Accession Number : ADA612011


Title :   The Supreme Allied Commander's Operational Approach


Descriptive Note : Master's thesis


Corporate Author : ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES


Personal Author(s) : Lynch, Timothy B


Full Text : http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA612011


Report Date : 22 May 2014


Pagination or Media Count : 58


Abstract : Since the end of WWII, many historians have criticized General Eisenhower's broad front strategy. These critics have argued that General Eisenhower's employment of what we now call operational art demonstrated a lack of decisiveness and operational boldness, thereby unnecessarily prolonging the war. To highlight the errors in his broad front strategy, some critics have misrepresented General Eisenhower's operational leadership by presenting historical situations out of context or portraying his caution as timidity. However, a critical review of General Eisenhower's actions during the campaigns on the Western Front reveals a more compelling story. Thus, upon closer examination, General Eisenhower's broad front strategy or what this monograph describes as his operational approach provides substantial evidence to silence his critics. This study seeks to prove that General Eisenhower successfully employed Allied forces using operational art in the manner most effective and most appropriate to the situation the Allies faced on the Western Front in the final campaigns to defeat Germany.


Descriptors :   *BATTLES , *GENERAL OFFICERS , *LEADERSHIP , *MILITARY STRATEGY , *SECOND WORLD WAR , DECISION MAKING , ERRORS , EUROPE , HISTORIANS , HISTORY , MILITARY ART , MILITARY HISTORY , OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS , POLITICAL ALLIANCES , THESES


Subject Categories : Administration and Management
      Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE