

DECIPHERING THE BALKAN ENIGMA:
USING HISTORY TO INFORM POLICY

Revised Edition

William T. Johnsen

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments may also be conveyed directly to the author by telephone: commercial (717) 245-4076 or DSN 242-4076, or via Internet at johnsenw@carlisle-emh.2.army.mil.

FOREWORD

After having been fueled by the events of the distant and recent past, the current wars in the former Yugoslavia finally may be grinding to a halt. An understanding of that past, and of how history and myth combine to influence the present and help to define the future in the Balkans, is no less relevant today than it was two years ago when the original version of this monograph was published.

Events of the intervening years have largely validated the insights and conclusions offered in the initial report. That said, strategic conditions have evolved, and two years of additional study and analysis provide a greater understanding of the long-term roots of conflict in the Balkans, as well as a firmer grasp of the proximate historical factors that contributed to the outbreak of violence.

In this revised monograph, the first four chapters that provide the historical examination of the Balkan enigma remain substantially unchanged. Details have been added, and interpretations modified—attenuated or accentuated—as the author's understanding of events has matured. The last chapter of the original version has been expanded into three chapters. Chapter 5 first offers insights that are drawn from the first portion of the report. Because the passage of time has foreclosed some alternatives, and the changed strategic conditions have created the possibility for new options to be examined, the policy assessments that are now Chapter 6 have been substantially rewritten. Similarly, a new Chapter 7, Conclusions, contains revised reflections on the preceding analysis.

Despite the revisions, the focus of the monograph remains on the tangled history of the region, and how policy options fit into the larger historical context that has influenced, and will continue to affect, the course of events in the Balkans.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a means of providing policymakers and the

public a greater understanding of the complex and complicated Balkan enigma.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies

Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1991 and currently serves as an Associate Research Professor of National Security Affairs. He has also held the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies of the U.S. Army War College since 1994. An infantry officer before retiring from the U.S. Army, Dr. Johnsen served in a variety of troop leading, command and staff assignments in the 25th Infantry Division and 7th Infantry Division (Light). He also served as Assistant Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy, and as an Arms Control Analyst in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Dr. Johnsen holds a B.S. degree from the U. S. Military Academy, an M.A. and Ph.D. in history from Duke University, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He has authored or coauthored numerous Strategic Studies Institute studies, as well as articles in a variety of policy journals that focus on U.S.-European security issues.

KEY JUDGEMENTS

Insights to Assist Decision-Making.

- The past is always present in the Balkans and defines the future.

- Centuries of history and myths shape daily events in the Balkans. Policymakers must understand the bases and importance of these influences and factor them into policy initiatives.

- The massive depredations of World War II, particularly Croatian *Ustasi* actions and the concomitant pan-Yugoslav civil war, contributed significantly to the outbreak of the ongoing hostilities, and will continue to influence events.

- Recent history, especially the last four years, has hardened negotiating positions.

- Cultural cleavage within the Balkans and between Balkan and U.S. leaders is wider than many understand.

- U.S. and Western European vs. Balkan thought processes.

- U.S. and Western European statesmen must be careful not to mirror image their values and logic onto Balkan leaders.

- Ethnic identity is *sine qua non* to individuals in the Balkans: many are willing to die or kill to protect it.

- The importance of religious animosities should not be underestimated.

- Violence is an accepted agent of change.

- Compromise represents weakness. Many inhabitants of the region think in "zero sum game" terms; importantly, frequently in the past defeat has meant death.

• The ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia stems from multiple causes:

- Ethnic Identity
- Religion
- Language
- Ethnic Group
- History
- Shared Myths
- Culture
- Nationalism
- Economics
- Regional Differences
- Urban vs. Rural
- Form of Central Government
- Tito's Manipulation of Ethnic Groups and Territories
- World War II

• Moreover, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is not a single war, but a melange of wars:

- Interstate Wars of Aggression
- Limited War vs. Total War
- Civil Wars
- Ethnic Conflict
- Religious Conflict
- Personal Power Struggles
- Battles to Retain Fiefdoms
- Individual Psychopaths Attracted to War

• Potential solutions to the ongoing wars in the Balkans, therefore, cannot focus solely on one or two of the many "wars" underway. Negotiators must weave a solution that addresses multiple issues as a complete whole.

- But creating a comprehensive solution in such a complex strategic environment will be difficult. As a consequence, negotiators may pursue incremental solutions. But this, too, is fraught with dangers because many individual initiatives may run at cross purposes. Such potential pitfalls underscore the importance of possessing a thorough understanding of the conflict, and crafting a comprehensive solution prior to embarking on incremental ways to resolve issues.
- Political institutions are weak. This condition complicates significantly the ability to arrive at

Long-Term Solutions.

- The search for long-term solutions will be protracted and difficult.
- A lasting peace in the region requires a fundamental break from the past along the lines mandated of post-World War II Germany and Japan.
- To achieve long-term stability requires considerable expenditure of political, economic, and military capital-will the United States, the European Union, and other European states spend it?
- Events in the Balkan crisis have demonstrated that U.S. leadership in Europe is essential to secure U.S. national interests in the region and Europe.
- Diplomatic actions, alone, are not likely to bring about a settlement, and military power will be required to establish conditions suitable to build a lasting peace settlement.
- Should U.S. political leaders decide to commit ground troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they will have to convince the American public and Congress that it is

in U.S. national interests to make the size of investments required to achieve an acceptable solution in the Balkans.

- Stable political institutions in the region that protect ethnic minority rights are needed to ensure stability over the longer term.
- Policymakers must recognize that a long-term solution may require decades, perhaps generations.

Short-Term Options.

- U.S. national interests are engaged.
- There are no easy options. Each has drawbacks, risks, and costs.
- The United States cannot abstain from participation in resolving the crisis:
 - The United States already is heavily involved: e.g., Operation SHARP GUARD, Operation DENY FLIGHT, and Operation DELIBERATE FORCE.
 - The United States has committed to providing up to 25,000 troops to assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, should that be required, as well as up to 25,000 troops to support peace implementation operations in the former Yugoslavia should a negotiated settlement emerge.
 - Avoiding deeper involvement also holds risks: a wider conflict, expansion into Central Europe, strains within NATO, tensions in U.S.-Russian relations.
- Containment of the conflicts within the former Yugoslavia has been successful, to date, but at tremendous costs to the inhabitants of the region. And, there is no guarantee that wars can be contained indefinitely.

- Diplomatic and economic efforts have contributed to, but have been insufficient to achieve a resolution of the crisis. Military power (whether in the form of the Croatian Army, the Bosnia Army, NATO air strikes, or a combination thereof) has been decisive in bringing the parties to the negotiating table.
- Lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia is problematic. Indeed, it is likely to precipitate an UNPROFOR withdrawal, which the United States has pledged to assist. Moreover, the United States and its allies and partners must be willing to protect Bosnian forces until they can obtain and make effective use of any new arms, or lifting the embargo will simply be an empty gesture.
- U.S. political leaders will have to convince the American public and their elected representatives that U.S. interests are sufficiently involved to make the investments—intellectual, political, economic, and military—necessary to achieve a lasting solution to the Balkan conflicts.
- Given the transfer of populations that has already taken place, territorial partition and mass exchange of residual populations, however morally reprehensible, may be a realistic option. It is fraught, nonetheless, with considerable difficulties: perceived aiding and abetting "ethnic cleansing," setting bad precedents for future ethnic violence in Europe, and establishing irredenta.
- Participation in Implementation Force (IFOR) operations is problematic.
 - Ethnic Serbs perceive that the United States has chosen sides—against them; thus, maintaining a neutral stance will be difficult.
 - U.S. peacekeepers are likely to become targets, perhaps eventually of all three sides.

- U.S. forces, therefore, initially must be configured, armed, and sized to engage in possible combat operations.
- U.S. forces must be of sufficient size to merit U.S. leadership of IFOR. In short, the United States must "pay the piper if it wants to call the tune."
- Forces must be configured to permit easy and rapid rotation and replacement.
- Reserve Component individuals and units may be required to fill critical shortages in Active Component forces.
- Should the current peace initiatives fail to bear fruit, the United States may become embroiled in operations to impose a peace. Should that eventuality emerge, policymakers must remain aware that:
 - The United States must be prepared to take action against *any* offender, not just against ethnic Serbs.
 - The United States will not be able to take half measures. The United States should not, therefore, start down the path unless willing to complete the journey.
 - Once committed to imposing a peace settlement, U.S. options will be circumscribed; i.e., U.S. national prestige and interests will have been committed. Pressure will be intense to "win," perhaps at the expense of limiting violence, or containing the conflict.
 - To preclude "mission creep" and unintended escalation, policymakers must clearly define, and continually reassess U.S. strategic objectives, and desired end states to ensure that ends, ways, and means remain synchronized.
 - Objectives, end states, and success criterion should be event driven, not time driven.

- The introduction of Muslim forces from outside the region to assist in peace enforcement operations is fraught with dangers.
- Use of air power appears to offer the safest, most effective means to impose a peace, especially in the wake of the apparent success of forcing the Bosnian Serbs to remove their weapons from the heavy weapons exclusion zone surrounding Sarajevo. But appearances may belie reality.
- Policymakers also must consider the key question: What if air power, even on a massive scale, is insufficient to bring reluctant belligerents to the negotiations table or to force compliance with an existing agreement? What further steps would the United States and its allies be willing to take? Specifically, will the United States consider the introduction of ground combat forces to impose a peace?

Key Questions to be Resolved Prior to a U.S. Decision to Commit Additional Forces, Especially Ground Troops.

- Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission?
- What is the environment of risk we are entering?
- What is needed to achieve our goals?
- What are the potential costs—human and financial—of the engagement?
- Do we have reasonable assurance of support from the American people and their elected representatives?
- Do we have time lines that will reveal the extent of success or failure, and, in either case, do we have an exit strategy?¹

- What are the specific political objectives to be achieved in Bosnia-Herzegovina? What is the desired end state of the conflict? How do these objectives contribute to U.S. objectives for the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans, as a whole? How will they affect U.S. relations with European allies and partners? What are the potential effects on U.S.-Russian relations?
- Will the employment of military power help achieve national objectives?
- What are the appropriate military ends, ways, and means to achieve political objectives? If air power proves to be insufficient, what are the next logical steps? Is the United States willing to take them?
- Will allies or partners join, or at least endorse, the U.S. resort to military force?
- How long and to what extent is the United States willing to commit forces to the region?

Policy Recommendations for the Ongoing Conflict in the Balkans:

- The first priority for policymakers must remain ensuring that the war does not spread beyond its current confines. The ongoing conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a human tragedy. But expansion of the conflict could be a strategic disaster. The United States, therefore, must give priority to preventing spill-over into Macedonia, Kosovo, or beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia.
- The second priority is to sustain a viable, cohesive, and effective North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
- The third priority is to cap the violence, as the United States is currently attempting to do, and provide a basis for a more lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia—and, by extension, the Balkans.

- American values, not simply geo-strategic realities, must be factored into the decision-making calculus.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This is the Balkans-rationality isn't a reliable compass.²

-A Western diplomat in Belgrade

PURPOSE

The primary purpose of this monograph is *not* to argue for or against U.S. military intervention in the former Yugoslavia or elsewhere in the Balkans. The main intent is to garner insights through historical examination that will shed light on the long-standing bases of the ongoing conflicts in the region. Some might question the relevancy of an historical exploration when the first European war since 1945 engulfs the former Yugoslavia and threatens to spill over to other parts of the Balkans. The purpose of historical study, however, is not simply to understand the past, but to inform the present and, hopefully, prepare for the future.

Nor is this report simply an academic exercise. Policymakers must be cognizant of the background and complexity of issues if they are to make informed decisions. As George F. Kennan cogently noted in his scathing criticism of President Woodrow Wilson's performance at the Paris Peace Conference (1919):

[His was] the colossal conceit of thinking that you could suddenly make international life over into what you believed to be your own image, when you dismissed the past with contempt, rejected the relevance of the past to the future, and refused to occupy yourself with the real problems that a study of the past would suggest.³

Kennan's words could easily apply to those pundits who have posed simplistic solutions to the ongoing wars in the former Yugoslavia. Proponents of single-issue solutions, such as "surgical" air strikes, economic sanctions, lifting the

arms embargo, or enforcement of "no-fly" zones neither comprehend the complexities of the issues involved nor address the root causes of conflict. Policymakers and analysts should seek, instead, comprehensive solutions to the multiple, interwoven sources of the conflict.

As anyone familiar with problem solving understands, a comprehensive solution first requires a definition of the fundamental nature of the problem. This is no less true when assessing ethnic conflicts, for in Barry Posen's words, "Whether one's purpose is to predict, prevent, or resolve such [ethnic] conflicts, one needs to understand their sources."⁴ Without an adequate understanding of the problem and its ramifications, proposed solutions may not address issues adequately to ensure resolution. Moreover, what on first consideration seems a relatively straight-forward solution may actually prove counterproductive when implemented.

The intent of this report is also to get beyond the emotional headlines of the day and to open the eyes of policymakers to local perceptions; as everyone should know, perception is reality in the eyes of the beholder. An understanding of perceptions will also help policymakers grapple with the underlying currents which run so deep in the Balkans and avoid the pitfall of mirror imaging their own ideas, values, and perceptions onto a radically different culture. Only through an understanding of these conditions can policymakers make informed decisions on the best ends, ways, and means to resolve the situation. As importantly, historical example may offer potential insights into second or third order consequences that may result from any decisions.

SCOPE

Concisely unraveling the tangled web of the Balkans is no easy task. To avoid oversimplifying highly complex issues, the more critical issues must be discussed in some detail. Issues in the Balkans intricately intertwine and

require a greater level of explication to comprehend the relationships and potential consequences.

Limitations of the written word require that issues be addressed in a relatively linear fashion; however, Balkan complexities are anything but linear in their inter-relationships. In many ways, therefore, the discussion that follows will be akin to using simple mathematics to explain quantum mechanics. But readers cannot view the Balkans in such a linear manner. They must connect the array of disparate and incredibly complex issues in a broad context that weaves the variegated strands of the Balkans into a coherent tapestry.

Complex crises such as the Balkans usually arise from a combination of long-standing circumstances that set the stage for an explosion and one or more proximate causes that spark the detonation. The intent of this monograph is to illuminate the long-term, deep running roots of the conflict to provide an historical context for the current events in the Balkans. The author refers the reader to a number of excellent works that describe and analyze the more proximate causes of the current crisis.⁵

Moreover, given the ongoing wars in the former Yugoslavia, the focus is on the history of conflict in the region. This approach is not intended to suggest that past conflict inexorably or inevitably guarantees future conflict. The author recognizes that other historical factors, to include peaceful relations between the various ethnic groups, have been a part of the historical record. Nonetheless, violence has significantly influenced the course of historical events and—as current evidence graphically illustrates—continues to shape conduct in the Balkans.⁶

The report first outlines a brief history of the region that sets the context for current conditions. The discussion next examines the clash of languages, religions, ethnic groups, and cultures that have shaped the region and brought the Balkan cauldron to a boil. An examination of the political development of the area and its influence on events follows.

Based on his background, the study then offers insights to assist decisionmakers in their policy deliberations. The report next assesses potential policy options, and offers some brief conclusions.

Finally, while the study examines the Balkans as a whole, greater attention will focus on matters relating to the former Yugoslavia.

DEFINITIONS

The Balkans. For the purposes of this monograph, the Balkans encompasses Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, European Turkey, and the states spawned from the erstwhile Yugoslavia—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). (See Map 1.) Some experts might exclude the European portion of Turkey from the region. Current influence in the region and the fact that many states in the Balkans once belonged to the Ottoman Empire argue, however, for including Turkey. Other experts




Map 1. The Balkans

might suggest including Hungary because of the large Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, but Hungary falls more logically in Central Europe. Hungarian minorities within the region will be addressed as required. Romania will not be considered in great detail because it remains generally aloof from the current crises.

Ethnic Identity. Ethnic identity is a critical concept for U.S. leaders to understand. American political leaders and their advisors may not fully appreciate the importance of ethnic or national identity to many Europeans, particularly how this concept shapes national or ethnic group policies. Indeed, American policymakers may find ethnicity and ethnic identity alien concepts, outside their cultural context, perhaps hiding or at least obscuring the causes and potential solutions to ethnic conflict.⁷ But, understanding the concept of ethnic identity is the keystone to comprehending the complexities of an ethnic conflict that might involve the United States.⁸

Defining ethnic identity in practical terms is no easy task, however. James G. Kellas, long-time observer of nationalism and ethnic groups, defines *ethnicity* as "the state of being ethnic, or *belonging to an ethnic group*."⁹ On the other hand, experts on ethnicity George De Vos and Anthony D. Smith define ethnic identity more in terms of *establishing and reinforcing the differences* between groups.¹⁰ These apparently divergent criteria establish two important points for understanding ethnic identity. First, a critical element of defining ethnic identity is determining *who cannot belong to the group*. Membership is posed in stark alternatives, with no room for compromise. Either you are like me or you are not like me. Second, ethnic identity usually is framed in a "zero sum game" context, where ethnic groups view a gain by another group as their loss. Compromise, therefore, is not viewed as a natural part of a political, economic, or cultural process, but as a sign of weakness. When carried to extremes, this argument can lead an ethnic group to perceive its very existence threatened over even the most minute issue.



Core - Ethnic Identification
 Outer Ring - Potential Sources of Integration and assimilation

Figure 1. Elements of Ethnic Identity

As indicated in Figure 1, the primary ties that determine an individual's ethnic affiliation begin with kin relationships. The basic building block is the family which combines with other families to form a clan¹¹. The tribe, ". . . the largest social group defined *primarily in terms of kinship* . . . is normally an aggregate of clans,¹² follows next in the ethnic hierarchy. While kin relationships form the core of ethnic identity, observers must consider additional attributes that contribute to an ethnic identity. The difficulty lies in determining which traits do or do not apply to an ethnic group and why, as well as the complex interactions between attributes. Complicating this process is a lack of consensus on specific attributes, a range of potential traits, or the minimum number required to constitute ethnic identity. A given ethnic group, for example, might display only a few traits, but still have a well-established identity. Alternatively, another group might display many characteristics, but not possess a cohesive identity. Attributes that help define one ethnic group might not apply in another case, even though the groups appear remarkably similar.¹³ Conversely, two ethnic groups could share a wide

number of attributes, but still view themselves as distinct, perhaps competing, ethnic identities.¹⁴

Race illustrates this challenge.¹⁵ On the one hand, for example, race forms the *sine qua non* of German ethnic identity.¹⁶ On the other hand, while Croats, Muslims, and Serbs within the erstwhile Yugoslavia derive from common racial origins, each group uses differences in language (even though considered petty by outsiders), religion (Roman Catholic, Muslim, and Serbian Orthodox), and culture (Central European, Ottoman, and Byzantine) to constitute a distinct ethnic identity.¹⁷

Equally important for analysts to grasp is that, while an ethnic identity may coalesce around a collection of attributes, ethnics also use these traits to separate themselves from other groups. In this manner, attributes found in the center and outer rings of Figure 1 may have dual, but contradictory, influences. Two (or more) ethnic groups, for example, may identify with a particular territory. Rather than serving as a unifying trait, ethnic groups may compete for territorial control as they try to bring all their members within the borders of a single "nation-state."¹⁸ At the same time, they may also exclude nonmembers from that same territory; setting the stage for "ethnic cleansing."¹⁹ Thus, the very traits that form the basis for an ethnic identity can be used to fracture a society along ethnic lines as the various ethnic subgroups use these characteristics to integrate themselves at the expense of others.

Finally, in assessing ethnic identity and its influence, analysts must keep several key points in mind:

- Ethnic identity is important to Europeans, so important that many people are willing to kill or to die to protect it.

- While it is possible to generalize about the attributes that make up an ethnic group, *the circumstances contributing to the establishment of ethnic identity makes each one unique.*

- To identify and assess the attributes that make up an ethnic identity require that analysts possess manifold talents and expertise; i.e., they must understand the general aspects of ethnicity and ethnic identity, as well as have a detailed knowledge of specific issues within regions or countries.

Nation-State. Although used almost interchangeably in the United States, the terms "nation" and "state" are not synonymous, and take on important distinctions in other parts of the world: Europe and, especially, in the Balkans. According to Hugh Seton-Watson, a noted scholar of nationalism, "A state is a legal and political organisation [sic], with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens." On the other hand, Seton-Watson defines a nation as ". . . a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness."²⁰ Thus, while it may be possible for a "nation" and a "state" to correspond (hence the term nation-state), the two ideas do not have to coincide and habitually they do not. Indeed, attempts in the Balkans over the centuries to make nations (i.e., a community of people) coincidental with the geographic boundaries of a state (i.e., a political entity) are the root cause of many past, present, and future problems in the region.

Yugoslavia. Lastly, although the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes became Yugoslavia only in 1929, Yugoslavia will be used throughout the report to identify the state after 1918. While Yugoslavia effectively ceased to exist in 1991, Serbia and Montenegro remain constituent republics within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, however, does not enjoy full international recognition.

CHAPTER 2

THE BALKANS: HISTORICAL BATTLEGROUND

"What happened here yesterday?" you ask the "cleansers" who took over the ruins. "Well, in 1389 . . ." explains a Serb irregular fighter while waving a gun. "No, not in 1389: yesterday," you interrupt . . . "Under the Ottoman Empire . . ." he tries again. "No, please! What happened yesterday?" You get impatient. "Because in 1921, they . . ." You cannot give up, of course, so you sigh and try again, until you get his version of the events.

-A conversation in time²¹

An understanding of the past throws light on current conditions in the Balkans. To paraphrase a concept borrowed from social scientist Morris Massey, "What these nations are now depends on where they were when."²² The brief historical outline that follows, therefore, offers the reader a sense of the ebb and flow of history across the Balkan stage; of the clash of empires, states, religions, cultures, and ethnic groups that have beset the region. The outline also provides an appreciation of the magnitude and continuous nature of the violence that has swept over the Balkans during the past two millennia.

GEOGRAPHY

An oftentimes overlooked, but key influence over a region's historical development is its geographic character. This condition holds true for the Balkans where geography has played a critical role in the evolution of ethnic and national groups, as well as in the cultural formation of the area. Before delving into the region's history, therefore, a short excursion into its geography is instructive.

"Balkan" is derived from the Turkish word for mountain and the Balkan Peninsula could hardly be more aptly

named: mountains represent the predominant terrain feature in the region.²³ The great mountain chains crisscrossing the region—the Carpathian Mountains in Romania, the Balkan and Rhodope Mountains of Bulgaria, the Pindus Range of Greece, and the Dinaric Alps of the former Yugoslavia and Albania (Map 2)—fragmented not only the region's geography, but also its ethnic and political development. In the first instance, the isolation and physical compartmentalization of the peninsula mitigated against the emergence of a cohesive ethnic or national identity. In the second case, the combination of fragmented ethnic identities and geographic divisions inhibited the development of a single large power in the region and led, instead, to a number of smaller, less powerful and competing states.²⁴

Paradoxically, geographic circumstances promoted external access to the region. Lying between Asia Minor and the Mediterranean Sea to the east and south and the fertile European plains to the north and west, three major migratory or invasion routes cut across the Balkans. The first route runs along the north shore of the Black Sea and then to the Danube into Central Europe, or alternatively southeast through modern day Bulgaria to Constantinople (Istanbul). A second path flows down the Danube from Central Europe to Nis and diverges along two paths: down the Vardar River through the Skopje Gate toward Thessaloniki; or toward Sofia along the Maritsa River and then to Constantinople. A third route begins in Italy, crosses the Adriatic, moves across Albania and northern Greece, again terminating in Constantinople. Finally, the extensive coastlines of the Adriatic, Aegean, and Black Seas open the Balkans to penetration.²⁵ As Balkan historians Charles and Barbara Jelavich pointed out:

the peninsula is a crossroads between Europe, Asia, and Africa. Here the peoples and cultures of three continents have met and mingled, or clashed and conquered. The major powers of each historical epoch have made their influence felt here and left their marks upon the peoples. The great imperial powers of the past—Greeks, Romans, Turks, Venetians, Austrians, Germans, French, British, and Russians—all in their turn have dominated or sought to dominate this area.²⁶



Map 2. Balkans Relie Map.

Source: Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 5

Of greater importance than the numbers of peoples and powers that have moved through the area are the turmoil and violence that followed in their wake. The long-term consequences of this violence will primarily concern the discussion that follows.

ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME

The recorded history of the Balkans begins with ancient Greece. While much good can be said about the political and cultural roots of ancient Greece, the area seethed with warfare. While the Greeks successfully fended off outside, largely Persian, invasion, the century-long conflicts between Athens and Sparta and their respective allies for dominance on the Greek peninsula (most notably, the Peloponnesian Wars [460-404 B.C.]) fatally weakened the Greek city-states.

Taking advantage of Greek vulnerabilities, Philip of Macedon crushed the Greek armies and established Macedonian dominance in the region.²⁷ Upon his father's death, Alexander-whom peers and history would dub the Great-consolidated his hold over the remainder of Greece and rapidly expanded his empire through conquest southward through Egypt and eastward through Persia to India. After Alexander's untimely death (323 B.C.), his successors proved unable to maintain his empire which quickly collapsed under internal bickering and war. Elements of the empire survived for some time, but an increasingly expansionist Rome exerted considerable influence in the Balkans and, by 146 B.C., conquering legions consolidated Rome's hold over the entire region.²⁸

BYZANTINE EMPIRE

The Romans extended their empire over the next century, but a further three centuries of *Pax Romana* did not mean an absence of conflict within the Balkans.²⁹ The Romans came under increasing pressure, particularly from barbarian invasions emanating from Western and Central Europe. The pressure became so intense that in A.D. 326

Emperor Constantine transferred the administrative capital of the empire to Byzantium, on the western shores of the Bosphorus (currently Istanbul).³⁰

Divisions between the eastern and western halves of the empire grew rapidly. By A.D. 395, the Roman Empire cleaved in two with the border cutting across modern day Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The importance of Byzantium (Constantinople) increased considerably thereafter, and when the western portion of the empire collapsed under the barbarian invasions of the 5th and 6th centuries, the Byzantine Empire emerged as a major actor on the world stage.³¹

While the Byzantine Empire retained control of the Balkans for most of the next millennia, continuous conflict raged across the periphery of the empire and then ever closer to Constantinople. Of special concern to the Balkans, Bulgar and Slav encroachments continually pressured the empire from the north, which the Byzantines brutally resisted.³² Slavery, immense cruelties, or outright annihilation awaited the defeated. For example, one Byzantine Emperor, Basil the Bulgar-Slayer, not content with annihilating his opponents, had 14,000 captives blinded and sent home as an example.³³

Despite pressures from the north, the more critical threat rose in the east, where first Arabs, then Persians and Ottomans assaulted the Byzantines. Inexorably, these groups wore away at the empire, until the Ottomans successfully besieged Constantinople in 1453, putting an end to over 1000 years of Byzantine rule in the Balkans.³⁴

OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The fall of Constantinople firmly established the Ottomans in the Balkans, but did not end the brutality that would continue to rack the region. The repressive nature of the Ottoman Empire made violence and brutality commonplace.³⁵ Not unnaturally, oppressive measures led to numerous and equally brutal revolts that the Ottomans savagely crushed.³⁶ Reprisal begot reprisal in an escalating

spiral that increased in frequency and scope throughout the Ottoman occupation. Sadly, as current reports of atrocities, mutilations, and rapes indicate, such brutality remains far too commonplace.³⁷

Many peasants took to the mountains to avoid taxes, harassment, and repression of Ottoman rule. To survive they resorted to banditry. But, because these groups also participated in insurrections against the Ottomans, they acquired the reputation of national heroes rather than mere brigands; a Balkan form of Robin Hood. Hajduks in Serbia, Uskoks in Croatia and Dalmatia, Haiduks in Bulgaria, and Klephts in Greece³⁸ established the long tradition of armed resistance against governments or outsiders. Reinforced by the Partisan experience in World War II, this tradition continues with the numerous ethnic and religious irregular forces currently running amok in the wars in what was once Yugoslavia.³⁹

As a result of the ebb and flow of Ottoman campaigns to expand their empire north and west into Central Europe, the Balkans remained the scene of nearly continuous violence for the next six centuries (1400s-1900s).⁴⁰ Because the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary immediately abutted the Ottomans, the clash of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires dominated life in the Balkans until the early 20th century.⁴¹ While the Ottomans reached their peak at the first siege of Vienna in 1529, the long decline of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans began only after the Turkish defeat outside Vienna in 1683. Shortly after the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699),⁴² mutual exhaustion, Habsburg preoccupation with affairs in Central and Western Europe, and Turkish concerns with Russian encroachment from the north stabilized frontiers in the Balkans for nearly a century.⁴³ This stalemate further reinforced the existing religious, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic fault line that cut across the heart of the Balkans from the 4th century and which continues to divide the region to this day.

Conflict became a way of life along this dividing line, particularly along the Austrian Military Frontier between

the Habsburg and Ottoman empires. Officially established in the 17th century, the zone stretched originally across what would be the modern day borders between Slovenia and Croatia, and, as Turkish power waned, advanced south into the general area of what today is known as the Krajina region of Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴⁴

Interested in defending their hard fought gains from further Turkish incursions, but increasingly preoccupied with threats from Central and Western Europe, the Habsburgs populated the region with farmers *cum* soldiers who received land in return for defending Habsburg lands.⁴⁵ This practice led to the development of a warrior caste in the region, for even if the two empires did not directly wage "war," both sides skirmished continuously for military advantage and territorial acquisition. Peoples along the frontier had long suffered harsh treatment under the Ottomans, and oftentimes responded in kind.⁴⁶ The result was that for the next two centuries the Balkans served as a battleground between the two massive empires.⁴⁷

Imperial Austrian practices for populating the region with soldier-farmers also contributed to the ethnic patchwork that evolved in the region. Habsburg subjects, especially Roman Catholic Croats, originally populated the area. But increasing Ottoman pressure in the southern Balkans drove large numbers of refugees, largely Orthodox Serbs, into Croatia. Perennially short of military colonists, the Habsburgs accelerated this movement by granting freedom of worship to all Orthodox adherents who would settle in the area. This stimulus, combined with small land grants, direct rule from Vienna, relief from manorial obligations, and a share of any captured booty, induced large numbers of ethnic Serbs to settle in the Krajina region. This resulted in Serb majorities, or at least strong minorities, sprinkled throughout the region. Later failure, however, to live up to these incentives created considerable tensions that frequently led to open revolts by the Serb population.⁴⁸

The Napoleonic era brought a surge of nationalist activity and violence to the Balkans. Serbia seethed in revolt from 1804-13 and again from 1815-17, winning partial

autonomy.⁴⁹ Not satisfied, the Serbs continued their efforts at freeing all Serbs from the Ottoman Empire, frequently leading to attacks on local Muslim populations.⁵⁰ The Greek Revolution from 1823-29 cleaved off the lower Peloponnesus from the Ottoman Empire.⁵¹ These successes did not come without costs, particularly in human lives. Nor were all efforts successful. In Bulgaria, for example, failed revolts in 1834, 1849, 1850, 1853, and 1876 resulted in harsh reprisals.⁵²

Centrifugal and nationalist tendencies also affected the Austrian Empire. With the breakdown of the Concert of Europe after the Crimean War (1856), German domination of Central Europe from 1871, and Russian activity after the Treaty of San Stefano (1878), Austrian attention turned to the Balkans. But, like their Ottoman opponents, the Habsburgs faced the rising power of Russia, which also coveted the Balkans. France and Great Britain saw no advantage to Austrians or Russians adding to their empires at the expense of the Turks. Thus, by the second half of the 19th century, the Balkans had become the central arena of Great Power competition in Europe. These conditions further heightened tensions, and conflicts increased in frequency, size, and intensity as the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires continued to disintegrate.⁵³

Rising tensions came to a new peak with the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. While the origins and conduct of the war are not significant for this discussion, it is interesting that, like many subsequent emergencies, events in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1875 and Serbian attacks on the Ottomans in support of their brethren in Bosnia-Herzegovina precipitated the crisis. The consequences of the Russo-Turkish War are more important for this analysis. Under the Russian imposed terms of the Treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878), Serbia, Romania, and an enlarged Montenegro received independence. Equally significant, an autonomous and greatly augmented Bulgaria emerged that stretched from Serbia to the Black Sea and included extensive territory in Thrace, abutting the Aegean Sea.⁵⁴

The remaining Great Powers, particularly Great Britain and Austria, expressed dissatisfaction with the treaty and provoked a European crisis. Again, one need only be concerned with the consequences. At the Congress of Berlin (June 13-July 13, 1878), Chancellor Otto von Bismarck of Imperial Germany served as the "honest broker" who crafted a compromise solution for the distribution of Ottoman spoils. While superficially meeting the demands of the Great Powers, the Habsburgs and Russians remained dissatisfied with the results and the seeds of future Great Power conflict had been sown.⁵⁵

The Congress of Berlin also dashed nationalist aspirations of the smaller Balkan states. The Congress cut Bulgaria into thirds with only the territory north of the Balkan Mountains retaining the autonomy granted less than three months earlier under the Treaty of San Stefano. The Greeks received nothing but promises of negotiations with the Turks. While Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania retained their independence, all three lost territory gained under the Treaty of San Stefano. Moreover, the Habsburg mandate over Bosnia-Herzegovina angered Serbia and Montenegro.⁵⁶ In sum, according to the noted European historian Carlton J. H. Hayes, "If before 1878 the 'Eastern Question' concerned one 'sick man', after 1878 it involved a half-dozen maniacs. For the Congress of Berlin drove the Balkan peoples mad."⁵⁷

Little time elapsed before the first sparks flew. An unsuccessful revolt racked Albania in 1880, and in 1881 the Ottomans ceded Epirus (with its largely Albanian population) (see Map 3) to Greece, further agitating Albanian nationalists and raising Albania to the international stage.⁵⁸ In 1885, Eastern Rumelia revolted and joined with Bulgaria, provoking another European crisis. British and Habsburg opposition to Russian initiatives further increased tensions. The crisis worsened when the Serbs attacked Bulgaria, suffered a drubbing, and were saved only through Austrian intervention.⁵⁹

Tensions rose further in 1898 when Greece attacked its Ottoman neighbor in support of Cretan *enosis* (union) with



Map 3. Traditional Place Names

Greece. The Turks decisively defeated the Greeks, and subsequently invaded Greece, only to have the Great Powers intervene. In the end, the Greeks lost the war and paid a small indemnity, and Crete received autonomous status, but without union with Greece; a solution that only dissatisfied all participants.⁶⁰

PRE-WORLD WAR I

By the turn of the 20th century, nationalist passions had reached a fever pitch, and conflicts raged across the region with little respite as nations great and small fought over the carcasses of the declining Habsburg and Ottoman empires. In 1908, Bulgaria gained its independence, fanning nationalist flames throughout the region. More importantly, also in 1908, Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, frustrating Serbian nationalist aspirations for

that territory and dealing the Russians a humiliating diplomatic defeat, both of which would have severe repercussions.⁶¹

Within short order, Southeastern Europe suffered the First Balkan War (1912) between Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, on the one hand, and the Ottomans on the other. Rapidly defeating the Turks, the victorious allies soon fell to squabbling over the division of Macedonia and Albania. Serbian and Greek designs on Albania particularly upset Austria and Italy which did not want to see any strong power, specifically Serbia, established on the Adriatic coast. As a result, the Great Powers again imposed a peace settlement on the Balkans that left nationalist expectations unfulfilled.⁶²

Feeling isolated and not trusting its erstwhile allies, Bulgaria attacked Greece and Serbia, starting the Second Balkan War (June 1913). In a remarkable turnaround, the Ottomans joined the Greeks, Serbs, and Romanians in quickly defeating Bulgaria. By means of the Treaty of Bucharest, however, the Great Powers again imposed a territorial solution upon the region. Serbia and Greece received those parts of Macedonia they had seized, but not the full amounts they desired. Bulgaria retained only a part of Macedonia, and kept a small coastline in Thrace along the Aegean Sea, but lost Thessaloniki to Greece. While Greece gained territory at Bulgarian expense, the concomitant establishment of an independent Albania meant Greece received only a portion of Epirus, all of which it coveted. The Ottomans recovered Adrianople and territory up to the Maritsa River, but still suffered the loss of considerable territory relative to 1911. Only the Romanians, who obtained southern Dobrudja, and the Albanians, who achieved their independence, expressed satisfaction with the final settlement. The other states could be expected to seek redress at the earliest opportunity.⁶³

WORLD WAR I

Gavrilo Princip (an ethnic Bosnian Serb terrorist intent on promoting union of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Serbia) provided that opportunity in June 1914, when he assassinated Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo. The events that turned the third Balkan War into World War I, as well as the events of the war, are well known and will not be repeated here. However, several key consequences of the war merit further discussion.

First, the various alignments of the powers during the course of the war, both within and outside the region, contributed to unresolved tensions that continued to afflict the region after the post-war settlements. For example, Bulgarian support of the Central Powers and murderous occupation of Macedonia and Montenegro only increased Serbian hatred of their eastern neighbor.⁶⁴ Similarly, Greek entry into the war against Bulgaria and Turkey only further sharpened centuries-old animosities.

A second critical consequence of the war was the considerable devastation that significantly set back the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy.⁶⁵ More importantly, nations in the region paid a high cost in human suffering that fed tensions in the post-war era. The plight of Yugoslavia is illustrative. According to documents provided at the Versailles Peace Conference, Yugoslavia suffered 1,900,000 deaths (from all causes) during World War I. Of the 705,343 men Serbia mobilized during the war, 369,815 were killed or died of wounds. This represented nearly one-half of the young male population—a demographic disaster that continues to plague Serbia.⁶⁶

Finally, most states within the Balkans perceived the peace treaties following the war to be imposed and unjust. As a result, they served only to exacerbate old wounds. Bulgarian claims to an outlet on the Aegean Sea, competing claims over Macedonia, and Yugoslav complaints over Italy receiving parts of Illyria and the Dalmatian Coast only fostered further resentment.⁶⁷ Territorial settlements

created future difficulties as numerous ethnic minority situations emerged from a "fair and lasting peace."⁶⁸

INTER-WAR ERA

While World War I ended in Western Europe in November 1918, war in the Balkans did not. Perceived inequities of the peace settlements, coupled with newly invigorated Turkish nationalism and Greek adventurism in Asia Minor, lead to the Greco-Turkish War of 1921-22. Although the Greeks enjoyed initial success, the Turks eventually soundly defeated them. Both sides suffered heavy losses, but Turkish actions in clearing out Greek enclaves in Asia Minor lead to many civilian casualties. After routing the Greeks from Asia Minor, the Turks pushed beyond the Maritsa River in Thrace, where hostilities ceased.⁶⁹

The aftermath of the Greco-Turkish War had key consequences that would vex Balkan relations for decades. First, a resurgent and nationalist Turkey rose from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. And, although the Turks had defeated Greece and triumphed over the harsh Treaty of Sevres, they remained humiliated by their long imperial decline and defeats during World War I. Second, Greek sacrifices during World War I went for nought, as Greece surrendered much of the territory gained under earlier agreements; a humiliation that deeply rankled the country.⁷⁰ Third, to resolve permanently the intermingling of Greek and Turkish populations, approximately 1.3 million Greeks and 380,000 Turks were forcibly exchanged. As might be expected, the conditions took a considerable toll in human suffering and the Greeks, particularly, were ill prepared to receive the massive numbers of refugees involved.⁷¹

But, as noted Balkan historian L.S. Stavrianos pointed out, this exchange represents only the last in a long series of migrations. Approximately 100,000 ethnic Turks fled in the wake of the First Balkan War (1912), and the Second Balkan War (1913) brought the emigration of roughly

50,000 Turks, 70,000 Greeks, and 60,000 Bulgarians. At the outbreak of World War I, roughly 250,000 Moslems fled Greece and elsewhere in the Balkans and approximately 135,000 Greeks left eastern Thrace. Thus, between 1912-23, roughly 2.2 million people were uprooted from homes they had occupied for centuries.⁷²

Despite the massive extent of these migrations, approximately 100,000 ethnic Greeks remained in Constantinople (which had not been subject to the exchange) and 100,000 Turks remained in western Thrace to balance the Greeks in Constantinople. Thus, the seeds for future ethnic conflict bear fruit today in continued agitation over treatment of Turkish minorities in Greece.⁷³

Nor did other countries in the region fare well in the inter-war years. States experimented briefly with democratic government, but largely exchanged Habsburg or Ottoman authoritarianism for national dictatorships. Ethnic discrimination also increased. The net result was that authoritarian regimes of the inter-war era failed to resolve outstanding religious, ethnic, and nationalist problems left over from World War I. Instead, they barely capped popular rage and problems simmered just below the surface awaiting the opportunity to burst once again on the European scene.

WORLD WAR II

The opportunity came quickly with the onset of the Nazi *Drang nach Osten* [expansion toward the east]. Although Hitler aimed his policies predominantly at the Soviet Union, he felt unable to advance against the Soviets without a secure southern flank. Germany also needed the key resources of the Balkan region. Throughout 1939 to early 1941, therefore, the Nazis cemented their relationships with the other revisionist powers (Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) in the region. When, in April and May 1941, Yugoslavia and Greece failed to yield to Hitler's demands, the Germans quickly overran and occupied both nations.⁷⁴

The Balkans suffered terribly during the war years. Even those states that initially sided with the Germans eventually felt Soviet invasion and retribution from German and Russian alike. The Greek and Yugoslav examples represent, perhaps, the most severe cases, because they actively fought the occupier. German and Italian reprisals exacted a tremendous toll on both states, but especially Yugoslavia.

The severity of the Yugoslav case and its effects on the current situation in the Balkans deserve closer attention. Total casualties came to approximately 1.7 million dead out of a population of 16 million.⁷⁵ The numbers of wounded and maimed can only be guessed. Coupled with the massive losses sustained in World War I, two generations of Yugoslavs effectively had been wiped out. Continuous fighting decimated the agricultural and industrial infrastructure of the Yugoslav economy. More importantly, perhaps, were the scars left by the ideological civil war, with its intense ethnic and religious overtones, waged by communists, royalists, and ultranationalists that helped set the stage for the ongoing wars in the former Yugoslavia.

POST-WORLD WAR II

The years immediately following World War II did not see an end to conflict in the Balkans. From 1943-49, civil war tortured Greece. Yugoslavs settled scores of their civil war probably until 1947, when Tito's Communist regime managed to cap the majority of the violence. The extent of the violence and the strains that divided the Balkans are, perhaps, best summed up in novelist Nikos Kazantzakis description of the Greek Civil War (1944-49):

[the inhabitants] were not surprised when the killing began, brother against brother. They were not afraid; they did not change their way of life. But what had been simmering slowly within them, mute and unrevealed, now burst out, insolent and free. The primeval passion of man to kill poured from within them. Each had a neighbor, or a friend, or a brother, whom he had hated for years, without reason, often without realizing it. The hate simmered there, unable to find an outlet. And now, suddenly, they were given rifles and hand grenades; noble flags

waved over their heads. The clergy, the army, the press urged them on-to kill their neighbor, their friend, their brother. Only in this manner, they shouted to them, can faith and country be saved. Murder, the most ancient need of man, took on a high, mystic meaning. And the chase began-brother hunting brother.⁷⁶

The post-World War II division of the Balkans temporarily checked the incessant warfare that has plagued the region. Largely the result of the imposition of Communist regimes in Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria and the fear that local conflict could lead to superpower involvement, the region entered a seeming state of suspended historical animation. As the revolutions of 1989 awoke these states and the specter of superpower confrontation receded, past animosities quickly bubbled to the surface. Conflict first erupted in the former Yugoslavia and threatens to spill over into the Balkans as a whole. Thus, for reasons that will be more fully explored in the next chapter, the region has once again assumed its historical role as the Balkan battleground.

CHAPTER 3

THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF CONFLICT: LANGUAGE, RELIGION, ETHNIC ORIGIN AND CULTURE⁷⁷

Why do we kill the children? Because some day they will grow up and then we will have to kill them.

- A Serbian insurgent in Bosnia⁷⁸

Just as enormous pressures created the chaotic physical geography of the Balkans, so, too, have language, religion, ethnic origin, and culture exerted great forces on the region. These forces have no less impact today and undoubtedly will continue to vex policymakers as they grapple with the intractable issues that emerge from the flow of history.

Individually analyzing these issues presents a considerable challenge. Within the Balkans, language, religious identity, and ethnic origin are too closely intertwined to be addressed separately and the complexity of assessing these issues assumes an exponential function. Thus, although issues are addressed separately in the discussion that follows, the reader must remain aware that they are not isolated in the real world.

LANGUAGE DIVISIONS

As a result of the massive migrations that passed through the Balkans, a variety of languages are spoken within the region. Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek, Serbo-Croat (or Croato-Serb, depending upon ethnic origin), Slovenian, and Turkish are official languages. Although many consider Macedonian a dialect, the existence of an independent Macedonia argues for its inclusion as an official language. Numerous ethnic minorities within the region speak other languages: German, Hungarian, and Italian, for example.⁷⁹

What makes this phenomenon of more than passing interest to policymakers is that language is inextricably linked with religious and ethnic identity. The spoken or written language immediately establishes an individual's ethnic identity and, perhaps, state or nation. Only Greeks, for example, speak Greek. The same for Turks. Even within a country, the concept applies. Within the former Yugoslavia, for example, dialects divide the official language along ethnic lines. Even though few distinctions exist (differences between "Croatian" and "Serbian" are oftentimes less than the variations in some dialects of "Croatian"⁸⁰), Croats adamantly speak Croatian, while Serbs and Montenegrins rigidly speak Serbian.⁸¹

A more distinct difference occurs in the written word where Serbs and Montenegrins write in Cyrillic, while Croats and Muslims use the Latin or Roman alphabet.⁸² The choice of alphabet, then, immediately marks ethnic origin or "national identity." The language or alphabet used may also mark an individual's religious affiliation, as Cyrillic generally is the alphabet of Orthodoxy. And, while the use of the Latin alphabet does not necessarily identify the religious affiliation of the user (i.e., Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims use the Roman alphabet), it does identify what the individual is not: Orthodox or Serb.

The consequences of the proliferation of languages in this area, and, particularly, the establishment of "official" languages along ethnic lines have long exerted strong influences on the region. In the words of Balkan expert Barbara Jelavich:

The efforts of scholars and politicians to divide these peoples by neat lines into Bulgarians, Croats, Serbs, and, later, Macedonians, with language as a chief consideration, was to lead to recrimination and hatred in the future.⁸³

Unfortunately for policymakers, Jelavich's future is today and will undoubtedly extend further into time.

RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS

Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy (subdivided into Serbian, Greek, and Eastern), Islam, and a variety of Protestant sects are practiced within the region. Religion, like language, is inextricably bound to ethnic issues, as religious identity first served as the basis for determining ethnicity and, later, nationality.⁸⁴ Like much of early modern Europe, Christianity based on the Roman Catholic Church predominated throughout the region. Prior to the fall of Rome, Emperor Constantine the Great transferred the seat of government to Constantinople, but the seat of Catholicism remained in Rome. Because of the close links between church and state in Constantinople, church leaders took on increasing importance in the competition between Rome and Constantinople for control of the church. Small doctrinal differences eventually grew to major proportions that culminated in the "Great Schism" of 1054 and the emergence of two separate and doctrinally distinct churches: the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox-which have significantly complicated matters in the Balkans to this very day.⁸⁵

The geographic dividing line between the two churches fell squarely across the Balkans. Croats and Slovenes remained under the religious rule of the Pope in Rome. Greeks, Bulgars, Serbs, and Orthodox Romanians came under control of the Patriarch in Constantinople.⁸⁶ The two branches of the Christian Church continued to draw apart and Croats have remained overwhelmingly Roman Catholic and Serbs have clung fast to Orthodoxy, further alienating their respective followers from each other.⁸⁷

The religious situation in the region became ever more complicated with the arrival of the Ottomans and Islam. The Turks practiced considerable religious toleration, at least among Jews and Christians who as "people of the Book" (Koran) were not forced to convert to Islam. That said, the Ottomans mistreated non-Muslims who suffered economic and civil discrimination.⁸⁸ To avoid such discrimination, voluntary conversions to Islam occurred throughout the

Balkans, mostly in Albania and Bosnia.⁸⁹ Because of these circumstances, some, more radical, Christian Slavs, especially Croats and Serbs, do not consider Muslims a separate ethnic group deserving of its place within the Balkans, but simply apostate Serbs (or Croats) who should be returned to the fold-forcibly if necessary.⁹⁰

Turkish religious toleration resulted in Christian Churches enjoying considerable autonomy under the Ottoman Empire, which would have important consequences. Because of the doctrinaire inflexibility of the Roman Church, aided and abetted by the Habsburg monarchy, many of the Orthodox hierarchy preferred Ottoman rule to expansion of Catholicism.⁹¹ Ottoman policies also had an effect beyond spiritual differences as religions became identified with the various ethnic groups.⁹² For example, when the Patriarch of Pec and 30,000 followers defected to Austria in 1766, the Ottomans replaced him with a Greek. Thereafter, Greeks held the position, which caused considerable animus: the Serbs took offense at Turkish interference with the Serbian Orthodox Church and resented the Greeks for being Ottoman stooges. A similar situation occurred in Bulgaria, where Greeks controlled the Orthodox Church and became identified with the ruling Ottoman class.⁹³ Religious issues, therefore, reinforced ethnic tensions.

In an interesting paradox, the relative religious freedom within the Ottoman Empire and the propensity to identify religious affiliation with a specific ethnic group combined to make local churches the principal symbol of nationalism within the Balkans. The Serbian Orthodox Church, for example, became the sole remaining expression of anything "Serbian" and, thus, the focus of Serbian nationalism under the Ottomans. Similarly, the Latin Church was a significant element that made the Croats different from Serbs; therefore, the Catholic Church served as the rallying point for Croatian nationalism versus the Serbs.⁹⁴ Unfortunately, this also meant that religious organizations increasingly became drawn into ethnic and nationalist conflicts.

These difficulties continued into modern Yugoslavia. A telling example of the levels of animosity may be found in the crisis of 1937. In an attempt to appease the Croatian population, the Yugoslav government negotiated a Concordat with the Vatican that would have granted the Roman Church and its adherents greater freedoms within Yugoslavia. When the Concordat came before the *Skupstina* (parliament) for approval, a storm of outrage broke over Serbia. The Synod of the Orthodox Church immediately excommunicated government ministers of the Orthodox faith, as well as parliamentary members who had voted for the Concordat. Moreover, the Serbian peasantry and middle class saw the move as a capitulation to Croatia. Even Croats, who would benefit from the Concordat, viewed the document with suspicion, fearing a Serbian ploy to break their opposition to the government. As a result, the Concordat had to be withdrawn.⁹⁵ Thus, a plan genuinely intended to improve internal relations led instead to increased ethnic, nationalist, and religious enmity.

ETHNIC DIVISIONS


Ethnic diversity represents the most problematic division within the Balkans. Ethnic composition was largely set by the end of the 9th century when the last wave of migrations broke over the Balkans.⁹⁶ But even at this early time, no ethnically pure groups remained in the region. True, a band of Slavic speaking people separated Romanians and Hungarians in the north from Albanians and Greeks to the south, but no group, despite their boasts, could prove ethnic purity.⁹⁷

The expansion and later contraction of the Ottoman Empire significantly increased ethnic intermingling. The Ottomans initially pushed the Serbs north and west, where sizeable groups settled in southern Hungary, Slavonia, western Bosnia, Croatia, and Dalmatia. (See Map 3.) Displaced Serbs crowded Croats into Austria, Slovenia, and southwest Hungary. With the contraction of the Ottoman Empire, large segments of the displaced populations migrated southward once again. The net result of this ebb

and flow of populations across the Balkans, and particularly Yugoslavia, has been the creation of a patchwork ethnic quilt that continues to this day.⁹⁸ (See Map 4 and Figure 2.)

This ethnic patchwork has considerably hindered the development of harmonious nationalist movements within the Balkans. As William Pfaff has pointed out: "In . . . Balkan Europe, nationality is identified with ethnic or religious background,"⁹⁹ and these ethnic and religious divisions and distributions frustrated the ability of groups to coalesce around one, single unifying "nation." Concomitantly, harsh, repressive Ottoman rule posed considerable obstacles to the rise of nationalism, as the Turks crushed political dissent at the earliest opportunity.¹⁰⁰


Despite these impediments, nascent nationalism always existed throughout the Balkans. But, unable to consolidate around a single unifying definition of nation, ethnic groups coalesced around their language and religion and hearkened back to the glory days of their respective national



Map 4. Ethnic Distribution.

Croatia has an aging population and a fairly low growth rate, in part because many Croats emigrate to Europe as guestworkers. If the many thousands of Serbs and Croats who fled Croatia during the war do not return, the growth rate will be even further reduced.

Percent




^a Preliminary 1991 census data.
^b The growth rate is a measure of annual population increase or decrease because of births, deaths, and migration expressed as a percentage of the base population.
^c Based on 1980 estimates by the Demographic Research Center, OECD estimates for 1986, and preliminary 1991 census data.

Serbia (proper) has experienced a tremendous influx of displaced persons as a result of the war. Even if these immigrants become permanent, however, they probably will not significantly offset Serbia's low growth rate or reimmigrate its gradually aging population.

Vojvodina had a negative growth rate between 1981 and 1991, but the region has absorbed tens of thousands of Serbs displaced by the war.

Bosnia and Herzegovina's growth rate is comparable to most countries in the developed world despite a constant and fairly heavy emigration of Croats and Serbs to their native republics. Massive war-related refugee movements both into and out of Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, could have a lasting impact on the population structure.

Percent




^a Preliminary 1991 census data.
^b The growth rate is a measure of annual population increase or decrease because of births, deaths, and migration expressed as a percentage of the base population.
^c Based on 1980 estimates by the Demographic Research Center, OECD estimates for 1986, and preliminary 1991 census data.

Kosovo is the only region of former Yugoslavia experiencing dramatic population growth. At current rates, the Albanian population in Kosovo—probably closer to 90 percent of the population than the official figures of 82 percent—will double by the year 2000. Its proportion of the working-age population is kept low by the large number of children in the population.

Montenegro's growth rate is about average for the developed world despite some emigration to northern republics in search of work. Nonetheless, its age distribution is roughly normal. The Albanians and Muslims are the most rapidly growing ethnic groups and will probably comprise a larger share of the population in the 1991 census.


Percent




^a Preliminary 1991 census data.
^b The growth rate is a measure of annual population increase or decrease because of births, deaths, and migration expressed as a percentage of the base population.
^c Based on 1980 estimates by the Demographic Research Center, OECD estimates for 1986, and preliminary 1991 census data.

Although some Macedonians emigrate to northern republics in search of work, the growth rate is about average for the developed world, and the age distribution is normal. The Albanians and Muslims are the most rapidly growing ethnic groups and will probably comprise a larger share of the population in the 1991 census.

Percent




^a Albanian representatives in both Macedonia and Montenegro complain their numbers are underrepresented in official reports. Some claim the Macedonian population is as much as 50 percent Albanian.
^b 1991 census data reported by Center for International Research, US Bureau of the Census.
^c Preliminary 1991 census data.
^d The growth rate is a measure of annual population increase or decrease because of births, deaths, and migration expressed as a percentage of the base population.
^e Based on 1980 estimates by the Demographic Research Center, OECD estimates for 1986, and preliminary 1991 census data.



^a The Albanian population reported here is an official Yugoslav estimate because of the Albanian boycott of the 1991 census.
^b 1981 census data reported by Center for International Research, US Bureau of the Census.

Slovenia's low growth rate is due largely to an aging population since emigration is essentially balanced by immigration from southern republics. This low growth will eventually cause Slovenia's large working-age population to decline even though many thousand displaced Croats, Bosnians, and Kosovars have arrived in Slovenia seeking refuge from the war.

Percent



^a 1991 census data reported by Center for International Research, US Bureau of the Census.
^b Preliminary 1991 census data.
^c The growth rate is a measure of annual population increase or decrease because of births, deaths, and migration expressed as a percentage of the base population.
^d Based on 1980 estimates by the Demographic Research Center, OECD estimates for 1986, and preliminary 1991 census data.

Figure 2. Population Resources in the Former Yugoslavia

kingdoms.¹⁰¹ Bulgarians have looked to the First Bulgarian Empire (893-927) or the empire of Tsar John Asen II (1218-41), when Bulgaria stretched from the Adriatic to the Aegean to the Black Seas.¹⁰² Greeks, on the other hand, sought to emulate Alexander the Great and create a nation-state that united all Hellenes in the Balkans.¹⁰³ Croats traced their nationhood back to the *Pacta Conventa* (1102) that established a Croatian state under Magyar rule that encompassed the northwest corner of the Balkans.¹⁰⁴ Serbs based their national claims on the domain of Stephen Dusan (1321-55) when Serbia included parts of Albania, Macedonia, Epirus, and Thessaly and extended from the Aegean to the Adriatic; the Danube to the Gulf of Corinth.¹⁰⁵

Establishment of these independent kingdoms 800-1000 years ago is no mere historical footnote. As Stavrianos pointed out:

First, it should be noted that the past—even the very distant past—and the present are side by side in the Balkans. Centuries chronologically removed from each other are really contemporary. Governments and peoples, particularly intellectuals, have based their attitudes and actions on what happened, or what they believed happened, centuries ago. The reason is that during almost five centuries of Turkish rule the Balkan people had no history. Time stood still for them. Consequently, when they won their independence in the nineteenth century their point of reference was the pre-Turkish period—to the medieval ages or beyond.¹⁰⁶

Although written in 1958, these sentiments currently reverberate throughout the erstwhile Yugoslavia. A Croatian fighter in Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina declares, "Don't forget, this was all part of Croatia in 1101 . . . Muslims and Serbs took it away from us."¹⁰⁷ Or, the Serb irregular fresh from "cleansing" who, when asked, "What happened here yesterday?" replies "Well, in 1389 . . .," or "Under the Ottomans," or "Because in 1921 they" to justify his actions.¹⁰⁸ The trek of over 1,000,000 Serbs to the "Field of the Blackbirds" in Kosovo in 1989 to commemorate the 600th anniversary of the Ottoman victory that ended an independent Serbia best illustrates, perhaps, the depth of historical attachment in this region.¹⁰⁹

Equally important is that many ethnic groups use these historical claims to justify their current territorial demands; many of which overlap significantly.¹¹⁰ And, if past or present rhetoric is any indication, no side appears willing to compromise on the extent of its claim.¹¹¹ Instead of being a forgotten page of history, these antecedents provide considerable grist for conflict, as the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia graphically illustrates.

Only after considerable decline in Ottoman power (i.e., the late 18th and 19th centuries) could nationalism gather momentum. Indeed, not until the Napoleonic Revolution could the peoples of the Balkans establish and sustain a national identity.¹¹² Even then, however, popular expectations went largely unfulfilled. Great Power concerns over the division of Ottoman spoils oftentimes deferred nationalist hopes as boundaries failed to incorporate large segments of an ethnic population. Thus, the continuing-but apparently impossible to fulfill-desire to bring all segments of an ethnic group under one nation only stoked the fires of nationalism until the next conflict inevitably burst on the scene.¹¹³

The participation of various ethnic groups in World War I increased these strains. Large numbers of Croats fought for the Habsburg Empire against Serbia, and Croatian and Slovene politicians actively supported the Habsburgs.¹¹⁴ Early in the war, Muslims living in Serbia fought with the Serbs against the Austrians. When Turkey later entered the war, many Muslims believed a secret agreement had been reached between Turkey and Austria that would return Bosnia-Herzegovina to Turkish rule. Many Muslims, therefore, left Serbian service, and fought against the Serbs.¹¹⁵ More importantly, for an understanding of current events in the Balkans, Croats collected Serbs and Bosnians into as many as seven concentration camps, the most infamous being Doboij. According to Dediđer, *et al.*, tens of thousands of Serbs and Bosnian Serbs died in these camps, largely through disease and neglect.¹¹⁶ The fighting in World War I, thus, took on not only a strong nationalistic

propensity against outside oppressors, but also an ethnic and religious bent.

The creation of Yugoslavia in the wake of World War I offers an excellent illustration of the failure to soothe ethnic and nationalist sentiments. Convinced they could not survive as independent states, Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina opted for union with Serbia rather than run the risk of being swallowed up by another more powerful and non-Slavic neighbor (e.g., Italy or Hungary). Like most marriages of convenience, the participants entered into the agreement with decidedly different views of the pre-nuptial agreement—one side pursued a Greater Serbia dominated by Belgrade, while the other sought a loose, federal system with considerable autonomy.¹¹⁷

Nor were the Yugoslavs the only dissatisfied parties. Romania doubled in size, but only at the expense of other states within the region, particularly Hungary. Greece obtained a small portion of Thrace from Bulgaria, but felt betrayed when denied the full territorial concessions offered to entice Greece into the war. Defeated Bulgaria suffered partial dismemberment that led to discontent and irredentism in the post-World War I era.¹¹⁸

Additionally, ethnic discrimination oftentimes worsened in the inter-war era. For example, the Yugoslav government viewed any dissent as treason and took harsh repressive actions. Croatians, Albanians, and Macedonians suffered considerably under the Serbian dominated government. The Serbs were not alone in this practice, as other ethnic *cum* national leaders in Yugoslavia took to calling minorities foreigners, even if ethnic groups had lived in the region for generations.¹¹⁹

The onset of World War II once again brought forth the ethnic genie in the Balkans. After conquering the Balkans, Germany planned to deport Slovenes from Lower Styria and Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia. Although the massive scale of forced emigration did not occur because of the uprising against the occupiers, the Nazis deported roughly 50,000 Slovenes, and another 200,000 Serbs and Slovenes moved

of their own accord to avoid the deportations.¹²⁰ Nor were the Germans alone as animosities throughout the region motivated other ethnic groups to settle old scores. Bulgarians carried out mass expulsions of Serbs in Macedonia and introduced large numbers of Bulgarian colonists in the area. Hungarians expelled thousands of Serbs, Gypsies, and Jews from their occupied areas.¹²¹

More important for the purposes of this monograph, the ethnic- and ultranationalist-based hatred that surfaced during the course of the Yugoslav civil war, which continues to plague that erstwhile state today, deserves special attention. Within five days of the German invasion of Yugoslavia, the puppet *Ustasi* regime had been established in Croatia. As early as May 2, 1941, Milovan Zanic, Minister of the Legislative Council of the Independent State of Croatia, declared in a note of instruction:

This country can only be a Croatian country, and there is no method we would hesitate to use in order to make it truly Croatian and *cleanse* [added emphasis] it of Serbs, who have for centuries endangered us and who will endanger us again if they are given the opportunity.¹²²

Shortly thereafter, reprisals against Serbs and Muslims began. Outright murder and massacres became commonplace. "Ethnic cleansing," the current hot buzz word, began in earnest as the *Ustasi* forced hundreds of thousands of Serbs and Muslims to emigrate from their homelands in Croatia or to convert to Catholicism.

Once the *Ustasi* campaign began, Serbs, most prominently under Colonel Drazha Mihailovic and his *Chetniks*, defended themselves. The *Chetniks* held strong nationalistic, Greater Serbia, anti-Croatian, and anti-Communist beliefs, and seemed only secondarily concerned with the German or Italian invaders. Moreover, Mihailovic proved unable to control many separate *Chetnik* groups which acted as little more than brigands who attacked whoever happened to be nearest.¹²³

During this same time, the largely Communist (but pan-Yugoslav) Partisan movement under Joseph Broz, better known as Tito, began guerrilla operations against the

Axis occupiers. Although ethnically Croatian, the strong anti-Communist bent of the *Ustasi* and orders from Stalin drove Tito to take up arms against the Nazis and their Croatian allies. Initially, he established his forces in and around Zagreb, but *Ustasi* and German pressure forced him to move into Serbian territory, where he set up his headquarters in the vicinity of Belgrade.¹²⁴

This move immediately brought him into conflict with Mihailovic, and by November 1941, the two men and their organizations stood at dagger points. This circumstance initially resulted as much from tactical differences as ideologic ones. The Germans carried out brutal reprisals against any Partisan actions and, because both groups operated predominantly from Serbian territory, Serbs suffered the brunt of the reprisals. After German raids in Kragujevac resulted in the deaths of over 8,000—including hundreds of children—Mihailovic suspended operations against Axis forces to avoid further reprisals and focused on survival of his troops until such time that liberation seemed closer at hand.¹²⁵

Tito, on the other hand, continued his operations. These actions, combined with ideological (i.e., communist versus royalist) and ethnic differences, resulted in the *Chetniks* actively cooperating with the Germans and Italians in anti-Partisan operations from November 1941 onwards.¹²⁶ Thus began a four way civil war among the *Ustasi*, *Chetniks*, Partisans, and rump Serbia under Nedic that escalated in scope and level of violence until the end of World War II.¹²⁷ An indication of the levels of hatred and nationalist sentiment involved can be found in an anecdote concerning the Croatian leader Vladko Macek and one of his guards, a devout Catholic. When Macek asked the man if he feared God's punishment for his actions, the guard replied:

Don't talk to me about that . . . for I am perfectly aware of what is in store for me. For my past, present, and future deeds I shall burn in hell, but at least I shall burn for Croatia.¹²⁸

The civil and ethnic war quickly spread beyond Croatian-Serbian warfare as both sides also settled old scores with the Muslim community.¹²⁹ Muslims later joined

with Croats in reprisals against the Serbs. Muslims also enlisted in two SS divisions—the Albanian SS "*Skanderbeg*" Division and the Croatian/Bosnian SS "*Handschar*" (Scimitar) Division—that participated in the numerous German anti-Partisan operations and carried out indiscriminate attacks against Partisans and civilians alike.¹³⁰ In many ways it became difficult to separate the civil and ethnic wars from the religious aspects of the centuries old conflicts in the region.¹³¹

The costs of this civil-ethnic-religious war were staggering. Estimates indicate that upwards of 300,000 Serbs may have been forcibly converted to Catholicism and that between 200,000-600,000 Serbs died in Croatia, alone. Jozo Tomasevich notes that Serbs claim between 500,000-700,000 Serbs may have perished in Croatian cleansing campaigns, but concludes that the minimum number may have been closer to 350,000. Nor were Serbs the only victims, as the Germans and their satellites killed large numbers of anti-*Ustasi* Croats, Jews and Gypsies who lived in the Balkans.¹³² Muslims also suffered considerably. Within Bosnia-Hercegovina, for instance, roughly 75,000 or 8.1 percent of the pre-war population perished.¹³³

Precise numbers of Croatian casualties are difficult to determine, and, while likely less than Serbs, they would still be considerable. What is known is that at the end of the war approximately 100,000 *Ustasi* supporters surrendered to British authorities. The British, per established procedures, returned the personnel to Yugoslav (i.e., Tito, thus imparting a political/military motive) control, where over the course of roughly six weeks, between 40,000-100,000 (depending upon the estimate) died.¹³⁴ Moreover, the civil war did not end in 1945, and carried on well into 1946. Estimates indicate that as many as 250,000 perished in mass executions, death marches, and concentration camps during the period.¹³⁵

Perhaps the greatest consequence of civil war was that, despite the levels of bloodshed, ethnic issues had not been resolved. To the people of the Balkans who either lived through this era or to the current generation who heard, in

vivid detail, grim horror stories from parents or grandparents, these activities are not history, but life as it exists in the Hobbesian sense—"solitary, poor, nasty, cruel, brutish, and short."¹³⁶ Moreover, many of these people have a face to put on this misery. A face that belongs to the Croat, Serb, Muslim, Albanian, or Macedonian who participated in, or who is perceived as responsible for the crimes of World War II.¹³⁷ As F. Stephen Larrabee aptly pointed out, memories run long and deep in the Balkans.¹³⁸

Post-war events, particularly the establishment of totalitarian regimes with an anti-national bent (i.e., Communism) in much of the Balkans and East-West polarity, generally dampened ethnic conflict throughout the region. Yugoslavia again provides an illustrative example of events. In crafting the Constitution of 1946, Tito attempted to establish internal borders based on national or historical bases, but the substantial intermingling of ethnic groups made it impossible to draw lines strictly on ethnic lines. To compensate for this failing, republic borders "were defined as sovereign homelands of sovereign nations: Croatia of Croats, Serbia of Serbs, and so on."¹³⁹ Obviously designed to protect ethnic minorities in other republics, this provision also meant that minorities living within one republic became part of their respective nation; e.g., Serbs in Croatia were still part of the Serbian nation.¹⁴⁰ Such a proviso could justify inter-republic interference in the internal affairs of a neighbor in the name of protecting one's ethnic brethren. Serbia's actions in Croatia and Bosnia from 1991 to the present can be traced directly to this precedent.¹⁴¹

Through a series of constitutional changes (1953, 1962, 1974), Tito attempted to restrain ethnic and nationalist passions by providing greater local autonomy, the most dramatic instance being the Constitution of 1974.¹⁴² Tito also periodically purged republic parties that demonstrated too much nationalism, most notably his purge of the Croatian, Serbian, and Slovenian branches of the party in 1970-74.¹⁴³ But Tito only succeeded in temporarily capping ethnic animosities.

With Tito's passing in 1980, the body politic of Yugoslavia proved unable to withstand the internal assault of nationalism and ethnic strife that has engulfed that state. Given the ethnic groups within the former Yugoslavia that have close ties with neighboring states, the possibility of the conflict spreading throughout the Balkans runs high. This potential for expansion is what the policymakers of today must contend with. But, in developing their policy options, decisionmakers must understand the depths of the ethnic animosities that exist within the Balkans and the second and third order consequences that might result from policy initiatives.

CULTURE

The linguistic, religious, and ethnic issues outlined above constitute the fundamental elements of culture,¹⁴⁴ and for the purposes of this report offer a largely complete picture of the clash of cultures that has taken place (and will likely continue) in the Balkans. That said, three additional points critical for decisionmakers' fuller understanding of policy shoals in the Balkans require explication.

First, policymakers must understand that violence is ingrained in the cultures of the region. This statement is not intended as a value judgement, but rather as a recognition of the influences that have shaped the region. Nor should this result be surprising: for over two millennia, the Balkans not only has been the major battleground among competing Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, and Habsburg empires, but also the killing ground for World War I, World War II, and numerous civil wars.

Second, no one culture dominates the region. The Balkans contains a melange of Albanian, Greek, Italian, Croatian, Slovenian, Romanian, Byzantine, Ottoman, Magyar, and Slav cultures, to name only the major contributors.

Third, the region suffers from a cultural cleavage of substantial proportions. The reasons for this condition are manifold and must be understood if policymakers are to

make informed decisions. Populations were first separated along the border between Rome and Byzantium, which also became the cultural dividing line between Occident and Orient. Cultural differences sharpened as a series of conquerors passed through the region and Magyars, Venetians, Italians, and Germans left their cultural imprint. But, the key cultural abyss resulted from the clash of Ottoman and European cultures whose dramatic differences in government, language, religion, and customs could not have been any more distinct. As L.S. Stavrianos pointed out, this clash resulted in:

. . . a cultural dividing line [albeit murky and ill-defined, that] runs across the peninsula with Catholic Christianity, the Latin alphabet, and Western cultural orientation on one side, and Orthodox Christianity, the Greek alphabet, and a Byzantine cultural pattern on the other.¹⁴⁵

Finally, the various cultures are exclusive in nature. If an individual does not display all necessary prerequisites, i.e., language, religion, and ethnic origin, he or she is excluded from membership. Moreover, there appears to be no room for compromise. Even should an individual speak the language or convert to another religion, ethnic origin appears to be a distinctive difference that cannot be overcome.¹⁴⁶ Literally, an "us versus them" cultural mentality exists and, given the rising levels of violence, is not likely to change in the near future.

The ongoing conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is instructive in this regard. Bosnia-Herzegovina has largely been a geographical-political expression vice a nation or national identity. Because Bosnians have been unable to develop either an independent culture or a culture that conforms to one or the other cultures in the region, they have been denied entrance into either. Indeed, the Bosnian state may likely be viewed as antithetical to the interests of the other competing cultures. The existence of an independent Bosnia will, therefore, remain problematic as cultures within the region continue to clash. Undoubtedly, this condition will vex policymakers as they attempt to craft a comprehensive settlement to the violence in the former Yugoslavia or its successor states.

Nor is the situation in former Yugoslavia unique. Similar divisions afflict other states within the region, (e.g., Romania, Bulgaria, Greece) and cultural differences will likely continue to raise temperatures. Whether they will erupt into violence on a scale equivalent to the wars in the former Yugoslavia may hinge on how well national leaders and international organizations learn from the mistakes of the past and craft future policies that redress age-old societal tensions. The most effective long-term solution to this clash of cultures is the development of political institutions that will safeguard the minority rights of the various ethnic and religious groups. Neither the recent nor distant past offers much hope that such a political solution will be found quickly, however. The rationale behind this pessimistic assessment will be explored next.

CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND MISTRUST

Balkan politics—frequent and haphazard changes of government and general corruption.¹⁴⁷

An understanding of the historical factors that have influenced political outlooks and governmental institutions in the Balkans is essential to grasping the complexities of current difficulties within the region. Without a thorough understanding of the past political development of the region, policymakers may neither comprehend the complications of the present nor identify a successful path to the future.

With one or two key exceptions, political developments within the Balkans tend to follow similar paths. Therefore, the report will focus first on the legacies of the Ottoman Empire, and then trace the general political development of the states within the region from the time they escaped the bonds of empire to the present day. Finally, the investigation will focus more sharply on the political development of Yugoslavia.

THE OTTOMAN HERITAGE

At the upper levels of government, the Ottomans established the precedent of arbitrary, authoritarian, thoroughly repressive, and violent rule that tightly controlled state policies. If individuals or regions failed to pay taxes, offer suitable tribute, or provide sufficient sons to meet the levies for the Janissaries, retribution came swiftly and violently.¹⁴⁸

Contrary to their tight hold at the state level, the Turks allowed local governments considerable autonomy. After

conquering an area, the Ottomans desired no direct control over their subject populations and preferred to rule indirectly through intermediaries.¹⁴⁹ Under the *millet* system, the Turks eliminated any residual local secular government and replaced it with a religious authority of local origin, or at least of local confession, that also had civic responsibilities. Within the Balkans, this system resulted in the Orthodox Church serving as the Ottomans' agent for regional and local governments.¹⁵⁰ Equally, this led to the Orthodox Church being identified with the Ottoman state. Thus, when nationalism began to emerge within the region, non-Orthodox groups saw the Orthodox Church as an obstacle to their ethnic and nationalist goals.¹⁵¹ Religion, therefore, tended to reinforce ethnic differences, exacerbating societal divisions and complicating political development.¹⁵²

Finally, the Ottomans bequeathed a tradition of corrupt government. Within the late Ottoman Empire (late 1600s onwards), office holders viewed their position as a means of amassing personal wealth as opposed to providing a service to the governed. At lower governmental levels, wages and salaries were ridiculously small, encouraging rampant corruption (the concept of paying *baksheesh*, for example) to obtain even the most fundamental services. These traits passed on to succeeding governments.¹⁵³

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AFTER OTTOMAN RULE

As states within the Balkans emerged from Ottoman rule, they tended to follow similar paths. Nationalist awakenings and repressive Ottoman practices stirred local populations first to agitation, then to revolt. Initially, insurrectionists did not achieve full independence, but obtained limited autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, often under the rule of a local prince.¹⁵⁴

To achieve full independence, these states generally required assistance from an outside power that frequently left them beholden to their patron, if not under *de facto*

control.¹⁵⁵ This dependency resulted in two interesting phenomena. On the one hand, the requirement to conform to their patron's desires oftentimes constrained the princes' ability to influence the international arena. On the other hand, because the princes could rely on outside support, they did not have to develop stable internal political institutions and, instead, could rely on outside support to prop up their regimes.¹⁵⁶

Most states evolved into monarchies with strong centralizing tendencies.¹⁵⁷ Although states declared themselves constitutional monarchies in name and form, monarchy normally prevailed over constitution, at least through World War II. Political parties, nonetheless, did come into existence and their rise led to conflicts between monarchs and emerging political elites. While these conflicts sometimes curtailed monarchical power, they were frequently based on regional or ethnic composition that, more often than not, only further alienated the parties involved.¹⁵⁸

World War I provided a watershed for the growth of political institutions within the Balkans. The Ottoman and Habsburg empires disappeared, and their territories and nationalities were distributed among the victorious powers or the states within the region. The territorial distribution did not, however, satisfy many of the ethnic-*cum*-nationalist aspirations in the region.¹⁵⁹ The most pressing issue in the immediate post-war period, then, became how to integrate politically these disgruntled groups.

An increasing number of political parties considerably complicated this integration process. Because of the manner in which countries had been cobbled together (or taken apart), parties in most states spanned the political spectrum: communists, agrarians, populists, moderates, and rabid nationalists, few of whom could agree on much of anything.¹⁶⁰ Their diversity and political opposition to the increasingly centralizing nature of the monarchies caused them to fragment, leading, in turn, to increased weakness of the parliamentary factions.¹⁶¹

More importantly, perhaps, this political fragmentation resulted in an inability to resolve the vast problems left over from before World War I, as well as the dilemmas generated by the war and the peace that followed. In short, throughout the Balkans, political parties failed to govern effectively. As a result, internal political instability and economic crisis led to the demise of democratic government.¹⁶²

The economic disasters of the Great Depression brought matters to a head. Throughout the region, right wing, authoritarian dictatorships stepped in to end ethnic violence, political instability, and economic crisis. The facade of democracy might have been maintained, but the dictators ruled with a strong hand, effectively emasculating any opposition.¹⁶³ The events leading up to World War II, particularly the rise of fascism, only further contributed to the accretion of dictatorial power within the region.

The German conquest of the Balkans clamped the region ever more firmly in the grip of authoritarian regimes. The occupied countries of Albania, Greece, and Yugoslavia suffered varying degrees of harsh occupation. Bulgaria and Romania initially enjoyed considerable freedom from German interference, but the exigencies of war inevitably led to a tightening of the dictatorial grips of their rulers.

The end of World War II brought mixed results for the political development of the region. In Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia, Communist governments established a dictatorial hold that exceeded that of the right wing dictators. While Tito's variant of communism may have been considerably more gentle than that of nearby Stalinist clones, Yugoslavia was still Communist. As Barbara Jelavich noted, the establishment of Communist regimes in the Balkans created a political dividing line in the bipolar world that reinforced existing cultural, religious, and linguistic divisions¹⁶⁴ and would not be breached for over 40 years.

Nor did Greece and Turkey easily escape from the clutches of authoritarianism. Greece fought a brutal civil war against a Communist insurrection from 1944-49. After

conclusion of the civil war, a relatively stable and democratic government emerged that would last for nearly two decades. By the mid-1960s, Greek politics began to fragment, primarily over the failed union with Cyprus and the rapid rise of Andreas Papandreu.¹⁶⁵ With the emergence of a dysfunctional government, the Greek Army once again took matters into its own hands and for 7 years Greece lived under a harsh military dictatorship. Greece returned to a democratically elected government in 1974 and has subsequently maintained a stable and open political system.¹⁶⁶

After World War II, Turkey followed a regular cycle of civilian government, increasing political polarization, decreasing ability to govern, rising radical violence, and military intervention that led to a series of coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980.¹⁶⁷ In all cases, military leaders stated their aim to restore civil peace and prepare the country for the rapid reintroduction of civil government under the rule of law. In each instance, the military yielded power to civil authorities as promised.¹⁶⁸ These actions did not, however, entirely remove the specter of future military intervention which still hangs over Turkey.¹⁶⁹ While Turkey has made tremendous strides in this century, it continues to struggle toward full democracy.¹⁷⁰

THE YUGOSLAV EXAMPLE

The rationale behind a sharper focus on Yugoslavia is several-fold. First, Yugoslavia represents a microcosm of the various general trends of the region. Second, Yugoslavia (initially in the form of an autonomous and then an independent Serbia) arrived first on the international stage and set precedents for others to follow. Third, the Serbian nationalist drive throughout the 19th century exerted tremendous influence over the political development of other emerging states within the region. Finally, the ongoing wars in the former Yugoslavia are, in many ways, an extension of the long historical battle between the political concepts of a highly centralized "Greater Serbia" and a loose federal union of South Slavs. An examination of

Yugoslavia's political development may shed light on the efficacy of potential solutions to the current crisis.

The origins of the modern Yugoslav state can be traced to 1804, when Djordje Petrovic (Karadjordje or "Black George") led a decade-long revolt against oppressive Janissary rule in Serbia. Initially successful, the movement captured Belgrade and liberated large portions of Serbia, but lost momentum after Russia failed to provide promised support and the Ottomans awoke to the threat. Forced to flee to the Austrian Empire in 1813, Karadjordje could still claim considerable success in mobilizing Serbian nationalism. Moreover, he left behind a legacy of limited Serbian autonomy under his personal rule, as well as a large number of trained and motivated supporters who would bide their time until the next revolt.¹⁷¹

The next rebellion was not long in coming, for in 1817 Milos Obrenovic, one of Karadjordje's rivals, led another, more successful revolt. The circumstances surrounding it are quite interesting. In return for helping the Ottomans put down a local revolt in 1814, the Porte named Obrenovic supreme prince of Serbia and granted him limited autonomy in the collection of taxes and the conduct of local government.¹⁷²

Milos received the right of personal, not hereditary rule. Dissatisfied with these circumstances, he commenced a long campaign to expand Serbian borders, increase his authority, and establish his own hereditary line, which he declared in 1817. In one of his first acts to cement his rule, Milos had Karadjordje (who had returned in the wake of Milos' success) beheaded, supposedly in retaliation for the suspected poisoning of Milos' half-brother. This event set in motion the long political and blood feud between the Karadjordjevic and Obrenovic families.¹⁷³

Largely because of Russian intercession on Milos' behalf and Turkey's defeat in the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29, the Ottomans granted Serbia full autonomy in 1830 and Milos received the right of hereditary rule. Under the terms of the Porte's agreement, Milos shared power with the

Skupstina, an assembly of notables whom he attempted-with some success-to eliminate one by one. Milos' arbitrary, violent, and corrupt rule precipitated numerous revolts and, finally, outside intervention in 1838 that resulted in a new constitution. Milos refused to cooperate with the Serbian oligarchy as stipulated in the constitution and abdicated in favor of his son, Milan.¹⁷⁴

Figure 3 summarizes the confusing succession to the Serbian throne throughout the 19th century. It also can be used to derive insights into the political development of Serbia from Milos' abdication through the assassination of Alexander Obrenovic (1903). First, the figure reflects the bitter political rivalry between the Obrenovic and Karadjordjevic families that would debilitate Serbian politics for nearly a century. Second, it provides an indication of the long struggle between the *Skupstina* and either very weak or capricious authoritarian rulers who were forced to abdicate. Third, the figure reveals a predilection toward violence as the means of political change. What it does not indicate, but which is also important for an understanding of political developments, is the tradition of corrupt and repressive government that resulted from the continuous political instability during this period.

Shortly after Alexander Obrenovic's assassination, the *Skupstina* elected Peter Karadjordjevic, then age 60, to the throne. Peter I returned from 45 years exile and immediately revitalized Serbia. Internally, Peter ruled as a constitutional monarch in close cooperation with a *Skupstina* controlled by the Radicals, predominantly under the leadership of Nikola Pasic. From 1903 to the outbreak of World War I, Serbia enjoyed a period of relative calm and prosperity that saw the country make tremendous strides in civil liberties, economics, education, and national prestige.¹⁷⁵

After Peter's accession, Serbian foreign policies became decidedly nationalistic and anti-Austrian. The Austrians exacerbated conditions through the so-called "Pig War" (a tariff war in 1906 designed to halt Serbian-Bulgarian

rapprochement) and the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, two traditionally South Slav provinces, in 1908. After the Bosnian crisis (1908), Serbian-Austrian relations had reached the point of no return.¹⁷⁶

| Years of Rule | Ruler | End of Reign |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------|--|
| 1804-1813 | Karadjordje | Defeated by Turks. Later beheaded by Milos Obrenovic. |
| 1817-1839 (first reign) | Milos Obrenovic | Forced to abdicate. |
| 1839 | Milan Obrenovic | Died from disease. |
| 1839-1842 (first reign) | Michael obrenovic | Forced to abdicate. |
| 1842-1858 | Alexander Karadjordjevic | Forced to abdicate. |
| 1858-1860 (second reign) | Milos obrenovic | Died of natural causes. |
| 1860-1868 | Michael Obrenovic | Assassinated by Karadjordjevic faction? |
| 1868-1889 | Milan II obrenovic | Forced to abdicate. |
| 1889-1903 | Alexander obrenovic | Assassinated by army of~lcers. |
| 1903-1921 | Peter I Karadjordjevic | Senile from 1914. Died of natural causes. |
| 1921-1934 (regent 1914) | Alexander Karadjordjevic | Assassinated by Macedonian terrorist. |
| 1934-1945 | Peter II Karadjordjevic | Prince Regent Paul Karadjordjevic overthrown by a military coup, 1941. Monarchy abolished, 1945. |

Figure 1. Rulers of Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1804-1945.

Source: William L. Langer, *An Encyclopedia of World History*, 5th ed., Boston: Houghton-Mimin, 1972, p. 760.

Denied access to the Adriatic Sea by the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbs turned their attention to the southeast. Here Peter I helped construct the Balkan League which first successfully dismembered much of the European portion of the Ottoman Empire in the First Balkan War (1912), and later stopped Bulgarian aggression in the Second Balkan War (1913). Three key results emerged from these successes. First, Serbia nearly doubled in size. Second, the Serbian victories electrified Slavs under Austrian domination who began to look to Belgrade for salvation.¹⁷⁷ Third, the combination of these circumstances set Serbia and Austria on a collision course that culminated shortly thereafter in Sarajevo, where Gavrilo Princip (a Bosnian Serb working for the Serbian society Union or Death, better known as the Black Hand) assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and lit the powder trail that exploded into World War I.

The major events of World War I are too well-known to be repeated here. But it is important to understand the levels of Croat-Serb mistrust generated during the war. First, of the South Slav states, Serbia suffered the brunt of the casualties of the war.¹⁷⁸ Second, many Croats fought for the Habsburgs.¹⁷⁹ Third, under the terms of the secret Treaty of London (1915) that brought Italy into the war against Austria-Hungary, the allies granted much ethnically Croat and Slovene territory to Italy. Well-founded rumors circulated that Serbian Premier Pasic would acquiesce to the agreement so long as Serbia gained territory populated by Serbs or Orthodox followers, as well as access to the Adriatic.¹⁸⁰

By the summer of 1917, however, the various nationalities felt compelled to reach some form of agreement on the future of the South Slav peoples. The Habsburgs and their allies had driven the Serbian Army and government into exile on the island of Corfu. Isolated, knowing the terms of the Treaty of London, and in need of allies, the Serbs pursued negotiations with the Yugoslav Committee on the formation of a South Slav state.¹⁸¹ Croats and Slovenes realized that, individually, each was too weak to withstand

the Habsburgs or Italians. An alliance with Serbia within the construct of a Yugoslav state offered the only viable alternative and they, too, sought the good offices of the Yugoslav Committee.¹⁸²

This convergence of interests resulted in the Corfu Declaration of July 1917, where the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee agreed to the creation of a Yugoslav state as a constitutional monarchy under the Karadjordjevic dynasty.¹⁸³ While perhaps not a "shotgun" marriage, the agreement certainly represented a marriage of convenience. On the one hand, the Serbs compromised because they needed allies and U.S. approval, but looked to establish a "Greater Serbia" that included all Serbs whose land would be dominated by Belgrade. On the other hand, the remaining ethnic groups, particularly Croats (who wanted a Croatian state, but realized some form of autonomy within a confederation was the only practical option), feared a Serbian-dominated state and wanted a loose confederation that would grant relative autonomy to the various elements of the South Slav state.¹⁸⁴ These attitudes undoubtedly sowed the seeds of future estrangement, and, it is worth pointing out, much of the impetus behind the ongoing civil war in the former Yugoslavia stems from this very point: perceived Serb domination versus independence and autonomy.

Despite these misgivings, the new state took life in the waning days of World War I. On October 29, 1918, the National Council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs meeting in Croatia announced the founding of the "State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs." Less than one month later (November 24) the Kingdoms of Montenegro and Serbia merged with the new state. Shortly thereafter, the National Council's delegates in Belgrade opted to accept the Karadjordjevic dynasty as ruler of a joint state. Thus, the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs merged with Serbia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes emerged on the world scene on December 1, 1918, with Prince Alexander Karadjordjevic of Serbia as king.¹⁸⁵ Little noticed at the time, however, Stephen Radic, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party and

who would rapidly emerge as the dominant Croatian leader, refused to sign the agreements, and instead called for an independent Croatia.¹⁸⁶

Political developments in the inter-war era generally can be divided into three periods. Almost immediately, disputes arose over the question of centralism versus federalism. Put simply, the Serb view of centralization triumphed and Belgrade dominated the government of the new state.¹⁸⁷ These circumstances created considerable tensions between the Serb-dominated government and the increasingly frustrated Croats, as well as Muslims, who, having fought for centuries to achieve their freedom, felt cheated of even the autonomy they had enjoyed under the Habsburgs.¹⁸⁸ But the Croats proved unable to unite sufficient opposition to Serb centralizing policies. Moreover, the Serb-dominated government suppressed opposition parties, initiated repressive measures, and labelled any criticism of the government or constitution (which, of course, legitimized Serb domination) as treason.¹⁸⁹ The combination of repressive measures, obvious election chicanery, and unfulfilled Croatian expectations only heightened animosity that would continue to grow throughout the 1920s. Political tensions gradually increased to a fever pitch until June 1928 when a Montenegrin delegate opened fire on the Croatian Peasant Party delegation in the *Skupstina*, killing two delegates (one of whom was Radic's nephew) and wounding three, including Stephen Radic, who died a few weeks later.¹⁹⁰

Not surprisingly, Croats reacted violently to Radic's death, demanded a free Croatia, and the Peasant Party once again boycotted the *Skupstina*. Vladko Macek, Radic's successor, met with King Alexander in January 1929 and demanded a new constitution based on federal principles that would grant Croatia nearly complete internal autonomy (government, military, economic, currency, etc.). When Serbian members of the government refused to accept Croatian demands, Alexander abolished the 1921 constitution, dissolved the *Skupstina*, suppressed all

political parties, and established his personal dictatorship.¹⁹¹

Alexander's dictatorship ended in true Yugoslav political tradition with his murder in Marseilles in October 1934. Ominously, Italian and Hungarian authorities had aided and abetted his Macedonian assassin. More importantly for Yugoslav political developments, the Croatian nationalist group, *Ustasa*, also assisted in the assassination.¹⁹²

Alexander's death briefly united the country, but the opportunity for conciliation quickly passed. The new king, Peter II, was only 11 years old at the time of his father's death and, therefore, a three man regency council headed by his uncle, Prince Paul, guided the government. Prince Paul held genuinely liberal views, but given the tense political situation and his own tenuous hold on the regency, he moved slowly. Conditions did improve as Prince Paul lifted press restrictions and eliminated many repressive practices. He also granted a general amnesty and held new elections to the *Skupstina* in 1935. Despite a bare plurality, stacked electoral laws gave the Serbs and their parliamentary allies two thirds of the seats. As a result, the Croats, once again under Macek's leadership, refused to participate in the *Skupstina*, governmental deadlock continued, and nationalist tensions rose.¹⁹³

The government remained split until August 1939 when most parties finally recognized the rising threats from Germany and Italy. After 6 months of negotiations with Prince Paul, Macek turned his back on his old opposition allies and signed an agreement (*Sporazum* [Understanding], August 1939) that, if fully implemented, would have granted significant internal Croatian autonomy. Macek also became one of two Yugoslav vice-premiers.¹⁹⁴ Importantly for present conditions in the former Yugoslavia, the agreement also joined Croatia, Dalmatia, and seven largely Croatian districts in Bosnia-Hercegovina into one administrative unit.¹⁹⁵ With this agreement, internal politics largely stagnated, as the government focused more and more on the course of World War II.

The German invasion of Yugoslavia temporarily, at least, resolved the issue of centralism versus federalism as the Germans and Italians dismembered the country. After dividing the spoils among themselves, the Axis Powers and their allies left only a rump Croatia and Serbia. And, while Croatia enjoyed relative autonomy under the control of Ante Pavelic' and his *Ustasi*, Serbia remained under the tight control of German occupation forces. This control became ever tighter as the Partisan and *Chetnik* uprisings began.

The resulting Yugoslav civil war needs no further elaboration beyond one key observation: the intense frustrations and hatreds that had simmered since the inception of Yugoslavia boiled over from 1941-45. Serb fought Croat, Communist fought Royalist, *Chetnik* fought *Ustasa*, and Catholic fought Orthodox, while both fought Muslim. That tempest of blood which plagued post-World War II political developments continues to this very day.¹⁹⁶

By the end of World War II, Tito's Partisans had won the civil war and firmly controlled Yugoslavia. In November 1945, the Anti-Fascist Council held national elections that, unsurprisingly, voted overwhelmingly for the official list of candidates and Tito's Communists cemented their control over the country. Shortly thereafter, a constitutional assembly met, disbanded the monarchy, and began drafting a new constitution. In crafting this document, Tito attempted to devise a political settlement that would preclude the ethnic and resultant political tensions that had plagued Yugoslavia in the inter-war era and spilled so much Yugoslav blood during the war.¹⁹⁷

The new constitution clearly established a federal basis for the state, which was divided into six republics: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Within Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo hypothetically enjoyed autonomous status. The constitution recognized four major languages (Croatian, Macedonian, Serbian, and Slovenian) and Hungarians and Albanians could speak their native tongues in their respective autonomous areas. Theoretically, the state remained responsible only for finance, economic planning, foreign

policy, defense, communications and legal matters. The republics would retain all other government functions.¹⁹⁸

Reality proved much different, however. As in the early years of the state, Belgrade maintained tight control over all aspects of Yugoslav society (although the basis was different—Communism, not nationalism). As Tito broke from the Stalinist Bloc (from 1948), centralized control relaxed somewhat and the republics assumed greater influence over their internal affairs throughout the 1950s, and over the federal government under the constitution of 1953.¹⁹⁹ Conditions continued to improve when Tito promulgated a new constitution in 1963 that further decentralized government and established considerable legislative independence at the republic level.²⁰⁰

Despite the considerable gains made in establishing republican autonomy from the central government in Belgrade, Croatia and Slovenia ceaselessly demanded and received greater decentralization. Moreover, as Barbara Jelavich points out, discussions took on an increasingly nationalistic tone, as republics once again aired old grievances against Belgrade's (i.e., Serbian) centralization.²⁰¹ By 1971, according to some observers, Yugoslavia verged on disintegration and only Tito's prestige held the country together.²⁰²

Tito acted quickly to stave off further fragmentation. First, he severely purged the Croatian branch of the party and removed the separatist factions. Second, in 1974, he proclaimed a new constitution designed to appease republic demands for increased autonomy. In the first instance, his actions may have bought time, but he succeeded only in further alienating Croatian nationalists who resented the reinstatement of centralized control of the party from Belgrade.²⁰³ In the second instance, the increased autonomy granted under the new constitution only accelerated centrifugal forces already at work within Yugoslavia. And, while Tito could keep the lid on because of his immense personal prestige, he would not live forever and, eventually, these cracks could no longer be papered over.²⁰⁴

Tito's death in 1980 set in motion the slow, painful demise of Yugoslavia. In a gradual process, republic leaders increasingly focused on local and republic issues at the expense of the state as a whole. According to Sabrina Petra Ramet's article in *Foreign Affairs*, the unravelling of Yugoslavia began in April 1981 when ethnic Albanians in Kosovo rioted to protest their economic straits and demonstrations took on an anti-Serb tone. As rumors spread of supposed Albanian atrocities, Serbian nationalism steadily grew until March 1986 when the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences declared Serbs to be the oppressed minority in Yugoslavia.²⁰⁵

At this point, Slobodan Milosevic entered the Serbian political scene. Milosevic professed a simple platform: unrestrained Serbian nationalism that sought to overturn the existing system and restore Serbs and Serbia to their "rightful place." Within 2 years, Milosevic seized control of the Serbian Communist Party organization, eliminated his rivals within Serbia, and gained support of the Yugoslav Army.²⁰⁶ In short order, Milosevic then brought down the governments of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro, and replaced them with loyal supporters. Then, in February 1989, Milosevic succeeded in eliminating the constitutional provisions guaranteeing autonomy to Kosovo and Vojvodina and reincorporated them into Serbia.²⁰⁷

These events obviously had considerable consequences for Yugoslavia. As Yugoslav commentator Branka Magas pointed out, eventual Federal sanction of Milosevic's actions legitimized Serbian nationalism, as well as the use of extra-parliamentary action and violence to attain that goal. Because of the violent Kosovar reaction to the loss of their freedom, the Federal Yugoslav Army occupied Kosovo in 1990, establishing the precedent of using the army against a fellow Federal member. Serbia kept the votes of Vojvodina and Kosovo within the collective Federal Presidency, providing Serbia with a disproportionate influence in that body.²⁰⁸

These events produced anxiety throughout Yugoslavia, as the other republics feared Milosevic's centralizing

tendencies.²⁰⁹ Indeed, there was legitimate reason for concern. Throughout 1989, Serbian nationalists argued that the internal republic boundaries artificially divided the Serb nation, and that Serbia reserved the right to speak for all Serbs, not just those living within Serbia.²¹⁰

By autumn 1989, matters worsened when Slovenia instituted a series of internal constitutional reforms, the most important being the right to secede from the Federal state, the exclusive right to declare a state of emergency (to forestall actions similar to Milosevic's in Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro), and the exclusive right to authorize the presence or use of the Yugoslav military in Slovenia.²¹¹

By the end of 1990, the disintegration of Yugoslavia accelerated. With the exception of Kosovo (under military occupation), republics held elections that resulted in non-Communist governments in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia, and a Communist-controlled minority coalition in Macedonia. Moreover, Croatia and Slovenia expressed interest in coordinating their defense and security policies, which smacked of a mutual defense pact against Serbia.²¹²

None of these republics had any desire to accede to Milosevic's demands for increased centralization. The leaders of the six republics held a series of meetings intended to find a way out of the impasse between Serbian demands for centralization and equally strident demands (predominantly from Croatia and Slovenia) for increased decentralization. When Milosevic showed no signs of yielding his strong nationalist position, Croatia and Slovenia declared that if a new inter-republican agreement had not been reached by June 26, 1991, they would leave the federation.²¹³ Yugoslavia effectively ceased to exist on June 27, 1991, when "Yugoslav Army" tanks invaded independent Slovenia.

Over 4 years of internal war in the former Yugoslavia represents a continuation of centuries-old nationalism: Croatian ultranationalists, the quest for a "Greater Serbia," and the refusal of one or more ethnic groups to live under

the political control of another ethnic group. Despite recent international interventions,²¹⁴ no end of the civil war is in sight. Moreover, internal political difficulties within Serbia (i.e., Kosovo and Vojvodina) portend further conflict that may exceed the current scale of violence.

Nor is the Yugoslav example dramatically different from other states within the Balkans. Indeed, through the end of World War II, political developments in much of the region closely paralleled those of Yugoslavia as Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania succumbed to totalitarian communism that stifled their political development for more than 40 years. Recent events in the Balkans, however, offer a more positive, but still spotty, picture of political development. Greece has demonstrated considerable dedication to democratic ideals since the Colonels' Revolt of 1967 and the return to democratic institutions in 1974. Despite repeated military intervention and the ongoing PKK revolt, Turkey appears to be on a solid path toward increased democratic reform.

Revolutions in former Communist states also offer a ray of hope for further evolution of democratic institutions within the Balkans. But developments may be more problematic in these states, as nascent and fragile freedoms face considerable internal, as well as external, instability that threatens the growth of democracy. Despite executing Ceausescu, for example, Romania appears merely to have changed the name of the ruling party apparatus. Albania struggles with immense economic difficulties, a potential war with Serbia over Kosovo, and a total absence of any democratic history or institutions. And, while Bulgaria offers the most positive example, the final vote on democracy is still not in.

The general historical development of political institutions in the Balkans offers little optimism for dramatic improvement in political conditions. Indeed, the course of historical development is more a study of instability, authoritarianism, and violence. To overcome this tragic history, Balkan leaders will have to break from their past and establish dramatically new political patterns.

This may require considerable time, resources, and effort on the part not only of the Balkan states, but of the remainder of Europe and the United States, as well. Only the test of time will determine whether the Balkans, as a whole, can overcome its political heritage and establish lasting political systems based on democratic tenets. At this point, expectations should not be raised too high.

CHAPTER 5

INSIGHTS TO ASSIST INFORMED DECISIONMAKING

The problem is learning how to govern over diversity:
Ethnic, cultural, religious, linguistic diversity.

-former Secretary of State
George Shultz²¹⁵

As stated in the introductory section, the primary intent of this monograph is not to argue for or against military intervention in the Balkans, or, specifically, Yugoslavia. Nor has the purpose of this historical examination been simply to chronicle the woes of the region. The intent, thus far, has been to provide policymakers with an understanding of the depths of the issues, to offer insights into the perceptions of the participants, and to offer greater comprehension of the root causes of conflicts, which will allow policymakers to make informed decisions on potential policy choices.

The preceding discussion paints a rather complex landscape that policymakers must decipher if they are successfully to grasp the nettle of the Balkans. As they grapple for solutions to the multiple and seemingly intractable conflicts, policymakers must acknowledge this complexity and craft comprehensive solutions. To do so, they must think in a broader context that weaves the variegated strands of the Balkans into a coherent tapestry. They must identify, examine, and connect an array of disparate and incredibly complex individual issues (e.g., language, religion, ethnic origin, and culture) in a manner that produces an accurate and coherent articulation of the problems. Without such an understanding, policymakers may not fully comprehend the consequences of their decisions. To this end, the general conclusions outlined below offer some insights that may prove useful in developing policy.

In the Balkans, the past-no matter how distant it may appear to Americans-is inextricably entwined with the present and extends into the future. Analysts must understand this history, and the local perceptions that enshroud it. Balkan history is not the collective record of the region, but the fragmented story of competing religious groups, ethnic tribes, nationalist movements, and internal political factions, each of which bears an historical grudge or claim against one or more groups. The recent history of the last 4 years has reinforced these long-standing animosities. This is not to argue that a history of conflict will lead inexorably to future violence in the region, but those who dismiss such historical rancor as anachronistic or irrational seriously underestimate the influence of the distant and recent past on the present and the future.

Cultural cleavages-whether within the Balkans or between Balkan and U.S. leaders-are wider than many analysts comprehend. Although impolitic to say, substantial dissimilarities exist between U.S. and Balkan cultures and mind sets (e.g., values, ethics, logic patterns). Furthermore, markedly different civilizations meet in the Balkans, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where religious and ethnic frictions exacerbate the clash of cultures. Above all, American decisionmakers must understand that-whether at the individual, national, or international level-violence has been an accepted vehicle of change for over 2 millennia and undoubtedly will continue to be so.

Analysts and policymakers, therefore, should not assume that Balkan politicians follow Western European or American logic. This is not to imply that Balkan leaders are irrational, but to point out that they have different historical bases and values that may drive an entirely different thought process. What may look irrational to a Western interlocutor may be absolutely credible in the eyes of a Balkan leader or his followers. American decisionmakers must understand that such dichotomies will occur and, rather than dismiss them out of hand, learn to bridge the gap between Balkan and Western logic.

U.S. and Western European analysts also must be careful not to mirror image their own values onto Balkan political leaders. A misguided assumption of common values could lead to a fundamental misunderstanding of an interlocutor's negotiating position or room for political maneuver. For example, many Balkan politicians (e.g., Karadzic of the so-called Republica Srpska or Milosevic of Serbia) have painted themselves into a corner because their rhetoric has stirred up a whirlwind of passion from which they may not be able to disengage, let alone control.

Ethnic identity is sine qua non to individuals in the Balkans, especially to the participants in the ongoing wars in the former Yugoslavia--so important that many are willing to kill or die for it. Policymakers must remain aware that the conflict is largely rooted in the fact that no one ethnic group was, or is, willing to live under the political control of another ethnic group. An "us versus them" situation offers little room for compromise. Potential solutions to the conflict must take these realities into account.

One should not minimize the depths of religious animosity in the Balkans. This statement is more than a truism. Western analysts must comprehend the importance of the religious component of ethnic identity to the inhabitants of the Balkans. Croats and Slovenes are Roman Catholic and Serbs are Orthodox; they have been in conflict since the "Great Schism" of 1054 and show no sign of compromising. Equally important, both groups consider Bosnian and ethnic Albanian Muslims apostate Serbs (or Croats) who expediently converted to Islam and should be returned to the fold--by force, if necessary. At the same time, events of the past 4 years have introduced a stronger faith among the once largely nominal Muslim population. Thus, the religious overtones of the ongoing civil war in the former Yugoslavia--to include the broader influences of the Islamic world--cannot be ignored.

The patchwork quilt of ethnic groups in the Balkans complicates conflict resolution more than many understand. Despite 4 years of ethnic cleansing and massive population displacement, ethnically heterogeneous or "pure" territories

or states will not exist. Ethnic groups will still live in close proximity to recent adversaries, complicating the ability to achieve lasting peace. Indeed, animosities developed over centuries, and reinforced by the events of the last 4 years, will not be resolved quickly. Short-term expedients to bring peace to the region may only worsen conditions, setting the stage for a future explosion.

Compromise represents weakness, particularly to politicians who think only in zero-sum game terms, and where in the past, defeat has frequently meant death. Moreover, compromise is difficult when matters of principle are involved on such major issues as historical rights, territorial boundaries, national states, and sovereignty, much less on ethnic, religious, and cultural beliefs. Negotiators must be prepared for difficult and protracted dialogue. Progress will occur only in an incremental and discontinuous manner. Backsliding can be expected. Diplomats and leaders, therefore, must display considerable patience and be prepared for a painfully slow process.

The ongoing wars in the former Yugoslavia stem from multiple causes: fervent nationalism that springs from artificially heightened ethnic identity (religion, language, and an ethnic group's shared history, myths, and culture), economic disparities, regional differences, urban versus rural cultures, and preferred governmental structures, to name only the most prominent. Thus, solutions to the wars in the former Yugoslavia must address not simply one issue, but a large number of complex, interactive problems that exponentially increase the difficulties inherent in achieving a settlement. As a result, policymakers and interlocutors must be aware of the potential for short-term negotiating expedients to jeopardize long-term solutions to the conflict.

Not one war, but a melange of wars is currently being waged within the former Yugoslavia. Elements of interstate aggression (e.g., initial Yugoslav National Army actions in Slovenia and Croatia (1991), continued Serbian Army support for ethnic Bosnian and Croatian Serbs), civil/ethnic war (e.g., ethnic Croats, Muslims, and ethnic Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina), religious conflict between Muslims

and Christians, limited war (United States and NATO approach) versus total war (i.e., wars of survival for the various ethnic groups), personal power (e.g., Abdic, Karadzic, and Milosevic), and psychopaths who simply enjoy the killing all exist within the conflict raging in the Balkans. Therefore, in developing potential solutions, policymakers must pursue options that, at best, address as many of these individual conflicts as possible. At the least, negotiators must not pursue resolution of one factor at the expense of others, for doing so may only exacerbate another element, prolonging war in the region.

Existing political institutions in the Balkans are not likely to contribute to the peaceful resolution of tensions, as the political development of the region is but a long history of instability and violence. From the Byzantine Empire through the 1980s, corrupt and repressive governments have been the norm. The region largely lacks the precedent of the peaceful transfer of power. Large segments of the population see democracy as an institution of chaos. Ethnic minorities currently have no historical basis-long-term or proximate-to believe that political institutions will protect their lives, much less their political rights. Four years of war have hardened nationalist positions, exacerbating these forces and shrinking political maneuvering room.

POTENTIAL LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS

As former Secretary of State George Schultz has pointed out, the basic problem to be overcome in the Balkans "... is learning how to govern over diversity: Ethnic, cultural, religious, linguistic diversity."²¹⁶ Under the best of conditions, diversity alone poses significant challenges to finding tolerable solutions. But the history of the region, particularly recent history, exponentially complicates the ability of leaders to devise acceptable ones. Thus, the search for solutions to problems in the region will be protracted and difficult.

Only a fundamental break from the past-distant, as well as recent-offers the possibility of a viable long-term solution.

Forging a new path will be difficult, however, for the people of the Balkans hold their history close to their hearts. If long-term solutions are to succeed, a thorough reform of political systems and institutions must occur. Long-term progress will be possible only if governments can instill sufficient confidence in their populations to overcome the profound mistrust and deep animosity that have developed over the centuries, and have been violently reinforced over the past 4 years. Ethnic and religious minorities will have to be convinced that governments will safeguard their interests. Nationalist and irredentist demands, particularly an expansionist Croatia or the long drive for a "Greater Serbia," will have to be contained. At the same time, the oftentimes legitimate fears of ethnic Serbs in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Croatia of living under the political control of another ethnic group will have to be acknowledged and addressed.²¹⁷ All of these matters are much easier said than done.

To effect a break from the past, the United States and Europe will have to invest considerable long-term economic, political, intellectual, and military capital to support the development of democratic institutions within the region. The European Union (EU) represents an important mechanism in this regard. The prospect of substantial EU reconstruction funds offers a powerful incentive for belligerents to reach an agreement. Similarly, membership in the EU—and the future economic development it entails—will not be offered until the parties conform to EU standards of conduct. In other words, those nations seeking EU membership will have to learn to settle their differences through negotiation—not through violence. Finally, should states within the former Yugoslavia become EU members, the penalties for operating outside the norms of the European community can be significant, thereby exercising a dampening factor on any future conflicts.²¹⁸ All of this presumes, of course, that the EU and its members are willing to devote the time, money, and effort that will be required to see these initiatives through to fruition.

Given the past history of the Balkans and the current ethnic, religious, and cultural divisions, this course will prove daunting. The level of political, economic, and intellectual commitment needed, however, cannot be forecast with any accuracy-but it will be considerable. Governments must begin now to lay the groundwork with publics and parliaments for the level and duration of commitment that may be required.

*Events in the Balkan crisis have demonstrated that U.S. leadership in Europe is essential to secure U.S. national interests in the region and Europe.*²¹⁹ This will require a level of engagement in Europe and in European security organizations larger than U.S. political leaders have previously anticipated. Such a degree of involvement will also require U.S. political leaders to explain to the American public the interests involved, and why such a commitment of U.S. capital-time, prestige, fiscal resources-is necessary to sustain those interests.

Diplomatic actions, alone, are not likely to bring about a settlement, and military power will be required to establish conditions suitable to build a lasting peace settlement. Diplomatic initiatives, political pressure, and economic embargoes and sanctions have not yet yielded success. Granted, such options take time and economic sanctions appear to be having an effect on Serbia and Montenegro, but these efforts alone have not brought an end to the conflict and forced a political settlement in the former Yugoslavia. Conversely, Croatian and Bosnian military successes of recent months, coupled with a firm display of NATO political will and military airpower, have redressed the strategic balance in the region and brought the parties to the negotiating table in earnest. To be sure, diplomatic and economic initiatives laid the groundwork and set the stage for successful application of military power, but military power is the decisive catalyst that brought all parties to a potential solution.²²⁰

Should U.S. political leaders decide to commit ground troops in Bosnia-Hercegovina, they will have to convince the American public and Congress that it is in U.S. national

interests to make the size of investments-intellectual, political, economic, and military-required to achieve an acceptable solution in the Balkans. This effort will prove to be no easy task if the United States becomes increasingly preoccupied with its own domestic difficulties. But, without such a level and duration of commitment, acceptable solutions may not be found.

Substantial time-perhaps decades or generations-will be necessary to build and sustain the political ethos, organizations, and governmental structures needed for a lasting solution in the Balkans. Problems that developed over centuries cannot be transformed overnight. This is not to argue that long-term solutions are not possible, but only to point out the difficulties involved. The post-World War II Franco-German model²²¹ offers hope, but even that case indicates the time, effort, and leadership dedicated to good will on all sides that are necessary. Such examples are absent from the historical political landscape of the former Yugoslavia. And, the events of the last 4 years are unlikely to generate favorable conditions or leaders capable of dramatic policy reversals.

These insights are not intended to provide an overly pessimistic portrait of the difficulties inherent in resolving the crisis in the Balkans. They do, however, illuminate the root causes of the ongoing conflict, reflect the perceptions of Balkan leaders, and provide a fuller context for policymakers as they deliberate U.S. policy. Leaders, however, not only must recognize these insights, they must assimilate and factor them into their decisionmaking calculus as they assess policy options for the Balkans. It is to this issue that the discussion next turns.

CHAPTER 6

NO EASY CHOICES: ASSESSING SHORT-TERM POLICY OPTIONS

All that is required for evil to flourish is that good men do nothing.

-Edmund Burke²²²

The purpose of foreign policy is not to provide an outlet for our own sentiments of hope or indignation; it is to shape real events in a real world.

-John F. Kennedy²²³

In the 2-plus years since the original version of this monograph was published, U.S. policymakers have struggled with the fundamental dilemma reflected in the two quotes cited above as they labored to identify U.S. national interests in the region,²²⁴ defined policy objectives, and delimited options to effect those goals. As a result of those efforts, the United States also has outlined specific policy objectives for resolving the wars in the former Yugoslavia:

- A political settlement in Bosnia that preserves the country's territorial integrity and provides a viable future for all its peoples;
- Preventing the spread of fighting into a broader Balkan war that could threaten both allies and the stability of new democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe;
- Stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees from the conflict;

- Halting the slaughter of innocents; and,
- Helping to support NATO's central role in post-Cold War Europe while maintaining the U.S. role in shaping Europe's security architecture.²²⁵

Equally important for understanding the formulation and execution of U.S. policy in the Balkans, the United States has avoided deploying ground forces to the region except under certain, very circumscribed conditions. Indeed, avoiding ground commitments, especially combat troops, has been a *de facto* goal.²²⁶ Whether these oftentimes conflicting goals can all be achieved is open to question.²²⁷

To fulfill U.S. objectives and ensure U.S. national interests in the region, policymakers have a broad range of options from which to choose. As they weigh possible alternatives, decisionmakers should keep several points in mind. First, while the options are presented and assessed separately, none of them are individually capable of redressing the multiple causes of the conflict in the Balkans. Second, several of the options could and should be used concurrently, in a complementary and reinforcing manner. In doing so, policymakers must ensure that conflicting or contradictory options are not pursued simultaneously. Finally, political leaders must ensure that expedients to achieve short-range policy objectives are not self-defeating in the longer term.²²⁸

U.S. Abstention from the Conflict.

Initially ignoring the Balkan crisis, and leaving matters in European and U.N. hands have not been helpful. While credit must be given to European and U.N. attempts to resolve the crisis, those efforts failed. Nor did intermittent U.S. attention to the crisis until mid-1995 contribute to efforts to end the conflict. Indeed, only clear, strong, and continuous U.S. leadership has been able to coalesce NATO and bring Balkan belligerents to the negotiating table. Thus, like it or not—either in Europe or in the United

States-American leadership remains central to a prolonged settlement.

On a more general level, the United States observing the Balkan crisis from the sidelines sends a disturbing signal to the rest of the world. What does such a move say of U.S. credibility in remaining engaged as a European power and NATO leader? Moreover, could the United States expect allies, particularly Muslim allies, to support the embargo of Iraq when the United States is unwilling to underwrite similar action in the Balkans? Allowing the violence to continue also sets a poor precedent for other ongoing or potential ethnic conflicts in Europe.²²⁹ If the United States wishes to minimize future occurrences of ethnic violence around the globe, it must send an appropriate message of engagement to end the worst case of ethnic conflict in Europe in the past half century.

While some might argue that U.S. interests are not sufficiently engaged to merit U.S. military intervention in the conflict,²³⁰ the fact of the matter is that the United States is already deeply engaged militarily in the ongoing crisis in the Balkans. Since November 1992, U.S. naval vessels have taken part in the maritime enforcement of the U.N. embargo of the belligerents. U.S. Air Force transport aircraft have landed and dropped tons of humanitarian aid to besieged enclaves. U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy aircraft participate daily in the enforcement of the U.N. "no-fly zone" over Bosnia-Herzegovina, have shot down Bosnian Serb aircraft, and have been the principal participants in NATO bombing missions supporting the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. American planes have been fired on by Bosnian Serb anti-aircraft batteries and surface-to-air missiles and one USAF F-16 has been shot down. The United States has undertaken the vast majority of the sorties in the substantial NATO bombing effort to remove Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from the Sarajevo area, and to protect remaining "safe havens." To the south, over 500 U.S. soldiers are in Macedonia to deter expansion of the conflict.²³¹

Whether a more creative and decisive application of U.S. military power could have contributed to a satisfactory conclusion to the war without causing more harm than good is unknown and probably unknowable at this juncture. Before undertaking full-fledged peace enforcement operations, the United States and its allies would have had to be willing to exert the level of military force necessary to impose peace on the region. To date, they have not been so inclined, because the costs loomed larger than the uncertain prospects of "success" (which itself was hard to define). Should peace not be achieved, the questions surrounding such a decision to impose a peace will remain. Is the United States willing to involve itself in an asymmetric conflict (i.e., the United States perceives such involvement to be of a limited nature, while the current belligerents see themselves engaged in a total war of survival), a circumstance which has caused the United States much agony in the past?²³² Will the United States and its allies and partners be willing to fight ethnic Serbian or ethnic Croatian militias, the Croatian or Serbian armies, or Bosnian government forces? Are U.S. and European publics willing to underwrite the levels of forces and resources that might be required? Are they willing to sustain the casualties that might result? For how long? Current indications offer little evidence of the level of governmental or public commitment that would likely be required.²³³

Avoiding the employment of ground forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, also is fraught with consequences. First, the United States has elevated a means normally used to assist in achieving a national objective to the status of a policy goal. In doing so, the United States has stood the strategy formulation process (i.e., the balancing of objectives, options, and resources—also known as ends, ways, and means) on its head.²³⁴ In effect, the United States has denied itself the use of a key element of national power, and considerably circumscribed its ability to influence resolution of the conflict through an integrated and complementary application of national power.

Conversely, decisionmakers must address the possibility that, even in support of a peace settlement it largely brokered, the United States might be unable to sustain an internal consensus for the prolonged deployment of U.S. forces in the region. If that is the case, are policymakers prepared for the potential consequences? Premature removal of U.S. troops from the implementation force (IFOR) would undermine U.S. credibility throughout the world, not just in the Balkans or Europe, as the "demonstration effect" of failure might encourage other states or groups to test U.S. resolve.²³⁵ Such an outcome would thereby affect the credibility of the United Nations and NATO, two institutions that loom large in the U.S. global security architecture.²³⁶ Key allies within NATO might question the level of U.S. commitment to Europe, with repercussions that extend to U.S. interests elsewhere in the world (e.g., the Middle East). Lastly, recriminations surrounding a U.S. withdrawal may add impetus to the rising tide of "neo-isolationism" or unilateralism in the United States that will further undermine U.S. support of international institutions, which, one must emphasize, generally serve U.S. interests.

Despite the risks and costs inherent in U.S. participation, the United States must remain engaged in the Balkans. The course of events in the former Yugoslavia clearly indicates that absent strong U.S. leadership, the wars will continue without resolution. Moreover, only U.S. leadership has been able to mold the consensus within NATO and among U.S. European allies and partners to make progress towards ending the wars. Likewise, only the United States has sufficient military forces and staying power to underwrite a prolonged supervision of the peace.

This conclusion does not imply that America's allies and partners in Europe are absolved of responsibility. To the contrary, they must continue to support—as they have for the past 4 years—the peace process. At the same time, the U.S. public and government must recognize that Europeans have borne the brunt of peacekeeping operations in the

Balkans, albeit unsuccessfully thus far, and have already paid a high price in treasure and lives.

Nor does this conclusion imply that the United States, in assuming the leadership role, can simply shove aside its European allies and partners. Leadership does not mean dominance or unilateralism. The United States must ensure that its partners remain fully integrated into the peace process and consultation continues to occur. None of this will be easy, but close cooperation will be an essential element for maintaining peace. If not, the United States runs the risk of alienating its allies and partners, or, worse still, being left holding the bag in the Balkans.

Containment.

A wider war within the former Yugoslavia still holds considerable potential to expand to a larger Balkan conflict. Albania and Albanian minorities in Macedonia have close religious ties to their coreligionists in Bosnia. Additionally, Turkey has extensive ties to Albania and Macedonia, and has voiced strong support for Bosnia.²³⁷ Should Turkey become embroiled in the war, Greece would undoubtedly be drawn in, pitting two NATO allies on opposite sides. Should conflict spread into Macedonia, Bulgaria would also probably feel compelled to enter into the conflict. Or, if war spread into the Vojvodina region with its substantial Hungarian minorities, it could then expand into Central Europe. In any of these cases, U.S. national interests in Europe would be jeopardized.

To date, efforts to contain the conflict to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and prevent the spread of fighting have been largely successful.²³⁸ How long that success can be sustained in the face of renewed pressures from belligerents for a military resolution of the crisis remains to be seen. While recent Croatian and Bosnian successes may have redressed the balance within the former Yugoslavia, that balance is tenuous and cannot guarantee that the conflict can be contained within the borders of the former Yugoslavia, much less within Bosnia-Herzegovina.²³⁹

Bosnian and Croatian assaults against the ethnic Bosnian Serb stronghold of Banja Luka could force Serbian President Milosevic's hand and result in the intervention of the Yugoslav Army, and a widening of the war.²⁴⁰ And, despite recent reverses, ethnic Serb resistance is stiffening, and they remain capable of launching a counterattack.²⁴¹

Additionally, eastern Slavonia remains a bone of contention between Croatia and Serbia, and Croatian authorities have indicated that Croatia will go to war to retrieve the territory if peace negotiations fail.²⁴² This time, however, given the increased firepower and capabilities of each side, the war could be substantially bloodier, with the potential to spill over the borders of the former Yugoslavia.

The possibility also exists that the fragile Bosnian-Croatian coalition could collapse, resulting in renewed war between Bosnian forces and ethnic Croatian militias or the Croatian Army. Depending upon the outcome of such a conflict, two subsequent branches are possible: ethnic Serb militias and/or Serbian Army forces fighting a greatly weakened Bosnian government, or, more likely, Serbia and Croatia fighting over the remains of Bosnia-Herzegovina.²⁴³

Lastly, given their recent successes against ethnic Serbs, the Bosnian government may no longer find that the proposed 51-49 percent split contained in the U.S. initiative holds much appeal.²⁴⁴ After 4 years of failed negotiations and recent battlefield success, it may have concluded that much more is to be gained through continuing the war than by ending it.²⁴⁵ And, so long as the wars continue, the potential for the Yugoslav crisis to escape its current bounds remains a clear possibility.

All that having been said, the policy of containment has been successful on two key counts. It has kept the conflict from spreading beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia, and it is avoided the commitment of substantial numbers of U.S. ground troops in a combat role.²⁴⁶ But, as argued two-and-one-half years ago, the cost of those

"successes" has been extremely high, particularly for the inhabitants of the Balkans.

Diplomatic and Economic Options.

Another option is to increase diplomatic and economic pressure on Serbia and its Bosnian Serb allies. Should the conflict extend into 1996, U.S. and European negotiators could continue increasingly to isolate the Bosnian Serbs by inducing Milosevic's cooperation in more strictly enforcing the existing embargo in return for temporarily lifting economic sanctions against Serbia. The Contact Group (Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States), however, have shown an inability to agree on either the terms for the Serbian side of the deal or on how long sanctions might be lifted.²⁴⁷ Even if consensus could be achieved within the Contact Group, whether Milosevic could or would deliver his part of the bargain after sanctions against Serbia had been lifted is an open question. Nor is it apparent that Belgrade could bring much more pressure to bear on the Pale Serbs than is currently the case.

The United States and its allies and partners also could strengthen the existing embargo of Serbia and Montenegro, and use economic warfare to force Belgrade and Pale to change their course. This would require adding to the commodities prohibited, making the embargo more impermeable, and subsidizing states (Hungary, Italy, and the Balkan states) negatively affected by the increased sanctions.²⁴⁸ Given the split within the Contact Group and the unlikelihood of economic subsidies, however, this option offers little prospect of occurring.²⁴⁹

Nonetheless, if the United States and its allies continue to eschew the application of decisive military power to end the conflict, this may be the only option available that has a significant chance for long-term success. For, despite continued disappointment over the slow course of diplomatic and economic efforts, the United States can look back on 3 years of gradual success in weakening the Serbian

economy and splitting the Serb factions in Bosnia and Croatia from wholehearted Serbian government support.

Lift the Arms Embargo of Bosnia.

Some observers have long advocated lifting the arms embargo and providing the Bosnians with the means for effective resistance.²⁵⁰ Two-plus years ago, the author considered such an option wrongheaded because it would neither solve the underlying political conflict nor bring the civil war to military resolution—except, perhaps, after a forced U.N. withdrawal and Bosnian defeat.²⁵¹ As the recent and successful Croatian and Bosnian government offensives have demonstrated, however, that situation no longer holds. Indeed, the situation on the ground appears to make lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia more feasible from the standpoint of delivering materiel and providing training support.

But lifting the arms embargo is still problematic. Such an option is still more likely to lead to an escalation of fighting than it is to a political settlement of the conflict. Moreover, "leveling the playing field" to allow the Bosnian government to defend the territory it currently holds does not secure its authority over all of Bosnia. That goal, despite the boost given to it by recent Bosnian and Croatian success in the Krajina region and in central Bosnia, seems well out of reach of the Bosnian government. Only substantial military aid, time to receive, distribute, and train with it, and, most crucial, Croatian support could produce such an outcome. And, while the United States has raised the possibility of assisting in the training of Bosnian government forces, this initiative generally has received a chilly response from NATO allies.²⁵² Whether the aid or the time would be available without large-scale U.S. intervention is doubtful.

Even absent significant U.S. participation in arming and training Bosnian government forces, a number of other issues also must be factored into the decisionmaking calculus.²⁵³ For instance, how much aid should be allowed

to flow to the Bosnian government? This is not a calculation that can be made with a high degree of certainty. Too little aid simply prolongs the war by raising Bosnian expectations, but not necessarily providing adequate capabilities to prevail. Too much assistance might cause Bosnian government forces to overreach, precipitating a repeat of the Krajina Serb exodus, intervention by the Yugoslav Army on behalf of its ethnic Serbian brethren, or both. If the United States and its NATO allies are not prepared to take steps to forestall potential Serb actions (such as air strikes or the deployment of ground forces), lifting the arms embargo will be little more than, in the words of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, "a feel-good option."²⁵⁴

Alternatively, how much aid, if any, should go to the already formidable Croatian Army? Too much aid risks a broader war between Croatia and Serbia over eastern Slavonia. Or, the Croats could turn on their nominal Bosnian allies to carve off areas of Bosnia populated by ethnic Croats.

Beyond the likely deadly results inside Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia, lifting the arms embargo would have severe repercussions throughout Europe. To date, the United States has been unable to build consensus within NATO to lift the arms embargo. Indeed, Britain and France, key European and NATO allies who also have borne the largest portion of the UNPROFOR burden, have threatened to remove their contingents in the event the United States no longer complies with the arms embargo of Bosnia.²⁵⁵ Undoubtedly, UNPROFOR would collapse, and the United States would have to make good on its pledge to provide ground forces to assist in UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Finally, Russia has threatened to defy the trade sanctions regime against Serbia should the United States unilaterally overturn the arms embargo of Bosnia.²⁵⁶ Such an outcome would have obvious effects on U.S.-Russian, as well as European-Russian relations.

Despite all the potential drawbacks, however, lifting the arms embargo should remain an option. Should the Bosnian

government face defeat from ethnic Serb forces or from Croatian forces (either ethnic Croat Bosnians or the Croatian Army), and the United States and its allies and partners choose not to intervene directly, lifting the embargo—even unilaterally—may be the only choice, unless the United States is willing to see Bosnia-Herzegovina defeated and dismembered. But, that choice must be made with the full understanding of the ramifications for U.S. policy and commitment to the region.

Partition and Mass Exchange of Populations.

The United States has pursued the objective of retaining the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and retaining a multi-ethnic state that remains viable for all its peoples.²⁵⁷ In the original version of this report, the author supported this idealistic goal, arguing that the human costs of a population exchange that would result from a partition would be staggering. The author also argued at that time that an exchange of ethnic populations would be viewed as little more than aiding and abetting the ongoing "ethnic cleansing," and would set a bad precedent for other ethnic groups in Europe to use as a pretext for initiating conflict in hopes of obtaining a similar solution.²⁵⁸

The events of the last 2 years have altered that judgement. While still morally repugnant, the harsh realities of the circumstances in the former Yugoslavia must prevail. Large-scale population shifts—either through ethnic cleansing or mass refugee movements fleeing combat operations—already have changed the ethnic distribution of peoples throughout the former Yugoslavia. Additionally, events of the past 4 years have polarized the attitudes of large elements of the population, making the likelihood of stable multi-ethnic communities difficult, at best.²⁵⁹

That having been said, partition, *de facto* or *de jure*, is not without its difficulties. Sizeable elements of ethnic groups continue to reside in their historical homelands, and may be loathe to leave. The prospect of forcing their displacement to conform to a partition agreement is only

slightly less daunting than the prospect of large-scale return of refugees to their pre-war homes. No one looks forward to forced displacement should an individual, family, or group refuse to leave their homes. On the other hand, if such groups remain, they may be the target of future ethnic cleansing or the source of future conflict. Nor does partition necessarily lead to peace, as displaced groups are likely to harbor irredentist hopes to return to their ancestral homes. Finally, should partition and further exchange of peoples occur, how can victims be compensated?

Participation in Implementation Force (IFOR) Operations.²⁶⁰

The United States has committed to assist in implementing a peace settlement in Bosnia- Hercegovina.²⁶¹ The logic behind such a significant U.S. commitment merits brief discussion. First, the three warring parties each stipulate that they will not sign an agreement unless U.S. troops are part of the implementation force. Thus, failure to support a peace settlement will undoubtedly lead to a collapse of the current cease-fire, with consequent repercussions. Large-scale military operations would likely resume, with a concomitant increase in "ethnic cleansing." Renewed fighting increases the likelihood that Serbia would be drawn into the conflict, increasing casualties and suffering, and raising the potential for war to spread beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia. Second, a breakdown in the current cease-fire also would undoubtedly lead to an UNPROFOR withdrawal, which the United States has pledged to assist. Thus, U.S. forces would be committed to the region in any case, and probably under much more difficult and dangerous conditions than implementing a peace settlement. Lastly, U.S. leadership and prestige-in Europe and world-wide-would suffer a tremendous blow.²⁶² U.S. participation in implementing an agreement, therefore, may be the *sine qua non* for a peace settlement and sustainment of U.S. national interests in the region.

The possibility that a peace agreement may be reached looms large on the horizon. As a consequence, the United

States must now seriously consider the implications of its commitment. American participation in the peace implementation effort is premised on three key assumptions:

- All sides in the ongoing conflict will sign an agreement;
- All sides will implement the agreement; and,
- Fighting will not resume at a level that peace implementation forces would have to be withdrawn for their own safety.

None of these assumptions should be taken for granted, and planning for U.S. participation should include measures that will protect its forces in the event one or more of the assumptions do not hold.

The composition of the U.S. contribution, for example, deserves reflection. Policymakers understand that air power, alone, is not sufficient to implement an agreement, and the United States has previously committed to deploy up to 25,000 troops. But, notwithstanding that 2-plus-year commitment, considerable pulling and tugging is being waged in Washington over the eventual size of the peace implementation force. Size options vary from little or no U.S. ground troops, as currently being advocated by elements within Congress, to 8-10,000 personnel being espoused by elements of the Clinton administration, to the Pentagon's recommendation to deploy a powerful force (20-25,000) capable of responding to any contingency.²⁶³

In assessing the level of contribution that the United States is willing to make, several points need to be considered. First, despite any peace agreement, U.S. forces will be entering a tense and volatile environment. Indeed, for 3-plus years Bosnia-Herzegovina has been a killing ground that has generated intense emotions. To expect those passions to dissipate rapidly is to expect too much. Moreover, a NATO force can be expected to oversee implementing provisions of the peace settlement. *U.S.*

forces, therefore, initially must be configured, armed, and sized to engage in possible combat operations. Over time, and as conditions permit, force composition and size can evolve to fit the changing circumstances-but initially forces must be capable of defending themselves and enforcing a peace settlement on any recalcitrant parties.

Second, national influence within most coalitions usually is proportional to the level of participation and the degree of risk assumed. Projections of NATO force requirements approach 50,000-60,000 troops.²⁶⁴ While the United States may not be required to provide a majority of the forces, a plurality among the participating countries may be necessary to assert leadership over the operation. *In short, the United States will have to pay the piper if it wants to call the tune.* Whether a troop level at the lower end of the range currently being debated in Washington (0-10,000) will be sufficient to ensure U.S. leadership of the overall operation is open to question.²⁶⁵ This is especially true if U.S. troop levels approximate those of France, which has borne the heaviest peacekeeping role-as well as casualties-in the former Yugoslavia. Nor is U.S. leadership guaranteed if Russia contributes upwards of 20,000 troops, as Moscow recently indicated.²⁶⁶

Third, conditions in Yugoslavia will not be resolved quickly and a *long-term commitment of forces will likely be required.*²⁶⁷ A prolonged deployment would necessitate provisions for rotating units through the peace implementation mission. To accomplish this over the long term, forces initially deployed must be sized and "tailored" to accommodate such rotations. Additionally, because of the reduction of forces in Europe, units from the continental United States might be required. This may be especially true of specialized combat support and combat service support units (such as port handling, transportation). Moreover, the numbers of such specialized units are limited in the Active Component, and provisions may have to be made to ensure appropriate augmentation from the Reserve Components.²⁶⁸

Imposing a Peace Settlement.²⁶⁹

Despite the recent success of peace efforts, negotiations could easily fall apart, and large scale conflict could resume.²⁷⁰ Such an outcome might induce the United States and its allies and partners to impose a settlement on (a) reluctant belligerent(s) in order to contain the conflict. In fact, in announcing its latest peace initiative, the Clinton administration indicated that if peace could not be achieved, then additional "sticks" would be applied to get the recalcitrant parties to negotiate in earnest. These "sticks" could include replacing UNPROFOR peacekeepers with troops from Islamic states, or lifting the arms embargo, which would undoubtedly trigger a NATO protected UNPROFOR withdrawal that the United States has pledged to support with up to 25,000 ground troops.²⁷¹

U.S. policymakers must understand that in imposing a peace settlement, they must be prepared to take action against *any and all* sides who refuse to enter into an agreement. While the United States repeatedly has professed its neutrality, or at least that it is not anti-Serb, that perception is not shared by Bosnian Serbs. Indeed, ethnic Serbs are likely to resent U.S. intervention, which they perceive to be the reason for their latest reversals. Certainly, Bosnian Serbs are likely to harbor ill will against the United States because of its lead in the NATO bombing effort. U.S. forces, therefore, must be prepared to undertake operations against Bosnian Serbs who might obstruct the peace agreement. Operations might also have to be conducted against Croatian units—both regular Croatian Army troops and ethnic Croatian irregulars—who currently occupy Bosnian territory, but refuse to leave.²⁷² Finally, the United States and its allies and partners may have to undertake operations against Bosnian government forces that refuse to enter into negotiations or fail to abide by the provisions of an eventual peace agreement.²⁷³

Potential means to impose a peace also require some forethought. *Use of air power appears to offer the safest, most effective means to impose the peace, especially in the wake*

of the apparent success of forcing the Bosnian Serbs to remove their weapons from the heavy weapons exclusion zone surrounding Sarajevo. *But appearances may belie reality.* In the recent NATO bombing campaign (August-September 1995), for example, many of the targets struck were air defense sites or fixed installations, while the heavy weapons were not attacked. Tanks and artillery pieces make good targets only if they can be detected and attacked before they disperse. The mountainous terrain, considerable foliage, weather conditions, and proximity to civilian habitation in Yugoslavia combined to hinder air attacks on mobile targets. Moreover, according to media reports, NATO had eliminated the more "lucrative" targets and was running out of feasible points to attack.²⁷⁴

Additionally, media reports noted that tensions within NATO were rising over the duration and scope of NATO air attacks.²⁷⁵ These strains raise a host of questions on the use of air power to drive belligerent(s) to the negotiating table that require resolution. What level of force should be applied? What should be targeted: ethnic irregular forces or the regular forces of the combatants; tanks, artillery, or units; supply lines, depots, and airfields; government centers (if appropriate ones can be identified²⁷⁶) and command and control facilities; or power grids, fuel supplies, and other dual civil-military use resources? What should be the priority? Answers to these questions, as well as potential second and third order consequences, must be considered before the further commitment of U.S. aircraft in support of NATO efforts.

Lastly, when considering the use of air power as a means to impose a peace settlement, policymakers must take into account its key limitation. *Air power, even if sufficient to bring reluctant belligerents to the negotiations table, is a woefully inappropriate instrument to compel compliance with the myriad technical details of an agreement.*

The possibility also exists that air power, alone, would prove insufficient to bring a reluctant belligerent(s) to negotiate in earnest. What further steps, then, would the United States and its allies be willing to take? The United

States may be faced with two equally unpalatable options. On the one hand, the United States could simply wash its hands, and walk away from the conflict. For obvious reasons (U.S. prestige involved, influence in Europe, global U.S. leadership), such an option is not to be taken lightly.

On the other hand, the United States, in conjunction with its allies and partners, could undertake ground operations to impose a peace. Obviously, exercising the "ground" option raises a number of key questions:

- Will the United States and its allies and partners undertake military operations against Croatia, should that state refuse to accede to a peace settlement?
- Will the United States, NATO, and partners undertake operations against Bosnian government forces should the Bosnian government attempt to recover additional territory, or restore the territorial *status quo ante bellum*?
- What additional actions should be taken against Bosnian Serbs if they refuse to accept a peace settlement? Concomitantly, should actions be directed only against Bosnian Serbs, what are the likely reactions from Serbia and Russia?
- What actions, if any, should be taken against Serbia proper if ethnic Bosnian Serbs refuse to comply with a peace settlement?
- In a worst case scenario, how might the United States and its allies and partners respond to a renewed outbreak of general hostilities despite their presence?
- How should Russian forces be incorporated into a peace enforcement effort?

Answers to these questions are complicated and cannot be answered here with any certainty, but some generalizations may be appropriate. While NATO and

partner forces would likely prevail tactically in imposing a peace, the price could be considerable. Given the terrain, ethnic Croatian and Serbian irregular forces available, and Serbian and, particularly, Croatian regular formations, ground operations would not resemble the U.S. experience in Panama or Somalia. Nor would operations be similar to Operation DESERT STORM, where a clearly delineated battlefield and open terrain allowed the allied coalition to bring overwhelming military power to bear rapidly to defeat the enemy.

Even should operations initially succeed, allied forces could remain within a sea of hostile populations. Given the distant and recent history of the region, irregular operations, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism should not be ruled out. This is not an attempt to conjure up ghosts of the past (either the U.S. experience in Vietnam or the Yugoslav Partisan experience during World War II), but if the U.S. commitment lasts too long, or if U.S. casualties mount, the Vietnam, Beirut, and Mogadishu analogies are certain to surface.²⁷⁷

Even if casualties are low, financial expenditures would be considerable. Current estimates for U.S. participation in peace implementation operations—a much less expensive undertaking than imposing a peace settlement—range from \$1 billion to \$2 billion.²⁷⁸ Estimates for such complex operations appear low. For example, the final costs of Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia were \$1.51 billion.²⁷⁹ Certainly, operations in Yugoslavia that would be on a much larger scale and would be carried out against a well-armed and organized opponent(s) would be much higher, and could prove to be a considerable drain on a reduced defense budget.

Neither potential casualties nor resource costs that might be associated with U.S. participation in imposing a peace settlement can be forecast with any accuracy, largely because the extent of a possible U.S. commitment is not known. But, none of the options and alternatives outlined above comes without cost. *The key question is: How much is the United States willing to pay in terms of political capital,*

national treasure, and, most importantly, in the lives of its young men and women?

Finally, even if operations are an overwhelming success, *how long will the United States and its allies be willing to maintain forces in Bosnia to keep the resultant peace?* As the aftermath of the Gulf War indicates, the U.S.-led coalition is still ensnared by events in the region, and no end of a substantial commitment is in sight.²⁸⁰ Given the history of the Balkans, especially recently, not much time might elapse between the departure of outside intervention forces and renewed hostilities. To preclude a return to war and the threat to U.S. interests posed by such conflict may require a prolonged U.S. presence in the Balkans.

Policymakers need to examine these issues, and their potential consequences, before they undertake additional operations. If they are unwilling to pursue any of the options outlined above, then they should not start down the path of intervention, or, at least, not before they understand the fuller consequences of their actions. If, after consideration, they determine that potential costs are acceptable, then they must articulate their rationale to the American public and their elected representatives and build the consensus that will be necessary to sustain a prolonged U.S. involvement in the Balkans.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

The statesman must cross the Rubicon not knowing how deep and turbulent the river is, nor what he will find on the other side . . . He must face the impenetrable darkness of the future and not flinch from walking into it, drawing the nation behind him.

-Hans J. Morganthau²⁸¹

Pressures are building for a stronger U.S. military intervention in the former Yugoslavia, to include the introduction of ground troops. Before such steps are taken, policymakers must recognize several key points. *First*, whether we admit it or not, *the United States is already involved*. *Second*, there are *no easy answers to the many Balkan conundra and potential long-term solutions could be painful*. *Third*, *all alternatives have consequences: some intended, others unintended*. Decisionmakers must be fully cognizant of the former and identify as many as possible of the latter. *Fourth*, *all short-term options are flawed: each has drawbacks, costs, and risks that must be weighed against the potential gains*. *Fifth*, there is *no agreed-upon script on how these options will play out*. Policymakers, therefore, must understand the second and third order consequences of their decisions and must be prepared to implement alternatives. *Finally*, *the American public must be made aware of the U.S. interests involved, and the risks inherent in increased U.S. intervention in the conflict*.

To assess the potential consequences of U.S. involvement, policymakers and the public can first turn to the general criteria for the employment of U.S. forces laid out in *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*:

- Have we considered nonmilitary means that offer a reasonable chance of success?

- Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission?
- What is the environment of risk we are entering?
- What is needed to achieve our goals?
- What are the potential costs-human and financial -of the engagement?
- Do we have reasonable assurance of support from the American people and their elected representatives?
- Do we have time lines that will reveal the extent of success or failure, and, in either case, do we have an exit strategy?²⁸²

Not included within the criteria spelled out in A *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* are a number of additional questions that merit reflection.

- What are the specific political objectives to be achieved in Bosnia-Herzegovina? What is the desired end state of the conflict? How do these objectives contribute to U.S. objectives for the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans, as a whole? How will they affect U.S. relations with European allies and partners? What are the potential effects on U.S.-Russian relations?
- Will the employment of military power help achieve national objectives?
- What are the appropriate military ends, ways, and means to achieve political objectives?
- Will allies or partners join, or at least endorse, the U.S. resort to military force?
- How long and to what extent is the United States willing to commit forces to the region?

The reasons for asking these questions deserve repeating. If policymakers do not clearly understand their

goals and the possible directions their decisions may take them, the United States runs the risk of its policy being controlled by, rather than controlling, events. As former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara noted in his recent book, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*, the failure to ask the difficult questions about policy, questions the answers to which were bound to be unsettling, allowed the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to make decisions based on addressing short-term crises. "Over and over again . . . we failed to address the fundamental issues; our failure to identify them was not recognized; and deep-seated disagreements among the president's advisers about how to proceed were neither surfaced nor resolved."²⁸³ Thus, if not careful, the United States could be incrementally drawn into the miasma of the Balkans with no clear idea of how it got there or how it can get out.

Answering such difficult questions, particularly given the number of weighty issues, is not an easy task. And, a comprehensive answer to each question is beyond the constraints of this monograph. Nonetheless, the issue of U.S. national interests in the ongoing crisis in the Balkans deserves some attention. The United States has a vital interest in ensuring a peaceful and stable Europe, and the ongoing wars in the former Yugoslavia represent a significant threat to that goal.

Should the fighting spill over the borders of the former Yugoslavia, the stability and security of the entire Balkan peninsula may be at risk. This disequilibrium could set back the development of newly emerging market-based democracies in the region that have struggled successfully, to date, to change their national and international behavior. An expanded war also would likely involve Greece and Turkey—two key U.S. and NATO allies—probably on opposite sides. The ramifications for Balkan security and NATO would be significant.

Instability in the Balkans naturally influences security within the remainder of Europe. Most immediately, a massive exchange of populations could generate a wave of

refugees that destabilizes the region. Of greater importance, perhaps, prolonged strife in the Balkans could strain relations between Western Europe and Russia, as well as between the United States and Russia. This could lead to a nationalization of security agendas throughout Eastern Europe, which would have cascading effects for security agendas in Central and Western Europe, as well.

Continued war in the Balkans also holds significant potential to increase strains within NATO. Differences with key NATO allies over the course of policy regarding Bosnia already have placed a heavy strain on relations within the Alliance. These tensions could be exacerbated by continued stagnation of the peace process, escalation of the fighting to include Greece and Turkey, or the withdrawal of British, French, or other NATO forces from UNPROFOR.

Ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia is also likely to diminish support within the United States for substantial U.S. engagement in international affairs. The apparent ineffectiveness of the United Nations, and the intramural squabbling within NATO could undermine U.S. public support for both of those key security organizations; thereby undercutting the larger role anticipated for these institutions in supporting and promoting U.S. security interests.

The inability of the United States to shape a resolution of the war in the former Yugoslavia is likely to have additional indirect consequences for U.S. global security interests. Should nations question the depth of U.S. commitment to security and stability or its willingness to confront aggression, U.S. influence might be undermined in key areas of the world. At the same time, potential opponents might perceive that they could challenge U.S. interests at low levels without fear of penalty. At the very least, subnational and transnational groups may draw the lesson that they have a fairly free hand to pursue their agendas in this new security order. If combined, these phenomena could have a "snowball" effect that contributes to a downward spiral of U.S. influence abroad. Eventually, the United States might find its deterrent capability

sufficiently eroded that an adversary might directly confront major U.S. interests.

Normally, the United States would rely on European states or security bodies to address a crisis such as the Balkans, but few, if any, states or multinational organizations are prepared to cope with this conflict. Nor does it appear that a European coalition, much less individual states, have the capacity or the will for decisive political, economic, or military action to settle a war in what has been perceived as a distant land. As a result, national interests compel the United States to take a leading role in resolving the violence in the former Yugoslavia.

As the preceding analysis indicates, however, there are no easy alternatives for U.S. policymakers to pursue in their efforts to resolve the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia. Each has its pluses and minuses; each is fraught with risk. But, while the war is complex, confusing, and appears intractable, the United States should not be deterred from seeking potential solutions. In fact, the severity of potential consequences should drive U.S. policymakers to take an even more active role in conflict resolution efforts, for much more is at stake than simply the fighting in Bosnia.

In pursuing policy options for the ongoing conflict in the Balkans:

- The first priority for policymakers must remain ensuring that the war does not spread beyond its current confines.
- The second priority is to sustain a viable, cohesive, and effective North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
- The third priority is to cap the violence, as the United States is currently attempting to do, and provide a basis for a more lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia—and, by extension the Balkans.

While arguably a harsh choice, this priority represents strategic reality. This conclusion, however, does not argue that policymakers should assess options only from the cold

detachment of harsh strategic realities. The leadership role of the United States has been built not only on its political, economic, and military power, but on American values. As pressures build for the United States to exercise its leadership role, American policymakers will have to factor this critical imperative into their strategic decision-making calculus.

ENDNOTES

1. These points are drawn from *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995, pp. 12-13.

2. Attributed to an unidentified Western diplomat in Belgrade in Roger Thurow and Tony Horwitz, "History's Lessons," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 7, 1992, p. A1. This quote reflects one of the great difficulties in coming to grips with the problems in the Balkans. It is not that Balkan interlocutors are irrational. They simply begin at a start point and follow a path that is different from their Western counterparts. Until Western diplomats and policymakers recognize this key difference and understand its full ramifications, solutions to the Balkan crisis will remain elusive.

3. George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 69. Also cited in William Pfaff, "Reflections: Absence of Empire," *The New Yorker*, August 10, 1992, pp. 59-69, p. 68.

4. Barry Posen, "Realist Theory and the Assessment of Ethnic Conflict," typescript, version June 29, 1992, p. 1.

5. See, e.g., Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After Cold War*, Washington, DC, 1995; Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992; Milicia Z. Bookman, *Economic Decline and Nationalism in the Balkans*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1994; and Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War*, New York: Penguin Books, 1992.

6. As Bookman concludes: "It seems instead that in the Balkans, periods of inter-ethnic peace are the exception, rather than the rule." *Economic Decline and Nationalism in the Balkans*, p. 34.

7. As Donald Horowitz points out, this condition, when combined with the open nature of American society and cultural development may, ". . . disqualify us from understanding much of what is going on in the [ethnic] world." Donald Horowitz, "Ethnic Conflict: The Known and the Unknown," paper presented at the Defense Intelligence College Conference, Ethnic Conflict: Challenge to U.S. Security?, June 23, 1992, p. 3.

8. Subject matter experts may be more inclined to substitute the French term *ethnie* for ethnic identity or group because *ethnie* "unites an emphasis upon cultural differences with a sense of an historical community. It is this sense of history and the perception of cultural uniqueness and individuality which differentiates populations from each other and which endows a given population with a definite identity, both in their own eyes and in those of outsiders." Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 21-22. The more common nomenclature, ethnic identity, will be used in this report, however.

9. James G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991, p. 5. [emphasis added] At first glance, this definition may not appear to be very helpful. But, it underscores the fact that a *sense of belonging* is the elemental force that binds together members of an ethnic group.

10. In De Vos' words, ethnicity consists of the "subjective, symbolic, or emblematic use by a group of people . . . of any aspect of culture, in order to differentiate themselves from other groups." George De Vos, "Ethnic Pluralism" in George De Vos and Lola Romanucci-Ross, eds., *Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change*, Palo Alto: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1976, p. 16, in Paul R. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*, New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1991, p. 19. See also Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p. 28.

11. According to Webster's, a clan is "a social unit smaller than a tribe and larger than the family and claiming descent from a common ancestor." Philip B. Gove, ed. in chief, *Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language*, Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, Inc., 1986, p. 415. "Theoretically, a clan embraces the descendants of a single ancestor or ancestress, the sense of the common descent leading to the rule of exogamy." Edwin R.A. Seligman, ed. in chief, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, New York: The MacMillan Co., 1950, Vol. 14, p. 142.

12. J.S. Coleman, *Nigeria, Background to Nationalism*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958, Appendix, quoted in Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 180.

13. See, for example, Anthony Smith's discussion of *ethnie*, myths, and symbols, in Smith, *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*, pp. 13-16.

14. The example of Croats and Serbs in the former Yugoslavia is an excellent example.

15. "Races," as James Kellas points out, "are discussed predominantly in biological terms, with particular emphasis on

'phenotypical' distinctions such as skin color, stature, etc., and presumed genetic distinctions." Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, p. 5. Phenotypical distinctions are not without their controversies, however.

16. See, for example, Andrew Nagorski and Theresa Waldrop, "The Laws of Blood," *Newsweek*, June 14, 1993, pp. 38-39; and Marc Fisher, "Germans Ponder: What Does It Mean to Be German?," *The Washington Post*, June 28, 1993, p. A1.

17. For a discussion of these differences and how they contribute to ethnic identity, chapter 3.

18. The terms "nation" and "state" require amplification. In the United States, the two terms are used interchangeably, but, in fact, they are not synonymous. Indeed, the terms take on important distinctions, especially in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. See the discussion of the "nation-state" that follows.

19. As examples in the former Yugoslavia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Moldova illustrate, this is not simply a theoretical issue.

20. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977, p. 1.

21. Anna Husarska, "No End of Troubles in the Balkans," *The Washington Post*, Book World, November 1, 1992, p. 5.

22. Morris Massey, *The People Puzzle: Understanding Yourself and Others*, Reston, VA: Reston Press, 1979.

23. Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, *The Balkans*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965, p. 3.

24. *Ibid.*

25. Robert J. Kerner, ed., *Yugoslavia*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949, p. 8, and Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Balkans*, p. 3.

26. Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Balkans*, pp. 2-3.

27. Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 4-7, and William L. Langer, *The Encyclopedia of World History*, 5th ed., Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Press, 1972, pp. 68-76. For a brief description of the wars and conflicts in this era see R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N.

Dupuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present*, 2d rev. ed., New York: Harper and Row, 1986, pp. 29-33 and pp. 41-47.

28. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, p. 7, and Langer, *Encyclopedia of World History*, 78-80 and 91-92.

29. For a brief discussion of Roman conquests and ensuing defense of their empire, see Dupuy and Dupuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present*, pp. 85-129, *passim*.

30. L.S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1958, p. 22.

31. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, pp. 7-13.

32. See John V.A. Fine, *The Late Medieval Balkans*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994, Chapters 1-7.

33. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 26. See also Lord Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire*, New York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks, 1977, Chapters 2-7 for a detailed discussion.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-32.

35. As Jelavich noted, for example, "The staking of heads and impalement were regular methods of public control." B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, p. 232.

36. For example, in suppressing the uprisings of 1875, the Bulgarians estimate the Turks killed between 30,000-100,000 Bulgarians. Contemporary American and British estimates ran between 12,000-15,000 and are probably closer to the mark. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, pp. 347-348. Nonetheless, the number of deaths and undoubtedly higher numbers of wounded and dispossessed are still quite high. Moreover, these took place in the late 1800s when outside observers could report to the outside world. One can only imagine the numbers from earlier, less tolerant periods.

37. Unfortunately, far too many examples exist. For more recent accounts see, for example, Mike O'Connor, "Bosnian Village Fears 500 Captives Were Killed by Serbs," *The New York Times*, October 15, 1995, p. A3; John Pomfret, "Bosnia's 'Ethnic Cleansers' Strike Again," *The Washington Post*, October 12, 1995, p. A20; and Dean E. Murray, "Anguish Over the Missing Keeps Deepening in Bosnia," *The Los Angeles Times*, October 8, 1995, p. 1.

38. For brief discussions of the background to these groups, see Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Balkans*, pp. 32-33; Vladimir Dedijer, Ivan Bozic, Sima Cirkovic, and Milorad Ekmečić, *History of Yugoslavia*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974, (hereafter cited as Dedijer, et al.) pp. 192-193; Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 375-376; and H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p. 111.

39. See descriptions of irregular forces contained in Roger Cohen, "Serbs Defy Belgrade to Join the Fighting in Bosnia," *The New York Times*, September 28, 1992, p. 5; Judy Dempsey, "Weekend 'Chetniks' on the Warpath," *Financial Times* (London), August 21, 1992, p. 2; or Blaine Harden, "Bosnia Bleeds Under Serb 'Purification'," *The Washington Post*, June 23, 1992, p. A1. See Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War*, New York: Penguin Books, 1992, pp. 3-11, for a graphic description of such groups.

40. See, e.g., Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries*, Chapters 10-40, *passim*.

41. Examples stem from the early efforts to halt the Ottoman advance of Suleiman the Magnificent after his victory at the battle of Mohacs in Hungary (1526) (Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. I, p. 34) through the events leading up to World War I.

42. Under the terms of the Treaty of Karlowitz, the Ottomans lost Transylvania, Croatia, Slavonia, and all of Hungary, save the Banat [province] of Temesvar. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 171-177.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 178.

44. Gunter E. Rothenberg's *The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522-1747*, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960), and *The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-1881: A Study of Imperial Institutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966) are the standard studies. Jozo Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955, pp. 74-81, contains a brief description of the purpose and organization of the Military Frontier. See also, Dedijer, et al., *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 233-235 and 313-315, which contains a description of the Military Frontier, as well as brief overview of the wars and violence that took place in this volatile region.

45. See Rothenberg, *The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522-1747*, pp. 1-17 for a discussion of how the Krajina emerged and evolved.

46. For a description of the warrior caste that evolved in the Krajina, see Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, pp. 7-10.
47. See Rothenberg, *The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522-1747*, and *Idem, The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-1881*, for descriptions of events.
48. Rothenberg, *The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522- 1747*, pp. 8-14.
49. For a description of events see Dedijer, *et al., History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 261-276. For a more dispassionate view, see Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 240-250.
50. Justin McCarthy, "Ottoman Bosnia, 1800-1878," in Mark Pinson, ed., *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994, pp. 73-74.
51. For a detailed description of events, to include foreign intervention, see Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 269-292.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 375-380. In suppressing the revolt of 1875, the Turks inflicted between 12-15,000 deaths according to the more reliable sources. *Ibid.*, p. 380.
53. A description of the growing Great Power competition over the carcass of the Ottoman Empire and the tensions created can be found in chapters 3, 4, and 11 of A.J.P. Taylor, *Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954. For a view from the Ottoman perspective, see Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries*, pp. 487ff.
54. An excellent description and analysis of events surrounding the Russo-Turkish War is in *ibid.*, pp. 228-254. Russia also received considerable territories along the Black Sea and in the Caucasus, as well as a huge indemnity.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 251-254.
56. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, pp. 360-361.
57. Carlton J.H. Hayes, *A Generation of Materialism, 1871-1900*, New York: Harper, 1941, p. 33.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 361-366, and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 496-506.
59. Information on these crises may be found in Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*, pp. 303-306.

60. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II, Twentieth Century*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 41-44.

61. For a description of the events and consequences, see Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna*, New York: Harper and Row, 1973, pp. 259-272.

62. For a description of events and consequences of the First Balkan War, see *ibid.*, pp. 280-284 and Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery of Europe*, pp. 483-496.

63. For a discussion of the Second Balkan War and its consequences, see Albrecht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe*, pp. 284-288 and Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*, pp. 497-510.

64. As Stavrianos notes, the Bulgarians turned the occupation of Macedonia over to the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) and "In this task it distinguished itself by its irresponsible violence and terrorism." Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 649. Moreover, in January 1917, Montenegro rose in revolt to protest Bulgarian conscription in the area. In reprisal, the Bulgarians razed villages and upwards of 20,000 innocent civilians died. Dedijs, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 492-493.

65. As Stavrianos notes, war in the Balkans began in 1912 and did not end until termination of the Greco-Turkish War in 1923. He also notes that, per capita, Serbia suffered 2.5 times the casualties of France and 3.0 times those of Britain or Italy. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 632-633.

66. Additionally, Serbia suffered roughly 600,000 civilian casualties. Similarly, Montenegro lost about 63,000 people, or roughly 25 percent of its prewar population. Dedijs, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, p. 501. While some might question the Yugoslav figures, Jozo Tomasevich in *Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia*, pp. 222-226, offers a dispassionate survey that largely confirms the numbers.

67. The disappointments of the various nations with the post-war settlements are outlined in B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, pp. 121-125.

68. The dismemberment of Hungary is, perhaps, the most striking example. Under the Treaty of Trianon (1920), within the Balkans alone, Hungary surrendered Croatia, Slavonia, and Vojvodina to Yugoslavia, as well as Transylvania and a portion of the Banat to Romania. These cessions created sizeable Hungarian minorities in these nations. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 576-578.

69. A brief description of events may be found in B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, pp. 172-175, or Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 587-590.

70. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, p. 172.

71. *Ibid*, p. 174.

72. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 590.

73. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, p. 174. For more recent Turkish concerns on treatment of ethnic Turks in Greece, see Ankara TRT Television Network, 1700 hours, April 17, 1992 in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-WEU-92-076*, April 20, 1992, p. 41; and Athens Elliniki Radhiofonia Radio Network, 1800, GMT, November 24, 1992, in *FBIS-WEU-92-231*, December 1, 1992, p. 69. See also F. Stephen Larrabee, "Instability and Change in the Balkans," *Survival*, Vol. 34, No. 2, Summer 1992, pp. 44 and 49 (note 20).

74. A brief, but excellent account of the events leading up to and the conduct of the German Balkan campaign can be found in Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-260, *The German Campaign in the Balkans* (Spring 1941), Washington, DC: Department of the Army, November 1953. For greater details, see Martin Van Creveld, *Hitler's Strategy: The Balkan Clue*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. After long experience with German interference in Serbian/Yugoslav affairs (1878, 1908, 1914-1918), it should not be surprising that the Yugoslav Army with its high density of Serbian officers would refuse to accede to Hitler's demands. Nor should the Federal Republic of Germany's recognition of Croatia in 1992 be depreciated as a contributing factor to the inception of the current crisis.

75. Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, p. 415.

76. Nikos Kazantzakis, *The Fratricide*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964, p. 8, cited in B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, p. 314.

77. Because this report focuses on long-term historical causes and only briefly discusses proximate causes, the economic origins of the ongoing conflict receive short shrift. Those interested in examining economic contributions to the wars in the former Yugoslavia should consult Bookman, *Economic Decline and Nationalism in the Balkans*, and Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*, chapters 3-5.

78. Frank Havlicek, "Riding Shotgun in Bosnia," *The Washington Post*, December 6, 1992, p. C2.

79. Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Balkans*, p. 2.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 2. According to Aleksa Djilas, the principal difference in the dialects is found in the word used to pose the question: who? Aleksa Djilas, *The Contested Country*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 3. Barbara Jelavich, on the other hand, cites differences over use of the pronoun: what. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, pp. 306-307. Regardless, neither issue appears significant to an outside observer.

81. A Slovenian acquaintance informed the author that Zagreb periodically (roughly every two weeks) issues dictionary supplements that delete "Serbian" words and add "Croatian" words. She indicated that Sarajevo and Belgrade likewise are "purifying" their languages. Hence, what was once a common language has been turned into politically loaded and destructive patterns of speech.

82. Djilas, *The Contested Country*, pp. 2-3.

83. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, p. 177.

84. As Gerard Chaliand points out, until the mid-19th century, minorities within Europe were based on religious affiliation, not ethnic origin. Gerard Chaliand, "Minorities," paper presented at the Defense Intelligence College Conference, *Ethnic Conflict: Challenge to U.S. Security?*, June 23, 1992, p. 1.

85. For background to the religious, as well as political differences between the various branches of the church and the division, see Robert R. Palmer and Joel Colton, *A History of the Modern World*, 7th ed., New York: Alfred Knopf, 1992, p. 25. A brief description of current religious enmities can be found in Roger Cohen, "Cross vs. Crescent," *The New York Times*, September 17, 1992, p. 14.

86. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 12.

87. Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., *Contemporary Yugoslavia*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, pp. 3 and 282, respectively. See also, B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, p. 12.

88. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, p. 40.

89. Dedijer, et al., *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 179-180 and Kerner, ed., *Yugoslavia*, p. 261. Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina experienced conversion rates of approximately 70 percent. On the other hand, conflict-military as well as religious-between Roman Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs that resulted in considerable destruction and suffering in Bosnia and Albania may have promoted conversions, in that

local populations that bore the brunt of the fighting may have converted to gain Turkish protection. Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Balkans*, p. 26. See also Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*, New York: New York University Press, 1994, chapter 5.

90. See Roger Thurow and Tony Horwitz, "History's Lessons," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 7, 1992, p. A1ff.

91. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, p. 53.

92. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

93. *Ibid.*, pp. 92-94 and 95-97.

94. Djilas, *The Contested Country*, p. 7.

95. R.W. Seton-Watson and R.G.D. Laffan, "Yugoslavia Between the Wars," in Stephen Clissold, ed., *A Short History of Yugoslavia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966 (hereafter cited as Clissold, ed., *A Short History of Yugoslavia*), pp. 170-207, (hereafter cited as R.W. Seton-Watson and Laffan, "Yugoslavia Between the Wars"), pp. 194-195; Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 630; and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, p. 203.

96. Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Balkans*, pp. 15-23, contains a brief overview of migrations and conquests from the Greeks to the Bulgars. For a more detailed description of these migrations, see e.g., John A.V. Fine, Jr., *The Early Medieval Balkans*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1991, Chapter 2.

97. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, p. 27. See also Malcolm, *Bosnia*, pp. 1-7.

98. Dedijer, et al., *History of Yugoslavia*, p. 140. As Peter Sugar concludes, the patchwork quilt may be the most crucial legacy of the Ottoman Empire. See, Peter Sugar, *Southeastern Europe Under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977, pp. 283-284 and 221-224.

99. William Pfaff, "The Absence of Empire," *The New Yorker*, August 10, 1992, pp. 59-69, at p. 60.

100. Even in the 19th century, Turkish reprisals remained harsh. For example, after crushing a Bulgarian rebellion in April 1875, roughly 12-15,000 civilians were killed. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, pp. 347-348. Dusko Doder relates a visit to the town of Nis (Serbia) where, after suppressing a revolt in 1804 the Turks built a large tower

out of the skulls of the defeated peasants. Dusko Doder, *The Yugoslavs*, New York: Random House, 1978, p. 19.

101. For example, intense Serbian nationalism goes well back to the early Middle Ages and a rejection of the failings of the Byzantine Empire. Thus, by the time of the Ottoman invasion, Serbs had already developed a strong national character. Invasion by the dramatically different and oppressive Ottomans only served to intensify desires to maintain a Serbian identity. Equally important, this nationalism focused on a strongly chauvinistic Serbian Orthodox Church which served as a beacon for nationalist sentiment over the centuries, thus further entangling the question of religion and ethnic identity. Kerner, ed., *Yugoslavia*, pp. 218-219. Other national groups underwent similar circumstances.

102. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 15; and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, p. 17.

103. Seton-Watson contains a discussion of the concept of *Ellinismos* and the idea of a greater Greece. See H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, pp. 110-117.

104. Djilas, *The Contested Country*, pp. 5, 103, and 112; and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, pp. 23-25.

105. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, p. 19.

106. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 13.

107. Roger Thurow and Tony Horwitz, "History's Lessons," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 7, 1992, p. A1. Nor is this an isolated incident. As Anna Husarska has noted, journalists in the former Yugoslavia rarely get a direct answer to any question without some form of historical background being interjected. "Everything has a historical dimension, explanation, or excuse, and it is a very complicated history indeed." Anna Husarska, "No End of Trouble in the Balkans," p. 5.

108. Husarska, "No End to Trouble in the Balkans."

109. J.F.O. McAllister, "Ever Greater Serbia," *Time*, September 28, 1992, p. 56.

110. For example, Serbs and Croats claim territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina; Transylvania has long been contested by Romania and Hungary; Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey have quarrelled over Thrace; and Serbs, Greeks, Albanians, and Bulgarians fought over Macedonia.

111. For example, Radovan Karadzic, President of the so-called Republica Srpska, has claimed that Bosnian Serbs can accept no less than 64 percent of the territory of Bosnia. Liam McDowall, "Serb Leader Rejects Anything Less than 64% of Bosnia," *The Washington Times*, August 24, 1995, p. 13. Recent Bosnian Serb defeats on the battlefield may, however, render his objections moot.

112. Hugh Seton-Watson notes that "A nation is a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness." And, while the peoples under Ottoman domination exhibited these qualities throughout their repression, they were not yet able to fulfill the requirements of a national state, which Seton-Watson defined as "a legal and political organization, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens," because of Ottoman power. Both quotes from H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p. 1.

113. For example, Bulgaria and Serbia after the Treaty of San Stefano (1878); establishment of Albania at Great Power insistence (1912); or the post-World War I territorial settlements.

114. Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 479-480, and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, p. 144. But, as Jelavich also points out, ethnic Serb units in Habsburg service also fought against their ethnic kinsman. *Ibid.*, pp. 115-116.

115. Kerner, ed., *Yugoslavia*, p. 270.

116. Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 494-495.

117. While John Zametica plays down Serb-Croat differences in the pre-war and inter-war eras, other observers, such as Barbara Jelavich, have taken a much less optimistic view. See John Zametica, *Adelphi Paper No. 270*, "The Yugoslav Conflict," London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1992, pp. 6-7. Jelavich's discussion of the inter-war struggles can be found in B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, pp. 143-157 and 200-204. Indeed, Zametica's own description of Slovenia's rationale for originally joining Yugoslavia in 1918 and concerns about Serbian domination undercut his own argument. Zametica, *The Yugoslav Conflict*, pp. 12-13. See also B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, p. 147 and H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p. 139.

118. For Yugoslav and Romanian dissatisfaction with agreements, see Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Balkans*, pp. 81 and 82, respectively. For Bulgarian and Greek dissatisfaction see B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, p. 125.

119. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, pp. 134-136.
120. Dediđer, et al., *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 579-580.
121. *Ibid.*, pp. 580-582 and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 772.
122. Cited in Djilas, *The Contested Country*, p. 120, from *Novi list*, June 3, 1941, in V. Novak, *Magnum Crimen*, Zagreb: 1948, p. 606.
123. Jozo Tomasevich, "Yugoslavia During the Second World War," in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., *Contemporary Yugoslavia*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, pp. 59-118, p. 82. The term, *Chetnik*, was derived from ". . . a member of the *Cheta* or a military detachment that fought against the Turks in the nineteenth century." Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 773. For a description of *Chetnik* ideology, see *ibid.* and Kerner, ed., *Yugoslavia*, p. 361.
124. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 773.
125. Mihailovic believed that to avoid substantial casualties from inevitable Axis reprisals, actions should be taken only in close proximity to an allied invasion of Yugoslavia. Thus, he adopted a minimalist approach designed to save Serb lives. Tomasevich, "Yugoslavia in the Second World War," pp. 90-91; Kerner, ed., *Yugoslavia*, p. 361; and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 775.
126. Tomasevich, "Yugoslavia in the Second World War," p. 92, and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 780-781.
127. For a brief summary of *Chetnik* and Partisan differences and consequences for Yugoslavia, see Tomasevich, "Yugoslavia in the Second World War," pp. 88-97. The best treatment of the conflicts in Yugoslavia during World War II can be found in Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975.
128. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, p. 266, cited from Vladko Macek, *In the Struggle for Freedom*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1957, p. 245.
129. For example, when Bosnian Serbs erupted in a spontaneous revolt against the *Ustasi* in August 1941, they also turned their frustrations on their Muslim neighbors. As one report to Tito indicated: "The insurgents had plundered Muslim villages and thereby turned the entire Muslim population against themselves." Dediđer, et al., *History of Yugoslavia*, p. 596.

130. Kerner, ed., *Yugoslavia*, p. 359, and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 772. For a more detailed discussion of events, see Malcolm, *Bosnia*, pp. 176-192. Descriptions of the SS divisions can be found in George Stein, *The Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939-1945*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 180-184. The Scimitar Division was so ill-disciplined that the Nazis disbanded the unit in November 1944.

131. Dediđer, et al., *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 591-592, and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 772.

132. Jozo Tomasevich, "Yugoslavia During the Second World War," pp. 78-79.

133. Malcolm, *Bosnia*, p. 192.

134. Under the terms of the post-war agreements, all prisoners were to be returned to their home nation or the nation they had fought against. Information taken from Tomasevich, "Yugoslavia During the Second World War," pp. 112-113, and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, p. 272.

135. Malcolm, *Bosnia*, p. 193.

136. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Gateway ed., Los Angeles: Henry Regnery, 1956, p. 113.

137. As Vojo Kupresanin, a Serb leader in Banja Luka noted, "World War II was bitter here. . . . Serbs were butchered, and many families were left with only one male member. Now these people are the soldiers and carrying guns. Now the chance has arisen for people to take revenge." Chuck Sudetic, "Serbs' Gains in Bosnia Create Chaotic Patchwork," *The New York Times*, August 21, 1992, p. 1.

138. F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3, Winter 1990/1991, pp. 58-91. For examples of these long memories, see Brian Hall, *The Impossible Country: A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia*, Boston: David R. Godine Publisher, 1994, which is peppered with historical anecdotes.

139. Djilas, *The Contested Country*, pp. 161-162.

140. Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, pp. 114-117.

141. Roger Thurow, "Divisive Populist," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 10, 1991, p. A1, A10, contains one of many of Milosevic's justifications for actions to protect all Serbs.

142. The Constitution of 1974 greatly increased the power of the republics and autonomous regions at the expense of the central government. In many ways, according to Zametica, the Constitution fragmented the Communist Party and "feudalized" Yugoslavia. Zametica, *The Yugoslav Conflict*, p. 10.

143. *Ibid.*

144. Culture is defined as "the body of customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits constituting a distinct complex of tradition of racial [ethnic], religious, or social group," *Webster's Third International Dictionary*, Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 1986, p. 552. The discussion that follows is not intended as a value judgement on the culture or cultures within the region. Rather, the discussion seeks to identify critical elements of the culture, explain how events contributed to that cultural development, and help policymakers understand these cultures to improve the output of the decision-making process. Comments that follow should be viewed in that context.

145. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 12. For a similar view, see Dedijer, et al., *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 98-99. Because of the ebb and flow of the Ottoman Empire, divisions fell less upon a definable line than in a broad band between the eastern and western cultural zones. Unfortunately, the occupants of that band, the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, have borne the brunt of the clash of cultures, for as Stavrianos pointed out:

Between the eastern and western zones lay Bosnia, sunk in its mountains and pursuing its own religious beliefs [Islam], equally distant from East and West. Consequently, its culture, bearing strong patriarchal legacy, reflected both cultural trends, neither of which gained precedence.

Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 98.

146. For example, Serbs (or Croats) view Muslims as apostate Orthodox (or Roman Catholic). See Roger Thurow and Tony Horwitz, "Hostile Forces," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 18, 1992, p. 1. See also Blaine Harden, "Bosnia Bleeds Under Serb 'Purification,'" *The Washington Post*, June 23, 1992, p. A1. Nor does ethnic/religious inter-marriage appear to make much difference. See, Peter Maass, "Serbs Strike Fear in a Bosnian City," *The Washington Post*, August 12, 1992, p. A1.

147. Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Balkans*, p. 1.

148. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, pp. 298-299, and Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia*, pp. 143-144.

149. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, pp. 39-62, contains an excellent overview of the Ottoman system of government. See, particularly, pp. 57-62 for local government.

150. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-53.

151. Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Balkans*, p. 28.

152. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, pp. 52-53.

153. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 607-608. Stavrianos notes that in the 1930s, for example, the Greek government controlled the distribution of quinine and was found to be dispensing a worthless powder, while 20 percent of the population suffered from malaria. *Ibid.* See also B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, pp. 298-299.

154. See the Serbian example, discussed in more detail below.

155. Great Power intervention that assisted Greek independence and then Greek dependence on British and French naval assistance; Russian domination of Romania, and to a lesser extent Bulgaria; and Austrian and Russian influence over Serbia are pertinent examples.

156. The Russian-Serbian example under Prince Milan Obrenovic' is an excellent example. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 259.

157. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, p. 298.

158. *Ibid.*, pp. 298-299. In the period leading up to World War I, constant Great Power competition over the remains of the Ottoman Empire resulted in near continuous interference. Best examples, perhaps, are the Habsburgs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Russians in Romania.

159. The post-war territorial settlements satisfied no one in the region, largely because significant ethnic minorities remained outside national boundaries. For a description of how the territorial settlements were fashioned, see Alan W. Palmer, *Lands Between: A History of East-Central Europe Since the Congress of Vienna*, New York: The MacMillan Co., 1970, pp. 150-173. Kemalist Turkey, successor to the Ottoman Empire, represents an exception to this general rule.

160. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 608-615, offers an overview of political trends in the region. Over 40 parties participated

in the November 1920 election for the constituent assembly in Yugoslavia. Vucinich, "Interwar Yugoslavia" p. 7. For specific examples, e.g., confusion in the Yugoslav parliament, Romanian government, or Bulgaria, see Palmer, *Lands Between*, pp. 190-194, 197-201, 203-206, respectively.

161. The Romanian, Serbian, and Bulgarian examples are the most prominent.

162. The Turkish example under Ataturk provides an alternative option. Relative to the Ottoman Empire, Ataturk and his followers ruled well and enacted numerous reforms. Still, the Ataturk state was based on one party, authoritarian rule. For a description of the tenets and workings of the early Kemalist state, see Paul Pitman III, ed., *Turkey: A Country Study*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988, pp. 48-54.

163. This should not be taken to mean that all of the governments were unpopular. Some populations welcomed the internal stability and improved economic conditions that sometimes emerged. Serbians, for example, widely supported Alexander's dictatorship, hoping it could bring order out of chaos. R.W. Seton-Watson and Laffan, "Yugoslavia Between the Wars," pp. 176-178.

164. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I.* p. ix.

165. Andreas Papandreou is the son of George Papandreou, leader of the Social Democrats. American educated, indeed a naturalized American citizen, Andreas returned to Greece while his father was Premier and advancing in age. Thus, it appeared that Andreas, after many years absence, would step up to his father's position without having paid his dues. His rapid rise to the top levels of Greek politics created considerable jealousy, that Papandreou compounded with his increasingly anti-American and radical positions. Having, like his father, served as Premier, Andreas continues to exert no small influence in Greek politics. For a fuller explication of events see *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 423-426.

166. For a description of the hurley-burley of Greek political behavior and actions since World War II, see *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 406-438.

167. In all, the military has intervened in governmental affairs eight times since the advent of Republican Turkey. Not all of these interventions were full-fledged coups, however. For the role of the military in Turkish government and society, see George S. Harris, *Turkey: Coping With Crisis*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 153-173.

168. For a brief description of the events leading up to each crisis, the conduct of the coups, and the military hand over to civil control, see Pitman, *Turkey*, pp. 55-62, 64-72, and 77-83, respectively. See, also, Harris, *Turkey*, pp. 55-68. It is also important to note that in many instances the population generally took a positive view of the military interventions. See, e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 159-160 and pp. 171-172.

169. This is especially true in southeastern Turkey which is under *de facto* martial law due to PKK terrorism. Nor is it likely that the current President, Suleiman Demirel, or many of his contemporaries have forgotten their past brushes with the military.

170. See, for example, the latest constitutional changes passed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on July 23, 1995. Press release, Turkish Embassy, Washington, "Turkish Parliament Passes Sweeping Democratic Reforms," July 24, 1995.

171. Palmer, *Lands Between*, p. 34. For a fuller description of Karadjordje's exploits and their effects, see B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, pp. 196-204.

172. Curiously, the Porte's grant of powers failed to establish the precise geographic borders of Serbia or delineate the extent of Milos' powers. See Palmer, *Lands Between*, p. 34, and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, p. 239.

173. For Milos' declarations see B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, p. 240. For Karadjordje's murder see, Palmer, *Lands Between*, p. 34, or Langer, *An Encyclopedia of World History*, p. 761. For the effects of the blood-feud on Serbian politics, see H.C. Darby, "Serbia," in Clissold, ed., *A Short History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 87-134, p. 118. (Hereafter cited as Darby, "Serbia. ")

174. Dediđer, et al., *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 279-282, and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. I*, pp. 238-242.

175. Darby, "Serbia," pp. 127-128 and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, p. 33. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 457-461, contains a brief description of Serbian economic development during Peter's rule.

176. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 456-457 and 528-531, and Darby, "Serbia," pp. 129-130.

177. Darby, "Serbia," pp. 130-133, B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, pp. 95-100, and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 532-543.

178. See Chapter 2, p. 19.

179. Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 478-479.

180. Darby, "Serbia," pp. 160-161.

181. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 618. The Yugoslav Committee consisted largely of Habsburg Slav exiles. For a discussion of the Yugoslav Committee and its influence, see Gale Stokes, "The Role of the Yugoslav Committee in the Formation of Yugoslavia," in *The Creation of Yugoslavia*, ed. by Djordjevic, Santa Barbara, CA: CLIO Books, 1980. A briefer discussion may be found in Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, pp. 144-147.

182. James Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," *Survival*, Vol. 33, No. 4, July-August 1992, p. 292.

183. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, pp. 145-146, and Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 497-498.

184. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 616; Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," p. 292; and Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, p. 497. As Dedijer, *et al.*, point out, Serbia and Croatia were the primary actors and the interests of the remaining Slavic nationalities were largely ignored. Dedijer, *et al.*, p. 492. Nor, as Stavrianos points out, should this surprise anyone. All areas had fought for and received varying levels of autonomy and had no desire to trade Ottoman, Austrian, or Hungarian oppression for Serbian domination. Nor did Serbs wish to trade independent nation-statehood for anything less.

185. Dedijer, *et al.*, *History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 503-504. Although King Peter of Serbia still lived, he had been mentally incompetent for quite some time and Alexander had served as regent since 1914.

186. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, p. 149, and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 619.

187. Serbs dominated the government for a number of reasons. Designation of the Karadjordjevic dynasty as the ruling house and availability and experience of Serbian institutions led to early Serb control of the government, which they translated into permanent dominance. Croatian and other armed forces were disbanded while the Serbian Army, which owed its allegiance to King Alexander, metamorphosed into the Yugoslav Army. In true Balkan tradition, the Serb-dominated government doled out patronage and corruption to coopt the business community and government bureaucracies. An indication of Serbian dominance from December 1918-January 1929 can

be found in the following statistics of Serbian control of key positions: Premier, 117 of 121 months; Minister of Army and Minister of Navy, 121 of 121 months; Minister of the Interior, 111 of 121 months; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 100 of 121 months; and Minister of Education, 110 of 121 months. All of this information is taken from Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 624-627. See also, Vucinich, "Interwar Yugoslavia," pp. 10-11.

188. For a description of Muslim frustrations at the Serb dominated government, see Ivo Banic, "Bosnian Muslims: From Religious Community to Socialist Nationhood and Postcommunist Statehood," in Pinson, ed., *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, pp. 134-141.

189. One example tells the tale. As a result of Radic's trip to Moscow in July 1924, Prime Minister Pasic' (a Serb) outlawed the Croatian Peasant Party and jailed Radic' and his fellow leaders. Elections held in February 1925, unsurprisingly, returned a Serb dominated *Skupstina*. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, pp. 151-155.

190. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 626-627.

191. *Ibid.*, p. 627.

192. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, p. 201 and R.W. Seton-Watson and Laffan, "Yugoslavia Between the Wars," p. 188.

193. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 629, and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, pp. 201-203.

194. R.W. Seton-Watson and Laffan, "Yugoslavia Between the Wars," pp. 192-201, and Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 631-632.

195. Vucinich, "Interwar Yugoslavia," p. 30, Jacob B. Hoptner, *Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-1941*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, p. 154, and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, pp. 202-204.

196. As Vojo Kupresanin, a Serb leader in Banja Luka noted, "World War II was bitter here Serbs were butchered, and many families were left with only one male member. Now these people are the soldiers and carrying guns. Now the chance has arisen for people to take revenge." Sudetic, "Serbs' Gains in Bosnia Create Chaotic Patchwork," p. 1. See also, Roger Cohen, "As Serbs See War: Foreign Plots and Ingratitude," *The New York Times*, September 2, 1992, p. A3, Roger Cohen, "Cross vs. Crescent," *The New York Times*, September 17, 1992, p. A14, and Roger Thurow and Tony Horowitz, "Paranoid and Vengeful, Serbs Claim Their War Is to Right Old Wrongs," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 18, 1992, p. 1.

197. Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," pp. 293-294, B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, p. 296, and Stephen Clissold, "Occupation and Resistance," in Clissold, ed., *A Short History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 208-235, pp. 236-239. (Hereafter cited as Clissold, "Occupation and Resistance.")

198. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, pp. 296-297, and Phyllis Auty, "The Post-War Period," in Clissold, ed., *A Short History of Yugoslavia*, pp. 236-264, pp. 239-240. (Hereafter cited as Auty, "The Post-War Period.")

199. Woodford McClellan, "Postwar Political Evolution," in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., *Contemporary Yugoslavia*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, pp. 119-153; pp. 134-137 contains an excellent overview of the decentralization process and the rationale behind it. See also, Auty, "The Post-War Period," pp. 252-257.

200. Auty, "The Post-War Period," pp. 257-258. See also McClellan, "Postwar Political Evolution," pp. 141-147.

201. Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," pp. 293-294, and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, p. 293.

202. Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," p. 294.

203. *Ibid.*, pp. 294-295, and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, p. 397.

204. Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," pp. 294-295 and B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Vol. II*, p. 397.

205. Sabrina Petra Ramet, "War in the Balkans," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 4, Fall 1992, p. 82. For a more detailed analysis of the political events leading to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, see Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 7-53.

206. *Ibid.*, p. 83, and Branka Magas, "The War in Yugoslavia," *Royal United Services Institute Journal*, Winter 1991, p. 34.

207. Magas, "The War in Yugoslavia," p. 34, and Ramet, "War in the Balkans," pp. 83-84. See also, F. Stephen Larrabee, "Instability and Change in the Balkans," p. 40.

208. Magas, "The War in Yugoslavia," p. 34.

209. Ramet, "War in the Balkans," p. 85.

210. Magas, "The War in Yugoslavia," p. 35.

211. Ramet, "War in the Balkans, " p. 84.

212. Magas, "The War in Yugoslavia," p. 35, and Ramet, "War in the Balkans, " pp. 85-86.

213. Ramet, "War in the Balkans," p. 85.

214. For example, U.N. economic sanctions, cease-fire resolutions, or the declaration of a "no-fly zone" over Bosnian air space have had little effect. It is too soon to tell if the latest U.S. initiative (August-November 1995) will lead to a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

215. George Schultz, "Why Bosnia Needs NATO and U.S. Forces," *The Washington Times*, January 11, 1993, p. E4.

216. *Ibid.*

217. For example, the experience of ethnic Serbs at the hands of the Croatian *Ustasi* during World War II and the actions of the Tudjman government in Croatia in 1991 (See, e.g., Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, pp. 11-19)

218. I am grateful to my colleague, Dr. Thomas-Durell Young, for these observations.

219. See, e.g., Michael Dobbs, "New U.S. Role in Bosnia Is Welcomed in Europe," *The Washington Post*, September 1, 1995, p. A28.

220. Chris Hedges, "In Belgrade, View Is Still Hands Off," *The New York Times*, September 21, 1995, p. A14. Military power-Croatian offensives in Western Slavonia and the Krajina, Croatian and Bosnian government successes in northwest and central Bosnia, and NATO bombing operations-obviously also have had an effect.

221. Some might argue that the Franco-German example is *sui generis*, brought about due to the unique conditions of the time: a thoroughly defeated and bankrupt Germany, unparalleled leadership on both sides, and the massive Soviet threat. More importantly, perhaps, victorious French leaders sought a compromise solution, having learned that a retributive peace (i.e., Versailles, 1871 and Versailles, 1919) only laid the seeds of future conflict.

222. Attributed to Edmund Burke, an 18th century British parliamentarian, scholar, and writer. For various constructions of this quote, see Angela Partington, ed., *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, 4th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 160:4; and Suzy Platt, ed., *Respectfully Quoted*, Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1989, no. 560.

223. Platt, no. 122.

224. The U.S. Government has articulated general American interests in Europe: a stable and secure Europe achieved through military strength and cooperation; U.S. access to open and vibrant European market economies; and support for the growth of democracy and individual freedoms in Central and Eastern Russia, especially Russia. A *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995, pp. 24-28. Additionally, the viability of NATO, U.S. leadership in Europe, and U.S. global influence have also emerged as important U.S. national interests entwined with the Balkan crisis. See, e.g., Secretary of State Christopher's statements in Norman Kempster, "Christopher Links NATO's Future, U.S. Role in Bosnia," *The Los Angeles Times*, October 4, 1995, p. 16.

225. A *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p. 25.

226. Granted, U.S. Army forces are engaged in a preventive deployment in Macedonia, and the Clinton administration has promised to provide forces to oversee peace implementation in Bosnia or to help extract UNPROFOR from Bosnia. But, the administration is adamantly opposed to deploying U.S. ground forces except under stringent conditions. See, for example, President Clinton's recent statement in "The Risk of 'Americanizing' the War," *Newsweek*, August 7, 1995, p. 40: "From the beginning of my presidency, I have refused to cross that line ['a massive NATO commitment, including U.S. ground forces'], and I will continue to do so." And, importantly, there has been some wavering within Washington on the number of troops that might be required to support an UNPROFOR withdrawal. See, Thomas E. Ricks and Carla Anne Robbins, "Pentagon Officials Say Fewer Troops May Be Needed for U.N. Bosnia Pullout," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 20, 1995, pp. 1, 2. Nor are U.S. European allies convinced of the depth of U.S. commitment. See, e.g., William Drozdiak, "Allies Set to Prod U.S. Into Role in Bosnia," *The Washington Post*, July 19, 1995, p. 1, 17.

227. While an assessment of these goals is beyond the scope of this report, a critique can be found in Stephen J. Blank, William T. Johnsen, and Earl H. Tilford, Jr., *U.S. Policy in the Balkans: A Hobson's Choice*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, August 28, 1995, pp. 4-12.

228. For example, U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrooke was recently quoted as stating: "If I can get a cease-fire, I'll take that. . . . If I can get some constitutional principles, I'll take them. If I can get a corridor to Gorazde, I'll grab it. If I can settle Sarajevo, I'll do it. We're inventing peace as we go." Roger Cohen, "A 'Piecemeal' Peace," *The New York*

Times, September 28, 1995, p. A1, 12. Whether such an incremental approach can produce a lasting peace remains to be seen.

229. The so-called demonstration effect. See Richard H. Schultz, Jr. and William J. Olson, *Ethnic and Religious Conflict: Emerging Threat to U.S. Security*, Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Service, 1994, p. 42. For an overview of potential ethnic/religious-based violence in Europe, see Johnsen, *Pandora's Box Reopened*, Appendix A.

230. One need only look as far as congressional opposition to the participation of U.S. ground forces at the current levels of violence. See e.g., Dana Priest, "Republicans Voice Objections to U.S. Ground Troops in Bosnia," *The Washington Post*, September 22, 1995, p. A14; Michael Dobbs, "Dole, Gingrich Attack Use of Pentagon Funds for U.N. Reaction Force," *The Washington Post*, June 30, 1995, p. 20; William Branigin, "U.N. Vote on New Bosnia Force Delayed by Republican Concerns," *The Washington Post*, June 16, 1995, p. 29; and Art Pine and Doyle McManus, "U.S. Support for New Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia Wanes," *Los Angeles Times* (Washington ed.), June 15, 1995, p. 4.

231. The United States began participating in maritime enforcement in July 1992. U.S. participation in Operation SKY MONITOR began in October 1992, and became Operation DENY FLIGHT in April 1993. U.S. aircraft supporting NATO operations shot down four Serbian aircraft in February 1994. The first close air support missions occurred in March 1993. U.S. soldiers first deployed to Macedonia under Operation ABLE SENTRY in July 1993.

232. As the U.S. experiences in Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia demonstrate.

233. See e.g., Priest, "Republicans Voice Objections to U.S. Ground Troops in Bosnia"; Michael Dobbs, "Dole, Gingrich Attack Use of Pentagon Funds for U.N. Reaction Force"; William Branigin, "U.N. Vote on New Bosnia Force Delayed by Republican Concerns"; and Art Pine and Doyle McManus, "U.S. Support for New Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia Wanes."

234. A discussion of the ends, ways, and means model is found in Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*, Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., ed., Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1993, pp. 3-8.

235. Somalia is a good example of the former. The demonstration effect is from Schultz and Olson, *Ethnic and Religious Conflict: Emerging Threat to U.S. Security*, p. 42.

236. "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," pp. 1-2, and *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p. 26, respectively.

237. Turkish support has been longstanding. See, e.g., *Gunaydin* (Istanbul), September 10, 1991 in *FBIS-WEU-91-178*, September 13, 1991, p. 29; Robert Mauther, "Turkey Criticizes Allies on Bosnia," *London Financial Times*, September 29, 1992, p. 3; Chuck Sudetic, "Bosnia Neighbors Nervously Seek Pacts," *The New York Times*, February 17, 1993, p. A8; James Yuenger, "Turkey Urges Desert Storm for Bosnia," *The Chicago Tribune*, February 28, 1993, p. 1; and Ankara TRT Network, "Turkish Chief of Staff Urges NATO Action in Bosnia," in *FBIS-WEU-93-081*, April 29, 1993, p. 2.

238. For example, in December 1992, then President Bush warned Serbia not to take offensive action against Kosovo. President Clinton reiterated that message shortly after taking office. John M. Goshko, "Bush Threatens Military Force If Serbs Attack Kosovo Province," *The Washington Post*, December 29, 1992, p. A10, and Daniel Williams, "Clinton's Policy in Balkans Puts U.S. Prestige, Power on the Line," *The Washington Post*, February 11, 1993, p. A35, respectively. The Clinton administration also dispatched roughly 500 U.S. soldiers to Macedonia as part of the U.N. effort to deter the conflict from spilling over into that nation. See Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Says It Will Send 300 Troops to Balkan Republic to Limit Strife," *The New York Times*, June 11, 1993, p. A1.

239. For example, recent Bosnian Serb counterattacks may once again reverse strategic momentum. See, e.g., John Pomfret, "Serbs Counterattack to Retake Territory," *The Washington Post*, October 3, 1995, p. A14.

240. See Chris Hedges, "Fighting in Bosnia Eases, Boasting [sic] Truce," *The New York Times*, October 15, 1995, p. A10; John Pomfret, "Bosnia, Croatia Agree to Halt Offensive," *The Washington Post*, September 20, 1995, p. A1, and "If Talks Fail, War Will Widen, Serb Military Chief Warns," Reuters, in *The Washington Post*, September 27, 1995, p. A24.

241. Stephen Kinder, "Bosnian Serbs Fend Off Croatian and Muslim Attacks," *The New York Times*, September 22, 1995, p. A12; Roger Cohen, "Cycle of War and Illusion," *The New York Times*, September 24, 1995, Section 4, p. 3, and Pomfret, "Serbs Counterattack to Retake Territory."

242. "Croatia's President Pledges to Retake Serb-Held Enclave," *The New York Times*, August 27, 1995, p. A8, and Pomfret, "Serbs Counterattack to Retake Territory."

243. See, e.g., Cohen, "A 'Piecemeal' Peace"; Thomas Friedman, "Whose Balkan Menu?," *The New York Times*, September 27, 1995, p. A23; and Misha Glenny, "And the Winner Is . . . Croatia," *The New York Times*, September 26, 1995, p. A23.

244. See, e.g., John Pomfret, "Bosnia Balks at Cease-Fire," *The Washington Post*, October 11, 1995, p. A1.

245. Kit R. Roane, "Bosnia Cease-Fire Goes Into Effect As Pact Is Signed," *The New York Times*, October 12, 1995, p. A1; and Pomfret, "Bosnia Balks at Cease-Fire." Alternatively, the central government may not be able to exert full control over military commanders in the field who have been made heady by their recent successes. See, e.g., John Pomfret, "Bosnia, Croatia Agree to Halt Offensive;" and *Idem.*, "Mastermind of Muslim Push Charges Ahead," *The Washington Post*, September 28, 1995, p. A24.

246. The United States has deployed roughly an infantry battalion (ca. 500 men) to Macedonia to support the U.N. Confidence Restoration Operation in Macedonia, known in the United States as Operation ABLE SENTRY. Arguably, this U.N./U.S. deployment has contributed substantially to preventing the spread of the conflict to Macedonia. To date, the deployment has been a very small price to pay for bringing stability to this part of the Balkans.

247. Steven Greenhouse, "U.S. Still Opposes European Plan for Bosnia," *The New York Times*, August 4, 1995, p. A3. Carl Bildt, the EU negotiator recommends a 9-month suspension of the sanctions against Serbia, while the United States argues for no more than 2 or 3 months. Also, significantly under the Bildt plan, sanctions could not be reimposed for at least 9 months, even if Milosevic' reneges on his promises.

248. Otherwise those states will only more loudly call for ending the embargo. Budapest, *Nepszabadsag*, in Hungarian, May 23, 1995, *FBIS-EEU-95-101*, May 25, 1995, pp. 8-9, for Hungary's burden from the embargo.

249. However, the cumulative effect may be beginning to take a substantial toll on Serbia. See, for example, the discussion of the differences in Croatian and Serbian economies and standards of living in John Pomfret and Christine Spolar, "Croatian Drive Turns Tables on Serbians," *The Washington Post*, August 22, 1995, p. 1, and Chris Hedges, "In Belgrade, View Is Still 'Hands Off,'" *The New York Times*, September 21, 1995, p. A14.

250. Zalmay Khalilzad, "Arm the Bosnians," *The Washington Post*, December 28, 1992, p. A15. As a candidate, then-Governor Clinton

supported lifting the embargo. President Clinton has now backed away from any proposals to lift the arms embargo. Irvin Molotsky, "Serb Gains a Fact, Christopher Says," *The New York Times*, March 1, 1993, p. A6. See also recent U.S. congressional pressure to lift the embargo. Elaine Sciolino, "Clinton's Policy on Bosnia Draws Criticism in Congress," *The New York Times*, June 8, 1995, p. A10, and Michael Dobbs, "Embargo Vote Is Bipartisan Slap at Clinton," *The Washington Post*, June 9, 1995, p. A22.

251. See Johnsen, *Deciphering the Balkan Enigma*, pp. 65-66.

252. See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino, "A Seesaw In Bosnia," *The New York Times*, October 20, 1995, p. A13; Dana Priest, "In Shift, U.S. Would Arm Bosnia Muslims," *The Washington Post*, October 7, 1995, p. A1, 22; and Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, "Prospect of Bosnia Peace Raises Thorny Questions," *The Baltimore Sun*, October 6, 1995, p. A12.

253. The United States has surfaced the possibility of arming and training the Bosnian Army during the peace implementation period. This initiative has drawn a largely negative reaction from NATO allies. See, e.g., Rick Atkinson, "Conditions for Withdrawal Remain Vague in Planning," *The Washington Post*, October 13, 1995, p. A1, A27; and Dana Priest, "In Shift, U.S. Would Arm Bosnian Muslims," *The Washington Post*, October 7, 1995, p. A1, A22.

254. John Pomfret and Dana Priest, "Bosnia Force May Be Used This Week," *The Washington Post*, June 5, 1995, p. 1.

255. See, e.g., Michael Dobbs, "Serbs May Have Dealt a Death Blow to U.N. Peacekeeping," *The Washington Post*, July 12, 1995, p. 15, and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. and NATO Face Unhappy Choices for U.N. Force in the Balkans," *The New York Times*, July 12, 1995, pp. 1, 6.

256. Lee Hockstader, "Yeltsin Threatens to Defy Yugoslav Trade Embargo," *The Washington Post*, August 11, 1995, p. 30.

257. A *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p. 25. The United States has maintained this principle in the ongoing negotiations toward a peaceful settlement of the crisis. See "Details of the Accord: Division Within Unity," *The New York Times*, September 9, 1995, p. A4.

258. See Johnsen, *Deciphering the Balkan Enigma*, p. 65. These conclusions have been borne out by the mass population movements (upwards of 400,000 people) that followed in the wake of the recent military offensives in Bosnia, and the concomitant "ethnic cleansing." See, e.g., John Pomfret, "Serb Forces Renew 'Ethnic Cleansing'," *The Washington Post*, October 10, 1995, p. A21, and Dean E. Murphy,

"Anguish Over the Missing Keeps Deepening in Bosnia," *Los Angeles Times*, October 8, 1995, p. 1. These are only the latest in a series of large-scale shifts of population.

259. See, for instance, John Pomfret, "Bosnian Foes Stake Claims with Settlers," *The Washington Post*, September 27, 1995, p. A1, 24; Chris Hedges, "Bosnia Revolving Door: Muslims Get Serb Homes," *The New York Times*, September 25, 1995, p. A3; and Mike O'Connor, "For Serbs, A Flashback to '43 Horror," *The New York Times*, September 21, 1995, p. A14.

260. The current nomenclature for operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the event of a peace settlement is: "Operation of the Implementation Force for Bosnia-Herzegovina," William Drozdiak, "U.S., Russia at Odds On Bosnia Peace Force," *The Washington Post*, October 9, 1995, p. A29. It is worth noting that this title does not conform to agreed doctrinal terminology (either U.S. Army, Joint, or NATO doctrine). See, Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 30, 1994, and Joint Pub. No. 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For Peacekeeping Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 29, 1994. For NATO approved definitions, see Annex C, "MC 327 Definitions of Peace Support Operations," *Multinational Force Command Authorities Handbook*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 1, 1995. Jim Hoagland reports that White House briefing papers now use the term "International Force." Jim Hoagland, "On to Bosnia," *The Washington Post*, October 22, 1995, p. C7. However, there are no reports of an official name change.

261. The United States initially announced it would participate in a peacekeeping force in February 1993. Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Backs Bosnian Peace Plan; Serbs May Keep Occupied Land," *The New York Times*, February 11, 1993, p. A1.

262. These points appear in numerous articles. See, e.g., Henry Kissinger, "What Is the Mission?," *The Washington Post*, October 22, 1995, p. C1; Hoagland, "On to Bosnia"; and Warren Christopher, "Send Troops to Bosnia," *USA Today*, October 18, 1995, p. 1, 13.

263. The numbers of potential troops has fluctuated, but the official number of 25,000 was first articulated in September 1993. John Lancaster and Daniel Williams, "U.S. Shapes Terms for Role in Bosnia," *The Washington Post*, September 26, 1993, p. A1. The range of positions may be found in Eric Schmitt, "As Prospects in Bosnia Brighten, G.O.P. Doubts a Need for G.I.'s," *The New York Times*, September 22, 1995, pp. A1; Ann Devroy and Dana Priest, "Clinton Aides Debate Size of U.S. Peacekeeping Force for Bosnia," *The Washington Post*, September 21,

1995, p. A1, A24; and Art Pine, Size of Bosnia Force Divides Clinton Team," *Los Angeles Times*, October 3, 1995, p. 1.

264. John Pomfret, "Bosnia Cease-Fire Accord Takes Effect," *The Washington Post*, October 12, 1995, p. A1.

265. The range of positions may be found in Schmitt, "As Prospects in Bosnia Brighten, G.O.P. Doubts a Need for G.I.'s," and Pine, "Size of Bosnia Force Divides Clinton Team."

266. Gilbert A. Lewthwaite and Mark Matthews, "Russians Complicate NATO Deployment Plan," *The Baltimore Sun*, October 11, 1995, p. 12.

267. This conclusion does not conform to current Clinton administration forecasts that forces will be deployed for approximately one year. (Secretary of Defense Perry has indicated a 9-12 month deployment. See, e.g., Steve Komarow, "Perry: Peace Won't Erase Risk," *USA Today*, October 3, 1995, p. 1.) Other analysis argues against a short deployment scenario. For example, initial planning forecasts indicated that a commitment of up to 10 years might be required. (Richard H.P. Sia, "U.S. Troops in Bosnia Envisioned," *The Baltimore Sun*, March 1, 1993, p. 1.) While circumstances have changed since that assessment, it is difficult to imagine that after 4 years of war, the requirement has been reduced by 90 percent. Indeed, as Thomas Friedman has concluded: "The U.S. can have the peace it wants in Bosnia—one that preserves a Muslim entity between Serbia and Croatia—as long as it, or a force equally powerful, stays there to maintain the partition." Friedman, "Whose Balkan Menu?" To presume such a force, without the United States, is not realistic. The United States, therefore, may face a longer deployment than some currently forecast.

268. U.S. commanders are already anticipating such a requirement. See, Dana Priest and Rick Atkinson, "Weather May Alter U.S. Bosnia Plan," *The Washington Post*, October 15, 1995, p. A1.

269. Such operations would fall under the rubric of peace enforcement operations which can include restoration and maintenance of order and stability, protection of humanitarian assistance, guarantee and denial of movement, enforcement of sanctions, establishment and supervision of protected zones, and the forceful separation of belligerents. Most importantly for the discussion that follows, it includes the conduct of combat operations. See Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, pp. 2-12. See also Joint Pub. No. 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For Peacekeeping Operations*. For NATO approved definitions, see Annex C, "MC 327 Definitions of Peace Support Operations. "

270. As the dozens of previous failed cease-fires unfortunately illustrate.

271. Potential "carrots" include a land swap that would favor each side, lifting sanctions against Serbia, and a "mini-Marshall Plan" for Bosnia. "Sticks" include, if Serbs refuse, lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia and replacing UNPROFOR with forces from Islamic nations. Should the Bosnians refuse to accede to the terms of the plan, UNPROFOR could be withdrawn and the embargo lifted against all sides. See various reports in e.g., Ann Devroy, "Europeans Respond Favorably to Ideas for Bosnia Settlement, Clinton Is Told," *The Washington Post*, August 16, 1995, pp. 1, 26; "U.S. Talks with Serb President 'Useful'," *The Washington Times*, August 18, 1995, p. 13; and Steven Greenhouse, "U.S. Officials Say Bosnian Serbs Face NATO Attack if Talks Stall," *The New York Times*, August 28, 1995, p. A1. For U.S. pledge to assist in UNPROFOR withdrawal, see, e.g., Ann Devroy and Bradley Graham, "Seeking to Reassure Europe, Clinton Alarmed Congress," *The Washington Post*, June 5, 1995, p. 1.

272. See, for instance, Michael Dobbs, "Shift in U.S. Policy Brings Controversy—and Results," *The Washington Post*, September 28, 1995; Cohen, "A 'Piecemeal' Peace"; Stephen Kinder, "Bosnia Vows Not to Attack Serb Town," *The New York Times*, September 20, 1995, p. A14; and Richard C. Gross, "Croats Gird to Push Serbs Farther Back," *The Washington Times*, August 21, 1995, p. 1.

273. For example, Muslim forces initially violated the provisions of the existing heavy weapons zone around Sarajevo. See, e.g., John Pomfret, "Muslims Attack Serb Positions Around Sarajevo," *The Washington Post*, October 4, 1995, p. A17; and Stephen Kinder, "Bosnian Serbs Fend Off Croatian and Muslim Attacks," *The New York Times*, September 22, 1995, p. A12. See also, John Pomfret, "Mastermind of Muslim Push Charges Ahead," *The Washington Post*, September 28, 1995, p. A24.

274. See, e.g., Daniel William and Rick Atkinson, "Limits on Targets Hamper NATO, UN Officers Say," *The Washington Post*, September 13, 1995, p. A1. Cf., GEN Ronald R. Fogleman, "What Air Power Can Do in Bosnia," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 11, 1995, p. 15.

275. See, for instance, Eric Schmitt, "Wider NATO Raids on Serbs Expose Rift in Alliance," *The New York Times*, September 12, 1995, p. A1; and Rick Atkinson and Daniel Williams, "NATO Rejects Demands to End Bombing," *The Washington Post*, September 13, 1995, p. A1, A14.

276. For example, if Serb irregular forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina are fighting and the Serbian Army is not, could the United States or its allies legitimately bomb government centers in Serbia?

277. As they did during congressional questioning of Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili on October 17-18, 1995. See, e.g., Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, "Bosnia Revives Legacy of Vietnam," *The Baltimore Sun*, October 19, 1995, p. 1, and John Diamond, "Clinton Challenged on Troops to Bosnia," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, October 19, 1995, p. 1.

278. Current estimates for a 9-12 month peace implementation deployment indicate costs to the United States of \$1-2 billion. See, e.g., Gilbert Lewthwaite, "Prospect of Bosnia Peace Raises Thorny Questions," *The Baltimore Sun*, October 6, 1995, p. 12. Total NATO costs are estimated to be \$6 billion. Pomfret, "Bosnia Cease-Fire Accord Takes Effect."

279. Data obtained from Operations, Programs and Budget, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

280. For example, the United States still participates in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT-support for the Kurdish population of northern Iraq, enforces "no-fly" zones over northern and southern Iraq, assists in enforcing the U.N. economic embargo of Iraq, maintains a considerable forward presence in the Arabian Gulf region, and has carried out large-scale deployments of ground forces to Kuwait to deter Iraqi hostile acts. Other, longer duration examples include the U.N. in Cyprus, the British in Northern Ireland, and the United States in the Sinai.

281. Cited in Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., *The Diplomat's Dictionary*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994, p. 357.

282. A *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p. 13.

283. Robert S. McNamara (with Brian Van De Mark), *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*, New York: Times Books, pp. 331-332. I am grateful to Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., for bringing this citation to my attention.