in quality, CBO used a method called TASCFORM,

developed by The Analytic Sciences Corporation. In a manner similar to the WEI/WUV method used for the ground forces, TASCFORM assigns scores to
each type of aircraft. {6}

Taking into account the quality of Pact and NATO aircraft through application of the TASCFORM scores reduces the Pact's advantage because NATO's aircraft are more sophisticated and more capable. While Pact aircraft in the ATTU region outnumber NATO aircraft by a ratio of 1.9 to 1, the ratio of TASCFORM scores is only about 1.6 to 1 before the arrival of reinforcements from the continental United States (see Figure 3).{7} The Pact advantage would be even smaller if trainer and interceptor aircraft are assumed not to be used in combat.

Despite its large advantage in tactical aircraft throughout the ATTU region, the Pact is at a disadvantage when only those tactical aircraft based in the central region are considered. Although aircraft are more mobile than ground forces, the early stages of a conflict in a particular region might initially involve only the aircraft stationed there. The availability of ground facilities could also limit the number of additional aircraft that could be brought into the central region from the rest of the ATTU area. Before the arrival of reinforcements, NATO air forces in the central region outscore the Pact by a ratio of 1.3 to 1 using the TASCFORM system (see Figure 3). After the arrival of reinforcements from the United States and the Soviet Union, NATO outscores the Pact by a ratio of 1.5 to 1.



Figure 3. Current Air Force Ratios in Europe

SOURCE: Compiled by the Congressional Budget Office based on data from
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1989-1990 (London: IISS, Autumn 1989); The Analytic Sciences Corporation,
Atlantic-to-the-Urals Unclassified Conventional Weapon Systems Data Base (Arlington, Va.: TASC, April 1988; and The Analytic Sciences corporation,

The TASCFORM Methodology: A Technique for Assessing Comparative Force
Modernization (Arlington, Va.: TASC. January 1984).

NOTE: The ATTU region extends from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. The analysis assumes that all reinforcing aircraft arrive in the ATTU region within 14 days of Pact mobilization. The ratios depicted between zero and 14 days after mobilization are not meant to imply detailed knowledge of the exact arrival schedule of reinforcements. They are presented here only to give an indication of the impact of reinforcements on the air force ratios.

What the Ratios Mean. The measures of air and ground combat capability used in this study are crude and subject to important limitations. Neither the TASCFORM nor the WEI/WUV method takes into account losses during combat. Thus, the methods show the availability of weapons but do not predict the likely outcome of war. Nor do they account for the aptitude and training of the soldiers and pilots operating the weapons. Both methods also ignore the contribution of noncombat capabilities such as logistics support, communications, and medical equipment. Finally, the scores and weights are, to some extent, subjective. Despite these limitations, both methods provide a simple way to assess the approximate level of combat capability.

The WEI/WUV method reveals a clear advantage for the Pact in ground forces in the central region. Would this advantage be sufficient to ensure success if the Pact decides to invade Western Europe today? Many defense experts feel that, because the defender can choose the place to defend, an attacker must attain a ratio of ground forces of at least 3 to 1 in a local area in order to overwhelm the defender. There is less agreement, however, on what ratios are needed in the central region as a whole in order to achieve the required local advantage while still providing enough forces elsewhere to prevent an enemy breakthrough. Although experts differ widely, ratios ranging between 1.2 to 1 and 2 to 1 are commonly suggested as the minimum theater-wide advantage that the Pact would need to have confidence of succeeding in an attack. {8} CBO's analysis suggested that the ratio of Pact to NATO forces generally hovered around 1.6 to 1-above the level that some experts believe could lead to a Pact victory, but well below the threshold cited by other analysts.

Consequently, CBO's analysis leads to the conclusion that the Pact could not be confident of obtaining a military victory. The Pact's advantage on the ground is substantial but not overwhelming; it may not be enough to ensure quick success. Moreover, the ground advantage may be offset somewhat by the superiority of NATO air forces in the central region. Nor could the Soviet Union know ahead of time whether its allies would fully support an invasion or how quickly NATO would respond. Unfavorable assumptions about either of these factors would reduce

significantly the Pact's advantage in ground forces. All these uncertainties make it hard for Pact planners to be confident of victory, and so add to deterrence. This uncertainty has probably helped to maintain the peace in Europe for 40 years.

Nevertheless, NATO military commanders have long argued that, if the Pact decided to attack NATO, they would have no choice but to resort quickly to the use of nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe. General Bernard Rogers, former Supreme Commander of NATO, has said repeatedly that he would be forced to seek permission to use tactical nuclear weapons within days of a Warsaw Pact invasion. Military commanders may have used conservative assessments in reaching such a conclusion, but their concerns have fostered strong interest in negotiating reductions in the Pact's military advantage through an agreement to limit conventional arms. Recent political events have made reductions of conventional forces in Europe a real possibility in the near future.

Effects of a CFE Treaty on the Military Balance in Europe and on the U.S. Defense Budget

Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have submitted the outlines of their proposals for a treaty limiting conventional arms at the CFE negotiations in Vienna. Although the submissions are not identical, they are surprisingly similar with respect to the ground force equipment each side would be allowed to retain. Most important, the Warsaw Pact has accepted NATO's longstanding position that the Pact must reduce its forces to a level equal to NATO's forces. The analysis that follows is based on NATO's proposed treaty. Major differences between the two proposals are noted, however, because those differences could well lead to revisions in NATO's proposal.

NATO's Proposal. In general, NATO's proposal for a treaty limiting conventional forces in Europe would reduce to equal levels the number of weapons held by each alliance in various categories. The proposed ceilings are purposely set below current NATO holdings (see Table 2). Although NATO would have to reduce its weapons holdings in various categories by between 2 percent and 27 percent, the Pact would have to make much larger reductions, as high as 65 percent. Proposed ceilings differ for various categories of equipment, as does the size of the reductions that would have been made.

Ground Equipment. NATO proposes that each side would be allowed to station in the ATTU region no more than 20,000 tanks; 28,000 armored personnel carriers; 16,500 pieces of artillery; and 1,900 helicopters. Because the Pact starts with large numerical advantages in ground equipment, it would have to make much larger reductions than NATO. For example, the Pact would have to eliminate 37,300 tanks compared with only about 2,200 for NATO.

The Pact proposal includes similar ceilings for most ground equipment, but has different definitions of what would be counted. For example, the Pact would include light tanks, as well as main battle tanks, in its limit of 20,000 tanks, whereas NATO would count only main battle tanks. Similar disagreements exist with regard to definitions of armored personnel carriers and helicopters.

Aircraft. NATO proposes a limit of 5,700 on all land-based combat aircraft, including aircraft used for training and the Soviet interceptors that the Soviet Union claims would be used primarily to defend its homeland. This limit would require NATO to reduce its inventory of these aircraft by 15 percent and the Pact by 55 percent. Disagreements between NATO and the Warsaw Pact about aircraft are much more significant than those regarding ground equipment. The Pact would exclude some or all of the trainer and interceptor aircraft from the negotiations.

Troops. The treaty would also limit the number of U.S. and Soviet troops stationed in Europe but outside their home territory. The proposed ceiling of 275,000 On air and ground personnel would require the withdrawal of 30,000 U.S. and 325,000 Soviet troops. The Pact proposal would allow a larger number of troops in Europe but would apply the limit to all NATO and Pact troops located outside their home territory-not just those of the United States and the Soviet Union.

TABLE 2. PROVISIONS OF NATO'S PROPOSED TREATY LIMITING CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

		Proposed Reductions				
	Proposed Ceiling	NATO Number	NATO Percent	Warsaw Pact Number	Warsaw Pact Percent	Ratio NATO: Pact
Main Battle Tanks	20,000	2,234	10	37,300	65	1:17
Armored Personnel Carriers	28,000	600	2	35,235	56	1:59
Artillery	16,500	828	5	29,7706	64	1:36
Helicopters	1,900 {a}	699	27	1,980	51	1:3

Aircraft	5,700	1,006	15	6,892	55	1:7
Troops {b}	275,000	30,000	1	325,000	11	1:11

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Congressional Research Service, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Negotiations: Facts and Figures (October 30, 1989.)

{a} The ceiling on helicopters and the current NATO inventory reported by NATO (2,599) are inconsistent with a 15 percent reduction.

{b} U.S. and Soviet troops only.

NATO also proposes that all eliminated weapons be destroyed and that the U.S. and Soviet troops removed from Europe be demobilized. NATO has proposed extensive verification procedures, including the right of both sides to inspect the other's military forces. Finally, NATO asks that a treaty be signed in 1990 and be fully carried out by 1993, although doubts remain about the feasibility of this schedule.

The Implications of a CFE Treaty for the Military Balance. The large reductions in the number of Warsaw Pact weapons required by NATO's proposed CFE treaty would have profound effects on the relative combat capability of both sides. The proposal would greatly reduce the concentration of arms in Europe, although each alliance would retain large military forces. In fact, even after the treaty is implemented and more than 39,000 tanks have been destroyed, the 40,000 tanks remaining in Europe would still exceed the number deployed there during World War II. Thus, each side would still have considerable capability to wage war.

Once the treaty has been carried out, the capability of Pact ground forces-as measured by the WEI/WUV method--would almost never exceed that of NATO ground forces (see Figure 4). {9} Indeed, during most of the 90-day period after the Pact starts to mobilize, NATO would enjoy a modest advantage because of its higher quality of weapons and the time that the Soviet Union would need to prepare its less ready units and transport them to the region near the inter-German border. This situation contrasts sharply with the current balance of forces; the Pact's current capability on the ground exceeds NATO's by between 20 percent and 90 percent during the first 90 days after mobilization begins.

The effects of NATO's proposed CFE treaty on air forces would be even more favorable to NATO. The proposal would permit each alliance to

have 5,700 aircraft stationed in the ATTU region during peacetime. But aircraft stationed in the continental United States would not be limited by the treaty and would add significantly to NATO's air capability during a crisis. After these reinforcements arrived in Europe, NATO would have 28 percent more aircraft and, because its aircraft are of higher average quality, a 32 percent advantage in capability as measured by TASCFORM scores (see Figure 5). In contrast, the Pact currently enjoys an advantage in both numbers and capability in the ATTU region.

NATO's advantage could be even more pronounced in the central region of Europe. After reinforcements arrive from the United States, NATO could enjoy an advantage of 2.6 to 1 in capability based on the TASCFORM method
(see Figure 5). This large advantage results in part because of the following assumptions: that, in complying with NATO's proposal, each Warsaw Pact member reduces its total holdings by the same proportion; that within broad types of aircraft, such as fighter-bombers, reductions are made proportionately; that the least capable aircraft are eliminated first; and that the remaining Soviet aircraft would not be redistributed from their current location. This disadvantage in air capability in the central region would be minimized if the Pact accommodated the proposed limits in a different manner. But NATO's proposal would almost certainly leave NATO with some advantage in air forces, both in the central region and in the entire ATTU region.

Figure 4.
Ground Force Ratios in the European Central Region Under NATO's Proposed CFE Treaty



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Congressional Research
Service, conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Negotiations: Facts and Figures (October 30, 1989).

Budgetary Savings Resulting from a CFE Treaty. NATO's proposed CFE treaty
would require it to reduce its inventory of selected weapons by as much as 27 percent. Assuming that all members of the alliance reduced their inventories proportionately, the United States would have to remove from Europe and destroy 600 tanks, 122 armored personnel carriers, 112 pieces of artillery, 189 helicopters, and 105 aircraft. To reduce the number of U.S. Air Force and Army personnel stationed in Europe to the proposed ceiling of 275,000, about 30,000 U.S. troops would have to be brought back from Europe and demobilized.

There are, of course, many ways to accommodate these limits. In order to estimate potential budgetary savings, CBO constructed an illustrative withdrawal that included two-thirds of one Army "heavy"

division (that is, a full division minus one of its three brigades) and 1 1/3 wings of F-16

Air Force Ratios in Europe Under
NATO's Proposed CFE Treaty



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Congressional Research Service, conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Negotiations: Facts and Figures (October 30, 1989).

NOTE: The ATTU region extends from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. The analysis assumes that all reinforcing aircraft arrive in the ATTU region within 14 days of Pact mobilization. The ratios depicted between zero and 14 days after mobilization are not meant to imply detailed knowledge of the exact arrival schedule of reinforcements. They are presented here only to give an indication of the impact of reinforcements on the air force ratios.

---

fighter aircraft. {10} The troops assigned to these units, and those that support them, would total 30,000--including 25,900 Army and 4,100 Air Force personnel (see Table 3).

The operating savings associated with eliminating these units and personnel from the military would total slightly more than $2 billion a year in 1990 dollars (see Table 4).{11} These savings include money for military pay and benefits, operation and maintenance of equipment

associated with the units, procurement of spare and replacement parts, and some military construction. These savings, measured from the 1990 budget, would not be fully realized until the reductions associated with the treaty were made. Based on the current schedule for implementing the treaty, the cuts may not be completed until 1993.

TABLE 3. EFFECT OF NATO'S PROPOSED CFE TREATY AND OPTIONS ON THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE

	1990 Level {a}	Reductions Treaty	Option I	Option II
	Army			
Active Military Personnel	764,000	25,900	113,400	246,000
Active Divisions	18	2/3	2 2/3	7
Reserve Divisions	10	0	0	0
	Air Force			
Active Military Personnel	567,500	4,100	29,800	75,600
Active Tactical Wings	23	1 1/3	4	10
Reserve Tactical Wings	12	0	1 2/3	4 2/3

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office Based on Department of Defense data.

NOTE: Option I would provide sufficient NATO forces to cover the entire inter-German border. Option II would make reductions in U.S. forces for NATO proportional to reductions in Pact forces resulting from the CFE treaty.

{a} Based on Congressionally authorized end strengths for 1990.

TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF ANNUAL BUDGETARY SAVINGS
(In billions of 1990 dollars)

	Operating and Support {a}	Long-Term Procure-ment {b}	Total Annual Savings	Percentage Reductions in Army and Tactical Air Force Budgets
Reductions Required by NATO's Proposed CFE Treaty	2	{c}	3	3
Option I: Make Larger Reductions in U.S. Forces for NATO but Maintain Adequate Geographic Coverage	10	2	12	12
Option II: Make Reductions in U.S. Forces for NATO Proportional to Pact Reductions	22	5	27	26

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense data.

{a} Includes share of overhead

{b} Long-term procurement savings are based on proportional reductions in procurement budgets for the Army and tactical Air Force.

{c} Less than $500 million.

Further savings would also be achieved in procurement funding, because the fewer remaining units would not need as much modern equipment. If the annual procurement budgets for the Army and tactical Air Force were reduced by the same proportion as the force structure, then almost half a billion dollars could be added to the annual savings in an average year, resulting in total savings of almost $3 billion a year.

These savings would be a small percentage of the total defense dollars spent each year for the Army and tactical Air Force. In 1990, funds for these forces accounted for about $103 billion, or approximately 35 percent of the total budget for the Department of Defense. The estimated annual savings of $3 billion amounts to about 3 percent of the combined Army and tactical Air Force budgets for 1990, and less than 1 percent of the entire DoD budget for that year.

Costs of Verification. It is difficult to predict how much it will cost the United States to verify compliance with the proposed CFE treaty. History provides no guidance because the United States has not been involved recently in such a treaty. Moreover, basic decisions that will greatly affect the costs of verification, such as the frequency of inspections at military installations and production facilities, have not yet been made. Because verification costs cannot be predicted with confidence, they are not included in any of the cost estimates in this study.

It is fair to assume, however, that the costs associated with verifying compliance with a CFE treaty could substantially reduce the annual savings of $3 billion attributable to the treaty. Implementation of the INF treaty, for example, costs the United States about $150 million annually. These funds pay for destroying U.S. INF missiles, monitoring the Soviet Union's destruction of its missiles, monitoring several sites in the Soviet Union, and escorting the Soviet inspectors who are monitoring the single U.S. production site. While compliance with the INF treaty required each country to destroy hundreds of missiles and to monitor a small number of sites, carrying out a CFE treaty could require each alliance to destroy thousands of weapons and to monitor many production and storage sites. Thus, verification costs associated with the CFE treaty could conceivably be many times those associated with the INF treaty.

Overall Assessment of the Impact of NATO's CFE Proposal. NATO would enjoy substantial benefits if its proposed CFE treaty were carried out. The Warsaw Pact would have to make much larger reductions in its personnel and inventories of weapons than would the NATO allies, leaving NATO in a much better military position, both on ground and in the air, than it enjoys today. As a result, a CFE treaty would enhance NATO's conventional deterrence and reduce the risk of NATO's having to resort to nuclear weapons in response to a Pact attack. In short, military risk would be sharply reduced.

While the reduction in risk is substantial, budgetary savings would be modest. Moreover, even these modest savings would be offset, perhaps to a substantial degree, by the costs of verifying compliance with the treaty. If larger budgetary savings are to be achieved, then NATO will have to consider forgoing some of the reduction in military risk offered by the treaty.

Options for Larger U.S. Force Reductions

The proposed CFE treaty could reduce the combat capability of the Warsaw Pact on the ground and in the air by as much as 50 percent. NATO's combat capability, however, would be reduced by a much smaller fraction, about 8 percent or less. An attack by the Warsaw Pact might be highly unlikely, however, in view of the pact's greatly reduced military forces, the economic problems plaguing its members, and the reduced cohesion within the Warsaw Pact as many of its members move toward democracy. Given this situation, the United States and its NATO allies might decide to make larger cuts in their military forces than are required by the proposed treaty, thereby achieving larger budgetary savings.

To illustrate the effects of larger reductions, this paper examines two options. The first would attempt to provide NATO with enough forces for adequate geographic coverage while still producing moderately larger budgetary savings than those associated solely with the treaty. The second would make reductions of 50 percent in U.S. forces currently committed to NATO-proportional to those that would be made by the Warsaw Pact under the treaty and would produce even larger budgetary savings. Both options would reduce U.S. forces stationed in Europe as well as those forces that are stationed in the United States during peacetime but are intended as reinforcements for NATO in time of war.

Since the focus of this paper is on changes in the U.S. military that might occur as a result of the completion of a treaty limiting conventional forces in Europe, the options were constructed with the same limitations in mind. Only those forces that would be limited by a CFE treaty-forces of the U.S. Army and the tactical Air Force were considered as candidates for elimination from the U.S. military. The options that CBO analyzed therefore do not include reductions in naval, marine, or strategic forces. Nor are any reductions assumed in funding for the defense agencies that support the U.S. military as a whole, or in research and development programs.

Although this study focuses on budgetary changes in the Army and the tactical portion of the Air Force because those parts of the defense budget would be directly affected by the proposed CFE treaty, other portions of the defense budget could be affected indirectly. For example, if there are fewer Army divisions to support during a major European war, then fewer aircraft carriers and submarines may be needed to protect convoys headed for Europe. More important, if arms limitations of the sort in the proposed CFE treaty convince the United States that its national security is less threatened, then it may elect to make reductions in other defense forces, such as naval or strategic forces, even if they are not at all related to the treaty. Reductions in the 65 percent of the defense budget not addressed in this paper would obviously increase savings. Such reductions, although possible in the face of reduced threat, cannot be directly attributed to a CFE treaty and are therefore beyond the scope of this

paper.

The options considered here would remove units and personnel completely from the Army and tactical Air Force, resulting in a smaller U.S. military. One alternative to this approach would be to remove units from the active military and put them in the reserves. By placing units in the reserves, the United States would retain the capability to reinforce NATO, albeit at a slower pace than is possible today. Retaining some residual capability would come at a price, however. Although reserve Army units are much cheaper to maintain than active units, reserve Air Force units are almost as expensive to operate and support as active units, in part because of the high level of training required of reserve pilots. Although this paper focuses on eliminating active forces because such reductions produce large budgetary savings, placing such forces in the reserves is certainly an alternative that merits serious consideration.

Both options examined in this paper include reductions that go beyond those required by any treaty that is likely to be signed in the next year. As such, they would most likely be considered as actions that would be taken after the provisions of a CFE treaty have been carried out. Thus, the process for making the reductions included in the options might not be initiated until 1993. Furthermore, the larger reductions associated with the options, several divisions and tactical air wings, could take several years to complete if they are to be made without significant disruption to the armed services or to local economies. The full annual savings associated with each of the options, therefore, might not be realized until several years after 1993.

Option I: Make Larger Reductions in U.S. Forces for NATO but Maintain Adequate Geographic Coverage. Some analysts have argued that, regardless of the threat from the Warsaw Pact, a minimum number of combat units would be required in the central region to cover adequately the entire 750-kilometer border between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. They claim that a minimum force is required to provide adequate firepower along the border and to provide enough personnel to maintain communications. Adequate geographic coverage is particularly important if NATO is to mount a forward defense near the inter-German border, rather than withdraw to better defensive positions deep within West Germany. A forward defense has been NATO's strategy since the 1960s.

A recent RAND analysis proposes an illustrative minimum force required for adequate geographic coverage in the central region. {12} That force would consist of 27 ground combat divisions equivalent in firepower to a U.S. armored division. Providing enough personnel to ensure adequate communications would require 32 divisions, each containing 16,500 troops; roughly the number in a heavy U.S. division, or an equivalent number of divisions containing a total of 528,000 combat personnel. This force would have to be in place at the start of a Pact invasion, assumed here to begin 15 days after the Pact starts to mobilize

its forces. NATO, therefore, could have up to two weeks after the Pact starts to mobilize to amass a force containing at least 27 equivalent divisions of firepower and 528,000 combat personnel. {13} Finally, in addition to these minimum forces, RAND argues that NATO would need to
field forces sufficient to match the total capability of Pact forces that would be available in the central region.

According to CBO's analysis, NATO could reduce by 20 percent its air and ground forces that would be available 15 days after the Pact starts to mobilize and still have enough forces in the region to meet the criteria defined above. This 20 percent reduction from current levels would contrast with the much smaller reduction required by the CFE treaty (roughly 4 percent in U.S. military forces for NATO) and would produce larger budgetary savings. A 20 percent cut in U.S. forces for NATO would mean 2 2/3 fewer active Army divisions and 5 2/3 fewer Air Force tactical fighter wings. As many as 113,400 soldiers could be eliminated from the active Army, and another 29,800 could be eliminated from the Air Force (see Table 3).

Only 1 2/3 of the 2 2/3 divisions eliminated from the Army would come from U.S. forces stationed in Europe; the other division would be one of those stationed in the United States during peacetime but intended as a reinforcement in the event of a major war in Europe. Of the Air Force reductions, 1 2/3 active wings would come out of Europe. The remaining reductions would come from among active and reserve wings stationed in the United States.

Savings. Budgetary savings associated with these reductions could total as much as $12 billion a year, relative to the 1990 budget about 12 percent of the funds for the Army and tactical Air Force and 4 percent of the total DoD budget. This figure compares with annual savings of about $3 billion if the United States makes only the cuts required by the proposed treaty. As noted above, none of these estimates reflects the costs of verifying compliance with the CFE treaty.

TABLE 5. POTENTIAL ANNUAL SAVINGS ASSOCIATED WITH OPTION I (In billions of 1990 dollars)

(Table with figures)

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense data.

NOTES: Army units are active heavy divisions; Air Force units are tactical wings.

O&S - operating and support; CONUS continental United States.

a. Direct O&S costs are those tied to individual units. Examples include civilian and military pay, fuel, some supplies and spare parts, modifications, and munitions.

b. Indirect O&S costs pay for items that are necessary to support units, but are not linked as closely to particular units. Examples include funds for operating bases, depot maintenance, training, management support, medical care, personnel support, logistics, and other centralized support factions.

c. Represents a proportional reduction in that portion of the service's budget for military personnel and for operation and maintenance not covered by direct and indirect factors. The proportion is based on a ratio of O&S costs for the units eliminated to the total estimated O&S costs for combat units.

d. Based on proportional reductions in procurement budgets for the Army and the tactical Air Force.

e. Less than $50 million.

Approximately $6 billion of the $12 billion in potential savings stems from reductions in operating and support costs that are associated directly or indirectly with the units that are eliminated (see Table 5). Direct costs pay for the operation of the unit itself. Indirect costs pay for combat support (for example, a portion of an artillery unit not included in a division that provides firepower for several Army divisions would be included in indirect costs for an Army division) or combat service support (for example, truck companies not assigned to any particular division that provide logistic support). Indirect costs also include portions of the costs of training, medical care, repair facilities, and other support necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the unit.

Another $4 billion of the $12 billion in savings could be realized through reductions in what this study labels "overhead." In addition to direct and indirect support, some categories of support are commonly assumed not to vary in size as the number of operating units changes, especially if such changes are small. Examples of overhead would include costs of operating headquarters and providing military support to other nations as well as portions of training, medical care, and other support costs that are assumed not to vary with small changes in numbers of units. Overhead costs might vary significantly, however, with large changes such as those assumed under this option. To illustrate the

potential for savings in this category, CBO assumed that overhead costs are reduced in proportion to the number of units that are eliminated. Thus, for example, if the Army cuts 10 percent of its divisions, overhead costs are assumed to be reduced by 10 percent.

Finally, because the Army and the Air Force would have a smaller force to equip and modernize, this option could eventually save $2 billion a year in procurement costs. As with the savings associated with the treaty, this estimate assumes that procurement costs are reduced in proportion to the reduction in the number of operating units. {14} The full amount of these reductions in procurement might not be realized for many years. For example, if a military unit had recently been modernized with a new weapon, it might be many years before another, newer version of the weapon would be required.

Military Consequences. Although a reduction of 20 percent in current NATO forces available within 15 days of mobilization would negate some of the benefits afforded by the CFE treaty, most would be retained. As was noted above, if both sides comply with the proposed treaty, then NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces would be roughly equal in combat capability; indeed, in some cases NATO would have a modest advantage. Under the 20
percent reduction assumed in this Option, the balance of ground forces shifts from the post-treaty level to one that modestly favors the Warsaw Pact, but never by more than about 20 percent (see Figure 6). In contrast, the Pact today enjoys an advantage that generally exceeds 50 percent.

The situation is even more favorable for NATO air forces in the ATTU region (see Figure 7). Even with the 20 percent reductions assumed in this option, NATO would continue to enjoy a modest advantage in air combat capability once reinforcing units had arrived from the United States.

In sum, this option would give up the parity of military forces that NATO could achieve under the proposed treaty but would retain most of the treaty's benefits. The option would enable the United States to save approximately

Figure 6.
Ground Force Ratios in the European Central Region Under Option I



Figure 6. Ground Force Ratios in the European Central Region Under Option

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense data.

NOTE: Option I would provide sufficient NATO forces to cover the entire inter-German border.

a. Based on data available in mid-1989. Does not reflect unilateral Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe. Warsaw Pact forces include those from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

b. Based on withdrawal of combat units to meet the treaty's ceilings on weapons.

$12 billion a year--a 12 percent reduction in the budgets for the Army and tactical Air Force. Moreover, NATO might still be able to field the minimum forces required to provide adequate geographic coverage and to mount a forward defense in the event of a war in Europe.

Option II: Make Reductions in U.S. Forces for NATO Proportional to Pact Reductions. This second option would reduce active U.S. Army forces and U.S. tactical Air Force units (both active and reserve) committed to NATO by 50 percent from current levels, roughly the cut that would be imposed on the Warsaw pact's ground and air forces under the proposed CFE treaty. Such a proportional reduction would not only involve major cuts in U.S. forces stationed in Europe but also large cuts in forces based in the United States that are intended to reinforce Europe in the event of war. In view of the strong pressure for military reductions in NATO countries, this option

Air Force Ratios
in the ATTU Region
Under Option I



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office Current based on Department of
Defense data.

NOTE: The ATTU region extends from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. The analysis assumes that all reinforcing aircraft arrive in the ATTU region within 14 days of Pact mobilization. The ratios depicted between zero and 14 days after mobilization are not meant to imply detailed knowledge of the exact arrival schedule of reinforcements. They are presented here only to give an indication of the impact of reinforcements on the air force ratios.

assumes that both the United States and its NATO allies reduce their air and ground forces by 50 percent.

Of course, if the United States and its NATO allies made cuts proportional to those imposed on the Warsaw Pact, then the balance of military forces would remain roughly where it is today, giving the Warsaw Pact an advantage, especially on the ground. Thus, NATO would forgo most of the military benefits afforded by the proposed treaty. A proportional reduction might be consistent, however, with the perception that an adverse balance of military forces is acceptable because political changes have made the risk of war in Europe negligible. In addition, a proportional reduction in U.S. forces for NATO would yield large budgetary savings.

Under this option, the United States would make reductions only in the active Army units slated for use during a major European war. Army reserve units would not be reduced because they are relatively inexpensive to maintain and because they help to offset the capability provided by late arriving Soviet units.

Based on these assumptions, the Army would eliminate 7 of its 18 active divisions, including 2 of the 4 2/3 divisions currently stationed in Europe and 5 divisions stationed in the United States intended as reinforcements for European forces in the event of war. As a result of these reductions, the Army would need 185,500 fewer soldiers, counting only those directly or indirectly involved with the disbanded units. If proportional reductions were also made in Army overhead, another 60,500 active-duty personnel could be demobilized. Thus, the total reduction could be as large as 246,000--leaving the Army about one-third smaller than it is today.

U.S. tactical air forces for NATO would also be reduced by 50 percent. Because operating costs for active and reserve units are more similar for air forces than for ground forces, reductions in air units are assumed to affect both active and reserve units. Specifically, this option would reduce the size of the tactical air forces by 10 active wings and 4 2/3 reserve wings (see Table 3). Counting only direct and indirect personnel, the Air Force would be smaller by about 37,100 personnel. Assuming a proportional reduction in overhead would bring the total to 75,600, which would mean roughly a 40 percent reduction in the tactical Air Force but only a 13 percent reduction in the size of the total Air Force.

Savings. Once fully implemented, possibly several years after 1993, this option could reduce U.S. defense spending from the 1990 level by as much as $27 billion a year; a reduction of 26 percent in the combined Army and tactical Air Force budgets and a 9 percent reduction in the total DoD budget (see Table 4). About two-thirds of the total savings would represent reduced funding for the Army; the remainder would come out of funds for the tactical Air Force.

Considering the Army and Air Force together, about $14 billion of the total savings of $27 billion would stem from operating costs directly and indirectly associated with the units that are eliminated (see Table 6). Another $8 billion would be saved if overhead costs were reduced in proportion to the number of units eliminated. The final $5 billion of savings would result from reductions in funds for procurement.

Military Consequences. Under this option, the balance of military forces would remain roughly at current (pre-treaty) levels. On the ground, the Warsaw Pact would enjoy a substantial advantage in conventional forces, as it does today (see Figure 8). At some points after mobilization begins, the ground capability of the Warsaw Pact, as measured by WEI/WUV scores, would exceed NATO's capability by 50 percent or more. In the air, reductions in NATO air forces would mean that NATO would have significantly fewer aircraft; in fact, Pact aircraft would outnumber NATO aircraft by one-third. Because of the technical superiority of NATO's aircraft as reflected in TASCFORM scores, however, NATO would suffer only a modest disadvantage in capability (see Figure 9).

Even though the balance of forces under this option would be similar to today's balance, some analysts would argue that NATO would be worse off than it is today. As was noted above, some analysts maintain that a minimum level of military forces is needed to provide adequate geographic coverage of the long border between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. This coverage is particularly important if NATO is to defend forward, near the inter-German border.

TABLE 6. POTENTIAL ANNUAL SAVINGS ASSOCIATED WITH OPTION II (In billions of 1990 dollars)

(graph)

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense data.

NOTES: Army units are active divisions; Air Force units are tactical wings.

O&S = operating and support; CONUS = continental United States.

a. Direct O&S costs are those tied to individual units. Examples include civilian and military pay, fuel, some supplies and spare parts,

modifications, and munitions.

b. Indirect O&S costs pay for items that are necessary to support units, but are not linked as closely to particular units. Examples include funds for operating bases, depot maintenance, training, management support, medical care, personnel support, logistics, and other centralized support functions.

c. Represents a proportional reduction in that portion of the service's budget for military personnel and for operation and maintenance not covered by direct and indirect factors. The proportion is based on ratio of O&S costs for the units eliminated to the total estimated O&S costs for combat units.

d. Based on Proportional reductions in procurement budgets for the Army and the tactical Air Force.

Assuming the force reductions under this option, NATO would probably not be able to provide the geographic coverage necessary for a forward defense. Fifteen days after the Pact begins to mobilize, NATO would be able to field only 17 divisions equivalent in combat capability to a U.S. armored division. Analysis cited earlier suggested that at least 27 such divisions would be needed to provide the necessary firepower. Nor would NATO, under this option, be able to field the equivalent of 32 divisions

Ground Force Ratios in the European
Central Region Under Option II

.

Figure 8.
Ground Force Ratios in the European Central Region Under Option II



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense data.

NOTE: Option II would make reductions in U.S. forces for NATO proportional to reductions in Pact forces resulting from the CFE treaty.

a. Based on data available in mid-1989. Does not reflect unilateral Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe. Warsaw Pact forces include those from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

b. Based on withdrawal of combat units to meet the treaty's ceilings on weapons.

---

with 16,500 troops, the minimum required in order to have sufficient personnel available to maintain communications along the entire inter German border.

A forward defense would be more feasible if the United States cut its forces by 50 percent but the NATO allies made only modest cuts in their forces. Such asymmetric changes might be justified considering the strong interest our NATO allies have in a forward defense. Asymmetric changes would also reduce the U.S. share of the costs to maintain NATO defenses. But such changes seem highly unlikely in view of the political pressure for

Air Force Ratios

in the ATTU Region
Under Option II



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense data.

NOTE: The ATTU region extends from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. The analysis assumes that all reinforcing aircraft arrive in the ATTU region within 14 days of Pact mobilization. The ratios depicted between zero and 14 days after mobilization are not meant to imply detailed knowledge of the exact arrival schedule of reinforcements. They are presented here only to give an indication of the impact of reinforcements on the air force ratios.

---

military reductions in Western Europe and in view of the sharp declines in the number of young people available for military service--particularly in West Germany.

Impact of Recent Political Changes on
Conventional Forces in Europe

The problem of having inadequate forces to guarantee geographic

coverage suggests that, with a CFE treaty accompanied by a 50 percent reduction in current NATO forces, the alliance could actually face greater military risk, at least on the ground, than it faces today. But this conclusion ignores the dramatic political changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These changes may greatly reduce the risks facing NATO even,f the allies carry out large reductions in their military forces.

Cohesion of the Warsaw Pact. One reason the Warsaw Pact might be less threatening is that its cohesion can no longer be taken for granted; it is hard to predict what role, if any, the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations would play in an armed conflict. The preceding analysis of the ground force ratios assumes that East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia--all countries that are located in the key central region of Europe--would support the Warsaw Pact in an armed attack on NATO. But in recent months, all three nations have moved toward democratic governments and more open societies. If those new governments chose not to support the other Warsaw Pact nations in an attack, but instead remained neutral, then only Soviet forces would be available to fight in the central region. Thus, the ratio of forces that Pact planners could expect in the central region would be much less favorable, even in the absence of a CFE treaty (see Figure 10). The outlook for the Pact would be even worse if these countries chose not to remain neutral and instead fought against their Pact allies.

Current Ground Force Ratios in the European
Central Region, With and Without
Full Participation of the Warsaw Pact

%G P003020.PCX;Figure 10.



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense data.

NOTE: Based on data available in mid-1899. Does not reflect unilateral Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe. The shaded area represents the potential contribution of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

a. Includes forces from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

The situation becomes even more problematic for Pact planners after implementation of a CFE treaty. With the treaty reductions in place, Pact planners--who could only count on the participation of Soviet forces in the central region--would face a balance of forces sharply in NATO's favor. In such an environment, even a 50 percent cut in NATO forces from current levels might not add substantially to military risk. Figure 11 emphasizes this point with regard to ground forces, assuming a 50 percent reduction in NATO forces and a reduction of Pact forces in order to comply with the CFE treaty currently under negotiation. The shaded area shows a range of ground force ratios depicting the contributions that the forces from Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland would make to the Pact if they fought alongside the Soviet Union and other Pact members. The top of the range suggests that a 50 percent cut in NATO forces would lead to a balance of forces that is unfavorable to NATO. However, if these countries do not fight with the Warsaw Pact, then even with a 50 percent

reduction in NATO's forces, the balance of forces is roughly equal--a great improvement over today's situation.

Ground Force Ratios in the European Central Region
Under a 50 Percent Reduction in NATO Forces,
With and Without Full Participation of the Warsaw Pact



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense data.

a. Based on data available in mid-1989. Does not reflect unilateral Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe. Warsaw Pact forces include those from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

b. The shaded area represents the potential contribution of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland to Pact ground forces after the CFE treaty has been carried out.

c. Based on withdrawal of combat units to meet the treaty's ceilings on weapons.

The risks inherent in a particular balance of military forces must also be weighed against the probability of war. The recent political changes in Eastern Europe, coupled with a Soviet Union that seems much more concerned with its own political changes and improving its faltering economy than it does about intimidating or attacking Western Europe, have seemingly reduced the chance of a war in Europe to a very low level. If the chance of war reaches a sufficiently low level, then the added risk inherent in a 50 percent reduction in NATO forces may be deemed

acceptable.

Ground Force Ratios in the European Central Region
Under Follow-on (CFE II) Treaty, With and Without
Full Participation of the Warsaw Pact



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office, based on Department of Defense data.

a. Based on data available in mid-1989. Does not reflect unilateral Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe. Warsaw Pact forces include those from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

b. Based on withdrawal of combat units to meet the treaty's ceilings on weapons.

c. The shaded area represents the potential contribution of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland to Pact ground forces under further force reductions mandated by a CFE II treaty.

Effects of Further Negotiated Reductions in Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE II). Option II may serve as an illustration of the potential budgetary effects of arms control negotiations that go beyond those currently under way. Although no formal proposals have been made, such a follow-on negotiation--commonly referred to as CFE II--could involve reductions in weapons inventories to a level of 50 percent below NATO's current holdings. If a CFE II were in place, then NATO could cut its ground forces by 50 percent and still maintain at least parity with the Pact's

military capability. Indeed, as the shaded range in Figure 12 suggests, if the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations in the central region do not fight on the side of the Pact, then the balance of forces would favor NATO by a significant amount even after NATO made a 50 percent reduction in its forces.

Notes

1. The rest of the Air Force budget provides funds for the strategic, air defense, and airlift forces within the U.S. Air Force, as well as for research and development programs, military construction, and other activities.

2. For a detailed discussion of CBO's analysis of the military balance in Europe, see Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Ground Forces and the Conventional Balance in Europe (June 1988). The WEI/WUV scores used in this paper are from a 1979 study and represent the latest data available on an unclassified basis (see Department of the Army, U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Weapon Effectiveness Indices/Weighted Unit Values III (WEI/WUV III) (November 1979)). Although 10 years old, this study included scores for weapons currently in use, such as the M1 and T-80 tanks and the Bradley fighting vehicle.

3. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, NATO Center Region Military Balance Study. 1978-1984 (July 1979).

4. For more details on the effect of Pact mobilization times on the Pact/NATO force balance in the European central region, see Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Ground Forces and the Conventional Balance in Europe, pp. 23-25.

5. House Committee on Armed Services, "Status of the Soviet Union's Unilateral Force Reductions and Restructuring of its Forces" (October 16, 1989).

6. The Analytic Sciences Corporation, The TASCFORM Methodology: A Technique for Assessing Comparative Force Modernization (Arlington, VA.: TASC, January 1984). TASCFORM scores are also discussed in Congressional Budget Office, Tactical Combat Forces of the United States Air Force: Issues and Alternatives (April 1985).

7. NATO probably would not start to mobilize its forces until it observed that the Pact was doing so. For this analysis, CBO assumed that NATO would start to mobilize 4 days after the Pact started to mobilize. All reinforcing aircraft, therefore, would arrive in theater by 14 days after Pact mobilization.

8. Andrew Hamilton, "Redressing the Conventional Balance," International Security, vol. 10, no. 1 (Summer 1985), pp. 111-136, cited in James A. Thomson, An Unfavorable Situation: NATO and the Conventional Balance,
RAND Note N-2842-FF/RC (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, November 1988), p.
21.

9. This analysis was based on the removal of entire combat units in order to meet CFE treaty limits on weapons held by each alliance. The analysis also assumes that each country in both alliances reduces its weapons inventories within each category by the same proportion.

10. An Army division of the "heavy" type that would be withdrawn consist of about 16,000 personnel directly assigned to the division and associated equipment. The heavy designation means that the division contains tanks and other heavy equipment. Divisions usually include three brigades. A wing of aircraft typically consists of 72 aircraft plus backups. A wing is usually made up of three squadrons, each with 24 aircraft. Thus, 1 1/3 wings would refer to one full wing plus an extra squadron.

11. Budgetary savings could be even more modest because of recent Congressional action. In its 1990 authorization bill for the Department of Defense, the Congress directed the Army and the Air Force to reduce their personnel in Europe by a total of 14,600 to reflect the removal of units associated with intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) under the recent treaty. Since NATO's proposed CFE treaty would establish a ceiling of 275,000 for U.S. forces in Europe, removing the 14,600 INF-related troops might mean that only 15,400 other troops would have to be demobilized in order to comply with the CFE treaty. Demobilizing fewer troops could reduce annual savings by about $550 million.

12. Paul Davis, Robert Howe, Richard Kugler, and William Wild, Jr., Variables Affecting the Central Region Stability: The "Operational Minimum" and Other Issues at Low Force Levels, RAND Note N-2976-USDP
(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, September 1989). The report stresses that the size of the minimum force is highly uncertain and depends on many assumptions. In addition, reducing NATO's forces to this minimum might require NATO to adopt new tactics in order to continue to maintain a forward defense.

13. Recent press articles have indicated that DoD has revised its estimate of how much preparation time the Pact might need before it could attack NATO. The longer preparation times suggested by the articles (up to several months) would mean more delay before war began and so would provide NATO with more time to gather its forces. Thus, longer preparation time would yield more favorable results for NATO than those discussed here.

14. Only the tactical portion of the Air Force procurement budget was included and was reduced by the same proportion as the number of tactical wings (5 2/3 out of 35 wings or 16 percent). The entire Army procurement budget was reduced by 10 percent 2 2/3 divisions out of 28 total, including the reserve divisions, because the Army must equip both active and reserve units.

CHAPTER 3.C.7

* * *

Meeting New National Security Needs: Options for the U.S. Military Forces in the 1990s

Congressional Budget Office

Introduction

Recent dramatic political changes in Eastern Europe, coupled with ore likely prospect of major arms limitation treaties, have raised the issue of whether the number of U.S. military forces (often referred to as force structure) can be significantly reduced. To reflect the wide range of possibilities, this paper examines five alternative force structures resulting from the following changes:

- The minimum changes in forces required by the CFE and START treaties;

- Possible Administration plans for reductions in active and reserve forces;

- Large active-duty reductions coupled with use of cadre divisions to maintain flexibility to rebuild quickly;

- Large active-duty reduction coupled with greater use of selected reserves to maintain flexibility to rebuild; and

- Large active-duty reductions, plus reductions in reserve forces, that assume a major decrease in security threats.

Because the Congress needs to make judgments about the eventual size and nature of U.S. military forces, this paper focuses primarily on the longrun effects of alternative force structures; that is, effects after changes in the numbers of forces have been fully made and procurement programs have been adjusted to reflect changed numbers. But the paper also discusses how quickly the manpower changes might be realized.

The long-run analysis assumes that the CFE and START treaties are in place. Both are currently being negotiated. Where important issues are in

---

Reprinted from Meeting New National Security Needs: Options for U.S. Military Forces in the 1990s, February 1990. Published by the Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC.

contention, this paper assumes that the NATO and U.S. versions of the treaties; including the lower troop ceilings proposed by President Bush in his 1990 State of the Union message are negotiated, ratified, and implemented. {1}

Force Structure Alternatives and Military Strategy. It is beyond the scope of this paper to lay out an alternative military strategy for the United States. Nevertheless, adopting the alternatives in this paper would imply changes in some aspects of U.S. military strategy. Consistent with the reduced security threats implied by the CFE treaty and recent political changes, all of the alternatives assume proportionally larger reductions in the capability of U.S. military forces most oriented toward the defense of Europe. Thus, percentage reductions are larger in the budgets of the Army, whose primary mission involves the defense of Europe, than in the forces of the Navy and Marine Corps. All of the alternatives are also designed to provide adequate numbers of active-duty military personnel to handle smaller military contingencies, such as the recent action in Panama. Moreover, all of the alternatives are intended to provide adequate active and reserve forces to permit mobilization for a future, large war.

The alternatives examined in this paper differ in the amount of flexibility they retain to rebuild U.S. military forces quickly in the event of a major war. The alternatives differ most in the total amount of reductions they assume can prudently be made, a difficult strategic decision that must be made by the Congress and the Administration.

Alternative I: Make Changes Required to Carry Out Treaties

The United States could decide to respond to the proposed CFE treaty by making the minimum changes in force structure required by the treaty and to the START treaty by making the minimum required reductions in warheads while maintaining an aggressive program of weapons modernization. Such an approach would be consistent with the view that, while the reductions in threats to U.S. national security appear to be far-reaching, they could be transitory. Thus, according to this argument, the United States should only make the minimum required changes in its military forces until the CFE and START treaties have been fully carried out and until it is clear that recent political changes will not be reversed.

Many changes in force structure would accommodate the limits in the proposed treaties. (Tables A-1 and A-2 in Appendix A detail the assumptions about the proposed treaties.) CBO assumed one such change in
order to illustrate the effects on costs and manpower. To comply with the proposed CFE treaty, CBO assumed that the United States would withdraw two heavy Army divisions and two Air Force tactical fighter wings from Europe (see Table 1 and Table A-3). These units are assumed to be

demobilized and appropriate numbers of equipment destroyed. {2} To comply with the proposed START treaty, CBO assumed that the United States would retire its older strategic forces--including land-based missiles, submarines, and bombers--but carry out its planned program of modernization in all three legs of the strategic triad (see Table 2). That would mean eventual purchase of the rail MX missiles, small ICBMs, B-2 bombers, and continued purchases of Trident submarines.

TABLE 1: CHANGES IN SELECTED CONVENTIONAL FORCE STRUCTURES

		Reductions (-)/Additions (+) Under Alternatives				
		I.	II.	III.	IV.	V.
Category	1990 Level	Required Cuts only	Possible Adminis-tration Cuts	Large Cuts With Cadres	Large Cuts, More Reserves	Large Cuts
Army Divisions						
Active	18	- 2	- 3	- 7	-7	-8
Reserve/cadre	10	0	- 2	+5{a}	+2{b}	-3{c}
Air Force Tactical Wings						
Active	24	- 2	- 5	-10	- 10	-10
Reserve	12	0	0	0	+ 5	- 5
Navy Ships						
Active	518	-11	-50	-72	-103	-108
Reserve	33	0	0	0	+ 35	0
Marine Corps Brigades						
Active	9	0	0	- 1	-2	-3
Reserve	3	0	0	0	+1	0

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

a. These would be cadre divisions in peacetime.

b. These would be reserve divisions.

c. While the equivalent of three divisions would be eliminated, only two

headquarters would be eliminated.

Except for some changes in strategic submarines associated with START, there would be no changes in Navy forces, and there would be none at all in the forces of the Marine Corps. Budgetary categories not tied directly to force structure (research and development, military construction, family housing) are assumed to remain at their 1990 level of budget authority in real terms.

Budgetary and Manpower Effects. Eventually, these force changes would result in a real reduction in the annual budget of the Department of Defense (DoD) of about $9 billion. This would leave the DoD with a budget of $282 billion, roughly 3 percent below the 1990 level of $291 billion (see Table 3). (Except where noted, all savings are specified in 1990 dollars of budget authority and are relative to defense budget authority in 1990.) About $6.6 billion of these savings (rounded to $7 billion elsewhere in this paper) would result from conventional reductions under the CFE treaty. Another $2.5 billion (rounded to $3 billion elsewhere in this paper) would result from strategic cuts under the START treaty (see Table A-4).

TABLE 2: STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS

		Alternatives				
		I.	II.	III.	IV.	V.
Category	1990 Level	Required Cut only	Possible Adminis-stration	Large Cuts With Cadres	Large Cuts More Reserves	Large Cuts,
Land-Based Missiles						
SICBM	O	500	500	250	250	0
Rail MX	0	50	50	50	50	0
Silo-Based MX	50	0	0	0	0	50
Minuteman III	500	0	0	295	295	500
Minuteman II	450	0	0	0	0	0
Bombers						
B-2	0	132	132	66	66	15
B-1	97	97	97	97	97	97
B-52	186	0	0	0	0	23
Submarines						

Trident	11	23	23	20	20	17
Poseidon	23	0	0	0	0	0

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

This $9 billion in long-run savings includes reductions in operating costs, both direct and indirect, and in procurement costs. Direct operating funds pay for personnel and operating costs of the unit itself. Indirect funds pay for combat support that is not part of the unit, as well as for portions of the training, medical care, repair facilities, and other support needed by the unit. The savings of $9 billion also include estimates of reductions in procurement, which are based on the numbers of conventional military units (divisions, wings, or ships) or strategic systems that are eliminated. For example, if particular reduction in force eliminates 2 Army divisions, the Army's procurement budget is assumed to be reduced by two twenty-eights (2 divided by the total of 28 active and reserve divisions in the Army). Appendix B describes the costing methods.

Savings under this alternative and the others in this paper do not reflect the added costs of verifying the proposed treaties. While these added costs could be substantial, it is difficult to predict their magnitude. Indeed, key decisions that will affect these verification costs are still being debated and negotiated.

TABLE 3: LONG-RUN BUDGETARY SAVINGS (In billions of 1990 dollars)

	Alternatives				
Category	I. Required Cuts only	II. Possible Adminis-tration Cuts	III. Large Cuts With Cadres	IV. Large Cuts, More Reserves	V. Large Cuts
Operating Costs					
Direct and Indirect	7	13	20	20	31
Overhead	{a}	8	13	13	19
Subtotal{b}	7	21	33	33	50
Procurement	2	5	10	9	18

RDT&E	0	0	0	0	10
Military Construction/ Family Housing	0	1	1	1	2
Total	9	26	43	43	80

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTES: Numbers may not add to totals because of rounding.

RDT&E = Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation.

See Appendix B for a discussion of costing methods.

{a} Because reductions are assumed to be made in a manner that responds to the treaties with only minimum changes, no overhead reductions are assumed.

{b} Operating costs include funding for some spare parts that are bought out of procurement funds.

As Table 4 shows, Alternative I would also eventually result in a reduction below the 1990 level of about 107,000 in the number of active-duty military personnel (5 percent of the 1990 level) and 16,000 in the number of DoD civilian employees (2 percent). Thus, under this approach, personnel reductions would be relatively modest.

Indeed, the Administration's budget proposal for 1991 would impose manpower and budgetary reductions that would accomplish a substantial portion of the long-run changes considered under this alternative. Active duty manpower reductions under the Administration's proposals for 1991 would total 38,000 below the 1990 level, about 36 percent of the cuts assumed under Alternative I. Real reductions in budget authority below the 1990 level total roughly $8 billion under the Administration plan for 1991, nearly equal to the savings under Alternative I.

TABLE 4: LONG-RUN MANPOWER EFFECTS (Number of personnel in thousands)

	Reductions (-)/Additions (+) Under Alternatives				
	I.	II.	III.	IV.	V.

Category	1990 End Strength	Required Cuts only	Possible Administration Cuts	Large Cuts With Cadres	Large Cuts, More Reserves	Large Cuts
Active-Duty Personnel						
Army	744	- 77	-132	-199	-240	-272
Air Force	545	- 22	- 61	-101	-115	-139
Navy	591	- 9	- 57	- 82	- 99	-127
Marine Corps	197	0	0	- 20	- 36	-56
Total	2,076	-107	-251	-401	-191	-594
Selected Reserves						
Army{a}	756	0	-130	0	+ 75	-149
Air Force{a}	201	0	0	0	+ 25	-19
Navy	153	0	0	0	+ 11	0
Marine Corps	44	0	0	0	+ 14	0
Total	1,155	0	-130	0	+125	-169
DoD Civilian Personnel{b}						
Army	334	- 15	- 79	-103	- 89	-132
Air Force	249	- 1	- 8	- 15	- 6	-44
Navy	337	0	- 18	- 29	- 33	-49
Marine Corps	{c}	0	0	- 2	- 4	- 7
Total	1,018{d}	- 16	-105	-149	-132	-231

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTES: Numbers may not add to totals because of rounding.

{a} Includes changes to both the Reserves and National Guard components.

{b} Reductions in civilian personnel do not include cuts made as a result of reductions in strategic forces, which were not estimated.

{c} Included in Navy numbers.

{d} Includes civilians in the defense agencies.

Effect on Military Capability. The response to the CFE and START treaties envisioned under this alternative would substantially reduce military risk, particularly the risk associated with conventional forces. In 1988, before any of the unilateral force reductions now being made by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations, the Warsaw Pact had an advantage of roughly 1.6 to 1 in ground forces in the central region of Europe (see Table 5). The ratio assumes that both sides had mobilized fully for war and is based on a scoring method that accounts for both the quantity and quality of major weapons (see Appendix C for a discussion of the method). After the CFE treaty is fully implemented, the ratio under Alternative I would fall to 0.95 to 1. Thus, NATO would actually have a very slight advantage in a post CFE environment because the treaty would require equality in the number of weapons in Europe. But NATO's weapons are modestly better in quality than those of the Pact, and U.S.-based forces that would be deployed to Europe in the event of war are not constrained by the treaty. After the CFE treaty has been carried out, the balance of tactical air forces would be even more favorable to NATO than the balance for ground forces. Currently, the ratio of Pact to NATO air forces in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region is about 1.2 to 1 after both alliances have fully mobilized (see Table 5). This ratio, like the one for ground forces, is based on a scoring method that accounts for both the quantity and quality of aircraft (see Appendix C). After full implementation of the proposed CFE treaty, that ratio would fall to 0.7 to 1.

Finally, this alternative would probably maintain the rough parity in numbers of strategic warheads that exists today between the United States and the Soviet Union, but at a lower level. Today, the ratio of on-line warheads is close to even (actually, as Table 5 shows, it is 0.9 to 1 in favor of the United States). {3} Once all changes under Alternative I are in place, the ratio would still be close to parity, but the total number of U.S. warheads would probably be roughly one quarter smaller.

The precise numbers of warheads are uncertain because of possible Soviet responses to the treaty and because of counting rules in the START treaty. The numbers assume that the Soviets choose to retire older systems in order to maximize their own modernization. Even under this assumption, numbers could vary depending on changes in bomber and submarine forces that, under START, either do not count or count only partially (see Table A-2 for a description of the counting rules). Warheads that do not count also explain why the percentage reductions in on-line warheads are less than the 50 percent reduction often associated with the proposed START treaty.

In addition to changes in the number of on-line warheads, there would be a decline of about 11 percent in the number of U.S. warheads that survived a Soviet attack in what is viewed as the most likely scenario-an attack that occurs after sufficient warning to allow U.S. systems to be deployed in ways that increase their chances of surviving (see Table 5). With fewer surviving warheads, the United States would be

able to destroy fewer targets, which could reduce deterrence. Nevertheless, under this alternative, about 7,500 warheads would still survive. This substantial total would exceed by one-third the surviving warheads that would have existed had an attack occurred as recently as 1982, before the effects of the strategic buildup of the 1980s (see Table A-5).

These shifts in the balance of military forces, particularly conventional ground and air forces, should greatly reduce the risk that the Warsaw Pact could successfully invade NATO countries.

TABLE 5: EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVES ON SELECTED INDICATORS OF MILITARY CAPABILITY

Category	1990 Level{a}	I. Required Cuts	II. Possible Administration only	III. Large Cuts With Cuts	IV. Large Cuts, More Cadres	V. Large Reserves Cuts
		Alternatives				
Strategic Forces						
Soviet/U.S. Ratio of On-Line Warheads	0.9:1	0.9:1	0.9:1	0.9:1	0.9:1	0.9:1
U.S. Number of Surviving Warheads {b}	8,400	7,500	7,500	6,600	6,600	5,800
Conventional Forces						
Ground Forces {c}						
WP/NATO/Ratio	1.6:1	0.95:1	1.0:1	1.2:1	1.3:1	1.4:1
Soviet/NATO Ratio	1.2:1	0.7:1	0.8:1	0.9:1	1.0:1	1.1:1
Tactical Air Forces						
WP/NATO Ratio	1.2:1	0.7:1	0.8:1	1.0:1	0.9:1	1.1:1
Soviet/NATO Ratio	1.0:1	0.6:1	0.7:1	0.8:1	0.8:1	0.9:1
Navy Ships						
Total	551	540	501	479	483	443
Carriers {d}	14	14	13	12	12	10

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE: See Appendix C for discussion of methods used here.

{a} Ground force ratios based on Pact forces available in 1988, before any of the ongoing unilateral reductions.

{b} Estimates assume Warning of an attack.

{c} Estimates assume enough time has elapsed so that most forces are in place.

{d} This represents deployable carriers.

Alternative II: Implement Possible Administration Proposals

Reduced military risk may permit the United States to make reductions in forces larger than the minimum ones required by the treaties. The Department of Defense (DoD) itself may propose larger reductions. DoD has not yet submitted a long-range plan that fully reflects the proposed treaties and recent political changes. However, based mainly on recent testimony by the Secretary of Defense, CBO has constructed an alternative intended to illustrate the Administration's possible long-term plan. This possible Administration plan is consistent with a strategy that emphasizes reductions in the U.S. ground and tactical air forces that would be most tied to a major war in Europe. Reductions in strategic forces would respond to the START treaty by reducing warheads but maintain an aggressive modernization program. Cuts in Navy and Marine Corps forces would be relatively modest because the reduction in commitments for these forces is less clear than for ground and tactical air forces.

Specific Force and Budgetary Changes. If a CFE treaty is in place and political changes in Europe are not reversed, Secretary of Defense Cheney has said that the United States could reduce its forces below 1990 levels by five Army divisions and five Air Force tactical fighter wings. Army documents state that three of those five divisions would be active divisions; the other two would be reserve divisions. In the absence of any firm information, this alternative assumes that all five Air Force wings would come out of the active forces.

Secretary Cheney has also suggested that, even with a START treaty in place, he would favor an aggressive program of strategic modernization. Thus, this alternative assumes the same strategic program as in Alternative I--retirement of older systems coupled with continued modernization in all three legs of the strategic triad.

Secretary Cheney has not discussed what specific changes might be made in naval forces, though he has suggested that some changes could be made. For the sake of illustration, this alternative assumes that the United States eliminates one aircraft carrier and the escort vessels and support ships associated with the carrier. In addition, this alternative assumes the elimination of 10 submarines and all 4 battleships. Together these changes would result in a reduction of 39 conventional ships from current levels. As the older Poseidon strategic submarines retire and are replaced with Trident submarines, there would eventually be 11 fewer strategic submarines, bringing the total reduction in ships to 50 (see Table 1 and Table A-6 for details).

Under this alternative, spending for research and development is assumed to remain at its 1990 level in real terms, while spending for military construction and family housing is cut in proportion to reductions in the rest of the DoD budget.

Budgetary and Manpower Effects. Eventually, this possible Administration plan would reduce the annual defense budget by about $26 billion. The resulting DoD budget would be about $265 billion, roughly 9 percent below the 1990 level. If accomplished in even increments over five years, these savings would result in an annual real reduction in the defense budget of nearly 2 percent a year-the target adopted by the Administration in its budget proposal submitted in January 1990.

About $23 billion of the $26 billion in savings would be achieved through cuts in conventional forces; the rest would result from reductions in strategic forces. Percentage reductions in the budgets of the Army and tactical Air Force would be significantly larger than those in the budgets of the Navy and Marine Corps.

These total savings of $26 billion include savings in procurement and in direct and indirect operating costs. In addition, about $8 billion of the total savings are achieved through reductions in "overhead." CBO defines overhead as total operating costs less those operating costs that can be associated directly or indirectly with military units (divisions, wings, ships). {4} Thus, overhead includes portions of training, medical care, base operating support, and logistics facilities, which are often assumed not to vary in size as the number of operating units changes, especially if such changes are small.

Overhead costs might vary significantly, however, with larger changes such as some of those envisioned under this alternative. To illustrate the potential for savings, CBO estimated overhead savings from a particular reduction in military forces assuming that overhead is reduced in proportion to the direct and indirect operating costs for those forces. For example, if a particular reduction in forces cuts direct and indirect costs by 10 percent, that reduction in force is assumed to save 10 percent of total overhead costs. (See appendix B for discussion of the costing method.)

These overhead savings raise an important issue for the Congress. Achieving reductions in overhead will require choices beyond the decision to eliminate a military unit. For example, proportional reductions in overhead would certainly require closing and realigning military bases. It may also be difficult to achieve reductions in overhead--particularly the proportional reductions assumed by CBO--for relatively small force changes, such as the cut in the Navy fleet assumed in this alternative. For relatively small changes in forces, part or all of overhead may indeed be fixed. However, if substantial reductions in overhead are not achieved when larger reductions are made in military units, then cost savings from force cuts would be significantly smaller, and more military units would have to be eliminated to achieve the same total amount of savings.

Alternative II would reduce military manpower. Active-duty manpower would be reduced by 251,000, about 12 percent of the 1990 level. About 30 percent of this cut would be associated with reductions in overhead. Civilian personnel would be cut by 105,000 or 10 percent. Almost three-quarters of these reductions in civilian personnel would come from overhead positions. Finally, under these possible Administration proposals, there would be a reduction of 130,000, or 11 percent, in the number of personnel in the Army components of the selected reserves (that is, in the reserves who are paid to drill on a part-time basis in peacetime).

Effects on Military Capability. The effects of this alternative on strategic forces would be identical to those described under Alternative I. This alternative would, however, forgo some of the improvements in the balance of Pact and NATO conventional forces that would be available to NATO if it followed Alternative I and simply carried out the treaty. For example, after full mobilization of forces, the ratio of Pact-to-NATO ground forces in the central region of Europe would be slightly greater than 1 to 1 under this alternative, less favorable for NATO than the ratio of 0.95 to 1 if NATO only made cuts required by the treaty. This analysis assumes that all the NATO allies make reductions in their ground forces proportional to those made by the United States but that the Warsaw Pact makes only the changes required by the Treaty.

While less favorable than the ratio that would result from carrying out the treaty, the one under this alternative would still be substantially better than the 1988 Pact-to-NATO ratio of 1.6 to 1. Moreover, political changes in Eastern Europe may mean that NATO would only have to be concerned about the threat from Soviet forces. Under this assumption, the ratio of ground forces under this alternative is a favorable 0.8 to 1.

The balance of tactical air forces suggests a similar story. The ratio of Pact-to-NATO capability would be about 0.8 to 1 under this alternative. This ratio would be substantially more favorable than the current balance of 1.2 to 1 but not as favorable as the ratio of 0.7 to 1 that would exist if NATO made only the minimum changes required by the

proposed CFE treaty. If NATO need concern itself only with the Soviet threat, however, then under this alternative the ratio returns to the favorable level of 0.7 to 1.

Alternative III: Make Large Active Force Reduction but Retain Flexibility to Rebuild with Cadre Divisions

This alternative assumes that the world becomes, and remains, a safer place to live and that military forces can be reduced much more substantially than the reductions currently suggested by the Administration's statements. Reductions under this approach would remain relatively larger in ground and tactical air forces, where the reduction in threat is clearest, and more modest, but still substantial, for strategic forces and for Navy and Marine Corps forces.

This alternative also assumes that the political situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, while not returning to the pre-Gorbachev era, remains uncertain for many years. In this environment, the United States may want to retain the flexibility to rebuild its military forces in less time than would be required if all the trained personnel and equipment associated with demobilized active-duty units were to be eliminated. To retain this flexibility, this alternative proposes to establish cadre divisions in the Army.

Specific Force and Budgetary Changes. Specifically, this alternative, like all those in this paper, assumes that the United States would retain the rough numerical parity of strategic warheads it enjoys today, but at the lower levels consistent with START. Under this alternative, however, procurement of new systems would be reduced in all legs of the triad by buying fewer B2 bombers, fewer Trident submarines, and fewer small ICBMs than were assumed to be purchased under the preceding two alternatives. To maintain total numbers of warheads, the United States would retain some of its older Minuteman III land-based missiles.

For conventional forces, this alternative assumes that active ground and air forces designed primarily to defend Europe could be reduced by about 50 percent-roughly the reduction in total capability required of the Warsaw Pact by the proposed CFE treaty. That would mean a reduction of 7 Army divisions (including 2-1/3 of the divisions in Europe, half of the total) and 10 tactical fighter wings (including 4 of the wings in Europe, half of the total). Five Army divisions would be converted to cadre status.

Because the reductions in military threat and peacetime commitments are less clear, the percentage reduction in Navy and Marine Corps forces is assumed to be smaller than those for Army and tactical Air Force units. Some of these Navy and Marine Corps forces are designed to maintain U.S. military presence in peacetime and to defend against contingencies other than a war in Europe, missions whose importance may

not have been altered by the proposed treaties and political changes in Europe. Nevertheless, other Navy and Marine Corps forces are committed to defending Europe, and therefore some reductions are likely. By way of illustration, CBO assumes a reduction of 58 conventional Navy ships (including 2 aircraft carriers and all 4 battleships) in addition to the eventual net reduction of 14 strategic submarines associated with the addition of Trident submarines and the retirement of the older Poseidon submarines. One Marine expeditionary brigade (one-third of a division) would be eliminated from active service. In keeping with the reduced likelihood of a European war, the mission of this brigade-assisting in the defense of Norway in the event of a major war-is assumed to be taken over by existing Marine reserve units. The method for determining costs for other budgetary categories (research and development, military construction, family housing) remains the same as in Alternative II.
Flexibility to Rebuild with Reserves. These large cuts in active forces, particularly in the Army and Air Force, would reduce U.S. ability to rebuild its military forces quickly in the event of an increase in security threats. To avoid further loss, this alternative does not reduce the size of the selected reserves in any service.

Flexibility to Rebuild with Cadre Divisions. Flexibility to rebuild under this alternative is enhanced by keeping in cadre status five Army divisions that are eliminated from full active-duty status under this alternative. This approach would involve retaining on active duty a cadre of about 3,000 senior non-commissioned officers (pay grades E-6 and above) and officers (pay grades 0-2 and above) for each division. Their mission would be to remain ready to fight a war in Europe by maintaining up-to-date war plans, performing limited training, and maintaining equipment. {5} In the event of war, the unit would be filled out with individual ready reservists (people who have had active duty service but are not in the selected or drilling reserve). Only those individual ready reserve (IRR) personnel who have been off active duty for fewer than 18 months would be assigned to fill out these cadre divisions.

The Federal Republic of Germany currently maintains cadre units and apparently plans to expand their use. German cadre units are quite similar in concept to those proposed here, though they differ in some of the details of their design.

This cadre concept has some potential drawbacks. Individual ready reservists would be located all over the United States in peacetime, and it might be difficult for all of them to respond immediately to a mobilization call. Thus, to ensure rapid ability to mobilize, more IRR personnel may have to be assigned to units than there are spaces. The peacetime cadre of 3,000 persons might not be large enough to maintain all of the equipment adequately, thus requiring civilian funding beyond what is assumed in this alternative. The active-duty military might take an unfavorable view of assignment to these cadre units in peacetime because there would be few if any soldiers to lead. This situation might lead to the assignment of less than the best qualified active-duty

officers to the cadre divisions.

Finally, the active Army-smaller by about 25 percent under this alternative-would have to revamp its personnel policies significantly in order to build up the pooh of IRR personnel who have had active-duty experience. For example, the Army might have to accept more of the shorter, two-year initial enlistments and restrict the number allowed to reenlist. Doing so could add to training and other costs related to higher personnel turnover. But these additional costs would be largely offset by lower payroll costs caused by the increase in junior personnel. An extra $130 million is included in this alternative to cover CBO 's estimate of the net addition to costs.

Despite the added costs and potential drawbacks, cadre divisions, once mobilized, should offer at least as much military capability as selected reserve divisions. The IRR personnel who would fill out the cadre divisions in wartime would not have trained together before mobilization as would those in selected reserve units. But all IRR and other personnel in the cadre division would have the experience that comes with service on active duty. In contrast, only about half the personnel in a typical ground division of the selected reserve would have served a substantial period in an active duty unit.

Moreover, cadre divisions offer a means of retaining, at least for a number of years, the capability of some of the high-quality, well-trained personnel who are now in the U.S. military. Should world events shift in a way that requires a return to a large peacetime military, the talents of these individuals would provide a basis for rebuilding U.S. military forces.

Finally, because of recruiting problems, cadre divisions may be the only way to maintain some ability to rebuild as many as five divisions. Selected reserve units must recruit in small geographic areas so that personnel can travel to units for weekend drills. Adding a large number of selected reserve divisions may not be feasible in view of the limited number of areas where additional recruiting potential would be favorable. Moreover, about half of the recruits entering the Army's selected reserves have served on active duty. If the active Army is reduced by seven divisions, as this alternative assumes, then in the long run fewer of these recruits with prior service would be available, further exacerbating recruiting problems.

The potential advantages of cadre divisions, coupled with the risks inherent in what for the United States would be a new concept, suggests the need for some form of test. The Army might, for example, create one or two cadre divisions and evaluate the success of the concept before attempting to create five of them.

Budgetary and Manpower Effects. In the long run, Alternative III would reduce the annual DoD budget by about $43 billion. This cut would leave

DoD with a budget of about $248 billion, a reduction of roughly 15 percent below the 1990 budget level. Most of these savings (about $33 billion) would stem from changes in conventional forces, with strategic forces contributing the remainder. Savings would be larger in percentage terms in the budgets of the Army and tactical Air Force and smaller in the Navy and Marine Corps.

These savings would be significantly larger than the roughly $8 billion of real reductions proposed by the Administration for 1990 and larger than the $26 billion in long-run savings associated with Alternative II, which represents one possible version of the Administration's long-run plan.

As for manpower changes, Alternative III would eventually reduce the size of the active-duty forces by 401,000 personnel, a reduction below the 1990 level of about 19 percent. Civilian personnel would be reduced by 149,000 or 15 percent. As with costs, these reductions are substantially larger than those proposed by the Administration for 1991 and are larger than the reductions in Alternative II.

Effects on Military Capability. Under Alternative III, the United States would be likely to maintain the rough numerical parity of strategic warheads with the Soviet Union that it enjoys today, though at lower START levels. Compared with 1990 levels, however, there would be a reduction of about one-quarter (22 percent) in the number of strategic warheads likely to survive a Soviet attack that occurred after a period of warning. This lower number of warheads could reduce U.S. ability to cover targets during a retaliatory strike and so could adversely affect deterrence.

Nevertheless, the United States would still have about 6,600 surviving warheads after an attack with warning, a substantial number that exceeds the number available in 1982. Moreover, under this alternative, surviving warheads would be divided more evenly among the three legs of the strategic triad, a balance that could enhance deterrence by minimizing the risk associated with a sudden technological breakthrough that threatens one or two legs of the triad.

Under some assumptions, the balance of conventional ground capability would not be as favorable to NATO under this alternative as it would be under the proposed CFE treaty. Assume that the Warsaw Pact makes
only the force reductions required by the CFE treaty. Assume also that U.S. allies in NATO reduce their forces by 50 percent, similar to the U.S. reduction. In this case, the ratio of ground forces after full mobilization would stand at 1.2 to 1. That would be less favorable to NATO than what would exist under the proposed CFE treaty (0.95 to 1).

Moreover, the cadre divisions that are assumed to be created under this alternative would be slower to mobilize than active forces. The ratios cited in this paper assume that both sides have mobilized most of

their divisions. U.S. active-duty divisions could mobilize for war within a few weeks. The cadre divisions created under this alternative would require several additional weeks. Thus, slower mobilization under this alternative would adversely affect military capability in the early days of a war.

While the ratio after mobilization is less favorable under this alternative than the one under Alternative I, it is substantially more favorable than the 1988 ratio of 1.6 to 1. Moreover, certain factors could make the ratio under this alternative more favorable to NATO. The recent political changes in the Eastern European nations suggest that they may not join the Soviet Union in any attack on NATO. If only Soviet forces are assumed to oppose NATO, then the ratio of ground forces is a favorable 0.9 to 1 under this alternative. If the NATO allies create cadre divisions of their own, rather than just eliminating forces, the ratio would also be more favorable. Trends in ratios of tactical aircraft tell a similar story.

As for naval forces, the number of deployable ships would decline by about 13 percent below the expected 1990 level under this Alternative III. As was noted above, there is no simple measure that would permit calculating the shift this would cause in the balance of U.S. and Soviet naval forces.

Alternative IV: Make Large Active Force Reduction but Retain Flexibility to Rebuild with Selected Reserves

This alternative adopts the same view as Alternative III. The world is a safer place to live, which permits substantial reductions in active-duty forces and particularly in the ground and tactical air forces. But the United States needs to retain the flexibility to rebuild its military forces reasonably quickly. In contrast to Alternative III with its cadre divisions, this alternative retains flexibility by transferring some active-duty units to the selected reserves.

Specifically, this alternative makes the same changes in strategic forces as were made under the preceding alternative. It also assumes the same reductions in active-duty forces in the Army and tactical Air Force. But, to retain flexibility, this alternative transfers two divisions to the Army selected reserve components and five tactical fighter wings to the Air Force selected reserve components. Reflecting the reduced requirements for moving material, this alternative also assumes the elimination of nine active duty airlift squadrons (whose planes are designed to transport material). About half of the planes eliminated from active duty are assumed to be used to add seven reserve squadrons. {6}

Changes in the Marine Corps are larger than those in the preceding alternative so that, after mobIlization, the same number of units would be available. Two Marine expeditionary brigades are eliminated from active service, one of which is transferred to the reserves. Thus, after mobilization, the net reduction of one brigade is the same as the

reduction under Alternative III.

The reduction in active-duty Navy ships is also larger under this alternative than under Alternative III so that the number of units available after mobilization is roughly the same. Some 89 conventional ships (103 including the submarines eliminated in response to the retirement of older Poseidon submarines and START) are eliminated from the active-duty Navy, 35 of which are transferred to the selected reserves. Therefore, after mobilization, the net reduction of ships is similar to that under Alternative III.

Budgetary Effects. Eventually, this alternative would reduce the annual DoD budget by about $43 billion. This would leave DoD with a budget of about $248 billion, roughly 15 percent below the 1990 budget level. These savings are identical to those under the preceding alternative. As under Alternative III, most savings stem from reductions in conventional forces ($33 billion of the total), and percentage reductions are larger in the budgets of the Army and tactical Air Force than in the Navy and Marine Corps.

Some substantial one-time costs could result from creating additional reserve units. Reserve units must be dispersed geographically so that enough personnel can be recruited. That requires building new armories and new facilities at airfields and ports. CBO is currently working with the military services to develop estimates of the size of these added one-time costs. Preliminary results suggest that several billion dollars of one-time costs could be incurred. One-time expenditures would be incurred in the first year or two after this alternative was implemented. In contrast, savings from eliminating active-duty units would be relatively small in the first year or so as units were demobilized, which suggests that near-term savings associated with this alternative would be smaller than those associated with Alternative III.

Effects on Manpower and Reserve Recruiting. Under this alternative, reductions in active-duty personnel would eventually total 491,000, a 24 percent reduction below the 1990 level. Civilian cuts would amount to 132,000, about 13 percent. This alternative would add 125,000 personnel to the selected reserves, an increase of 11 percent.

It would be difficult but probably feasible to recruit these added reserve personnel if the transition to a larger reserve were done over a number of years. The required number of new recruits would increase substantially. For all reserve components, increases in required enlisted recruits would average 16 percent above 1988 recruit levels (the latest year for which detailed data are available) if the reserve forces were increased in size in even steps over a period of five years. An increase of 11 percent over 1988 enlisted recruit levels would be required to sustain the larger number of reserve personnel once it is achieved. {7} Moreover, recruits would have to be increased in geographical areas where

new reserve units were located. This requirement would pose problems for all reserve components, but the problems would be especially difficult for the Navy, which can locate reserve ships only at selected ports that have adequate facilities.

Reserve recruiting efforts would initially be aided, but eventually would be harmed, by the large reductions in the size of the active-duty forces envisioned under this option. While they were taking place, many personnel would be leaving active duty. Some of these personnel would no doubt join the reserves, which would help increase their numbers. However, once the new, lower level of active-duty personnel is reached, fewer people would be leaving active duty than is the case today. This situation would exacerbate the long-run problem of reserve recruiting.

Despite these potential problems, the Army has indicated to CBO that it could recruit enough additional reserves to add two reserve divisions. Moreover, in recognition of potential recruiting problems, especially the problems that would occur after all the reductions in the active-duty forces had been carried out, the long-term savings under this alternative reflect added costs of about $600 million for additional reserve recruiting incentives. This amount represents a rough estimate of added recruiting costs that would be required under reasonable assumptions about the response of reserves to higher pay. The added funds could be used to increase educational benefits or to pay larger cash bonuses to recruits. Added funds could also be used to increase the numbers of recruiters or to seek ways to reduce the high loss rates among recruits who have not yet completed their first term of service.

Effects on Military Capability. The effects of this alternative on strategic forces are identical to effects under the preceding alternative. Once forces have mobilized fully for war, there would be some differences in ground capability between this alternative and the preceding one with its cadre divisions, but the differences would not be large. After mobilization, ground capability under this alternative would be modestly less favorable for NATO than capability under Alternative III because only two of the seven divisions eliminated from active duty are converted to reserve status under this alternative, whereas Alternative III converted five to cadre status. Consequently, after 75 days of mobilization, the ground ratio under this alternative would be 1.3 to 1 compared with the ratio of 1.2 to 1 under Alternative III.

It is less clear how the alternatives would compare in ground capability while mobilization was taking place. The selected reserve divisions under this alternative would have the advantage of having trained together (at least in groups as large as Army companies) in peacetime and so might be able to mobilize more quickly. But the cadre divisions would also have advantages that could speed their mobilization: all their senior leaders would have current active-duty experience and more of their personnel would have had some active-duty experience.

In contrast to ground forces, after full mobilization, tactical air forces would be modestly more capable under this alternative than under Alternative III because this alternative places about half of the wings cut from the active force structure into the reserves; Alternative III does not place any Air Force wings in the equivalent of cadre status. {8} Thus, the ratio of Warsaw Pact to NATO forces would be 0.9 to 1 under this alternative compared with 1.0 to 1 under Alternative III.

In sum, Alternatives III and IV offer two means of retaining flexibility to rebuild forces that do not differ greatly in their cost or in the capability they would provide after full mobilization. Both offer a possible means of retaining the skills of at least some of the high-quality, well-trained personnel who are now in the military. Alternative IV relies on selected reserve divisions to retain flexibility to rebuild in the event of war. Reserves have been used for many years and so provide a proven basis for retaining capability to rebuild forces in war. But recruiting problems may prevent converting large numbers of forces to reserve status. Alternative III with its cadre divisions presents an alternative approach to retaining capability for Army forces that would avoid many of the recruiting problems. But cadre divisions represent a new concept for the United States that should be tested before it is used extensively.

Alternative V: Make Large Cuts

The United States could begin now to make large reductions in its active forces and some accompanying reductions in reserve forces. This alternative would be consistent with a judgment that political changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are far-reaching and could not be reversed without substantial warning. Large cuts would also be consistent with the seemingly high probability that the proposed CFE and START treaties will be negotiated and ratified within a year or so. Finally, large cuts would be consistent with a desire to realize large savings in the defense budget. Percentage cuts under this alternative are larger in the ground and tactical air forces, where the reduction in military threat is most clear, but reductions are substantial in all categories of forces.

Despite substantial cuts, this alternative should still provide sufficient active forces to handle smaller military contingencies, such as the recent operation in Panama.The active forces and reserves are also designed to be sufficient in size to provide a base for mobilization in the event of future major war. Under pessimistic assumptions, the reductions envisioned under this alternative could make the balance of conventional forces in Europe almost as unfavorable as the current balance. But under more optimistic assumptions, which are becoming the most realistic assumptions, the balance may be acceptable.

Specific Force and Budgetary Changes. This alternative would immediately halt further procurement of new strategic weapons systems including rail

MX missiles, small ICBMs, B-2 bombers (beyond the 15 already under contract), and Trident submarines (beyond the 17 already purchased). Older systems, including the Minuteman III land-based missiles and B-52 bombers, would be retained in sufficient numbers to remain at the START limits and to retain rough numerical parity with the Soviet Union in total strategic warheads.

As for Army divisions, this alternative would recognize reduced security threats in Europe by eliminating the same seven active divisions that were cut under the previous two alternatives. In addition, one more active Army division would be eliminated from the Pacific theater in recognition of the increased ability of nations in that region to defend themselves.

Moreover, this alternative begins with the same assumption about reductions in Army reserves that was made under the possible Administration plan (Alternative II): two Army reserve divisions would be eliminated plus enough additional reserve personnel to bring the total reduction in reserves to 130,000. In addition, this alternative would eliminate the roundout units associated with the active divisions that would be eliminated. (Roundout units are in the selected reserve during peacetime but would join their active unit in time of war.) Thus, the total reduction in Army selected reserves in 149,000, the equivalent of about three divisions.

This alternative would also impose the same cut of 10 active-duty tactical fighter wings that was assumed under the previous two alternatives. In addition, there would be a proportional cut in the reserves, leading to a reduction of about five reserve wings.

Navy ship cuts would be proportionally smaller than cuts in Army and tactical Air Force units because the reduction in military commitments is less clear. However, in recognition of reduced security threats and in an effort to achieve large budgetary reductions, this alternative would eliminate 91 conventional Navy ships including 4 carrier battle groups. Retiring older Poseidon submarines and the response to the START treaty would result in 17 fewer strategic submarines, bringing the total reduction in Navy ships to 108. One full expeditionary force-that is, a combat division (three brigades) plus a wing of aircraft-would be eliminated from the Marine Corps. Also, because of reduced airlift requirements that could accompany a lower probability of war in Europe, this alternative would eliminate 9 of the 73 airlift squadrons in the U.S. military (see Table A-6). (Airlift squadrons include transport aircraft designed to move high priority military equipment quickly in the event of war or crisis.)

In contrast to the first four alternatives in this paper, this one would also assume reductions in funding for research and development below the real 1990 level of budget. Research funds would be reduced in proportion to cuts in the rest of the DoD budget, as would funds for

military construction and family housing, resulting in a real dollar reduction of about $12 billion below the 1990 level (see Table 3).

The United States could, of course, consider reductions in forces and budgetary categories larger than those imposed under this alternative. Private analysts have in fact discussed larger cuts. However, this paper did not consider larger reductions because under some pessimistic assumptions about threats to U.S. security, larger reductions--even if coupled with the proposed CFE and START treaties--could create a Pact-to-NATO balance of ground and tactical air forces substantially worse than the one that exists today.

Budgetary and Manpower Effects. In the long run, the far-reaching changes under Alternative V would reduce the annual DoD budget by about $80 billion. DoD would have a budget of about $210 billion, roughly one-quarter lower than the 1990 level. Most of the reduction ($64 billion) would come from reductions in conventional forces. Budgets of the Army and the tactical Air Force would be cut by larger percentages than those of the Navy and Marine Corps, but all would be substantially reduced.

Reductions in numbers of personnel would also be large. Eventually 594,000 personnel would be eliminated from active duty, a reduction of 29 percent below the 1990 level. Civilian personnel reductions would total 231,000 or 23 percent. The selected reserve would also be reduced in size by 169,000 people or 15 percent.

The savings under this and other alternatives would be altered, but not greatly, by changes in the proportion of troops withdrawn from Europe. Roughly one-quarter or 150,000 of the active-duty troops eliminated under this alternative are assumed to be withdrawn from Europe (see Table A-3). This withdrawal would reduce U.S. troop levels in Europe to about one half their current level. If the Congress requires a reduction of the same total number of troops, but fewer or more are assumed to be based in Europe, then cost savings would only change slightly because the difference in cost to maintain a military person in Europe or the United States is relatively small. In terms of costs, the key decision is the number of units and troops that are eliminated, not their peacetime location.

Effects on Military Capability. Alternative V would have significant effects on forces for strategic, ground, tactical air, and naval missions. It could also affect the ability of the United States to meet the needs of smaller military interventions or to mobilize for major war.

Strategic Forces. Under this alternative, the United States should continue to retain rough numerical parity with the Soviet Union in total numbers of strategic warheads but at the lower START level. Warheads likely to survive a Soviet attack, however, would fall to the lowest level among all the alternative approaches in this paper. In the most stressful situation for U.S. forces--a Soviet attack that occurred

without any substantial warning--surviving warheads would fall to a level about 37 percent below the level that would exist after such an attack today and about 13 percent below the level that would have been available in 1982 (see Table A-5).

Moreover, under this alternative, the United States would rely on significantly older strategic forces than those under the previous alternatives. Relying on older forces may require accepting reduced flexibility and effectiveness in attacking certain types of Soviet targets, for example, targets that are heavily hardened against nuclear attacks or those that are well defended. Older forces, particularly the bomber force, may also be less able to survive these Soviet defenses. This shortcoming is not reflected in counts shown in this paper of warheads surviving a Soviet attack.

Finally, some older weapon systems may eventually require modification programs, such as "reskinning" the wings of B-52 bombers to extend their service lives. Because of their uncertain size, additional costs for this purpose are not reflected in the savings for this alternative. But any additional costs are not likely to be incurred until well beyond the year 2000.

Despite shortcomings under this alternative, U.S. strategic forces would still have substantial capability. Even after an attack without notice, the United States under this alternative would have about 2,900 surviving warheads to use in retaliation, a substantial number. In the less stressful but more likely case of a Soviet attack that occurs after some warning, the United States would have about 32 percent fewer surviving warheads under this alternative than it would have today. But the 5,800 surviving warheads would still represent a substantial capability and would be roughly equal to the 5,600 warheads that would have been available if an attack with warning had occurred in 1982.

Ground and Tactical Air Forces. Under certain assumptions, Alternative V would leave NATO with a disadvantage in ground capability similar to the one it faces today. If, in response to these large U.S. cuts, all the NATO allies make proportional cuts in their forces, but the Warsaw Pact nations make only the cuts required by the proposed CFE treaty, then the ratio of Pact-to-NATO ground forces in Central Europe would rise to 1.4 to 1, almost as unfavorable as the 1988 ratio of 1.6 to 1. This 1988 ratio was viewed by some as unacceptable. {9} Moreover, under these assumptions NATO would probably not have enough forces to maintain adequate geographic coverage of its border with the Warsaw Pact and so could not mount a forward defense near the border between East and West Germany. Therefore, the alliance could face greater military risk on the ground than it faces today.

But this situation may be substantially less worrisome in view of political changes in Eastern Europe. For example, nations in that region

might not join the Soviet Union in any attack on NATO. If only Soviet forces are considered, then after a CFE treaty the ratio of ground forces is about 1.1 to 1 even after the large force reductions assumed under this alternative. That ratio would be significantly less than the 1.6 to 1 ratio that NATO faces today and might well be acceptable to a defensive alliance such as NATO.

The story for tactical aircraft is similar. Under some assumptions, Alternative V could lead to ratios of forces similar to the ones that exist today. But if only Soviet tactical air forces are assumed to oppose NATO, then the ratios under Alternative V may be acceptable to a defensive alliance.

Navy and Marine Corps Forces. This alternative would reduce Navy and Marine Corps capability. No simple ratios are available to use in assessing the balance of Navy and Marine Corps forces. But the reduction of about 20 percent in numbers of ships (including the elimination of 4 of today's 14 aircraft carriers) and the reduction of one-third in active Marine divisions would clearly leave the United States with substantially less capability than it has today. In peacetime, for example, the United States would be able to keep only about three aircraft carriers deployed overseas compared with the four to five carriers deployed today. This smaller number could be a problem in periods of crisis, when carriers are often needed at distant places on short notice.

But the Navy could plan on using other types of ships, perhaps including larger amphibious ships for missions aimed primarily at "showing the flag." Aircraft carriers could be reserved for missions that demand the presence of highly capable fighter aircraft based at sea.

Ability to Meet Smaller Contingencies. In addition to a specific discussion of the capabilities of each type of military force, the Congress must ask if, under Alternative V, the U.S. military could meet the requirements of lesser military contingencies that seem likely to continue to occur. These include operations such as the recent one in Panama.

The answer should be yes. Since World War II, all military interventions (excluding the Korean and Vietnam Wars) at most required only a tiny fraction of the active-duty personnel who would be available under this alternative. In the largest of these operations, the recent military action in Panama, the troops attributable to the operation numbered 27,000. Under Alternative V, the United States would have 1.5 million people on active duty. Of course, many of these personnel would not be in the right place or have the right skills to meet the immediate needs of a particular military intervention. But it seems reasonable to assume that an active-duty military of 1.5 million could handle contingencies of the sort that have occurred in the last 45 years.

Ability to Mobilize for a Major War. The large reductions imposed by

Alternative V may raise more difficult questions about the ability of the United States to mobilize for a major war. Unlike other alternatives in this paper, this one makes large cuts in active-duty forces that are not offset by increases in cadre divisions or selected reserves. Indeed, the selected reserves are also reduced. Could the United States respond if world conditions changed and a major war loomed?

If it chooses the forces of Alternative V, this country would clearly be less able to mobilize a large fighting force than would be the case today. It would also be less able to mobilize than would be true if this country maintains the larger forces described under other alternatives in this paper.

Under Alternative V, however, the United States would still have about 1.5 million personnel on active duty, about the same number of personnel on active duty as it had in 1950 when the United States began mobilizing for the Korean War. {10} It would equal more than four times the roughly 350,000 personnel on active duty in 1939, just before the United States began to build up its forces in anticipation of World War II. Thus, this country would not be without a base for possible mobilization.

The key issue would be warning time. Presumably, the United States would not put in place the smaller forces defined by Alternative V until it judges that the Soviet military threat is much diminished. But if that threat begins to build up again someday, or if some other country emerges as a major security threat, would the United States recognize that change and allow itself the substantial time that would be required to reestablish a significantly larger military?

No one can know for sure. The risk of failing to build up again must be weighed against the substantial costs of retaining a large military in a period when it may not be needed.

Timing of Manpower Effects

So far this paper has focused on savings and manpower effects in a future year when force reductions associated with the CFE and START treaties have been fully carried out and procurement programs have been adjusted to reflect the smaller forces. But the Congress must put together a budget each year, and it needs to know when these savings and manpower effects might be realized.

Unfortunately, this paper cannot provide a precise answer about appropriate timing because it depends on answers to many complex questions that are not fully covered in the proposed treaties or in current Administration plans. For example, when will the CFE and START treaties be signed, ratified, and implemented? What pace of manpower and other reductions are appropriate in view of uncertainty about future

developments in the Soviet Union? Would rapid manpower and budget reductions jeopardize the NATO alliance? What pace of manpower reduction
would be fair to military employees and to defense industries and affected communities in the civilian sector?

History of Past Personnel Draw down:. Given this uncertainty, the history of past personnel draw downs might be one source of insight. Unfortunately, however, history does not provide much guidance about the potential problems associated with future draw downs.

The draw downs of active-duty personnel that seem likely over the next five years would probably be small compared with the draw downs that followed previous post-war periods. If accomplished in equal increments over five years, the largest reduction in this paper would involve reductions of about 120,000 a year in active-duty personnel. In the six years of draw down that followed the Vietnam War, the annual reduction in active duty personnel averaged about 230,000 a year. In the three years after the Korean War, the annual reduction averaged 250,000 a year.

But these wartime periods may not provide much guidance for today. After these past wars, the U.S. military contained large numbers of draftees who presumably were anxious to leave the military. Today's force is entirely composed of volunteers, many of whom want to make a career of military service.

Moreover, today's military force is more senior, which may make large reductions in personnel more difficult and costly. Today, about 53 percent of all military personnel have four or more years of service compared with 39 percent in 1974. Most of these career personnel will not want to leave, raising the specter of large involuntary separations of personnel that would be painful to carry out and could be costly in terms of separation payments.

Alternative Approaches and Effects on Outlays. The effects of these problems can be illustrated by examining three approaches to a draw down. Such an analysis can also establish the potential for outlay reductions in 1991. Each draw down assumes a reduction of 100,000 a year in enlisted personnel "end strength" (numbers at the end of the year) for each of the next five years. A roughly proportional reduction of 15,000 officers a year is also assumed. All reductions are assumed to begin in 1991. The three cases illustrate the effects of alternative policies regarding accessions, involuntary separations, and timing of manpower changes.

These results are preliminary findings from an ongoing analysis. CBO has not yet completed five-year estimates of the effects of cutbacks; nor has it examined alternative policies regarding separation pay and other issues. Moreover, CBO has not examined the problems associated with officer reductions in any detail. Thus, the discussion in this section will focus on enlisted personnel, though the costs include those

associated with officers.

Case 1: Emphasize Accession Cuts. One way to reduce the number of personnel is to emphasize reductions in accessions. Under this approach, attempts would be made to increase losses of career personnel by tightening reenlistment standards. Specifically, about 25,000 enlisted personnel are assumed to be denied reenlistment in 1991. But there would be no involuntary separations, and 75 percent of the total reduction in end strength would come through reduced accessions. Total enlisted accessions in 1991 would fall to 217,000, a reduction of about 28 percent below the level that would have prevailed in the absence of any cut in end strength.

CBO has not examined officer reductions in detail. By way of illustration, this option assumes that officer accessions in 1991 are reduced by the same percent as enlisted accessions. The remainder of the reductions required to eliminate 15,000 officers in 1991 would be accomplished through involuntary separations.

Several important assumptions influence cost savings under this approach. To allow for orderly management, only one-half of the full annual savings from reduced accessions and personnel denied reenlistment are assumed to be realized in 1991. Full savings would, of course, be achieved in subsequent years. Also, those denied reenlistment are assumed to be eligible for travel at government expense under permanent change of station (PCS) orders and for reimbursement for unused annual leave. Although the government would have to pay these costs whether or not personnel were denied reenlistment, they occur in an earlier year for those who are not allowed to reenlist.

With these assumptions, 1991 outlay savings under Case 1 would total $1.1 billion compared with costs under the CBO baseline, which assumes no reductions in end strength (see Table 6). (To ensure comparability with the budget, savings in this section of the paper are expressed in 1991 dollars.) Outlay savings of about $0.4 billion are already assumed in the Administration budget proposal for 1991. Thus, compared with the Administration's proposal, additional savings under Case 1 would total only about $0.7 billion in 1991.

Case 2: Make More Balanced Cuts. Achieving reductions primarily through reduced accessions would lead to an even more senior military than the one that now exists. Moreover, the reductions in accessions may not provide enough recruits to sustain the military over the long term, even if that military is substantially smaller. {11}

To minimize these problems, the military could decide to rely less on reduced accessions to accomplish reductions in end strength. Instead, the military could tighten enlisted reenlistment standards as in the previous approach and, in addition, involuntarily separate 23,000 career enlisted personnel in 1991. This approach would limit the reduction in

1991 enlisted accessions to 17 percent of the level assuming no cuts in end strength. Looked at another way, under this Case 2, reductions in accessions would account for only about 47 percent of the personnel cut in 1991.

For officers, this case assumes that accessions are cut in proportion to the total reduction in officer strength. The remainder of the reduction of 15,000 officers is assumed to be accomplished through early retirements and involuntary separations.

TABLE 6: SAVINGS UNDER ALTERNATIVE MANPOWER REDUCTIONS
(Compared with the CBO Baseline)

	Savings (In billions of 1991 dollars)		
	Percentage of Enlisted Cuts Through Accessions	1991 Dollars	Second-Year Effects of 1991
Current Law			
Emphasize Accessions	75	1.1	2.1
Make Balanced Reductions	47	0.9	2.3
Emphasize Savings	47	1.3	2.3
Current Law Plus Enlisted Separation Payments {a}			
Emphasize Accessions	75	1.1	2.1
Make Balanced Reductions	47	0.4	2.3
Emphasize Savings	47	0.9	2.3

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

{a} Assumes enlisted separation payments are made based on the current officer formula.

Under these assumptions, outlay savings in 1991 would total about $0.9 billion compared with CBO baseline costs that assume no cuts in end strength. Compared with the Administration's proposal, savings would total about $0.5 billion. Savings are more modest than those under Case 1 because the reduction in payroll costs is offset by travel costs,

payments for unused leave that must be made to career personnel who are separated, and severance pay for officers.

This case could lead to even more modest savings in 1991 if the Congress authorizes enlisted separation pay. Currently, the law requires no severance payments to enlisted personnel who are involuntarily separated. The Congress may, however, consider providing such separation payments. If payments are made to enlisted personnel based on the current officer formula (defined in Section 1174 of Title 10), then in 1991 the reduction under Case 2 would result in outlay savings of only $0.4 billion compared with the CBO baseline. Compared with the Administration's proposal, Case 2 with enlisted separation payments would result in almost no savings.

Case 3: Seek Large First-Year Savings. To realize larger first-year savings, or to minimize added costs, the Congress could follow the same pattern of forcing out career personnel and reducing accessions associated with Case 2. But it could urge DoD to force out personnel quickly. This approach might be difficult to carry out and would result in less notice being given to those who are involuntarily separated. However, budget-year savings would be larger.

For example, assume that first-year savings associated with those denied reenlistment and involuntarily separated equal three-quarters of the total annual savings instead of one-half, as was assumed in the first two cases. This amount would be consistent with average involuntary separations occurring three months after the beginning of 1991, a rapid pace. Under this assumption, 1991 outlay savings without separation payments for enlisted personnel would total $1.3 billion compared with the CBO baseline assuming no cut in end strength. With separation payments, outlay savings in 1991 would total $0.9 billion.

It is important to note that, under all three of these cases, outlay savings would be substantially larger in the second year than in the budget year. Even if no further personnel changes were made in 1992, outlay savings in that year resulting from the 1991 cuts would total between $2.1 billion and $2.3 billion (see Table 6). Thus, the second-year savings would often be several times the size of the first-year savings.

As was noted earlier, the Congress must assess the desirability of a particular rate of manpower and budgetary reduction taking into account U.S. security interests. However, these illustrative cases make it clear that it will be difficult to use personnel cuts to achieve large outlay savings in 1991, especially compared with the Administration's plan that already assumes some reductions.

APPENDIX A

TABLES

TABLE A-1. PROVISIONS OF NATO'S PROPOSED TREATY LIMITING CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

	Proposed Ceiling	Proposed Reductions NATO Number	NATO %	Warsaw Pact Number	Warsaw Pact %	Ratio NATO: Pact
Main Battle Tanks	20,000	2,224	10	37,300	65	1:17
Armored Personnel Carriers	28,000	600	2	35,235	56	1:59
Artillery	16,500	828	5	29,770	64	1:36
Helicopters	1,900 {a}	699	27	1,980	51	1:3
Aircraft	5,700	1,006	15	6,892	55	1:7
Troops {b}	195,000/ 225,000 {c}	80,000	3	405,000	12	1:5

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Congressional Research Service, "Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Negotiations: Facts and Figures" (October 30, 1989).

NOTE: Except where specified, these numbers are based on NATO proposals submitted before October 30, 1989.

{a} The ceiling on helicopters and the current NATO inventory reported by NATO (2,599) are inconsistent with a 15 percent reduction.

{b} U.S. and Soviet troops only.

{c} These numbers reflect the proposal made by the President in his 1990 State of the Union message, which included a limit of 195,000 U.S. and Soviet troops in Central Europe. Another 30,000 U.S. troops would be permitted in Europe but outside the central region.

TABLE A-2. PROVISIONS OF PROPOSED START TREATY

Limits	
Total Accountable Warheads	6,000
Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles	1,600
Ballistic Missile Warheads	4,900
ICBM Warheads {a}	3,300
Heavy ICBM Warheads (SS-18 type)	1,540

Special Counting Rules

Penetrating Bombers Count as One Warhead

Bombers Carrying Cruise Missiles Count as 10 Warheads {a}

Seventy-Two Submarine-Based Launchers in Overhaul Do Not Count {a}

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on U.S. government sources.

{a} U.S. proposal apparently not yet accepted by the Soviet Union.

TABLE A-3. ACTIVE UNITS AND ACTIVE-DUTY PERSONNEL IN EUROPE

		Reductions Under Alternatives				
Category	1990 Level	I. Required Cuts only	II. Possible Adminis-tration Cuts	III. Large Cuts With Cadres	IV. Large Cuts, More Reserves	V. Large Cuts
Army Divisions	4 2/3	2	2	2 1/3	2 1/3	2 1/3{a}
Air Force Wings	8	2	2	4	4	5a
All Services End Strength (In thousands)	325{b}	80	80	100	100	150

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

{a} These alternatives assume sufficient changes in headquarters and noncombat personnel to reduce the total number of Army and Air Force personnel in Europe by one-half.

{b} This number does not reflect any effects of the legislative requirement that personnel in Europe be reduced to 312,000 by the end of 1991.

TABLE A-4. LONG-RUN BUDGETARY SAVINGS ASSOCIATED WITH STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES (In billions of 1990 dollars)

	Alternatives				
Category	I. Required Cuts only	II. Possible Adminis-tration Cuts	III. Large Cuts With Cadres	IV. Large Cuts, More Reserves	V. Large Cuts
Strategic					
Army	0	0	0	0	0
Air Force	{a}	{b}	5	5	10
Navy	3	3	5	5	5
Marine Corps	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal	3	4	10	10	16
Conventional					
Army	5	14	17	18	27
Air Force{c}	1	4	7	5	17
Navy	0	5	8	8	17
Marine Corps	0	0	1	2	3
Total	9{d}	26	43	43	80

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
NOTE: Numbers may not add to totals because of rounding.
{a} Annual costs of less than $500 million.
{b} Annual savings of less than $500 million.
{c} Most reductions are in the budget of the tactical Air Force.

{d} Excludes overhead savings.

TABLE A-5. DETAILS OF EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVES ON U.S. STRATEGIC CAPABILITY

	Alternatives					
Category	1900 Level	I. Required Cuts only	II. Possible Adininis-tration Cuts	III. Large Cuts With Cadres	IV. Large Cuts, More Reserves	V. Large Cuts
Total On-Line Warheads	11,800	8,900	8,900	8,600	8,600	8,600
Surviving Warheads						
Attack with warning	8,400	7,500	7,500	6,600	6,600	5,800
Attack without warning{a}	4,600	3,700	3,700	3,200	3,200	2,900

1982 Levels for Reference

Total On-Line Warheads	8,100
Surviving Warheads (With warning)	5,600
Surviving Warheads (Without warning)	3,300

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

NOTE: Limitations on Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs) are not being considered as part of the START negotiations. Therefore, SLCMs are not included in this analysis.

{a} Calculations are based on the assumption that SICBMs are dispersed and therefore largely survive an initial attack.

TABLE A-6. NAVY AND AIRLIFT FORCE LEVELS

Category	1990 Level	Reductions (-)/Additions (+) Under Alternatives I. Required Cuts only	II. Possible Adminis-tration Cuts	III. Large Cuts With Cadres	IV. Large Cuts, More Reserves	V. Large Cuts
Navy						
Total Deployable Ships	551	-11	-50	-72	-68	-108
Trident/Poseidon Submarines	34	-11	-11	-14	-14	- 17
SSN Submarines	9	20	-10	-15	-15	- 20
Aircraft Carriers	14	0	- 1	- 2	- 2	- 4
Battleships	4	0	- 4	- 4	- 4	- 4
Amphibious Ships						
Active	61	0	0	0	-3	10
Reserve	3	0	0	0	+16	0
Other Combatants and Support Ships						
Active	313	0	-24	-37	-37	- 63
Reserve	30	0	0	0	+19	0
Air Wings						
Active	13	0	- 1	- 2	- 3	- 4
Reserve	2	0	0	0	+ 1	0
Airlift						
Squadrons{a}	73	0	0	0	- 2	- 9

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

{a} Includes active and reserve squadrons.

APPENDIX B

COSTING METHODS

Conventional Forces. CBO used various methods to estimate costs associated with conventional forces.

Operating Costs. Operating costs include funds in the appropriations for military personnel and operation and maintenance, as well as portions of the military construction appropriation and spare parts accounts.

Direct and indirect operating savings are based on factors multiplied by the military units (for example, divisions or wings) that are eliminated. The factors reflect manning and operating tempos in the budget. Overhead savings reflect an allocation of all operating costs not captured by the direct and indirect factors. The allocation to each unit is based on the unit's share of direct and indirect costs.

Procurement. Long-term procurement savings are estimated as a proportion of the 1990 procurement budgets of the Army, Navy, and the tactical Air Force. The proportion is the ratio of divisions, or ships, or wings eliminated to the total number of active and reserve divisions, ships, or wings.

Start Treaty. In some cases, methods of estimating costs for strategic forces differed from those used in connection with conventional forces.

Operating. Estimates are based on a method similar to the one used for conventional forces, except that factors are applied to specific weapons systems rather than military units.

Procurement. For a particular option, annual procurement savings associated with major. systems are assumed to equal the total cost of the systems in the option divided by 25. Twenty-five years was used as an average service life for a strategic system. Additional savings were assumed to be achieved in non-major procurement. Non-major procurement includes purchases of command, control, and communication equipment, ordnance, major spare parts, and similar items. In recent years, total spending for non-major procurement has varied widely. Based on a rough average of past patterns, CBO assumed that savings associated with non-major procurement were equal to those estimated for major procurement items.

APPENDIX C

MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS

Several measures of effectiveness were used for strategic systems. On-line warheads include all those not in the maintenance pipeline or overhaul. CBO also calculated warheads that would survive a Soviet attack. The survivability of deployed forces depends on their physical characteristics, such as hardness to a nuclear attack, and their escape characteristics, such as speed and location. The number of deployed systems was first calculated assuming sufficient warning of a Soviet attack to allow the United States to deploy all of the mobile missiles, submarines in port, and bombers not on everyday alert. CBO also calculated the numbers of systems that could be deployed assuming an attack occurred without warning. In this less likely case, only the submarines at sea, the portion of the bomber force on continuous alert, and the mobile land based missiles are assumed deployed in the roughly 30 minutes of notice that would be available.

The method used to analyze tactical aircraft effectiveness, known as the TASCFORM method, applies a numerical score to each type of aircraft in both the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. The value of each side's force is calculated by summing the scores of the aircraft available at a particular time. A ratio of scores is used to reflect the relative sense of balance between the two forces. The ratios shown in this paper assume that both sides have mobilized all their aircraft (including U.S. aircraft based in this country in peacetime), a task that might require as much as several weeks. For more details on TASCFORM, see The Analytic Sciences Corporation, The TASCFORM Methodology: A Technique for Assessing Comparative Force Modernization January 1984).

The ground force measure, known as the WEI/WUV methodology, uses the same type of approach as TASCFORM. It assigns a score to each weapon within a particular category of weapons (rifles, tanks, artillery, helicopters, and so forth) and a weight to each category based upon overall contribution to the mission of the unit. The value for each unit is computed by summing the weighted values for each weapon in the unit. The unit score is normalized by dividing by the score of a U.S. armored division. The ratio of scores for Warsaw Pact and NATO can be calculated at any time after mobilization of forces begins. Ratios in this paper assume both sides have most of their forces in place, which is assumed to occur 75 days after the onset of mobilization. The data for the analyses in this paper are derived from a 1979 DoD study, which is the latest data available on an unclassified basis. Although 10 years old, the study includes scores for weapons currently in use by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. For more details on CBO's method of analysis, as well as a discussion

of important limitations, see Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Ground Forces and the Conventional Balance in Europe (June 1988).

Notes

1. The analysis of the effects of the CFE treaty on tactical aircraft is based on the NATO proposal submitted in July 1989. More recent NATO proposals contain modifications to the July submission that may exclude some trainer and interceptor aircraft. But details of this latest proposal were not available when this paper was prepared.

2. NATO's proposed CFE treaty, as modified by President Bush in his 1999) State of the Union message, may not require that all troops withdrawn from Europe be demobilized. Equipment removed from Europe to meet the
ceilings proposed by the treaty would still have to be destroyed. Thus, it is possible that the United States could relocate some of its troops to stateside bases and furnish them with some new equipment. That would involve substantial added one-time costs with minimal recurring savings. The Secretary of Defense, however, has said he would reduce U.S. forces once the treaty is in place. Therefore, it did not seem reasonable to associate with the proposed CFE treaty the cost of transferring any of the 80,000 troops from European to stateside bases.

3. On-line warheads include all warheads in the inventory less those whose delivery vehicles are in the maintenance pipeline or in overhaul.

4. For this paper, CBO also excluded from overhead the operating costs for intelligence and communications on the assumption that these costs would not change as the United States responded to arms limitation treaties and political changes.

5. Training under this concept would involve individual leadership training, physical fitness, instructor training, and unit training in the form of command post exercises. The purpose of the training would be to ensure that the cadre is prepared to train individual reservists in the event of mobilization for war and knows how to conduct combat operations. Because these forces are unlikely to be required to fight anywhere other than in Europe against a Warsaw Pact force, all training would be conducted based on that scenario.

6. Reserve squadrons frequently have fewer planes assigned to them than active-duty squadrons. As a result, the addition of seven reserve squadrons employs only about half of the aircraft eliminated from the active force.

7. Percentage increases vary by service. For example, percentage increases for recruits into the Navy's selected reserve are somewhat lower than those for the other services because changes in naval forces are smaller under this alternative.

8. CBO is currently assessing the costs and effects of establishing the

equivalent of "cadre" wings. This approach would involve placing aircraft in peacetime storage with periodic inspections to ensure that the planes could be reactivated quickly. Personnel for these wings might be made available by a combination of use of individual ready reserves and by overmanning of selected reserve units in peacetime. (Overmanning would be the preferred alternative in cases where the time required to acquire a skill exceeded the time expected to be available after mobilization.) In the case of larger planes where flying skills are more comparable to those available among commercial pilots, pilots for the cadre wings would be supplied by individual ready reserve personnel. Fighter pilots for the cadre divisions would come from active-duty pilots who occupy non-flying positions during peacetime. CBO is also examining a concept analogous to cadre units for the Navy and Marine Corps.

9. Military commanders-notably General Bernard Rogers, former Supreme Commander of NATO-have long argued that, in the face of a balance of conventional forces such as the one that existed in 1988, they would have had no choice but to resort quickly to the use of nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack.

10. In one important respect, the experience of 1950 might not be a guide to future mobilization problems. Because of World War II, the portion of the military and the population that had combat experience was considerably higher in 1950 than it would probably be in some future year.

11. Continued emphasis on reducing accessions could result in very large reductions in accessions. After several years, the smaller number of accessions entering the military would mean fewer people leaving the military. Thus, a higher percentage of each year's personnel reduction would have to be carried out through cuts in accession. Assume, for example, that reductions of 100,000 enlisted personnel a year were made in each of the next five years and that reductions were all made with an emphasis on cuts in accessions. By the fifth year, enlisted accessions would have to be reduced by more than 50 percent below the accession level that would prevail assuming no changes in end strength.

Chapter 3.C.8

* * *

Force Planning in an Era of Uncertainty

Mackubin Thomas Owens

Not available at this time

Force Planning Faculty
Naval War College

Dr. Richmond M. Lloyd coordinates the Force Planning course and holds the Theodore Roosevelt Chair of Economics. He received a Ph.D in business administration from the University of Rochester, has a M.B.A. from the University of Chicago, and a B.S. in mechanical engineering from the University of Rochester. His current research interests include force planning, defense economics, and logistics.

Dr. Henry C. Barlett is a graduate of the Naval War College and holds D.B.A, M.B.A. and B.S. degrees from Indiana University. He served in the USAF, from 1955 to 1980, primarily in tactical aviation. His research interests include force planning, defense economics, NATO and war gaming.

Commander Donald J. Denny is a Naval Flight Officer with twenty-one years of naval service in anti-submarine warfare, strategic communications, and strategic nuclear planning. A 1986 graduate of the Naval War College, he holds a bachelor's degree in chemistry from the University of North Carolina and a master's degree in general management from Salve Regina College. Commander Denny teaches and conducts research
in the planning of U.S. military forces, with emphasis upon the naval and strategic nuclear elements of U.S. strategy and force structure.

Dr. G. Paul Holman, Jr. is a career intelligence officer. He holds a PH.D. in M.A. in Russian history from Georgetown University and a B.A. from Harvard College. His research and teaching interests include force planning, economics and a variety of specialties focused on the Soviet Armed Forces.

Captain John M. Kirby, USNR, is a Selected Reservist on recall for special work in the National Security Decision Making Department. A Surface Warfare Officer with primary experience in cruisers and destroyers, he was a 1988 graduate of the Naval War College and recipient of the B. Franklin Reinauer II Defense Economics prize. He is involved in research and writing on reserve force planning issues.

Captain Tom Lawler is a Naval Flight Officer with 21 years of anti-submarine warfare experience. A former P-3 squadron Commanding Officer, he graduated from St. John's University, N.Y. in 1967 with a degree in economics, and is a 1979 graduate of the Naval War College. His research emphasis is on planning naval forces.

Dr. Mackubin T. Owens, Jr. received a regular Marine Corps commission upon graduation from the University of California, Santa Barbara in 1968. He transferred to the Marine Corps Reserve in 1978 and earned his Ph.D. from the University of Dallas in 1982. He has served as

National Security Advisor to Senator Bob Kasten and as Director of Legislative Affairs for the Nuclear Weapons Programs of the U.S. Department of Energy. He is Editor-in-Chief of the defense quarterly, Strategic Review. His research interests include defense economics, the defense industrial base, naval strategy and force structure, and the congressional role in national strategy.

Dr. Kenneth E. Freeman received his Ph.D. from the Department of War Studies, King's College, London University, has a M.B.A. from Harvard Business School, a M.P.A. from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government,
and a B.A. from Eisenhower College. He has been a Research Associate at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, London, and a Visiting Scholar, at the Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, MIT, and has extensive experience as a management consultant.

LTC Edward F. Smith, Jr. received a regular Army commission in the Corps of Engineers upon graduating from Northeastern University with a B.S. degree in electrical engineering. He holds a M.S. degree in industrial engineering from New Mexico State University and a M.S. in management from Salve Regina. He is a registered professional engineer and is currently enrolled in the Applied Math Science Ph.D. program at the University of Rhode Island. His past assignments include Associate Professor of Management at the United States Military Academy, Strategic C3 Analysis for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Aviation Systems Analyst, and Engineer Staff and Command positions.