US Government
Draft Planning Framework for
Reconstruction, Stabilization,
as well as Conflict Transformation
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PREFACE

This pamphlet presents a US Government (USG) draft interagency planning process for reconstruction/stabilization (R/S) and conflict transformation operations. It is the second of what will be a three-part package of DOS R/S and conflict transformation documents, and provides a point of departure for further concept development, experimentation, interagency training, and doctrinal analysis. The first part of the three-part package is an Essential Task Matrix, which gathers lessons learned from international experience about the range of requirements that may exist during an R/S operation. This pamphlet describes an interagency R/S planning process and includes a brief overview of the capabilities the military may contribute to R/S. A third document will discuss metrics, so that USG performance in R/S operations is rigorously assessed to provide feedback on current efforts and lessons for future engagements.

The success of the USG in R/S will depend heavily upon the ability to plan early and to develop an integrated, interagency approach to deal with the interdependent civilian and military responsibilities on the ground. To address this challenge, the President of the United States has designated that the Secretary of State coordinate and lead integrated USG efforts, involving all US Departments and Agencies (with relevant capabilities) to prepare, plan, conduct, and assess R/S activities in coordination with international, other governmental, and nongovernmental partners and organizations. The DOS will coordinate these tasks with other civilian agencies and the Department of Defense to ensure unified action is sustained in all future operations.

The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and US Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) recognize that the ability to plan and respond to highly fluid environments relies upon flexible structures and creative individuals. This pamphlet attempts to address one side of that equation: establishing a process which encourages better interagency coordination and lays a foundation for civil-military planning. While such a process is not a panacea for coordination, it is our intent that, in tandem with the development of a skilled cadre of civilian and military planners, the interagency planning process outlined here may advance efforts to respond more effectively to the challenges of reconstruction, stabilization, and conflict transformation.
The R/S planning framework must be useful to a wide audience. The feedback of all readers is key to developing a sound planning process. Both S/CRS and the JWFC welcome your comments on this important topic. In particular, we appreciate feedback on how the process described in this pamphlet might better help to integrate current planning efforts and USG responses. Your views will help refine this important interagency planning process. The points of contact for the Planning Pamphlet are Kara McDonald, S/CRS, 202-663-0308 and Robert S. Brodel, JWFC/DEG, 757-203-6186. Comments may be sent to: CRSPlanning@state.gov or robert.brodel@jfcom.mil. Also, please advise if S/CRS may send a team to meet you and discuss the pamphlet in more detail. If there is another way we may work to answer your questions, understand your views, and obtain your feedback, please do not hesitate to contact us.

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SECTION I: PURPOSE, BACKGROUND, AND DEFINITIONS

PURPOSE

The purpose of this pamphlet is to present and refine an interagency planning process for reconstruction, stabilization, and conflict transformation operations that will serve as the future framework for integrated civilian and military planning. This planning framework, developed by the S/CRS, enables USG civilian agency planners to identify and gain policy-level approval for overarching policy goals, corresponding major mission elements, and the essential tasks of an operation. The process develops a resource strategy to achieve policy goals, identifies lead agencies responsible for essential tasks, and incorporates a structure for metrics and evaluation.

This pamphlet is not intended to discuss specific policy or country plans, and any country-specific information contained herein is only illustrative to explain planning processes.

The pamphlet is organized into five sections:

Section 1: Purpose, Background, and Definitions. Provides a discussion of the reasons for an interagency planning process for these operations, objectives of the process, and lessons on which the process is based.

Section 2: The Planning Process. Provides an overview of the three-part planning process: policy formulation, strategy development, and implementation. This section discusses the agents and stakeholders in that process, and the audiences for the planning framework and corresponding planning products.

Section 3: The Toolbox. Provides an overview of the tools that the USG has at its disposal in conflict transformation operations.
Section 4: Metrics and Evaluating Progress. Explains how metrics, by providing a baseline and mechanism for evaluating progress toward policy goals, are inextricably tied to the planning process.

Section 5: Next Steps in Testing and Refining the Planning Framework. Explores next steps in designing and testing the civilian conflict transformation planning framework.

BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS

S/CRS was established to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize USG civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy.

To fulfill this mission, a standardized interagency approach to planning for conflict transformation operations is needed. S/CRS and other organizations within the USG must have tools to develop clear policy options concerning states and regions of greatest risk and interest, to facilitate USG decision-making on these options, and to lead USG planning focused on these priorities.

The planning process is designed to:

- **Assess the operational environment** to determine drivers of conflict or instability, define assumptions and interests, and focus all efforts on transforming these dynamics.
- **Determine clear and measurable goals** of intervention based on US national interests and drivers of instability.
- **Harmonize policy goals with available resources**, and focus policymakers on resource implications that may limit goal achievement.
- **Identify essential tasks and assign agency responsibility** for tasks.
- **Orchestrate the application and integration of all USG “tools”** to accomplish policy goals.
- **Integrate US national efforts** with those of other international partners and organizations.
- **Create a meaningful evaluation** system to measure progress in achieving goals and mission elements.
- **Incorporate lessons learned** from international experience.

The planning process described in this pamphlet can be applied to a number of mission scenarios, most frequently stabilization, reconstruction, and conflict transformation
leading to a sustainable peace. While the pamphlet relies on the following definitions of terms, the planning process can be equally useful for more discrete missions or for operations to address other sources of instability, such as extremism or state fragility.

**Stabilization:** The process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a break-down in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful longer-term development.

**Reconstruction:** The process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for longer-term development.

**Conflict Transformation:** The process of diminishing the motivations and means for destructive forms of conflict while developing local institutions so they can take the lead role in national governance, economic development, and enforcing the rule of law. Success in this process permits an evolution from internationally imposed stability to a peace that is sustainable by local actors, with the international community providing continued support at a greatly reduced cost.

**Locally Led Nascent Peace:** The stage in a conflict transformation process at which the motivations and means for destructive forms of conflict are sufficiently diminished and local institutional capacity is sufficiently developed to allow international actors to pass the lead to local actors, usually with continued international assistance, without the country falling back into conflict.

**PRINCIPLES OF PLANNING**

The planning framework sets forth elements needed to conduct successful civilian planning for conflict transformation operations. Several principles characterize the process:

**Unity of Effort:** The framework facilitates unity of effort and coordination through planning tools and processes, from integrated assessments to development and implementation of plans, including integration of US efforts with international and nongovernmental responses.

**Simplicity:** The framework fosters user-friendly presentation of planning information and decision-making points in a clear, concise manner that avoids overburdening a small number of civilian planning staffs. It seeks to work from existing assessment structures and knowledge bases, and helps planners quickly cut through large amounts of information to focus on priorities.
PLANNING FOR STABILIZATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

**Flexibility**: No plan survives contact with reality, nor can any planning regime be expected to address all unanticipated exigencies. Adaptability and “practicing planning” are ultimately more important to mission success than developing the “perfect plan.” The framework therefore promotes flexible structures and processes that allow for decentralized decision-making in the field. The structure can accommodate scenarios, ranging from sub-national operations to wider regional strategies.

**Consistency and Standardization of Products**: *Ad hoc* solutions deny planners the opportunity to maximize efficiency by utilizing universally endorsed processes and time-tested tools. The framework is designed to facilitate expeditious and accurate planning by standardizing the planning process and products.

**LESSONS LEARNED AS THE BASIS OF THE PLANNING PROCESS**

A key to improved results of operations is the USG’s ability to learn from past experience — applying best practices and lessons in planning to future operations. The structure and approach of the S/CRS planning process itself reflects the lessons of past experience, including those of PDD 56¹ and other political-military planning processes, to integrate the efforts of multiple agencies, sectoral activities, and USG efforts in advance planning. Work recently done on the concepts of Viable Peace and Conflict Transformation² is one source of lessons that shaped the expectations of policy goals, policy formulation, and interagency organization toward those goals. Understanding the drivers of instability, insurgency, or conflict, for example, is the first step in the proposed planning process described. Recent roundtables and think tank discussions have also influenced S/CRS thinking about the scope of policy goals, authorities, and the availability of resources which must be in alignment. Finally, these discussions underscored the need to organize for integrated approaches to persistent cross-sectoral issues, such as spoilers and organized crime.³

One of the best ways to bring lessons learned into practice is through planners who have absorbed past lessons. Recruiting and training a cadre of experienced planners is a key component of incorporating lessons learned into the planning process. Direct experience and familiarity with the plethora of resources on lessons learned in R/S operations that exist in the academic, think tank, and nongovernmental environment ensures that planners maximize efficiency by applying lessons to current planning efforts.

The Essential Task Matrix
The Essential Task Matrix (ETM) is another tool to capture lessons learned. The ETM presents many of the requirements to support countries in transition from armed conflict or civil strife. The ETM is a way to bring functional knowledge and systematic thinking into mission analysis and planning. The ETM ensures that:

- planners are reminded of tasks that may be necessary to achieve goals and objectives;
- tasks not undertaken by the USG are highlighted and responsibility for them in the international community is identified;
- sectoral specialists understand the diversity of tasks in other sectors and how those sectors may relate to their own.

The ETM is divided into five broad technical areas of which planners need to be aware:

- Security
- Justice and Reconciliation
- Economic Stability and Infrastructure
- Humanitarian and Social Well-being
- Governance and Participation

While the assignment of specific tasks, and prioritization among them will greatly depend upon the local environment, planners can use the ETM to identify relevant tasks, to sequence activities within an operation, and to develop priorities. The ETM is not itself a planning framework; but is a foundation for thinking systematically about R/S operations. Many tasks are cross-cutting and require planners to reference other sectors. In this respect, the ETM facilitates integration by allowing experts in specific sectoral fields to make and understand linkages with other sectoral activities. The ETM then is a lessons learned reference tool to assist in plan development, not to prescribe them. Planners should be cautioned that the inclusion of activities from the ETM does not necessarily mean that the capacity to achieve those activities exists within the USG interagency community. Where capacity does not exist, the ETM then facilitates an understanding of gap areas that require capability to be built or to be sought out in the international community.

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4 Robert C. Orr, Ed, Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Ed., CSIS, 2004. The Essential Task Matrix (ETM) is based on AUSA and CSIS’s “Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework” found in annex to above. The initial framework was revised and adopted through interagency working groups that brought to bear the most recent and extensive USG experience in stabilization and reconstruction. The ETM can be accessed from the S/CRS webpage (www.crs.state.gov) at this address: S/CRS - ESSENTIAL TASKS MATRIX-PREFACE.
Other Lessons-Applied Products
S/CRS is in the process of developing a range of lessons-applied products that can serve USG planners. First, a series of “Best Practices Thematic Guides” that summarizes lessons learned on a range of R/S and conflict transformation topics. These Guides are a complement to the ETM—going into greater depth on key tasks in R/S operations.

S/CRS will develop an interagency evaluation agenda. This agenda will allow agencies conducting evaluation related to R/S to contribute to the formation of a wider body of knowledge. In some cases, shared information on evaluation priorities will lead to joint evaluations among interagency partners.

In coordination with regional counterparts from the State Department and other agencies, S/CRS can convene roundtables and gaming exercises that include participants with technical expertise from other relevant country contexts to inform real-time planning. Roundtables and games allow planning processes to take advantage of expertise inside and outside of the USG and provide an efficient forum to capture lessons learned in the design of plans. Finally, planning teams will also have the opportunity to take advantage of real-time reviews that provide opportunity for future or mid-course changes in planning processes and operations.
SECTION II: THE PLANNING PROCESS

"A good plan now is better than a great plan later..."  Gen. Patton

The guidelines presented in this pamphlet walk USG policymakers, program managers, and military officials through an integrated process to plan for reconstruction, stabilization, and conflict transformation. The process includes problem or conflict assessment, the formulation of overarching policy goals, the development of strategies that include necessary and sufficient major mission elements and essential tasks required to achieve the goals, metrics to measure progress, clear assignment of lead agency responsibility for tasks, and the building of a comprehensive resource plan. Additionally, the process proposes the use of a planning framework to facilitate decisions on policy options and priorities, including the sequencing of US and international activities. The framework draws regional and topical experts together to conduct planning on specific operations. This provides the best possible marriage between regional expertise, technical backgrounds in conflict transformation operations, and strategic planning skills when designing a USG intervention and formulating policy in complex contingency operations.

PLANNING SCENARIOS

The planning process facilitates integrated USG planning. The success of the process depends on its capacity to adapt to the unique situation it is designed to address. The planning framework can be adapted to the entire range of reconstruction, stabilization, and/or conflict transformation scenarios, including but not limited to USG civilian interventions with little or no military support, civil-military operations, and USG contributions to United Nations (UN) or multilateral operations.

TRIGGERS FOR PLANNING

The Secretary of State is the focal point for coordinating and strengthening USG efforts to prepare for and conduct R/S assistance and is therefore the primary initiator of the R/S planning process. A State Department Regional Bureau Assistant Secretary may trigger the planning process by requesting S/CRS’s support for integrated civilian conflict transformation planning for a specific country or region. In such a case, planning occurs under the auspices of existing interagency bodies, such as a Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC).
Other agencies may direct a request for planning assistance to the State Department’s Coordinator for R/S, who will then obtain concurrence from the Secretary of State. In the event of crisis action planning, a geographic combatant command (GCC) would submit a request for planning assistance to the Secretary of Defense, who will then in turn forward the request to the Secretary of State. In this case, planning could occur under the auspices of the GCC, existing interagency bodies, or both.

Another trigger for country or region-specific planning is the creation of a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) — a new, interagency coordination body, similar to a PCC, and charged with preparing options for senior leadership, reporting to Deputies, and overseeing implementation of planning decisions. A CRSG, in which S/CRS would play a co-managing role and under the auspices of which planning might occur, originates with a request from the Secretary of State to the National Security Council (NSC).

Civilian planning can thus occur under the authority of NSC interagency bodies (a PCC or CRSG), a State Regional Bureau, or upon request from a military GCC through the Secretary of Defense.

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5 In December 2004, the Principals’ Committee (PC) approved the concept of a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) to serve as the main interagency coordination body for comprehensive USG engagement in a post-conflict or complex contingency. The NSC establishes a CRSG upon the recommendation of the Secretary of State. The CRSG oversees strategic planning and implementation of USG policy and programs for reconstruction and stabilization in the region of engagement, prepares options for senior leadership, and reports to the Deputies’ Committee.
The interagency planning process for R/S operations or conflict transformation begins with an assessment and policy formulation process at the strategic level. Once approved, policy goals then inform the development of strategic planning around central priorities, or Major Mission Elements (MME). These strategic plans in turn inform individual agency implementation planning at the task and activity level. The interagency planning process described in this experimental pamphlet focuses primarily on the first two levels of planning: situation assessment/policy formulation and MME strategy development. While some aspects of implementation planning are discussed, these plans are usually reserved to individual agency planning processes.

The steps below illustrate a sample interagency planning process using the planning framework. While it may be ideal to formulate policy before strategy development, and likewise to develop strategy before implementation planning, operational realities require that the process be simultaneous and iterative. Some cases may require that steps occur concurrently or in a different order than presented. Moreover, bureaucratic obstacles
such as time pressures, lack of information, managing turf, and lack of technological interoperability will also require the adjustment of products and processes outlined in this pamphlet. For this reason, the steps and products presented below are intended to be flexible.

Together, policy formulation, strategy development, and implementation planning form the backbone of the interagency planning process. S/CRS’ role in planning is an integrating and coordinating function, while individual agencies retain responsibility and management over implementation. Once a strategic plan has policy-level approval, S/CRS continues to play a central role in monitoring performance and adapting the plan based on experience and progress.
PLANNING FOR STABILIZATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

S/CRS ROLE: VALUE ADDED

**Policy Formulation**
- Conduct the Situation Assessment (a synthesis of existing USG information/plans and Nongovernmental Organization, Think Tank, and Academic insights and assessments)
- Forge Consensus Among PCC/CRSG-level Stakeholders on Goals
- Foster USG-wide Buy In
- Ensure that the Strategy is Conceptualized for Conflict Transformation/Reducing Instability
- Ensure Compatibility with Bilateral and Multilateral Partners
- Ensure Consistency and Appropriateness of Indicators

**Strategy Development**
- Ensure that All USG Players are in the Dialogue
- Facilitate Meetings to Move Planning Forward and Ensure Vertical Integration of Policy and Strategy USG-wide
- Provide Trained Planners to Ensure Strategic Thinking
- Track Performance and Adapt Plans as Needed

**Implementation Planning**
- Track Performance and Adapt Plans as Needed
- Provide Gap Analysis across program and funding areas
- Help Agencies Analyze Programs Through the Conflict Transformation Lens (reduce the power of spoilers, facilitate resources to those committed to peace)
POLICY FORMULATION

Identifying the Strategic Planning Team

Once the planning process has been triggered, a Strategic Planning Team must be identified to coordinate an initial assessment and the development of goals, priorities, and a broad resource strategy to obtain them. While the composition may vary depending on a number of factors, the success of a Strategic Planning Team depends upon the convergence of functional, regional, and planning expertise. Each operation has a different center of gravity within the USG. In many cases, the USG Strategic Planning Team will need to work with multinational, interagency partners, and local partners to form a multilateral Strategic Planning Team to align US national efforts and resources that support international and local priorities.

If the planning process flows from a civilian initiative, S/CRS planners and State Regional Bureau can identify a small Strategic Planning Team to include both planning experts in conflict transformation operations, and regional or country experts who have extensive understanding of the operational context. The planning process will constitute a full-time commitment for the members of the Strategic Planning Team, and contracted experts may augment the team to supplement planning capacity.
In the event of large-scale multilateral involvement, the USG Strategic Planning Team will coordinate USG strategic plans with international counterparts. As the planning framework becomes more compatible and integrated with international ones, Strategic Planning Teams will ideally accommodate international participation from close allies or coalition partners in coordinating multilateral plans.

If the military is involved in resolving the crisis, the Strategic Planning Team may send planners and sectoral experts from the USG civilian agencies as part of a civilian planning team to the GCC. This civilian team facilitates the integration of military and civilian planning. S/CRS would coordinate the provision of civilian planning expertise to inform combatant command decisions and allocation of resources and forces. S/CRS would likewise play a supporting role if invited to consult on a military contingency planning team.

Performing Situation Assessment

A key component of the strategic planning process is an integrated understanding of the underlying drivers of instability or conflict, the US interests at stake, key assumptions, possible contingencies, anticipated resource availability, and the dynamics of the regional and international context. One of the Strategic Planning Team’s first activities is to gather and synthesize information provided by major stakeholders, including the international, nongovernmental, and think tank communities. Recognizing that the last thing needed in an emergency is yet another lengthy assessment process, the first objective of the Strategic Planning Team should be to integrate existing international, USG, nongovernmental organization (NGO), and other agency assessments into a common USG understanding of the situation. To do this requires that the Strategic Planning Team read-in and consult internal USG and external sources of information, including host nationals when possible, to determine key policy questions that remain unanswered or on which there is disagreement.

In addition to synthesizing extant information, the Strategic Planning Team may need to conduct a full-scale assessment of the drivers of conflict or state fragility that a USG mission will have to address, if such an assessment has not already been completed. Such an assessment:

- Promotes a shared understanding of the causes and consequences of instability that are most important in a given context;
- Helps explore how existing USG programs and policies interact with these factors; and

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6 In December 2004, the Principals’ Committee (PC) approved the concept of a Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Team (HRST) to serve as a civilian planning and advising body at a Geographic Combatant Command, in the event of a military-led R/S operation.
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- Helps determine where coordinated USG efforts might more effectively support efforts to manage fragility and build peace.

An interagency conflict assessment can promote integrated and coordinated USG responses to the causes and consequences of fragility and conflict in reconstruction. It can help policymakers focus on conflict transformation goals and inform strategy development toward those goals. In cases where a US Embassy is present, the Strategic Planning Team will work closely with Embassy and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) mission counterparts on this assessment process. See following graphic.

During the assessment process, it is likely that the USG will not understand or have critical pieces of assessment information. The Strategic Planning Team may determine the need for trips to the field, specific intelligence/information, policy games and roundtables with NGOs and think tanks, targeted reporting by a Mission or Embassy if existent, direct outreach with host country nationals, or other to fill knowledge gaps that are critical to mission success. It is essential that these gaps in understanding be
acknowledged and that the Strategic Planning Team establish contacts with the intelligence, nongovernmental, and local communities to build the capacity necessary to fill these gaps. This assessment process then becomes the foundation on which rests a consensus-building effort to formulate policy options and plan development. See following graphic.

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**FILLING KNOWLEDGE GAPS**

Key Illustrative Examples....

1) **Capacity of Existing Programs in the Territory**
   - Inventory of all current USG programs in the territory
   - Inventory of all bilateral, multilateral, or UN activities

2) **Identification and Assessment of In-Country Actors**
   - Overview of intelligence services, sources, methods, and access
   - Directory of major political party and opposition players
   - Directory of key players in political economy
   - Directory of key military players

3) **Assessment of Political, Economic, and Legal Issues**
   - Assessment of current and past legal and constitutional frameworks, including:
     - USG legislative proscriptions
     - Bilateral/Multilateral Treaties
     - Comprehensive inventory of links between oligarchies, organized crime, the military, and foreign investors
   - Analysis of who owns what
   - Assessment of property rights issues

4) **Assessment of Technical and Infrastructural Issues**
   - Analysis of key industries and resources
   - Evaluation of infrastructural development and related potential impact on implementation of activities
   - Sectoral analyses as appropriate

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Developing the Planning Template

Once the Strategic Planning Team has synthesized USG assessments, it then identifies the Overarching Policy Goals, MMEs, and draft Essential Tasks (ETs) of the Planning Template—a one page diagram that enables planners and policymakers to visualize the interrelationship among these constituent elements.

Identifying Goals

The identification of goals sets the stage for the development of the entire planning framework. Given that a mismatch between goals and resources always spells mission failure, planners should strive to ensure goals and objectives are obtainable, measurable, and resources can be matched to the task.

Overarching Policy/Conflict Transformation Goal (Blue Box): The overall objective stated as an outcome, that the USG (as a whole) would like to achieve and is capable of achieving with the resources available and in a short-term (2-3 year) timeframe.

While planners should use long-term perspectives to inform this goal, the planning process requires a shorter-term goal, given that political and financial resources are
typically at their highest levels during this period. Planners must better focus the opportunity inherent in initial capital flows and prepare for a time when spigots run dry. Through planning, the USG can begin to address issues that arise from this sometimes intense and short-term focus of resources.

While in some cases policy goals may be limited and discrete, planners should generally consider “locally led nascent peace” as the loftiest conflict transformation goal likely to be achievable in the 2-3 year timeframe. A nascent peace becomes locally led when the means and motivations for conflict are sufficiently diminished and local institutional capacity is sufficiently developed to allow international actors to pass the lead to local actors without the country falling back into conflict. In most cases, international actors will need to continue to provide assistance, but the host country will take the lead in overseeing its political, economic, and security institutions. Otherwise stated, the country or region should be beyond major conflict and beyond major security, political, and economic reliance on foreign interveners so that future transformation of the country or region is largely and increasingly in the hands of benign, credible, and legitimate local authorities, with international assistance shifting to a supporting role. This requires the conflict transformation plan focus on reducing sources of instability and conflict while building local capacity to govern, promote economic development, and enforce the rule of law.

Planners need to state this goal in terms relevant to each specific country situation. Limiting the scope of the planning template helps focus a response strategy on a realizable set of goals. This helps mission leadership, domestic constituencies, and implementing staff come to a common understanding of the threshold for intervention success, and in turn, down-sizing or exit. The planning template should not be based on long-term developmental goals that may require decades of sustained assistance or support, but should nonetheless be informed by and consistent with that perspective.

**Major Mission Elements (MMEs) (Orange Box):** The elements of a plan that are necessary, and together sufficient, to achieve the Mission Conflict Transformation Goal.

Development of MMEs flows from a careful and comprehensive assessment of the drivers of conflict or instability, and the necessary components to achieve the goals. MMEs therefore must represent a narrowly-tailored set of objective statements upon which the achievement of the goals depends. Stating MMEs as objectives will help planners avoid stove-piped responses based on current capacities, and helps orchestrate cross-sectoral and interagency responses toward the goals.
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Policy Options
The process of drafting a planning template is an iterative process. Upon considering attendant contingencies and resource levels, planners may need to evaluate several policy options. Creation of several planning templates that present more than one set of policy goals, MMEs, and corresponding resource commitment levels can facilitate this process.

Presenting a Phased Response
The planning template is not defined by phase of a response but by an outcome to be achieved, such as conflict transformation. This allows the plan to be flexible and its strategies to apply to an operational environment that may have areas that are simultaneously in different phases of conflict or instability. Nonetheless, planners may find that multiple planning templates are helpful when distinct phases of a future intervention require reformulated policy goals. In such a case, planners could outline the goals and strategy of each stage on a separate template. In such a case, planners should also define the conditions under which the plan would move from one set of overarching policy goals to another.

Approval of Policy Goals
It is advisable to present policy goal and priority options to a Deputies’ or Principals’ Committee for approval before delving into strategy development; however, in many cases, strategy development must occur concurrently with policy formulation. A package including one or more of the following may be sent to a Deputies’ or Principals’ Committee for approval:

- **Planning Template:** A one-page diagram that captures all elements of the USG plan. Planners may prefer to submit more than one planning template to prompt a decision among a variety of policy options or scenarios. See Appendix B, “Sample Planning Template.”

- **A Planning Template Narrative:** A narrative that presents the context and reasoning behind the structure of the planning template. It may describe the goal and major mission elements, and explain how progress toward them will be measured. If this document is unclassified, it can be used to facilitate unity of effort with implementing, host country, and international partners. See Appendix D, “Sample Planning Framework Narrative.”

- **A Policy Guidance Memo:** A memo that outlines unresolved policy or resource issues for decision or guidance. The memo should address cross-sectoral dynamics, resource availability, sequencing of priorities, policy incoherence, interagency disconnects, gaps in capability, or longstanding legislative and policy issues. While all resource issues may not be fully identified at this stage in the planning process, it is crucial to put potential resource gaps squarely before
policymakers as early as possible, so they understand the hurdles in achieving desired policy objectives.

The submission of policy goals and the MMEs necessary to achieve those goals begins an iterative, interagency process to identify strategies — including resources, capabilities, and lead agencies for implementation — for MME and goal achievement. Once Deputies approve a planning template or provide specific guidance on it, the planning documents and guidance can be issued to executing agencies through S/CRS and the State Regional Bureau.
PLANNING FOR STABILIZATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

S/CRS-Led:
- **Policy Development**

S/CRS-Led:
- **Strategy Development**
  - MME Planning Team:
    - Develops MME Strategy (which must include indicators and a resource strategy)
    - Identifies Essential Tasks
    - Determines Lead Agency/Bureau for Each Task
    - Tracks Other Donor Contributions
  - Product for Policy Coordinating Committee/CRSG

Agency-Led:
- **Implementation Planning**

Major Mission Elements (MMEs)

OVERARCHING POLICY GOAL
The overall objective, stated as an outcome, that the US Government (as a whole) would like to achieve and is capable of achieving with the resources available and in a specified timeframe.

- More specific and nuanced statements of the overarching policy goal, as appropriate.

Forming MME Planning Teams and Developing MME Strategies
Once the Strategic Planning Team has identified the overall goals and MMEs, and the Deputies Committee has approved the Planning Template, the Strategic Planning Team identifies MME planning teams from key actors in the interagency community to develop a strategy for each MME. MME teams function as interagency sub-working groups (sub-PCC level) charged with developing the USG strategy to achieve each MME, and report to the civilian interagency body under which they are convened (PCC, CRSG, etc.). Generally, an MME planning team is formed for each MME, but in some cases it may be more efficient for a planning team to develop the strategy for multiple MMEs.

MME Team Composition
MME Planning Teams integrate regional expertise with sectoral and functional expertise in R/S and conflict transformation. In addition, they should include members skilled in using the various elements of national power that may be useful in the MME strategy. This composition ensures an integrated USG strategy toward the MME outcome. MME teams may be Washington- or field-based, and ultimately could be civilian-military, international, or coordinated with host country structures. It is advisable that a regional
or sectoral expert and a strategic planner co-chair MME planning teams. The participation of a strategic planner as a co-chair of each MME planning team ensures strong vertical integration between goals and tasks, as well as interagency integration of the expertise, tools, and resources within and external to the USG that can be brought to bear on MME strategic development. MME planning teams should be designed to facilitate the maximum gain from coordination among actors, and between regional and functional experts, while minimizing the inefficiencies that could arise from that inclusiveness.

In some cases, there will be an obvious agency or office to lead an MME and undertake the bulk of the strategy development for the MME. Even in such a case, however, planners should be careful to ensure that all equities and capacities, particularly those from agencies with which they are not familiar, are represented and can be brought to bear on the MME. In the case of cross-sectoral and cross-agency MMEs, planners should form a planning group that includes representatives of each agency relevant to the MME. This ensures that USG planners consider all available expertise and perspectives when planning for an MME.

In the event of crisis action planning at a GCC, a civilian Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Team (HRST)\(^7\) can help identify members from the civilian agencies that should participate in MME planning with military counterparts. Likewise, if the USG is contributing to a larger international response, MME teams may be formed around USG activity, with MME teams coordinating closely with international counterparts contributing similar capacities. In the event that MME activities are led by a non-USG body (e.g., the United Kingdom or the UN), a small planning working group could coordinate USG activity in that MME with internationally led responses.

**MME Strategy Development**

MME strategies should not necessarily be prescribed by sectoral topics (e.g., security, humanitarian, governance, etc.) but should be organic—that is, driven by facts on the ground—and cross-sectoral—drawing essential tasks from multiple sectors as necessary.

*Example:* If an MME is to “Disrupt Paramilitary/Criminal Spoilers,” the MME will likely include a variety of sectoral responses including economic incentive packages, legal reforms, a public affairs campaign, infrastructure investment, and improved civilian police performance.\(^8\)

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\(^7\) In December 2004, the Principals’ Committee (PC) approved the concept of a Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Team (HRST) to serve as a civilian planning and advising body at a Geographic Combatant Command, in the event of a military-led R/S operation.

\(^8\) Planners will need to use their judgment to determine when a cross-sectoral MME so extensively overlaps with other MMEs that fleshing them out in the planning framework would simply be duplicative. Conceivably all elements of a strategy for disrupting criminal spoilers might be included in separate MMEs.
Once MMEs are identified, planners use the ETM and functional expertise to develop a comprehensive list of the Essential Tasks and Sub-Tasks necessary and sufficient to achieve the MME outcome objective. Like the MME, Essential Tasks should be stated as outcomes with suitable indicators measuring achievement.

**Essential Task (ET) (Green Box):** A process or activity that is an essential component of an MME. When possible, ETs should be stated as outcomes.

**Sub-Task (Yellow Box):** A specific process or activity, stated as an outcome when possible, that is one part of an Essential Task.

MME Planning Team meetings should include a discussion of MME outcome statements, the Essential Tasks necessary and sufficient to achieve the MME, metrics to gauge progress toward achievement of the MME and ETs, identifying USG and international current funding and targets, potential flash points, spoiler strategies, linkages to other MMEs, and sequencing. MME Planning teams may be brought together as necessary to address cross-MME linkages and to reconnect MMEs for strategy development.

**Resources**

One of the critical aspects of MME Strategy development is integrating policy priorities established in the Planning Template with resources available (or potentially available). Discrepancies between the two are inevitable because priorities in a fluid environment often evolve on a shorter timescale than USG budget cycles. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and relevant agencies should be involved in developing a resource plan to correspond to policy goals and MME strategies. The flexibility of resources will vary depending on when planning commences in budget cycles, the scale of funding needs, the types and numbers of accounts implicated in planning, the options for reprogramming, and/or competing priorities for new money. Planners should consider the timing of OMB and individual agency budget cycles as these will greatly impact the ability to match resources to MME strategies. Using three years of the budget cycle—past year, current year, and the proposed year’s budgets—will provide a trend line of resource progress as plans or programs are implemented. Resource-related tasks of an MME Planning Team may include the following:

related to the rule of law and job creation. In such cases, one might include a performance measure that focuses attention on criminal spoilers, rather than repeating tasks already elaborated in other MMEs.
Agreeing on global requirements and USG funding targets for each ET, using external assessments (e.g., World Bank, United Nations development programme, etc.) and input from USG agencies.

Categorizing the USG funding target into several priority levels for each ET.

Matching available programmatic funding to prioritized funding targets on an Essential Task-by-Task basis to determine where there are gaps.

Examining creative options and/or flexibility in accounts to cover gaps that may be identified.

It is essential that the achievement of MMEs and ETs drive the identification of resources, rather than existing budget accounts and programs—outlined months or years prior—defining ETs or Sub-Tasks. Most agencies or offices will have an inherent bias toward aligning tasks with existing budgets or plans, rather than focusing attention on the most critical tasks for conflict transformation. When prioritizing funding needs, planners should consider whether additional funds are required to achieve the tasks, or whether current funds can be made more effective; funds for the task are available in other international organizations or donor governments; or whether the task is catalytic to the achievement of other ETs.

Once the MME Planning Teams have identified needs, priorities, and gaps, a resource spreadsheet with this information becomes the basis for coordinating with OMB and other agencies on required reprogramming or supplemental requests. It is expected that an iterative process will ensue as decision-makers increase resources, limit goals, adjust timelines, pursue international burden-sharing, and otherwise adjust plans. A primary role then of the MME Planning Team is to seek ways to make available funds more effective, agile, and focused on agreed policy goals, and to clarify for policymakers the tradeoffs between goals and limited resources as this iterative process moves forward.

Preparing an MME Strategy Package
MME planning teams are responsible for producing an MME strategy package for the PCC or CRSG. The package may consist of one or more of the following deliverables:

- **An MME Strategy Memo and PowerPoint Presentation** explains the USG strategy for achieving the MME, including a discussion of assumptions, how the MMEs support policy goals, linkages with other MMEs, a breakdown of the ETs that comprise the MME strategy, lead agency responsibilities for each ET, international efforts that support the MME, resources directed toward ETs, and metrics for the MMEs and ETs.

- **An MME Task Tracking Template** is a tool for program managers who track ETs in a matrix format. It identifies which agencies and international partners
are implementing the tasks, the required and available resources, indicators, and issues surrounding implementation. Its purpose is to provide a snapshot of the activities underway to achieve the MME.

- **An MME Planning Calendar or Gantt Chart** shows actions necessary to achieve tasks along parallel lines. The purpose is to highlight critical path actions and their sequencing, and timeframes for achieving these tasks, particularly where coordination among multiple actors is needed.

- **An MME Resource spreadsheet** identifying on a task-by-task basis, international, host country, and USG prioritized funding targets, and USG funds available to match those targets.

Once the MME strategy packages are completed, MME Planning Teams can meet as needed to review progress against the work plan and strategy, respond as warranted to changing situations, and/or to raise issues that need to be referred to higher level decision-making.
IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING

S/CRS-Led:
Policy Development

S/CRS-Led:
Strategic Development

Agency-Led:
Implementation Planning
Lead Agency/Bureau:
- Develops and Monitors Essential Task Indicators
- Develops Sub-Tasks
- Provides Budget Inputs for Resource Strategy
- Tracks Program Management

OVERARCHING POLICY GOAL
The overall objective, stated as an outcome, that the US Government (as a whole) would like to achieve and is capable of achieving with the resources available and in a specified timeframe.
Subgoal 1: A more specific and textured statement of the overarching policy goal.
Subgoal 2:
Subgoal 3:

IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING

The interagency planning process relies upon individual agency responsibility for and management of the implementation of policies and programs in each agency’s purview. The policy formulation and strategy development process should inform each agency’s planning for the implementation of tasks that fall within its responsibility. Likewise, implementation planning as it surfaces operational realities and technical detail will inform continued strategy development and policy formulation. S/CRS’ role in this level of planning is not a supervisory one, but a coordinating one in which gaps in implementation planning may be raised and identified throughout strategy development and evaluation, so that individual agency responsibilities can be assigned to missing tasks or gap areas. Program management remains the purview of individual agencies. However, S/CRS maintains responsibility for monitoring performance to achieve MMEs. If performance against MME targets lags, S/CRS will work with the MME co-chairs to convene relevant agencies and assess where implementation performance is problematic.
Agency Strategies and Workplans
Most agencies or offices involved in program implementation have established procedures for laying out program strategies or resource requirements. As long as those documents are consistent with the budget and performance data in the interagency R/S plan, agencies do not need to create new and duplicative documents. Agencies must, however, be able to report on budget and performance targets that support the planning template. In some cases, implementing agencies may find it helpful to apply the planning framework to elaborate the plans and procedures that each agency will implement to achieve the tasks set forth in the essential tasks.
SECTION III: THE TOOLBOX

As planners identify the ETs that support MMEs, they must analyze how all aspects of current USG relations with a country affect identified goals, and they must focus all USG capabilities on those objectives. A key job of trained planners is to ensure that all necessary skill sets work in an integrated fashion to build a conflict transformation plan. To do so requires knowledge of the entire toolbox the USG has at its disposal and how these tools can be implemented to shape outcomes.

Application of all tools in the toolbox ensures that:

- Planners consider all possible USG capabilities to address and achieve identified objectives;
- Planning groups include necessary personnel from all relevant sectors and agencies;
- Planners approach problems in a multi-sectoral way and avoid stove-piped sectoral responses;
- Planners sequence prioritized tasks;
- USG activities in various sectors and agencies do not work at cross-purposes;
- On-going or existing policies and programs are reassessed and integrated into new objectives and desired outcomes; and
- Planners consider and incorporate multinational, interagency capabilities, activities, and comparative advantages in view of the application of the above tools.

Creative thinking about available tools increases the likelihood that the entire footprint of USG bilateral and regional relations is focused and harmonized with international partners on identified objectives and outcomes. Therefore, the toolbox must not become prescriptive but should be used to enhance innovation in planning. The tools described below should not be used to determine what the goals of a mission should be. Rather, planners must innovate new ways to use the tools below to contribute to desired objectives.

TOOLS IN THE TOOLBOX

Diplomacy
USG diplomatic activity is a central tool in most conflict transformation goals. US diplomats use a variety of bilateral and multilateral means to affect outcomes, including carrot/stick methods, coercion, and persuasion. US diplomatic initiatives may target governmental actors, opposition groups, nongovernmental entities, civil society, or any other local actors that influence or affect the political process. A core dimension of any
US diplomatic initiative is to build the international partnerships that maximize political leverage to effect change, sustain a process of transformation, and reinforce legitimacy.

**Communications Outreach**
Experience demonstrates the need to integrate long-underutilized communications outreach into all goal planning. This tool includes USG efforts to reach out to and communicate with a local public in a host nation. It includes the full range of public diplomacy efforts (exchange programs, placing opinion editorials, etc.), but also encompasses wider initiatives to sway public opinion or to get out information quickly on fast-changing environments.

**Intelligence**
Intelligence products inform the formulation of policy and the goals and programs that flow from the policy making process. Analysis of timely, actionable information can advance progress on policy goals and specific task objectives. Intelligence helps to determine the effectiveness of actions taken to date and to tailor planned future actions. When easily and widely accessible to those cleared to use it, intelligence is a useful tool for both policymakers in Washington and practitioners in the field.

**Military**
American military power has vital roles in peace, crisis, and conflict. In peace, the political imperative is to maintain visible, credible military capability and readiness for response across the range of military operations. Demonstrated military capability is the cornerstone of deterrence, which remains a principal means for dissuading would-be aggressors and adversaries from action harmful to the United States. When instability or political tensions may lead to conflict, US military authorities may focus on activities that bolster deterrence in conjunction with the other instruments of national power and prepare for rapid and effective transitions to conflict should deterrence fail. During conflict, the principal responsibility of the Armed Forces of the United States is to employ rapid and decisive military power to achieve US objectives, and do so in a manner that sustains the fruits of success in the post-conflict environment.

With respect to R/S operations, American military forces may be tasked to provide various types of support to DOS and interagency partners in an operational area, to include local security, logistics (transportation, supply, maintenance, civil engineering, health services, and other services), legal support, and communications support.

**Economic Relations**
Bilateral and multilateral economic relations are essential components of the USG’s diplomatic association with another country. Trade, sanction, and economic policies are all tools that forge outcomes. Commercial sector, foreign direct investment, and regulatory frameworks (i.e., public law) also influence economic relations. Relations and
policy toward International Financial Institutions are additional factors that merit consideration.

**Assistance Programs**

With substantial financial resources behind it, USG assistance programming can be one of the most powerful tools in the USG Toolbox. Assistance programs are numerous and involve the full range of civilian agencies (USAID, Department of Justice, United States Department of Agriculture, State, etc.) Assistance programs exist in almost every sector, and planners should be attentive to the various kinds of programmatic support that might be available to advance a particular major mission element. The USG utilizes assistance programs to reach a wide number of beneficiaries including the host government, non-governmental actors, the general public, and vulnerable groups. Assistance programs are an ideal tool for expanding the reach and influence of local partners who share our vision and goals.

In addition to official USG assistance programs, numerous assistance programs are implemented by nongovernmental and private sector organizations, which may operate under principles of impartiality and neutrality. The programs carried out by these organizations, while generally pursued as a matter of humanitarian concern rather than policy, may also be conducive to achieving the USG regional goals. The USG should seek opportunities to collaborate with these organizations to achieve unity of effort when appropriate.

**Law Enforcement**

The USG uses expertise found in its law enforcement agencies to shape and implement policy overseas. This tool can affect security sector reform, border control, cooperation on criminal matters, including organized crime, terrorism, and trafficking. Law enforcement operations include technical assistance as well as training programs.

**Consular Policy**

While consular regulations are determined by legislative statute, consular policy has enormous impact on the USG bilateral relations with a country. Planners should be acutely aware of consular policies toward a crisis country and possible changes to those policies that may occur during a crisis or transition. Visa policy in particular can be an effective tool for targeting obstructionists specifically, without the negative impact on the population that often comes from the broader diplomatic tool of sanctions.
SECTION IV: METRICS AND EVALUATING PROGRESS

A metrics system — using measures to understand the baseline problems and to track progress in conflict transformation operations – is a key part of R/S planning. Metrics are a means for mission leadership, planners, and implementers to build a successful intervention as they:

- express goals in terms that can be assessed;
- track progress and results to make decisions about resources and policies;
- reinforce coordination and integrated planning; and
- promote effective use of resources for the greatest impact.

A METRICS SYSTEM:

- is an active part of conflict transformation planning. Metrics need to be somebody’s responsibility but a part of everybody’s work.
- covers programmatic results as well as outputs that allow all the actors to use systematic information in making decisions.
- should be as streamlined and un-burdensome as possible balanced with the real need for a set of comprehensive metrics. One way to do this is to use quality data from existing sources whenever possible.
- is coordinated well with agencies own requirements for metrics and program reporting.
- include data reflecting local perception in key mission areas that informs planning. Perceptions should continue to be tracked during the intervention.
- use unclassified data when possible to ease joint planning with multilateral and international partners.
- reflect basic agreement on the choices of metrics by leadership, staff, and implementing and local partners.
- ensure the metrics developed serve their purpose versus being developed because the data is already collected.

Metrics will follow the planning template:

- metrics of progress in the achievement of the overarching policy/conflict transformation goal for the country;
- metrics to measure the MME outcomes;
- metrics for the accomplishment of essential tasks and sub-tasks.

Overarching Policy/Conflict Transformation Goal Metrics: Metrics for the overarching policy goal will be identified as part of the S/CRS effort to develop a system
of metrics for conflict transformation, stabilization, and reconstruction. This system of metrics will not be associated with any programmatic efforts but will capture the broad changes occurring in theater.

**MME Metrics:** The highest programmatic metrics will be those capturing the outcomes of the MMEs. S/CRS, in support of the CRSG or other interagency planning body, actively manages and monitors metrics at the MME level. There should be one or two metrics that are direct, objective measures of MME accomplishment.

Metrics are identified by the MME teams in the interagency MME planning team meetings and are an integral part of the MME strategy. The MME planning teams should draw on existing data from independent international sources when available, the Embassy’s Mission Performance Plans, USAID’s Performance Management Plans, and other data available from interagency partners. Every effort should be made to minimize the need for new data collection efforts. To the extent that new metrics are required, S/CRS is committed to supporting staff to support the embassy and the interagency in these processes.

**Essential Tasks and Sub-Tasks:** The development and management of ET metrics are the responsibility of individual agencies. However, MME planning teams should identify notional metrics as part of their discussions. This clarifies what the ET is and provides a reality check on what is achievable. Where several agencies share an ET, MME planning teams help coordinate the identification or development of metrics. This is so that each implementing agency will have sufficient data on what their colleagues, who are working on the same task, are achieving.

**Evaluation:** a study using research methods to understand why things happened as they did. Because of the challenges to getting good metrics data, rapid appraisal evaluations will be very valuable tools in measuring progress.

S/CRS will:
- Work with planning teams and agencies as metrics systems are developed.
- Identify existing sources for quality data and methods for planners and implementers to utilize.
- Develop a metrics approach to comparing country progress.
- Design a rapid appraisal approach.
- Synthesize and report on lessons from all operations.
SECTION V: NEXT STEPS IN TESTING AND REFINING THE PLANNING FRAMEWORK

This section describes other aspects of the R/S Planning Framework that require further testing or development.

MULTILATERAL/INTERNATIONAL PLANNING

The R/S planning framework creates an architecture that permits early collaboration of all stakeholders in a conflict transformation plan. The USG is usually only one of many governments involved in a conflict transformation response, and international donor and government coordination remains a challenge. Moreover, while MMEs in the planning framework are meant to be necessary and sufficient in achieving policy goals, they are often highly dependent on external factors and coordination of efforts and resources, many of which are produced and/or performed by the international community as well as those of the host state.

A number of other governments have developed counterpart offices to S/CRS (The United Kingdom’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, for example) and are in the process of developing planning capabilities similar to that described in this pamphlet. This provides an unprecedented opportunity for the USG to work with key partners to develop compatible planning systems that facilitate a multinational interagency unit of effort based on early collaboration in strategic design for conflict transformation planning.

LOCAL UNDERSTANDING/PRIORITIES IN THE USG PLANNING PROCESS

The planning process must ensure the best possible understanding of a situation before initiating an operation or intervention. To improve that understanding, the planning process should institutionalize consultation with non-USG experts and host-country nationals when appropriate and feasible. This may be achieved through expert roundtables, gaming, or consultations/meetings. These processes also allow USG planners to consider new thinking, competing analyses, and creative proposals that might not normally be heard by policymakers.

Beyond assessment, however, the achievement of USG policy goals in many of these operations depends largely on the intersection of USG and international interests with those of moderate, democratic voices in a host region. Success of USG planning toward those goals then may be directly dependent upon the ability to associate international planning processes with a local priority-setting process. While this can be problematic given asymmetries of resources and the highly political decisions of who participates in international planning and resource allocation decisions, USG interagency planning
processes for conflict transformation or R/S operations should incorporate an ability to interface and share information with local partners.

**USING TECHNOLOGY AND AUTOMATION**

The development of collaborative workspaces provides a unique opportunity to facilitate planning processes that are geographically and organizationally disparate. S/CRS would like to explore collaborative work systems that promote organizational interoperability and mobility of the planning process. In addition, the planning framework should benefit from basic software applications, such as macro forms, to improve user-friendliness and to decrease the burden on planning staff.
PLANNING FOR STABILIZATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND TERMS

Acronyms

CRSG  Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group
DOS   Department of State
EPP   Erewanese Peace Pact
ET    Essential Task
ETM   Essential Task Matrix
GOE   Government of Erewan
HRST  Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Team
IDP   Internally Displaced Person
JWFC  Joint Warfighting Center
MMEs  Major Mission Elements
NGO   nongovernmental organization
NSC   National Security Council
OMB   Office of Management and Budget
PCC   Policy Coordinating Committee
R/S   Reconstruction and Stabilization

9 In December 2004, the Principals’ Committee (PC) approved the concept of a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) to serve as the main interagency coordination body for comprehensive USG engagement in a post-conflict or complex contingency. The NSC creates a CRSG upon the recommendation of the Secretary of State. The CRSG oversees strategic planning and implementation of USG policy and programs for reconstruction and stabilization in the region of engagement, prepares options for senior leadership, and reports to the Deputies’ Committee.
PLANNING FOR STABILIZATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

S/CRS The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State

UN United Nations

USAID United States Agency for International Development

Terms

Conflict Transformation: The process of diminishing the means and motivations for conflict while developing local institutions so they can take the lead role in national governance, economic development, and enforcing the rule of law. Success in this process permits an evolution from internationally imposed stability to a peace that is sustained by local actors, with the international community providing continued support at a greatly reduced cost.

Essential Task (ET) (Green Box): A process or activity that is an essential component of a Major Mission Element. When possible, ETAs should be stated as outcomes.

Locally Led Nascent Peace: The point in a conflict transformation process at which the motivations and means for destructive forms of conflict are sufficiently diminished and local institutional capacity is sufficiently developed to allow international actors to pass the lead to local actors, usually with continued international assistance, without the country falling back into conflict.

Major Mission Element (MME) (Orange Box): The elements of the plan that are necessary and sufficient to achieve the Overarching Policy Goals. MMEs should be stated as outcomes.

Overarching Policy/Conflict Transformation Goal (Blue Box): The overall objective, stated as an outcome, that the U.S. Government (as a whole) would like to achieve and is capable of achieving with the resources available and in a short-term (2-3 year) timeframe.

Planning Calendar: A visual representation of the sequencing of Essential Tasks during an operation, thereby facilitating sequential and efficient performance of Essential Tasks. Rather than focusing on specific dates, the Calendar emphasizes the pacing of actions toward the realization of prioritized objectives or results.
PLANNING FOR STABILIZATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

**Planning Framework:** The entire body of products that comprise the R/S planning process. A Planning Framework may include one or more planning templates, a planning calendar, a Policy Guidance Memo (PGM), and MME strategy packages.

**Planning Template:** A one-page visual diagram of the Overarching Policy Goals (Blue Boxes), Major Mission Elements (Orange Boxes), and Task Areas (Green Boxes).

**Reconstruction:** The process of rebuilding the economic and physical infrastructure of a country or territory where it has been damaged or destroyed to create the foundation for longer term development.

**Stabilization:** The process of making a country or territory unlikely to return to conflict or upheaval through the provision of public security.

**Sub-Task (Yellow Box):** A specific process or activity, stated as an outcome when possible, that is one part of an Essential Task.
PLANNING FOR STABILIZATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

APPENDIX B: SAMPLE PLANNING TEMPLATE

**Erewan Planning Template**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MME #1: Immediate humanitarian needs addressed</th>
<th>MME #2: Peace and stability in West Erewan</th>
<th>MME #3: Military transformed and demobilized, disarmament, and reintegration initiated, bolstering confidence of Erewanese</th>
<th>MME #4: A functioning National Unity Government that implements wealth and power sharing provisions</th>
<th>MME #5: Economic and social infrastructure and services strengthened in targeted communities in southern Erewan, including those receiving returns</th>
<th>MME #6: More responsive and participating governance in southern Erewan in accordance with the peace accords</th>
<th>MME #7: Rule of law is restored because public order is maintained and conflict is mitigated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>West Erewan</strong></td>
<td><strong>Peace</strong></td>
<td><strong>Military</strong></td>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conflict Mitigation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian assistance (including food) and protection provided to IDPs and vulnerable communities in Erewan</td>
<td>Peace agreement achieved</td>
<td>Government of Erewan troops downsized and units re-positioned as agreed to by the parties</td>
<td>Ministries transformed per the peace agreement</td>
<td>Essential social services received by targeted populations</td>
<td>Institutional legal structures for a transparent and accountable Government of Erewan developed</td>
<td>Conflict mitigated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian assistance (including food) and protection provided to refugees and affected communities across borders</td>
<td>Expanded and sustained peacekeeping mission</td>
<td>Defense functions deployed and operational</td>
<td>Functioning government divided cities</td>
<td>Human rights and religious freedoms protected</td>
<td>Legal Frameworks for Government of Erewan (Min of Justice - Attorney General)</td>
<td>- Support peacekeeping forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary repatriation and return of refugees and IDPs supported, as appropriate</td>
<td>Coordinated international community promoting peace and ending violence</td>
<td>Southern Erewan factions transformed into a standing conventional force</td>
<td>- Other community services received by targeted populations</td>
<td>Conflict mitigated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence against women in West Erewan mitigated and victims assisted</td>
<td>Peace agreement accepted by West Erewan</td>
<td>- Women in West Erewan</td>
<td>- Peace/ending violence</td>
<td>- Women in West Erewan</td>
<td>- Women in West Erewan</td>
<td>Conflict mitigated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Erewan</td>
<td>Recovery and reconstruction strategy including a budget and rehabilitation sites</td>
<td>Effective demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) program builds confidence for a demilitarized Erewan</td>
<td>Census designed and infrastructure established</td>
<td>Key transport links rehabilitated and expanded</td>
<td>More responsive and participatory governance in southern Erewan in accordance with the peace accords</td>
<td>- More effective justice system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian assistance, including food, and protection provided to IDPs, non-Erewanese refugees, Erewanese refugees outside Erewan, and vulnerable communities in the rest of Erewan, along with support for voluntary repatriation and return of refugees and IDPs</td>
<td>Local communities resolve issues that caused conflict</td>
<td>- Effective social services received by targeted populations</td>
<td>Foundation for economic recovery, including food security, strengthened</td>
<td>- Development of critical democratic political parties</td>
<td>More effective and border control</td>
<td>Conflict mitigated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War criminals held accountable</td>
<td>Increased level of peacekeeping troops</td>
<td>- Peace accords established</td>
<td>- Justice system and courts strengthened</td>
<td>- Erewan Constitution ratified</td>
<td>Transitional contingencies addressed</td>
<td>- More effective police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Methods and Approaches</td>
<td>Tap Diaspora Build Indigenous Capacity Gain Donor Support Fight Corruption Community Development Gender Sensitive Programming</td>
<td>- Access to independent media</td>
<td>- Oversight of crime and corruption established</td>
<td>- Public knowledge of civic rights and responsibilities</td>
<td>Decentralized local government structures strengthened</td>
<td>Institutional capacity of a vibrant inclusive civil society increased</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The MMEs and Essential Tasks constitute a 2-3 year USG strategy encompassing both programmatic and diplomatic efforts to reach the Conflict Transformation Goal. This Planning Template is intended as a complement to interagency planning materials and as a graphic representation of processes articulated therein.

Note that this template assumes a civilian-led scenario that does not rely upon military intervention.
APPENDIX C: SAMPLE PLANNING CALENDAR

Erewan

Six Month Sequencing Calendar

Note: The purpose of this timeline is to provide a general idea of the sequencing of emergency response/conflict transformation priorities over the next six months outlined in the accompanying strategy memo. While the timeline also incorporates descriptive information regarding deployments, DDR activity, etc., it does not attempt to provide a comprehensive picture of all related activities/programs underway in Erewan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Mission Element (MME)</th>
<th>Jul-05</th>
<th>Aug-05</th>
<th>Sep-05</th>
<th>Oct-05</th>
<th>Nov-05</th>
<th>Dec-05</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MME #1: Immediate Humanitarian Need Addressed</strong></td>
<td>Diplomatic Pressure on Donors to Fulfill Kennewick Pledges</td>
<td>Provide $228-400 million in Food Aid and $45-70 Million of Non-Food Aid for West Erewan in FY 2006</td>
<td>Provide $20 Million of Funding for Refugees in FY 2006</td>
<td>Provide $35 Million of Funding for Internal Food Purchases in West Erewan in FY 2006</td>
<td>Provide $30 Million in UNMIE Funding in FY 2006</td>
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<td><strong>MME #2: Peace and Stability in East Erewan</strong></td>
<td>Planned UNMIE Troop Deployments (1,360 in July, 2,148 in August, 2,357 in September) Note: Troop Rotation Included in Above Figures</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MME #3: DDR and Military Reform</strong></td>
<td>DDR Workshop Held at Pilot’s Knob 30-31 July</td>
<td>One-Week Site Survey of Potential East Erewanese Military HQ and Training Centers 2nd Week of July</td>
<td>Ongoing Project Planning and Obligation of $25 Million of PKO Funding</td>
<td>Phase 1 of DDR Program (Women, Children, and Disabled) Phase 2 of DDR Program (Ex-Combatants) Expected to Begin in 18 Months</td>
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APPENDIX D: SAMPLE PLANNING FRAMEWORK NARRATIVE

Erewan: Planning Framework and Priorities for Conflict Transformation

Summary

This paper proposes a conflict transformation strategy for Erewan, based on interagency consultations, that addresses the following question: “What could the USG do to seize the immediate post-conflict moment in Erewan to transform the situation and improve the prospects that peace will take hold?” The paper builds on objectives and operational priorities identified through previous PCCs and Deputies’ meetings. The conflict transformation strategy will help ensure alignment between policy goals and programmatic resources. As a starting point in that process, this paper identifies six immediate priorities that must be addressed within the coming six months or less to have impacts on the ground keyed to Erewan’s political process or to the rainy season, which will affect humanitarian needs and the ability to conduct reconstruction activities. The funding shortfall for immediate conflict transformation priorities is $115.5 million. $70 million of this total would be part of a request for nonfood humanitarian assistance, part of which would be redirected to shifting internally displaced persons (IDPs) from humanitarian aid to productive livelihoods if there is peace and security in West Erewan before the 2006 rainy season.

Overview of the Planning Framework

The attached planning template developed by S/CRS is a tool to capture the goals (blue boxes) of key USG post-conflict priorities in Erewan. The template also identifies the major mission elements (MMEs) (orange boxes) and essential tasks (green boxes) that are necessary and sufficient to achieve realistic goals in approximately two years. The template addresses a two-year time horizon to focus attention on critical near-term actions with the potential to transform the conflict by taking Erewan to a locally led nascent peace and putting the country on a trajectory toward self-sufficiency and a full democratic transition.

The purpose of this template is to:
PLANNING FOR STABILIZATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

- Achieve interagency consensus on clear goals so all agencies and activities work toward the same outcomes.
- Identify tasks, grouped into major mission elements, essential to achieving the goals.
- Uncover gaps in USG resources and activities that may hinder achievement of the goals.
- Match realistic goals to a resource strategy that supports them, or force a revision of goals if we cannot generate sufficient resources.

Discussion of Goals

Conflict Transformation Goal:
Erewan is at peace, with a government representative of the Erewanese people that makes unity attractive in a referendum.

Generally, the core goal for post-conflict interventions is to take the country to viable peace during the two- to three-year window before international interest has historically waned and resources dropped; this modest goal is far less ambitious than achieving a free-market democracy, often the default goal of past interventions. The two- to three-year window forces a sharp and realistic focus on critical investments and their sequencing in order to support a sustainable transition from conflict to peace. In defining a strategy to support our two-year goal, we must still consider policy implications to achieve our longer-term goal, which Deputies decided in January 2005 is “to achieve a democratic transformation and to promote a just, viable political settlement to the conflict in a unified Erewan.” Achieving our two-year goal does not mean an end to US engagement, but it would mark the passing of a critical benchmark in achieving our long-term objectives.

Given that a root cause of conflict in Erewan has been a government that took care of the center in Pilot’s Knob at the expense of the periphery, the proposed goal speaks of achieving viable peace through a representative government. The goal underscores making unity attractive in a southern referendum. Since US interests would be best served by a unified Erewan, we should leverage our assistance to make unity attractive. That would include such practical measures as empowering women, the southern group most open to a unity outcome; building north-south transport links; favoring governing and civil society structures that link center with periphery and bring multiple ethnic groups together; and, counter-intuitively, moving aggressively to strengthen southern Erewanese capacity to assume places in governing structures in the Government of National Unity, the Government of Erewan (GOE), the ten states of western Erewan and the three transition areas.
Strengthening the capacity of the GOE and the southern states need not contradict the goal of making unity attractive to Erewanese voters. Focus groups suggest that if southerners feel empowered to act on their needs, they may be willing to consider a unified Erewan. If they do not see the benefits of peace in a unified state, they are almost certain to opt for independence. Failure to demonstrate peace dividends in the South in the near-term will also increase the risk of disaffected ethnic groups again taking up arms. If the South were to choose independence after a referendum, working to build eastern capacity would ease the agony of separation if that is the eventual outcome.

**Subgoals:**

*Peaceful resolution to the conflict in West Erewan.*

While the Erewanese Peace Pact (EPP) has largely ended fighting in the south of Erewan, the conflict in West Erewan has displaced millions of people, many of whom now live in camps and depend on food aid. These displacements have been exacerbated by drought in many parts of Erewan that will likely increase the number of IDPs in 2005 even if security improves. It will be impossible to achieve the goal of a peaceful Erewan without a resolution to the conflict in West Erewan that permits people displaced by violence and drought to return in safety to their homes. We propose to measure progress toward this goal by tracking progress toward a peace agreement as well as by tracking the number of IDPs and refugees who have been able to return home.

*Broad and sustained international engagement, support, and funding.*

Continued international support is vital to achieving the goals of most, if not all, major mission elements; the United States cannot and should not shoulder this burden alone. Given the emphasis key international donors place on a unified Erewan, this goal is intertwined with and supported by our efforts to leverage our assistance (and, where possible, the assistance of other international donors) to make unity attractive. The metrics for this goal are both food aid levels and a dollar figure for assistance pledges and deliveries for humanitarian requirements and transformational requirements identified by the Joint Assessment Mission. We will also track the percentage of total assistance coming from the US and other international donors.

*Immediate humanitarian needs met, with eventual voluntary reintegration of IDPs, refugees, and ex-combatants into functioning local communities.*

The path beyond dependence on expensive food aid requires people to return home, plant crops, and take charge of their own lives. Adequate security is the crucial prerequisite for permitting such returns, although some basic services—availability of transportation, water, food, health care, and education—are also powerful draws for potential returnees. Informal surveys of returnees to the east indicate that, after security, availability of
educational opportunities for their children is the most important factor in deciding whether to return home. To achieve this goal and to target resources given overwhelming needs throughout Erewan, we will focus on specific geographic areas based on information on where refugees and IDPs originated, and areas that have already begun to absorb ex-combatants. We would measure immediate progress by determining the percentage of IDPs, refugees, and ex-combatants who have returned to their place of origin (this may prove to be the most effective proxy measure of whether security is, in the eyes of affected Erewanese, adequate) and by tracking the ratio of food aid to assistance for social and economic programs in these areas, with the expectation that food requirements would diminish radically over two-three years. Given the likely difficulty of measuring local gross domestic product in West Erewan, and given the number of returnees likely to raise crops, a good proxy measure of success would be the percentage of people who are self-sufficient for food.

More participatory, inclusive, and responsive governance, empowerment of women, and enhanced economic opportunity.

Inclusive, responsive government is crucial to the success of the EPP in the East and West. There are two general issues in the East: diversifying the government to create checks and balances on the ruling party, and giving a political voice to actors beyond Pilot’s Knob in order to give them a stake in supporting a unified Erewan. In the West, balanced representation of ethnic groups in the army, civil service and police – as well as balance in the distribution of resources – will be key to sustaining support for peace and avoiding skirmishes among southern groups that could be exploited and potentially lead to the resurgence of other armed groups. Comparatively few women took part in the fighting in Erewan. They have been the main preservers of the social fabric, and they are virtually the only group in southern Erewan open to a unity outcome in the anticipated referendum. Enhanced economic opportunity contributes to self-sufficiency and phasing out of expensive food aid as well as to making unity attractive. We would propose measuring progress on this broad set of issues by adapting Freedom House’s analytical tool for measuring democracy and governance, by measuring progress on educating and providing independent identity documents to women, and by tracking improving economic conditions.

Public order and stability and accountable civilian-controlled security forces.

Erewan has been a nation at war with itself. Public order is a vital to encouraging returns, self-sufficiency, and a winding down of food aid. Armed groups, whether official or not, must be brought under control or disarmed, and there must be transparency in funding for armed forces, if the peace process is to be sustainable. Three sets of armed forces need to be created: in the north, in the south, and joint integrated units that could provide the foundation for a future military. The EPP calls for militias to
be folded into GOE forces or the CPU and then disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated as part of a national demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration initiative. In the west, a dialogue among all armed forces is essential to let them choose a course of integration. The creation of the Government of National Unity provides an opportunity to bring transparency to military funding and to end all support for militias. We propose to measure progress toward this goal by polling to track local perception of public order and stability.

*Continued effective counterterrorism cooperation.*

If needed, this goal can be discussed in greater detail in a separate classified paper.

**Major Mission Elements (MMEs)**

The Major Mission Elements (MMEs) (shown in the orange boxes) attempt to capture the tasks that would be necessary and sufficient to achieve the goals and goals. The MMEs represent operational priorities for conflict transformation in Erewan. The USG would focus diplomatic, humanitarian, development, public information, and security resources in these MMEs. Tasks within these MMEs must be sequenced and prioritized. Deputies are asked to approve the goals and MMEs for the Erewan conflict transformation framework. Once approved, the CRSG will oversee interagency working groups for each MME to further elaborate the essential tasks under them, identify lead institutional responsibilities, international contributors, resource requirements and key issues. Based on these interagency sessions, further revisions may be proposed in the MMEs. Given immediate needs in some areas, a series of interagency discussions have already taken place within the context of the strategic planning process to identify pressing funding issues driven by calendar requirements.
APPENDIX E: SAMPLE MAJOR MISSION ELEMENT SUMMARY PRESENTATION

R/S Plan for Erewan

Major Mission Element 3 (MME3): DDR and Military Reform
MME3 is Necessary to Achieve the Goal

CONFLICT TRANSFORMATIONAL GOAL: Erewan is at peace, with a government representative of the Erewanese people that makes unity attractive in referendum.

Sub-goal 3 – Immediate humanitarian needs met, with eventual voluntary reintegration of IDPs, refugees, and ex-combatants into functioning local communities.

Sub-goal 5 – Public order and stability and accountable civilian-controlled security forces.

Numerous militias preclude realization of core goal:
• Multiple militias operating throughout Erewan, especially in the South.
• Militias unaffiliated or only loosely controlled by GOE.
• Militias tied to specific ethnic groups provide potential to spark renewed conflict.
• Militias aligned with GOE against South—provides potential for continued conflict.

MME3 Objective: Reduce potential for renewed combat operations by ensuring that the various militias and military forces of Southern Erewan and the transitional areas are reduced, re-positioned, and reconfigured into a conventional and transparent national military.
MME3 Assumptions and Flashpoints

Assumption #1: Int’l community, including USG, provides sufficient assistance for reformation and unification of GOE and Southern militaries.

Issue: US sanctions against Erewan b/c state sponsor of terrorism and military coup; presidential waiver required to provide advisors to GOE.

Assumption #2: Adequate progress is made in civilian law enforcement/judicial sector development to maintain local-level security.

Issue: Very weak judicial system; UK has lead in police and justice sectors and UN is assisting; both are searching for partners to assist; USG should encourage int’l community contributions.

Assumption #3: UN Mission will continue with sufficient strength to implement peace agreement.

Issue: UN Mission will require sufficient funding to maintain levels; immediate need to locate funds.

Assumption #4: Other armed groups will participate in the military reformation process by disbanding or merging into GOE forces.

Issue: SESM is largest militia in South; commander had personal enmity with other southern leaders; has been aligned with GOE; must reconcile tribal and resource based conflict and bring all militias into peace process.
MME3 in Relation with Other MMEs

**FLASH POINT**
Force reduction could lead to security void if civilian institutions are not established to maintain peace.

| MME #1: Immediate Humanitarian Needs Addressed |
| MME #3: DDR and Military Reform |
| MME #4: A functioning GNU that is implementing wealth and power sharing provisions |
| MME #5: Economic and Social Infrastructure Facilitates Returns |
| MME #7: Public Order and Conflict Mitigation |

**MME #2:** Peace and Stability in Darfur (DONE)

**MME #4:** A functioning GNU per the CPA that is implementing wealth and power sharing provisions (DONE)

**MME #5:** Economic and Social Infrastructure Facilitates Returns

**MME #6:** More responsive and participatory governance in Southern Sudan in accordance with the CPA (DONE)

**MME #7:** Public Order and Conflict Mitigation

Force reduction could lead to security void if UN Mission levels are not sufficient to maintain order.

Must be undertaken in conjunction with economic and social infrastructure to ensure that communities are able to absorb demobilized soldiers into civilian life.

DDR programs will require significant coordination with refugee and IDP return programs.
Achieving MME3 through Essential Task Execution

Appropriate USG agencies will work with international partners to perform the tasks essential to realizing the MME.

DESCRIPTION

MME #3: DDR and Military Reform

Press GOE to Reposition/Reduce Units per Peace Accord

Support Joint Defense Unit Development & Employment

Support Restructure/Reform of SESM

Support DDR

Encourage UN deployments; Monitor force reduction and repositioning timetables; Engage GOE, and SESM to meet Peace Accord timetables; Engage GOE to absorb other armed groups;

Provide advisors, equipment, funding; Provide capacity building; Assist on a deployment plan; Train appropriate military/civilian transition advisors;

Help SESM develop national capacity; Help SESM develop national training; Provide technical capacity building; Help SESM develop National HQ and 10 regional commands; Tech. and staff training; Provide military/civilian transition advisors;

Support technical capacity building of UN Mission; Support DDR information dissemination program; Support community control of militia weapons; Assist in DDR information dissemination program;

UN
EU
EU
EU

State
DOD
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DOD

INT'L
US
EU
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EU

UNCLASSIFIED

S/CRS 54
MME3 Indicators and Timeline

Progress measured by:
- Number of OAGs reintegrated
- Number of forces redeployed
- Number of HQs established
- Number of ex-combatants DDRed.

Year 3
Year 2
Year 1

OAGs demobilized and reintegrated

Press GOE to Reposition/Reduce Units per Accords
Support Joint Defense Unit Development & Employment
Support Restructure/Reform of SESM
Support DDR

FLASH POINT
OAGs may refuse to join peace process.

Phases I & II DDR Complete
GOE redeployment and Joint Defense establishment
## APPENDIX F: SAMPLE BUDGET TEMPLATE

### FY PY, CY, and BY Priority Funding for XXXXX

By Account, as of XXXXXXXXX XX, XXXX

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<td>MME #3: Military Transformation</td>
<td>Troops downsized and units repositioned as agreed to by the parties</td>
<td>Security units deployed and operational</td>
<td>Transformed troops into a standing conventional force, incorporating other militia forces and under the control of a representational civilian authority</td>
<td>Effective Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) Program</td>
<td>Security units deployed and operational</td>
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<td>Security units deployed and operational</td>
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Footnotes:
1/ FY CY: Fiscal Year (FY), Past Year (PY), and Current Year (CY) Funding
2/ Effective Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) Program

Security Units Deployed and Operational

Troops downsized and units repositioned as agreed to by the parties

Transformed troops into a standing conventional force, incorporating other militia forces and under the control of a representational civilian authority

Effective Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) Program

Security units deployed and operational

Transferred troops into a standing conventional force, incorporating other militia forces and under the control of a representational civilian authority

Effective Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) Program

Security units deployed and operational

Transferred troops into a standing conventional force, incorporating other militia forces and under the control of a representational civilian authority

Effective Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) Program
<table>
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<tr>
<th>MME/Essential Task/Requirement</th>
<th>FY CY Global Funding Need (USG/Other Donors/Suda)</th>
<th>FY CY USG Funding Target</th>
<th>FY CY % of Global Need</th>
<th>Account</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>FY Obligated</th>
<th>FY FY Pipeline</th>
<th>FY FY Carryover to FY CY</th>
<th>FY CY Request</th>
<th>Total USG Funds Available in FY CY</th>
<th>FY CY USG Gap</th>
<th>Est. Q1 Commit</th>
<th>Est. Q2 Commit</th>
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Footnote: