HISTORY OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN
1946–2012

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Foreword

Faced with the need to establish unified command of US military forces in peacetime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1946 created an organizational directive, the “Outline Command Plan,” which was the first in a series of documents known as Unified Command Plans. Approved by the President, the Unified Command Plan prescribes high-level command arrangements for operational forces on a global basis; its structure and the organizational philosophies that structure represents have had a major impact on US military operations in the post-World War II era. Thus, the History of the Unified Command Plan is a useful guide for those engaged in the development of current military policy and strategy as well as an important reference for students of US policy and strategy during the Cold War.

The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946–2012, covers the formulation of the plan, modifications, and periodic revisions. This volume includes four separate histories that were originally classified and an update covering the period from 1999 to 2012. The section describing the development of the Unified Command Plan between 1946 and 1977 was written by Dr. Robert J. Watson, Mr. James F. Schnabel, and Mr. Willard J. Webb and first published in declassified form in the late 1980s. The section covering the period from 1977 to 1983 was written by Dr. Ronald H. Cole and published in a classified version in 1985. The two sections covering 1983 through 1999 were prepared by Dr. Walter S. Poole. Dr. Edward J. Drea prepared the Overview and the update covering 1999 to 2012. Ms. Penny Norman prepared the volume for publication.

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Overview

Following the experience of global warfare in World War II, the Services recognized the importance of unity of military effort achieved through the unified command of US forces. Generally, over the next 50 years, the Unified Command Plan did adapt to the changing strategic environment and to great advances in technology, particularly the growing global reach of US forces. But there were failures, notably the cumbersome command organization for the Vietnam War. The recurring difficulty lay in creating an organizational scheme that would centralize control without impinging upon what the Services saw as their basic roles and functions. Much of the history of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) involves debates over how commands should be organized. Such disputes usually pitted those who wanted commands organized by geographic areas against those who advocated forming commands according to functional groupings of forces. Command by forces or functions seemed to restrict Service prerogatives, while command by areas appeared to preserve them. The importance and intractability of this dispute is, perhaps, best demonstrated by tracing three particularly difficult sets of command arrangements, those for the Pacific Ocean and Far East, strategic nuclear forces, and general purpose forces based in the continental United States.

During 1945 and 1946, Pacific command organization became the main obstacle to completing an “Outline Campaign Plan,” the first version of the UCP. A line had to be drawn between a geographically organized Pacific Command (PACOM) and a Far East Command (FECOM) that was functionally organized for the occupation of Japan. The Army pushed for assigning command by forces or functions, a position based on its advocacy of a Department of Defense (DOD) under strong centralized direction. Behind the Navy’s insistence upon command by geographical area lay its desire for a loosely coordinated DOD organization that would preserve Service autonomy. Command arrangements, the Navy argued, had to reflect the reality that ships were not tied to functions but constantly steamed from one area of responsibility into another. Whether to place the Bonin and Mariana Islands under PACOM or FECOM became the bone of contention. The Navy saw all Pacific islands as one strategic entity, while the Army insisted that FECOM be able to draw upon military resources in the Bonin-Marianas during an emergency. Accordingly, the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), was given control over local forces and facilities in these islands, while naval administration and logistics there fell under Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). In 1951, during the Korean War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) shifted responsibility for the Bonin and Mariana Islands as well as the Philippines and Taiwan from FECOM to PACOM. Five years later, with the Korean War over and the Japanese peace treaty concluded, FECOM was disestablished over Army protests and PACOM gained control over that area.

Command arrangements for the Vietnam War were complex and unsatisfactory. The Army failed to gain approval either for creating a Southeast Asia Command or for raising Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), to a unified command with PACOM in a supporting role. Instead, under CINCPAC, the Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), largely controlled forces and operations within South Vietnam; CINCPAC delegated to its Service components, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) and Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), responsibility for conducting air and naval operations against North Vietnam and Laos; PACFLT also retained control of 7th Fleet forces provid-
ing gunfire support and air strikes on targets in South Vietnam. Control of B-52s remained under the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air command (CINCSAC), but targets in South Vietnam were selected by COMUSMACV, refined by CINCPAC, and approved in Washington. CINCPAC’s domination of command arrangements created resentment among senior Army and Air Force officers. In 1972 the Army Chief of Staff was General William Westmoreland, a former COMUSMACV. He nominated and pressed for the current COMUSMACV, General Creighton Abrams, to become CINCPAC. Westmoreland’s effort failed. But after Abrams became Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), he argued for radical changes in the command structure in the Pacific. Joined by the Chief of Staff, Air Force (CSAF), General George Brown, who had commanded 7th Air Force in Vietnam, Abrams proposed disestablishing PACOM, making the Pacific Fleet a specified command, and creating four new unified commands: western Pacific, eastern Asia, northeast Asia, and southwest Pacific. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger preserved PACOM, accepting the Navy’s arguments that since the Pacific area was a single geographic entity, four commands would interfere constantly with each other in a time of crisis. Indeed, Schlesinger expanded PACOM: CINCPAC was given responsibility for the Indian Ocean. During the 1980s the Army repeatedly pressed for creation of a northeast Asia command; even the end of the Cold War did not close the debate. The history of PACOM demonstrated both the viability and limitations of a large area command.

Control of strategic nuclear forces raised some of the same issues: jointness versus Service prerogatives, functional versus geographical command. In 1946 the Army Air Force (AAF) advocated a Strategic Air Command controlled by one commander and operating globally. The Navy insisted that SAC neither control forces normally based in other commands nor duplicate specialized search and rescue efforts. The Navy’s desires were accommodated and SAC was designated the first specified command—an organization which controlled only the forces of a single Service. Then, in the late 1950s, the problem of fitting Polaris ballistic missile submarines into the nuclear command structure provoked a heated debate. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Arleigh Burke, argued that the operations of Polaris submarines had to be coordinated with other naval forces and, therefore, they must be allocated by area to the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), European Command (EUCOM) and PACOM. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, totally disagreeing, proposed putting all long-range missiles, their launch platforms and heavy bombers under one strategic command. In August 1960, the Secretary of Defense decided against making SAC a unified command and the Air Force failed to gain control over all strategic nuclear weapons systems. Instead, CINCSAC became the Director, Strategic Target Planning, supported by a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) with a Navy deputy. The JSTPS coordinated the process of identifying and prioritizing nuclear targets and then of matching weapons against them. Admiral Burke fought vigorously but vainly against the JSTPS, even carrying his case to the President. Subsequently, the Navy tacitly allowed the Air Force to dominate the JSTPS. This compromise integrated nuclear targeting while allowing each Service to protect its own prerogatives, the Air Force by controlling the bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of SAC, the Navy by controlling its submarines through the naval components of LANTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM.

During 1982 to 1983, a proposal was made to centralize the handling of all nuclear weapons within a strategic nuclear forces command. Here, and again in 1987, the JCS considered and rejected a unified strategic command on grounds that the SAC/JSTPS system worked satisfactorily. But arms control agreements and the end of the Cold War considerably reduced the size and importance of the strategic nuclear arsenal. Because the strategic nuclear mission mattered less, the Services’ basic interests were
no longer at stake. Quickly, long-standing barriers to unified command of strategic nuclear forces fell away. The Chairman, General Colin L. Powell, USA, and the CINCSAC, General George Lee Butler, USAF, took the lead in pushing through reorganization. The US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) began operations on 1 June 1992, and, simultaneously, SAC ceased to exist. In July 1993, mainly to conform to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks II (START II) treaty, combatant command of heavy bombers and strategic reconnaissance aircraft was shifted from USSTRATCOM to the newly expanded Atlantic Command.

No issue connected with the UCP provoked more debate than unified command of deployable general-purpose forces based in the continental United States (CONUS). In 1961 these forces consisted of the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), the composite air strike forces of Tactical Air Command (TAC), and Navy and Marine Corps units not assigned to unified commands. Secretary Robert S. McNamara asked the JCS to develop a plan for integrating STRAC and TAC under a unified command. The Army and Air Force readily concurred, provided that a new command eventually would include Navy and Marine Corps units. The Navy, claiming that its flexibility would suffer in a command tailored to STRAC and TAC, suggested either organizing joint task forces or giving transport aircraft to the Army. The Marines favored doing nothing more than developing a joint doctrine for the employment of these forces. McNamara decided to activate Strike Command (STRICOM), under an Army general, with the missions of conducting joint training, developing joint doctrine, providing a general reserve, and planning contingency operations as directed by the JCS. The Navy and Marines wanted the UCP to state that STRICOM would consist only of Army and Air Force units. McNamara refused but did not integrate Navy and Marine units into the command.

It was not simply the absence of Navy and Marine units that denied STRICOM the ability to act as joint force integrator. In 1962, when the Army started organizing an air assault division, the Army and Air Force separately assessed its requirements for tactical mobility and air support; both Services sought more air mobility assets. Secretary McNamara ordered CINCSTRIKE, General Paul D. Adams, USA, to test and evaluate the joint aspects of Army air mobility concepts. But the Army balked at using a standard “Reorganized Army Division” (ROAD) to support Air Force tests. Early in 1964 the JCS (less the Air Force) proposed and Secretary McNamara agreed that the Army would test its air mobility concepts unilaterally and then recommend for joint testing any concepts needing validation. When CINCSTRIKE sought a larger role, the JCS limited him to “actively observing” Army tests, thereby abruptly ending joint evaluation of Army concepts.

Subsequently, CINCSTRIKE planned to use a ROAD brigade to test the Air Force concept for air mobility during the autumn of 1964. McNamara ordered CINCSTRIKE to evaluate an Army air assault exercise, to allow comparison of the ROAD and air assault divisions. The tests were scheduled concurrently. CINCSTRIKE asked the Army to postpone its test for two weeks to allow his team to observe both; the Army refused. The JCS did allow CINCSTRIKE to establish a joint observer group to monitor both exercises but would not let him use the existing Inter-Service Coordination Board for that purpose. Despite its support of STRICOM, Army attitudes had not advanced to the point of allowing joint evaluation of an important Army program. The JCS acquiesced in this approach.

In 1963 STRICOM was given regional responsibilities. At a time when intervention in the Congo seemed possible, the Army and Air Force proposed making STRICOM responsible for planning and operations in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (MEAFSA). Otherwise, they argued, existing unified commands would have to execute operations using forces they had not trained and
plans they had not prepared. The Navy saw no need for major changes; the Marine Corps worried that adding area responsibilities would lead to a worldwide general purpose forces command. McNamara, agreeing with the Army and Air Force, did expand CINCSTRIKE’s responsibilities to include MEAFSA. Subsequently, though, events undermined this change. In 1964, EUCOM, not CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA, coordinated a hostage rescue mission in the Congo because EUCOM provided the transports that carried Belgian paratroopers. In 1967, for the same reason, EUCOM conducted noncombatant evacuation operations from Middle East countries during the Arab-Israeli War. In both cases, the unified command with the nearest forces, not STRICOM, executed the mission.

In 1970 a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommended merging LANTCOM and STRICOM into a tactical or general purpose command, incorporating all CONUS-based general purpose forces assigned to organized combat units. This idea surfaced 20 years too early and nothing came of it. Instead, in 1971 STRICOM/MEAFSA was disestablished; its replacement, a new Readiness Command (REDCOM), was a version of the original STRICOM. The post-Vietnam climate, with public feeling running against further overseas involvements, militated against a “Strike” command with far-flung responsibilities. In 1974 the Navy and Marine Corps recommended replacing REDCOM with a joint training and exercise headquarters. Secretary James Schlesinger refused. He made REDCOM responsible for contingency planning and providing a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters staff for future operations but gave REDCOM neither additional assets nor area responsibilities. The 1970s witnessed a reaction in DOD against the centralization of the McNamara years, and the restrictions placed upon REDCOM reflected this trend.

When Southwest Asia became a top strategic priority in the late 1970s, the Army and Air Force pressed for assigning REDCOM all responsibility for major contingencies there. The Navy and Marine Corps repeated their long-standing preference: let a CONUS-based JTF headquarters carry out planning and exercising, but pass operational control of forces to EUCOM once their deployment took place. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown approved the Navy-Marine solution, but that proved to be only the first step. Spurred by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, what ultimately emerged was the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) as the combatant area command, with REDCOM as its force provider. USCINCREDEC kept his role limited and did not accomplish major initiatives in joint doctrine and integration. When the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was activated in 1987, budgetary constraints meant that a unified command had to disappear. REDCOM was the obvious choice.

Enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act in 1986, followed by the appointment of General Powell as Chairman, brought about a major change of course. Powell was determined to make full use of his powers in fostering changes in the organization of combatant commands. Early in 1986, a Blue Ribbon Panel had proposed creating three major functional commands for strategic, logistical, and tactical or general-purpose forces. Pressure from civilian leaders brought about the activation of the US Transportation Command (USTRANSOCOM) in 1987. But TRANSOCOM’s Service components retained operational command over their forces, controlled procurement and industrial funds, and bore responsibility for performing Service-unique missions. General Powell worked with Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney to push through a charter that gave the US Commander in Chief, Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS) a peacetime as well as a wartime mission, and made him the single manager of transportation assets in place of the Service Secretaries.

Not only was creation of USSTRATCOM basically the work of Generals Powell and Butler but General Powell also took the initiative in creating a CONUS-based command designed to deal with
contingencies and perform the function of joint force integrator. He believed that, while the unified command system worked well overseas, CONUS forces were Service-oriented. Drawing upon the experiences of DESERT SHIELD/STORM, he rejected Marine arguments that a CONUS-based command that was globally oriented could not acquire regional expertise. Because it was CONUS-based and its Cold War mission had been greatly reduced, Powell selected US Atlantic Command (USACOM), in which all Services would be represented. As of 1 October 1993, an expanded USACOM had as its components Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) (which lost its status as the last specified command), Air Combat Command (ACC), Marine Forces Atlantic (MARLANT), and Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT). The Army wanted USACOM to control west coast Navy and Marine forces but argued against giving it any area responsibilities. Powell decided to do just the opposite. Thus USACOM uniquely melded area and functional responsibilities. As the joint force integrator, it promised to open a new chapter in the evolution of the joint system.

During the second half of the 1990s, the organization and focus of USACOM continued to be a major issue facing joint planners. In late 1995, a new UCP assigned the waters off the Central and South American coasts including the Caribbean basin, the Gulf of Mexico and portions of the Atlantic Ocean (all formerly part of the USCENTCOM AOR. While USACOM at this point retained a geographic AOR, its future roles appeared linked to joint training and doctrine. Satisfied with the direction taken in 1995, the Chairman, General John M. Shalikashvili, oversaw evolutionary changes, principally the assignment of former Soviet states to the geographic AORs of USEUCOM and USCENTCOM, during the next UCP revision. The Western Slavic and Caucasus states—Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—were assigned to USEUCOM and the Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan—came under USCENTCOM’s aegis in the Unified Command Plan approved in January 1998.

The next cycle of UCP revision took up more far reaching change. In response to increasing threats from terrorism, the new Chairman, General Hugh H. Shelton, USA, commissioned a study of how the UCP should evolve as far forward as 2010. Chief among Shelton’s concerns were homeland defense and a further revision of USACOM’s role to address issues surrounding joint training and joint force integration. After considering CINC recommendations, Joint Staff proposals and a contractor study titled UCP 21, Shelton decided to give a redesigned USACOM the lead on a variety of joint issues including developing joint responses to emerging threats. Accordingly in the UCP approved on 29 September 1999, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) replaced USACOM. USJCOM would serve as the lead joint force integrator, the lead agent for joint force training, and the DOD executive agent for joint force experimentation. Operating under USJFCOM, JTF-Civil Support would plan for and integrate DOD assistance to the federal agency leading the response to an attack using weapons of mass destruction within the United States.

The UCP has exhibited great adaptability for more than 60 years of war and peace. Revisions led to improved joint effort and enhanced COCOM authority. Unity of effort had suffered during the Korean War because of the FECOM commander’s overreliance on an army staff and during the Vietnam War because the Defense Secretary dealt directly with the theater commander, circumventing PACOM. Worsening inter-Service rivalry in the immediate post-Vietnam era adversely affected US operations in Grenada and led to congressionally mandated reforms in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. Redefining the Chairman’s role enabled him to promote jointness via reorganized combatant commands and newly established functional commands. These reforms yielded decisive results in the first Gulf War of 1991.
The 21st century’s decade-long war on terror caused the UCP to adapt to multiple conflicts, including two major contingency operations, and simultaneously integrated new technologies, reorganize COCOMs, and establish AFRICOM to meet emerging issues. JFCOM’s success in inculcating a joint culture made its mission redundant. The dynamic continued between OSD initiatives for greater centralized control of the COCOMs without impinging on what the Services or the COCOMs understood as their fundamental roles and missions.
PART ONE

1946–1977
Origins in World War II

Unified command over US operational forces was adopted during World War II. It was a natural concomitant of the system of combined (US-British) command set up during that conflict by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Unified command called for a single commander, responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assisted by a joint staff, and exercising command over all the units of his assigned force, regardless of Service. The system was generally applied during World War II in the conduct of individual operations and within geographic theater commands.

Even before the war ended, the Joint Chiefs of Staff envisioned retention of the unified command system in peacetime. They agreed that when General Eisenhower’s combined headquarters (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force) was dissolved, he would then become the commander of all US forces in Europe. A directive appointing General Eisenhower as Commanding General, US Forces, European Theater (CG USFET), was issued by the JCS on 28 June 1945, soon after V-E Day.

In the Pacific, attempts to establish a unified command for the entire area proved impossible. Service interests precluded the subordination of either of the two major commanders in that area (General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz). During the final campaigns in the Pacific, therefore, these two officers held separate commands, as Commander in Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific (CINCAFPAC), and Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), respectively.

The First Unified Command Plan, 1946

The impetus for the establishment of a postwar system of unified command over US military forces worldwide stemmed from the Navy’s dissatisfaction with this divided command in the Pacific. On 1 February 1946, the CNO characterized the existing arrangement, with Army and Navy forces under separate command, as “ambiguous” and “unsatisfactory.” He favored establishing a single command over the entire Pacific Theater (excluding Japan, Korea, and China), whose commander would have a joint staff and would exercise “unity of command” over all US forces in the theater.

This CNO proposal was discussed at some length. It was opposed by representatives of the Army and Army Air Forces, who favored unity of command on a basis of assignment of mission and forces, rather than assignment of area of responsibility. The Navy’s plan, they feared, would deprive General MacArthur of control of ground and air forces that he might need for his mission.1

After considerable discussion, a compromise emerged as part of a comprehensive worldwide system of unified command for US forces under JCS control. The resulting “Outline Command Plan,” which was in effect the first Unified Command Plan, was approved by President Truman on 14 December 1946. It called for the eventual establishment, as an “interim measure for the immediate postwar period,” of seven unified commands. These commands, their areas of responsibility, and their missions were as follows:

**Far East Command.** US forces in Japan, Korea, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, the Marianas, and the Bonins. Its commander, CINCFE, would carry out occupation duties, maintain the security of his
command, plan and prepare for a general emergency in his area, support CINCPAC, and command US forces in China in an emergency.

**Pacific Command.** Forces allocated by the JCS within the Pacific area. CINCPAC would defend the US against attack through the Pacific, conduct operations in the Pacific, and maintain security of US island positions and sea and air communications, support US military commitments in China, plan and prepare for a general emergency, and support CINCFE and CINCAL.

**Alaskan Command.** US forces in Alaska, including the Aleutians. CINCAL would protect Alaska, including sea and air communications, and protect the United States from attack through Alaska and the Arctic regions. He would plan and prepare for a general emergency and support CINCFE, CINCPAC, and CG SAC.

**Northeast Command.** US forces assigned to Newfoundland, Labrador, and Greenland. CINCNE would maintain the security of his area and defend the United States against attack through the Arctic regions within his command; protect sea and air communications in his area; control Arctic airways as appropriate; support CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, (CINCLANTFLT) and SAC; and plan and prepare for a general emergency.

**Atlantic Fleet.** Comprising forces assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, US Navy. CINCLANTFLT would defend the United States against attack through the Atlantic; plan and prepare for a general emergency; and support US forces in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Northeast, and the Caribbean.

**Caribbean Command.** US forces in Panama and the Antilles. CINCARIB would defend the United States against attack through his area; defend sea and air communications (with CNO coordinating between CINCARIB and CINCLANTFLT); secure the Panama Canal and US bases in Panama and the Caribbean; plan and prepare for a general emergency; and support CINCLANTFLT.

**European Command.** All forces allocated to the European Theater by the JCS or other authority. CINCEUR would occupy Germany, support the national policy in Europe “within the scope of his command responsibility,” and plan and prepare for a general emergency.

The general principles established by the UCP were as follows:

Unified command in each command will be established in accordance, in so far as practicable, with Chapter 2, paragraph 12, of Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, [with] component forces consisting of Army, Army Air, and Naval forces. Forces assigned to a command will normally consist of two or more components and each will be commanded directly by an officer of that component. Each commander will have a joint staff with appropriate members from the various components of the Services under his command in key positions of responsibility. Commanders of component forces will communicate directly with appropriate headquarters on matters such as administration, training, and supply, expenditure of appropriate funds, and authorization of construction, which are not a responsibility of a unified command. The assignment of forces and the significant changes therein will be as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The JCS would exercise strategic direction over all elements of the armed forces. They would assign forces to the unified commands and prescribe the missions and tasks of those commands. The Services would retain operational control of all forces not specifically assigned by the JCS. Each unified command would operate under a designated Service Chief acting as executive agent for the JCS: the Chief of Staff, US Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; or the Commanding General, Army Air Forces (CG, AAF) (later Chief of Staff, US Air Force).
By a separate provision of the UCP, the JCS recognized the existence of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), a command of the Army Air Forces (later USAF) which was not normally based overseas. It was made up of strategic air forces of the Army Air Forces not otherwise assigned. The commander of SAC was responsible to the JCS, but no specific mission was assigned to him by the JCS at that time. SAC became the first example of what was later designated a specific command though the term did not come into use until 1951.2

CINCFE, CINCPAC, CINCAL, CINCEUR

Approval of the UCP did not in itself establish the commands named in the plan; a separate implementing directive was required for each command. The first three to be created were the Far East Command (FECOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), and Alaskan Command (ALCOM). A JCS directive of 16 December 1946 established these commands effective 1 January 1947. The executive agents for these commands were the CSA, CNO, and CG, AAF, respectively.3

The next to be established was the European Command (EUCOM), established by directive of 24 February 1947, effective 15 March 1947, with the CSA as executive agent. In effect, CINCEUR was simply a new title for CG USFET. Since the latter had earlier been given direct command over US ground forces in Europe, no intermediate Army component headquarters was necessary.4

CINCLANT

For the Atlantic, the original UCP would have set up a purely naval command under JCS direction (CINCLANTFLT). On 5 August 1947 the CNO recommended instead that CINCLANTFLT be established as a fully unified commander under the broader title of Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT), and with its mission being “to conduct operations in the Atlantic,” instead of the narrower phraseology used in the UCP: “to control the sea and secure the airways through the Atlantic.” Also, the relations between the Atlantic and Caribbean Commands required clarification, in the CNO’s view. Finally, the CNO recommended that the JCS assume direction of US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (NAVEASTLANTMED, formerly US Naval Forces Europe, or USNAVEUR).5

The Army and Army Air Forces members on the JCS considered it “neither necessary nor desirable” to broaden the status and mission of CINCLANTFLT as the CNO desired or to give CINCLANTFLT command over ground and air forces. The JCS postponed action on this matter while they dealt with less controversial aspects of unified command. Effective 1 November 1947, CINCARIB and CINCLANTFLT were activated, and CINNAVEASTLANTMED (shortened in May 1948 to CINCNELM) was placed under JCS direction. The CSA became executive agent for CINCARIB and the CNO for the other two. CINCARIB assumed command of all US forces in the Caribbean Islands and the Panama area except for certain fleet units and facilities that were placed under operational control of CINCLANTFLT.6

A few days later, the CNO renewed his suggestion for the establishment of a unified Atlantic Command. This time his colleagues withdrew their objections, and on 1 December 1947, the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) was created under the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT).7

Thus by the end of 1947, action had been taken on all of the seven commands envisioned in the original UCP except the Northeast Command (CINCNE). This presented political difficulties involving
the Canadian Government, as described below. Meanwhile the National Security Act of 1947 had been passed by Congress and signed by the President; it gave the JCS a legal basis for existence and affirmed their responsibility for establishing unified commands in “strategic areas,” “subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense.”

Developments in 1948

As a result of continuing controversies over the roles and missions of the Services, the Secretary of Defense met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Key West, Florida, in March 1948 and worked out a detailed statement of the functions of each Service and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This Key West Agreement, approved by the President and the Secretary of Defense and formally issued on 21 April 1948, recognized the JCS responsibility for unified commands and allowed them to authorize unified commanders “to establish such subordinate unified commands as may be necessary.” It also sanctioned the practice, already well established, of designating a JCS member as executive agent for each command.

Several months later, mounting tensions in Europe led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enlarge CINCEUR’s mission somewhat. On 30 June 1948, they directed CINCEUR to supervise and coordinate all plans and actions of US forces under his command (and such other forces as might be made available in a general emergency) and to maintain reserve forces that could be employed elsewhere in an emergency.

Neither CINCEUR nor other unified commanders had been assigned logistic or administrative responsibilities under the original UCP. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized a need to grant them such responsibilities and did so in an amendment to the UCP on 7 September 1948. Commanders of unified commands were made responsible for “coordination of logistic and administrative support of the component forces of their unified command,” subject to legislative limitations, departmental regulations, and budgetary considerations.

On 29 September 1948, the JCS assigned to CINCNELM responsibility for joint planning at the theater level for implementation within his area of joint plans directed by them. “This planning,” they stated, “will be accomplished for all three US Military Services, and will include plans for the employment of such other forces as may be available for meeting a general emergency. CINCNELM’s planning for employment of the Strategic Air Forces will be confined to logistic planning in support of such operations.”

The status of SAC as a command under JCS direction was clarified by two directives issued by the JCS in 1949. On 4 January they designated the CSAF their executive agent for SAC. On 13 April the missions of CG, SAC, (or CINCSAC, as he was later called) were set forth. He was charged with command over all forces allocated to him by the JCS or other authority and was assigned definite missions, including the conduct of strategic air operations or such other air operations as the JCS directed and with the support of other commanders under the JCS. He was also charged with planning for his assigned missions.

Northeast Command

The question of activating the Northeast Command, to cover the approach route for enemy attack across Greenland, Labrador, and Newfoundland, was addressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1948. At that time, the CNO expressed opposition to the establishment of a unified command in that
area. There were, in his view, too few US forces there to justify a unified command; moreover, its location in foreign territory would provide excellent propaganda for the communists and would generate misunderstanding and friction with Canada and the United Kingdom. The CNO favored instead an Air Force command in the area, under JCS operational control exercised through the CSAF (in effect, a specified command). The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force rejoined that the JCS would be “derelict if they did not provide a command structure for the efficient, integrated control of . . . forces” in the area in question. Thereupon, the CNO evidently withdrew his objection. In April 1949 the JCS approved the establishment of the Northeast Command and sought approval from the Secretary of Defense to issue a directive for the command. Recognizing the political sensitivity of the issue, they cautioned the Secretary against publicity and urged that the action be coordinated through the US/Canadian Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD). This recommendation was adopted; the Secretary of Defense instructed the US section of the PJBD to inform their Canadian colleagues that the United States intended to establish the command.\textsuperscript{14}

The Canadian Government asked that the new command be titled “US Forces, Northeast.” As a compromise, the JCS suggested “US Northeast Command,” which Canada accepted. By a JCS decision on 29 August 1950, approved by the Secretary of Defense on 8 September, the US Northeast Command was established effective 1 October 1950, with the CSAF as executive agent.\textsuperscript{15}

**Changes in the European Theater, 1949–1952**

Important political developments occurring in Europe in 1949 were reflected in altered command arrangements. On 23 May 1949, the JCS removed US Forces in Austria from assignment to EUCOM, setting up these forces as an independent command responsible directly to the JCS. Several weeks later, when the President appointed a civilian High Commissioner for Germany, CINCEUR was relieved of his responsibilities as Military Governor of Germany. Changes in his mission affected by the JCS spelled out his relationship with the High Commissioner.\textsuperscript{16}

The year 1949 also saw the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (NATO). In the ensuing months, NATO moved to shore up the defenses of Western Europe against a possible attack from the east. These developments showed a need for a stronger US air command in Europe. The JCS approved establishment of the Commander in Chief, US Air Forces in Europe (CINCUSAFE), on 20 November 1950 at the same level as CINCEUR and CINCNELM. Since those two commands were in effect Army and Navy commands, the result was three separate Service commands for the European area. The CSAF was named the JCS executive agent for CINCUSAFE. Missions of CINCLANT, CINCEUR and CINCNELM were modified as necessitated by creation of the new command.\textsuperscript{17}

In 1951 the position of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), was established and to be held by a US officer. SACEUR was given “operational command, to the extent necessary for the accomplishment of your mission,” of all US forces in Europe, regardless of Service: that is US [Army] Forces, Europe; US Air Forces, Europe; and US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.

The precise relationship between SACEUR and US commands remained to be spelled out in detail. On 7 July 1952, the President approved recommendations by the JCS that effected fundamental changes in unified command in Europe. Those changes vested requisite command authority in one individual. With presidential concurrence, the JCS established a full-fledged unified command in Europe under the title US European Command (USEUCOM) under a Commander in Chief, US
European Command (USCINCEUR), who was also SACEUR. USCINCEUR exercised unified command and authority (except to the extent that operational control was exercised by NATO commanders) over all US forces allocated him by the JCS or other competent authority. He was granted covert limited authority to operate in Berlin, Austria, Trieste and Yugoslavia when so directed by the JCS. USCINCEUR was instructed to establish a US headquarters with a deputy and joint US staff at the earliest practicable date. He was encouraged to delegate extensive authority to his deputy. The existing “JCS commands” in Europe—EUCOM, NELM and USAFE—were designated component commands under the new US European Command, although unilateral Service functions would still be handled through single Service channels. EUCOM was to be given a new title and would continue as a JCS specified command for missions with respect to Berlin. Both NELM and USAFE would continue as specified commands for currently assigned missions outside USCINCEUR’s area of responsibility. The CSA was designated executive agent for USEUCOM, and for the old European Command, now redesignated US Army Forces Europe (USAREUR). The CNO was named executive agent for NELM and the CSAF for USAFE.18

USCINCEUR assumed command in Europe effective 1 August 1952. In a message approved by the Secretary of Defense, the JCS on 2 December 1952 spelled out for USCINCEUR his geographical area of responsibility: Norway, Denmark, Western Germany, Berlin, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Austria, Trieste, the Mediterranean Sea, the Mediterranean Islands (exclusive of the Balearics), Algerian Departments of France, and the United Kingdom, including the territorial waters of those countries. His only authority for the rest of continental Europe was in the field of covert military planning. His North African responsibilities were limited to joint planning in French Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya and to military aspects of negotiations for base rights. The Secretary of Defense delegated some of his responsibilities concerning the Mutual Security Program (MSP) in Europe to USCINCEUR on 15 July 1952. He directed that USCINCEUR administer the military aspects of the MSP, including the control and administration of military units engaged in military assistance. USCINCEUR would also coordinate US military matters that were of joint logistical or administrative nature, including military assistance activities, US military procurement, base rights negotiations, and base construction.19

Clarifying Responsibilities, 1950

Following a review of missions and deployments of US forces, the JCS approved several changes to the basic UCP on 16 February 1950. They removed South Korea from CINCFE’s area of responsibility but added the Volcano Islands, while also divesting CINCFE of some responsibilities for China. CINCEUR was relieved of his requirement to maintain reserve forces, and CINCAL and CINCNE were charged with coordinating Arctic airways. Finally, the statement that the UCP was an “interim measure” was deleted.20

The status of forces under one unified commander operating within the general area assigned to another commander was the subject of a JCS directive of 27 April 1950. The JCS did not intend to limit unified commanders rigidly to fixed geographic boundaries but wished rather to leave them free to operate where necessary to carry out their assigned missions. Commanders were authorized to extend operations into areas normally under cognizance of another commander if necessary for the accomplishment of assigned tasks. In routine operational matters, commanders under the JCS
were enjoined to coordinate closely with each other. Forces sent to reinforce a unified commander (or other commander operating under JCS direction) would be assigned to that commander’s operational control.21

Adjustments in areas of responsibilities affecting CINCARIB, CINCLANT and, to a lesser extent, CINCPAC, were ordered by the JCS in the early 1950s. In changes to the UCP suggested by the CNO and approved by the JCS on 18 July 1950, CINCLANT was given the missions of protecting Caribbean sea communications, to include antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations and the control, routing, and protection of shipping. Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier (COMCARIBSEAFRON), would perform these missions for CINCLANT. Additionally, CINCLANT was charged with furnishing CINCARIB with sealift in an emergency. CINCARIB’s mission was modified accordingly. He was also directed to coordinate with British, Venezuelan, and Dutch authorities in protecting oil fields in Venezuela, Trinidad, and Curacao. These changes brought questions from both CINCLANT and CINCARIB, which called forth clarifications on 21 August 1950. The JCS made CINCLANT responsible for protection of the Pacific Ocean approaches to the Panama Canal and made it clear that COMCARIBSEAFRON was directly responsible to CINCLANT for protection of sea communications in the Caribbean and the Pacific approaches. (In early 1951, protection of the Pacific approaches to the Panama Canal was reassigned from CINCLANT to CINCPAC.)22

Command in the Far East during the Korean War

The outbreak of the Korean War and subsequent developments in the Far East put the US unified command there to a test, which it passed readily. Although General MacArthur, as CINCFE, had been relieved of responsibility for South Korea, early US reactions to the North Korean attack on 25 June 1950 were taken through his command, which was conveniently located for the purpose. These initial reactions, including logistic support to the Republic of Korea (ROK); protection of evacuation; air operations; and, eventually, ground operations were taken with presidential approval outside the authority of the unified command under the UCP. On 10 July at the request of the United Nations, President Truman directed General MacArthur to establish the United Nations Command (UNC) for purposes of operations against the North Korean invaders. From that point General MacArthur, as CINCFE, supported the operations of the UNC, which he commanded as CINCUNC. However, his primary responsibility as CINCFE remained the defense of Japan. Over the strong objections of CINCFE, the JCS transferred the Marianas-Bonin and Volcano Islands from his responsibility and placed them under CINCPAC. The President concurred in this action on 9 April 1951. Further transfers of responsibility from CINCFE were approved by the JCS in late 1951, when they made CINCPAC responsible for US security interests in the Philippines, the Pescadores, and Formosa.23

In seeking presidential approval of these actions, the JCS also noted a need for a change in the provisions in the UCP relating to the control of units designated for atomic operations. The existing UCP assigned these units to the control of SAC but provided that in case of “dire emergency” other commanders might request authority from the JCS to assume temporary operational control of such units. The JCS now recommended that when lack of communications prevented a commander from applying to the JCS for such authority in a “dire emergency,” he might assume temporary operational control without further authorization. On 22 January 1952, the Secretary of Defense approved this and the other amendments to the UCP recommended by the JCS.24
In the Far East Command as organized under General MacArthur, there were component commanders for the Air Force and Navy: Commanding General, Far East Air Forces (CG FEAF), and Commander, Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVFGE). General MacArthur himself, however, retained direct command of Army components, wearing a second hat as Commanding General, Army Forces Far East (CG AFFE). His staff was essentially an Army staff, except for a Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), which had Air Force and Navy representation. In 1952, after General MacArthur had left ECOM, the headquarters of Army Forces Far East was fully staffed and placed on a par with the other two component commands, and the Far East Command was given a truly joint staff.25

**Interim Revision of the UCP, 1952–1953**

The establishment of USEUCOM in July 1952 with attendant changes in the command structure in Europe, as described earlier, pointed to a need for a new UCP. A draft revision submitted by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense on 24 December 1952 incorporated these changes and extended USCINCEUR's responsibilities to include planning for military operations in Spain and Yugoslavia. At the same time the revision proposed to centralize ASW responsibilities under CINCLANT and CINCPAC in their respective areas, ending the existing situation whereby ASW responsibility in the Atlantic was divided among CINCLANT, CINCNELM, and CINCNE.26

The revised plan also listed those responsibilities given USCINCEUR for coordinating logistical and administrative matters, such as military assistance and base rights negotiation. Because the CSA was listed as the executive agent for USCINCEUR, the plan could be read as broadening the responsibilities of executive agents beyond the sphere of strategic direction and operational control of forces. This aspect of the plan attracted unfavorable attention from the new administration that took office in January 1953, just after the JCS plan was completed. The new Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, at once began a review of DOD organization and functions, focusing particularly on the role of executive agents. On 13 February Secretary Wilson instructed the JCS to rewrite the plan to stipulate that USCINCEUR's logistic and administrative responsibilities were exercised on the authority of the Secretary of Defense. Thus revised, the plan was approved by the Secretary on 30 June 1953, purely for use in the preparation of emergency plans and without prejudice to later modifications. The JCS promulgated the plan, with this limitation, on 24 July 1953.27

**1953 Change in the Executive Agent System**

The Eisenhower administration's review of DOD organization stemmed from a promise made by General Eisenhower during his successful campaign in 1952. The result was a reorganization plan sent to Congress in April 1953. This plan had several objectives, one of which was to strengthen civilian control of the military forces. With this end in view, the President directed that authority to appoint executive agents for unified and specified commands be transferred from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, who would name the secretary of a military department to act in this capacity for each command (although the Secretaries would be authorized to delegate this responsibility to the military Chiefs of their Services). This change, according to the President, would strengthen civilian control by fixing responsibility along a definite channel of accountable civilian officials. It would also
allow the Joint Chiefs to concentrate on strategic planning and policy advice by freeing them from operational responsibilities.28

The transfer of authority to name executive agents was accomplished by revising the Key West Agreement on 21 April 1948. The Secretary of Defense approved the revision on 1 October 1953 and circulated it on 16 March 1954. On 15 January 1954, he designated the following executive agencies for the unified and specified commands: the Department of the Army for the Far East Command, Caribbean Command, and US European Command; the Department of the Navy for the Atlantic Command, Pacific Command, and US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean; and the Department of the Air Force for the Alaskan Command, US Northeast Command, Strategic Air Command, and US Air Forces, Europe.29

An Air Force Component for CINCPAC

At the beginning of 1954, the US Air Force component commander for CINCPAC also held the position of senior US Air Force officer of the Pacific Division, Military Air Transport Service. Since this officer had no staff as component commander, he could not adequately assist CINCPAC in performing his assigned missions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 April 1954, in connection with CINCPAC’s planning for the defense of Taiwan, directed the CSAF to establish an Air Force component of Pacific Command, with a designated component commander and appropriate staff. To avoid duplication, the component commander was to act as a subordinate commander of CG FEAF on matters pertaining solely to the US Air Force. On 5 June 1954, the CSAF announced that the Pacific Air Force would be established effective 1 July 1954 as the Air Force component command under CINCPAC with headquarters in Hawaii.30

Continental Air Defense Command Established

By 1954 the increasing threat of Soviet atomic air attack on the continental United States led the JCS to establish a command, including forces of all three Services, to defend against this new danger. In arriving at this decision, the JCS were responding, in part, to conclusions reached by the Eisenhower administration on the need to improve continental air defenses, including command arrangements.

The actual form of the new organization, arrived at after lengthy discussion, was a “joint,” rather than a “unified” or “specified” command. This terminology was adopted to allow issuance of terms of reference that might not fit exactly the definitions of these two forms of command organization.31

The JCS informed the Secretary of Defense of their intention to form the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) on 25 July 1954; he indicated his approval on 30 July and, in accordance, with a JCS recommendation, named the Secretary of the Air Force as his executive agent for the new command.32


The new command was to consist initially of the US Air Force Air Defense Command, the US Army Antiaircraft Command, and a naval command composed of the forces of the contiguous naval radar coverage system. Forces of the seaward extensions of the early warning system (as distinct from
contiguous forces) were to continue under CINCLANT and CINCPAC, and the early warning installations in Alaska and US Northeast Command were to continue under CINCAL and CINCNE.\textsuperscript{33}

**The Unified Command Plan, 1955**

Earlier, Secretary Wilson had directed the JCS to make recommendations to him with respect to the unified command system areas and executive agent responsibilities. In studying these matters the JCS came to the conclusion that because of unsettled world conditions, no major revisions in the command structure should be made at that time. They agreed instead to bring the limited interim UCP of 24 July 1953 into line with the revised Key West Agreement and the establishment of CONAD. After considerable review and personal consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the JCS submitted a revised UCP for his approval on 18 February 1955. The only substantive changes from the earlier version involved those necessitated by the creation of CONAD and the establishment of an early warning system. On 2 March 1955, the Secretary of Defense approved this revision of the UCP and directed the JCS to keep the unified command structure under continuing review, reporting to him on the subject at least once each year. The plan was distributed on 9 March 1955.\textsuperscript{34}

**Changes in Terms of Reference for CONAD**

After two years’ experience with the command arrangements they had established for CONAD, the JCS concluded that the “double hatted” arrangement by which CINCONAD was also commander of the Air Force Component (Air Defense Command) was not desirable. They accordingly informed the Secretary of Defense on 5 June 1956 that CINCONAD should not serve as the commander of the Air Defense Command but should establish a separate and distinct headquarters (including a joint staff) for CONAD and exercise operational control over all components and assigned forces. However, the JCS could not agree on the meaning of “operational control.” The CJCS, supported by the CMC, CSAF, and CNO, wanted a clear and unequivocal delegation of authority to CINCONAD to centralize control of all operations down to the assignment of targets to individual antiaircraft batteries. The CSA, who was particularly concerned that Army antiaircraft unit commanders would lose the right to engage targets of opportunity, insisted that CINCONAD share responsibility for operational control with his component commanders through a requirement to “coordinate” with them. However, the JCS were all in agreement that CINCONAD’s responsibilities should be strengthened by assigning him specific responsibility to submit estimates of force and weapons requirements to the JCS. The Secretary of Defense resolved the split in favor of the JCS majority; the new terms of reference were issued to CINCONAD on 4 September 1956.\textsuperscript{35}

**Reorganization in 1956: Abolition of CINCFE**

The first of the annual reviews of the UCP directed by the Secretary of Defense was carried out by the JCS in 1956. On 4 June of that year they submitted a revised UCP, in which they proposed some important changes. The responsibilities of CONAD would be enlarged to include air defense of Alaska and the Northeast. The US Northeast Command would be abolished. The Alaskan Command would continue but with sharply reduced responsibility, since it would also lose the mission of protecting sea
communications in Alaskan waters, which would be assumed by CINCPAC. In Europe, USAFE would be abolished as a specified command but would continue as the Air Force component of USEUCOM. A Middle East Command (MECOM) would be established some time in the future, at which time the Navy specified command, CINCNELM, would be abolished. (CINCNELM had already been relieved of responsibility for preparing plans for the Middle East, which had been assigned to an OCJS committee, the Joint Middle East Planning Committee.) CINCARIB’s status would be considerably altered. His responsibility for defending the US against attack through the Caribbean and for security of bases and possessions in that sea would be transferred to CINCLANT. On the other hand, CINCARIB would become responsible for representing US interests and administering the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) in Central and South America (less Mexico); he would also continue to administer the MDAP in the Caribbean Islands. The plan also provided that, unless specifically authorized, no unified commander was to exercise direct command of any of the Service components or of a subordinate force. This would mean that CINCPAC would no longer exercise direct command of the Pacific Fleet, as he had been doing.

The future of the Far East Command was the subject of a disagreement, which the JCS referred to the Secretary of Defense for decision. Four of the members recommended that CINCFE be abolished and his functions turned over to CINCPAC. They believed that the divided command in the Western Pacific–Far East area should be abolished, particularly in view of the dwindling US military strength in Japan and Korea, which cast doubt on the advisability of a separate command for that region. The lone dissenter was the CSA, who argued that an attempt to split up CINCFE’s multiple functions—as a US commander, as commander of the UNC in Korea, and as military governor of the Ryukyu Islands—would produce inefficiency and higher costs. He wanted the Far East Command to be expanded, with CINCFE given responsibility for Southeast Asia, Taiwan, Indonesia, and the Philippines, places where the CSA perceived a growing communist threat. Especially, he wanted CINCFE to assume the supervision of military assistance in those regions.36

The Secretary of Defense approved the proposed new UCP on 21 June 1956. In so doing, he approved the disestablishment of CINCFE, effective 1 July 1957. The President subsequently approved his decisions, and the revised plan was distributed on 3 July 1956. A JCS directive had already abolished USAFE as a specified command on 1 July. The US Northeast Command was disestablished effective 1 September 1956.37

An outline plan for disestablishing CINCFE and redistributing his responsibilities was approved by the JCS and the Secretary of Defense and took effect on 1 July 1957. A subordinate unified command under CINCPAC was established in Japan: Commander, US Forces (COMUS) Japan. The senior US Army officer in Korea was designated Commander, US Forces, Korea (COMUSKOREA), directly subordinate to the Commanding General, US Army, Pacific (CG USARPAC); he was also named CINCCUNC. CG, USARPAC, became governor of the Ryukyu Islands.38

CINCPAC, whose responsibilities were enlarged upon the disappearance of FECOM, gave up direct command of the Pacific Fleet, in accord with the UCP of 3 July 1956. He delegated this command to the Deputy CINCPAC. Later (13 January 1958), the Deputy position was abolished and replaced by Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), as the naval component command of PACOM.39

The disestablishment of FECOM was reflected in a revised UCP drawn up by the JCS in 1957 following their annual review of the unified command system. During this review, at the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, they examined the advisability of retaining ALCOM. They concluded
that, despite ALCOM’s reduced responsibilities, its strategic location and its responsibilities for ground defense of the Alaska area justified its retention.40

Establishment of CINCNORAD; Alteration of CINCONAD’s Status

In September 1957 a combined US-Canadian command, the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), was established to defend the Continental United States, Canada, and Alaska against air attack. At that time CINCONAD was also designated CINCNORAD, and the establishment of this US-Canadian command made a new directive for CINCONAD necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly issued terms of reference to CINCONAD, effective 10 June 1958. CINCONAD was designated senior US officer in NORAD headquarters and given operational control over US forces assigned to him in carrying out the following missions: defending US installations in Greenland against air attack; assisting in the defense of Canada and Mexico; and coordinating and implementing purely national matters pertaining to the air defense of the continental United States and Alaska.41

Department of Defense Reorganization, 1958

By 1958 President Eisenhower had become convinced that rapidly developing military technology, as dramatized by the launching of the first Soviet satellite, Sputnik, demanded a more unified and streamlined chain of command to deploy combat forces. The days of separate land, sea and air warfare were over, the President believed; therefore complete unification of all military planning and combat forces and commands was essential. To this end, the President proposed and the Congress enacted the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, amending the National Security Act of 1947.

The new law authorized the President, acting through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice of the JCS, to establish unified and specified commands, to assign missions to them, and to determine their force structure. This provision did not alter procedure or confer any new authorities, since under the 1947 law the JCS had taken these actions subject to the “authority and direction” of the President. The intent of the new law was to establish a clear line of command from the President through the Secretary, with the JCS as the Secretary’s operational staff. The commanders of unified and specified commands were made responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense for carrying out assigned missions and were delegated full “operational command” over forces assigned to them. Forces, once assigned, could only be transferred with presidential approval. However, responsibility for administration of these forces remained with the respective Military Departments.42

By separate executive action, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, discontinued the designation of military departments as executive agents for unified and specified commands. Henceforth, the chain of command would run from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified commanders. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were assigned to serve as the Secretary’s staff in performing this function. Orders issued by them to the commands would be in the name of, and under the authority of, the Secretary of Defense.43

Necessary revisions of the UCP to bring it into conformity with the Defense Reorganization Act were approved by the President and issued by the Secretary of Defense, based on JCS recommendations, on 4 September 1958. They were issued to the commanders on 8 September. This revised plan redesignated CONAD a unified rather than a joint command. It also authorized component commanders
to communicate directly with their Service Chiefs on administration, personnel, training, doctrine, logistics, communications, and other matters of uniservice interest.\(^{44}\)

The Secretary of Defense, again on JCS advice, took an additional step to implement the Reorganization Act on 2 February 1959, when he approved a definition for “operational command,” as delegated by the Act to commanders of unified and specified commands. It contained the following elements: to direct the composition of subordinate forces, assign tasks, designate objectives, control overall assigned resources, and exercise full authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational command would be exercised through Service component commanders or commanders of subordinate commands, if established. This definition was included in the 1963 revision of the UCP and amended to state specifically that operational command did not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training.\(^{45}\)

The Revised Unified Command Plan, 1961

A revised UCP was approved by the President on 30 December 1960 and issued to commanders on 4 February 1961. It introduced only one significant substantive change in existing authorities of unified and specified commanders: deletion of the authority for a commander, in times of dire emergency, to assert operational command of forces scheduled for, or actually engaged in, operations under war plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This deletion was made on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who feared the consequences to the orderly conduct of operations that might result from a diversion of forces by a unified or specified commander. Of particular concern was any diversion of SAC forces engaged in assigned general war missions, where centralized control over timing, penetration, and weight of effort were essential to a successful effort. Of lesser concern were the possible adverse effects of diversions of naval and ground forces transiting a unified command area en route to accomplish assigned missions in other areas. In addition, provisions of CINCONAD’s terms of reference were incorporated in the UCP and his separate terms of reference rescinded.\(^{46}\)

Refining Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Responsibilities

Political developments in the Middle East, Africa, and the Caribbean during the 1960s presented new challenges to the United States and called for adjustments in the military command structure. The first of these changes concerned the Middle East. Pending activation of a Middle East Command, CINCNELM was acting as specified commander responsible for the conduct of operations in countries east of Libya and south of Turkey, and in the Arabian and Red Seas and the Bay of Bengal. In 1959, however, reconsideration of this temporary arrangement became necessary because the Department of State opposed creation of a military command in the Middle East. When queried by the JCS, USCINCEUR and CINCNELM each insisted that he was best qualified to assume Middle East planning responsibilities. The Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff agreed with USCINCEUR, on grounds that assignment of these functions to CINCNELM might violate the 1958 Reorganization Act’s concept of unity of command and that it was “an anomaly” for CINCNELM, a subordinate of USCINCEUR, to exercise operational control over the forces of his superior. In fact, they favored disestablishment of CINCNELM as a specified command. But the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) maintained that experiences in Suez and Lebanon demonstrated the necessity for retaining a specified commander
(i.e., CINCNELM) unencumbered by NATO responsibilities. Concurrently, two additional problems arose. First, the CNO proposed that CINCNELM’s title, in his capacity as naval component commander to USCINCEUR, should be changed to USCINCNELM— an appellation more descriptive of his responsibilities in USEUCOM. Second, the CSAF complained about CINCNELM’s practice of identifying himself as Commander in Chief, Specified Command, Middle East (CINCSPECOMME), saying that the JCS had neither recognized nor authorized that title. The CNO, in rebuttal, defended the use of the title as “a very practical and customary means of facilitating the performance of CINCNELM’s Middle East mission.”

In February 1960 the Secretary of Defense settled these questions on the basis of an “interim solution” suggested by the JCS Chairman. First, CINCNELM was renamed CINCUSNAVEUR when acting in his component capacity. Second, CINCNELM was confirmed as a specified commander and authorized to carry out contingency and general war planning and to continue coordinated planning with the British. Third, CINCNELM would cease using the title CINCSPECOMME. If he conducted operations in the Middle East, he would do so as CINCNELM.

CINCLANT’s Assumption of African Tasks

Communist penetration of the chaos-ridden Congo created another set of new command problems. In November 1960, the Secretary of Defense gave CINCLANT the responsibility for plans and operations pertaining to sub-Saharan Africa; he also instructed CINCLANT to establish a small Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF-4) under an Army lieutenant general. Several months later, in response to a JCS request, Secretary Robert S. McNamara changed the UCP’s wording so that CINCLANT no longer bore responsibility for “routine” matters in sub-Saharan Africa but was, instead, responsible for contingency planning and for commanding any JCS-directed operations.

A controversy arose over whether CINCLANT was now excluded from “routine” sub-Saharan operations. The CNO and the CMC recommended that he assume responsibilities similar to those assigned to all other unified commanders. The CSA and CSAF asked that the matter be deferred to allow further study. In July 1961 Secretary McNamara apportioned sub-Saharan responsibilities as follows: Military Assistance Program (MAP) to USCINCEUR and the Secretary of the Army, Congo air evacuation to USCINCEUR, and the Congo sea evacuation to CINCLANT.

Command Changes for Cuban Operations

The emergence of a communist regime in Cuba added to CINCLANT’s burdens. In April 1961 CINCLANT asked the JCS to activate Army and Air Force components (CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT) already authorized under general provisions of the UCP. He cited, as justification, increased planning requirements for Cuba and the Congo. In July the CNO and the CMC recommended to their colleagues that CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT be activated. The CSA and CSAF replied that Tactical Air Command (TAC) and Continental Army Command (CONARC) were already giving CINCLANT sufficient planning support. Secretary McNamara’s decision was as follows. First, CINCLANT should be provided with an adequate staff; the JCS Chairman would decide how many Army and Air Force officers should be so assigned and whether their billets would be permanent. Additionally, COMTAC and CG, CONARC, were told to designate interim Army and Air Force component commanders, who would assist in Cuban
contingency planning. They chose CG, XVIII Airborne Corps, and Commander, 19th Air Force. The Secretary did not authorize any further steps at that time because CINCLANT possessed no significant Air Force and Army units and JTF-4 supplied adequate support for sub-Saharan planning.

The Cuban missile crisis tested CINCLANT’s supporting organization. On 20 October 1962, when the quarantine of Cuba was being prepared, CINCLANT designated COMTAC and CG, CONARC, as interim Air Force and Army component commanders for contingency planning. (In September, on his own initiative, COMTAC had assumed the duties of CINCAFLANT). Also, CINCLANT changed the invasion plan by naming CG, CONARC, rather than CG, XVIII Airborne Corps, as Commander, Joint Task Force—Cuba. CINCLANT intended to exercise “operational command” of Service task forces through the component commanders. On 21 October, the JCS transferred from CINCSTRIKE to CINCLANT temporary operational control of all Army and Air Force units involved in Cuban operations. Next day, CINCLANT promulgated a new command structure. The CG, XVIII Airborne Corps, was redesignated CJTF-Cuba; he would report directly to CINCLANT. Thus CG, CONARC, was effectively excluded from the operational chain of command.

The CNO believed that the Cuban missile crisis clearly demonstrated CINCLANT’s need for full-time Army and Air Force component commanders, which every other unified commander possessed. Accordingly, in December 1962, he recommended to the JCS that COMTAC and CG, CONARC, be so designated. No action was taken at the time, however. It was not until December 1966 that COMTAC and CG, CONARC, were designated component commanders for CINCLANT.

During the 1965 Dominican intervention, CINCLANT again exercised operational control over Service task force commanders. A Navy vice admiral supervised evacuation of US citizens and Marine landings; an Army lieutenant general became US Commander, Dominican Republic.

**Strike Command Established**

In 1961 general purpose forces available in CONUS for fast overseas deployment consisted of the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), containing the combat-ready units in Continental Army Command; the composite air strike forces of Tactical Air Command (TAC); and Navy and Marine Corps units not assigned to unified commands. In March 1961 Secretary of Defense McNamara ordered the JCS to develop a plan for integrating STRAC and TAC into a unified command.

The JCS Chairman, the CSA, and the CSAF endorsed this idea, provided that the new command eventually included Navy and Marine Corps units. But the CNO objected that the inherent flexibility of naval forces would be sacrificed if assigned to a command tailored to STRAC and TAC. He suggested instead that troop carrier and ground-support aircraft be made organic to the Army or that a joint task force be organized that would train air-ground teams for augmentation of existing commands. Similarly, the CMC argued that development of a “doctrine” for joint Army-Air Force operations would suffice.

Secretary McNamara ruled in favor of the proposed new command. United States Strike Command (USSTRICOM) was activated on 1 January 1962 under an Army general. USSTRICOM assumed operational control over the combat-ready forces of TAC and CONARC. Its missions were to provide a general reserve for reinforcement of other unified commands, train assigned forces, develop joint doctrine, and plan for and execute contingency operations if ordered by the JCS. It had no regional responsibilities.
In the drafting of an amendment to the UCP incorporating the new command, a further JCS split occurred. The CNO and the CMC wished to include a statement that USSTRICOM would comprise only Army and Air Force units. Their colleagues considered such a statement unnecessary and, indeed, incompatible with the basic considerations appropriately included in the UCP. Secretary McNamara approved their view, and an amendment formally incorporating USSTRICOM into the UCP, omitting the restrictive limitation on forces, was promulgated in October 1962.59

Altered Arrangements for the Middle East and Africa

In December 1962 a US military commitment in the Congo seemed possible. Consequently, the Chairman requested a review of planning and operational responsibilities in sub-Saharan Africa. Under current arrangements, CINCLANT carried the responsibility for planning and conducting operations in this area. The JTF-4 acted as his executive agent; if necessary, it would also serve as the nucleus of a theater headquarters. Related responsibilities were USCINCEUR, for North Africa and for “cold war” and MAP matters in the Middle East; CINCNELM, for planning and operations in the Middle East.60

A long inter-Service controversy, which had to be settled by Secretary McNamara, ensued. The Chairman, supported by the CSA and CSAF wanted CINCSTRIKE to be made responsible for planning and force employment in the Middle East, sub-Sahara Africa, and Southern Asia (MEAFSA). They justified this solution from the standpoint of speed and flexibility. Currently, they contended, “LANTCOM and NELM are required to execute operations with forces they do not have, using force employment plans developed by other commands, while USSTRICOM, with the organization and resources, is restricted to non-combatant functions and responsibilities.” But the CMC feared that this extension of CINCSTRIKE’s responsibilities would lead to creation of a “world-wide General Purpose Forces Command,” which he opposed. He therefore advocated assigning all Middle East and Sub-Sahara responsibilities to CINCNELM. The CNO saw no need for major changes; CINCNELM was thoroughly familiar with Middle Eastern problems, and the likelihood of a major military confrontation in Africa struck him as remote.61

Secretary McNamara decided that CINCSTRIKE’s responsibilities should expand to include MEAFSA. Since the Department of State voiced concern about African reaction to the title “CINCSTRIKE,” he assigned to the commander the concurrent title of “CINCMEAFSA.” On 30 November 1963, CINCSTRIKE became responsible for planning and operations in the Middle East, sub-Sahara Africa, and Southern Asia. He also would continue coordinated Middle East planning with the British in London. MEAFSA included the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf; CINCLANT’s area encompassed the western Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and the Bay of Bengal. COMTAC and CG, CONARC, became CINCMEAFSA’s Air Force and Army component commanders; in 1966, CINCLANT became his naval component. On 1 December 1963, NELM and JTF-4 were disestablished. USCINCEUR no longer faced the paradoxical situation of his naval component commander also being a specified commander responsible to the JCS. Further, the shearing of USCINCEUR’s MAP and Cold War duties in the Middle East reduced USEUCOM to NATO-Europe and North Africa west of Egypt, making it more accurately a European command.62

The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted to the Secretary of Defense the necessary changes in the UCP to reflect these decisions. He directed that they be incorporated, along with all other recent changes in the complete revision of the Plan. This revision was submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 15 October 1963 and was subsequently approved by the President, with effective date of 1 December 1963.63
Nonetheless, implementing these new arrangements was not without practical difficulties. In 1964, when hostages in the Congo had to be rescued, USCINCEUR, rather than CINCMEAFSA, coordinated the operation because USEUCOM provided the transports that carried the Belgian paratroopers. For the same reason, during the 1967 Middle East war, USEUCOM arranged the evacuation of Americans from Jordan as well as Libya.\(^6^4\)

**CARIBCOM becomes USSOUTHCOM**

On 17 August 1962, the JCS recommended that the Caribbean Command be redesignated US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), a title that would more nearly reflect the actual geographical responsibilities of the command (Central America, less Mexico, and South America) and thereby facilitate the relations of CINCARIB with Latin American governments. In addition, the new title would emphasize the interest of the United States in promoting the Alliance for Progress, and in encouraging Latin American countries to tighten internal security against communist subversion. The Secretary of Defense, while not objecting to the change in title, withheld his approval until 1 May 1963 because of Congressional criticism of the Latin American Military Assistance Program. The change in title was announced on 11 June 1963 and was incorporated in the revised UCP of 1 December 1963.\(^6^5\)

**CONAD Assigned to Defend against Space Systems**

Political developments were not the only causes for changes in command responsibilities in the early 1960s. Rapidly developing technology also contributed. In June 1963 the Secretary of Defense, concerned that the Soviets might deploy space satellites capable of bombarding the United States, directed the Secretary of the Army to adapt an experimental Nike Zeus unit to attack such space vehicles. This unit was located on Kwajalein, a UN Trust Territory. On Army recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that operational control of this Nike Zeus unit, when employed to shoot down satellites, be assigned to CINCONAD. They recommended this assignment to CINCONAD rather than CINC-NORAD (who, as commander responsible for the air defenses of North America, would seem to be the logical choice), because of delicate political and security considerations arising from employing nuclear weapons based on a UN Trust Territory to perform a mission that was, in itself, politically sensitive.\(^6^6\)

The Secretary of Defense approved this command arrangement in principle on 29 July; appropriate changes were made in the UCP revision that went into effect on 1 December 1963.\(^6^7\)

**Command Relations in the Vietnam War**

Command over US forces engaged in the war in Vietnam was exercised by CINCPAC, in whose command area the scene of operations lay, and by CINCSAC, who retained command of SAC forces employed in the war. CINCPAC’s command authority was delegated to three subordinates: COMUS-MACV; Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF); and, CINCPACFLT.

COMUSMACV, the first of the PACOM subordinate commanders to assume Vietnam responsibilities, was appointed on 8 February 1962 to take control of an expanding US program of advice to South Vietnamese military forces and of operations by US military forces (largely air transport or helicopters) being introduced to support South Vietnamese combat operations. When President
Kennedy directed the establishment of a new US command in Vietnam, the Secretary of Defense called for the creation of a new unified command reporting to him through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCPAC objected to this arrangement on the grounds that communist pressures throughout Southeast Asia dictated a unified military effort for the area as a whole. They proposed that this could best be accomplished by a subordinate unified command under CINCPAC. This was the solution adopted.\textsuperscript{68}

As the war intensified and US forces entered combat in increasing numbers, USMACV acquired air and naval component commands. The Commanding General, 2nd Air Division, became the commander of the air component in 1964 and Deputy COMUSMACV for Air in 1965. In 1966 the 2nd Air Division became the 7th Air Force. The air component commander controlled the operations within South Vietnam of all units comprising the 2nd Air Division (or 7th Air Force). At first, the Chief of Naval Advisory Group served as Naval Component Commander. When Marine units landed in South Vietnam in 1965, their commander assumed the responsibility of naval component commander for COMUSMACV, a post he held until 1966. At that time, problems inherent in the formation of Navy units for inshore patrol the previous year led to the appointment of a Navy flag officer to the post of Commander, US Naval Forces, Vietnam. He was responsible, under COMUSMACV, for coastal patrols and operations on South Vietnamese inland waters.\textsuperscript{69}

Introduction of substantial US Army ground forces in Vietnam also required establishment of arrangements to assure the necessary command and control over them. After lengthy debate among authorities in Washington, South Vietnam and Pearl Harbor, the decision was made not to create an Army component command under COMUSMACV but to continue COMUSMACV in a duel-hatted role as overall commander and commander of Army forces.\textsuperscript{70}

COMUSMACV thus commanded all US forces and operations within South Vietnam and certain naval coastal patrol activities in contiguous waters extending out about 30-40 miles. There was one exception to his command authority, however. Air strikes and naval gunfire support on targets in South Vietnam were provided by the 7th Fleet, operating under control of CINCPACFLT.\textsuperscript{71}

Decisions to expand the war beyond the boundaries of South Vietnam and adjacent coastal waters gave rise to new command relationships. In general, command of these operations was exercised by CINCPAC’s air and naval component commanders. Responsibility for conducting air attacks on North Vietnam, designated ROLLING THUNDER, was delegated by CINCPAC to CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT, who directed operations by the 2nd Air Division (later 7th Air Force) and 7th Fleet respectively. COMUSMACV participated in ROLLING THUNDER by exercising an informal operational control over the Vietnamese Air Force, thereby avoiding the necessity for creating a combined command structure. The CG, 2nd Air Division (7th Air Force), coordinated the efforts of all forces engaged in ROLLING THUNDER. Naval surface operations in North Vietnamese waters were the responsibility of CINCPACFLT.\textsuperscript{72}

The decision, taken in 1965, to employ B-52s against targets in South Vietnam brought SAC units into the war in a program entitled ARC LIGHT. They remained under the command of CINCSAC, who, through his subordinate commanders and with assistance of PACOM, prepared the operations plans and conducted the operations. The targets attacked, however, were first selected by COMUSMACV, refined by CINCPAC, and approved for attack in Washington. In 1966, authority to execute ARC LIGHT strikes was delegated to CINCSAC and CINCPAC, with the proviso that any strike that risked a border violation would require Department of State concurrence.\textsuperscript{73}
Developments in the Late 1960s

Only minor changes in the unified command structure took place in the late 1960s. On 17 June 1967, the JCS granted CINCONAD authority to designate his five regional commands as subordinate unified commands. The rationale was that these regional commands were command and control levels through which operational control was exercised over multi-service and multipurpose weapon and environmental systems and that air defense required the coordinated contributions of more than a single Service.74

Over two years later, in late 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the mission, tasks, and organization of USSTRICOM/MEAFSA. They concluded that recent budget restrictions and strategic guidance had lowered the level of forces available for operations in the MEAFSA area. Accordingly, they directed USCINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA on 18 February 1970 to modify his headquarters to provide a capability to undertake only one contingency operation in the MEAFSA area at one time instead of two, as had previously been stipulated.75

Blue Ribbon Panel Considers the Unified Command System

In July 1969, the President and the Secretary of Defense appointed a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, a group of experts from outside the government, to study the organization and management of the Department of Defense. The panel included the “combatant commands” in its study and found the existing structure of eight unified and specified commands cumbersome, imposing “too broad a span of control for a single decision point in time of peace.” Moreover, the panel judged the organization of the commands “excessively layered, unwieldy and unworkable in crises, and too fragmented to provide the best potential for coordinated response to a general war situation.” The panel observed that the area commands did not receive adequate guidance for effective planning and that strategic offensive weapons were divided among several commands. Every crisis within the last decade, the panel said, had required both ad hoc planning and organizational rearrangements.76

In its report to the President on 1 July 1970, the Blue Ribbon Panel recommended a broad reorganization of the Department of Defense that included provision for a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Operations who, among other things, would be responsible for the unified commands. The duties currently delegated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve as the military staff in the operational chain of command for the unified commands would be reassigned to “a senior military officer.” This officer would supervise a separate staff to support military operations and serve as the channel of communication from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the unified commands. The panel also proposed the creation of three major functional commands: a strategic command, including the existing SAC and CONAD; a tactical or general purpose command, incorporating all combatant general purpose forces in the United States assigned to organized combat units; and a logistic command. The panel further proposed to consolidate existing area unified commands into the tactical command by merging LANTCOM and USSTRICOM, and abolishing ALCOM and USSOUTHCOM. Finally, the panel recommended “unfragmented command authority” for the unified commanders and designation of the component commanders as deputies to the unified commander to make “unmistakably clear” that the combatant forces were in the chain of command that ran exclusively through the unified commander.77
The Unified Command Plan, 1971

The Blue Ribbon Panel recommendations concerning the unified commands resulted in no action. But in the meantime, an extensive review of the commands had been undertaken within the Department of Defense. Deputy Secretary David A. Packard initiated this review in September 1969. He directed a study of the need for the US Southern Command. As part of a continuing effort to reduce the US presence overseas, the resulting study, dated 1 March 1970, found a unified combatant command in Latin America incompatible with a policy of low US visibility and with “military requirements.” It therefore recommended disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM and transfer of essential missions to other unified commands. The JCS, however, did not agree. They favored retention of SOUTHCOM, believing that the benefits of “an area-oriented senior US military command” in Latin America outweighed the advantage of the small reduction in US military presence accomplished by the command’s abolition.78

After further review, Deputy Secretary Packard decided to recommend to the President the disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM but, at JCS request, deferred this action, pending an overall review of the unified command structure. Thereupon, the JCS conducted a review but could not reach agreement and forwarded divergent views to the Secretary of Defense on 17 November 1970.79

The JCS remained united in opposing the disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM. Such an action, they believed, would not be in the best interests of the United States in light of the unsettled political conditions in Latin America and the continued evidence of Soviet political and military interest in the region. The JCS also agreed that SAC and CONAD should be retained without change. On other issues, however, they could not reach a consensus. Major questions were the redistribution of the USSOUTHCOM responsibilities should the President decide to abolish the command and the responsibility for the MEAFSA area. The CSA and CSAF would reassign the Middle East to USEUCOM, assign Latin America and the Caribbean Islands to USSTRICOM, and redesignate LANTCOM a specified command. The CNO, however, would abolish USSTRICOM/CINCMEAFSA and USSOUTHCOM as well as ALCOM. The US CINCMEAFSA area would be divided as follows: southern Asia to PACOM, the Middle East to USEUCOM, and Africa south of the Sahara to LANTCOM. The USSTRICOM training and augmentation functions as well as the USSOUTHCOM area would go to LANTCOM and the ALCOM responsibilities would be divided between CONAD and PACOM. The CMC supported the CNO position except to propose that USSTRICOM be redesignated the US Readiness Command (USREDCOM), with unchanged responsibilities.80

These differences were ultimately resolved between Deputy Secretary Packard and the JCS, and the following changes to the Unified Command Plan recommended to the President on 5 March 1971: (1) extension of USEUCOM to include “the Mediterranean littoral, the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Iran”; (2) adjustment of the PACOM area to join with USEUCOM east of Iran and with LANTCOM west of South America and east of Africa, in such a way that LANTCOM would have responsibility for the waters surrounding South America and Africa; (3) retention of ALCOM as a unified command, but with area responsibility altered to assign PACOM the Aleutian Islands; (4) disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM and USSTRICOM/CINCMEAFSA, with area responsibility for Africa south of the Sahara and Latin America unassigned, except for the defense of the Canal Zone, which was assigned to LANTCOM, and with contingency planning for these areas (primarily evacuation and disaster relief) retained by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and (5) establishment of a new unified command, US Readiness Command (USREDCOM), without area responsibility and consisting of CONUS-based forces to reinforce other unified commands. Both SAC and CONAD would be retained without change. These revisions in
the command structure, the Deputy Secretary of Defense explained to the President, adjusted area responsibilities of the major unified commands in a more logical way, improved the responsiveness of the world-wide command structure, reduced manpower and costs, and were consistent with the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Panel. Mr. Packard indicated, however, that the Army had reservations over the disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM and the proposed arrangement for the Canal Zone.81

On 21 April 1971 President Nixon approved all the proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan except for the disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM. That action he deferred, pending “a clarification of the political and diplomatic implications of such a move.” Thereafter, Deputy Secretary Packard directed implementation of the President’s decisions, and on 30 June 1971 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a new Unified Command Plan to be effective 1 January 1972, superseding the version of 20 November 1963.82

Accordingly, on 31 December 1971 USSTRICOM was disestablished and replaced the following day by USREDCOM. CINCSTRIKE became USCINCRED; his headquarters remained at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The new command was tasked with providing a general reserve of combat-ready forces to reinforce other unified commands, conducting joint training and exercises with assigned forces, and developing recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding doctrine and “techniques for the joint employment of forces assigned.” In essence, USREDCOM was a redesignated USSTRICOM divested of its MEAFSA responsibilities.83

On 1 January 1972 the various adjustments in the command areas took place. USCINCEUR became responsible for the entire Mediterranean littoral, the Middle East, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and Iran. CINCPAC assumed responsibility for the countries of southern Asia, much of the Indian Ocean, the Aleutian Islands, and part of the Arctic Ocean. CINCLANT’s area in the Indian Ocean was reduced appropriately. In the previous Unified Command Plan, CINCLANT and CINCPAC were charged with planning for submarine, anti-submarine, and mining operations, together with the control and protection of shipping in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. Now the new plan assigned this planning mission to CINCLANT, CINCPAC, and USCINCEUR, in coordination with CINCSAC, to cover not only the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, but the Arctic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea as well.84

The President took no further action to eliminate USSOUTHCOM and it continued to be responsible for normal operations, other than air defense and protection of sea communications, in Central and South America (less Mexico). The new Unified Command Plan contained only one change for USSOUTHCOM. Except for the defense of the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone, USCINCSO was to orient contingency planning primarily to evacuation and disaster relief. ALCOM, now shorn of responsibility for the Aleutian Islands, also continued without change. Six months previously, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the disestablishment of the ALCOM naval component, the Alaskan Sea Frontier, effective 30 June 1971. Thereafter, responsibility for sea areas contiguous to ALCOM was given to the Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and CINCPAC assigned a liaison officer to CINCAL’s headquarters to provide necessary operational and planning information with regard to the sea approaches to Alaska.85

No changes were made in the Unified Command Plan between 1 January 1972 and 1 July 1975, but a number of related developments did occur. With the signature of the Vietnam Agreement in January 1973 and the subsequent withdrawal of US combat forces from South Vietnam, the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), the subordinate unified command under CINCPAC, responsible for the conduct of combat operations in Vietnam, was disestablished on 29 March 1973. There now remained in PACOM four subordinate unified commands: US Forces, Korea; US Forces, Japan; US Taiwan Defense
Command; and US Military Assistance Command, Thailand; and one multi-Service Headquarters, the US Support Activities Group (USSAG). The last named organization was activated in Thailand on 11 February 1973 in order to retain a capability for resumption of air and naval support to friendly forces in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The USSAG was subsequently disestablished on 30 June 1975 and the US Military Assistance Command, Thailand, on 1 October 1976. None of these subordinate organizations, however, were provided for in the Unified Command Plan.86

In the interest of streamlining a major command headquarters as well as saving nearly 900 military and civilian personnel spaces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved on 24 April 1973 the consolidation of the Headquarters, CONAD, with the headquarters of its Air Force component, the Aerospace Defense Command (ADC). Included in this action was provision for the Commander, ADC, to be raised to a four-star position, with CINCONAD now serving concurrently as Commander, ADC. Simultaneously, a new Deputy CINCONAD position was established and filled by the concurrent assignment of the Commanding General, US Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM), the Army component of CONAD. This consolidation did not affect the structure of the US-Canadian North American Air Defense Command (NORAD); CINCONAD/Commander ADC continued as CINCNORAD. With Secretary of Defense and presidential sanction, the consolidation entered into effect on 1 July 1973. Subsequently the Joint Chiefs of Staff studied, but did not act on, the consolidation of the Headquarters, ARADCOM, with the Headquarters CONAD/ADC.87

On 5 October 1973 the Secretary of Defense directed a review of DOD headquarters with the goal of achieving substantial economies in manpower requirements. He specifically included the unified commands in the review and asked for the impact of 10, 20, and 30 percent reductions in the overall strengths of their headquarters. The JCS provided analyses of the impacts as requested but warned that such reductions would result in loss of flexibility and responsiveness. They pointed out that the unified command system had been restructured on 1 January 1972 and argued that this structure provided a sound basis of organization and should not be altered. Thereafter, the Secretary of Defense took no immediate action to reduce the headquarters of the unified commands.88

Responding to the same Secretary of Defense directive, the Army took various actions in 1974 to reduce headquarters, notably by disestablishing the Army component headquarters in PACOM, ALCOM, and USSOUTHCOM. In USSOUTHCOM the Army discontinued US Army Forces, Southern Command (USARSO), on 31 October 1974. The 193rd Infantry Brigade (Canal Zone) assumed the Army component functions while retaining its mission for the defense of the Canal Zone. The US Army Pacific (USARPAC) was disestablished on 31 December 1974. It was replaced by the US Army CINCPAC Support Group, a field operating agency of the Army charged with providing liaison, advice, and assistance to and coordinating with the CINCPAC Headquarters and the PACOM Service components on Army matters; assisting CINCPAC Headquarters in preparation of plans; and preparing primary Army supporting plans for all areas of PACOM except Korea and Japan. In ALCOM, the 172nd Infantry Brigade (Alaska) replaced the US Army Alaska (USARAL) as the Army component on 1 January 1975 and Headquarters, USARAL, was disestablished.89

1974–1975 Review

The CSA initiated a review of the UCP in 1974. In connection with reductions of Army headquarters, he also reappraised the structure of the unified and specified commands, in light of current political
attitudes, manpower and budget realities. He also established strategic concepts for security of US interests. As a consequence, on 11 January 1974, the CSA recommended a JCS review of the UCP and the submission of appropriate revisions to the Secretary of Defense and the President.90

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did study the command structure and provided their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on 19 March 1974. They favored retention of both USEUCOM and SAC without change and recommended disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM, ALCOM and CONAD. Whereas they had strenuously opposed abolition of USSOUTHCOM in 1969 to 1970, they had now changed their minds. In its place they proposed an austere Latin American Mutual Security Assistance Headquarters for security assistance and representational functions. With respect to planning for defense of the Canal Zone, emergency evacuation, and disaster relief, they did not agree. The CSA and CSAF wanted the mission to go to USREDCOM, while the CNO and CMC, supported by the Chairman, favored LANTCOM. To replace CONAD, the JCS proposed designation of the USAF Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) as a specified command to take over all the CONAD responsibilities, exercise operational command of Army air defense elements, and serve as CINCNORAD. The ALCOM air defense responsibilities would be assumed by CINCNORAD/CINCADCOM; other US forces remaining in Alaska would be administered by their respective Military Departments.

With regard to LANTCOM, PACOM, and USREDCOM, as well as command arrangements for the Middle East/Indian Ocean area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not agree. The CNO, the CMC, and the Chairman favored retention of LANTCOM as a unified command; the CSA and CSAF proposed that it be disestablished and the Atlantic Fleet be designated a specified command responsible for the sea areas currently assigned to LANTCOM. There was a similar split over PACOM, with CSA and CSAF proposing that the Pacific Fleet replace it as a specified command, while the other JCS members supported its retention. In addition, the CSA and CSAF proposed two new mission-oriented unified commands in the western Pacific and eastern Asia as well as a Northeast Asia Command for Korea, Japan, and Okinawa and a Southwest Pacific Command. The CSA and CSAF would keep USREDCOM as currently constituted and assign it responsibility to provide joint task forces for operations in the Caribbean and defense of the Canal Zone. The CNO, CMC, and Chairman recommended elimination of USREDCOM and its replacement with a joint training and exercise headquarters, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for planning and scheduling joint training. Deployment planning in support of other unified commands would be provided for by separate JCS directive.

The 1973 Middle East crisis had caused “increased awareness” of US and Free World interests both in that area and the Indian Ocean. The JCS Chairman recommended the establishment of a new mobile Joint Task Force Command for the entire area, responsible to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff for security assistance, defense of the sea lines of communication (including planning), emergency evacuation, and disaster relief. The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, wanted no change in the existing arrangements. The CSA, CSAF and CMC did propose a definition of US military interests and objectives in the area, to be followed by a reconsideration of command structure. In the meantime, the CNO and CMC wanted an immediate change in the PACOM area to include the entire Indian Ocean, but the CSA and CSAF opposed any changes, pending completion of the study of US military interests and objectives.91

Over five months later, on 3 September 1974, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger announced his decision on the Unified Command Plan. He intended to recommend to the President retention of PACOM, USREDCOM, USEUCOM, and LANTCOM as unified commands and SAC as a specified
command. He wanted both realignment of responsibilities and missions for the unified commands to improve organizational effectiveness and reductions in headquarters. He did not plan to recommend any changes in existing arrangements for the Middle East and Indian Ocean at that time, but he did ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study alternative command relations for the area. Finally, he accepted the JCS recommendations to disestablish CONAD (with ADCOM as a replacement) and to eliminate ALCOM and USSOUTHCOM. He instructed the JCS to be prepared to disestablish USSOUTHCOM as early as 30 June 1975, though the actual date would be timed to allow flexibility for the US delegation in the Panama Canal treaty negotiations.

The Secretary provided specific guidance for the realignment of missions and responsibilities for the unified commands. In PACOM, he wanted substantial reductions in all headquarters by means of consolidation or elimination of redundant activities. In the event of war, the Secretary would decide whether operational control of forces assigned to PACOM would continue under CINCPAC or be transferred for activation of a Northeast Asia Command, a Southwest Pacific Command, and other regional commands and task forces as necessary. In USEUCOM, US and NATO headquarters were to be consolidated as far as possible. Secretary Schlesinger also directed a 15 percent reduction in LANTCOM Headquarters. In addition to its existing tasks of reinforcing other commands and conducting joint training, he made USREDCOM responsible for contingency planning and provision of joint task force headquarters staff for the conduct of future joint operations. The Secretary did not intend, he added, to authorize additional assets or to assign any geographical responsibility for USREDCOM.  

To incorporate these decisions, the JCS drafted a revised UCP, which the Secretary submitted to the President on 17 December 1974. All the changes, he told the President, were in the “interests of management effectiveness and the efficient use of resources” and were part of the overall effort to reduce the layering of headquarters and to streamline command relationships. On 24 February 1975 the President approved the changes as submitted by the Secretary of Defense except for the disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM. He held that action in abeyance pending receipt of plans for the allocation of residual functions.

Later, on 21 April 1975, the Secretary of Defense advised the President that USSOUTHCOM should not be disestablished, pending the resolution of the Panama Canal negotiations. Once they were concluded, the Secretary intended to “move to a renamed and smaller unified command.” In the interim, he planned to reduce the size and grade structure of the USSOUTHCOM Headquarters. As a result, the President took no action to eliminate USSOUTHCOM, and on 6 June 1975 the Secretary of Defense directed that the size and grade structure in the Canal Zone be reduced to the utmost.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a new Unified Command Plan on 27 June 1975, to enter into force on 1 July 1975. Changes in the general guidance of the Plan were primarily editorial, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff did add the statement that Service forces assigned to unified and specified commands “will be organized by the Service to support accomplishment of the unified or specified command mission.”

The new plan deleted ALCOM and CONAD and established the Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) as a specified command. CINCAD was responsible for the aerospace defense of CONUS and Alaska under circumstances requiring unilateral action by the United States. This was essentially the same mission previously assigned to CONAD, with the additional responsibility for air defenses of Alaska. CINCAD also served as CINCNORAD and in this latter capacity had primary responsibility to defend CONUS, Alaska, and Canada against air attack. As CINCAD, he would exercise operational command for aerospace defense of CONUS and Alaska “only in the event of action by Canada and the
United States which makes it impossible for CINCNORAD to exercise this assigned responsibility.” In addition, CINCAD was charged with defense against “space systems,” air defense of bases in Greenland, and assistance in the air defense of Mexico in accordance with approved plans and agreements.

In accord with the Secretary of Defense’s decision, the new Unified Command Plan assigned USREDCOM the additional task of conducting planning and providing joint task force headquarters and forces for contingency operations as well as planning for disaster relief and emergency evacuation in areas not assigned to other unified commands. These areas included Africa south of the Sahara, the Malagasy Republic, Canada, Greenland, Mexico, Antarctica, Alaska, and CONUS. The new plan continued LANTCOM, USEUCOM, PACOM, and SAC without change but deleted the responsibility of CINCLANT, CINCPAC, and USCINCEUR, in coordination with CINCSAC, to plan for submarine, anti-submarine, and mining operations and for protection of shipping throughout the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, and Arctic Oceans and the Mediterranean Sea.95

The new command arrangements became effective on 1 July 1975. CONAD and its regional headquarters were disestablished on 30 June, with ADCOM activated the following day as a specified command. (The CONAD Army component, ARADCOM, had already been disestablished effective 4 January 1974.) ALCOM was disestablished on 1 July 1975 as well. USSOUTHCOM continued without change, but, in accordance with the Secretary of Defense’s directive, its size and structure were reduced (for example, the Commander’s billet was downgraded from four to three stars). In addition, Headquarters, US Naval Forces Southern Command, and Headquarters, US Air Forces Southern Command, were disestablished on 31 December, the Navy and Air Force components of the Command becoming the US Naval Station, Panama Canal, and the USAF Southern Air Division. In a later action, on 8 October 1975, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave USCINCRED the additional responsibility for joint contingency planning, other than aerospace defense, for Alaska.96

In the meantime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had by separate actions directed reduction in the Headquarters, USEUCOM, as well as planning for the activation of regional commands in the PACOM area in compliance with the Secretary of Defense’s earlier guidance on improved organizational effectiveness of the commands. They had, however, deferred action on reducing LANTCOM Headquarters by 15 percent as requested by Mr. Schlesinger.97 Then, on 22 October 1975, the Secretary asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review further the tasking of the unified commands to eliminate or reduce outdated tasks. He also directed the following manpower reductions in the headquarters of the commands: 20 percent in PACOM; 8 percent in LANTCOM; and 210 spaces in USEUCOM.98

**Adjustment in the PACOM Boundary**

The new Unified Command Plan that became effective on 1 July 1975 made no change in the command arrangements for the Middle East and Indian Ocean area. In approving the plan, the Secretary of Defense had asked the JCS to study alternatives for the area, but they had been unable to agree. All except the CSA favored retention of the Middle East in the USEUCOM area as currently assigned. They believed any change unwise at that time in view of the “volatility” of the Middle East situation. However, they supported the inclusion of the entire Indian Ocean in PACOM to simplify command arrangements. The CSA wanted the Middle East assigned to USREDCOM, since that command was unhampered with geographical responsibilities elsewhere; he also recommended realignment of USEUCOM to coincide with the NATO boundaries.99
The Secretary of Defense had made no decision on command arrangements for the Middle East and Indian Ocean when the new Unified Command Plan was issued in June 1975. But later, on 22 October 1975, he reached a decision, selecting the position of the JCS majority. He directed adjustment in the LANTCOM/PACOM boundary to give CINCPAC responsibility for the entire Indian Ocean to the east coast of Africa, including the Gulfs of Aden and Oman and the Indian Ocean Islands (Seychelles, Mauritius, and Maldives) but excluding the Malagasy Republic. The land areas of the Middle East and North Africa remained in the USEUCOM area; Africa south of the Sahara was still unassigned. The Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared and the President approved in March 1976 an amendment to the Unified Command Plan (which became effective on 1 May 1976) to implement this area adjustment.100

Designation of MAC as a Specified Command

In a program decision memorandum in July 1974, the Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to consolidate all strategic and tactical airlifts under the Commander, Military Airlift Command (MAC), who became the specified commander for airlift. He took this action as part of a continuing effort toward greater reliance on Service mutual reinforcement.101

The Air Force, however, could see no advantage in such a move. It would, the Air Force believed, only introduce excessive headquarters layering in the approval and coordination process and could reduce the responsiveness of airlift service currently provided. Therefore, the Air Force prepared in March 1975 a plan to retain MAC as the single manager for airlift service under the Secretary of the Air Force. All the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported this plan except for the Chairman. He favored the original Secretary of Defense decision, since it would further the principle of unification and increase the stature of the Commander, MAC, in his relationship with other CINCs.102

The Deputy Secretary of Defense resolved the matter on 9 June 1976, reaffirming the original decision to make MAC a specified command and directing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare the necessary change to the Unified Command Plan. They did so, and the President approved this change in December 1976. Thereupon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff amended the Unified Command Plan effective 1 February 1977. The Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command (CINCMAC), was named “the commander of a specified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his military airlift missions during wartime, periods of crisis, JCS exercises, and as necessary to ensure the operational support to other unified and specified commands.”103
PART TWO

1977–1983
1977–1983

Requirement for a Biennial Review

One of the earliest administrative modifications of the UCP of 1975 involved the requirement for mandatory review and revision. In 1977 President Jimmy Carter directed a sweeping review of the National Military Command Structure System (NMCSS). Less than a year later, Richard C. Steadman, the study director for the Defense Department, submitted a report to the Secretary of Defense in which, among other recommendations, he urged that the CINCs, the Services, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff conduct a review of the UCP at “intervals not to exceed two years.” Mr. Steadman believed that a mandatory biennial review would permit the President and the Secretary of Defense to respond more efficiently and effectively to the increasingly rapid evolution of “political and military realities.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in the recommendation for a biennial review of the UCP and issued Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 181 on 29 January 1979 to implement the new procedures.

Air Defense of the Panama Canal, 1978

The issue of air defense of the Panama Canal surfaced in 1978. By a treaty ratified in April 1978, the United States agreed to relinquish to the Republic of Panama in the year 2000 all control over the canal and the Canal Zone. Meanwhile, USCINCSO was to defend that area with a modest force that included the 193rd Infantry Brigade, the 450-man US Naval Station, and a handful of A-7 Corsair II close air support fighters from the USAF Southern Division. While such forces might suffice to protect the canal from sabotage or land attack by a neighboring state, USSOUTHCOM forces could not prevent a major air attack by Cuba.

In 1978 the Soviet Union provided Cuba with several MiG 23 Floggers, fighter-bombers with an effective radius of 615 nautical miles. Alarmed, USCINCSO wrote the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 September requesting six F-4 Phantoms to provide his command with the capability to shoot down at sea any Floggers attempting to mount an attack on the canal. Under the UCP, air defense of the Caribbean air approaches to the canal were the responsibility of CINCLANT. In the event of air attack, the UCP specified that CINCLANT and USCINCSO were to coordinate their air assets in a joint defense: LANTCOM aircraft intercepting attackers at sea and USSOUTHCOM finishing off any attackers that managed to reach the Canal Zone. Arguing that shared command arrangements led to ambiguity and delay, USCINCSO requested that he alone be tasked with defending the Canal. In his opinion, augmentation or replacement of A-7 Corsairs with the higher performance F-4 Phantoms would enable his command to assume such responsibility.

While the Air Force supported USCINCSO recommendations, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) did not. He feared that placement of the Phantoms in USSOUTHCOM would convey the unintended impression that the United States was trying to intimidate Panama or other Caribbean states. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) made a convincing case against the USCINCSO proposal. When fully armed with 500 kg. bombs and external fuel tanks, the Floggers,
departing from the Cuban airfield nearest to Panama, Antonio Maceo, could only fly 615 nautical miles. Yet Antonio Maceo was 676 nautical miles away. Moreover, DIA concluded that neither the Soviet Union nor Cuba wished a confrontation with the United States in the Caribbean at that time. For the reasons cited by DIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided by 15 December 1978 to reject USCINCSO's proposal.5

Although USCINCSO lost his bid in late 1978 for full responsibility for air defense of the Panama Canal, he worked out a satisfactory compromise solution with CINCLANT in August 1979. At a conference the two men agreed that the commander with ground responsibility for the canal, USCINCSO, should also assume its air defense. Hence they reached an understanding that USCINCSO should have full-time responsibility for air defense of the canal within a fifty-mile radius and temporary responsibility for the area outside the circle until relieved of the latter by a carrier battle group from LANTCOM.6


While the Soviets and the Cubans may have wished to avoid military confrontation with the United States in the Caribbean, both communist powers were already heavily committed in a region where the US presence was minimal, sub-Saharan Africa. Since World War II the North African states had been assigned to USCINCEUR for planning and normal operations, but sub-Saharan Africa had remained unassigned until 1960. At that time the Secretary of Defense had established within LANTCOM a small joint task force headquarters, under an Army lieutenant general, with the mission of planning for and conducting operations in the sub-Saharan region. A year later the Secretary of Defense reapportioned responsibility for the sub-Sahara giving security assistance and air evacuation to USCINCEUR but retaining seaward evacuation with CINCLANT. In 1963 the Joint Chiefs of Staff made USCINCSTRIKE responsible for planning and operations in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southern Asia (MEAFSA). At that time USCINCSTRIKE received the additional title of Commander in Chief, Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, and South Asia (CINCMEAFA). Subsequently, in 1971, USSTRICOM was redesignated the US Readiness Command (USREDCOM) and divested of all responsibility for the MEAFSA area. Thereafter sub-Saharan Africa was again unassigned.7

By late 1976 the conspicuous growth of Soviet, Cuban, and Chinese influence in Africa south of the Sahara impelled planners on the Joint Staff to call for a reassessment of the area’s importance to US strategic interests. Despite the withdrawal after World War II of colonial regimes from sub-Saharan Africa, the vast region remained important to the economy of Western Europe. At the crossroads of two oceans and three seas, Africa straddled air- and sea-lanes linking North America and Europe to the Middle East, Asia, and the Pacific islands. The subcontinent also contained essential minerals. While US policy had been based on the principle that Africans should resolve African problems, the Joint Staff believed increasing Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban involvement in sub-Saharan Africa now posed a serious threat to US interests.8

Since expanding communist influence might jeopardize US access to bases, ports, and raw materials in sub-Saharan Africa, and possibly threaten the lives of some 35,000 Americans living there, the Joint Staff foresaw a possibility of military involvement in that region. In December 1976 the Joint Staff recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconsider assigning the sub-Saharan region to one of the unified commands. On 6 December 1976 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the Joint Staff’s assessment of US military interests in the region and, at a conference of unified commanders convened in June
1977, broached the subject of assigning sub-Saharan Africa to one of them for contingency planning, if not for normal operations. In November 1977 the Army Operations Deputy proposed assigning the region to USCINCREDC for both contingency planning and normal operations.\(^9\)

Having heard the Army’s views, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked on 15 May 1978 for the views of the four unified commanders with some degree of interest in sub-Saharan Africa: CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, and USCINCREDC. They responded in June 1978. CINCLANT recommended assigning the land area of sub-Saharan Africa to USEUCOM for planning and normal operations but pushing the LANTCOM/PACOM boundary eastward to make LANTCOM responsible for the ocean area surrounding Africa. USCINCEUR agreed with the assignment of the region to his command as the one with demonstrated ability to conduct planning and limited military operations for that area. CINCPAC thought that sub-Saharan Africa should be assigned either to USCINCREDC or USCINCEUR for normal operations but not to CINCLANT or CINCPAC. USCINCREDC volunteered to assume immediate responsibility for contingency planning and later on, perhaps, for normal operations as well.\(^10\)

In November 1978 the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted a compromise position. While agreeing with the commanders and the Joint Staff that sub-Saharan Africa should be assigned to a unified command for contingency planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no pressing need to make a similar assignment for normal operations. By recommending assignment of the region to a unified command for contingency planning only, the Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped to provide the National Command Authorities (NCA) with a broad range of options covering the deployment and employment of forces on the African continent. In passing on their conclusions to the Secretary of Defense on 28 November 1978, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended USCINCEUR for the assignment. The Secretary of Defense, however, took no action and sub-Saharan Africa continued to be unassigned.\(^11\)

**Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 1977–1979**

Beginning in 1977, the JCS again undertook to merge command arrangements for MEAFSA with efforts to create a rapid deployment force (RDF) for use in the area. After the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, oil-producing states in the Persian Gulf region raised oil prices to punish the Western countries and Japan for Israeli occupation of former Arab lands. Further to the east, political and social unrest in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan threatened to create a power vacuum along the southern border of the Soviet Union. Concerned that the Arab states might choke off the flow of oil to the West or that the Soviet Union might invade neighboring Islamic states, President Carter on 24 August 1977 directed that a study be made of creating a rapid deployment force of two or more light divisions for use in the Persian Gulf region.\(^12\)

From 1977 to 1979, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered creating a multi-division rapid deployment force. By late 1979 they agreed that the bulk of ground forces for the RDF would have to come from CONUS-based USREDCOM. Since that command possessed only enough air- and sea-lift capability to deploy a single battalion to the Middle East, advanced bases for headquarters and logistics would be needed to field larger forces. Out of sympathy for Israel’s Arab neighbors, the Islamic nations refused to provide the facilities needed. To circumvent such obstacles, the Secretary of Defense on 22 June 1979 ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the entire system of command arrangements for the Middle East and look into the possibility of obtaining bases in the sub-Saharan region. It was at this juncture that US command arrangements for MEAFSA emerged as one of the most important UCP issues for the period 1977 to 1983.\(^13\)
Following a two-month review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a split decision to the Secretary of Defense on 29 August 1979. Made up of the Chairman, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the majority favored assignment of the MEAFSA countries to USREDCOM for most normal operations and to USEUCOM for security assistance and contingency operations. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps preferred to assign responsibility for planning and contingency operations to a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force headquarters, administratively within USREDCOM but with operational autonomy to plan, exercise, and deploy forces to the Persian Gulf region. The JCS majority advanced several reasons for their recommendation. Under the UCP of 1975, USCINCEUR had satisfactorily demonstrated his capacity to plan security assistance, noncombatant evacuations, disaster relief, and minor contingency operations for the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. For executing such operations the Sixth Fleet and the Middle East Task Force appeared quite adequate. Recognizing, however, that USEUCOM could not provide enough manpower to protect NATO and handle a major contingency in the Persian Gulf area, the three generals recommended assigning all responsibility for major contingencies in that region to USREDCOM. That arrangement avoided embarrassing USCINCEUR by requiring him to perform operations in the Persian Gulf region likely to alienate NATO partners when their foreign policies diverged from the United States’ policies in the region.

In opposition, the CNO and the CMC regarded assignment of major contingencies directly to USREDCOM as unacceptable. Involvement of USREDCOM in a region vitally important to USEUCOM would probably evoke rivalry and problems of coordination that would delay the rapid execution of operations. Instead, they recommended the original presidential concept: a CONUS-based joint task force headquarters, under operational command of USREDCOM but with full responsibility for planning and conducting joint exercises and joint operations in the Persian Gulf area. Under the Navy-Marine Corps concept, once the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Headquarters had actually deployed, operational control over it would pass completely to USCINCEUR.14

The Secretary of Defense agreed with the minority position and on 22 October 1979 ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to organize by 1 March 1980 a CONUS-based joint task force headquarters prepared to plan, train, deploy forces, and to conduct operations anywhere in the world but initially in the Middle East and Africa.15 On 29 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed establishment within USREDCOM headquarters of the RDJTF headquarters as a separate subordinate element under operational control of USCINCRE. As an initial task, the RDJTF would be responsible for all aspects of planning for rapid deployment force operations in the Middle East and Africa. The RDJTF would be responsible for planning and conducting rapid deployment operations in other regions of the world as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Subsequently, in December 1979 the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed Major General P. X. Kelley, USMC, as the first Commander of the RDJTF.16

The Middle East and the First Biennial Review, 1980

With a massive airlift of troops and equipment into Afghanistan on Christmas night 1979, the Soviet Union provided dramatic impetus for development of the RDJTF. In his State of the Union Address on 23 January 1980, President Carter announced what became known as the “Carter Doctrine”:

An attempt by any outside forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be
repelled by any means necessary, including military force . . . We are . . . improving our capability to deploy US military forces rapidly to distant areas . . . We’ve increased and strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and we are now making arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used by our forces in the region of northeast Africa and the Persian Gulf . . . All these efforts combined emphasize our dedication to defend and preserve the vital interests of the region and of the nation which we represent . . .

Afterward, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs asked the Secretary of Defense on 25 January to review the UCP to determine what changes in the existing structures for command and control, intelligence collection, and military security assistance would be required to accommodate establishment of the RDJTF.

This request coincided with the first UCP biennial review required by the JCS MOP 181 of 29 January 1979. On 9 January 1980 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed the CINCs and the Services to submit proposed changes to the UCP by mid-February 1980. Their responses focused primarily on command arrangements for the Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean (MEAFSAIO).

There was immediate disagreement. While spokesmen for the Marine Corps, the Army, and USREDCOM agreed on the necessity for demonstrating US determination to defend its vital interests in MEAFSAIO, they differed on the best command organization to achieve that goal. The Marine Corps’ Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Policies saw no need to revise UCP command arrangements until the RDJTF had been given ample opportunity to become fully operational and demonstrate what it could do. The Army Operations Deputy, however, asserted that deterrence of Soviet aggression in the Middle East required a unified command with its headquarters located in the region. As for the RDJTF, he recommended keeping it but reemphasizing the worldwide mission given it under the original concept. USCINCREDC welcomed the RDJTF as a “significant step in providing rapid response to non-NATO contingencies” but doubted that it could handle more than limited operations in the Middle East. In his view, only a single unified command would “demonstrate US resolve and properly focus on the strategic importance of the area.”

Adopting a modified version of the Marine Corps recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense on 1 March 1980 that, given the inherent flexibility of the UCP and the potential of the RDJTF under existing command arrangements, current area assignments for unified commanders should be retained. In the event of RDJTF deployment to the Persian Gulf area, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Commander, RDJTF (COMRDJTF), be designated as a commander of a unified command for that region. Otherwise, problems of coordination between the RDJTF, USEUCOM, and PACOM would be handled by memorandums of understanding reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also informed the Secretary that, as of 1 March 1980, the RDJTF headquarters had become fully operational. While the RDJTF headquarters would be under the operational command of USCINCREDC for planning, training, and deploying, the new headquarters would be a separate subordinate element of USREDCOM. Once deployed to the Persian Gulf region, the RDJTF headquarters and forces would come under the operational control of either USCINCEUR or CINCPAC. Whichever unified command was selected, that command would provide the COMRDJTF with logistical bases and personnel for operations, intelligence, civil affairs, communications, and medical care.
The debate over command arrangements for the RDJTF, USEUCOM, PACOM, and USREDCOM continued into December. The possibility of sharing responsibility for the Persian Gulf with a joint task force lacking resources or bases disturbed USCINCEUR and CINCPAC. Having recently prepositioned ships, secured access to bases in three East African countries, and participated in the RDJTF-sponsored Command Post Exercise (CPX) in Egypt (BRIGHT STAR), USCINCEUR professed ability to deploy forces anywhere in the Middle East or Africa. He therefore recommended that the RDJTF be made into a permanent subordinate unified command of USEUCOM, subject, however, to direct tasking by the NCA. For similar reasons, CINCPAC recommended that the RDJTF be made a subordinate command either of USEUCOM or PACOM. USCINCRED preferred, however, that the RDJTF should remain under his command but with status as a subordinate unified command for Southwest Asia. The Army Operations Deputy, repeating his earlier position, maintained that Soviet actions in Afghanistan must be answered boldly—by creation of a single unified command for all MEAFSAIO. No agreement was reached and controversy over command arrangements in the Middle East persisted throughout 1981.21


The JCS call on 9 January 1980 for the first biennial review precipitated considerable discussion of optimum command arrangements for the Caribbean Basin. Neither CINCLANT nor USCINCSO were entirely satisfied with the division of functions in effect there since 1979. Following the discovery in 1979 of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, President Carter on 2 October 1979 had established the Caribbean Combined Joint Task Force (CCJTF) “to monitor and respond [by deployment of US forces] to any attempted military encroachment in the region.” With headquarters at Key West, Florida, the CCJTF was a subordinate unified command of LANTCOM. While the CCJTF concentrated its efforts on Cuba and the northern Caribbean, LANTCOM’s other subordinate organization, the Antilles Defense Command (ANTEDEFCOM), performed a similar mission in the southern Caribbean. Meanwhile, USSOUTHCOM continued to hold responsibility for security assistance activity in the Caribbean and for normal operations on the mainland of Central and South America, save for Mexico.

On 17 February 1980, CINCLANT recommended that the UCP be modified to give him responsibility vice USCINCSO for the military aspects of security assistance in the Caribbean. He advanced two arguments for the modification. First, the Caribbean fell within his geographic area of responsibility at a time when national policy called for increased operational planning to curtail Soviet and Cuban influence in the region. In CINCLANT’s view, since operational planning and security assistance were closely linked, he should hold responsibility for both functions. His second argument was that the administration of military security assistance to Latin American navies would greatly enhance his ability to enlist their support for planning exercises and operations to protect the South Atlantic sea lines of communications (SLOCs).22

Conceding that CINCLANT had made some valid points for transferring security assistance to LANTCOM, USCINCSO on 16 April 1980 nevertheless concluded that he should retain management of all security assistance in Latin America, including the Caribbean, because “most of the nations in the Caribbean Basin are inseparable from Latin America due to historical, cultural, and political ties.” Moreover, while LANTCOM was “oriented on an easterly axis” toward NATO, USSOUTHCOM focused entirely on the Western Hemisphere and already had programs and organizations in place.
to assist the Caribbean countries: military schools in the Panama Canal Zone served several of the Caribbean Basin countries; USSOUTHCOM had repeatedly shown its capacity to render speedy disaster relief throughout the area; and a directorate within USSOUTHCOM was already “dedicated exclusively to Latin American military affairs and security assistance matters.” With regard to Mexico, however, USCINCSO argued that responsibility for security assistance only would no longer suffice. That country’s newfound oil wealth and potential for joint hemispheric leadership with the United States made it opportune that Mexico be assigned to USSOUTHCOM for normal operations as well as for security assistance.

When no action resulted, USCINCSO restated his case in December 1980. While Cuba posed no present danger to Atlantic shipping or other LANTCOM interests, Soviet- and Cuban-sponsored military and political activities in the Caribbean had already overthrown the pro-US government in Nicaragua and threatened to topple another in El Salvador. With communist subversion and revolutionary activities spreading up the Central American isthmus toward Mexico, USCINCSO concluded that the USSOUTHCOM area of operations should be expanded to encompass not only Cuba and the Caribbean basin but Mexico as well. Not only would such assignments recognize the integral nature of Mexico, other Central American states, and the Caribbean, but the assignments would greatly streamline unity of command in a region where shared command arrangements weakened operational effectiveness.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff took up the issue of command arrangements for Latin America and the Caribbean in June 1981. Meeting on 8 June, the Operations Deputies favored assignment of all normal operations in the Caribbean, including security assistance, to one unified commander. Under that one commander, they also favored consolidation of CCJTF and ANTEDEFCOM as a single subordinate unified command. On the assignment of Mexico, the Operations Deputies clearly disagreed with USCINCSO. Given the growing strategic importance of Mexico, they preferred to keep responsibility for that country with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In meetings on 19 and 23 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the preliminary recommendations of the Operations Deputies and concentrated on the choice of a single unified commander for the Caribbean basin. In reaching that determination they asked the question: In the event of a general war between the NATO powers and the Warsaw Pact what strategic US interests in the Caribbean would take priority? Once that question was answered, the choice of a single unified commander would be a foregone conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, less the Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed on 23 June that, during a general war, protecting sea lines of communication from the United States to Europe and from the oil fields of Venezuela to the Gulf Coast of the United States represented the nation’s most vital interests. Hence they picked CINCLANT as the commander best equipped with the air, sea, and ground forces needed to prevent Soviet or Cuban efforts to interdict those sea lines of communication. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided: (1) to retain assignment of area responsibility for the Caribbean with CINCLANT and Central and South America (less Mexico) with USCINCSO; (2) to assign responsibility for security assistance for the Caribbean to CINCLANT (vice USCINCSO), and (3) to consolidate the CCJTF and the Antilles Defense Command into a single subordinate unified command under CINCLANT.

Dissenting from the majority, the Chief of Staff of the Army restated USCINCSO’s argument that, like the Mediterranean and its littoral states, the Caribbean Basin and Central America formed an integral strategic whole. USCINCSO’s traditional orientation toward that whole made him intimately acquainted with its leaders and its unique military requirements. In the event of a general war, while
CINCLANT would necessarily concentrate on defense of the North Atlantic, USCINCSO would be a better choice to protect the Caribbean sea lines of communications and the Panama Canal. What USCINCSO required in air and sea assets to conduct that mission could be provided, in part, by assignment to him of the CCJTF and the ANTEDEFCOM—both combined into one subordinate unified command. The Chief of Staff of the Army also concurred with USCINCSO that while a general war was a possibility, communist revolutionary designs on Central America posed a clear and present danger to the security of Mexico and ultimately to the United States. That greater danger fell squarely within USCINCSO’s area of responsibility, experience, and expertise.27

Before authorizing the Joint Staff to prepare a final report for the Secretary of Defense, the Operations Deputies met on 26 June to discuss various minor modifications and amendments to the recommendations of the JCS majority. They also considered the Army view and rationale for supporting USCINCSO as the overall commander of the Caribbean Basin. The process of discussion, amendment, and revision continued until 17 July, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the report containing the majority recommendations, essentially as stated on 23 June. The Joint Chiefs of Staff annexed the CSA’s dissent to the report.28

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not forward their split on Latin American and Caribbean command arrangements to the Secretary of Defense until 9 September. At that time the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a separate opinion. He recommended acceptance of the majority position as an interim measure to “clean up and consolidate” command arrangements in the Caribbean. He added, however, that USSOUTHCOM was too deficient in organic forces, command, control and communications (C3) capability, and headquarters assets to remain viable as a unified command. He therefore proposed examination of a course of action whereby USSOUTHCOM eventually would be made into a second subordinate unified command of LANTCOM, with continued responsibility for political-military affairs, security assistance, and counterinsurgency on the Latin American mainland. Despite the Chairman’s view, on 2 November 1981 the Secretary of Defense approved the majority position.29

On 1 December 1981 CINCLANT combined his two subordinate commands into the United States Forces Caribbean (USFORCARIB), with headquarters at Puerto Rico. At JCS request, President Ronald Reagan on 12 April 1982 approved the necessary revision of the UCP to accommodate the changes. His approval carried with it the proviso that CINCLANT’s new responsibility for security assistance be limited exclusively to the islands of the Caribbean as distinguished from the countries on the mainland.30

The Transition from RDJTF to USCENTCOM, 1981–1982

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not agreed in 1979 on the creation of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and command arrangements for the Middle East remained a controversial issue during 1980. Then, on 24 April 1981, the Secretary of Defense instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit a plan for transformation of the RDJTF within three to five years or less into a “separate unified command” for the countries bordering the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the western part of the Indian Ocean. He also directed that the COMRDJTF plan to deploy assigned forces anywhere in the world but, especially, to Southwest Asia.31 In the event of imminent Soviet invasion of Iran, the COMRDJTF was to employ air, sea, and ground forces to deter the invasion or at least delay its progress.32
The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted an interim response to the Secretary of Defense on 18 May 1981. Assuming that the predominantly Muslim nations of Southwest Asia would oppose the sudden assignment of their region to a powerful new US military organization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported gradual establishment of a unified command over a period of a year and a half. The evolution from RDJTF to unified command was to take place in three stages. During the first stage, the RDJTF would remain under USCINCREDO in Tampa. Placement of Army, Navy, and Air Force component headquarters under the operational control of the COMRDJTF would complete Stage I. Stage II would conclude in the fall of 1981 with designation of the RDJTF as a separate command reporting directly through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the NCA. During Stage III the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, would assign forces and work out command arrangements with other unified commanders. For the date marking conclusion of Stage III and the birth of the new unified command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff chose New Year’s Day 1983.

To facilitate implementation of Stages II and III, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formulated several interim objectives—transition links—to be accomplished within the next few months. These included a direct command linkage from the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the COMRDJTF, definition of “terms of reference” (the mission, geographic boundaries, components and forces of the new command), placement of elements of the RDJTF headquarters at a forward base in the region, enlargement of the headquarters staff of the Service component headquarters at MacDill, and narrowing of RDJTF focus from a worldwide to a Southwest Asia perspective (USREDCOM would continue to be prepared to activate “a separate JTF headquarters” for contingencies in other areas not assigned to another unified command).33

Expanding upon the recommendations of 18 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to the Secretary of Defense on 6 July 1981 terms of reference and additional forces for the RDJTF. The terms of reference enumerated the countries for the RDJTF’s area of operations and the missions and command arrangements for the transition through Stages II and III. The proposed RDJTF area of operations included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Democratic Yemen, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya, and the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Once the RDJTF developed its capacity to perform all normal operations as a unified command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to expand the area of operations to include some or all of the following: Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan, India, and the Indian Ocean.

COMRDJTF would be under the operational command of USCINCREDO until the conclusion of Stage II, sometime during the fall of 1981. His mission would include planning, joint training, preparation to deploy designated forces, and the management of the RDJTF’s transition to Stage III. According to the same terms of reference, while the COMRDJTF exercised operational control of the RDJTF components’ headquarters and designated forces, the Military Departments and Services would provide logistical and administrative support to those same headquarters and forces. Also, during Stage II, the JCS terms of reference called for the COMRDJTF to submit for approval all command arrangements involving the COMRDJTF and unified commanders through the USCINCREDO to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Regarding employment of the RDJTF in the name of the National Command Authorities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, exercised direct command over the COMRDJTF.

Removal of the COMRDJTF from the operational command of USCINCREDO would signal the end of Stage II. During Stage III, COMRDJTF would report directly to the NCA through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and carry out the same tasks as during the previous stage. In addition, the COMRDJTF would
communicate directly with the Military Departments and Services for administrative and logistical support, with the unified and specified commands during joint exercises and operations, and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on strategic and logistical planning, the operational direction of forces, and the conduct of combat operations. Any command arrangements concluded between the COMRDJTF and the unified or specified commanders would be submitted for review and approval directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also proposed the following additional forces for the RDJTF: eleven tactical fighter squadrons under the operational control of COMRDJTF; Task Force 70 with one to three carrier battle groups with necessary logistic forces to support COMRDJTF; and Marine Corps forces consisting of Headquarters, I Marine Amphibious Force (HQ I MAF), with appropriate forces to operate in support of, or under the operational control of, COMRDJTF, as appropriate. The Secretary of Defense approved the terms of reference and the additional force assignments on 6 August. Six days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered USCINCRED to place the additional forces under the COMRDJTF. In the process of approving the terms of reference, however, the Secretary of Defense had asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the “ultimate” geographic area of the new command be more clearly defined and that the RDJTF be specifically designated as a separate joint task force on 1 October 1981.34

The Joint Chiefs of Staff complied with both of the Secretary’s requests. In a memorandum on 23 September 1981, they added Egypt and Sudan to the “ultimate” geographic area of RDJTF. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also agreed to designate the RDJTF as a separate joint task force, effective 1 October 1981. While at MacDill, it would continue to depend heavily upon USREDCOM for personnel, facilities, and logistical support. After deployment it would likewise depend upon the unified and specified commands, the Services, and the Joint Communications Support Element.35 Despite the JCS reservations about RDJTF dependence on USREDCOM, the RDJTF did become a separate joint task force on 1 October 1981, with all the privileges of direct communication spelled out for it in Stage III of the JCS terms of reference.

The problem of base facilities and logistical support for the RDJTF preoccupied JCS planners throughout late 1981 and early 1982. The Joint Chiefs of Staff planned to exercise direct oversight over the construction until the RDJTF could take over as the new unified command. Meanwhile, after requesting that the State Department negotiate with other Middle East states for similar base rights, the Joint Chiefs of Staff enhanced the RDJTF logistical base by expanding the Near Term Pre-Positioning Fleet stationed at Diego Garcia, an island in the Indian Ocean, south of Sri Lanka.36

In response to a JCS call for a biennial review, both CINCLANT and CINCPAC expressed dissatisfaction with the assigned area of the RDJTF. On 14 May CINCLANT recommended broadening the RDJTF area of Africa to include all the remaining states not already assigned to it or to USEUCOM, that is, all of Africa south of the Sahara and west of the Sudan and Kenya. Three days later, CINCPAC asserted that responsibility for naval operations in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea should not be artificially divided between himself and COMRDJTF but should be assigned entirely to himself as the commander with the experience and naval resources to do the job.37

In May 1982 the Joint Chiefs of Staff reevaluated the RDJTF area of operations in light of a presidential query on 17 May about the desirability of including all Middle Eastern countries. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on 26 May 1982, the Joint Chiefs of Staff firmly advised against expanding the new unified command’s area to include the so-called “confrontation states of Israel, Syria, and Lebanon.” In conclusion, the Secretary recommended that the President approve activation of the new unified command on 1 January 1983 and that the new command include all
Middle Eastern nations except the confrontation states. When the President finally approved the recommendation in December, the practical effect was the addition of one more country to the RDJTF list—Jordan.\footnote{38}

In September and November 1982 the Navy and the Marine Corps both tried to divert the RDJTF from its transition to a unified command. On 13 September 1982 the Chief of Naval Operations made clear to his JCS colleagues his belief that the RDJTF should not be encumbered with the routine responsibilities of a unified command—security assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations, etc.—that had been satisfactorily performed by USEUCOM, nor should the new organization’s mission be confined to the Middle East and East Africa. He resurrected the 1979 proposal that the rapid deployment force be prepared on short notice to conduct combat operations anywhere in the world to deter Soviet or Cuban aggression. On 10 November the Commandant of the Marine Corps recommended renaming the RDJTF the Rapid Deployment Force, giving it a worldwide mission and placing it directly under the NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\footnote{39}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not accept the Navy and Marine Corps recommendations, and the RDJTF transition proceeded. On 12 November 1982 they named the future unified command the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and its commander, USCINCCENT. On 19 November a command center for USCINCCENT began operations at MacDill AFB. On 2 December the President formally approved the establishment of USCENTCOM on 1 January 1983 and requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff inform his Assistant for National Security Affairs of proposed changes in the UCP pertaining to “major force allocation and precise geographic boundaries.”\footnote{40}

To reflect the new command arrangements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff revised the UCP of 1975 for the sixth and final time on 10 December 1982. Effective 1 January 1983, USCINCCENT would plan and conduct all normal operations, with one exception, for the northeast African countries of Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia; the Arabian peninsular countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, the Yemen Arab Republic, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Bahrain; the Middle East mainland countries of Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Jordan; and the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The exception, security assistance for Pakistan and Afghanistan, would continue as a CINCPAC responsibility until transferral to USCINCCENT on 1 October 1983. Also under the revised UCP, USCINCEUR would remain responsible for the three confrontation states of Israel, Syria, and Lebanon and for the North African states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. All other African states south of the Sahara and west of Sudan and Kenya would continue to be unassigned.\footnote{41}

In late December the Secretary of Defense announced intentions to augment USCENTCOM with the Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) then serving in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea areas.\footnote{42} While promising the future USCINCCENT full support and cooperation, CINCPAC reiterated on 21 December his request that he retain operational command of the Middle East Force in the Arabian Sea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff denied that request on 30 December but directed USCINCCENT to coordinate with CINCPAC for contingency planning for rapid integration of MIDEASTFOR into PACOM’s Indian Ocean battle force, Task Force 70, whenever called upon to do so by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\footnote{43}

**The 1982 Biennial Review**

The Joint Chiefs of Staff launched the second biennial review of the UCP on 15 April 1982. The Joint Staff advised the CINCs that their responses should anticipate two changes already underway in the
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UCP: transfer of security assistance in the Caribbean area to LANTCOM vice USSOUTHCOM and the establishment of the RDJTF as a new unified command. The CINC’s replies raised several new issues. On 13 May 1982 CINCLANT recommended that Portugal be assigned to him because of its maritime orientation and its control over the Azores and the Madeira Islands, two strategically important island groups in the LANTCOM area. He also recommended that another strategically located island, Greenland, which guarded the northern gateway to the North Atlantic, be assigned to his area. The next day USCINCSO again urged that his command be expanded by inclusion of the Caribbean Basin and Mexico to reverse the growing Soviet/Cuban intrusion in Central America and to aid him in the task of building a pro-US Latin American coalition. On 17 May CINCPAC proposed that North Korea, the People’s Republic of China, and the eastern USSR be assigned to him for normal operations. He also requested responsibility for the Aleutian Islands.44

No immediate action resulted, and on 20 September the Army Operations Deputy categorized the changes in the UCP recommended during May as important but “easy to handle” secondary issues. In his view, they tended to divert consideration from fundamental geographic divisions and functional responsibilities necessary to “optimal command arrangements” for each unified command. He therefore proposed a “thorough overhaul of the UCP . . . to provide efficient command arrangements and structure to implement the national military strategy.” He recommended completion of “an extended review” in time for presentation of alternatives to the CINC’s Conference in March 1983, to be followed by revision of the UCP to incorporate the necessary changes.45

In light of the threats of revolutionary communism and state-sponsored terrorism, USCINCSO on 5 October 1982 urged revision of the UCP to allow unified commanders greater flexibility of action outside their traditional areas of responsibility (AORs). For areas immediately contiguous to the AORs, USCINCSO called for delineation within the UCP of “areas of influence,” where two adjacent commanders, on their own initiative, could coordinate combined exercises or operations on an ad hoc basis. Beyond such areas of influence, he would have the UCP specify “areas of interest,” where commanders would be allowed to monitor events that might eventually impact upon their areas of influence and ultimately upon their areas of responsibility. For his area of influence, USCINCSO would include all maritime waters up to twelve miles from the Latin American mainland. His area of interest, for example, might include sub-Saharan Africa, where several Latin American nations already enjoyed brisk commercial and political contacts.46

On 15 November the Army Operations Deputy submitted to the Joint Staff detailed recommendations for revising the UCP. If adopted, they would alter “the totality of US global command arrangements, unassigned areas, planning for rapid deployment of forces, and the structure and control of strategic nuclear forces.” The recommendations began with a discussion of command arrangements for the Pacific and the Latin American-Caribbean areas. He sought to unify command arrangements in the northeast Pacific by combining US Forces, Korea, and US Forces, Japan, into one subordinate unified command under CINCPAC. He also recommended enhancing command arrangements in the Pacific by assigning the Aleutian Islands to CINCPAC and by creating within PACOM headquarters a joint planning cell for matters pertaining to the southwest Pacific. In the matter of Latin America and the Caribbean, the Army Operations Deputy borrowed the concept suggested by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 September 1981 of assigning all of the Caribbean and Latin America to USCINCSO but then making USSOUTHCOM a subordinate unified command of LANTCOM.47
The Army Operations Deputy also addressed command arrangements for Southwest Asia and Africa south of the Sahara. First he recommended a study of what impact creation of a rapid deployment force under USCINCRED might have on the mission of the new unified command in Southwest Asia. Next he noted that all African states south of the Sahara and west of Sudan and Kenya remained unassigned. Because of the area’s strategic mineral wealth and location astride principal sea lines of communication, the Army Operations Deputy urged assigning the area to a unified command.

Command arrangements for strategic nuclear forces, joint special operations, and space also interested the Army Operations Deputy. Uncertain whether the present unified and specified command system provided the best vehicle for planning and execution of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) by US strategic nuclear forces, he recommended scrutiny of the present system. The growing worldwide threat of insurgency and instability convinced him that the Joint Chiefs of Staff also needed to assess the Joint Special Operations Command’s ability to coordinate the conduct of conventional and unconventional warfare and special operations. In light of the new space programs, the USAF Space Command, and the possibility of a new unified command for space, the Army Operations Deputy proposed discussion of the impact of such developments upon national strategy, global planning, joint command arrangements, and global conflict.

In the matter of assigning the three major “adversary states”—the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea—and reassigning Greenland and Portugal, the Army Operations Deputy argued for no change. Because of the multi-faceted threat posed by both the Soviet Union and China, he contended that military relationships between the United States and the communist nations should continue to be supervised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Deputy also concluded that assignment of North Korea to PACOM would only complicate the command structure in the Far East. Moreover, since the air threat to Greenland constituted an integral part of the air threat to all of CONUS, the Deputy opposed reassigning Greenland from ADCOM to LANTCOM, and he thought Portugal represented a vital outpost on NATO’s southwestern flank that should remain in USEUCOM.48

On 26 November the Joint Staff invited CINCs and Service Chiefs to reevaluate and update their previous inputs for the biennial review. They were to consider the following proposals: (l) assignment of responsibility for rapid deployment planning and creation of a new joint task force for unassigned areas now that the RDJTF had become a geographic unified command; (2) revision of command arrangements in the North Pacific with regard to the Republic of Korea, Japan, Alaska, and the Aleutians; (3) determination of optimum command arrangements and structure for control of strategic nuclear forces; and (4) incorporation within the UCP of USCINCSO’s recommendations for “areas of influence” and “areas of interest.”49

The imminent transformation of the RDJTF into a unified command on 1 January 1983 revived the original need to plan for and execute rapid deployment outside the USCENTCOM area. Between 8 and 15 December 1982 USCINCRED, USCINCEUR, and CINCLANT joined in recommending the assignment of planning for worldwide rapid deployment to one or more unified commanders. USCINCRED concurred with USCINCEUR that such responsibility should be consolidated within USREDCOM and stipulated that a joint task force headquarters be set up within his headquarters solely for that mission. Upon its deployment, operational control of such a headquarters and its assigned forces would pass from USCINCRED to the supported unified commander. CINCLANT opposed consolidation of RDF planning or establishment of a joint task force headquarters under a single commander; he preferred that rapid deployment become a function of each geographic unified commander.50
The question of optimum command arrangements and structure for control of strategic nuclear forces ultimately involved a proposal to centralize handling of all nuclear weapons within a strategic nuclear forces command. Both CINCLANT and USCINCEUR firmly opposed such centralization. On 10 December, USCINCEUR opposed establishment of a strategic nuclear command because it would deprive theater commanders of their “proper” role of controlling and targeting intermediate range nuclear forces. He added that “some [nuclear] systems currently under development could have both strategic and tactical roles” and that the theater commander should always have a voice in the use of the latter. On 15 December CINCLANT declared that change in the existing structure was neither necessary nor desirable inasmuch as “planning and control . . . within the existing unified and specified command structure is efficient and responsive to national policy objectives.”

With regard to USCINCSo’s proposals for areas of influence and interest, both USCINCRED and USCINCEUR agreed that commanders should be aware “of events and crisis situations relevant to their responsibilities, regardless of boundaries.” However, neither favored enactment within the UCP of formal “areas of influence” or “areas of interest.” USCINCREd believed that cross boundary matters should be handled by close coordination and exchange of information between commanders. USCINCEUR suspected that inclusion of areas of influence and interest in the UCP would only add to the complexity and ambiguity of the document. CINCLANT seconded the opinions of USCINCRED and USCINCEUR on the grounds that the UCP already provided for maximum flexibility for adjacent commanders to coordinate action on matters of mutual interest in its provision that: “In establishing commands, it is not intended to delineate restrictive geographic areas of responsibility for accomplishment of missions assigned. . . . To provide a basis for coordination by commanders, general geographic areas are delineated.”

On 23 December 1982, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked USCINCSo and CINCLANT to address a new issue for the biennial review: Should USSOUTHCOM at last be made fully responsible for all of Latin America and the Caribbean Basin but only as a subordinate unified command of LANTCOM? In answer on 23 December, USCINCSo explained that at a time when Latin America’s importance to the United States was increasing, it would be folly to subordinate a command uniquely devoted to Latin American problems to a command whose interests focused eastward and northward toward NATO and the North Atlantic. Such subordination, he reasoned, would signal to Latin American governments and their military organizations that the United States did not deem them worthy of full-time concern. Such a view might demoralize them and encourage increased communist revolutionary activity in this hemisphere. Further, USCINCSo noted that placing his command under LANTCOM would impose a new layer of bureaucracy between his headquarters and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and could hinder prompt and effective communications during a crisis.

CINCLANT strongly supported the concept of revising command arrangements to promote regional integration of Latin America and the Caribbean Basin. He favored incorporating USSOUTHCOM into LANTCOM as a subordinate unified command with full responsibility for all Latin America. At the same time he wanted to reflect high national interest in the Caribbean by retaining USFORCARIB as a parallel subordinate unified command responsible for that area. But, by placing USSOUTHCOM under his command, CINCLANT recognized that Latin American army commanders might take umbrage at having to deal with a maritime-oriented unified command. The obvious way around that obstacle, he believed, consisted of retaining USSOUTHCOM as an Army-oriented subordinate command to “interface” between LANTCOM and the Latin American military commanders. In any
event, he insisted on retaining responsibility for the Caribbean Basin whether it was included under USFORCARIB or USOUTHCOM.55

The New Unified Command Plan of 1983

During the early part of 1983, the Joint Staff reviewed the comments and proposals of the CINCs and the Service Chiefs. On 2 May, rather than submit more revisions of the 1975 UCP, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to the Secretary of Defense the draft of a new unified command plan. It embodied several important changes affecting USEUCOM, PACOM, USCENTCOM, and USREDCOM. While retaining responsibility for the Soviet Union, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned to USCINCEUR responsibility for all other countries of Eastern Europe. The Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped to exploit the growing “potential for improvement in political-military linkage between this region and the West.”

Seeking to use longstanding links between certain NATO nations and their former colonies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also assigned to USCINCEUR responsibility for all states of Africa above and below the Sahara except those assigned to USCENTCOM (Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia). By adding to the North African states already in USEUCOM those countries from the Sahara to South Africa, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to signal to allies and adversaries the strategic importance the United States attached to this region.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also expanded the number of countries assigned to CINCPAC. While labeling the Soviet Union a worldwide threat, they categorized China, North Korea, and Mongolia as strictly Asiatic problem areas and assigned them to PACOM. Moreover the Joint Chiefs of Staff foresaw increased political-military contacts between China and the United States that could best be handled at the unified command level. The decision to assign North Korea to PACOM stemmed from the belief that unifying responsibility for the entire Korean peninsula under CINCPAC would greatly enhance his ability to make the transition from peace to war.56

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommended assignment of Alaska, the Aleutians, and Madagascar to CINCPAC. While growing Soviet air and naval activity in the north Pacific Ocean made it necessary to assign Alaska and the Aleutians to the only major command in the area with the ships and planes capable of protecting both places in the event of war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned Madagascar to PACOM because that island impinged directly upon CINCPAC’s mission of protecting US sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean. In a parallel move the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended assignment of Greenland to LANTCOM. Along with Iceland, Greenland formed an important island link in CINCLANT’s wartime strategy for penning up Soviet missile-launching submarines in the Norwegian Sea. The proposed assignments of Madagascar and Greenland underlined the strategic concept that a large sea or ocean area and all the islands therein formed a continuous sea line of communication best handled by a single commander.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff could not agree on responsibility for the Indian Ocean. All except the Chief of Staff of the Army favored continued assignment of the entire Indian Ocean to CINCPAC. The Army member, however, wanted the northwest portion of the Indian Ocean to go to USCINCENT. In the event of a major war on the Horn of Africa or in the Middle East, he argued, USCINCENT would require “complete and effective operational control” over all naval and air forces in that portion of the Indian Ocean north of Madagascar and west of India. Such an assignment would “provide boundaries in war that circumscribe the likely and more coherent theater of operations and that move military command seams from strategically vital areas to open maritime areas.”
In their memorandum submitting the new UCP to the Secretary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommended that, in addition to being tasked with land defense of CONUS, USCINCREDC be charged with responsibility both for establishing a new joint task force headquarters to plan for contingency operations worldwide and selecting forces from USREDCOM to make up the joint task force. Upon its deployment, however, operational control of such a joint task force would transfer to the nearest unified commander or remain with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Command Authorities.57

The Secretary of Defense accepted the JCS majority recommendation on retention of the entire Indian Ocean by CINCPAC and approved all other JCS recommendations for the new UCP, save one. Rather than reassign Alaska to CINCPAC for normal operations, he retained it under ADCOM for air defense only. On 28 July the Secretary forwarded the UCP to the President for approval, and the President approved the UCP on 3 October 1983.58

Before disseminating the UCP, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made one minor change to accommodate CINCPAC. He believed that his title, Commander in Chief, Pacific, suggested the inclusion of non-US forces, and he had asked that his title and command be redesignated USCINCPAC and USPACOM, respectively. The Joint Chiefs of Staff honored the request on 11 October and, in the interest of uniformity, renamed CINCLANT and LANTCOM respectively USCINCLANT and USLANTCOM.59

On 28 October 1983, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published the new Unified Command Plan as SM-729-83. It was largely the product of the 1980 and 1982 mandatory biennial reviews. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently promulgated a new Memorandum of Policy 181 on 15 February 1984 that declared the biennial review unnecessary and replaced it with a requirement for periodic review at their discretion. The 1983 plan also greatly enlarged the area of operation for three of the unified commands. It extended USEUCOM to include Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa west of Sudan; it expanded USPACOM to include China, Mongolia, North Korea, Madagascar, and the Aleutians; and it enlarged USLANTCOM to include Greenland. These changes were significant, but the most dramatic alteration of command arrangements for the period 1977 through 1983 remained the establishment of USCENTCOM—a testimonial to the determination of two Presidents to defend US strategic interests in that turbulent region.60
PART THREE

1983–1993
Two broad factors precipitated changes to the UCP between 1983 and 1993. First, great fluctuations occurred on the international scene. The early 1980s witnessed a sizeable US military buildup and a heightening of Soviet-American confrontation; the late 1980s saw a rapid waning of Cold War tensions. Second, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 considerably expanded the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as those of the commanders of unified and specified commands.

Between 1983 and 1987 new commands were created for Space, Special Operations, and Transportation. But the JCS as a corporate body still reviewed the UCP and showed themselves to be more comfortable with the status quo than with innovation. Service prerogatives often precluded sweeping reforms or what might seem efficient solutions. Consequently, outside agents were the instruments of change. Goldwater-Nichols did not immediately alter that situation. In 1989, General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the JCS, became the catalyst for reform. He carried through measures—most notably, the expansion of Atlantic Command (USACOM)—that were designed to enhance a joint culture.

Setting Up US Space Command

President Ronald Reagan took actions that led to the creation of the US Space Command. On 4 July 1982 he announced a National Space Policy that, among other things, committed the United States to developing survivable and enduring space systems, an anti-satellite capability, and means for detecting and reacting to threats against US space systems. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger then initiated a study of how DOD space assets could be integrated into the overall space structure. In March 1983 President Reagan unveiled a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly dubbed “Star Wars,” which aimed at creating an impenetrable shield against Soviet ballistic missiles. Already, by conducting exercises that involved operational control of space, the Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciated the need for improving coordination of space assets. The SDI highlighted space’s potential as a theater of operations.

In April 1983, General James V. Hartinger, who was CINC, Aerospace Defense Command, as well as Commander, US Air Force Space Command, proposed organizational moves toward a unified space command. These, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be logical steps to support SDI. On 7 June the Chief of Staff, Air Force, urged an immediate JCS recommendation to establish a unified space command that would “consolidate the mission areas of space control, space support, force application and force enhancement, and exercise operational control over all related systems developed for military application.”

The Operations Deputies responded by commissioning a Service/Joint Staff study group to examine solutions. The Air Force advocated a single command, which of course it would dominate. The Army, Navy and Marine Corps reported no major problems with existing organizational mechanisms. On 11 October 1983 the group reported that while command arrangements for space appeared adequate during the near term, some deficiencies should be corrected. Clearer command and control over space defense ought to be established; a joint planning staff for space should be created; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should assess what changes in command arrangements ought to be made by 1985.
Meanwhile, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, William P. Clark, had asked for JCS views about the Air Force proposal to establish a unified command and about how to exercise operational control over space systems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to recommend establishing a unified space command on 1 November 1985. They also created a Joint Planning Staff for Space that, among other things, would help develop a transition plan for the new command. The JCS recommendation for a space command went forward to Secretary Weinberger on 23 November 1983; Weinberger endorsed it and so advised the White House three days later. President Reagan, on 20 November 1984, formally approved establishing the new command.4

In February 1984 the Joint Planning Staff for Space began reviewing the processes for establishing a command. The JCS, in December, started assigning missions and responsibilities; US Space Command would integrate tactical warning and space operations, including control of space, direction of space support activities, and planning for ballistic missile defense.

The JCS also began defining what should be the relationship between USSPACECOM and the US-Canadian North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). USSPACECOM would replace the soon-to-be-deactivated Aerospace Defense Command as a supporting command to NORAD, providing it with integrated warning and assessment information. The CINCNORAD, General Robert T. Herres, USAF, strongly favored having CINCNORAD serve also as USCINCSPACE. The Chairman, along with the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, agreed that, at least during USSPACECOM’s first year, this should be the case. But the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant, Marine Corps, strongly supported separating the two positions. The duties of USCINCSPACE and CINCNORAD, they argued, were different and expanding. Also, by standing alone, USCINCSPACE would provide the proper military focus and singleness of purpose as well as send the political signals consistent with presidential guidance. Nonetheless, President Reagan decided that—at least for the first year—General Herres would be both USCINCSPACE and CINCNORAD. The US Space Command was activated at Colorado Springs on 23 September 1985. In November 1986 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended continuing General Herres in his dual role; Secretary Weinberger approved.5 After the final transfers of its principal missions to USSPACECOM had taken place, Aerospace Defense Command was inactivated on 19 December 1986.

The Strategic Defense Initiative had been a driving force behind USSPACECOM’s creation. In June 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the operational requirements proposed for Phase I of a ballistic missile defense system. With expectations of an operational system, they deemed the time right to place it within the traditional command framework. Accordingly, on 23 November they recommended assigning the ballistic missile defense mission to USSPACECOM. A single commander then would bear responsibility for both operational planning and force execution. Further, USCINCSPACE could influence the operational integration of systems being developed by the Services and the SDI Organization. USSPACECOM did acquire this mission in February 1988.6 Very soon, however, the ending of the Cold War made SDI seem outdated.

Readjusting for a Special Operations Command

The impetus to create a US Special Operations Command came largely from Capitol Hill. The staffs of Senator William Cohen (R, ME) and Representative Dan Daniel (D, VA) included men who had served with Special Forces. These staffers, as well as some retired officers, convinced Senator Cohen and
Congressman Daniel that the Services were deliberately and unwisely neglecting special operations, low-intensity conflict, and non-traditional threats. Early in 1986 Representative Daniel introduced legislation to create a National Special Operations Agency, headed by an Assistant Secretary of Defense. Senator Cohen sponsored a bill creating the post of Assistant Secretary for Low Intensity Conflict and Special Operations as well as a unified command for special operations.

Two years earlier, on 1 January 1984, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had established a Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA) under a two-star officer who reported to the Director, Joint Staff. In 1986, the Director, JSOA, Major General Thomas W. Kelly, USA, frankly described the agency’s coordinating efforts as a “failure.” Faced with the Cohen and Nichols bills, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 June 1986 decided to advocate establishing a special operations command under a three-star officer, on grounds that doing so would preserve the normal chain of command and keep the CINCs squarely in charge. They presented this proposal to President Reagan on 1 August, telling him that they opposed Rep. Daniel’s bill on grounds that it really would create a fifth Service for Special Operations Forces. Senator Cohen’s proposal, they argued, also was unacceptable because it confused low intensity warfare with special operations. The former encompassed much more and was a mission for all Services.\(^7\)

If the Joint Chiefs of Staff were trying to forestall anything resembling the Cohen and Daniel bills, they did not succeed. Public Law 99-661, signed by the President on 14 November 1986, mandated appointment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict as well as creation of a unified combatant command for special operations forces.

The main issue now became whether to split special operations completely away from conventional forces. Early in January 1987 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., raised this matter with Senator Cohen, Representative Daniel, Senator Sam Nunn (D, GA; Chairman, Armed Services Committee), and Secretary Weinberger. Nunn and Weinberger thought that the new command should not retain any of USREDCOM’s conventional missions. Weinberger, in fact, concluded that Congress would not accept an amalgamation. The USCINCCENT, General James J. Lindsay, USA, advised Admiral Crowe that he looked upon a divorce of special operations from conventional forces as the worst possible solution, but Congress already had decided to do just that.

On 9 January General Kelly, the Director for Operations, J-3, briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on two alternatives. The first was to create a US Special Operations Command and disestablish USREDCOM, distributing its residual missions among USLANTCOM, USCENTCOM, and US Army Forces Command. The Army, Navy and Air Staffs favored this solution. The second was simply to establish USSOCOM. Only the Marine Corps advocated this alternative.\(^8\) The first alternative won out because adding a new command meant that an existing one had to disappear.

General Lindsay wanted USREDCOM’s major missions transferred to USCENTCOM. But the USCINCCENT, General George B. Crist, Jr., USMC, argued that the Services should assume responsibility for maintaining strategic reserves. By 21 January USREDCOM’s disestablishment was taken for granted. That step would free 250 billets, including flag slots, for reallocation. Also, PL 99-661’s requirement to establish a special operations command by 15 April rendered urgent the need for identifying a suitable headquarters and supporting staff. General Kelly, the Army Staff, and the Marine Corps had come to favor having the Commander, Army Forces Command, act as the CINC, US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). The Navy and Air Staffs advocated creating a new unified command by making USCINCCENT also serve as US Commander in Chief, Joint Forces Command (USCINCJFCOM), with responsibility for some of USREDCOM’s missions.
During a JCS meeting on 23 January, Admiral Crowe defined the crux of the matter as convincing Secretary Weinberger that USREDCOM’s residual missions should go to USCENTCOM. Evidently the Secretary could not be convinced; so a different course was chosen. On 20 February the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to change US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) into a specified command that would take over USREDCOM’s Army-unique missions (land defense of CONUS and Alaska, a general reserve of ground forces to support CINCs) as well as its joint training and exercise missions. Essentially, they overturned Secretary McNamara’s 1961 decision to have USREDCOM’s predecessor, USSTRICOM, control most of the strategic reserve. Some Army divisions in CONUS were not assigned to an overseas command but all USAF tactical fighter squadrons (TFS) were. Why, the Air Force argued, assign squadrons to a CINC who never would employ them? Also, the Air Force worried that making Tactical Air Command a component of FORSCOM would disrupt its own personnel programs by bringing field commanders under the criteria for joint duty assignment that had been imposed by Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The JCS characterized the tasks remaining for USREDCOM’s Air Force component as narrow, non-operational, and indistinguishable from Service-only responsibilities. Accordingly, squadrons now were to be distributed among warfighting CINCs in accordance with “base case” plans. Thus 32 of 41 were assigned to USEUCOM, even though some of them were based in the United States.

Subsequently, Secretary Weinberger voiced concern that CINCs might be able to direct deployments to their theaters without his approval. Therefore, he asked, why not either turn Tactical Air Command into a specified command or establish a unified US Forces Command? The Chairman replied that the Joint Operational Planning System prevented CINCs from acting on their own and that making FORSCOM a specified command represented the best and most economical way of complying with the Goldwater-Nichols Act.9

The formal JCS recommendation to create USSOCOM, disestablish USREDCOM, and turn Forces Command into a specified command was submitted on 18 March. Secretary Weinberger concurred, and on 13 April President Reagan approved it. Three days later, General Lindsay became USCINCSOC; the disestablishment of USREDCOM occurred on 30 September 1987. General Joseph T. Palastra, Jr., USA, took up the post of CINCFOR on 1 July. USCENTCOM assumed responsibilities for Southwest Asia; responsibilities for strategic mobility planning went to the new USTRANSCOM. FORSCOM would provide a general reserve of combat-ready Army forces, carry out readiness and related deployment planning as well as joint training of assigned forces, and be responsible for the land defense of CONUS.

USCINCSOC controlled all active and reserve special operations forces, except for two Naval Special Warfare Groups that stayed under USPACOM and USLANTCOM. General Lindsay wanted these Groups, and in October, despite Navy protests, Secretary Weinberger ordered them transferred. USCINCSOC’s responsibilities included providing a general reserve of combat-ready special operations forces, ensuring proper training, readiness exercises and deployment planning, validating requirements and establishing priorities for special operations forces, and commanding selected missions.10

USCINCSOC possessed unique authority to oversee promotion, assignment, retention, and professional development of Special Forces personnel. He bore responsibility not only for developing and acquiring materiel, supplies, and services peculiar to special operations but also for submitting program and budget proposals under Major Force Program (MFP) 11. Nevertheless, influential members of Congress remained frustrated by what they termed “malicious implementation” of the legislation by OSD. To reinforce congressional intent, PL 100-80, which became law on 4 December 1987, gave USCINCSOC head of agency authority that would enable him to facilitate the development and procurement of hardware.
In 1988 Congress reiterated USCINCSOC’s programming (MFP 11), budgeting, and execution authority and gave him acquisition authority as well. Thus, in these areas, USCINCSOC wields unique authority among the CINCs.

The Evolution of USTRANSCOM

Efforts at unifying transportation assets date back to World War II, and progress proved to be very slow. A JCS mobilization exercise in 1978, NIFTY NUGGET, revealed major shortcomings in transportation planning. In one case, airlift planners received 27 requests to move the same unit to 27 different locations. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made USCINCRED responsible for mobilization deployment planning. The Joint Deployment Agency (JDA), a distinct organization collocated with USREDCOM, was established on 1 May 1979 to coordinate and monitor intra-CONUS and inter-theater movements involving common user lift. USCINCRED took the added responsibility of Director, JDA.

In 1981 Congress required the Defense Department to submit a plan for improving transportation and traffic management. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 24 July, recommended integrating the Army’s Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) and the Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC) into a unified transportation command, reporting through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. But the Army and Navy lobbied against this solution on Capitol Hill so effectively that the FY 1982 DOD Authorization Act (PL 97-252) prohibited using any funds for such a purpose.11

Secretary Weinberger rated a unified transportation command as the most needed improvement in readiness management. Accordingly, he sought remedial legislation. The chance came in February 1986, when a Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the Packard Commission) recommended setting up a single unified command to integrate global air, land, and sea transportation and repealing the legislation that prohibited such a command. President Reagan, on 1 April, directed Secretary Weinberger to take appropriate action.12

An interservice working group chaired by the Vice Director for Logistics, J-4, began deliberations on 7 April. Representatives from the Army Staff, the Air Staff and JDA favored a unified command. The Navy, backed by the Marine Corps, argued that consolidation would erode a Service’s authority over its own operations. The group presented eleven proposals to a general officer steering committee headed by the Director, J-4, Lieutenant General Alfred G. Hansen, USAF. The committee worked out two alternatives. It proposed either a unified headquarters functioning only as an integrating and coordinating entity, with the Services retaining command of their transportation operations and functions in peace and war or a typical unified command organization with Service components (MTMC, MSC, and Military Airlift Command (MAC)) under the CINC’s operational control. On 16 May the second alternative won the committee’s endorsement.13

General Duane H. Cassidy, USAF, who was CINCMAC, briefed members of the Packard Commission on 18 June. Members reacted by stressing that a coordinating agency would not be enough. The CINC must have directive authority although in peacetime forces might be assigned for planning purposes only. On 7 October, after more study by the committee and the working group, General Hansen presented the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a three-tiered sequential approach:

1. Make a unified transportation command the peacetime focal point for planning and deployment exercises. In wartime, it would assess movement requirements, task Service components, and adjust plans and modes of transport.
2. In addition to 1, the unified command would develop and evaluate procedures for facilitating the flow of forces and re-supply.

3. In addition to 1 and 2, give the CINC operational command of forces but decentralize execution.

The Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff favored moving directly to 3, bypassing 1 and 2. But the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant, Marine Corps, argued adamantly for starting with 1. They wanted the Service Secretaries to remain single managers of their respective components. At a JCS meeting on 28 October, Admiral Crowe decided to recommend moving immediately to 3, with General Cassidy becoming USCINCTRANS as well as CINCMAC. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act, meantime, had lifted the legislative prohibition against a unified transportation command.

On 1 December the Chairman, supported by the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, formally proposed phasing in USTRANSCOM over the next 12 months, having CINCMAC also serve as USCINCTRANS for the time being, and disestablishing the JDA. The Chief of Naval Operations dissented, arguing for the “evolutionary” approach on grounds that mechanisms that only recently had been put in place to correct problems should not be disrupted. He also voiced concern that USCINCTRANS’s functions would infringe upon single manager responsibilities that flowed from Congress to the Service Secretaries and then to the Service Chiefs. The Commandant, Marine Corps, recommended simply appointing a USCINCTRANS; separating him totally from MTMC, MSC and MAC; and ordering him to conduct a comprehensive management analysis before proceeding any further.

Secretary Weinberger accepted the Chairman’s proposal. USTRANSCOM under General Cassidy was activated on 1 July 1987. Military Airlift Command lost its status as a specified command on 30 September 1988 and became a component of USTRANSCOM. But while the organizational charts now showed a superior-to-subordinate relationship, the reality was quite different. Service components retained operational command over their forces, control of industrial funds, and responsibility for performing Service-unique missions as well as procurement. Thus nearly all-essential headquarters functions associated with transportation management and control of transportation functions remained with the components. Headquarters, USTRANSCOM, was still so new that it played only a small role in Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama. During Operation DESERT SHIELD, the deployment to Saudi Arabia in 1990, the vague nature of USTRANSCOM’s responsibilities during situations short of war created confusion. The MTMC received taskings directly from FORSCOM, not through USCINCTRANS, who had to spend two weeks establishing his full authority over components. Even during Operation DESERT STORM, the operation to liberate Kuwait during January to March 1991, the DOD Inspector General claimed later, USTRANSCOM primarily reiterated directions and information produced by higher levels as well as by the components. That may well have been an exaggeration, but it helped shape a perception that more centralized control was needed.

Before DESERT STORM began, General Powell (who became Chairman in October 1989) had started enhancing USCINCTRANS’s authority. On 30 November 1990, with the Service Chiefs’ concurrence, General Powell approved proceeding with a reorganization that would give USCINCTRANS a peacetime mission, assign all Service components to him, develop a charter establishing his responsibilities for common-user lift, and create a financial management office for the command. General Powell sent a draft charter to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in January. But Mr. David Addington, the Secretary’s Special Assistant, then wrote a very different charter that would keep the Services as single managers of their specialties, restrict USCINCTRANS’s mission to “crises and war,” and deny
authority to analyze industrial funds. General Powell met with Mr. Addington on 21 October 1991 and convinced him that major revisions were necessary.

Late in December Mr. Addington circulated a proposal that the transportation mission, authority, and resources be transferred from the Service Secretaries to USCINCTRANS. The Marine Corps voiced strong objections against such “fundamental changes to established DOD authorities and responsibilities.” The Navy also argued against parts of the proposal. But General Powell recommended giving USCINCTRANS even more authority. Mr. Addington’s draft still allowed the Services to withhold “service-unique” transportation assets, defined in part as “organic parts of Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps units assigned to the commander of a unified or specified combatant command other than CINCTRANS.” General Powell wanted to delete that part of the definition. Assigning assets to another CINC, he maintained, did not necessarily remove them from common-user roles. The Addington draft also described afloat pre-positioning ships as being under Service control and assigned to a particular theater. General Powell claimed that these ships also served the Army and Air Force on a global strategic basis and therefore should be under combatant command of some CINC. Lastly, the draft did give USCINCTRANS control over the transportation accounts of the Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF). But a proposed National Defense Sealift Fund would not be part of the DBOF, so the draft would grant USCINCTRANS wartime authority only. General Powell sought more latitude, so that USCINCTRANS could deal directly with the civilian transportation industry.

On 14 February 1992 Secretary Cheney issued a directive making USCINCTRANS the single manager for transportation in place of the Service Secretaries. During peace and war, the MTMC, MSC, and the new Air Mobility Command would come under his combatant command, except that the Services could withhold Service-unique or theater-assigned assets. Cheney dropped the portion of the “service-unique” definition that General Powell had found objectionable. Cheney also decided that afloat pre-positioning ships would be theater-assigned only prior to the initial discharge of cargo. He did not, however, extend USCINCTRANS’s control beyond the DBOF. Although USCINCTRANS had hoped for a detailed charter granting broader authority, he still believed that this directive brought about a great increase in his powers.

**Debating Smaller Adjustments, 1983–1990**

In 1982 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had inclined toward turning USSOUTHCOM into a sub-unified command under USLANTCOM when the time appeared right. But USSOUTHCOM’s strong objections led them to endorse the status quo. Just a year later, however, the Chairman reopened the issue. General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, informed both CINCs early in 1983 that he believed the time for this change had come, and that USFORCARIB in Key West should be put under USSOUTHCOM as its naval component. Then USSOUTHCOM, as a sub-unified command, would have a pool of forces and a naval headquarters to carry out a wide variety of missions as well as a command dedicated to controlling the Caribbean and South Atlantic sea-lanes in the event of war with the USSR. Both CINCs balked, however, and the Chairman took no further action. In September 1987 the Joint Chiefs of Staff went on record as opposing USFORCARIB’s dissolution as long as Cuba threatened regional stability. Five months later, though, the DOD Inspector General concluded that the USFORCARIB headquarters was “nice to have, but clearly not essential” because it would play no part in any contingency except a minor noncombatant evacuation during peacetime. He recommended abolishing it as part of a worldwide
trimming of headquarters. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred, and USFORCARIB was disestablished on 30 June 1989.\textsuperscript{18}

Another piece of unfinished business flowed from the fact that Alaska remained unassigned, except for air defense. In 1983 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended creating a sub-unified Alaskan Command under USCINCPAC. That would have transformed the Alaskan Air Command into a numbered air force, subordinate to PACAF. Senator Ted Stevens (R, AK) pressed Secretary Weinberger into disapproving the change and later secured a series of legislative prohibitions against it. Lobbying by the Air Force finally ended his opposition. In February 1989, after getting assurances that Congress would remove legislative barriers at the first opportunity, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended assigning Alaska to USCINCPAC. Changes were made, and on 7 July 1989, the sub-unified Alaskan Command started functioning.\textsuperscript{19}

Early in 1983 the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to move in the direction of a sub-unified command for Northeast Asia when it appeared politically feasible. In 1974 the Secretary of Defense had directed USCINCPAC to prepare contingency plans for activating Northeast Asia and Southwest Pacific commands. Such plans were incorporated into the Joint Operations Planning System edition for 1975 but not into the one for 1984. The Army Staff revived its argument that, without them, USCINCPAC would be overwhelmed by the distances involved as well as the diversity of nations and missions. Nonetheless, as part of a review required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September 1987 stated their opposition to a Northeast Asia command. As in the past, they worried that long-standing animosity between Japan and Korea would keep the CINC of such a command constantly walking a tightrope. By early 1990 the ending of the Cold War, plus USCINCPAC’s continuing opposition, for the time being ended consideration of a new command.\textsuperscript{20}

The Goldwater-Nichols Act also required an appraisal of whether USCENTCOM should become responsible for the ocean areas adjacent to Southwest Asia and for the “confrontation states” of Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. The Chief of Staff, Air Force, favored giving USCENTCENT the North Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Oman. Conversely, the Chief of Naval Operations proposed reassigning the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf from USCENTCENT to USCINCPAC. His rationale was that USCENTCENT could not carry out his mission without command of the seas stretching all the way back to the California coast, which was USCINCPAC’s responsibility. Treating the Pacific and Indian Oceans as a single strategic entity would enhance efficiency and flexibility. Ultimately, in September 1987 the Joint Chiefs of Staff opted for the status quo. They concluded that current arrangements should remain intact and that keeping USCENTCENT separate from the “confrontation states” would make him more effective and credible in dealing with other Arab and Muslim states.\textsuperscript{21}

In October 1988 the inactivation of MAC as a specified command, coupled with the start of a biennial UCP review mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, created what the Director, Joint Staff, called a “window of opportunity” to reexamine several issues. He suggested expanding USCENTCOM’s ocean area; giving the Caribbean, Mexico and the water around South America to USSOUTHCOM; and assigning CONUS to FORSCOM as its geographic area of responsibility. But these proposals raised some old and emotional issues. The Navy never had wanted land CINC to control significant ocean areas; Mexico always had remained unassigned because of its “special relationship” with the United States; and a specified command never had been given a geographic area of responsibility. As in the past, Army and Air Force planners favored expanding USCENTCENT’s ocean area and giving ocean area to USSOUTHCOM; Navy and Marine Corps planners opposed not
only those steps but also assigning Mexico. The Joint Staff broached the possibility of establishing a CINC North America. Ultimately, on 9 February 1989 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended only one significant change: adding the Gulfs of Aden and Oman to USCINCCENT’s area of responsibility. This modest shift meant that the new boundaries between PACOM and CENTCOM no longer would cut through the Bab el Mandeb/Strait of Hormuz and their approaches. The sensitive issue of USCINCCENT commanding fleets or controlling broad ocean areas was finessed. On 26 June Secretary Weinberger endorsed this change.22

Adapting to a New World Order

The opening of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe during late 1989 created a far wider “window of opportunity.” The Cold War was over. In March 1990 an ad hoc working group started a UCP review based on the assumptions that there would be force reductions in PACOM and, especially, EUCOM and that Congress would mandate cutbacks in overseas headquarters. The group believed that options submitted to the Chairman should be as bold and as free of organizational bias as possible. They decided that several possibilities deserved consideration: disestablishing USCENTCOM and USSOUTHCOM, creating a North America command, and retaining those commands that served the most clearly identifiable US strategic interests (PACOM, LANTCOM, and EUCOM), letting joint task forces handle crises elsewhere.23

The Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, believed that a radical approach should at least be presented to the JCS. The Director of J-5, Lieutenant General George Lee Butler, USAF, presided over a number of free-ranging sessions and kept General Powell informed. The outcome was a proposal, given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 November 1990, for reducing the ten commands to six:

1. Strategic Command, absorbing SAC, giving strategic direction to the Trident fleet, and taking responsibility for ballistic missile defense and the anti-satellite mission.
2. Contingency Command, in which USSOCOM would be a sub-unified command; FORSCOM would be disestablished.
3. Transportation Command.
5. Atlantic Command, containing USEUCOM and USCENTCOM as sub-unified commands.
6. Pacific Command, with Northeast Asia as a new sub-unified command.

The Service Chiefs identified two problems with this proposal. The first was how to organize CONUS-based forces. The Army and Air Force favored placing all such forces under Americas Command and creating a National Contingency Force. The second problem was how to organize STRATCOM, SPACECOM and NORAD forces.24

The six-command proposal was intended to serve as a starting point and nothing more; J-5 believed from the outset that it would not be adopted. They felt certain, for instance, that General Powell would neither try to win JCS approval of an Americas Command nor, for political and diplomatic reasons, seek to abolish USSOUTHCOM. But the Chairman did worry that Congress might take the lead on UCP changes if the JCS failed to do so. The end of the Cold War meant shrinking budgets and switching from a global to a regionally based strategy, a smaller conventional capability, and a rationalization of strategic nuclear forces. The next UCP briefing, given by J-5 to the Chiefs on 22 May 1991, envisioned
nine CINCs: STRATCOM would supersede SAC; Americas Command would replace SOUTHCOM and FORSCOM; all other commands would remain.\textsuperscript{25}

**Strategic Command: An Easy Change**

The 1960 compromise that created a specified SAC, a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), and a CINCSAC who was also Director, JSTPS, had weathered the Cold War unchanged. During the UCP review of 1982–1983, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered and rejected a unified strategic command on grounds that “if it’s not broken, don’t fix it.” In September 1987, when the Goldwater-Nichols Act required reconsideration of the UCP, the JCS repeated that position. No Service or combatant command, they advised Secretary Weinberger, advocated changing the current system. Diffusing responsibility for strategic nuclear forces among four CINCs (SAC, LANTCOM, PACOM, and EUCOM) enhanced force survivability by enforcing redundancy. Target planning was what required coordination, and that the JSTPS accomplished. Poseidon and Trident missile submarine patrols had to be coordinated with the movements of friendly and hostile forces, a task best handled by the associated maritime commander.\textsuperscript{26}

When the Soviet Union ceased to be an adversary, the importance of the SIOP and the strategic nuclear arsenal declined. As the defense budget shrank, the institutional and inter-Service barriers that long had prevented a specified SAC from becoming a unified strategic command began to fall away. The J-5 began considering a possible structure of a new command. The CINCSAC, who was General John T. Chain, made a short presentation called “If I Were King” during the CINCs’ Conference in August 1990: A Strategic Command would include ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, SDI, and elements of USSPACECOM. Strategic warning, however, should become part of a command that also contained FORSCOM, TAC, and North American Air Defense. Two months later, drawing upon proposals passed from J-5 to SAC, General Chain recommended to General Powell that STRATCOM combine responsibilities assigned to CINCSAC, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, and USCINCSPACE. But the attack warning and assessment mission, together with TAC and FORSCOM, should form part of another new unified command. General Chain suggested that STRATCOM’s responsibilities include preparing and maintaining a national strategic target list and a SIOP; long-range nuclear and non-nuclear air strikes; ballistic missile combat and defense; strategic reconnaissance; management of USAF aerial refueling assets; and, finally, space surveillance, control, and support. The post of CINCSTRAT would rotate between the Navy and the Air Force. SAC would become the Air Force component of STRATCOM; USSPACECOM would be redesignated a sub-unified command under STRATCOM.\textsuperscript{27}

Early in January 1991 General Powell broached the possibility of a smaller STRATCOM that incorporated strategic nuclear offensive forces, the JSTPS, anti-satellite and ballistic missile defense, and USCINCSPACE’s defensive planning element. As an alternative, the Navy Staff proposed creating a STRATCOM headquarters with SAC, LANTFLT, and PACFLT as its Service components.\textsuperscript{28}

One question raised by creating STRATCOM was whether to subordinate or fragment USSPACECOM. The USCINCSPACE, who was General Donald J. Kutyna, USAF, strongly opposed doing either. On 8 March 1991, at the end of DESERT STORM, he reminded General Powell that USSPACECOM’s activities and emphases were changing. No longer was it merely a provider of strategic nuclear intelligence. DESERT STORM illustrated how USSPACECOM had become a major supplier of operational and tactical intelligence for the Army and Navy. Space, he said, had spent 30 years emerging from the umbrella of the intelligence community, then of research and development experimenters, and finally
of an offensive-minded SAC headquarters. Today, Kutyna continued, an Army cook used a pocket-sized
global positioning system to deliver meals to soldiers scattered across the sands of Saudi Arabia. Within
two minutes of an Iraqi SCUD missile launch, PATRIOT missiles were alerted and primed while troops
had time to don their protective gear and F-15s flew toward mobile SCUD launchers—all using target
coordinates provided from space.29 His arguments were extremely effective.

In January 1991 General Butler succeeded General Chain as CINCSAC. By July Butler had become
convinced that SAC suffered from an outdated mission focus that translated “strategic” as “nuclear,”
which meant execution of the SIOP. He recommended not only merging SAC’s and TAC’s reconnaissance
assets into a numbered air force but also integrating SAC’s bomber, tanker, and reconnaissance
assets with TAC forces into a single operational command. Butler particularly wanted to make the B-1
bomber usable in conventional conflicts. The Chief of Staff, Air Force, endorsed creating new air combat
and air mobility commands, which would replace SAC, MAC, and TAC.

During a JCS meeting in July 1991, General Powell promised that he would take no steps toward
reorganization without first securing the Service Chiefs’ and the CINC’s approval. The Army and Air
Force Chiefs of Staff as well as the Commandant, Marine Corps, all said that they supported a unified
STRATCOM. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, worried about finding the
personnel to staff a new unified command. He told J-5 officers that STRATCOM was “a good concept
but the devil’s in the details.”30

Two more JCS meetings, followed by the CINCs’ Conference of August 1991, produced an agreement
to establish USSTRATCOM. Admiral Kelso won consent that the Navy’s staff representation should
increase to 35 percent and that USCINCSTRAT would become a rotational billet and not also be a Service
component commander. On 27 September 1991 President George H. W. Bush publicly announced that he
had approved dramatic cutbacks in nuclear weapons as well as creation of a unified strategic command.31

It was agreed at the 1991 CINCs’ Conference that General Butler, in his capacity as Director, Strategic
Target Planning, would take the lead in developing an implementation plan to have USSTRATCOM
start functioning by June 1992 and complete the transition six months later. On 27 September 1991 General
Butler sent the Joint Staff a proposal that USCINCSTRAT be given geographical responsibility for
the former USSR. That proposal was rejected. Two weeks later, he recommended giving USSTRATCOM
responsibility for “strategic conventional forces.” The Navy and Air Staffs objected strenuously, claiming
that such wording would cover aircraft carriers, airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), and
conventional bombers. The Joint Staff agreed. General Butler said that he was looking toward possibly
integrating conventional capability into the SIOP. But General Powell decided against him, on grounds
that USSTRATCOM’s mission had been conceived by the CINCs as a strategic nuclear one and was so
approved by the President.32

General Powell endorsed an implementation plan for USSTRATCOM on 6 April 1992. The next
day President Bush approved a UCP revision establishing the new command. USSTRATCOM began
functioning on 1 June, and, simultaneously, SAC ceased to exist. USSTRATCOM’s components were
elements from the new Air Combat Command (ICBMs, bombers, and battle management), CINCLANTFLT, and CINCPACFLT (ballistic missile submarines and a strategic communications wing).

The START II Treaty required that a substantial number of US heavy bombers be reoriented to
a primarily conventional role. Accordingly, Admiral Paul David Miller, who was CINC of the newly
expanded Atlantic Command, proposed that combatant command of heavy bombers and strategic
reconnaissance aircraft shift from USCINCSTRAT to him. On 27 December 1993 a transfer took place,
and USSTRATCOM’s command of forces was reduced to ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines and battle management aircraft, which had no role except in a strategic nuclear war.33

Meanwhile, in his February 1993 Report on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, General Powell had recommended a review to determine whether USSPACECOM should be abolished and the space mission assigned to USSTRATCOM. Such a consolidation might occur if it could be shown to conserve resources and eliminate a substantial number of staff positions. On 15 April Secretary of Defense Les Aspin commissioned a 90-day study of such a merger. A working group led by J-5 but drawn from USSTRATCOM, USSPACECOM, NORAD, the Services, and all the Joint Staff directorates agreed that the space mission could be transferred to USSTRATCOM. The cost saving, however, would be limited to eliminating 100 to 300 staff support billets. But was this saving significant enough to justify a merger? And would the “value added”—that is, improving space support, operational effectiveness, efficiency, and interoperability while maintaining joint Service expertise and a joint operational focus—be enough to warrant a major change? Over this issue, members disagreed sharply. On 2 August, the Director, Joint Staff, informed OSD that streamlining already was under way and that the merger issue would be reexamined after the extent of saving became known. He added that merging USSTRATCOM into USSPACECOM might then be examined—a reversal of perception about the two commands’ relative importance.34

Expanding the Atlantic Command

On 22 May 1991, when J-5 presented its plan for nine commands to the JCS, Americas Command attracted the most attention. FORSCOM, Tactical Air Command, and Atlantic Fleet would be its Service components. The Chief of Staff, Air Force, General Merrill A. McPeak, strongly supported this concept on grounds that having such a command would reduce ad hoc responses to crises. The Chief of Staff, Army, argued that tailoring force packages was the key to meeting contingencies. The Commandant of the Marine Corps cautioned against presenting Americas Command as the only solution. The Director, J-5, noted that failure to reduce headquarters was a major weakness; the Joint National Contingency Force might even require an extra one. General Powell, observing that USEUCOM would lose at least half its personnel, suggested that a CINCAMERICAS might have his headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia, and control a sub-unified command in Europe. He had watched USREDCOM falter because the Navy was not part of it and favored an East Coast headquarters to be sure that the Navy was involved this time.35

The CINCs’ Conference on 13 August 1991 considered and rejected Americas Command, at least in the form presented by J-5: a command covering all of North and South America except Alaska, with USSOUTHCOM being disestablished. General Edwin H. Burba, Jr., strongly advocated retaining his FORSCOM as a specified command. During DESERT SHIELD/STORM, he had talked to and coordinated with many CINCs; going through a CINCAMERICAS would have made his task more cumbersome. He, CINCLANT, and the Commandant, Marine Corps, all opposed a Joint National Contingency Force. The Commandant argued that, since CONUS-based ground and air forces already were built into the CINCs’ operational plans (OPLANS), none of them wanted such a force. General Powell agreed on that point. He also favored retaining USSOUTHCOM and added that he had difficulty seeing how CINCAMERICAS could handle such a wide span of control. “None of the choices are pleasant,” he reminded conferees, “but we must get smaller.”36
A new Air Combat Command (ACC), incorporating elements of TAC, SAC, and MAC, was scheduled to start operating in June 1992. Early in December 1991 a memorandum signed by the Vice Chief of Staff, Air Force, recommended designating ACC as a specified command that would parallel FORSCOM’s role in providing a general reserve, joint training, and readiness and deployment planning. J-5 opposed this solution as undercutting the practice of assigning forces to the CINCs.37 No action was taken.

At the CINCs’ Conference of August 1992, General Powell reopened the question of whether there should be a permanent CONUS-based command designed to deal with contingencies. The answers showed no consensus. General Burba argued again that going through another CINC would make FORSCOM’s task too complicated. General McPeak disagreed: the CINC simply would tell General Burba to make telephone calls and coordinate his requirements. McPeak said that he wanted ACC to be part of another command and not an independent force. General Powell defined the main issue as whether a joint national contingency force was needed. The USCINCEUR, General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, gave his opinion that FORSCOM had rendered good service and he would not like to see it dissolved. The USCINCCENT, General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, argued that any war in CENTCOM would be a coalition war. A CONUS-based force that was globally oriented could acquire only limited regional expertise. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., agreed. Not so, General Powell replied. A joint task force was built for DESERT STORM, except that it was built in Saudi Arabia. But, the Commandant countered, USCENTCOM contained officers who knew the area and the personalities. General Powell had a rejoinder. When DESERT SHIELD started, he asked, did General Charles Horner know that he would be the Joint Forces Air Component Commander? General Horner, who was now the USCINCSPACE, replied that he had not. As Commanding General, 9th Air Force, he could not have become a regional expert because he was reporting to both USCENTCOM and Tactical Air Command.38

The CINCs’ Conference crystallized three alternatives: First, keep the status quo. Second, establish ACC as a specified command. Third, assign all CONUS-based Army and Air Force units to USLANTCOM, making it the joint force integrator, and disestablish FORSCOM as a specified command. General Powell decided to take the initiative in pressing the third alternative. The Chairman’s rationale ran as follows: While the joint/unified system worked well overseas, CONUS forces still were Service-oriented. As the US presence overseas shrank, it became more important that CONUS-based forces “be trained to operate jointly as a way of life and not just for occasional exercises.” Growing acceptance of jointness opened the way toward this last step in unification. ACC as well as FORSCOM would become components in a unified command, and the term “specified” would be retired. A single combatant command would ensure the joint training and readiness of response forces. It also would support emerging missions, such as peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance; help cope with domestic disasters; and prepare and test joint doctrines. General Powell deemed USLANTCOM the most suitable choice for these tasks. The Cold War’s end freed it for a new mission, and it already enjoyed component relationships with FORSCOM, ACC, MARLANT, and LANTFLT. Since the USCINCLANT was also SACLANT, building joint capabilities would be as important as using the seaways and so would enhance his position as a major NATO commander. Thus USLANTCOM would change from a principally naval headquarters into a more balanced one, and an officer from any Service could fill the CINC’s position.39

General Powell presented his concept to the Service Chiefs on 16 October 1992. After another meeting on 2 November, they approved its further development. Under Joint Staff leadership, a working
group with USLANTCOM and Service officers set about refining the concept. On 18 November the Chairman authorized the preparation of a concept plan. The Joint Staff moved away from the term “Americas Command” because it carried too much emotional baggage from past debates. The Army still worried about declining Service authority, and the Marine Corps wanted to be sure of retaining Service-unique capabilities. General Burba several times visited the Director, J-5, Lieutenant General Edwin S. Leland, USA, to argue against disestablishing FORSCOM.40

In February 1993, in his Report on Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces, General Powell expounded his concept for combining the CONUS-based forces of FORSCOM, ACC, LANTFLT, and MARLANT into an expanded Atlantic Command. On 11 March the Chairman approved a final concept for USACOM—the acronym that would replace USLANTCOM.

Yet, to a far greater degree than with the creation of USSTRATCOM, the devil was in the details. The drafting of guidance for USACOM’s implementation plan sparked a number of controversies. The Army wanted USACOM to control west coast Navy and Marine forces but argued against giving the CINC geographic as well as functional responsibilities. USCENTCOM agreed about giving west coast forces to USACOM. The Navy, supported by USEUCOM and the Marine Corps, advocated having the component CINCLANTFLT also be SACLANT so that SACLANT would remain a naval officer. On 7 April General Powell resolved these issues. First, West Coast naval forces would stay under PACOM. Second, CINCLANT (soon to be USCINACOM) would remain SACLANT; the Chairman had canvassed NATO Defense Chiefs and found that none insisted upon SACLANT always being a naval officer. Third, Atlantic Command would continue controlling a geographic area so that, among other things, Vieques in Puerto Rico would be available for joint exercises. General Powell remarked that transferring its geographic area to USEUCOM, for example, would make that command in turn too large. Fourth, the Chairman did agree that the Secretary of the Army would remain Executive Agent for domestic emergencies. But, since the Secretary would have to approach the Chairman about using a CINC’s forces, General Powell believed that his own role as principal military adviser was protected. The Secretary of the Army, moreover, did lose his role as Executive Agent for many “peacekeeping” operations; the UCP now assigned combatant command over peacekeeping forces to the appropriate CINC. General Powell wanted the whole implementation plan to reach a rapid completion and directed, “Make this happen before 30 September”—his own retirement date.41

On 15 April Secretary Aspin directed that USCINACOM would assume command of FORSCOM, ACC, LANTFLT, and MARLANT as well as responsibility for joint training, force packaging, and facilitating deployments of designated CONUS forces. To facilitate USCINACOM’s mission as the joint force integrator of most CONUS-based forces, key stateside USAF units that provided the conventional capabilities for joint force “packages” were brought under USCINACOM’s command. Also, the Chairman’s Instruction that detailed the purpose and management of dual-based forces was revised to reflect USCINACOM’s new role as the CINC who supported USCINCEUR. This revision did not fundamentally alter the political or military significance of the dual-based forces concept as stated in the NATO Defense Planning Guidance. A directive dated 20 September formalized all these changes.42

Meantime, on 27 August General Powell asked Secretary Aspin to approve UCP revisions reflecting USACOM’s new role. USCINCSOUTH proposed stripping USACOM of its geographic area of responsibility; USCINCEUR favored delay until both an implementation plan and an FY 1994 “Forces” document had been approved. The Chairman recommended rejecting both and making the UCP changes
take effect on 1 October. Secretary Aspin agreed and President Clinton gave his approval. Accordingly, on 1 October USLANTCOM became USACOM, and FORSCOM lost its specified command status.43

Conclusion

The end of the Cold War triggered dramatic changes in the US military establishment but not in the UCP, because the unified command structure was the product of different factors.44 A functional UCP reorganization would have cut deeply into what the Services saw as their traditional prerogatives. The debate over making USCINCTRANS single manager of transportation assets would have been replicated many times. Instead, working within the old geographical framework, the UCP was reshaped to carry out General Powell’s regional approach set forth in the new National Military Strategy. Here other constraints worked against major cuts. First, reducing to only four or five CINCs could create one dominant figure who might undercut other CINCs and even the Chairman. Such a fear did exist about USCINCACOM, and the UCP placed a unique limitation upon him: “In coordination with the other combatant commanders, identify and prepare for review by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, joint force packages for worldwide employment.” Second, eliminating unified command headquarters might not have generated the manpower savings sought by Congress. With a “super” CINC, controlling very large areas or forces, work simply would have shifted down to enlarged sub-unified commands and required bigger staffs there. Third, political and diplomatic factors helped keep commands in being. USSOUTHCOM survived in large part so that direct ties could be maintained with military officers who played dominant roles in many Latin American countries. Fourth, the Services acted as a powerful force for the status quo. Before Goldwater-Nichols, the corporate JCS usually shied away from major reforms and the President or Congress had to precipitate change.

After Goldwater-Nichols, the Chairman’s attitude became crucial. Admiral Crowe, having to work with some Service Chiefs who had taken office before Goldwater-Nichols, adopted an evolutionary approach in which consensus still played a significant part. General Powell took the lead in creating USACOM and turning USCINCTRANS into the single manager. At a more mundane level, he cooperated with OSD in trimming the UCP from 28 pages in 1989 to 14 pages in 1992. Joint Staff officers characterized longer UCPs as “Christmas trees” in the sense that the Services hung on them qualifiers designed to protect their own prerogatives. In sum, General Powell used the powers given him by Goldwater-Nichols to work with CINCs like Admiral Miller in removing what he saw as barriers to jointness.
PART FOUR

1993–1999
1993–1999

Oiling the Machinery

In the 1995 review, Atlantic Command (ACOM) again emerged as the major topic of debate. Should ACOM continue combining functional with regional responsibilities? The Chairman, General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, began the biennial review in February by soliciting recommendations from the CINCs and the Services. The Chief of Naval Operations and the CINCUSACOM, General John M. Sheehan, USMC, proposed turning SOUTHCOM into a sub-unified command under ACOM. Sheehan also wanted to acquire either combatant command or training oversight of West Coast forces. Conversely, the Chief of Staff of the Army wanted to eliminate ACOM’s entire geographical AOR. The Chief of Staff, Air Force, and USCINCSOUTH recommended shifting the Caribbean area from ACOM to SOUTHCOM; USCINCSOUTH also sought to control the waters adjoining his command out to 200 nautical miles, on grounds that this would improve regional engagement, contingency planning, and counter-drug operations.1

Concurrently, a Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) was reviewing UCP issues. The Commission’s members leaned toward turning ACOM into a purely functional command. Talking to them in April, General Shalikashvili did not dismiss General Sheehan’s argument that having a geographic area of responsibility gave him credibility. The Chairman saw reasons for, ultimately, assigning West Coast forces to ACOM; deploying a brigade from the Hawaii-based 25th Infantry Division to Haiti had shown how units could be multi-tasked. Shalikashvili did agree that, because protecting the sea-lanes to Europe had lost importance, the Caribbean should be shifted to SOUTHCOM. Miami, where CINCSOUTH would be relocating his headquarters from Panama, impressed the Chairman as having become a major Latin American city. Broadening CINCSOUTH’s warfighting capabilities would give him credibility with Latin American counterparts who came to Miami.2

Some familiar issues were debated again. The USCINCCENT, supported by the Army and Marine Corps, suggested adding India and a good part of the Indian Ocean to his AOR. Speaking with CORM members, General Shalikashvili defined the underlying issue as whether India and Pakistan saw a CINC as the officer who decided which country the United States would fight beside in a war or simply as the officer who conducted exercises. If the latter, he believed that large nations like India would prefer dealing directly with Washington when major issues arose. That being so, India and Pakistan could remain divided between USPACOM and USCENTCOM. A Commission member favored establishing a Northeast Asia Command. The Chairman replied that Korean unification had to come first; the Chinese would not talk to an officer who was also Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. Finally, opinions differed over whether newly independent states created from the former Soviet Union should remain unassigned. USCINCPAC and USCINCCENT said yes; USCINCACOM recommended assigning countries as they joined the Partnership for Peace; CINCSTRAT wanted to assign Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan after they became non-nuclear states.3
During May and June 1995, the Chairman removed from consideration a number of controversial proposals: turning SOUTHCOM into a sub-unified command under ACOM; making CINCSOUTH responsible for all counter-drug operations in his AOR; giving geographic CINCs authority to budget and administer operations and maintenance funds for joint training; granting functional CINCs programming and budgeting authority similar to that possessed by USSOCOM; and creating a CINC for logistics. The Chairman also dropped, as premature, General Sheehan’s suggestion of designating a CINC for command, control, communications, computers and intelligence.

Concurrently, the CORM recommended changing ACOM into a purely geographical command and creating a new functional command that would control CONUS-based general-purpose forces, reserve as well as active. That way, the Commission concluded, joint force integration would be better defined, understood and accepted by all the CINCs. But General Shalikashvili successfully urged the Secretary to postpone action, on grounds that the issue needed more study.

At the CINCs’ conference, on 8 September 1995, the location of a redrawn boundary between ACOM and SOUTHCOM was the main point of contention. Discussion brought out some points that had not come to the Chairman’s attention (e.g., the extent of cooperation between PACOM and the Chilean navy, and the fact that every agency except the Department of Defense managed Caribbean and Latin American affairs through a single office). If SOUTHCOM did acquire a water area, the Navy preferred using lines of latitude and longitude for boundaries rather than following a two hundred mile limit as it curved along the coasts. However, the J-5 proposed giving SOUTHCOM water areas inside contour lines running three hundred nautical miles from the coasts. Expanding SOUTHCOM’s water area, the J-5 reasoned, would allow it to interact more effectively with Latin American navies and give it an area of responsibility with more space for joint operations and exercises. Phase I, proposed for 1 January 1996, would shift the waters adjoining Central and South America from ACOM to SOUTHCOM. Phase II, occurring no earlier than 1 June 1997, would transfer the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, and portions of the Atlantic to SOUTHCOM.

General Sheehan protested that losing so much water would return ACOM to the two-dimensional focus of the old Atlantic Command. Why not, instead, consider putting SOUTHCOM under ACOM to (1) firmly establish ACOM’s multi-dimensional joint focus and (2) provide an AOR that would be exceptionally conducive to joint training and integration? In October, nonetheless, the JCS agreed to the expansion of SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility outlined above. But the Navy prevailed to the extent that the new water boundaries would be drawn along lines of latitude and longitude.

On 23 October 1995, General Shalikashvili asked Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to endorse three UCP changes. First, revise STRATCOM’s mission to replace outdated wording that had encompassed peacetime missions as well as wartime taskings. Second, shift from USPACOM to USCENTCOM the Arabian Sea and portions of the Indian Ocean. This would move command boundaries away from choke points and provide space to conduct joint operations and training. Third, immediately enlarge USSOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility to include waters off the Central and South American coasts. Not earlier than 1 June 1997, transfer to USSOUTHCOM the Caribbean basin, the Gulf of Mexico and a portion of the Atlantic Ocean. As spokesman for the combatant commanders, Shalikashvili pointed out that CINCUSACOM and USCINCPAC opposed enlarging USSOUTHCOM. The Chairman also concluded that, contrary to the CORM’s recommendation, USACOM should retain both geographic and functional responsibilities for the time being. He favored postponing, until the joint training system had time to mature, a decision about putting West Coast forces under USACOM. Some in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense tried to accelerate transferring the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, but Secretary Perry supported the Chairman. On 28 December 1995, President William J. Clinton approved these changes.9

At the CINCs’ conference in January 1997, General Shalikashvili asserted that US armed forces had reached a new level of competence; he was “not persuaded that we are doing anything wrong.” The Director, J-5, recommended tasking an evolutionary approach to the UCP in 1997, leaving consideration of “revolutionary” changes for the next cycle—and the next Chairman. Assignment of countries created from the former Soviet Union fell into the category of evolutionary change. In the Defense Department’s view, the increased US presence in these countries showed the need for CINC’s to assume planning responsibilities. Accordingly, J-5 proposed assigning the Western Slavic and Caucasus states—Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—to USEUCOM. USCENTCOM would get the Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The State Department did not object, and these assignments were incorporated into the next UCP.10

Should space be defined as a geographic AOR? The J-5 cautioned against creating perceptions of intent to militarize space and saw no compelling reason to define space as an AOR. But in June 1997 the USCINCSPACE, General Howell M. Estes, III, USAF, advised the Chairman that it was time to act. Having an AOR would allow USSPACECOM to develop a cohesive regional strategy for space and to establish ties, through military-to-military contacts, with other entities involved in space. State Department representatives, however, voiced “serious concerns” about damaging Russian-American relations, particularly, ABM negotiations and the ratification of START II. The NSC Staff held a similar view. Accordingly, J-5 proposed expanding USSPACECOM’s mission only in modest ways: first, to serve as the single point of contact for space operational matters; second, to provide military representation to US national, commercial and international agencies for matters related to space operations; third, to plan and implement security assistance related to space operations; and fourth, to coordinate and conduct space campaign planning. These additions mostly codified what already was taking place.11 On January 1998, President Clinton approved a UCP that incorporated the revisions for USEUCOM, USCENTCOM and USSPACECOM described above. It also tasked each CINC with responsibility for the security and force protection of his command, and precisely spelled out USACOM’s responsibilities as the joint force integrator.12

Emerging Issues: Homeland Defense and Information Warfare

The next UCP cycle took up “revolutionary” changes, and the focus of attention shifted sharply. The threats to US territory, particularly from terrorism, appeared to be large and growing. The bombing in Oklahoma City, the attempted destruction of the World Trade Center, and the release of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway dramatized the new dangers. A National Defense Panel, in December 1997, outlined a “transformation strategy” that accentuated homeland defense and control of cyberspace. The Panel proposed abolishing USACOM, giving USSPACECOM the mission of information support on a global scale, and creating three new commands. A Joint Forces Command would take responsibility for the readiness and training of all CONUS-based active and reserve forces, and provide combat-ready forces to all other commands. An Americas Command would have the mission of protecting the hemisphere, deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction, and building hemispheric cooperation. Homeland Defense and North American Aerospace Defense would be sub-unified commands under it. A Logistics Command would integrate the missions of USTRANSCOM and the Defense Logistics Agency.13
In May 1998, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre concluded that homeland defense ought to become a CINC’s responsibility. What, he asked the Vice Chairman, was the best way to proceed? As matters stood, the Secretary of the Army served as the executive agent for military support to civil authority. In certain situations, the Secretary could task service assets directly without CINC or Joint Staff coordination. The Army’s Director of Military Support (DOMS), who reported to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, was executive agent for “weapons of mass destruction consequence management”—i.e., dealing with the aftermath of a manmade disaster. The current UCP made CINCUSACOM responsible for military support to civil authorities as well as military assistance for civil disturbances.\textsuperscript{14}

The January 1998 CINCs’ conference decided to commission a study of how the UCP should evolve as far ahead as 2010. The new chairman, General Hugh H. Shelton, USA, cited review of ACOM’s role and homeland defense as his top priorities. Should homeland defense remain decentralized among several DOD organizations or be centralized, either within the DOD or under a unified command?\textsuperscript{25} Shelton believed that the key to turning Joint Vision 2010 into operational reality lay in an aggressive experimentation program focused at the joint or “seam” areas where the Services by themselves fell short. ACOM struck him as the logical place to locate these experiments. The Chairman wanted to review the roles of ACOM and CONUS-based commands in the coming UCP cycle, then address 21st century issues in the next one. He also directed the Joint Staff to work upon defensive information operations and, after an organization had been created, deal with offensive information operations.\textsuperscript{16}

In September, the Chairman and the CINCs agreed upon important steps. First, replace ACOM in 1999 with a Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) that would be geographic as well as functional. Second, organize a Joint Task Force—Civil Support that would be subordinate to JFCOM; hold open the possibility of assigning it to a sub-unified command or another CINC. Third, continue organizing a JTF for computer network defense (CND). The CINCUSACOM observed that giving Information Support to SPACECOM would not leave enough duties to justify a homeland defense command. General Shelton replied that counter-terrorism, consequence management, DOMS, and national missile defense all could become larger tasks.\textsuperscript{17}

Concurrently, contractors submitted to the Joint Staff a study, UCP-21, that buttressed the Chairman’s and CINC’s conclusions. According to UCP-21, service component headquarters in geographic commands were inadequately prepared, trained, and equipped to head joint task forces. Therefore, Joint Forces Command should integrate service capabilities by training joint command and control elements. Also, JFCOM ought to design and manage the development of joint doctrine, and experiment with new operational concepts. Among other things, the study recommended creating, at some later time, an all-service Logistics Command as well as a US Defense Command. The latter would: control national missile and air defense; assume DOMS missions; support crisis and consequence management; and exercise oversight of efforts to protect DOD installations and computer networks.\textsuperscript{18}

In June 1999 General Shelton spelled out his UCP priorities for Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen. Joint Forces Command would receive the resources needed to get the most benefits from its experimentation program. A JTF-Civil Support, reporting through CINCJFCOM to the Chairman, would start functioning. But, he reported, there was disagreement within Defense and among agencies about the next step. Shelton’s inclination was to build the JTF into a homeland defense command. As an interim step, he wanted JTF-Civil Support to acquire responsibility for all military support to civilian authorities within the United States. JTF-Computer Network Defense had reached full operational capability.\textsuperscript{19}
The J-5 had circulated a draft UCP for final coordination. In mid-June, unresolved issues were brought to General Shelton for resolution. The most important ones concerned JFCOM. First, the Air Force opposed giving JFCOM a mission to “support development and utilization of fully interoperable systems and capabilities,” including Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Since everyone else had approved this mission, however, Shelton retained it. Second, for the task of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consequence management, the Army sought to insert “subject to Secretary of Defense approval and/or applicable DOD guidance.” But, J-5 noted, the Chairman’s intent was to require that orders come from the Secretary of Defense, not from the Secretary of the Army via DOMS. Consequently, Shelton deleted “and/or applicable DOD guidance.” Third, instead of simply serving as the joint force trainer, CINCUSACOM wanted the new CINCJFCOM to be “Executive Agent for Joint Training by implementing, managing, and assessing the CJCS exercise program.” Shelton compromised, designating him as “lead” rather than executive agent, and only for the CINC’s portion of the program. Fourth, CINCUSACOM asked that JFCOM acquire the following missions: conduct joint and interoperability training of assigned forces that were to operate as part of joint/combined task forces; and provide joint training of units not trained by other geographic commands. He wanted to have joint interoperability training recognized as being separate from component interoperability training. The basic difference lay in who would be the commander. General Shelton agreed to the first mission but not the second. Thus, he ensured that JFCOM would advance beyond ACOM in joint experimentation and training and WMD consequence management.

On 29 September 1999, upon the recommendations of General Shelton and Secretary Cohen, President Clinton approved the UCP. Effective 1 October, replacing USACOM, US Joint Forces Command would serve as the lead joint force integrator, the lead agent for joint force training, and the DOD executive agent for joint force experimentation. Its JTF-Civil Support would plan for and integrate DOD assistance to the lead federal agency managing the consequences of a domestic WMD event. The JTF would be commanded by a two-star officer, drawn from the Guard or Reserve component, with a small headquarters staff.

Appended to the Plan was a non-binding “Vision” statement, the first of its kind that described possible developments in the next century. USJFCOM might change into a purely functional command. Homeland defense either could be consolidated under a US Command or those tasks could remain distributed among combatant commanders. Missions related to information support might burgeon to such an extent that USSPACECOM would be reconfigured into a Space and Information Command. Finally, some areas long left unassigned, particularly Mexico, might be given to unified commands.
PART FIVE

1999–2012
The 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP)

At the time of the September 11, 2001, multiple terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, JFCOM (established by the 1999 UCP) was in charge of land defense of the continental United States and the land and maritime defense of Canada. NORAD defended the land, sea, and air approaches to North America. Under a bi-national agreement with Canada, the commander of NORAD was simultaneously the commander of SPACECOM and answered directly to the CJCS as well as the Canadian Chief of the Defense Staff. PACOM and SOUTHCOM were responsible for states and territories outside the continental United States but within their respective AORs.

In reaction to the attacks, on 21 September the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld the creation of a Unified CINC for Homeland Defense to coordinate and integrate joint and interagency planning and execution. A single military commander would direct military support for preemption of or response to future attacks against United States territory.

One week later, the OSD staff proposed to include Southern Command in a merged organization renamed "Americas Command." Under this arrangement, JFCOM would become a functional command, leading joint efforts in transformation, interoperability, and force deployment. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Stephen Cambone, further proposed merging adjacent commands in Europe, Asia, and Africa, ultimately creating three mega-commands. Each would have three or four standing joint task forces, for example JTF Europe, JTF Mediterranean, JTF Middle East, and so forth. Such changes, he believed, would force commanders to think more globally and better prepare for trans-regional threats.

Around the same time, USCINCJFCOM proposed consolidating all homeland security efforts under his command with a Joint Operating Area that included the continental United States or CONUS, Alaska, Canada, and littoral waters out to a 200 nautical mile limit. NORAD would retain the air defense mission. OSD Policy favored a single CINC for homeland security but opposed JFCOM filling that role. To resolve JFCOM's status in homeland defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers, USAF, suggested the imminent UCP review (then in its preliminary stage) might be an appropriate venue to explore such a change.

Service Reactions to OSD’s 2002 UCP Proposals

To organize for the Global War on Terrorism and to address transformation and homeland security issues raised by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (published 20 September 2001), on 1 October the Secretary of Defense asked the Chiefs for their thoughts on two UCP concepts. Plan A proposed the formation of an Americas Command to unify the direction of the homeland security mission. STRATCOM and SOUTHCOM would be downgraded to three-star sub-unified command status. JFCOM would become a purely functional command without an area of responsibility, allowing it to focus on transformation issues. SOCOM would become the supported CINC for aspects of the Global
War on Terrorism while EUCOM would be converted to LANTCOM and assume responsibility for the Atlantic AOR, all of Russia, and the Horn of Africa. PACOM would relinquish control of US west coast naval and Marine forces and responsibility for Alaska.8

Plan B was more sweeping. It would shift the regionally oriented CINCs into globally oriented ones by strengthening forward deterrence with regionally tailored Standing Joint Task Forces (SJTF) and headquarters. Accordingly, two functional unified commands—Strategic, Space, Information Operations Command (STRATSPACEINFOCOM) and SOCOM—would have global conventional strike, counter-terrorism, and counter-proliferation missions. The Services would provide forces directly to the SJTFs and the Chairman would allocate forces, create a new readiness and force management system to support the SJTFs, and maintain the joint pool of forces available for deployment. The nine Combatant Commands would become six and merge into three mega-commands: Americas Command; Projection Forces Command (East) (responsible for Europe, the Levant, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, the Atlantic, and West Africa); and Projection Forces Command (West) (responsible for Northeast and Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, South and Central Asia, and East Africa).9

The Army wanted either JFCOM or SOUTHCOM designated for the homeland defense mission. It concurred on the need to realign the combatant commanders’ area of responsibility but cautioned that making hasty decisions with neither a strategic plan nor defined homeland security responsibilities was risky and might alienate allies. Army leaders rejected Approach B because of the excessive operational span of control, multiplicity of JTF headquarters, and over dependence of SJTFs that they felt reduced the CINC’s operational flexibility.10

The Navy, in contrast, favored a new AMERICOM for homeland defense and fewer geographic CINCs for improved coordination; as a consequence, JFCOM would become a functional command. Like the Army, however, the Navy opposed Plan B, citing the layered headquarters that reduced efficiency, a CINCAMERICA simultaneously commanding NORAD that overextended the span of control, and SJTF requirements that diminished rotational force flexibility and forward presence.11 The Air Force agreed with the idea of a single regional America Command for homeland security and, consistent with the other services, opposed Plan B, arguing that it was essential to preserve the regional CINCs political-military and operational relationships.12

The Marine Corps also endorsed the concept of a single CINC for homeland security but opposed JFCOM filling that role or being responsible for SACLANT. Differing from the other services, the Marine Corps thought the Plan B approach would increase unity of effort for homeland defense and promote better forward presence operations through multiple SJTFs. The Commandant did hedge slightly by acknowledging that such a radical reorganization might carry unforeseen consequences. A proliferation of headquarters, for instance, would not streamline organizations; nor would dismantling current CINC relationships improve intelligence and information sharing with allies.13

The Joint Staff opposed placing JFCOM in charge of homeland security and reducing geographic commands below four. It wanted a definition of the homeland security mission and accompanying responsibilities; a single CINC Americas Command for that mission; a reorganized JFCOM as a purely functional command; transfer of the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic (SACLANT) from JFCOM; and designation of currently “unassigned regions” to geographic CINCs.14

Until a new command for homeland defense became operational, General Myers and the Combatant Commanders agreed that JFCOM should continue its homeland defense and transformation missions. They rejected replacing the five regional commands with three mega-commands,
which they felt would carry unmanageable spans of control, disrupt existing bilateral and regional relationships, and complicate the proposed new homeland defense command’s mission. The J-5, Service, and COCOM planners instead recommended JFCOM’s gradual conversion to a functional command, the establishment of a new homeland defense command, and placing NORAD within that new command. This became Approach “C” and foreshadowed the revisions eventually incorporated into the 2002 UCP.

The Service Chiefs’ and the CINC’s initial appraisals of the proposed UCP changes were mixed. The Army, Marine Corps, and Southern Command pressed for the retention of SOUTHCOM, arguing that only a four-star commander could interact effectively with Latin and South American military leaders. JFCOM sought responsibility for Homeland Security, but with the exception of the Army, the Services favored NORAD for that mission. Few CINC’s supported JFCOM’s initiative. By late October, the Director of the Joint Staff urged greater consensus among the Services to improve General Myers’ efforts to gain OSD agreement for Option C.

From mid-October 2001 through mid-February 2002, Secretary Cambone met frequently with the J-5 Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy, Rear Admiral (lower half) Barry M. Costello, to discuss UCP revisions; they also met irregularly with General Myers and Secretary Rumsfeld on the subject. One seemingly attractive suggestion was to make the commander of NORAD simultaneously a subordinate unified commander under a homeland defense command. This would alter the NORAD Agreement that gave the NORAD commander and his Canadian deputy direct access to their respective governments. To maintain this treaty requirement, General Myers directed the Joint Staff to dual-hat the homeland security commander as head of NORAD thereby retaining the bi-national CINC. After a 26 November JCS Tank review, the emerging military consensus supported a homeland security commander dual-hatted as NORAD, although some sympathy remained for a sub-unified NORAD command under a new CINC or JFCOM becoming the Homeland Security CINC.

Shortly afterward the Secretary approved a CINC dedicated to homeland security but rejected JFCOM for that mission. He also wanted SACLANT removed from JFCOM’s control to allow USCIN CJFCOM to focus on training and transformation issues. SOUTHCOM would retain its four-star status. The location of the new Homeland Security Command headquarters remained the outstanding issue. OSD was concerned that removing the headquarters from the immediate Washington, DC, area might complicate the interagency coordination process, which was, after all, the purpose of the Office of Homeland Security located in the nation’s capital. In mid-December, the Joint Staff recommended a new homeland defense command, with a four-star CINC dual-hatted as NORAD commander, be located in Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Several UCP issues still divided the Joint Chiefs. These included the decision on a CINC for Homeland Security, SOUTHCOM’s status, and the location of the new homeland security command either in Norfolk, Virginia, or Colorado Springs, Colorado. The Navy, Marines, and especially the Army strongly opposed dual-hatting NORAD (an Air Force general officer position) as new homeland security chief, believing there would be a bias toward the air threat at the expense of maritime and land interests. The Navy still favored a sub-unified SOUTHCOM; the Marines did not. Although it was known that Secretary Rumsfeld wanted the UCP process to move quickly, the Army recommended a slower approach while the Marines favored immediate action, believing it imperative to stiffen public confidence sufficiently to withstand another weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack. Only the Air Force was satisfied with the CJCS’ draft recommendations and did not furnish written comments.
At a 3 January 2002 JCS executive session, a consensus emerged to create a new, tenth CINC, NORTHCOM, for homeland security effective 1 October 2002; to divest JFCOM of SACLANT responsibility; to assign unassigned countries to geographic AORs; and to maintain SOUTHCOM as a four-star command. Four days later, Generals Myers and Peter Pace, USMC, the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended to Secretary Rumsfeld the creation of a Northern Command for homeland security with NORAD as a sub-unified command. Senior Canadian officials sought to preserve NORAD’s existing chain of command, which allowed the Canadian deputy commander direct access to the Ottawa government. NORTHCOM’s location was likewise a sensitive issue between allies; placing the headquarters in the National Capital Region, for example, would diminish the importance of NORAD Headquarters in Colorado Springs and with it the Canadian role in the defense of North America.

After the Joint Staff made certain revisions as directed by Secretary Rumsfeld, he approved the creation of a Homeland Security Combatant Command effective 1 October 2002. Its area of responsibility would include the continental United States, Alaska (whose forces would remain assigned to PACOM), Canada, Mexico, and adjoining waters to at least 500 nautical miles, the US Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. Secretary Rumsfeld endorsed naming the new command NORTHCOM but did not select its location. He agreed to divest JFCOM of SACLANT and its lead role for homeland security support in order to enable JFCOM to focus on transformation, training, and experimentation issues. USSPACECOM would relinquish the NORAD mission, and the geographic commands would assign responsibility for currently unassigned countries. The Secretary simultaneously initiated a review of the establishment of a US Americas Command effective 1 October 2003 and a possible merger of SPACECOM with STRATCOM. Merging two CINCs would permit the establishment of the new CINCNORTHCOM without exceeding the current number of nine CINCs.

On 21 January 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld shifted the boundary of EUCOM to include Greenland and Iceland (previously under SACLANT) and assigned Antarctica (previously unassigned) to PACOM. The Joint Staff originally recommended that two other unassigned areas—Russia west of 100 degrees longitude and the Caspian Sea be assigned to EUCOM and Russia east of 100 degrees go to PACOM. The Navy and PACOM concurred, but the Army, Air Force, and EUCOM insisted that because the geopolitical center of Russia faced the West, it should be assigned to EUCOM. The following month the Secretary approved General Myers’ recommendation that assigned Russia to EUCOM with PACOM in support for the Russian Far East. On 11 February General Myers and Secretary Rumsfeld briefed President George W. Bush, fulfilling the statutory requirement to notify the President of changes to the UCP. The President agreed to all recommendations.

Two days later General Myers formally requested Secretary Rumsfeld’s approval of the final UCP draft. As revised, on 1 October NORTHCOM would begin operations to defend the continental United States (out to 500 nautical miles), Canada, Mexico, and Alaska. The CINCNORTHCOM would be dual-hatted as commander of NORAD with authority over participating Canadian air units. The new command would absorb JFCOM’s geographic area of responsibility, except for the Atlantic, which would be transferred to EUCOM. General Myers also recommended an in-depth study of the merger of STRATCOM and SPACECOM before its inclusion in future UCP revisions.

Secretary Rumsfeld’s approval carried the caveat that the Services could not use the UCP changes to justify additional staffing or another four-star position. Augmentation of new commands such as NORTHCOM would have to come from levies of personnel currently assigned to other headquarters.
In early March, General Myers assured the Secretary that all other headquarters’ staffs would be cut 15 percent to provide personnel for the NORTHCOM Headquarters.32

The resolution of the NORTHCOM four-star position altered the existing arrangement of having two NATO supreme commanders, SACEUR for Europe and SACLANT, then in JFCOM, for the Atlantic. The European NATO partners originally wanted JFCOM to retain the Atlantic area in order to maintain NATO’s trans-Atlantic link with the United States. Secretary Rumsfeld’s mid-January decision that JFCOM would be a functional command divested it of its SACLANT responsibilities. In part to accommodate the European allies and in part to solve the NORTHCOM issue, he accepted the SACEUR and head of EUCOM General Joseph Ralston’s, USAF, advice to dual-hat SACEUR and SACLANT. Combining two current four-star billets would make a four-star position available for NORTHCOM and satisfy Secretary Rumsfeld’s requirement that no new four-star positions be created.33 In mid-February General Myers, with NATO officials’ agreement, recommended that Secretary Rumsfeld approve the reassignment of the Atlantic area of operations to European Command.

General Myers sent the finalized UCP to Secretary Rumsfeld who in turn forwarded the document to President Bush on 16 April. The President signed the document two weeks later. The officially approved UCP established NORTHCOM effective 1 October 2002, realigned geographic areas, made JFCOM a purely functional command effective upon NORTHCOM’s activation, assigned Alaska to NORTHCOM, and retained SOUTHCOM and USSTRATCOM.34

Changes to the 2002 UCP: Change-1

During the 2002 UCP review, General Myers had recommended to Secretary Rumsfeld that a comprehensive study precede a possible merger of US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and US Space Command (SPACECOM). The Secretary agreed and deferred any merger, pending the study’s outcome. Consequently the 2002 UCP identified ten CINCs. Secretary Rumsfeld, however, still opposed a tenth CINC, so one had to be deactivated.35

By March 2002 the J-5 Policy Division had already started planning for a STRATCOM/SPACECOM merger. Over the next two months, a series of conferences, special studies, outside expert panels, tabletop studies, and briefings involving J-5 personnel, retired senior officers, as well as military and civilian officials culminated on 19 April when the Deputy Directorate for Strategy and Policy’s (DDS&P) proposed merger received approval in principle at the JCS Tank. Later that month, an expert panel headed by three retired senior officers (one from each service), under the sponsorship of the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), endorsed a merger of STRATCOM and SPACECOM to enhance command and control under a single combatant commander. Technological advances were outpacing doctrine, particularly in global information operations, and a new STRATCOM could direct integrated global planning and execution to link strategic capabilities and the space domain. On 30 April General Myers gained Secretary Rumsfeld’s approval for the JCS’ merger concept.36

CINCSTRATCOM supported the merger in the name of integrated operational effectiveness and recommended a quick decision to capitalize on the current momentum of support for major change. CINCSPACE agreed on the imperative to merge to resolve growing overlap between space, information operations, and strategic attack and defense.37

The Secretary requested the Joint Staff prepare a briefing on the merger for the President based on the assumptions that the 2002 UCP would be revised not later than mid-August; a commander would
be nominated; and the merged command would achieve initial operating capability on 1 October 2002 with Full Operation Capability to follow one year later. He further directed study of potential emerging missions—global strike; missile defense; information operations; and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR)—for the new command. Secretary Rumsfeld subsequently met with President Bush on 31 May and, after discussing possible locations for the new, expanded STRATCOM headquarters, the President agreed to use Offutt AFB in Omaha, Nebraska.

Naming the new command was essential in order to nominate a commander and revise the UCP. Admiral James O. Ellis, Commander, USSTRATCOM, preferred either Global Operations Command or retaining STRATCOM. The Vice Chairman and influential Congressional members recommended retaining the STRATCOM name in order to present the merger as an internal reorganization. On 20 June, Secretary Rumsfeld officially requested the President approve Change-1 to the 2002 UCP, the merger of STRATCOM and SPACECOM under a four-star general officer designated as a commander of a Unified Combatant Command, effective 1 October 2002. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers publicly announced the merger at a 26 June press conference. The same day General Myers issued terms of reference for the merger to the Service Chiefs and COCOM commanders.

In mid-July General Myers formally recommended to Secretary Rumsfeld that US Strategic Command and US Space Command be merged as a new combatant command, retaining the name US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and headquartered at Offutt Air Force Base. The new STRATCOM would be assigned the missions and responsibilities of the two current commands while the Joint Staff studied the feasibility and desirability of assigning it other emerging missions. Secretary Rumsfeld approved after the Chairman reassured him that the Joint Staff and the Combatant Commands were determined to stay within current end strength.

On 22 July the Secretary forwarded Change-1 to the 2002 UCP to the President, who on 30 July signed the document that created a “new” USSTRATCOM that had the responsibilities for the nuclear missions of the “old” STRATCOM and space operations, including warning and assessment of space attack, previously assigned to USSPACECOM, the latter being disestablished. The accelerated pace enabled the President to nominate Admiral Ellis as STRATCOM commander on 2 August before Congress adjourned for its August recess.

Changes to the 2002 UCP: Change-2

Under the Joint Staff’s lead, the emerging issues studies that resulted in Change-2 to the 2002 UCP were conducted at IDA with the participation from the Services, Combatant Commands, and OSD. As a generalization, the Services and the Combatant Commanders carefully restricted a merged STRATCOM’s authorities over their resources or geographic areas of responsibility. On 11 September the J-5 briefed the results of the missile defense study to the Joint Chiefs in the Tank and made several changes that satisfied Service and COCOM concerns. Two JCS Tank sessions—one in September and another in October—approved the recommended UCP changes.

After final coordination with the Service Chiefs, OSD, and the Combatant Commanders, on 7 December General Myers recommended that Secretary Rumsfeld approve changes that consolidated STRATCOM’s missile defense responsibilities, expanded the merged command’s role in C4ISR in support of strategic, global missions, and increased responsibility for strategic information operations.
The range of the new responsibilities extended STRATCOM’s date for full operational capability until 1 January 2004. On 11 December the Secretary forwarded his endorsement of the revisions to the White House for the President’s approval.

President Bush signed Change-2 to the 2002 UCP on 10 January 2003. A merged STRATCOM and SPACECOM formed the “new” STRATCOM headquartered at Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, with elements at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado. STRATCOM continued to retain primary responsibility among the combatant commanders for strategic nuclear forces, gained SPACECOM’s missions, assumed the global strike responsibility, tasked and coordinated C4ISR capabilities in support of strategic force employment, to include global strike, missile defense, and, as directed, associated planning.

The 2004 UCP

Although the revised UCP 2002 and its accompanying two changes were the most dramatic modifications to the UCP since its inception in 1946, there was still unfinished business. NORTHCOM was to achieve full operating capability by 1 October 2003 and implement its newly assigned emerging missions by January 2004; memoranda of agreement to coordinate several AOR boundaries were in preparation; the “new” STRATCOM Headquarters was undergoing consolidation; and STRATCOM’s newly assigned missions were due for completion by January 2004.

Also unresolved were reassessments of several geographic AORs, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, the Levant, and Central Asia. Furthermore, the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for FY 04-09 tasked the Combatant Commanders to establish Standing Joint Forces Headquarters (SJFHQ) by FY 2005 that reflected standards developed by JFCOM; a related November 2002 DPG-directed study recommended that DLA and TRANSCOM become “Distribution Process Co-owners” of the logistics function. OSD retained a strong interest in the establishment of a US Americas Command, and SOCOM, with new OSD-approved responsibilities, wanted to codify these authorities in the revised UCP. NORTHCOM sought clarification of the role of US Element, NORAD, in the new COCOM arrangement.

Two major UCP changes—the reassignment of the Levant and the clarification of TRANSCOM’s role—were decided independently of the UCP process. The former became part of the 2004 UCP while the latter appeared as Change-3 to the 2002 UCP.

The Levant (Israel, Lebanon, and Syria)

After Secretary Rumsfeld’s mid-April 2003 injunction to examine adding Syria, Israel, and Lebanon, among other countries, to CENTCOM’s AOR, General Myers recommended that the issue be considered as part of the next UCP review. The J-5 Organization & Policy believed that the three nations were inextricably linked and should remain within the EUCOM AOR for two reasons. First, UCP changes involving Israel might disrupt the Middle East Peace process and second, they might interfere with the strong working relationship developed over the years between EUCOM and the Israeli military. Among the Services, only the Air Force favored shifting the Levant countries to CENTCOM, and only CENTCOM among the COCOMs endorsed the move.

A December JCS Tank meeting endorsed the status quo arrangement. Secretary Rumsfeld, though, pursued the issue and in February 2004 again asked senior military and civilian officials to consider
moving Syria and Lebanon to CENTCOM. He believed that the deterrent effect coupled with imminent US sanctions then under consideration would compel Syria to react seriously to United States’ actions. Without awaiting a reply, two days later Secretary Rumsfeld brought Vice Chairman General Peter Pace, USMC, to the White House (General Myers being out of the country).

Following a meeting with President Bush, the Vice Chairman notified the Director of the Joint Staff that the President had directed that Syria and Lebanon be immediately transferred to the CENTCOM AOR. The next day, 12 February, the J-5 prepared appropriate language and transmittal memoranda and forwarded them to the Vice Chairman and Secretary of Defense. Later that day, Secretary Rumsfeld endorsed and forwarded the packet to the White House where the President approved Change-3 to the 2002 UCP on 10 March, although without signing the enclosed cover memo. On 22 March the National Security Council’s Executive Secretary signed a memo indicating the President’s formal approval of the change, which was officially released over the Joint Staff Director’s signature on 27 April.

**TRANSCOM**

General Myers disagreed with the DPG’s proposal for dual oversight of the logistics distribution process and advocated a single management organization. Apparently to address such concerns, in January 2003 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz commissioned a Joint Staff-OSD Senior Executive Council six-month study to determine how best to implement a single DOD supply chain manager. In April General Myers informed Secretary Rumsfeld of the progress of the Wolfowitz-directed study and the possibility that it would propose changes to the UCP.

Apparently based on the findings of the Wolfowitz study, in September Secretary Rumsfeld designated TRANSCOM the Distribution Process Owner to serve as the single entity to direct and supervise execution of the Strategic Distribution system. He instructed the Chairman to prepare appropriate language to reflect the change in the UCP 2004. Following the Secretary’s guidance, in January 2004 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved TRANSCOM as the Distribution Process Owner for the DOD and the single command responsible for providing patient movement, redeployment, and terminal management. Its new responsibilities in the 2004 UCP included directing and supervising the execution of the strategic distribution system and developing and implementing distribution process improvements that enhance the Defense Logistics and Global Supply Chain.

**The 2004 UCP Process**

During the Combatant Commander Conference in late January 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld had identified potential issues for the 2004 UCP review, including the establishment of Americas Command; a merger of CENTCOM and EUCOM; the concept of standing joint task forces; and a revalidation of JFCOM’s role as a force provider in addition to its responsibilities for joint warfighting, transformation, and experimentation.

The Joint Staff questioned the specifics of these issues. Was only recently established NORTHCOM, for instance, prepared to handle South American affairs? It judged the CENTCOM-EUCOM merger to be poorly timed and disruptive of unity of command because of the resulting enormous span of control. In late February, General Myers requested the Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders provide
him with their top five specific proposals for the next UCP review cycle. Their input became the basis for his 5 March 2003 recommendations to Secretary Rumsfeld.61

The Chairman, following his personal inclinations and the VCJCS’ advice, proposed postponing study of a merger of NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM until late 2004—one year after USNORTHCOM achieved full operational capability. Before realigning geographic AORs, he recommended a thorough cost-benefit study, something previously never conducted.62

The J-5 likewise was leery of hurried geographic changes and cautioned against the disruptive effects of hasty mergers of AOR expansion in favor of a phased approach to UCP change premised on strengthening unity of command and unity of effort. Similar considerations of unity of command led J-5 planners to oppose sub-unifying combatant commands with global missions.63

Planners also addressed significant functional issues, including JFCOM’s role as the Joint Provider and in the joint development process, US Element North American Aerospace Defense’s (USELEMNORAD) continued relevance, and SOCOM’s newly assigned missions and responsibilities relative to the War on Terror. The creation of standing Joint Task Force headquarters and sub-unified commands were the chief organizational concerns.64

The J-5 planners again advised careful deliberation regarding major functional issues such as USELEMNORAD’s proposed elimination or the specifics of SOCOM’s role in the war on terrorism in the UCP. Their “go slow” approach reflected in part General Myers’ desire to “let the dust settle” on the 2002 UCP changes before undertaking “more big issues” and in part the need to reassert the J-5’s and the Chairman’s prerogative in crafting the UCP review process against perceived OSD encroachments.65

The Services unanimously opposed AMERICOM, pending NORTHCOM achieving full operating capability. The geographic COCOMs were divided on the issue. CENTCOM, NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, and STRATCOM opposed a merger because separate commands were essential to execute separate missions. PACOM and SOCOM favored further study during the current UCP review. For reasons of span of control the Services and COCOMs rejected a EUCOM-CENTCOM merger.66 Only the Marines would sub-unify Africa, the other Services agreeing there was no compelling need to do so. Indeed, sub-unifying Africa would not rectify the security issue, run counter to DOD efforts to streamline management of headquarters’ staffs, and hamper EUCOM, which would have to staff the new headquarters from existing resources.

The Combatant Commands tended to be protective of their respective AORs and interests at the expense of others. CENTCOM, for instance, wanted the Levant; EUCOM did not want to transfer it. CENTCOM, NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, and STRATCOM opposed Americas Command, but PACOM and SOCOM recommended further study during the review.67 The Services unanimously opposed attempts to strengthen JFCOM’s role in concept development and experimentation (CDE) or make JFCOM the CDE agent for the Services. The COCOMs and the Services also opposed JFCOM developing standards for Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters (STFHQ) or joint readiness standards in COCOMs.68

USELEMNORAD’s status in the UCP generated a lengthy debate. USELEMNORAD’s UCP role made it responsible for the strategic aerospace defense of North America, assigned US forces to support NORAD’s mission, and provided a US-only chain of command for unilateral US aerospace defense using forces assigned to support NORAD. Would NORTHCOM assume USELEMNORAD’s responsibilities, forces, and tasks? The USNORTHCOM commander introduced the issue at a J-5 hosted Planners Conference in April 2003, evidently anticipating clarification of USELEMNORAD’s responsibilities in light of USNORTHCOM’s creation. The advantage of eliminating USELEMNORAD
was a simplified command relationship, but did this benefit outweigh the adverse effect on Canadian perceptions of the reduced importance of NORAD and the bi-lateral air defense mission?69

The NORTHCOM Commander, General Ralph E. Eberhart, USAF, disagreed, and in mid-July recommended USELNMORAD’s retention in the 2004 UCP, insisting that it was the key to NORAD’s bi-national and USNORTHCOM’s unilateral operations. The Services and affected COCOMs, however, would either eliminate USELNMORAD or move its mission and organization to NORTHCOM to improve command relationships for unilateral homeland defense.70

CINCNORAD insisted, however, that USELNMORAD was critical for operations such as NOBLE EAGLE (air defense of the United States), including the integrated defense of the National Capitol Region (NCR). General Eberhart recommended to the Chairman in mid-July that USELNMORAD’s role remain unchanged.

The matter was seemingly resolved on 4 December when the JCS concurred on assigning USELNMORAD’s responsibilities to NORTHCOM and removing USELNMORAD from the UCP. NORAD continued to raise significant concerns about such a course of action.73 General Myers also had second thoughts and, following the Chairman’s briefing, Secretary Rumsfeld agreed to postpone any decision pending additional information. After consulting with General Eberhart, General Myers supported retention of USELNMORAD and moving the unilateral air defense mission of the United States to NORTHCOM.74

By early 2004, the Services, COCOMs, and NATO executives had reached an “in principle” decision to postpone discussion of an Americas Command, retain the current CENTCOM AOR (although CENTCOM requested further study of the issue), and rejected the following: a sub-unified Africa command, the assignment of Central Asia states to EUCOM, and a merger of CENTCOM and EUCOM. They approved defining SOCOM’s role in operations against terrorists, removing USELNMORAD as a headquarters element and assigning its responsibilities to NORTHCOM to support NORAD in coordination with STRATCOM (NORTHCOM wanted to remove the mission but not the organization), and clarifying JFCOM’s coordination role in joint concept development and experimentation. They balked at giving JFCOM either the authority to set STFHQ standards or to certify COCOM-assigned forces to JFCOM standards.75

Secretary Rumsfeld attended the mid-January 2004 UCP in-progress review to hear the JCS’ “in principle” recommendations. Among other issues, the Secretary directed the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy (DASD(S)) to draft a “UCP First Principles” study. He also requested further information on SOCOM’s responsibility as PSYOP capability provider and a merger of NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. In response, J-5 Policy recommended that IDA manage a study of Americas Command, similar to its role in the merger of STRATCOM and SPACECOM.76

The IDA participants were unanimous that no significant benefit would accrue from merging NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM and were unable to identify likely increases in mission effectiveness or efficiency. While minor manpower savings (perhaps 6-7 percent) could result from consolidating the two headquarters at one location, no single location was appropriate for the combined missions of a merged command. IDA recommended maintaining NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM as separate commands for homeland defense purposes, for defense in depth of the SOUTHCOM AOR, and for the security cooperation mission. To deal with the geographical seam, a standing JTF responsive to both commands should be formed. After General Myers informed Secretary Rumsfeld of IDA’s conclusions, the Secretary agreed not to pursue the merger.77

In March the DASD(S) submitted a draft proposal to assess the future integrated global command structure. The regional combatant commands were “Cold War relics” that did not fit the “new
strategic circumstances” of terrorist or rogue state-driven crises that often superseded national or regional boundaries. This so-called first principles briefing offered various scenarios that envisaged a sweeping reorganization and centralization of the COCOMs to achieve unity of command, unity of effort in interagency and combined operations, and unity of resource management. The net gain would be improved integration of new technologies with new command organizations to expedite cross-boundary operations and joint warfighting.77

Certain J-5 action officers resented OSD “meddling” in the internal COCOM command structure. They saw the “First Principles” initiative as an attempt to reduce the number of COCOMs, questioned several of its assumptions, but concluded that the OSD proposal had merit as a starting point to reconsider the UCP.78 Apparently swayed by Joint Staff arguments (and the Chairman’s desire to move quickly on Change-1), the DASD(S) agreed to defer the initiative until the next UCP review.

SOCOM

After the 11 September 2001 attacks, Secretary Rumsfeld verbally and through memoranda assigned SOCOM expanded responsibilities for the War on Terror (WOT). The ASD Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) favored inserting new language into the UCP that would delineate SOCOM’s new authorities in the WOT vis-à-vis the COCOMs.79 In July 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld told the newly nominated SOCOM commander that he would have greater responsibility and authority as the supported commander in the global war on terror. SOCOM wanted the revised UCP to validate the command’s new lead roles in PYSOPS and the War on Terror. The PSYOPS matter was quickly resolved. STRATCOM (DOD’s designated information operations lead in the 2002 UCP) agreed that SOCOM should be responsible for “integrating and coordinating” DOD PSYOPS’ capabilities. The COCOMs, however, insisted that SOCOM lacked expertise and capability to direct special operations within the COCOM AORs. SOCOM’s WOT role was so contentious that SOCOM, the J5, the Services, and the COCOMs finally submitted the issue to the JCS Tank for decision.80

In mid-January 2004 the JCS approved SOCOM’s preferred war on terror language (owing largely to the support of Army Chief of Staff, General Peter J. Schoomaker, who had a special operations background). Nevertheless, the DUSD(I), Lieutenant General William G. Boykin, USA, (also an experienced special operations specialist) and the new USD(I), Stephen Cambone, had reservations. They wanted Secretary Rumsfeld’s assignment of specific WOT responsibilities to SOCOM codified in the UCP to insure that the other combatant commanders understood SOCOM’s new authorities.81

The J-5 action officers believed that codifying authorities for a specific conflict would prevent the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, or the Combatant Commanders from recommending what command relationships ought to be and reduce the flexibility of commands in the AORs to combat terrorism. The Services (less the Army) and COCOMs non-concurred with the more specific language revisions, but a follow-up JCS Tank session overrode their objections and endorsed most of the recommendations on 30 April. The JCS did retain the proviso that for matters of theater security cooperation SOCOM would coordinate with the Geographic Combatant Commanders. The CJCS approved the new language in late May 2004.82

The SOCOM Commander then insisted that the UCP state explicitly that SOCOM could synchronize Special Operations Forces in all geographic regions to fight the global war on terror, when directed. Synchronize implied greater command authority for SOCOM when conducting war on terror.
operations. PACOM and CENTCOM, concerned over insufficient coordination with the Combatant Commands over SOCOM’s war on terror language, refused to support the proposal. The geographic commanders again questioned whether SOCOM had the expertise or capability to direct special operations in the respective COCOM areas without compromising local operations. The draft UCP assigned SOCOM a coordinating role in the global war against terrorist organizations.83

On 13 September 2004 the Chairman sent the draft UCP 2004 to the Secretary of Defense who in turn forwarded the revised document to the President on 10 January 2005. The interval, however, witnessed a major change to the draft UCP. During a 17 September strategic review of the war on terror, the SOCOM commander informed Secretary Rumsfeld that the UCP needed a specific statement that he could synchronize (be directive) special operations in all COCOM AORs. The draft UCP language only authorized him to coordinate, which he equated to allowing him to call meetings. The Secretary agreed with SOCOM’s position.85

As a consequence, in early November a compromise between J-5 Policy Division and the ASD (SO/LIC) changed “coordinating” to “synchronizing” but dropped language that made such activity specific to the war on terror. SOCOM accordingly became “the lead combatant commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other combatant commanders.”86

SOCOM’s synchronization role became the major change in the UCP 2004. SOCOM also became the lead combatant commander for integrating and coordinating DOD PSYOP in support of USSTRATCOM’s information operations mission. Other significant changes mandated that all combatant commanders designate a Joint Task Force (JTF) within their headquarters and geographic combatant commanders establish and maintain Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters core elements. JFCOM assumed responsibility for coordinating CDE, integration, joint doctrine, collaborative development of joint training/readiness standards while TRANSCOM took control of patient movement, redeployment, and terminal management, and as Distribution Process Owner. A realignment of the CENTCOM and the PACOM AORs placed the entire Seychelles Archipelago within the CENTCOM AOR.87

The President approved the 2004 UCP on 1 March 2005 and on the 17th the Chairman distributed the revised version to the Chiefs of Services, Commanders of Combatant Commands, and the Commander, USELEMNORAD.88


By the time President Bush signed the 2004 UCP on 1 March 2005, J-5 Policy action officers were already revising the document to make it more responsive to the evolving missions of the combatant commanders. OSD staffers had raised issues during the 2004 UCP review that remained unresolved such as the revision of the NORTHCOM/SOUTHCOM boundary, the transfer of Shemya Island in the Aleutian chain to NORTHCOM’s AOR, USELEMNORAD’s status, and the addition of Global Network Operations to the Information Operations (IO) mission.89 Joint Staff action officers and their OSD counterparts in the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy) (DASD(S)) office coordinated their reviews, but by that time the UCP process was running well behind schedule. In an effort to expedite the 2004 UCP draft, the J-5 told OSD representatives that unresolved OSD concerns would be included in a subsequent change to the approved 2004 UCP. As a result, in August 2004 the J-5 Deputy
Director for Strategy and Policy (DDS&P) and the DASD(S) had agreed to defer further review of OSD comments until the preparation of the 2004 UCP Change-1.90

Approximately three weeks after the President signed the 2004 UCP, the J-5 Policy updated the Chairman on its concept for Change-1, which included a revised STRATCOM role and addressed the issues raised by OSD.91 The minor changes, which were primarily administrative, aimed to limit new issues in order to hasten approval of Change-1 by mid-2005. It made little sense to grapple with major changes such as new combatant commands or the redefinition of responsibilities between a geographic and functional combatant commander until the forthcoming 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and ongoing OSD initiatives to consolidate the COCOM command structure were completed.92

General Myers approved the J-5’s overall approach and on 4 April informed the Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders that the Joint Staff would begin its review of the next UCP in 2006 (by law the next UCP was due by January 2007). In the meantime, he directed the J-5 to address several administrative changes to the 2004 UCP, including STRATCOM’s WMD role, the NORTHCOM/SOUTHCOM AOR boundary, and the alignment of UCP security cooperation/assistance language with DOD’s security cooperation guidance. The Chairman intended to move swiftly and submit UCP 2004 Change-1 for approval by 31 July 2005. He requested the Services’ and COCOMs’ input by 30 April.93

The Services, CENTCOM, and JFCOM raised no additional issues. EUCOM proposed renaming USEUCOM to USEASTCOM and USPACOM to USWESTCOM, or at least renaming USEUCOM the United States Europe-Africa Command (USEURAFCOM). The Commander NORTHCOM wanted modification of the USELEMNORAD language to clarify the lines of responsibility between the two commands. At present, NORTHCOM had the mission—but not the forces; USELEMNORAD had the forces—but not the mission. USSOUTHCOM desired clarification or revision of the NORTHCOM/SOUTHCOM AOR boundary. NORTHCOM and PACOM agreed to extend NORTHCOM’s AOR boundary westward to encompass all of the Aleutian Islands. Their agreement in turn satisfied OSD’s request that Shemya be moved to NORTHCOM’s AOR.94

SOCOM sought to become the primary force provider for Special Operations Forces while TRANSCOM recommended modification of the joint distribution process and a review of strategic mobility for joint forces’ planning purposes. STRATCOM would incorporate its new, Secretary of Defense-authorized mission of combating WMDs; the command also wanted to add network warfare and global network operations to its global missions. STRATCOM’s initiative to become the primary joint forces provider for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), however, impinged on JFCOM’s responsibilities. The J-5 opposed STRATCOM’s ISR proposal and expressed doubts that TRANSCOM’s strategic mobility issue could be resolved without a prior decision on C-17 transport basing, but otherwise they supported the recommendations.95

OSD’s priority for Change-1 was to revise and update the current UCP language governing security assistance and security cooperation to link it directly to the Secretary’s Security Cooperation Guidance. The J-5 Policy Division found this connection inappropriate because the UCP intentionally avoided categorical reference to other strategic documents. The J-5 Policy initially expected that following the OPSDEPS and JCS Tank sessions the Chairman would be able to send a finalized Change-1 draft to the Secretary of Defense. Presidential approval was anticipated by mid-October.96

By mid-July, coordination with General and Flag Officers was well underway, and the J-5 had scheduled an OPSDEPS and JCS Tank meeting for early August. The most controversial issues were
STRATCOM’s responsibilities for combating WMDs and conducting IO and TRANSCOM’s proposed modifications to the Distribution Process Owner (DPO) authorities. In other respects the J-5 Policy review, as originally proposed, was administrative and designed to clarify responsibilities, eliminate redundancies, and make the UCP document easier to understand.97

By mid-August the JCS Tank had approved all issues with the exception of TRANSCOM’s request for modified DPO language, which, the command argued, was necessary to dispel COCOM perceptions of limited TRANSCOM authority within the distribution system. NORTHCOM would have responsibility for the entire Aleutian chain, including Shemya, while Cuba, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands would be reassigned to SOUTHCOM. The Chiefs concurred with Joint Force Provider authority granted to SOCOM and TRANSCOM, clarified the USELEMNORAD language, approved STRATCOM assuming the DOD global operations mission, and added responsibilities for combating WMDs to STRATCOM, geographic combatant commands, and NORTHCOM. TRANSCOM was requested to present its recommendations via the Tank.98

Since mid-June, J-5 Policy action officers had coordinated Change-1 with their OSD counterparts.99 The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)’s office (OSD (Policy)), however, failed to meet a July deadline to submit comments. This meant in turn that the J-5 could not incorporate OSD’s remarks from five Assistant Secretaries in time for either the August OPSDEPs or the JCS Tank meetings. Instead J-5 Policy found itself with a handful of OSD (Policy) recommendations that contradicted Tank-approved positions and would either require time-consuming re-staffing or were inappropriate for the UCP. J-5 Policy lamented that “OSD typically cannot react to a normal Joint Staff suspense of two weeks. . . .”100

Two administrative factors further hindered the UCP 2004 Change-1 momentum. First, the Chairman preferred OSD comments on major documents before he dispatched a finalized version to the Secretary of Defense. The Under Secretaries of Defense, however, did not want to review draft documents and insisted on a final copy that had been fully staffed with the Services and the Combatant Commanders.101 Second, the Joint Staff normally coordinated UCP matters directly with Service Secretariat staffs, not the Secretariat. The OSD Legal Counsel expressed concern that the Secretariats were left out of the process, leading the Joint Staff to recommend to the DJ-5 that the Secretariats be included in the review via their staffs.102

On 11 December, General Peter Pace, USMC, the recently appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviewed the recommended changes. The draft document would realign NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, and PACOM AORs, confirm STRATCOM’s WMD mission as well as assign the command the responsibility for DOD’s global network operations, clarify USELEMNORAD’s role vis-à-vis NORTHCOM, assign SOCOM and TRANSCOM joint force provider responsibilities, and modify TRANSCOM’s responsibility as Distribution Process Owner assigned in the 2004 UCP.103 The next day General Pace sent the finalized 2004 UCP Change-1 to Secretary Rumsfeld.

The Secretary likely awaited the imminent results of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) before addressing the UCP issues, and the draft Change-1 remained in his office through early February 2006 when the QDR results were announced. The QDR’s major lessons, according to the document, focused on the requirements for prolonged, irregular conflict, wider irregular operations across the globe, and humanitarian actions.104 To address these issues, on 6 February 2006, Secretary Rumsfeld asked General Pace for his ideas about SOCOM’s role as a more “global warfighter,” cyberspace roles and missions, a lead COCOM for humanitarian missions, requirements for standing joint task forces, and a sub-unified or specified command for Africa.105
EUCOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM, JFCOM, the Joint Staff and the J-8 opposed greater emphasis on SOCOM’s role or priority for SOCOM’s requirements. All Services and COCOMs agreed that further study of the cyberspace issue, including a national level study, was essential to develop a national military strategic plan to secure cyberspace. J-5 Policy recommended that JFCOM assume the humanitarian mission lead. The Services and COCOMs, except for JFCOM, concurred. JFCOM insisted that each COCOM should have a core element to augment the designated Joint Forces Headquarters during relief operations. Neither EUCOM nor CENTCOM agreed with the J-5’s recommendation to establish a three-star sub-unified command in Africa, reporting to the Commander, USEUCOM. EUCOM did not want the extra responsibilities added to its deputy commander’s tasks while CENTCOM wanted the AFRICOM commander to report to both EUCOM and CENTCOM thereby eliminating the existing “seam” or boundary between COCOMs. EUCOM, CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, and PACOM wanted more time to consider the initiative and thought it more appropriate for the next UCP iteration.106

Meanwhile, J-5 Policy’s briefing on the 2004 UCP Change-1 for Secretary Rumsfeld recommended, with General Myers’ approval, renaming 2004 UCP Change-1 to UCP 2006. There would be no change to the document’s contents (except for a revised date). The proposed name change allowed the Joint Staff to meet the two-year statutory requirement for the Chairman to review the UCP yet not delay the next UCP review. Contrary to J-5 expectations, the Secretary also wanted to discuss possible issues for the next UCP review, which would start sometime in 2006.107

During the 4 April briefing for Secretary Rumsfeld, the J-5 explained the reason for the name change and presented the identical UCP recommendations that General Pace had submitted the previous December. Participants also discussed various scenarios for AOR boundary adjustments such as transferring Kazakhstan to EUCOM, Diego Garcia to CENTCOM, Madagascar, the Comoros, the Seychelles, and the Horn of Africa to EUCOM as well as organizational adjustments, chief among them a new command for Africa. Possible future functional issues involved interagency cooperation and coordination as well as responsibilities for humanitarian response to a pandemic outbreak.108

The Secretary approved placing the entire Aleutian chain in the NORTHCOM AOR; endorsed the NORTHCOM/SOUTHCOM boundary change; agreed to modified language for SOCOM and TRANSCOM as joint force providers; authorized STRATCOM’s lead to combat WMDs and its new global network operations; and provided NORTHCOM authority to employ USELEMNORAD forces for non-NORAD unilateral missions. He requested additional information on TRANSCOM’s unique responsibilities as the DPO.109

As for the next UCP, Mr. Rumsfeld agreed with these recommendations: to emphasize SOCOM’s role as a global warfighter; to have STRATCOM coordinate policies and operational concepts for cyberspace missions, identify requirements DOD-wide and to integrate network management, security, and dissemination into a core operational capability; and to consider JFCOM as the designated lead combatant command for humanitarian operations. The Secretary also approved a sub-unified command for Africa as a four-star billet, vice the three-star position recommended by the J-5.110 Satisfied with the briefing, the Secretary requested the revised version of UCP 2006 that incorporated his minor changes for final signature by 7 April. He instructed the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD (ATL)) and the OSD Director of Program Analysis & Evaluation (PA&E) to coordinate the change in TRANSCOM responsibilities with the USTRANSCOM Commander.111

On 7 April, the USD (ATL), PA&E, and CINC TRANSCOM agreed to change the proposed language making the Distribution Process Owner responsible for “coordinating and supervising”
was changed to read “coordinating and overseeing” the DOD distribution system.112 Four days later, General Pace forwarded the change along with the updated UCP package to Secretary Rumsfeld. The approved UCP 2006 was, with minor changes, the 2004 UCP Change-1 document that the Chairman had endorsed the previous December.113

Secretary Rumsfeld sent the draft UCP 2006 to the White House on 12 April. To stimulate additional “creative thinking,” he requested Eric Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to work with General Pace to initiate a full re-write of the UCP 2006 to incorporate the topics identified as potential issues for the next UCP. He also asked for “new models” for the UCP by 7 June, a theme reminiscent of the “first principles” scenarios developed for the 2004 UCP.114 The Secretary’s suspense for the “new models” was later extended until mid-July and marked the beginning of work on the next UCP.115

On 5 May, the President approved Unified Command Plan 2006, which became effective that day. On 31 May, the Chairman, noting its major changes, distributed copies of the UCP 2006 to the Chiefs of Services, Commanders of Combatant Commands, and the Commander, US Element, NORAD.116

**The 2008 UCP**

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s guidance during the final approval process for the 2006 UCP set the agenda for the 2008 UCP. Among unfinished UCP 2006 items were: resolution of AOR boundary shifts; a rewritten, more “user-friendly” UCP; SOCOM’s synchronization role; and coordination across UCP seams. Major new initiatives included examination of emerging areas of interests such as cyberspace and missile defense, humanitarian assistance missions, responses to pandemic diseases, and a new command responsible for Africa.

Some of the so-called new initiatives like AFRICOM had been under consideration for several years. Discussion about the DOD role in cyberspace dated from February 2003 when the President signed the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. There was, however, no linkage of national strategy, military capabilities, and operational means to secure cyberspace. The 2004 UCP had assigned STRATCOM cyberspace integration and coordination roles and split C4ISR responsibilities between STRATCOM and JFCOM. Consequently on 4 February 2004, the Joint Staff created a strategic planning cell to produce a national military strategy for cyberspace within six months for the Secretary’s approval.117 SOCOM continued to seek additional Global War on Terror (GWOT) authorities by defining “synchronize” more expansively in the UCP document.118

The Services and a majority of COCOMs wanted to review all Africa command options in the next UCP. CENTCOM, EUCOM, and SOUTHCOM did not: CENTCOM and EUCOM because an Africa command would impinge on their command responsibilities and missions. All endorsed the Joint Staff’s cyber-strategy cell study but split regarding SOCOM’s GWOT role. CENTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM opposed giving SOCOM special status while JFCOM and SOUTHCOM believed that expanded SOCOM authorities would interfere within COCOMs’ AORs. The consensus would retain the status quo arrangement for SOCOM.119 The Services favored consolidation of Humanitarian/Disaster Relief operations and wanted JFCOM to take the lead in the effort. JFCOM, however, argued that no single COCOM should lead humanitarian missions. Instead, SJTFHs could augment Joint Task Force Headquarters as necessary.120

The J-5 Vice-Director recommended to Secretary Rumsfeld an incremental approach to Africa, by establishing a three-star commander, reporting to CDRUSEUCOM, and a small interagency staff located in Ethiopia.121
In mid-March, NORAD raised several issues for consideration in the next UCP review. Among them were the resolution of the Virgin Islands/Puerto Rico and the Florida Straits air defense responsibilities among SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM, and NORAD and a precise delineation of STRATCOM and NORAD roles and missions for cruise missile defense (CMD) and ballistic missile defense (BMD).122

Secretary Rumsfeld incorporated these concepts in his April injunction for a full rewrite of the UCP by early June (a deadline later extended). J-5 would prepare the “new models” the Secretary requested and develop three major items (humanitarian operations, Kazakhstan, and Africa) in the UCP rewrite.123 Given limited resources and OSD mandated headquarters’ reductions, a natural question became a budget to underwrite the AFRICOM mission, personnel, infrastructure, and associated requirements. Span of control issues reappeared when EUCOM noted that the proposed Africa command was presently composed of 53 countries divided among three unified commanders.124

In early June, General Pace issued guidance on UCP options. The subsequent J-5 “new models” briefing addressed 21st century challenges such as the GWOT, missile defense, stability operations, humanitarian relief, and pandemic response. It also identified four alternative command structures: 1) retain the status quo because of a good span of control and proven success; 2) create three geographic COCOMs (the Americas, Europe/Africa, and East Asia) with operationally focused JTF’s and four functional combat commands. This configuration reduced seams between COCOMs but the resulting larger span of control and questions of unity of command needed further study. Option 3 would switch to functional combatant commanders along joint operating concepts such as GWOT, homeland security, combat and stability operations, and strategic deterrence. Option 4 combined Forces Commands with operationally focused CJTFs in key regions to provide regional orientation and reduce seams. Options 3 and 4 raised questions about unity of command and the overall benefit to national security. The Chairman approved a J-5 briefing for Secretary Rumsfeld for mid-July to obtain the Secretary’s guidance on which options merited further study.125

The 10 July UCP-next briefing to the JCS was well received and only minor changes suggested. The Chiefs recommended pursuing both geographic COCOM and sub-unified command options for Africa but warned against adding a sub-unified AFRICOM and Central Asia to EUCOM’s already full load. They tabled one study to expand SOCOM options and endorsed another for a functional COCOM for cyber warfare.126

The J-5 DDS&P briefing to Secretary Rumsfeld on 19 July recommended further study of a functional cyber command, responses to pandemic diseases, regional stability operations, and improved interagency coordination. It proposed a transfer of Kazakhstan or all Central Asian states to EUCOM or their retention in CENTCOM, and a separate or a sub-unified AFRICOM. They were satisfied with the status quo for SOCOM, seeing no need to expand the command’s authorities.127

Secretary Rumsfeld in turn directed EUCOM, in coordination with the Joint Staff, CENTCOM, and PACOM, to develop an implementation plan by 15 September to establish a Geographic Combatant Command for Africa (USAFRICOM) with a four-star commander. The COCOMs and Services were to study options to counter pandemic influenza, provide military support in stability operations, strengthen interagency cooperation, create a sub-unified cyber command, specify “mutual interest” states with shared responsibilities, and possibly move Central Asian states to EUCOM. There would be no changes to SOCOM. The Joint Staff anticipated presenting the COCOM and Service recommendations to the Secretary in early October.128

NORTHCOM sought responsibility in the UCP as the lead COCOM to respond to pandemic influenza outbreaks and, pending fuller detail, supported a sub-unified cyber command under STRATCOM.
The STRATCOM commander, however, saw little gain in such an arrangement. NORTHCOM also wanted to clarify STRATCOM’s role in ballistic and cruise missile defense, a topic not covered in the current UCP. SOUTHCOM recommended NORTHCOM for the pandemic influenza responsibility, concurred with the sub-unified cyber command concept provided additional resources became available, and suggested that clarification of its shared responsibility with NORTHCOM for Mexico might serve as a “mutual interest test case.” CENTCOM agreed with the pandemic influenza and cyber command initiatives but insisted that the Geographic Combatant Commands have the authority to address idiosyncrasies in their respective AORs. CENTCOM opposed the “mutual interest” states model, arguing that seam issues were already being addressed and shared responsibilities were counter-intuitive to a clear chain of command. EUCOM approved moving five Central Asian states from the CENTCOM AOR to the EUCOM’s AOR; CENTCOM opposed it citing the key roles of the five states in CENTCOM’s ongoing operations in Afghanistan. Army and Marine planners recommended that the Central Asian states remain in CENTCOM’s AOR.

The Air Force, EUCOM, PACOM, and JFCOM saw no need to include pandemic influenza planning in the UCP because the JSCP already tasked the requirement. The Army and Navy believed that the UCP sufficiently addressed humanitarian assistance and stability operations, which EUCOM allowed were already within the GCC’s span of operations. The Navy and Air Force opposed the concept of “mutual interest states,” and among the COCOMs only SOUTHCOM endorsed the idea. The Air Force regarded a sub-unified cyber command as below the level of the UCP and questioned resourcing a new command. The other Services asked for further study. CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM endorsed a sub-unified cyber command, but STRATCOM, the proposed reporting command, opposed the initiative because it added another layer of command whose costs would outweigh any benefits.

Being the most affected COCOM, EUCOM addressed the AFRICOM initiative separately and recommended a phased approach to establish an interim sub-unified command in Europe. The new unified command headquarters would subsequently be placed in Africa. EUCOM favored a unified African continent under one unified commander, although this entailed removing the Horn of Africa from CENTCOM’s AOR. CENTCOM objected. The DASD (Africa) had previously proposed such a transfer for unity of purpose and command, noting that CENTCOM’s focus was on Iraq and Afghanistan, not the Horn of Africa.

On 28 September, a National Security Presidential Directive outlined a strategy that would strengthen strategic partnerships, consolidate democratic transitions, and bolster fragile states in sub-Saharan Africa. Although the approach emphasized regional peacekeeping and economic partnerships, as well as humanitarian and developmental assistance, the underlying goal was to blunt the spread of Islamic radicalism and terrorism throughout Africa.

In line with the new directive, the J-5 agreed with EUCOM’s phased approach and ultimate result but wanted the Horn of Africa to remain initially in CENTCOM to avoid disrupting the global war on terror. Following a 13 October briefing via secure video teleconference (SVTC) by the Deputy EUCOM Commander, Secretary Rumsfeld agreed that AFRICOM should begin as a sub-unified command under EUCOM. Once AFRICOM achieved full operating capability, however, the command would encompass the entire African continent.

An interim planning team consisting of OSD and Joint Staff members aimed to achieve AFRICOM’s initial operating capability by June 2007 and its full capability by June 2008. Secretary Rumsfeld insisted that EUCOM be reduced in size and reorganized to fit the new AFRICOM arrangement, a point he
reiterated when approving future action and terms of reference for AFRICOM. On 7 November, the Secretary issued terms of reference and directed the immediate stand-up of an implementation planning team, headed by a rear admiral, to prepare options, a plan of action, and a schedule for the activation of AFRICOM.\textsuperscript{138}

That same day the Democratic Party captured a majority of House and Senate seats in the off-year 2006 elections. At a news conference the following day, President Bush acknowledged that voter displeasure over the lack of progress in Iraq contributed to the Republican defeat and announced Secretary Rumsfeld’s resignation as Secretary of Defense. Robert M. Gates would replace Secretary Rumsfeld, who would stay on during the transition.\textsuperscript{139}

Secretary Rumsfeld had previously directed the DJ-5 to incorporate an AFRICOM command in the revised UCP 2006 by 11 December. J-5 action officers drafted Change-1 to UCP 2006, making AFRICOM a sub-unified command by October 2007 that would transition to a unified command in October 2008. This was done to allow UCP participants the time they needed to resolve the numerous and interrelated changes to responsibilities, missions, and geographic boundaries involved in establishing a new unified command.\textsuperscript{140}

The J-5 Policy’s coordination with the Services, COCOMs, and JCS Tank gained a favorable general consensus, and on 4 December the DJ-5 briefed the Secretary on the UCP 2006 Change-1 initiatives. The Services, less the Army, and the COCOMs, less CENTCOM, endorsed a sub-unified/unified AFRICOM. The J-5 Policy wanted to delay AFRICOM’s establishment until specific responsibilities and AORs for the new unified command had been vetted with the Services and COCOMs.\textsuperscript{141}

At a 5 December in-progress review, Secretary Rumsfeld directed the AFRICOM implementation planning team to recommend the best way for a unified Africa command to achieve full operating capability in FY 2008. Two days later the Secretary requested the President approve DOD’s establishment of a Unified Combatant Command for Africa to achieve full operating capability in FY 2008.\textsuperscript{142} The President’s classified 15 December memorandum simply approved the establishment of an AFRICOM not later than 30 September 2008 (the end of the fiscal year).\textsuperscript{143}

Secretary Rumsfeld departed office on 18 December. The next day the DASD (Africa) briefed the NSC Deputies Committee on AFRICOM’s status. The same day the implementation planning team delivered its executive report that, among other things, described missions, AORs, resources, and location of AFRICOM as well as a five-phase plan to establish the new command.\textsuperscript{144} On 10 January 2007, OSD (Policy) updated Secretary Gates on AFRICOM developments, including costs, and General Pace requested the Secretary’s authorization to establish a transition team in Germany that would become the core of the USAFRICOM’s headquarters staff. Secretary Gates approved on 12 January. He further directed the Chairman to coordinate with the Services and COCOMs to assign military personnel to the transition team by 1 February and authorized consultations with Congress and other appropriate members of the US Government, along with key allies and partners, before any public announcement of the establishment of AFRICOM.\textsuperscript{145}

EUCOM saw an initial sub-unified command as a natural progression to a unified command, but OSD (Africa) thought a sub-unified command was unnecessary and might retard the establishment of a unified command. Establishing a unified command would demonstrate the US commitment to Africa, give it more prestige, and place AFRICOM on an equal status with other COCOMs when competing for resources. A sub-unified command involved a less risky, incremental approach that allowed AFRICOM to draw on EUCOM’s resources. It would, however, result in lowered prestige and reduced
expectations. Rear Admiral Robert T. Moeller, who led the transition team, recommended a unified command, and noted that without a decision from senior leaders the transition team could neither establish proper relationships with other COCOMs nor determine resources.146

During open testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 6 February, Secretary Gates announced the establishment of AFRICOM, and the President issued a formal announcement of the new command the same day.147 About a month later, on 9 March, the Chairman recommended that AFRICOM be established initially as a sub-unified command under EUCOM and then develop to full unified command. OSD(P)’s non-concurrence delayed coordinated guidance to the transition team until 4 April when Secretary Gates approved the Chairman’s recommendations.148 In mid-April an inter-agency delegation consulted with various African officials about a possible location for AFRICOM and concluded that regional sensitivities and security concerns militated against a headquarters in Africa.149

Besides the AFRICOM decisions, the J-5 Policy dealt with issues identified by the combatant commanders, such as clarification of ballistic missile defense and cyberspace responsibility. There were also several pending administrative changes, initiated by former Secretary Rumsfeld, such as NORTHCOM’s role in a pandemic influenza response, combatant commanders’ responsibility for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations, and JFCOM’s role in transformation.150 In mid-August 2007 the outgoing Chairman, General Pace, notified the Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders that he expected the UCP review to be complete by February 2008. To meet the deadline, the Chairman asked that they respond by 31 August 2007 to allow the J-5 to provide participants a final draft by the end of November.151 The J-5 Strategic Policy aimed to have the UCP signed in February 2008. The effective date would be 30 September 2008 to coincide with AFRICOM’s transition to a combatant command. Contrary to expectations, the UCP 2008 review took eleven months.

In early August 2007 Secretary Gates, at the request of the NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM commanders, had assigned NORTHCOM the responsibility for DOD’s natural disaster response in the US Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico (VIPR). He directed their question of a permanent transfer of all responsibilities be addressed during the UCP review.152 Following coordination with the Joint Staff J-5, the two commands requested approval of the transfer of all responsibilities for the VIPR AOR to NORTHCOM. J-5 Policy judged that such action was beyond the Secretary’s authority and required presidential approval. The DASD for Policy Planning agreed that, without a compelling justification for the shift, the transfer should be treated in the UCP and not go separately to the White House. After a discussion with the J-5, SOUTHCOM requested that the next UCP implement the desired changes.153

Cyberspace was a developing mission that the UCP did not address. The 2006 UCP gave STRATCOM the responsibility to integrate and coordinate the DOD’s information operations, which included computer network attack and defense. One of Secretary Rumsfeld’s “bold initiatives” was the creation of a cyber-command, and in early February 2006 the Joint Staff established a planning cell to produce a national military strategy for cyberspace within six months. The study was not completed until December 2006 at which time the scope of cyberspace operations was still under review. Consequently, J-5 Policy had dropped the sub-unified cyber-command concept and replaced it with a proposal to assign geographic combatant commanders responsibility for conducting cyberspace operations in their AORs.154

STRATCOM claimed that such a policy disrupted current STRATCOM missions and ineffectively partitioned responsibilities that could not be relegated to a specific AOR. The other COCOMs and the Services were lukewarm, observing the authorities already existed, the effort was premature without a national military strategy for cyberspace, and more details were needed before they could make any
decisions. On 2 October, Secretary Gates directed immediate action to implement a four-star sub-unified cyber command. In November the new Chairman, Admiral Michael Mullen, who took office on 1 October 2007, directed STRATCOM to take the lead for cyberspace.

The Joint Staff J-6 suspected that STRATCOM might take advantage of new authority to impose its views of cyberspace on the DOD community. After lengthy discussions, by mid-June 2008, four options had emerged: 1) to revert to the UCP 2006 language; 2) to accept STRATCOM’s proposal to identify specifically its lead role in cyberspace planning and operations; 3) to approve the Joint Staff J-5’s more restrictive recommendation that STRATCOM operations, as directed, be coordinated with the COCOMs and other appropriate government agencies; and 4) to endorse a second J-5 version that gave STRATCOM more latitude over the Geographic Combatant Commanders in cyberspace and information operations. The OPSDEPs preferred option 1, believing it premature to assign the mission until ongoing studies were completed. The Services agreed, less the Air Force which supported option 4. PACOM and CENTCOM favored option 1 because it allowed GCC’s to conduct cyberspace operations. The other COCOMs and the functional commands would expand STRATCOM’s cyberspace responsibilities in the UCP. The Joint Staff recommended option 3.

By late November the Services and COCOMs had submitted their comments on 26 UCP issues recommended by the J-5 and raised additional subjects for consideration. During the next several months a series of OPSDEPs and JCS Tank sessions adjudicated differences, sponsors added or deleted items for deliberation, and the Services and COCOMs gradually reached common ground on J-5’s proposed UCP 2008 language.

Four major issues remained: 1) the AFRICOM mission statement; 2) alternate missile defense execution as part of STRATCOM’s UCP responsibilities; 3) cyberspace as a new STRATCOM responsibility; and 4) the synchronization role as it related to SOCOM’s GWOT responsibilities. The OPSDEPs wanted explicit language describing AFRICOM’s humanitarian focus, but the command did not.

In mid-January 2008, OSD and JFCOM hosted an AFRICOM conference to address the AFRICOM mission statement. The State Department, USAID, and the J-5 action officers favored the EUCOM commander’s version which “implied” the full range of AFRICOM’s mission. DASD (Africa) preferred more specific language. In mid-April, OSD(P), the Joint Staff, and AFRICOM Commander agreed to insert a clause stating AFRICOM would conduct its mission “in concert with US Government civilian agencies and international partners,” making explicit the interagency nature of the command. Secretary Gates approved the revision on 16 May.

The missile defense issue involved delineating the roles of STRATCOM/NORTHCOM in ballistic missile defense of the United States. The COCOMs, less STRATCOM and JFCOM, and the Services, less the Air Force, wanted to await the outcome of pending studies before amending the UCP to give STRATCOM additional missile defense duties. A solution was assigning STRATCOM responsibility for “synchronizing global missile defense planning.”

The term “synchronizing” had been added to the UCP in 2004 and since then remained a contentious issue. The current 2006 UCP used the term in reference to STRATCOM’s role in combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD), SOCOM’s role in global operations against terrorist networks, and TRANSCOM’s role as the Distribution Process Owner. But each role was different, and NORTHCOM’s proposed new role in leading pandemic influenza response would give it synchronizing authority for planning purposes.
The Joint Staff offered three options: use the current UCP 2006 language; accept the current 2008 draft that eliminated all but one use of the word “synchronizing”; or reinsert “synchronizing” into the 2008 draft, but only in reference to “planning.” SOCOM strongly opposed the elimination of the word “synchronizing,” believing that it diminished SOCOM’s authority in global operations against terrorist networks. SOCOM wanted to revert to the 2006 UCP language, but the other COCOMs favored the 2008 draft that limited SOCOM’s authority. The Services, however, endorsed the 2006 UCP, which had expanded SOCOM’s authority.161

By late May 2008, thirteen OPSDEPs and JCS Tank sessions had adjudicated 43 issues, but synchronization, global missile defense, and cyberspace matters remained unresolved.162 In late June, the Joint Chiefs decided those three outstanding issues by approving the J-5 draft UCP 2008 language.163 The new language defined “synchronization planning” as specifically pertinent to planning efforts and implied no authority to execute or direct the execution of operations. The definition was based on SOCOM’s language and applied to NORTHCOM’S pandemic influenza role and STRATCOM’S following global missions: 1) combating weapons of mass destruction; 2) global missile defense; and 3) cyberspace.164

By August 2008 a reformatted UCP text, organized by COCOMs, would establish AFRICOM, realign VIPR responsibilities, assign the Pandemic Influenza mission to NORTHCOM, give the cyberspace mission to STRATCOM, define “synchronizing planning” terminology, address areas of shared interest, and make all Combat Commanders responsible to plan and conduct military support for SSTR operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.165

Although the draft 2008 UCP codified AFRICOM’s missions, responsibilities, and AOR, it did not transfer execution authorities or authorize operational control (OPCON) of forces assigned to other COCOMs. To remedy this shortcoming, on 8 September 2008 Admiral Mullen notified the COCOMs and Services that beginning no earlier than 1 October the Commander, AFRICOM, would assume execution authorities and forces from CENTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM. On 30 September Secretary Gates officially established USAFRICOM as a unified combatant command effective 1 October and delineated its geographic AOR. This was necessary to fill the gap between the command reaching full operational capability and the President’s signature of the 2008 UCP. The Secretary’s memorandum remained in effect until the President signed the 2008 UCP.166

On 2 October, the Chairman submitted the draft 2008 UCP to the Secretary who in turn forwarded it to the President for signature on 3 October. In mid-December the President signed the UCP 2008, and on 23 December the Chairman distributed the document to the Service Chiefs, COCOM commanders, and the Commander, US Element, NORAD.167

OSD was responsible for shaping the UCP 2008. Revision of the UCP text, AFRICOM, areas of shared interest, SSTR operations, pandemic oversight, and cyberspace initiatives all originated in Secretary Rumsfeld’s office. NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM developed their AOR realignment, but otherwise there were few COCOM initiatives that survived the UCP vetting process. (NORTHCOM, PACOM, and JFCOM initiatives also.) The COCOMs sought to preserve their AORs and authorities. The Services tended toward parochialism. As part of its coordination role, the Joint Staff protected CJCS authorities and resolved the synchronization issue.

Looking back it was an eventful six-year span for the UCP. New COCOMs—NORTHCOM and AFRICOM—emerged; SPACECOM merged with STRATCOM to form a “new” STRATCOM. Yet radical organizational changes did not occur. Despite OSD’s push for consolidation, mega-commands did not materialize. The existing COCOM structure remained intact and recognizable. Nevertheless,
the Secretary of Defense defined the direction of the UCP process through numerous OSD initiatives and occasionally by unilateral action such as moving Syria and Lebanon to CENTCOM’s AOR. The post 9-11 era witnessed SOCOM’s steady rise under the patronage of the Secretary of Defense and OSD. The other COCOMs’ resistance to SOCOM’s increased authorities reflected their tendency to protect respective AORs and responsibilities. New contingencies demanded new responses and besides the COCOM reorganizations, the UCP reflected initiatives for cyberspace, global missile defense, pandemic influenza, security assistance, and humanitarian operations.

The 2011 UCP and Change-1

The 2008 UCP process commenced in July 2007 and concluded in December 2008. The eighteen-month review had included fourteen OPSDEPs and JCS decision Tank meetings, six formal rounds of general and flag officer coordination, as well as formal and informal coordination with OSD. In an effort to streamline, better coordinate, and accelerate the UCP process, the J-5 Deputy Director, Strategy & Policy (DDS&P) action officers proposed a new approach for the 2010 UCP. It relied on information technology (IT) and conferences organized around commonly agreed upon “business rules” to promote transparency and collaboration. These procedures would break down “stove pipes” (isolating information internally separate from the overall process) and enable globally dispersed stakeholders (contributors with vital interests affected by UCP decisions) to join an ongoing, multi-participant, real time exchange of information.

Based on this new methodology, in August 2009 DDS&P action officers developed a five-phase outline. Phase one, actually in progress since the completion of the current UCP in December 2008, identified senior leaders’ guidance and the principles for the 2010 review. Phase two (September 2009-January 2010) relied on web-based Issue Development Papers (IDP) to provide transparent and accountable exchanges among participants, which, in turn, would determine the issues for the 2010 review. Next, in phase three (February 2010), a Pentagon conference would enable COCOM and Service planners, communicating via IT directly and in real time with their respective commanders or directors, to incorporate agreed-upon language for the draft UCP, record recommendations, and refine unresolved matters. Phase four (March–May 2010) would adjudicate a final draft UCP, beginning with DDS&P, continuing sequentially through the DJ-5, an OPSDEP Tank (if so referred by DJ-5), and a CJCS/JCS Tank decision. Phase five would commence when the Chairman sent the draft 2010 UCP to all four-star officers via e-mail with a two-week suspense. OSD and NSC coordination would follow in July and August, respectively. Presidential approval was anticipated by September. The DDS&P planners’ overall intent was to impose commonality, discipline, and timeliness on a process that had grown increasingly idiosyncratic, unresponsive, and tardy.

In early September, following approval of the business rules at the action officers’ UCP initial planning conference, the Joint Staff requested the COCOMs’ and the Services’ representatives to provide their UCP recommendations by 31 October. On 25 September, the Chairman notified the COCOM Commanders and the Service Chiefs that the UCP review was underway and endorsed the business rules, which, he believed, would facilitate rigorous assessment of issues, incorporate Web-based information exchange, and improve adjudication at the appropriate level.

The COCOMs submitted 53 IDPs. Among the more contentious was AFRICOM’s proposal to alter several maritime boundaries, which conflicted with EUCOM and CENTCOM positions, particularly
CENTCOM’s proposal to transfer the Seychelles to its AOR. Other IDPs dealt with internal command specific issues such as EUCOM’s advocacy of dual-hatting the Commander, EUCOM, as the SACEUR or PACOM’s proposal to drop references to the Senior US Military Officer Assigned to Korea (SUSMOAK). JFCOM sought clarification of UCP language to reflect its evolving responsibilities. NORTHCOM endorsed force health protection issues and, like JFCOM, clarity of its missions. NORTHCOM also suggested reorganized COCOM responsibilities for the Arctic Region to improve command and control. PACOM wanted resolution of stratcom forces in its AOR and security and force protection responsibilities in the geographic combatant commanders’ AORs. SOCOM continued to champion integration and interoperability with general purpose forces and new language to define proponency for Security Force Assistance matters. SOUTHCOM recommended that Mexico, Belize, and Guatemala be designated mutual interest states, and STRATCOM sought responsibility for synchronized domestic and allied cyberspace operations. TRANSCOM proposed a formalization of the distribution process by synchronizing planning for global distribution operations in coordination with the combatant commands.\textsuperscript{172} In short, COCOMs advanced issues peculiar to their interests.

By mid-December, the DJ-5 had validated 42 IDPs (including four selected for immediate administrative incorporation into the draft UCP) and, in collaboration with the COCOMs, had rejected eleven. Among the eleven, the DJ-5 rejected SOUTHCOM’s proposal for mutual interest states, EUCOM’s recommendation to clarify its relationship with NATO (which involved personnel and manning issues), and PACOM’s contention that it should have operational control of STRATCOM forces in the PACOM AOR. SOUTHCOM’s mutual interest states’ initiative had been previously addressed and rejected during the UCP 2008 review. The Joint Staff believed that command relationships between EUCOM and NATO were adequately outlined in a CJCS instruction (CJCSI 5130.01D); and that because existing UCP language was sufficiently general to allow the Secretary of Defense to delineate a command relationship, it was unnecessary to consider PACOM’s initiative.\textsuperscript{173}

Major issues adopted for review included boundary alignments for CENTCOM and AFRICOM, formal recognition in the UCP of the command relationship between EUCOM and NATO by acknowledging that the EUCOM commander was normally dual-hatted as SACEUR, clarification and modification of JFCOM responsibilities, refinement of STRATCOM’s cyber operations mission, modification of Arctic boundaries, and augmentation of NORTHCOM’s foreign consequence management by adding a deployable CBRNE-CM (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive consequence management) capability.\textsuperscript{174}

Two DDS&P adjudication review sessions held in March extended AFRICOM’s AOR in the vicinity of Cape Verde, explicitly identified EUCOM dual-hatted as SACEUR, and approved compromise language regarding several of JFCOM’s responsibilities as well as modifications to SOCOM’s request on integration and interoperability of Special Operations and General Purpose Forces. Participants rejected NORTHCOM’s modification of CBRNE-CM for deployment outside the United States.\textsuperscript{175}

The process then moved to the OPSDEPs review stage. The first session, held on 7 April, considered four geographic items—modifying Arctic AOR boundaries, eliminating the 2008 UCP’s cross-hatched map of Alaska that indicated PACOM interests, moving the Caspian Sea to the CENTCOM AOR, and shifting the Seychelles to CENTCOM.\textsuperscript{176} The Arctic region’s natural resources (estimated by the US Geological Survey in 2008 to contain 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil, 30 percent of undiscovered natural gas, and 20 percent of natural gas liquids) and the effects of climate change created an increased enterprise in the region, evidenced by new sea routes through the previously impassable northern and
northwest passages. The growing activity raised human and environmental safety and security issues, as well as questions of freedom of navigation. Furthermore, there was a divergence between recent presidentially approved Arctic region policy and the Geographic COCOMs’ missions.177

These considerations convinced the DJ-5 to modify his original support for the current COCOM arrangements in the Arctic and establish a special Joint Staff working group to analyze the issue. Three COCOMs—NORTHCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM—shared Arctic AORs. NORTHCOM and EUCOM favored consolidating the area to improve command and control and unity of effort.

Participants at the first OPSDEPs Tank session, held 7 April 2010, recommended making NORTHCOM the advocate for Arctic capabilities in coordination with the relevant combatant command. The DJ-5 agreed to modify the Arctic boundaries contingent upon the OPSDEPs providing additional information.

Cross-hatching the Alaska map in the UCP had been a politically expedient decision, apparently made by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in 2002, to mollify Senator Daniel K. Inouye’s (D, HI) concerns that PACOM assets in Alaska might be assigned permanently to the newly established NORTHCOM. With the passage of time, NORTHCOM found that cross-hatching was both unnecessary and confusing. The DJ-5 originally preferred the current arrangement, regarding the deletion of cross-hatching as merely cosmetic and not an improvement to the UCP. The OSD, the Joint Staff, and PACOM (the last contingent on Senator Inouye’s concurrence) backed the elimination of the cross-hatching depiction. At the 7 April OPSDEPs Tank, PACOM agreed to review the political background that led to the cross-hatching decision and alert the Joint Chiefs to possible political implications of revising the depiction. The Caspian Sea transfer involved shifting traditional EUCOM interests to CENTCOM and was referred to the Joint Chiefs for decision.178

Even before the April OPSDEPs meeting, the Seychelles move was in trouble. In late December 2009, the US Ambassador to the Seychelles and the State Department notified the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff of their opposition to any UCP realignment of the Seychelles under CENTCOM. State claimed that it would result in duplication of effort and complicate anti-piracy operations.179 On 29 March 2010 the ambassador informed the AFRICOM commander of State’s opposition and the next day the AFRICOM commander withdrew his proposal to move the maritime boundary north. OSD and the Joint Staff also endorsed the status quo boundary arrangement.180

The second OPSDEPs meeting, held on 14 April, discussed recommendations to rename JFCOM the Joint and Coalition Forces Command, assign additional responsibilities to JFCOM, clarify strategic deterrence planning responsibilities, and modify responsibilities for chemical weapons of mass destruction’s (CWMD’s) synchronizing planning and advocacy. The JFCOM commander sought the name change to better reflect daily operations and the command’s global focus. The Director, Joint Staff, returned the proposal to the OPSDEPs for additional review, believing that the proposed name was inappropriate because JFCOM was not a coalition “command” and that any name change had limited impact.181 The Director did forward the recommendations for additional JFCOM missions to the Joint Chiefs and endorsed modified language for strategic deterrence planning responsibility.182

One week later, the third OPSDEPs meeting revisited the proposed JFCOM name change, the modification of Arctic boundaries, and the global “Synchronizing Planning” framework as prerequisites for further discussion of UCP topics. “Synchronizing” first appeared in the 2008 UCP and a footnote defined the concept for commanders and explained the distinction between planning and execution. The nomenclature, however, had been contentious since SOCOM first proposed the term for the 2002 UCP. Other COCOM commanders insisted that “synchronizing” conferred authority to impinge on
their respective AORs and resisted its use. CENTCOM further noted the absence of a joint definition for global synchronization and the inconsistency of five global synchronizers for three global campaign plans. The “Synchronizing Planning” discussion continued during the fourth OPSDEPs session of 28 April. Participants preferred the status quo but agreed that more analysis was needed before the next UCP review tentatively set for 2012. A complicating factor was the establishment of CYBERCOM as a sub-unified command in June 2009 and its charter to synchronize “warfighting effects across the global security environment.”

The fifth session, 5 May 2010, continued the “Synchronizing Planning” discussion. The Joint Staff opted for the status quo by retaining the global synchronizer language and felt that a related issue of responsibility for counter-threat finance was already covered by existing UCP language. OSD, however, favored SOCOM’s new, explicit language that gave SOCOM responsibility for synchronizing planning for global counter threat finance operations.

The first JCS Tank meeting convened on 21 May and examined the ten unresolved issues, including the renaming of JFCOM and adding to its responsibilities, as well as the global synchronizing planning framework. Their second session, on 28 May, considered geographic realignments, such as modifying Arctic AOR boundaries and deleting the Alaska map cross-hatching. Shortly afterwards, Senator Inouye requested Secretary Gates’ assurances that the current UCP review would not alter PACOM’s structure or AOR. The Secretary affirmed that neither removing the cross-hatching of Alaska nor realigning the Arctic AOR would involve any operational or administrative shift of forces. He further explained that eliminating cross-hatching on the Alaska portion of the UCP map would make the map consistent and avoid having to crosshatch other geographic areas where forces from one COCOM were stationed in the AOR of a different COCOM. Thus reassured, the senator agreed to the elimination of the Alaska cross-hatching on the UCP map.

Adjustment of Arctic boundaries drew the Service chiefs’ attention. The Army preferred the status quo while the other Services, OSD, the OPSDEPs, DJ-3, DJ-5, and DJS recommended that EUCOM and NORTHCOM share the AOR. They would extend NORTHCOM’s AOR westward to include the North Pole and expand the EUCOM AOR eastward to the maximum, thereby eliminating the PACOM presence in the Arctic. Discussion about moving the Seychelles to CENTCOM’s AOR concluded that the DJ5 and CJCS decisions from the UCP 2008 supported the status quo, a position favored by OSD, the OPSDEPs, and the State Department. The third JCS Tank meeting, 11 June, dealt with additional responsibilities for JFCOM and TRANSCOM’s responsibilities for global distribution synchronizer.

A 21 June OPSDEPs review focused on JCS-directed language modifications to JFCOM responsibilities, identifying which combatant command should be responsible for a Standing Joint Force Headquarters for WMD Elimination (SJFHQ-E), and the sufficiency of the current UCP’s language to establish SJFHQ-E. The Joint Staff favored STRATCOM for the SJFHQ-E responsibility while OSD preferred either STRATCOM or JFCOM. The JCS endorsed the status quo retention of global synchronizer planning.

As noted, several OPSDEPs and JCS Tank sessions between April and July 2010 were devoted to JFCOM initiatives. During May 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, concerned about the DOD’s ability to sustain the current force structure and continue military modernization in an era of reduced Defense budgets, directed the Defense Business Board to review personnel, organization, and operations to identify efficiencies and savings. In mid-July the board recommended a downsizing of the COCOMs, beginning with the elimination of JFCOM. Secretary Gates’ 9 August announcement that he would recommend JFCOM’s closure to the President and the assignment of its force management
and sourcing functions to the Joint Staff surprised UCP action officers. One week later, the Secretary officially notified the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among others, of a series of initiatives to reduce excess and duplication department-wide that would eliminate the J-6 and JFCOM. Following the President’s approval of the recommendations in early January 2011, J-5 action officers amended the draft UCP to acknowledge the Secretary of Defense’s decision to disestablish JFCOM effective 31 August 2011. Until that date, JFCOM remained responsible for executing its assigned missions and tasks.190

By late August, the major proposed changes to the 2010 UCP would modify the Arctic region’s AORs and assign the Commander NORTHCOM advocacy for Arctic capabilities; account for the pending disestablishment of JFCOM in the UCP; give TRANSCOM responsibility for planning global distribution operations; and, based on the Chairman’s decision in lieu of a planned JCS Tank, strengthen STRATCOM’s authorities as a global synchronizer for planning for combating WMDs as well as separately giving STRATCOM authority to synchronize domestic (but not allied) cyberspace operations. AFRICOM’s maritime boundary shifted westward to Cape Verde, NORTHCOM and EUCOM divided the Arctic AOR; the Commander, USEUCOM, was specifically identified as the dual-hatted Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). All references to Senior US Military Officers Assigned to Korea (SUSMOAK) were deleted and Alaska cross-hatching was removed in the UCP. SOUTHCOM’s boundary was shifted to include the entire Sandwich Islands group. The current AOR boundaries for the Seychelles remained unchanged.191

On 1 November Admiral Mullen forwarded the UCP 2010 to Secretary Gates for signature and transmittal to the President.192 Mr. Gates was then awaiting recommendations related to his August efficiency initiatives and did not immediately forward the document to the White House. Instead, about one month later, the Secretary directed that the term “Psychological Operations (PSYOP)” be replaced with “Military Information Support Operations” (MISO). According to Secretary Gates, the former terminology had become anachronistic and misleading, connoting propaganda, manipulation, and deceit. The Commander, USSOCOM, would be the Joint Proponent for MISO (as he had been for PYSOPS), but the name change would also require a change to the draft UCP language then awaiting the Secretary’s signature.193 This was also the case for JFCOM when on 9 February 2011 Secretary Gates announced his initial guidance and direction for the command’s disestablishment.194

Rather than redo the draft UCP document, apparently the Secretary decided to amend the UCP at a later date. On 11 March, he sent the UCP 2010 to the President. Just three days later, however, Secretary Gates disseminated a series of efficiency decisions related to his August 2010 initiatives. Besides the disestablishment of JFCOM, the announcement mandated a reduction from seven SJFHQs at Combatant Commands (abbreviated now as CCDM per Joint Publication 1-02, 8 November 2012) to two global SJFHQs by the end of FY 2012. A subsequent Secretary of Defense memorandum, based on recommendations from a Chairman-led DOD working group that included OSD, the CCDMs, and Services, specified the redistribution of USJFCOM organizations and functions to other CCDMs, Services, OSD, and the Joint Staff to be accomplished not later than 31 August 2011.195 During this interval, on 6 April, the President signed the UCP 2011.196

Meanwhile, in late February, to respond to the recent changes, the Deputy Director Joint Strategic Planning (DDJSP) began a UCP review to produce a Change-1 by September that would amend the UCP 2010 to comport with the Defense Secretary’s latest guidance.197 On 2 May Admiral Mullen notified the Service Chiefs and the CCDM commanders of his decision that the DDJSP would review the presidentially approved 2010 UCP to facilitate the rapid integration of Secretary Gates’ recent decisions
into the document as Change-1. J-5 action officers and CCDM and Service representatives relied on a revised set of “Business Rules” that focused on JFCOM’s disestablishment and set a September 2011 deadline to produce Change-1.198

During a three-day conference in early May, Joint Staff, Service, and CCDM planners removed the SJFHQ and JFCOM language and references from the 2010 UCP. Thereafter the process moved with unprecedented speed. In mid-June the OPSDEPs approved the results without discussion, and, due to the unanimous concurrence, the Joint Chiefs cancelled a scheduled Tank meeting and instead moved the recommended change directly to the four-star coordination level. In mid-July the general and flag officers completed their coordination. The Chairman submitted Change-1 to the new Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, on 4 August; eight days later Secretary Panetta forwarded the document to the President. By mid-August it had reached the National Security Staff where it awaited presidential signature. On 12 September the President issued Change-1 that amended the 2010 UCP by removing the USJFCOM section; deleting the SJFHQ language from all sections pertaining to geographic commands; eliminating USSOCOM IO support to STRATCOM; and removing IO, military deception, and operations security missions from STRATCOM. Change-1 expanded STRATCOM’s joint electronic warfare responsibilities, transferred the Joint Warfare Analysis Center missions to STRATCOM, and added responsibility for a global SJFHQ to TRANSCOM.199

The post 9-11 decade was arguably the most momentous period in the UCP’s history. The multiple terror attacks on the United States in September 2001 led to the creation of NORTHCOM, which became responsible for homeland security, and a “new” STRATCOM, which enhanced integrated global planning. Between 2001 and 2011 OSD pushed for consolidation to achieve efficiencies and reduce costs. Yet mega-commands did not materialize. The proposed merger of NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM into Americas Command was discarded, in part because independent studies identified no substantive saving. A proposed merger of EUCOM and CENTCOM was also shelved because of span of control issues. The existing CCDM structure remained intact and recognizable, regardless of OSD’s push for consolidation. Nevertheless, the Secretary of Defense exerted significant influence on the UCP process during much of the decade through numerous OSD initiatives and occasionally by unilateral actions such as moving Syria and Lebanon to CENTCOM’s AOR or recommending JFCOM’s disestablishment. In similar fashion, the post 9-11 era witnessed SOCOM’s steady rise under the patronage of the Secretary of Defense and OSD.

The other COCOMs’ resistance to SOCOM’s increased authorities reflected the traditional tendency to preserve their respective AORs and responsibilities. New contingencies demanded new responses. AFRICOM emerged to deal with the growing importance of Africa’s promise and threat. Besides the COCOM reorganizations, the evolving UCP reflected initiatives for cyberspace, global missile defense, pandemic influenza, security assistance, and humanitarian operations. Despite increased jointness, the COCOMs’ greater assertiveness during wartime, and OSD initiatives, the Services retained a powerful role in UCP formulation by virtue of their participation in the JCS Tank sessions.

The UCP has demonstrated its flexibility as it evolved during more than 60 years of war and peace. Change occurred in an irregular, occasionally erratic, fashion, but in general resulted in greater joint effort and the rise of the COCOM’s authority. The long sought after goal of unity of effort suffered during the Korean War when the FECOM commander depended almost entirely on an Army staff and during the Vietnam War when the Defense Secretary routinely bypassed PACOM to deal directly with the theater commanders. The initial post-Vietnam era witnessed a worsening of inter-Service rivalry
that adversely affected US operations Grenada and led to congressionally mandated reforms in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. The act redefined the Chairman’s role, enabling him to promote jointness via reorganized combatant commands and newly established functional commands. These efforts paid dividends during the first Gulf War during 1991. The UCP’s evolution during the first decade of the 21st century not only adapted to multiple conflicts occasioned by the war on terror, including two major contingency operations, but also integrated emerging technologies, reorganized COCOMs, and established AFRICOM to meet emerging issues. JFCOM’s disestablishment paradoxically reflected its success in inculcating a joint culture that made its mission redundant. In sum, the interaction continued between OSD efforts to centralize and streamline control of the COCOMs without impinging on what the Services or the COCOMs viewed as their basic roles and missions.
# Appendix I

## Dates Unified and Specified Commands Established

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CINCSAC</strong></td>
<td>Strategic Air Command (SAC)</td>
<td>14 Dec 1946</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A specified command. President Truman's approval of the first Unified Command Plan on 14 Dec 1946 recognized the already existing SAC and brought it under JCS control. The JCS did not issue a directive to SAC until 13 Apr 1949.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Disestablished 1 Jun 1992; most functions assumed by USSTRATCOM.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CINCPAC</strong></td>
<td>Pacific Command (PACOM)</td>
<td>1 Jan 1947</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Redesignated:</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>USCINCPAC</strong></td>
<td>US Pacific Command (USPACOM)</td>
<td>11 Oct 1983</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CINCFE</strong></td>
<td>Far East Command (FECOM)</td>
<td>1 Jan 1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disestablished 1 Jul 1957; functions assumed by USPACOM.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CINCEUR</strong></td>
<td>European Command (EUCOM)</td>
<td>15 Mar 1947</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nominally a unified command, but almost wholly of Army composition.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Succeeded by:</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>USCINCEUR</strong></td>
<td>US European Command (EUCOM), a full-fledged unified command.</td>
<td>1 Aug 1952</td>
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<td>Command</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCNELM</td>
<td>US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (NELM)</td>
<td>1 Nov 1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A specified command. From 1 Aug 1952 to 19 Feb 1960, also the Navy component of USEUCOM. Thereafter, CINCNELM had the concurrent title of CINCUS-NAVEUR as the Navy component of USEUCOM.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disestablished 1 Dec 1963.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCARIB</td>
<td>Caribbean Command (CARIBCOM)</td>
<td>1 Nov 1947</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Redesignated:</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCINCSO</td>
<td>US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)</td>
<td>6 Jun 1963</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCLANT</td>
<td>Atlantic Command (LANTCOM)</td>
<td>1 Dec 1947</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Redesignated:</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCINCLANT</td>
<td>US Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM)</td>
<td>11 Oct 1983</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Redesignated:</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCUSACOM</td>
<td>US Atlantic Command (USACOM) with expanded responsibilities, including all CONUS-based Army and Air Force combat units.</td>
<td>1 Oct 1993</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Redesignated:</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCUSJFCOM</td>
<td>US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) with focus as force provider, joint doctrine/training, interoperability, experimentation and transformation.</td>
<td>1 Oct 1999</td>
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<td>Disestablished 31 Aug 2011.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCNE</td>
<td>US Northeast Command (USNEC)</td>
<td>1 Oct 1950</td>
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<td>Disestablished 1 Sep 1956.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCUSAFE</td>
<td>US Air Forces, Europe (USAFE)</td>
<td>22 Jan 1951</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A specified command. From 1 Aug 1952 onward, also the Air Force component of USEUCOM.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Specified command status terminated 1 Jul 1956.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCONAD</td>
<td>Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD)</td>
<td>1 Sep 1954</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Originally designated a joint command; made a unified command in Sep 1958. With Canada, the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) was established 12 Sep 1957. CINCONAD also designated CINCNORAD.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disestablished 30 Jun 1975; functions assumed by ADCOM.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCSTRIKE</td>
<td>US Strike Command (USSTRICOM)</td>
<td>1 Jan 1962</td>
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<td>Assumed additional responsibilities, 1 Dec 1963, under added designation USCINCMEAFSA (Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, and South Asia).</td>
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<td>Disestablished 31 Dec 1971; original functions passed to USREDCOM.</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCINCREDS</td>
<td>US Readiness Command (USREDCOM)</td>
<td>1 Jan 1972</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disestablished on 30 Sep 1987.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCAD</td>
<td>Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM)</td>
<td>1 Jul 1975</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A specified command. NORAD continued, with CINCAD also designated CINCNORAD.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Disestablished 19 Dec 86; functions assumed by USSPACECOM.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCMAC</td>
<td>Military Airlift Command (MAC)</td>
<td>1 Feb 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Designated a specified command for airlift.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terminated as a specified command 30 Sep 1988.</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCINCCENT</td>
<td>US Central Command (USCENTCOM)</td>
<td>1 Jan 1983</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Replaced the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force which was established 1 Mar 1980.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCINCSOC</td>
<td>US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)</td>
<td>16 Apr 1987</td>
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<td>USCINCTRANS</td>
<td>US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)</td>
<td>1 Jul 1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCFORSCOM</td>
<td>Forces Command (FORSCOM) designated a specified command.</td>
<td>1 Jul 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specified command status terminated on 1 Oct 1993; FORSCOM then became the Army component of USACOM.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>US Strategic Command</td>
<td>1 Oct 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)</td>
<td>1 Oct 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAFRICOM</td>
<td>US Africa Command (USAFRICOM)</td>
<td>1 Oct 2008</td>
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## Appendix II

### Unified Command Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Superseded By</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(U) Outline Command Plan</td>
<td>Approved by President Truman 14 Dec 1946</td>
<td>SM-180-55, 9 Mar 1955</td>
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<tr>
<td>(U) SM-548-56</td>
<td>3 Jul 1956</td>
<td>SM-749-57, 24 Oct 1957</td>
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<td>(C) SM-749-57</td>
<td>24 Oct 1957</td>
<td>SM-643-58, 8 Sep 1958</td>
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<td>(C) SM-643-58</td>
<td>8 Sep 1958</td>
<td>SM-105-61, 4 Feb 1961</td>
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<td>(C) SM-105-61</td>
<td>4 Feb 1961</td>
<td>SM-1400-63, 20 Nov 1963</td>
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<td>SM-422-71, 30 Jun 1971</td>
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<td>SM-356-75, 27 Jun 1975</td>
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<td>SM-729-83, 28 Oct 1983</td>
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<td>28 Oct 1983</td>
<td>SM-143-88, 1 Mar 1988</td>
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<td>(S) SM-143-88</td>
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<td>SM-712-89, 16 Aug 1989</td>
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<td>(S) MCM-64-92</td>
<td>24 Apr 1992</td>
<td>MCM-57-93, 5 Apr 1993</td>
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<td>5 Apr 1993</td>
<td>MCM-144-93, 6 Oct 1993</td>
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<td>(effective 15 Apr 1993)</td>
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<td>Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
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<td>(S) MCM-144-93</td>
<td>6 Oct 1993</td>
<td>MCM-080-95, 21 Jun 1995</td>
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<td>(S) MCM-162-99</td>
<td>12 Oct 1999</td>
<td>MCM-0016-03, 4 Feb 2003</td>
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<td>(S) MCM-0016-03</td>
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<td>MCM-0012-05, 17 Mar 2005 (incorporates Changes 1 and 2)</td>
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<td>(FOUO) MCM-0012-05</td>
<td>17 Mar 2005</td>
<td>MCM-0004-06, 31 May 2006</td>
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<td>(FOUO) MCM-0004-06</td>
<td>31 May 2006</td>
<td>MCM-0044-08, 23 Dec 2008</td>
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<td>(U) MCM-0044-08</td>
<td>23 Dec 2008</td>
<td>MCM-0013-11, 20 Apr 2011</td>
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<td>(U) MCM-0013-11</td>
<td>20 Apr 2011</td>
<td>DJSM-0604-11, 21 Sep 2011</td>
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<td>21 Sep 2011</td>
<td>MCM-0013-11, 20 Apr 2011 (incorporates Change 1)</td>
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## Appendix III

**Chronological Listing of Presidents of the United States, Secretaries of Defense, and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Secretary</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harry S. Truman</td>
<td>James V. Forrestal</td>
<td>General of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Apr 45–20 Jan 53</td>
<td>17 Sep 47–27 Mar 49</td>
<td>Omar N. Bradley, USA 16 Aug 49–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Louis A. Johnson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28 Mar 49–19 Sep 50</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>George C. Marshall</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21 Sep 50–12 Sep 51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Robert A. Lovett</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17 Sep 51–20 Jan 53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwight D. Eisenhower</td>
<td>Charles E. Wilson</td>
<td>General of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>09 Oct 57–01 Dec 59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas S. Gates, Jr.</td>
<td>Gen Nathan F. Twining, USA 15 Aug 57–30 Sep 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>02 Dec 59–20 Jan 61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John F. Kennedy</td>
<td>Robert S. McNamara</td>
<td>GEN Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA 01 Oct 60–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 61–22 Nov 63</td>
<td>21 Jan 61–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GEN Maxwell D. Taylor, USA 01 Oct 62–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyndon B. Johnson</td>
<td>Robert S. McNamara</td>
<td>GEN Maxwell D. Taylor, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 Nov 63–20 Jan 69</td>
<td>–29 Feb 68</td>
<td>–01 Jul 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clark M. Clifford</td>
<td>GEN Earle G. Wheeler, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>01 Mar 68–20 Jan 69</td>
<td>03 Jul 64–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard M. Nixon</td>
<td>Melvin R. Laird</td>
<td>GEN Earle G. Wheeler, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 69–09 Aug 74</td>
<td>22 Jan 69–29 Jan 73</td>
<td>–02 Jul 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elliot L. Richardson</td>
<td>ADM Thomas H. Moorer, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 Jan 73–24 May 73</td>
<td>02 Jul 70–01 Jul 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>James R. Schlesinger</td>
<td>Gen George S. Brown, USAAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>02 Jul 73–</td>
<td>01 Jul 74–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerald R. Ford</td>
<td>James R. Schlesinger</td>
<td>Gen George S. Brown, USAAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09 Aug 74–20 Jan 77</td>
<td>–19 Nov 75</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Donald H. Rumsfeld</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 Nov 75–20 Jan 77</td>
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<td>Jimmy Carter</td>
<td>Harold Brown</td>
<td>Gen George S. Brown, USAAF</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gen David C. Jones, USAAF</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21 Jun 78–</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ronald W. Reagan</td>
<td>Caspar W. Weinberger</td>
<td>Gen David C. Jones, USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 81–20 Jan 89</td>
<td>21 Jan 81–23 Nov 87</td>
<td>–18 Jun 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., USA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18 Jun 82–30 Sep 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frank C. Carlucci</td>
<td>ADM William J. Crowe, Jr., USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23 Nov 87–20 Jan 89</td>
<td>01 Oct 85–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George H. W. Bush</td>
<td>Dick Cheney</td>
<td>ADM William J. Crowe, Jr., USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 89–20 Jan 93</td>
<td>21 Mar 89–20 Jan 93</td>
<td>–30 Sep 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GEN Colin L. Powell, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30 Sep 89–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William J. Clinton</td>
<td>Les Aspin 20 Jan 93–03 Feb 94</td>
<td>GEN Colin L. Powell, USA 30 Sep 93</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William S. Cohen 24 Jan 97–20 Jan 01</td>
<td>GEN Henry H. Shelton, USA 01 Oct 97–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>Donald H. Rumsfeld 20 Jan 01–18 Dec 06</td>
<td>GEN Henry H. Shelton, USA 30 Sep 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 01–20 Jan 09</td>
<td>Robert M. Gates 18 Dec 06–</td>
<td>Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF 01 Oct 01–30 Sep 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gen Peter Pace, USMC 01 Oct 05–30 Sep 07</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN 01 Oct 07–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barack Obama</td>
<td>Robert M. Gates –01 Jul 11</td>
<td>ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN 30 Sep 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 09 –</td>
<td>Leon E. Panetta 01 Jul 11–</td>
<td>GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA 01 Oct 11–</td>
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</table>
### Appendix IV

**Membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fleet ADM William D. Leahy</td>
<td>20 Jul 42</td>
<td>21 Mar 49&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, USA</td>
<td>16 Aug 49</td>
<td>15 Aug 53</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM Arthur W. Radford, USN</td>
<td>15 Aug 53</td>
<td>15 Aug 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Nathan F. Twining, USAF</td>
<td>15 Aug 57</td>
<td>30 Sep 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA</td>
<td>01 Oct 60</td>
<td>30 Sep 62</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN Maxwell D. Taylor, USA</td>
<td>01 Oct 62</td>
<td>01 Jul 64&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN Earle G. Wheeler, USA</td>
<td>03 Jul 64</td>
<td>02 Jul 70&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Thomas H. Moorer, USN</td>
<td>02 Jul 70</td>
<td>01 Jul 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen George S. Brown, USAF</td>
<td>01 Jul 74</td>
<td>20 Jun 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen David C. Jones, USAF</td>
<td>21 Jun 78&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>18 Jun 82&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., USA</td>
<td>18 Jun 82&lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>30 Sep 85</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM William J. Crowe, Jr., USN</td>
<td>01 Oct 85</td>
<td>30 Sep 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Colin L. Powell, USA</td>
<td>01 Oct 89</td>
<td>30 Sep 93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. President Roosevelt established this position on 20 July 1942 to provide an officer to preside over JCS meetings and maintain liaison with the White House. The position lapsed in March 1949 when Admiral Leahy was detached.

2. Date detached. At the request of President Truman, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, while president of Columbia University, served as the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from February to August 1949.

3. The position of Chairman was created by the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 approved 10 August 1949. The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the Chairman. Originally, the Chairman served a two-year term with eligibility for a second two-year term, except in time of war when there would be no limit on the number of reappointments. Since 1 October 1986, the Chairman is appointed for a two-year term beginning on 1 October of odd-numbered years. He may be reappointed for one additional term, except in time of war when there is no limit on the number of reappointments. An officer may not serve as Chairman or Vice Chairman if his combined service in such positions exceeds six years.

4. Retired 1 July 1959; recalled to active duty 1 July 1961; relieved from active duty 1 July 1964; reverted to retired status 2 July 1964.


6. His Presidential commission was dated 20 June 1978. General Jones became Acting Chairman on 21 February 1978, when General Brown entered the hospital; he was sworn in as Chairman on 30 June 1978. He retired 1 July 1982.

7. Took oath of office privately on 18 June 1982; he was sworn in publicly on 21 June 1982.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADM David E. Jeremiah, USA (acting)</td>
<td>01 Oct 93</td>
<td>24 Oct 93</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA</td>
<td>25 Oct 93</td>
<td>30 Sep 97</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN Henry H. Shelton, USA</td>
<td>01 Oct 97</td>
<td>01 Oct 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF</td>
<td>01 Oct 01</td>
<td>30 Sep 05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen Peter Pace, USMC</td>
<td>01 Oct 05</td>
<td>30 Sep 07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN</td>
<td>01 Oct 07</td>
<td>30 Sep 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA</td>
<td>01 Oct 11</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
The position of Vice Chairman was created by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (Public Law 99-433) of 1 October 1986. The Vice Chairman acts as Chairman when there is a vacancy in that office or in the absence or disability of the Chairman. Until October 1992, the Vice Chairman was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff only when he was acting for the Chairman. Public Law 102-484 of 23 October 1992 made him a full member of the JCS. The Chairman and the Vice Chairman may not be members of the same military Service although the President may briefly waive that restriction in order to facilitate the orderly filling of the positions.

The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the Vice Chairman for a term of two years, and may be reappointed for two additional terms, except in time of war when there is no limit on the number of reappointments.

Served as Acting Vice Chairman from 3 August 2007.
### History of the Unified Command Plan 1946–2012

**Chief of Staff, US Army**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General of the Army</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George C. Marshall</td>
<td>09 Feb 4211</td>
<td>18 Nov 45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dwight D. Eisenhower</td>
<td>19 Nov 45</td>
<td>07 Feb 48</td>
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<td>GEN Omar N. Bradley</td>
<td>07 Feb 48</td>
<td>16 Aug 49</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN J. Lawton Collins</td>
<td>16 Aug 49</td>
<td>15 Aug 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Matthew B. Ridgway</td>
<td>15 Aug 53</td>
<td>30 Jun 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Maxwell D. Taylor</td>
<td>30 Jun 55</td>
<td>01 Jul 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Lyman L. Lemnitzer</td>
<td>01 Jul 59</td>
<td>30 Sep 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN George H. Decker</td>
<td>01 Oct 60</td>
<td>30 Sep 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Earle G. Wheeler</td>
<td>01 Oct 62</td>
<td>02 Jul 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Harold K. Johnson</td>
<td>03 Jul 64</td>
<td>02 Jul 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN William C. Westmoreland</td>
<td>03 Jul 68</td>
<td>30 Jun 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Bruce Palmer, Jr. (acting)</td>
<td>01 Jul 72</td>
<td>11 Oct 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Creighton W. Abrams</td>
<td>12 Oct 72</td>
<td>04 Sep 7412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Fred C. Weyand13</td>
<td>03 Oct 74</td>
<td>01 Oct 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Bernard W. Rogers</td>
<td>01 Oct 76</td>
<td>21 Jun 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Edward C. Meyer</td>
<td>22 Jun 79</td>
<td>22 Jun 83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN John A. Wickham, Jr.</td>
<td>23 Jun 83</td>
<td>22 Jun 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Carl E. Vuono</td>
<td>23 Jun 87</td>
<td>21 Jun 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN Gordon R. Sullivan</td>
<td>21 Jun 91</td>
<td>19 Jun 95</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN Dennis A. Reimer</td>
<td>20 Jun 95</td>
<td>20 Jun 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Eric K. Shinseki</td>
<td>21 Jun 99</td>
<td>11 Jun 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Peter J. Schoomaker</td>
<td>01 Aug 03</td>
<td>10 Apr 07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN George W. Casey, Jr.</td>
<td>10 Apr 07</td>
<td>10 Apr 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Martin E. Dempsey14</td>
<td>11 Apr 11</td>
<td>07 Sep 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Raymond T. Odierno</td>
<td>07 Sep 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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10 Since 1 January 1969 (under Public Law 90-22 of 5 June 1967 which amended Section 3034(a) of Title 10, US Code), the Chief of Staff, US Army, is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a four-year term and, in time of war, is eligible for reappointment for a term of not more than four years.

11 Date of first formal JCS meeting.

12 Date of death.

13 Acting Chief of Staff, 4 September to 2 October 1974.

14 Appointed Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 2011.
### Chief of Naval Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADM Harold R. Stark</td>
<td>09 Feb 42¹⁶</td>
<td>12 Mar 42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fleet ADM Ernest J. King¹⁷</td>
<td>09 Feb 42¹⁶</td>
<td>15 Dec 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet ADM Chester W. Nimitz</td>
<td>15 Dec 45</td>
<td>15 Dec 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Louis E. Denfeld</td>
<td>15 Dec 47</td>
<td>02 Nov 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Forrest P. Sherman</td>
<td>02 Nov 49</td>
<td>22 Jul 51¹⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM William M. Fechteler</td>
<td>16 Aug 51</td>
<td>16 Aug 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Robert B. Carney</td>
<td>17 Aug 53</td>
<td>17 Aug 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Arleigh A. Burke</td>
<td>17 Aug 55</td>
<td>01 Aug 61</td>
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<td>ADM Carlisle A. H. Trost</td>
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<td>ADM Frank B. Kelso II</td>
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<td>ADM Jeremy M. Boorda</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM Jay L. Johnson (acting)</td>
<td>16 May 96</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM Jonathan W. Greenert</td>
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¹⁵ Since 1 January 1969 (under Public Law 9-22 of 5 June 1967 which amended Section 5081(a) of Title 10, US Code), the Chief of Naval Operations is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a four-year term and, in time of war, may be reappointed for a term of not more than four years.

¹⁶ Date of first formal JCS meeting.

¹⁷ At the initial JCS meetings both the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, and the Commander in Chief, US Fleet, Admiral King, represented the Navy. By Executive Order 9096, on 12 March 1942, the two positions were combined in one individual, Admiral King, who served as Commander in Chief, US Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations. In accordance with Executive Order 9635, on 10 October 1945, Admiral King’s title became simply Chief of Naval Operations, and the title of Commander in Chief, US Fleet, ceased to exist.

¹⁸ Date of death.
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<tr>
<th>Chief of Staff, US Air Force</th>
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<td>General of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Henry H. Arnold</td>
<td>09 Feb 4221</td>
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<td>GEN Carl Spaatz</td>
<td>01 Mar 46</td>
<td>30 Apr 48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg</td>
<td>30 Apr 48</td>
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<td>Gen Nathan F. Twining</td>
<td>30 Jun 53</td>
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<td>Gen Thomas D. White</td>
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<td>Gen John P. McConnell</td>
<td>01 Feb 65</td>
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<td>Gen George S. Brown</td>
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<td>Gen Charles A. Gabriel</td>
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<td>Gen Larry D. Welch</td>
<td>01 Jul 86</td>
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<td>Gen Merrill A. McPeak</td>
<td>27 Oct 90</td>
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<td>Gen Ronald R. Fogleman</td>
<td>26 Oct 94</td>
<td>02 Oct 97</td>
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<td>Gen Michael E. Ryan</td>
<td>02 Oct 97</td>
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<td>Gen John P. Jumper</td>
<td>06 Sep 01</td>
<td>02 Sep 05</td>
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<td>Gen T. Michael Moseley</td>
<td>02 Sep 05</td>
<td>12 Jul 08</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12 Jul 08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen Norton A. Schwartz</td>
<td>12 Aug 08</td>
<td>10 Aug 12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen Mark A. Welsh</td>
<td>10 Aug 12</td>
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19 Position created by the National Security Act of 1947. Since 1 January 1969 (under Public Law 90-22 of 5 June 1967 which amended Section 8034(A) of Title 10, US Code), the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a four-year term and, in time of war, may be reappointed for a term of not more than four years.

20 Served as member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

21 Date of first formal JCS meeting.

22 Commanding General, Army Air Forces, until sworn in as the first Chief of Staff, US Air Force, on 26 September 1947.

Appendix IV

Commandant, US Marine Corps

From  To
Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.  28 Jun 52  31 Dec 55
Gen Randolph McC. Pate  01 Jan 56  31 Dec 59
Gen David M. Shoup  01 Jan 60  31 Dec 63
Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr.  01 Jan 64  31 Dec 67
Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr.  01 Jan 68  31 Dec 71
Gen Robert E. Cushman, Jr.  01 Jan 72  30 Jun 75
Gen Louis H. Wilson  01 Jul 75  30 Jun 79
Gen Robert H. Barrow  01 Jul 79  30 Jun 83
Gen Paul X. Kelley  01 Jul 83  30 Jun 87
Gen Alfred M. Gray, Jr.  01 Jul 87  01 Jul 91
Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr.  01 Jul 91  30 Jun 95
Gen Charles C. Krulak  01 Jul 95  30 Jun 99
Gen James L. Jones  01 Jul 99  13 Jan 03
Gen Michael W. Hagee  13 Jan 03  13 Nov 06
Gen James T. Conroy  14 Nov 06  22 Oct 10
Gen James F. Amos  22 Oct 10

24 By Public Law 416, 82d Congress, 28 June 1952, the Commandant of the US Marine Corps was placed in co-equal status with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when matters of direct concern to the Marine Corps were considered. In 1978, Section 141 of Title 10, US Code, was amended by Public Law 485, 95th Congress, approved 20 October 1978, to provide full membership for the Commandant of the Marine Corps in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Effective 1 January 1969 (under Public Law 90-22 of 5 June 1967, which amended Section 5201(a) of Title 10, US Code) the Commandant of the US Marine Corps is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a four-year term and, in time of war, may be reappointed for a term of not more than four years.
Appendix V

Glossary of Abbreviations

A
AAF Army Air Force
ACC Air Combat Command
ACOM Atlantic Command
ADCOM Aerospace Defense Command
ALCOM Alaskan Command
ANTEDEFCOM Antilles Defense Command
AOR Area of Responsibility
ARADCOM Army Air Defense Command
ASD/ISA Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs
ASD/SOLIC Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict
ASW Antisubmarine Warfare
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

B
BMD ballistic missile defense

C
CBRNE-CM chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive consequence management
CCJTF Caribbean Combined Joint Task Force
CDE concept development and experimentation
CENTCOM Central Command
CG AAF Commanding General, Army Air Forces
CG AFFE Commanding General, Army Forces, Far East
CG CONARC Commanding General, Continental Army Command
CG FEAF Commanding General, Far East Air Forces
CG SAC Commanding General, Strategic Air Command
CG USARPAC Commanding General, US Army Pacific
CG USFET Commanding General, US Forces, European Theater
CINCAD Commander in Chief, Aerospace Defense Command
CINCAFLANT Commander in Chief, Air Forces, Atlantic
CINCAFPAC Commander in Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific
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<th>Description</th>
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<td>Commander in Chief, Alaska</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCARIB</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Caribbean</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCARLANT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Army Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCEUR</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCFE</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Far East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCLANT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCLANTFLT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCMAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCMACF</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, and South Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCMELM</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean</td>
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<td>CINCNORAD</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCONAD</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPACAF</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces</td>
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<td>CINCPACFLT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet</td>
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<td>CINCSAC</td>
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<td>CINCSPECOMME</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Specified Command, Middle East</td>
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<td>CINCSTRIKE</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Strike Command</td>
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<td>CINCUNC</td>
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<td>CINCUSAFE</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Air Forces, Europe</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Commander, Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Commandant, US Marine Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMD</td>
<td>Cruise missile defense</td>
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<td>CND</td>
<td>Computer Network Defense</td>
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<td>CNO</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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<td>COMCARIBSEAFRON</td>
<td>Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier</td>
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<td>COMNAVEF</td>
<td>Commander, Naval Forces, Far East</td>
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<td>COMRDJTF</td>
<td>Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>COMTAC</td>
<td>Commander, Tactical Air Command</td>
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<td>COMUS JAPAN</td>
<td>Commander, US Forces, Japan</td>
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<td>COMUS KOREA</td>
<td>Commander, US Forces, Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV</td>
<td>Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
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<td>CONAD</td>
<td>Continental Air Defense Command</td>
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<td>CONARC</td>
<td>Continental Army Command</td>
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**Appendix V**

CONUS  Continental United States
CORM  Commission on Roles and Missions
CSA  Chief of Staff, US Army
CSAF  Chief of Staff, US Air Force
CWMD  combating weapons of mass destruction

D
DASD(S)  Deputy Assistant Secretary for Strategy
DBOF  Defense Business Operations Fund
DDJSP  Deputy Director Joint Strategic Planning
DDS&P  Deputy Director for Strategy & Policy
DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency
DLA  Defense Logistics Agency
DOD  Department of Defense
DOMS  Director of Military Support
DPG  Defense Planning Group

E
ENRAAF  Europe, NATO, Russia, Africa
EUCOM  European Command

F
FECOM  Far East Command
FORSCOM  Forces Command

G
GCC  Geographic Combatant Commander
GWOT  Global War on Terror

I
ICBM  Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IDA  Institute for Defense Analysis
IDP  Issue Development Paper
IO  Information Operations
IT  information technology
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<td>JDA</td>
<td>Joint Deployment Agency</td>
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<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>Joint Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSOA</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSPOG</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSTPS</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff</td>
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<td>LIO</td>
<td>low intensity conflict</td>
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<td>MAF</td>
<td>Marine Amphibious Force</td>
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<td>MDAP</td>
<td>Mutual Defense Assistance Program</td>
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<td>MEAFSA</td>
<td>Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, and South Asia</td>
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<td>MEAFSAIO</td>
<td>Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, South Asia, Indian Ocean</td>
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<td>MOP</td>
<td>Memorandum of Policy</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Sealift Command</td>
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<td>Mutual Security Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMCSS</td>
<td>National Military Command Structure System</td>
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<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>operational control</td>
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<td>PJBD</td>
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<td>SAC</td>
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<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>SIOP</td>
<td>Single Integrated Operational Plan</td>
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<td>SLOC</td>
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<td>SO</td>
<td>special operations</td>
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<td>SSTR</td>
<td>stability, security, transition, and reconstruction</td>
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<td>START</td>
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<td>SUSMOAK</td>
<td>Senior US Military Officer Assigned to Korea</td>
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<td>secure video teleconference</td>
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<td>USREDCOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>US Transportation Command</td>
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**V**  
VIPR | US Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico

**W**  
WMD | Weapons of Mass Destruction
NOTES
1946–1977

1. (U) JCS 1259/7, 23 Mar 46, CCS 323.361 (2-26-45) sec 3.
2. (U) JCS 1259/27, 11 Dec 46; (U) Note by Secys on JCS 1259/27, 23 Jan 47; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 4.
3. (U) Msg, WARX 87793, JCS to CINCUSARPAC et al., 16 Dec 46, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 4.
4. (U) Msg, WAR 92711, JCS to CG USFET, 24 Feb 47, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 5.
5. (U) JCS 1259/38, 6 Aug 47, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 5.
7. (U) JCS 1259/49, 6 Nov 47; (U) Dec On JCS 1259/49, 26 Nov 47; (U) Msg, WAR 91186, JCS to CINCLANTFLT, 26 Nov 47; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 7.
11. (U) JCS 1259/78, 3 Jul 48; (U) Dec On JCS 1259/78, 7 Sep 48; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 11.
12. (U) Msg, WAR 90049, JCS to CINCNELM, 29 Sep 48 (derived from JCS 1259/95), CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 13.
14. (U) JCS 1259/106, 30 Nov 48, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 14. (U) JCS 1259/112, 22 Dec 48; (U) JCS 1259/113, 22 Dec 48, same file, sec 15. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 13 Apr 49 (derived from JCS 1259/136); (U) Memo, Actg Chm. US Section PJBD to SecDef, 2 May 49; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 17.
16. (U) Dec On JCS 1369/18, 23 May 49, CCS 383.21 Austria (1-21-44) sec 17. (U) JCS 1259/152, 7 Jun 49; (U) SM-1361-49 to CINCEUR, 18 Jul 49; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 18.
17. (U) SM-75-51 to LTG Lauris Norstad, 11 Jan 51; (U) SM-76-51 to CINCs et al., 11 Jan 51; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 22.
18. (U) JCS 1259/241, 30 Jun 52; (U) N/H of JCS 1259/241, 9 Jul 52; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 30. (U) Msg, JCS 912973 to USLO SHAPE, 7 Jul 52, same file, sec 31.
20. (U) Dec On JCS 521/49, 16 Feb 50, CCS 381 (2-8-43) sec 17.
24. (U) Dec On JCS 1259/218, 22 Dec 51; (U) N/H of JCS 1259/218, 24 Jan 52; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 27.
26. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 24 Dec 52 (derived from JCS 1259/270), CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 37.

29. DOD Directive 5100.1, 16 Mar 54. (U) Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., 15 Jan 54, corrected and reissued on 5 Mar 54 in JCS 1259/317, 12 Mar 54, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 47.

30. (U) Msg, JCS 959318 to CINCPAC, 2 Apr 54, Encl to Dec On JCS 1259/315, 2 Apr 54, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 47. (U) JCS 1259/322, 9 Jun 54, same file, sec 48.

31. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 26 Jul 54 (derived from JCS 1899/135), same file, sec 50.

32. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 26 Jul 54 (derived from JCS 1899/135); N/H of JCS 1899/135, 4 Aug 54; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 50.

33. (U) JCS 1899/100, 25 Jan 54, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 50.

34. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 18 Feb 55 (derived from JCS 1259/337); (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 2 Mar 55; (U) N/H of JCS 1259/337, 10 Mar 55; (U) SM-180-55 to CINCAL et al., 9 Mar 55; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 53.

35. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 5 Jun 56 (derived from JCS 1899/265 and JCS 1899/268); (C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 19 Jun 56, Encl to JCS 1899/274, 26 Jun 56; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 61. (U) JCS 1899/281, 15 Aug 56; (U) N/H to JCS 1899/281, 5 Sep 56; same file, sec 62; (U) SM-716-56 to CINCONAD, 4 Sep 56, same file, sec 63.

36. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 4 Jun 56 (derived from JCS 1899/135); (C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 21 Jun 56; (C) N/H of JCS 1259/357, 23 Jul 56; (U) Msg, JCS 905628 to USCINCEUR, 28 Jun 56, Encl to JCS 1259/356, 28 Jun 56; (U) SM-551-56 to Chm, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, 3 Jul 56 (derived from JCS 1259/359); CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 61.

37. (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 28 Dec 56, Encl to JCS 1259/378, 31 Dec 56; (S) Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 16 Jan 57, Encl JCS 1259/380, 1 Feb 57; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 69.

38. (C) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 29 May 57 (derived from JCS 1259/394); (C) N/H to JCS 1259/394, 24 Oct 57; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 73. (C) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 11 Oct 57 (derived from JCS 1259/402); (C) SM-479-57 to CINCAL et al., 24 Oct 57; same file, sec 76.

39. (C) JCSM-29-59 to SecDef, 26 Jan 59 (derived from JCS 1259/452); (U) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Feb 59, Encl to JCS 1259/455, 5 Feb 59; JMF 5160 (24 Jan 59).

40. (C) JCSM-407-60 to SecDef, 15 Sep 59; (C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 19 Nov 59, Encl to JCS 1259/516, 19 Nov 59; JMF 5020 (29 May 59).

41. (C) CJCS Paper, “Proposed Interim Solution on Middle East Command Arrangements,” 30 Jan 60; (C) Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 3 Feb 60, Encl to JCS 1259/500, 6 Feb 60; JMF 5167 (3 Feb 60) sec 1.
50. (C) Briefing Sheet for CJCS, "JCS 2262/63," 3 Jan 61, JMF 5162 (30 Dec 60). (S) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 13 Mar 61, Encl to JCS 1259/528, 16 Mar 61, JMF 5160 (16 Jul 60) sec 2.

51. (C) Briefing Sheet for CJCS, "JCS 1259/540," 26 Jun 61; (C) Memo, CNO to JCS, 7 Jul 61, Att to JCS 1259/543, 7 Jul 61; (U) CSAFM-220-61 to JCS, 8 Jul 61, Encl to JCS 1259/544, 8 Jul 61; (S) Memo, BG Brown to SJCS, 11 Jul 61, Encl to JCS 1259/545, 12 Jul 61; JMF 5162 (20 Jun 61).

52. (S) Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 231916Z Apr 61, JMF 5162 (23 Apr 61). (C) Briefing Sheet for CJCS, "JCS 1259/540," 26 Jun 61; (C) Memo, CNO to JCS, 7 Jul 61, Att to JCS 1259/543, same date; (U) CSAFM-220-61 to JCS, 8 Jul 61, Encl to JCS 1259/544, same date; (S) Memo, BG Brown to SJCS, 11 Jul 61, Encl to JCS 1259/545, 12 Jul 61; JMF 5162 (20 Jun 61).

53. (S) CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis: 1962, pp. 17–23.


55. (S) CINCLANT Historical Report, 1965, p. 21.

56. (U) Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 8 Mar 61, Encl to JCS 2101/413, 10 Mar 61, JMF 5000 (8 Mar 61) sec 1.

57. (C) JCSM-292-61 to SecDef, 1 May 61 (derived from JCS 1259/535), JMF 3140 (11 Apr 61) sec 1. (S) JCSM-549-61 to SecDef, 18 Aug 61 (derived from JCS 1259/547); (S) CM-335-61 to SecDef, 18 Aug 61; same file, sec 4.

58. (U) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 19 Sep 61, Att to JCS 1259/552, 19 Sep 61, JMF 3140 (11 Apr 61) sec 4.

59. (U) JCSM-815-61 to SecDef, 5 Dec 61 (derived from JCS 1259/571); (C) SM 461-61 to SecDef, 5 Dec 61, JMF 5170 (18 Dec 62) sec 1.

60. (U) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Aug 63, Att to JCS 1259/634-6, 17 Aug 63, JMF 5160 (18 Dec 62) sec 5. (U) Memo, SecDef to Pres, 31 Oct 63, Att to JCS 1259/634-24, 1 Nov 63, same file, sec 8. (U) SM-1400-63 to CINCAL et al., 20 Nov 63, JMF 5160 (11 Oct 63). (C) JCSM-719-63 to SecDef, 17 Sep 63 (derived from JCS 1259/634-12), JMF 5160 (18 Dec 62) sec 6.

61. (S) JCSM-496-63 to SecDef, 12 Jul 63 (derived from JCS 1259/634-5); (S) CM-736-63 to SecDef, 12 Jul 63; JMF 5160 (18 Dec 62) sec 5.

62. (U) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Aug 63, Att to JCS 1259/634-6, 17 Aug 63, JMF 5160 (18 Dec 62) sec 5. (U) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Aug 63, Encl to JCS 1259/596, 28 Aug 63; (U) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1 May 63, Encl to JCS 1259/625, 3 May 63; (U) JCS Info Memo 20-63, 11 Jan 63; JMF 5160 (24 Apr 62). (C) JCS 1259/645, 20 Nov 63, JMF 5160 (11 Oct 63).

63. (S) JCSM-533-63 to SecDef, 15 Jul 63 (derived from JCS 2283/285-1); (TS) JCS 2283/285, 27 Jun 63; JMF 3213 (25 Feb 63). (U) NORAD Historical Reference Paper No. 11, "Nineteen Years of Air Defense," 1 May 65, p. 76.

64. (TS) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 29 Jul 63, Encl to JCS 2282/285-2, 31 Jul 63, JMF 3213 (25 Feb 63). (C) JCS 1259/645, 20 Nov 63, JMF 5160 (11 Oct 63).


66. (C) JCSM-627-62 to SecDef, 17 Aug 62 (derived from JCS 1259/595); (C) Memo, MilAsst to SecDef to CJCS, 24 Aug 62, Encl to JCS 1259/596, 28 Aug 62; (U) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1 May 63, Encl to JCS 1259/625, 3 May 63; (U) JCS Info Memo 20-63, 11 Jan 63; JMF 5160 (24 Apr 62). (C) JCS 1259/645, 20 Nov 63, JMF 5160 (11 Oct 63).

67. (C) JCSM-533-63 to SecDef, 15 Jul 63 (derived from JCS 2283/285-1); (TS) JCS 2283/285, 27 Jun 63; JMF 3213 (25 Feb 63). (U) NORAD Historical Reference Paper No. 11, "Nineteen Years of Air Defense," 1 May 65, p. 76.


70. Ekhardt, Command and Control, pp. 50–51.


74. (U) SM-427-67 to CINCONAD, 17 Jun 67 (derived from JCS 1259/680-1), JMF 043 (7 Apr 67).

75. (S) SM-106-70 to USCINGSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA, 18 Feb 70 (derived from JCS 1259/712-3), JMF 047 (10 Jul 69).
77. Ibid., pp. 212–214.
78. (C) Memo, DepSecDef to Secys of MilDepts et al., 12 Sep 69, Att to JCS 1259/715, 15 Sep 69, JMF 046 (12 Sep 69) sec 1. (S) Memo, DepSecDef to Secys of MilDepts et al., 2 Mar 70, Att to JCS 1259/715-12, 2 Mar 70, same file, sec 4. (TS) JCSM-120-70, 19 Mar 70, Encl A to JCS 1259/715-14, 16 Mar 70, same file, sec 5.
79. (S) Memo, DepSecDef to Secys of MilDepts et al., 21 May 70, Att to JCS 1259/715-15, 22 May 70, JMF 046 (12 Sep 69) sec 5. (S) JCSM-432-70 to SecDef, 4 Sep 70, Encl to JCS 1259/715-21, 4 Sep 70; (S) Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 14 Sep 70, Att to JCS 1259/715-22, 16 Sep 70; (C) JCSM-530-70 to SecDef, 15 Nov 70, App to JCS 1259/715-27, 12 Nov 70, same file, sec 7.
80. (C) JCSM-530-70 to SecDef, 15 Nov 70, App to JCS 1259/715-27, 12 Nov 70, JMF 046 (12 Sep 69) sec 9.
81. (TS) Memo, DepSecDef to Pres, 5 Mar 71, Att to JCS 1259/715-34, 9 Mar 71, JMF 046 (12 Sep 69) sec 9.
82. (TS) Memo, Pres to DepSecDef, 21 Apr 71, att to JCS 1259/715-42, 22 Apr 71; (C) Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 19 Jun 71, Att to JCS 1259/715-45, 21 Jun 71; (C) SM-422-71 to CINCs, 30 Jun 71 (derived from JCS 1259/715-46), JMF 046 (12 Sep 69) sec 10.
83. (S) USCINCRED Command History, 1972, (C), pp. 1–1, 1–3.
85. (C) Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 21 Jul 71, Att to JCS 1259/715-51, 23 Jul 71, JMF 046 (12 Sep 69) sec 12. (C) SM-422-71 to CINCs, 30 Jun 71 (derived from JCS 1259/715-46), same file, sec 10. (S) SM-377-71 to CNO, CINCAL, and CINCPAC, 8 Jun 71 (derived from JCS 1259/730-1), JMF 378 (28 May 71). (S) CINCAL Command History, 1971, (C) p. 3.
87. (C) JCSM-174-73 to SecDef, 24 Apr 73, Encl A to JCS 1259/752-1, 18 Apr 73, JMF 043 (18 Dec 72) sec 1. (U) JCSM-367-73 to SecDef, 17 Aug 73, Encl A to JCS 1259/752-5, 18 Aug 73, same file, sec 2. (S) CINCONAD Command History, 1 Jan 73–30 Jun 74, (C) pp. 2-12.
88. (U) Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 5 Oct 73, Att to JCS 1977/365, 6 Oct 73, JMF 010 (5 Oct 73) sec 1. (C) JCSM-536-73 to SecDef, 28 Dec 73, Encl A to JCS 1977/365-22, 21 Dec 73, same file, sec 4.
89. (S) CSAM-12-74 to JCS, 4 Feb 74, Att to JCS 1259/758-1, 4 Feb 74, JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 1. (S) USCINCSO Command History, 1974, (U) p. 27. (TS) CINCPAC Command History, 1974, (C) p. 41. (TS) CINCPAC Command History, 1975, (U) p. 34. (S) CINCAL Command History, 1975, (C) p. 3.
90. (C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 3 Sep 74, Att to JCS 1259/758-8, 6 Sep 74, JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 2. (C) JCSM-411-74 to SecDef, 15 Oct 74, Encl A to JCS 1259/758-9, 24 Sep 74, JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 2. (C) Memo, SecDef to Pres, 17 Dec 74, Att to JCS 1259/758-31, 20 Dec 74, same file, sec 8. (C) Memo, Pres to SecDef, 24 Feb 75, Att to JCS 1259/758-37, 25 Feb 74, same file, sec 11.
91. (C) Memo, MilAsst to SecDef to DepSpecAsst to Pres for NSA, 21 Apr 75, Att to JCS 1259/758-41, 8 May 75; (C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 6 Jun 75, Att to JCS 1259/758-42, 10 Jun 75; JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 11. (C) SM-356-75 to CINCs et al., 27 Jun 75 (derived from JCS 1259/758-43), JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 11.
92. (S) CINCAD Command History, 1 Jul–31 Dec 75, (U) p. 1. (S) CINCAL Command History, 1975, (C) p. 1. (S) USCINCSO Command History, 1975, (U) pp. 2, 32-33. (C) JCSM-400-75 to SecDef, 7 Nov 75, Encl to JCS 1259/758-45, 24 Oct 75, JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 12. (C) Memo, SecDef to Pres for NSA, 12 Jan 74, JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 12. (C) Memo, MilAsst to SecDef to DepSpecAsst to Pres for NSA, 21 Apr 75, Att to JCS 1259/758-41, 8 May 75; (C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 6 Jun 75, Att to JCS 1259/758-42, 10 Jun 75; JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 11. (C) SM-356-75 to CINCs et al., 27 Jun 75 (derived from JCS 1259/758-43), JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 11.
93. (C) JCS 1259/758-35, 18 Feb 75; (C) Memo, SecDef to Pres for NSA, 21 Apr 75, Att to JCS 1259/758-41, 8 May 75; (C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 6 Jun 75, Att to JCS 1259/758-42, 10 Jun 75; JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 11. (C) SM-356-75 to CINCs et al., 27 Jun 75 (derived from JCS 1259/758-43), JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 11.
94. (S) USCINCSO Command History, 1975, (U) pp. 2, 32-33. (C) JCSM-400-75 to SecDef, 7 Nov 75, Encl to JCS 1259/758-45, 24 Oct 75, JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 12. (C) Memo, SecDef to Pres for NSA, 12 Jan 74, JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 12. (C) Memo, MilAsst to SecDef to DepSpecAsst to Pres for NSA, 21 Apr 75, Att to JCS 1259/758-41, 8 May 75; (C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 6 Jun 75, Att to JCS 1259/758-42, 10 Jun 75; JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 11. (C) SM-356-75 to CINCs et al., 27 Jun 75 (derived from JCS 1259/758-43), JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 11.
Notes to Pages 34–41

SecDef, 10 Nov 75, Encl to JCS 1259/758–46, 31 Oct 75; JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 12. (C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 23 Mar 76, Att to JCS 1259/758–66, 24 Mar 76; (C) Msg, JCS 2290 to CINCcs, 2 Apr 76 (derived from JCS 1259/758–67), same file, sec 16. (C) 1st N/H of SM-356-75, 1 May 76, same file, sec 11.

101. (S) PCDM, SecDef to SecAF, 29 Jul 74, Att to JCS 2458/902-1, 31 Jul 74, JMF 557 (25 Feb 75) sec 2.

102. (U) Memo, SecAF to ASD(PA&E), n.d., Encl to Att to JCS 2165/101-2, 27 Mar 75, JMF 445 (22 Nov 74) sec 1. (U) JCSM-333-75 to SecDef, 12 Nov 75; (U) CM-672-75 to SecDef, 12 Nov 75; Encls to JCS 2165/101-3, 12 May 76, same file.

103. (U) Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 9 Jun 76, Att to JCS 2165/101-7, 11 Jun 76, JMF 445 (22 Nov 74) sec 2. (C) JCSM-240-76 to SecDef, 2 Jul 76, Encl to JCS 1259/780, 21 Jun 76; (C) Memo, Asst to Pres for NSA to SecDef, 13 Dec 76, Att to JCS 1259/780-2, 15 Dec 76; 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 17. (C) 2nd N/H of SM-356/75, 18 Jan 77, same file., sec 11.

1977–1983


2. JCSM-290-78 to SecDef, 1 Sep 78, JCS 1977/409-5, S, JMF 010 (13 Jul 78) sec 2. JCS MOP 181, 29 Jan 79, JCS 1259/844, JMF 040 (15 Jan 79).


4. Ltr, USCINCSO to JCS, 8 Sep 78, JCS 1259/828, S-NOFORN, JMF 040 (8 Sep 78).


19. Memo, DCS Plans and Policies, USMC, to Dir, J-5, 15 Feb 80, S; Memo, Army OpsDep to DJS, 8 Feb 80, S; Msg, USCINCREDS to Dir, J-5, 151512Z Feb 80, S; J-5/G&OP Files.

20. JCSM-59-80 to SecDef, 1 Mar 80, JCS 1259/881, S, JMF 040 (29 Feb 80). RDJTF Command History,


30. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 24 Apr 81, JCS 1259/920, S, JMF 915/040 (24 Apr 81).


32. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1259/920, S, JMF 040 (26 Feb 82).

33. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1259/920-1, TS, JMF 040 (26 Feb 82).

34. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1259/920-2, TS, JMF 040 (26 Feb 82).

35. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 1259/920-3, TS, JMF 040 (26 Feb 82). That same date the Joint Chiefs of Staff distributed the approved terms of reference, including Egypt and Sudan in the AOR, to the Services and the CINCs. Also see SM-661-81 to CSA et al., 28 Sep 81, JCS 1976/648, S, JMF 040 (26 Feb 82). 4th N/H of JCS 1259/758-43, 30 Jul 82, C, JMF 040 (25 May 82).

49. Msg, JCS to CINCAD et al., 262309Z Nov 82, S, J-5/G&OP Files.
50. Msgs, USCINCRED to JCS, 081715Z Dec 82, S; USCINCEUR to JCS, 101728Z Dec 82, S; CINCLANT to JCS, 152330Z Dec 82, S; J-5/G&OP Files.
51. Msgs, USCINCEUR to JCS, 101728Z Dec 82, S; CINCLANT to JCS, 152330Z Dec 82, S; J-5/G&OP Files.
52. Msgs, USCINCRED to JCS, 081715Z Dec 82, S; USCINCEUR to JCS, 101728Z Dec 82, S; CINCLANT to JCS, 152330Z Dec 82, S; J-5/G&OP Files.
53. Msgs, JCS to USCINCSO and CINCLANT, 232313Z Dec 82, S; USCINCSO to JCS, 302330Z Dec 82, S; J-5/G&OP Files.
56. Although the UCP does not mention the Mongolian People's Republic by name, the map clearly includes it in CINCPAC's area. Interviews of J-5 officers verified that Mongolia had been assigned to USCINCPAC in the new UCP.
57. JCSM-129-83 to SecDef, 2 May 83, JCS 1259/994, S, JMF 040 (8 Apr 83).
58. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 28 Jul 83, JCS 1259/994-1, S; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Oct 83, JCS 1259/994-2, S; JMF 040 (8 Apr 83).

1983–1993

1. Two Directors of the Joint Staff tried, in 1984 and again in 1988, to launch broad reexaminations of the UCP. Both times, little resulted beyond rearguments of old disputes. Memo, DJS to Dir, J-3, Dir, J-5, and DepDir, J-2, 3 Oct 84, U; DJSM-2166-88 to USCINCLANT et al., 3 Oct 88, S; J-5 Organizational Policy Branch File. The Directors were LTG Jack N. Merritt, USA, in 1984 and LTG Robert W. RisCassi, USA, in 1988.
2. CSAFM-5-83 to JCS, 7 Jun 83, JCS 2542/8, S, JMF 040 (7 Jun 83).
3. JCS 2542/8-3, 26 Oct 83, S, JMF 040 (7 Jun 83).
4. JCSM-296-83 to SecDef, 23 Nov 83, S, JCS 2542/8-3, JMF 040 (7 Jun 83). Ltr, Pres to SecDef, 20 Nov 84, U, JCS 2542/76, JMF 043 (20 Nov 84).
5. JCSM-287-85 to SecDef, 25 Nov 83, S; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Sep 85, JCS 2542/101-2, C; JCSM-275-86 to SecDef, 26 Nov 86, JCS 2542/101-10, C; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Dec 86, 1st N/H of JCS 2542/101-10, 31 Dec 86, U; JMF 040.1 (6 Jun 85) sec. 1. In 1992 USCINCSPACE started filling another function as the Service component commander.
9. Partin, pp. P 56, 64–65, 68–73, 88–90, U. TelCon, W. S. Poole with Gen. Larry D. Welch, USAF (Ret.), 25 Jan 94, U. Gen. Welch also commented that Title IV’s burdens turned out to be much less onerous than the Air Force had expected. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Nov 87, JCS 2542/136-3, S; CM-1043-87 to SecDef, 19 Nov 87, 1st N/H of JCS 2542/136-3, S, JMF 040 (15 Feb 86) sec. 2.
10. JCSM-26-87 to SecDef, 18 Mar 87, JCS 2542/181, U; Memo, SecDef to Pres, 6 Apr 87, JCS 2542/181-3, U; Memo, Pres to SecDef, 13 Apr 87, JCS 2542/181-3, U; JMF 047 (22 Jan 87). Tab E to Ann B to App to JCSM-163-87 to SecDef, 24 Sep 87, JCS 2542/136-2, S, JMF 040 (15 Feb 87). Psychological warfare operations and civil
affairs functions were assigned to USSOCOM on 15 October.


12. An Interim Report to the President by the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 28 Feb 86, p. 12. NSDD 219, 1 Apr 86, U.


15. CM-457-86 to SecDef, 1 Dec 86, U, J-5 Org Pol Branch File.

16. Memo, LTC Higgins to DASD (Admin), 8 Dec 86, U; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, "Recommendations for a UTC," 31 Dec 86, U; Memo, Pres to SecDef, "Establishment of the UTC," 18 Apr 87, U; J-5 Org Pol Br File.

17. DJSM-1419-90 to DepUSCINTRANSS, 27 Dec 90, U; IP by CAPT Brown, "USTRANSCOM Charter," n.d.; J-5 Org Pol Branch File. Memo, Mr. Addington to SecDef, 27 Dec 91, JCS 1672/447-3, U; Memo, SecDef to Svc Secys et al., 14 Feb 92, JCS 1672/449, U, JMF 047.3 (CY 92). USINTRANSS now also became Commander, Air Mobility Command.


19. CSAFM-10-85 to JCS, 9 Sep 85, S, JMF 040 (15 Feb 86) sec. 4. JCSM-23-89 to SecDef, 9 Feb 89, JCS 2542/257, S; Memo, SecDef to Pres, "The UCP: Biennial Review and Revision," 26 Jun 89, U; J-5 Org Pol Br File.

20. MFR by Col. J. A. Smith, "Proposed Northeast Asia Command," 22 Feb 83, S; IP by LTC Crowell, 21 Dec 84, S, J-5 Org Pol Br File. JCSM-163-87 to SecDef, 24 Sep 87, JCS 2542/136-2, S, JMF 040 (15 Feb 86) sec. 1. JCSM-229-90 to OpsDeps, 8 Mar 90, JCS 2542/324, S; AFODM 8-90 to DJS, 8 Mar 90, JCS 2542/324, S; NODM 7-90 to DJS, 26 Mar 90, JCS 2542/324-1, S; Memo, Army Ops Dep to DJS, 10 Apr 90, JCS 2542/324-2, S; JMF 520 (CY 90).

21. AF Flimsy 9-87 to JCS, 26 Aug 87, S; CNOF-12-87 to JCS, 26 Aug 87, S; Notes to AMD, "JCS 2542/136-2," 28 Aug & 2 Sep 87, U; JCSM-163-87 to SecDef, 24 Sep 87, JCS 2542/136-2, S; JMF 040 (15 Feb 86) sec. 3.

22. DJSM-2166-88 to USCINCLANT et al., 3 Oct 88, S; J-5 PP 497-88, 7 Dec 88, U; Msg, USCINCENT to JCS, 261829Z Jan 89, S; PP, "USCINCSO UCP Issues," n.d., C; Memo, Col. Conrad to Svc Planners, "Agenda for 19 Jan 89 Planners’ Mtg," 19 Jan 89, S; Note to Actions Div by SJS, "UCP Revision," 3 Feb 89, S; Memo, Army OpsDep to DJS, "Review of the UCP," n.d. (2 Feb 89), S; Memo, USMC OpsDep to Dir, J-5, same subj., 2 Feb 89, C; AF DepOpsDep 15-88 for DJS, 23 Dec 88, S; JCSM-23-89 to SecDef, 9 Feb 89, JCS 2542/257, S; Memo, SecDef to Pres, "The UCP: Biennial Review and Revision," 26 Jun 89, U; J-5 Org Pol Br File. The SecDef disapproved a JCS recommendation that Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania be transferred from USEUCOM to USECENTCOM.


27. CAPT Paul Brown interviewed by Walter S. Poole, 28 Feb 94. Ltr, CINCSAC to CJCS, 9 Oct 90, SJS 2542/364, S, 373 (CY 90).

29. Ltr, USCINCSPACE to CJCS, 8 Mar 91, S, J-5 Org Pol Br File.
33. Ltr, USCINCRSTRAT to CJCS, “USCOM Implementation Plan,” 16 Jun 93, U; CM-1757-93 to CJCS, 1 Jul 93, U; MCM-82-93 to USCINCINCLANT, CH 1, 21 Jul 93, U, J-5 Org Pol Br File. On 27 December 1993 the Secretary of Defense approved the “Forces for Unified Commands” document as part of implementation of the revised UCP.
34. DJSM-816-93 to USD(P), 2 Aug 93, U, J-5 Org Pol Br File.
36. Bfg by LTG E. S. Leland, “Unified Command Plan,” 13 Aug 91, J-5 Working Papers, J-5 Org Pol Br File, S; Memo, DJS to CSA et al., 19 Sep 91, S; J-5 Org Pol Br File. CAPT Paul Brown interview, 13 Jan 94. On 1 July LTG Leland had proposed either giving the whole hemisphere to CINCAMERICAS or assigning him only North and Central America, giving the Caribbean and South America to USCINCINCLANT. The Director, Joint Staff, preferred the former, on grounds that USCINCLANT was focused toward Europe and that Army officers dominated most Latin American military establishments. GEN Powell commented: “Good points. Another option is ‘No change’.” Memo, DJS to CJCS, “The UCP and Latin America,” 1 Jul 91, S, J-5 Org Pol Br File.
37. CSAFM-6-91 to CJCS, 2 Dec 91, SJS 2542/415, U. USAF Bfg, “Air Combat Command as a Specified Combatant Command,” 13 Dec 91, U, J-5 Org Pol Br File. The Vice Chief who signed the CSAFM, Gen. Michael P. C. Carns, previously had been Director, Joint Staff.
38. J-5 Working Papers, S.
40. J-5A 5948-92 thru DJS to CJCS, 17 Nov 92, U; Bfg by RADM Gehman, USCINCLANT J-3, 13 Jan 93, with Handwritten Notes, “Debrief from J-7 Tank Brief ref LANTCOM,” U; J-5 Org Pol Br File. CAPT Paul Brown interview, 13 Jan 94.
42. Msg, USCINCEUR to CJCS, 091200Z Jul 93, S; Msg, CJCS to USNMR SHAPE, 191432Z Jul 93, S; Msg, USCINCEUR to CJCS, 301200Z Jul 93, S; Form 136, SJS 2147/866, 5 Aug 93 with handwritten CJCS approval dated 14 Aug, S; J-5 Org Pol Br File.
43. CM-1831-93 to SecDef, 27 Aug 93, SJS 2542/513., S, 040 (12 Jan 93). MCM-144-93 to CSA et al., 6 Oct 93, S. GEN Burba had retired on 1 Apr 93.
44. Memo, USD(P) to SecDef, 13 Jan 93, SJS 2542/513, S; Memo, Pres to SecDef, 26 Feb 93, SJS 2542/513-1, U; 040 (12 Jan 93). The three Baltic states were deemed to have unique historical and cultural ties with Western Europe.

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3. Ibid.
4. J-5A 2502-95 to CJCS, 1 Jun 95, FOUO, 040 (26 May 95); CM-885-95 to SecDef, 24 Jul 95, U, J-5 File.
5. CORM Rpt, Directions for Defense, 24 May 95, pp. 2-9 & 2-10; CM-885-95 to SecDef, 24 Jul 95, U; J-5 File.
6. The figure of three hundred nautical miles coincided with the definition of a littoral region approved by the Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment for Ground Warfare.
7. J-5A 3746-95 to CJCS, 11 Sep, S-OADR, J-5 File. The date of 1 June 1997 was chosen to mesh with the relocation of USSOUTHCOM's headquarters to Miami, the drawdown of US forces in Panama, and the projected completion of the UN mission in Haiti.
9. CM-1013-95 to SecDef, 23 Oct 95, S-X-4, 040 (26 May 95); J-5-A 4915-95 to DJS, 1 Dec 95, S; Memo, Pres to SecDef, “Unified Command Plan,” 28 Sec 95, S; J-5 File.
10. J-5A 1016-95 to DJS, 12 Sep 97, S; DJSM-818-97 to Army Ops Dep et al., 23 Sep 97, S; 040 (12 Sep 97). Memo, ASD (Strategy and Threat Reduction) to SecDef, “Unified Command Revision,” 24 Dec 97, U, 040 (9 Jan 98).
11. Ltr, USCINCSPACE to CJCS, 26 Jun 97, U, SJS 97-2422/1; MFRs by CAPT Stavridis, “Space as an AOR Bfg to DOS,” 3 Sep 97, U, and “NSC Discussion of Space as an AOR with Mr. Bob Bell,” 4 Sep 97, U; J-5 File. Commercial organizations had been added to the second point at Gen. Estes' request. Estes also protested that directions to coordinate planning with other CINCs were unique, unnecessary and a bit demeaning. The wording remained, however, because it was part of a compromise that had been carefully worked out among J-5, the Army, and the Air Force. Ltr, USCINCSPACE to VCJCS, 2 Nov 97, U; J-5A 3263-97 to VCJCS, 2 Nov 97, U; 040/040.1 (2 Nov 97).
12. CM-38-97 to SecDef, 8 Dec 97, S, 040 (20 Nov); Memo, Pres to SecDef, “Unified Command Plan,” 29 Jan 98, U; MCM 24-98 to CINCUSACOM et al., 9 Feb 98, S, 040 (31 Dec 97).
14. Memo, DepSecDef to VCJCS, 9 May 98, U; CM-212-98 to DepSecDef, 20 May 98, U, 040/320 (11 May 98); SJ 98-2447 to VCJCS, 14 May 98, U; J-5 IP, “Homeland Defense,” 14 May 98, U; J-5 Pol Div File. In 1994, DOMS had tasked the 10th Division to fight forest fires while ACOM and the Joint Staff were tasking it to prepare for an invasion of Haiti. In 1995, the SecDef limited DOMS' tasking authority (1) when forces assigned to a CINC were involved, (2) for responses to terrorism, and (3) for the planned use of lethal force. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 12 Dec 95, U.
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7. A unified command had a broad continuing mission under a single commander and was composed of assigned components from two or more military departments. It was so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. A subordinated unified (or sub-unified) command was established by the commanders of unified commands when authorized by the CJCS. It conducted continuing operations according to criteria set forth by the unified command and might have an area or functional basis.
10. Memo, CSA thru CJCS for SecDef, Revisions to the Unified Command Plan (UCP), 1 Nov 01, S, book Responses to SecDef Memorandum on UCP, JHO.
12. Memo, HQ USAF/CC for SecDef, CJCS, Thoughts on the UCP, 1 Nov 01, S w/attchs UCP Background Paper, S, and UCP Slide Presentation, UCP Reorganization, 31 Oct 01, S, book Responses to SecDef Memorandum on UCP, JHO.
13. Memo, Commandant of the Marine Corps for SecDef, Thoughts on UCP Revisions, 1 Nov 01, S, w/attchs Analysis of Approaches A and B, S, book Responses to SecDef Memorandum on UCP, JHO.
14. Revised Unified Command Plan Terms of Reference, not dated but mid-October 01, S/Close Hold, no folder, box 1, UCP 2002 Historians Research and Reference Materials, JHO.
19. The NORAD Agreement, originally signed in 1958, was a legally binding international document and the UCP could not direct changes to the document.


26. Action memo, ASD/ISA for USD (Policy), Call to Calder [Canadian Asst. Deputy Minister of Defense (Policy)] on the Unified Command Plan, 10 Jan 02, S, doc 1312ucp, Feith Papers, Special Collections Library, NDU.

27. Info memo, Principal Deputy USD (Policy) for DepSecDef, USC (Policy), Unified Command Plan 2002 and Canada (U), 6 Feb 02, S, doc 1677uepl, Feith Papers, Special Collections Library, NDU.

28. Note, Steven Cambone to USD (Policy), no subject, 16 Jan 02, U, doc 1312ucp, Feith Papers, Special Collections Library, NDU; Note, SecDef to LTG Cradock, 22 Jan 03, 10:16 AM, Tracking, U, w/encl SecDef Meetings with Service Chiefs, 2002, CD: Dr Drea Deliverables, file U11580-03.pdf, OSD Records Manager; Info Paper, DDS&P, J-5, Summary of SecDef UCP Briefing on 19 January 2002, 21 Jan 02, S/Close Hold, no folder, box 1, UCP 2002 Historians Research and Reference Materials, JHO.


30. E-mail, RDML Costello to MG Dunn, UCP POTUS Brief/Implementation Meeting Backbrief, 11 Feb 02, 11:00 AM, S, no folder, box 1, UCP 2002 Historians Research and Reference Materials, JHO.


34. Memo, SecDef for the President, Unified Command Plan 2002 (U), 16 Apr 02, S, doc 1480ucp, Feith Papers, Special Collections Library, NDU; Memo, The President for SecDef, Unified Command Plan 2002, 30 Apr 02, U, w/attch Unified Command Plan, FOUO, no folder, box 1, UCP 2002 Historians Research and Reference Materials, JHO.

35. Memo, SecDef for the President, Unified Command Plan 2002 (U), Apr 02, S, folder 8, box 2 UCP 2002, Historians Research and Reference Materials, JHO.
36. J-5, STRATCOM-SPACECOM Merger Briefing Secretary of Defense, 30 Apr 02, S/LIMDIS, no folder, box 3, UCP 2002 Historians Notes, JHO; JSAP, DJ-5 to CJCS, CH-1 to Unified Command Plan 2002, J-5A 00563-02, 30 Sep 02, U, no folder, box 3, UCP 2002 Historians Notes, JHO.

37. Briefing, J-5, STRATCOM-SPACECOM MERGER: Joint Chiefs of Staff TANK, 19 Apr 02, S/LIMDIS, JHO; Briefing for Mr. Andy Hoehn, J-5 DDS&P, STRATCOM Emerging Missions Studies Unified Command Plan 2002 Change-2, 21 Aug 02, S, both Box UCP 2004 New Docs, JHO.

38. Creating a “New” USSTRATCOM (Daily History) 4 Mar 02–14 Aug 02, 9, S, Box UCP Historian's Notes, JHO; Info Paper, J-5 DDS&P, “GLOBAL STRIKE” Language for Change 1 to UCP 2002, 24 Jun 02, Close Hold, Box UCP 2004 New Docs, JHO.

39. JSAP, DJ-5 to CJCS, CH-1 to Unified Command Plan 2002, J-5A 00563-02, 30 Sep 02, U, no folder, box 3, UCP 2002 Historians Notes, JHO.

40. Letter, Rumsfeld to Cheney et al, 25 Jun 02; Creating a “New” USSTRATCOM (Daily History) 4 Mar 02–14 Aug 02, 13-18, S, Box UCP Historian's Notes, JHO; Memo, SecDef for the President, Recommended Changes to Unified Command Plan 2002, 20 Jun 02, U, no folder, box 3, UCP 2002 Historians Notes, JHO.

41. Memo, CJCS for Chief of Staff, US Army et al, Terms of Reference for Merging USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM (U), CM-384-02, 26 Jun 02, S, w/encl Terms of Reference for Merger of US Strategic Command and US Space Command (U), S; Appendix A to Enclosure Current Missions Assigned Per UCP 2002, U; Appendix B to Enclosure Terms of Reference for Emerging Missions Studies, (U), S, Box UCP 2002 Historian's Notes, JHO.

42. Action Memo, CJCS for SecDef, Recommended Change to Unified Command Plan (UCP) 2002, CM-403-02, 15 Jul 02, Green Folder, J-5.

43. Memo, SecDef for CJCS, Cost of Commands, 15 Jul 02, U; memo CJCS for SecDef, Cost of Commands, CM-426-02, 1 Aug 02, U, T:\Master Archives Files\0008-01\CMS\2002\CM 400-499, SCL, NDU.

44. Memo, President for the SecDEF, Change to Unified Command Plan 2002, 30 Jul 02, (U), Box UCP 2002 Historian's Notes, JHO; Creating a "New" USSTRATCOM (Daily History) 4 Mar 02 – 14 Aug 02, 19, S, Box UCP Historian's Notes, JHO.

45. 5X8, J-5 Policy Division, UCP 02 Change 2 Talking Points, 25 Nov 02, Box UCP 2004 New Documents, JHO.

46. Briefing, DDS&P J-5, Decision Briefing to the JCS: Assignment of the Global Strike Mission, 4 Sep 02, S, JHO.

47. 5X8, J-5 Policy Division, UCP 02 Change 2 Talking Points, 25 Nov 02, Box UCP 2004 New Documents, JHO; Briefing, DDS&P J-5, Decision Briefing for the JCS, STRATCOM Emerging Missions Studies: Unified Command Plan 2002, Change 2, 18 Oct 02, S, JHO.

48. Action Memo, CJCS for SecDef, Recommended Change 2 to Unified Command Plan 2002, CM-648-02, 7 Dec 02, Green Folder, J-5.

49. Memo, SecDef for the President, Recommended Change-2 to Unified Command Plan 2002, 11 Dec 02, Green Folder, J-5. Change-2 language officially left OSD on 11 Dec for the White House. E-mail, CAPT K. Walker, J-5 to CJCS VU-DJ-5, DJ5 Daily Update, 12 Dec 02, S, Box UCP 2002 Historian's Notes, JHO.

50. Memo, CJCS for Chief of Staff, US Army et al, Promulgation of Unified Command Plan 2002 (with Change-1 and Change-2 incorporated), MCM-0016-03, 4 Feb 03, S, Box UCP 2004 New Docs, JHO.


52. 5X8, J-5 DDS&P Policy Division, Unified Command Plan Way Ahead, 1 Apr 03, FOOU, box UCP 2004 New Docs, JHO.

53. Info Paper, J-5 DDS&P, Development of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) Review Slate of Issues, 16 Oct 03, C:\Documents and Settings\dreaej\Desktop\UCP04\ucp organization, information paper–UCP Review background.doc; Info memo, CJCS for SecDef, Unified Command Plan (UCP) Way Ahead, CM-809-03, 5 Mar
03, Box 4 Historian’s Notes, JHO; J5 Organization & Policy Working Briefs, JFCOM Language, 22 Sep 04, box 3, Historian’s Notes, UCP 2004, JHO.

54. Memo, SecDef for USD(P), Issues w/Various Countries, 7 Apr 03, 11:46 AM, U, Box UCP 2006, JHO; Memo, SecDef for CJCS, CENTCOM AOR, 15 Apr 03.

55. Why Syria, Lebanon, and Israel should remain within the EUCOM AOR, 23 Apr 03, U, Box 1, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO; Info Paper, J-5 Organization and Policy, Assigning the Levant, 19 Jun 03, (U), Box 1, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO; Info Memo, CJCS for SecDef, USCENTCOM CM, CM-924-03, 5 May 03, S, Box 1, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO; Briefing, J-5 Deputy Director, Unified Command Plan Review, 11 Sep 03, U, C:\dreae\desktop\UCP04\CJCS brief, 11 Sep 03, ppt.

56. Draft JSAP, J-5 Policy to J-5 DDS&P, Syria in the UCP Review, not dated, Box 1, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO; Interview, COL Alan F. Mangan, USMC, and CDR Mark V. Metzger, USN, by Ronald Cole, 5 Jan 06, S, Box, UCP 2004 New Docs, JHO; Info Paper, DDS&P J-5, UCP Review Update, 30 Jan 04, Box 2, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO. Memo, SecDef for CJCS et al, Syria and Lebanon, 9 Feb 04, Box 2, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO.

57. Info Paper, J-5 Policy, UCP 02 Change 3-Syria and Lebanon moved to USCENTCOM, 11 May 04, S; 5X8, J-5 Policy Division, UCP 02 CH-3: Syria & Lebanon to CENTCOM (U), not dated, S; Action memo, CJCS for SecDef, Recommended Change-3 to Unified Command Plan 2002 (w/Ch-1 and 2), 12 Feb 04 w/SecDef initial approval, 12 Feb 04; Memo, NSC Executive Secretary for Executive Secretary, DOD, Change-3 to Unified Command Plan 2002, 22 Mar 04; Memo, JS for Chiefs of Services, Commanders of the Combatant Commands, Promulgation of Change-3 to Unified Command Plan 2002 (UCP 02), MCM-0016-04, 29 Apr 04, S, all Box UCP 2004 New Docs, JHO. (U) This decision coincided with a White House interagency group’s deliberations on specific sanctions on Syria. The discussions led to the issuance of Executive Order 13338 on 11 May 2004 that prohibited export or re-export to Syria of all products of the United States and proscribed Syrian aircraft from the United States, except in limited circumstances. (US Dept of Commerce, Implementation of the Syria Accountability Act, 14 May 2004, http://www.bis.doc.gov/licensing/syriaimplementationmay14_04.html).

58. 5X8, J5 DDS&P Policy Division, Unified Command Plan Way Ahead, 1 Apr 03, FOOU, box UCP 2004 New Docs, JHO; J-5 DDS&P Policy Division, 5X8, Unified Command Plan Way Ahead, 1 Apr 03, FOOU; Action Memo, CJCS for SecDef, Defense Planning Guidance Fiscal Year 2004-2009 (DPG 04-09)-Directed Study on Options for Improving Logistics, CM-827-03, 12 Mar 03, S, Box 1, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO.

59. Memo, SecDef for Acting USD (AT&L), Commander, US Transportation Command, 18 Sep 03; 5X8, J-5 DDS&P Policy Division, Unified Command Plan Review, 18 Sep 03, FOOU, Box 1, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO; 5X8, J-5 Policy, Unified Command Plan Review, 5 May 04 FOOU, Box UCP 2004 New Documents, JHO.

60. J-5 Organization & Policy, Comments on SecDef’s UCP Talking Points, 28 Jan 03 (S), Historian’s Notes, UCP 2004, box 1, JHO; SecDef Talking Points, Combatant Commander Conference – 30-31 January 2002, Unified Command Plan (UCP), 30 Jan 03, S, Box 1, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO.

61. J-5 Organization and Policy, Comments on SecDef’s UCP Talking Points, not dated, S, Box 1, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO; Message, CJCS to JS et al, 262200Z Feb 03, box 1, UCP 2004 Historians Notes, JHO.

62. Message, J-5 to Personal For LTG Bedard, et al, UCP Inputs, 242200Z Feb 03, U, Box 1, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO; Info Memo, CJCS for SecDef, Unified Command Plan (UCP) Way Ahead, CM-809-03, 5 Mar 03, Box 1, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO.

63. J-5, Unified Command Plan Review, 2 Apr 03, file Read-ahead, 2 Apr 03.ppt, C:\Documents & Settings\dreae\desktop\UCP04\UCP organization, JHO.

64. J-5 Policy Division, Unified Command Plan 2004 User’s Manual, 15 Mar 05, 2, C:\dreae\desktop\UCP04\Unified Command Plan 2004 User’s Manual 15 March 05; J-5, Unified Command Plan Review, 2 Apr 03, file Read-ahead, 2 Apr 03.ppt, C:\Documents & Settings\dreae\desktop\UCP04\UCP organization, JHO.

65. USELEMNORAD was included in the UCP review because it is a US-only command that had combatant command authority over forces assigned to it.

66. J-5 Organization & Policy, Working Brief 29 May 03 Agenda, not dated, U, Box 1, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO; e-mail, CDR Dalton to R. Cole, UCP Questions, 9 Jan 06, 6:21 PM, Box UCP 2004 New Docs, JHO;

66. Position paper, J-5 Organization & Policy, Creating a US Americas Command, 19 Jun 03, U, Box 1, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO; Briefing, J-5 Deputy Director, Unified Command Plan Review, 11 Sep 03, U, C:\dreae\desktop\UCP04\CJCSbrief, 11 Sep 03, ppt.

67. Briefing, RADM Patrick M. Walsh, J-5 Deputy Director, Strategy and Policy to USD (P), UCP Review, 11 Sep 03.ppt, C:\\Documents & Settings\dreae\desktop\UCP04\UCP organization, JHO; UCP 04 Summary, not dated but after 19 Nov 04, U – Close Hold, Box 1, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO.

68. Briefing, RADM Patrick M. Walsh, J-5 Deputy Director, Strategy and Policy to USD (P), UCP Review, 11 Sep 03.ppt, C:\Documents & Settings\dreae\desktop\UCP04\UCP organization, JHO.

69. Talking Paper, J-6, J6Z, NORAD-USNORTHCOM Missions/Responsibilities, 14 Aug 03, Box 1, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO; Info Paper, J-5 Organization & Policy, Removing USELMNORAD form the UCP, 19 Jun 03, S, Box 1, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO; JS, J5 DDS&P, Unified Command Plan Review: Functional Issues, 10 Apr 03, Box 1, UCP Historian Notes, JHO; HQRNORAD to CJCS, USELMNORAD in 2004 Unified Command Plan (UCP), 211232Z Jul 03, Box UCP 2004 New Docs, JHO.

70. Message, CDR USNORTHCOM to CJCS et al, USELMNORAD in 2004 Unified Command Plan, 152110Z Jul 03, S, UCP 2004 New Docs, JHO; Briefing, J-5 Deputy Director, Unified Command Plan Review, 11 Sep 03, U, C:\dreae\desktop\UCP04\ CJS brief, 11 Sep 03.ppt. The other five COCOMs abstained.

71. Message, CDR USNORTHCOM to CJCS et al, USELMNORAD in 2004 Unified Command Plan, 152110Z Jul 03, S, UCP 2004 New Docs, JHO; 5X8, J-5 Organizational Policy, USELMNORAD in the UCP, 27 Oct 03; Briefing, J-5 Policy Division, OPSDEPS Decision Brief Unified Command Plan Review, 20 Oct 03, Box 1, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO; 5X8, J-5 Organization & Policy, USELMNORAD Issue Timeline, 15 Dec 03, Box 2, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO; e-mail NORAD J5 to CDR Dalton, FW: TMS 20040646084 UCP Review Recommendation for USELMNORAD, w/attchs, 12 Mar 04, 1:28 PM, Box UCP 2004 New Docs, JHO.

72. Briefing, OUSD(P) DASD/Strategy, Evaluating Proposed Unified Command Plan (UCP) Changes, 4 Dec 03, S; 5X8, J-5 Organization & Policy, USELMNORAD Issue Timeline, 15 Dec 03, Box 2, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO.

73. Fax, Eberhart for Pace, Talking Paper on USELMNORAD–Draft UCP Language, Box 2, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO; 5X8, J-5 Organization & Policy, USELMNORAD Issue, 3 Feb 04, Box 2, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO.

74. 5X8, J-5 Policy, To describe UCP Review issues for Oct 6-10 Tanks, 22 Sep 03, Box 1, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO.

75. Info Paper, DDS&P J-5, UCP Review Update, 30 Jan 04, Box 2, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO; Position Paper, J-5 Policy, Americas Command Study Expert Panel Options, 2 Feb 04, Box 2, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO.

76. Letter Welch to CJCS, Independent Assessment of a SouthCom/NorthCom Merger, 7 May 04; Briefing, J-5 Policy, JCS Brief NORTHCOM–SOUTHCOM Merger Study IPR, 7 May 04, S, Box 2, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO; Briefing, J-5 Policy Division, Decision Brief NORTHCOM—SOUTHCOM Merger Study v9a, 10 Jun 04, Box 3, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO; Info Memo, CJCS for SECDEF, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) White Paper on Study of Potential NORTHCOM-SOUTHCOM Merger, CM-1882-04, 30 Jun 04, Box UCP 2004 New Docs, JHO; e-mail, VADM Keating to LTG Sharp, NORTHCOM-SOUTHCOM Merger, 14 Jul 04, 8:00 AM, S, Box UCP 2004 New Docs, JHO.


79. Memo SecDef for CJCS, Terrorist Organizations, 22 Jul 02, S; Box 4, UCP 2004 Historians’ Notes, JHO; Interview, COL Alan F. Mangan, USMC, and CDR Mark V. Metzger, USN, by Ronald Cole, 5 Jan 06, S, Box, UCP 2004 New Docs, JHO.

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172. Strategic Alignment Division, UCP 2010 Issue Development Paper Submission Summary, 6 Nov 09, S/NF, JHO; Briefing, DDS&P, UCP 2010 Review: OPSDEPs Tank #5, 5 May 10, S, JHO.

173. DDS&P, Strategic Alignment Division, UCP 2010 “Slate” (DJ5 Validated), 14 Dec 09, S/NF, JHO. Two other IDPs were withdrawn by the submitting COCOM. CENTCOM rescinded its recommendation to assign the Palestinian Authority to its AOR and SOCOM dropped its proposal for joint proponency for Security Force Assistance. Six proposed issues were rejected at the one-star level; four at the two-star, and one at the three star.

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176. Briefing, DDS&P, UCP 2010 Review: OPSDEPs Tank #1, 7 Apr 10, JHO.


178. Briefing, DDS&P, UCP 2010 Review: OPSDEPs Tank #1, 7 Apr 10, and marginalia, file 1004-07 April
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181. JSAP, J-5/SPOL to CJCS, /SL-JFCOM/Renaming of US Joint Forces Command to US Joint and Coalition Forces Command, 20 Jan 10; Action memo DASD(Strategy) for DUSD (SPF), Concurrence in Consideration of Renaming Joint Forces Command as Part of UCP Process, 21 Jan 10, both JHO.

182. Briefing, DDS&P, UCP 2010 Review: OPSDEPs Tank #1, 14 Apr 10, JHO.

183. Briefing DDS&P, UCP 2010 Review: OPSDEPs Tank #3, 21 Apr 10, JHO.


185. Briefing, DDS&P, UCP 2010 Review: OPSDEPs Tank #5, 5 May 10, S, JHO. The Joint Staff wanted STRATCOM for the CWMD “Global Synchronizer.” OSD preferred SJFHQ-E assignment to either STRATCOM or JFCOM but did not want to interfere with SOCOM’s GWOT missions. Briefing, J-5, DDS&P, UCP 2010 Review OPSDEPs Tank #7, 19 Jul 10, S, JHO.

186. Briefing, DDS&P, UCP 2010 Review; JCS Tank #1, 21 May 10, U, JHO.

187. Action memo CJCS for SecDef, Senator Inouye’s Request to Maintain Current Structure of USPACOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR), CM-1076-10, 2 Jun 10 and Letter SecDef to Inouye, 15 Jun 10, JHO. Forces in CONUS were typically assigned to PACOM or JFCOM but resided in the NORTHCOM AOR. Thus naval forces in San Diego were assigned to PACOM but were stationed in NORTHCOM’s AOR. Briefing, J-5, DDS&P, UCP 2010 Review JCS Tank #2, 28 May 10.

188. Briefing, DDS&P, UCP 2010 Review; JCS Tank #2, 28 May 10, S, JHO.

189. Briefing, DDS&P, UCP 2010 Review, OPSDEPs Tank # 6, 21 Jun 10, S, JHO.

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192. Action memo, CJCS for SecDef, Unified Command Plan (UCP) 2010, CM-1235-10, 1 Nov 10, JHO.


194. Memo SecDef for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al, United States Joint Forces Command Disestablishment, 9 Feb 11, JHO.


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196. Memo The President for SecDef, Unified Command Plan 2011, 6 Apr 11, JHO.

197. JSAP, J-5, DDJSP, SAD, to CJCS, CJCS Initiates Unified Command Plan (UCP) 2011 Change 1 Review (U/FOUO), 25 Feb 11, FOOU, JHO. As part of an internal J-5 reorganization DDJSP replaced DDS&P. The objective was to bring national security strategy under one directorate.


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