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Joint Warfighting Center**

Pre-doctrinal Research White Paper No. 07-01



***Provincial Reconstruction
Teams***

21 November 2007

“Development without security is unachievable, and security without development is meaningless.”

***- Afghanistan Millennium
Development Goals Report (2005)***

Preface


This United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) white paper, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams*, is part of a series of pre-doctrinal research white papers intended to promote doctrinal change based on sound concepts, emerging best practices, and joint operational experience. These papers do not represent approved joint doctrine, but rather report on the analysis of a specific topic, informing the doctrine development process. The primary purpose of this white paper is to raise awareness and promote discussion in regard to provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), promote the combatant command understanding of PRTs, identify implications associated with fielding PRTs, and facilitate integrating the PRT concept into joint doctrine.

Following major combat operations during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the importance of stability and reconstruction efforts throughout all phases of a joint operation have become more and more apparent. Both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the multinational coalition in **Iraq** have met this need through PRTs, bringing together military combat power and civilian stability and reconstruction capabilities into a single unit that can operate in difficult security environments to help nations move from conflict to peace by building and enhancing the government's legitimacy and effectiveness.

PRTs build on capabilities previously established, but represent a new step in the evolution of interagency coordination. In a way not seen since Vietnam, military and civilian government officials are working side-by-side in the field to ensure unity of effort in meeting our national objectives. Although each implementation of PRTs has varied from the next, largely dependent upon the operational environment in the local area, some underlying organization and implementation principles have begun to emerge.

Point of Contact

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Introduction

"Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."

- George C. Marshall (1947)
Address embodying the European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan)

Purpose

This paper examines the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) construct, reviews existing doctrine for treatment of PRTs, and describes implications for future doctrine based on this analysis.

Background

In modern warfare, what happens after the battle is won has become as important as what happens during the fight. As adversaries turn to “the people in arms” as a valid defense in the face of numerical and technological superiority, the protagonist must turn to equally “irregular” means to prevent the people from joining in insurrection, insurgency, lawlessness, and other means of preventing the conclusion of a peace that favors the “battlefield” victors. Victory, thus, may not be achievable by the force of arms alone, but also by careful tending of the populace through reconstruction of infrastructure, commerce, education, and public utilities. In support of that, military operations continue beyond sustained combat (or even in the absence of major combat operations).

Countries in conflict are particularly susceptible to continued conflict. This is caused by many factors, but among them are the effects conflict inflicts upon an economy, effects that may linger for years following conflict resolution.¹ The risk of further conflict may be tempered by, among other things, economic development, demobilization, political reform, and coping with health care crises.² These areas for improvement fall under the greater umbrella known as “development.” Although many aspects of development are best left to civilian agencies, military participation may be required to assist in creating a stable environment that is prepared for development.³

¹ Collier, Paul, V. L. Elliott, Harvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, (Washington, DC: World Bank and University of Oxford Press), 2003, p 104-105.

² *Ibid.*, pp 150-171.

³ Department of State, Department of Defense, and US Agency for International Development, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment*, 2006, p 11.

During recent operations, US forces have responded to this new reality and have developed new ways to organize, train, and equip the joint force to assist in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. The military's support to SSTR takes the form of *stability operations*, which are various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.⁴

Some aspects of the effort to prevent post-conflict hostilities are achievable by military forces, but a combination of civil-military action will be required to ensure the national strategic objectives are achieved. When planning for SSTR, the chief of mission (COM) and the joint force commander (JFC) have an array of options; among the newest of these is the PRT.

PRTs, as established in Afghanistan at the end of 2002, were integrated civilian-military organizations designed to meet three objectives: improve security, extend the reach of the Afghan government, and facilitate reconstruction in priority provinces. In keeping with the overall policy environment at the time, the central focus was on maintaining a light international security "footprint" and on building the capacity of Afghan institutions to address instability in remote, ungoverned regions.⁵

PRTs were subsequently established in Iraq in October 2005 with the mission to assist Iraq's provincial governments in developing a transparent and sustained capacity to govern, to promote increased security and rule of law, to promote political and economic development, and to provide the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the people.⁶

As of 2007, there are 25 PRTs operating in Afghanistan under the direction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (approximately half are US-led)⁷, and there are 25 PRTs operating in Iraq under the direction of the US Embassy and the Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I).⁸ ISAF has produced a PRT handbook for Afghanistan, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has produced a PRT handbook for Iraq. Additionally, in September 2007, CALL produced a PRT handbook applicable to future operations that combined lessons learned from both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Methodology

Research for this analysis included a review of existing joint doctrine and of related Department of Defense (DOD) directives; lessons learned files from the Joint Center for

⁴ Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*.

⁵ *Interagency Assessment*, p. 8.

⁶ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (07-11)*, January 2007, p. 6.

⁷ NATO International Security and Assistance Force Official Homepage. 2007. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 9 October 2007 <http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/recon_dev/prts.html>.

⁸ Fact Sheet on Provincial Reconstruction Teams. 2007. Embassy of the United States – Baghdad, Iraq. 9 October 2007 <http://iraq.usembassy.gov/iraq/20060223_prt_fact_sheet.html>

Operational Analysis; and extant and emerging joint, multinational, multi-Service, and Service doctrine and procedures. Additional research involved informal discussions with former PRT members and various DOD and Department of State (DOS) officials involved in PRT implementation.

Discussion

General

The PRT is a relatively new organization that builds on the foundations of the joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF) and joint interagency task force (JIATF), providing a unique interagency approach to SSTR operations.

A PRT is an interim civil-military operations (CMO) organization that is able to help stabilize the operational environment in an unstable or insecure province or locality through its combined diplomatic, military, informational, and economic capabilities.⁹ Generally, PRTs help create conditions for development in areas that are so unstable that traditional development organizations (intergovernmental and nongovernmental) are inhibited from full operation. It combines representatives from DOD, DOS, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other interagency partners into a cohesive unit capable of independently conducting operations to enhance the legitimacy and the effectiveness of a host nation (HN) government.

Organization

The focus of the PRT is on the provincial government and local infrastructure in the area assigned. Normally, PRTs are assigned by province, but may be assigned to local governments within a province or to more than one province. Both the effectiveness and legitimacy of provincial governments will vary widely from country to country and even from province to province within a country; as such, the focus of the PRT's effort will largely depend on the needs of the government in place. In an area where the government lacks legitimacy (possibly because it has not existed previously or is perceived as corrupt and ineffective), it may be necessary for the PRT to take on initial stabilization activities without the presence of the HN government until initial trust can be established and relationships built that will help enhance the legitimacy of the provincial government as progress continues. In another area where the government enjoys some measure of legitimacy, but is largely ineffective (and therefore in danger of losing legitimacy as well), the PRT will focus on helping HN government institutions develop the capacity to govern.

Ranging from as little as 30 to over 400 personnel, the organization and size of the PRT will vary largely depending on the operational environment and required tasks (see the figure below for an example of a PRT organization). In addition to size, PRTs differ in military roles,


⁹ ISAF Handbook, p. 13

contractor participation, interagency participation, staff organization, and even the chain of command. Military participation, which will be driven by the operational requirements among other considerations, is often the driving factor in PRT size.

The PRT leader (or commander) may come from any agency, but is normally either a military officer (O-5/O-6) or a senior foreign service officer. Personnel serving in a PRT continue to work for their parent agency and are subject to operating guidelines of their original chain of command for performance, discipline, etc., but are expected to follow the PRT leader’s directions, rules, policies, and procedures. The PRT leader, responsible for ensuring unity of effort from all agencies involved, monitors and evaluates the members’ individual performance. Although the agency providing the PRT leader may differ from one PRT to the next, generally a command group that integrates a military officer, a DOS civilian, or a USAID civilian will lead the PRT; consensus within this command group will be key to the integration of all the organization’s elements. In some cases, it may be difficult to achieve unity of command in a single leader; even so, the imperative to maintain unity of effort remains, and close collaboration between different agency leaders becomes even more important.

Functional groups within the PRT will also vary, but are generally similar to joint task force (JTF) directorates (administration, operations, service support, etc.). The operations group (or groups) may be organized by lines of operations (rule of law, economic development, etc.), by capabilities (engineer, USAID office, security, etc.), or by a combination thereof. When multinational partners are included in a PRT, they may function as a distinct organization within the PRT. The PRT organization may include the establishment of a civil-military operations

Example PRT Organization



ISAF – International Security Assistance Force
 DOS – Department of State
 USAID – United States Agency for International Development
 USDA – United States Department of Agriculture
 HN MOI – Host Nation Ministry of the Interior
 OPS – Operations
 FP – Force Protection
 CMOC – Civil Military Operations Center

Source: *PRTs in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment*

center (CMOC) to coordinate and share information with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) operating in the area.

Agencies participating in addition to DOD, DOS, and USAID may include, but are not limited to, Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Justice, Department of Health and Human Services, and Department of Commerce as well as HN national government agencies (such as the Interior Ministry). Interagency (and possibly international) memoranda of agreement will be required in the establishment of PRTs to define roles, responsibilities, command relationships, and funding lines. When possible, PRT members should receive their training as a unit prior to deployment to facilitate unity of effort upon arrival in country.

The composition and proportion of military participation within a PRT will vary depending on the operational requirements and the operational environment. In less stable areas where lethal operations continue to dominate the support of SSTR, PRTs will be largely civilian organizations collocated with a separate military unit conducting counterinsurgency operations, for example a brigade combat team (BCT). When operations are more balanced between lethal and nonlethal operations, PRTs will operate independently and will have a relatively large military participation, often including a military PRT leader.

Military participation in a PRT should normally include, as a minimum, civil affairs (CA) representation and other forces for CMO. Additionally, the military may provide for a security element that conducts compound security and other force protection operations (such as escorts), as well as providing a quick reaction force for the PRT leader. The PRT may also include a mobile patrolling/observing capability provided by the military. Sustainment and staff personnel (e.g., communications, food service, administration, etc.) may also be a military responsibility. The PRT may contract for many of these functions, including security, rather than drawing on direct military support; this will be most prevalent as the security environment becomes more stable. Alternatively, when the security environment dictates the location of the PRT on a forward operating base, the local military commander may provide some of these support capabilities.

Command and Control


Due to the interagency nature of PRTs, the operational control of a PRT may be a source of contention. PRTs with heavy military participation and a military commander tend to be considered DOD organizations, subject to the command of the JFC. PRTs in which military participation is limited to a CA cell tend to be considered DOS organizations, subject to the direction of the COM. This may cause confusion in operational direction, funding, staffing, coordination with local combat forces, and other planning considerations.

Ideally, direction and coordination of PRTs is conducted by a national level interagency steering committee, under the supervision of the COM and JFC (for US-led PRTs) or a multinational executive committee (for coalition-led PRTs). This body will also conduct liaison with the HN national government to support PRT operations. The steering committee is staffed by both embassy and JTF personnel. Regional authorities may also be established with regional commanders overseeing a number of PRTs to ensure coordination between provinces and with national level objectives.

Lines of funding are perhaps the most difficult issue for PRT management. Funding will come from several different sources, even within a single executive department. PRT leaders must carefully track and understand sources of funding lines and legal restrictions on their use. These funding lines may, in and of themselves, establish command relationships between the PRT and United States Government (USG) agencies. The success of interagency coordination at the highest levels will be reflected in the ability of the PRT to coordinate interagency funding lines in the field.

Employment

Joint operations—particularly large-scale major operations and campaigns—are complex. Phasing helps the JFC and staff visualize the entire operation or campaign and define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. Although the JFC determines the number and actual phases, those in the figure below provide a flexible model for arranging operations.¹⁰ As the figure illustrates, major operations and campaigns typically feature a balance of offensive, defensive, and stability operations in all phases.



The planning, organization, and training of a PRT should occur during predeployment planning and the early execution phases of an operation. Participation in planning by the core PRT staff should begin as early in this process as possible to build coordinating relationships.

¹⁰ JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, p. V-2, 17 September 2006.

Although the JFC employs PRTs primarily for the purpose of stability operations (which can occur in each phase), PRTs typically focus their efforts on achieving desired effects in the *stabilize* phase of a joint operation, facilitating the transition to *enable civil authority* phase. It should be noted that the stabilize phase may come at different times for different provinces or operational areas based on the design of the operation.

The PRT should enter the operational area not later than when the joint force begins the transition from *dominate* to *stabilize*. As civil authority is established and the environment is stabilized, the requirement for lethal military capabilities will gradually be replaced by an increased requirement for nonlethal capabilities. As this happens, military participation in the PRT will decrease, and eventually the PRT will dissolve; the other components of the PRT will transition to more traditional means of pursuing SSTR.

Fundamental Guidelines

Although each PRT is as unique as its operational area, certain guidelines—based on the principles of joint operations—apply across all PRT operations.¹¹ Planners must apply the overall strategy of the COM and JFC along with these principles when planning and executing PRT operations.

Objective. The mission of a PRT is to stabilize the operational environment, creating conditions for development, laying the foundations for long-term stability, and enabling the civil authorities. All efforts of the PRT must support this mission. PRT planners for a particular area must define decisive and achievable goals for that province that meet the objective of stability, giving direction to all PRT operations. These goals will define the lifespan of the PRT, facilitating its transition to more traditional development mechanisms.

Unity of Effort. The success of the PRT depends on its ability to operate as a composite unit. When unity of command is not possible, members nonetheless must lay aside interagency differences to focus on the common objective. Additionally, members of the PRT must ensure higher agency organizations understand and support the unified effort required. Beyond interagency integration, the PRT must also work with IGOs and NGOs in the area to share information, reduce duplication of work (or counterproductive efforts), and communicate about civil-military sensitivities.

"Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is."

- T.E. Lawrence

Promotion of Legitimacy and Effectiveness. The key to achieving long-term stability and development is the establishment of the local government as the legitimate and effective governing authority. To achieve this, the PRT will often need to "lead from behind and underneath,"

¹¹ These are a summarization of the principles of PRTs established in ISAF's *PRT Handbook*, as related to the principles of joint operations from JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.

building capacity and working behind the scenes to ensure HN ownership and promoting HN primacy and legitimacy. This will often mean accepting local government solutions rather than imposing expertise. Legitimacy may be partly achieved by facilitating the visibility of HN presence in the province by assisting official visits to remote districts and villages (e.g., transportation, communications, etc). Another key element will be the engagement of HN officials, the local communities, and the population through established and traditional bodies.

Restraint. Although the stabilization efforts of a PRT may be the main effort of the joint operation, PRT planners must be careful to restrain operations to maintain the primacy of HN legitimacy and effectiveness. Strategic communication efforts must be aimed at managing expectations – promising only what can be delivered. Planning for all programs and projects must include long-term sustainability. Additionally, efforts at the local level must be coordinated with national level processes to ensure the legitimacy and effectiveness of the entire HN government.

Implementation

JFCs must recognize that PRT implementation may vary greatly based on specific circumstances in the operational environment. For example, during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), coalition forces established PRTs throughout Iraq and Afghanistan. Although PRTs currently are used to support SSTR in both operations, the organization, oversight, and PRT operations differ in several significant ways.

ENDURING FREEDOM. Initial guidance on the structure and functions of US-led PRTs in Afghanistan was agreed to by senior civilian and military leadership in Afghanistan and approved by the National Security Council Deputies Committee in June 2003. All US PRTs in Afghanistan are commanded by a military officer. Civilians make up only a small part of PRT membership: generally a DOS representative, a USAID representative, and a representative from USDA. There is also usually an Afghan representative from the Ministry of Interior. On the military side, there is a PRT commander, two CA teams (with four members each), operational and administrative staff, and force protection elements. The PRTs generally maintain their own operating bases with their own force protection and support services (which can contribute to large military contingents). Although each PRT has its own focus based on the individual province and is organized differently depending on the operational environment, the Afghan PRTs largely focus on helping local governments rebuild infrastructure to meet basic needs. PRTs in Afghanistan report to the Regional Commands of NATO's ISAF under the direction of the PRT Executive Steering Committee made up of the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, ISAF commander, a UN [United Nations] representative, the NATO Senior Civilian Representative, an EU [European Union] representative, and ambassadors from all troop providing nations.¹²

IRAQI FREEDOM. PRTs in Iraq were established in 2005 by a joint cable from the US embassy and Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I) and have been a significant part of the 2007 “surge.” Led by a senior foreign service officer, PRTs in Iraq are generally comprised of 50-85

¹² *PRTs in Iraq*, p 23-24, and *Interagency Assessment*, p 24.

personnel, of which less than half are military. Iraqi PRTs have a standardized organization based on lines of operations. While most PRTs in Iraq are independent, even while located on either an established MNF-I forward operating base or at a regional embassy office, some PRTs are embedded into BCTs, working directly with the brigade commander to achieve common goals. Unlike those in Afghanistan, the focus of PRTs in Iraq tends to be on building capacity (i.e., coaching, mentoring, and training local government officials) rather than infrastructure. PRTs in Iraq report to the National Coordination Team, operated by the US embassy and MNF-I and under the direction of a joint executive steering committee, comprised of senior officials from the embassy, MNF-I, and the government of Iraq.¹³

Implications

Existing Doctrine

Currently, neither joint nor Service doctrine uses the term “provincial reconstruction team,” nor is it defined in JP 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary*. JPs with significant discussion relating to PRTs include JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* and JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*.

JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, discusses the role of the JTF during stabilization. Although it does not mention PRTs, it does emphasize civil-military coordination in integrated teams with DOS and other agencies. JP 3-0 recommends the JFC be prepared to lead reconstruction efforts until other government agencies (OGAs), IGOs, and NGOs are capable of assuming responsibility. Typical roles for the military include security, rebuilding infrastructure, restoring essential services, training, and public affairs.

JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, discusses military civic action (MCA), which involves predominantly HN military forces, as well as humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), which has Title 10 restrictions. Although it provides guidance on CMOCs and JCMOTFs, which provided the foundation of the PRT efforts, neither has a structure or function similar to the PRT. Additionally, JP 3-57 discusses interagency functional groups and subgroups; these are essentially working groups of NGOs and IGOs that are focusing on particular sectors of a large-scale humanitarian effort rather than small multi-sector groups operating in one geographic area. Notably, JP 3-57 is currently in revision and will likely include discussion of PRTs.

There are currently three PRT handbooks, which delineate tactics, techniques, and procedures for PRTs. The *ISAF PRT Handbook* is specific to PRTs in OEF, while CALL’s *PRT’s in Iraq* is specific to PRTs in OIF. Additionally, CALL has produced the *PRT Playbook*, which combines lessons learned and best practices from both OEF and OIF into a single publication usable by PRTs in future operations; the *PRT Playbook* draws heavily on the other two handbooks. These handbooks appear to be an excellent source for the PRT leader, providing fundamentals and guidelines, key governing documents, and specific implementation examples.

¹³ *Ibid.*

They each cover organization, suggested lines of operations, assessment techniques, and other operational considerations. They in general focus on the PRT level of operation, and little is discussed in regard to decisions by the JFC regarding incorporating PRTs into campaign planning.

Related Concepts and Capabilities

Although PRTs are unique in their capabilities, they are not the only organization available to support interagency operations or CMO. The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG), JCMOTF, and JIATF are some of the building blocks from which to draw lessons in the establishment of PRTs.

The JIACG is an interagency staff element that assists the combatant commander (CCDR) in interagency coordination. Composed of USG civilian and military experts, members participate in contingency, crisis, and transition planning, and provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize JTF operations with the efforts of civilian USG agencies and departments. The JIACG does not conduct operations, but rather serves organizational and advisory functions on a CCDR staff.¹⁴

The JCMOTF is a joint task force composed of CMO units from more than one Service. It provides support to the JFC in humanitarian or nation assistance operations or CMO concurrent with or subsequent to other joint operations. It can organize military interaction among many governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian agencies within the theater. A JCMOTF normally is a joint force organization, similar in organization to a JTF or joint special operations task force and is flexible in size and composition, depending on mission circumstances. It normally is subordinate to a JTF.¹⁵

Although not fully developed in joint doctrine, the JIATF is an interagency organization under a single military director that coordinates counterdrug operations at the operational and tactical level. The missions of the JIATF range from coordination of DOD detection and monitoring programs to counterdrug support to country teams around the globe.¹⁶

PRTs have many similarities to a JCMOTF or a JIATF, and some may consider the PRT to be a “special case” of either. Despite (or perhaps because of) these similarities, PRTs represent the next evolutionary step in interagency operations. The PRT may have the command structure and directorates of a JTF, but the full integration of OGAs is far more significant than in a JCMOTF or JIATF. The level of interagency coordination (both prior to implementation and during operations), unique command and control requirements, and wide-ranging organization constructs involved in PRTs make them a truly unique structure in joint operations.

¹⁴ See JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*, and Joint Warfighting Center’s *Commander’s Handbook for Joint Interagency Coordination Group*.

¹⁵ See JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*.

¹⁶ See JP 3-07.4, *Counterdrug Operations*.

The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is a DOS organization with the mission to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize USG civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy. In addition to leading and coordinating interagency SSTR efforts, S/CRS intends to create an expeditionary capability to rapidly deploy civilians with requisite skills sets to conduct SSTR operations.¹⁷

Under the direction of National Security Presidential Directive-44, S/CRS is leading the effort to develop the Interagency Management System (IMS) to direct whole-of-government efforts in stabilization and reconstruction. Although not fully developed or implemented, the IMS includes constructs similar to JIACGs and PRTs. The field advanced civilian teams (FACTs) are envisioned as an interagency activity that will implement reconstruction and stabilization programs at the provincial level that may integrate with military forces as required.¹⁸ As guidance and a concept of operations are still being established, it is unclear how FACTs will relate to PRTs. It is possible FACTs will replace PRTs as a construct in the future, or it is possible that PRTs may be established combining a FACT and elements of a JTF into a single PRT. As with most aspects of PRTs, much will depend on the operating environment and requirements at the time of implementation.

Implications for Doctrine

CALL's *PRT Playbook* fulfills the need for a PRT-focused handbook for PRT leaders and a primer for JFCs. A void remains, however, in joint doctrine concerning PRTs. Current doctrine publications neither describe PRTs nor communicate tactics, techniques, and procedures in the employment of PRTs during joint operations. Even as JP 3-57 is revised, it appears unlikely that the new doctrine will include operational criteria for establishing PRTs, command and control mechanisms, or other operational design considerations.

Initial development of doctrine for PRTs should include the establishment of a definition and a description of the purpose, functions, organization, and command and control structure of current PRTs. Further doctrine development should incorporate lessons learned to develop guidelines, assessment techniques, and operational planning considerations. Much of this is already available via the existing PRT handbooks and may be ready for immediate incorporation into JP revisions. Additional doctrine that covers incorporation of PRTs into campaign design may require additional research and experimentation prior to mature development.

As doctrine on PRTs is developed, JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, and JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*, should be revised to include this guidance. As doctrine matures,

¹⁷ Building Civilian Conflict Response Capabilities. May, 2005. US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman. 9 October 2007 <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/46721.htm>>.

¹⁸ United States. National Security Council. "Interagency Management System for Stability & Reconstruction." March 9, 2007.

updates to JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, JP 3-07.1, *Foreign Internal Defense*, JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*, and JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations* should also be considered.

Implications for Organization and Training

There are currently no standing interagency organizations capable of conducting the PRT mission. Certainly, individual elements of various agencies do train and equip to conduct or support SSTR operations as well as to conduct CMO, but when an interagency effort to conduct SSTR in the field is required, an ad hoc organization must be formed. Ad hoc organizations may be too late to conduct considered and common training, planning, and execution through all phases of a joint operation, as is required by emerging lessons learned. Although it may be too early to establish standing interagency organizations for SSTR that include combat arms, an alternative would be the development of interagency exercises that combine S/CRS personnel (including civilian reserves) with combat units in PRT roles. Such exercises will not only train individuals in PRT operations, but may also be a useful tool in validating new concepts and gleaning lessons learned for future use.

Training and education must expand beyond PRT members to operational leaders. CCDRs, JFCs, senior military officers, and senior foreign service officers must understand the roles and missions of the PRT as well as criteria for and methods of employment in joint operations. This may be partially accomplished by the incorporation of PRTs into doctrine, but it also requires the injection of PRTs into joint and interagency operational exercises. PRTs must be more than just sources of “injects” in exercises; rather operational commanders should be trained to determine when PRTs may be required, how to establish PRTs, and how to conduct the interagency coordination required at the operational level for command and control when PRTs are a part of the joint operation. Again, such exercises will not only train individuals in PRT operations, but may also be a useful tool in validating new concepts and gleaning lessons learned.

Conclusion

PRTs are a relatively new type of civil-military organization, having existed only since 2003 in practice. Many of the issues that face employment of PRTs today are similar to those that faced employment of joint forces in the past: unclear chains of command, interagency cultural clashes, and divergent (or nonexistent) funding. Changes to doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities are required not only in DOD but also in DOS, other interagency partners, and perhaps the entire Executive process to streamline the employment of PRTs and to continue to the next step in interagency coordination.

Nevertheless, it is clear that PRTs are a step toward sustained interagency operations. Their continued use in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM indicate that PRTs will be a tool for conducting CMO in future operations. Lessons learned and best practices from current operations utilizing PRTs must be studied and incorporated into joint doctrine to guide the employment of joint forces in these future operations.

Sources

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