Accession Number : ADA521804


Title :   Military Planning Systems and Stability Operations


Descriptive Note : Journal article


Corporate Author : NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC


Full Text : http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA521804


Report Date : JUN 2010


Pagination or Media Count : 17


Abstract : September 21, 2009, the Washington Post published an article entitled "McChrystal: More Forces or Mission Failure?" The basis for the piece was a leaked copy of General Stanley McChrystal's "Commander's Initial Assessment," dated August 30, 2009. In asking for additional forces for Afghanistan, General McChrystal stated that his conclusions were supported by a rigorous multidisciplinary assessment by a team of civilian and military personnel and by his personal experience and core beliefs. A week before the Washington Post article appeared, Senators Lindsey Graham, Joseph Lieberman, and John McCain made a similar call for more forces in the Wall Street Journal. In an editorial labeled "Only Decisive Force Can Prevail in Afghanistan," the senators argued that General McChrystal was an exceptional commander and that he, the new Ambassador, and a new deputy commander composed a team that could win the war. Nevertheless, many hold a different view. Senator John Kerry, for instance, has warned against repeating the mistakes of the Vietnam War. Vice President Joe Biden has advocated an alternative strategy to a force buildup. Former Secretary of State and retired General Colin Powell has expressed skepticism that more troops would guarantee success because, in his opinion, the military mission cannot be clearly de!defined. President Barack Obama probably asked whom he should rely on or, more precisely, who really understands the situation. If he read General McChrystal's report thoroughly, he would have had even more reason to wonder. In Section V, "Assessments: Measuring Progress," the President would have read: "[the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)] must develop effective assessment architectures . . . to measure the effects of the strategy, assess progress toward key objectives, and make necessary adjustments."


Descriptors :   *MILITARY PLANNING , *AFGHANISTAN , MILITARY PERSONNEL , WARFARE , STRATEGY , MISSIONS , SECURITY PERSONNEL , INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS , STABILITY , REPRINTS , SECURITY


Subject Categories : MILITARY OPERATIONS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE