

United States Joint Forces Command

The Joint Warfighting Center
Joint Doctrine Series

Pamphlet 8



*Doctrinal Implications of the
Joint Deployment Distribution Operations
Center (JDDOC)*

10 February 2006

Force application in multiple overlapping operations will challenge sustainment capabilities. Sustaining such operations requires the ability to support forces operating in and from austere or unimproved forward locations. Additionally, the increasing importance of mobility will necessitate more expeditionary logistics capabilities. Focused logistics provides the right personnel, equipment and supplies in the right quantities and at the right place and time. Such focused logistics capabilities will place a premium on networking to create a seamless end-to-end logistics system that synchronizes all aspects of the deployment and distribution processes.

National Military Strategy
of the United States of America
2004

The Commander, US Transportation Command is designated as the Distribution Process Owner (DPO). The DPO shall improve the overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution related activities - deployment, sustainment, and redeployment support during peace and war.

Secretary of Defense Memorandum
Subject: *Actions To Improve Logistics And Global Supply Chain Management*
September 16, 2003

Preface

This United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) pamphlet, ***Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC)***, is part of a “***Joint Doctrine Series***” intended to promote doctrinal change based on sound concepts, emerging best practices, and joint operational experience. The primary purpose of **JWFC Doctrine Pam 8** is to raise awareness and promote discussion on the JDDOC, promote the combatant command understanding of the JDDOC, identify implications associated with fielding a JDDOC, and facilitate integrating the JDDOC concept into Joint Doctrine.

In its role as the Department of Defense (DOD) Distribution Process Owner (DPO), United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) was tasked to improve the overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution-related activities throughout the range of military operations. One of USTRANSCOM’s first initiatives was to determine the viability of establishing a JDDOC structure at each of the geographic combatant commands. In support of JDDOC, USTRANSCOM has established business rules and processes linking sustainment, distribution, and movement of unit and non-unit requirements.

The JDDOC mission is to support the geographic combatant commander’s operational objectives by synchronizing and optimizing the intertheater and intratheater distribution aspects of deployment and multi-modal transfer of resources to integrate the proper mix of flow of forces, materiel, and other forms of sustainment in support of the geographic combatant commander missions. Its ultimate goal is to maximize the geographic combatant command’s operational effectiveness through integrated support to joint force projection, improved end-to-end (E2E) distribution, and asset and intransit visibility.

We welcome your comments and ideas on this important topic. Submit your feedback to Alfred.perrie@jfc.com.mil or call the Doctrine Integration team at DSN 668-6159/6167 or 6147. The commercial numbers are 757-203-6159/6167 or 6147.



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Section 1 – Introduction

"The U.S. military juggernaut that swept into Iraq last March (March 2003) was plagued by shortages of ammunition, spare parts and fuel, an epic logistics mess for which the old military term "SNAFU" might have been invented.

Battalions of tanks and armored vehicles, dashing forward under grueling conditions, got no repair parts for three weeks. Broken-down vehicles had to be stripped of useable parts and left behind. Some units ran dangerously low on ammunition and couldn't get resupplied; others in desperate need of M-16 and machine gun rounds got unneeded tank shells instead, according to logistics officers. Some troops had virtually no water while receiving truckloads of stuff they didn't need and couldn't carry."


*Military Acknowledges Massive Supply Problems in Iraq War
David Wood, Newhouse News Service
January 22, 2004*

Background: Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) revealed multiple challenges associated with joint theater logistics¹.

- **LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOC) MULTIPLE PLAYERS AND "CHOKE POINTS."** Supplies and forces from multiple Service, national-level logistics organizations, commercial firms, as well as multinational interdepartmental/agencies flowed into theater along separate "sub-" lines of communication from various shipping origins and ports in coalition nations and their overseas storage/afloat capabilities. Yet these forces and supplies entered the Area of Responsibility (AOR) through a limited number of ports and distribution staging areas, creating a "sorting congestion mess" -- a re-prioritization problem for further distribution. All of these organizations left it to the supported commanders on-the-ground to rectify this mess.

¹ Joint theater logistics is defined in this document as: The capability for the joint force commander (JFC) to apply logistics resources to generate and sustain force employment that spans the range of military operations (ROMO) throughout an assigned theater or joint operations area. JTL includes organization, authorities and processes over assigned and attached forces to achieve desired joint and combined effects and operational objectives. It involves the management of a collective and synchronized set of activities, operations, organizations and tools which enable the application of joint logistics capabilities from strategic resource partners to tactical commanders (to include contractors, logistics civil augmentation exploitation of captured materiel and support capabilities) in support of two or more military department components. (Source: JTL Council of Colonels, approved by General Officer Steering Committee 26 July 2005)

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This graphic of the logistical support milieu of operations, cargo systems, and organizations supporting OIF OEF provides a complex depiction of the challenges faced by the geographic combatant commander.

- **SKILLED STAFF.** Service component oriented headquarters staff elements and subordinate organizations were not manned with the right organizational and level of representation, grades, expertise, and numbers of personnel to identify early the potential for joint solutions and then collectively design ways to manage or accomplish effective joint theater logistics.
- **JTTP.** Even when the potential for common user logistics was identified, the various stakeholders lacked joint techniques, tactics, and procedures (JTTP--to include knowledge sharing technologies) to manage and/or control it. JTTP are needed to ensure supporting commanders and staff can have oversight (to include asset and in-transit visibility) to ensure the deployment and distribution requirements and priorities of the supported commander are met.²
- **COMPETING AUTHORITIES.** Title 10 United States Code (USC) empowers the geographic combatant commander to exercise combatant command (command authority) COCOM, over *assigned* forces. Title 10 USC requires the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to ensure that a commander of a combatant command has sufficient authority, direction, and control over assigned forces. If a combatant commander considers his authority to be insufficient to carry out the missions assigned to the command, the commander shall promptly inform the Secretary of Defense. As deemed appropriate, SECDEF may assign+ additional authorities to the combatant commander for those aspects of administration and support considered necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command. For example, the SECDEF could specify adjustments to accommodate authorities beyond OPCON – e.g., Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL) over assigned and attached forces. Service Title 10 USC responsibilities for logistics, other agency responsibilities to support joint force commanders, and SECDEF directed executive agency responsibilities for cross-servicing or to provide common user logistics often compete and are not always subject to unified direction by the geographic combatant commander. Service- and agency-assigned forces and capabilities are usually placed in *support* of combatant

² Support is a doctrinal command relationship. The supported combatant commander is responsible for ensuring that the supporting national level commanders (in this case through representatives present in the JDDOC) understand the assistance required (source: derived from JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*).

commanders. Furthermore, national level organizations and national support elements³ in coalition operations provided capabilities to support their own national forces; even though sharing of capabilities could have resulted in better efficiencies and effectiveness. The ability to create efficiencies and effectiveness through early use of centers⁴ could have enhanced operational support even in the absence of command or directive authority.

- **LOC “HAND-OFF POINTS.”** There was ineffective management and/or control of the transitions between strategic-national and strategic-theater, and strategic-theater and intratheater resulting in wasted time, losses, demurrage, and failure to “hand-off” responsibility cleanly from one task level to the next. Also, there was failure to achieve maximum throughput.⁵

Military logistics and other support activities face fundamental challenges. Processes remain stove piped, lack flexibility, and responsiveness. Logistics and support integration and interoperability must move beyond improvisation and become part of the deployment, employment, redeployment and distribution processes.

Based on OIF and OEF Major Combat Operations Lessons Learned these objectives must be addressed:

- Empower the geographic combatant commander with the right “rules, tools and processes” to achieve better efficiency and effectiveness during deployment and distribution operations through employment of common user logistics and cross-servicing.
- Resource headquarters and subordinate organizations with human resources that reflect the required logistics specialties and numbers, to include resourcing of applicable joint manning documents.
- Exercise a single point of contact for logistics and other support in order to reliably, rapidly, and consistently communicate and help satisfy the supported commander’s requirements.
- Enable visibility of deployment and distribution status, which can result in supported command prioritization when applied against limited common-user lift capabilities.
- Establish effective management of the transition between strategic-national and strategic theater supporting deployment and distribution systems (i.e. in

³ NSEs are any national organization or activity supporting national forces that are a part of a multinational force. Their mission is nation-specific support to units and common support that is retained by the nation. Source JP 1-02 *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

⁴ For the purposes of this document, a center is task organized to gather, process, analyze, display, and disseminate planning and operational data and perform other related tasks. A center is a collage of representatives from otherwise disparate organizations so collaboration, knowledge-sharing, and coordination can be accomplished.

⁵ The average quantity of cargo and passengers that can pass through a port on a daily basis from arrival at the port to loading onto a ship or plane, or from the discharge from a ship or plane to the exit (clearance) from the port complex. Throughput is usually expressed in measurement tons, short tons, or passengers. Reception and storage limitation may affect final throughput. Source: JP 1-02 *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

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coordination with supporting commands, military service departments and their operating agencies and organizations, other-governmental and nongovernmental organizations and allied or coalition organizations) and joint reception, staging onward movement and integration (JRSOI) and distribution operations within the geographic combatant command AOR.

- Maintain asset visibility across an integrated deployment and distribution network.
- Maintain geographic combatant command information technology (IT) capabilities to link to national-level systems. It is the national-level logistics community that must respond to the needs of the supported commander to help the commander shape the logistics support and services required across the range of military operations and perhaps across multiple joint operations areas, theaters of war, or theaters of operations.

The proposal for a United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Deployment Distribution Operations Center (CDDOC) was initiated by USTRANSCOM in October 2003 and accepted by USCENTCOM in December 2003⁶. The CDDOC initiative was proposed to address challenges encountered with the *ad hoc* nature of the distribution pipeline in the USCENTCOM AOR in support of OIF. Some of those challenges included the uncoordinated Service-component oriented control of distribution into theater and onward, retrograde operations, command and control of reception and staging, land transportation of arriving/departing forces, and multiple Service component and agency points of coordination. The success of the CDDOC to rectify these conditions was the catalyst for United States Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM) request for a similar capability to support the February – March 2004 Haiti Operation SECURE TOMORROW. United States European Command (USEUCOM) finalized their charter for the European JDDOC (EDDOC) in November 2004.⁷ About the same time, US Forces Korea (USFK) requested assessment for standing up a JDDOC capability. This assessment was accomplished over a number of exercises: RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, and INTEGRATION 2004 (RSOI04), Mar 2004, and ULCHI FOCUS LENS 2004 (UFL 04), August and September 2004. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) subsequently requested an assessment for a JDDOC capability during the Tier 1 TERMINAL FURY 2005 (TF05), November and December 2004 exercise. Portions of the USPACOM DDOC (PDDOC) shifted from assessment into reality only a few weeks later in December 2004 when the command worked to support the Indian Ocean tsunami relief effort, Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. For the RSOI exercise in March 2005, both a PDDOC in Hawaii and PDDOC-Forward (Fwd) in Korea were established. USPACOM and USFK solidified the integrated JDDOC concept in a geographic combatant command in RSOI05, March 2005. Additionally, the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) DDOC was

⁶ For the purpose of this publication, the JDDOC is concerned primarily with the force movement (" as distribution of forces") aspect of "deployment" and does not address all phases of deployment (i.e. predeployment activities such as mobilization, training/rehearsal, and other readiness activities. (Source: Joint Pub 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*).

⁷ In order to eliminate confusion, DDOC refers to the USTRANSCOM Deployment Distribution Operations Center located in Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, whereas JDDOC refers to the concept or a generic theater operations center.

deployed to Ft Gillem, Georgia in support of JTF Katrina. The USPACOM DDOC-FWD was expanded to Japan during TERMINAL FURY 06 in December 2005.

National Military Strategy Implications

"Clearly, Logistics is the hard part of fighting a war."

Lt Gen. E. T. Cook, USMC
November 1990

The JDDOC concept directly supports the 2004 National Military Strategy's strategic principles of **agility, decisiveness, and integration**. **Agility** is the ability to rapidly deploy, employ, sustain and re-deploy capabilities in geographically separated and environmentally diverse regions. The JDDOC gives the geographic combatant commander sufficient visibility into the many Defense transportation and materiel systems in order to synchronize, optimize, monitor and make decisions on modes of transportation, and recognize how best to achieve agility with the appropriate flow of forces, equipment, and materiel in and out of the theater of operations or joint operations area (JOA).⁸

JDDOC enables the geographic combatant commander to achieve **decisiveness** by improving flow of forces, equipment, and materiel in the defense transportation system to deliver and sustain capabilities required to deter or overwhelm adversaries, achieve control over otherwise chaotic situations, and achieve desired effects. Information fusion that occurs in the JDDOC enables the creation of knowledge⁹ and knowledge-sharing that supports overall decision superiority.

JDDOC promotes **integration** through providing the geographic combatant commander a single point for coordination, collaboration and source of knowledge on the flow of forces, equipment, and materiel across all of the Services components and, when expanded even further, those of coalition partners. In addition to its integration and synchronization functions, the JDDOC also operates as a coordination and information "fusion"¹⁰ center among the supporting and supported combatant commanders, the Service components, and other national-level support organizations. Its structure is scalable¹¹ by the geographic combatant commander after considering situational needs (i.e., US-only, allied, coalition participation, force readiness posture, etc.) and the maturity of the theater of operations (e.g., assigned forces, lines of communications, infrastructure, etc.).

⁸ JDDOC may be authorized by the supported commander to *direct* intratheater movements and distribution.

⁹ Knowledge, in this case, refers to processed or interpreted information useful to sustain situational awareness and to make good plans and rapid execution decisions about deployment and distribution.

¹⁰ In current joint doctrine, fusion is associated with the intelligence function. It is suggested here, the same concept applies to deployment and distribution information – and an integrative process of examining all sources of information to derive a complete assessment (i.e. create knowledge) from these activities to support the geographic combatant commander's priorities and decisions.

¹¹ For this publication, there are two aspects of scalability: complexity and workload. It is the ability for the staff or commander to continue work when the *complexity* of the problem increases. Also, this quality includes the ability for staff and commander to increase or decrease in capacity in order to meet increasing/decreasing *workloads* over a period of time.

Joint Context

The JDDOC enhances the combatant commander's ability to see, sense and respond to a dynamically changing operational environment with a scalable capability that links supporting national-level organizations. The JDDOC facilitates the geographic combatant commander's joint operations capability by acting as the theater's single point of contact for all deployment and distribution operations for the entire AOR as well as leveraging the expertise of the Services' materiel commands, DLA, and other national-level support representatives. As the network hub for consolidation and dissemination of deployment and distribution information, it optimizes information flow between multiple organizations, interprets that information and provides knowledge to the supported combatant commander and staff. The JDDOC's expertise and capability to reach-back to national support capabilities creates synergy between the inter-theater and intra-theater deployment and distribution systems. The JDDOC's subject matter experts have the ability to orient on geographic AOR- or JOA-unique requirements.

Section II - Organization

"The CDDOC -- set up in January 2004 - already has paid dividends, the CDDOC synchronized onward movement of 672 air pallets destined for Iraq that were flown into Kuwait when military airlift was consumed by force rotation operations."

*Vice Admiral Lippert
Director of Defense Logistics Agency
Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee
30 March 2004*

Command Relationships

JDDOC is an integrated operations and fusion center, acting in consonance with the geographic combatant commander's overall requirements and priorities, and, on behalf of the combatant commander, may direct common user and intratheater distribution operations. A JDDOC is normally placed under the direction of the combatant commander's Director for Logistics (J4), but may be placed

"The line between disorder and order lies in logistics..."

Sun Tzu

The JDDOC mission is to support the geographic combatant commander's operational objectives by synchronizing and optimizing the intertheater and intratheater distribution aspects of deployment and multi-modal transfer resources to integrate the proper mix of flow of forces, materiel, and other forms of sustainment in support of the geographic combatant commander missions. Its ultimate goal is to maximize the geographic combatant command's operational effectiveness through integrated support to joint force projection, improved end-to-end (E2E) distribution, and Asset Visibility (AV).

under other command or staff organizations. It is up to the geographic combatant commander to place the JDDOC anywhere in their AOR that affords the best support relationship. The JDDOC supports the geographic combatant commander's operational objectives by monitoring, coordinating, synchronizing, and optimizing force movement during deployment and distribution operations. JDDOC may also be authorized by the supported commander to

direct intratheater movements and distribution. As a source of knowledge about deployment and distribution, the JDDOC enhances the combatant commander's ability to plan, receive, decide, and execute support, by linking supporting national-level

organizations to his assigned or allocated supported forces. The JDDOC relies on liaison and collaboration to achieve reachback¹² to access national support capabilities.

The JDDOC purpose is to help manage the intertheater and intratheater distribution processes in order to assure uninterrupted support to the joint force. Lessons learned from OEF and OIF, and other military operations, revealed the joint force commander (JFC) lacked clear knowledge of all of the important deployment and distribution activities occurring in his theater of operations or joint operations area (JOA). Many commanders at the senior levels were not able to implement their priorities, satisfy their requirements or make decisions in the early stages of the deployment and distribution process simply because they did not know the where, when, how, and what was being distributed to them.

The JDDOC improves support to the geographic combatant commander through six focus areas:

- Provide staff supervision¹³ to support the geographic combatant commander's intent and his deployment, employment, redeployment, and sustainment requirements and priorities;
- Provide expert knowledge, reachback, and liaison¹⁴ to the supported combatant commander and staff, to include Asset Visibility (AV) of force movements, logistics sustainment and retrograde;
- Manage the theater distribution architecture in coordination with theater organizations, national-level support organizations, the Service departments, multinational/coalition military capabilities, and the interagency;
- Synchronize between strategic-national (SN), strategic-theater (ST) and operational (OP) levels of movement and distribution among national support organizations and operating forces in the AOR/JOA;¹⁵
- Develop relevant strategic lift and E2E distribution performance measures responsive to the requirements and priorities of a geographic combatant commander; and,

¹² Reachback is the process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed. Source: JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

¹³ Staff supervision is the process of advising other staff officers and individuals subordinate to the commander of the commander's plans and policies, interpreting those plans and policies, assisting such subordinates in carrying them out, determining the extent to which they are being followed, and advising the commander thereof (source: JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*).

¹⁴ Liaisons ensure contact or intercommunication is maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action (source: JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*). In this case National Partner liaisons in the JDDOC can also serve a vital staff role, providing expert knowledge to the supported command and staff about the capabilities and activities of their parent organization which remains in a supporting-to-supported relationship.

¹⁵ In the *Universal Joint Task List*, CJCSM 3500.04D, the strategic level of war is sub-divided into strategic-national (e.g., DOD/Service/Interagency) and strategic-theater (e.g., combined command) to provide more clarity and focus for task development and execution.

- Manage intermodal equipment oversight (i.e, such systems as the 463L pallet and radio frequency identification (RFID)/in-transit visibility technologies for the AOR, and containers).

The JDDOC uses emergent joint tactics, techniques and procedures (JTTP) to link deployment and distribution movement requirements. This linkage is then made visible to the warfighters so they know the how, what, where and when of the deployment and distribution pipeline to sustain the joint operation. While the objective is to have JTTP applicable to each geographic combatant command JDDOC, the intent of the overall concept is not to dictate a rigid structure. Rather, the JDDOC concept is designed to be flexible, allowing each geographic combatant commander to tailor their organization and processes to meet each situation in their AOR. The JDDOC manning requirements reflect a scalable capability, consisting of three echelons:

- **Echelon 1) the Core** which supports routine operations,
- **Echelon 2) the In-AOR Plus Up** to meet increased requirements, and
- **Echelon 3) Augmentees** as arranged with Service military departments, supporting commands (such as USTRANSCOM), and Defense agencies (such as DLA) for requirements that exceed available expertise in the AOR.

USTRANSCOM and much of the joint logistics community refer to non-assigned element Echelon 2 and 3 as *National Partners* referring to an interdependent and collaborative relationship among USTRANSCOM, the Services, DLA, and other supporting organizations/activities to create an *integrated and interdependent national-level and intratheater support capability*¹⁶ for the supported combatant commander. National Partners provide the collective subject matter expertise for the JDDOC. In some cases, the geographic combatant commanders are responsible for requesting Echelon 3 augmentation to provide necessary expertise within the JDDOC from the National Partners by generating a request for forces/capabilities in accordance with CJCS Manual 3122.01, *Joint Operation and Planning System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning, Policies and Procedures*, or by generating requests for Individual Augmentation (IA) in accordance with CJCS Instruction 1301.01C, *Individual Augmentation Procedures*. DLA will respond to emergency requirements to support a JDDOC on a “Deputy to Deputy basis” based on their general support mission to all combatant commanders. However, DLA has stated that for sustained commitments, such as the current CENTCOM JDDOC, a formal request is required.

Liaisons and augmentees to a JDDOC are normally attached to the supported combatant command. The supported combatant commander is responsible for the force protection of the liaisons and augmentees working in their AOR. Local sustainment

¹⁶ By interdependent, we mean facilitating a Service component’s or combat support agency’s purposeful reliance on another Service’s/agency’s capabilities to maximize complementary and reinforcing effects, while minimizing relative vulnerabilities in order to achieve the mission requirements of the joint force commander. Interdependence reduces unnecessary redundancy without reducing effectiveness. (Source: adapted from *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, August 2005).

requirements for these personnel, such as quarters, rations, etc, are normally provided by whoever sustains the JDDOC Core (Echelon 1). These local sustainment details should be worked out in advance and should be specified in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) or in the liaison or augmentee orders. ADCON of liaisons normally remains with their parent organization. ADCON of augmentees normally is transferred to the supported combatant commander.

The Echelon 1 Core should be an ongoing JDDOC capability and encompass all the functional areas of the JDDOC. The JDDOC Core capability provides the basic foundation for the scalable organization. From the Core, the geographic combatant commander performs the deployment and distribution functions during normal day-to-day conditions and provides the continuity and AOR expertise for transitioning to the increased operations tempo of a contingency operation or crisis. The core capability is not an added geographic combatant commander staff, but is achieved by internally reorganizing existing staff assets. The organizing principle is to provide a standardized core structure for integrating Echelons 2 and 3 more efficiently and effectively. "Plug and play" is a useful metaphor to describe the plus-up of the JDDOC through Echelon 3 (see the following example).




Figure II-1. JDDOC Augmentation

As requirements increase or are expected to increase, Echelon 2 would be called upon to increase the JDDOC with additional members from those available in the AOR. National-level support organizations typically have established permanent forward presence in the AOR from which Echelon 2 personnel would be drawn. For example,

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DLA has regional offices forward in Europe, the Pacific, and in the Middle East, as does USTRANSCOM, Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), Army Materiel Command, and the Army and Air Force Exchange System (AAFES). The senior officer from these organizations and the geographic combatant commander will collaborate to determine the appropriate “plus up” to the JDDOC from available assets. In the event of a larger operational requirement, Echelon 3 Augmentation would deploy from outside the AOR and “plug and play” into the established theater capability to correspond with increased scale of deployment and distribution operations. For example, CONUS-based augmentation teams for SECURE TOMORROW, TERMINAL FURY 2005, and UNIFIED ASSISTANCE deployed to the geographic combatant command headquarters. The augmentation teams for exercise RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION 2004 and OIF were deployed to increase the JDDOC capability. Defense national-level support organizations have typically developed contingency response capabilities to provide this augmentation. For example, the DLA would form a DLA Contingency Support Team (DCST) to provide the DLA supporting capability that would report to their existing forward office or deploy directly to the JDDOC location as required.

Note: See Distribution Process Owner (DPO) “Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC)” Template, dated 30 June 2005 for additional detail at <https://dpo.transcom.mil> under ‘References’.

The JDDOC functions as the geographic combatant commander’s single integrating center with these many organizations as depicted in Figure II-2.




Figure II-2. Theater Relationships

The JDDOC serves as the single manager for intratheater distribution and force movements and the integrator of requirements and priorities concerning national-level supporting commanders on behalf of the supported joint force commander.

Structure

"Gentlemen, the officer who doesn't know his communications and supply as well as his tactics is totally useless."

Gen. George S. Patton, USA


The JDDOC represents a significant improvement from the joint doctrine Joint Movement Center (JMC) explained in JP 4-01.3 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control* (09 April 2002) and mentioned in JP 4-01.4, *Joint Tactics,*

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Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution (22 August 2000), and JP 4-09 *Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution* (14 December 2001). The JDDOC's clearly defined business rules, automated information systems, and communication requirements assist the commander in preparing to integrate Echelons 2 and 3 augmentation directly into the Core. The JDDOC also improves on current doctrine by being specific on suggesting the qualifying rank, specialty, and responsibilities of the Echelon 3 augmentation.

The generic JDDOC organizational structure consists of a Director Group, Support Element and four divisions: **Mission Division; Sustainment Division; Information and Systems Integration Division; and, Combined Operations Integration Division.** The organizational chart is reflected in figure II-3, *JDDOC Generic Structure*. This structure can be tailored to meet the geographic combatant commander's needs and situational requirements.

There may be occasions when a JDDOC capability will need to be established in a forward location, or in multiple locations. In these cases, the geographic combatant commander may create modules of capability from the JDDOC. The "JDDOC-Fwd" is a tailored JDDOC capability designed to work in designated theaters of war, theaters of operations, or joint operations areas. It serves as a coordinating activity of the JDDOC. There may be multiple JDDOC-Fwd modules of the JDDOC operating at the same time and in multiple theaters/areas in the AOR.



Note: National Partners liaise as indicated by the dotted line and represent an interdependent and collaborative relationship among USTRANSCOM, the Services, DLA, and other supporting organizations to create an integrated national support capability for the supported combatant commander.

Figure II-3 JDDOC Generic Organization Structure

The **Director Group** directs, coordinates, and monitors JDDOC activities to ensure effectiveness and efficiency. The Director Group advises the geographic combatant commander on the performance of deployment and distribution operations.

The **Support Element** supports the Director Group and the JDDOC divisions. The Support Element may be resourced as a part from an existing headquarters support structure. The Support Element executive officer is a special staff officer working at the direction of the Director and Deputy Director. The IT and Administrative Branches provide JDDOC communication support and administrative assistance to the Director Group and JDDOC Divisions. The Lessons Assessment Branch documents the overall JDDOC performance as required.

The **Mission Division** is divided into three Branches: Requirements, Air, and Surface. The Mission Division synchronizes intertheater and intratheater requirements and air and surface movements, and optimizes modal distribution. The Requirements Branch coordinates strategic to operational requirements and execution of common user modes. The branch provides visibility and analysis of inter and intratheater

distribution requirements and capabilities to synchronize the entire spectrum of global mobility capabilities. It optimizes the flow of combat capability into and out of the AOR. The Air Branch analyzes intertheater and intratheater air transportation movements to synchronize and expedite movements. The Surface Branch analyzes intertheater and intratheater surface movements to optimize processes, personnel, and use of assets.

The **Sustainment Division**, having ties to National-level resources, provides strategic visibility and analysis of materiel in the defense transportation system in order to synchronize and optimize the flow of sustainment, with force flow, from the source of supply to the designated geographic combatant commander and back. The Sustainment Division leverages Service component and other defense agency capabilities against joint operations area (JOA) requirements. The Service Component Representatives maintain currency and provide insight into their respective Service component's mission and capabilities.

The **Information and Systems Integration Division** consists of two Branches, In-Transit Visibility (ITV) and Systems Integration, providing automated capabilities and expertise for ITV systems. The ITV Branch provides data support to the JDDOC to support management of the distribution and deployment processes. The Systems Integration Branch standardizes and enforces theater ITV policy and provides automation and collaboration tools for the theater.

The requirement for a **Combined Operations Integration Division** is under development and is dependent on whether the operation is a US only operation or a combined or coalition operation. If the JDDOC supports a combined or coalition operation, the Operations Integration Division will be established. Both host nation and multinational partners influence the US Forces freedom of action and maneuver during deployment and distribution operations. Both influence the availability, utility, and function of a JOA's infrastructure including, but not limited to, convoy clearance, airports, railcars, railroads, and pipelines. Multinational integration with US deployment and sustainment coordination activities is both a necessity and an opportunity. Integration enables synchronized force deployment, efficient use of host nation infrastructure and contractor support, and timely distribution/allocation of logistics support with a reduced logistics footprint.

JP 4-08, *Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations* (25 September 2002), describes the principles of multinational logistics, multinational logistics planning at the operational and strategic level, logistics command and control, and legal authorities.

The mere existence of Host Nation (HN) or Multi-National Force (MNF) operations does not inherently mandate a Combined Operations Integration Division. Rather, it should be established if there is a requirement to support MNF movements or coordinate the use of coalition assets for theater movement. Also, the geographic combatant commander should determine if there is a requirement to coordinate with the US State Department and US Embassies, and the geographic combatant commander

should initiate those actions and contacts. The requirement to establish a Combined Operations Integration Division is dependent on whether the operation is a US only operation or a combined or coalition operation. If combined or coalition (Multinational), the Division will be established. Both host nation and multinational partners significantly influence US Forces' freedom of action and maneuver during deployment, sustainment, retrograde operations and redeployment phases of any operation. Both influence the availability, utility, and function of a JOA's infrastructure, including (but not limited to) convoy clearance, airports, railcars, railroads, and pipelines. Multinational integration with US deployment and sustainment coordination activities is both a necessity and an opportunity. Integration enables synchronized force deployment, efficient use of host nation infrastructure and contractor support, and timely distribution/allocation of logistics support with reduced logistics footprint.

Resourcing

The JDDOC operates as a partnership among the geographic combatant commands and the national partners. Its structure is tailored by the geographic combatant commander after considering the operational environment (e.g., considering whether US-only, allied,

coalition participation, force readiness posture, etc.) and the maturity of the theater of operations (e.g., assigned forces, lines of communications infrastructure, etc.). As a jointly-staffed organization, manning the JDDOC is a shared responsibility, and the sourcing of position fills will vary across AORs.

"Because of my wartime experience, I am insistent on the point that logistics know-how must be maintained, that logistic is second to nothing in importance in warfare, that logistic training must be widespread and thorough..."

VADM Robert B. Carney, USN
July 1945

The geographic combatant command Echelon 1 Core provides the ongoing foundation for the scalable organization. The core supports deployment and distribution functions during normal day-to-day operations and provides the continuity and theater expertise for expansion due to the increased ops tempo or complexity of a contingency or crisis. The Core is normally staffed by reorganizing existing geographic combatant commander personnel assets. There are likely to be some cases where the Core will be augmented by Echelons 2 and 3 personnel through the Joint Manning Document (JMD) process (see CJCSI 1001.01, *Joint Manpower and Personnel Program*) to support crisis operations.

The Echelon 2, In-AOR Plus-Up represents the addition of available AOR assets to augment the JDDOC. These personnel can come from the Service components, forward-stationed Reserve Components and forward stationed national level support organizations, agencies and staff. Echelon 3 personnel are sourced from the national partners.

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As geographic combatant commanders source Core and In-AOR Plus-Up personnel, they must be cognizant of the requirement to provide personnel who possess in-depth knowledge of their function and the unique aspects of their AOR. In the case of the national partner augmentees, personnel must have both functional expertise and an in-depth knowledge of their parent organization.

The geographic combatant commander may request augmentation from National Partners to meet the demands of the crisis or wartime situation. There are two aspects of scalability of the JDDOC: complexity and workload. It is the ability for management or command and control to work when the complexity of the problem increases. Also, this quality includes the ability for management or command and control to increase in capacity in order to meet increasing workloads over a period of time.

Section III – Concept of Employment

Support rapid, agile deployment, employment, sustainment and reset/reconstitution of the Total Force, within acceptable risk, across the full spectrum of operations in a cost-effective manner.

Department of Defense Logistics Vision
Joint Logistics Board Approved, August 2003

Global Distribution

Global distribution is the process that synchronizes and integrates the fulfillment of joint force requirements in time and space with the operational concept for employing the joint force. E2E distribution is fundamental to joint operations because it links national means to the joint operating forces. It assures national resources (forces, equipment, and materiel) to support execution of joint operations. The ultimate objective of this process is effective and efficient accomplishment of the joint force mission.

My logisticians are a humorless lot... they know if my campaign fails, they are the first ones I will slay.

Alexander

The global distribution system has two distinct lines of communication (LOC) segments that comprise the E2E distribution system. The first segment is the strategic-national LOC consisting of pipeline connecting national sources of supply external to the supported AOR/JOA. The second segment is the intratheater LOC. The JDDOC links deployment and distribution aspects of the strategic-national LOC to the intratheater LOC as shown in figure III-1.




Figure III-1 JDDOC “E2E” Influences

With a JDDOC, the geographic combatant commander has a single organization that monitors, coordinates, synchronizes, and has visibility over the flow of personnel, materiel, and equipment from the source of supply into the theater. When authorized by the supported commander, the JDDOC may direct intratheater force movement and distribution to the designated customer or as far forward as necessary.

Organizational Alignment

The organizational alignment of the JDDOC within the geographic combatant commander’s staff is dependent on the requirements of the command and the demands of the situation. Since the JDDOC is the geographic combatant commander’s operations center for deployment and distribution, the commander may align the organization wherever necessary to provide desired support and requisite authority. Normally under the direction of the geographic combatant commander’s Director for Logistics (J4), the JDDOC is an integral organization of the combatant commander’s staff. As an integrated part of a supported combatant commander’s staff, in accordance with Joint Pub 4-01.4, it normally has the authority to develop deployment and distribution plans and coordinate and supervise supply, transportation and related intratheater force movement and distribution activities.

Sustainability - Intertheater and Intratheater Support

The JDDOC provides the vital link between the national level and theater pipeline segments providing

“Vulnerability lies in the equipment chain, from manufacturing to employment, and other similarly interdependent systems, such as fuel and pilot training... logistics might well be considered the real center of gravity.

Air Commodore Peter Dye
Royal Air Force
2000

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the geographic combatant commander support from national capabilities. The JDDOC, as the single point of contact, provides a significant organizational tool to communicate with the national support level organizations to synchronize the intertheater and intratheater distribution process.

The JDDOC enhances AV and ITV providing commanders increased confidence in the deployment and distribution system. The enforcement of Defense Department and theater-level ITV policies enhances commanders' assurance in the supply pipeline reducing the need for duplication of requisitions to ensure they receive the needed forces and materiel. When augmented by the National Partners, the JDDOC's enhanced reachback capability can work issues prior to or during any movement in the pipeline.



The visibility of the flow of personnel, equipment, and materiel in the deployment and distribution system and capability to control common-user transportation assets facilitates:

- Alignment of movement requirements with the geographic combatant commander priorities,
- Reducing bottlenecks and disconnects at the seams of the intertheater and intratheater distribution processes,
- Planning of follow-on

transportation arrangements prior to personnel or cargo arrival at the port of embarkation, port of debarkation, or intermediate transportation points in theater.

JDDOC also provides the capability to forecast sustainment requirements. The JDDOC Sustainment Division has visibility over all Service requirements, can analyze usage rates, replenishment times, and make recommendations on forward stocking locations and levels in the AOR/JOA.

Leveraging visibility of both strategic and tactical airlift



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requirements, the JDDOC is able to significantly enhance intratheater movement and maximize the efficient use of airlift assets. **In a specific example from USCENTCOM:** prior to the CDDOC, the theater of operations had limited visibility of strategic airlift operating within the AOR. The CDDOC, using its reach-back capability to USTRANSCOM was able to identify and coordinate the use of strategic lift in “hold status” awaiting the next mission for intratheater air movements. This activity created a new paradigm -- strategic airlift could be employed to meet intratheater requirements. In the first month of employing strategic airlift in support of theater movement requirements, the CDDOC coordinated the movement of over 800 short tons of cargo.



The combination of in-theater expertise augmented by supporting command and agency experts vastly improves the deployment and distribution processes and reduces the cost to the taxpayer. In another specific CDDOC example, the collaboration resulted in container detention charges slashed by nearly \$14 million per month.

Section IV – Doctrinal Implications

This section explores some of the joint doctrine implications associated with establishing the JDDOC structure in the geographic combatant commands. The JDDOC touches 24 joint doctrine publications. However, the six publications most significantly impacted by the roles and missions of JDDOC are JP 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, JP 4-0 *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*, JP 4-01, *Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System*, JP 4-01.3 *JTTP for Movement Control*, JP 4-07 *JTTP for Common-User Logistics during Joint Operations*, and JP 4-09 *Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution*.

JP 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, 7 September 1999, is currently being revised and JDDOC impacts or logistical support to deployment operations is being included in the revision.

JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*, 6 April 2000, is the capstone publication for the logistic support of joint operations. The JDDOC will require a revision of JP 4-0 to incorporate the DPO and national support level commands, agencies, staffs and Service roles and responsibilities as executed under the JDDOC construct. This document is under revision.

The **additional planning capabilities** JDDOC brings to the supported combatant commander should be codified in JP 4-0. As part of the supported combatant commander's staff, the JDDOC coordinates supply, transportation, and related logistics activities.

Additionally, the future of joint logistics must be juxtaposed with authorities established by Title 10, United States Code, and in policy, and the results need to be clarified in JP 4-0. The JDDOC is tasked with coordinating the deployment and distribution priorities of the combatant/joint force commander. Per current JP 4-0 guidance, "**Implementation and execution of logistic functions** remain the responsibility of the Services and the Service component commanders. **Each Service is responsible** for the logistic support of its **own forces**, except when logistic support is otherwise provided for by agreements with national agencies or allies, or by assignments to common, joint, or cross-servicing." The Title 10 USC responsibilities of the Services often trumps the need to ensure the efficient and effective use of logistics in a joint way during operations. This issue remains unresolved.

The **Joint Theater Logistics (JTL)** element(s)' roles and missions, as outlined in JP 4-0, have been superseded by the Joint Movement Center (JMC) as outlined in the more recent JP 4-01.3. The JDDOC assumes the coordination of supply distribution formerly addressed by the JMC. The JP 4-01.3 prescribed JMC would now be replaced by the JDDOC.

JP 4-01, *Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System*, 19 March 2003, outlines the employment of the Defense Transportation System. The JDDOC

supports the execution of the transportation mission through collecting, prioritizing and synchronizing requirements for the movement of personnel and materiel during peacetime, conflict, or wartime for the supported combatant commander.

The JDDOC Mission Branch is the single point of entry for the geographic combatant commander with the Defense Transportation System and provides visibility and analysis of intertheater and intratheater requirements. The revised JP 4-01 should capture this new supported combatant command capability.

JP 4-01.3, *JTTP for Movement Control*, 9 April 2002, covers JTTP for integration, management, and utilization of common-user air, sea, and land transportation at the combatant command level. JP 4-01.3 states the geographic combatant commander should consider assigning responsibility for theater transportation movement control to a single joint office, which is the JMC. The JDDOC transforms the JMC mission outlined in JP 4-01.3, Chapter III.

Additionally, the JDDOC provides more, and greater, support than the JMC outlined in JP 4-01.3 by adding the Mission, Sustainment, and Information and Systems Integration Divisions. The interaction of the JDDOC divisions, coupled with reach-back capabilities, enhance strategic visibility of forces and materiel. These additional capabilities should be incorporated in the JP 4-01.3.

Appendix A to JP 4-01.3, *Joint Movement Center Organization and Functions*, should be revised to reflect the JDDOC organization and functions.

JP 4-07 *JTTP for Common-User Logistics during Joint Operations*, 11 June 2001, discusses the Common-User Logistics (CUL) concept and rationale in Joint operations. The JDDOC operation directly affects the planning and execution of the CUL. Additionally, the JDDOC executes portions of the planning and the coordinating and execution roles JP 4-07 assigns to the combatant command J4 and the component commands.

Again, the **Joint Theater Logistics Management (JTLM)** element(s)' roles and missions, as outlined in JP 4-07, have been superseded as discussed above. The JDDOC defines the roles and relationship of the geographic combatant commander with the supporting national level agencies and commands providing support. These organizations are now represented on the geographic combatant commander's staff with reachback capability.

JP 4-09 *Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution*, 14 December 2001, covers the planning and execution of global distribution operations in support of the Armed Forces of the United States. JP 4-09 provides the wherewithal to execute deployment, sustainment, retrograde, and redeployment; outline guidance on global distribution, networks, responsibilities and command relationships; and interact with defense and federal agencies. JDDOC provides the core capabilities to synchronize "all elements of

the logistic system to deliver the “right things” to the “right place” at the “right time” in order to generate and sustain the military capability required by joint forces.”¹⁷

Again, the distribution aspects of **Joint Theater Logistics Management (JTLM)** as discussed in JP 4-09 would now be supported by the JDDOC construct.

JP 4-09 will provide the overarching umbrella for global distribution concept; reducing the seam between intertheater and intratheater deployment and distribution movements.

Additional Doctrine publications affected by JDDOC include:

- JP 3-05.1 *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Special Operations Task Force Operation*, 19 December 2001
- JP 3-07.6 *JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, 15 August 2001
- JP 3-08V1 *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol 1*, 9 October 1996
- JP 3-10 *Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations*, 28 May 1996
- JP 3-10.1 *JTTP for Base Defense*, 22 July 1996
- JP 3-17 *Joint Doctrine and JTTP for Air Mobility Operations*, 14 August 2002
- JP 3-18 *Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations*, 16 July 2001
- JP 3-30 *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*, 5 June 2003
- JP 3-31 *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*, 23 March 2004
- JP 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, 7 September 1999
- JP 4-01.2 *JTTP for Sealift Support to Joint Operations*, 9 October 1996
- JP 4-01.4 *JTTP for Theater Distribution*, 22 August 2000*
- JP 4-01.5 *JTTP for Transportation Terminal Operations*, 9 April 2002
- JP 4-01.7 *JTTP for use of Intermodal Containers in Joint Operations*, 7 January 1997*
- JP 4-02.1 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Logistics Support in Joint Operations*, 6 October 1997
- JP 4-02.2 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Patient Movement in Joint Operations*, 30 December 1996
- JP 4-07, *JTTP for Common-User Logistics during Joint Operations*. 11 June 2001
- JP 4-08, *Joint Doctrine for Logistics Support of Multinational Operations*, 15 September 2002
- JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, 13 April 1995
- JP 5-00.2 *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, 13 January 1999

¹⁷ Joint Publication 4-09, *Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution*, 14 December 2001, p. vii

* The Joint Doctrine Working Party has approved the consolidation of JP 4-01.3, JP 4-01.4 and JP 4-01.7 with JP 4-09 with the final document being JP 4-09.

Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications

- **Doctrine:** The major doctrinal changes involve updating JPs 3-35, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.3, 4-07 and 4-09 to reflect what JDDOC brings to the supported combatant commander and how it relates to other organizations in the AOR.
- **Organization:** Organizational change requirements for the geographic combatant commanders will be minimal. The JDDOC builds on existing theater resources.
 - Geographic combatant commanders need to develop Joint Manning Document (JMD) and agreements in collaboration with national partners/supporting commands to foster expectations and trigger commitment for support. The geographic combatant commander and National Partners should identify Echelon 2 In-AOR Plus-Up and Echelon 3 augmentation requirements, respectively.
 - Geographic combatant commanders need to identify what portions of their JDDOC capability (i.e. JDDOC-Fwd) that will be forward deployed in support of existing theater engagement plans and likely scenarios.
- **Training:** JDDOC training of the core and In-AOR Plus-Up personnel and other augmentation should be a continuous process. Training falls into two broad categories: individual and collective.

- **Individual Training**

Skill sets are defined as those processes and software tools in which an individual must be competent to perform assigned duties. The geographic combatant commander is responsible for training its Core and In-AOR Plus-Up personnel in the basic skill sets required by their position. National Partners are responsible for ensuring Echelon 3 deploying personnel have the skill sets required for the positions they will occupy upon arrival in theater.

- **Collective Training**

The execution of contingency operations and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Exercise Program warrants the expansion of the JDDOC Core through the use of In-AOR Plus-Up personnel and Echelon 3 augmentees. While these personnel are technically competent in the basic skill sets required by their duty position, collective training is required to integrate these individuals into the ongoing JDDOC operations.

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Collective training in support of contingency operations and the CJCS Exercise Program focuses on re-familiarization of processes and software systems used in support of JDDOC operations. How this collective training is executed, is dependent upon whether the JDDOC is being scaled in support of contingency operations or a CJCS Exercise.

- **Materiel:** The majority of the materiel needed to support the JDDOC requirements is addressed through the Joint Theater Logistics initiatives and Joint Capabilities Development and Experimentation. Further consideration should be given to developing a deployable 'systems' package to support the increased scale of the JDDOC upon the activation of the Echelon 3 augmentation.

- **Leadership and Education:**

The JDDOC concept and processes should be incorporated in Joint Professional Military Education and Service education programs.

The Services logistics education programs should ensure individuals have a broad knowledge of the JDDOC capabilities.

Service and commands need to ensure members assigned to a JDDOC have the knowledge to influence the deployment and distribution processes.

- **Personnel:**

Manning requirements for the JDDOC Core will normally be satisfied by internally reorganizing existing geographic combatant commander personnel assets. In-AOR Plus Up, requirements should be met through the use of local assets available to the geographic combatant commander such as Service component personnel, in-theater reserve component organizations, and Individual Augmentees. The "plug and play" Echelon 3 augmentees will be provided by those specific organizations as required.

Leadership must ensure personnel possess the right skill sets (not just the right military specialty code), and experience to augment the JDDOC.

- **Facilities:** One of the greater challenges facing geographic combatant commanders is identifying a facility large enough to accommodate the JDDOC. Commands should ensure co-location of all divisions and branches to ensure synergy. **Facilities should accommodate the scalability of the JDDOC.**

Section V - Conclusions

The Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC) provides a significant organizational improvement in supporting geographic combatant commanders. The addition of national support level commands, agencies, staffs and Service representation in theater on the combatant commander's staff with reachback capability, bridges the seams between the strategic-national and tactical pipeline. Further work is required to address several issues. One is how to best push capabilities forward to a Subordinate Unified (Subunified) Commander and/or subordinate Joint Task Force (JTF) or multinational force (MNF) Commander with a JDDOC-Fwd. The decision to deploy JDDOC capability forward is operationally dependent and determined by the geographic combatant commander in coordination with the Subunified, JTF, or MNF Commander.

The JDDOC's authorities must be made clear if the JDDOC is to be efficient and effective. To reach its full potential, the JDDOC, acting under the control, direction, and auspices of the geographic combatant commander must be able to effectively monitor, coordinate, and synchronize deployment, redeployment, and distribution operations and enhance the supported commander's ability to execute logistics plans with the support of National Partners. This may include authority to direct intratheater force movements and distribution.

Further examination of the roles and missions of the USCENTCOM Theater Support Control Center (TSCC) with respect to the JDDOC could reduce the overall logistics command and control footprint and streamline communications. This deeper examination will also require a determination of the optimum points for communications and coordination with multinational and coalition forces.

While PAM 8 is intended to promote doctrinal change based on the JDDOC concept, synergistic and parallel efforts to advance and refine the related tenants of joint logistics are ongoing. Some of these related concepts and initiatives under development include the Focused Logistics-Joint Functional Concept definition of Joint Theater Logistics (JTL), JTL Lessons Learned Approach Packages, the Joint Force Projection and Sustainment for Full Spectrum Operations initiative, Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept, and the Joint experimentation Deployment and Support capability concept. It is important to understand that in all related concepts and initiatives, the JDDOC advancements will be the building block for the final solution and its effort will not be discarded but rather incorporated or enhanced.

The United States will increasingly be part of coalition and multinational operations hence, the United States must integrate joint deployment and distribution operations with coalition/multinational partners. The OIF Major Combat Operations (MCO) lessons learned report and the Joint Theater Logistic initiatives both address the need to strengthen US policies and procedures to better interoperate within coalition and multinational environments. Additionally, in future scenarios, the DOD will be increasingly involved with interagency and inter-governmental entities (state and local

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governments, in the case of USNORTHCOM). While the generic JDDOC structure contains a Combined Operations Integration Division for multinational interface, and a Sustainment Division Support Branch for interagency interface, further refinements in these areas are required.

Part 1 - Glossary

Part 1 – Abbreviations and Acronyms

AOR	area of operations
AV	asset visibility
CDDOC	USCENTCOM Deployment Distribution Operations Center
CFLCC	Combined Forces Land Component Command
CJCS	Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
CONUS	continental United States
CUL	common user logistics
DDOC	deployment distribution operations center
DIRMOBFOR	director of mobility forces
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
DPO	distribution process owner (USTRANSCOM)
DTS	defense transportation system
E2E	end to end
FLJFC	Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept
GATES	global air transportation execution system
GTN	global transportation network
HN	host nation
IA	Individual Augmentee
ITV	in-transit visibility
JDDOC	joint deployment distribution operations center
JDPO	Joint Deployment Process Owner (USJFCOM)
JFP&S	joint force projection & sustainment
JL(D) JIC	joint logistics (distribution) joint integrating concept
JMC	Joint Movement Center
JMD	joint manning document
JOA	joint operations area
JOC	joint operating concepts
JTL	joint theater logistics
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
JWFC	Joint Warfighter Center
JxDS	joint experimentation deployment and support
MCO	major combat operations
MNF	Multinational Force
MOU	memorandum of understanding
NCA	National Command Authority
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NMS	national military strategy
OEF	Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

OIF	Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
TSCC	theater support control center
TTP	tactics, techniques and procedures
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command

Part 2 – Terms and Definitions

Deployment — 1. In naval usage, the change from a cruising approach or contact disposition to a disposition for battle. 2. The movement of forces within operational areas. 3. The positioning of forces into a formation for battle. 4. **The relocation of forces and materiel to desired operational areas. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intercontinental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas.** See also **deployment order; deployment planning; deployment preparation order.** Source: JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

Distribution — 1. The arrangement of troops for any purpose, such as a battle, march, or maneuver. 2. A planned pattern of projectiles about a point. 3. A planned spread of fire to cover a desired frontage or depth. 4. An official delivery of anything, such as orders or supplies. 5. **The operational process of synchronizing all elements of the logistic system to deliver the “right things” to the “right place” at the “right time” to support the geographic combatant commander.** 6. The process of assigning military personnel to activities, units, or billets. Source: JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

End to End (E2E): End-to-end from the point of manufacture or storage location to the “hand-off point” or “logistics release point” as designated by the supported combatant commander or supported joint force commander (e.g., a point where wholesale supplier throughputs directly to a direct support capability for further “tactical” distribution).

Fusion: In current joint doctrine, fusion is associated with the intelligence function. It is suggested here, the same concept applies to deployment and distribution information – and an integrative process of examining all sources of information to derive a complete assessment (i.e. create knowledge) from these activities to support the geographic combatant commander’s priorities and decisions.

Joint Theater Logistics: The capability for the joint force commander (JFC) to apply logistics resources to generate and sustain force employment that spans the range of military operations (ROMO) throughout an assigned theater or joint operations area. JTL includes organization, authorities and processes over assigned and attached forces to achieve desired joint and combined effects and operational objectives. It involves the management of a collective and synchronized set of activities, operations, organizations and tools which enable the application of joint logistics capabilities from strategic resource partners to tactical commanders (to include contractors, logistics civil augmentation exploitation of captured materiel and support capabilities) in support of two or more military department components. (Source: JTL Council of Colonels, approved by General Officer Steering Committee 26 July 2005)

Knowledge: Knowledge, in this case, refers to processed or interpreted information useful to sustain situational awareness and to make good plans and rapid execution decisions about deployment and distribution.

Liaisons: Liaisons ensure contact or intercommunication is maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action (source: JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*). In this case National Partner liaisons of the JDDOC can also serve a vital staff role, providing expert knowledge to the supported command and staff about the capabilities and activities of their parent organization which remains in a supporting-to-supported relationship.

National Partners: An interdependent and collaborative relationship among USTRANSCOM, the Services, DLA, and other supporting organizations to create an integrated national support capability for the supported combatant commander.

National Support Elements (NSEs): NSEs are any national organization or activity supporting national forces that are a part of a multinational force. Their mission is nation-specific support to units and common support that is retained by the nation. Source JP 1-02 *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

Pipeline: In logistics, the channel of support or a specific portion thereof by means of which materiel or personnel flow from sources of procurement to their point of use. Source JP 1-02 *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

Reachback: Reachback is the process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed. Source: JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

Scalability: For this publication, there are two aspects of scalability: complexity and workload. It is the ability for the staff or commander to continue work when the *complexity* of the problem increases. Also, this quality includes the ability for staff and commander to increase or decrease in capacity in order to meet increasing/decreasing *workloads* over a period of time.

Staff Supervision: Staff supervision is the process of advising other staff officers and individuals subordinate to the commander of the commander's plans and policies, interpreting those plans and policies, assisting such subordinates in carrying them out, determining the extent to which they are being followed, and advising the commander thereof. Source: JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

Throughput: The average quantity of cargo and passengers that can pass through a port on a daily basis from arrival at the port to loading onto a ship or plane, or from the discharge from a ship or plane to the exit (clearance) from the port complex. Throughput is usually expressed in measurement tons, short tons, or passengers. Reception and storage limitation may affect final throughput. Source: JP 1-02 *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

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Techniques- (DOD) Non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks. See also procedures, tactics. Source: JP 1-02 *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

Tactics- (DOD) The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. See also procedures, techniques. Source: JP 1-02 *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

Procedures- (DOD) Standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks. See also tactics, techniques. Source: JP 1-02 *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

“Unquestionably, the JDDOC concept has proven to be a key logistics enabler. The challenge before us is to codify the concept in policy, doctrine and training.”

**Memorandum from General Richard B. Myers
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
7 July, 2005**

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